[Senate Hearing 112-745]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                        S. Hrg. 112-745
 
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION, 
                             112TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================


                                HEARINGS

                               before the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                      ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                                   on

                             NOMINATIONS OF

ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, USN; LTG THOMAS P. BOSTICK, USA; HON. FRANK 
  KENDALL III; HON. JAMES N. MILLER, JR.; HON. ERIN C. CONATON; MRS. 
  JESSICA L. WRIGHT; MRS. KATHARINA G. McFARLAND; MS. HEIDI SHYU; DR. 
KATHLEEN H. HICKS; MR. DEREK H. CHOLLET; GEN. MARK A. WELSH III, USAF; 
LT.GEN. JOHN F. KELLY, USMC; LTG FRANK J. GRASS, ARNG; AND GEN. JOSEPH 
                         F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC

                               ----------                              

       FEBRUARY 9; MARCH 29; APRIL 26; JULY 19; NOVEMBER 15, 2012

                               ----------                              

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION, 
                             112TH CONGRESS


                                                        S. Hrg. 112-745

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION, 
                             112TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               before the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                      ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                                   on

                             NOMINATIONS OF

ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, USN; LTG THOMAS P. BOSTICK, USA; HON. FRANK 
  KENDALL III; HON. JAMES N. MILLER, JR.; HON. ERIN C. CONATON; MRS. 
  JESSICA L. WRIGHT; MRS. KATHARINA G. McFARLAND; MS. HEIDI SHYU; DR. 
KATHLEEN H. HICKS; MR. DEREK H. CHOLLET; GEN. MARK A. WELSH III, USAF; 
LT.GEN. JOHN F. KELLY, USMC; LTG FRANK J. GRASS, ARNG; AND GEN. JOSEPH 
                         F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC

                               __________

       FEBRUARY 9; MARCH 29; APRIL 26; JULY 19; NOVEMBER 15, 2012

                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services






        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

                               __________




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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                     CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island              JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado                 ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina         KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia       LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut

                   Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

                 Ann E. Sauer, Minority Staff Director

                                  (ii)


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                    CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

                                                                   Page

                            february 9, 2012

Nominations of ADM Samuel J. Locklear III, USN, for Reappointment 
  to the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Pacific 
  Command; and LTG Thomas P. Bostick, USA, for Reappointment to 
  the Grade of Lieutenant General and to be Chief of Engineers/
  Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers...............     1

Statements of:

Locklear, ADM Samuel J., III, USN, for Reappointment to the Grade 
  of Admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Pacific Command...........     4
Bostick, LTG Thomas P., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of 
  Lieutenant General and to be Chief of Engineers/Commanding 
  General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers..........................     4

                             march 29, 2012

Nominations of Hon. Frank Kendall III to be Under Secretary of 
  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Hon. James 
  N. Miller, Jr., to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; 
  Hon. Erin C. Conaton to be Under Secretary of Defense for 
  Personnel and Readiness; Mrs. Jessica L. Wright to be Assistant 
  Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; Mrs. Katharina G. 
  Mcfarland to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition; 
  and Ms. Heidi Shyu to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
  Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.........................   111

Statements of:

Hoyer, Hon. Steny H., U.S. Representative from the State of 
  Maryland.......................................................   116
Reed, Hon. Jack, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island.....   117
Kendall, Hon. Frank, III, to be Under Secretary of Defense for 
  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.........................   120
Miller, Hon. James N., Jr. to be Under Secretary of Defense for 
  Policy.........................................................   121
Conaton, Hon. Erin C., to be Under Secretary of Defense for 
  Personnel and Readiness........................................   123
Wright, Mrs. Jessica L., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  Reserve Affairs................................................   124
McFarland, Mrs. Katharina G., to be Assistant Secretary of 
  Defense for Acquisition........................................   125
Shyu, Ms. Heidi, to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
  Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.........................   126

                             april 26, 2012

Nominations of Dr. Kathleen H. Hicks to be Principal Deputy Under 
  Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Mr. Derek H. Chollet to be 
  Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 
  Affairs........................................................   319

                                  iii

Statements of:

Hicks, Dr. Kathleen H., to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 
  Defense for Policy.............................................   332
Chollet, Mr. Derek H., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  International Security Affairs.................................   333

                             july 19, 2012

Nominations of Gen. Mark A. Welsh III, USAF, for Reappointment to 
  the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; 
  Lt.Gen. John F. Kelly, USMC, to be General and Commander, U.S. 
  Southern Command; and LTG Frank J. Grass, ARNG, to be General 
  and Chief, National Guard Bureau...............................   421

Statement of:

Welsh, Gen. Mark A., III, USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of 
  General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force...............   426
Kelly, Lt. Gen. John F., USMC, to be General and Commander, U.S. 
  Southern Command...............................................   427
Grass, LTG Frank J., ARNG, to be General and Chief, National 
  Guard Bureau...................................................   428

                           november 15, 2012

Nomination of Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, for 
  Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, 
  International Security Assistance Force/Commander, U.S. Forces-
  Afghanistan....................................................   573

Statement of:

Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr., USMC, for Reappointment to the 
  Grade of General and to be Commander, International Security 
  Assistance Force/Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan............   577

APPENDIX.........................................................   651


 NOMINATIONS OF ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO 
THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND; AND LTG 
 THOMAS P. BOSTICK, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT 
  GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS/COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY 
                           CORPS OF ENGINEERS

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2012

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 
(chairman) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 
Akaka, Webb, McCaskill, Begich, Shaheen, Blumenthal, McCain, 
Inhofe, Chambliss, Ayotte, Graham, and Vitter.
    Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff 
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
    Majority staff members present: Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; 
Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, 
professional staff member; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; and 
Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.
    Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority 
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; 
Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Lucian L. 
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Michael J. Sistak, 
research assistant; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
    Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd, Mariah K. 
McNamara, and Bradley S. Watson.
    Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Greene, 
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Nick Ikeda, assistant to 
Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon 
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Maria Mahler-Haug, 
assistant to Senator McCaskill; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to 
Senator Begich; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; 
Kathryn Parker, assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon, 
assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to 
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; 
Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, 
assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator 
Ayotte; Sergio Sarkany, assistant to Senator Graham; and Joshua 
Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

    Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
    This morning the committee meets to consider military 
nominations for two critical and challenging command 
assignments.
    We welcome Admiral Samuel Locklear, U.S. Navy, who is 
nominated to be Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), 
and Lieutenant General Tom Bostick, U.S. Army, nominated to be 
the Army's Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Thank you both for your many 
years of service to our Nation, for your willingness to 
continue to serve in these positions of great responsibility.
    I would also like to welcome and thank your family members, 
some of whom are here this morning. The committee is keenly 
aware of the importance of our military families to the overall 
success and well-being of our Armed Forces, and we appreciate 
greatly their unwavering support and their many sacrifices, 
particularly during the course of long military careers. In 
this regard and as a tradition of this committee, I invite both 
of our witnesses during your opening remarks to introduce the 
family members or others who are here with you this morning.
    One of the main components of the President's recently 
announced defense strategic guidance is to rebalance force 
structure and investments toward the Asia-Pacific. The 
nomination of Admiral Locklear to be the senior-most U.S. 
military commander in the Asia-Pacific region is most timely. 
Stability and security in the Asia-Pacific is indeed in the 
United States' national interest, and we must maintain and 
support a strategy that recognizes and protects that interest 
and works with allies and partners to address regional 
challenges. These regional challenges include some of the 
following:
    The abrupt leadership change in North Korea, occasioned by 
the recent death of long-time dictator Kim Jong Il, opens new 
questions about possible future threats from a regime that has 
shown little interest in cooperating with the international 
community and little concern for the well-being of its people;
    China's continued rise as a regional and global power, 
coupled with its pursuit of military technology and capability, 
and its increasing propensity for challenging the territorial 
and maritime claims of other countries, particularly in the 
South China Sea and the East China Sea, has had an unsettling 
effect in the region and increased the prospects for 
miscalculation; and
    Other parts of the region continue to struggle with 
transnational violent extremism, insurgent groups, illegal 
narcotics, and humanitarian crises.
    These challenges, and others, underscore the need for the 
United States to remain engaged and active in this vital 
region. But as we renew our commitment to the Asia-Pacific, we 
must also look for creative and new ways of thinking about U.S. 
military presence overseas, particularly in a constrained 
budget environment. For example, realignment plans for U.S. 
forces in Korea, Okinawa, and Guam rely on the old paradigm of 
large, elaborate overseas bases to accommodate permanent force 
structure for long periods of time.
    While these plans might have fulfilled some specific needs 
and purposes when originally designed, it now appears that 
regional strategic requirements may be better served by looking 
at these realignments in the context of the needs of the 
broader Asia-Pacific and by rebalancing the U.S. military 
presence throughout the region. Senators McCain, Webb, and I 
have advocated for changes to these plans in ways that support 
the strategic goals of U.S. military posture and presence 
throughout the region while avoiding excessive and 
unsustainable costs associated with large and elaborate new 
bases.
    The current Okinawa-Guam realignment plan is unworkable, 
unrealistic, and unaffordable. Our alliance with Japan is 
important for many reasons, we need to get this right. The 
United States and Japan have recently announced that they are 
considering adjustments to the plan. It is important that there 
be adjustments and that there be changes that are jointly 
agreed upon and jointly announced and that a more viable and 
sustainable U.S. presence in Japan and on Guam results.
    Admiral, we look forward to learning more about how you 
would approach these various challenges and how the U.S. 
military can best remain present and active in this important 
region during the upcoming period of budget constraints.
    Before the committee today also is Lieutenant General 
Bostick, a career Army engineer, who has been nominated to be 
the Army's next Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of 
the Army Corps of Engineers.
    Flooding in Louisiana caused by Hurricane Katrina and the 
relentless flood waters that poured over the banks of the 
Mississippi River last year vividly dramatize the importance of 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, but these high-profile events 
are by no means the only challenges that confront the Army 
Corps. The Army's Chief of Engineers and Commanding General is 
responsible for both military and civilian programs and the 
associated planning, engineering, construction, and maintenance 
of a wide range of infrastructure requirements.
    The responsibilities also include projects dealing with 
navigable waterways, flood control, environmental restoration, 
and disaster response. Under its broad national charter, the 
Army Corps deals with difficult and important issues in 
virtually every State in the union, including my home State of 
Michigan, which is inextricably tied to the vast navigable 
water systems of the Great Lakes. The Great Lakes shoreline is 
the Nation's largest. The system connects manufacturing 
facilities, agricultural markets of the Midwest with trading 
partners throughout the world and provides the most efficient 
means of transportation, which is vital to our economic 
competitiveness. Yet, our harbors need dredging. Some are 
threatened with closure to commercial shipping or require ships 
to lighten their loads in order to enter some of our Great 
Lakes ports.
    The Army Corps of Engineers for far too long has paid 
inadequate attention to the Great Lakes. General, we are 
interested in hearing your views on the various challenges 
facing the Army Corps and how you would, if confirmed, 
prioritize efforts to deal with those challenges. As co-chair 
with Senator Kirk of the Great Lakes Task Force, I would be 
particularly interested in your thoughts on the Great Lakes 
navigation system.
    By the way, Senator Kirk is doing well. He had surgery 
yesterday, and we are all gratified to hear yesterday afternoon 
and this morning that he is in fact recovering very well.
    It is against the backdrop of these various challenges, 
both foreign and domestic, that we again welcome both of you 
here today. We look forward to your testimony.
    Senator McCain I know is coming but he is going to be late, 
and I think we will wait for his opening remarks when he gets 
here.
    We are going to call on you, Admiral Locklear, for your 
opening statement.

STATEMENT OF ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT 
   TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC 
                            COMMAND

    Admiral Locklear. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, honorable 
committee members. Good morning. Thank you for scheduling this 
hearing.
    I would like to take this opportunity to thank President 
Obama and Secretary Panetta for this nomination. I am deeply 
honored and humbled, and I do appreciate their confidence that 
they have in my ability to lead the outstanding men and women 
of PACOM.
    I would also like to thank this committee for your enduring 
support of our servicemembers and their families. They see it. 
They appreciate it as well.
    Now, I would not be here today without the love and support 
of my family. My wife of 33 years Pam, my two daughters, Jenny 
and Jillian, are here with me this morning. It gives me great 
pride and pleasure to introduce them to you. Now, these special 
women--they embody the strength and the courage of our military 
community, and they have been my inspiration to serve with 
honor and integrity for almost 4 decades. Jenny and Jill, my 
daughters, have blessed Pam and me with three grandsons who are 
well on their way to becoming fine citizens of our great Nation 
and we hope one day they will carry on our family's tradition 
of service and leadership.
    If confirmed, I look very much forward to working with the 
committee to solve our Nation's security challenges in the 
Asia-Pacific region.
    Again, thank you for this opportunity and for your support 
of our uniformed servicemembers and their families.
    Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to take your questions.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral, very much.
    General Bostick.

 STATEMENT OF LTG THOMAS P. BOSTICK, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO 
 THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS/
        COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

    General Bostick. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, 
distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I 
am honored to appear before you today in support of my 
nomination as the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General, 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. I thank President Obama, 
Secretary Panetta, Secretary McHugh, and General Odierno for 
the opportunity to continue serving this great Nation.
    It has been my privilege to serve our country in uniform 
for over 33 years. My wife Renee, who is here today, is a 
principal of Randolph Elementary School in Arlington Public 
Schools. Renee and I have been married for over 30 years, and 
she has managed to support our Army, our communities, her many 
different schools, 26 in total, and our family. Our son Joshua, 
who has moved with us 14 of our 19 moves, is a student at 
Stanford University and could not be here today.
    We often say that we enlist the soldier, commission an 
officer, but we retain a family. I am here today still serving 
because of Renee and Joshua, my extended family, friends, and 
our great soldiers and civilians. I deeply appreciate their 
love and support. My father was an Army master sergeant, and 
Renee's father was a Marine Corps sergeant major. We have been 
in the military our entire lives, and we are very proud and 
honored to continue serving.
    If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress, the 
administration, the Department of Defense (DOD), as well as 
other national, State, local government, and nongovernmental 
organizations to continue executing the Corps' important 
mission of providing vital engineering services in peace and 
war to strengthen our Nation's security, energize our economy, 
and reduce the risk of disasters. The significant role of the 
Corps of Engineers was highlighted again during last year's 
flooding throughout the Nation, the enormous work related to 
base realignment and closure (BRAC) and the global 
repositioning of our Armed Forces, and during the operational 
support in Iraq, Afghanistan, and locations around the world.
    If confirmed, I will ensure the Corps works closely with 
national, State, and local leaders to address the many 
challenges ahead. I will focus on maintaining trust in the 
Corps of Engineers through consistent and clear communications 
with all stakeholders to achieve a common vision, and will 
continue developing the professional teams that must 
collaborate within and outside the Corps.
    The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is a key member of the 
Nation's team that must collectively address complex 
engineering and changing defense requirements with the precious 
resources provided by Congress and the American people.
    I embrace the challenges ahead and, if confirmed, look 
forward to leading the Corps of Engineers.
    I look forward to your questions.
    Chairman Levin. We thank you very much, General. Again, we 
are delighted that your and the Admiral's family are with us 
here today, except those who could not be with us. We are very 
much honored to have them here just as you are honored to have 
their presence and how much their support has meant to you 
throughout your careers.
    Senator McCain.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

    Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 
courtesy. I was testifying at another committee meeting.
    Let me join you in welcoming Admiral Locklear and General 
Bostick and congratulating them on their nominations and in 
thanking them for their many years of distinguished service to 
our Nation.
    Before this week, the last time I saw Admiral Locklear was 
in Naples, Italy where he helped to lead the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Libya. Despite the 
restrictions placed on him and despite lacking the ability to 
employ the full weight of U.S. air power to defend the Libyan 
people, I must say that Admiral Locklear excelled in managing 
that complex coalition operation which ultimately succeeded in 
helping the Libyan people to liberate their country. We owe him 
our thanks for that achievement.
    If confirmed to be Commander of PACOM, Admiral Locklear, 
you will oversee the rebalancing of our defense strategy toward 
the Asia-Pacific region. This is the right mission, though talk 
of it as a pivot is misguided. For 7 decades, the United States 
has maintained a balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region 
that fosters political and economic liberty. We will continue 
to do so and that requires the sustainment of U.S. military 
power to secure our vital interests, from the defense of our 
treaty allies, to freedom of navigation through international 
waters, to the preservation of a regional order that enables 
sovereign countries to resolve their differences peacefully 
free from intimidation and coercion.
    To maintain this commitment, we need a more effective and 
sustainable military posture in the region. Our current plans 
to realign bases in Japan, Guam, and Korea are all grossly over 
budget, and Congress will not pay that bill. This committee led 
Congress in putting a pause on the entire enterprise and 
included a provision in the recently enacted National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) that requires an independent 
assessment and alternative recommendations on how to proceed.
    I want to point out that the administration is free to move 
forward with a revised force posture, but this committee and 
the Pentagon must wait for the findings of our congressionally 
mandated independent assessment before authorizing funding for 
any regional posture arrangements. It is essential that the 
U.S. military maintain its active and stabilizing presence in 
the Asia-Pacific region, but we need to get these important 
decisions right. Frankly, the Pentagon does not have a good 
record on this issue as the costs have escalated from around $6 
billion to at least $16 billion.
    At the same time, for our prioritization of the Asia-
Pacific region to be meaningful, we must avoid catastrophic 
cuts to our defense budget, especially sequestration. It 
should, therefore, be of concern to us all that the Navy 
remains short of its goal of 313 ships. That goal will be 
impeded further by the administration's recently announced plan 
to retire seven cruisers earlier than planned, to retire two 
major amphibious lift ships needed by the Marine Corps, and to 
delay buying one large-deck amphibious ship, one Virginia-class 
attack submarine, two littoral combat ships, and eight high-
speed transport vessels. It is well and good to maintain 11 
aircraft carriers, but cuts to our naval capabilities such as 
these, without a plan to compensate for them, only put our 
goals in the Asia-Pacific region at greater risk.
    General Bostick comes before this committee with a long 
record of distinguished service, 33 years, and carries forward 
his family's proud legacy of military service to our country. 
General Bostick, if confirmed, you will be responsible for the 
performance of 38,000 civilians and soldiers who provide 
engineering services to more than 90 countries worldwide. We 
look to the Corps of Engineers to provide vital engineering 
services in peace and war, to strengthen our security, energize 
our economy, and reduce the risks from disasters. In other 
words, this is a critical post.
    At a time when our Government faces daunting fiscal 
challenges, we will have to make tough decisions about 
investments in our critical infrastructure. In a prior 
Congress, then-Senator Russ Feingold and I repeatedly attempted 
to put in place a procedure for the Army Corps to provide to 
Congress clear, objective analysis of national priorities for 
our water infrastructure projects. Unfortunately, many Members 
of Congress would rather maintain the current system of 
selecting projects based on seniority and the individual 
Member's influence over the committee process. I believe this 
earmarking of Army Corps projects puts lives at risk. We must 
be informed by the capable expertise and objective analysis of 
the Corps of Engineers, and we will continue to work to ensure 
these priorities are provided to Congress in order to ensure 
that taxpayer funds are spent wisely, efficiently, and 
effectively.
    I thank and congratulate both of our witnesses.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
    Let us try a 7-minute round for questions. We have a lot of 
Senators here, and we can have a second round.
    Admiral, yesterday's announcement describing negotiations 
between the United States and Japan is welcome news because it 
demonstrates a willingness to address issues about the level of 
our troop presence on Okinawa without conditioning the movement 
of marines off of Okinawa to progress on the Futenma 
replacement facility. However, the new thinking is not yet 
going far enough. For instance, there appears to be no 
intention of reconsidering yet the plan to build the Futenma 
replacement facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa, nor does there 
appear that the Air Force bases in the region are being 
considered as part of the solution.
    We want to make it clear that the requirements in the 
statute that are contained in the fiscal year 2012 defense 
authorization bill must still be met before any funds, 
including funds provided by the Government of Japan, may be 
obligated or expended to implement realignment.
    Some of the requirements are the following: submission by 
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the 
PACOM Commander of his preferred force laydown; a master plan 
for the construction of the facilities and infrastructure 
necessary to implement the Commandant's preferred force 
laydown; a plan coordinated by all pertinent Federal agencies 
detailing how the Federal Government will satisfy the off-post 
requirements associated with the buildup on Guam; and the 
Secretary of Defense submits an independent assessment of the 
U.S. force posture in East Asia and the Pacific region as 
detailed in our NDAA.
    Admiral, first, are you familiar with these requirements, 
and if so, will you make sure that those requirements are met 
before there is any obligation of funds for those purposes?
    Admiral Locklear. Mr. Chairman, I have reviewed the 
concerns of the committee, the various communications that have 
been presented to the leadership of DOD. I am aware of the 
release of the communique that discusses the ongoing 
discussions between the Government of Japan and the potential 
that may come out of those.
    I am prepared to support the leadership of DOD, if I am 
confirmed, to give them my best military advice as they go 
forward with this process.
    Chairman Levin. All right. To the extent that you are not 
yet familiar with our statute's requirements, including for 
that independent assessment before funds are obligated or 
expended to implement the realignment which we discussed, will 
you do so and will you abide by them?
    Admiral Locklear. I will abide by them.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    As I alluded to in my opening remarks, much of the interest 
in China's continued rise as a global power involves its 
pursuit of military technology and capability and what that 
means in terms of regional stability.
    Admiral, give us your assessment, if you would, of the 
situation in the South China Sea, particularly with respect to 
the competing maritime and territorial claims of the countries 
bordering that area?
    Admiral Locklear. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, there 
are competing claims in the South China Sea between many 
competing interests in that area, in particular between the 
Chinese and a number of our allies and our partners in that 
region. My impression is that we need to ensure that we move 
forward with a security environment that allows those 
determinations to be realized through proper rule of law, 
proper international law, and that they do that in a 
multilateral fashion following the norms of international law 
based on the territorial land masses that then relate into 
maritime claims.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral.
    Can you tell us whether you support the United States 
joining the United Nations (U.N.) Treaty on the Law of the Sea?
    Admiral Locklear. Mr. Chairman, I do support the United 
States joining the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
    Chairman Levin. Why is that?
    Admiral Locklear. It has been my observation as a naval 
officer for many years that as this subject has been debated 
that having this tool, us being a member of this important 
United Nations initiative, will provide a better framework 
globally for us as there are competing interests globally 
particularly as economic zones are discussed, as we start 
looking at resources that are on the sea bed. It allows us a 
better mechanism to be able to have a legal discussion that 
prevents us from having miscalculated events. It overall 
provides us a framework for better future security.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    General, let me ask you now about some of the Corps of 
Engineers' expenditures and how they are determined.
    One of the issues which strikes me as a Great Lakes Senator 
is that the maintenance of our Great Lakes navigational system 
is funded entirely through the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, 
which is financed through fees which are charged on the value 
of shipments that arrive at these federally maintained ports. 
In contrast, only a portion of other waterway systems are 
maintained through user fees and other systems get general fund 
contributions.
    Will you, first of all, explain to us why it is that we 
have fees supporting our harbors in the Great Lakes but other 
activities are supplemented by general funds for other harbors 
and other waterway systems? Why is that the case, if you know?
    General Bostick. Mr. Chairman, I do not have the history on 
why the funds were set up in that fashion. I do know that the 
Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund contains about $6 billion and 
collects about $1.5 billion each year, and the Corps of 
Engineers plans about $750 million of construction and 
maintenance using those funds annually.
    We have a lot of work to do, and if confirmed, I am 
committed to working with the Corps, Congress, and the 
administration to ensure we do the best with the monies that we 
are provided.
    Chairman Levin. Just to follow up on that question, we feel 
that we have been short-changed in the Great Lakes for a long 
time even though we have the longest shoreline of any of the 
areas of our country. Will you review, when you are confirmed, 
the benefits of various navigational systems, including the 
Great Lakes, compared to the budget which is allocated to those 
systems and tell us whether or not in your judgment, after you 
are confirmed, there is a fair relationship between the 
benefits that are received by those various systems or 
allocated to those various systems and how those benefits 
compare to the financial expenditures which the Corps makes? 
Will you make that assessment after you are confirmed?
    General Bostick. Mr. Chairman, you have my commitment that 
I will make that assessment. I will visit the Great Lakes and I 
will make sure that I understand how the performance-based 
budgeting priorities are set by the Corps and how that takes 
into consideration both the large systems such as the 
Mississippi and the smaller systems. In the Great Lakes, it is 
not a complete system in terms of how it is considered. I will 
take a look at that, if confirmed.
    Chairman Levin. We thank you very much, General.
    Senator McCain.
    Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, I thank the witnesses.
    Admiral, the plans the administration has announced to 
retire seven cruisers earlier than planned, retire two major 
amphibious lift ships, delay buying one large-deck amphibious 
ship, one Virginia-class attack submarine, two littoral combat 
ships, and eight high-speed transport vessels--does this 
increase our risks in the Asia-Pacific region?
    Admiral Locklear. Senator, I would say that any number of 
ships less than what we state is the requirement does require 
combatant commanders and, if confirmed, will require me to 
manage those risks. It is always difficult, particularly from a 
Navy perspective, for us to see those type of decisions that 
have been made and will ultimately be made in budget decisions. 
But we will have to manage with the resources that the American 
people give us, that you authorize us. If I am confirmed, I 
will have to be frank with you about the decisions that are 
made because of the resources available and the risk that 
requires me to assume.
    Senator McCain. We will look forward to that because I 
understand flexibility and I understand a lot of the arguments 
the administration is making, but as you well know, presence is 
something that can only be achieved by numbers. The goal of 313 
ships is obviously not going to be met.
    I just want to repeat what the chairman said. We have 
looked at this issue of Okinawa and Guam and the basing issue. 
Senator Webb has been heavily involved in it. We did come to 
the conclusion that we needed an outside look at it, and we did 
not come to that conclusion just because it was an idea we had. 
We came to that conclusion because we have seen the costs go up 
from $6 billion to $16 billion or more, and there was not a 
coherent plan. We continue to get visits from Japanese members 
of the Diet saying, ``what are we going to do?'' We really 
believed that an outside look was important. It will not take a 
long period of time. But I would like for you to participate in 
helping conduct that study and provide the assessment team that 
they need. Can I have that commitment from you, Admiral?
    Admiral Locklear. You have my commitment, sir.
    Senator McCain. Thank you.
    General, the omnibus appropriations bill for fiscal year 
2012 included a slush fund totaling $507 million for the Corps 
to spend on various construction, maintenance, and other 
projects that were not included in the President's budget. The 
funds were financed by reducing money for projects included in 
the President's budget request and adding $375 million to the 
Army Corps of Engineers' budget. The funds added by the 
appropriators were not a part of the text of the omnibus bill 
but were listed in a joint report that accompanies the spending 
bill, which is the new way for Congress to circumvent the 
earmark moratorium. As such, they should not have the force of 
law.
    Despite a crushing budget deficit and significant 
reductions to Government spending, including over $20 billion 
less for DOD, the appropriators actually added more to the 
Corps budget than the administration had requested.
    I note in your written answers to questions posed by the 
committee that you recognize in a constrained Federal budget 
that, ``with an aging population, therefore more entitlement 
spending, we can expect less to be available for discretionary 
programs. The Corps will have to prioritize projects and 
programs with rigorous analysis to ensure the greatest value 
for taxpayer funds.''
    If confirmed, will you spend these excess funds that were 
not requested by the President, General?
    General Bostick. Senator, the Corps executes projects that 
are authorized and appropriated by Congress. We do not make a 
decision in terms of whether we expend those funds or not, but 
if authorized and appropriated by Congress, then we will 
execute the mission to the greatest degree possible.
    Senator McCain. So you believe that the joint report that 
accompanies a spending bill has the force of law?
    General Bostick. Sir, I have not been privy to the joint 
report. If confirmed, I am willing to go back and take a look 
at that in detail. What I can say is we would execute what is 
authorized and appropriated by Congress.
    Senator McCain. General, I am going to need your assessment 
on that before I move that the committee move forward with your 
nomination. I think it is outrageous that the appropriators 
should put into a ``joint report'' earmarked projects that are 
not authorized or requested. I am going to have to know your 
view as to whether you are required to spend those funds or 
not. I hope that you will provide us an answer to that question 
as soon as possible. Okay?
    General Bostick. Senator, I will.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Please see the attached documents.
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    Senator McCain. Admiral, how concerned are you about the 
fact that we may have a serious North Korean provocation or 
miscalculation this year?
    Admiral Locklear. Senator, I am very much concerned about 
the stability of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. It is 
in our best interests to ensure that we maintain a strong 
deterrent there. I have not had discussions with General 
Thurman yet, but if confirmed, I will, to get his immediate 
assessment.
    But we have had a transition of leadership there. Day by 
day, so far, so good. It is yet to be determined how this will 
play out in the mid- to long-term.
    There has been a shift over the last couple of decades in 
my observation of the North Koreans' ability in the military 
area. We have seen them through some provocation activity over 
the last several years using more asymmetric tactics such as 
small submarines, and certainly their proliferation of delivery 
vehicles for short-, medium-, and eventually longer-range 
ballistic missiles is a great concern.
    I am very much concerned and we should certainly stay 
vigilant, and if confirmed, I will assure you it will be one of 
my highest priorities.
    Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. General, relative to the question which 
Senator McCain has very properly asked you about whether you 
are required to spend certain funds, you may submit a legal 
opinion on that question, if you so desire. I just talked to 
Senator McCain as to whether that would be satisfactory and he 
indicated it would be. If that is a legal question, you may 
submit a legal opinion rather than your own personal opinion. 
We do need an answer to that question. Thank you.
    General Bostick. Mr. Chairman, I will do that.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Senator Lieberman.
    Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Locklear, General Bostick, thanks very much for 
your extraordinary service to our country. I think the 
President has acted wisely in nominating both of you and I look 
forward to supporting your nominations.
    Admiral Locklear, we are naturally focused, as we have been 
for quite a while, on the alignment of forces in Okinawa. But I 
want to state my own opinion and ask you for your reaction. 
Regardless of what developments occur regarding the alignment 
of our forces, it is essential that all parties in the region 
and particularly the people of Japan know that America's 
commitment to their security is strong and unbreakable. Do you 
agree with that?
    Admiral Locklear. Absolutely, sir. Our alliance with Japan 
is the cornerstone of our strategy in the Pacific, of our 
friendships, of our future in the Pacific, and if I am 
confirmed, it will remain a priority and remain the 
cornerstone.
    Senator Lieberman. Thank you for that answer. I agree with 
you. This is another classic case of how you sometimes run the 
risk of taking your best friends for granted when things are 
happening elsewhere or you are making new friends. But in fact, 
over the last decade, the United States and Japan have reached 
a number of very significant agreements to develop our 
bilateral security relationship and to share missions and 
capabilities within the alliance, including areas such as air 
and missile defense.
    I wonder if you would take just a moment to give your 
opinion on the importance of those agreements as you assume 
command of PACOM?
    Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. Those agreements are very 
important. I am quite proud of the relationship we have with 
Japan particularly in relation to the exposure I have had to 
the area of ballistic missile defense developments and their 
participation, their partnership that will allow us to more 
rapidly move into the future with capabilities that are 
critical not only to this region but globally.
    Senator Lieberman. Let me move briefly to the South China 
Sea, which you have already been asked about and also the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. I wanted specifically to ask 
you, because you have said you support ratification of the 
convention, to relate the convention to the competing claims 
that are now being made for various rights on and under the 
South China Sea.
    Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. In general, my understanding is 
that we as a Nation, we as a military, we conform to the basic 
premises that are inside the Law of the Sea today. However, 
because we have not ratified it, when we approach a region such 
as the South China Sea, which has the potential for 
miscalculation, if the responsible parties here do not go 
through the normal rule of law to solve these kind of 
frictions, that if we are not a signatory, to some degree it 
lessens our credibility as we try to help them work through 
this. This is not only in the South China Sea but I think it 
will become increasingly important globally as people look for 
resources and competing claims in oceans around the world.
    Senator Lieberman. Okay. I appreciate that answer.
    I want to talk for a moment about the so-called ``pivot'' 
to the Asia-Pacific, which is a term I do not like because it 
suggests we have not been in the Asia-Pacific and we are going 
to turn our back presumably on the Middle East where we have 
been. We cannot turn our back on either. Of course, we have 
been in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the World War II, and 
the security that we have provided has, in my opinion, been the 
foundation or the underpinning of the extraordinary economic 
growth that has occurred there and, in some sense, the 
development of nations that we now focus on as we think about 
the security relationship or arrangements there.
    This gets specifically to China. I wanted to invite you to 
talk about your opinion about what is the current status of our 
relationship with China and where do you hope to bring it in 
your time at PACOM? In other words, is China a hostile power to 
us? Is it a competitor? Is it a partner? What is it and what do 
you hope it will be?
    Admiral Locklear. Yes, Senator. First, I fully agree that 
since World War II, our security posture in that part of the 
world has underpinned much of the progress that has been made 
not only in the military area but in all areas of progress with 
our allies, our partners, and in some ways, China.
    Today I would say that our partnership with China, which we 
should have a partnership--and we do in many, many areas, not 
just militarily--I would categorize as cooperative but 
competitive. We are an Asian power. We are a Pacific power. We 
are a global power. We have interest in that part of the world. 
I believe that the Chinese and other people in that part of the 
world need to recognize that we do have U.S. national interests 
there and we have the interests of strong allies there. I would 
call it cooperative but competitive.
    In the area of military-to-military, which I think is 
important that we continue to pursue productive military-to-
military relationships between our military and the Chinese 
military. That is so we can gain greater clarity and greater 
transparency as the world evolves, as the region evolves. If I 
am confirmed, it will be my plan to, in every way possible, 
improve our military-to-military relationships with a 
recognition that there are things we will not agree on. That 
greater transparency is for the good of all of us to avoid 
miscalculation. But in the end, the objective is a secure, 
stable environment that allows our allies, our partners, and 
China, which should be a partner, to have the best security 
environment to allow us to grow economically, socially together 
into a better world.
    Senator Lieberman. Thanks again for that answer.
    Incidentally, when I talk about the American security 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region underpinning the economic 
growth that has occurred there in the last several decades, it 
is important to state also that we have benefitted tremendously 
from that economic growth. Do not hold me to it, but I believe 
I saw a number just recently that said that $1.2 trillion of 
American commerce travels through the South China Sea every 
year. So you get some sense of the benefit here and the 
extraordinary impact it has on our economy and on jobs here as 
well.
    My time is up. I thank you very much, and I look forward to 
working with both of you in the time ahead.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
    Senator Inhofe.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, let me thank both of you for the personal 
time you gave me, and we had a chance to go over almost 
everything that I would ask you today except for one thing, 
which I will get to in just a moment.
    General Bostick, the Army Corps has done a pretty good job 
on the 404 permits under the Clean Water Act. I would ask you 
if you would continue to try to expedite those permits as well 
as you can.
    General Bostick. Senator, if confirmed, I will certainly 
look at the permits that are associated with the Clean Water 
Act and ensure that the Corps works as effectively and 
efficiently as possible.
    Senator Inhofe. That is good.
    Also, Senator Levin talked about the Great Lakes and we 
have talked about all these waterways. Will you not forget the 
Nation's most inland waterway that goes into Oklahoma, the 
Kerr-McClellan waterway?
    General Bostick. Senator, as we have discussed, once 
confirmed, I will make a trip out there and make sure that I 
understand the issues surrounding that particular project.
    Senator Inhofe. I would appreciate that. I am not asking 
for that commitment, but I would like to have you become 
familiar with that.
    Right now we are considering the reauthorization of the 
highway bill. It comes from part of that. At least the highway 
title comes in my committee where I am the ranking member 
[Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works]. But we also 
have jurisdiction over the Water Resources Development Act 
(WRDA). Do you have any idea when we might get something from 
the administration on a WRDA bill?
    General Bostick. Senator, I do not have any knowledge of 
when a WRDA bill might come out.
    Senator Inhofe. We can talk about that later.
    Now, Admiral Locklear, I enjoyed very much meeting your 
beautiful wife and 2 beautiful daughters, and if you guys are 
going to reach my number of 20 grandchildren, you are going to 
have to get very busy, as we discussed.
    First of all, I understand the way this goes. You were 
nominated by the President. You are going to have to assume the 
President, who is the Commander in Chief--his line. This always 
happens. It has happened ever since I have been on here. I do 
not know where you really are personally and I do not want to 
know. I do not want you to answer.
    But as far as the Law of the Sea Treaty is concerned, there 
are a lot of us against it. I have been fighting that since the 
Reagan administration. It has not really changed any. To have 
the United Nations pay an international body, which sometimes 
they deny it, but it is the United Nations, gets royalties from 
offshore drilling, a body that we would have 1 vote out of 160 
and distribute funds as it sees fit to the Nations it chooses. 
I often wonder whatever happened to sovereignty. I can tell you 
right now the idea of handing over our offshore technology to 
other countries, any country who wants it, I think is 
unreasonable. There is going to be opposition to that.
    Now, having said that, let me get to a friendlier issue 
here.
    I remember so well back in 1998--that was during the 
Clinton administration--when they were talking about the 
capability, at that time, of North Korea in terms of when they 
would have something that would be a threat to the United 
States. I remember at that time General Shelton was in charge, 
and I wrote a letter to President Clinton and to General 
Shelton. How long would it be until the North Koreans have the 
capability of a multiple stage rocket that they would be able 
to use against the United States? The answer at that time was--
we had two letters. One said 3 years; the other said 5 years. 
Seven days later on August 31, 1998, they fired one. It was a 
three-stage rocket. Only two of them worked, but nonetheless, 
that happened.
    I could take a long time and talk about how we have guessed 
it wrong with them over a long period of time.
    How confident are you in the intelligence that we are 
getting right now, considering that all of a sudden there is a 
wake-up call and the American people realize there is a threat 
out there? How confident are you with our intel into North 
Korea in terms of their capabilities?
    Admiral Locklear. Senator, again, I will consult, if I am 
confirmed, with General Thurman about this important issue. I 
believe I understand that he has and his predecessors have said 
for some time that there is a need for more intelligence and 
surveillance assets to be able to understand and to shape what 
may be the future on that critical part of the Asia-Pacific.
    As far as the Intelligence Community, my sense is that we 
have a better understanding than we probably did in 1998 of 
their emerging capabilities. But it is a very closed society 
and it is one that we need to work very carefully with, and I 
will do that, if I am confirmed, with all of the intelligence 
agencies that can bring capabilities to bear to help me 
understand so that I can help you understand where the 
shortfalls are.
    Senator Inhofe. Okay. Let us stay on top of that one.
    In the last minute and a half of my time here, I would like 
to renew, as I always do at these confirmation hearings, my 
four favorite programs, and we would like to get your opinion. 
Actually five. That would be the 1206, 1207, 1208 programs, 
train and equip, the State Partnership Program (SPP). More 
important than the rest of them or as important is the 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. 
Would you comment on each of those five programs relative to 
your support for those programs?
    Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. The ones that were related, 
1206, 1207, 1208, and IMET, I fully support. I know that from 
my introduction thus far into what is happening in PACOM today, 
1206 is a critical aspect of our ability to help train and 
prepare our allies and partners for the counterterrorism 
operations which are critical to not only their security, but 
our security.
    I can tell you that from the job I am in now in Europe and 
Africa where I spend a lot of time visiting our U.S. 
ambassadors, the IMET program is essential from their 
perspective. It has been over my experience one of the most 
powerful tools where it allows us to bring officers and other 
leaders from these other countries into our training systems 
and to socialize with them and to bring them into our value 
system and have them understand how we operate. Critical to the 
future and I believe, for the amount of money, a great return 
on investment.
    Senator Inhofe. Yes, I do too. In your current position 
where you have the naval operations over U.S. Africa Command, 
certainly those countries down there--I am glad we are beyond 
the point where we thought we were doing a favor to these 
countries out there who are participating in this program. In 
fact, they are doing us a favor because I think we need to get 
into the record and understand--and I am sure you agree--that 
if we do not develop those relationships that are enduring 
through the IMET program, China will do it. Other countries 
will do it. I think it has been very successful not just in 
Africa. I am the ranking member on the East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. I 
am concerned about continuing that program in your new 
assignment.
    I look forward to supporting both of your nominations.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
    Senator Akaka.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Aloha to the two outstanding leaders we have before us 
today and also to your families.
    First, I would like to thank you each for your many years 
of dedicated service to our country and what you have done 
already with our country.
    Admiral Locklear, it was nice meeting with you earlier this 
week, and I appreciated hearing your thoughts on the tremendous 
responsibilities you will assume, should you be confirmed as 
the next PACOM commander. You have shown outstanding leadership 
throughout your career, including significant time in the 
Pacific theater. I would like to congratulate you, your wife, 
and your family because your family does support you, and 
welcome also Pam and Jenny and Jillian to our hearing today.
    I also want to welcome General Bostick. As a former member 
of the Corps, I appreciate the efforts of the men and women who 
serve in this very important organization. Of course, I want to 
welcome your wife Renee and aloha to your son Joshua as well.
    Admiral Locklear, piracy is one of the problems out there. 
With the President's new strategy, the Navy will be deploying 
four ships to Singapore, I understand. The Strait of Malacca is 
one of the world's most important shipping lanes, accounting 
for a third of the world's trade and half of the petroleum 
imports of Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and China. The strait is also 
one of the world's most dangerous maritime chokepoints and a 
hot spot for transnational crime.
    My question to you, Admiral, is how do you see our forces 
working to secure this critical region?
    Admiral Locklear. Thank you, Senator. I have transited the 
Straits of Malacca on Navy ships many times in my career, and 
your assessment is exactly right. It can be an exciting 
transit. It is a critical chokepoint and it can be highly 
vulnerable to such things as piracy.
    We have seen, obviously, over the past number of years the 
impact that piracy can have in many areas of the world and that 
it is not just located off the Horn of Africa. It is actually 
spreading north and have seen it spread north into the Indian 
Ocean. We have seen some instances of it in the South China 
Sea.
    If you take a look at the rebalancing strategy, I believe 
that it starts to help us address this in a better way. First 
of all, it starts to recognize that we do have security 
interests that are not just in the north of Asia and that we 
have to be aware of. It allows us to partner with our allies 
and our partners in that region to be able to better coordinate 
together to give us better maritime domain awareness.
    You alluded to the possibility of putting some U.S. ships 
in and out of Changi in Singapore. Singapore is a tremendous 
partner with the United States and has worked very closely with 
us--as has other of our countries and allies in that region to 
be able to provide us collectively the ability to have a better 
maritime lane awareness and a better response capability for 
anti-piracy activities. I hope to see that continue and to grow 
as we move forward with a rebalancing strategy.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Admiral.
    General Bostick, there is a critical need in Hawaii and the 
U.S. Pacific territories for public infrastructure to support 
the waterborne commerce these islands rely upon to protect 
vulnerable coastal communities and to preserve unique 
environmental resources. Therefore, I am concerned by the 
Honolulu district's challenges in competing for Army Corps 
construction funds. Under current Army Corps policy, projects 
are favored that support large population bases and are not 
subject to the high construction costs.
    If confirmed, would you be willing to look into this issue 
and possibly identify a more equitable policy which addresses 
the needs of these insular areas?
    General Bostick. Senator, if confirmed, you have my 
commitment to look at that. As I understand the Corps' process 
in setting priorities, it is performance-based, and performance 
is based on a number of things. They have nine different 
business lines, including navigation, coastal restoration, risk 
management, and other areas. I will look into that with the 
Corps. I will discuss it with the Honolulu district and ensure 
that all that we do is fair and equitable and done in a cost 
efficient and effective manner.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you.
    Admiral Locklear, the U.S. relationships with Japan and 
South Korea help to form the basis for regional stability in 
the Asia-Pacific region. I know that you have touched on it in 
response to Senator Lieberman, but should you be confirmed, 
what would you like to accomplish with respect to these key 
allies?
    Admiral Locklear. First of all, if I am confirmed, I would 
like for them to understand that I realize the importance of 
our alliance and the criticality of our partnerships in that 
alliance and the importance of it to the security of the Asia-
Pacific region.
    Second of all, I would like to make sure that as we look at 
this rebalancing strategy that I can properly articulate what 
we are doing, how we are doing it, and the benefits of it as it 
relates to our alliances with those two critical allies.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
    Senator Ayotte.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Admiral, thank you, General, for your service 
and all that you do for us.
    Admiral Locklear, I wanted to ask what is your assessment 
of the Virginia-class submarine program, how has this Virginia-
class submarine performed, and also what sort of capability 
will the littoral combat ship provide you as PACOM Commander, 
and how important are both capabilities to our national 
security interests in the Asia-Pacific and around the world?
    Admiral Locklear. Thank you, Senator.
    The Virginia-class submarine is the backbone of our attack 
submarine force today. It provides us worldwide coverage in 
covert ways. It is a critical element of any combatant 
commander's higher-end campaigns or campaign planning, whatever 
that might be. I think it has performed well and we should all 
be very proud of the crews and the men and, at some point in 
time, the women who will serve in those submarines.
    The littoral combat ship is just now coming on-line, and 
that ship will bring to the combatant commander and, if 
confirmed, hopefully to the PACOM Commander a high-speed, very 
versatile ship that has minimum draft, which means we can get 
into more shallow areas, more littoral areas, with 
reconfigurable mission bays that allow us to more quickly 
address a variety of mission sets than perhaps other ships that 
we have built over the decades. It is an important aspect, and 
I think that they are particularly well suited to the littoral 
areas particularly around the straits and in the South China 
Sea area.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you so much for your assessment of 
the Virginia-class submarine and littoral combat ships.
    I share your assessment of those ships and appreciate your 
sharing that with us.
    DOD has repeatedly said that strategy is driving the budget 
guidance and not just a pure numbers exercise because we have 
seen in the past where we just do a pure numbers exercise and 
we are not driven by strategy. We really put our national 
security at stake when we do that. I hope that is the case this 
time, but I am concerned about what I see as a mismatch between 
our stated national security objectives and a portion of the 
Pentagon budget proposal.
    You talked about the importance of, for example, the 
Virginia-class submarine as a backbone and a critical element 
to our national security, and also the importance of the 
littoral combat ship. You also described the importance of this 
in the Future Year Defense Plan.
    I would ask you why would the Navy postpone the acquisition 
of one Virginia-class submarine given the importance of it, 
particularly with our focus on the Asia-Pacific? Also why would 
the Navy reduce the purchase of two littoral combat ships? What 
is the strategic rationale for these reductions?
    Admiral Locklear. Senator, in my current position, I have 
not been part of the budget deliberations, and I cannot tell 
you that I know exactly what is in the President's budget as it 
will be delivered.
    But in my previous roles, I have done programming for the 
Navy and strategy development for the Navy, and we always start 
with a strategy-based approach, which is the right thing to do 
to see what it is that we would all like to have. Then we 
recognize pragmatically that the American people will only be 
able to afford so much. Then there are decisions made that 
force us to have to manage risk. If I am confirmed, I will 
assure you that I will identify to you where I think, when 
those decisions are made, that I have identified where the 
risks are unacceptable for me.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Admiral. I obviously hope that 
we are not taking on additional risk as a result of these 
decisions in terms of our national security, and I hope when 
you get in the position--and I do expect you to be confirmed 
and appreciate your wonderful credentials and service--that you 
will consult back with us and provide me with a more detailed 
answer on how you think the reduction in the production of the 
Virginia-class submarine or postponement of it and the littoral 
combat ships affects our national security and what your 
assessment is of the risk of this portion of the Pentagon 
budget. I hope you could circle back with me on that.
    Admiral Locklear. If I am confirmed, I will, ma'am.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much, Admiral. I appreciate 
that.
    Admiral, I certainly was pleased to see in your responses 
in the advance policy questions your testimony about the Joint 
Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) Accounting Command 
(JPAC). This is, obviously, a very important issue. I recently 
had the opportunity to meet with Major General Stephen Tom, the 
Commander of JPAC, in January. The recovery operations in North 
Korea are set to resume later this year, and I applaud that 
development. Most Korean War veterans and their spouses are now 
in their 80s, and the Veterans Administration has said that 
close to 1,000 Korean War veterans who served during the 
conflict, unfortunately, leave us every day. We cannot wait any 
longer to resume this critical work.
    JPAC is identifying and recovering the remains of 80 to 90 
Americans per year. In the 2010 NDAA, it requires the Secretary 
of Defense to ensure sufficient resources are allotted to 
increase the recovery rate to 200 a year. I appreciate that 
there are many factors that will go into determining how to 
reach the goal of 200 recoveries a year. Will you commit to 
fully supporting the work of the Joint POW/MIA Accountability 
Command and doing all you can to ensure that we can meet that 
goal and, obviously, supporting General Tom in his efforts?
    Admiral Locklear. Senator, if I am confirmed, I fully 
commit to supporting that critical program.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you. Thank you very much. I see that 
my time is up.
    I also wanted to just say to General Bostick--in Hanover, 
New Hampshire, we have the Cold Regions Research and 
Engineering Lab. The New England district and the Cold Regions 
Research Engineering Lab have done great work. Please let me 
know, as you go forward, what I can do to support their 
excellent efforts and your efforts in that regard. Thank you, 
General.
    General Bostick. If confirmed, I will. That is a positive 
movement for the Corps.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
    Senator McCaskill.
    Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I certainly do not want to diminish PACOM in any way, but 
we have a lot of floods in Missouri. So I hope you will forgive 
me, Admiral, if I direct my questions during this time to 
General Bostick because his job is very important to thousands 
of Missouri families that live along our greatest rivers in 
this country.
    Let me start, General Bostick, about the Missouri River 
Recovery Program currently in the budget. Let me just start 
with this question, do you agree that the number one priority 
for the Army Corps of Engineers is flood management?
    General Bostick. Senator, I would say the number one 
priority is the protection of life and some of that will be in 
flood management. Some of it will be in other areas. But 
protection of life, safety, and risk management are the number 
one priority.
    Senator McCaskill. I am not aware of where there is a 
significant risk to life in terms of the Army Corps' 
responsibilities aside from flooding, which is obviously very 
important to my State and all of the people who live along the 
Missouri and Mississippi Rivers. Obviously, protection of 
property comes in behind protection of life.
    Maybe this is something you can explain, and if you cannot 
today, I will look forward to a follow-up. Right now in the 
Missouri River Recovery Program budget, there is $5 million for 
flood management and north of $70 million for habitat. That 
disparity in terms of the priorities of the Army Corps is like 
fingernails on a blackboard to most Missouri families, 
particularly those who live and have land along our great 
rivers. I would like you to comment on that and if you believe 
that is an appropriate disparity between flood management and 
habitat or whether you think that is out of whack because I 
guarantee you that is what most of the folks I work for think.
    General Bostick. Senator, if confirmed, I would have to 
follow up with you on the details of the flood management and 
how that varies with the habitat.
    What I will say is that the Corps has done extensive 
studies into what happened this last year with the floods, 
particularly along the Missouri River. There was a lot of 
damage that was done, and Congress appropriated $1.7 billion in 
the supplemental. I do not know how much of that will break 
down in terms of repairing the systems on the Missouri, but I 
know that the Corps is committed to repairing those as quickly 
as possible. If confirmed, I will look into the specifics of 
the issue that you brought up here today.
    Senator McCaskill. I am confident that you will be 
confirmed, and I will look forward to some time with you to 
talk about that discrepancy. I can assure you that the members 
of the Missouri delegation that represent our State here, along 
with the other Senators along the Missouri River--and by the 
way, the interesting thing along the Missouri River--I do not 
know what it is about the water of the Missouri, but almost 
every State in the Missouri River basin has one Republican and 
one Democrat representing them in the U.S. Senate. It is a very 
bipartisan group, this Missouri River Working Group, that 
Senator Blunt and I, along with Senator Conrad and Hoeven, have 
gotten started. Now, rather than working north versus south, 
which as you may know, the historic fight has been recreation 
and irrigation up north versus navigation down south. We are 
now singing Kumbaya. We have joined hands and are united for 
flood control. I think you will hit a real brick wall if there 
continues to be that kind of discrepancy in terms of the 
priority of funding going forward.
    The Birds Point levee was blown. Now we have switched over 
to the Mississippi River. It was very controversial. All of us 
opposed the blowing of Birds Point. It was at 62.5 feet before 
it was blown. So far, the Army Corps has only rebuilt it to 55 
feet. I need a commitment from you today, General, or as soon 
as you can give it to me, if you are not comfortable giving it 
today, that it will get rebuilt to 62 feet.
    General Bostick. Senator, if confirmed, you have my 
commitment that I will work with the Corps of Engineers and 
ensure that they work as quickly as possible using the funds 
appropriated by Congress to do the repairs that are necessary.
    Senator McCaskill. That is a great answer except it was not 
the answer I was looking for. I need to know from you--and I 
need to know before my vote on you--whether or not you will 
make the commitment that what the Army Corps blew up they will 
put back to the way it was before they blew it up. That will be 
one I will not be able to wait until your confirmation on. I 
need to know before your confirmation your feelings about that 
levee being built back up to the place it was before the Army 
Corps decided to blow it. That will be important to me, just so 
you know.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Please see the attached documents.
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    Senator McCaskill. Finally, I want to briefly talk with 
you, General. There seems to be a sense that if we are not 
earmarking in the U.S. Senate, the Army Corps will be ill-
equipped to address the priorities of flood control and 
management along all of our great waterways in this country. 
Let us assume for purposes of this discussion--let me give you 
a hypothetical.
    If individual Members of Congress were not injecting their 
priorities within the priorities that the engineers had 
determined were the best cost-benefit analysis for all of the 
uses of the rivers and the most important in terms of 
protection of property and protection of life, would the Army 
Corps be able to prioritize the funds given to them in a way 
that would address the most urgent needs of our waterways as 
opposed to who sits on the Appropriations Committee deciding 
that their State deserved more just because they were senior 
ranking member or the chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy 
and Water Department?
    General Bostick. Senator, in my view, the Corps works for 
the American people who express their views through Congress. 
The Corps works for the National Command Authority, the 
Secretary of Defense, and the President. The Corps has to do 
that work for those two bodies under the laws that are written. 
While doing so, the Corps can prioritize projects through 
performance-based analysis, but I think each one of those 
bodies and our law have responsibilities to ensure that when 
those priorities are set by the Corps of Engineers, they fit 
within the expressed desires of the people through Congress and 
the National Command Authority.
    Senator McCaskill. Since you all make priorities based on 
performance-based measurement, on engineering studies, on 
safety and flood control and you have those priorities, would 
you not agree, General, that just because a Member happens to 
be the senior on a subcommittee of appropriations does not mean 
that their priority should substitute for a performance 
evaluation throughout the whole country?
    General Bostick. Senator, as I had stated earlier, the 
Corps can only execute what is authorized and appropriated by 
Congress. Determining which Member and whether they are senior 
or not--that is really not what the Corps is responsible to 
make decisions on. At this point, I cannot make a personal 
decision one way or the other on your question. But I can say 
that the Corps will execute what Congress authorizes and 
appropriates.
    Senator McCaskill. I think this is a delicate problem you 
face and I put you on the spot here and I apologize. I have 
done it more than once in these questions. I know that I have. 
I will continue to follow up with you.
    Just when I examine the water budgets that have been done 
around this place--my State has a lot of water. We have the two 
mightiest rivers and the confluence of those rivers. The 
management of those rivers is very important. It is as 
important as rural airports are to my friend from Alaska. But 
if our State is not fortunate enough to have a member on the 
right appropriations committee, then frankly we get to the back 
of the bus, not based on merit, not based on need, but just 
based on who is on what committee and how long they have been 
here and what party they belong to. It seems to me a very 
backwards way to prioritize the resources of managing our 
rivers in this country, and I wanted to make that point while I 
had the chance.
    Thank you both very much for your service, and thank you 
for your patience, General Bostick, and my very pointed 
questions.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
    Senator Graham.
    Senator Graham. General Bostick, are you sure you want this 
job? [Laughter.]
    General Bostick. Senator, I am sure.
    Senator Graham. What Senator McCaskill is saying has a lot 
of truth to it, that we need to spend taxpayer dollars wisely 
with some kind of plan. But I have been here for about an hour 
and you have been asked about 35 specific things that people 
would like you to do before you get confirmed, which makes me 
believe that we seem to know our States better than maybe other 
people do because I do not know about this thing you blew up. 
She wants you to build it back. I assume she knows what she is 
talking about, and I would support it. Is that an earmark to 
rebuild something you blew up?
    Senator McCaskill. No. To fix what was blown up by them is 
not an earmark especially when they made a commitment to do so 
when they blew it up.
    Senator Graham. All right. The point is that we are trying 
to fix an old problem with a new way of doing business, and I 
just feel for you.
    The Panama Canal is going to be widened in 2014. Is that 
correct, General Bostick?
    General Bostick. Sir, I understand that it will be widened 
in 2014.
    Senator Graham. The ships on the sea today are going to be 
replaced by ships almost three times their size. Is that 
correct?
    General Bostick. I understand that to be true, Senator.
    Senator Graham. So if you widen the Panama Canal and these 
super cargo ships can come directly to the east coast, that 
means we have to look at our infrastructure on the east coast 
anew. Is that correct?
    General Bostick. Senator, I would say we have to look at 
our infrastructure across the country.
    Senator Graham. Do we have a plan to deal with the widening 
of the Panama Canal and how it would affect infrastructure in 
the Nation to make sure we can export our products to the 
market? Is there a national vision to deal with the changes in 
shipping? Is there an administration plan or congressional plan 
that you know of?
    General Bostick. Sir, I cannot answer whether there is or 
is not a plan.
    Senator Graham. I can tell you there is not, and that 
reflects badly on us all.
    To my colleagues, shipping as we know it is about to 
change. Earmarking is a very parochial endeavor that does not 
allow you to look beyond your local interest. But if you just 
withdraw from the game and your port like Charleston gets no 
money in the budget and you think it should be considered based 
on a merit-based system, what do you do?
    I would just say you have been beat up a lot, but I am 
going to beat up myself and my colleagues. We have absolutely 
no vision as a Nation as to how to deal with the change in 
shipping, and that is just one infrastructure change.
    I would suggest that we all sit down with this 
administration and come up with a game plan and say what does 
it mean if the ships are going to be three times the size they 
are today coming through the Panama Canal. What does it mean to 
the Mississippi River? Do you have to widen the Mississippi 
River because you are going to have more barge traffic? Can 
every port on the east coast go to 50 feet, which is the 
minimum requirement to service these ships 24/7? If every port 
cannot, who says no? If you are not lucky enough to get in the 
President's budget, what are you supposed to do? Go home to 
your people and say sorry, we just lost, cannot help you. I 
just do not think these are good responses to real problems.
    The Great Lakes. If it is the largest shoreline in the 
Nation, how do you deal with the largest shoreline in the 
Nation? How does it fit into the change in export opportunity? 
The President says he wants to double exports in the next 5 
years. Count me in. How the hell do you get your products to 
the market? What do you do when shipping changes? Does it 
affect transportation? Does it mean you have to have more roads 
for trucks?
    There is no vision in this country, and I pledge to you, 
General Bostick, not just to complain but to sit down and work 
with you to come up with a merit-based system that would allow 
Congress and the administration in a collaborative fashion to 
get ahead of what is going to be a major change in our economy. 
Rather than just talking about how bad earmarks are and how 
dirty Congress is, I want to do a little more than that. I want 
to actually bring a solution.
    If you do not like earmarking and you think it is 
corrupting--and there is a case to be made--what have you done 
to fix it? What have you done to solve the problem of a world 
changing and America being left behind?
    Have you ever been to the Shanghai port, General Bostick?
    General Bostick. Senator, I have not.
    Senator Graham. You need to go and visit our ports and see 
the difference.
    So I enjoyed talking to you. [Laughter.]
    To be continued.
    Now, the Charleston port--you are familiar with that. 
Right?
    General Bostick. Senator, I am.
    Senator Graham. They tell me it is going to take until 2024 
to get the harbor deepened to accept these new cargo ships if 
funding stays the same. Is that okay with you?
    General Bostick. Senator, I have not seen the plan, but it 
seems like an awfully long time.
    Senator Graham. You know why I think it is an awfully long 
time to go from 45 to 50 feet? It is three times longer than it 
took to build the Panama Canal itself. We built the Panama 
Canal shorter than it would take us to go from 45 to 50 feet in 
the Port of Charleston.
    We have a lot to talk about in the Port of Charleston. You 
have been great to help us get into the work plan. It is just 
not the Port of Charleston. It is the Port of Savannah. We are 
going to sit down and talk about a merit-based system, and I 
need your input and I need my colleagues to do more than 
complain about the old system. If you want merit-based 
decisions, we need to come up with a system that gets us there. 
I am willing to help anybody to get there, Republican, 
Democratic, Libertarian, vegetarian.
    Now, Admiral, are you familiar with sequestration plans of 
Congress?
    Admiral Locklear. I am generally familiar with the law and 
what it would entail.
    Senator Graham. How do you feel about it?
    Admiral Locklear. I believe the Secretary of Defense has 
properly articulated it would be devastating.
    Senator Graham. Devastating, dumb. We would be shooting 
ourselves in the head. It would be a Navy without ships, 
without sailors, brigades without bullets, air wings without 
trained pilots. Do you agree with that assessment?
    Admiral Locklear. I agree with that assessment.
    Senator Graham. Do you have any idea why we continue to 
want to go down that road? I mean, I do not. I am just asking 
you.
    Admiral Locklear. I do not have an opinion on that.
    Senator Graham. You are going to be the head of PACOM, and 
you are telling the members of this committee that if we 
execute sequestration on top of the $487 billion that we are 
already trying to cut, we will be devastating the U.S. Navy's 
capability to defend this Nation?
    Admiral Locklear. I would say it is not just the Navy but 
across all the Services.
    Senator Graham. So we would be devastating our military. 
Thank you for your candid testimony because I could not agree 
with you more.
    Now, China. That is your theater of operations, right? Is 
China engaged in a sustained effort of cyber attacks against 
this country's defense infrastructure? Is the People's 
Liberation Army engaged in cyber attacks against this country?
    Admiral Locklear. Senator, I do not have direct knowledge 
that I would share in this forum about that.
    Senator Graham. It is widely believed they are.
    Would you agree with this? This will be my last question. 
If the People's Liberation Army of China is engaged in cyber 
attacks against this country to steal our defense 
infrastructure, our trade secrets, our national security 
information, would you consider such activity, if it did occur, 
a hostile act against the United States? Would it be legitimate 
for us under the law of war to respond in kind?
    Admiral Locklear. I would only be speculating to give you a 
legal opinion at this point in time.
    Senator Graham. Forget about that. From a military 
commander's point of view, if our Nation is being attacked in a 
cyber fashion against our defense infrastructure, do you 
consider that a hostile act as a military commander?
    Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir, certainly an act against the 
best interests of our----
    Senator Graham. Can you get with me about whether or not 
you consider it a hostile act and whether or not we have the 
right to respond in kind and whether or not we should?
    Admiral Locklear. Senator, I would say certainly the 
activity is hostile. Whether it fits in the category of an 
exact hostile act, I need to give you a legal opinion on that 
because there are legalities in warfare that we would have to 
categorize that. But certainly it tends in that direction.
    Senator Graham. You can get back with me.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Currently, the precise definition of a cyber attack is evolving. 
Over the past decade, the term computer network attack was defined in 
Joint Publication 1-02 as ``actions taken in or through the use of 
computer networks to disrupt, degrade, deny, or destroy information 
resident in computers or computer networks, or the computers and 
networks themselves.'' This definition includes a broad range of 
activities from those that cause no noticeable effect and fall far 
below a use of force, to those that cause destruction equivalent to a 
kinetic attack. Efforts are ongoing to ensure the Joint Publication's 
definition is not overly broad and properly aligns with international 
law.
    For the purposes of defining rights and responsibilities under 
international law, U.S. Cyber Command defines cyber attack ``as actions 
in cyberspace whose foreseeable results include damage or destruction 
of property or death or injury to persons. A cyber attack, defined as 
such, is a use of forces, equivalent to an `armed attack,' and may be 
responded to in self-defense.''

    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
    Senator Begich.
    Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    It has actually been somewhat enlightening, this process 
and testimony so far. I want to say to both the General and 
Admiral thank you very much for your willingness to participate 
in what I am learning here. I am making a list of every demand 
that members have of you or they will not give you your 
confirmation. The problem is if you are not confirmed, those 
demands cannot happen. Maybe there is a disconnect, but also 
that is the old way, in my view, of doing business around this 
place.
    I have questions. I want you to get in the service of the 
positions that you are being nominated for because we want to 
work with you to make things happen.
    But I made this shopping list that everyone has requested 
of you or demanded of you, which I think is somewhat amazing.
    I want to just make a comment, and I hope maybe the 
chairman and we could consider something in the future, on the 
Law of the Sea because there was a comment from my good friend 
from Oklahoma earlier. We do a lot of work on issues together. 
He comes from an oil and gas State like I do. But there is a 
lot of misinformation out there on the Law of the Sea. The fact 
is there are only four countries that have not signed on: North 
Korea, Libya, Iran, and us. Now, maybe I am confused, but I do 
not think so. Those are people I do not want to hang out with. 
I think the Law of the Sea from where it affects the country 
the most, Alaska, is an important part of our long-term 
national security, national economic opportunities, and a huge 
undiscovered resource up there in a variety of ways.
    I appreciate our conversation, Admiral, regarding your 
understanding of the importance of it from a national security 
perspective, and I hope maybe we could have a further 
discussion because it is a national security issue if we are 
not part of the equation. To be frank with you, I am not real 
interested in hanging out with North Korea, Iran, and Libya in 
regards to our not signing on.
    It is more of a comment, but I think there is a lot of 
misinformation up there in regards to how the revenue streams 
would work, what our sovereignty is, and the rule of law that 
we would be able to operate under. So it is more of a comment. 
I again want to thank you for your comment in support of that.
    Admiral, let me touch on the pivot to the Asia-Pacific 
priority or at least an enhanced priority, I should say, for 
the area and for PACOM and the importance at least from my 
perspective, Alaska and Hawaii. These are strategic if we are 
upping our ante in the Asia-Pacific area. Can you give me your 
comments on the importance of these somewhat forward-basing but 
also some of the critical pieces of missile defense from 
Alaska's perspective?
    Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir, I can. I had the privilege in a 
previous command of serving as the 3rd Fleet Commander, which 
is in command of all the naval forces that are in the eastern 
Pacific. So I am quite familiar with the implications of 
Hawaii, of the west coast of the United States, the Pacific 
Northwest, as well as Alaska.
    First of all, as a mariner, you look at the globe and you 
look at it as a globe and you see the world in great circles 
not in straight lines. If you take a look at the geography of 
where you are when you are in Alaska, you really are very close 
and very significantly positioned geographically on the 
northern periphery of the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR). 
It is critical not only from a ballistic missile defense 
perspective but also for the strategic positioning of forces to 
be able to have forces that are well supported inside the 
United States but at the same time are close enough to be able 
to be relevant in a short-term, quick-reaction requirement that 
we could have if our security interests are threatened in the 
Asia-Pacific.
    I had some time on the east coast, and if you look at the 
Atlantic, it takes you about the same time to go from 
Charleston, SC, on a ship to Portsmouth, England as it does to 
go from San Diego to Hawaii. You start to see this strategic 
position of that island chain and our other island chains that 
we deal with as we move forward.
    All of these are critical to the overall rebalancing 
strategy, and I look forward, if I am confirmed, to making sure 
that is well articulated.
    Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
    The other one I would like to ask you--I know we talked a 
little bit about it. It is the Joint Pacific-Alaska Range 
Complex, which is an important training facility. It has the 
largest air space and ground domain that anyone in the country 
can train in. Can you give me your thoughts of how that may 
play into PACOM and the work you are doing?
    Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. That range, as do all of our 
ranges, are critical to our military's ability to be ready when 
we go forward. Protection of those ranges from encroachment, 
ensuring that we are allowed to access them for the type of 
training we need and training that we do in a responsible, 
environmentally respectful way--we can do that as a military, 
but that is very important for us as we send young men and 
women forward with these very well built, very sophisticated 
systems that we need to counter the type of threats we might 
have. We have to have places where they can rehearse. Some can 
be done synthetically but the range systems are very important 
to our overall national security strategy.
    Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
    General, thank you. My late father-in-law, who passed away 
recently, was a colonel in the Corps. I hear all the stories 
and heard all the stories. I thank you for your service.
    In Alaska, we love the Corps. You have your own Alaska 
district up there because of the size. When my friend from 
Missouri talked about water, we understand water. We are not 
the State of 10,000 Lakes. We are the State of a million lakes. 
Three-quarters of the coastline of this country is Alaska, and 
we have the Arctic which the Corps is now working on which is 
an amazing part of the equation.
    Let me ask you a couple questions. One, this whole 
prioritization, which I understand how you have to dice the 
answer because if you do not have the money, you cannot do it, 
if you are not authorized. The big debate here is earmarks. 
That is why the water bill is where it is because some people 
think because we nominate projects in the water bill, it is an 
earmark. We are in this quandary of how to move that bill 
forward. But that is your authorizing bill to do your projects. 
Other than that, it is then just the presidential list. So we 
are kind of in this stalemate.
    I am very interested in what Senator Graham said in setting 
the metrics and trying to figure it out, because you have 
multiple layers. You have flood control. You have habitat. In 
my State, flood control is important to a certain extent. 
Habitat, I can tell you, is very important when 60 percent of 
the fishing industry of this country in the sense of live catch 
is from Alaska, a huge business, also a huge employer. The 
Corps plays a role in that to ensure that we have a viable 
fishing industry in this country. It is a very careful balance.
    I would be interested, because my time is limited here, to 
get your thoughts at a later time, of how you see us building 
some metrics that we can restrain ourselves but also do what is 
right for this country but also giving the input that we are 
hearing from our own constituents on needs in port development. 
For example, in my State, with the Arctic, we are going to need 
a deep water port up there. There is no question about it. If 
we are not careful, we will be in dire straights not having 
that up there for a variety of reasons. But can you just give 
me a quick comment? I know my time has expired.
    General Bostick. I agree, Senator, with many of the points 
both you and Senator Graham raised on the national priorities 
and how do we get at a national set of priorities. I think it 
is going to take governmental, nongovernmental, the 
administration, and State and local leaders working together to 
come to a consensus and a common vision on a way to move 
forward. I look forward, if confirmed, to being part of that 
team and helping to serve as a catalyst to bring our team 
together with the other teams in order to address this issue.
    Senator Begich. Thank you very much. I look forward to 
seeing you both, if possible, in Alaska. General, I will follow 
up in a written question--we have about 300 used defense sites. 
I am curious where they fit and the priorities. We can talk 
offline on that.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Begich. We may 
have a slightly different definition of coastline since we 
think we have either the longest or second longest coastline in 
the Great Lakes. But nonetheless----
    Senator Begich. We will measure it.
    Chairman Levin. You are either number one or number two.
    Senator Begich. We like to consider ourselves number one. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. In any event, thank you, Senator Begich, 
for your contribution.
    I agree with you, by the way, about the confirmation. These 
two gentlemen hopefully will be not only confirmed but promptly 
confirmed and the answers that they will be offering to 
questions for the record are, I hope, in terms of their coming 
in, will be the only thing that will be between them and 
confirmation. Not so much the substance of it, I hope, but just 
the speed with which you can get us the answers because I think 
your answers will be satisfactory and believe they will be.
    Senator Chambliss.
    Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to pick up where both Senator Graham and Senator 
Begich left off with respect to this issue, General Bostick, of 
trying to make sure that the President's Executive Order number 
13534 issued back in 2010 does come to reality. In that 
executive order, he said we need to have a national strategy 
for doubling U.S. exports by 2015. If we do not get our act 
together at our ports, then not only are we not going to double 
our exports, we are going to have a hard time receiving imports 
with the ships that are going to be coming through the expanded 
Panama Canal at the end of 2014.
    We have been working on the deepening project at Savannah 
Harbor for 10 years. For 10 years we have been jumping through 
all of the hoops that we have to jump through, some dictated by 
the Corps, some by environmental requirements and whatnot. I am 
not saying whether all of that is necessary or not. But I know 
what is necessary, and what is necessary is getting to the end 
of the day and getting the port at Savannah--and I am very 
supportive of the port at Charleston and Jacksonville and all 
of our ports around the country--to have the capability of 
receiving those Panamax ships.
    It is going to be extremely difficult under the process 
they have now, and the reason it is going to be difficult is 
because history dictates to us that every major Corps project 
is an earmark. That is the way it has always been. We are 
having to change the process now in this post-earmark world. I 
am not sure what the answer is either.
    But Senator Graham and I have had this debate and 
conversation time and time again about how we do go forward and 
represent our respective parts of the country. In fairness to 
the ports at Mobile, and Jacksonville, and wherever, we have to 
come up with a better solution than earmarks and, at the same 
time, we have to recognize that priorities are going to have to 
be set.
    At Savannah, we are now ready. You and I have talked a 
little bit earlier today. We have a small tranche of Federal 
money that is going to be joined up with a commitment that has 
been made by our State, and a major commitment that has been 
made by our State, to hopefully begin the process at Savannah. 
We are the fastest growing container port in the Nation. Last 
year, 12.5 percent of all containers that came in the United 
States came through Savannah. If we are not ready by 2014 for 
these Panamax ships, not only is the port at Savannah going to 
suffer, but retailers throughout the whole east coast and 
manufacturers throughout the whole eastern part of the United 
States are going to suffer. It is of critical importance that 
we address this issue, General Bostick, in the short term.
    You said in response to your advance policy questions the 
Nation must be prepared to take advantage of the opportunities 
with completion of the Panama Canal in 2014. Now, as Chief of 
Engineers, what will you do to ensure that projects of national 
significance such as the Savannah Harbor project are not 
subject to unnecessary delays and are completed in the 
timeliest manner as is possible?
    General Bostick. Senator, I would agree with you and the 
other Senators that have talked about the urgency of the work 
that we have ahead of us. We do need a national strategy in a 
number of different areas, whether it is navigation, 
hydropower, economic, ecosystem revitalization, some of the 
aging infrastructure that we are dealing with. All of that 
requires priorities, and some of those priorities are going to 
be important at the national level and some will be very 
important at the local level. I believe it is important for us 
to work as a team to sort out those priorities.
    I think we have demonstrated throughout our history many 
times in the past that when we have a common vision, when we 
have all parties pulling together, when we have the funding, 
and when we change our business processes accordingly, and then 
work within the laws and regulations that bind us, that we can 
move things faster than we currently are. I am committed to 
being part of the team that moves this forward.
    Senator Chambliss. We look forward to working with you on 
this. Obviously, I think all of us are concerned about it, but 
we do not have the answers. We need the Corps to be forward-
thinking with respect to how we deal with this post-earmark 
world.
    Admiral Locklear, the F-35 program was designed to replace 
the F-16, the A-10, the F/A-18 fighter planes as a new fifth 
generation, multi-role fighter. The U.S. military's current 
top-of-the-line fighter is the F-22, the world's only fully 
operational fifth generation fighter. There have been less than 
200 F-22s produced for the Air Force, and as you and I talked 
yesterday, 40 of those are in the PACOM AOR. According to 
recent defense strategic guidance, DOD is further slowing the 
acquisition and delivery of F-35s, and this issue of budget 
reduction and the potential for sequestration makes that very 
difficult.
    Now, both China and Russia are developing fifth generation 
fighters: the J-20 and the Sukhoi PAK FA. Both these aircraft 
will be challengers and in some facets may be superior to U.S. 
fighters. There is also a strong possibility that these new 
fighters will not only be used by China and Russia but may be 
sold to other countries elsewhere in the Pacific theater. The 
J-20 and the Sukhoi PAK FA are likely to start entering service 
in significant numbers by the end of the decade, and both 
countries are capable of accelerating this acquisition 
timeframe by settling for alternative engines or a little 
lesser capability. The presence of these aircraft and our delay 
in modernizing our tactical aviation forces in the Pacific 
could possibly alter the balance of power in the PACOM region.
    Admiral, assuming you are confirmed, this will be your AOR 
and your airspace. I know that the J-20 is a new airplane and 
we have little data on it at this point in time, but it does 
concern me personally that it flew its first flight test 
earlier than expected and that the U.S. Intelligence Community 
is predicting its initial operational capability date may be at 
least 2 years earlier than originally predicted.
    What I see happening at some point in the future is that 
options the United States currently has in terms of defending 
U.S. interests and providing deterrence to U.S. allies in the 
Pacific region may not be available. When those options are no 
longer available, it will fundamentally change the balance of 
power in your AOR.
    I would appreciate your thoughts on this issue and your 
thoughts on what the United States needs to do to preserve its 
options and ability to defend U.S. interests in the region 
specifically in relation to maintaining air dominance.
    Admiral Locklear. Senator, a critical aspect of our ability 
to ensure our national interests and the interests of our 
allies and partners are well protected in this critical region 
is our ability to stay forward, just to be there. As any other 
nation or nations pursue anti-access, area denial capabilities, 
which are some of the ones you are alluding to, it is critical 
that we do a couple things. One is that we understand what they 
are doing. Two is that we keep the systems that we have already 
invested in as well prepared to address those, and I think that 
we are doing that at this point in time. Then we have to look 
longer term are we pacing the threat not only in the air domain 
but in all other domains.
    The F-22 you mentioned are critical to our ability at this 
point in time to stay forward. The F-35 will be a great 
addition to that. Certainly any slow-down of that forces the 
combatant commanders to have to take additional risk in their 
planning as we look forward. So it is important that if I am 
confirmed, that I help this committee and the leadership in DOD 
to stay focused on what we may be giving up if we do not 
proceed properly.
    Senator Chambliss. Thanks to both of you for your 
leadership and your service to our country. Thanks to your 
families for their commitment. We look forward to your 
confirmation and look forward to working with both of you.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
    Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Locklear, Lieutenant General Bostick, thank you 
both very much for being here and congratulations on your 
nominations. I share Senator Chambliss' hope that we will see 
very swift confirmations.
    Admiral Locklear, I know that you are looking forward to 
your future command in the Pacific, and we had a chance to talk 
earlier this week a little bit about that.
    But as subcommittee chair of the European Affairs 
Subcommittee on the Foreign Relations Committee, we have been 
looking with great interest towards what is going to happen at 
the NATO summit in Chicago. As you and I discussed, one of the 
potential topics for discussion will be what happened in Libya 
and the lessons learned. Given your recent post at NATO, I 
wonder if you could talk a little bit about what you think some 
of those lessons learned from the Libyan effort are.
    Admiral Locklear. First, even as we rebalance our strategy 
and we start to articulate the Asia-Pacific--our national 
interests there and our military priorities there, I think from 
my perspective it is important for us to recognize that our 
alliance in the NATO alliance is, first of all, a very strong 
alliance, a mature alliance. It is a large alliance and it has 
a lot of capability when you put it together and you put it 
together in a way where it comes together in a meaningful way.
    In the case of the Libya operation, it was the first 
opportunity for NATO to be able to accomplish an alliance 
operation of that size in a very short period of time. It was a 
matter of days when they could take the operation from a U.S.-
led coalition to a NATO-led coalition, and it is something that 
really has not been done in the history of NATO. I think it 
started to show the flexibility of that alliance.
    I think it has pointed out some areas where defense 
spending within the alliance needs to be expanded, and some of 
the areas that they found that there were shortfalls where we 
had to rely maybe too heavily on one partner or one member of 
the alliance. But I think it was also an opportunity for those 
countries--because Libya was in the back yard of the NATO 
alliance, it was important for the leadership of key countries 
to step forward and to take responsibility, and they did that. 
Overall, I think we gave the Libyan people a chance.
    Senator Shaheen. As we are recognizing that every situation 
is different, every country is different, but do you think this 
provides one of the models that we ought to be looking at in 
the future as we face other threats to NATO?
    Admiral Locklear. I am always hesitant to plan on the last 
event because it never proves right to do that. But I think it 
had elements of it that could help us forecast in the future. I 
think it does demonstrate the benefits of partners and building 
partner capacity which I think is critical to the long-term 
security of an increasingly globalized world. The more friends, 
allies, and partners that we can have that we can understand, 
that we can interoperate with, that we have systems that have 
somewhat compatibility--but there were some amazing instances 
where we had countries in the NATO alliance that, when I was 
born, would have never spoken to each other, that came together 
and were able to interoperate and to do some really, I think, 
quite significant things in the area of warfare in a very 
responsible and effective way. From that regard, it can be a 
model.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    I know that the issue of the slowing of the building of 
Virginia-class subs has been raised already, but I wonder if 
you could talk about the unique capabilities that submarines 
provide in the Pacific region both in terms of traditional 
warfare and asymmetric warfare. As I think I probably 
mentioned, I represent the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard where they 
do a lot of work on Virginia-class subs. We are following very 
closely what is going on with this issue.
    Admiral Locklear. Globally our attack submarine force 
provide basically a critical element of our defense strategy 
both from their ability to operate forward for sustained 
periods, their ability to operate somewhat covertly for 
sustained periods, and their ability to bring significant 
combat power to bear, as well as their ability to bring 
significant intelligence and reconnaissance. I think they are a 
key element of our joint force.
    Certainly in the Asia-Pacific area because of the vastness 
of the area, the tyranny of distance, the size of the oceans, 
the size of the littorals--half the people in the world live in 
the Asia-Pacific. Most of the emerging economies are there, as 
we have already heard, most of the trade, the globalization of 
trade. In the Navy, we are commonly heard to say 90 percent of 
everything that moves in the world moves in the oceans and 
through the littorals. What we do not say very often is in the 
last couple of decades that 90 percent has increased fourfold. 
It is 90 percent of four times what it was a couple decades. So 
that is an indication and we are talking about the Panama Canal 
being expanded. Being able to have an effective understanding 
of what happens in that globalized environment I think is 
critical, and our submarines are a big part of that.
    Senator Shaheen. Can you talk at all about the trajectory 
of our submarine capabilities versus Russia and China over the 
next 10 years? Do we have a sense of how we will compare?
    Admiral Locklear. We build the best submarines in the 
world.
    Senator Shaheen. I had no doubt about that.
    Are they developing any technology that may rival ours?
    Admiral Locklear. I think that what has concerned me most 
over time is the proliferation of very quiet diesel or diesel-
electric submarines and the proliferation of those around the 
world. I think today there are well over 300 of those types of 
submarines that are in the various parts of the world, some 
with friends, allies, and partners, but some places where they 
are not. The proliferation of those assets, even though they 
are locally distributed--I mean, they are not far-reaching and 
they don't leave generally the coastal areas of those 
countries--they become area denial weapons, asymmetric area 
denial weapons, which as we have seen in North Korea where they 
used a mini-sub that was able to accomplish an attack there.
    So that does concern us and it concerns us not only as it 
relates to our own submarines' ability to counter that, but 
also the rest of our technology that has to be developed, 
whether it is our airborne sensors, whether it is our surface-
borne sensors, whether it is our intelligence community to be 
able to keep track of what is happening inside these nations 
that are proliferating. Those are the things that concern me.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    I am out of time, but I wonder if I could ask Lieutenant 
General Bostick just one question. I know my colleague from New 
Hampshire, Senator Ayotte, raised the importance of the Cold 
Regions Lab up in Hanover which does such great work, so I just 
want to echo that.
    But one of the things that I have been very concerned about 
and I know that our military is also very concerned about is 
the number of engineers, science and technology professionals, 
that we are losing. By 2020, about 50 percent of them will be 
eligible for retirement. Can you talk a little bit about how 
you see being able to rebuild that science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) capacity within the Army? 
As you think about the challenges facing the work that you will 
be taking on in our labs and other technical areas, how are we 
going to attract the engineers and the STEM professionals that 
we need for the future?
    General Bostick. Senator, I think this is a very important 
point for the country. I sit on the advisory board up at West 
Point for the civil engineering department and for the systems 
engineering department. Even at the institution that was the 
first engineering school in the country, we have concerns about 
growing engineers.
    But it really starts at a very young level. I mentioned 
that my wife is an elementary school teacher, and each time 
during the year I try to go to speak to the youngsters about 
the importance of engineering. I think that is where it starts. 
Our education in America must focus on science, technology, 
engineering, and math in a greater degree than we may be now, 
and to galvanize that interest in the young men and women so 
that we have a population to choose from to encourage them to 
study in this important area. We are going to need STEM 
specialists in every part of the country, and the Corps of 
Engineers will be part of the team that helps develop them.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I could not agree more with 
your comments, especially when it applies to early childhood 
education.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Vitter.
    Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to both 
of you for your dedication, for your lifetime of military and 
public service. We all appreciate that.
    General Bostick, because of the enormous importance of the 
Corps to Louisiana, I will focus the conversation with you. I 
also want to thank publicly the many, many fine men and women 
in the Corps, very talented, very dedicated, and very bright.
    But I also want to focus on a problem which is that the 
Corps, as a bureaucracy, as an organization, is really broken 
in fundamental ways, is really dysfunctional in fundamental 
ways. The average Corps project that gets done takes 20 years 
to get done. It is studied for 8-plus years, and that has grown 
over time. The Corps seems to be best at studying things, and 
over time, of course, costs go up, so limited resources never 
quite keep up. It is like a dog running after its tail. Those 
issues have only gotten worse in the last decade within the 
Corps in terms of that dysfunction and those problems.
    What would be the top three specific reforms you would make 
if confirmed to fix that?
    General Bostick. Senator, first, thanks for the compliments 
about the Corps employees. I think they are hard-working, 
dedicated professionals, and I have served with them in peace 
and combat. I deployed with the 1st Calvary Division and then 
helped lead the Gulf Region Division, and I saw Corps military 
and civilian employees do things side by side with our 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. I am very proud of 
them.
    As I look at the Corps--first, I talked about trust and 
building trust and understanding each of our issues and each of 
our concerns, whether it is national, local, State, government 
or nongovernmental, is bringing the team together. I think the 
Corps' team has to come together, and I think they have a solid 
team, but making sure that the issues of all the teammates are 
understood.
    I think we have to transform the Corps in terms of our 
programs, both military and civil. The Corps is working on 
that. I think they have to be aligned to the national 
priorities of this country. I believe we have a huge issue with 
aging infrastructure. Many of our hydropower plants are over 34 
years old. The infrastructure along our levees and our dams is 
also very old and aging. Our navigation channels. We have over 
900 that we are responsible for: 250 are maintained at any 
level, and of that 59 are top priorities that 90 percent of 
commercial traffic flow against. Of those 59, they are going to 
dredge to the depths and widths that they are authorized only 
35 percent of the time. The other issue is to focus on funding 
and how do we take the precious resources that we have and 
align them to the national priorities and achieve energy goals. 
Achieving the energy goals is very important.
    Finally, I think about our business processes. Sir, I think 
you saw in Louisiana that the Corps adjusted its business 
processes in addressing the issues after Katrina. I think what 
happened there also is that the Nation had a common vision. It 
went after the post-Katrina problems with immediate funding, a 
common vision on what had to be done, and the Corps adjusted 
its business processes to make things happen. So it can be 
done, and I am convinced that it can be done, and I look 
forward to working with you on that.
    Senator Vitter. General, right after Katrina, the Corps did 
adjust in part because of extraordinary authority and funding. 
I am here to tell you that the Corps has completely adjusted 
back. That phase, unfortunately, is done and the Corps has 
completely adjusted back to pre-Katrina organizational 
responses.
    My question was about specific organizational reforms. What 
are your thoughts about your top three specific organizational 
reforms that you would implement to help fix this?
    General Bostick. First, I would look directly at the 
business processes in military programs and civil works. I 
think with BRAC and what we have seen with BRAC and what has 
happened on the military side to move BRAC 2005 along from 
design, bid, build processes to design, build has taken the 
contractor and brought them forward and moved things quickly. I 
think those lessons learned and the lessons learned in Katrina 
that allowed for the rapid funding, allowed for some of the 
accommodations of the National Environmental Policy Act, and 
allowed for the team to work together in a common vision--I 
think a business process from those two examples is what we 
need to do throughout the Corps with the agreement of Congress, 
the administration, and the American people.
    I think energy goals remain important in this day and age. 
I am going to look at the energy security and energy 
sustainment and ensure that we are meeting the requirements of 
the American people and the Nation. Finally, looking at the 
aging infrastructure, as I talked about before, and 
prioritizing that to national priorities.
    Senator Vitter. General, in the written questions that were 
submitted and answered before the hearing, one of the questions 
goes directly to this. In your view, does the Army Corps of 
Engineers need to make any changes in the way it operates, and 
if so, what changes would you recommend? Your answer was 
basically, if confirmed, you would consult with a lot of people 
and we could determine what, if any, changes are needed.
    Are you really unsure that significant changes are needed 
as you answered in your written response?
    General Bostick. I believe changes are needed, and I 
believe some of them are significant.
    Senator Vitter. Okay. So you would amend this written 
response in that regard.
    General Bostick. I have had time to think about this since 
I provided that response some time ago, and I believe that 
based on the things that we have seen and the time that I have 
been able to review this, that there are significant changes. 
Some changes require changes well outside the Corps. There are 
issues with funding. There are issues with the amount of risks 
we are willing to take, the amount of lawsuits that occur, the 
environmental requirements that are required by law. I think 
all of that has to be taken into consideration and changes in 
those areas, just as we were allowed to do post-Katrina, are 
the kind of changes I think that are necessary to move all of 
us along with a common vision.
    Senator Vitter. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
    Just one additional question for you, Admiral, relating to 
our strong alliance with South Korea. There has been in the 
past a number of times when we said we were going to transfer 
the wartime situation that we were in, to transfer the wartime 
operational control (OPCON), from the United States to South 
Korea. That has been delayed again. It is scheduled now for 
December 2015.
    Would you agree that it is appropriate that the Republic of 
Korea assume OPCON of its own forces during time of war?
    Admiral Locklear. Mr. Chairman, I would agree and I would 
agree that the 2015 timeline appears to be moving in that 
direction from everything I have been told and that we seem to 
be on track for that. I would support staying on track for that 
transition date.
    Chairman Levin. I think it is important that we stick to 
that when we should have stuck to the earlier one, but that is 
now water over the dam. The 2015 date is now one that ought to 
be kept. I am glad to hear your answer that it is your 
intention that we keep on that track.
    Okay. We have come to the end of Senators' questions, and 
now let me ask you the standard questions which we ask of our 
nominees, which usually come before all of your other answers, 
but this time come afterward. These are the standard questions 
and you can answer together.
    First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations 
governing conflicts of interest?
    Admiral Locklear. I have.
    General Bostick. I have.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your 
personal views, even if those views differ from the 
administration in power?
    Admiral Locklear. I do.
    General Bostick. I will.
    Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the 
confirmation process?
    Admiral Locklear. No, sir.
    General Bostick. No, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with 
deadlines established for requested communications, including 
questions for the record in hearings?
    Admiral Locklear. I will.
    General Bostick. I will.
    Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
    Admiral Locklear. I will.
    General Bostick. I will.
    Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from 
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
    Admiral Locklear. They will.
    General Bostick. They will.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 
testify upon request before this committee?
    Admiral Locklear. I do.
    General Bostick. I do.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, 
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a 
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or 
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good 
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
    Admiral Locklear. I will.
    General Bostick. I do.
    Chairman Levin. We thank you. We thank again your families. 
We are delighted to see them here and know how important they 
are in your lives and in the security of this country. We look 
forward to a prompt confirmation and hope that you can get your 
answers for the record in promptly so we can proceed to vote on 
your confirmation here as soon as possible. Thank you both. 
Congratulations on your nominations.
    We will stand adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    [Prepared questions submitted to ADM Samuel J. Locklear 
III, USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers 
supplied follow:]
                        Questions and Responses
                            defense reforms
    Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have 
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have 
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain 
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant 
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments 
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment 
to the combatant commanders.
    Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act 
provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to 
address in these modifications?
    Answer. No, I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act. If confirmed, I will continue to be alert to the need for any 
modifications.
                                 duties
    Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of 
the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)?
    Answer. The Commander, PACOM, is responsible for deterring attacks 
against the United States and its territories, possessions, and bases, 
to protect Americans and American interests and, in the event that 
deterrence fails, to win its Nation's wars. The commander is also 
responsible for expanding security cooperation with our allies, 
partners, and friends across the Asia-Pacific region.
    Question. What background and experience do you possess that you 
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
    Answer. I believe my 35 years of military experience, culminating 
in command of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Joint Force Command 
Naples, Italy have prepared me for assuming command of PACOM.
    Operationally, I have gained valuable experience and insights 
planning and leading extensive joint and coalition operations at both 
the tactical and operational levels. In my current position, I 
commanded both the U.S. and NATO-led Libya operations, Odyssey Dawn and 
Unified Protector. As Commander, U.S. Third Fleet in San Diego, CA, I 
was responsible for the training and certification of all Pacific 
rotational naval forces, for the planning and execution of the bi-
annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational exercise, and served 
as the alternate Joint Maritime Component Commander for key Pacific 
Operational Plans. As the Commander of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group, 
also in San Diego, CA, I operated throughout the PACOM and CENTCOM 
areas of responsibility (AOR) and commanded naval forces in the 
planning and execution of the initial combat phase of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. Additionally, I was privileged to command the destroyer, USS 
Leftwich (DD984), homeported in Pearl Harbor, HI.
    Ashore, as a member of the Joint Staff, J-5, Plans and Policy 
Directorate, and three times as a flag officer assigned to the Navy 
staff, including serving as the Director of the Navy Staff, I gained 
valuable insights into the resourcing and administrative processes that 
underpin an effective Department of Defense (DOD), including a deep 
appreciation for the interagency and the importance of the whole-of-
government approach.
    Finally, Pam, my wife of 33 years, embodies today's military spouse 
and family, and is a superb representative of our U.S. Armed Forces. We 
are a great team and she adds significantly to my qualifications.
    Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to 
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, 
PACOM?
    Answer. If confirmed, I intend to take every opportunity to enhance 
my knowledge of and relationships with our allies and partners across 
the Pacific. I look forward to engaging with senior leaders within DOD, 
the Department of State, regional security experts, leading think tanks 
and universities, and military and civilian leaders throughout the 
Asia-Pacific in order to improve my understanding of U.S. interests in 
the region.
                             relationships
    Question. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:
    The Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. The Commander, PACOM, performs his duties under the 
authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense. He is 
directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the ability of the 
command to carry out its missions.
    Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs duties as directed 
by the Secretary and performs the duties of the Secretary in his 
absence. The Commander, PACOM, ensures the Deputy has the information 
necessary to perform these duties and coordinates with him on major 
issues.
    Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
    Answer. Under Secretaries are key advocates for combatant commands' 
requirements. The Commander, PACOM, coordinates and exchanges 
information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on strategic 
and regional security issues involving the Asia-Pacific theater.
    Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
    Answer. The Commander, PACOM, coordinates and exchanges information 
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as needed to set 
and meet the command's intelligence requirements.
    Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Answer. The Chairman functions under the authority, direction and 
control of the National Command Authority. The Chairman transmits 
communications between the National Command Authority and the PACOM 
Commander and oversees the activities of the PACOM Commander as 
directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor 
to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key 
conduit between the combatant commander, interagency, and Service 
Chiefs.
    The PACOM Commander keeps the Chairman informed on significant 
issues regarding the PACOM Area of Responsibility. The Commander 
communicates directly with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 
a regular basis.
    Question. Commander, U.S. Central Command.
    Answer. The PACOM and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) share a border 
between their respective AORs. The Commander, PACOM, maintains a close 
relationship and communicates directly with the Commander, CENTCOM, on 
issues of mutual interest that affect both of their AORs so that 
respective strategies, policies and operations are coordinated and 
mutually supportive. India-Pakistan issues have heightened the 
importance of close cross-combatant command coordination.
    Question. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
    Answer. As a subordinate unified command of PACOM, Special 
Operations Command Pacific and its component units deploy throughout 
the Pacific, supporting Commander, PACOM's Theater Security Cooperation 
Program, deliberate plans, and real world contingencies. The Commander, 
PACOM, maintains a close relationship and communicates directly with 
the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command on issues of mutual 
interest. PACOM coordinates requirements and operations of Special 
Operations Forces within the PACOM AOR through Commander, Special 
Operations Command, Pacific.
    Question. The other combatant commanders.
    Answer. Commander, PACOM, shares borders with and maintains close 
relationships with the other combatant commanders. These relationships 
are critical to the execution of our National Military Strategy and are 
characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive 
exchanges of information on key issues.
    Question. The Service Secretaries.
    Answer. The Service Secretaries are responsible for the 
administration and support of forces assigned to combatant commands. 
The Commander, PACOM, coordinates with the Secretaries to ensure that 
requirements to organize, train, and equip PACOM forces are met.
    Question. The Service Chiefs.
    Answer. The Commander, PACOM, communicates and exchanges 
information with the Service Chiefs to support their responsibility for 
organizing, training, and equipping forces. Successful execution of 
PACOM's mission responsibilities requires coordination with the Service 
Chiefs. Like the Chairman, the Service Chiefs are valuable sources of 
judgment and advice for the combatant commanders.
    Question. Commander United Nations/Combined Forces Command/U.S. 
Forces Korea.
    Answer. As a subordinate unified commander, the Commander, U.S. 
Forces Korea receives missions and functions from Commander, PACOM. I 
recognize his role as Commander, Combined Forces Command and will fully 
support his actions in that sensitive and demanding role.
    Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of 
War (POW)/Missing in Action (MIA) Personnel.
    Answer. The Commander, PACOM, coordinates and exchanges information 
with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing 
Personnel Affairs on strategic policy issues involving the POW/MIA 
accounting mission worldwide and Personnel Recovery requirements in the 
Asia-Pacific Region.
    Question. The Chief of Naval Research.
    Answer. The Office of Naval Research is a valuable source for 
technologies that help the Commander, PACOM, counter developing threats 
in the Asia-Pacific region. If confirmed, I will maintain a close 
relationship with the Chief of Naval Research as well as the other 
service research organizations and national laboratories to ensure the 
requirements for developing technologies for PACOM are understood.
                       challenges and priorities
    Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will 
confront the next Commander of PACOM?
    Answer. As our Nation globally rebalances toward the Asia-Pacific 
region, I will focus on three main challenges in the PACOM AOR. First, 
North Korea's conventional military, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
and proliferation activities coupled with the ongoing Kim regime 
transition create threats to regional security and stability. Second, 
the stability, security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific will depend 
on strong relationships with our Asia-Pacific treaty allies and 
partners to ensure that we are able to maintain regional access to and 
use of the global commons. Finally, China's rise as a regional and 
global power, including its substantial military modernization and 
buildup, is a source of strategic uncertainty and potential friction. 
The China/U.S. relationship has been an area of in-depth study and 
analysis by the current Commander and Staff of PACOM. I look forward to 
closely reading and broadening my understanding of this very dynamic 
relationship that cuts across all facets of our Government.
    Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for 
addressing these challenges?
    Answer. PACOM will support the administration's whole-of-government 
approaches to achieve a peaceful, secure and prosperous future security 
environment on the Korean Peninsula. Our forward military presence 
reassures our treaty allies and deters aggression by North Korea. While 
the ongoing leadership transition creates a period of uncertainty, it 
may also present opportunities for the Peninsula to advance to a 
greater level of stability and security.
    We will continue our commitments to modernizing and strengthening 
our treaty alliances and partnerships in the region. These critical 
relationships will be enhanced by maintaining interoperable military 
capabilities that deter regional aggression and build partner security 
capacity.
    We will remain steadfast in our efforts to mature the military-to-
military relationship with China. Both China and the United States have 
a strong stake in the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. 
Building a cooperative bilateral relationship will reduce the 
likelihood of a miscalculation, increase the clarity of Chinese 
strategic intentions and encourage mutual engagement in areas of common 
concern.
    Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish 
in terms of issues which must be addressed?
    Answer. My first priority will be to continue to maintain a 
credible deterrent posture and reassuring military presence in the 
Asia-Pacific.
    Next, we must both deter North Korean aggression and counter their 
proliferation activities. To do so we will work through DOD to 
collaborate with other elements of U.S. Government and our allies to 
maintain peace on the Peninsula and dissuade North Korea from actively 
pursuing a nuclear weapons program. With regard to China, actively 
pursuing steady and measured military-to-military engagement will be 
one of my top priorities.
    Lastly, while supporting our Nation's strategic focus on the Asia-
Pacific and sustaining the realignment and transformation processes 
already underway, we must also carefully shepherd and repeatedly assess 
progress toward desired force posture, ensuring we remain cognizant of 
evolving budgetary realities. These efforts will receive my prioritized 
attention as we work to build on and strengthen bilateral relationships 
with our regional allies and partners.
           defense strategic guidance and pacom force posture
    Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance, ``Sustaining U.S. Global 
Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense'', announced by 
President Obama on January 5, 2012, includes, among other things, the 
intention of the administration and the Pentagon to ``rebalance toward 
the Asia-Pacific region''. In his associated remarks, Secretary Panetta 
explained that the ``U.S. military will increase its institutional 
weight and focus on enhanced presence, power projection, and deterrence 
in Asia-Pacific.'' Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the 
region are already planned over the next several years, including 
movement of marines from Okinawa to Guam and the relocation of U.S. 
forces within South Korea. There are also discussions about increasing 
presence in southern parts of the Asia-Pacific, including countries 
like Australia and Singapore, and developing more comprehensive 
engagement strategies with a number of other countries in the region. 
These initiatives will likely compete with other global commitments for 
increasingly constrained funding.
    What is your understanding of the plan for the Asia-Pacific region 
as contemplated in the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance?
    Answer. My understanding is that we will emphasize our existing 
alliances, which provide a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security. 
We will also expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners 
throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability and 
capacity for securing common interests. Additionally, we look to invest 
in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability 
to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the 
broader Indian Ocean region. Furthermore, we will maintain peace on the 
Korean Peninsula by effectively working with allies and other regional 
states to deter and defend against provocation from North Korea, which 
is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
    The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and 
of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on an 
underlying balance of military capability and presence. Over the long 
term, China's emergence as a regional power will have the potential to 
affect U.S. economic and security interests in a variety of ways. Our 
two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia 
and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. 
However, the growth of China's military power must be accompanied by 
greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to reduce the 
prospects for regional instability. The United States will continue to 
make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional 
access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty 
obligations and with international law. Working closely with our 
network of allies and partners, we will continue to promote a rules-
based international order that ensures underlying stability and 
encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and 
constructive defense cooperation.
    Question. In your view, what should the United States do to 
``increase its institutional weight and focus'' in the Asia-Pacific?
    Answer. In keeping with our national-level strategic guidance, I 
believe it is essential that the United States maintain an enduring 
military presence that reassures countries in the region that the 
United States is committed to Asia-Pacific security, economic 
development, and rules and norms necessary to the region's success. My 
understanding is that the strategic guidance seeks to maintain a robust 
force presence in Northeast Asia and to distribute U.S. forces 
geographically better throughout the region to address the significant 
security challenges we face across the entirety of the region. This 
affords the United States the capability to strengthen regional 
security and better perform the types of missions our forces are likely 
to face in the future such as combating terrorism, responding to 
natural disasters, and counter proliferation.
    Question. As you understand it, what does this strategy guidance 
mean in terms of changes to the numbers and types of operational units 
assigned within the PACOM AOR?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and his staff 
and my counterparts across the Department to assess the potential 
global tradeoffs, risks, and budgetary implications associated with any 
changes in U.S. forward presence in the Asia-Pacific. Consulting 
closely with our allies and partners, and tailoring defense posture 
appropriately will allow the United States to respond more effectively 
to the wide range of challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific region.
    Question. What are your views on the current number and types of 
ships forward-stationed in the Asia-Pacific region? Are they sufficient 
to support the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, as you 
understand it, or would you foresee the need to increase or change that 
naval force structure in the AOR?
    Answer. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance places an 
emphasis on the importance of the Asia-Pacific. If confirmed, I will 
review levels of assigned forces in the Asia-Pacific region and if 
there are shortfalls, I will advocate for additional resources required 
to support the President's and Secretary's priorities.
    Question. What do you believe should be the United States' force 
posture priorities in the Asia-Pacific and what strategic criteria, if 
any, should guide the posture of U.S. forces in the region to best 
support those priorities at acceptable risk levels?
    Answer. I believe the United States should prioritize an enduring 
military presence in the Asia-Pacific region that demonstrates our 
commitment to Asia's security and the protection of American interests.
    I agree with the assessment that U.S. force posture in the region 
must be geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and 
politically sustainable.
    Question. How important is a forward-basing strategy to the ability 
of PACOM to execute its day-to-day mission? Its operational contingency 
plans?
    Answer. I believe the United States' forward-based forces are our 
most visible sign of our commitment to regional peace and stability. 
Forward based forces are not only the first responders in any 
contingency, they also serve to assure allies and partners and deter 
potential adversaries and are vital for day-to-day engagement where we 
train and exercise together to enhance capabilities and capacities 
across the region.
    Based on the above thoughts and because of the wide expanse of the 
theater, I believe forward-based forces are critical to PACOM's day-to-
day operations as well as operational contingency plans.
    Question. How, if at all, do the methods of forward-basing, 
rotational forces, and agreements with allies for training and 
logistics activities throughout the region contribute to forward 
presence?
    Answer. DOD views posture as a combination of three elements: 
forces, footprint, and agreements. ``Forces'' are U.S. military 
capabilities, equipment, and commands, assigned or deployed. 
``Footprint'' describes our infrastructure, facilities, land, and 
prepositioned equipment. ``Agreements'' are treaties, as well as 
access, transit, support, and status of forces (SOFA) agreements with 
allies and partners.
    Together, these enable the United States to maintain a forward 
presence to achieve our national security objectives and demonstrate 
our commitment to the region.
    Question. What do you see as the implications, if any, of the 
planned force posture changes in Korea, Japan, and Guam for the U.S. 
commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in general?
    Answer. As the President has made very clear, we are steadfast in 
our commitment to the defense of Japan and the Republic of Korea. I 
understand that as the Department considers posture changes in the 
Asia-Pacific region, the goal is to fulfill our treaty obligations in 
Northeast Asia, while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia, and 
ensuring our posture is geographically distributed, operationally 
resilient, and politically sustainable.
    Question. How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces from 
Okinawa to Guam improve U.S. security in the region?
    Answer. Our commitment to the security of Japan is unshakeable. I 
understand the planned changes in the Asia-Pacific region will result 
in force posture that is geographically distributed, operationally 
resilient, and politically sustainable. Guam's strategic location 
supports our ability to operate forces from a forward location.
    Planned posture shifts result in greater geographic distribution of 
our forces in the region, enhancing our ability to respond to 
contingencies and meet treaty obligations in Asia. It demonstrates our 
commitment to allies and to fulfilling our agreements with allies and 
partners.
    Question. How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces on the 
Korean Peninsula improve security?
    Answer. Our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea is 
unshakeable. I understand that as with planning for Japan, Guam, and 
Australia, the planned posture changes in Korea will result in force 
posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, 
and politically sustainable. The changes appear to address host nation 
concerns and simultaneously improve our mutual defense infrastructure. 
I support the posture changes on the Peninsula consistent with the 
joint vision for the alliance laid out by our Presidents and further 
developed by the Secretary of Defense and his Republic of Korea 
counterpart.
    Question. What is your understanding of the plans for rotational 
deployments of U.S. marines to Australia and how, in your view, will 
such a presence advance U.S. security interests?
    Answer. In November 2010, the Department established a Force 
Posture Working Group with our ally, Australia to develop options to 
align our countries' force postures in complementary ways to benefit 
the national security of both nations. During the September 2011 
Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations, Secretaries Clinton 
and Panetta discussed with their counterparts several of the Working 
Group's recommendations. When the President visited Australia this past 
November, he and Australian Prime Minister Gillard announced two new 
force posture initiatives--one to phase in a rotational deployment of 
up to 2,500 marines near Darwin, and another to expand U.S. access to 
Northern Australian airfields.
    As I understand it, the initiatives will enhance our engagement 
with Australia and with regional partners. They will also enable the 
military forces of both our Nations to better--and possibly 
cooperatively--respond to contingencies, including humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief.
    These initiatives--developed in cooperation with a key ally--
demonstrate the strength of the U.S.-Australia Alliance and its ability 
to enhance regional stability and security. If confirmed, I will 
continue the close defense cooperation with Australia.
    Question. In your view, are the levels of funding, manning and 
military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region appropriate 
to the management of current and future risk to U.S. strategic 
interests in the region?
    Answer. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance places an 
emphasis on the importance of the Asia-Pacific. If confirmed, I will 
review levels of funding, manning, and military-to-military engagement 
in the Asia-Pacific region and--if there are shortfalls in existing 
resources--I will advocate for additional resources required to support 
the President's priorities.
                           engagement policy
    Question. One of the central pillars of our national security 
strategy has been military engagement as a means of building 
relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, joint 
combined exchange training exercises, combatant commander exercises, 
humanitarian assistance operations, and similar activities are used to 
achieve this goal.
    If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of 
the U.S. military? If yes, would you advocate for expanding U.S. 
military-to-military engagement? If not, why not?
    Answer. A regular program of military engagement is essential to 
sustaining existing relationships and nurturing emerging ones. I would 
support a sustainable pace of operations that whenever possible 
includes innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to 
achieve national security objectives. Military-to-military contacts at 
both senior and junior levels, bilateral and multilateral exercises, 
humanitarian assistance operations and similar activities are important 
elements of this engagement. With the current budget environment, 
careful choices will need to be made that focus resources where they 
provide the most value and return. Whenever possible, we will develop 
innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve Pacific 
theater security objectives.
    Question. In your opinion, how do these activities contribute to 
U.S. national security?
    Answer. Military engagement activities strengthen the network of 
alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific reinforcing deterrence, 
helping to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and 
partner forces which in turn advances common interests, addresses 
shared threats, and facilitates freedom of movement and access to the 
region. Military engagement builds partnership capacity which remains 
important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global 
leadership and postures the United States as the security partner of 
choice.
                       building partner capacity
    Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number 
of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner 
nations, including the global train and equip authority (``section 
1206'') and Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF).
    What is your understanding of the purpose of the section 1206 
global train and equip authority and GSCF?
    Answer.
1206
    Congress approved section 1206 global train and equip authority in 
2006 in part to give the State Department and DOD a more flexible 
capacity building authority to address urgent and emergent threats 
before the threats destabilize theater partners or threaten the 
Homeland. Later in 2009, the scope expanded to assist coalition 
partners as they prepare for deployment. I understand this rapid 
funding tool currently is PACOM's most agile mechanism to address 
counterterrorism capability gaps in partner nations.
Global Security Contingency Fund
    The GSCF is a new initiative to pool the resources of State and 
DOD, as well as the expertise of other departments, to provide security 
sector assistance for emergent challenges and opportunities.
    The GSCF has no appropriated funding, rather State and DOD can 
transfer funds from other fiscal year 2012 appropriations into the 
GSCF. DOD can transfer up to $200 million from defense-wide Operations 
and Maintenance and State can transfer up to a combined $50 million 
from Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Narcotics Control 
and Law Enforcement, and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability 
Fund. Once transferred, funds remain available until September 20, 
2015.
    The GSCF can provide assistance: (1) to national military and 
security forces, as well as the Government agencies responsible for 
overseeing these forces; and (2) for the justice sector when civilian 
agencies are challenged (including law enforcement and prisons), rule 
of law programs, and stabilization efforts in a country.
    As I understand it, the GSCF will be run by a small staff composed 
of both State and DOD employees, as well as employees from other 
departments and agencies in some cases. Exact reporting structures and 
procedures for implementation are being developed to address the 
specifics of the legislation granted by Congress.
    Question. In your view, what are our strategic objectives in 
building the capacities of partner nations in the Asia and Pacific 
region?
    Answer. The United States' primary objective in building the 
capacity of foreign partners should continue to be to help them develop 
effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for 
their countries' internal security, and contribute to regional and 
multilateral responses to shared threats and instability. Maintaining 
and strengthening our alliances and partnerships are critical to the 
stability in the region. Capacity building provides opportunities to 
build defense relationships and promotes both interoperability between 
our forces and access to the region during peacetime and contingency 
operations. Lastly, building this capacity in our allies and partners 
lessens the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats 
outside the United States.
                                 china
    Question. China's defense spending has had double-digit increases 
annually for about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of 
military expansion is to be expected for a country experiencing the 
kind of economic growth that China has over about that same period, the 
types of platforms and capabilities China is developing have been 
interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of 
movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at 
increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric 
and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China's 
intentions in the region. The Defense Strategic Guidance, announced on 
January 5, refers to China as one of the countries that ``will continue 
to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection 
capabilities''.
    How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with 
China?
    Answer. In January 2010, President Obama and Chinese President Hu 
Jintao affirmed the need for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 
U.S.-China relationship. I would describe the relationship as 
simultaneously possessing elements of cooperation and competition. The 
United States, including DOD, continues to pursue opportunities to 
cooperate where there is a mutual benefit, while having frank 
discussions of areas where we may have differences.
    Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady 
increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization 
program?
    Answer. China appears to be building the capability to fight and 
win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. Its 
near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies 
involving Taiwan, and to deter or deny effective intervention in a 
cross-strait conflict. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access 
and area denial capabilities. China is also devoting increasing 
attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and 
China's immediate periphery. Beijing's growing focus on military 
missions other than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat 
evacuation operations, and counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is 
strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike 
capabilities through the modernization of its nuclear forces, and is 
improving other strategic capabilities, such as in space, counterspace, 
and computer network operations.
    Question. How should the United States respond to this Chinese 
military growth and modernization?
    Answer. I believe the United States should continue to monitor 
developments in China's military concepts and capabilities while 
encouraging Beijing to be more transparent about its military and 
security affairs. The United States has been and should remain the 
pivotal military power in the Asia-Pacific region in order to preserve 
the conditions that have fostered peace and prosperity. The United 
States' response to China's military modernization should be flexible 
and supported by the continued transformation of our force posture in 
the Asia-Pacific region, the maintenance of our global presence and 
access, the modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as 
countering anti-access and area denial, and the strengthening of our 
alliances and partnerships.
    Question. What do you believe are the Chinese political-military 
goals in the Asia-Pacific region? Globally?
    Answer. The overriding objectives of China's leaders appear to be 
to ensure the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party, continue 
China's economic development, maintain the country's domestic political 
stability, defend China's national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and secure China's influence and status. Within this 
context, preventing any moves by Taipei toward de jure independence is 
a key part of Beijing's strategy. Within each dimension there lies a 
mix of important challenges and opportunities for the United States 
that will continue to deserve priority attention.
    Question. What effect is China's military growth having on other 
countries in the region?
    Answer. In terms of regional security, China's economic growth has 
increased China's international profile and influence, and has enabled 
China's leaders to embark upon and sustain a comprehensive 
transformation of its military forces. The pace and scale of China's 
military modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency, raise 
many questions, both within the United States and in the region as a 
whole, about China's future.
    Other countries in the region are closely watching the growth of 
China's military, and how its military acts. China's military is 
working through the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense 
Ministers Plus structure to enhance regional cooperation on 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the same time, there 
have been worrisome incidents in disputed waters in China's neighboring 
seas that have caused concern in nations such as the Philippines and 
Vietnam. Security concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have 
contributed to a greater focus on regional forums, such as ASEAN, where 
issues may be addressed multilaterally; such security concerns have 
also led to stronger and more welcoming relations with the United 
States as a security partner of choice.
    Question. How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship 
between China and Taiwan, and how can we help prevent miscalculation on 
either side?
    Answer. Both China and Taiwan have made significant strides to 
reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait. These initiatives should be 
encouraged and we welcome progress made by both sides. I believe the 
United States can help contribute to cross-strait stability by 
continuing to abide by our longstanding policies, based on the one-
China policy, three joint U.S.-China Communiques, and the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA), including making available to Taiwan ``defense 
articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable 
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability''. We are 
committed to our one-China policy and would oppose unilateral changes, 
by either side, to the status quo.
    Question. How do China's efforts to establish a strategic presence 
in the Indian Ocean by securing and maintaining access to seaports in 
various South and Southeast Asian countries affect its political-
military posture and influence in the region?
    Answer. China looks to South and Southeast Asia as an area of 
strategic importance, which includes political objectives, access to 
resources, trade, and investment. With regard to South and Southeast 
Asian seaports, the important question is how China intends to use its 
presence. As China increases deployments to the region, including 
ongoing participation in counterpiracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, 
China will require greater forward logistical capabilities to sustain 
operations in that region. Yet in order to establish access to various 
seaports, China will encounter the same political issues the United 
States faces in maintaining our overseas access. This will require 
improving ties with states along the Indian Ocean littoral, closer 
cooperation with other regional navies, and will expose them to more 
nontraditional security challenges such as terrorism and piracy. The 
United States retains strong relationships in South and Southeast Asia 
and should continue to monitor China's growing presence in the region.
    Question. What is the role of DOD in helping to ensure that China's 
nuclear power industry does not contribute to the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in the region?
    Answer. The Obama administration has reiterated that preventing the 
proliferation of WMD and delivery systems, along with related 
technologies and materials, is a key goal for the United States. I 
believe that DOD should work in the interagency process to ensure that 
any proliferation concerns relating to China are expressed to the 
Chinese Government in appropriate forums.
    Question. Our military-to-military relations with the Chinese 
military have been modest, at best, and can be accurately described as 
``on again, off again.'' One thing that has hobbled U.S.-China military 
relations in recent years has been China's propensity for canceling or 
postponing military-to-military engagements in response to U.S. arm 
sales to Taiwan.
    What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China 
military-to-military relations?
    Answer. As President Obama stated in January 2011, the United 
States seeks a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship 
with China. We continue to pursue opportunities to cooperate where 
there is mutual benefit while discussing areas where we may have 
differences in a frank and candid manner. Such dialogue can be 
especially important during periods of friction and turbulence.
    I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China 
as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security 
of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive 
role in the region, and to press China to partner with the United 
States and our Asian allies and partners in addressing common security 
challenges.
    Question. Do you believe that the United States should make any 
changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with 
China? If so, what changes and why?
    Answer. I believe that military exchanges with China can be 
valuable, but can only truly work if China is equally committed to open 
and regular exchanges. If confirmed, I would look for ways to deepen 
and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to 
encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.
    Question. What is your view regarding the longstanding U.S. policy 
of selling defense articles and services to Taiwan despite objections 
and criticism from China?
    Answer. U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979 
TRA, which provides that the United States will make available to 
Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantities as may be 
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense 
capability. The Act also states that the President and Congress shall 
determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services 
based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. That policy 
has contributed to peace and stability in the region for more than 30 
years and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
    Question. In your view, to what extent, if at all, should China's 
possible reaction to such sales be considered by the United States when 
making decisions about the provision of defense articles and services 
to Taiwan?
    Answer. Our decisions about arms sales to Taiwan are based solely 
on our assessment of Taiwan's defense needs. The TRA states the United 
States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense 
services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
    Question. By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its 
claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air and 
space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, but one in 
particular is China's increased aggressiveness in asserting its 
excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea. In one such incident, 
Chinese-flagged ships harassed the USNS Impeccable, a U.S. military 
ship conducting ocean surveillance in the international waters of the 
South China Sea. That incident underscored the nature of Chinese 
maritime claims and the Chinese sensitivity associated with U.S. Navy 
operations in these areas.
    What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime 
disputes in the South China Sea?
    Answer. As the President stated clearly during his trip to Asia 
last November and as Secretary Panetta affirmed when he met with 
representatives from the ASEAN Defense Ministers meeting in October of 
last year, the United States is a Pacific nation with a national 
interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime 
domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open commerce, 
and respect for international law, including in the South China Sea.
    The United States does not take a position on the competing 
territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea, and I 
believe all parties should resolve their disputes through peaceful 
means and in accordance with customary international law, without 
resorting to the threat or use of force.
    At the same time, the United States should continue to call upon 
all parties to clarify their claims in the South China Sea in terms 
consistent with international law. Consistent with international law, 
claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived 
solely from legitimate claims to land features.
    Question. How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China 
Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an 
increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or 
destabilize the situation?
    Answer. The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence 
that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the 
South China Sea. I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to 
maintain its presence and assert its freedom of navigation and over 
flight rights in the South China Sea in accordance with customary 
international law.
    Preservation of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea depend 
largely upon their continual exercise. Around the world, U.S. military 
forces conduct operations to prevent excessive maritime claims asserted 
by coastal states from limiting our national interest in freedom of 
navigation. In the South China Sea, we have expressed our freedom of 
navigation interest for many decades, through diplomatic protests and 
operational assertions against excessive maritime claims asserted by 
several nations. Of note, we challenge excessive maritime claims 
asserted by any nation, including claims by allies and partners. Our 
military presence in the South China Sea includes Freedom of Navigation 
Operations, Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations, Special Mission Ship 
operations, and other routine military transits, operations, and 
exercises. The United States should sustain our military presence in 
international waters and uphold its commitments to its allies and 
partners in order to maintain peace and stability in the region.
    Question. What should the United States do to help prevent 
dangerous encounters in the South China Sea?
    Answer. To reduce the risk of conflict in the South China Sea, I 
believe the United States should continue to support initiatives and 
confidence building measures that will help claimant States reach 
agreement on a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. 
Additionally, the United States should continue serving as a positive 
example of a nation that adheres to the international norms of safe 
conduct, through policy implementation, effective training, and proper 
accountability. The United States also continues to robustly exercise 
the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement with China as a positive 
bilateral mechanism to address operational safety issues in the 
maritime domain.
    These include the international ``rules of the road'', such as the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and other 
established international safety and communication procedures, such as 
the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea. The United States should also 
encourage all South China Sea claimants to abide by these norms of safe 
conduct to ensure greater operational safety and reduce the risk of 
dangerous incidents at sea.
    Question. Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and 
military applications and also represents a potentially substantial 
vulnerability. There are reports that China is aggressively pursuing 
cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take advantage of 
U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential conflict 
situation.
    What is your understanding of China's efforts to develop and deploy 
cyber warfare capabilities?
    Answer. As with the United States and many other countries around 
the world, China fully understands the critical importance of cyber as 
an element of modern warfare. Chinese military writing clearly shows 
that China views itself at a disadvantage in any potential conflict 
with a modern high-tech military, such as that of the United States. To 
overcome this disadvantage, China is developing organizations and 
capabilities that are designed to reduce the perceived technological 
gap. This is done by increasing China's own military technological 
capability, and by building capability to target U.S. military space-
based assets and computer networks using network and electronic 
warfare. The development of these wartime capabilities are the 
motivation for China's efforts at peacetime penetration of U.S. 
Government and industry computer systems. The theft of U.S. information 
and intellectual property is attractive as a low-cost research and 
development tool for China's defense industry, and provides insight 
into potential U.S. vulnerabilities. Overall, China's development in 
the cyber realm, combined with its other anti-access/area denial 
capabilities, imposes significant potential risk on U.S. military 
activities.
    Question. If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our 
military is protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a 
cyber attack?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would be sure to work with other parts of 
DOD and interagency partners to include the Departments of State, 
Homeland Security, and Commerce, to facilitate a coordinated approach 
to cyber threats, not only from China, but from any potential 
adversary. While an increased cyber defensive posture is important, it 
is not enough for us to build thicker walls and continue to absorb 
daily cyber attacks. Defense in itself will not deter our Nation's 
adversaries. We must work together as a government to not only defend, 
but also to impose costs on our adversaries to deter future 
exploitation and attack. These costs we impose cannot simply be 
symmetrical cyber activities; a cyber versus cyber fight is not 
sustainable in the long-term. As the President stated in his 
International Strategy for Cyberspace, we Reserve the right to use all 
necessary means--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic--as 
appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, in order 
to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests 
against hostile acts on cyberspace. In so doing, we will exhaust all 
options before military force whenever we can.
    Question. In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit 
and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test 
creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the 
international community. Since then, China has continued its active 
pursuit of missile and satellite technology.
    What is your view of China's purposes for its pursuit of these 
capabilities?
    Answer. In my view, this test was just one element of China's 
military modernization effort to develop and field disruptive military 
technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as 
for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare. The United States' goal is to 
promote the responsible use of space.
    Question. What do you see as the long-term implications of such 
developments for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for 
U.S. interests in space?
    Answer. Space systems are vital to our national security and our 
economy. In this regard, the United States should seek ways to protect 
our interests in space. U.S. space policies and programs should be 
informed by China's space and counter space capabilities, which have 
contributed to today's challenging space environment. I believe we need 
to enhance our deterrence and ability to operate in a degraded 
environment. At the same time, the United States should seek to engage 
China, a major space-faring nation, to promote the responsible use of 
space. However, our concern should not be focused on only one country, 
but on the range of actors that add to the increasingly congested, 
contested, and competitive environment in space.
    Question. What are your views regarding the potential weaponization 
of space and the international agreements to prevent space 
weaponization?
    Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National 
Space Policy, including that all nations have a right to explore and 
use space for peaceful purposes, and that all nations should act 
responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and 
mistrust.
    Space is vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies and 
partners. I support our longstanding national policies of affirming the 
right of all nations to use outer space for peaceful purposes, the 
right of free passage through space, and the right to protect our 
forces and our Nation from those that would use space for hostile 
purposes.
                                 taiwan
    Question. Much of the recent discourse regarding Taiwan has 
involved the readiness and capacity of Taiwan's defensive military 
capabilities and the U.S. commitment to do what is ``necessary to 
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability'' as 
required by the TRA. In particular, much of the debate about how best 
to enhance Taiwan's current defensive capabilities has revolved around 
fighter aircraft and what air defense capabilities are most prudent and 
appropriate under the circumstances.
    What is your view of U.S.-Taiwan security relations?
    Answer. Our relations are guided by the TRA stipulation that we 
will make available to Taiwan defensive articles and services as 
necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. 
To that end we maintain military-to-military engagement with Taiwan.
    Question. What do you believe should be the priorities for U.S. 
military assistance to Taiwan?
    Answer. We closely monitor the shifting balance in the Taiwan 
Strait and Taiwan's defense needs. Given the rapid pace of PRC military 
modernization, I believe our priorities should include assisting Taiwan 
with its joint operations capabilities and training, streamlining, and 
integrating its existing defense programs to be more effective, and 
seeking innovative solutions to complement its traditional military 
capabilities.
    Question. What is your opinion of the TRA? Enacted 33 years ago 
this year, do you see any need to modify the TRA to reflect the current 
state of affairs in the region? If so, how?
    Answer. The TRA, which guides our unofficial relations with Taiwan, 
has been in force now for over 30 years and plays a valuable and 
important role in our approach to the Asia-Pacific region. As called 
for in the TRA, our longstanding policy to assist Taiwan with 
maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability helps ensure security 
and stability in the region. I would not recommend any changes to the 
law.
    Question. Given the increasing military imbalance across the Taiwan 
Strait, do you think Taiwan is making appropriate investments in its 
defensive capabilities? If not, what is the best way to encourage 
Taiwan to invest more in its military?
    Answer. Taiwan must ensure that it adequately resources its defense 
programs and defense transformation, to include looking at increasing 
its defense budget. I believe the best way to encourage Taiwan to 
invest more in its military is to send strong and consistent messages 
from the U.S. Government to Taiwan.
    Question. What military capabilities do you believe would be most 
effective in improving Taiwan's self-defense capability over the next 5 
to 10 years?
    Answer. Capabilities that deter the PRC or increase the Taiwan 
military's survivability are critical. No less important, non-materiel 
solutions such as improved jointness, training, integration and 
innovative solutions will improve Taiwan's defense capability. Finally, 
one of the most cost effective solutions Taiwan can adapt from the U.S. 
military is to continue developing their NCOs and junior officers--an 
invaluable element of our past and future success.
    Question. Do you think the United States should sell new F-16 C/D 
aircraft to Taiwan?
    Answer. The recently announced F-16 A/B upgrades are similar in 
capability to new F-16 C/Ds and are an important and much needed 
contribution to the capabilities of Taiwan's Air Force. As Taiwan 
recapitalizes its air force, it must ensure its future air force is 
made more effective by being integrated into a joint construct, by 
ensuring that its air defense capability is survivable, and by seeking 
other innovative solutions to complement its traditional military 
capability.
    If confirmed, this is an issue I will continue to evaluate in 
coordination with the rest of DOD.
                              north korea
    Question. Despite the death of long-time leader Kim Jong-Il, North 
Korea remains one of the greatest near term challenges to security and 
stability in Asia and deterring conflict on the Korean Peninsula 
remains a top priority. In fact, with the uncertainties associated with 
the ongoing leadership transition, upcoming challenges on the Peninsula 
may be even greater.
    With the unexpected change in leadership in North Korea, what is 
your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean 
peninsula?
    Answer. Following the death of Kim Jong Il, North Korea so far 
appears to be managing the leadership transition from father to son. On 
the surface, North Korea appears stable, and Kim Jong Un and his 
leadership is primarily focused on domestic matters. However, enduring 
U.S. and allied concerns--North Korea's past provocative behavior, 
large conventional military, proliferation activities, and pursuit of 
asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and WMD programs 
(including uranium enrichment)--present a serious threat to the United 
States, our allies and partners in the region, and the international 
community. The change in leadership in North Korea adds to our concerns 
as new variables have been added to North Korea's decision-making 
process.
    Question. What is your understanding of the threats posed to the 
United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD 
capabilities?
    Answer. North Korea's potential use of WMD presents a serious 
threat. We must ensure our forces are prepared to respond and that 
North Korea is deterred from using WMD. North Korea has an ambitious 
ballistic missile program that poses a significant threat to the 
Pacific region. As witnessed in 2006 and 2009, North Korea continues to 
flight-test theater ballistic missiles--demonstrating the capability to 
target South Korea and Japan. North Korea also continues to develop the 
Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2), which Pyongyang claims to have tested in a space 
launch configuration but could also reach the United States if 
developed as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Furthermore, 
North Korea continues to develop newer systems--including a solid 
propellant short-range ballistic missile and intermediate-range 
ballistic missile.
    Question. What is your estimate of North Korea's threat of nuclear 
proliferation?
    Answer. North Korea's continued proliferation efforts pose a 
significant threat to the Pacific region and beyond. It is a proven 
proliferator of ballistic missiles and associated technologies to 
countries like Iran--creating a serious and growing capability to 
target U.S. forces and our allies in the Middle East and assisted Syria 
in building a covert reactor in the early 2000s, which would have been 
capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. As such, we 
continue to work with our allies and partners to build a regional 
capability to combat WMD.
    Question. What concerns you most about North Korea and, if 
confirmed, what would you do to address those concerns?
    Answer. North Korea maintains a large, offensively postured 
conventional military, continues to develop long-range ballistic 
missiles, seeks to develop nuclear weapons, and engages in the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles against international norms and 
law. North Korea has also conducted provocative attacks against the 
Republic of Korea. Most concerning about this range of threats is that 
they come from a single state standing on the outside of the 
international community. If confirmed as Commander, PACOM, I will drive 
intelligence to refine forecasts and warnings, sustain and advance our 
military readiness and coordination with allies and partners, and 
whether in lead or support, will both seek and welcome opportunities to 
apply all means of national power to affect North Korean behavior.
    Question. The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 
established a policy and program priority for defending against near-
term regional ballistic missile threats, and elaborated on the Phased 
Adaptive Approach (PAA) to regional missile defense, including to 
defend against North Korean ballistic missile threats.
    Do you support the missile defense policies and priorities 
established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, including the 
Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region 
to defend against North Korean regional ballistic missile threats?
    Answer. Yes, the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review provides the 
PACOM region with an integrated effort to strengthen regional 
deterrence architectures against North Korea. It aligns our defensive 
strategy, policies and capabilities to the strategic environment. The 
implementation of a PAA will strengthen defenses against North Korean 
missile threats to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners. 
PAA will enable regional allies to do more to defend themselves against 
a growing North Korean ballistic missile threat. It must be built on 
the foundation of strong cooperative relationships with allies and 
appropriate burden sharing. Finally, it reinforces the defense of the 
Homeland.
                           republic of korea
    Question. What is your understanding of the current status of the 
U.S.-South Korean security relationship?
    Answer. In my view, the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance remains one 
of the cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and is 
as strong and viable today as it has ever been. This was most recently 
reaffirmed by the Secretary during participation in the Security 
Consultative Meeting in Seoul on October 28, 2011. Our security 
relationship is based on mutual commitment to common interests, shared 
values, continuous dialogue, and combined planning, ensuring a 
comprehensive strategic alliance.
    Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to 
improve this security relationship?
    Answer. As I understand it, DOD and the Republic of Korea continue 
to work closely to realign U.S. forces on the Peninsula and to prepare 
for the transition of wartime operational control to the Republic of 
Korea by December 2015. If confirmed, I would support this continued 
realignment and the return of facilities that our forces no longer 
require. The United States is also working toward developing new 
command and control relationships with Korea, which will ensure that 
contingency plans remain appropriate to changing circumstances. 
Additionally, I believe it is important to ensure the U.S. and Korean 
publics continue to understand the enduring mutual benefits derived 
from this alliance, and that the United States effectively works with 
the Republic of Korea as it plays an increasing role in regional and 
global security issues commensurate with the Republic of Korea's 
economic status and influence. If confirmed, I would work hard to 
maintain close contact with Republic of Korea military leadership and 
to build upon the solid foundation developed to date to improve and 
transform this important security relationship.
    Question. What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of 
wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now 
planned for December 2015, and what will you do to ensure this 
transition takes place as planned?
    Answer. I understand that the United States and the Republic of 
Korea have a comprehensive way forward to transition wartime 
operational control by December 2015. If confirmed, I will work with 
Republic of Korea military leadership to complete this process under 
the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework, ensuring the transition is 
implemented methodically that the combined defense posture remains 
strong and seamless.
    Question. Do you support increasing the tour lengths of U.S. 
personnel assigned to the Republic of Korea to 2- or 3-year tours of 
duty and increasing the number of military and civilian personnel 
authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for these longer 
assignments? If so, how would you purport to implement such an increase 
in accompanied tours?
    Answer. I understand tour normalization in Korea was designed to 
further our commitment to support our forward-stationed forces and 
family members. It was to be implemented on an ``as affordable'' basis 
and not according to any specific timeline. However, as Secretary 
Panetta has said, DOD is closely evaluating all spending. If confirmed, 
I will continue to thoroughly assess the cost of implementation and our 
proposed force posture to determine the best way forward.
    Question. Are the costs associated with this policy change 
affordable in the current fiscal environment?
    Answer. In the January 2012 Priorities for 21st Century Defense, 
the President announced a necessary rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific 
region. He also emphasized the importance of our existing alliances as 
providing a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security. If confirmed, I 
will continue to assess the costs associated with this policy change 
and how they fit into our current fiscal environment.
    Question. Do you believe that the security relationship with South 
Korea should remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or 
should U.S. forces stationed in Korea be available for regional or 
global deployments?
    Answer. In accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the 
United States and the Republic of Korea, U.S. presence on the Korean 
Peninsula serves to deter potential aggressors from taking hostile 
actions that would threaten the peace and security of the Republic of 
Korea. In my view, this presence has both deterred further war on the 
Korean Peninsula and contributed to the stability of the Northeast Asia 
region. The U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance is transforming to ensure a 
capable and relevant forward presence for the future security 
environment. For U.S. forces in Korea, it is my understanding that the 
Strategic Alliance 2015 annex on Force Management agreed at the 42nd 
Security Consultative Meeting in 2010 provides us flexibility for 
regional and global deployments, while assuring we will continue to 
meet our commitments to the safety and security of Korea. As Republic 
of Korea military forces have served and will continue to serve with 
the U.S. military in places off the Peninsula (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and in the Gulf of Aden), I believe the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance 
will continue to serve an important role regionally and globally.
    Question. What is your assessment of the security benefits of the 
force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the 
Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change 
the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?
    Answer. The two plans work to consolidate and relocate U.S. forces 
from north of Seoul and from the Seoul Metropolitan area to locations 
south of Seoul, primarily U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys and Daegu. The 
movement of units and facilities to areas south of the Han River 
improves force protection and survivability, placing the majority of 
personnel and equipment outside of the tactical effective range of 
North Korean artillery. In addition, the move to a central location 
outside of Seoul provides efficiencies, reduces costs, contributes to 
the political sustainability of our forward presence, and improves 
military readiness on the Korean Peninsula.
    Question. Is the relocation plan affordable?
    Answer. The majority of costs associated with the Yongsan 
Relocation Plan will be paid by the Republic of Korea. Costs associated 
with the Land Partnership Plan will be shared between the Republic of 
Korea and U.S. and is affordable.
    Question. Since the North Korean attacks last year--the sinking of 
the South Korea Navy ship Cheonan and the artillery attack on the South 
Korean island--South Korea has been adamant that it will responded 
``firmly'' to the next such provocation. A main topic during recent 
U.S.-Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meetings was reportedly 
the Joint Operational Plan for responding to future North Korean 
provocations.
    What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of 
an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances 
do you believe the U.S. Armed Forces should be committed to engage 
North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?
    Answer. My understanding is that, under the Mutual Defense Treaty, 
when the political independence or security of South Korea or the 
United States are threatened by external armed attack, the United 
States and South Korea will consult together and develop appropriate 
means to deter the attack. Given the pattern and future likelihood of 
North Korean provocations, the two sides should continue to consult 
closely so that responses are effective.
                                 japan
    Question. How would you characterize the current U.S.-Japan 
security relationship?
    Answer. The U.S.-Japan relationship is the cornerstone of security 
in East Asia. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and 
prosperity in the region. Our alliance has held fast through the 
turbulence of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and at 
times contentious trade disputes, and now stands poised as a truly 
global alliance. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a 
complicated realignment process that is part of a larger Alliance 
Transformation agenda that also includes a review of roles, missions, 
and capabilities to strengthen and ensure the relevance, capability, 
and cohesiveness of the alliance for the next several decades. In terms 
of our military-to-military relationship, the shared experience of U.S. 
and Japanese forces, working should-to-shoulder in response to the 
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis of last spring validated our 
continuing close cooperation and mutual respect.
    Question. How does Japan's relationship with its regional 
neighbors, mainly China, North Korea, and South Korea influence the 
U.S.-Japan relationship?
    Answer. I believe it is important for Japan to continue to maintain 
and further develop constructive relations with all of its neighbors. 
Japan and other East Asian nations can and should increase their 
security cooperation. Working with other U.S. allies and partners in 
the region, Japan can increase its contribution to peace, security, and 
prosperity throughout Asia and globally. Japan is a valued and 
essential partner in the Six-Party Talks process and in other important 
regional security architectures. Progress made to bolster trilateral 
security dialogues in Northeast Asia effectively links Japan, U.S., and 
South Korean approaches.
    Question. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to 
become a more active partner in security activities with the United 
States and in the international security arena?
    Answer. Japan is already a strong security partner with the United 
States, and is increasingly contributing to international security 
activities; however, the changing security environment in Asia will 
present new challenges. The United States needs to continue to work 
with Japan to deal with these challenges, including greater 
interoperability between our Armed Forces at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels. If confirmed, I would encourage 
Japan's development of joint doctrine and organizations that will 
enhance Japan's ability to undertake complex missions to build security 
in East Asia. I would also encourage trilateral security cooperation 
with the Republic of Korea and with Australia, as these kinds of 
activities effectively strengthen the functional capacity of the 
emerging regional security architecture. Regarding international 
security activity, Japan has actively participated in combined 
counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, is participating in the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and has been a significant donor 
to ongoing Afghanistan reconstruction. I believe participation in such 
international security operations are very positive developments, and 
would encourage future Japanese participation in such missions.
    Question. What is your view of the United States-Japanese joint 
development of the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense 
interceptor, and of the overall program of cooperation between the 
United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense?
    Answer. Ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan is a 
success story for the alliance and has resulted in Japan's fielding of 
both sea and land-based missile defense systems. Japan is one of our 
most important ballistic missile defense partners and U.S.-Japan 
bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defense plays an important 
role in supporting our common strategic objectives on defense. The SM3 
Block IIA is an important cooperative program that will result in a 
significant increase in ballistic missile defense capability.
    Question. Currently, the 2006 Roadmap Agreement between the United 
States and Japan links the closure of the Futenma Marine Corps Air 
Station on Okinawa and the movement of U.S. marines from Okinawa to 
Guam to the plan to build a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp 
Schwab on Okinawa. The plan to build the FRF has run into difficulties 
and, as a result, the closure of Futenma and the movement of marines 
remain uncertain.
    What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful 
construction of the FRF at Camp Schwab on Okinawa?
    Answer. I believe that the Government of Japan (GOJ), like the U.S. 
Government, remains committed to the principles of the 2006 Realignment 
Roadmap, and although both governments have acknowledged that the FRF 
will not be constructed by 2014, as originally planned, there appears 
to be incremental but positive movement towards the construction of a 
replacement facility at Camp Schwab. The GOJ submission of the 
environmental impact statement to the prefectural Government of Okinawa 
in December 2011 was a necessary and politically significant step 
forward. The U.S. Government is committed to working with the GOJ in 
taking the next step prior to the start of construction, securing the 
Governor's approval for the landfill permit.
    Question. Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States 
and Japan to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam 
and to cover the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. 
forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why not?
    Answer. I believe the cost-sharing arrangements with the GOJ to be 
among the best we have. Under the terms of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap 
and the 2009 Guam International Agreement, Japan committed to providing 
up to $6.09 billion (in fiscal year 2008 dollars) for the relocation of 
marines to Guam. For the GOJ this was an unprecedented step, funding 
the construction of facilities for the use of U.S. Forces on U.S. 
sovereign territory. To date, the GOJ has provided $834 million towards 
fulfillment of that commitment. For relocations within Japan, the GOJ 
is paying the lion's share of the costs to develop new facilities. In 
April 2011, we entered into a new, 5-year host nation support agreement 
with Japan that maintained the overall level of support we receive from 
Japan for labor and utilities, while for the first time putting a floor 
on the amount the GOJ provides for facilities construction.
    Question. How, in your view, does building a new airfield on 
Okinawa, one that is opposed by a large segment of the population on 
Okinawa and could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a cost of at least 
$3.6 billion, serve to improve the U.S.-Japan relations in general and 
the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in particular?
    Answer. The Government of Japan and the United States agreed to 
construct a FRF at Camp Schwab, in conjunction with reducing the number 
of U.S. Forces on Okinawa and consolidating U.S. basing on the island. 
FRF will enable the closing of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, which 
is located in a very densely populated portion of Okinawa. At the same 
time, the plan preserves U.S. Forces' ability to meet our security 
commitments to Japan, in accordance with the Mutual Security Treaty. 
Thus, when fully executed, this new force posture will improve U.S.-
Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in 
particular.
                                 india
    Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India 
security relations?
    Answer. A close, continuing, and expanding security relationship 
with India will be important for security and stability in Asia and for 
effectively managing Indian Ocean security in the 21st century. The 
United States and India have a range of common security interests that 
include maritime security, counterterrorism, and humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief. Over the past decade, there has been a 
rapid transformation in the U.S.-India defense relationship. What was 
once a nascent relationship between unfamiliar nations has evolved into 
a strategic partnership between two of the preeminent security powers 
in Asia. Today, U.S.-India defense ties are strong and growing, 
including a robust slate of dialogues, military exercises, defense 
trade, personnel exchanges, and armaments cooperation. Efforts over the 
past 10 years have focused on relationship-building and establishing 
the foundation for a long-term partnership. The strong ties between our 
two militaries reflect this. The United States remains committed to a 
broad defense trade relationship that enables transfers of some of our 
most advanced technologies to assist India's military with its 
modernization efforts. Having said this, India has a long history of 
non alignment and is firmly committed to its policy of strategic 
autonomy. The continued growth of our partnership should be focused on 
working closely on common interests in a true partnership, rather than 
attempting to build a U.S.-India bilateral alliance in the traditional 
sense.
    Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you 
establish for this relationship?
    Answer. India is essential to achieving long-term U.S. goals for 
regional economic development, security and stability, and wide-ranging 
cooperation to counter extremism and radicalization. If confirmed, I 
believe our priorities for this relationship should focus on increasing 
maritime security cooperation, expanding the military-to-military 
relationship, and deepening cooperation on defense trade and 
production. I believe there is potential for cooperating on 
counterproliferation, collaborating on humanitarian assistance and 
disaster response, countering piracy, cooperating on counterterrorism, 
greater intelligence sharing on common threats, and working towards 
stability in Afghanistan and the broader Indian Ocean region.
    Question. What, in your view, is the effect on DOD interests, if 
any, of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India?
    Answer. The civil-nuclear cooperation agreement was a landmark 
agreement that significantly transformed the U.S.-India bilateral 
relationship. The agreement deepened the level of trust between the 
United States and India and will have positive effects on DOD interests 
leading to greater military-to-military cooperation and increased 
defense trade. Successful implementation of this agreement will serve 
to deepen U.S.-India ties.
    Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between India 
and China and how does that relationship impact the security and 
stability of the region?
    Answer. The current relationship between the region's two fastest 
growing powers, India and China, is complicated by a trust deficit 
stemming from China's longstanding relationship with Pakistan, India's 
defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, and increasing competition for 
resources. The ongoing border dispute, trade imbalances and competition 
for influence across South and Southeast Asia complicate efforts to 
reduce the mistrust. Regional states exploit the competitive Sino-
Indian relationship, seeking favorable aid packages from New Delhi and 
Beijing to enable their own development. New Delhi and Beijing do find 
common ground and cooperate in international forums such as BRICS, the 
G20, and in Climate Change Conferences where both countries leverage 
their convergent interests to shape international trade rules to ensure 
their continued domestic development and economic growth.
    Question. What do you believe the United States should do to assist 
the Indian Government in the prevention of and response to terrorist 
events in India?
    Answer. As the world's largest democracy, I believe India is a 
critical strategic partner of the United States. Both India and the 
United States share a strong interest in preventing terrorism. The 
United States can continue to work with the Government of Pakistan to 
take effective action against groups based in Pakistan that advocate 
and actively participate in attacks against India. As to capacity 
building, counterterrorism efforts in India are primarily a Ministry of 
Home Affairs responsibility that employs domestic intelligence assets 
in conjunction with police and paramilitary forces. Therefore, 
counterterrorism cooperation with India is through a whole-of-
government approach led by the Departments of State (via the 
Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative) and Homeland Security (via the 
Homeland Security Dialogue), with support from the Department of 
Justice and DOD. If confirmed, I will work with the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense in support of this whole-of-government approach to 
address counterterrorism efforts with India in the areas they request 
support or seek to expand the relationship.
    Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship 
between India and Pakistan?
    Answer. India and Pakistan have a long and complex history 
characterized by animosity, mistrust, and conflict. Support by elements 
of Pakistan's military and intelligence services for violent extremist 
organizations targeting India strains the relationship; this support 
has the potential to result in military confrontation which could 
rapidly escalate to a nuclear exchange. Current efforts at dialogue 
have yielded few concrete results on the core security issues, 
especially regarding the resolution of territorial disputes; however, 
the efforts have provided each side greater insight into the other's 
positions. While progress is slow, the trajectory is positive and 
offers the promise of increased confidence-building measures.
    Question. In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between 
Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia 
generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?
    Answer. India's actions in South and Central Asia generally align 
with U.S. goals--increasing economic growth and political stability 
through strengthened democratic institutions, and developmental 
assistance to help prevent radicalization. Regional stability depends 
on cooperation among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Transparency in 
the India-Afghanistan and Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relationships 
is critical to reduce misunderstanding and mistrust between India and 
Pakistan. The ongoing transition of lead responsibility for security in 
Afghanistan to Afghan forces and the strategic partnerships Afghanistan 
has been negotiating with the United States and other international 
partners are important steps toward demonstrating long-term commitment 
of the international community, addressing conditions that create 
uncertainty, and stabilizing the region.
                      republic of the philippines
    Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippine 
military relations?
    Answer. The Philippines is one of the United States' five treaty 
allies in the Pacific and remains a committed security partner facing 
regional challenges characteristic of current geostrategic realities. 
Our alliance is strong and is the foundation of our security 
partnership. The U.S. military-to-military engagement with the 
Philippines is mature and focused, allowing the Philippines security 
forces (military, coast guard, and police) to better address security 
needs as evident by enhanced counterterrorism performance, expanded 
maritime security activities, increased multilateral engagement, and 
effective participation in UN Peacekeeping operations.
    Question. What do you believe the U.S. goals should be in the 
Republic of the Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals?
    Answer. The primary goal of the United States should be to 
strengthen the alliance with the Philippines and assist them in 
building and maintaining the capabilities of their security forces. Our 
alliances in the Pacific, such as what we have with the Philippines, 
are the bedrock of U.S. security strategy within the region as we face 
common threats. A Philippines that is capable of mitigating terrorist 
threats, providing a secure maritime environment that ensures freedom 
of navigation within its sub-region, and leading multilateral 
approaches towards regional peace and stability will enable it to 
fulfill its treaty obligations to the United States, directly benefit 
U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and contribute to regional 
security and stability.
    Question. What is your assessment of U.S. military efforts in the 
Philippines and the effectiveness of the U.S. assistance being provided 
to the Philippine military in its fight against insurgent groups?
    Answer. U.S. military efforts and assistance in the Philippines are 
in support of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to which both 
sides are committed. The United States, however, does not assist the 
Philippines in its fight against insurgent groups, e.g. the New 
People's Army and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The Philippines 
was the first country in Asia to support the United States after 
September 11 in fighting terrorism. In this regard, U.S. military 
assistance is focused on helping the Philippines fight terrorism by 
assisting with the development of skill sets that are no different than 
those needed to adequately help and protect its civilian populations. 
It is the Philippine Government's prerogative to assert its 
capabilities and resources where needed in conducting its internal 
security operations.
    Question. Do you anticipate a reduced U.S. military footprint or 
change in mission for U.S. military forces in the Philippines in the 
near- to mid-term?
    Answer. The United States and the Philippines are discussing 
arrangements that will allow greater flexibility for U.S. and 
Philippine security forces to train and work together. This may, on a 
rotational basis, increase U.S. military engagement with the 
Philippines in the near to mid-term.
    Question. What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if 
confirmed, to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in 
combat or law enforcement in the Republic of the Philippines?
    Answer. Current U.S. guidelines in place for the conduct of U.S. 
forces in the Philippines adequately address the roles and 
responsibilities of our military forces. All U.S. military personnel 
are in the Philippines under the Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces 
Agreement and operate under the auspices of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual 
Defense Board and Security Engagement Board.
    Their activities, which will always be in consultation with, and 
agreement by, the Philippine Government, are limited to conducting 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response; assisting Philippine 
security forces improve their capacity and capability including 
training and upgrading equipment; and supporting Philippine 
counterterrorism operations through activities such as intelligence 
fusion, and sustainment support. Additionally, U.S. forces are 
prohibited from engaging in combat without prejudice to their right of 
self defense.
                               indonesia
    Question. Indonesia is a key Asian power and is the largest Muslim 
country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on 
opportunities to improve and expand U.S. relations with Indonesia where 
possible. In July 2010, Secretary Gates announced that DOD intended to 
resume working with elements of the Indonesian Special Forces, known as 
Kopassus. DOD engagement with Kopassus had been suspended for more than 
a decade because of past human rights violations by some of its 
members.
    What is your view of the current state of military-to-military 
relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?
    Answer. In 2010, Presidents Obama and Yudhoyono inaugurated the 
U.S.-Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership. A key element of this broad 
partnership is the security component. Our defense relationship with 
Indonesia--a pivotal country to U.S. national interests--is managed 
through the Defense Framework Arrangement and facilitated through 
several forums and mechanisms. Our military-to-military relations with 
Indonesia are robust and continue to progress and mature, with over 140 
theater security cooperation activities scheduled for this fiscal year. 
These security cooperation engagements include a wide range of 
activities focused on four main areas of emphasis: Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief, Peace Keeping Operations, Maritime Security 
and continued professionalization/reform of the Indonesian Defense 
Forces (TNI). Beginning with the normalization of military-to-military 
relationship in 2005, engagements have increased in number and evolved 
from initial small-scale bilateral exchanges into more complex 
bilateral and multilateral activities.
    In addressing the current state of military-to-military relations 
with the Indonesian Army Special Forces (known as Kopassus), it is 
worth noting that this unit has undergone a near-complete 
transformation over the past decade and is at the forefront of TNI 
professionalization and adherence to human rights standards. Following 
a 12-year hiatus in bilateral activities, at the direction of then 
Secretary Gates, PACOM established a measured and gradual program of 
security cooperation activities with Kopassus. These security 
cooperation activities have consisted of key leader engagements and 
small-scale subject matter expert exchanges in areas such as military 
decision making, medical planning, law of war, and safeguarding human 
rights. I expect future activities of this type to continue and 
gradually expand at a pace commensurate with the demonstrated progress 
in TNI transparency and reform efforts. Chief among these reform 
efforts are the fulfillment of commitments made by Indonesian leaders 
to then Secretary Gates in 2010 to continue to safeguard human rights 
and accountability throughout the Indonesian military through the 
unequivocal investigation and prosecution of those military personnel 
accused of human rights abuses and, if convicted, their removal from 
Military Service.
    Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the 
Indonesian Government is cooperating with the United States in the war 
on terrorism?
    Answer. Based on my current understanding, the Government of 
Indonesia has cooperated closely and effectively with the United States 
and our partners in combating global terrorist networks in the region. 
The Government of Indonesia has shown tremendous success in arresting 
and convicting terrorists. Additionally, Indonesia has leveraged its 
leadership role within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) by electing to co-chair the Executive Working Group on 
Counterterrorism with the United States in the ASEAN Defense Ministers 
Meeting Plus forum. This initiative seeks to encourage greater regional 
counterterrorism cooperation, reinforce military support to civil 
authorities, build capacity and collectively address regional security 
issues in an open consultative forum.
    Question. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-
military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-
military contact within the context of the Comprehensive Partnership, 
guided by close consultation with the Departments of State and Defense, 
and within the boundaries of existing legal mechanisms. I believe close 
military-to-military relations with Indonesia are integral to achieving 
numerous stated U.S. national interests in the region. I also believe 
that one of the most effective methods for encouraging reform is 
through interaction between Indonesian and U.S. servicemembers. 
Regardless of their mission, any interactions with U.S. servicemembers 
reinforce professional military practices, to include respect for human 
rights and the rule of law. Increased interactions facilitate greater 
understanding and reinforce professional values.
    Question. What is your understanding of the factors that informed 
the decision to re-engage with Kopassus members?
    Answer. It is my understanding that the decision to begin a 
measured and gradual re-engagement with Kopassus within the limits of 
U.S. law was intended to acknowledge the significant progress made by 
the TNI over the past decade and encourage continued reform within the 
TNI. Essential to this decision to move ahead with Kopassus were the 
commitments made by the Government of Indonesia to protect human rights 
and advance TNI accountability.
    Question. What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian 
military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, 
adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and 
cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute 
those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?
    Answer. Indonesian defense reform progressed at a rapid pace after 
the resignation of President Suharto in 1998, with the separation of 
the police from the military, the elimination of formal political roles 
for the TNI, increased accountability, and the establishment of 
widespread human rights training initiatives. While reform efforts 
appear to have slowed, they have notably not reversed. According to 
several public opinion polls, the TNI enjoys the respect of the 
majority of the Indonesian populace. In fact, TNI often is the most 
respected of government institutions. This is a concrete indicator of 
progress. Continued reforms that the United States should continue to 
encourage include accountability for past human rights abuses, 
strengthening civilian control and oversight of the military, and 
continued professionalism of the TNI officer corps.
    Question. If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for 
human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would support TNI's continued progress by 
encouraging senior Indonesian leaders to fulfill their stated 
commitments with particular emphasis on accountability, transparency 
and respect for human rights. We can accomplish this through bilateral 
security discussions, joint training, military assistance, including 
military training programs. I view U.S. interaction with TNI 
counterparts as an effective, indeed essential, method to encourage 
professionalism and continued reform within the Indonesian military.
                                 burma
    Question. Recent developments in Burma suggest that the government 
may be willing to take steps toward meaningful reform.
    What is your understanding of the current security situation in 
Burma and, if confirmed, what would be your approach toward Burma?
    Answer. While there have been very encouraging signs of reform and 
positive government intentions, Burma still faces many challenges in 
its road to reform, and there are still many obstacles in the U.S.-
Burma relationship that must be overcome. The Department of State 
remains the lead agency in all U.S. engagement with Burma.
                operational access and freedom of action
    Question. Much has been made in recent years of the development of 
anti-access/area denial capabilities of certain countries, and the 
impact such capabilities might have on the United States' freedom of 
action and ability to project power.
    What is your understanding of the emerging challenges associated 
with anti-access and area denial strategies in the Asia-Pacific?
    Answer. As discussed in the Defense Strategic Guidance released in 
January, ``China will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter 
our power projection capabilities.'' This would include PRC pursuit of 
anti-access/area denial strategies. The United States maintains robust 
regional and global power projection capabilities that provide a full 
range of options to succeed in defense of national interests and of our 
allies. To this end, if confirmed, I will work closely with OSD and the 
Services in support of policy and programmatic inputs based on assessed 
operational risk, to ensure we have the ability to project power 
throughout the theater and preserve the capabilities necessary to 
maneuver within it.
    Question. The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) released on 
January 17 this year broadly describes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff's intent for how joint forces will respond to the operational 
challenges associated with potential adversaries' anti-access and area 
denial capabilities.
    What, in your view, is the JOAC's contribution to better 
understanding and dealing with the challenges of military operations in 
the PACOM AOR?
    Answer. The JOAC's primary contributions are illuminating the 
variety of challenges for which U.S. forces must be prepared across an 
increasingly diverse and rapidly evolving set of domains--air, sea, 
land, space, and cyber--and identifying Cross-Domain Synergy as the 
central tenet for addressing these challenges in order to assure 
operational access.
    Question. The JOAC identifies 33 capabilities required for its 
implementation, but this list of capabilities is not exhaustive nor is 
it prioritized.
    In view of the PACOM mission, how would you prioritize the required 
capabilities listed in the JOAC and what capabilities, if any, would 
you add?
    Answer. Because achieving unity of effort at all echelons within 
the U.S. Armed Forces is central to Cross-Domain Synergy, I would 
prioritize capabilities required for situational awareness and command 
and control, especially across domains. I would add the capability to 
develop, exercise, and validate potential lines of operation across the 
Government as a whole during pre-, post- and ongoing hostility phases 
in a manner that complements military activities.
    Question. What new technologies would you suggest DOD pursue in 
order to develop or improve these capabilities?
    Answer. In general, I would suggest pursuit of technologies that 
improve situational awareness, command and control, and interagency 
coordination.
    Question. With respect to air, sea and land capabilities, some 
proponents of the ``air-sea battle'' concept appear to de-emphasize 
ground combat forces.
    Answer. This concept looks at ways to improve our inter-Service 
coordination and ability to counter developing challenges but it does 
not discount the contribution of ground forces.
    There are numerous potential operations in the PACOM AOR that could 
require ground forces. Decisiveness in an operation or campaign still 
requires the credible threat of land combat forces that can physically 
threaten an adversary, seize and/or hold ground.
    Question. What are your views on the requirement for land forces 
before, during, and after operations to gain and maintain assured 
access?
    Answer. Land forces are necessary for all phases of an operation, 
including peacetime, steady-state. Most notably, in Phase 0 Shaping, 
land forces are critical to tangibly demonstrating U.S. commitment to 
allies and partners as well as resolve to potential adversaries. Land 
forces, as an integrated part of the joint force, engage with allies 
and partners in the region to influence, train with, and improve the 
capabilities and integration of those capabilities enabling allies and 
partners to better defend themselves against aggression. Ground forces 
allow rapid and effective response, not only to conflict, but also to 
natural disasters and humanitarian crises. A recurring theme in U.S. 
military engagement is that, while our peer competitors may provide 
money in an attempt to buy influence, most militaries identify with and 
attempt to emulate the United States in doctrine, professionalism, and 
values. This is principally due to the one-on-one contact and influence 
that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen have 
with their counterparts of all ranks in exercises and training events 
throughout the year.
    During conflict, we must be able to credibly project ground forces 
in a maritime environment consisting of numerous islands, 
archipelagoes, and littoral population centers. Expeditionary land 
forces provide indispensible capabilities which complement our navy and 
air forces in the region. Land force headquarters and staffs also 
provide a Joint Task Force command and control capability that is 
necessary to pursue multiple operations simultaneously, a necessity for 
a region that spans 51 percent of the globe. If conflict arises, these 
same ground forces would be called on to not only make gains but 
consolidate those gains in the aftermath.
    Question. What, in your view, are the required size and 
capabilities for ground combat forces in the Pacific region, and what 
capabilities, if any, may be needed to improve their effectiveness?
    Answer. The President's new Strategic Guidelines now clearly 
establish the Asia-Pacific as the strategic focus. As we assess our 
increased commitment to the region, the Department will more precisely 
determine the required size and capabilities necessary for ground 
combat, and other forces.
    Broadly speaking, however, we can categorize potential needed 
improvements in basing, mobility, and technologies.

         Traditionally, basing focused on threats in Northeast 
        Asia. Adequate basing throughout Asia is necessary to address 
        the whole of the region.
         The vastness of the Asia-Pacific means that forces 
        throughout the region must have adequate mobility in the form 
        of sealift and air transportation to allow them to engage, 
        train, and respond to disasters in Phase 0, as well as to fight 
        during contingencies.
         Given the vastness of the region, deployment of 
        technologies in the form of Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
        Reconnaissance (ISR) assets that allow timely and continuous 
        situational awareness are required. This enables the rapid and 
        focused application of limited resources to the point of 
        necessity. Movement of men, weapons, and equipment is measured 
        in days and weeks in the Pacific theater. Area denial systems 
        and tactics make that even more difficult without the 
        technologies to observe and accurately assess the actions of 
        potential adversaries.
                     high altitude transition plan
    Question. DOD, under the High Altitude Transition (HAT) Plan, 
intends to retire the U-2 ISR fleet in the middle of this decade and 
replace these aircraft with the Global Hawk RQ-4. Under the HAT Plan, 
the RQ-4s will apparently be a PACOM-wide asset, flying missions 
throughout the region, whereas the U-2s have been dedicated to 
supporting U.S. and Korean forces on the Korean peninsula. The United 
States and Republic of Korea have been considering a Republic of Korea 
purchase of the Global Hawk aircraft through the Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) process. If this FMS case were to proceed, much but not all of 
the impact of U-2 retirement would be mitigated, but either way the 
level of airborne ISR available on a day-to-day basis in Korea may well 
be diminished.
    In your assessment, is the possibility that the level of airborne 
ISR available on a day-to-day basis will be diminished a concern, or 
are there other means to compensate for the retirement of the U-2?
    Answer. The possibility of diminished ISR capacity in PACOM is a 
concern. As the Defense Strategic Guidance shifts focus toward the 
Asia-Pacific region, I expect that PACOM ISR requirements will grow. 
While we depend on our allies and partners to contribute to our ISR in 
the region, the U-2 is a unique platform with capabilities that cannot 
currently be duplicated by other collection platforms.
    Question. If the sale does not go through, how would you propose 
that the United States sustain required levels of airborne ISR support 
on the Korean peninsula?
    Answer. If the FMS process were curtailed, if confirmed, I would 
closely consider recommendations keeping the U-2 on the Korean 
peninsula until a similar capability is fully operational. The U-2 
provides USFK a deep look multi-intelligence collection capability that 
supports both U.S. and Republic of Korea daily intelligence 
requirements. However, without FMS to the Republic of Korea, PACOM's 
strategic flexibility to respond to requirements outside the Korean 
peninsula may be limited.
    Question. What will happen if Global Hawk is cancelled or curtailed 
as part of the budget process?
    Answer. If Global Hawk is divested, I am concerned about how the 
impact of losing these platforms translates into an overall reduction 
of available ISR worldwide. The removal of these assets would likely 
result in a rebalancing of global assets that could translate into a 
decrease of ISR capacity in the Pacific Theater. Furthermore, the 
second order effect from such a decision has the potential to impact 
critical strategic relationships with our allies and partners. Given 
the Defense Strategic Guidance's increased focus toward the Asia-
Pacific, any potential reduction of ISR capacity warrants detailed 
assessment.
                 united nations peacekeeping operations
    Question. A number of the Nations in the PACOM AOR contribute large 
numbers of police and troops to multilateral peacekeeping operations.
    What role, if any, do you believe PACOM should play with regard to 
engaging the troops from Asia-Pacific nations which contribute to 
peacekeeping missions?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue engagement with Asia-Pacific 
nations in regards to peacekeeping contributions. This is another venue 
for military-to-military cooperation that allows us to increase partner 
capacity in military capability, professionalism, and increased 
awareness of human rights issues such as the protection of civilians in 
a U.N. mission area. It is in our best interest that countries 
contributing peacekeepers provide quality troops that are capable, 
respected, and have the requisite tactical and technical ability, and 
will enforce the U.N. mandate of that particular mission.
                        counterpiracy operations
    Question. Since January 2009, the U.S. Navy has been patrolling the 
waters of the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia as part of the 
international coalition engaged in counterpiracy operations. Even 
before our engagement off the coast of Somalia, DOD worked with our 
Asian partners to address piracy in Southeast Asia, including the 
Strait of Malacca.
    What is your understanding of the current threat of piracy in the 
Asia-Pacific region?
    Answer. Piracy in the PACOM AOR exists in the Strait of Malacca and 
South China Sea. Somali-based piracy also migrates eastward to the 
PACOM AOR across the Indian Ocean to the vicinity of India and the 
Maldives.
    Question. What role, if any, should PACOM play in countering piracy 
in the Asia-Pacific?
    Answer. Continued PACOM focus on enabling Asian partners to be 
successful in counterpiracy efforts through education, training, and 
exercises is vitally important. Current efforts are focused on 
employing resources via partner nation engagement to increase the 
effectiveness ally and partner nation forces as well as continuing 
development of information sharing to locate, isolate, and defeat 
piracy as it surfaces within the AOR. This process of developing the 
capabilities of our Asian partners proved very effective in reversing 
the piracy threat within the Strait of Malacca.
                          combating terrorism
    Question. Last year, the administration released its National 
Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to 
maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of 
partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the 
need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked groups 
``that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South 
Asia.''
    If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to 
counter terrorism?
    Answer. If confirmed, PACOM will continue highly successful ``by, 
with, and through'' approaches to counterterrorism that have produced 
measurable success in the Asia-Pacific region. These efforts rely on a 
capacity, capability, and network building approach that emphasizes 
working together with regional host nation partners, other U.S. 
Government agencies, and key allies, such as the Australians, to deny 
al Qaeda, adherents, affiliates, and associated forces the ability to 
operate in the region.
    Question. What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda 
and affiliated groups in the Asia-Pacific region?
    Answer. The threat of attack by al Qaeda, its affiliates, and like-
minded groups and individuals against U.S. and partner nation interests 
in the PACOM AOR is still a serious concern. The possible re-emergence 
of other terrorist organizations, like Jamaah Islamia and the Abu 
Sayaaf Group, that have been weakened but not defeated by the 
counterterror efforts of our allies and partners could quickly affect 
the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Other 
decentralized groups and individuals ideologically linked to al Qaeda, 
as well as organizations based primarily outside the PACOM AOR like 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, desire to support their agendas by conducting 
destabilizing attacks inside the region. Additionally, al Qaeda 
affiliated groups operate in the PACOM AOR using facilitation networks 
that support threats to U.S. interests throughout the world.
    Question. Is there a nexus between terrorist groups and criminal 
networks in the Asia-Pacific?
    Answer. Yes, there is a nexus and it is a serious impediment to 
regional stability. Transnational crime and terrorism thrive on common 
enablers such as illicit transportation networks, weapons trafficking, 
corruption, trafficking in persons, counterfeiting, and movement of 
money to support nefarious activities. These threats impact political, 
social, and economic systems by eroding the rule of law and undermining 
the legitimacy of governments and institutions.
    Question. In Southeast Asia, most notably in the Philippines and 
Indonesia, U.S. engagement with partner nations has helped combat 
violent extremist ideology and activities. The integration of 
operations by host nation security forces with U.S. capacity building, 
development, and information support operations has dramatically 
reduced the ability of violent extremist organizations to operate.
    What more can the United States do in Southeast Asia to help combat 
the threat of terrorism perpetrated by violent extremists?
    Answer. The United States should sustain current engagements with 
individual nations in the region and continually look for opportunities 
to assist with ally and partner efforts. Additionally, we should foster 
multilateral efforts, specifically through organizations like the 
Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), to build regional 
networks that deny transnational violent extremist and global terrorist 
facilitation networks the ability to operate within or through 
Southeast Asia.
    Question. Which Southeast Asian countries are most important in the 
fight against terrorism in that region and what should the United 
States do to enhance relations with those countries?
    Answer. Even though Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines 
have seen tremendous counterterrorism successes, they remain vulnerable 
to violent extremism through radicalization and recruitment and are 
potential terrorist safe havens. Additionally, Malaysia and Thailand 
have been used as facilitation hubs by violent extremist organizations 
that operate across the region. On behalf of the U.S. effort, PACOM 
should maintain its robust presence and continue its ``by, with, and 
through'' engagement strategy in Southeast Asia.
                        section 1208 operations
    Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended 
by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support 
(including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, 
irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military 
operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
    What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this 
authority?
    Answer. It is my understanding that section 1208 funding is most 
effective in the CENTCOM AOR, and currently limited in its application 
in PACOM. I understand it is an extremely effective authority and if 
confirmed, I will work with DOD to identify any potential requirements 
appropriate for using 1208 authority.
           department of defense counternarcotics activities
    Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program 
expends approximately $1.5 billion to support CN operations, build the 
capacity of certain foreign governments in Asia and around the globe, 
and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters.
    What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?
    Answer. DOD Counternarcotics and Global Threats program is a 
capabilities-based, mission-focused, fully integrated effort that 
provides a comprehensive structure to support U.S. Government agencies 
principally responsible for securing the health and safety of U.S. 
citizens. These agencies strive to effectively disrupt and degrade 
national security threats posed by drug trafficking, transnational 
organized crime, threat finance networks, piracy, and any potential 
nexus among these activities.
    Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are 
multidimensional threats. In addition to the impact on our Nation's 
public health and economy, drug trafficking, and other forms of 
transnational organized crime provide a funding source for terrorists 
and insurgents, undermine legitimate government institutions, and 
contribute to international instability.
    Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West) executes PACOM's CN 
program. Funded with approximately $30.4 million out of the CN budget, 
JIATF West focuses their efforts on Asian, Iranian, Eurasian and other 
transnational criminal organizations that operate within the PACOM AOR 
while also conducting detection and monitoring of illicitly trafficked 
Asian-sourced precursor chemicals used for the production of 
methamphetamine, particularly precursor chemical shipments to the 
Western Hemisphere.
    Question. What is your understanding of the illegal narcotics 
industry in Asia?
    Answer. Methamphetamine produced using diverted precursor 
chemicals, heroin trans-shipment through Asia, poppy cultivation, and 
potential narco-terrorist funding remain the principle drug threats to 
the United States from the Asia-Pacific region.
    Methamphetamine precursors produced in Asia are the primary source 
of required chemicals used to produce methamphetamine trafficked to the 
U.S. Southwest Border violence is fueled by the Mexican Cartel's battle 
to control this market.
    South and Southeast Asia have become increasingly attractive as 
bases for drug trafficking organizations' production and smuggling 
operations. Several Asian and Pacific nations have experienced an 
increase in the production, trans-shipment, trafficking, and 
consumption of narcotics in recent years.
    JIATF West's detection and monitoring efforts support U.S. and 
partner nations' law enforcement agencies in combating this threat. In 
fiscal year 2011, their interagency collaborative efforts resulted in 
the seizure of over 1,000 metric tons of meth precursor chemicals bound 
for the Western Hemisphere and were critical in interrupting 
distribution to U.S. markets while contributing to the disruption of 
Asian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Conservatively, 1,000 
metric tons of precursors equate to approximately 220 metric tons of 
methamphetamine with a street value of $23.2 billion.
    Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in countering--either 
directly or and with our Asian partners--the illegal narcotics industry 
in Asia?
    Answer. I believe the current DOD role is appropriate. The 
Department serves as the single lead agency for the detection and 
monitoring of aerial and maritime trafficking of illicit drugs flowing 
toward the United States. In addition, DOD plays a critical role in 
supporting U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies responsible for 
counterdrug and drug-related activities, primarily through information 
sharing and building partner nation security capacity. In cooperation 
with the U.S. interagency and foreign partners, DOD conducts activities 
to detect, disrupt, and dismantle drug-related transnational threats in 
Asia and the Pacific.
                             law of the sea
    Question. Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea? If so, why?
    Answer. I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. 
It is in the enduring interests of the United States to be at the 
forefront of promoting the rule of law, including in the world's 
oceans. U.S. accession to the Convention would send an additional, 
clear signal to the world that we remain committed to advancing the 
rule of law at sea. Additionally, under the Convention, the United 
States would have the firmest possible legal foundation for the rights, 
freedoms, and uses of the sea needed to project power, reassure allies 
and partners, deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain deployed 
combat forces, and secure sea and air lines of communication that 
underpin international trade and our own economic prosperity.
    Question. Would U.S. accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Convention benefit the U.S. military's mission in the Asia-Pacific 
region? If so, how?
    Answer. U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would 
benefit the U.S. military's mission in the Asia-Pacific region by 
enabling the United States to reinforce and assert the Convention's 
rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea, including the right of innocent 
passage of U.S. warships through the territorial seas of other nations, 
the right of transit passage of U.S. warships and aircraft in strategic 
straits, and the freedom of U.S. forces to conduct a wide range of 
military activities beyond the territorial seas of any coastal state. 
In addition, becoming a party to the Convention would support combined 
operations with regional partners and demonstrate our commitment to 
conduct Proliferation Security Initiative activities consistent with 
international law; establish undisputed title to our extended 
continental shelf areas; strengthen our position in bilateral 
discussions with the People's Republic of China; and bolster our 
leadership in future developments in the law of the sea. Accession 
would also improve the United States' position and add to our 
credibility in a large number of Asia-focused multilateral venues where 
Law of the Sea matters are discussed.
    It is important to note that the United States was one of the 
leaders of the Conventions' negotiations and our national interests--as 
both a coastal nation and maritime nation--are reflected in its 
provisions. Consequently, accession by the United States would send a 
powerful and affirmative message to the international community that 
the United States believes the legal regime reflected in the Convention 
is worth supporting and upholding against any nation that might seek to 
manipulate the ordinary and intended meaning of certain provisions in 
its self-interest. In short, ratification would enhance stability for 
international maritime rules and the freedom of access for U.S. forces 
in the PACOM AOR to execute assigned missions.
                       pow/mia accounting efforts
    Question. The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command is critical to the 
recovery and identification of remains of missing military members. 
Recovery of remains of U.S. servicemembers from World War II, the 
Korean War, and the Vietnam war continues to be a high priority. 
Section 541 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010 requires that the Secretary of Defense ensure that sufficient 
resources, personnel, and funds are provided to attain at least 200 
identifications per year by fiscal year 2015.
    What is your view of the Department's and the POW/MIA community's 
ability to achieve this goal?
    Answer. While Department leaders have made a significant increase 
in resources available to meet the requirement, the goal of reaching 
200 identifications a year remains a challenge. JPAC has been funded to 
hire an additional 253 personnel (civilians and military). I understand 
the JPAC Commander and his team are working to increase efficiencies 
and find new scientific ways of making identifications. DOD, in its 
review of its budget requirements for fiscal years 2012-2016, fully 
resourced JPAC's requirements in its efforts to reach 200 
identifications by 2015. However, real world events and current budget 
deliberations could alter actual funding received affect attainment of 
JPAC's mandated goal.
    Question. On October 20, 2011, DOD announced an agreement with 
North Korea that will allow U.S. personnel to return to North Korea to 
resume recovery of remains of U.S. servicemembers missing from the 
Korean War. Recovery operations in North Korea were suspended in 2005.
    What is your understanding of this recent agreement to resume 
recovery operations in North Korea?
    Answer. During the first quarter of fiscal year 2012, the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel 
Office negotiated an arrangement with North Korea to conduct joint 
operations in 2012 to recover the remains of American personnel. JPAC 
had previously conducted operations in North Korea; however operations 
were suspended in 2005 due to rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
    JPAC has committed to conduct its mission in North Korea and is 
currently preparing to conduct four Joint Field Activities in the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea during this calendar year.
    Question. How might the resumption of recovery efforts in North 
Korea impact the future of the Six Party talks or the stability on the 
Korean Peninsula?
    Answer. The resumption of recovery operations in North Korea is not 
linked to the future of the Six Party talks or to stability on the 
Korean Peninsula.
    Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to 
enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the PACOM AOR?
    Answer. If confirmed, the JPAC Commander and his team will have my 
full support. The noble mission of JPAC and the U.S. Government's 
commitment to accounting for missing servicemembers from past conflicts 
are a powerful signal to our Nation's military and their families that 
we believe strongly in the return of our fallen heroes. Proper 
resourcing for JPAC missions and force protection for personnel 
participating in recovery efforts will be a personal priority.
    In the context of maintaining and improving PACOM's engagement 
strategy, and fully recognizing the POW/MIA effort as humanitarian, I 
will establish an environment to encourage full cooperation in host 
nations where we conduct POW/MIA activities and continue to reinforce 
U.S. Government priorities as I meet and talk with national leaders. 
Because JPAC's mission is worldwide, I will work to ensure JPAC's 
resources and accounting efforts are available and focused not only in 
PACOM's AOR but as globally as appropriate.
                        foreign language policy
    Question. In 2005, DOD approved the Defense Language Transformation 
Roadmap to improve the Department's foreign language capability and 
regional area expertise. Since then, the Department has been working 
toward implementing that roadmap.
    Does PACOM have access to enough foreign language experts to ensure 
good intelligence assessments?
    Answer. While there are shortages in some languages, overall there 
are sufficient linguists for non-crisis intelligence assessments. 
During a significant crisis, existing foreign language resources will 
be hard pressed to maintain the current level of quality intelligence 
collection and assessments.
    Question. In your view, how should the United States expand the 
foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel in order to 
improve the quality of intelligence input to, and policy output by, the 
Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?
    Answer. Greater emphasis and incentives should be placed on 
recruiting both civilian and military personnel with existing language 
capability and regional expertise. Improvements to machine translation 
tools should be resourced so that they can be used routinely to provide 
first draft translations/interpretations to increase productivity of 
the linguist workforce.
                         counterthreat finance
    Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence 
Community have called for investing significantly more resources in 
identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist 
networks and illicit trafficking.
    What are your views on the role of DOD in counterthreat finance 
activities?
    Answer. DOD has tremendous ISR assets that are invaluable in 
identifying and defining threat finance networks and characterizing 
those networks critical vulnerabilities. This information can then 
support and enable our interagency partners' counterthreat finance 
actions, be shared with partner nations to allow them to defeat threat 
finance activities within their own borders, and help drive bilateral 
and multi-lateral engagement strategies. We have unique access and 
placement through our military-to-military engagements that allow us to 
work closely in collaboration with the interagency to provide training 
and advice to partner nations on counterthreat finance and to bolster 
their capabilities. These and other DOD capabilities will ensure, in 
close coordination with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, 
that threat finance networks do not threaten our national security.
    Question. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to 
other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter 
threat finance activities?
    Answer. With the understanding that an enemy's financial capability 
is the linchpin to their operational capability, I believe we should 
expand our support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies. 
As we continue to further detect and define the various and numerous 
threat finance networks that support adversaries around the globe, a 
whole-of-government approach is the only way to contain and defeat 
these threats to national security. Different U.S. Government 
departments and agencies each have authorities to attack these networks 
from different directions. DOD, can be a major enabler and supporter of 
these agencies in the execution of their authorities.
    Question. Transnational criminal organizations are having a 
debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern 
their nations and provide opportunities for their people.
    Do you think expanding counterthreat finance activities in the 
Asia-Pacific region would be beneficial? If so, what role--if any--
should DOD play in those activities?
    Answer. Within the Asia-Pacific region, the threat finance 
environment is extremely complex, diverse and growing, encompassing 
terrorism, proliferation, narcotics trafficking, transnational 
organized criminal groups, and other threat finance networks which 
threaten the security and stability of the region. Countering these 
threat finance activities is critical and we should examine the 
potential expansion of counterthreat finance capabilities in the 
region.
                            quality of life
    Question. Combatant commanders have an interest in the quality of 
life of military personnel and their families assigned within their 
AOR.
    In your view, what is the role and responsibility of combatant 
commanders for the quality of life of personnel assigned to their AOR?
    Answer. The combatant commander is a strong advocate for programs 
which will ensure the needs of our servicemembers and their families 
continue to be met, even during an era of fiscal constraint. The 
commander advocates for sustainment of critical quality of life 
programs and for improvement where needed in the quality of life (QoL) 
of assigned personnel. The commander ensures that QoL issues are 
articulated to community leaders, military installation commanders, DOD 
policymakers, and Members of Congress.
    Question. If confirmed, what would you do to enhance quality of 
life programs for military members and their families within the PACOM 
AOR?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would make QoL for the servicemembers and 
families of PACOM a top priority; our servicemembers and their families 
deserve nothing less. People are our most important resource and 
constant focus on QoL initiatives is vital to effectively implementing 
a ``partnership, readiness, and presence'' strategy in the region. 
Tailored and effective QoL programs and services demonstrate our 
commitment to our personnel, both at home and deployed, by 
appropriately supporting their service and providing for their 
families. Our fighting forces deserve exceptional access to such QoL 
programs and services; I stand committed to ensuring they get them.
    Question. What is your view of the challenges associated with 
global rebasing on the quality of life of members and their families in 
the PACOM AOR (including adequate health care services and DOD 
schools)?
    Answer. The biggest challenge will be preserving the QoL for our 
servicemembers and their families while we realign our forces in 
theater. Throughout the transition process, we should focus efforts on 
maintaining quality housing, DOD schools, commissary and exchange 
services, medical/dental facilities, higher education, work life, 
family and community support programs for our people. We should sustain 
current levels of service during the transformation and ensure to the 
greatest extent possible that these systems are in place before 
families arrive in an area.
                 joint professional military education
    Question. What is your assessment of the value of and current 
requirements for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) for 
military officers? What changes, if any, would you recommend in this 
regard?
    Answer. I believe that the last 10 years of conflict have proven 
the value of JPME for our military officer corps. Our joint forces have 
made huge strides in synchronizing their efforts and capabilities to 
bring about desired effects on the battlefield. I believe that the 
incorporation of JPMEII into the Senior Service College curriculum was 
a good decision, and recommend we continue to look for opportunities to 
identify efficient ways to prepare our officers for the joint and 
interagency challenges ahead.
              preventing and responding to sexual assaults
    Question. What steps do you plan to take, if confirmed, to ensure 
that military forces assigned to PACOM comply with DOD policies aimed 
at preventing and responding adequately to sexual assaults and the 
recent changes announced by Secretary of Defense Panetta?
    Answer. Sexual assault is criminal conduct punishable under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and must be taken very 
seriously. If confirmed, my commitment is to zero tolerance of sexual 
assault or related behaviors within the PACOM AOR. To ensure this, I 
will establish clear policies and procedures for my leaders, at all 
levels, to take action to prevent sexual assault, protect and support 
victims, hold offenders accountable, and to ensure a safe and healthy 
environment for those in their charge. As is the case in most major 
commands, subordinate commanders in PACOM are required to immediately 
notify the combatant commander of any sexual assault incidents. In line 
with Secretary Panetta's recent changes, I will ensure all personnel 
(military and civilians) at every level are fully aware, trained, and 
committed to eradicating sexual assault.
    Question. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging 
the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and 
responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate 
and intend to implement as Commander, PACOM?
    Answer. I will ensure commanders comply with all requirements in 
accordance with DOD Directive 6495.0 and other established Department 
policies. Additionally, I will require commanders provide me 
assessments of their prevention efforts as well as their responsiveness 
to incidents. From these assessments, I will monitor trends and provide 
further guidance and direction as necessary. I will emphasize the 
importance of commanders monitoring their command climate with respect 
to sexual assault and ensuring sexual assault response capabilities be 
available at all locations in my AOR. I will demand victims be treated 
with fairness and respect and that sexual assault incidents be given 
the highest priority and treated as emergency cases. I will not allow 
sexual assault to injure our personnel, our friends, our families, 
destroy our professional values, or compromise readiness.
              humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
    Question. What should be the role for the U.S. military in 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region?
    Answer. PACOM continues to provide Foreign Disaster Relief in the 
PACOM AOR on an ``as needed'' basis. When countries request assistance, 
PACOM either provides immediate assistance within the initial 72-hours 
of a disaster based on life and limb or after U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) validates the country request against 
an urgent and unique capability that PACOM can provide. PACOM continues 
to assist Asia-Pacific nations with their disaster preparations by 
engaging in multinational forums to share best practices, participating 
in various bi/multilateral HA/DR exercises, as well as partnering with 
the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian 
Assistance and USAID in country resiliency training. Overall, PACOM 
should be viewed as a quick response force for countries in dire need 
with an ability to respond rapidly, for short duration, and to provide 
assistance when requested.
    Additionally, steady-state Humanitarian Assistance activities are 
an important part of PACOM's Theater Campaign Plan. PACOM provides 
humanitarian assistance annually to countries within its AOR. These HA 
activities are low cost, non-obtrusive, but highly effective efforts 
that improve DOD access, visibility and influence in a partner nation 
or region, generate positive public relations and goodwill for DOD, and 
build collaborative relationships with the partner nations' civil 
society.
    Question. Are the resources necessary to fulfill this role 
currently available to the PACOM commander? If not, what additional 
resources are necessary?
    Answer. Yes, PACOM receives adequate funding from the Overseas 
Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid appropriation, under title 10 
U.S.C. 2561 for humanitarian assistance activities, and title 10 U.S.C. 
404 to respond to disasters within the PACOM AOR.
                         science and technology
    Question. As with other combatant commands, a Science and 
Technology (S&T) advisor is assigned to support PACOM.
    If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the PACOM S&T 
advisor?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will rely on my S&T Advisor to support our 
strategic mission with three priorities:

    (1)  Discover, develop, and demonstrate solutions to warfighter 
challenges;
    (2)  Avoid surprise by adversary technology; and
    (3)  Build defense partnerships with regional allies and partners.

    To accomplish these priorities, I will direct my S&T Advisor to 
continue to expand PACOM's S&T collaboration with the national research 
enterprise composed of service, DOD, and Department of Energy 
laboratories, and international partners, and to provide expert advice 
to my staff on new and emerging capabilities that can aid us in meeting 
theater objectives.
    Question. DOD has, in recent years, put greater emphasis on 
research and development of persistent ISR capabilities.
    In your view, how can persistent ISR improve operations in the 
Pacific theater, and how would you utilize new platform and sensor 
technologies?
    Answer. Persistent ISR has proven an enduring challenge globally, 
and is especially difficult considering the ``tyranny of distance'' 
faced in the vast Asia/Pacific region. Technology continues to play a 
critical enabling role in addressing this challenge. I am following 
with keen interest developments in several technologies that promise to 
mitigate ISR challenges. In all the warfighting domains, advances in 
unattended sensors and autonomous systems promise to revolutionize how 
we conduct ISR, especially in environments where risk mitigation and 
cost-benefit analysis favors their implementation. Finally, I will 
continue to promote the principle of working by, with and through our 
allies and partners in areas such as shared regional maritime domain 
awareness.
    Question. Do you believe that airship platforms can be effectively 
employed in the Pacific theater?
    Answer. I see a need for a broad spectrum of platforms to 
effectively conduct ISR in the Asia/Pacific. Airship-based platforms 
have shown promising capabilities to fill part of this need, especially 
in permissive environments, in support of missions such as air and 
surface domain awareness. Furthermore, airships of sufficient scale 
also offer a promising capability to conduct mobility operations 
independent of traditional aerial or seaport facilities; a useful 
capability for missions such as disaster response.
                        congressional oversight
    Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight 
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other 
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, 
briefings, and other communications of information.
    Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before 
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, 
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this 
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide 
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, 
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, PACOM?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and 
other communications of information are provided to this committee and 
its staff and other appropriate committees?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of 
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by 
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee 
regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such 
documents?
    Answer. Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
             Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                       30-year shipbuilding plan
    1. Senator Wicker. Admiral Locklear, the Navy's current 30-Year 
Shipbuilding Plan indicates that we will be building ships at minimum 
sustaining rates. Many observe that this could pose challenges to 
fulfilling the amphibious force requirement and possibly give rise to a 
sea-lift capability gap and an aviation-lift gap in 2015. Let's set 
aside the operational implications of those issues for a moment. Many 
worry that the relatively low orders for new ships proposed in the 2013 
Plan may jeopardize the administration's plans to support the 
shipbuilding industrial base over the intermediate- to long-term. The 
reductions in vendors to provide equipment for the shipbuilding 
industry may also make it difficult to realize desired efficiencies. 
With a ``pivot'' to the Asia-Pacific region and given the vast maritime 
size of the Asia-Pacific area of responsibility (AOR), and the Navy's 
inability to meet its own requirement of 313 ships, currently at 284 
ships, how will this affect your ability to protect America's security 
interests?
    Admiral Locklear. The Navy's shipbuilding plan reflects the new 
strategic guidance and evolving operational plan requirements. From a 
Pacific Command perspective, it is more important how we manage those 
ships globally and whether or not the Asia Pacific area of 
responsibility is adequately serviced. That is, having the right number 
and types of ships present. To date, the Navy has met that 
responsibility.

                           korea f-16 radars
    2. Senator Wicker. Admiral Locklear, the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
Air Force has been asking for advanced F-16 Radars for several years. A 
major element of the upgrade would be the addition of active 
electronically scanned array (AESA) radar to ROK Air Force F-16s--known 
as the KF-16 in Korean service. Replacing the F-16's mechanically 
scanned array radar with an AESA will provide not only performance but 
reliability and maintenance improvements. Do you support the 
expeditious Korean procurement of existing defense technology if such 
technology meets their operational requirements?
    Admiral Locklear. Yes, I strongly support the expeditious Korean 
procurement of the AESA radar for the ROK Air Force KF-16 aircraft. Our 
combined operational readiness on the Korean Peninsula is key to 
maintaining an effective deterrence against the North Korean threat.

    3. Senator Wicker. Admiral Locklear, do you agree that the U.S. 
Government should fully support the ROK Air Force's requirements and 
acquisition process timeline for a U.S. export-compliant AESA radar 
acquired via the foreign military sales (FMS) process?
    Admiral Locklear. Yes, I do feel the U.S. Government should support 
the ROK Air Force's requirements and acquisition process timelines, 
within our own established and legal foreign military sales standards. 
The ROK Government and Air Force have asked for our assurances that 
they will be able to select the same radar our own Air Force will 
select, and be able to acquire it in their requested acquisition 
timeline with assurances of cost savings. I believe this is a 
reasonable request and that the U.S. Government should be able to offer 
these assurances to a strong ally who must be interoperable with our 
own Air Force on the Korean Peninsula.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown
                          sensor-fuzed weapon
    4. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, there are a number of 
constituents in my State who are involved in the manufacture and 
assembly of the Air Force's Sensor-Fuzed Weapon (SFW).
    As you may know, the 2010 Oslo Convention to eliminate legacy 
cluster munitions has led some global activists to target the SFW and 
its supply chain, despite the fact that this system is not a legacy 
cluster munition but instead the Department of Defense's (DOD) solution 
to the humanitarian problem caused by those munitions. While the 
weapons that the Oslo Convention seeks to ban are responsible for 
unexploded ordnance injuring civilians long after a conflict has ended, 
the SFW leaves virtually none of these remnants due to its advance 
design and safety features. Regardless, my constituents and I expect 
the Air Force is concerned about campaigns to undermine the industrial 
base for this system.
    Given this situation, I would appreciate your informing me about 
the role the SFW has in operational planning for the U.S. Pacific 
Command (PACOM), and in particular, our mission to help defend the ROK. 
Specifically, does a massive tank incursion by North Korean forces 
remain a threat that our warfighters plan for?
    Admiral Locklear. A preponderance of North Korea's large and 
capable military is in its ground conventional forces, which include 
significant armor and mechanized capability. Given this capability, 
current plans must consider the threat to security that conventional 
forces, including tanks and armored personnel carriers, pose to the 
Alliance. North Korean tanks could play a significant role in their 
offensive strategy as part of Infantry Divisions, Mechanized Brigades, 
and Armor Corps. Consequently, sensor-fuzed weapons are one of the key 
munitions considered in countering North Korean aggression.

    5. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, what is the role of area versus 
unitary munitions in addressing this threat?
    Admiral Locklear. The Sensor-Fuzed Weapon (SFW) in PACOM's 
inventory is the CBU-105, which is a type of cluster munitions. The 
advantages of ``cluster munitions'' versus unitary munitions are 
clearly delineated in U.S. policy and included in PACOM internal 
doctrine (PACOM Instruction 0601.10), specifically: ``Use of cluster 
munitions provide the ability to engage area targets that include 
massed formations of enemy forces, individual targets dispersed over a 
defined area, targets whose precise locations are not known, and time-
sensitive or moving targets.''

    6. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, what capability does the SFW 
provide that other munitions in the U.S. inventory cannot in this 
environment?
    Admiral Locklear. Each individual SFW includes 10 submunitions, 
with the capability to sense and engage 4 separate targets. The 
effective coverage area can be several acres in size. When used in a 
target-rich environment, as would be represented by either staged or 
advancing troops and armor, there are no other single alternatives that 
favorably compare. To reach the same levels of effectiveness with 
unitary weapons, far greater numbers of weapons and weapons systems, 
combined with higher explosive yields would be necessary.

    7. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, how does it address the 
humanitarian concerns that have been raised about the use of other 
munitions?
    Admiral Locklear. The United States complies with the law of armed 
conflict during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are 
characterized, and in all other military operations. Under that body of 
international law, the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring 
the enemy is not unlimited.
    Per DOD and Service guidance, all weapons, weapon systems, and 
munitions must be reviewed by the Judge Advocate Generals of the 
respective Services or the DOD General Counsel for legality under the 
law of armed conflict. This review occurs before the award of the 
engineering and manufacturing development contract and again before the 
award of the initial production contract. The weapons review process of 
the United States allows commanders, including myself as Commander, 
U.S. Pacific Command, and all other personnel to reasonably assume that 
any weapon or munition contained in the U.S. military inventory and 
issued to military personnel is lawful. For specific details on how 
humanitarian concerns are addressed in the development of any weapon, 
weapon system, or munition in the U.S. inventory, I respectfully 
encourage you to raise this question to the Judge Advocate Generals and 
the DOD General Counsel.
    At the same time, I have a responsibility to ensure that all 
weapons and munitions under my cognizance are employed in a lawful 
manner. This includes employing weapons against only lawful targets, 
and minimizing collateral damage and incidental injury. I can assure 
you that I take this responsibility seriously.

    8. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, what type of consequences would 
you foresee if U.S. forces could rely only on unitary systems to defend 
against a North Korean ground attack?
    Admiral Locklear. Based upon a formidable North Korean threat that 
includes conventional and asymmetric capabilities, during the initial 
stages of aggression, limiting Alliance defense to unitary systems will 
increase operational risk. It is important to maximize U.S. and 
Alliance capabilities to quickly defeat North Korean aggression, 
minimize military and civilian casualties, and maintain security and 
stability on the peninsula and the NE Asia region.

    9. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, what costs would be incurred in 
terms of protecting friendly forces, materiel, and dollars?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    10. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, in terms of deterrence, what 
value do you put on area weapons in deterring enemy forces from 
considering massing forces to attack our allied forces?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
                         chinese cyber attacks
    11. Senator Graham. Admiral Locklear, it is now widely believed 
that China, and particularly the People's Liberation Army (PLA), is 
engaged in sustained cyber attacks upon the United States to steal 
information on our defense and trade infrastructures. Evidence exists, 
for example, of China's involvement in cyber attacks at the U.S. 
Department of State, Lockheed Martin, Google, and the NASDAQ, all 
within the last year. If China engages in a cyber attack upon the 
United States, do you consider such an attack to be a hostile act 
against the United States?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    12. Senator Graham. Admiral Locklear, if China engages in a cyber 
attack upon the United States, do you believe it is legitimate under 
the Law of War for the United States to respond in kind?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    13. Senator Graham. Admiral Locklear, if China engages in a cyber 
attack upon the United States, do you believe it is legitimate under 
the Law of War for the United States to act offensively to counter any 
perceived cyber attack upon the United States?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    14. Senator Graham. Admiral Locklear, if China engages in a cyber 
attack upon the United States, do you believe that the United States 
should respond to such an attack?
    Admiral Locklear. That would depend greatly on the target of that 
attack. Cyber threats to our national security go well beyond only 
military targets and affect all aspects of society. Given the 
integrated nature of cyberspace, computer-induced failures of power 
grids, transportation networks, or financial systems could cause 
massive physical damage and economic disruption. Our military and our 
society as a whole are dependent on this critical infrastructure, and I 
believe an attack on that infrastructure would warrant a response if we 
could accurately and confidently determine the origin of that attack.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
                                 taiwan
    15. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, in your advance policy 
question (APQ) responses, you acknowledge that two of the three main 
challenges in the PACOM AOR are preserving strong relationships with 
our Asia-Pacific allies and partners, while dealing with China's 
substantial military modernization and buildup. You note that one of 
the key means to addressing these challenges is by continuing our 
``commitments to modernizing and strengthening our treaty alliances and 
partnerships in the region,'' relationships that ``will be enhanced by 
maintaining interoperable military capabilities that deter regional 
aggression and build partner security capacity.'' You also maintain 
that the ``United States' primary objective in building the capacity of 
foreign partners should continue to be to help them develop effective 
and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their 
countries' internal security.'' I welcome these statements, and can 
think of no greater example of the importance of these facts than the 
United States' relationship with Taiwan. What is your assessment of the 
value of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship and of the strategic value of 
building Taiwan's capacity to defend itself?
    Admiral Locklear. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship provides valuable 
contributions to Taiwan's self-defense capability. In turn, Taiwan's 
self-defense capability enhances stability across the Strait and 
enables its dialogue with the Mainland. This contributes to stability 
in the region.

    16. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, your APQ responses also 
highlight China's military modernization program and its near-term 
focus, which ``appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies 
involving Taiwan.'' According to DOD's 2011 report, ``Military and 
Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (PRC)'', 
the ``balance of cross-Strait military forces and capabilities 
continues to shift in the mainland's favor.'' As you rightly said, 
under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the United States is statutorily 
obligated to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense 
services ``as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a 
sufficient self-defense capability.'' In your opinion, how could this 
cross-strait balance have shifted in favor of the PRC, if the United 
States has been upholding our obligations under the TRA?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    17. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, I also appreciate your 
acknowledgment that the TRA states that the President and Congress 
shall determine the nature and quantity of defense articles ``based 
solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan.'' You further state 
that you ``would not recommend any changes to the law.'' It is my 
opinion--and that of a bipartisan group of colleagues who joined me in 
cosponsoring the Taiwan Airpower Modernization Act--that Taiwan would 
benefit from the sale of new F-16 C/Ds. However, the current 
administration continues to refuse to sell these aircraft to Taiwan. In 
your opinion, should China be allowed to dictate or substantially 
influence what military equipment the United States does or does not 
sell to Taiwan?
    Admiral Locklear. No. Whether to go forward with arms sales to 
Taiwan is determined by the President and Congress based solely upon 
their judgment.

    18. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, when asked if you believe the 
United States should sell new F-16 C/D aircraft to Taiwan, you 
responded that ``the recently announced F-16 A/B upgrades are similar 
in capability to new F-16 C/Ds.'' Yet, this misses the larger problem, 
which is Taiwan's looming fighter shortfall, as much of its fleet 
reaches the end of its lifespan. Wu Jin-lin, Secretary General to 
President Ma of Taiwan, notified me in a letter dated October 14, 2011, 
that ``the main purpose for purchasing new F-16 C/D fighters is to 
replace our aging fleet of some 65 F-5 fighters, which is obviously a 
different matter from the acquisition of the F-16 A/B retrofit 
packages.'' As a result, Taiwan continues to ask to be allowed to 
purchase new F-16 C/D fighters, even after the announced sale of the A/
B upgrades. Furthermore, according to DOD's 2011 report, the PRC has a 
total of approximately 2,300 operational combat aircraft. In contrast, 
Taiwan has a total of 388 aircraft. The sale of F-16 A/B upgrades does 
nothing to attempt to restore any quantitative balance. In light of 
these facts, please elaborate on your response, and do you believe the 
United States should sell new F-16 C/D aircraft to Taiwan?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    19. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, you state that ``capabilities 
that deter the PRC or increase the Taiwan military's survivability are 
critical.'' What is your assessment of Taiwan's current need to build 
its air defense capacity?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    20. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, in your opinion, would the 
sale of new F-16 C/Ds serve as a deterrent to the PRC? Would they 
increase Taiwan's military survivability?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    21. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, in your APQ responses, you 
said that Taiwan must ensure that it adequately resources its defense 
program, to include looking at increasing its defense budget, 
maintaining that you believe ``the best way to encourage Taiwan to 
invest more in its military is to send strong and consistent messages 
from the U.S. Government to Taiwan.'' What message do you believe the 
current administration's failure to approve the sale of 66 new F-16 C/D 
fighters sends to the Government of Taiwan? Does this message encourage 
Taiwan to continue investing in its military?
    Admiral Locklear. The Taiwan authorities understand the foreign 
military sales process and what it entails. The President and Congress 
make the determination based upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan 
and the U.S. military supports this assessment.
    Regardless, Taiwan must continue to invest in its military, 
particularly in the area of joint operations. Taiwan's commitment to 
its own defense contributes to its ability to deter PRC aggression.

    22. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, in your opinion, would 66 new 
F-16s C/Ds bolster Taiwan's ability to conduct maritime interdiction in 
a blockade scenario?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    23. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, if the administration 
continues to stall on Taiwan's pending request, and Taiwan becomes 
unable to purchase new F-16s, what are the potential impacts on 
Taiwan's ability to defend its own skies?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    24. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, what would be the impact on 
U.S. interests in the region?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    25. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, according to DOD, in 2011 the 
PLA Navy had the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and 
amphibious warships in Asia. This fleet includes 49 diesel attack 
submarines and 5 nuclear attack submarines. In contrast, Taiwan 
currently has four diesel attack submarines and zero nuclear attack 
submarines. What is your assessment of the current status of Taiwan's 
submarine fleet and the ability of Taiwan's navy to defend against an 
amphibious attack?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    26. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, what is your assessment of 
how long it will be before Taiwan's current submarines must be 
replaced?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    27. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, should the United States be 
looking for ways to help Taiwan replace its current submarines, and 
even grow its submarine fleet, in the near future?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    28. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, do you believe the United 
States has met its obligations under the TRA to ensure that Taiwan has 
the opportunity to upgrade its submarine fleet?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    29. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, what risks would the United 
States face if Taiwan cannot protect itself?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    30. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, if hostilities were to break 
out between China and Taiwan, is the United States currently able to 
provide an air deterrent over Taiwan, if Taiwan proves unable to 
protect itself?
    Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

    31. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, you note that, ``with the 
current budget environment, careful choices will need to be made that 
focus resources where they provide the most value and return.'' As you 
correctly state, building partner capacity ``in our allies and partners 
lessens the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats 
outside the United States.'' In light of the current fiscal crisis and 
the drastic budget constraints DOD is currently facing, do you agree 
that a Taiwanese air force that possesses the capacity to deter Chinese 
aggression is in the best interest of the United States?
    Admiral Locklear. I agree, and I would expand that statement to 
cover the entire Taiwan military. Taiwan must continue to focus its 
efforts on improving joint operations capabilities, streamlining 
defense programs to be less costly and more effective, and seeking 
innovative solutions to complement its traditional military 
capabilities.

    32. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, do you agree that a capable 
Taiwan air force would lessen the burden on U.S. forces in the region, 
reducing the risk that U.S. forces would potentially have to respond to 
Chinese military aggression against Taiwan?
    Admiral Locklear. Taiwan's overall military capability, to include 
its air force, contributes to Taiwan's overall ability to deter 
conflict.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nomination reference of ADM Samuel J. Locklear III, 
USN, follows:]
                    Nomination Reference and Report
                           As In Executive Session,
                               Senate of the United States,
                                                  January 23, 2012.
    Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee 
on Armed Services:
    The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Navy to the 
grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and 
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

                             To be Admiral

    ADM Samuel J. Locklear III, USN, 1250.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The biographical sketch of ADM Samuel J. Locklear III, 
USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the 
nomination was referred, follows:]
   Transcript of Naval Service for ADM Samuel Jones Locklear III, USN


      28 Oct. 1954........................  Born in Macon, GA
      08 June 1977........................  Ensign
      08 June 1979........................  Lieutenant (junior grade)
      01 July 1981........................  Lieutenant
      01 Dec. 1986........................  Lieutenant Commander
      01 Sep. 1990........................  Commander
      01 Sep. 1995........................  Captain
      01 Sep. 2001........................  Rear Admiral (lower half)
      01 Apr. 2005........................  Rear Admiral
      03 May 2007.........................  Vice Admiral
      06 Oct. 2010........................  Admiral, Service continuous
                                             to date



Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Assignments and duties                  From          To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Naval Academy (Executive Assistant to       June 1977    Sep. 1977
 OIC, Fourth Class Regiment)..................
Surface Warfare Officers School Command,         Sep. 1977    Apr. 1978
 Newport, RI (DUINS)..........................
USS William V. Pratt (DDG 44) (Fire Control      Apr. 1978    Mar. 1981
 Officer).....................................
U.S. Naval Academy (Company Officer)..........   Mar. 1981    July 1983
Naval Nuclear Power School, Naval Training       July 1983    Feb. 1984
 Center, Orlando, FL (DUINS)..................
Nuclear Power Training Unit, Ballston Spa, NY    Feb. 1984    Aug. 1984
 (DUINS)......................................
USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) (Electrical Officer).   Aug. 1984    Jan. 1987
Surface Warfare Officers School Command          Jan. 1987    July 1987
 Newport, RI (DUINS)..........................
USS Callaghan (DDG 994) (Operations Officer)..   July 1987    June 1989
Surface Warfare Officers School Command          June 1989    Aug. 1989
 Newport, RI (DUINS)..........................
Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific     Aug. 1989    Oct. 1989
 Fleet (Nuclear Propulsion MIT Division)......
XO, USS Truxtun (CGN 35)......................   Oct. 1989    July 1991
Industrial College of the Armed Forces           July 1991    Aug. 1992
 (Student)....................................
CO, USS Leftwich (DO 984).....................   Aug. 1992    Dec. 1994
Joint Staff (Branch Chief, Regional Engagement   Dec. 1994    Feb. 1997
 and Presence Joint Warfighting Capabilities
 Assessment Branch) (J-5).....................
Commander, Destroyer Squadron Two.............   Feb. 1997    Dec. 1998
Office of the CNO (Executive Assistant to the    Dec. 1998    Dec. 1999
 Vice Chief of Naval Operations) (N09A).......
Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy..   Dec. 1999    Jan. 2002
Office of the CNO (Deputy Director for           Jan. 2002    Oct. 2002
 Requirements Assessment, N81D/Director, CINC
 Liaison Division, N83).......................
Commander. Cruiser Destroyer Group Five.......   Oct. 2002    Jan. 2004
Office of the CNO (Deputy Director, Surface      Jan. 2004    Oct. 2004
 Warfare Division) (N76B).....................
Office of the CNO (Director, Assessment          Oct. 2004    Oct. 2005
 Division) (N81)..............................
Office of the CNO (Director, Programming         Oct. 2005     May 2007
 Division) (N80)..............................
Commander. Third Fleet........................    May 2007    July 2009
Office of the CNO (Director, Navy Staff)         July 2009    Sep. 2010
 (N09B).......................................
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe/            Oct. 2010      To date
 Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa/
 Commander, Allied Joint Forces Command,
 Naples.......................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Medals and awards:
    Defense Superior Service Medal
    Legion of Merit with four Gold Stars
    Bronze Star
    Meritorious Service Medal with three Gold Stars
    Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one Gold Star
    Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal with one Gold Star
    Navy Unit Commendation
    Navy ``E'' Ribbon
    National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
    Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
    Southwest Asia Service Medal
    Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
    Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
    Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star
    Kuwait Liberation (Kuwait)

Special qualifications:
    BS (Operations Research) U.S. Naval Academy, 1977
    MA (Public Administration) George Washington University, 1992
    Designated Surface Warfare Officer, 1978
    Graduate of Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1992
    Designated Joint Specialty Officer, 1998
    Capstone, 2005-1

Personal data:
    Wife: Pamela Ann Nichols of Peabody, MA
    Children: Jennifer N. Locklear (Daughter) Born: 14 December 1980.
             Jillian L. Locklear (Daughter) Born: 16 February 1984.

Summary of joint duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Assignment                       Dates              Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Staff (Branch Chief, Regional  Dec. 94-Feb. 97.......            CDR/CAPT
 Engagement and Presence Joint
 Warfighting Capabilities
 Assessment Branch) (J-5).
Commander, Allied Joint Forces       Oct. 10-To Date.......         ADM
 Command, Naples.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 ______
                                 
    [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior 
military officers nominated by the President to positions 
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a 
form that details the biographical, financial, and other 
information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM Samuel J. 
Locklear III, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]
                          UNITED STATES SENATE
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              Room SR-228
                       Washington, DC 20510-6050
                             (202) 224-3871
                    COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
      BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
    Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If 
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the 
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation 
of your answer applies.
                    Part A--Biographical Information
    Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in 
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for 
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in 
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

    1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
    Samuel J. Locklear III.

    2. Position to which nominated:
    Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.

    3. Date of nomination:
    23 January 2012.

    4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
    [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the 
committee's executive files.]

    5. Date and place of birth:
    28 October 1954; Macon, GA.

    6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
    Married to Pamela Ann Locklear (Nichols).

    7. Names and ages of children:
    Jennifer Nichols Loustanunau (Locklear), age 30.
    Jillian Leigh Bauersfeld (Locklear), age 27.

    8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary 
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local 
governments, other than those listed above.
    None.

    9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an 
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, 
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other 
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    None.

    10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in 
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and 
other organizations.
    U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association-Member.
    Surface Navy Association-Member.

    11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary 
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions 
for outstanding service or achievements.
    None.

    12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, 
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly 
constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes.

    13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly 
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if 
those views differ from the administration in power?
    Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the 
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set 
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to 
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                ------                                

                           Signature and Date
    I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement 
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information 
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, 
and complete.

                                   ADM Samuel J. Locklear III, USN.
    This 5th day of December, 2011.

    [The nomination of ADM Samuel J. Locklear III, USN was 
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on February 17, 2012, 
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The 
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on February 17, 2012.]
                              ----------                              

    [Prepared questions submitted to LTG Thomas P. Bostick, 
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers 
supplied follow:]
                        Questions and Responses
                            defense reforms
    Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have 
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have 
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly 
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities 
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These 
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and 
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and 
education and in the execution of military operations.
    Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act 
provisions?
    Answer. No. The goals of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation are as 
important today as when the act passed 30 years ago. I continue to 
support these reforms and will be guided by the objectives of this 
important legislation, which promote the effectiveness of military 
operations, strengthen civilian control, provide for more efficient and 
effective use of defense resources, and improve the management and 
administration of the Department of the Army and Department of Defense 
(DOD).
    Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to 
address in these modifications?
    Answer. Not applicable, in view of my previous answer.
                             relationships
    Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of 
the Chief of Engineers to the following offices (for the purpose of 
these questions, the term ``Chief of Engineers'' should be read to 
include Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers):
    The Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. As head of DOD, the Secretary of Defense has full 
authority, direction, and control over all its elements. The Secretary 
exercises this power over the Corps of Engineers through the Secretary 
of the Army, whose responsibility for, and authority to conduct all 
affairs of the Army is subject to the authority, direction, and control 
of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with 
the Secretary of Defense in fulfilling the Nation's national defense 
priorities and efficiently administering the Corps of Engineers in 
accordance with the policies established by the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense.
    Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as 
military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and 
the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and 
control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, 
with assistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff has responsibility of 
providing for the strategic direction, strategic planning, and 
contingency planning; advising the Secretary of Defense on 
requirements, programs, and budgets identified by the commanders of the 
unified and specified combatant commands; developing doctrine for the 
joint employment of the Armed Forces; providing for representation of 
the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United 
Nations; furnishing certain reports to the Secretary of Defense; and 
performing such other duties as may be prescribed by law or by the 
President or the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will cooperate 
fully with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the performance 
of his responsibilities.
    Question. The Secretary of the Army.
    Answer. As head of the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the 
Army is responsible for, and has the authority to conduct, all affairs 
of the Department of the Army, subject to the authority, direction, and 
control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army may 
assign such of his functions, powers, and duties as he considers 
appropriate to the Under Secretary of the Army, as well as the 
Assistant Secretaries of the Army, and require officers of the Army to 
report to these officials on any matter. If confirmed, I will support 
the Secretary in the performance of the Secretary's important duties. I 
will strive, to establish and maintain a close, professional 
relationship with the Secretary of the Army, based on full and candid 
communication with the Secretary on all matters assigned to me.
    Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works.
    Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works is 
principally responsible for the overall supervision of the Army's 
functions relating to programs for conservation and development of the 
national water resources, including flood control, navigation, shore 
protection, and related purposes. Carrying out the Army's civil works 
program is a principal mission of the Corps of Engineers and the 
complex issues that arise in this area demand a close, professional 
relationship between the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil 
Works and the Chief of Engineers, based on mutual respect, trust, 
cooperation, and full communication. If confirmed, I am committed to 
establishing and maintaining such a relationship.
    Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
    Answer. The General Counsel of the Army is the chief legal officer 
of the Army. The General Counsel serves as counsel to the Secretary of 
the Army and other Secretariat officials and is responsible for 
determining the position of the Department of the Army on any legal 
question or procedure. If confirmed, I will ensure that my Chief 
Counsel maintains a close and professional relationship with the 
General Counsel and actively seeks the General Counsel's guidance in 
order to ensure that Army Corps of Engineers policies and practices are 
in strict accordance with the law and the highest principles of ethical 
conduct.
    Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff.
    Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army performs the Chief of 
Staff's duties under the authority, direction, and control of the 
Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The 
Chief of Staff also performs the duties prescribed by law as a member 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    The Army Staff assists the Secretary of the Army in carrying out 
the Secretary's responsibilities, by furnishing professional advice and 
operations expertise to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the 
Assistant Secretaries of the Army and to the Chief of Staff of the 
Army. Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of 
the Army, the Army Staff prepares for and assists in executing any 
power, duty, or function of the Secretary or the Chief of Staff; 
investigates and reports on the Army's efficiency and preparedness to 
support military operations; supervises the execution of approved 
plans; and coordinates the action of Army organizations, as directed by 
the Secretary or Chief of Staff. As a statutory member of the Army 
Staff, the Chief of Engineers assists the Secretary in carrying out the 
Secretary's responsibilities and furnishes necessary professional 
assistance to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant 
Secretaries of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army. 
Specifically, the Chief of Engineers is the principal adviser to the 
Army Staff on engineering and construction matters. In discharging 
these responsibilities, the Chief of Engineers must develop positive, 
professional relationships with the Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief of 
Staff, the Deputy and Assistant Chief of Staff, The Surgeon General, 
the Judge Advocate General, the Chief of Chaplains and the Chief of the 
Army Reserve, in order to ensure that the Army Staff works harmoniously 
and effectively in assisting the Army Secretariat. If confirmed, I am 
committed to establishing and maintaining such relationship with the 
members of the Army Staff.
    Question. The combatant commanders.
    Answer. The combatant commanders are responsible to the President 
and to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions 
assigned to the commands by the President or by the Secretary with the 
approval of the President. Subject to the direction of the President, 
the combatant commanders perform their duties under the authority, 
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and a redirectly 
responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of the commands to 
carry out their assigned missions. These missions include providing 
humanitarian and civil assistance, training the force, conducting joint 
exercises, contingency activities, and other selected operations. If 
confirmed, I will support the combatant commanders in the performance 
of these important duties by providing any necessary engineering and 
construction services required from the Corps of Engineers to the 
combatant commanders' component commands.
    Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.
    Answer. The Corps of Engineers has provided a broad array of 
engineering and construction related services in Iraq generally to 
either the Commander, U.S. Forces Iraq (USF-I), the State Department, 
or the Government of Iraq. As the size and the scope of the military's 
mission has reduced, so has the size and the scope of the Corps of 
Engineers' mission. Despite the reduced mission and reduced number of 
deployed personnel, the Corps of Engineers remains prepared to support 
the Commander USF-I, the State Department, or the Government of Iraq as 
needed either by leveraging reachback to U.S.-based engineering 
services, or through a temporary surge of personnel. In all cases, the 
primary representative in providing all required support is the 
Transatlantic Division Commander.
    Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.
    Answer. The Corps of Engineers continues to provide an array of 
engineering and construction related services in Afghanistan generally 
to either the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A)/
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or the State Department. 
The Corps of Engineers remains prepared to support the Commander and 
the State Department either by leveraging reachback to U.S.-based 
engineering services, or through a temporary surge of personnel, as 
required. In all cases, the primary representative in providing all 
required support is the Transatlantic Division Commander.
    Question. Commander, U.S. Forces Iraq.
    Answer. The Corps of Engineers has provided a broad array of 
engineering and construction related services in Iraq generally to 
either the Commander, U.S. Forces Iraq (USF-I), the State Department, 
or the Government of Iraq. As the size and the scope of the military's 
mission has reduced, so has the size and the scope of the Corps of 
Engineers' mission. Despite the reduced mission and reduced number of 
deployed personnel, the Corps of Engineers remains prepared to support 
the Commander USF-I, the State Department, or the Government of Iraq as 
needed either by leveraging reachback to U.S.-based engineering 
services, or through a temporary surge of personnel. In all cases, the 
primary representative in providing all required support is the 
Transatlantic Division Commander.
    Question. Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan/International Security 
Assistance Force.
    Answer. The Corps of Engineers continues to provide an array of 
engineering and construction related services in Afghanistan generally 
to either the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A)/
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or the State Department. 
The Corps of Engineers remains prepared to support the Commander and 
the State Department either by leveraging reachback to U.S.-based 
engineering services, or through a temporary surge of personnel; as 
required. In all cases, the primary representative in providing all 
required support is the Transatlantic Division Commander.
    Question. The State Governors.
    Answer. The execution of the Corps of Engineers civil and military 
missions often demands a balancing of diverse interests. The proper 
reconciliation of these interests requires an understanding of the 
Corps' authorities and legal responsibilities and open communication 
among all parties. If confirmed, I am committed to working 
cooperatively with the Governors of the States for the public interest 
and pledge to establish and maintain a full dialogue with the Governors 
of the States on all issues we must cooperatively address.
                            chain of command
    Question. Please describe your understanding of the chain of 
command for the Chief of Engineers on: (a) military matters; (b) civil 
works matters; (c) operational matters; and (d) any other matters for 
which the Chief of Engineers may be responsible.
    Answer.
(a) Military matters
    The Chief of Staff presides over the Army Staff and assists the 
Secretary of the Army in carrying out the Secretary's responsibilities. 
The Vice Chief of Staff has such authority and duties with respect to 
the Army Staff as the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the 
Secretary of the Army, may prescribe for him. As a statutory member of 
the Army Staff, the Chief of Engineers reports to the Chief of Staff, 
through the Vice Chief of Staff, with respect to military matters.
(b) Civil Works matters
    The supervisory duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Civil Works extends to all functions of the Army relating to programs 
for conservation and development of the national water resources--in 
other words, for all of what is known as the civil works program. The 
Chief of Engineers reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Civil Works on civil works functions.
(c) Operational matters
    The Chief of Engineers serves as a member of the Army Staff and as 
Commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In this latter capacity, 
the Chief of Engineers commands nine engineer divisions and one 
engineer battalion. When employed in support of military contingency 
operations, these engineer assets fall under the command and control of 
the combatant commander designated for the particular operation.
(d) Any other matters for which the Chief of Engineers may be 
        responsible:
    The Chief of Engineers reports to each of the Assistant Secretaries 
within their areas of functional responsibility. For example, in the 
areas of installation and real estate management, the Chief of 
Engineers reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Installations, Environment, and Energy. Similarly, the Chief of 
Engineers reports on procurement matters to the Assistant Secretary of 
the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.
    Question. Who is responsible for providing direction and 
supervision to the Chief of Engineers in each of the four areas listed 
above?
    Answer. In each of these areas, the Chief of Engineers acts under 
the overall authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the 
Army. With respect to military matters, the Secretary has assigned to 
the Chief of Staff, the authority to preside over and supervise the 
Army Staff, including the Chief of Engineers. With respect to civil 
works functions, the Chief of Engineers reports to the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. In operational contexts, command 
and control of engineer assets is exercised by the combatant commanders 
designated for the particular operation.
    Question. In your view, are there any areas of responsibility where 
it would be inappropriate for the Chief of Engineers to provide 
information to the Secretary of the Army or the Assistant Secretary of 
the Army for Civil Works? If so, what areas and why?
    Answer. No. Certain information may require protection from 
disclosure, as in the case of certain procurement sensitive 
information, however, even this information may be shared if 
appropriate steps are taken to protect sensitive and proprietary 
aspects of the information. The relationships between the Secretary of 
the Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works and 
the Chief of Engineers must be founded upon information sharing, and 
full and open communication about all matters. If confirmed, I will 
ensure that all Secretariat officials are informed about issues and 
provided with all information pertinent to their functional areas of 
responsibility.
    Question. What is your view of the relative authority of the Chief 
of Engineers, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, the 
Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of 
Defense with regard to the civil works functions of the Army Corps of 
Engineers?
    Answer. As head of DOD, the Secretary of Defense has full 
authority, direction, and control over all elements within DOD. 
Similarly, as head of the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the 
Army has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the 
Department of the Army. Therefore, either Secretary could personally 
intervene in an issue involving the civil functions of the Corps of 
Engineers. However, the principal responsibility for overall 
supervision of the Corps civil works functions has been assigned to the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works by statute and various 
directives. Generally speaking, this supervisory responsibility 
includes the responsibility for setting program policies and for 
coordinating with the Department of the Army, DOD, Office of Management 
and Budget, and other executive branch officials on the Corps budget, 
legislative program, and other matters of program interest involving 
the Corps civil functions. In general, the Chief of Engineers is the 
engineering and construction expert responsible for carrying out the 
civil functions of the Corps and for conducting the various program, 
project, or study activities that comprise the civil works program. 
Typically, the Chief of Engineers does not interact with the Chief of 
Staff of the Army on a regular basis with respect to matters involving 
the Corps civil functions.
    Question. The work of the Chief of Engineers often involves issues 
of great significance to the States and localities and their elected 
officials in Congress.
    If confirmed, what would be your role in addressing such matters 
with Congress?
    Answer. I agree this work often does involve issues of great 
significance to the States and localities and their elected officials 
in Congress. In fulfilling its statutory requirements, the Corps must 
interact positively to define an appropriate Federal role in addressing 
these issues that recognizes fiscal realities, environmental, and other 
societal considerations. The challenges the Corps faces are complex, 
and there are many difficult decisions to be made. It is important that 
all interests be brought to the table and that they be given a voice in 
the development of solutions to our Nation's problems. The Corps must 
be responsive to these interests and must engage in an open, 
constructive, and cooperative dialogue with the States, localities, and 
elected officials to ensure issues are resolved in a manner that 
maximizes the public interest.
    Question. What is your understanding of the role of the civilian 
and military leadership of the Army Corps of Engineers in developing 
goals for Army Corps of Engineers programs and presenting these goals 
to the legislative branch?
    Answer. The civilian and military leadership of the Corps of 
Engineers plays an important role in developing goals for Corps 
programs and in presenting these goals to the legislative branch. These 
goals are guided by the leaders' technical knowledge and understanding 
of Corps capabilities and by information gleaned from a variety of 
sources inside and outside the Corps of Engineers. The leaders' goals 
must promote the public interest, be affordable, and comport with 
existing law. Ultimately, the leadership's goals will set the direction 
and tone for the execution of the Corps missions, if embraced by the 
administration and Congress. Military and civilian leaders within the 
Corps play a pivotal role in shaping these goals, and in ensuring that 
the goals are supported by the executive branch and Congress. These 
leaders may be asked by Congress to give testimony on the goals or to 
answer questions about the goals. They must be prepared to enter into a 
full and constructive dialogue with Congress to ensure that the goals 
are understood by and endorsed by Congress as promoting the public 
interest.
                             qualifications
    Sections 3031, 3032, and 3036 of title 10, U.S.C. prescribe some of 
the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of Engineers. Other civil 
works related responsibilities are described in title 33, U.S.C.
    What background and experience do you have that you believe 
qualifies you for this position?
    Answer.
Background:
         Undergraduate - Bachelor of Science Degree with 
        concentration in Engineering from West Point (majors not 
        offered at that time)
         Graduate - Masters Degree in Mechanical Engineering; 
        Masters Degree in Civil Engineering (Structures); both from 
        Stanford University
         Registered Professional Engineer in State of Virginia 
        (License #18133)
         Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering at West 
        Point
Experience:
         Commander, B Company, 54th Engineer Battalion, 
        Wildflecken Germany (Completed numerous construction projects; 
        Recognized by Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff as 
        DA level Maintenance Company of the Year;)
         Executive Officer to Chief of Engineers 1993-1994 
        (supported the Chief of Engineers through many challenging 
        issues including The Great Mississippi and Missouri Rivers 
        Flood of 1993)
         White House Fellow, 1989-1990, Department of Veterans 
        Affairs, Special Assistant to Secretary of Veteran Affairs 
        (conducted review and concept development for Joint DOD-VA 
        hospitals)
         U.S. Army Europe, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, 
        Engineer. Significant contribution to the Concept Plan to 
        drawdown Europe. Prepared leadership and participated in 
        engagements with key staffers on Congress.
         Commander, 1st Engineer Battalion (led Task Force 
        working with Government and State officials in fighting the 
        1994 Idaho Fires)
         Commander, Engineer Brigade, 1st Armored Division. 
        Deployed to Bosnia and served as the Senior Engineer 
        responsible for de-mining operation and the construction 
        mission (interagency, joint, and combined work with over a 
        dozen international partners; projects included building a 
        hospital, barracks and cafeterias, a strategic airfield, water 
        projects; port, bridge, road, rail preparations to bring 1st 
        Cavalry Division into an unused Port of Rijeka, Croatia); 
        deployed elements of the brigade in support of operations in 
        Kosovo and provide engineering expertise to the leadership on 
        the ground.
         Executive Officer to Chief of Staff of the Army, 1999-
        2001 (supported the chief in joint, interagency, congressional, 
        media, and numerous other engagements)
         Deputy Director for Operations, J-3, The Pentagon, 
        2001-2002 (served on watch team working through the events of 
        11 September 2001, and the initiation of hostilities in 
        Afghanistan)
         Assistant Division Commander for Support, and 
        Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver, 1st Cavalry 
        Division. Planned and executed the deployment of over 25,000 
        soldiers and equipment into theater)
         Gulf Region Division, Iraq, 2004-2005 (responsible for 
        $18 billion of construction projects including water, sewage, 
        transportation, electricity, oil, security, hospitals, schools, 
        and several other areas)
         Commander, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, 2005-2009 
        (recruited the Grow the Army Force, during some of the most 
        challenging times for the All-Volunteer Force; worked with 
        local and national government officials, Congress, media, 
        businesses, and education. Participated in the development of 
        the ``Army Strong'' Campaign)
         Deputy Chief of Staff, G1 (managed the personnel 
        policies and program to support 1.1 million soldiers, over 
        300,000 civilians and their families)
                     major challenges and problems
    Question. The Army Corps of Engineers is facing a major, current 
challenge in the rising Mississippi River and the devastating toll it 
is taking on the people and property in the path of the flood waters. 
There are various other challenges that require the attention of the 
Army Corps of Engineers.
    In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next 
Chief of Engineers?
    Answer. If confirmed, my first priority would be to meet with the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, Corps Leaders, Army, 
DOD and administration leadership, as well as Members of Congress to 
seek their input into the major challenges confronting the next Chief.
    In my view, the next Chief--and probably the next several Chiefs--
must be concerned with the following issues.
    Maintaining the technical competence and professionalism of the 
Corps. The Corps must build and maintain a skilled, agile, and 
disciplined workforce, equipped with the necessary resources, tools, 
and processes to serve the Army, DOD, and the Nation across the 
spectrum of engineering and infrastructure requirements. Additionally, 
the Corps must constantly evaluate and improve its business processes 
in order to become more efficient and effective in the execution of its 
missions.
    Meeting the Army's infrastructure requirements in the post-BRAC 
era, as we operate in a more budget constrained environment. As the 
historic BRAC and MILCON workload declines, the Corps will adapt 
knowledge, skills, and capability from that high-volume new 
construction program to an integrated suite of infrastructure solutions 
to installations. That will include adapting new or existing facilities 
to current operational standards, applying technologies for achieving 
energy and sustainability goals, and leveraging the Corps' strong 
capabilities to provide environmental services.
    Sustaining the Corps' expeditionary capability to support overseas 
contingency missions. Since the beginning of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the Corps has provided critical support for military and 
stability operations through both deployed and reach-back capabilities 
for delivery of facilities and infrastructure, command and control of 
engineer assets, training and deployment of technical teams, 
engineering reach-back services, and Army geospatial services for the 
warfighter.
    Aging infrastructure. The Nation's water resource infrastructure 
constitutes an immense accumulation of assets requiring continual 
maintenance and periodic upgrades. Much of this infrastructure has 
reached or exceeded its design life and will require more extensive 
maintenance and/or rehabilitation in the near future. Unscheduled 
outages due to mechanical breakdowns have been increasing. Recently, 
the American Society of Civil Engineers gave the U.S. infrastructure an 
overall grade of ``D'' in 2011.
    Constrained Federal budget. With an aging population and therefore 
more entitlement spending, we can expect less to be available for 
discretionary programs. The Corps will have to prioritize projects and 
programs with rigorous analysis to ensure the greatest value for 
taxpayer funds.
    Energy and Sustainability. Developing the Nation's water resources 
in a sustainable way is one of the greatest challenges the Corps faces. 
This will require a cultural shift and lifestyle changes as well as 
technical innovation. An outgrowth of sustainable energy which is 
impacting U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is a renewed interest in 
hydropower.
    Vulnerability to natural and manmade disasters. The current 
flooding in the Missouri, Ohio and Mississippi River systems is a 
reminder of the power of these huge natural systems, and the difficult 
trade-offs which are required in their management.
    Flood risk management. Since floods cannot be fully controlled, nor 
can all damages be prevented, the Corps' ``flood control'' mission is 
shifting into one of ``flood risk management''. Flood risks increase 
with the strong attraction of people to water. Many regions near water 
continue to grow in population and economic development in low lying 
areas is expanding. Flood risk management is also challenging because 
it is a shared responsibility with State and local governments, and 
individuals.
    Increasing competition for water. A major driver of increasing 
demand for water is population, and the U.S. population of 308 million 
in 2010 is expected to reach 440 million by 2050. Energy production and 
manufacturing are also large users of water, and global climate change 
may impact water supply and demand in ways that are not yet well 
understood.
    Governance. Since the responsibility for water resources is shared 
among multiple Federal agencies, States, local governments, tribes, 
interstate organizations, and the private sector, it is a challenge to 
coordinate roles and eliminate gaps in jurisdiction.
    Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these 
challenges?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would establish priorities based on my 
assessment of the challenges and consultations with key Army and DOD 
leadership, Members of Congress, Corps leaders, and other stakeholders. 
I would seek broad input and be open to new strategies to successfully 
accomplish the Corps mission and achieve its goals. Competing water 
uses must be balanced to provide multiple benefits such as economic 
security, environmental health, social well-being, and public safety. 
Strategies for addressing the challenges outlined above will clearly be 
among the highest priorities.
    Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in 
the performance of the functions of the Chief of Engineers?
    Answer. Many of the Corps' missions require balancing disparate 
interests. The Corps must further the public interest while executing 
the assigned missions.
    Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would 
you establish to address these problems?
    Answer. As previously discussed, if confirmed, my first priority 
will be to meet with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil 
Works, Corps leaders, Army and DOD leadership, others in the 
administration, as well as with Members of Congress to seek their input 
in preparation for developing a plan to meet the various challenges. As 
an enterprise, the Corps must continue to evolve and improve its 
business processes in order to become more efficient and effective in 
the execution of its missions. I would go to the most critical areas 
with the greatest challenges to make a personal and thorough assessment 
of the needs and to meet with stakeholders and officials.
    Question. In your view, does the USACE need to make any changes in 
the way it operates and, if so, what changes would you recommend?
    Answer. If confirmed, assessing the need for changes would be a top 
priority. Typically there are opportunities for improvements in any 
organization. I am confident that, in consultation with Congress, Corps 
partners and others within the administration, we could determine what, 
if any, changes are needed. Historically, the Nation's rich and 
abundant water, and related land resources provided the foundation for 
our successful development and rapid achievement of preeminence within 
the international community. Since the beginning of our Nation, the 
USACE has been a great asset, providing engineering support to the 
military, developing our Nation's water resources, and restoring and 
protecting our environment. The Corps must continue to be flexible and 
continue to evolve if it is to continue to make important contributions 
to the Nation and respond to today's and future challenges.
    Question. If confirmed, what priorities will you set for the USACE?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would establish priorities based on my 
assessment of the challenges and consultations with key Army and DOD 
leadership, Members of Congress, Corps leaders, and other stakeholders. 
Strategies for addressing the challenges outlined above will clearly be 
among the highest priorities.
                          iraq reconstruction
    Question. What do you see as the major lessons learned for the 
USACE from reconstruction contracting in Iraq?
    Answer. I believe an overall lesson learned by the Corps from the 
Iraq reconstruction mission is the need for a permanent organization to 
oversee the contingency missions, assess and implement the lessons 
learned, and to develop and sustain business practices for current and 
future contingencies. To address this need, the Corps established the 
Transatlantic Division (TAD) to provide direct engineering support in 
the U.S. Central Command area of operations.
    Some of the more specific lessons learned in terms of program 
management include: the importance to develop well-defined 
requirements; the significance of the involvement and support from 
local officials; the importance to plan projects suited to local 
culture, requirements and capacity; the importance of capacity 
development to sustainments of projects; the necessity for a range of 
acquisition strategies for the diverse and evolving needs of the 
mission; the importance of use of established USACE business processes; 
and finally, the importance of planning to address security and 
logistics.
    Question. What changes, if any, do you believe that the USACE 
should make to improve its processes for reconstruction contracting in 
future contingencies?
    Answer. Contractor oversight and requirements definition are 
inherent challenges in contingency operations. The Corps must ensure 
that the many valuable lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
institutionalized to improve ongoing activity and are ready for future 
overseas missions.
                       afghanistan reconstruction
    Question. In 2010, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR) conducted an audit of Afghan National Police 
facilities in Helmand Province and Kandahar that found deficiencies in 
USACE implementation of quality assurance and quality control plans. 
SIGAR is also examining whether the USACE received security services 
from Global Strategies Group, Inc., at a reasonable cost and whether 
oversight of the contract was in accordance with Federal Acquisition 
Regulations and other applicable requirements.
    What is your assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of 
contract oversight by the USACE in Afghanistan?
    Answer. Overall, I understand that the Corps recognized the need to 
increase the level of oversight of projects in Afghanistan. The Corps 
established a second District in Afghanistan in September 2009 and has 
increased its total staff. The Corps is also expanding the use of 
Afghan Quality Assurance Representatives to help to provide an 
experienced eye on construction projects at remote sites while also 
reducing costs and its security footprint.
    It is my understanding that the SIGAR report on the Afghan National 
Police Headquarters recognized that oversight of the contracts was 
severely hampered by the security situation in Kandahar and Helmand 
provinces. I understand that the Corps has been working very closely 
with the contractor to correct deficiencies and complete the facilities 
at no additional cost to the government.
    Question. What steps, if any, would you take if confirmed to 
improve contract oversight in Afghanistan?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Corps is using all 
available procurement oversight and management assets and tools to the 
greatest extent possible. This would include ensuring the Corps is 
filling the necessary positions in theater with the right people, 
ensuring deploying qualified personnel are receiving the necessary 
training and support, maximizing the use of Afghan Quality Assurance 
Representatives, and employing technology such as remote sensing where 
possible.
                   afghanistan infrastructure program
    Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2011 established the Afghanistan Infrastructure Program, under which 
the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State are authorized to 
develop jointly high-priority, large-scale infrastructure projects in 
support of the civil-military campaign plan in Afghanistan, including 
water, power and transportation projects. Up to $400 million in DOD 
funding is authorized in support of these projects. Projects will be 
implemented by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and the USACE.
    What do you see as the major challenges in implementing large-scale 
infrastructure projects under the Afghanistan Infrastructure Program?
    Answer. USAID is the lead agency for the Afghanistan Infrastructure 
Program and the Corps provides engineering and construction support as 
requested. I would expect key challenges to include making sure that 
Afghan officials are involved closely in the process from the local to 
the ministerial level. Attention will need to be given to selecting 
projects suited to local, cultural needs and capacity. Another 
challenge will be the security environment and associated risks. 
Project planning and execution will also need to be coordinated with 
other projects and initiatives being undertaken in the theater. It is 
also important that projects support a master plan that has a high 
probability of support through changing Afghan leadership.
    Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, will you take to ensure 
coordination in the implementation of these projects between USAID and 
the USACE?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Corps maintains a 
close working relationship with USAID and provides transparency at all 
stages of the process. The Corps has a colonel serving as the Chief of 
Staff to the USAID mission in Afghanistan and a liaison officer at the 
USAID headquarters in Washington. There are also Corps of Engineers 
personnel currently working for USAID in Afghanistan to provide subject 
matter expertise. I will make sure that these arrangements between the 
two organizations continue so that we continue our close coordination. 
I will also reinforce the need for a well coordinated team that 
provides any engineering and construction support that USAID requires.
                           navigation mission
    Question. The USACE has built and maintains an intracoastal and 
inland network of commercial navigation channels, locks and dams for 
navigation. The Corps also maintains 300 commercial harbors and more 
than 600 smaller harbors.
    What do you view as the greatest challenges facing the USACE with 
respect to the execution of its navigation mission?
    Answer. I expect one of the greatest challenges with the execution 
of the navigation mission to be the maintenance and modernization of 
the Nation's aging infrastructure. Maintaining our ports and waterways 
is critical to our economic well-being. An equally significant 
challenge to the navigation mission is the management of hundreds of 
millions of cubic yards of dredged material removed from our Nation's 
marine transportation harbors and waterways. My understanding is that 
the Corps is continually working to make dredging and placement of 
dredged material environmentally safe and acceptable. I believe that 
the Corps should continue these efforts and look for innovative ways to 
increase harmony between need for navigation improvements and our 
precious aquatic environment.
    Question. What do you see as the most significant navigation 
projects planned for the next 10 years by the USACE?
    Answer. I understand that many ports, gateways to domestic and 
international trade and overseas military operations, are operating at 
the margin in terms of channel depths. For coastal navigation, I see 
one of the greatest challenges to be working with the administration, 
Congress, other Federal transportation agencies, and navigation 
stakeholders to prioritize and pursue capital investments to prepare 
the Nation to maximize the opportunities for freight movement 
efficiencies associated with opening the new deeper Panama Canal locks 
in 2014. Clearly we must sustain the efficiency of our major ports to 
assure our competitiveness in world trade. In addition, segments of the 
inland waterways system are congested and are in need of 
recapitalization or rehabilitation. The Corps must work with the 
administration, Congress, and inland waterways stakeholders to find 
solutions to the shortage in the Inland Waterways Trust Fund to allow 
the needed capital investments to move forward.
    Question. What role, if any, do you believe the approval or 
disapproval of navigation industry groups should play in decisions made 
by the USACE about specific projects?
    Answer. Decisions regarding Corps of Engineers projects are the 
responsibility of officials in the executive and legislative branches. 
For its part, the Corps should listen to its non-Federal sponsors, 
stakeholders, and other interested parties, and fully integrate 
economic, environmental, and social values. The Water Resources 
Development Act of 1986 established the Inland Waterways User Board and 
charged this board to report to the President and Congress on 
priorities for investment in the inland waterways system.
    Question. In November 2000, the Army Inspector General found that 
three USACE officials had manipulated data in a cost-benefit analysis 
in order to justify a $1 billion project.
    What is your understanding of the steps that the USACE has taken 
since 2000 to ensure that projects are appropriately analyzed and 
justified?
    Answer. My understanding is that the Corps has made substantial 
changes to assure that projects are appropriately analyzed and 
justified. The Corps has strengthened its procedures for internal peer 
review and has adopted procedures for independent external peer review 
under guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget and 
consistent with direction provided in the Water Resources Development 
Act of 2007. The Directorate of Civil Works now houses an Office of 
Water Project Review that is separate from project development 
functions. It is my understanding that a significant program of 
planning improvement continues to be undertaken, including 
strengthening planner capability, certifying planning models, utilizing 
national centers of planning expertise, and engaging decisionmakers 
throughout the planning process.
    Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that 
technical analyses conducted by and for the USACE are independent and 
sound?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would evaluate the current process and be 
guided by the principle that Corps technical analyses be absolutely 
sound and the project evaluation process be transparent. The Chief of 
Engineers provides technical expertise on water resources issues 
throughout the Nation. Additionally, independent external reviews have 
contributed to reducing risk, and to improving, informing and 
reinforcing the recommendations of the Chief of Engineers. I would work 
to assure that these external reviews continue to be effectively 
integrated into the project development process, not added on at the 
end of the process. Integration of independent external review improves 
projects and will continue to assist the Corps in meeting the Nation's 
urgent water resources needs.
                     national levee safety program
    Question. The USACE has been criticized for its failure to do more 
to protect New Orleans from catastrophic hurricane damage. The alleged 
failures of the Army Corps include: (1) the construction of a shipping 
channel that acted as a ``superhighway'' funneling the storm surge from 
Katrina directly into New Orleans; (2) the failure to properly evaluate 
the soil structure under the New Orleans levees; (3) the failure to 
adequately maintain the levees; and (4) the failure to construct levees 
sufficient to protect the city in the event of a direct hit by a strong 
hurricane.
    What is your view of these criticisms?
    Answer. The lessons of Hurricane Katrina and the resulting 
widespread failure and breaching of the levees has been a wake-up call 
for not only the Corps but everyone involved with the management of 
risks associated with levee systems. I understand that the Corps of 
Engineers initiated several analyses and studies of the potential 
causes and effects of the hurricane and the status of the hurricane 
storm damage reduction projects in the New Orleans area. As a result of 
these studies, the Corps also has developed and is in the final stages 
of constructing billions of dollars of improvements to the system that 
will provide the New Orleans area with risk reduction from the 1 
percent event. I understand and appreciate the importance of continuing 
to study this issue and, if confirmed, will immediately learn more 
about the past, present and future work and the issues associated with 
the Corps' ongoing efforts in the New Orleans area and the Nation. In 
addition, the Corps has implemented a new policy of independent 
external peer review that follows the guidelines of the National 
Academies of Science for all studies, design, and construction of 
projects that have the potential for public safety concerns and 
significant economic damage. A full and complete understanding of what 
happened in both the technical and decisionmaking arenas is an 
essential component of assuring it does not happen again.
    Question. Do you see the need for any changes to the structure, 
processes, or priorities of the USACE as a result of the events in New 
Orleans?
    Answer. I believe the tragedy of the events in New Orleans has 
caused some positive changes to the Corps over the last several years. 
Since Katrina, I understand that the Corps has implemented a strategic 
campaign to examine and improve all the major facets of how it delivers 
value to the Nation in the Civil Works and Military Programs missions. 
The Corps efforts have included the integration of concepts of risk, 
systems, and resiliency into policies, programs, and procedures and the 
assessment of its workforce competencies and plans for building a 
technically competent workforce to implement these practices. If 
confirmed, I plan to continue these efforts to assess whether any other 
changes may be needed.
    Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the USACE is 
taking in the reconstruction of the New Orleans levees to protect the 
city from a recurrence of the tragic events of August 2005?
    Answer. I know that the Corps of Engineers is involved in many 
ongoing reconstruction efforts in the New Orleans area, including 
improvements to the hurricane storm damage reduction projects. I know 
that the Corps is working towards designing and building an integrated 
system that will provide protection from a 100-year storm event. If 
confirmed, I will make it a priority to learn more about all ongoing 
efforts in this area.
    Question. The USACE recently completed a nationwide river levee 
inspection process and identified numerous unacceptably maintained 
levees. Media reports quoted Corps of Engineers officials as 
acknowledging that past inspections were not documented adequately and 
that a shortage of inspectors has made it difficult for periodic 
inspections to be performed. The operation and maintenance of levee 
systems is a shared responsibility of State and local sponsors, 
however, there is enormous dependence on the USACE for inspection, 
identification of problems, risk assessment, and where required, 
rehabilitation.
    What is your opinion of what the USACE and Federal, State, and 
local authorities need to accomplish in order to ensure that existing 
deficiencies in the national system of levees are addressed?
    Answer. The Corps Levee Safety Program works continuously and 
periodically to systematically evaluate and communicate the risks 
associated with levees in its program authorities. I recognize that it 
is important that the Corps conduct its activities in concert with 
sponsors and stakeholders and share information obtained from the 
evaluation of levees. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Corps' 
evaluation activities are transparent to the public and coordinated 
with sponsors.
    The management of risks associated with the Nation's levees is a 
shared responsibility among local, State, and Federal Government and 
the individuals that live and work behind them. My understanding is 
that the national scope of levees greatly exceeds the (approximately 
15,000 miles) levees for which the Corps has authorities. The National 
Committee on Levee Safety (which the Corps of Engineers chairs but is a 
primarily non-Federal committee) has estimated that there may be as 
many as 100,000 miles of levees in the United States that are outside 
the current authorities of the Corps. If confirmed, I am committed to 
learning more of the details of these programs and how the Corps can 
continue to assist in this very important area.
    Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that 
those levees representing the highest risk of failure and loss of life 
and property are rehabilitated?
    Answer. Holding public safety paramount is the key principle for 
the Corps Civil Works mission. The Corps has developed a levee safety 
program that uses state-of-the-art practices in inspection, risk 
assessment and portfolio management to consistently identify, 
communicate, prioritize, and, where appropriate, reduce the risks for 
(approximately 2,000) levee systems within its authorities. Because 
these processes involve shared responsibilities, the Corps works 
closely with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, States, local 
governments and other stakeholders to coordinate our policies and 
programs, and ensure a common understanding of risks and comprehensive 
solutions that best address the need to improve system performance and 
reduce future flood risks. If confirmed, I will learn more about the 
results of the Corps' levee inspections and risk assessments and will 
work with all parties to determine best courses of actions as the 
Nation moves forward to addressing these issues.
        hurricane katrina relief and reconstruction contracting
    Question. The USACE played a major role in contracting for 
reconstruction and relief in the wake of the major hurricanes of 2005.
    What is your understanding of the major successes of the USACE in 
relief and reconstruction contracting?
    Answer. The Corps of Engineers has a long tradition of providing 
disaster response assistance. The Corps was a major player in the 
Federal response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. In addition to 
deploying over 8,000 Corps employees to provide disaster support, it 
leveraged the expertise, capacity, and capabilities of the private 
sector to provide relief assistance. It is my understanding that a 
major contracting success is that of the Corps' program which utilizes 
``Pre-Awarded'' contracts. This initiative provides the Corps with the 
ability to rapidly and effectively respond in order to execute major 
relief missions. After Hurricane Katrina, the Corps employed this 
initiative to rapidly provide emergency services. These contracts 
allowed the Corps to provide the initial assistance, while follow on 
contracts could be competitively awarded to provide additional 
capabilities and capacity.
    Question. What is your understanding of the major failures?
    Answer. I am not aware of any specific major failures; however, if 
confirmed, I will look into the lessons learned from this event, and 
other emergencies, and look for ways to improve the Corps' processes.
    Question. What changes, if any, do you believe that the USACE 
should make to improve its processes for reconstruction and relief 
contracting?
    Answer. From my experience with the Corps of Engineers, it is an 
organization that is constantly looking for ways to improve. I believe 
it is important that the Corps work closely with the Department of 
Homeland Security (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)), and 
other Federal and non-Federal partners, to improve the collective 
abilities to deliver required commodities and services in a timely, 
efficient, and cost-effective manner. The work that the Corps performed 
during Hurricane Katrina has been and will continue to be extensively 
audited and, if confirmed, I would look forward to continue to work 
with these agencies to implement collective actions and improvements to 
the Corps' processes.
    Question. Press articles have described a process in which work was 
passed down from the USACE to a prime contractor, then to a 
subcontractor, then to another subcontractor--with each company 
charging the government for profit and overhead--before finally 
reaching the company that would actually do the work. In one such case, 
the USACE reportedly paid a prime contractor $1.75 per square foot to 
nail plastic tarps onto damaged roofs in Louisiana. The prime 
contractor paid another company 75 cents per square foot to do the 
work; that subcontractor paid a third company 35 cents per square foot 
to do the work; and that subcontractor paid yet another company 10 
cents per square foot to do the work. In a second such case, the USACE 
reportedly paid prime contractors $28 to $30 per cubic yard to remove 
debris. The companies that actually performed the work were paid only 
$6 to $10 per cubic yard.
    What steps do you plan to take, if confirmed, to ensure that the 
USACE does not pay excessive ``pass-through'' charges of this kind on 
future contracts?
    Answer. While I am not personally familiar with these particular 
contracts, it is my understanding that the Corps of Engineers entered 
into competitive firm fixed price contracts in order to complete its 
mission. Existing procurement regulations address excessive ``pass-
through'' charges. These regulations were not in effect at the time of 
the Katrina response. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that these 
regulations are complied with.
    Question. Federal agencies, including the USACE, have been 
criticized for awarding sole-source contracts on the basis of ``urgent 
and compelling circumstances'' in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, even 
though some of these contracts were awarded long after the Hurricane 
took place or extended long beyond what could be justified on the basis 
of that disaster.
    Would you agree that the ``urgent and compelling'' exception to 
competition requirements should be used to award a contract only on the 
basis of an event, or series of events, that is reasonably proximate in 
time to the contract award? Would you agree that the term of a contract 
awarded on the basis of the urgent and compelling exception to 
competition requirements should not ordinarily exceed the period of 
time the agency reasonably believes to be necessary to award a follow-
on contract?
    Answer. Yes, in general I believe that the ``urgent and 
compelling'' exception should be used only in the immediate wake of the 
disaster. I understand that the law requires competition except in very 
limited circumstances and believe that competition is vitally 
important. I also agree that the term of a contract awarded on the 
basis of the urgent and compelling exception should not ordinarily 
exceed a reasonable period to award a follow on contract. However, any 
determination regarding the specific use of an ``urgent and 
compelling'' exception to competition should be looked at on a case-by-
case basis. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the Corps judiciously 
uses the ``urgent and compelling'' exception in compliance with the 
applicable statutes and regulations.
      competition in the contract management of military programs
    Question. The USACE has historically been designated as the primary 
contracting agent for military construction (MILCON) projects carried 
out by the Department of the Air Force. However, in recent years, due 
to the perception of excessive overhead costs associated with the 
USACE, the Air Force sought to establish an organic contracting agency 
through the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence in San 
Antonio, TX.
    What is your view of whether the Air Force should be allowed to 
carry out a larger percentage of MILCON contracts?
    Answer. The Corps of Engineers executes its military construction 
responsibilities in compliance with title 10 U.S.C. 2851, subsection 
(a), which provides that ``Each contract entered into by the United 
States in connection with a military construction project or a military 
family housing project shall be carried out under the direction and 
supervision of the Secretary of the Army (acting through the Chief of 
Engineers), the Secretary of the Navy (acting through the Commander of 
the Naval Facilities Engineering Command), or such other department or 
Government agency as the Secretary of Defense approves to assure the 
most efficient, expeditious, and cost-effective completion of the 
project.'' DOD Directive 4270.5 establishes policies and 
responsibilities for the military construction program and the use of 
DOD construction agents in the design or construction of military 
construction program facilities.
    The Corps of Engineers has successfully provided the Air Force 
military design and construction mission since the Air Force was 
established. I do not have an opinion on this specific issue at this 
time. If I am confirmed, I will review the matter and will work with 
DOD, the administration, and Congress to develop a position on this 
matter.
    Question. In your opinion, what would the impact be to the USACE by 
allowing the Air Force to serve as their own contracting agent without 
limitations?
    Answer. Congress passed a law in the early 1950s that designated 
the Army and the Navy as the DOD construction agents and specific 
certain assessments that needed to be completed prior to allowing 
another agent to execute the DOD-construction mission. If I am 
confirmed, I will review the matter and will work with DOD, the 
administration, and Congress to develop a position on this matter.
     efficient management practices in the army corps of engineers
    Question. In a report to Congress dated February 1, 2007 and 
entitled ``U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Response to Senate Report 109-
254, Management of Military Programs in the United States Corps of 
Engineers, January 2007'', the Commander of the U.S. Corps of Engineers 
stated that ``through MILCON Transformation, USACE will gain economic 
efficiencies through design standardization of Army facility types, 
centralization of design activities in USACE Centers of 
Standardization, and focused business line contracting with regional 
acquisition strategies.'' The report also forecasted that savings from 
these efficiencies would be experienced by customers in later years 
after full implementation of transformation initiatives, possibly 
affecting rates charged by the Corps for supervision, inspection, and 
overhead.
    Do you support the goals of the USACEs' plan for MILCON 
Transformation?
    Answer. Yes. The goals of implementing a MILCON business process 
that seeks to reduce design and construction costs and delivery time 
and to build efficiencies through standardization of facilities and 
processes remain extremely important and relevant. The cycle of 
building, learning, adapting best practices and feeding this 
information back into the programming phase has resulted in more 
efficient and effective program execution.
    Question. How do you assess the success of this program?
    Answer. Based on what I know so far, the initiative to implement a 
transformed Army MILCON Business Process was extremely successful. Like 
any new process, there were lessons learned. Although a 2010 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report faulted the Army for not 
establishing clear baseline for measuring achievement of goals for cost 
and time savings, the report concluded that the Army did reduce the 
estimated cost of some facility construction projects and shortened 
building timelines during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. Perhaps the 
greatest benefits resulted from more consistent solicitations and 
delivery of a high volume of standard facilities during this period. 
The MILCON Transformation initiative was a key factor enabling the 
successful execution and delivery of an unprecedented MILCON program 
during a period of very volatile market conditions. If confirmed, I 
will learn more about the program and strive to continue to build on 
its success. The transformed MILCON process provides a strong 
foundation for continued adaptation and refinement of facilities 
delivery processes to satisfy current and future program requirements.
    Question. Are you aware of any customer concerns that you would 
want to address, if confirmed?
    Answer. It is my understanding that Army installation customers 
have expressed a desire for more flexibility to accommodate local 
installation preferences that may conflict with Army facilities 
standards or standard designs. In an era of constrained staffing and 
resources, installations are also interested in an integrated system 
that results in delivery of a complete (ready to occupy) facility 
including furniture and information technology systems. I understand 
that the Corps is working with the Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Installation Management and the Installation Management Command to 
streamline processes for consideration of waivers to standards and 
standard designs. If confirmed, I will learn more about customer 
concerns and try to address them as appropriate.
    Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes or 
improvements?
    Answer. I believe that the Corps must continuously assess its 
facilities delivery processes and seek improvements to better satisfy 
program requirements and customer expectations. I believe that the 
Corps should produce more energy efficient designs to support Army 
objectives for compliance with energy mandates and reduced operating 
costs. I would give priority to ensuring that Corps design and 
construction techniques support energy mandates. Energy efficiency best 
practices are specific to the site (climate zone) and facility type. 
For instance, some areas of the country can take advantage of solar 
energy while wind energy might be more efficient in another area.
    Question. Have the Corps' customers seen any benefits of MILCON 
transformation in terms of decreased costs for supervision, inspection, 
and overhead and improved delivery times for construction products?
    Answer. I believe that customers have benefited from reduced 
supervision and administration costs to the. extent that contract cost 
savings have been achieved. This is because the Corps operates within a 
flat rate for supervision and administration (S&A) of MILCON projects 
based on a fixed percentage of the contract amount. This system 
provides for predictability and consistency for programming of 
projects. I also understand there has been a savings in design costs 
based on the use of standard designs and expanded use of design-build 
acquisitions. I understand that resources are tight and demands for 
them are high and, if confirmed, I commit to continue these 
transformation efforts to improving services while trying to maximize 
efficiencies.
    Question. If not, when do you expect they will begin to see such 
benefits?
    Answer. I believe the Army has realized savings as discussed above.
            bundling of contracts by the corps of engineers
    Question. The USACE is faced with the significant challenge of 
carrying out construction requirements imposed by force structure 
changes due to Army modularity, wrapping up the 2005 round of Base 
Realignments and Closures, the implementation of the Integrated Global 
Presence and Basing Strategy, and most recently, the Army's initiative 
to grow the force. In response, the Corps plans to allow construction 
contractors to propose alternate types of construction, including pre-
manufactured and modular buildings, to bundle projects for multiple 
buildings into one delivery order, and to rely on design-build 
acquisitions, which requires one contractor to provide both design and 
construction services. The net effect of these proposals will be to 
reduce the pool of qualified contractors able to bid on such large and 
complicated projects.
    In your view, what benefits, if any would be gained by these 
initiatives?
    Answer. The shift from the legacy practice of defining prescriptive 
requirements to performance based requirements and criteria allows the 
market to drive the solution that provides the most efficient and cost-
effective means to comply with the facility requirements and criteria. 
Allowing a broad range of construction types allows contractors to 
adapt to changing market conditions and materials costs by proposing 
the systems that they can deliver most efficiently. During fiscal year 
2008-2009 when the Corps construction program peaked, the construction 
market (both labor and material) was very volatile as a result of 
rising diesel fuel prices. Steel prices were up in one region, down in 
another, with similar conditions for concrete and wood. Flexibility in 
design allowed more contractors to participate and offer their unique 
solutions based on the sector of the market where they had a 
competitive advantage.
    Question. What are the risks to increasing the size and range of 
services required by these contracts?
    Answer. The risks of combining multiple facilities into single 
large contracts include reducing the number of contractors that have 
the capability to perform the work, and reducing opportunities for 
small- and medium-sized businesses to compete as prime contractors. If 
confirmed, I will help the Corps continue to choose acquisition 
strategies designed to efficiently execute projects, provide 
competitive opportunities for industry, and achieve the small business 
goals. Packaging one or more facilities together in one delivery order 
is not a standard business practice, but may be appropriate for a very 
tight construction site or to satisfy unique phasing requirements.
    Question. In your opinion, how can the Corps of Engineers ensure a 
healthy bid climate that allows for a full range of small- and mid-
range businesses to compete for construction contracts?
    Answer. I believe that proper acquisition planning that includes a 
level of market research commensurate with the requirements will 
identify qualified businesses interested in the specific procurements 
and the available competition in the market. Careful analysis of this 
information ensures the maximum level of competition by all qualified 
businesses and the ability to provide maximum opportunities for small 
business.
    Question. In your opinion, what are the benefits and costs 
resulting from the Corps of Engineers' decision to accept a less 
permanent type of construction?
    Answer. There has been no change to required facility service life 
for MILCON projects. The Corps' solicitations require a 50-year 
structure life, with a 25-year cycle for renovation or repurposing of 
facilities. When properly designed and maintained, all types of 
construction (wood, steel, concrete, or masonry) can achieve or exceed 
the 50-year target facility service life. The use of alternative 
construction types does not compromise the durability of the facility, 
but does permit facilities designs to be as cost effective and 
efficient as possible while complying with all applicable codes, life-
safety standards and other requirements. The Corps has reviewed the 
issue of durability of alternative building systems and determined that 
design of a structure to building codes for service loads, wind, 
seismic forces, force protection and progressive collapse results in a 
very robust structure. A 2010 GAO report recommended DOD conduct 
additional study and analysis to assess the merits and long-term costs 
resulting from the use of alternative building materials and methods. 
If confirmed, I will work with DOD and the Corps to further assess this 
issue.
  construction services acquisition methods for the corps of engineers
    Question. In response to urgent requirements to complete military 
construction projects related to the 2005 round of Base Realignments 
and Closures (BRAC), the Corps adopted an integrated design bid build 
process with early contractor involvement. Various Corps districts used 
different versions of this process with disparate levels of success 
depending on the steps written in the contract to negotiate firm, fixed 
prices after contract award and during actual construction. In the case 
of the construction of a new hospital at Fort Belvoir, VA, costing more 
than $1 billion, the committee was notified in December 2010 that DOD 
was required to pay the contractor an additional $160 million as a 
payment for ``firm-fixed price contract definitization'' even though 
the facility was 80 percent construction complete and the cost was in 
excess to the amount that had been authorized by Congress. 
Representatives from the Corps briefed this committee in January 2011 
that this process is being used in at least 19 other construction 
contracts.
    Are you familiar with this process?
    Answer. Yes, I am generally familiar with the use of Fixed Price 
Incentive Successive Targets (FPIS) contracts in general, and with the 
Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) methodologies developed by the 
Corps.
    Question. Do you believe that it was beneficial to the Government 
to award military construction projects without a clear firm-fixed 
price at contract award? If so, why?
    Answer. Yes. Considering the size, technical complexity, and time 
constraints for delivery of the Fort Belvoir Community Hospital and 
other large and complex facilities required to support implementation 
of BRAC 2005, the delivery timelines could not have been achieved while 
satisfying the functional and operational requirements using any 
traditional acquisition method. As the committee notes, the Corps has 
used the Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) method for only about 20 
MILCON projects. ECI is a specialized tool appropriate in unique 
circumstances. FPIS uses target and ceiling pricing, and a series of 
incentives, to determine a final price. This delivery method known as 
ECI has been used successfully to complete a number of quality projects 
with an expedited delivery schedule and includes a guaranteed maximum 
price that could increase if contractually appropriate scope changes 
arise. The hospital at Fort Belvoir was one of the pilot ECI projects 
awarded by the Corps and, I understand, a number of lessons learned 
have been identified as process improvements since that time and 
internal policies and procedures have been updated and continue to be 
updated.
    Question. In your opinion, given the risk to the Government, should 
the Corps establish guidelines and standards for the use of this 
acquisition process?
    Answer. It is my understanding that the Corps has been gathering 
lessons learned from its initial ECI experiences and is refining its 
processes and guidance. I also understand that management controls are 
in place that require each project proposing to utilize the ECI 
delivery method to be approved by the Headquarters, with subsequent 
approval of an acquisition plan by the Principal Assistant Responsible 
for Contracting. The Corps is also working with Defense Contract Audit 
Agency and Defense Contract Management Agency as part of its continuous 
learning and sharing.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure this process, if used, 
is managed in a way that does not expose the Government to a contract 
liability for amounts that have not been authorized by Congress?
    Answer. If confirmed, I intend to continue the work which the Corps 
has begun to capture lessons learned from the ECI contracts which have 
been awarded; and to refine criteria and improve the guidance for the 
application of ECI. In addition, I will seek to increase outreach to 
other DOD elements and industry, to explore ways to refine our 
management and contract administration practices to limit cost growth 
when using this acquisition method.
                 energy savings and sustainable design
    Question. DOD has goals for the reduction of energy consumption in 
facilities as well as the adoption of sustainable design standards. As 
the largest design and construction agent for the Department for the 
execution of military construction contracts, the Corps will be 
responsible for a qualitative response to the needs of military 
customers to meet those goals.
    How do you assess the expertise and professional education of the 
engineers in the Corps to be able to incorporate the latest technology 
and practices for energy consumption reductions and sustainable design 
in each military construction project?
    Answer. The Corps has demonstrated great capability in achieving 
energy savings in design and construction with infusion of new 
technologies. In that regard, I believe that the Corps is on par with 
industry as our society learns how to build energy efficient and 
sustainable facilities. The Corps is actively engaged with the Army, 
the Department of Energy, and other partners to learn how to 
incorporate new technologies and design methods into our standard 
business processes. It is also training its staff in energy efficient 
design, sustainable and high performing building at all levels and in 
all disciplines.
    Question. In your opinion, should this aspect of project design be 
subject to the request of the customer or established as a design 
standard for all Corps projects?
    Answer. In my view, customers have the flexibility to define the 
requirements for their facilities within the constraints of applicable 
codes, Federal mandates, and DOD policy requirements. The Corps is 
seeking to standardize the best business practices and to define the 
types of technologies and design features that will optimize energy 
efficiency for the climate zone and facility type being provided. For 
example, the Corps is working to implement new processes to conduct 
energy savings modeling for every project at the planning or early 
design phase. They are also working toward performing a full building 
life cycle cost analysis of the energy efficiency options that make 
sense and are available to the customer. This will allow the customer 
to make an informed decision regarding initial investment cost and the 
total cost of ownership over the facility life cycle.
    Question. In your opinion, how aggressive is the Corps in testing 
new technologies and products and then adjusting military 
specifications to be able to incorporate those technologies and 
products into facility designs?
    Answer. There are many great examples of new technologies going 
into projects daily, however I believe the Corps can be more aggressive 
to institutionalize or make these technologies wide spread. The Corps 
has identified development of a knowledge management capability as one 
of its Campaign Plan objectives, which will help improve the sharing of 
best practices.
    preference for design-build contracts for military construction 
                                projects
    Question. Over the past 10 years, the Corps of Engineers has 
adopted the design-build (DB) process as the preferred contracting 
vehicle for the acquisition of facility construction, as opposed to 
traditional methods of design-bid-build (DBB) and in-house design. 
While DB contracts offer the opportunity for a designer and a 
construction contractor to work together earlier in the contract, thus 
reducing claims and change orders, the risk of user-requested changes 
increases and the role of Corps engineers in the design phase as well 
as contract oversight are diminished. In addition, the proliferation of 
contracted designs has greatly reduced the amount of in-house design 
performed by Corps engineers.
    What is your view on the appropriate balance of DB, DBB, and in-
house design work accomplished by the Corps?
    Answer. In my view, it is important to carefully assess and make 
decisions regarding the acquisition strategy for each project in 
coordination with the customer early in the project development 
process. It is important to maintain an appropriate balance between DB 
and DBB methods in order to offer contractors a wide and varied 
opportunity to compete. Similarly, the Corps must balance the need to 
retain in-house design work to sustain technical competency with the 
need to provide design opportunities for the private architect-engineer 
community. These decisions are not driven by numbers of projects, but 
by the nature of the projects, the objectives of our customers, and the 
need to maintain a technically competent staff. Only through in-house 
design experiences can the Corps be prepared to provide the required 
technical and engineering skills required by its diverse missions.
    Question. In your opinion, on what factors should the design and 
acquisition process recommended by the Corps to its customers be based 
on for each military construction project?
    Answer. In my opinion, selection of the design and acquisition 
method should be based on the best tool available, considering the 
specific requirements of the projects and the objectives of the 
customer. For example, the need to define unique or specialized 
facility requirements during the design phase may make DBB the most 
appropriate tool. Renovation projects are often executed using the DBB 
method in order to reduce risk related to unknown as-built conditions. 
DB may be more attractive when the customer has well-defined functional 
requirements and criteria, or requires construction to fast track or 
start early--due to seasonal weather.
    Question. Are you concerned about the impact of the amount of in-
house design work on the capabilities of the engineering corps?
    Answer. I am concerned that the Corps maintains the right balance 
of work to remain technically competent. I know the Corps has placed a 
great deal of focus on this issue as reflected in its Campaign Plan, 
and I will continue to maintain a focus on technical competency if I am 
confirmed.
    Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes in the 
process and guidelines used by the Corps to determine the acquisition 
method for each military construction project?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would seek consistency in acquisition 
processes and solicitations among Corps districts, in order to assist 
industry to better understand project requirements and improve the 
quality and pricing of their proposals. I would also place a priority 
on ensuring selection of appropriate design and contracting strategies 
to facilitate compliance with energy and sustainability requirements.
                          environmental issues
    Question. If confirmed, you will take charge of the largest 
construction program in the country. Virtually every major civil works 
project of the USACE raises environmental concerns.
    What is your view of the appropriate balance between the missions 
and projects of the USACE and the National Environmental Policy Act and 
other environmental statutes?
    Answer. I believe that the Corps can and must carry out its 
missions in an environmentally responsible manner. The Corps has a long 
record of coordinating its missions and planning its projects in 
compliance with the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act 
and numerous other environmental statutes, consistent with the Corps' 
Environmental Operating Principals. Strong collaboration with other 
agencies and subject matter experts has led to better and more 
environmentally sensitive projects. If confirmed, I am committed to 
ensuring that Corps projects are planned, constructed, operated, and 
maintained in such a manner as to avoid or minimize adverse 
environmental effects.
    Question. The USACE is responsible for environmental restoration 
projects at Department of Defense Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) 
and at Department of Energy Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action 
Program (FUSRAP) sites.
    What do you view as the greatest challenges facing the USACE with 
respect to the execution of its environmental restoration mission?
    Answer. It is my understanding that continuing to execute the vital 
cleanup mission, adapting new technologies to gain efficiencies, while 
always protecting the health and safety of the public and workers is 
perhaps the biggest challenge for the FUDS and FUSRAP programs. The 
Corps must continue to apply good science, adopt innovative effective 
technology, and apply good management practices that will increase 
remediation safety and efficiency and meet commitments to stakeholders. 
Effective interim risk management and public education programs are 
important to the process.
    Question. Do you believe that goals established for environmental 
cleanup (including cleanup of unexploded ordnance) under these programs 
are realistic and achievable?
    Answer. The Corps has aggressive goals for these programs and 
meeting those goals will be a challenge. Much of this work is conducted 
on private property and involves numerous stakeholders, many with 
conflicting agendas. If confirmed, I will continue to press for ways to 
perform the mission in the most efficient and effective manner 
possible.
    Question. In the past, the USACE has not always been required to 
meet States' water quality standards in constructing and operating its 
water resources projects.
    Do you believe that the USACE should be required to meet State 
water quality standards in constructing and operating USACE projects?
    Answer. Yes. I believe that the Corps should be a leader in the 
environmental arena and, in most circumstances, should meet State water 
quality requirements.
    Question. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act requires landowners or 
developers to obtain USACE permits to carry out activities involving 
disposal of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of the 
United States, including wetlands. For almost 2 decades, the stated 
goal of the Federal Government has been ``no net loss of wetlands''.
    Do you support the goal of ``no net loss of wetlands''?
    Answer. Yes, I support the national no net loss goal. Wetlands are 
important to human health, the environment and the economy.
    Question. Do you believe that we are currently meeting that goal?
    Answer. I understand that the Corps is contributing to the national 
goal by requiring compensatory mitigation for unavoidable wetland 
impacts.
    Question. What specific steps do you believe that the USACE should 
take to move us closer to the goal of ``no net loss of wetlands''?
    Answer. I understand that the Corps' Regulatory Program continues 
to use the best available science and information to ensure the 
ecological success of compensatory mitigation required to offset 
unavoidable impacts to waters and wetlands. Two of the Corps' 
regulatory performance metrics emphasize the need to ensure that 
compensatory mitigation for authorized impacts to aquatic resources is 
accomplished. Additionally, I understand that the Corps does have a 
database in order to trace wetland impacts and mitigation. If 
confirmed, I will ensure that the Corps continues to successfully 
operate its Regulatory Program towards the goal of ``no net loss of 
wetlands''.
               recruiting and retention of army engineers
    Question. In recent years, competition among employers for the 
services of highly qualified engineers has greatly increased.
    What is your understanding of the Army's success in recruiting and 
retaining for careers sufficient numbers of highly-qualified officers 
and civilian employees for service in the USACE?
    Answer. From what I understand, the Corps is very successful at 
filling civilian positions and usually has multiple highly qualified 
candidates for each position announced. Recruiting the right talent to 
meet the challenges and projected workload is critical to the success 
of the Corps. Although the current economy has contributed to recent 
recruitment successes, the Corps must be ready to recruit from a 
projected shrinking talent pool. One of the objectives in the Corps 
Campaign Plan is to establish tools and systems to get the right people 
in the right jobs, and then develop and retain this highly-skilled 
workforce. In order to accomplish these objectives, the Corps has 
trained a civilian recruitment cadre to interact with job seekers and 
market the Corps of Engineers as an employer of choice. It is also my 
understanding that the Corps of Engineers generally does very well in 
helping to recruit and retain military officers. More officers are 
interested in branching Engineer and serving with the Corps of 
Engineers than the Army has authorizations to fill. Over the past 
several years, the Army has made significant progress to increase the 
percentage of incoming Engineer officers with engineering and other 
technical degrees. Many Engineer officers later earn Masters' degrees 
in engineering or related fields as well as professional certifications 
such as Professional Engineer (PE) and Project Management Professional.
    Question. What do you view as the Corps of Engineers greatest 
challenge in meeting its manpower and training and education 
requirements?
    Answer. The Corps has been successful in recruiting and retaining 
needed manpower. I believe that the greatest challenge will come as the 
economy improves and private industry begins to actively hire 
engineers, scientists, and other professionals. Many Corps employees 
are project funded; paying salaries during training periods has been a 
challenge and limits the amount of time employees can spend in a 
training status. However, I recognize the vital importance of 
continuing to identify competency strengths and gaps and then 
determining the training, education, experience, and resources to close 
those gaps.
    Question. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that the 
Army improves its attractiveness to highly qualified individuals for 
service in both the Active and Reserve components and in the civilian 
workforce?
    Answer. In addition to the programs previously mentioned, I would 
definitely support the Office of Personnel Management, DOD, and 
Department of Army in their efforts to streamline and shorten the 
Federal hiring process. Speed of hiring talent at all levels is 
important in order not to lose the best candidates to other employers. 
Also important is having an efficient and painless ``on-boarding'' 
process for new employees. The way new personnel are welcomed into the 
organization plays a significant role in whether they stay with the 
organization. Since Public Law 109-163, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the Department has had the 
mandate to assess existing and future competencies needed to accomplish 
its missions. The Army is doing that through use of the Competency 
Management System.
    The Corps of Engineer uses the Cadet District Engineer Program to 
bring Reserve Officers' Training Corps and U.S. Military Academy cadets 
into the Corps between their junior and senior years. This program 
introduces the cadets to engineering projects and gives them 3 weeks of 
hands-on experience. Approximately 40-50 cadets participate each 
summer. As stated previously, the Engineer branch vigorously recruits 
cadets with technical degrees and other appropriate qualifications for 
commissioning as Engineer officers. After commissioning, most Engineer 
officers serve with troop units through company command. The Human 
Resources Command places highly-qualified and competitive officers to 
serve with the Corps in various capacities. With over 75 percent of 
Engineer units in the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard, there 
is a tremendous reservoir of talented Engineer officers in the Reserve 
components. The Army could not meet all Engineer manning requirements 
without them. These Reserve component officers serve in a variety of 
critical positions alongside Active component military and civilian 
personnel. If confirmed, I would continue to support these great 
recruitment efforts and look for additional ways to improve the Corps 
military and civilian workforce.
           human capital planning for the civilian workforce
    Question. DOD is developing a comprehensive human capital strategic 
plan for its Federal civilian workforce which is intended to identify 
critical skills and competencies needed in the future civilian employee 
workforce, as well as a plan of action for developing and reshaping the 
Federal civilian workforce.
    If confirmed, how would you approach the task of identifying gaps 
in needed skills in the USACE workforce and ensuring that adequate 
resources, training, and professional developments efforts are 
undertaken to achieve the Corps' workforce goals?
    Answer. If confirmed I would serve as the Army Functional Chief for 
over 106 Army Civilian Engineering and Science occupations covering 
professional, blue collar, non-appropriated fund, and foreign national 
employees and would be responsible for instituting holistic life-cycle 
career management. I would continue the work the Corps has done to 
identify competencies for mission critical occupations, assess 
competencies and institute strategies to close competency gaps. I would 
continue refinement of professional development maps for all assigned 
occupations and will utilize the Corps Leader Development Program that 
incorporates the Army's Civilian Education System to promote an 
environment of continuous learning and leader development.
                        congressional oversight
    Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight 
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other 
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, 
briefings, and other communications of information.
    Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before 
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, 
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this 
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide 
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, 
with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Engineers?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and 
other communications of information are provided to this committee and 
its staff and other appropriate committees?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of 
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by 
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee 
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing 
such documents?
    Answer. Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
           Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
                         corps' spending budget
    1. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Bostick, we all know there 
is a large backlog of projects that are not being carried out by the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) due to lack of funding, and 
that was true even before our current budget crisis. Now that we will 
likely see cuts across many programs, how will the Army Corps determine 
which projects to fund?
    General Bostick. I am aware of the significant construction backlog 
that exists within the Civil Works program. I am also aware of the 
current budgetary constraints that face this great nation. If 
confirmed, I will work within the administration and with Congress to 
ensure that the process used by the Corps of Engineers will continue to 
be performance based, making the best overall use of available funds by 
prioritizing projects that provide the greatest return on investment to 
the Nation.

    2. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Bostick, many ports and 
harbors in my State are small by comparison, but act as the lifeline to 
the community, allowing our shellfishermen to head out every day, and 
our recreational boating industry to attract summer tourists. Without 
Congress' ability to provide suggestions through the traditional 
appropriations process, I fear that the Army Corps will continue to 
focus on dredging our large ports, and our small ports and harbors will 
be neglected. How will you balance the needs of the large industrial 
ports with the needs of the small industrial, recreational, and fishing 
harbors?
    General Bostick. I am aware of the ongoing discussions that are 
taking place throughout the country on the need for safe and reliable 
waterborne transportation systems for the movement of commercial goods 
and for national security needs. If confirmed, I will work within the 
administration and with Congress to ensure the maintenance of those 
inland and intracoastal waterways, coastal channels and the ports and 
harbors for which the Corps of Engineers has responsibility to 
maintain, will be accomplished in a manner that best supports the 
Nation's economy.

              supplemental environmental impact statement
    3. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Bostick, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has so far failed to proceed with a 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) for eastern Long 
Island Sound's dredged material disposal options. This is of grave 
concern to the maritime industry in Connecticut, as well as Submarine 
Base New London, since failure to complete an SEIS would have 
effectively shuttered our two existing dredged material disposal sites. 
Thankfully, after working with Army Corps officials from the New 
England District, I was able to have legislative language passed that 
would keep those two sites open an additional 5 years. What will you do 
to try to ensure that the SEIS proceeds as was promised a decade ago, 
so that the eastern half of Connecticut will not lose the ability to 
dredge its ports and harbors in a cost effective manner?
    General Bostick. It is my understanding that the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has the only authority to designate a long-term 
ocean dredged material placement site under section 103(b) of the 
Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act. It is also my 
understanding that the Corps of Engineers continues to coordinate with 
EPA in this matter and has provided information to EPA to assist. I 
understand the importance of adequate dredged material disposal sites 
in Long Island Sound and, if confirmed, will ensure that the Corps 
continues to do all it can to appropriately assist EPA in its 
requirements.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
                    environmental mission challenges
    4. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Bostick, there are over 300 
formerly used defense sites (FUDS) and service sites in Alaska. Much of 
the environmental contamination impacts Alaska Natives and their 
villages, like those on Saint Lawrence Island. Environmental 
restoration at many of these sites will not be completed for years. In 
your view, what is the greatest challenge facing the Army Corps with 
respect to the execution of its environmental mission?
    General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers' environmental mission 
involves multiple programs supporting the Department of Defense (DOD), 
the Department of the Army and non-DOD customers. For example, these 
programs include not only FUDS, but the Army Environmental Restoration 
Program, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund Program, 
the Army Civil Works Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program, 
the Native American Lands Environmental Mitigation Program (NALEMP) 
which has the vast majority of its projects in Alaska. Each 
environmental program presents its own unique challenges with support 
tailored to each customer's requirements. Overall, I see the greatest 
challenge is to efficiently and effectively mitigate the risks to human 
health and the environment, to communicate well with the public and to 
engage strategically with environmental regulators and stakeholders, 
while working within the resources made available to each program.
    The NALEMP program is a DOD program administered by the Corps which 
provides funding to local Native American communities to address 
environmental issues which are a result of DOD activities impacting 
Native American lands. The majority of the program has been focused on 
FUDS properties in Alaska and has assisted in the characterization and 
removal of environmental concerns while promoting Native American 
entities winning and executing projects using DOD funds provided 
through Cooperative Agreements.
    Concerning the FUDS program, the Army Corps currently executes the 
program on behalf of DOD and Army. DOD budgets for the program. The 
FUDS program has approximately 7,000 properties with an estimated 1,800 
sites remaining to be completed with a current cost to complete of 
approximately $14 billion. There are many challenges working with 
property no longer under DOD control but, if confirmed, I will ensure 
that the Corps continues to work with stakeholders to meet those 
challenges.

    5. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Bostick, if confirmed, what 
recommendations would you have for addressing those challenges?
    General Bostick. In addressing these challenges, I would recommend 
that the Corps of Engineers strives to continually improve execution, 
first by applying experiences gained via lessons learned throughout all 
environmental programs, second by utilizing innovative and greener 
solutions and concurrently engaging industry, and lastly by 
incorporating regular feedback that is continually being sought from 
the public, customers and stakeholders. For instance, in the cleanup of 
unexploded ordnance, a particular need is better site characterization 
technology, more effective interim risk management and public education 
programs until such time that all lands impacted by unexploded ordnance 
can be remediated, all of which are being addressed by FUDS program 
personnel.

    6. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Bostick, are the goals set 
for environmental cleanup realistic?
    General Bostick. I believe the Corps of Engineers has aggressive 
goals for conducting environmental cleanup set in conjunction with the 
Army, DOD and non-DOD customers. While meeting those goals will be a 
challenge, I believe they are achievable if adequate resources are made 
available on a timely basis. Much of the Corps environmental work is 
conducted on private property that may not have been used by the 
Federal Government for decades and involves numerous stakeholders, many 
with conflicting priorities, some of whom may be potentially 
responsible parties. If confirmed, I will continue to press for ways to 
perform the mission in the most efficient and effective manner 
possible.

                       small business contracting
    7. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Bostick, in recent years 
Congress has encouraged the agencies, particularly DOD, to increase 
competition for contracts. However, there is still an obligation of the 
agencies to utilize small businesses. In your opinion, how can the Army 
Corps ensure a bid climate that allows small- to mid-range businesses 
the opportunity for contracts?
    General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers must continue to ensure a 
bid climate that allows small businesses the opportunity to compete to 
the maximum extent possible. Market research and industry responses to 
sources sought synopses are the key to discovering small businesses' 
capabilities and the best way to structure procurements for 
construction, supplies and services. Information gained from industry 
during the sources sought process allows the Corps to develop 
acquisition strategies that consider small business participation as 
both prime contractors and subcontractors. While there is not a 
specific category for set aside of procurement actions for mid-range 
businesses, the Corps works to be as inclusive of all business sizes as 
possible, whether as a prime contractor or a subcontractor. If 
confirmed, I am committed to creating opportunities for small business 
participation in Corps projects. I will ensure that this continues to 
be a focus for the organization as a whole.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
   delivery of projects of regional importance and national security
    8. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, how do you plan 
to handle projects of undisputed regional significance which have 
opposition from an individual State for political purposes?
    General Bostick. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Corps of 
Engineers would work with the leadership of the affected states to 
attempt to resolve any differences or issues. If a mutual resolution 
could not be reached, the Corps would continue to evaluate the project 
on its own merits to determine if it is in the Federal interest to 
pursue the project.

 tri-state litigation on apalachicola-chattahoochee-flint river system
    9. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, the 11th Circuit 
opinion overruling the 2009 Magnuson decision remanded to the Army 
Corps the decision on whether [after having the breadth of its 
statutory authority under the 1946 Rivers and Harbors Act (P.L. 79-525) 
and the Water Supply Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-500)] the Army Corps will be 
able to grant Georgia's 2000 water supply request. We have been told 
that work is on track for completion by late June 2012. Do you expect 
that the Army Corps will be able to meet this deadline?
    General Bostick. Yes, my understanding is that the Corps of 
Engineers intends to complete the analysis that the Court of Appeals 
has directed by the end of June 2012.

    10. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, what do you 
believe is the extent of Army Corps authority to allocate storage for 
water supply in light of the 11th Circuit's ruling?
    General Bostick. I am not familiar with the details of the 11th 
Circuit's ruling or the legal authorities at issue. I understand that 
the Corps of Engineers is currently evaluating the extent of its 
authority to operate Lake Lanier for water supply, and intends to 
complete its analysis and provide its answer in accordance with the 
Court of Appeals ruling by June 2012.

    11. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, as part of this 
analysis, do you believe that the Army Corps will make the decision to 
credit return flows?
    General Bostick. I am unaware of the Corps of Engineers' existing 
policies on return flows. My understanding is that the Corps' analysis 
is focused on the specific instructions provided in the 11th Circuit's 
ruling. I do not know whether that analysis, once it is completed, will 
include any legal or policy determinations regarding return flows.

    12. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, in your opinion, 
how much direction do you feel that the 11th Circuit decision has given 
the Army Corps?
    General Bostick. I am not familiar with the details of the 11th 
Circuit's decision. I understand that the Court of Appeals has remanded 
the matter to the Corps to make certain determinations that are within 
the Corps of Engineers' discretion, and has given the Corps specific 
instructions as to the issues it should address.

    13. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, what is the 
degree to which you feel that individual States will have influence 
over the Army Corps as it prepares its decision on this matter?
    General Bostick. My understanding is that the Court of Appeals has 
remanded the matter to the Corps of Engineers to make certain 
determinations that are within the Corps' discretion, according to the 
Corps' interpretation of applicable law. I also understand that after 
the Corps determines the extent of its authority, prior to making any 
final decisions on how to operate the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint 
system, the Corps will involve the States and the public as 
appropriate. I expect that the Corps will take into account the views 
of all affected States in that decisionmaking process

                 permitting new water supply reservoirs
    14. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, we have received 
word that the EPA may be urging the Army Corps to do an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) on all new reservoirs due to the cumulative 
effects of reservoirs as they are put into use. An EIS on all new 
reservoirs is, of course, costly in terms of both time and money. Do 
you feel that an EIS for all new non-Federal reservoirs is necessary?
    General Bostick. I am not familiar with the details of any current 
permit applications for new water supply reservoirs, or the 
environmental reviews that may be associated with those permits. 
Moreover, I do not know what advice U.S. Environmental Agency may have 
given on this matter. I do expect that the Corps of Engineers will 
comply with all applicable legal requirements in any permitting 
process.

    15. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, how do you 
foresee the Army Corps handling this issue?
    General Bostick. I am not familiar with the details of any current 
permit applications for new water supply reservoirs. I expect the Corps 
of Engineers to comply with all applicable legal requirements in any 
permitting process.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                   corps of engineers prioritization
    16. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Bostick, historically, most 
Army Corps civil projects have been carried out through congressional 
direction, primarily through authorizations made in the Water Resources 
Development Act. In 2010, Congress refrained from authorizing directed 
spending for specific projects. This moratorium on directed spending 
will likely remain for the foreseeable future. Under these 
circumstances, how will the Army Corps prioritize funding for projects 
across the country?
    General Bostick. If confirmed, I will work within the 
administration and with Congress to ensure that the process used by the 
Corps of Engineers will continue to be performance based, making the 
best overall use of available funds by prioritizing projects that 
provide the greatest return on investment to the Nation.

    17. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Bostick, do certain regions 
have a higher priority compared to others?
    General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers does not place higher 
priority on different regions of the country. If confirmed, I will work 
within the administration and with Congress to ensure the emphasis in 
development of the Civil Works program will be on investments in the 
Nation's infrastructure that funds constructing, maintaining and 
operating critically important water infrastructure in every state of 
the Nation that contributes to the Nation's economy and quality of 
life. I will support management, restoration, and protection of the 
Nation's water, wetlands, and related resources.

    18. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Bostick, how will the Army 
Corps prioritize support for projects that serve a national purpose, 
such as repairing and maintaining the Mississippi River and Tributaries 
(MR&T) Project?
    General Bostick. I am aware of the great flood of 2011 and the 
extensive damages that occurred throughout the middle and northeast 
areas of our country. I am also aware that the infrastructure operated 
and maintained by the Corps of Engineers prevented damages in excess of 
$110 billion in the Mississippi River watershed alone. If confirmed, I 
will work within the administration and with Congress to ensure that 
the funding made available to the Corps, including the MR&T, for the 
repairs and recovery from this historic event, will be executed as 
quickly as possible, especially those critical repairs to protect life 
and public safety.

                     harbor maintenance trust fund
    19. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Bostick, ensuring the safety 
and uninterrupted operation in our Nation's ports is essential to 
commerce, trade, and America's economic prosperity. However, many of 
our country's ports face critical maintenance needs for which the Army 
Corps claims it has insufficient funding. This includes the requirement 
for congressionally-mandated routine dredging to maintain our ports at 
their authorized depths. Could funds made available from the Harbor 
Maintenance Trust Fund be a viable option to address the shortfall of 
Federal funding to carry out critical dredging needed by our Nation's 
ports?
    General Bostick. I am aware that our Nation's ports, harbors, and 
waterways are vital components of the Nation's transportation system. I 
am also aware of the current budgetary constraints that face this great 
nation. Since spending from the Harbor Maintenance Trust is dependent 
on congressional appropriations, Congress would have to appropriate the 
additional funds and provide a corresponding increase in the Corps' 
Civil Works budget, or offsetting reductions would have to be taken 
from other Civil Works mission areas. If confirmed, I will work within 
the administration and with Congress to ensure the Corps of Engineers 
civil works projects are prioritized based on maximum benefits to the 
Nation for all its missions within the limitations of the overall 
budgetary constraints.

    20. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Bostick, do you believe 
utilizing funds deposited into the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund each 
year to dredge and maintain ports would impact the financial solvency 
of the Fund?
    General Bostick. I understand that the Harbor Maintenance Trust 
Fund is made up of receipts collected in the form of an ad valorum tax 
on imports and interest earned on the balance in the Trust Fund. These 
revenues then reimburse the Corps of Engineers for expenditures on 
eligible navigation projects. I am not familiar with the specific 
details or the inner workings of this fund. I am told that utilization 
of the HMTF balance is being discussed within the administration. If 
confirmed, I will work within the administration and with Congress on 
this issue of critical importance to the Nation.

             leadership in energy and environmental design
    21. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Bostick, the recent practice 
of DOD to require construction of green buildings to meet certain 
standards of Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) has 
discriminated against various U.S. products and may have harmed 
competitiveness. How will the Army Corps ensure its Federal 
construction of any green building will allow all green rating systems 
to be considered when adopting green building standards?
    General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers is committed to achieving 
full and open competition in design and construction services and it is 
never the Corps' intent to implement any policy that would discriminate 
against various U.S. products or harm competitiveness. In making a 
decision on what certification standard to apply, I believe it is 
important that it achieves a high performance and sustainable building, 
identified by a minimum standard of performance, a certification that 
is widely accepted and recognized by industry. If confirmed, I will 
ensure that the Corps continues working with its Federal partners, as 
well as its customers, to influence and implement sustainable building 
requirements that support full and open competition.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman
                      confined disposal facilities
    22. Senator Portman. Lieutenant General Bostick, in the Great 
Lakes, certainly in Lake Erie, dredged material has traditionally been 
placed in Confined Disposal Facilities (CDFs). Projected costs for new 
CDFs make it substantially unlikely that new CDFs would be the 
preferred option. In Ohio, substantial work has been done to develop 
new upland uses for sediment, yet current Army Corps procedures seem to 
favor short-term disposal costs versus life-cycle asset growth and 
utilization. Can you please share your views on how the Army Corps can 
best support local efforts to develop alternatives to costly CDFs?
    General Bostick. It is my understanding that the Corps of Engineers 
seeks to accomplish its navigation mission through the Federal 
Standard, which is defined as the least costly, environmentally 
acceptable dredged material placement method. I would expect periodic 
testing and discussions with environmental resource agencies to assure 
the Federal Standard is maintained and placement costs are minimized. 
If confirmed, I would support the Corps continuing to work with non-
Federal sponsors and interested parties to explore all methods to best 
accomplish the mission within the law.

    23. Senator Portman. Lieutenant General Bostick, would you support 
the Army Corps' reliance on locally developed engineering solutions for 
sediment management?
    General Bostick. I would expect the Corps of Engineers to cooperate 
and collaborate with non-Federal sponsors and third party engineering 
firms experienced in sediment management to ensure that dredged 
material placement is accomplished in accordance with all applicable 
laws and environmental regulations and in the least costly manner to 
the U.S. taxpayer.

                         army corps procedures
    24. Senator Portman. Lieutenant General Bostick, concerns have been 
raised in a variety of venues regarding the pace and complexity of Army 
Corps procedures. The widely held perception is that the Army Corps is 
more focused on its process and procedures and narrow application of 
its rules than it is to actually achieving useful, effective outcomes 
in a timely manner. Can you please share your views about what plans, 
if any, you may bring to reform and streamline Army Corps procedures?
    General Bostick. I understand that the Corps of Engineers has been 
criticized for taking too long and costing too much to deliver 
essential services to the Nation. I believe that Corps leadership 
clearly understands that past strategies for planning, designing, 
constructing, operating, maintaining, repairing, replacing, and 
rehabilitating our infrastructure must be adapted to become leaner and 
more responsive to meet present needs. It is my understanding that the 
Corps currently has initiatives underway to improve project and program 
delivery. If confirmed, I will actively support the ongoing efforts and 
initiatives as well as others to make the Corps more efficient and 
effective.

    25. Senator Portman. Lieutenant General Bostick, there is also a 
sense that, when challenged, the Army Corps tends to adopt a highly 
self-protecting, defensive posture--preferring to protect its own 
policies and institution rather than accommodate and positively respond 
or adapt to concerns. Do you think the Army Corps needs to reform 
itself to become more accommodating, adaptable, and responsive to local 
concerns?
    General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers understands the need to 
consider local concerns and to be responsive to those concerns. In the 
recently published Civil Works Strategic Plan, one of the six 
strategies highlighted is Collaboration and Partnering-Building and 
sustaining collaboration and partnerships at all levels to leverage 
funding, talent, data, and research from multiple agencies and 
organizations to be more responsive to the public. Partnerships among 
Federal agencies, tribes, local entities, and private not-for-profit 
create efficiencies when scarce resources are combined toward common 
aims. If confirmed, I will support all efforts to ensure that the Corps 
is appropriately responsive to local concerns.

    26. Senator Portman. Lieutenant General Bostick, do you think the 
Army Corps is as efficient and cost-effective as it can be with 
shrinking fiscal resources?
    General Bostick. Any large organization can become more efficient 
and effective. If confirmed, I will make every effort to continuously 
improve and make the Corps of Engineers as efficient and effective as 
possible.

    27. Senator Portman. Lieutenant General Bostick, if confirmed as 
Commanding General, what plans, if any, would you have to make the Army 
Corps more efficient, with a modern business model?
    General Bostick. The current Corps of Engineers' business model is 
quite flexible. By leveraging private sector architect-engineer 
resources and private sector construction firms, while keeping a 
relatively small cadre of Federal employees, I understand that the 
Corps was able to accomplish a tripling of workload over the past 5 
years with virtually no increase in the number of Federal employees. 
But this business model can be improved. If confirmed, I will reexamine 
the Corps' business model and make every effort to employ modern 
business practices to make it as efficient and effective as possible.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
                       national export initiative
    28. Senator Graham. Lieutenant General Bostick, what benefits to 
this Nation does the Army Corps provide as we grow our economy through 
a resurgence of manufacturing, a modernization of the country's 
infrastructure, and the doubling of exports as described in President 
Obama's National Export Initiative?
    General Bostick. I believe that the Corps of Engineers continues to 
provide safe, reliable, cost-effective and environmentally sustainable 
transportation on its inland waterways and coastal channels and harbors 
in order to move commerce between the Nation's agricultural and 
manufacturing centers and its coastal ports to facilitate exports and 
imports of goods.

                         modernization of ports
    29. Senator Graham. Lieutenant General Bostick, how specifically 
can the Army Corps modernize our port infrastructure by reengineering 
our feasibility study process to be more responsive to global trends in 
shipping and trade that allow bigger ships to call upon our terminals 
either through the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal?
    General Bostick. I believe that the Corps of Engineers must be as 
efficient as possible in order to address the needs of the Nation. It 
is my understanding that the Corps has undertaken a number of recent 
initiatives to modernize its feasibility study process and strengthen 
its analyses of modernizing ports. This will result in shorter study 
timeframes and more responsive feasibility reports.
    To strengthen its analyses of ports, the Corps is improving its 
analytic procedures, methods of production, and understanding of the 
evolving global environment. Because navigation economic analysis is 
such a specialized field, the Corps established the National Deep Draft 
Navigation Planning Center of Expertise as a mandatory center for the 
production of all deep draft navigation related economic analyses. If 
confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the Corps is utilizing all 
possible tools to ensure consistent treatment across all studies 
nationally, which ultimately helps the Corps maintain the critical mass 
of expertise needed for conducting deep draft navigation economic 
studies in the most streamlined manner.

    30. Senator Graham. Lieutenant General Bostick, if confirmed as 
Chief of Engineers, you will oversee Federal aspects of domestic port 
operations. Do you view the Army Corps as the agency with the requisite 
expertise and obligation to recommend a port modernization strategy to 
the administration and to Congress?
    General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers is a premier public 
engineering organization, and I believe the Corps has the expertise, 
working in collaboration with other Federal agencies, to develop a port 
modernization strategy and to follow through with improvements and 
maintenance of its coastal ports and channels and inland waterways. The 
Corps is also taking a leadership role in the committee on the Marine 
Transportation System, which is enhancing Federal collaboration.

    31. Senator Graham. Lieutenant General Bostick, as DOD's budget 
shrinks in response to austerity measures, how would you prioritize 
which ports to invest in absent a comprehensive modernization strategy 
or a merit-based system of allocated funds?
    General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers develops its Civil Works 
budget by placing priority for funding to those projects with the 
highest economic and environmental return to the Nation. In the absence 
of a comprehensive modernization strategy, the Corps would continue to 
fund those projects which provide the greatest potential economic and 
environmental return to the Nation.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nomination reference of LTG Thomas P. Bostick, USA, 
follows:]
                    Nomination Reference and Report
                           As In Executive Session,
                               Senate of the United States,
                                                     April 6, 2011.
    Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee 
on Armed Services:
    The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of 
Engineers/Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and 
appointment to the grade indicated in the U.S. Army while assigned to a 
position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., 
sections 601 and 3036:

                        To be Lieutenant General

    LTG Thomas P. Bostick, 3680.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The biographical sketch of LTG Thomas P. Bostick, USA,, 
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the 
nomination was referred, follows:]
           Biographical Sketch of LTG Thomas P. Bostick, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA

Educational degrees:
    U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
    Stanford University - MS - Civil Engineering
    Stanford University - MS - Mechanical Engineering

Military schools attended:
    Engineer Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
    U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
    U.S. Army War College

Foreign language(s): Portuguese.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Promotions                       Date of Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT.......................................  7 Jun 78
1LT.......................................  7 Jun 80
CPT.......................................  1 Jan 82
MAJ.......................................  1 Jul 89
LTC.......................................  1 Jul 93
COL.......................................  1 Aug 97
BG........................................  1 May 02
MG........................................  15 Jul 05
LTG.......................................  2 Feb 10
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
              From                        To              Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan 75..........................  May 76............  Platoon Leader, A
                                                       Company, 54th
                                                       Engineer
                                                       Battalion, V
                                                       Corps, U.S. Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
May 80..........................  Mar 81............  Battalion
                                                       Maintenance
                                                       Officer, 54th
                                                       Engineer
                                                       Battalion, V
                                                       Corps, U.S. Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Mar 81..........................  Jul 81............  Executive Officer,
                                                       C Company, 54th
                                                       Engineer
                                                       Battalion, V
                                                       Corps, U.S. Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Jul 81..........................  Dec 82............  Commander, B
                                                       Company, 54th
                                                       Engineer
                                                       Battalion, V
                                                       Corps, U.S. Army
                                                       Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Jan 83..........................  Jul 83............  Student, Engineer
                                                       Officer Advanced
                                                       Course, U.S. Army
                                                       Engineer School,
                                                       Fort Belvoir, VA
Sep 83..........................  Jun 85............  Student, Stanford
                                                       University,
                                                       Stanford, CA
Jun 85..........................  Jun 88............  Instructor, later
                                                       Assistant
                                                       Professor,
                                                       Department of
                                                       Mechanics, U.S.
                                                       Military Academy,
                                                       West Point, NY
Jul 88..........................  Jun 89............  Student, U.S. Army
                                                       Command and
                                                       General Staff
                                                       College, Fort
                                                       Leavenworth, KS
Aug 89..........................  Aug 90............  White House
                                                       Fellow,
                                                       Department of
                                                       Veterans Affairs,
                                                       Washington, DC
Jun 90..........................  Jun 91............  Engineer
                                                       Operations Staff
                                                       Officer, Office
                                                       of the Deputy
                                                       Chief of Staff
                                                       for Engineers,
                                                       U.S. Army Europe
                                                       and Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Jun 91..........................  Jun 92............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                       40th Engineer
                                                       Battalion. 1st
                                                       Armored Division,
                                                       U.S. Army Europe
                                                       and Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Jun 92..........................  Jun 93............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                       Engineer Brigade,
                                                       1st Armored
                                                       Division, U.S.
                                                       Army Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Jun 93..........................  Jun 94............  Executive Officer
                                                       to the Chief of
                                                       Engineers, U.S.
                                                       Army Corps of
                                                       Engineers,
                                                       Washington, DC
Jun 94..........................  Jul 96............  Commander, 1st
                                                       Engineer
                                                       Battalion, 1st
                                                       Infantry Division
                                                       (Mechanized),
                                                       Fort Riley, KS
Aug 96..........................  Jun 97............  Student, U.S. Army
                                                       War College,
                                                       Carlisle
                                                       Barracks, PA
Jul 97..........................  Jun 99............  Commander,
                                                       Engineer Brigade,
                                                       1st Armored
                                                       Division, U.S.
                                                       Army Europe and
                                                       Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany and
                                                       Operation Joint
                                                       Forge, Bosnia-
                                                       Herzegovina
Jun 99..........................  May 01............  Executive Officer
                                                       to the Chief of
                                                       Staff, U.S. Army,
                                                       Washington, DC
May 01..........................  Aug 02............  Deputy Director
                                                       for Operations,
                                                       National Military
                                                       Command Center, J-
                                                       3, The Joint
                                                       Staff,
                                                       Washington, DC
Aug 02..........................  Jun 04............  Assistant Division
                                                       Commander
                                                       (Maneuver), later
                                                       Assistant
                                                       Division
                                                       Commander
                                                       (Support), 1st
                                                       Cavalry Division,
                                                       Fort Hood, TX,
                                                       and Operation
                                                       Iraqi Freedom,
                                                       Kuwait
Jun 04..........................  Jul 05............  Director of
                                                       Military
                                                       Programs, U.S.
                                                       Army Corps of
                                                       Engineers with
                                                       duty as
                                                       Commander, Gulf
                                                       Region Division,
                                                       Operation Iraqi
                                                       Freedom, Iraq
Oct 05..........................  May 09............  Commanding
                                                       General, U.S.
                                                       Army Recruiting
                                                       Command, Fort
                                                       Knox, KY
May 09..........................  Feb 10............  Special Assistant
                                                       to the Chief of
                                                       Staff, U.S. Army,
                                                       Washington, DC
Feb 10..........................  Present...........  Deputy Chief of
                                                       Staff, G-1, U.S.
                                                       Army, Washington,
                                                       DC
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Assignments                    Date              Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deputy Director for Operations,        May O1-Aug 02  Brigadier General
 National Military Command Center,
 J-3, The Joint Staff, Washington,
 DC................................
Director of Military Programs, U.S.    Jun 04-Jul 05  Brigadier General
 Army Corps of Engineers with duty
 as Commander, Gulf Region
 Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
 Iraq..............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Summary of operations assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Assignments                    Date              Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander. Engineer Brigade, 1st       Jul 97-Jun 99        Lieutenant Colonel/
 Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe                                    Colonel
 and Seventh Army, Germany and
 Operation Joint Forge, Bosnia-
 Herzegovina.......................
Assistant Division Commander           Mar 04-May 04  Brigadier General
 (Support), 1st Cavalry Division,
 Operation Iraqi Freedom, Kuwait...
Director of Military Programs, U.S.    Jun 04-Jul 05  Brigadier General
 Army Corps of Engineers with duty
 as Commander, Gulf Region
 Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
 Iraq..............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------


U.S. decorations and badges:
    Distinguished Service Medal
    Defense Superior Service Medal
    Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Bronze Star Medal
    Defense Meritorious Service Medal
    Meritotious Service Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Joint Service Commendation Medal
    Army Commendation Medal
    Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
    Combat Action Badge
    Parachutist Badge
    Recruiter Badge
    Ranger Tab
    Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
    Army Staff Identification Badge
                                 ______
                                 
    [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior 
military officers nominated by the President to positions 
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a 
form that details the biographical, financial, and other 
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Thomas P. 
Bostick, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
                          UNITED STATES SENATE
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              Room SR-228
                       Washington, DC 20510-6050
                             (202) 224-3871
                    COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
      BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
    Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If 
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the 
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation 
of your answer applies.
                    Part A--Biographical Information
    Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in 
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for 
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in 
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

    1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
    Thomas P. Bostick.

    2. Position to which nominated:
    Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers.

    3. Date of nomination:
    6 April 2011.

    4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
    [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the 
committee's executive files.]

    5. Date and place of birth:
    23 September 1956; Fukuoka, Japan.

    6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
    Married to Renee Yvonne Bostick (Maiden Name: Coyle).

    7. Names and ages of children:
    Joshua Jameson Bostick, age 27.

    8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary 
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local 
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract 
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

    9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an 
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, 
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other 
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    None.

    10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in 
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and 
other organizations.
    Society of American Military Engineers, Life Member
    Association of U.S. Army, Life Member
    Military Officers Association of America, Life Member
    ROCKs, Washington, DC, Local Member
    Pan Pacific American Leaders and Mentors Organization (PPALM)
    Association of Graduates, Advisor, Jan.-Dec. 2008.

    11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary 
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding 
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record 
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    Dean's List and Superintendent's at West Point, 1978
    Graduated 1st in Class in Language (Portuguese), 1978
    Captain of Sprint Football Team at West Point, 1978
    George C. Bass Award for Outstanding Leadership, 1978
    Best Maintenance Company in the Army, 1982
    Member of All-Army Power-lifter Team, 1983
    Community Mayor at Stewart Field, West Point, 1985
    Selected to present paper at American Society of Engineering 
Educators, 1986
    Honor Graduate, Engineer Officer Advance Course, 1983
    Selected for School of Advanced Military Studies, 1988
    White House Fellow, Department of Veterans Affairs, 1988-1989
    Who's Who in Science and Engineers in America, 1992
    Recognized by Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for actions in 
National Military Command Center on September 11, 2001
    Rock of the Year, 2008
    NAACP 2010 Roy Wilkins Renown Service Award for recent work as the 
commanding general, U.S. Army Recruiting Command.

    12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, 
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly 
constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes.

    13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly 
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if 
those views differ from the administration in power?
    Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the 
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set 
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to 
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                ------                                

                           Signature and Date
    I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement 
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information 
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, 
and complete.
                                        LTG Thomas P. Bostick, USA.
    This 15th day of July, 2011.

    [The nomination of LTG Thomas P. Bostick, USA, was reported 
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 22, 2012, with the 
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 
was confirmed by the Senate on April 26, 2012.]
                                     



NOMINATIONS OF HON. FRANK KENDALL III TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
 FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS; HON. JAMES N. MILLER, JR. 
TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY; HON. ERIN C. CONATON TO BE 
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS; MRS. JESSICA L. 
 WRIGHT TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS; MRS. 
    KATHARINA G. McFARLAND TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
 ACQUISITION; AND MS. HEIDI SHYU TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 
               FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 2012

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 
(chairman) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 
Akaka, Begich, Blumenthal, McCain, Brown, Ayotte, and Cornyn.
    Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations 
and hearings clerk.
    Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, 
professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research 
assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald 
J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. 
Maroney, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Robie I. 
Samanta Roy, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, 
professional staff member.
    Minority staff members present: Ann E. Sauer, minority 
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; 
Pablo E. Carrillo, minority general counsel; Paul C. Hutton IV, 
professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff 
member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Michael 
J. Sistak, research assistant; Diana G. Tabler, professional 
staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
    Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff and 
Mariah K. McNamara.
    Committee members' assistants present: Jeffrey Ratner, 
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to 
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Gordon 
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Lindsay Kavanaugh, 
assistant to Senator Begich; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to 
Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator 
Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brent 
Bombach, assistant to Senator Portman; Brad Bowman, assistant 
to Senator Ayotte; and Dave Hanke and Grace Smitham, assistants 
to Senator Cornyn.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

    Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
    The committee meets today to consider the nominations of 
Frank Kendall III to be Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; James Miller to be 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Erin Conaton to be Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Jessica 
Wright to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 
Affairs; Katharina McFarland to be Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition; and Heidi Shyu to be Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology.
    We welcome all of our nominees, their families, and friends 
to today's hearing. We appreciate the long hours and the other 
sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make to serve our 
country. Their families also deserve our thanks for the support 
that they provide which is so essential to the success of these 
officials.
    The positions to which today's witnesses have been 
nominated are among the most critical positions in the 
Department of Defense (DOD).
    The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics is the senior DOD official responsible for the 
oversight and management of an acquisition system that spends 
roughly $400 billion a year to buy everything from planes and 
ships, to scientific research and food services. The Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition is a new position 
established 2 years ago to assist the Under Secretary in these 
important responsibilities.
    If confirmed for these positions, Mr. Kendall and Mrs. 
McFarland will play the critical role in the Department's 
efforts to rein in costs and cost overruns in its acquisition 
programs. There are too many acquisition programs which are 
hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars over budget. 
We passed the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act a few 
years ago to bring to an end poorly planned programs, excessive 
concurrency in development and production, inadequate 
acquisition planning, and failure to perform important contract 
oversight and management functions necessary to protect our 
Nation's taxpayers. We will expect strong leadership from Mr. 
Kendall and Mrs. McFarland to hold both DOD officials and 
contractors accountable for failures of performance on defense 
acquisition programs.
    The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the senior 
civilian DOD official responsible for advising the Secretary of 
Defense on matters of policy, including oversight of war plans 
and the planning and execution of the Department's activities 
in combating terrorism. If confirmed for this position, Dr. 
Miller will play a critical role in issues ranging from 
managing the transition of security lead to Afghan forces and 
the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, to countering the 
Iranian threat, to helping formulate the U.S. response to the 
Syrian regime's brutality against its own people.
    The next Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will also 
put into effect the Department's recent Strategic Guidance 
which establishes the goal of a joint force that is smaller and 
leaner but that still meets the Department's global challenges. 
This includes rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region and 
the Middle East, including preventing Iranian efforts to 
destabilize the region, countering violent extremism, 
maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent, addressing the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction, protecting our operations in cyberspace and space, 
and building partnerships with allies and friendly nations.
    The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
is the senior DOD official responsible for total force 
management and military personnel policy, including military 
family programs, health care, compensation, DOD civilian 
personnel policy, and many other related activities. If 
confirmed for this position, Ms. Conaton will play a critical 
role in the Department's efforts to address difficult issues 
ranging from reductions in end strength, transition assistance 
for separating servicemembers, retirement reform, the rising 
costs of military health care, sexual assault, and changes in 
assignment policies relating to women in the Armed Forces, to 
name but a few. We will also expect Ms. Conaton to take steps 
to achieve an appropriate balance among the military, civilian, 
and contractor workforces of DOD while ensuring that this 
workforce is appropriate to meet the Department's needs.
    I would note that we have had an opportunity to work 
closely with Ms. Conaton when she served as staff director of 
the House Armed Services Committee. We know her to be honest, 
thoughtful, and extremely capable in everything that she does. 
I am delighted that her former boss and a dear friend of ours--
all of ours as a matter of fact--Congressman Ike Skelton and 
his wife Patty are here--I see you right there. They are here. 
I did not have a chance to greet you before, but by God, they 
are here and they are able to be with us for today's hearing. I 
know how proud they are of you, Ms. Conaton.
    The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs is 
responsible for overall supervision of matters which involve 
the Reserve components. If confirmed for this position, Mrs. 
Wright will play a key role in ensuring access to and 
appropriate use of the operational reserve and the appropriate 
balance between the Active and Reserve components.
    The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology is the senior Army official 
responsible for oversight and management of the Army 
acquisition system. Just last year, the Decker-Wagner report on 
Army acquisition found that since 2004 the Army has spent more 
than $3 billion a year, or more than a third of its budget for 
the development of major weapons systems on programs that 
failed and were ultimately canceled. If confirmed, Ms. Shyu 
will be responsible for the Army's efforts to address these 
failures and develop a stable, achievable, and affordable 
modernization strategy ensuring that the Army remains well 
equipped and maintained even as end strength and force 
structure are reduced. She will also be the official primarily 
responsible for mitigating risks to the industrial base 
resulting from program cancelations, delays, and restructuring 
arising out of upcoming budget reductions.
    Each of our nominees is well qualified for the position to 
which he or she has been nominated. I look forward to the 
testimony of our nominees.
    I call on Senator McCain.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

    Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I join the chairman in welcoming our nominees and their 
families today, and I congratulate them on their nominations.
    I also would like to join you in welcoming our dear and 
beloved friend, Ike Skelton, back before the committee who you 
and I had the great honor and privilege of working with for 
many years on behalf of the defense of this Nation.
    I have found several instances which have been very 
troubling to me of DOD not complying with the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) that we passed last December. I spoke 
to the Secretary of Defense about it, and until I get further 
clarification--hopefully we can get it done during the 2-week 
recess--I will not vote to approve these or any other 
nominations until I am satisfied that there is the proper 
compliance with laws that are passed by the Congress of the 
United States by the Secretary of Defense. For example, the 
study about Guam which for 3 months there was not even an 
effort made to begin the outside study. Clearly the 
administration and DOD feels it necessary just to move forward 
without the input of the outside study that we had mandated 
after long debate and discussion. That is just one example of 
the concerns that I have.
    I think we have a role to play, a constitutional 
obligation, and I think some of those obligations and roles 
that we are playing are being ignored by the Secretary of 
Defense. I will not vote to approve these or any another DOD 
civilian nominations until the Secretary of Defense convinces 
me that they are in compliance with and observance of laws that 
we pass here in Congress and signed by the President of the 
United States.
    Mr. Kendall, you have been the Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology for the 
last 2 years. I applaud you for your contributions to bringing 
the right tools and processes to bear on some of DOD's poorest 
performing programs. The Department has a long, long way to go. 
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the 
cost of the Department's major defense acquisition programs has 
increased by $135 billion since 2008. In the last 15 years, 
about one-third of the Department's major weapons procurement 
programs have had cost overruns of as much as 50 percent over 
original projections. I would like to hear from you what you 
will do to improve the Department's future acquisition 
performance. I would also ask you to comment on the potential 
effects of sequestration if imposed on the Department's largest 
programs.
    Ms. Shyu, you have served since November 2010 as the 
Principal Deputy of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. Over the past decade, 
the Army has been particularly unsuccessful in managing major 
acquisition programs, and the Future Combat System and the 
recently restructured Joint Tactical Radio System are egregious 
and costly examples of how not to meet a weapons system 
requirement. Taxpayers have a right to be frustrated and 
skeptical about the Army's ability to effectively develop and 
field major weapons systems. You have impressive credentials 
and I look forward to hearing how you will work to correct 
deficiencies and improve Army acquisition. As Senator Levin 
pointed out, the cost estimates for the Future Combat System, 
according to GAO, grew to $300 billion of the taxpayers' money, 
a scandal of proportions that if most taxpayers knew about it, 
they would share the outrage that a lot of us feel.
    Mrs. McFarland, you currently are serving as the President 
of the Defense Acquisition University and have been Acting 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition since October 
2011. How will you, if confirmed, help minimize excessive cost 
growth and schedule delays in DOD programs and how will you 
identify lessons learned and apply them to future acquisitions? 
Future instances of what Mr. Kendall has labeled ``acquisition 
malpractice'' are unaffordable and unacceptable especially with 
the budget cuts that we are facing.
    Just a year ago, Dr. Miller, the Senate of the United 
States ratified the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START). At that time, the President also committed to 
modernization of the nuclear weapons complex. That commitment 
has been undercut in the fiscal year 2013 budget request which 
seriously underfunds the weapons complex modernization plan. I 
would like to hear an explanation of the administration's 
position on a failure to fund, as had been committed in the 
past, the national nuclear security issue.
    Ms. Conaton, the position you have been nominated to fill 
has been vacant for over 5 months, and the Inspector General of 
DOD continues to investigate whistleblower allegations against 
your predecessor. Much valuable experience and expertise in the 
personnel and readiness office has departed. While I give Dr. 
Rooney as Acting Under Secretary credit for her interim 
efforts, you will be taking over an office that is sorely in 
need of forceful, effective leadership. Such leadership has 
been lacking in articulating the policies that will enable the 
Services fairly and without sacrificing readiness to achieve a 
drawdown of over 100,000 Active and Reserve troops. Leadership 
is needed that will result in critically needed changes in the 
defense health program and the inefficient disability 
evaluation system and in the unaffordable trajectory of 
military and civilian personnel costs.
    Ms. Conaton and Mrs. Wright, in your roles as civilian 
overseers of policies affecting the Reserve and Guard, it is 
essential that you help the Services and help Congress to 
achieve consensus about the future role in resourcing of the 
Reserve and National Guard.
    I thank the witnesses for their willingness to serve.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
    Congressman Hoyer has joined us. He is going to be 
introducing Ms. Conaton. I know that you have a very tough 
schedule, so we are going to go out of order here in order to 
accommodate you, Representative Hoyer.
    Senator McCain. I do not want to accommodate him. 
[Laughter.]
    Chairman Levin. We will have a roll call vote on this. 
[Laughter.]
    We are being inundated by House Members and former House 
Members. You are sitting in front of a dear friend of ours, Ike 
Skelton, who we previously have introduced. Now we will 
introduce you, Steny, so that you can introduce Ms. Conaton, 
and then we will excuse you if you wish to go, and then go back 
to the regular order.

STATEMENT OF HON. STENY H. HOYER, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE 
                       STATE OF MARYLAND

    Mr. Hoyer. Thank you very much, Senator Levin and Senator 
McCain. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman, Senator Reed, 
Senator Akaka, Senator Ayotte. Good to be with you all. Thank 
you for giving me this opportunity.
    First of all, let me start with the transparent admission. 
I am not objective with respect to this nominee. What you are 
going to hear from me is totally subjective. I am a huge, 
unrestrained fan of Ms. Conaton. She is absolutely excellent.
    I want to thank you for this opportunity to introduce the 
President's nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness to all of you, realizing full well that 
you need no introduction.
    I have had the privilege of serving in the House, as all of 
you know, for a long time and, very frankly, with many of you 
in the House. I have met many intelligent, capable, and 
talented men and women who came to work on Capitol Hill to 
serve their country. Erin Conaton stands out from this group as 
a proven leader who has been especially adept at helping bring 
the Pentagon and Congress together on important issues.
    To that extent, particularly in her last role on Capitol 
Hill, she complemented the extraordinary leader, Ike Skelton, 
as chairman and ranking member of the House Armed Services 
Committee. She reflected his personality, his bipartisanship, 
his commitment to America, and his patriotism. As Minority 
Staff Director of the House Armed Services Committee, Erin was 
the right hand of then Ranking Member Ike Skelton, as I have 
said. In that capacity, she worked closely with her Republican 
counterpart to ensure that measures benefitting the readiness 
of our military branches could advance through the committee 
without delay.
    When Democrats regained the majority in 2007, Erin became 
the staff director for the full committee overseeing every 
piece of legislation affecting military readiness, acquisition, 
and personnel. During that time, I had the privilege of serving 
as Majority Leader, and my staff and I worked closely with her, 
and I was constantly impressed by her effective, professional, 
insightful, responsive, and thoughtful approach to the job she 
undertook. Moreover, she has earned the respect of her 
colleagues on the committee and at the Pentagon where women 
have traditionally, as we know, been under-represented in the 
ranks of leadership.
    Her leadership of the committee staff during a period of 
two overseas military conflicts and increasing global demands 
on our Service branches made her eminently qualified when 
President Obama nominated her to serve as Under Secretary for 
the Air Force in 2009. Erin has served in that capacity with 
distinction, ensuring that the Air Force and Congress have been 
working closely together to make certain it has the tools 
required to carry out our missions.
    Prior to her career in the House, of course, Erin served as 
the Research Staff Director at the Hart-Rudman Commission for a 
National Security Strategy and as a financial analyst at 
Salomon Brothers.
    She holds a bachelor's degree in foreign service from 
Georgetown University and earned a master's degree and 
doctorate in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School at 
Tufts. During her post-graduate years, Erin completed 
fellowships at the Central Intelligence Agency and the National 
Security Agency.
    I cannot imagine a more qualified nominee, Mr. Chairman and 
Senator McCain, for this position. I am confident that, if 
confirmed, Erin will do an outstanding job as Under Secretary 
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. I strongly recommend 
her to you for confirmation.
    I thank you for this opportunity to speak on her behalf 
and, indeed, on behalf of our Nation.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Congressman Hoyer. I 
know how much she appreciates your being here and we all 
appreciate your being here as well. Again, you are free to go 
if you need to, as I am sure you do, because of your schedule.
    Mr. Hoyer. Thank you. I am going to return to the House and 
see if we can pass the Senate's transportation bill.
    Chairman Levin. Good luck to you.
    Next we are going to call on Senator Jack Reed who is going 
to introduce two of our nominees.
    Senator Reed.

  STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF 
                          RHODE ISLAND

    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me also recognize Steny Hoyer and Chairman Ike Skelton. 
I had the privilege of serving with both. Gentlemen, thank you 
for being here. It means a lot, I am sure, to the nominees.
    But my duty today, which is more than a duty--it is a 
privilege and pleasure--is to introduce Frank Kendall and Jim 
Miller.
    I have had the great privilege of knowing Frank Kendall for 
over 40 years. We were classmates at West Point. In that time, 
I have come to know him as a man of great character, of great 
intellect, great talent, and great dedication to his country.
    Today Frank is joined by his wife Beth, by his brother Ron, 
and his sister-in-law Francoise, and they share with me great 
pride in his accomplishments.
    Frank, after being commissioned, served 10 years in the 
U.S. Army and led troops in Germany. Then he went on to a 
distinguished career in business in the defense industry as 
Vice President of Raytheon Corporation.
    He also has an extraordinary educational preparation for 
this job. He has a master's degree in aeronautical engineering 
from Cal Tech. He has a master's of business administration 
from Pace, and he has a law degree from Georgetown University. 
I do not know anyone who is better prepared to deal with the 
complex issues of acquisition and military policy than Frank 
Kendall.
    In the last few years, he has been the principal deputy to 
Secretary Ash Carter. He has been there working with Ash to 
develop the Better Buying Power initiative. He was 
instrumental, as Senator McCain alluded to, in deploying the 
improvements made by Senator McCain and Senator Levin in their 
Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. We all 
recognize there is a long way to go, but Frank, I believe, is 
the individual to get us there.
    Again, it is a distinct pleasure to recognize someone who I 
admire, respect, and I hope will be speedily confirmed.
    Dr. Jim Miller has, as we know, been serving as the 
principal deputy to Secretary Michele Flournoy. He has done an 
extraordinary job. Dr. Miller is here today with his wife Adele 
and with his children Zoe, Collin, Lucas, and Adrienne. Allison 
is away at college. Having to pay college tuition, I think we 
should give this guy a job and keep him working.
    Jim just last week was here with General Allen. I think we 
were all thoughtfully impressed with his testimony, with his 
understanding of the issues. As Chairman Levin alluded to, he 
has a huge range of critical issues as the Under Secretary 
charged with policy from the Iranian nuclear ambitions to 
developing our response to evolving conditions in North Korea 
to the crisis in Syria. Again, I cannot think of anyone better 
prepared than Jim Miller to do this.
    He worked actively in the Quadrennial Defense Review, 
Nuclear Posture Review, and he has been literally, as I said, 
next to, standing beside and behind Secretary Flournoy when she 
has done all of her good work.
    He comes with extraordinary preparation, a graduate of 
Stanford and with a master's and doctorate from the Kennedy 
School at Harvard University.
    Again, I urge speedy consideration of this extraordinarily 
talented gentleman who has already demonstrated he can do the 
job.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
    We are now going to ask the standard questions of our 
nominees, and you can all answer at one time.
    Congressman Skelton, did you want to say a word? I did not 
have you on the list here to speak, but we clearly wanted to 
give you that opportunity.
    We are all set. Okay. Thank you. Senator McCain very 
properly asked whether or not you might want to speak, and it 
is always great to see you and to have you and your wife here.
    Standard questions for our nominees, and you can all answer 
at one time.
    Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations 
governing conflicts of interest?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes.
    Dr. Miller. Yes.
    Ms. Conaton. Yes.
    Mrs. Wright. Yes.
    Mrs. McFarland. Yes.
    Ms. Shyu. Yes.
    Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the 
confirmation process?
    Mr. Kendall. No
    Dr. Miller. No.
    Ms. Conaton. No.
    Mrs. Wright. No.
    Mrs. McFarland. No.
    Ms. Shyu. No.
    Chairman Levin. Will you assure your staff complies with 
deadlines established for requested communications, including 
questions for the record in hearings?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes.
    Dr. Miller. Yes.
    Ms. Conaton. Yes.
    Mrs. Wright. Yes.
    Mrs. McFarland. Yes.
    Ms. Shyu. Yes.
    Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes.
    Dr. Miller. Yes.
    Ms. Conaton. Yes.
    Mrs. Wright. Yes.
    Mrs. McFarland. Yes.
    Ms. Shyu. Yes.
    Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from 
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes.
    Dr. Miller. Yes.
    Ms. Conaton. Yes.
    Mrs. Wright. Yes.
    Mrs. McFarland. Yes.
    Ms. Shyu. Yes.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 
testify upon request before this committee?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes.
    Dr. Miller. Yes.
    Ms. Conaton. Yes.
    Mrs. Wright. Yes.
    Mrs. McFarland. Yes.
    Ms. Shyu. Yes.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, 
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a 
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or 
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good 
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes.
    Dr. Miller. Yes.
    Ms. Conaton. Yes.
    Mrs. Wright. Yes.
    Mrs. McFarland. Yes.
    Ms. Shyu. Yes.
    Chairman Levin. It is a long question, but the answer is 
yes, which I heard from each of you.
    Okay. Now we are going to start with Frank Kendall, then go 
to Jim Miller, then to Erin Conaton, then to Jessica Wright, 
then to Katharina McFarland, and then to Heidi Shyu. That will 
be the order that I will call on you. As I do call on you, you 
should feel free to introduce any family or friends that are 
with you. Let me start with you, Mr. Kendall.

 STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK KENDALL III TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF 
       DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

    Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin, 
Ranking Member McCain, members of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your 
committee today.
    I am grateful for the confidence that President Obama has 
shown in me by nominating me to be the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
    I want to thank Secretary Panetta and Deputy Secretary 
Carter for their support of my nomination.
    If confirmed, I will be deeply honored to serve.
    I would also like to thank my classmate from West Point, 
Senator Reed, for his support and his very kind introduction 
today. Senator Reed and I just attended our 40th reunion at 
West Point. Neither one of us can understand how all those 
other guys got so old so fast.
    I also want to acknowledge Senator Reed is from Rhode 
Island, and I noticed an article this morning about a 
specialist, Dennis Weichel, who was killed in Afghanistan. He 
is a native of Rhode Island and he was killed saving the life 
of a small girl in Afghanistan. That kind of dedication, 
courage, and commitment is what all of us that are here before 
you today believe in and are trying to support. I wanted to 
acknowledge that loss and how much we all share that loss with 
Rhode Island.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you for doing that.
    Mr. Kendall. Finally, I would like to thank my family for 
their support. My wife Elizabeth, Beth, is here with me today, 
as are my brother Ron and his wife Francoise, as Senator Reed 
mentioned.
    I want to offer Beth my special thanks and appreciation. In 
October of 2009 at my first confirmation hearing, I thanked 
Beth for her support. After my 2 years in the Pentagon, first 
as Principal Deputy to Dr. Carter for a year and a half and for 
the last 6 months as Acting Under Secretary, Beth knows now 
exactly what she has gotten herself into, and I am deeply 
appreciative of her continuing love and support.
    When I sat before this committee in October 2009, I said 
that I too knew what I was getting myself into. That is even 
more true today. I said then that I believe that DOD could do 
much better at equipping and sustaining our forces. I said that 
my background in operational units, defense research and 
development organizations, the Secretary of Defense's Office, 
and the defense industry had all prepared me to make a 
contribution to achieving the goal of obtaining more value for 
the investments our country makes in equipping and supporting 
its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. I believe today 
that I have much more to do and can do to contribute to this 
goal, and I would deeply appreciate the opportunity to do so.
    If the Senate confirms me in this position, I will make 
every effort to live up to the confidence that will have been 
placed in me.
    Thank you very much.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Kendall.
    Dr. Miller.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, JR. TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF 
                       DEFENSE FOR POLICY

    Dr. Miller. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the 
committee--and Senator Reed, thank you for that kind 
introduction.
    Three years ago this month, I testified to this committee 
in a confirmation hearing for my current position as Principal 
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy. I thank the committee for 
the trust you placed in me by confirming me for that position. 
It has been a great privilege to serve in that position for the 
past 3 years.
    I am deeply honored to appear here today as the nominee for 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I thank President Obama 
for the confidence he has placed in me as Principal Deputy and 
now as the nominee for Under Secretary for Policy. I also thank 
Secretary Panetta and former Secretary Gates for their 
confidence in me and for their outstanding leadership of DOD. I 
also want to thank the dedicated team of civilian and military 
personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 
Policy office and throughout DOD, particularly those in harm's 
way today for all that they do for national security.
    I want to especially thank our previous Under Secretary for 
Policy, Michele Flournoy, for her extraordinary service to our 
country. If I have the honor of being confirmed as Michele 
Flournoy's successor, I will hold her example of integrity and 
professionalism as my ultimate benchmark.
    My deepest debt of gratitude is to my family, to my wife 
Adele, and to my children Allison, Zoe, Collin, Lucas, and 
Adrienne. Adele's and our kids' love and strong support has 
made my service in Government possible. For the past 3 years, 
they have put up with an often absentee husband and dad. I 
cannot thank them enough for their support. With the consent of 
the Senate, Adele and I and the kids are ready to sign up for 
another tour.
    As I have watched my kids grow up, one of the thoughts that 
motivates me to stay in Government is that the choices that we 
make as a Nation will shape their future. We all want to hand 
our kids and their generation a better world. I believe that 
this includes ensuring that the United States succeeds in 
ongoing operations and ensuring that the United States retains 
the strongest military the world has ever seen.
    Much has happened in the 3 years since I first appeared 
before this committee. President Obama said that we would bring 
the Iraq war to a responsible end and we did.
    As I had the opportunity to testify to this committee last 
week with General Allen, we are making progress in Afghanistan. 
We have had a difficult few weeks and no doubt more challenges 
are ahead, but our strategy is working. It is not time for plan 
B. It is time to continue the hard work of plan A and complete 
the transition to the full Afghan responsibility for their 
security by the end of 2014.
    If I am confirmed by the Senate as Under Secretary, I will 
do all in my power to help the United States, our coalition, 
and the Afghans succeed to ensure that Afghanistan never again 
becomes a source of attacks on the United States.
    If confirmed, I will also focus on other immediate 
priorities, denying, degrading, and defeating al Qaeda, 
stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon--as President 
Obama has said, containment is not an option--preparing for the 
fall of the Assad regime in Syria, and more broadly posturing 
the United States to cope and take advantage of the 
transformations brought about by the Arab Spring.
    If I am confirmed, another top priority will be carrying 
out the Strategic Guidance that President Obama announced at 
the Pentagon earlier this year. Even as we deal with current 
operations in Afghanistan and across the globe, we are building 
the joint force of the future. The fiscal year 2013 DOD budget 
submission reflects a strategy-driven approach intended to 
provide a force that, as Secretary Panetta said and as Chairman 
Levin referred to, is smaller and leaner, but agile, flexible, 
ready, and technologically advanced.
    Consistent with our new Strategic Guidance, if confirmed as 
Under Secretary, I will work to continue to strengthen our 
posture in the Asia-Pacific. This includes addressing the 
challenges posed by the new regime in North Korea and 
continuing to work closely with our allies and partners in the 
Pacific.
    If confirmed, I will also continue to ensure that our 
Nation and our military are on a firm footing to meet the 
challenges of tomorrow, including improving our Nation's 
posture in space and cyberspace, responsibly growing our 
Special Operations Forces, reforming our systems of export 
controls which is a burden on industry and slows down our 
efforts to build partner capacity, advancing our missile 
defense posture to deal with the real threats from Iran and 
North Korea, and ensuring that we retain a safe, secure, and 
effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons 
exist.
    Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, 
thank you for considering my nomination for Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy. If confirmed, I am committed to continuing 
to work with Congress to ensure that we succeed in Afghanistan, 
to advance our national interests by maintaining a strong 
global posture, and continuing to strengthen our alliances and 
partnerships across the globe, and to preserve and strengthen 
our military so that the United States is on a firm footing to 
meet the challenges of the future.
    Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Miller.
    Ms. Conaton is next.

  STATEMENT OF HON. ERIN C. CONATON TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF 
              DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

    Ms. Conaton. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, members 
of the committee, and your staffs, thanks for the opportunity 
to again be before you and thanks for the confidence that you 
have placed in me in my current position as Under Secretary of 
the Air Force.
    Like my colleagues, I would like to start by thanking 
President Obama, Secretary Panetta, and Deputy Secretary Carter 
for the opportunity to continue serving, if you all see fit to 
confirm me.
    I am deeply honored that Mr. Hoyer would take the time to 
come over and spend a few minutes with us, and I never want to 
correct the distinguished Minority Whip, but I did not actually 
finish my doctoral dissertation. Maybe that will be a post-
Government project to be finished.
    To Ike Skelton, sir, truly you are my mentor, and all that 
I know about the personnel and readiness challenges facing our 
military I learned from you. But it seems perfectly fitting to 
me that you and Patty are sitting as part of my family.
    I am also honored to have my parents, Pat and Dan, my 
siblings, Sean and Meghan, and my sister-in-law, the other Erin 
Conaton. But I would particularly like to single out my 7-year-
old nephew William, my 4\1/2\-year-old niece Nora, and my 2-
year-old niece Cathleen. The oldest two of them are going to be 
giving a report at school tomorrow on what they learned today, 
so I know that they are paying close attention.
    I would also like to welcome three tremendous young women I 
have had the opportunity to get to know from McKinley High 
School, Vinecia, Taahiva, and Brooke. They are fast approaching 
graduation, and I know each of them has an incredibly bright 
future ahead of them.
    I have been blessed to serve under a great Air Force 
leadership team in Secretary Mike Donley and Chief Norty 
Schwartz. I have learned so much serving with them, as well as 
with two outstanding partners in my current Vice Chief General 
Phil Breedlove, as well as his predecessor, General Howie 
Chandler. These great leaders are a model of service and 
leadership. It has been an honor to serve with them.
    My eternal thanks, too, to the team who has supported me in 
the Air Force for over 2 years and to the OSD team led so ably 
by Dr. Jo Ann Rooney. They have been great in helping me to 
start to get smart on these issues.
    There would be no greater honor than to represent our 
outstanding servicemembers, Active, Guard, Reserve, and 
civilians, and their families. It would be a privilege to be 
their advocate and to continue to advocate for the strength of 
the All-Volunteer Force and its readiness. As Chairman Levin 
and Senator McCain pointed out in their opening statements, 
there are many challenging issues before the Department in this 
area. If confirmed, I would look forward to the opportunity to 
work with my DOD partners and with this committee to address 
these challenges.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to be before you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Ms. Conaton.
    Now Mrs. Wright.

 STATEMENT OF MRS. JESSICA L. WRIGHT TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
                 OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS

    Mrs. Wright. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, honorable 
committee members, good morning. I am humbled and honored to be 
sitting before you this morning.
    I thoroughly appreciate the confidence that President Obama 
has expressed in nominating me to be the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Reserve Affairs. I am grateful to Secretary Panetta 
for supporting that nomination.
    It has been my great honor and privilege to serve our 
Nation in uniform for 35 years and as a civilian these past 16 
months.
    My career in public service would not have happened without 
the love and support of my family. My husband Chuck, who is 
here with me today, is my most avid supporter and champion. He 
is a combat-tested Army veteran who retired as a lieutenant 
colonel with 24 years of service. Our son Mike is in college 
and not able to attend this hearing, though I know he is here 
in spirit. He will graduate in May from Kings College with a 
degree in accounting and a commission in infantry, 2nd 
lieutenant, following in his dad's footsteps.
    I would also like to thank my parents, John and Cass 
Garfola, who live in South Carolina and are not able to attend 
this hearing. They instilled in my brothers and me the 
importance of public service. My dad served in the China-Burma-
India theater in World War II and spent a lifetime in steel 
mills. My mom started in the Army nursing program and served a 
49-year career as a civilian nurse.
    Throughout my career, I have seen enormous changes in our 
military. I enlisted as a member of the women's Army Corps and 
it culminated as the Adjutant General of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania. I have worked my entire career promoting the 
Reserve components. These men and women number in the hundreds 
of thousands and carry the proud title of citizen warrior. As 
you certainly know, they have put their lives on the line and 
their careers on hold through this past decade of war, and they 
have performed with honor and dignity.
    Over the last decade, our Reserve components and the 
National Guard have transformed from a strategic reserve to an 
operational component. They fight and they serve alongside the 
Active component each and every day. If confirmed, it would be 
my privilege as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 
Affairs to build on their success, to work hard to support the 
men and women who proudly serve our Nation as members of our 
Reserve components.
    I am grateful to all Members of Congress and this 
distinguished committee for the energy and support that they 
have given our servicemen and women and their families. If the 
Senate confirms me in this position, I pledge to you that I 
will work diligently for the men and women of the seven Reserve 
components, their families, and their employers. I am deeply 
honored to have been nominated and to serve.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mrs. Wright.
    Next Mrs. McFarland.

   STATEMENT OF MRS. KATHARINA G. McFARLAND TO BE ASSISTANT 
              SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION

    Mrs. McFarland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished 
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for 
the opportunity to appear before your committee today.
    I am also grateful for the confidence that President Obama 
has shown in me by nominating me to be the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition.
    I personally want to thank Secretary Panetta, Deputy 
Secretary Carter, and Acting Under Secretary of Defense 
Kendall's support for my nomination. If confirmed, I will be 
truly honored to serve and will work to serve in the highest 
accord with the highest traditions of office and integrity.
    I am blessed with having some of my family and friends here 
and would like to thank them for their guidance and support 
that they have given me. My mother and father, Sonya and 
Wilbert Wahl, who are still working full-time and contributing 
to society and economy. My husband, former Marine Corps 
colonel, with 34 years of service, inclusive of two tours in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and one in Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF), Ron McFarland, and my son Jacob Brown.
    As my mother was witness and victim to the horrors of World 
War II on the eastern side of Germany, her stories, rarely 
told, stay with me and led me to work for DOD. My family was 
always tight for money. My dad took me everywhere, and every 
moment he was trying to find another way to stretch his poor 
dollar as far as it could go. If I am confirmed, you can be 
assured that his lessons will continue to guide me.
    I passionately believe in the high priority that this 
committee, Congress, the President, and the Secretary of 
Defense have placed on improving the results achieved by the 
defense acquisition system. We need to maintain the best 
equipped military to support the policies of national security 
for this country and the new Strategic Guidance that the 
Secretary and the President recently announced. In order to do 
that, we must have a better trained workforce, a more efficient 
process that focuses on content and product, and the ability to 
measure how we, the Government, and industry are performing. We 
must improve our ability to extract every bit of value from the 
public funds we are entrusted with.
    I consider this a monumental task, especially in this 
economic climate and with the continuing and emerging threats 
to our security. If the Senate confirms me, I will do 
everything in my power to live up to the confidence that has 
been placed in me.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mrs. McFarland.
    Ms. Shyu.

 STATEMENT OF MS. HEIDI SHYU TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 
        ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY

    Ms. Shyu. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of this 
esteemed committee, it is a great honor for me to appear before 
you as President Obama's nominee to serve as the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology. I am very grateful for this nomination, for 
Secretary McHugh's support, and the opportunity to be here 
today.
    I would like to take a moment to thank my family for their 
constant love, encouragement, and support. My 102-year-old 
grandmother in Taiwan is unable to be here today, but she is 
absolutely here in spirit with me.
    Chairman Levin. Why did she not fly in for this? 
[Laughter.]
    Ms. Shyu. If she could fly, I can guarantee you she will be 
here.
    Chairman Levin. Give her our greetings.
    Ms. Shyu. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Tell her we miss her too.
    Ms. Shyu. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I seek the committee's consent to serve as 
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, 
and Technology. It has been my distinct privilege to serve in 
this position in the acting capacity in the last 9 months. It 
is an appointment that has resulted from my job as the 
principal deputy since November 2010. This service, along with 
my prior experience, has given me firsthand knowledge and 
valuable insight into areas of opportunities to fundamentally 
change the way that the Army acquires weapons systems for our 
soldiers.
    Efforts to reform the acquisition systems have been ongoing 
for decades. The current fiscal environment has given these 
efforts a new sense of urgency. While I believe that the Army 
is heading in the right direction since the cancelation of the 
Future Combat System, I pledge my dedicated efforts to this 
present task. If confirmed, I will prioritize affordability, 
competition, challenging unrealistic requirements, and 
emphasize sound management. More must be done to ensure that 
the current and future modernization efforts are built on the 
best possible foundation for success.
    For more than 30 years, I have held a number of leadership 
positions within the defense industry that took me from entry 
level engineer to corporate vice president. I have direct 
experience in turning a vision into a system that is fielded to 
the hands of our warfighters. This experience will assist me in 
meeting challenges in performing this role.
    Again, Mr. Chairman, I am honored by this nomination. I 
believe that I possess the background, the experience, 
commitment, the ethical discipline taught to me by my 102-year-
old grandmother, and the judgment that is necessary to perform 
this important job.
    I look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Ms. Shyu.
    I think we have a vote at 11:30, and we are going to work 
right through that vote, as I mentioned. We will have a 7-
minute first round of questions.
    I want to start by reading from an e-mail that a friend of 
mine received from his son in Afghanistan from a forward 
operating base in Afghanistan. Mr. Kendall, you made reference 
to the loss of another American hero, and that kind of 
triggered my decision just to read a few paragraphs of this e-
mail to his folks.
    ``While the news certainly and rightly has paid a lot of 
attention to a few horrible incidents of Afghan army and police 
turning on their American counterparts, including a fairly 
horrific incident in our sister battalion resulting in the 
first two casualties of our deployment, I can say I have been 
nothing but amazed by the strength of the bonds that have been 
formed between American troops and the Afghan National Army 
(ANA). The reaction of our ANA counterparts to the insider 
attack on my sister battalion's company outpost was truly 
telling. Their first reaction was fear. They were deeply 
concerned that we would abandon them over this, that we would 
blame them for the actions of a few who turned their weapons 
not only on Americans but also on their ANA brothers who, I 
should mention, played an important role in counterattacking 
their traitorous comrades and bringing those involved to 
justice.
    ``When we had a similar potential threat revealed in our 
area of operations, it turned out that the ANA was already 
working internally to stop it. A couple of their soldiers who 
were at first erroneously suspected of being complicit were 
actually the proactive individuals who stopped anything well 
before it could happen. The ANA were in tears over the fact 
that they believed that we would never trust them again and 
suspect them always of being Taliban, people they literally 
risk their lives constantly to fight and honestly hate. I can 
say that I have truly never felt unsafe around any of my Afghan 
counterparts.''
    Dr. Miller, let me ask you a question about the Afghan 
security forces. They are on track to reach a goal of 352,000 
personnel by later this year. Building on the capabilities of 
the Afghan security forces is key to transitioning the security 
lead to Afghanistan. As General Allen testified last week, 
``transition is the linchpin of our strategy, not merely the 
way out''.
    Now, given the importance of developing capable Afghan 
security forces for our transition strategy, I frankly was 
surprised and concerned about news accounts of a U.S. proposal 
to reduce the size of the Afghan forces by a third after 2013 
apparently based on concerns about the affordability of a 
larger force. General Allen assured us that the option of 
reducing the size of the Afghan security forces after 2014 to 
the level of 230,000 was based on a current projection of 
possible options and certain possible scenarios, but that no 
decision had yet been taken. I hope not. In my view, it would 
be unwise and unfortunate if we were to risk the hard-fought 
gains that we, our coalition partners, and the Afghans have 
achieved by deciding in advance that we are not going to 
support an Afghan security force that is right-sized to provide 
security to the Afghan people and to prevent a Taliban return 
to power.
    Do you agree, Dr. Miller, that first of all, we have not 
made a decision and that whether or not that we should have a 
350,000-sized Afghan security force or whether or not that 
ought to be reduced to some number lower than that should be, 
number one, conditions-based and the affordability concerns 
predicted now for years from now should not be, at this point 
at least, the factor which controls that decision?
    Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, yes, I agree. As we indicated in 
testimony with General Allen, the surge force of 352,000 should 
be sustained beyond 2013 and quite likely beyond 2014.
    Chairman Levin. You also stated in answer to a prehearing 
question, Dr. Miller, that you support a, ``responsible 
drawdown as called for by the President''. Last June, the 
President announced his plan for drawing down the surge force 
in Afghanistan and said that after the initial reduction, which 
would be completed by this year, that the withdrawal of our 
forces would continue, ``at a steady pace''. That would be 
between the summer of this year and 2014 when most all of our 
combat forces would be removed under current plans from 
Afghanistan.
    My question, Dr. Miller, do you support the President's 
plan for U.S. troop reductions to continue at a steady pace 
after September of this year?
    Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, yes, I do, and we have not yet 
defined what the steady pace will mean in terms of numbers. 
Sir, General Allen intends to conduct an assessment at the end 
of September as we have drawn the force down to about 68,000 
Americans, have a hard look at any al Qaeda presence, at the 
strength of insurgency, and critically importantly, at the 
strength of the Afghan National Security Forces and then make a 
recommendation up the chain of command to the President. That 
would be a timeline for a recommendation and a decision this 
fall.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Let me now ask Mr. Kendall about our industrial base, and I 
will ask Ms. Shyu as well. I have a real concern about the 
industrial base including our second- and our third-tier 
suppliers, particularly for the ground combat and tactical 
vehicles that we know are going to be coming into our inventory 
and are going to be developed and produced. I want to know what 
steps you plan to take to address the potential loss of 
industrial capability or capacity associated with reductions at 
the same time that we need to prepare for the next generation.
    Mr. Kendall. Mr. Chairman, we are watching the industrial 
base probably more closely now than any other time since 
perhaps the end of the Cold War. We are taking account of it as 
we make budget decisions in particular because we are no longer 
in a period of growth in the budget. This year, as we went 
through the budget preparation process, we had meetings at the 
very senior level specifically to look at industrial base 
issues, and we did take some steps because of them.
    We are concerned about the tiers below the prime level. We 
have undertaken an in-depth analysis of that. We are building a 
database to help us completely understand each sector and each 
tier so that we are aware of and can respond perhaps 
proactively, as much proactively as possible, when problems 
arise. The database that we are building is well underway and 
it is allowing us to identify some things and perhaps intervene 
earlier than we might be able to otherwise.
    We are going to be limited in our resources. Any 
intervention in the industrial base is going to have to be on a 
case-by-case basis and probably fairly rare. But if there are 
niche capabilities that are critical to us, we may well 
intervene, and there may be cases where just to keep 
competition for critical components we do the same.
    We are watching the industrial base very carefully. We are 
going through a difficult period. There is going to be, 
obviously, less money available to the industrial base. As we 
stretch out production and delay programs in some cases, there 
are going to be smaller companies in particular that are 
impacted.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Ms. Shyu, do you have anything to add to that?
    Ms. Shyu. Senator, I absolutely am equally concerned about 
our industrial base, in particular the impacts to our second-, 
third-, and fourth-tier companies. My sister is a small 
business owner, so I absolutely understand the challenges in 
terms of running a small business. We are working aggressively 
with our prime contractors to identify Foreign Military Sales 
opportunities to fill in the bathtub. We are working very 
closely with OSD on the sector-by-sector and tier-by-tier 
database. As a matter of fact, just yesterday I spent a solid 
hour discussing issues in regards to our small companies. We 
are in the process of also working and assessing across our 
entire portfolio to look for opportunities for our small 
businesses. I think that is a huge area we can explore. If 
confirmed, I dedicate my efforts to take a look at the 
industrial base.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
    If you would, Mr. Kendall particularly, give us a status 
report by, say, May 10, if you would, on your assessment of the 
issue which you have addressed, particularly the second-, 
third-, and fourth-tiers Ms. Shyu made reference to, suppliers 
in those areas. If you could give us the status report so we 
can consider that situation in our own markup, we would 
appreciate that.
    Mr. Kendall. We can do that, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
    Senator Ayotte? Senator McCain is not yet back.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
    I want to thank all of you for being here and for your 
dedicated service to our country and all of your families and 
friends for the support you have given all of our distinguished 
witnesses today.
    I wanted to follow up on the chairman's question. Mr. 
Kendall, Ms. Shyu, what happens to the defense industrial base, 
particularly our second-, third-, and fourth-tier suppliers if 
sequestration happens?
    Mr. Kendall. Senator McCain mentioned sequestration also. 
In a word, it will be devastating. We have already taken $500 
billion a year, roughly, out of the defense budget. If we have 
to take roughly another $500 billion, that is $100 billion a 
year out of the budget, a lot of that would fall onto industry.
    There is a provision under the Budget Control Act which 
would allow the President to exempt military personnel. There 
is a good chance that he would do that because that would be a 
devastating impact on our people. That would increase the 
burden that would fall on the investment accounts, research and 
development, and production. It would be fairly deep cuts. They 
would also have to be applied very indiscriminately. We would 
not be allowed to prioritize and they would fall on unobligated 
balances. We would have a devastating impact.
    A lot of the work that we have done over the last couple of 
years to try to make more efficient acquisition decisions and 
get better contract structures would be broken. The tanker, for 
example, which the Air Force went through a very laborious and 
difficult process to get under contract on a sound acquisition 
strategy. We would break that fixed-price contract.
    Senator Ayotte. You are talking about the KC-46A?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes.
    Senator Ayotte. Yes, it would jeopardize that contract?
    Mr. Kendall. We would jeopardize that.
    Senator Ayotte. If sequestration goes forward?
    Mr. Kendall. We would jeopardize a number of contracts 
where we would have to take cuts that would break the contract 
from our side. Then we would have to go renegotiate. You are 
essentially opening it up and you have to go get another price. 
Once we are in a situation--and we did a competition, for 
example, for the tanker. That was very effective in getting the 
price down. Once you do not have a competitive environment, 
then it is much more difficult for us to negotiate a lower 
price.
    The littoral combat ship is another one where we have good 
prices out over the next few years. We would break that deal as 
well.
    Across the Department, there are places where a devastating 
impact would occur. Of course, that ripples down to all tiers 
in the industrial base.
    Industry is already very concerned about this. Some of the 
major firms have approached me about their concerns about 
having to provide notice of potential layoffs because there is 
a provision in the law that requires them to do that just in 
pending sequestration.
    It has been described by various people in various ways. 
Secretary Lynn talked about sequestration as being something 
that was so crazy--it was intended to be so crazy that nobody 
would ever do it. The people have done a very good job of 
making it that crazy.
    Senator Ayotte. So crazy that nobody would ever do it.
    Mr. Kendall. So crazy nobody would do it and they did a 
really good job of that.
    My boss, Secretary Panetta, who is sometimes very frank in 
his language, has called it, I think, goofy and a meat axe 
approach. In private conversations, he has used much stronger 
language than that.
    Senator Ayotte. Probably not good for this room. 
[Laughter.]
    Mr. Kendall. I will refrain from that.
    But sequestration, in a word, would be devastating to the 
Department.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
    Ms. Shyu?
    Ms. Shyu. Senator, I absolutely concur. If sequestration 
occurs, it would absolutely have a devastating impact on 
modernization. The bulk of the Army's budget is in the manning 
area, and that is not going to go down quickly. The 
modernization account, namely the procurement accounts, 
research and development accounts, which impacts our primes, 
our second-, third-, fourth-tier companies are going to be 
significantly impacted. Everything we have judiciously worked 
last year to identify affordability, cost savings, cost 
avoidances will be gone.
    Senator Ayotte. Just to be clear so everyone understands 
and those that are watching this hearing, when we are talking 
about particularly second-, third-, and fourth-tier suppliers, 
sometimes when those businesses go away, they do not come back. 
We are talking about small businesses that if they are put out 
of business by sequestration, then it is difficult often to 
bring that capability back. That is why we are concerned about 
our defense industrial base. Those are real jobs in this 
country, are they not, at stake?
    Mr. Kendall. That is correct. There would be hundreds of 
thousands of jobs impacted.
    Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that.
    One thing I wanted to follow up when we look at where we 
are with the $487 billion in reductions over the next 10 years 
as a result of the Budget Control Act, Secretary Conaton and 
Dr. Miller in particular, we are asking for a 72,000 reduction 
in the end strength of our Army. How did we get to that number, 
meaning is this a number that the Army recommended in terms of 
end strength reductions?
    The other important question that I would like to get at is 
how many involuntary terminations will we have to give to our 
soldiers in order to accommodate the 72,000 in reductions 
because it is really hard to think about those who have gone 
and done multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and handing 
them an involuntary termination.
    First, how did we get to the number and, second, what does 
this mean in terms of involuntary terminations?
    Ms. Conaton. Thank you, Senator. Given that I have been 
working in the Air Force for the last couple of years, I will 
defer to Dr. Miller, if he has insight as to how the exact 
number was chosen. It is my understanding, though, that the 
Army leadership had a great voice, as did the Marine Corps 
leadership, in looking at not only the numbers, but the ramp 
and how quickly folks are coming out of the force.
    I share your deep concern that we ensure that we do this in 
a way that minimizes the number of folks who are involuntarily 
removed from the rolls. I know Secretary Panetta's commitment, 
and if confirmed, it would be my commitment to work with the 
Services to make sure we do everything possible before we 
involuntarily remove folks and also strengthen the transition 
assistance program so that folks who are leaving our military 
have the best opportunity to gain follow-on employment, or 
education, or start a small business.
    Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that.
    Dr. Miller, can you help us, how did we get to the number? 
Here is where I look at it is that we were withdrawing from 
Iraq. We were certainly drawing down in Afghanistan. There was 
going to be some reduction. Would you be recommending to us 
72,000 but for the Budget Control Act, and how did we get to 
that number?
    Dr. Miller. Senator, let me first confirm what Ms. Conaton 
said and that is that the Army was very much involved in the 
discussions about both the size of the force that would result 
by the end of fiscal year 2017 and the ramp in terms of the 
reductions. That ramp was designed specifically to minimize the 
impact and to minimize the likelihood that anyone would have to 
be involuntarily separated.
    In terms of the overall size of the force, that reduction 
will take it to about the level that it was at September 11.
    Senator Ayotte. Pre-September 11, right? Before September 
11.
    Dr. Miller. Just before September 11.
    Senator Ayotte. The world has changed since then, has it 
not, Doctor?
    Dr. Miller. The world has changed.
    The reductions that will be phased in will leave an Army 
that is, between the Active and Reserve Force, still capable of 
conducting the full range of missions, capable of conducting 
stability operations, but not stability operations on the scale 
that we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. If we find that 
we are in a situation again where that scale of operations is 
required, either the force will have to be grown back, and we 
know that we can do that and we need to build in that capacity 
or we will have to tap into the Reserves more or for a period 
of time more strain would be put on the force. The number was 
selected at a level that still retains the full spectrum 
mission and the ability to conduct substantial stability 
operations and understanding that the force would have to grow 
in the future if we return to a scale of operations that we saw 
in OIF and OEF combined.
    Senator Ayotte. My time is expiring. But one of the issues 
that I would like to know about is was this a number that was 
recommended by our Army commanders, the 72,000? Is that the 
number that they gave the Secretary?
    Dr. Miller. Senator, this was a number that came out of 
discussions that deeply involved the Army leadership and 
obviously involved the Secretary of Defense and the leadership 
of the Joint Staff and which the combatant commanders were 
consulted on as well.
    Senator Ayotte. One thing that I would appreciate your 
taking to let us understand is if sequestration goes forward, 
what happens to the end strength of our Army as well. I think 
that is important for people to understand.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    As Secretary Panetta has said on several occasions, sequestration 
would have a devastating effect on the Defense Department overall, 
coming on top of the more than $450 billion that is already being cut 
from DOD accounts. The specific effect on Army end strength is 
unknowable until the Department understands the process and formula to 
be prescribed by Congress in applying sequestration. These additional 
cuts would clearly force a reassessment of our defense strategy and 
security commitments globally, likely leading to a scale back of 
current levels of defense activity, prompting hard choices about the 
challenges we can afford to confront, and incurring additional risks to 
our force and our ability to execute assigned missions.

    Senator Ayotte. I appreciate all of the witnesses being 
here today, and I may submit some additional questions for the 
record. Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
    Senator Lieberman.
    Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Thanks to the six of you for your willingness to serve. You 
are really an extraordinarily impressive group in my opinion. I 
am struck by the gender imbalance in the six of you, which 
shows that this was obviously a merit selection process by 
which you come before us.
    Dr. Miller, let me focus on you. The position you are 
coming into as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is a 
really important position, and I have every confidence that you 
are ready, more than ready, to fill it. I have been really 
impressed by the opportunities we have had to work together 
most recently. Just by your testimony last week alongside 
General Allen about Afghanistan, I thought you were very 
straightforward and very helpful to the committee.
    In some sense now you join the Secretary and Deputy as 
responsible for the security of just about the entire world. Do 
not let that give you sleepless nights.
    But let me focus first on two areas of obvious concern. The 
first is Iran. Obviously, one of the contingencies to which the 
Pentagon has been devoting a lot of time and consideration is 
Iran. I wanted to ask you about your thinking about the threat 
posed by Iran, how do you see it evolving, and what do you hope 
we do to get ready to meet the threat that Iran poses?
    Dr. Miller. Senator Lieberman, thank you for your kind 
words.
    The threat posed by Iran includes, as they have talked 
about, the possibility that they would attempt to close the 
Strait of Hormuz and interrupt international shipping, 
including the transportation of oil. With respect to that, 
Secretary Panetta and others have made clear that is a red line 
for the United States. We have had a number of ships, including 
carriers, transit through the Strait of Hormuz since a rather 
inflammatory statement was made by the Iranians, and they will 
continue to conduct that transit.
    Iran poses a significant threat in the region because of 
its activity in support of insurgency and terrorist tactics. 
This is something that has been the case for some time and 
something that we are working with our allies and partners in 
the region to contain.
    The most significant threat that Iran poses is its pursuit 
of a nuclear weapons capability. As I said earlier, the 
President has made clear that prevention is our policy and that 
containment is not an option.
    Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you to what extent concern 
about the threat posed by Iran informed the defense Strategic 
Guidance first and then the fiscal year 2013 budget request? In 
other words, have specific policies been arrived at and 
authorization/appropriations been asked for to meet that 
threat?
    Dr. Miller. Senator, Iran was certainly taken into account 
in both the Strategic Guidance and the fiscal year 2013 budget 
request. The guidance talked about the importance of both the 
Asia-Pacific and the Mideast and sustaining and in fact 
strengthening our posture there, and we have continued to do 
so. Iran also poses a potential threat to U.S. forces and 
coalition forces because of its anti-access and area denial 
capabilities, things like their small boats, cruise missiles, 
and so forth. As we look at the capabilities that DOD is 
developing to counter those threats, Iran is certainly a 
consideration.
    Senator Lieberman. Let me move now to Syria. Obviously, the 
killings by the Assad Government of its own people continues, I 
do not know whether a document was signed by Syria to agree to 
the Annan plan. If it was, history will show that it is not 
really worth even the paper the signature is on. The reports 
since the announcement of Syria's agreement to the Annan plan 
indicate that the government continues to brutally slaughter 
its own people.
    In this context, there will clearly be growing 
international pressure and domestic pressure, including from 
some of us up here, for some kind of external assistance to the 
Free Syrian Army and to the Syrian opposition. As Under 
Secretary for Policy, you will be in a key position to develop 
options to support that kind of intervention if the President 
decides to order it and to determine what is feasible and what 
is not. I wanted to ask you what you are thinking about that 
challenge now, including particularly a topic we took up 
earlier with Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what we 
might be able to do that would allow us to disrupt Assad's 
command and control over his own forces.
    Dr. Miller. Senator Lieberman, the Assad regime, as you 
have said, has continued to conduct activities within Syria 
that are reprehensible and that reinforce in my mind and in our 
mind the fact that this regime needs to go and that it is in 
the interests of the Syrian people and of the international 
community that the Assad regime leave power.
    We have provided nonlethal assistance at this point.
    Senator Lieberman. Just define that a bit about what we 
have provided thus far. I noticed the President made a 
statement with Prime Minister Erdogan in Seoul earlier in the 
week that they were both interested in continuing that. Tell us 
what we have done so far and what we are thinking of doing in 
terms of nonlethal assistance.
    Dr. Miller. Sir, the nonlethal assistance to date has been 
materials such as food and tents and so forth, as you would 
expect for humanitarian assistance, and we will continue to 
look at additional opportunities to provide that assistance as 
part of an international effort.
    At this point, a key challenge associated with considering 
lethal assistance is the reality that the Free Syrian Army and 
other groups do not have, at this point, a high degree of 
coherence, and so one needs to consider to whom that would be 
provided and what would be the ultimate disposition of any 
equipment. The answer to that question could evolve depending 
on what happens on the ground, and frankly, the viability of 
any additional aid depends to a degree on the ability of the 
opposition groups within the country to come together. Sir, 
this administration has undertaken an effort to try to 
facilitate that.
    Senator Lieberman. Let me just ask one quick follow-up 
question because my time is up.
    My impression from the reports from Seoul from the 
President and Prime Minister Erdogan was that the nonlethal 
assistance now would go beyond food and tents for, I presume, 
refugees and would include, for instance, communications 
equipment. Is that right?
    Dr. Miller. Senator Lieberman, I am not certain that a 
final decision has been taken on that. What I would like to do 
is get back to you with an answer.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary of State Clinton will be making an announcement regarding 
the topic of nonlethal assistance during the Friends of Syria meeting 
in Istanbul on April 1. I would refer you to her speech and subsequent 
press briefings.

    Senator Lieberman. Okay. Obviously, I hope it does. Thank 
you.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
    Senator McCain.
    Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, I will not comment on your 
response to Senator Lieberman except to say thank you for the 
food and tents. I am sure the people who are being slaughtered 
in the streets of Homs, Hamas, Idlib, and other places are very 
grateful for the food and tents.
    The administration, I understand, has proposed that North 
Korea be provided with 240,000 metric tons of food aid. My 
understanding is that is about $200 million worth of 
foodstuffs. Is that correct?
    Dr. Miller. Senator McCain, the amount of food is correct 
and the dollar figure sounds right to me as well.
    Senator McCain. Now, meanwhile the North Koreans apparently 
are planning on testing another missile. Is it your personal 
view that if they test that missile, that we should continue to 
provide them with the $200 million worth of food?
    Dr. Miller. My view is that we should not.
    Senator McCain. Do you know what the administration's view 
is?
    Dr. Miller. Senator, the view is that if North Korea goes 
forward with this test, we will stop this aid and stop the 
other steps that we have intended to take and have to have a 
complete reconsideration of where we go in the future.
    Senator McCain. Thank you.
    Mr. Kendall, you and I have had numerous conversations 
about cost overruns. I had an interesting exchange with the 
Secretary of the Navy when I pointed out that now with the 
carrier USS Gerald R. Ford there is a billion dollar overrun, 
he said, ``well, the next carrier we will do a lot better on.''
    Is it not true that the Joint Strike Fighter has been about 
$150 billion in cost overruns? Is that about correct, Mr. 
Kendall?
    Mr. Kendall. I think that number is approximately correct, 
yes.
    Senator McCain. Do you anticipate further cost overruns in 
the Joint Strike Fighter besides the $150 billion that has 
already been accumulated?
    Mr. Kendall. We are doing everything we can to drive down 
the cost of the Joint Strike Fighter. I do not anticipate any 
cost growth anything near the scale that you just described. We 
are still about----
    Senator McCain. Maybe only $10 billion?
    Mr. Kendall. I hope much less than that.
    We are still about 20 percent of the way through the test 
program. We are finding design issues as we go through the test 
program that we have to correct. There are some cost 
adjustments associated with that.
    Senator McCain. Would you provide for the record what you 
think will be the additional cost overruns associated with the 
development of this aircraft?
    Mr. Kendall. I will, Senator McCain.
    [The information referred to follows:]

Historical and Current Cost Estimates:
    The $150 billion cost overrun referenced is the increase in the 
total acquisition cost estimate from the original estimate in 2001 
($226 billion) to the estimate in the December 2010 Selected 
Acquisition Report (SAR) ($379 billion)--an increase of $153 billion. 
The current total acquisition cost estimate in the December 2011 SAR is 
$396 billion, which is an increase of $170 billion over the original 
estimate in 2001.
    The increase in the total acquisition cost estimate from the start 
of the development program in 2001 to the current estimate is primarily 
the result of unrealistic baseline estimates at the beginning of the 
program. Total acquisition costs are comprised of the development and 
procurement costs. The development cost estimate has increased from $34 
billion in 2001 to $55 billion in 2012, which is significant and 
primarily the result of unrealistic baseline development and test 
schedule estimates. The development estimate remained essentially 
unchanged from last year's 2010 SAR to the 2011 SAR.
    Accordingly, the bulk of the cost increase from the original total 
acquisition cost estimate to the current cost estimate is contained in 
the procurement costs. The procurement cost estimate in 2001 was $192 
billion while the current procurement estimate in the December 2011 SAR 
is $336 billion. The $336 billion procurement cost estimate is a $12 
billion increase over the procurement estimate contained in the 
December 2010 SAR. This was primarily driven by increased unit costs 
due to the reduced near term procurement profile, incorporation of 
development in parallel to limited rate production concurrency 
modifications, and the inflationary effects of stretching the 
completion of planned procurement from 2035 to 2037.
    Additionally, the estimate for Military Construction (MILCON) costs 
increased from $0.5 billion in the December 2010 SAR to $4.8 billion in 
the December 2011 SAR. This increase was due to my decision to use the 
MILCON estimate from the Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation (CAPE) Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) as the basis 
for the new Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) and SAR.
Risk of Additional Cost Increases:
    A specific projection of any future cost increases would be highly 
speculative and the Department's current estimate is its best estimate. 
If confirmed I will continue to make every effort to control and reduce 
costs. While the recently submitted SAR contains the Department's 
current best estimate of program costs, there are risks that could 
drive cost increases during the remainder of the program. The risks 
include that: the F-35 program has not completed development, 
particularly software development, that design changes may be greater 
than anticipated as a result of discovery of problems during the 
roughly 80 percent of the flight test program that remains, partner 
production plans may change lowering expected economies of scale, 
future DOD budget levels that could force the Department to follow a 
less efficient production profile, and finally that sustainment costs 
may be higher than predicted. The keys to controlling and avoiding 
additional cost increases will be to successfully complete the test 
program, stabilize the design, ramp up production to higher and more 
efficient rates as soon as possible, and to aggressively manage the 
sustainment costs.
Potential Development Cost Increases:
    There are two principal sources of potential increases in the 
development costs, which is being conducted on a cost plus contract; 
software and design changes that may result from discovery during the 
balance of the test program. The Department has programmed funds to 
account for the costs associated with these risks, but there is no 
guarantee that current estimates will not be exceeded.
    The software development program has not been executing to schedule 
and this area is always a source of risk, particularly in a large 
software centric program like the Joint Strike Fighter. The mission 
systems software and the Autonomic Logistics Information System are 
both sources of concern.
    Based on historical experience in similar programs the Department 
expects a certain level of design changes over the balance of the test 
program and has budgeted to cover those changes. Nevertheless there is 
the potential for higher than expected discovery or a major design flaw 
that could lead to costs associated with design changes. The remaining 
flight testing (particularly high performance flight near the edges of 
the envelope and weapons testing) and structural life testing are 
sources of risk. The Quick Look Review which I commissioned last fall 
also noted several specific areas in which development risk still 
exists.
Potential Production Cost Increases:
    The production costs have been roughly following the CAPE estimated 
learning curves. I do not anticipate a significant increase in 
production costs. In 2010, the Department began the transition to 
fixed-price contracting which will transfer responsibility for 
production cost to the supplier. In 2011, the Department also 
negotiated an agreement with Lockheed Martin whereby Lockheed would 
assume shared responsibility for costs associated with design changes 
resulting from problems found during testing. This concurrency risk 
will continue to exist for the next few years but decline as the test 
program is completed. The Department has budgeted funds to cover the 
anticipated costs of changes associated with concurrency, but there is 
some risk that these contingency funds will not be adequate.
Sustainment Cost Increases:
    Projected sustainment costs are too high and the Department must do 
everything it can to bring them down. The SAR submission is based on 
the Department's best estimate at this time. However, I have set an 
affordability target for sustainment that challenges the Air Force, 
Navy, and Marine Corps and the Joint Program Office to achieve lower 
costs than the current estimates by a significant margin.
    I would like to be able to say that there will be no further cost 
increases, however, that would be unrealistic and naive. There are many 
factors that could result in changes that could affect the current 
estimates. If I am confirmed, I will continue to do everything I can to 
control the costs of the program, and if any of those changes occur, I 
will be clear and transparent in communicating to Congress the 
magnitude, reasons, and effects on the program.

    Mr. Kendall. We have estimates of the changes that we could 
expect through the test program. We can give you that. But 
there is some risk, of course, even associated with that.
    I do think that the Strike Fighter is getting under 
control. I would like to say just a couple of words about that, 
if I may.
    We are attacking the production costs by putting strong 
incentives on the contractor to control costs and to get the 
changes that have to be made cut in quickly. We are focusing 
increasingly on the sustainment costs which are larger actually 
than the production costs. We have made some progress there 
this year in some areas but we slipped a little bit in some 
areas as well. That is where we think the greatest potential 
is. Dr. Carter testified a year ago about getting large 
fractions of that cost down, and I think we could approach 
that. I have set a goal for us to accomplish that.
    Senator McCain. As far as the Gerald R. Ford is concerned, 
also would you tell us how much more in cost overruns we expect 
on that particular product. Okay?
    [The information referred to follows:]
Historical and Current Cost Estimates:
    The current total acquisition cost estimate in the December 2011 
Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for the three ship CVN-78 program, in 
base year 2000 dollars, is $27.8 billion, which is a decrease of $0.9 
billion from the original baseline estimate of $28.7 billion in 2000. 
Relative to the updated baseline established in 2004 at $27.2 billion, 
the current estimate represents an increase of $0.6 billion. In then-
year dollars, the current estimate of $42.5 billion is $6.5 billion 
over the 2004 baseline estimate of $36.0 billion for the three ships. 
Much of this increase in then-year costs is due to budget moves, which 
delayed award of the construction contract for the CVN 79 from fiscal 
year 2012 to fiscal year 2013 and for CVN 80 from fiscal year 2016 to 
fiscal year 2018, and stretched the construction period for each by 
about 2 years.
    Costs for the CVN-78, Gerald R. Ford, have risen from an original 
estimate of $10.5 billion to a current estimate of $12.3 billion as 
submitted with the President's budget for fiscal year 2013 (PB-13), an 
increase of $1.8 billion.
    The increase in the total acquisition cost estimate from the start 
of the development program in 2004 to the current estimate is 
attributed to $680 million in design cost for the lead ship, $955 
million in Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), $273 million in the 
government share of the basic construction of the ship by the 
shipbuilder, and $67 million increase in shore based spares for the 
ship. There are also reductions in the program that lowered the 
estimates by $141 million.
    Increases in the GFE costs were attributed to growth in development 
of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS) by $538 
million, modifications to and additional testing requirements for the 
Dual Band Radar (DBR) amounting to $293 million, growth in the Advanced 
Arresting Gear (AAG) development by $43 million, and other combat 
system equipment growth totaling $81 million. Risk of further growth in 
EMALS and AAG production is mitigated by the fact that both systems are 
being procured under a firm fixed-price contract.
    Growth in the design and engineering products was attributed to the 
extent of concurrent design and major system development, the existence 
of a new ship specification, and a significant change from the prior 
Nimitz-class ship specification under which the shipbuilder had built 
the past 11 carriers. The Navy recently converted the design contract 
from a level of effort cost type contract with fixed fee to a 
completion type cost contract with incentive fee. Risk of continued 
growth in design is limited, as the design is now over 90 percent 
complete.
    Shipbuilder cost growth on actual construction has been affected by 
material cost increases, late material orders and deliveries, and 
resolution of some first-of-class construction issues. The primary 
construction issue was the use of a different alloy steel than in 
previous carriers for many of the decks and bulkheads. This allowed for 
thinner plating to save weight, however, the shipbuilder did not 
adequately plan to maintain flatness standards, requiring more 
extensive use of temporary bracing and rigging, and additional labor 
hours to eventually resolve.
Risk of Additional Cost Increases:
    Specific projections of any future cost increases would be 
speculative and the Department's current estimate is its best estimate. 
If confirmed, I will continue to make every effort to control and 
reduce costs. While the above discussion represents the Department's 
current best estimate of program costs, there are risks that could 
drive cost increases during the remainder of the program. If the 
Program Manager's current most likely estimate at completion for the 
shipbuilding contract is realized, the CVN-78 will require an 
additional $417 million beyond that provided in PB-13. The primary risk 
area is that the shipboard testing program, which will integrate and 
test many new systems not found on any existing aircraft carriers could 
lead to discovery of unknown technical issues, either in hardware or 
software. Other known risk areas include: integration of the DBR into 
the topside design and completion of DBR testing; late component 
deliveries for the AAG, which could require the shipyard to implement 
workarounds against the build plan; completion of AAG software to 
support shipboard testing; integration of the power system for EMALS, 
which by necessity will first occur once all four catapults are 
installed in the ship, and which could not be fully tested at the land 
based test site; and completion of the machinery control and monitoring 
system software to support shipboard testing, which also affects 
powering the EMALS for testing.
    I would like to be able to say that there will be no further cost 
increases, however, that would be unrealistic and naive. Until the ship 
delivers, there remain risks that could affect the current estimates. 
If I am confirmed I will continue to do everything I can to control the 
costs of the program, and if any of those changes occur, I will be 
clear and transparent in communicating to Congress the magnitude, 
reasons, and effects on the program.

    Senator McCain. Right now I understand it has been $1 
billion cost overrun. Is that correct?
    Mr. Kendall. When you take all the cost overrun, I think it 
is actually more than that, Senator McCain.
    Senator McCain. Ms. Shyu, you served as senior director for 
Raytheon's participation in the Joint Strike Fighter program?
    Ms. Shyu. Senator, I was on the losing side, unfortunately.
    Senator McCain. What does that mean?
    Ms. Shyu. That means our team, the radar system, everything 
we let, was on the Boeing team.
    Senator McCain. I see. But you did observe the progress or 
lack of progress of this aircraft?
    Ms. Shyu. Yes, sir.
    Senator McCain. Your conclusion was?
    Ms. Shyu. My conclusion is too much concurrency in the 
design development of the program.
    Senator McCain. Yet, Mr. Kendall, we are seeing concurrency 
practiced on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and the 
Ground Combat Vehicle. Are they practicing concurrency?
    Mr. Kendall. The problem with concurrency, Senator McCain, 
is the degree of concurrency. Most programs start production 
before they have completely finished their developmental tests. 
The question is how much. In the case of the Joint Strike 
Fighter, which is an extreme example of concurrency, production 
was started more than a year before the first flight test.
    In the programs that you mentioned, we will go somewhere 
into developmental test where we have prototypes that are 
fairly production representative and we will have confidence in 
the stability of the design. What we are doing now is we are 
setting up exit criteria so that we do not make that production 
commitment until we are confident that the design is reasonably 
stable.
    Senator McCain. Are you confident that both of those 
programs, the JLTV and the Ground Combat Vehicle, will not 
experience overruns?
    Mr. Kendall. I am not confident that any defense program 
will not experience an overrun. That would be quite a statement 
after the last 50 years of history.
    Senator McCain. Can you tell us what you estimate the cost 
overruns will be on these programs?
    Mr. Kendall. We are going to do everything we can to not 
have a cost overrun. I do not have an estimate that would 
suggest that there would be one. It is a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. We are funding our programs to the independent cost 
estimates, and we are going to try to cap our programs there.
    One of the things that we are doing now is setting 
affordability targets early for programs and forcing them to do 
the tradeoffs that have to be made so that they get under the 
cost that they initially put as a cap on the program. There has 
been a reluctance to do that in the past, and I think that will 
have a dramatic impact on the new starts that you talked about, 
both the JLTV and the Ground Combat Vehicle.
    Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, one of the concerns that I had 
that I relayed to Secretary Panetta concerns the study that we 
asked for concerning the base realignment from Okinawa and 
Guam. One of the reasons why Senator Levin and I and the 
committee unanimously asked for this study is because the costs 
have gone from previous estimates of some $6 billion to now $16 
billion with frankly no really hard numbers in sight.
    We asked for an outside assessment as to what plans should 
be for this much needed base realignment, and that bill was 
passed by the Congress of the United States in December and 
signed into law in December. Now, 3 months later, they still 
had not let the contract.
    I understand the contract for an outside study was awarded 
just a few days ago. But we asked for that study so that it 
would be part of the deliberations in developing the plans for 
the base realignment. Instead, you waited 3 months. I do not 
know why it would take 3 months to ask for an outside study. 
Now Senator Levin and I are being briefed this afternoon on the 
plans for base realignment. An outside observer, casual 
observer, would view that as a complete disregard of the 
instructions of the NDAA of 2011.
    Maybe you can explain to me why it would take 3 months to 
ask--there are many outside groups--to conduct a study. By the 
way, we asked for that study to be completed by the 1st of 
March so that as we deliberate on the defense authorization act 
for this year, that that would be part of our deliberations. Do 
you understand my frustrations, Dr. Miller?
    Dr. Miller. Senator McCain, I do. I am going to come back 
over and meet with you, Senator Levin, and Senator Webb and 
walk through what happened with this contract. There is no 
excuse for taking this long to get something on contract, and I 
will not make an excuse for it, sir. But we will have a 
proposal to show you and Senators Levin and Webb on how we can 
still make good use of the work that you have proposed from 
this outside group. They have already begun working and we 
believe we have a good plan, sir.
    Senator McCain. I thank you for that, Doctor, but I hope 
also that you understand to some degree the frustration that we 
feel. Senator Webb traveled throughout the region. Senator 
Levin traveled with him. We have had briefings. We have had 
conversations with not only American leaders and officials but 
foreign leaders and officials on this issue, Japanese 
delegations. Then we make an input and it is if not willfully 
ignored, certainly not pursued to fulfill the will of Congress 
and the legislation passed by Congress and signed by the 
President of the United States.
    We look forward to meeting with you and others on this 
issue and the other issues such as the Medium Extended Air 
Defense System (MEADS) and other concerns that I have raised.
    I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. I join 
Senator McCain in the expression of frustration with not 
complying with the congressional intent--it is not just intent. 
It is the language of the law. I share very much in that 
frustration and look forward to that meeting this afternoon.
    Senator Begich is next.
    Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to follow up on those comments, but also the 
discussion that went back and forth with Senator Ayotte in 
regards to what sequestration would do. I think the word I 
heard--and I do not know if it was the word of the day--was 
devastating.
    But I also think what you just heard is also devastating. 
That is billions that for years--let me give you an example. 
Last year, this committee unanimously agreed to get rid of the 
funding for MEADS, but you have now presented again in your 
budget to fund it, almost a half a billion dollars. It makes no 
sense.
    Now, I know you will tell me the contract says this. Every 
contract ever let by any department of any Federal Government, 
State government, local government is subject to appropriation. 
Subject to appropriation. Now, I know people say, well, we 
never really exercise that. Well, too bad. Contractors sign 
that. I was a mayor. That is how it works. You sign it. You 
understand if we do not give you the money because we do not 
appropriate it, then you are out of business. We do not do the 
contract.
    I understand and I know what is going on because people 
want to make the case later down the road a couple months from 
now we will try to delete the Defense Department out of the 
sequestration and then take it out of the hide of everyone 
else. Everyone is on the table until we resolve this because is 
it not more devastating than if we do not solve the deficit 
problem, sequestration is pocket change compared to what will 
happen if the economy crashes because we cannot deal with the 
deficit.
    Who would like to dare to throw something on the table and 
answer that? Am I mistaken? I think some of the folks in the 
military, DOD, have said the debt is the biggest security risk 
to this country. Did I miss that?
    Mr. Kendall. Senator, I cannot comment on the broader 
issue, but I would like to say a word about MEADS, if I could.
    MEADS is not just a contract. It is an agreement with two 
of our most closest international partners.
    Senator Begich. I understand that.
    Yes, and we pay 75 percent of it for a system we are not 
really going to use fully. I understand that. I have had this 
debate in my office with folks from not your shop specifically, 
but from everyone from the Pentagon to the contractor because 
they get a little freaked out when we start talking about 
canceling a program. We passed in the defense authorization 
bill do not do this program, and you present the budget for 
$400 million more.
    I understand all this international relationship activity, 
but we are paying the tab. Two of the countries, Germany--and I 
think it is Italy, the other one. Italy has no money. They are 
in their own problem. Germany questions this but I know the 
machinery has been busy to make sure we have letters from folks 
to say they are there.
    I understand the word of the day is devastating. I will use 
that word. It is devastating to hear all these cost overruns 
and lack of recognition and I cannot remember how you exactly 
said it, but you said you will always have cost overruns.
    Mr. Kendall. Senator, what I said was that I cannot 
guarantee we will not. I am going to do everything in my power, 
if confirmed, to eliminate them and actually save us money on 
our programs to come in below the budget. That is what we are 
challenging all of our people to do.
    Senator Begich. That is good.
    Mr. Kendall. But the history suggests that is going to be a 
very difficult task.
    Senator Begich. It would be pretty much like almost 100 
percent of the history. A high number.
    Mr. Kendall. We rarely have a program that does not have 
overruns, at least somewhat.
    Senator Begich. That tells you the system is broken.
    Mr. Kendall. It tells me, after 40 years of experience in 
the system, that we have a lot of forces for optimism and that 
we make mistakes about what we can do and how long it will take 
and what it will cost routinely for a variety of reasons.
    Senator Begich. I would say this. As a former mayor, if I 
had my purchasing department have a record like that, a high 
percentage of them would not be working there. There would be a 
different deck because obviously they are incapable of the 
long-term determination of what these values are. I will tell 
you, you can do projects if you design and change it, and let 
me give you one example.
    When we built the convention center in Anchorage, $100 
million plus everyone feared it would go over budget. We did 
something that government never does. First off, we made a 
guaranteed maximum price based on a 35 percent design, and then 
we made sure the contractors, the people that actually owned 
the companies, personally guaranteed any cost overruns. None of 
this garbage about their corporations because that is phony 
baloney stuff. But suddenly when you get the chief executive 
officer (CEO) to have to sign a $2 million personal guarantee, 
just like every bank does for them--we are the best bank, the 
Federal Government.
    I would encourage you for every contractor that does 
business with us that has a record of cost overruns, you tell 
the CEO and the chief financial officer (CFO) we have a new 
arrangement because they make a lot of money. When I look at 
these contractors, these CEOs make a lot of money. Put their 
name on the dotted line, and I guarantee you--just like we have 
here, if our budgets and our operations, our personal offices 
go over budget, guess what. I have to write a check for all the 
employees that work for me here in the Senate. If I go over 
budget, I have to write a personal check. So change the deck 
and get a little more responsible.
    This was not my line of questioning. I just got a little 
agitated here when I heard the word of the day is devastating. 
Somehow we are to blame for it. We are all in this mess. The 
lack of oversight over the years of the Defense Department and 
the cost overruns that you just heard cited, the lack of 
following through on things we pass here and tell you to do, 
you do not do. Let me stop my rant and get to my questions. I 
apologize. But you understand my point.
    Mr. Kendall. I do, Senator, and I agree with you completely 
we have to get better business deals. That is the essence of 
what we need to do. We need very strong incentives for our 
contractors to give them a very good reason, a very good 
financial reason, to do better. That is what they will respond 
to.
    Senator Begich. Yes. Have the CEOs and CFOs sign on the 
dotted line personally.
    I will tell you what happened on that project. Guess what, 
we got it done right on schedule; and guess what, below the 
budget. It was amazing, an amazing thing. We got more for the 
money we spent because they got innovative. I am just giving 
you a thought here. Now, of course, the contractors did not 
like it, but guess what. They are still doing business in our 
city because they became a very good qualified, and they use 
that now as an example to get business around the country of 
what they can do. They can use it.
    Let me put you on hold for a second, if I can.
    Secretary Conaton, let me ask you. I am sure you were aware 
that I was going to do this to you on Eielson Air Force Base. 
It goes to the same thing. Here we are in the process of the 
Air Force determining that Eielson should have a reduction 
within the F-16s and shift them. They have estimated around 600 
military personnel, undetermined civilian personnel. For some 
reason, they cannot figure that out. But they have already 
identified the exact potential savings they are going to have 
because they presented it through the budget process. The end 
result is they have calculated that in and everyone signed off 
on it. So it is all good.
    But now they are sending a team up--will not even be there 
until mid-April--to determine what the savings are. Help me 
here. It seems a little backwards. I think usually you send a 
team in, do an analysis, and not just on the Air Force but the 
secondary impacts. For example, they have no clue if Elmendorf, 
where they want to shift these, will have the capacity to house 
these new facilities, as well as the personnel to go along with 
it, and the air space that is a lot more crowded than ever 
before. We are the fourth largest cargo hub in the world. That 
is not the case it was 20 years ago when they used that as an 
example. Now they think they can save money. So help me here.
    Ms. Conaton. Sure, Senator. I know this has been a topic of 
conversation between you and Secretary Donley and General 
Schwartz. I understand that you still have some outstanding 
questions that you have not gotten complete answers to. Let me, 
on their behalf, promise to go back and follow up.
    In terms of the timing, the simple reality was because of 
the need to achieve the savings that you referred to earlier in 
terms of meeting the Budget Control Act targets, we had to make 
a series of decisions in the time frame of the budget cycle 
inside DOD. Part of the reason that we do not have that change 
at Eielson kicking in until fiscal year 2015 is in order to do 
some additional work. I definitely understand your frustration 
about the order in which this has been undertaken.
    Senator Begich. I will just end as my time is up. They said 
in the hearing we had--or not hearing but public meeting that 
families will be started to be moved or troops in 2013. That is 
not far away. I am very nervous about the uncertainty they are 
sitting with in that community because they have been told in 
the next 7 months or so, 2013, this starts moving. We are very 
nervous about the lack of understanding of the costs. If you 
could respond back to us.
    Everyone who comes here gets this question. If you have Air 
Force tagged on you, you are going to get the question.
    Ms. Conaton. I appreciate that, Senator, and I do promise 
to get back to you with some additional information on behalf 
of Secretary Donley and General Schwartz.
    [The information reffered to follows:]

    The fiscal year 2013 Force Structure Announcement included a net 
impact of ^668 positions which includes the fiscal year 2013 move of 
the Aggressor Squadron (19 F-16s) to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson 
(JBER). Breakout for the fiscal year 2013 manpower reductions are: ^623 
Active Duty military associated with Aggressor move from Eielson to 
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, ^41 civilians that were previously 
announced in fiscal year 2012, +8 Active Duty military for medical, and 
^12 Active Duty military for other actions. There are no changes to the 
Air National Guard refueling unit (8 KC-135s) in this or other years. 
The fiscal year 2013 President's budget also adds 43 Base Operating 
Support Military positions required to support the Aggressors at JBER. 
In fiscal year 2015, right-sizing the operations and support for the 
remaining missions at Eielson has an additional projected impact of 
^928 billets in fiscal year 2015 (^583 military and ^345 civilians). 
The fiscal year 2015 numbers will be further refined as we conduct Site 
Activation Task Force visits to guide implementation. The estimated net 
savings associated with these actions is $3.5 million in fiscal year 
2013 and $169.5 million over the Future Years Defense Plan.

    Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Chairman, I have some other questions I will just 
submit for the record on rare earth issues and some other 
issues, and I will just submit them for the record. Thank you 
very much.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Begich.
    Senator Brown.
    Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mrs. Wright, I just had a question regarding the cuts in 
the Air Force--proposed cuts. When the Air Force decided to 
propose what I viewed as lopsided cuts to the Air Guard, it 
gave me pause, and the reason is that I think there may be a 
better way, a way that preserves the readiness at a fraction of 
the cost, and I believe we could do this by leveraging the 
expertise, skill, and combat experience in the Guard and 
Reserve.
    My question is the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 directed that 
the Department provide Congress with a report on the difference 
in costs between the Active and Reserve components. Would you 
agree that we should wait until we have the most up-to-date and 
accurate information before imposing those cuts to the Guard 
and Reserve?
    Mrs. Wright. Sir, I will tell you all that the Services, 
along with the Air Force, had a very difficult decision to make 
with this last budget. I believe they put their best effort 
forward managing capacity and capability, and they made 
responsible choices.
    Senator Brown. Yes, but do you think we should wait for the 
report for the most up-to-date information before we go 
cutting? I can think of Westover Air Reserve Base where we have 
C-5s that are basically 80 percent battle-ready versus Active 
components at 40 percent, give or take, and yet we are going to 
be shifting and cutting and moving. I have to be honest with 
you. It does not make a heck of a lot sense when you have 80 
versus 40, you have battle-ready versus not, and you have teams 
that have worked together forever and they are potentially 
going to be dismantled or moved. How does that make sense? 
Would that report not help determine where the cost/benefit 
analysis is before we do something that we may not be able to 
recover from?
    Mrs. Wright. Sir, I do understand the issue, and I do know 
that there are four different cost/benefit analyses going on 
within the Department. One was directed by Congress. I believe 
that the Air Force has really looked at a lot of different cost 
methodologies when making the decisions that they have recently 
made.
    Senator Brown. So you are saying we should or we should not 
wait? It is just simply should we wait or should we not?
    Mrs. Wright. I believe the Air Force has already paid 
attention to the cost/benefit analysis that they have used for 
this particular budget.
    Senator Brown. The fact that we directed that they do a 
report and the difference really is irrelevant then. Is that 
what you are saying?
    Mrs. Wright. No, sir. I believe that they clearly will be 
paying attention to these upcoming reports also when making 
further decisions.
    Senator Brown. Ms. Conaton, what do you think?
    Ms. Conaton. Senator, I know you had an opportunity to have 
this discussion with Secretary Donley and General Schwartz.
    My answer, I guess, is similar to what I said to Senator 
Begich, which was the nature of the timeline we were on in 
terms of having to achieve the reductions in the budget under 
the Budget Control Act forced a very intensive period of 
analysis leading up to the budget. I know Secretary Donley and 
General Schwartz have explained to you that their thinking and 
Secretary Panetta's thinking is that with the new strategy and 
with the operational demand they see going forward, that is 
what led them to be more comfortable with the cuts that you 
have seen as part of the budget. I definitely appreciate your 
perspective. This was----
    Senator Brown. It is not just mine. It is quite a few 
members of the committee.
    Ms. Conaton. Yes, sir. No. I understand. This was, I think, 
one of the most difficult decisions that was made certainly 
within the United States Air Force and I definitely respect 
your opinion on that.
    Senator Brown. I have to tell you. The Army, I think, has 
struck a very solid balance between Active, Reserve, and Guard. 
I have to tell you the Air Force, on the other hand--I think I 
can speak for a lot of folks here. It is like they are taking 
all their toys and say, oh, we got them now, and then the 
Reserve and Air Guard are getting the short end of the stick.
    I would like to maybe just shift gears for a minute on what 
you think the role of women in combat is. Do you think it is 
appropriate? Do you think that by removing the barriers for 
those women servicemembers, rising on the ranks based on their 
talents and capabilities regardless of gender is appropriate?
    Ms. Conaton. Yes, sir. I agree with the recent report that 
the Department put forward which would open up some additional 
14,000 positions that had been previously closed to female 
servicemembers. I also agree with Secretary Panetta that this 
opportunity to expand those positions will give us lessons 
learned for where we take next steps. I know the Department is 
committed to trying to look at making positions available based 
on women's qualifications and physical abilities rather than on 
gender per se.
    Senator Brown. I think, quite frankly, they need to go a 
little bit further than that. I know personally our military 
fellow was a Kiowa pilot commander of men and was in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. If that is not the front lines, flying Kiowa 
missions and shooting people and weaponry and the like and 
targets, I do not know what is. I would actually encourage you 
in your position to advocate to, if qualified--if qualified--
they should have the ability to serve like men. I have been in 
32 years. I see them serving and I have served with them 
regularly. As I said, if they are qualified, they should have 
the same opportunities because there is that inability to rise 
up. There is a reason we do not have many four-star female 
generals and that is because of the barriers that have been 
placed.
    On TRICARE, I might as well stick with you. TRICARE is 
something I feel that was a contract between the men and women 
who have served as part of their effort to serve and serve 
well. I understand that there are budgetary pressures, and I 
agree with former Secretary Gates when he said health care 
costs are eating the Department alive. I understand that. But I 
will tell you I believe it is wrong and I think there are 
others--this very specific benefit that we promised to a very 
small group of people in this country, and I think it is wrong 
to tell those who signed on the dotted line--those who had a 
very clear understanding of the contract that they signed and 
listening to your contract is now changing. In the last year, 
we had to increase your premiums, and guess what? We are going 
to increase them again.
    To what extent have TRICARE managers executed best 
practices from the private sector to better manage health care 
costs so those costs are not going to be as high as maybe 
proposed?
    Ms. Conaton. Senator, I am not yet in the position, so I do 
not have great detailed knowledge on what has occurred up to 
date.
    Senator Brown. I thought you were running the whole thing. 
[Laughter.]
    Ms. Conaton. But, sir, what I do know is that the effort to 
deal with health care costs--and as you point out, I think 
Secretary Panetta is on the record before this committee saying 
that in this year alone it will be close to $50 billion in 
health care costs.
    But those costs have to be gone after in a couple of 
different ways. Obviously, you have highlighted the TRICARE fee 
increase, but there has also been a number of efforts to get at 
the cost of provider care and also making DOD's own TRICARE 
management more efficient. This is an area that I would intend 
to spend a great deal on, if confirmed. I appreciate the 
concern.
    Senator Brown. Thank you and good luck to everybody, all of 
the witnesses. Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
    Senator Akaka.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would 
like to add my aloha to this esteemed group of nominees that we 
have before us today. I would like to begin by thanking you for 
your public service over the years that you have given our 
country and your desire to continue to serve our Nation in 
these very important roles.
    I also want to thank your families and also your friends 
who are here who have supported and will continue to support 
you.
    I want to say a special aloha to my good friend and 
brother, Ike Skelton, who is here. There are so many memories 
that we have had on the House side. They are great memories.
    If confirmed, each of you will face significant 
challenges--and you know this--in your new positions. But 
looking at your background and experiences, I feel confident 
that you will be very able to handle the tasks that are before 
you.
    Secretary Conaton, foreign language skills and cultural 
understanding are critical in carrying out the Department's 
mission. However, our Nation has a shortage of employees with 
these skills. Often we compete with the private sector for 
individuals with these abilities. What steps will you take to 
ensure the Department has the language and cultural skills that 
it needs?
    Ms. Conaton. Senator, thank you very much. I completely 
agree with you that language and foreign culture knowledge has 
not only been critical over the last 10 years, but I think it 
is a set of skills that our military needs to maintain. If 
confirmed, sir, I would first go and look at the whole range of 
programs that we have currently underway to see where they are 
successful and where they perhaps have room for improvement and 
where we might find additional sources of recruiting folks with 
resident language capability, as well as those who have an 
affinity for language and could pick it up more quickly. But, 
sir, if confirmed, I would love to come, sit, and talk and get 
your perspective before I get underway in that work.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
    Dr. Stanley and I have been in contact and we have talked 
and in this particular case about a replacement commissary at 
Barbers Point on the island of Oahu. I understand that the 
commissary also recommended building this replacement 
commissary in light of the ever-growing demand for this benefit 
in West Oahu. If confirmed, I hope you will keep me informed on 
the progress of this project.
    Ms. Conaton. Senator, yes, if confirmed, I would be happy 
to get up to speed on where that stands and come back and visit 
with you.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you so much.
    Ms. Conaton. Thank you.
    Senator Akaka. Secretary Kendall, last year the Department 
named a new director of Pentagon pricing. In this budgetary 
environment, we must continue to do everything we can to 
improve the procurement process and efficiently use our 
taxpayers' money. In my opinion, this includes realistic 
requirements making sure that we get good cost and pricing data 
from potential vendors, and that the Department has a skilled 
and capable acquisition workforce to analyze proposals to 
manage the acquisition projects. My question to you is how does 
the Department ensure it has reliable cost and pricing data and 
is developing the skilled workforce needed to manage our major 
acquisitions?
    Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Senator Akaka. The two questions 
are closely related. The skilled workforce is the basis by 
which we are able to assess the pricing data that we receive 
from industry, and we do that as we examine our contracts. We 
have increased our use of that for some of our contracts in 
order to ensure that we are getting fair, reasonable prices 
from our vendors.
    The workforce has been under a great deal of attention both 
for Dr. Carter and myself and with tremendous support from 
first Secretary Gates and now Secretary Panetta. There was a 
recognition a few years ago--and I want to compliment the 
committee in particular for their Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Development Fund (DAWDF) initiative, which came from this 
committee, which has given us the resources to increase the 
size of the acquisition workforce and to bring on key skills 
like pricing you mentioned, but program management, system 
engineering, and particularly contracting so that we have a 
better sized workforce relative to the workload. There was a 
tremendous drawdown in the 1990s.
    I am focusing my attention much more now--and I would, if 
confirmed--on the quality of that workforce and its capacity to 
do its job, the training it receives, the mentoring it receives 
from people who are retiring out of the system, capture those 
skills before they leave. We have a ways to go in terms of 
building up the capacity within the workforce. Given the 
drawdowns that we are having in the overall budget, it is going 
to be hard to sustain the growth that we have had, but we want 
to hang onto what we have under DAWDF, perhaps get a little bit 
more, and then turn increasingly to the skill set of the 
workforce.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you.
    Dr. Miller, with respect to Afghanistan, many believe that 
the U.S. and its partners need to work with Pakistan and other 
neighboring states to reach a political settlement even if such 
a settlement might be favorable to the Taliban. Dr. Miller, can 
you discuss your view of a potential political settlement?
    Dr. Miller. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
    First of all, our work with Pakistan is extremely important 
both in our own bilateral relationship and in ensuring that we 
are able to succeed in Afghanistan. We currently have in 
Pakistan sanctuaries in which Taliban fighters have been able 
to operate and come across the border, and although Pakistan 
has done much more in recent years to deal with them, we 
continue to work with them to try to do yet more.
    With respect to a political settlement in Afghanistan, this 
is the so-called conversations on reconciliation and at a lower 
level fighters on reintegration. We have seen about 3,800 
former Taliban fighters come off the field--3,800 or so in the 
last couple of years through reintegration and expect that that 
effort will continue. That is led by the Afghan Government.
    With respect to reconciliation and the potential 
conversations with the leadership of the Taliban, first of all, 
those are essentially on hold at the present. But the objective 
is to structure a process in which Afghans talk to Afghans 
about the future of Afghanistan. If the Taliban are to come 
into that political process, they have to meet the criteria 
that have been established, including renouncing ties with al 
Qaeda, including entering into a political process, and 
honoring the Afghan constitution. The requirements for the 
Taliban to be able to participate as an outcome have been laid 
out very clearly by Secretary Clinton and by others in the 
administration. That door is open to them to come in, come off 
the battlefield, and legitimately participate should they be 
prepared to do so.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you.
    I wish you all well and thank you for your responses.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
    I am now going to turn the gavel over to Senator Reed who 
will recognize Senator Cornyn right away. The vote is on but 
they are holding it until 11:45 a.m., so you will be able to 
get your questions in.
    I will leave with this request of you, Mrs. Wright. You 
made reference, I believe, to a number of studies that are 
looking at cost/benefit methodologies relative to those 
proposed cuts in the Air Guard. I have real problems with those 
cuts. They are totally disproportionate to the reductions in 
the Active-Duty Force, and my staff is going to be in touch 
with you to get those studies to us so that we can see what it 
is that went into that decision because I agree with what 
Senator Brown said. They just appear totally disproportionate 
to me.
    Ms. Conaton, I hope your nieces and nephew got enough 
material here today to write their reports.
    I will recognize Senator Cornyn and give the gavel to 
Senator Reed.
    Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope they will 
share that report with us. Maybe we will learn something in the 
process. [Laughter.]
    Dr. Miller, this will not come as a surprise to us, but 
thank you for meeting with Senator Kyl, myself, and Senator 
Alexander about this topic. What I would like to do is get some 
of the substance of our discussion off the record, on the 
record. Of course, that has to do with the shortfall for the 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) weapons 
activities.
    Using the 1251 modernization plan which was the basis upon 
which, I think it is fair to say, a number of Senators voted 
for the New START treaty as the baseline, the fiscal year 2013 
request falls $372 million short and funding between fiscal 
year 2012 and 2017 could fall $4 billion short of the 1251 
commitment.
    What I would like to get from you and Mr. Kendall is your 
commitment to work with this committee and to work with 
Congress to identify efficiencies within the national 
laboratories or NNSA that could free up funding for the 
important weapons life extension programs and perhaps even fund 
the construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
Replacement Nuclear Facility, the plutonium producing 
capability, on its original schedule. $300 million is needed in 
fiscal year 2013 and $1.8 billion over the next 5 years.
    Will you give me your commitment, give the committee your 
commitment to work with us to try to find that money to keep 
that original program on track?
    Dr. Miller. Senator, you have my commitment to do so and to 
work with this committee, with Congress, and with the NNSA. 
Since we have met, I have had an opportunity to talk with the 
Administrator, Tom D'Agostino, and I can reassure you, as we 
discussed privately, that he is committed to doing everything 
possible to find efficiencies in his program. We will continue 
to provide support from DOD including through our cost analysis 
and program evaluation study that is underway today.
    Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Kendall. I am going to make the same commitment, 
Senator Cornyn. We are actively working this issue with the 
NNSA.
    Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much for that.
    Mr. Kendall, you testified in front of the House Armed 
Services Committee about the Joint Strike Fighter and indicated 
that it made strong progress in 2011. I share Senator McCain's 
frustrations--I am sure you have some--for the cost overruns. 
But I wonder whether all of us fully appreciate when you have a 
high degree of concurrency built into a cutting-edge program 
like this, just how accurate the original cost estimates can be 
because you are essentially developing this technology as you 
are building it and it makes things very challenging.
    My question is a little more specific about the time it is 
taking the Department to get F-35 production lots on contract. 
The fiscal year 2011 airplanes, lot 5, for which money was 
appropriated a year ago, are still not on contract. The delay 
in finalizing that contract could potentially put the fiscal 
year 2013 funding for this program at risk. The reason I say 
that is because the appropriators in 2011 cut planes last year 
and cited the principal reason as the Department's delay in 
getting the fiscal year 2010 aircraft on contract. I would urge 
you to expeditiously finalize the contract and would be glad to 
hear any comment you would care to make on that topic.
    Mr. Kendall. We are in negotiations for lot 5 now, as I 
think you are aware, Senator Cornyn. We have an undefinitized 
contract. The production is proceeding, but we have to 
negotiate a final price. I cannot really talk about the details 
of that negotiation, obviously.
    We appreciate the concern. We would like to have moved from 
where we seem to be doing undefinitized contracts each year, 
then taking a long time to finally definitize to a situation in 
which we can get a definitized contract earlier. We are hopeful 
as we transition to lot 6, then to lot 7, that we will be able 
to do that. As we get experience, obviously, and we get a 
better understanding of the cost, it should be much easier to 
negotiate these contracts as we go forward.
    Senator Cornyn. This always seems like a very mysterious 
and arcane subject, which I think the lack of clarity that we 
all have makes it more likely that there will be cost overruns 
in the future. I would welcome the opportunity to work with you 
and the Department, as I know we all would, to try to bring 
greater clarity to the process so we can, hopefully, keep this 
essential program on track. Since we put all of our eggs in the 
F-35 basket, as the saying goes, we better take care of the 
basket.
    Mr. Kendall. I agree with that, Senator Cornyn.
    Senator Cornyn. I would like to ask one last line of 
questioning for Dr. Miller and Mr. Kendall. This has to do with 
the subject I have discussed with Secretary Panetta and also 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This regards a 
contract that DOD has with a Russian arms exporter, 
Rosonboronexport, to provide 21 dual-use Mi-17 helicopters to 
the Afghan military. The reason why this has become so 
important is because, of course, this is the same arms merchant 
that has sold weapons to the Syrian Government used to kill 
innocent Syrians who are protesting the tyranny of the Assad 
Government.
    Specifically what I wanted to ask you about is the original 
contract calls for $375 million for the purchase of 21 Mi-17 
helicopters and spare parts. But reportedly there is an option 
to purchase for an additional $555 million which would raise 
the total value of the contract to $1 billion. I know I am not 
alone in being concerned that DOD would enter into a no-bid 
contract to purchase Russian helicopters when there are 
American-made helicopters that surely must be available to meet 
that requirement. Unfortunately, I think the contract 
undermines our goal for national security and is at odds with 
the U.S. policy toward the Assad regime.
    I would just like to ask, Mr. Kendall, Dr. Miller, do you 
share my concerns about DOD's ongoing business dealings with 
Rosonboronexport? I wonder whether you can add any comments 
that would give us some assurance that we are not doing 
business with the very same people who are aiding in the 
killing of innocent civilians in Syria.
    Dr. Miller. Senator, first of all, I want to say explicitly 
that we have had and have ongoing discussions with the Russians 
about any support to the Assad regime in Syria, and we will 
continue to do so.
    The issue with the Mi-17 in Afghanistan comes down to one 
that it is an aircraft that is first well-suited, extremely 
well-suited in fact, to the altitude and rugged terrain of 
Afghanistan, and it is one that the relatively small number of 
Afghan pilots that are currently in place and that we are 
continuing to try to train have an understanding of how to 
operate. The challenge that we have is that there is not 
another aircraft in the world that has the same combination of 
capabilities to be able to operate in Afghanistan, nor that the 
Afghan air forces will be able to train and fly on.
    Understanding the concerns that you raise about working 
with Rosonboronexport, we are continuing the effort that 
started a couple of years ago to have an explicit transition 
plan over time so that we do not find ourselves in this 
position in the future. That is for the rotary-wing support. We 
are looking to be able to transition over time. Sir, because 
the transition is so important in Afghanistan and because, as I 
said, this aircraft is well-suited and the people that we have 
and are training the Afghan air force to fly it are capable of 
operating this, I just think it makes tremendous sense for us 
to continue with the Mi-17 and to have that be the critical 
part of how we transition in Afghanistan. As we talked about 
previously, we stand shoulder to shoulder with the Afghans, but 
we are shifting the weight increasingly onto their shoulders. 
We need an aircraft that can allow them to be able to conduct 
these operations.
    Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, you strike me as a very decent 
human being and a good man, no doubt a great patriot, and I 
know you must be troubled. I know you are doing your job and 
trying to deal with a tough situation. But it just strikes me 
as completely unacceptable for us not to continue to look for 
an alternative to purchasing these helicopters for the Afghan 
army, and if we need to help them with training for a different 
helicopter, they can be purchased from another source. That 
would strike me as a good thing, and I bet you would agree.
    Dr. Miller. Senator, I fully agree. At the same time, I do 
not see a viable alternative today or within at least the next 
year. I have, for the last couple of years, looked into--and to 
say encouraged would be an understatement--our work to find 
alternative platforms, and I will continue to do so. I think it 
is possible Mr. Kendall wants to comment as well. This is an 
important effort from a policy perspective, but it is one where 
we have to get an acquisition of rotary wing capabilities that 
provides this set of capabilities that we can then have not 
just Afghans but others that we can sell to around the world 
for our own operations and for foreign military sales that 
could be used.
    Senator Cornyn. It strikes me, Mr. Kendall, as strange that 
the Russians can build a helicopter that meets Afghan 
requirements but U.S. manufacturers cannot. Is that your 
understanding?
    Mr. Kendall. The situation is they have a helicopter in 
existence that meets those requirements. We could certainly 
build a similar one if we had the time. It is relatively simple 
to operate and to maintain, and it operates well in the 
environment of Afghanistan.
    Part of the history of this is that we attempted to acquire 
Mi-17s through other sources originally, and Russia controls 
the export of them fairly carefully through Rosonboronexport 
that you mentioned. We were forced to go through that vehicle.
    Unfortunately, we would be depriving the Afghan military 
something they desperately need if we were to follow the line 
that you suggested, and I agree with Dr. Miller on that.
    Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator 
Cornyn.
    Before I recognize Senator Blumenthal, let me take my 
questions.
    First, let me thank Secretary Kendall for remembering 
Sergeant Dennis Weichel, and his service and sacrifice, as you 
said, Mr. Secretary, personifies the American soldier, sailor, 
marine, and airman and all they do every day. Thank you for 
that.
    I think you also very eloquently stated that the decisions 
we make here, not just in DOD, but on this side of the dais 
ultimately are carried out by young men and women like Sergeant 
Weichel, and we have to be very conscious of that in everything 
we do. I think this group of nominees feels that intensely. 
General Wright, you have served and so many have served in 
different ways. Thank you very much for that.
    Secretary Kendall, one of the issues that we have talked 
about is the nuclear infrastructure to create and maintain 
nuclear devices. There is another big part of that. That is the 
delivery platforms. Where you are facing a significant set of 
challenges, the lead procurement item is the Ohio-class 
replacement submarine, but the Air Force is talking about the 
need ultimately to replace their fleet. You have to make, I 
presume, improvements in ground-based systems.
    When the Services look individually at the cost--and I have 
more fidelity with respect to the Navy--these are very 
expensive platforms. They crowd out spending for other 
necessary ships in the Navy's case. I think there is a very 
compelling case because this is a strategic issue that the 
Services alone should not fundamentally share the burden, that 
in fact there has to be some DOD defense money because of the 
strategic nature committed to help the Services. I think the 
most immediate situation is in the Navy.
    Can you reflect on that and share your views?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes, Senator Reed. The Department basically 
builds its budget as a budget for the entire Department, and we 
do make tradeoffs that sometimes cut across the Services' lines 
in order to do that. Last fall, what we went through was a 
period where we formulated the strategy, the Strategic Guidance 
that we published, and that was used to guide the budget 
process. That was all done with regard to priorities to support 
the strategy. It was not about the Service portfolio 
specifically. At the end, we came to a decision about the best 
mix of systems to do that, and we tried to take into account 
the long-term issues that you alluded to which include the 30-
year shipbuilding plan which we just sent over which does show 
that the Ohio replacement does add substantially to that 
account. We are going to have to find some other way besides 
the shipbuilding account to pay that bill.
    We have put cost caps on both the SSBN-X, the Ohio 
replacement, and on the new bomber in order to try to control 
the costs and keep them within an affordable range. But there 
is going to be a challenge to us to do this, and it has to be 
done on a defense-wide DOD basis.
    Senator Reed. Part of your approach to this--and I know you 
have thought carefully about it--is not just in terms of 
capping systems but sort of the sequencing of when you build 
these systems. I thought General Kehler's testimony in response 
to Senator Blumenthal--the U.S. Strategic Command Commander--
about the most survivable element in the triad is the 
submarine. General Kehler is an Air Force officer. I think that 
is a double endorsement.
    Is that factor being considered too in terms of sequencing 
and funding in terms of what is the most survivable part that, 
if you extend, will give us more protections?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes. That factor is being taken into account.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Miller, you made it very clear that the policy of 
the President to prevent the Iranian Government from obtaining 
nuclear weapons--and that is a policy that I agree with and 
concur with. The President, as we are all aware, is pursuing 
some of the most aggressive diplomacy that we have ever seen 
with respect to the Iranian situation. I do not think a year or 
2 ago I would have said that the Europeans are prepared at the 
end of June to eliminate their importation of Iranian oil. 
There is some perhaps traction here. But this is a very 
difficult issue.
    There are those that are talking about an immediate or very 
close-on preemptive strike on the facilities. It seems to me 
that, as I look at their analysis, they are assuming a worst 
case on behalf of the Iranians, which is probably prudent to do 
in terms of their nuclear aspirations and what they would do 
with a nuclear device, but then a best case in terms of 
retaliation if such an attack was taking place. It just strikes 
me that that type of analysis is not the best. You have to 
assume, I think, a worst case for their aspirations and a worst 
case for their retaliation.
    Do you want to comment on that approach and your thoughts?
    Dr. Miller. Senator Reed, this administration believes 
there is time for diplomacy to work, and as we have increased 
the pressure through sanctions and through other steps, we 
think that the incentives for the Iranians to come to the table 
and to take the steps needed to come into compliance--those 
incentives are increasing and the impact of sanctions is 
increasing. At the same time, as you indicated, all options are 
on the table at present and all options will remain on the 
table.
    I guess I would add, Senator, that with respect to planning 
for scenarios, this is something--a potential conflict--I 
mentioned the Strait of Hormuz previously. DOD and the military 
is conducting planning across the full range of potential 
scenarios and will be as prepared as possible.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Dr. Miller.
    Thank you all for not only your willingness to serve but, 
in each and every case, your demonstrated service to the Nation 
already. We appreciate it very much.
    Again, I will echo my classmate. I have been doing this for 
40-plus years. Ultimately it is all about those young sergeants 
and boatswain's mates and crew chiefs that are out there 
protecting us.
    With that, let me recognize Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Thank you all for your service already and your service-to-
be and to your families as well.
    Ms. Conaton, I am concerned about the adequacy of the 
criminal justice system in the military in dealing with sexual 
assault. I accept and commend your commitment to ending sexual 
assault and holding accountable anybody who commits it. I know 
that Secretary Panetta is as well. Yet, fewer than 21 percent 
of assault cases now go to trial and about 6 percent of the 
accused are discharged or allowed to resign in lieu of court 
martial. Only half of the cases prosecuted result in 
convictions. I wonder what is being done to improve that 
record.
    Ms. Conaton. Senator, thank you and thanks for the 
leadership not only that you have demonstrated on this issue 
but the committee as well.
    I completely agree with Secretary Panetta that not only is 
one sexual assault too many, but it is completely antithetical 
to who we are as a military and completely contrary to the 
values that the military espouses.
    I think leadership remains critical on this issue. The fact 
that both Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, as well as 
many in Congress, have taken up this issue I think is 
appropriately shining a spotlight on this, and we need to keep 
up that pressure.
    There are definitely issues that go to how our commanders 
impose standards of behavior within their units and the 
training for those who would both investigate and prosecute. 
Secretary Panetta has a very near-term evaluation underway as 
to the adequacy of the training both at the commander level, at 
the investigator level, and for servicemembers at large. If 
confirmed, I would look very much forward to working with him 
and with the committee to see where we go next in terms of next 
steps.
    Senator Blumenthal. I know that he is about to propose or 
in the process of proposing some reforms and changes, and I 
would be very eager to work with you on improving the military 
justice system in dealing with these issues because I think a 
lot more and a lot better can be done.
    Ms. Conaton. Thank you, Senator. It is my understanding 
that the Department is preparing a package of legislative 
proposals to come forward. As I am not yet in that position, I 
have not had an opportunity to review them but would look 
forward to working with you on that.
    Senator Blumenthal. I was very interested and thankful to 
see the part of your testimony dealing with medical research 
programs, particularly psychological health, traumatic brain 
injury, and post-traumatic stress. We have facilities in 
Connecticut, the Eastern Blind Rehabilitation Center, that deal 
with visual injuries. I wonder if you could comment further on 
what will be done assuming that you are confirmed.
    Ms. Conaton. Yes, Senator. You highlighted the research 
aspect of this. As we know that these injuries of the conflict 
of the last 10 years are going to be with us for some time to 
come, I think maintaining the focus on medical research in the 
areas of traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress will 
be absolutely essential.
    But I think everything that the Department does for our 
wounded warriors, we have to keep in mind the fact that it is 
from their service that they are dealing with these injuries. 
Again, these are things that will be with them and their 
families over an extended period of time. If confirmed, I 
imagine these issues and wounded warrior issues more generally 
would be something that I would spend a great deal of time on 
and something I am personally very committed to.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Secretary Miller, the issue of human trafficking in 
contracting and contracts on our bases overseas, a security 
threat--maybe I should address this question as well to 
Secretary Kendall. I have introduced a bill. It has bipartisan 
support here and in the House to try to impose stronger 
criminal penalties on contractors who engage in this practice, 
stronger preventive measures, and providing better remedies. I 
hope that you will support such efforts to combat human 
trafficking not only because of the threat to the integrity of 
our contracts and the cost to taxpayers, but also because it is 
a security issue since many of those brought to these bases can 
pose a threat to our troops. I wonder if you could comment, 
either you or Secretary Kendall, on that issue.
    Dr. Miller. Senator, I will comment briefly.
    I agree absolutely that it is unacceptable and it is 
something that we have to deal with. I have not had the 
opportunity to review your legislation. I will do so and work 
with my colleagues as they operate in acting capacity.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Mr. Kendall. Senator Blumenthal, it was not mentioned but 
my background includes work as a human rights activist, and I 
am very interested in this subject.
    We are doing some things already. I would be very 
interested in things that would strengthen what we are doing as 
far as contracting is concerned. I would be happy to work with 
you on that.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Let me conclude by saying that I share the concerns that 
have been raised about helicopters sold by the Russians to the 
Afghanistan forces. Perhaps you can tell me as simply and 
concisely as possible why we cannot substitute our own 
helicopters. In other testimony before this committee, the 
Russian helicopter was described in its sophistication as a 
flying refrigerator. I am just wondering why the great American 
industrial base cannot provide a substitute for that product.
    Mr. Kendall. The problem is the immediacy of the need and 
the fact that we do not have a product that we can substitute 
immediately.
    Senator Blumenthal. A product that can be flown by the 
Afghans?
    Mr. Kendall. That has the same characteristics as the Mi-
17.
    Basically there are a lot of people in Afghanistan who have 
already had experience with the helicopter, which helps. That 
gives us a head start in terms of training and so on. It is 
suitable for the environment. It is relatively simple to 
operate. It is relatively simple to maintain. So with an Afghan 
force that we are trying to build, it seems to be the right 
platform. We do not have a ready substitute that we could use 
that is a U.S. product.
    Senator Blumenthal. I hesitate to repeat what you have 
already said, but is there an effort underway to develop such a 
substitute?
    Dr. Miller. Senator, yes, there is. A couple of years ago, 
a rotary wing support office was created. The challenge is that 
we do not have available a platform that could meet the needs 
in the very near term. I agree that this is a place that we 
should not find ourselves in the future, but this is where we 
are at least for the next year and perhaps for the next couple 
of years.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    One more question relating to the Joint Strike Fighter. Are 
you concerned that some of the supposed overrun is due to 
projections of inflation that seem to be at best somewhat 
speculative and therefore may not reflect accurately the real 
cost of the program?
    Mr. Kendall. Part of the increase that we are reporting 
today actually includes some inflation indices adjustments. 
There is a substantial piece of it that is that.
    I think we tend to get a little too fixated on some of 
these numbers. I am trying to attack the costs. I am trying to 
look at the things that I can do something about and drive them 
down. The aircraft is at an affordable level now I think as far 
as production is concerned, but we can do better and we need to 
make it better so we can afford more of them.
    The sustainment costs are too high. Dr. Carter testified 
about that a year ago, and we need to drive those down. I have 
set a target that I think is a cap on what we can do, and we 
have tried to drive to at least that, which is lower than the 
current estimate. Then we are going to try to drive it even 
lower. That will be the subject of an awful lot of activity 
over the next coming year.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. Again, thank you 
all for your service and good luck. Thank you.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your testimony and 
your service.
    With that, the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    [Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Frank Kendall III by 
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied 
follow:]
                        Questions and Responses
                            defense reforms
    Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have 
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have 
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain 
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant 
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments 
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment 
to the combatant commanders.
    Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act 
provisions?
    Answer. I do not see the need for modifications to Goldwater-
Nichols Act provisions at this time. I believe the current allocation 
of responsibility for acquisition-related matters in title 10, U.S.C., 
appropriately assigns responsibility to the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), and that the 
law also appropriately identifies the acquisition-related functions of 
the Military Department Secretaries. I will continue to consider this 
issue and will make proposals for modifications if and when required.
    Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to 
address in these modifications?
    Answer. N/A.
                                 duties
    Question. Section 133 of title 10, U.S.C., describes the duties and 
responsibilities of the USD(AT&L).
    Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties do you expect 
that the Secretary of Defense will prescribe for you?
    Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary to assign duties and 
functions commensurate with the USD(AT&L)'s function and expertise as 
he deems appropriate.
    Question. Do you recommend any changes to the provisions of section 
133 of title 10, U.S.C., with respect to the duties of the USD(AT&L)?
    Answer. No.
    Question. Do you believe that the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
effectively implemented a streamlined chain of command for acquisition 
programs, as envisioned by the Packard Commission?
    Answer. I believe that the Department has implemented a strong 
acquisition chain of command, built upon an effective management 
structure that meets the current acquisition requirements and outcomes. 
I am concerned, however, that some program managers have been given 
responsibility for too many programs. If confirmed, I will continue to 
examine this structure and oversight to ensure continued success in 
leadership.
    Question. Do you see the need for modifications in that chain of 
command, or in the duties and authorities of any of the officials in 
that chain of command?
    Answer. No, not at this time. I believe the statutory reporting 
chain providing USD(AT&L) directive authority concerning Military 
Department acquisition programs via the Military Department Secretaries 
is a crucial authority that must be maintained. If confirmed, I will 
evaluate the current chain of command and will recommend adjustments 
should any be needed to ensure continued success.
                             qualifications
    Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for managing an 
acquisition system pursuant to which DOD spends roughly $400 billion 
each year. Section 133 of title 10, U.S.C., provides for the Under 
Secretary to be appointed from among persons who have an extensive 
management background in the public or private sector.
    What background and experience do you have that you believe 
qualifies you for this position?
    Answer. I have over 40 years experience in the areas of national 
security, defense, and acquisition. My education includes degrees in 
engineering, business and law. I served on active duty in the Army for 
over 10 years including in operational units and research and 
development (R&D) commands. As a civil servant, I worked as a systems 
engineer and systems analyst. I spent over 8 years in the Pentagon on 
the Under Secretary for Acquisition's staff first as Assistant Deputy 
Under Secretary for Strategic Systems (Defense Systems) and then as 
Director, Tactical Warfare Programs. Outside of government I have been 
the Vice President of Engineering for Raytheon Company and a consultant 
on national security and acquisition related matters, principally 
program management, technology assessment, and strategic planning, for 
a variety of defense companies, think tanks, and government 
laboratories or R&D organizations. I re-entered the government in March 
2010 after confirmation by the Senate to be the Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Since 
October 2011, I have served as the acting Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
    Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in the 
acquisition of major weapon systems?
    Answer. During the past 2 years, I have served the Defense 
Department in the Office of the USD(AT&L). For a year and a half as the 
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics), and from October 2011 to the present as the 
acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics. In both positions, I played a central role overseeing and 
directing major weapons systems on behalf of the Department. In my 
previous Pentagon positions, I served in the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition's office from 1986 to 1994. During this period I had 
oversight responsibility, first for all strategic defense programs, and 
then for all tactical warfare programs. During my period as Director of 
Tactical Warfare Programs from 1989 to 1994, I chaired the Conventional 
Systems Committee, now called the Overarching Integrated Product Team, 
which was responsible for preparing for Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
decisions for the Under Secretary for Acquisition. In this capacity, I 
was responsible to the Under Secretary for approximately 100 DAB 
reviews covering systems from all three Military Departments that 
spanned the spectrum of major weapon systems. After I left government 
service in 1994, I was involved with a number of major weapons systems 
programs in my capacity as Vice President of Engineering at Raytheon. 
As an independent consultant, I spent several years providing technical 
management and program management consulting to the Lead System 
Integrator for the Future Combat Systems program. During the period 
1997 to 2008, I was also involved in reviews of a number of major 
acquisition programs, either as an independent consultant or as a 
member of a government advisory board.
                             relationships
    Question. In carrying out your duties, what would be your 
relationship with:
    The Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. If confirmed, I will be the principal staff advisor to the 
Secretary of Defense on matters concerning acquisition, including on 
the procurement of goods and services, R&D, developmental testing, and 
contract administration. I will also be the principal staff advisor to 
the Secretary on matters concerning logistics, maintenance and 
sustainment support, installations and environment, operational energy, 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and the defense industrial 
base.
    Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. If confirmed, I will be the principal staff advisor to the 
Deputy Secretary in the same manner as to the Secretary.
    Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense.
    Answer. There are many actions that require coordination among the 
Under Secretaries of Defense. If confirmed, I will work with the other 
Under Secretaries to serve the priorities of the Secretary of Defense.
    Question. The DOD General Counsel.
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the General Counsel's office 
to ensure all actions are legal, ethical, and within regulatory 
guidelines.
    Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Operational 
Test and Evaluation to ensure the Department has appropriate 
operational test and evaluation of defense acquisition programs.
    Question. The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation to ensure that the Department has 
independent cost analysis for defense acquisition programs and 
appropriate resource assessments for other programs within my 
responsibilities.
    Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering.
    Answer. If confirmed, I will direct the work of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to maintain the 
technological edge of the Armed Forces, ensure the Department has 
continued ability to acquire innovative capabilities, and to reduce the 
cost and risk of our major defense acquisition programs.
    Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Developmental Testing.
    Answer. If confirmed, I will direct the work of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Testing to ensure 
there is strong involvement early in program formulation, that 
comprehensive, independent developmental testing assessments of program 
maturity and performance are available to inform acquisition decisions, 
and that the developmental test community within the acquisition 
workforce is appropriately staffed and qualified.
    Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for System 
Engineering.
    Answer. If confirmed, I will direct the work of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for System Engineering to ensure the 
application of sound systems engineering principles to major defense 
acquisition programs and to ensure that the systems engineering 
community within the acquisition workforce is appropriately staffed and 
qualified.
    Question. The Director of Program Assessment and Root Cause 
Analysis.
    Answer. If confirmed, I will direct the work of the Director of 
Program Assessment and Root Cause Analysis to ensure that the 
performance of the defense acquisition system is carefully evaluated 
and to ensure that all relevant lessons learned are captured from 
programs which experience unacceptable cost growth and that performance 
measurement for DOD programs and institutions is effectively 
implemented.
    Question. The Acquisition Executives in the Military Departments.
    Answer. If confirmed, I will make communication and coordination 
with the Service Acquisition Executives a top priority. I will work 
with the Acquisition Executives to ensure effective oversight, through 
the Secretaries of the Military Departments, of acquisition programs in 
their areas, support transparency in sharing information about program 
status, take appropriate remedial actions to rectify problems, actively 
engage in departmental processes to improve acquisition outcomes, and 
support the policies and practices of the Department. I will also 
expect them to champion best practices and share ideas and concerns 
with me, with each other and with appropriate stakeholders.
    Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Vice Chairman in his role 
with respect to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and 
would support and encourage his active role as a member of the DAB. I 
will also seek to ensure the requirements and acquisition processes 
work effectively together in terms of stabilizing requirements, and 
ensuring requirements established for acquisition programs are 
achievable within appropriate cost, schedule, and technical risk.
                     major challenges and problems
    Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will 
confront the USD(AT&L)?
    Answer. My principle challenge will be to support the Department's 
recently announced Military Strategy Guidance within the available 
resources. My priorities as the acting USD(AT&L), and the priorities I 
would emphasize if confirmed, are tightly aligned with that challenge 
and with the principles the Secretary of Defense has expressed--
maintain the best military in the world, avoid a hollow force, take a 
balanced approach to achieving efficiencies, and keep faith with our 
men and women in uniform.
    My priorities and the major challenges I expect to face if 
confirmed as USD(AT&L) are: (1) providing effective support to current 
operations; (2) achieving affordable acquisition programs; (3) 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Department's 
acquisition of both products and services; (4) strengthening the 
industrial base during a period of lower than expected budgets; (5) 
strengthening the acquisition workforce in order to achieve better 
acquisition outcomes; and (6) ensuring that despite limited resources 
the Department protecting the capabilities the Department will need in 
the future to equip and sustain the force and conduct operations.
    Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for 
addressing these challenges?
    Answer. The following is a very brief summary of some of the plans 
that I have to address the challenges I see:
    To support the warfighter, if confirmed, I will continue to 
prioritize and institutionalize rapid acquisition to meet urgent needs, 
timely and reliable logistics support, effective contingency 
contracting, and more efficient operational energy solutions.
    To achieve affordable programs, if confirmed, I will continue to 
work with the requirements and resource communities and the acquisition 
community to ensure the programs the Department starts have firm cost 
goals in place for both production and sustainment, that appropriate 
priorities are set, and that the necessary tradeoffs are made to keep 
defense programs within affordable limits.
    To improve efficiency, if confirmed, I will continue to refine and 
evolve the Better Buying Power initiative. I will continue the 
continuous improvement management approach that Dr. Carter and I 
initiated to control and reduce costs while acquiring products and 
services that provide the highest possible value to the warfighters.
    To strengthen the industrial base, if confirmed, I will continue to 
focus on executing contracts with industry that include appropriate 
incentives to higher productivity and drive fair business deals to 
protect the taxpayers' interest, while providing industry with 
reasonable profit opportunities and without putting industry at 
unacceptable risk. I will also continue to ensure critical skills and 
capabilities in the industrial base are identified, and intervene where 
necessary to see that needed capabilities are preserved. If confirmed, 
I will keep strong two way lines of communication to industry open at 
all levels so that industry and government truly understand each 
other's perspectives and concerns.
    To strengthen the acquisition workforce, if confirmed, I will 
continue to work to increase the capability of the workforce. As budget 
reality reduces the capacity to increase the size of the workforce, I 
will turn greater attention to the capability within the workforce, 
particularly the development of key acquisition leaders in program 
management, engineering, contracting, and product support. This 
includes increased skills and leadership training. It also means 
setting high standards, recognizing good performance, and holding 
people accountable for poor performance.
    To protect the future, if confirmed, I will continue to advocate 
for sound investments in the next generation of technologies to 
maintain U.S. military superiority. This means protecting essential 
capabilities in the industrial base, such as design teams that would 
take a generation or more to replace. It means retaining a contingency 
contracting capability that can be expanded when needed for future 
operations. It means developing and nurturing small businesses, 
maintaining our installations, and ensuring the safety and security of 
our nuclear deterrent. Most of all, it means maintaining the very best 
military in the world, not just today, but for the long term.
                        acquisition organization
    Question. Do you believe that the office of the USD(AT&L) is 
appropriately structured to execute its management and oversight 
responsibilities?
    Answer. Yes. I have made a number of minor adjustments in the AT&L 
structure since I joined the organization in March 2010. As I evaluate 
the impact of these changes other adjustments are possible, but overall 
I believe the structure is appropriate.
    Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the relationship 
between the USD(AT&L) and senior acquisition officials in the Military 
Departments?
    Answer. No.
    Question. Do you see the need for any additional processes or 
mechanisms to ensure coordination between the budget, acquisition, and 
requirements systems of the DOD and ensure that appropriate trade-offs 
are made between cost, schedule, and performance requirements early in 
the acquisition process?
    Answer. I believe the correct mechanisms are in place at the DAB 
and the JROC, and in the process for performing analyses of 
alternatives, to ensure that appropriate trade-offs are made between 
cost, schedule, and performance requirements on major defense 
acquisition programs. Dr. Carter and I initiated the use of 
affordability production and sustainment cost requirements or caps 
early in program life cycles and, if confirmed, I will continue the use 
of this management tool to force trade-offs early in the system design 
process. If confirmed, I will also continue to examine whether there is 
a need for additional processes or mechanisms for ensuring appropriate 
trade-offs before program requirements are finalized.
    Question. What do you believe should be the appropriate role of the 
Service Chiefs in the requirements, acquisition, and resource-
allocation process?
    Answer. The acquisition process does not exist in isolation and the 
Service Chiefs play a major role as a result of their deep involvement 
in the budget and requirements processes, and because they are 
responsible for the health of the acquisition workforce of their 
respective Military Departments, particularly the officer corps. The 
acquisition process functions properly only when the Service's 
uniformed leadership is actively involved and takes responsibility for 
the success of the acquisition system. I believe the chain of 
professional acquisition authority--normally the program manager, 
program executive officer, component acquisition executive and/or 
milestone decision authority--is appropriate for acquisition decisions, 
but that these people cannot be successful without the involvement and 
active support of Service senior uniformed leadership.
    Question. What do you see as the potential advantages and 
disadvantages to giving the Service Chiefs authority and responsibility 
for the management and execution of acquisition programs?
    Answer. The Service Chiefs are usually not acquisition 
professionals, and in general, I believe that the management and 
execution of acquisition programs should be done by people who have the 
professional experience and qualifications to direct large scale 
complex programs. I also believe that the Service Chiefs already have 
significant responsibility for the success of acquisition programs, and 
that there is much they can and should do within their current 
authority to improve acquisition outcomes. The steps the Service Chiefs 
can take include: (1) making sure their personnel systems are doing 
everything they can to create a more capable and professional 
acquisition workforce (particularly key leaders including program 
managers, chief engineers, contracting officers, and product support 
managers); (2) recognizing the importance and unique skills of those 
key leaders and making it career enhancing to go into the acquisition 
field; (3) ensuring that realistic requirements are set and that there 
is a cooperative relationship between the acquisition community and the 
requirements community in which requirements trade-offs and informed 
decisions can be made efficiently; (4) creating a command environment 
where acquisition professionals are listened to and encouraged to bring 
realistic assessments forward to senior requirements and budget 
decision makers and where sound business practices that will save money 
and provide more value are supported; and (5) including the acquisition 
professionals in the cultural mainstream of their Service.
    Question. What do you believe should be the appropriate role of the 
combatant commanders in the requirements, acquisition, and resource-
allocation processes?
    Answer. Combatant commanders advise on capability needs, priorities 
and allocation of resources consistent with those needs. I am 
particularly sensitive to the need for the acquisition system to 
address urgent needs of the combatant commanders in support of wartime 
operations and changing threats. In those exceptional cases where a 
combatant commander holds special acquisition authorities such as the 
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, AT&L has responsibilities 
to foster their success through mentorship and positive process 
oversight. If confirmed, I will continue to respect and encourage their 
advice and solicit their input on meeting their needs effectively.
    Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the structure or 
operations of the JROC?
    Answer. I support the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' 
initiatives to emphasize cost-informed decisions in the military needs 
validation process and to streamline the JROC process. The current 
construct encourages direct and open discussion between senior military 
needs officials and acquisition leaders. Our staffs work continuously 
to evolve these processes to provide capability more effectively. The 
VCJCS and I have been working closely to streamline and coordinate 
requirements and acquisition, and if I am confirmed, I will continue 
this practice. I have been regularly attending JROC meetings to provide 
the acquisition perspective and if confirmed I will continue this 
practice.
    Question. What improvements, if any, do you believe are needed in 
the lines of authority and accountability for the procurement of major 
weapon systems?
    Answer. I believe in clear lines of authority and accountability 
for the procurement of major weapon systems. They go from the Defense 
Acquisition Executive through the Secretaries of the Military 
Departments to the Service Acquisition Executives and the Program 
Executive Officers and Program Managers. I see no need for changes to 
that structure. If confirmed, I will continuously review this to see if 
changes might be needed.
    Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to empower 
program managers to execute major defense acquisition programs and hold 
them accountable for how well their programs perform?
    Answer. Section 853 of the John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007 required the Department 
to develop a strategy to enhance the role of DOD program managers in 
developing and carrying out defense acquisition programs. The 
Department developed the strategy and has implemented many of the 
initiatives identified in its report to Congress to include more 
focused education and training, program manager forums, and 
institutionalized assist teams. Tenure agreements, program manager 
agreements, and configuration steering boards increase leadership 
stability while enhancing management accountability. The foundation of 
accountability is competency and experience. I am currently reviewing 
the Department's approach to developing and empowering program managers 
as well as the approach to holding them accountable for their 
performance. I regard leaving stronger, more effective acquisition 
leaders as the single most important legacy I could leave the 
Department and if confirmed that will continue to be one of my highest 
priorities.
                    major weapon system acquisition
    Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for 
major systems is affordable given decreasing defense budgets, the 
historic cost growth trends for major systems, and the continuing costs 
of ongoing contingency operations?
    Answer. I believe the current investment budget for major systems 
is affordable if properly managed, but that it will be a challenge to 
achieve this. The President's fiscal year 2013 Defense Budget provides 
a balanced approach to reducing force structure and procurement over 
the Future Years Defense Program. Cost growth in acquisition programs 
will have to be controlled if the Department is to execute this budget 
successfully. Secretary Gates and Dr. Carter foresaw the need for 
greater efficiency and effective execution and started the Better 
Buying Power initiative in 2010 to ensure that the performance of the 
defense acquisition system was everything that the warfighter and 
taxpayers have a right to expect. If the Department continues to 
experience over the next 10 years the same levels of cost growth and 
failed programs that occurred in the decade preceding this initiative, 
it will be extremely challenging to meet our minimum needs for 
recapitalization and modernization.
    Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to make cost control an over-
riding priority. As the USD(AT&L), I would continue to advise the 
Secretary on a sustainable and affordable investment strategy for the 
Department. As the acting Under Secretary, I have included formal 
affordability requirements as a critical element of the defense 
acquisition system. If confirmed, I will continue to work to control 
potential cost growth for existing programs and to work to improve the 
Department's requirements, acquisition, and budgeting processes to 
ensure investment decisions are informed by sound affordability 
constraints.
    Question. What would be the impact of a decision by the Department 
to reduce purchases of major systems because of affordability issues?
    Answer. Over the long term, the Department must balance force 
structure with operating costs, capital investments, and modernization. 
I believe that ultimately reductions in our recapitalization and 
modernization rates could jeopardize our ability to keep up with pacing 
threats, reduce production efficiency, increase sustainment costs for 
the existing force structure, and affect the health of the industrial 
base. In the short term, some reductions are manageable and 
affordability constraints cannot be ignored.
    Question. Nearly half of DOD's major defense acquisition programs 
have exceeded the so-called ``Nunn-McCurdy'' cost growth standards 
established in section 2433 of title 10, U.S.C., to identify seriously 
troubled programs. Section 206 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform 
Act of 2009 (WSARA) tightened the standards for addressing such 
programs.
    What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to address the out-
of-control cost growth on DOD's major defense acquisition programs?
    Answer. I believe the Department must continue to take steps such 
as those included in the Better Buying Power initiatives that Dr. 
Carter and I started. These initiatives are part of a process of 
continuous improvement in the acquisition system aimed at controlling 
costs in all acquisition activities, including major programs. First of 
all the Department's planning must be realistic and fully resourced. 
This means setting requirements that are affordable and achievable 
within the time and resources available. Affordability caps for both 
production and sustainment are now being applied early in program life 
cycles and their use must continue so that sound requirements trades 
are made as early as possible. In order to ensure more effective 
program execution, primarily by industry, acquisition strategies that 
emphasize sustaining a competitive environment and providing strong 
incentives to cost control must be implemented consistently. Continuous 
efforts to identify sources of cost reduction through ``should cost'' 
management should be used during all program phases. If confirmed, I 
will continue to implement these measures and work to identify 
additional steps that can be taken to control cost growth.
    Question. What steps if any do you believe that the Department 
should consider taking in the case of major defense acquisition 
programs that exceed the critical cost growth thresholds established in 
the ``Nunn-McCurdy'' provision?
    Answer. I believe DOD has full authority to take appropriate 
measures, including major restructuring or termination of poor 
performing programs. While terminations have rarely occurred in the 
past, one of my first acts as acting Under Secretary was to terminate 
the Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio program after a 
Nunn-McCurdy breach. I believe that the current budget environment will 
make it more likely that program terminations will occur after critical 
Nunn-McCurdy level cost breaches due to our overall affordability 
constraints. Also the Department will be more aggressive in taking 
action before Nunn-McCurdy thresholds are reached. As Principal Deputy 
USD(AT&L), I also instituted a practice of conducting Nunn-McCurdy-like 
reviews as soon as cost growth became apparent even if breaches had not 
occurred yet so that this mechanism is applied proactively instead of 
reactively. If confirmed, I will continue this practice.
    Question. Do you believe that the office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as currently 
structured, has the organization and resources necessary to effectively 
oversee the management of these major defense acquisition programs? If 
not, how would you address this problem?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you see the need for any changes to the Nunn-McCurdy 
provision, as revised by section 206?
    Answer. No.
    Question. What principles will guide your thinking on whether to 
recommend terminating a program that has experienced critical cost 
growth under Nunn-McCurdy?
    Answer. If confirmed, the five certification elements listed in the 
law will continue to guide me.
                      operating and support costs
    Question. The Department estimates that operating and support (O&S) 
costs account for up to 70 percent of the acquisition costs of major 
weapon systems. Section 832 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 requires 
the Department to take a series of steps to improve its processes for 
estimating, managing, and reducing such costs.
    What is the current status of the Department's efforts to implement 
the requirements of section 832?
    Answer. Several organizations within the Department, to include 
AT&L and the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office (CAPE), are 
currently addressing implementation of the requirements outlined in 
Section 832. The section 832 requirements will be implemented in a 
major revision of the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02, 
which includes an extensive restructure of the document, as well as 
``Fact of Life Changes'' and the incorporation of other NDAA directed 
requirements, including those of sections 805, 815, and 837.
    Question. What steps remain to be taken to implement section 832, 
and what is the Department's schedule for taking these steps?
    Answer. The planned completion date for these efforts is December 
2012. If confirmed, I will supplement the update to DODI 5000.02 with 
guidance, training, mentorship and oversight. If confirmed, I would 
expect to gain insight into the effectiveness of these efforts through 
Defense Acquisition Executive Reviews and incorporate the lessons 
learned into future policy refinements.
    Question. What steps, if any, are needed to ensure that the 
requirements and acquisition communities fully and effectively 
collaborate to understand and control the O&S costs prior to and early 
in product development, when it is possible to have the most 
significant impact on those costs?
    Answer. The Department recognizes that alignment and partnership 
among the operational requirements, development, and sustainment 
communities are essential to optimizing warfighter operating and 
support strategies at a minimal cost. Identifying, maintaining and 
understanding program impacts to O&S costs are critical during a 
program's early requirements definition, and technology development 
phases, and remains a priority during the Weapon System's entire life 
cycle.
    I recently elevated the importance of Life Cycle Product Support by 
making the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP) a stand-alone program 
management tool required for all programs prior to entering the 
Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase. The LCSP will 
capture the requirements for product support that include both 
Readiness and O&S cost objectives.
    Additionally, I am addressing the role/influence of reliability, 
availability, and maintainability (RAM) engineering during acquisition 
reviews. During the quarterly Defense Acquisition Executive Summary 
(DAES) assessments, I focus on reliability and availability as well as 
actual O&S cost performance against pre-determined objectives. These 
assessments act as a trigger for further in-depth reviews of programs 
between major milestones and during Post-IOC reviews.
    Operational energy costs are also an important target for O&S cost 
reduction. The Department recently published an operational energy 
strategy and implementation plan. If confirmed, I will work to ensure 
that this plan is successfully executed.
    If confirmed, I will continue to explore and implement these and 
other management tools to reduce support costs.
    Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the 
Department needs to take to bring O&S costs under control?
    Answer. I believe the Department should continue execution of the 
steps Dr. Carter and I put in place under the Better Buying Power 
initiatives and should seek other ways of controlling O&S costs. 
Specifically, if confirmed, I will continue and enforce the 
implementation of sustainment affordability constraints as programs 
conduct technology demonstration and enter engineering and 
manufacturing development. Sustainment cost constraints are intended to 
force programs to analyze sustainment costs and take steps to control 
them during product development, but these constraints must be 
enforced. If confirmed, I will ensure that this occurs.
    Under Better Buying Power, the Department also initiated a ``Should 
Cost'' management process that requires our managers to drive costs, 
including sustainment costs, down. Program Managers must develop clear 
cost objectives that are lower than the Independent Cost Estimate 
(ICE), or ``Will Cost,'' derived from historical data. These ``Should 
Cost'' targets are not arbitrary numbers. Rather, each target must be 
grounded in some form of a tangible, best practice and/or innovative 
business approach designed to improve upon historical performance.
    The Department also needs to continue the effort to align the 
incentives of the Government and its sustainment contractors to produce 
better results. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage use of 
Performance-Based Sustainment strategies to drive O&S costs down by 
providing competitive and financial incentives to both industry and 
Government. The data from the Department's use of performance-based 
sustainment demonstrates that properly structured and executed 
performance-based sustainment strategies produce better performance 
results at less cost than traditional, transactional sustainment 
approaches. Performance-based strategies can be applied to activities 
performed by both public and private sustainment providers.
    If confirmed, I will continue to explore and implement other 
management tools to reduce O&S costs.
                          systems engineering
    Question. One of the premises for WSARA was that the best way to 
improve acquisition outcomes is to place acquisition programs on a 
sounder footing from the outset by addressing program shortcomings in 
the early phases of the acquisition process. The Defense Science Board 
Task Force on Developmental Test and Evaluation reported in May 2008 
that ``the single most important step necessary'' to address high rates 
of failure on defense acquisition programs is ``to ensure programs are 
formulated to execute a viable systems engineering strategy from the 
beginning.''
    Do you believe that DOD has the systems engineering and 
developmental testing organizations, resources, and capabilities needed 
to ensure that there is a sound basis for key requirements, 
acquisition, and budget decisions on major defense acquisition 
programs?
    Answer. Since the passage of WSARA, the Department has worked to 
build the systems engineering expertise required for effective 
acquisition. While much progress has been made, the Department still 
has work to do in building its capacity for professional systems 
engineering. The Department has increased the numbers of system 
engineers, but the work force has a demographics issue with a senior 
workforce nearing retirement and a number of relatively inexperienced 
junior people who will need more experience to become proficient. If 
confirmed, I will continue to identify and implement creative measures 
to address this problem.
    Question. What is your assessment of the implementation to date of 
section 102 of WSARA, regarding systems engineering?
    Answer. I believe the Department has faithfully implemented section 
102 by establishing the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Developmental Test and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Systems Engineering offices, by staffing these offices with highly 
qualified teams, and by providing guidance and oversight to the systems 
engineering capabilities in the Military Services.
    Question. What additional steps will you take, if confirmed, to 
implement this provision?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Acquisition 
Executives to ensure the effective implementation of recently approved 
systems engineering policy and guidance and the adequacy of the 
competency, capacity, and authority of the systems engineering 
workforce as critical components in support of successful acquisition 
system performance.
    Question. Do you believe that the Nation as a whole is producing 
enough systems engineers and designers and giving them sufficient 
experience working on engineering and design projects to ensure that 
DOD can access an experienced and technically trained systems 
engineering and design workforce? If not, what do you recommend should 
be done to address the shortfall?
    Answer. I am not satisfied that the Nation is currently producing 
enough systems engineers and engineers in other disciplines to meet the 
Department's complex engineering challenges. The Department has ongoing 
efforts to promote engineering education in kindergarten through 12th 
grade and college curricula, and, if confirmed, I will continue to 
support those efforts to promote engineering as an important field of 
study with our national educational system. I will also promote 
engineering excellence within the acquisition work force as a core 
value.
    Question. Last year, the chairman and ranking member of the Armed 
Services Committee expressed concern that the annual report to Congress 
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering (SE) and 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Testing failed to 
meet applicable statutory requirements.
    What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that future 
reports on developmental testing and systems engineering fully comply 
with applicable statutory requirements?
    Answer. In response to the expressed concerns of the chairman and 
ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, the Department has 
increased the detail and extent of our reporting in the fiscal year 
2011 DT&E and SE Annual Report to Congress. If confirmed, this will 
continue to be a matter of priority for me.
                         technological maturity
    Question. Section 2366b of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Milestone 
Decision Authority for a major defense acquisition program to certify 
that critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of 
maturity before Milestone B approval.
    What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that 
DOD complies with the requirements of section 2366b?
    Answer. If confirmed, as chair of the DAB and Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA) for major defense acquisition programs, I will continue 
to use technology readiness assessments (TRAs) to ensure compliance 
with section 2366b. I am concerned however, that reliance on formal 
technology readiness levels (TRLs) has become a substitute for a deeper 
understanding of the state of risk prior to entering development. I 
commissioned a study of recent decisions to enter engineering and 
manufacturing development (EMD), which concluded that TRLs in many 
cases were not being used effectively to assess the risk of entering 
EMD. The TRL labels used in TRAs are a useful benchmark, but they alone 
are not enough.
    Question. What steps if any will you take to ensure that the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)) 
is adequately staffed and resourced to support decisionmakers in 
complying with the requirements of section 2366b?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to work with ASD(R&E) and 
other members of the OSD and Military Department staffs to ensure the 
adequacy of resources available to meet the challenges of complying 
with the requirements of section 2366b.
    Question. Are you satisfied that TRAs adequately address systems 
integration and engineering issues, which are the cause of many cost 
overruns and schedule delays in acquisition programs?
    Answer. I am not satisfied that TRAs are, by themselves, adequate 
for addressing systems integration and engineering risks. They are 
necessary but not fully sufficient to determine technical risk. A 
recent Department case study on technology development and prototyping 
found very little correlation between TRAs and program success in 
development. TRAs are, however, necessary for identifying and maturing 
the Critical Technology Elements enabling the key performance 
characteristics of advanced systems. They form an essential part of 
program managers' risk management strategies, planning, and execution. 
In May 2011, I directed the Department to revise its approach for 
conducting and independently verifying TRAs for Program Inception 
(Milestone B) in order to make program managers more responsible and 
accountable for understanding and managing program risks. It is too 
early to tell how effective these changes have been. If confirmed, I 
will continue to make improving risk management of technology, 
engineering, and integration risks a high priority.
    Question. Beyond addressing technological maturity issues in 
acquisition programs, what other steps should the Department take to 
increase accountability and discipline in the acquisition process?
    Answer. There are a great number of factors that contribute to the 
failure of programs to meet their cost, schedule, and performance 
objectives and many are associated with discipline and accountability. 
By instituting and enforcing affordability constraints on programs, I 
have begun to discipline the acquisition system to constrain 
requirements to affordable levels. Industry should also be held 
accountable for its performance, and I believe this is best 
accomplished through the incentives integrated into our contracts and 
through the actions taken when programs are not performing acceptably. 
Government institutional performance matters also, and I am beginning 
to implement new institutional performance measurement required by 
section 2548 of title 10, U.S.C. When this system is in place, it will 
allow the Department to compare institutional performance and identify 
best practices. If confirmed, I will aggressively continue this 
initiative. There are also perverse incentives in our budget execution 
system that encourages the workforce to obligate money, whether it 
makes sense to do so or not. The Department should not provide 
incentives that prioritize putting funds on contract over negotiating a 
contract that is in the Department and the American taxpayer's best 
interest. If confirmed, I will continue the effort to instill a culture 
of cost consciousness and stewardship of the taxpayer's dollars 
throughout the defense acquisition system. My emphasis is on taking 
steps to improve the quality and professionalism of the acquisition 
workforce that plans and manages the execution of the Department's 
programs. Program managers and other leaders who do not perform to 
standards have been removed from their positions, but I expect this to 
be infrequent. The Department (particularly the Military Departments) 
has the duty to ensure that the people entrusted with the 
responsibility for managing major programs have the qualifications and 
the professional development they need to assume this responsibility. 
If confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure that this is the case.
                          requirements process
    Question. What is your assessment of recent revisions made by the 
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Joint Capabilities 
and Integration Development System (JCIDS)?
    Answer. I believe these revisions will allow JCIDS execution to 
align more closely with the Department's new strategic guidance and to 
take account of cost and technological maturity factors. Additionally, 
I understand that the process makes permanent several important 
initiatives that enable more rapidly delivered and affordable 
capabilities to the warfighter. The updated policy addresses combatant 
commanders' Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) and Joint Emergent 
Operational Needs (JEONs), improving the Department's agility and 
efficiency in meeting the most urgent warfighter needs in current and 
future contingency operations. JROC review of analysis of alternatives 
results prior to Milestone A, and of Capabilities Development Documents 
(CDDs) prior to Milestone B, facilitate contracting activities before 
Technology Development and Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
acquisition phases. Lastly, new JCIDS limitations on length of Initial, 
Development, and Production Capability Documents reduce the often 
redundant administrative burden on program managers that has lengthened 
process timelines of systems acquisition and focuses the JROC on the 
most important requirements for a program.
    Question. In your view, has the JROC been effectively drawing and 
using input from the systems engineering, cost analysis and program 
planning, and budgeting communities as warranted, in its deliberations 
regarding requirements associated with major systems acquisitions?
    Answer. The updates to the JCIDS and JROC Charter place increased 
emphasis on how the JROC executes its responsibilities to consider 
cost, schedule, and performance of programs and identified 
alternatives. The AT&L staff has been working to help lay the 
groundwork for active collaboration among Joint Staff, Military 
Departments, combatant commanders (COCOMs), Cost Analysis and Program 
Evaluation (CAPE), and AT&L in analysis of how requirements 
alternatives drive cost, schedule, and performance. Some of these 
process changes are newly implemented, but I believe they provide a 
framework for success if effectively executed. I have also increased my 
personal participation in the JROC process in order to ensure that 
these considerations are taken into account during the deliberations 
over requirements. I believe this is having a significant impact. If 
confirmed, I will continue this practice.
                              concurrency
    Question. Some of the Department's largest and most troubled 
acquisition programs appear to have suffered significantly from 
excessive concurrency--the effort to produce a weapon system, even as 
it is still being designed.
    What impact do you believe that such excessive concurrency has on 
our efforts to produce major weapon systems on schedule and on budget?
    Answer. Excessive concurrency can drive cost growth and result in 
major schedule disruptions that produce further inefficiency. The 
acceptable degree of concurrency between development and production 
depends on a range of factors including the risk associated with the 
development phase, the urgency of the need, and the likely impact on 
cost and schedule of realizing that risk. A careful balance must be 
struck on every program, taking all these factors and others into 
account. If confirmed I will continue to work to ensure that balance is 
carefully assessed and properly managed.
    Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to address this 
issue?
    Answer. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that the risk/benefit of 
any given degree of concurrent production and development is carefully 
assessed before program plans are approved and before production 
decisions are made. I will ensure that major weapons systems program 
plans have clearly articulated and justified framing assumptions 
underlying concurrency risks and track progress against these 
assumptions. I will continue to require programs to reassess levels of 
planned concurrent production as necessary if these underlying 
assumptions change.
    Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that it 
is useful and appropriate to require prime contractors on major defense 
acquisition programs share in concurrency costs?
    Answer. In most circumstances, the Government will bear the bulk of 
concurrency risk. When the Government initiates production before 
development is complete, the Government can use cost plus contracts 
that cover concurrency risk or a fixed-price vehicle that excludes 
concurrency costs from the contracted deliverable. The first four lots 
of JSF, an example of an unusually highly concurrent program, used 
these approaches so that the government bore almost all concurrency 
costs. In general, I believe that industry should not be asked to bear 
excessive risk. At some point, however, the concurrency risk in a 
program should be reduced to the extent that industry can reasonably 
bear a portion or all of that risk, as is the case with JSF Lot 5. If 
industry is then unwilling to accept this risk as a reasonable part of 
doing business, then the risk may be too excessive to contract for 
continued production. In a well-structured program this situation 
should not occur.
    Question. In your view, would a requirement for such cost sharing 
reduce the likelihood of excessive concurrency in the development and 
production of major weapon systems?
    Answer. The Government usually controls the structure of the 
program and determines when to start production. If the concurrency 
risk is excessive, then the Government should usually wait until it is 
reduced before starting production. If the urgency of acquiring the 
product dictates accepting high concurrency risk, then in general the 
Government should bear it. Cost sharing arrangements do not change the 
existence of the risk, however if industry is unwilling to accept some 
concurrency risk as a condition of a production contract, this would be 
an indication that the risk may still be high.
                          joint strike fighter
    Question. You were recently quoted as saying that it was 
``acquisition malpractice'' to place the Joint Strike Fighter into 
production years before the first flight test.
    Does this quote accurately reflect your views?
    Answer. Yes. The context of this remark was specifically in 
reference to the decision made to enter into production of the Joint 
Strike Fighter prior to the initiation of flight test. This decision 
was a clear departure from well-established principles of sound program 
management. It is important to note that this judgment does not extend 
to the JSF program as a whole. The Department remains committed to the 
JSF program and I believe the program, if appropriately managed, will 
allow the Department to acquire a critical capability at an acceptable 
cost. My comment was also not an indictment of any individual, but of 
the systemic problem of allowing optimism and the presence of funding 
in the budget to over-rule sound program management practices.
    Question. What steps if any do you believe that we can take now to 
address any problems or deficiencies that may have developed as a 
result of excessive concurrency on the Joint Strike Fighter program?
    Answer. I believe that the Department has taken appropriate steps 
to address concurrency risk on the F-35 program by maintaining 
production at a fixed rate for the next 2 years as the design 
stabilizes and is validated by flight testing. The most recently 
awarded production contract is structured to ensure Lockheed Martin 
shares the cost of concurrency risk and incentivizes Lockheed Martin to 
quickly identify and implement solutions to deficiencies identified 
during testing. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate concurrency 
risk to ensure that there is a prudent balance between concurrency risk 
and efficient production.
    Question. What steps if any do you believe we should take to avoid 
similar problems in future acquisition programs?
    Answer. It is my understanding that the level of concurrency in the 
JSF program was established based on an expectation that our modeling 
and simulation capabilities would allow us to reduce the amount of 
discovery in flight test compared to our historical experience with 
similar programs. This assumption proved unrealistic, and I believe our 
experience on the JSF program should lead us to pursue acquisition 
strategies based on sounder program management practices. There is a 
bias toward optimism in our program planning that needs to be 
counteracted by experienced professional leadership. This can be a 
difficult balance, however as too much risk aversion can also lead to 
problems including extended schedules and increased cost in programs.
    Question. The Department recently completed a special ``quick 
look'' study on the progress of the Joint Strike Fighter program.
    What is your understanding of the key findings of the ``quick 
look'' study?
    Answer. I chartered the F-35 Quick-Look Review to determine if 
there was sufficient confidence in the stability of the basic F-35 
design to justify additional concurrent procurement. The review team, 
comprised of technical and program management experts from the AT&L 
staff, did not find any fundamental design risks sufficient to preclude 
further production. The team did identify several sources of design 
risk that warranted reexamining production plans and carefully 
monitoring of program progress going forward.
    Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should 
take on the Joint Strike Fighter program to address the findings of the 
study?
    Answer. The Department has already taken the appropriate steps to 
address the findings of this study. Maintaining production at lower 
than planned rates as the design stabilizes and is validated by 
developmental flight testing avoids excessive concurrency costs. There 
are now financial incentives to Lockheed Martin to rapidly identify 
effective solutions to design discrepancies discovered during flight 
test and to shorten the timelines for implementation of needed changes 
during production. The Department is moving to an event-based 
relationship between production and progress on the development 
program. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor the program closely 
and will intervene if the program does not execute to plan.
    Question. What lessons from this study, if any, do you believe that 
the Department should learn and apply to other programs?
    Answer. The Department learned that while engineering design tools 
have advanced remarkably in the information age, they have not replaced 
the need for careful developmental testing of complex military systems. 
Authorizing production before sufficient progress had been made in 
flight-testing to provide confidence in the design incurred excessive 
concurrency risk for the program as design deficiencies were identified 
after production aircraft had been ordered and delivered. A more 
general lesson, and a systemic problem, is the bias toward spending 
appropriated funds whether it is a sound management and business 
decision to do so or not.
    Question. Do you believe that the ``quick look'' approach is a 
model that should be repeated for other programs, or should the 
Department's established processes be sufficient to identify problems 
and opportunities in ongoing programs without the need for such special 
reviews?
    Answer. Yes, I believe the Quick-Look approach can and should be 
repeated on other programs. The F-35 Quick-Look Review relied on the 
technical expertise and engineering judgment of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Systems Engineering, the DASD for 
Developmental Test and Evaluation, and the Director for Strategic and 
Tactical Systems, supplemented by other subject-matter experts from the 
Service Technical Centers and the OSD staff. Their programmatic 
expertise and authority on the F-35 program derived directly from their 
oversight roles within the Department's established processes. Although 
the Department frequently requests technical advice and assistance from 
external subject matter experts, conducting timely, focused internal 
reviews of critical acquisition issues does provide the Department a 
valuable tool for responsively analyzing and resolving rapidly emerging 
programmatic issues. I do not regard this mechanism as a deviation from 
established processes, but as an adjunct to those processes. It was 
triggered in part by a report from the Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation, which was a part of the Department's normal processes.
                       fixed price-type contracts
    Question. Recent congressional and DOD initiatives attempt to 
reduce technical and performance risks associated with developing and 
producing major defense acquisition programs so as to minimize the use 
of cost-reimbursable contracts.
    Do you think that the Department should move towards more fixed 
price-type contracting in developing or procuring major defense 
acquisition programs? Why or why not?
    Answer. While I think greater use of fixed-price vehicles, 
particularly in early production, is warranted, I do not believe that 
the Department should be restricted in the available contract types 
because of the wide variety of situations faced by the Department. In 
general, I believe that the move to increased use of fixed-price 
contracting that Dr. Carter and I initiated in the Better Buying Power 
initiatives was a sound decision. Increased use of fixed price 
incentive fee contracting in early production has particularly high 
potential to improve outcomes. I am less enthusiastic about fixed price 
development because of my experiences with this approach in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, there are instances when fixed 
price development is the best approach. The AF tanker program is a good 
example. In this case the guidelines I would use for fixed price 
development were all present: (1) the requirements were firm; (2) the 
technical risk was low; (3) the expected bidders had the expertise and 
experience to bid rationally and to execute successfully; (4) the 
expected bidders had the financial capacity to absorb any reasonable 
overruns; and (5) they had a business case that would motivate them to 
do so. If any of these elements were not present, I would seriously 
consider whether a cost plus development approach was the best option. 
Many of our development programs do entail cost risk that may exceed 
industry's capacity and willingness to absorb losses. In many cases, 
the Department is reaching for unprecedented levels of performance in 
advanced designs. No amount of risk reduction can completely remove all 
the risk from next generation designs and the government may need 
flexibility to work closely with the contractor to adjust requirements 
as knowledge increases during development. In some cases, operational 
urgency makes long risk reduction programs prior to development for 
production unacceptable. The bottom-line is that there is a range of 
contract types for good reasons.
    Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would 
be appropriate for the Department to use a cost-type contract for the 
production of a major weapon system?
    Answer. I believe those circumstances should be limited, but they 
will sometimes occur. For the production of a major weapon system, I 
would consider a cost type contract in those circumstances where the 
system design and/or the state of production has not yet matured to the 
point where reliable cost outcomes can be projected. This situation can 
occur, for example, in production of new design first articles in 
commodities like satellites and ships. It can also occur when there is 
great schedule urgency, due to an operational situation or an 
intelligence surprise, which precludes taking time for risk reduction 
and design maturation. In these cases, higher degrees of risk and 
concurrency are warranted with concomitant risk in production costs and 
even feasibility that it may not be reasonable to ask industry to 
assume. Most production, certainly the production beyond low rate 
initial production, should be contracted for on a fixed price basis. I 
have continued to support the emphasis that Dr. Carter and I placed on 
the use of fixed price incentive fee contracts during low rate 
production. These vehicles cap the government's liability, while 
allowing some flexibility for cost uncertainty and providing a strong 
incentive for industry to control costs. They also provide the 
government with good visibility into contractor actual costs.
    Question. In a recent presentation at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, you were quoted as stating that ``The data says 
it doesn't make much difference'' whether the Department uses fixed-
price or cost-plus contracts for low-rate initial production contracts.
    Does this quote accurately reflect your views?
    Answer. I was not expressing a view. The quote reflects what the 
data suggests. The data is incomplete and needs greater study. I was 
making the point that our acquisition policies need to be data driven 
whenever possible, not just intuitive. I have seen several swings of 
the pendulum with regard to perceived best practices in acquisition. 
Usually the current conventional wisdom is based more on intuition and 
what seems to have not worked recently, than on an analysis of the 
historic data on program outcomes.
    Question. What data were you relying on in making this statement?
    Answer. This statement was based on an examination of earned-value 
data on the actual performance of 440 historical, large, early-stage 
production contracts for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). 
These data were reported between January 1970 and December 2011. They 
are available in the Defense Acquisition Management Information 
Retrieval system (DAMIR) and its predecessor, the Consolidated 
Acquisition Reporting System (CARS).
    Question. What conclusions if any have you reached about the way 
the Department should contract for low-rate initial production of major 
weapon systems?
    Answer. No single contract type works best in all cases for low-
rate initial production of major weapon systems and each situation has 
to be carefully evaluated to determine the best approach for that 
situation. In cases where risk has not been or cannot be adequately 
reduced (due to urgency or the technical feasibility of reducing risk 
without building a production asset) a cost plus vehicle may be 
appropriate. A fixed-price incentive firm (FPIF) or cost-reimbursable 
contract may also be appropriate when the incentive structure is 
properly designed and tied to desired performance over the anticipated 
risk range. Alternatively, firm-fixed price (FFP) contracts may be 
appropriate for low-rate initial production in cases where there is 
little risk and the production processes and costs are well understood.
                         technology transition
    Question. The Department continues to struggle with the transition 
of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons 
systems and platforms. Further, the Department also has struggled with 
moving technologies from DOD programs or other sources rapidly into the 
hands of operational users.
    What impediments to technology transition do you see within the 
Department?
    Answer. The impediments I see include the formality and rigidity 
associated with Programs of Record, inflexibility in the requirements 
process, the length of time it takes to obtain programmed funds, the 
difficulties associated with reprogramming funds, and the difficulties 
small businesses and non-defense companies have in doing business under 
Federal Acquisition Regulation they may not be familiar with.
    Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to enhance 
the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?
    Answer. There are a number of activities under way in the 
Department to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition. If 
confirmed I will continue to support these initiatives and look for 
other opportunities to enhance technology transition. The rapid 
acquisition programs that the Department has initiated to support 
ongoing operations have been very successful at acquiring new 
technologies and fielding them quickly. The Department needs to 
institutionalize this process so that future urgent needs can also be 
met effectively. DOD is in the process of expanding the rapid 
acquisition of Joint Urgent Operational Needs from primarily off the 
shelf technology to those that require some limited development time 
and may not be directly associated with ongoing operations. The 
Department is expanding it's out-reach to small businesses, including, 
with Congress' support, reinvigorating the mentor protege program which 
aligns traditional defense firms with small businesses trying to break 
into the defense markets. Under the Better Buying Power initiatives, 
the Department has taken steps to improve communication between 
government and industry about both government funded R&D priorities and 
company funded internal research and development (IR&D). The Army has 
initiated a program that allows firms to demonstrate their networking 
technologies and qualify for competitive awards. The Air Force is 
taking steps to allow advanced technology space launch firms to compete 
with traditional firms. All the Services are emphasizing open systems 
and open architectures as a means of permitting new technologies to be 
inserted into existing programs. These are just examples of the types 
of steps the Department needs to take to improve technology transition.
    Question. What can be done from a budget, policy, and 
organizational standpoint to facilitate the transition of technologies 
from science and technology programs and other sources, including small 
businesses, venture capital funded companies, and other non-traditional 
defense contractors, into acquisition programs?
    Answer. I believe that it is important that the Department tap into 
as great a range of sources of technology as possible. This includes 
commercial technology, small business, and traditional defense 
companies. By adopting open standards that keep pace with technology, 
the Department can tap into commercial technology, particularly in 
information systems. Small businesses, including non-traditional 
defense contractors are a critical source of innovation. Initiatives to 
increase small business participation in defense programs include 
reinvigorating the mentor protege program; lowering barriers to 
participation in the Small Business Innovation Research program such as 
restrictions on venture capital ownership; and expansion of some small 
business size restrictions. The Department has increased its efforts to 
stimulate and leverage independent research and development (IR&D) with 
new practices to improve communication with industry on Department 
priorities and ensuring Department science and technology and 
acquisition program managers are aware of the technology developments 
in IR&D projects. If confirmed, I will continue and expand the 
Departments efforts to reach out to and support all of these sources of 
technology and find ways to reduce barriers to entry for the sources of 
new technology.
    Where Congress has seen fit to provide funds for innovation beyond 
the level that the Department requested, the Department has acted 
promptly to execute those funds and if confirmed I will continue that 
practice. For example, the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 and 
the Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Appropriations Act included provisions for 
the establishment of the Defense Research and Development Rapid 
Innovation Fund (RIF). This program emphasizes rapid, responsive 
acquisition and engagement of small, innovative businesses in solving 
defense problems using a fully merit-based, competitive proposal 
process. The Department is in the process of awarding the initial 
contracts under the Rapid Innovation Fund.
    Our Office of Small Business Programs is also working with the 
Small Business Administration to implement the fiscal year 2012 
reauthorization of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and 
Small Business Technology Transfer programs. Two provisions within this 
reauthorization will facilitate transition of technology. The first is 
the Commercialization Readiness Program for DOD that directs DOD to 
establish goals for increasing transition of SBIR developed technology 
into fielded programs or programs of record, and provides for the use 
of incentives for program managers and prime contractors to meet these 
goals. The second is the provision to allow limited participation by 
small business firms that are owned in majority part by multiple 
venture operating companies, hedge funds or private equity firms. This 
action is intended to induce additional venture capital, hedge fund, or 
private equity firm funding of small business innovation.
    Question. Do you believe that the Department's science and 
technology organizations have the ability and the resources to carry 
technologies to higher levels of maturity before handing them off to 
acquisition programs?
    Answer. In general, I believe that the Department's S&T (Budget 
Activities 1-3) organizations collectively have the ability and 
adequate resources to carry technologies forward to the pre-production 
prototyping stage at Budget Activity 4, which may or may not be a 
formal acquisition program. Technological superiority underpins the 
Department's strategy and if confirmed, I will continue to monitor the 
balance of S&T and R&D investments to ensure a proper balance and that 
the S&T activities have adequate capacity and resources.
    Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should 
take to ensure that research programs are sufficiently funded to reduce 
technical risk in programs so that technological maturity can be 
demonstrated at the appropriate time?
    Answer. As I have stated in previous testimony, I believe 
technologies (that are necessary or desirable to meet proposed 
acquisition program needs) should be identified early and that specific 
maturation programs should be defined and agreed to by the S&T and 
development communities. Technology maturation programs should also be 
collaboratively managed. Within specific programs, this is based in 
part on the Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) process, which 
assesses the technological maturity of critical technology elements 
enabling systems performance, and the program manager's technology 
maturation strategies. The Milestone decision process ensures these 
strategies are adequately funded and determines exit criteria for 
demonstrating technical progress before the commitment to investments 
in development or production.
    Question. What role do you believe Technology Readiness Levels and 
Manufacturing Readiness Levels should play in the Department's efforts 
to enhance effective technology transition and reduce cost and risk in 
acquisition programs?
    Answer. Technology and Manufacturing Readiness Levels (TRLs and 
MRLs) are tools for gauging the maturity of technologies that might be 
adopted by an acquisition program to meet cost or performance goals or 
to achieve desired production capabilities. They provide an indicator 
of the degree of risk remaining in a program. I believe they are 
valuable benchmarks against which to assess program risk, but I also 
believe that TRLs and MRLs alone are not conclusive about whether a 
program should proceed to development and production or not. One has to 
look behind these labels to understand the actual risk associated with 
a technology and the steps that could be taken to mitigate that risk. 
If confirmed, I will continue to use TRLs and MRLs, but I will also 
continue to insist on thorough professional assessments of risk that go 
beyond the use of these benchmarks.
    Question. Section 253 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 required the 
Department to report to Congress by no later than October 1, 2009, on 
the feasibility and advisability of various approaches to technology 
transition. The Department has not yet complied with this requirement.
    When can the committee expect to receive the report required by 
section 209?
    Answer. It will be delivered by April 6, 2012.
    Question. Section 1073 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 established 
a competitive, merit-based rapid innovation fund to accelerate the 
fielding of technologies developed pursuant to SBIR projects, 
technologies developed by the defense laboratories, and other 
innovative technologies.
    What is your view of the rapid innovation fund established by 
section 1073?
    Answer. In September 2011, the Department issued solicitations for 
Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF) proposals and received over 3,500 
responses. I anticipate that approximately 160-180 of the responses 
will receive contract awards. My view is it is too early to determine 
the RIF's overall impact. Our implementation processes were successful 
in obtaining proposals, primarily from small businesses. However, 
contract awards should not be the sole criteria for success. I believe 
it will take at least 2 or 3 years before one can objectively assess 
the effectiveness of RIF in achieving the goal of accelerating the 
transition of innovative capabilities into Department programs.
    Question. What is your understanding of the Department's plans for 
the funds previously authorized and appropriated to the fund, but not 
yet expended?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2011 program value for the RIF is $496.1 
million of which $436.4 million are RDT&E funds, and $59.7 million are 
procurement funds. My understanding is that the Department is on track 
to obligate all of the $436.4 million RDT&E funds prior to September 
30, 2012 for contract awards to proposals.
        unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations
    Question. Many acquisition experts attribute the failure of DOD 
acquisition programs to a cultural bias that routinely produces overly 
optimistic cost and schedule estimates and unrealistic performance 
expectations. Section 201 of WSARA seeks to address this problem by 
promoting early consideration of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives in major defense acquisition programs.
    Do you believe that early communication between the acquisition, 
budget and requirements communities in DOD can help ensure more 
realistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. If so, what steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to 
ensure such communication?
    Answer. I have, and if confirmed will continue to stress the need 
for earlier communication among the requirements, budget and 
acquisition communities to enable more informed decisions on cost, 
schedule, and performance trades from the beginning of requirements 
development throughout the acquisition lifecycle. If confirmed, I will 
continue to take steps to forge closer ties between military needs and 
acquisition solution development in the services and in the Department 
overall. I regularly participate in the JROC where cost-informed and 
technologically sound decisions can yield savings in time and resources 
for acquisition programs. I have directed AT&L staff elements to engage 
with the Joint Staff early in the process of validating joint 
requirements to assist with assessment of candidate needs against 
existing capability portfolios. I strongly support Configuration 
Steering Boards and other forums in which requirements, budgeting, and 
acquisition communities work together to reach better solutions to our 
warfighters needs.
    Question. DOD has increasingly turned to incremental acquisition 
and spiral development approaches in an effort to make cost, schedule, 
and performance expectations more realistic and achievable.
    Do you believe that incremental acquisition and spiral development 
can help improve the performance of the Department's major acquisition 
programs?
    Answer. Yes. While not a silver bullet, incremental development can 
play a significant role in the development of major acquisition 
programs. The Department applies the term ``incremental'' to both the 
incremental and spiral acquisition approaches. In particular, an 
incremental approach could be the right strategy when the program 
manager is faced with an evolving requirement, an evolving threat, or 
where an investment in an immature technology is needed to achieve a 
longer-term advantage. In this last case, fielding a capable, call it 
an ``80 percent solution'' now, with an eye to incorporating the new 
technology when it is ready later, is a good strategy. In all these 
instances, getting a capability into the warfighters' hands sooner, 
then upgrading to a more capable system can be a smart business 
approach, and better serve our troops.
    Question. What risks do you see in the Department's use of 
incremental acquisition and spiral development?
    Answer. If implemented correctly, there is little additional 
technical risk to using an incremental strategy. There are upfront 
costs associated with an open design that can accommodate incremental 
upgrades. Part of the trade off for lowering the initial technical risk 
is the necessity in such a strategy to incorporate an intentional plan 
that allows for upgrading early deliveries to the final configuration 
or cutting changes into the production line. The additional cost and 
complexity for these upgrades is an important consideration that must 
be factored into the overall plan for an incremental approach. Smart 
use of open architecture and commercial standards, careful management 
of intellectual property rights, and well defined form, fit, and 
function interfaces are important to being able to upgrade systems more 
easily at a reasonable cost.
    Question. In your view, has the Department's approach to 
incremental acquisition and spiral development been successful? Why or 
why not?
    Answer. The department applies the term ``incremental'' to both the 
incremental and spiral acquisition approaches. The Department's success 
has been mixed. I believe the Department has been more successful in 
producing open designs that can accommodate uncertain new technology 
than in preplanned future spirals. Success depends upon the degree of 
technical risk or requirements instability and whether the program 
management and oversight structures are responsive to the needs of 
these strategies. No approach to acquisition is right for all 
circumstances but incremental acquisition strategies that enable 
multiple block upgrades can provide the Department with a useful 
flexibility and efficient improvements in capability.
    Question. What steps if any do you believe are needed to ensure 
that the requirements process, budget process, and testing regime can 
accommodate incremental acquisition and spiral development approaches?
    Answer. I do not believe that additional steps are required. Under 
our current acquisition policy, each increment of capability requires 
approved/achievable requirements, full funding for the increment and a 
test plan designed to assess the capability the increment is expected 
to provide. Affordability constraints are being implemented, and I 
believe that these constraints will discipline the requirements process 
to realistic initial capabilities that may be improved in future 
increments. In short, the Department's policies are designed to support 
an incremental acquisition approach in those cases where it is the most 
appropriate strategy.
    Question. How should the Department ensure that the incremental 
acquisition and spiral development programs have appropriate baselines 
against which to measure performance?
    Answer. Current department acquisition policy requires each program 
increment to have an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) that specifies 
the cost, schedule, and performance against which the program increment 
will be measured. The APB is approved by the Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA) and cannot be altered without MDA approval. In a multi-
increment program, each increment must have its own MDA-approved 
baseline.
                      major shipbuilding programs
    Question. Recent estimates indicate that the new nuclear-powered 
aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) will cost over $12 billion, 
exceeding the legislatively-imposed cost-cap by as much as a $500 
million. It appears that cost growth in this ship is attributable to, 
among other things, inaccurate assumptions in the cost of materials 
made when much of the ship's design was immature and unforeseen labor 
issues encountered with new design features.
    How confident are you that the Navy can effectively control the 
cost to build the CVN-78 in particular and other major shipbuilding 
programs in general?
    Answer. The Navy has worked aggressively with the contractor to get 
CVN-78 costs under control. I believe the Navy currently has a solid 
understanding of CVN-78 costs; however, the Navy will not be able to 
complete the ship within the cost cap. Although there has been 
substantial cost growth, there are reasons to be hopeful that costs are 
now under control:

         The ship design is now more than 90 percent complete 
        and the design is fully on contract;
         Shipbuilder cost performance on current work is 
        improving;
         Material cost estimates are mature; and
         The Navy is implementing should cost targets 
        throughout the supply chain including for government furnished 
        material.

    In general, I see activities in the Navy that focus on cost-
consciousness at all levels, government and industry, including major 
shipbuilding programs.
    Question. What do you see as the major factors contributing to the 
Navy's continuing difficulty in effectively managing the cost of 
building its largest ships?
    Answer. At this point, I see the following three major factors 
contributing to cost growth:

         CVN-78 is a lead ship, and as a consequence, there was 
        greater uncertainty about cost than with established programs;
         CVN-78 had an incomplete design at contract award; and
         The program involved concurrent development of major 
        ship systems such as the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching 
        System, the Advanced Arresting Gear, and the Dual Band Radar.

    In summary, the scope and complexity of the program were 
underestimated.
    Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to address these 
causal factors?
    Answer. For CVN-78 and follow-on Ford-class ships, achieving full 
design maturity for the ship and its major systems is the key to 
addressing the causal factors of cost growth. In addition, aggressive 
should cost management of the ship and subsystem contracts is required 
to identify and eliminate unnecessary cost in the transition to follow-
on ships.
                   funding and requirements stability
    Question. The poor performance of major defense acquisition 
programs has also been attributed to instability in funding and 
requirements. In the past, DOD has attempted to provide greater funding 
stability through the use of multiyear contracts. More recently, the 
Department has sought greater requirements stability by instituting 
Configuration Steering Boards to exercise control over any changes to 
requirements that would increase program costs.
    Do you support the use of Configuration Steering Boards to increase 
requirements stability on major defense acquisition programs?
    Answer. I support activities such as Configuration Steering Boards 
that provide Service leadership a forum to review proposed changes to 
program requirements or system configuration and preclude adverse 
impact on program cost and/or schedule. Configuration Steering Boards 
are entirely consistent with the Better Buying Power initiatives that 
seek to target affordability and control cost growth. If confirmed, I 
will continue to emphasize the importance of Configuration Steering 
Boards and ensure they are contributing to requirements stability and 
cost control as intended.
    Question. What other steps if any would you recommend taking to 
increase the funding and requirements stability of major defense 
acquisition programs?
    Answer. I believe that it is incumbent on the acquisition community 
to work with the requirements and resource communities to ensure 
programs have clear, achievable requirements and realistic funding 
profiles. The acquisition community must bring its technical expertise 
to the discussion of requirements and funding throughout the 
acquisition progress to enable requirements and funding profiles that 
are inherently stable because they are realistic and affordable.
                        time-certain development
    Question. The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) 
panel recommended in 2006 that the Department set fixed durations for 
program phases, including a requirement for the delivery of the first 
unit of a major weapon system to operational forces within 6 years of 
the Milestone A decision. The DAPA panel believed that durations for 
program phases could be limited by ensuring appropriate levels of 
technological maturity, defined risk-reduction horizons, and program 
execution criteria, while allowing for the use of spiral development or 
block upgrades for enhancements in capability or increased requirements 
over time. Proponents of this approach, called time-certain 
development, have highlighted its potential for helping ensure that 
evolutionary (or knowledge-based) acquisition strategies are used to 
develop major systems by forcing more manageable commitments to 
discrete increments of capability and stabilize funding by making costs 
and schedules more predictable.
    What is your view of the DAPA panel's recommendation?
    Answer. The DAPA panel identified several key ways to improve the 
DOD acquisition process. Many of these findings--knowledge based 
acquisition, reducing non-value added oversight, improving coordination 
with the requirements process - have been incorporated into the Better 
Buying Power initiatives put in place in 2010. The Department is seeing 
positive results from these efforts.
    Question. What is your view of time-certain development as an 
acquisition strategy for major weapons systems development programs?
    Answer. Time really is money, and prolonged extended development 
schedules that span multiple technology refresh cycles are inherently 
inefficient. This is not a silver bullet, however, and I believe 
placing arbitrary time limits on programs as a general approach would 
not be a smart strategy. I have worked, and if confirmed would continue 
to work to establish realistic program timelines and make sure thorough 
planning has been done upfront. Where it makes sense, I have also 
continued to emphasize the need to deliver the ``80 percent solution'' 
to the warfighter more quickly in less-risky and more cost effective 
ways, using an approach based on open systems and open architectures to 
meet the evolving requirements over time. In the more general case, 
program managers who do good up-front planning have a thorough 
understanding of the requirements, the technology, and industry 
capability can create an acquisition strategy that is both achievable 
in a reasonable time and affordable. The idea behind time-certain 
development programs is to force programs to adopt proven, lower-risk 
technologies, shorter engineering development, and less replanning and 
rework after a program starts. Sometimes this is the right approach. 
The purpose of a program, however, is to deliver a fielded capability 
that meets the user's needs. The best way to control program duration 
is to control the requirements, both initially and over the development 
cycle. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the 
requirements community, particularly the JROC, to ensure that 
requirements can be met in a reasonable time, are technically feasible, 
and are affordable.
    Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to 
implement time-certain development strategies in the future acquisition 
programs?
    Answer. I agree that program duration should be controlled, but the 
best approach to doing so is to limit requirements to those that can be 
achieved in a reasonable timeframe, where this makes sense. Once 
requirements are set, a development program should be structured to be 
as efficient as possible in preparing the product that meets those 
requirements to enter production. The emphasis during development 
should also be on controlling the costs of production and sustainment, 
which are the real drivers of most program's life cycle costs. Software 
intensive programs including business systems, command and control 
systems, and large scale embedded software programs for weapons systems 
should be structured in relatively short (nominally 1 year) increments 
as a way of forcing detailed planning, manageable work packages, and 
disciplined development.
                   military space procurement policy
    Question. DOD, the Intelligence Community, NASA, and other 
Government agencies rely on commercial domestic launch service 
providers to place spacecraft and satellites into and beyond orbit. The 
Government plans to spend at least $15 billion on launch services from 
fiscal year 2013 through 2017, and launch costs are expected to rise. 
The Department is in the midst of implementing a revised launch vehicle 
acquisition strategy.
    What steps do you believe the Department should take to:
    Answer.

    a.  Keep launch costs from continuing to spiral upwards?

    I believe that introducing more competition for launch as soon as 
feasible is the key to controlling launch costs. The Air Force is 
taking steps to determine and understand the root causes behind the 
upward spiral of costs and to attack the high overhead costs the 
Department is currently paying. The current efforts take the form of a 
dual prong approach that: (1) implements a block-buy acquisition 
strategy to purchase economic order quantities; and (2) provides a path 
to qualification of new entrants into the National Security Space (NSS) 
launch market. As required in the 2012 NDAA, I have acted to reinstate 
the evolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV) as a major defense 
acquisition program (MDAP) not in sustainment so that there will be 
greater visibility into the programs status. If confirmed I will work 
with the Air Force to ensure that reduction of launch costs is a high 
priority and that these initiatives are carried out.

    b.  Introduce new entrants, where they are available, to the launch 
industry while maintaining the Nation's unprecedented high level of 
launch successes?

    Competition will be a key component to reducing and promoting 
reduced launch costs and the key to creating competition is allowing 
new entrants into the market without sacrificing safety and 
reliability. Implementing the recently developed AF-NRO-NASA 
coordinated strategy for certifying new entrants and the subsequent AF 
New Entrant Certification Guide, which provides a risk-managed approach 
for introducing new-entrant launch companies to the NSS market for 
EELV-class missions, are important next steps. However, throughout the 
process of introducing new entrants, the Department can not sacrifice 
safety and must continue to maintain mission success rates.

    c.  Enable the U.S. launch industry to be more competitive on the 
world market?

    I believe several steps could be taken to promote U.S. competition 
in the world market. First, there is a need to consider possible 
reclassification of selected launch capabilities under the 
International Trafficking in Arms Regulation (ITAR). The Department 
should also explore developing and implementing policy to make it 
easier for commercial space enterprises to use DOD launch bases/ranges 
for commercial missions. This would make domestic launch providers more 
competitive commercially, because they would be able to employ existing 
capital infrastructure at our DOD launch facilities and ranges. Of 
course, this would require the Department to determine ways for these 
commercial companies to pay their fair share of the cost of 
modernizing, operating, and maintaining these facilities. Such a 
partnership could be a win-win situation, but would have to be designed 
and executed on a non-interference basis with national security 
missions.
    Question. GAO has found that there is a continuing, severe 
disconnect between satellite development programs and the development 
of ground control systems and receivers. For example, new Global 
Positioning System (GPS) satellites are expected to be in orbit nearly 
a decade without the ships, aircraft, and other weapon systems being 
able to take full advantage of them. Given that some satellites now 
cost well over $1 billion each to develop and launch, the implications 
of insufficiently aligning the Department's space and ground 
requirements are very significant.
    Do you agree with GAO's assessment of this issue?
    Answer. I agree with the GAO that there are timing disconnects in 
some of our space acquisitions between the satellites, ground control, 
and user equipment.
    Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to 
address this disconnect?
    Answer. Most of the situations the Department faces today with 
satellite, ground control, and user system disconnects leave the 
Department with little flexibility. These situations came about largely 
because one element of the system was delayed due to technical 
difficulties or funding shortfalls and got out of synchronization with 
the others. Disconnects can occur with any of the system elements, but 
the most frequent situation is for satellites to be ready before user 
equipment is ready. This problem exists with the mobile user objective 
system (MUOS) and the family of advanced beyond line-of-sight terminals 
(FAB-T), and with GPS III, depending on how the user equipment 
progresses. The only solution to the problem is to set up realistic 
coordinated schedules at the outset, design in as much flexibility as 
possible, and then monitor progress closely and make adjustments early 
before the disconnects grow out of control. For the programs that are 
well under way and in which these disconnects already exist, I have 
taken action on a case-by-case basis to address the situation. On MUOS, 
I have worked with industry and the two program offices involved (JTRS 
and MUOS) to achieve improved execution performance. I have insisted on 
a single end-to-end lead, the Navy, for the entire MUOS effort and the 
integrated Navy/JTRS team is being assessed on a regular basis to 
insure the product set and delivery time are optimized. For FAB-T, I 
have directed the initiation of an alternative source for the most 
critical terminals. I am reviewing the three GPS program segments as an 
enterprise with all three segments, GPS III, OCX, and MGUE being 
addressed simultaneously. If confirmed, I will continue these practices 
and work to anticipate any emerging disconnects and address them as 
early as possible.
                          multiyear contracts
    Question. The statement of managers accompanying section 811 of the 
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 addresses the requirements for buying major 
defense systems under multiyear contracts as follows: ``The conferees 
agree that `substantial savings' under section 2306b(a)(1) of title 10, 
U.S.C., means savings that exceed 10 percent of the total costs of 
carrying out the program through annual contracts, except that 
multiyear contracts for major systems providing savings estimated at 
less than 10 percent should only be considered if the Department 
presents an exceptionally strong case that the proposal meets the other 
requirements of section 2306b(a), as amended. The conferees agree with 
a Government Accountability Office finding that any major system that 
is at the end of its production line is unlikely to meet these 
standards and therefore would be a poor candidate for a multiyear 
procurement contract.''
    If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, do you anticipate 
that you would support a multiyear contract with expected savings of 
less than 10 percent?
    Answer. The complexity of each situation makes a general answer 
difficult. I believe that multiyear contracting can provide substantial 
cost savings, and therefore it should be considered as an option to 
serve best the warfighter and taxpayer. The total magnitude of the 
savings that could be achieved and the firmness of the procurement plan 
would be key considerations. I recently certified two multiyears for 
shipbuilding programs that might not reach the 10 percent savings 
threshold depending on how the baseline is calculated and how 
successful the contract negotiations are. The circumstances that 
motivated me to do so were my confidence in the Navy management team's 
ability to negotiate the best possible price for the Department, the 
certainty that the ships would be acquired, and the knowledge that if 
an acceptable price could not be negotiated that the Department would 
not execute a multiyear.
    Question. If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, would you 
support a multiyear contract for a major system at the end of its 
production line?
    Answer. It may be appropriate in some circumstances to consider a 
program for multiyear procurement when it is nearing the end of 
production. It depends upon the circumstances of the particular 
procurement. The total magnitude of the savings that could be achieved 
and the firmness of the procurement plan would be key considerations. 
Analysis and careful review of all information should be completed 
whenever a multiyear contract is being considered.
    Question. What are your views on multiyear procurements? Under what 
circumstances do you believe they should be used?
    Answer. In general, I favor multiyear procurement strategies if 
they provide substantial savings and if there is a firm commitment to 
the planned procurement. I believe that multiyear procurements can 
offer substantial savings through improved economies in production 
processes, better use of industrial facilities, and a reduction in the 
administrative burden in the placement and administration of contracts. 
The potential for multiyear procurement can be a powerful incentive to 
suppliers to reduce cost and negotiated price but it also has the 
disadvantage of reducing the Government's flexibility during the years 
the strategy is being executed. There are a number of criteria to 
consider in deciding whether a program should be considered for 
multiyear procurement. Among them are: savings when compared to the 
annual contracting methods; validity and stability of the mission need; 
stability of the funding; stability of the configuration; associated 
technical risks; degree of confidence in estimates of both contract 
costs and anticipated savings; and promotion of national security.
    Question. What is your opinion on the level of cost savings that 
constitute ``substantial savings'' for purposes of the defense 
multiyear procurement statute, title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2306b?
    Answer. There has been much debate over the threshold on the level 
of cost savings that constitutes ``substantial savings.'' In my view, 
the 10 percent figure cited in the conference manager's statement is a 
reasonable benchmark, but it should not be an absolute criteria. The 
Department needs to ensure that the savings achieved from multiyear 
contracts are substantial, not only in terms of the relative difference 
in price that the Department would otherwise pay for an annual 
procurement, but also in terms of the total dollars saved. But I also 
understand that placing an absolute minimum threshold on substantial 
savings could unnecessarily limit the contracting options available. 
The merits of any single multiyear procurement should be evaluated 
based upon the circumstances of each particular proposed program being 
considered for multiyear procurement.
    Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that a 
multiyear contract should be used for procuring weapons systems that 
have unsatisfactory program histories, e.g., displaying poor cost, 
scheduling, or performance outcomes but which might otherwise comply 
with the requirements of the defense multiyear procurement statute, 
title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2306b?
    Answer. Multiyears should be pursued when they are in the best 
interest of the government. However, in the circumstances set out in 
the question, the degree of scrutiny should be greater than in other 
cases. Additional analysis and careful review of all information should 
be completed whenever a multiyear contract is being considered for use 
in procuring weapon systems that have shown unsatisfactory program 
histories, but which otherwise comply with the statutory requirements. 
It is particularly important in a situation like this that the reasons 
for unsatisfactory history are understood and that those reasons have 
been addressed. If a supplier were deemed to have a high likelihood of 
failure to perform and default due to overruns, then a multiyear would 
not be in the Government's interest.
    Question. How would you analyze and evaluate proposals for 
multiyear procurement for such programs?
    Answer. The Department would need to examine all risk factors in 
conjunction with the potential for cost savings to determine if 
multiyear procurement would be appropriate for a program with an 
unsatisfactory history. If confirmed, I will ensure analysis and 
evaluation of proposals for multiyear procurements are in accordance 
with all statutory and regulatory requirements, and I will ensure that 
the Department fully understands the benefit to the warfighter and 
taxpayer to proceed with a multiyear procurement for a program that has 
an unsatisfactory history.
    Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in 
determining whether procuring such a system under a multiyear contract, 
is appropriate and should be proposed to Congress?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all of the regulatory and 
statutory requirements are met before proceeding with any multiyear 
procurement. I would also ensure that all risk factors had been 
carefully analyzed and considered.
    Question. What is the impact of the Department's current budget 
situation, in your view, on the feasibility and advisability of 
additional multiyear procurement contracts for major weapon systems?
    Answer. I believe that the current budget environment increases the 
inherent value that the stability of multiyear procurement contracts 
provides to industry, giving the Department the opportunity to enter 
into such agreements on favorable terms. However, this opportunity must 
be balanced against the fact that multiyear contracts encumber 
budgetary resources over multiple years and with our current budget 
constraints, the Department must be judicious in the extent to which it 
enters into such contracts. Above all, there must be a firm commitment 
to the entirety of the multiyear so that even if additional budget 
reductions are necessary the products being procured under multiyear 
arrangements will have a higher funding priority than other programs 
that would have to be reduced.
    Question. Under what circumstances, if any, should DOD ever break a 
multiyear procurement?
    Answer. If the Department has done its job properly and industry 
has proposed responsibly, the cancellation of a multiyear contract 
should be all but unheard of. There are very rare circumstances when it 
could occur. One such event would be in the case of extremely deep and 
unanticipated budget reductions that forced a fundamental reshaping of 
Department priorities. Another possibility would be the surprise 
emergence of a threat that rendered the program under contract 
instantly obsolete. In these circumstances, cancellation or 
renegotiation of a multiyear procurement could be appropriate or even 
required. Finally, if a contractor were to default and be totally 
unable to perform than the contract might have to be terminated so that 
another supplier could be arranged for.
    continuing competition and organizational conflicts of interest
    Question. Section 202 of WSARA requires DOD to take steps to 
promote continuing competition (or the option of such competition) 
throughout the life of major defense acquisition programs.
    What is your view on the utility of continuing competition as a 
tool to achieve long-term innovation and cost savings on major defense 
acquisition programs?
    Answer. In my view, there is no more effective tool to reduce 
prices than competition. The Department should use direct competitive 
acquisition strategies whenever possible. Utilizing competition in the 
marketplace allows the Department to leverage innovation, S&T, design, 
and drive efficiency through a program's lifecycle providing a stronger 
return on investment. For this reason, the Department should strive to 
use this model as much as possible in its programs. Under the Better 
Buying Power initiatives, I have stressed the need for creating a 
``competitive environment'' to the greatest extent possible in all our 
programs. This can be done any number of ways, including component 
breakout, initiation of a next generation concept or a program to 
upgrade an existing alternative. In recent speeches, I have emphasized 
that with ongoing budget reductions there is a competition within the 
budget for funding in which poorly performing programs will not do 
well. If confirmed, I will continue to stress creating a competitive 
environment as one of the most effective ways the Department has of 
controlling cost.
    Question. Do you believe that such continuing competition is a 
viable option on major defense acquisition programs?
    Answer. I believe that competition at both the prime and 
subcontract level are the most powerful tools available to the 
department to drive productivity and control cost. To ensure that 
competition is emphasized during every phase of the acquisition 
process, the Department has issued policy requiring our Program 
Managers to present a competition strategy for their programs at each 
program milestone. I personally review these strategies and would 
continue to do so, if confirmed, for Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
and would require Component Acquisition Executives to do the same for 
programs under their cognizance.
    Question. In your view, has the consolidation of the defense 
industrial base gone too far and undermined competition for defense 
contracts?
    Answer. I believe that the consolidation witnessed throughout the 
1990s has left us with a limited number of prime contractors for major 
programs and that further consolidation at that level is probably not 
in the Department's or the taxpayer's interest. I have said so publicly 
on multiple occasions, as I believe it is important for industry to 
understand the Department's views so that they can be taken into 
account. That said, if confirmed, I would certainly review any proposed 
business deal objectively on its merits. At the lower tiers, however, I 
would expect to see an increased amount of activity in mergers and 
acquisitions, and even consolidations to further streamline 
capabilities and respond in a market-driven manner to the reduced 
budgets anticipated over the coming decade. The Department will examine 
these transactions carefully on a case-by-case basis to preserve 
competition and facilitate the most efficient and effective industrial 
base possible.
    Question. If so, what steps if any can and should DOD take to 
address this issue?
    Answer. It is the Department's policy to allow market forces to 
shape the market, but to oppose transactions that eliminate competition 
and are not ultimately in the best interest of the Department and 
taxpayer. The Department continues to discourage mergers and 
acquisitions among defense materiel suppliers that are anti-competitive 
or injurious to national security. Ultimately, however, the Department 
is not an antitrust regulator and the ability for the DOJ and FTC to 
intervene must meet statutory criteria. The Department has long-
established procedures to provide information and the support needed by 
the antitrust regulators for their merger reviews. In areas where 
consolidation has resulted in a loss of competition, the Department has 
in the past encouraged new entrants or explored the use of alternative 
capabilities.
    Question. Section 203 of WSARA requires the use of competitive 
prototypes for major defense acquisition programs unless the cost of 
producing such prototypes would exceed the lifecycle benefits of 
improved performance and increased technological and design maturity 
that prototypes would achieve.
    Do you support the use of competitive prototypes for major defense 
acquisition programs?
    Answer. Yes, I support the use of competitive prototyping for major 
defense acquisition programs. This can be an effective mechanism for 
maturing technology, refining performance requirements, and improving 
our understanding of how those requirements can drive systems 
acquisition costs.
    Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the use of 
competitive prototypes is likely to be beneficial?
    Answer. This depends on the maturity of candidate technologies for 
meeting the Department's requirements and in particular on the degree 
of risk associated with integrating those technologies into a viable 
product. When planned or proposed technology has implementation risk, 
particularly in an integrated product, and has not been demonstrated 
adequately, competitive prototyping during the technology development 
phase works well as an element of a comprehensive technical risk 
management process. Like all other risk reduction techniques, 
competitive prototyping has to be considered on a case-by-case basis 
and it has to reduce the risk of entering Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD). Competitive pre-EMD prototyping requires resources 
and increases schedules. In short, there are costs and benefits to be 
considered. Overall, however, it can reduce risk, sustain competition 
further into the design process, reduce total program cost, and lead to 
better products for our warfighters. This is particularly true in the 
technology demonstration phase. The cost of competitive engineering and 
manufacturing development phases is usually prohibitive.
    Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the cost of such 
prototypes is likely to outweigh the potential benefits?
    Answer. In cases where the material solution is based on mature, 
well understood technologies and demonstrated designs with little 
integration risk, the additional costs of competitive prototyping are 
unlikely to offset the potential reduction of system lifecycle costs. 
Prototypes requiring very high investments with limited production runs 
are also unlikely to meet this test; competitive prototyping of ships 
and satellites is frequently cost-prohibitive, both in a technology 
demonstration phase and in engineering and manufacturing development 
phase. However, competitive prototyping of major subsystems can still 
provide opportunities for reducing risk and driving down production and 
sustainment costs.
    Question. Section 207 of WSARA required the Department to 
promulgate new regulations to address organizational conflicts of 
interest on major defense acquisition programs.
    What is your understanding of the steps the Department has taken to 
implement section 207?
    Answer. Section 207 of the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act 
(WSARA) of 2009 (Pub. L. 111-23) required the Secretary of Defense to 
revise the Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(DFARS) to provide uniform guidance and tighten existing requirements 
for organizational conflicts of interest by contractors in major 
defense acquisition programs. The DFARS rule implementing WSARA was 
published on December 29, 2010. This rule provided uniform guidance and 
tightened existing requirements for organizational conflicts of 
interest for DOD contracts. On April 26, 2011, a proposed change to FAR 
subpart 9.5 relating to organizational conflicts of interest was 
published, but this rule has not yet been finalized.
    Question. What additional steps if any do you believe DOD should 
take to address organizational conflicts of interest in major defense 
acquisition programs?
    Answer. The Department has already taken a number of steps, but at 
this point in time the Department is working with other Federal 
organizations on a final FAR rule that would guide the Department. The 
Department and the other Federal agencies determined that, in general, 
the coverage on organizational conflicts of interest included in the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations needed broadening and a proposed rule 
was published on April 26, 2011. The public comment period is now 
closed and the FAR Acquisition Ethics and International Law Team, 
including DOD membership, is evaluating public comments and developing 
the final rule.
    Furthermore, the Department's Panel on Contracting Integrity has 
also reviewed the area of post-employment restrictions pursuant to 
section 833 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-84. The 
purpose of the review was ``to determine if such policies adequately 
protect the public interest without unreasonably limiting future 
employment options of former DOD personnel'' in developing the revised 
regulation. A matter the Panel considered was the extent that post-
employment restrictions ``protect the public interest by preventing 
personal conflicts of interest and preventing former DOD officials from 
exercising undue or inappropriate influence.'' The Panel completed its 
report in December 2010 and as directed by section 833, the National 
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) performed an independent 
assessment of the Panel's report. NAPA completed its review in February 
2012 and provided additional recommendations for post award 
restrictions. The Panel will review the NAPA recommendations in 2012 
and recommend the way forward.
    I strongly support the Department's activities to remedy 
organizational conflict of interest (OCI) issues in major weapons 
systems to ensure that OCI issues are adequately reviewed and addressed 
in developing acquisition strategies and source selections and defense-
related mergers.
    Question. What are your views on the use of system engineering and 
technical assistance contractors that are affiliated with major defense 
contractors to provide ``independent'' advice to the Department on the 
acquisition of major weapon systems?
    Answer. I believe that Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance 
(SETA) support contractors are currently providing critical support to 
the Department's acquisition workforce. However, I believe these 
contractors must not be used to perform inherently governmental 
functions and they must not be used in a situation where a conflict of 
interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest would exist. At 
this point, I do not believe that it would be wise, as some have 
suggested, to create two totally separate classes of contractors 
separated by a bright line; those that provide support to government 
functions and those that provide products. Some of the Department's 
support contractors need the experience, knowledge and perspective that 
come from working on actual products. If mitigation does not prove 
effective, I would consider implementing more stringent constraints, 
but at this point, I believe that mitigation is still the preferred 
approach.
    Question. What lines do you believe the Department should draw 
between those acquisition responsibilities that are inherently 
governmental and those that may be performed by contractors?
    Answer. When it comes to the performance of functions that support 
our acquisition responsibilities, I believe that a clear line does 
exist between activities that may or may not be performed by 
contractors. An important feature for inherently governmental functions 
lies in the answer to the question whether the activity involves the 
exercise of discretion in applying Federal Government authority, or the 
making of value judgments in decisions that obligate government funds 
and commit the government contractually. Acquisition functions might be 
categorized in three phases, all of which are or involve inherently 
governmental functions: acquisition planning, source selection, and 
contract administration. In planning, certainly the task of determining 
or approving requirements falls on the inherently governmental side of 
the line. In source selection, inherently governmental functions 
include awarding of contracts, serving on a source selection board and 
making a determination about whether or not a price to be paid to an 
officer is reasonable. During contract performance, the Department must 
not have contractors participate on performance evaluation boards or 
determine whether contract costs are reasonable. I recognize that many 
of the tasks for which the Department acquires contracted support in 
the acquisition arena involve functions that are or may be closely 
associated with inherently governmental functions. As such, the 
Department has a responsibility to employ an enhanced degree of 
management oversight to ensure independent contract support and advice 
does not evolve into the performance of inherently governmental 
functions or the provision of impermissible government or proprietary 
information to contractors.
    Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure 
that defense contractors do not misuse their access to sensitive and 
proprietary information of DOD and other defense contractors?
    Answer. In my view, the rules that govern unauthorized disclosure 
of sensitive and proprietary information are adequate and must be 
followed. If I am confirmed, I will continue to support strong 
adherence to the applicable rules.
    Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure 
that defense contractors do not unnecessarily limit competition for 
subcontracts in a manner that would disadvantage the government or 
potential competitors in the private sector?
    Answer. I believe that competition at both the prime and 
subcontract level is essential to the Department's ability to control 
cost and provide opportunities for the insertion of new technology. If 
confirmed, I will continue the policy of requiring program managers to 
include a strategy to maximize the use of competition, at all levels, 
in program planning and execution. I will continue to enforce this 
policy rigorously.
  implementation of the weapon systems acquisition reform act of 2009 
                                (wsara)
    Question. Several new major weapons programs have been started 
since the WSARA was enacted. Examples include the Ohio-Class Submarine 
Replacement Program, the KC-46 Aerial Refueling Tanker Replacement 
Program, the VXX Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program, and the 
Ground Combat Vehicle Program.
    In your view, how effectively have such ``new start'' major defense 
acquisition programs abided by the tenets, and implemented the 
requirements, of the WSARA, particularly those that address ``starting 
programs off right'' by requiring that early investment decisions be 
informed by realistic cost estimates, sound systems engineering 
knowledge and reliable technological risk assessments?
    Answer. Based on my experience since I returned to the Department 
in March 2010, I can state that the Department has abided by the tenets 
and implemented the requirements of WSARA in each of its ``new start'' 
programs begun since the enactment of WSARA. This includes the examples 
cited in the question. The certifications required by WSARA provide a 
means to enforce each program's implementation. Each of these programs 
is notable for the careful attention paid to developing realistic 
requirements and a focus on affordability. I completely agree with the 
premise that the key to successful program execution is sound and 
realistic planning at program inception.
    Question. Where do you think there might be room for improvement?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to review the performance of 
``new start'' programs that have implemented WSARA to determine what 
the Department's implementation could do to improve a program's 
probability of successfully delivering affordable capability on time. I 
do not believe at this point that major policy changes are required. If 
confirmed, my focus will primarily be on effective implementation of 
the policies that have been put in place by WSARA and other 
initiatives. However, I strongly believe in a doctrine of continuous 
improvement throughout the acquisition system and if confirmed I will 
continue to seek opportunities for constructive change on the margins. 
The Better Buying Power initiative that Dr. Carter and I started is 
based on the premise that the Department can learn from experience and 
continuously improve. If confirmed, I will work to identify and 
implement continuous improvements to the acquisition system. There is 
plenty of room for improvement.
                   the better buying power initiative
    Question. DOD's Better Buying Power initiative provides acquisition 
professionals with important guidance on how to achieve greater 
efficiency, enhanced productivity and affordability in how the 
Department procures goods and services.
    If confirmed, what steps if any will you take to follow-through on 
this guidance and ensure that it is implemented as intended?
    Answer. I worked closely with then Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Dr. Ashton B. Carter on the 
development and initial implementation of the Better Buying Power 
initiative. If confirmed, I will follow-through on implementation of 
the initiative and carefully consider additional steps consistent with 
the principles and objectives of the initiative.
    Question. In particular, what steps will you take to ensure the 
implementation of the following elements of the better buying power 
initiative?

    a.  Sharing the benefits of cash flow
    b.  Targeting non-value-added costs
    c.  Mandating affordability as a requirement
    d.  Eliminating redundancy within warfighting portfolios

    Answer.

    a.  The cash flow initiative is being initiated by some buying 
commands with success, but the Department has not collected data on its 
effectiveness in general. Industry, through the Aerospace Industries 
Association, has raised some concerns with this initiative and I have 
agreed to meet to discuss its implications. Industry is concerned about 
accounting and cash flow implications and at this point, I do not fully 
understand the basis for these concerns, but I'm happy to listen to 
their perspective. Where I have received feedback from government 
contracting officials, they have indicated some success with the 
initiative. The premise of sharing the benefits of cash flow was that 
the government could receive a reduced price in return for accelerated 
cash flow to industry. This should be a mutually beneficial win-win 
prospect for both parties and where it has been implemented that seems 
to be the result, but I would like to Reserve judgment on this 
initiative until I understand industry's concerns more fully and until 
more data on its implementation can be accumulated.
    b.  Targeting non-value added costs is a continuous challenge. It 
involves identifying candidate costs, determining if they really are 
non-value added, and then working to eliminate them if that is the 
case. In the most obvious cases this involves duplicative efforts and 
requirements or regulations that have no beneficial impact. Some 
oversight and quality control measures may be non-value added and 
should be eliminated, but the perspective on the value of these 
measures is often not consistent. Management at all levels needs to be 
actively engaged in identifying and eliminating non-value added 
activities and requirements, and again this is a continuous process. 
The implementation of ``should cost'' analysis as a management tool is 
one way in which if confirmed, I will continue to attack non-value 
added requirements. One minor reform I have initiated within the 
Milestone review process is to streamline many of the planning 
documents required for these reviews, while increasing the substantive 
information present in them. If confirmed, this effort will have my 
attention in every aspect of the acquisition system.
    c.  Affordabilty as a requirement has been implemented for major 
programs, particularly new starts. The basic premise is that the 
Department should be smart enough to avoid starting programs that will 
ultimately be canceled because they are not affordable. Determining 
what affordability cap to put on production and sustainment costs is 
simply a matter of analyzing the expected long term funding that will 
be available for the portfolio of products that contains the product 
under consideration. The next challenge will be twofold: first to flow 
this type of analysis down to non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs, 
and second to enforce it for the major programs for which affordability 
constraints are in place. If confirmed, I intend to meet that 
management challenge.
    d.  The effort to eliminate redundancy across portfolios is a work 
in progress. It demands vigilance and constant attention to the 
possibilities for efficiencies by all parties. Three examples from my 
experience of the last 2 years are the Air Force Space Fence and Navy 
AMDR programs, the USMD Gator radar and the Air Force 3DLR program, and 
the Marine Corps and Army light tactical vehicle programs. In each 
case, I have initiated or supported efforts to eliminate redundancy at 
system or component levels. This is largely a matter of consistent and 
continuous management attention, particularly as new programs and 
projects are proposed for initiation. If confirmed, I will continue the 
effort to identify opportunities for commonality within and across 
portfolios and I will insist that the Services do the same.

    Question. Are there any elements of the Better Buying Power 
initiative with which you disagree and which you intend to modify 
materially or discontinue?
    Answer. The short answer is no, however the Better Buying Power 
initiatives are not static. They are under continuous review and will 
be modified and added to as the Department learns more from its 
experience with the initiatives. I recently conducted a review of the 
progress on the original initiatives at the Business Senior Integration 
Group, the body I chair that oversees and reviews the Department's 
progress improving the acquisition systems performance overall. While 
at this time I do not intend to materially modify or discontinue parts 
of Better Buying Power, I am committed to reviewing all aspects of the 
initiative to determine if they are working as intended or not. This is 
a results oriented initiative and if confirmed, I will discontinue 
efforts if I determine they are not adding value or if the management 
resources needed for implementation can be used more effectively 
elsewhere.
                        contracting for services
    Question. By most estimates, the Department now spends more for the 
purchase of services than it does for products (including major weapon 
systems). After a decade of rapid growth, section 808 of the NDAA for 
Fiscal Year 2012 placed a cap on DOD spending for contract services.
    Do you believe that DOD can do more to reduce spending on contract 
services?
    Answer. Yes. I am working aggressively to improve our tradecraft in 
services acquisition and will continue to examine our requirements for 
services and the ways services are acquired to ensure that the 
Department acquires only what is truly needed and does so as 
efficiently as possible.
    Question. Do you believe that the current balance between 
government employees (military and civilian) and contractor employees 
is in the best interests of DOD?
    Answer. I believe the balance is roughly in alignment, but that 
there is likely room for improvement, particularly on a local level. 
The Department greatly values the contributions made by private sector 
firms and recognizes that the private sector is, and will continue to 
be, a vital source of expertise, innovation, and support to the 
Department's Total Force. However, I believe the Department must 
constantly assess the mix and ensure that our utilization of contracted 
support is appropriate given the nature of the mission and work, the 
risks associated with contractor performance and reliance, and the need 
to ensure continuity of operations.
    Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to 
control the Department's spending on contract services and ensure that 
the Department complies with the requirements of section 808?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Department's 
senior leadership to manage the Department's spending on contract 
services. It is my understanding that the Department is refining the 
control mechanisms and procedural guidance to ensure compliance with 
the requirements of section 808 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, which 
limits the amount of funds the Department may obligate for contract 
services in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. The directed reductions in 
staff augmentation contracts in section 808 are consistent with the 
actions initiated by then Secretary Gates in 2010 and are underway. The 
requirement in section 808 to reduce by 10 percent funding for 
contracts for functions that are closely associated with inherently 
governmental functions presents challenges because most of the 
Department's components have not historically created a record of the 
amount of funding allocated to contracts for functions that are closely 
associated with inherently governmental functions. Therefore, these 
components do not have an accurate baseline amount from which to 
project the targeted reduction. If confirmed, I will work with all 
components to manage this work appropriately.
    Question. Section 812 of the NDAA for 2007 required DOD to develop 
a management structure for the procurement of contract services. 
Sections 807 and 808 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (subsequently 
codified in section 2330a of title 10, U.S.C.) require DOD to develop 
inventories and conduct management reviews of contracts for services.
    Do you believe the Department is providing appropriate stewardship 
over service contracts?
    Answer. I believe that the Department is improving the quality of 
the stewardship it maintains over service contracts but there remains 
room for further improvement. One of the principal focuses of the 
Better Buying Power initiatives Dr. Carter and I initiated is to 
improve the Department's tradecraft in managing service contracts. I 
have been working to increase the effort in this area, and recently 
reviewed the efforts underway in each Military Department. Progress is 
being made, but much more can be done. I believe that effective 
stewardship requires proactive engagement from senior leaders at 
operational and strategic levels of the Department to manage these 
contracts and if confirmed I will continue to work to provide that 
leadership at my level.
    Question. Do you believe that the Department has appropriate 
management structures in place to oversee the expenditure of more than 
$150 billion a year for contract services?
    Answer. In general yes, but I also believe they can be strengthened 
and expanded upon. Under Dr. Carter and my direction, each Military 
Department was required to appoint a senior manager responsible for 
oversight of all contracted services. This structure is now being 
expanded to cover each of the major types of services the Department 
acquires. If confirmed, I will continue to work toward an enterprise-
wide, structured program to enable sound business practices and 
decisions about how to fulfill service contract requirements. 
Foundational to the success of these structures will be the 
effectiveness of the front-end process to review and validate 
requirements for services (as required by section 863 of the NDAA for 
Fiscal Year 2011).
    Question. Do you support the use of management reviews, or peer 
reviews, of major service contracts to identify ``best practices'' and 
develop lessons learned?
    Answer. Yes. I fully support the use of peer reviews on major 
service contracts to identify best practices and lessons learned. The 
practice of conducting peer reviews on the Department's major service 
contracts is well engrained in our process and the Department has 
derived significant benefit from this initiative. The requirement to 
conduct peer reviews has been institutionalized in Department of 
Defense Instruction 5000.02. Recently, I have directed my staff to 
develop a stand-alone DOD instruction to govern the acquisition of 
services. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize best practices in 
the management of contracted services.
    Question. If confirmed, will you fully comply with the requirement 
of section 2330a, to develop an inventory of services performed by 
contractors comparable to the inventories of services performed by 
Federal employees that are already prepared pursuant to the Federal 
Acquisition Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act?
    Answer. Yes. The Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness and 
the staff in AT&L will compile inventories prepared by the Military 
Departments and defense agencies and publish the Department's fourth 
inventory of contracts for services later this year. Following the 
inventory submission, each department and agency will complete a review 
of its inventory within 90 days in accordance with the considerations 
at paragraph (e), section 2330a of title 10.
    Question. Section 863 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD 
to establish a process for identifying, assessing, reviewing, and 
validating requirements for the acquisition of contract services.
    What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the 
requirements of section 863?
    Answer. Over the past several months, the Director of Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy has been engaged with the Senior 
Service Managers from the Military Departments and the defense agencies 
to understand optimal approaches to implementing this requirement. The 
Department has issued guidance to the Military Departments and the 
defense agencies that reiterates the requirements of section 863 and 
requires them to submit their processes and initial implementation 
plans to the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 
not later than 30 days after receipt of the memorandum.
    Question. What steps remain to be taken, and what schedule has the 
Department established for taking these steps?
    Answer. Once the required plans are provided to the Director of 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy on the AT&L staff by the 
Military Departments and components, the AT&L staff will work with them 
to ensure that these plans are effective and are implemented. The 
Department at this point is taking a somewhat decentralized approach to 
implementing section 863 because of the substantial differences in 
Military Department and component structures and information management 
tools. If confirmed, I will review the effectiveness of the initial 
implementation of this requirement to determine whether or not stronger 
mechanisms should be put in place.
    Question. What additional steps if any would you take, if 
confirmed, to improve the Department's management of its contracts for 
services?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to make the improved 
management of contract services a high priority. Recently, I convened a 
2-day meeting of a select group of senior leaders, including the 
acquisition executives from the Military Departments. The purpose of 
the meeting was to flesh out required actions to support our objectives 
for the current calendar year. One of the eight areas discussed in 
depth was the need to improve our proactive management of services. 
Specific actions coming out of this session included: deployment of 
tools to generate quality contract performance work statements that 
clearly articulate requirements for services, deployment of tools to 
facilitate meaningful market research tailored for service 
requirements, establishment of a functional integrated product team 
unique for services to address the training needs of personnel (within 
or outside the defense acquisition workforce) who are tasked to manage 
and oversee individual service contracts, and a decision to formalize 
the program management function in the services arena. If confirmed, I 
will work to implement these steps and continue to look for additional 
ways to improve the Department's performance in managing contracts for 
services.
       contractor performance of critical governmental functions
    Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become 
progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that 
were once performed exclusively by Government employees. As a result, 
contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the 
management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of 
personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In 
many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the 
same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions 
as DOD employees.
    In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors to support 
the basic functions of the Department?
    Answer. Not in general, but I believe this is an area that requires 
continuous attention, particularly in a time of declining budgets. The 
appropriate balance between organic government performance and reliance 
on contractors is something that must be assessed function by function. 
Many functions are appropriate for contractor support; however, some 
functions, such as conducting military operations, establishing 
government requirements, determining acquisition strategies, conducting 
source selection, and program management, are more appropriately 
performed by government personnel because they are inherently 
governmental or close to inherently governmental and should not be 
performed by contractors. One area where the government's organic 
capacity had been allowed to decline so that needed work was either not 
performed or shifted to contractor support is the area of acquisition 
management. Over the last few years, the Department has been able to 
make significant gains in in-sourcing more of this work, particularly 
in engineering and program management. As a result, and with the 
committee's assistance, the Department has significantly strengthened 
the acquisition workforce. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the 
issue of appropriate use of contractors across the Department to 
determine whether and where DOD's reliance on contractors may have 
become excessive.
    Question. Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal 
services contracts is in the best interest of DOD?
    Answer. I believe the personal services contracts the Department 
has established in accordance with the applicable statutes to acquire, 
for example, medical providers are in the best interest of the 
Department. I am however concerned about the risk and potential that 
some of our non-personal contracts may inappropriately evolve into 
personal service arrangements, particularly those that utilize 
contractors to perform work that is closely associated with inherently 
governmental functions. Last year, the DFARS was amended to provide 
guidance that enables Department officials to more effectively 
distinguish between personal services and non-personal services and to 
ensure that procedures are adopted to prevent contracts from being 
awarded or administered as unauthorized personal services contracts. If 
confirmed, I will continue to enforce the limits on use of personal 
service contracts.
    Question. What is your view of the appropriate applicability of 
personal conflict of interest standards and other ethics requirements 
to contractor employees who perform functions similar to those 
performed by Government employees?
    Answer. In my opinion, contractor employees who directly support 
Government employees, and may have access to similar business sensitive 
or source selection sensitive information, should be subject to similar 
ethical standards as the Government employees they support. It is 
important that such contractor employees not be allowed to profit 
personally from the information that may be available to them because 
of their performance under a DOD contract.
    Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
relied on contractor support to a greater degree than any previous U.S. 
military operations. According to widely published reports, the number 
of U.S. contractor employees in Afghanistan is roughly equal to the 
number of U.S. military deployed in that country.
    Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on contractor 
support for military operations?
    Answer. Not at this point. In the long-term counter-insurgency 
environments in which the Department has used them so extensively, 
contractors have been necessary to performance of the mission. The 
Department has gone through a painful multiyear process of learning how 
to manage contractors effectively in the area of operations. This 
process isn't over yet, but a great deal of progress has been made. 
Contractors provide a broad range of supplies, services, and critical 
logistics support. They serve as force multipliers, performing non-
inherently governmental functions and allowing limited military 
resources to focus on what they are trained to do. The Department 
continually assesses implications with respect to force size and mix, 
contract support integration, planning, and resourcing.
    Based on our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe the 
Department should continue to improve and evolve our strategy regarding 
the use and management of contractors. At this time, I do not believe 
the Department is too dependent on contractors, but I believe there is 
still room for improvement in our management of contractors supporting 
ongoing operations.
    Question. What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on 
such contractor support? What steps do you believe the Department 
should take to mitigate such risk?
    Answer. I believe the risks associated with a large reliance on 
contractor support include: possible loss of those services for future 
contingencies and in changed operational environments, the performance 
of inherently governmental functions by contractors, the Department 
losing critical core knowledge and capability, and the risk of losing 
the expertise and structure for contingency contract management that 
was created over the last several years. The Department continues to 
conduct assessments of the risks associated with reliance on contracted 
support in contingency operations and is working to ensure they are 
mitigated. The Department mitigates that risk by ensuring contractor 
support estimates are integrated into existing planning processes and 
procedures, and through consideration of operational contract support 
requirements in force planning scenario development and joint force 
assessments.
    Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized 
and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?
    Answer. In general yes, but as in other areas there is room for 
improvement. At the start of our conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
Department was not properly organized and staffed to manage contractors 
in the ongoing contingency operations effectively. This isn't 
surprising, as neither the long conflicts nor the need to rely on 
contractors were anticipated. A number of corrective actions have been 
taken over the last several years. The Department has matured these 
capabilities and now has in place a functioning governance body that 
synchronizes efforts with the Joint Staff, the Services, and other 
Department staff and agencies to ensure processes and policy are in 
place to oversee contracted support in contingency operations 
effectively. The Department continues to revise policies to incorporate 
lessons learned and emerging legislative requirements, assess planning 
capability requirements, and update business systems to improve 
capabilities. If confirmed, I will continue to oversee ongoing efforts 
to improve the Department's performance and to ensure DOD 
institutionalizes its contingency contracting and operational contract 
support capabilities and applies lessons learned from our experiences 
in Iraq and Afghanistan to future conflicts.
    Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should 
take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?
    Answer. For ongoing operations, I believe work must continue to 
implement and enforce the policies that have been put in place over the 
last few years and to strengthen them where needed. One area that needs 
strengthening is the enforcement of anti-corruption measures and of the 
ability to prevent contract funds from ending up in the hands of our 
enemies. I support the efforts of Congress and members of the SASC to 
add to the tools available to the Department in this area. Looking 
ahead to a time when the current contingency has ended, the Department 
needs to ensure: (1) training and contingency plans account 
realistically for the role of contractors on the battlefield; (2) 
adequate numbers of contracting officers, contracting officer 
representatives, and other skilled personnel will be available to 
manage contractors; (3) transparency of contractor and subcontractor 
performance is provided for; (4) measures remain in place for the 
prevention of waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption; and (5) continued 
effective coordination with other Departments and agencies.
                          wartime contracting
    Question. Section 804 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 requires the 
Department to establish procedures to ensure that rapid acquisition 
processes are not misused for the acquisition of systems and 
capabilities that are not urgent and would be more appropriately 
acquired in accordance with normal acquisition procedures.
    What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the 
requirements of section 804?
    Answer. Pursuant to section 804 of the 2011 NDAA, the Department 
conducted a review of the Department's rapid processes and is 
developing policy in response to its findings and recommendations. 
Primary among these was the need for improved management oversight of 
the Department's urgent needs processes. The Secretary therefore issued 
Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 11-006, ``Establishment of the Senior 
Integration Group (SIG) for the Resolution of Joint Urgent Operational 
Needs (JUONs),'' June 14, 2011, which defined the responsibilities of 
the many DOD components to include the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, and other 
components. In January, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
issued CJCSI 3170.01H, ``Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System'' which established processes for identifying, assessing, 
validating, and prioritizing joint military capability requirements, 
including Urgent Operational Needs (UONs), Joint Urgent Operational 
Needs (JUONs), and Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEONs). Additional 
policy is under development to address the remaining findings to 
include the requirement to discriminate clearly those urgent 
requirements appropriate to be resolved through our rapid acquisition 
processes rather than the traditional acquisition process. This policy 
will be included in a revision to the DOD Instruction 5000.02 
``Operation of the Defense Acquisition System'' which is currently in 
staffing.
    Question. Do you agree that rapid acquisition procedures are not 
generally suited to the acquisition of complex systems that require 
substantial development effort, are based on technologies that are 
unproven, and are too risky to be acquired under fixed-price contracts?
    Answer. In general, yes. There may be rare cases however, such as 
when technological surprise is achieved by a potential adversary, that 
the risks associated with rapid acquisition procedures are justified 
for complex systems that require substantial development. In my earlier 
experience during the Cold War, this did occur on at least two 
occasions. Also, there are cases when the fulfillment of an urgent need 
associated with an ongoing conflict can only be met by pursuing a 
complex new technology that entails significant risk. Even if the time 
needed to develop and field the needed solution exceeds the expected 
duration of the conflict, it may still be the right decision to proceed 
with a rapid acquisition process. Wars often do not end on one side's 
schedule. In both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
Freedom, the department fielded solutions ranging from airborne ISR and 
communications relays to ground based mine rollers to satisfy urgent 
needs across the spectrum of complexity and technical maturity. 
Contracting strategies for our rapid acquisition efforts are guided by 
the existing Federal Acquisition Regulation, which encourages our 
acquisition officials to use the contract type that represents the best 
value, in terms of both risk and schedule, to the benefit of the 
government. In all cases, the decision to embark upon a rapid 
acquisition effort should be based on the determination by the decision 
authority that the strategy represents an appropriate balance of risk 
between operational and acquisition considerations.
    Question. Section 848 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 and section 
820 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 establish planning requirements 
for contractor logistics support.
    What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the 
requirements of section 848 and section 820?
    Answer. Section 848 provisions in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 
provided the necessary charter for a Defense Science Board Study on DOD 
organization, doctrine, training, and planning for contractor logistics 
support of contingency operations. I am establishing a task force to 
meet all of the requisite elements identified in the NDAA language 
pertaining to this matter. My intent is for the task force to cover all 
aspects of the contractor logistics support to contingency operations 
throughout the Department, to include reviewing previous findings and 
recommendations related to legislative or policy guidance. 
Implementation of this task force was delayed because some of the 
questions the task force was required to address had serious conflict 
of interest implications that had to be mitigated and this took longer 
than expected. With respect to our implementation of Section 820 of the 
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, I have worked closely with The Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Staff to incorporate 
requirements determination and Operational Contract Support (OCS) into 
the Department's strategic planning documents. If confirmed, I will 
continue to support inclusion of OCS as strategic guidance is revised.
    Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs 
to take to improve its planning processes for the use of contractors in 
contingency operations?
    Answer. I believe that it is critical to ensure adequate and 
appropriate planning for contractor support in all planning for 
contingency operations. The Department is integrating contractor 
support estimates into existing planning processes and procedures, and 
ensuring that Operational Contract Support requirements are considered 
in force planning scenario development and joint force assessments. If 
confirmed, I will continue to monitor these initiatives closely to 
ensure they are carried out.
    Question. What is the status of the Department's efforts to 
implement the requirements of sections 841 and 842?
    Answer. The Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Director 
implemented Sections 841 and 842 on January 26, 2012 via the Class 
Deviation (No. 2012-O0005). Effective immediately, this Class Deviation 
mandates contracting officers to incorporate this provision in all 
contracts that will be awarded on or before December 31, 2014 and to 
modify existing contracts to the maximum extent practicable.
    Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs 
to take to avoid contracting with the enemy in Afghanistan?
    Answer. The Department primarily needs to continue the forceful 
implementation and enforcement of the measures it has already put in 
place or is considering. The Department has instituted many initiatives 
to improve accountability and oversight of contracts awarded to local 
firms in Afghanistan and to prevent flow of U.S. funds to the enemy. 
One such initiative is the U.S. Central Command's ``Vendor Vetting'' 
process of all non-U.S. vendors prior to contract award to ensure U.S. 
funds do not support or finance insurgent, foreign intelligence 
capabilities and to reduce the risk of insider threats to the U.S. 
Forces. Another such initiative is at General Petraeus' request to 
establish the U.S. Government Acquisition Accountability Office for 
Afghanistan (AAOA). The impetus of this initiative is the threat posed 
by corruption to the ISAF/Embassy/NATO mission that can alter the 
social and political dynamics and fuel local powerbrokers. If 
confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance of avoiding 
contracting with the enemy in Afghanistan.
    Question. Does the Department need additional tools for this 
purpose?
    Answer. I believe sections 841 and 842 have provided the Department 
the statutory authority needed to prevent flow of U.S. funds to the 
enemy. If I am confirmed, I will continue the effort to identify and to 
pursue other tools that will assist in preventing flow of U.S. funds to 
the enemy in Afghanistan.
    Question. In August 2011, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in 
Iraq and Afghanistan issued its final report. The report included 
numerous recommendations, including recommendations for reducing the 
Government's over-reliance on contractors in contingency operations; 
making organizational changes to provide greater focus on contingency 
contracting; providing additional staffing and resources for 
contingency contracting; and tightening contracting policies to address 
deficiencies in past performance databases, suspension and debarment 
procedures, government access to contractor records.
    What is your view of the Commission's recommendations?
    Answer. In general, I agree with the Commission's recommendations, 
particularly those that apply to DOD. The Department worked closely 
with the Commission throughout its existence and benefited from its 
interim and final recommendations. I appreciate and welcome the 
Commission's efforts to assist the Department in eliminating waste, 
fraud and abuse in wartime contracting. In March 2010, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics created 
a permanent board to provide strategic leadership to the multiple 
stakeholders working to institutionalize operational contract support 
and to track accepted Commission recommendations to completion. As a 
result of these steps, a great majority of the Commission's final 
recommendations have already been acted upon. If confirmed, I will 
continue this office's focus on implementing these improvements.
    Question. Are there any of the Commission's recommendations which 
you believe DOD should not implement? If so, why not?
    Answer. I agree in principle with all 11 of the DOD-specific 
recommendations. But I am concerned about the Commission's tactical 
approach in one area: Recommendation 6 suggested changes within the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
regarding civilian officials responsible for contingency contracting. I 
believe two separate organizations for two key functional communities 
(contracting and logistics), rather than a single organization as the 
Commission envisioned, best supports the AT&L mission. Those two 
organizations are Program Support under our Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness, and the Contingency 
Contracting Office under our Director for Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with 
both organizations to ensure accountability and leadership focus on 
operational contract support and contingency contracting.
    Question. Section 844 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 requires DOD 
to implement a commission recommendation by establishing annual 
competition goals for contingency contracts.
    Do you agree that sole-source contracting, while it may be 
necessary in the early stages of a contingency operation, should be 
phased out as quickly as possible thereafter?
    Answer. Yes. I believe promoting competition is an important 
Departmental focus area. Competition in a mature military operation 
such as Operation Enduring Freedom is a key means of obtaining the best 
business deal for the warfighter. But the long-held flexibility 
provided by statutory exceptions to competition is instrumental in 
assisting the forces, particularly in obtaining urgent requirements as 
they begin military operation. I believe it is in the best interest of 
the government to compete requirements as soon as practicable. If 
confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance of competition 
in getting the best business deals for our taxpayers.
    Question. What is the status of the Department's efforts to 
implement the requirements of section 844?
    Answer. The Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Director 
established the contingency competition goals required by section 844 
on February 17, 2012. In addition, this event was used as an 
opportunity to improve transparency into contingency competition data. 
If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize transparency and competition 
in contracting.
    Question. Are there additional steps that the Department should 
take to reduce its reliance on sole-source contracts in contingency 
operations?
    Answer. Although the competition rate in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
generally been well over 80 percent, I believe the Department should 
look for opportunities to do even better. With the recent initiative to 
improve transparency into contingency competition data through a unique 
code in the Federal Procurement Data System for Operation Enduring 
Freedom, the Department expects to gain additional insights into 
opportunities for increased competition. If confirmed, I intend to 
monitor this area closely to ensure competitive procedures are 
effectively implemented and used whenever possible.
    Question. Section 806 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 requires DOD 
to implement a commission recommendation to improve the operation of 
its past performance databases.
    What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the 
requirements of section 806?
    Answer. I believe that more effective use of past performance data 
bases is needed in general, not just in contingency contracting. There 
are actually two ongoing efforts to implement section 806, ``Inclusion 
of Data on Contractor Performance in Past Performance Databases for 
source selection decisions.'' The first is a DOD, GSA, and NASA 
proposed change to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to provide 
Government-wide standardized past performance evaluation factors and 
performance rating categories and require that all past performance 
information be entered into the Contractor Performance Assessment 
Reporting System (CPARS). The proposed rule responds to the 
requirements of section 806 to: (1) establish standards for the 
timeliness and completeness of past performance submissions; and (2) 
assign responsibility and management accountability for the 
completeness of past performance submissions for such purposes. At the 
present time, the proposed rule is in final drafting. The second is a 
Defense Acquisition Regulation Council proposed rule currently in 
drafting that will address the requirements of section 806 with regard 
to the statutory notification and transfer requirements to send the 
contractor assessment to the Past Performance Information and Retrieval 
System (PPIRS) after the 14 day period established.
    Question. What additional steps will you take, if confirmed, to 
improve the Department's use of past performance data in the award of 
new contracts?
    Answer. I believe that it is critical that the Department have up-
to-date and accurate information about defense contractors in source 
selections for new awards. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
already requires that a contractor's past performance be evaluated in 
all source selections for negotiated competitive acquisitions expected 
to exceed the simplified acquisition threshold. It has been a challenge 
to ensure that past performance data is entered into the Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). I recently wrote to 
all the defense components stressing the importance of not only 
completing assessments in a timely manner but also including quality 
supporting narratives with the ratings. These assessments are a shared 
responsibility between the program manager team and the contracting 
officer and the acquisition chain of command must continue the effort 
to ensure compliance. If confirmed I will continue to emphasize the 
importance of past performance and to hold the chain of command 
responsible.
                      private security contractors
    Question. In 2010, the Armed Services Committee reviewed DOD's use 
of private security contractors in Afghanistan and identified numerous 
problems, including a lack of oversight, failure to comply with 
existing statutory and regulatory requirements, and improper 
qualification and vetting of security contractor personnel. Section 831 
of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 established new oversight and 
accountability requirements for contractors performing private security 
functions in an area of combat operations. Section 833 of that Act 
required the establishment of standards and certification requirements 
for private security contractors. In 2011, the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting recommended that DOD and other Federal agencies 
significantly reduce their reliance on private security contractors.
    What is your view of the recommendations of the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting regarding the use of private security contractors?
    Answer. I generally agree with the observations and recommendations 
of the Commission on Wartime Contracting, including those on private 
security contracting. The Department recognized many of these problem 
areas independently of the Commission's work and began Department-level 
regulatory initiatives to address them as soon as the Department was 
aware of them. These initiatives include revisions to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation and the Defense supplement to that regulation, 
the publication of a new rule governing private security contractors 
under title 32 of the U.S.C., and implementation instructions for 
operational contractor support and for Private Security Contractors 
(PSC) in particular. These efforts establish clear policy for the use 
of PSCs in contingencies and similar operations and address issues such 
as background screening and vetting, registration, reporting, and 
determining those situations when PSCs may and may not be used. 
Following the legislative guidance provided by Congress in the 2008 and 
2011 NDAAs, these rules apply to all U.S. Government agencies 
contracting for security services in areas of combat or other 
significant military operations, not just to Defense Department 
contracts, and are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). 
The standards and certification requirements for PSCs, developed 
pursuant to section 833 of the 2011 NDAA, will provide additional 
controls and accountability over private security contractors. Since 
this will be a commercial standard, it can be used by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID) implementing partners, other 
governments, and private sector users of PSC services, and therefore 
offers the potential to raise the level of performance of all security 
contractors, not just those of DOD.
    Question. Do you believe DOD and other Federal agencies should 
reduce their reliance on contractors to perform security functions that 
may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly 
hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations?
    Answer. I believe that any use of PSCs must be carefully considered 
against the risk of becoming involved in combat operations, of causing 
inadvertent harm to the civilian population, and of damaging the 
performance of the mission. In counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 
operations, without clear lines of battle or safe areas, the military 
troops or police that might be needed to protect all of the logistics, 
installation and personnel needing protection (including relief, 
recovery, and development activities that are conducted simultaneously 
with combat operations) can easily be prohibitive. PSCs may be the only 
practical solution. When it is appropriate and necessary to use PSCs, 
these security contractors must be properly regulated and supervised to 
ensure that the services are being performed competently and within 
well-defined limitations. Under these circumstances, I believe that the 
use of security contractors in contingency operations is acceptable and 
I believe that current levels are consistent with this approach.
    Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure 
that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an 
area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with 
U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the efforts 
already begun within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in the Military Services, and 
in the combatant commands and with other agencies and internationally. 
These efforts include development of Department-level policy, 
coordinating this policy with the Departments of State and Justice and 
other Government agencies, and engaging the international community to 
provide a common framework for the proper roles and oversight of 
private security contractors and the enforcement of those policies 
during overseas operations by the appropriate authorities. I will 
continue the work to implement fully the recently published provision 
in title 32 of the U.S.C. that applies to private security contractors 
working for all Federal agencies operating in overseas operations, 
consistent with DODI 3020.50. I believe that additional work remains to 
be done to ensure that DOD instructions and combatant commander 
guidance and orders remain current, clear, and aligned with U.S. 
defense and foreign policy objectives. The imminent publication of the 
business and operational standards required by section 833 of the 2011 
NDAA will improve the standards of performance for all PSCs. These 
standards will be available for use by other U.S. Government agencies 
and anyone who contracts for PSC services. Collaboration among DOD, the 
Department of State, and other governmental agencies must continue. 
This will ensure consistent policy is developed across the Federal 
Government with potential coalition partners and host nations, 
promoting a common interagency and international understanding of 
responsible use and oversight of private security services. Collective 
collaboration will also result in the use of binding and enforceable 
standards for private security contractors.
                     socom acquisition authorities
    Question. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is unique within 
DOD as the only unified command with acquisition authorities and 
funding. Further, the Commander of SOCOM is the only uniformed 
commander with a subordinate senior acquisition executive.
    Would you recommend any changes to SOCOM's current acquisition 
authorities?
    Answer. No. I believe that SOCOM currently has appropriate 
acquisition authorities. If confirmed, I will continue to meet 
periodically with the Commander, SOCOM and the SOCOM Acquisition 
Executive to discuss opportunities to improve acquisition efficiency 
and effectiveness.
    Question. What role do you believe SOCOM's development and 
acquisition activities should play in broader Service and DOD efforts?
    Answer. I believe that SOCOM's activities should continue to be 
coordinated with those of the broader Department acquisition system to 
achieve synergies, avoid duplication, control cost, and identify best 
practices that can be used more widely. The Department should always 
seek the broadest benefit and application of its development and 
acquisition activities, including those activities sponsored or led by 
SOCOM.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that special 
operations capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall 
DOD research, development, and acquisition programs?
    Answer. Approximately 18 months ago, Dr. Carter and I instituted a 
``SOCOM Acquisition Summit'' that meets every 6 months to coordinate 
and integrate SOCOM's activities with the rest of the Department. These 
meetings have been very beneficial to both SOCOM and the Department, 
and if confirmed I will continue to hold them and use them as a 
catalyst to improve the Department's efficiency and effectiveness and 
to ensure SOCOM's acquisition needs are understood and are being met. 
If confirmed, I will continue to work with SOCOM, the Services, and 
defense agencies to improve their collaboration efforts in order to 
achieve the most efficient allocation of the Department's research, 
development, and acquisition resources.
                          contracting methods
    Question. In recent years, DOD has relied heavily on time-and-
materials contracts for the acquisition of services. Under such a 
contract, the Department pays a set rate per hour for contractor 
services, rather than paying for specific tasks to be performed. In 
some cases, contractors have substituted less expensive labor under 
time-and-materials contracts, while continuing to charge Federal 
agencies the same hourly rates, resulting in effective contractor 
profits of 25 percent or more.
    What is your view of the appropriate use of time-and-materials 
contracts by DOD?
    Answer. I believe that time-and-materials (T&M) contracts are the 
least desirable contract type because they provide no positive 
incentive for cost control or labor efficiency. There are circumstances 
when the use of T&M contracts is appropriate such as situations 
requiring emergency repairs or immediate disaster response, but when 
used, the conditions that supported the decision to use them must be 
documented. A T&M contract might be appropriate when commercial 
services that are commonly provided in this way are not reasonably 
available by other contracting approaches. Legal services could fall 
into this category, for example. The Better Buying Power memorandum of 
September 14, 2010 includes direction to move away from T&M contracts 
for services and move toward Cost Plus Fixed Fee or Cost Plus Incentive 
arrangements when robust competition or recent competitive pricing 
history does not exist to provide the ability to firm fix price the 
effort.
    Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should 
take to minimize the abuse of time-and-materials contracts?
    Answer. The Department has already taken steps to minimize the use 
of T&M contracts. Their use is questioned in all peer reviews and 
during the review of service acquisition strategies. T&M awards within 
the Department have decreased by 49 percent since 2009, down from 5,505 
in 2009 to 2,836 in 2011, a reflection of the direction in the Better 
Buying Power memorandum of 2010. As recently as early February, the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation was revised to ensure that T&M contracts 
are used to acquire commercial services only when no other contract 
type is suitable and to instill discipline in the determination of 
contract type with the view toward managing risk to the Government.
    Question. Section 852 of the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 
requires DOD to promulgate regulations prohibiting excessive ``pass-
through'' charges on DOD contracts. Pass-through charges are charges 
added by a contractor for overhead and profit on work performed by one 
of its subcontractors, to which the contractor provided no added value. 
In some cases, pass-through charges have more than doubled the cost of 
services provided to DOD.
    What is your view of the regulations promulgated by DOD to 
implement the requirements of section 852?
    Answer. The Department has made several changes to the FAR and 
DFARS to implement the requirements of section 852 in the last few 
years. FAR 52.215-22--Limitations on Pass-Through Charges--
Identification of Subcontract Effort (Oct. 2009) requires contracting 
officers to review contractor proposals, before agreeing to a price, to 
verify that the contractor's efforts add value where there is 
significant subcontracting and to ensure there are no excessive pass-
through charges. After contract award, contracting officers can recover 
excessive pass-through charges and reduce the contract price. FAR 
52.215-23--Limitations on Pass-Through Charges (Oct. 2009) requires 
contractors to notify the Contracting officer if 70 percent of the 
total cost of work to be performed is intended to be subcontracted or 
reaches this level during the performance of the contract. The 
contractor must then provide documentation to describe their value 
added, indirect costs and profit/fee applicable to the work performed 
by the subcontractor(s). This requirement flows-down to the lower-tier 
subcontractors as well. Additional changes include FAR 31.2 which 
entitles the government to a price reduction for excessive pass through 
charges and FAR 52.215-2 provides the right for the government to 
examine the contractor's records. I believe these regulations are an 
important step in addressing pass-through charges, but they will only 
be effective if they are implemented by experienced program and 
contract management professionals.
    Question. What additional steps if any do you believe the 
Department should take to address the problem of excessive pass-through 
charges?
    Answer. In addition to implementing the requirements of section 
852, the Department is taking steps through two Better Buying Power 
initiatives to address this issue. If confirmed, I will continue to 
implement those steps. The first is to address the issue of excessive 
pass-through charges as an element of to be considered in determining 
pricing arrangements in contracting, particularly sole-source 
contracting. Effective supply chain management is one of the services 
the Department expects from its prime contractors and the Department 
should structure its business arrangements to reward superior 
performance, particularly price reduction, in this area. Conversely, 
where a prime contractor is not providing value added, as in the 
acquisition of a commodity, the premium the Department pays for supply 
chain management should be very limited. This is an element of the 
Department's peer reviews of pending acquisitions. Pre-award peer 
reviews of non-competitive actions have placed special emphasis on the 
need to align contractor profitability to performance and avoid blanket 
profit levels. The second Better Buying Power initiative that applies 
here is the use of ``should cost'' review. These reviews are conducted 
by Program Managers to identify opportunities for cost reduction and 
can result in changes to acquisition strategies including break out of 
components from primes for direct acquisition by the government and 
more effective negotiations of total price. Another step that the 
Department is in the process of taking is to implement a final DFARS 
rule on the use of a Proposal Adequacy Checklist, which will also 
provide guidance in the review of proposals to prevent excessive-pass 
through charges.
                        interagency contracting
    Question. What is your assessment of the risks and benefits 
associated with DOD's continued extensive use of interagency contracts?
    Answer. The decision to utilize interagency contracts to meet 
Department requirements is essentially a business decision that should 
take many factors into account. When done properly, interagency 
contracts can be an efficient and effective method of meeting important 
requirements. While often convenient, however, interagency contracts 
can be used to avoid oversight and the control mechanisms associated 
with sound management. I believe the practice does have utility, but 
must be carefully monitored to ensure it is not abused.
    Question. Do you believe additional authority or measures are 
needed to hold DOD or other agency personnel accountable for their use 
of interagency contracts?
    Answer. I do not have any information that would suggest that 
existing statute, regulation, and policy are insufficient with regard 
to accountability and the proper use of interagency contracts if 
properly implemented. If confirmed, I would be open to considering such 
measures if the need became apparent.
    Question. Do you believe contractors have any responsibility for 
assuring that the work requested by DOD personnel is within the scope 
of their contract?
    Answer. Yes, however the primary responsibility for ensuring work 
is within the scope of a particular contract rests with the contracting 
officer. If the contractor believes the DOD work is outside the scope 
of the other agency's contract, he has a responsibility to discuss it 
with the other agency contracting officer.
    Question. Do you believe that DOD's continued heavy reliance on 
outside agencies to award and manage contracts on its behalf is a sign 
that the Department has failed to adequately staff its own acquisition 
system?
    Answer. I do not believe that the use of non-DOD agencies to award 
and manage contracts on behalf of the Department is generally a 
reflection that the Department has failed to adequately staff its own 
acquisition needs. Interagency acquisition can support the whole of 
Government approach to strategic sourcing and leveraging the buying 
power of the Federal Government. The Department should continue to 
utilize the expertise of non-DOD agencies as authorized by Congress, 
when it is done properly, efficiently and effectively, and is a cost 
effective alternative to direct DOD management.
                       alaska native corporations
    Question. Over the last few years, there have been a number of 
reported abuses involving defense contracts awarded to Alaska Native 
Corporations (ANCs) under Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act. 
Section 811 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 required that sole-source 
awards to ANCs in excess of $20 million be subject to the same 
``justification and approval'' applicable to other large sole-source 
contracts.
    What is your understanding of the status of the Department's 
implementation of section 811?
    Answer. DOD implemented the interim rule regarding section 811, 
immediately upon its publication on March 16, 2011 and provided 
guidance to the DOD acquisition community.
    Question. If you are confirmed, what additional steps if any would 
you take to address abuses of the 8(a) program?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure that the 
acquisition community monitors 8(a) acquisitions for potential abuses 
and that DOD addresses reported abuses as they arise.
    Question. In one reported case, Army Corps of Engineers officials 
allegedly conspired with a subcontractor allegedly to rig a bid by 
stacking the source selection board to favor a particular bidder.
    Are you comfortable that the Department has effective controls in 
place to prevent the ``stacking'' or manipulation of source selection 
boards?
    Answer. On the whole, I believe this type of activity is 
exceedingly rare, but it can occur and must be vigorously guarded 
against. I believe that even the perception that activities like this 
may have occurred is extremely damaging to the credibility of the 
acquisition system. When conducting competitively negotiated source 
selections within the Department, compliance with statutory and 
regulatory requirements is absolutely required. Those requirements 
include fairness and objectivity in source selection as a fundamental 
value that is central to an effective system. I believe there are 
adequate controls in place, but that constant reinforcement of the 
importance of following the rules with regard to fair and objective 
source selection is a continuing responsibility of every individual 
working in the acquisition system.
    Question. Are you comfortable that effective controls are currently 
in place to prevent the ``stacking'' or manipulation of source 
selection boards on acquisitions with a total estimated value of less 
than $100,000,000, where the Procurement Contracting Officer may also 
serve as the Source Selection Authority, responsible for appointing the 
chairperson of the Source Selection Evaluation Board?
    Answer. Yes, the Services and agencies have strong warranting 
programs and require annual ethics training. I am aware, however, of a 
recent allegation that a contracting officer may have ``stacked'' a 
source selection panel.
    Question. If not, what additional controls would you, if you are 
confirmed, put in place to help ensure that source selection boards 
cannot be ``stacked'' or otherwise manipulated to favor a particular 
bidder, especially on low-profile contracts of relatively small value?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will direct the section 813 panel review 
the procedures for establishing source selection panels, especially 
those where the contracting officer will be the source selection 
authority, to ensure the existing procedures are sound.
                 acquisition of information technology
    Question. Most of the Department's Major Automated Information 
System acquisitions are substantially over budget and behind schedule. 
In particular, the Department has run into unanticipated difficulties 
with virtually every new business system it has tried to field in the 
last 10 years. Section 804 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 required 
DOD to establish a new acquisition process for information technology.
    Do you believe that unique problems in the acquisition of business 
systems require different acquisition strategies or approaches?
    Answer. Yes, I believe there are unique characteristics associated 
with the acquisition of information systems that call for the use of 
acquisition approaches different from those normally used by the 
Department for acquiring weapon systems. All acquisitions should be 
tailored to the nature of the product being acquired. As a class, 
business systems are products having characteristics that tend to 
dictate a specific type of program structure. They can be generally 
characterized as products that are based on commercial information 
technology infrastructure and commercial software that has to be 
adapted, often extensively, to meet Defense Department requirements. 
The Department has already begun to adapt to the unique challenges of 
business information system acquisition through the implementation of 
the Business Capability Lifecycle (BCL), an acquisition approach for 
defense business systems that emphasizes well defined increments of 
capability that are developed, tested, and often fielded in increments 
structured around 1 to 2 year software builds. This structure will also 
be incorporated as one of the acquisition approaches covered by the new 
DODI 5000.02 which is currently in staffing.
    Question. What steps if any do you believe DOD should take to 
address these problems?
    Answer. The issuance of the June 23, 2011, directive requiring the 
use of the BCL for the acquisition process for business systems and the 
updates being made to the DODI 5000.02 for BCL policies and procedures 
are important steps forward in improving the acquisition processes. The 
Department has been implementing the BCL model on a case-by-case basis 
for approximately 2 years. It is the Department's intent that each new 
defense business system will begin its lifecycle under the BCL model. 
If confirmed I will continue to engage and direct the incremental 
acquisition approach to delivering capabilities, as well as engage the 
Department to look for opportunities whenever possible to tailor the 
acquisition process to further improve outcomes. If confirmed, I will 
also monitor the effectiveness of this approach to acquiring business 
systems to determine if further changes are needed.
    Question. What steps has the Department taken to implement the 
requirements of section 804? What steps remain to be taken?
    Answer. The Department has made steady progress in implementing 
several of the key approaches outlined in section 804, specifically in 
the areas of Acquisition, Requirements, Testing and Certification and 
Human Capital. On June 23, 2011, a Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) on 
BCL was signed and issued by USD(AT&L). The BCL provides a framework 
for implementing a more flexible and streamlined process for the 
acquisition of these business information systems. I recently launched 
efforts to update DODI 5000.02 in part in order to implement some key 
IT acquisition reform efforts indentified in the 804 report. The 
departments testing community has been working in collaboration with 
USD(AT&L) to incorporate an integrated testing, evaluation, and 
certification approach into the DODI 5000.02, to reduce redundancies in 
system testing activities and improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of testing the Department's information systems. The Joint Staff has 
also initiated efforts to include more streamlined requirements 
management and approval process for acquisition of information systems. 
A comprehensive review of IT acquisition competencies is also currently 
being conducted by the Department's Chief Information Officer (CIO). 
This review will update the IT acquisition competencies to better 
define DOD critical skill sets and assist in the update of curricula at 
the Defense Acquisition University and the Information Resources 
Management College. We are working directly with ongoing and new start 
acquisition programs to drive many of the IT reform principles 
identified in section 804. Implementation of Business Capabilities 
Lifecycle (BCL) is a current focus area. The Department will use the 
experience and lessons learned from the ``pilots/early adopters'' to 
inform and shape the ongoing improvements and updates to policy and 
guidance.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the CIO of DOD to 
take these steps?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the DOD 
CIO, and I will ensure the OUSD(AT&L) staff and the DOD CIO staff work 
collaboratively to identify and take any steps needed to improve the 
acquisition of information technology based capabilities. This is an 
important area for the Department to achieve more consistent and better 
outcomes given the continuing evolution of technology.
    Question. Section 806 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 gives DOD 
new tools to address supply chain risk in the acquisition of 
information technology.
    What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the 
requirements of section 806?
    Answer. Section 806 provides pilot authority for the Department to 
deny award to a vendor if USD(AT&L) determines, based on intelligence 
provided by the DOD CIO, that the vendor is a threat. The authorities 
provided by section 806 have the potential to significantly reduce 
risks associated with those who may have intentions to damage our 
systems and capabilities through the supply chain. The challenge is to 
exercise these authorities effectively; particularly the potential 
changes to source selection, debriefing and protest procedures. The DOD 
components and AT&L General Counsel are discussing the potential for 
rulemaking. Three procurement pilots have been identified.
    Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs 
to take to address supply chain risk?
    Answer. The Department's approach to addressing supply chain risk 
encompasses a number of efforts including use of the specific 
authorities of Section 806 and more recently enacted legislation. I 
believe the Department needs a comprehensive approach to supply chain 
risk. If confirmed, this will remain a high priority for me and I will 
work to identify additional steps to address this risk.
    Question. Section 818 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 establishes 
new requirements for DOD and its contractors to detect and avoid the 
use of counterfeit electronic parts.
    What steps has the Department taken to implement the requirements 
of section 818?
    Answer. I have recently signed out a memorandum providing 
overarching guidance to the Services and Agencies. The memorandum 
directs specific actions, including using risk assessment for the 
impact of a counterfeit part, directing the purchase of mission 
critical items from the manufacturer's distribution chain, reporting 
all counterfeit incidents within the Department's supply chain to the 
Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP), and directing the 
use of existing DFAR clauses to address counterfeiting while the 
Department coordinates a broader anti-counterfeit DFAR case. This 
memorandum covers items that could potentially affect mission 
performance and warfighter safety, in addition to electronics parts.
    Question. What steps remain to be taken, and what schedule has the 
Department established for taking these steps?
    Answer. In addition to efforts to strengthen contracting clauses, 
establish central reporting of counterfeit incidents, and collaborate 
with industry on the development of counterfeit standards, the 
Department is taking steps to define requirements and processes for the 
purchase of critical items from ``Trusted Suppliers''. The Department 
is also working closely with the Department of Homeland Security on 
anti-counterfeit inspections, and defining rules for the reimbursement 
of counterfeit costs. This will lead to revisions in policies, such as 
the DOD Instruction 4140, the Supply Chain Materiel Management 
Regulations, and the development of changes to procurement regulations, 
including the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. While 
the definitive schedule will be based on the assessment mandated by the 
legislation, the Department continues its ongoing efforts to address 
counterfeit material in its supply chain. If confirmed, I will ensure 
that section 818 is implemented as expeditiously as possible.
    Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs 
to take to address the problem of counterfeit electronic parts?
    Answer. I believe the Department should explore expanded use of 
technology to assist in combating this threat. This includes developing 
tools to provide greater traceability and validation of authenticity 
over the components lifecycle, such as, DNA marking, unique identifiers 
inserted at time of manufacturing, and software methods. These steps 
could have a significant impact on the problem of counterfeit 
electronic parts, and if successful, greatly decrease the probability 
of counterfeit items in the DOD supply chain in the future.
    Question. Some have argued that the current test and evaluation 
process does not appropriately address the unique circumstances 
applicable to the acquisition of information technology systems.
    What steps if any do you believe the Department should take to 
improve the test and evaluation process for information technology 
systems, including their vulnerabilities in the face of a growing 
cybersecurity threat environment?
    Answer. Information technology systems are ubiquitous but occur in 
several very distinct types of products: they are embedded in weapon 
systems, found in specialized command and control systems, and are the 
basis for the Department's business systems. The Department should 
continue to explore more efficient and effective test regimes for each 
of these situations. To support iterative, incremental software 
development, I believe the Department should move toward a more 
continuous integration and test approach that integrates developmental 
test, operational test, and certification and accreditation activities 
to the greatest extent practical. This approach will rely more heavily 
on early user involvement, use of automated testing, and continuous 
monitoring of deployed capabilities. An essential element of this 
approach is a robust pre-production cyber test environment that permits 
us to better understand and characterize the cyber threat, and take 
corrective actions prior to fielding systems. I believe that the 
Department still has a considerable amount of work to do in maturing 
this capability, building on the test-beds and laboratories that have 
already been established. The Report on the Acquisition and Oversight 
of Department of Defense Cyberspace Operations Capabilities that I 
recently submitted to Congress provides more detail on the steps that 
need to be and are being taken.
                 cyberspace-related procurement policy
    Question. DOD's new strategic guidance highlights the increasing 
importance of cyber operations with respect to both defensive and 
offensive capabilities. As a result, this is one of the few areas in 
which the Department is proposing to increase its investments.
    What acquisition challenges do you foresee that are unique to the 
procurement of cyber-related capabilities?
    Answer. There are a number of challenges in this area, but the 
greatest one is time and the need for agility. I recently submitted a 
report to Congress that describes the Department's new cyber 
acquisition management approach, which I am just beginning to 
implement. Cyber offense and defense products are usually far smaller 
in dollars than the major programs that undergo Department level 
oversight, but they are critical to the Department's capabilities. 
Cyber related products must often be developed, tested and fielded on 
very short timelines that keep pace with both the threat and the 
agility with which new technologies are created and enter the market 
place. The implementation challenges to acquiring cyber capabilities at 
the pace needed will be: (1) streamlining the acquisition framework to 
manage risk and accommodate the rapid timelines of information 
technology modernization and cyberspace operations; (2) evaluating 
operational performance and risk while maintaining speed of execution; 
(3) establishing a robust infrastructure for developing and testing 
cyber capabilities quickly and effectively prior to implementation; and 
(4) enabling timely collaboration across the Department, across the 
Government, and with industry to address a ubiquitous problem that will 
require strong collective action. If confirmed, I will continue to 
implement and refine this approach.
    Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to address 
these unique challenges?
    Answer. Section 933 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 
directed the Department to provide a strategy for the rapid acquisition 
of tools, applications, and other capabilities for cyber warfare. The 
Department's response to Congress, which I recently submitted, 
addressed many of the challenges I have described. If confirmed, I will 
actively oversee the Department's cyber acquisition investments in 
cooperation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief Information Officer, 
the Commanders of STRATCOM and CYBERCOM, and the Services. I will also 
work with other agencies and with industry to address the challenge of 
cyber offense and defense acquisition.
                         acquisition workforce
    Question. Section 852 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 established 
an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address 
shortcomings in its acquisition workforce. The fund provides a 
continuing source of funds for this purpose.
    Do you believe that the Acquisition Workforce Development Fund is 
still needed to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees with 
the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost 
effective manner for the taxpayers?
    Answer. Yes. The fund supports continued strengthening of the 
acquisition workforce. The quality and capability of this workforce is 
critical to improved acquisition outcomes and achieving efficiencies.
    Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the 
money made available through the Acquisition Workforce Fund is spent in 
a manner that best meets the needs of DOD and its acquisition 
workforce?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with senior 
acquisition leaders and the leadership of the Military Departments to 
ensure that only sufficient levels of funding are used and that the 
funding is employed to meet the Department's highest priority needs. I 
have directed the Military Departments to reevaluate the balance of the 
various acquisition professional career fields in their workforces 
funded through DAWDF, and if confirmed I will work to ensure the 
Department has an appropriate balance.
                      the defense industrial base
    Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S. 
defense industry?
    Answer. In concise terms; capable and healthy, but understandably 
nervous and cautious. The industrial base greatly is concerned about 
the unthinkable possibility of sequestration and the near certainty of 
defense budgets that will be essentially flat at best. This is a major 
change from the first decade of this century, and something everyone is 
adjusting to. The changes currently taking place, including the 
reduction of nearly half a trillion dollars from the planned defense 
budget over 10 years, with more possible even if sequestration is 
avoided, is of great concern to the defense industry and skilled 
workers that support our national defense. I believe that defense 
industry is a vital component of our total force structure and as such, 
its health is essential to our national security. The industrial base 
today is increasingly global, commercial, and financially complex, with 
significant differences in the business environment faced in different 
sectors and at different tiers of the supply chain. Demand for many 
products has been very strong in recent years, other parts of the 
industrial base faced low demand even during the up-cycle of defense 
spending. Overall, our industry produces systems that offer an 
unsurpassed technological advantage to our warfighters, but I believe 
the industrial base could significantly improve the efficiency with 
which it produces these products and the Department must be prepared to 
assist them in doing so. If confirmed, I will carefully monitor the 
industrial base and adapt policies and make necessary investments when 
warranted to minimize risk to our technological advantage for future 
warfighters.
    Question. Do you support further consolidation of the U.S. defense 
industry?
    Answer. As far as merger and acquisition activity at the major 
prime level, I do not believe that further consolidated at that level 
is likely to be in the interest of either the warfighter or the 
taxpayer. I believe the Department should preserve as much competition 
as possible at every tier. Below the top tier, I believe it is a 
reasonable expectation that there will be some further transaction 
activity as industry repositions in response to the current budget 
environment and the new strategy. That is normal and healthy, and I 
believe it should be driven by market forces and industry, not by the 
government. The Department will certainly fulfill our commitments to 
seriously and judiciously review all proposed mergers and acquisitions 
on a case-by-case basis to ensure they are consistent with the 
preservation of competition and the continued health of the industrial 
base.
    Question. What is your position on foreign investment in the U.S. 
defense sector?
    Answer. Foreign investment can provide benefits to the Department 
and the economy, but each investment must be considered on its own 
merits. I am generally supportive of investment in the defense sector 
including foreign investment if appropriate national security concerns 
have been resolved and such investments do not compromise the 
department's critical technology supply chain. As Acting Under 
Secretary, I have the lead role in DOD's participation in the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) which conducts 
national security reviews of foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms. I 
support a leading role for DOD and a strong presence on CFIUS. I also 
support robust DOD participation in implementation of the export 
control laws to help ensure that defense-relevant U.S. technologies 
resident in foreign-owned or controlled firms with DOD contracts are 
not inappropriately transferred overseas or to foreign nationals.
    Question. What steps if any do you believe DOD should take to 
ensure the continued health of the U.S. defense industry?
    Answer. I believe one of the most important steps the Department 
can take to ensure the continued health of the industry is to engage 
our industrial partners directly and be open with industry about 
Department plans and intentions. The Department must also continue and 
enhance our efforts to be receptive to industry concerns and address 
legitimate issues as quickly and efficiently as possible. The 
Department must also take all responsible steps to ensure that the 
defense industry can support our warfighters' needs, now and in the 
future. For some product and technologies, the Department is the only 
customer, so the Government's budget and program choices have 
significant influence on the financial health of the providing 
companies. The Department's primary mechanism for supporting the 
industrial base is through the programs that buy the defense industry's 
products. In exceptional cases, when an acquisition program will not 
support the minimum volume that a niche supplier needs to remain 
viable, I believe the Department should consider the use of various 
strategies to ensure the continued health of segments of the defense 
industry that are deemed vital to our future capabilities. The Defense 
Production Act title III authority, the Industrial Base Innovation 
Fund, and the Manufacturing Technology Program are three such resources 
to support critical capabilities that are at risk. These interventions 
should only in exceptional cases, which I believe will be rare.
    Question. What is your understanding of the status of the 
Department's ongoing Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) analysis of 
the defense industrial base?
    Answer. The S2T2 project is making solid progress, but it is a 
process, not a singular effort, so its status is, and will remain, 
ongoing. The Department has used several techniques to collect a broad 
baseline of data across the sectors and down the tiers of the 
industrial base, and that data has already proven useful in considering 
the industrial base implications of some proposed program adjustments. 
The Department integrated initial S2T2 analysis into the process of 
developing the Department's fiscal year 2013 budget proposal, and if 
confirmed, one of my priorities will be to institutionalize the process 
to evaluate the impact of acquisition decisions on the industrial base. 
S2T2 is also making strong progress in fulfilling its mission to serve 
as the Department's central repository for industrial base data, 
working with the Services and components to eliminate duplication and 
fill in gaps in data collection.
    Question. Has the Department taken any concrete steps to enhance 
the health and status of a particular sector or tier based upon this 
analysis?
    Answer. In response to initial analysis of S2T2 data, the 
Department adjusted some of the program schedules in the fiscal year 
2013 budget proposal to smooth workflow, maintaining the health of some 
critical and fragile niches in the industrial base. The Department has 
also adjusted the emphasis in planning for some industrial base 
investments through the Manufacturing Technology Program and the 
Defense Production Act title III authority, responding to data 
collected as part of the S2T2 program. Moreover, as the Department 
enters deliberations on the fiscal year 2014 budget, data collected as 
part of the S2T2 effort will be essential as the Department 
institutionalizes the process to consider the industrial base impacts 
of program decisions.
    Question. Under what circumstances if any do you believe the 
Department should use Defense Production Act title III authorities to 
address defense industrial base needs?
    Answer. I believe that the Department should use title III 
authorities, consistent with section 303 of that law, which requires 
two determinations submitted to Congress prior to contract execution--
(1) Such action ``is essential to the national defense; and (2) without 
[such action], United States industry cannot reasonably be expected to 
provide the capability for the needed industrial resource, material, or 
critical technology item in a timely manner.'' Title III decisions 
should be informed by thorough industrial base analysis, based largely 
on activities of the Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC), as well 
as the Sector-by-Sector Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) project, and Space 
Industrial Base Council Critical Technology Working Group (CTWG). 
Established by section 722 of the act, DPAC is composed of Department 
and Agency heads from across the Federal Government. Its mandate is to 
advise the President on the effective use of DPA authorities, including 
title III provisions. The CTWG was chartered to assess key domestic 
space industries and, when necessary, coordinate strategies (primarily 
through DPA title III) for ensuring reliable access to critical space-
related products. The CTWG is composed of military, intelligence, and 
civilian agency representatives. The Department should rely on these 
sources of information and advice as well as other sources in 
determining industrial base priorities for DPA title III investments.
    Question. What is your view of current or anticipated consolidation 
efforts by major defense contractors?
    Answer. As far as merger and acquisition activity at the major 
prime level, I do not believe that further consolidated at that level 
is likely to be in the interest of either the warfighter or the 
taxpayer. I believe the Department should preserve as much competition 
as possible at every tier. Below the top tier, I believe it is a 
reasonable expectation that there will be some further transaction 
activity as industry repositions in response to the current budget 
environment and the new strategy. That is normal and healthy, and I 
believe it should be driven by market forces and industry, not by the 
government. The Department will certainly fulfill our commitments to 
seriously and judiciously review all proposed mergers and acquisitions 
on a case-by-case basis to ensure they are consistent with the 
preservation of competition and the continued health of the industrial 
base.
    Question. How does the Department evaluate the effect that such 
consolidations may have on the ability of DOD to leverage competition 
to obtain fair value and the best quality in the goods and services it 
procures and cultivate technological and engineering innovation?
    Answer. When examining a merger, the Department weighs potential 
harm to competition and innovation caused by horizontal consolidation 
and vertical integration against potential benefits such as reduced 
overhead costs and other synergies for both existing and planned 
programs and future requirements.
    Question. What role, if any, should DOD have in vetting and 
approving or disapproving such consolidation efforts?
    Answer. The Department examines mergers and acquisitions 
concurrently and in cooperation with the DOJ or FTC and provides a 
unified Department position on major transactions to the appropriate 
antitrust regulatory agency for consideration in determining the U.S. 
Government's position. As the primary customer impacted by defense 
business combinations, the Department's views are particularly 
significant because of its special insight into a proposed merger's 
impact on innovation, competition, national security, and the defense 
industrial base. However, the regulatory agencies have the authorities 
provided by the antitrust statutes and may or may not take actions 
supported by the Department. In certain limited cases, the Department 
has in the past unilaterally asked the parties for certain behavioral 
or structural remedies to address potential issues. Where warranted, 
the Department supports transactions that eliminate excess capacity; 
achieve cost savings to the Department; and improve national security.
                          manufacturing issues
    Question. Section 812 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD 
to issue comprehensive guidance to improve its management of 
manufacturing risk in major defense acquisition programs.
    What steps has the Department taken to implement the requirements 
of section 812? What steps remain to be taken?
    Answer. Section 812 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 required the 
Department to issue guidance on the management of manufacturing risk 
for the major defense acquisition programs. In July 2011, the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering (DASD(SE)) 
updated the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) with new guidance on 
how manufacturing readiness should be assessed throughout all phases of 
the acquisition process and at specific systems engineering technical 
reviews. This new guidance, added to DAG Chapter 4 (Systems 
Engineering), was developed based on industry best practices and prior 
DOD knowledge base maintained by DAU. If confirmed, I will continue to 
evaluate the impact of these steps and refine these best practices to 
stay abreast of rapidly changing technologies and industrial-base 
capabilities.
    Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to 
address continuing shortcomings in manufacturing research and 
capabilities in the development and acquisition of defense systems?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to promote the Department's 
investments in advanced manufacturing technology and the transition of 
those concepts to the industrial base, through competitive incentives 
and direct investment.
    I also see great value in having program managers consider 
manufacturing and production issues early in program planning and 
source selection. Manufacturing technology should routinely be included 
in the risk reduction efforts during the technology demonstration phase 
of the acquisition process and through continuing engineering support. 
The Department should continue to embed advanced manufacturing into 
specific weapons system platforms through technology transition 
agreements between the Manufacturing Technology Program and the Program 
of Record.
    In late 2010, DARPA launched a major initiative to create 
revolutionary approaches to the design, verification and manufacturing 
of complex defense systems. Though the Adaptive Vehicle Make (AVM) 
portfolio, DARPA is developing design tools and manufacturing 
approaches that include a richer design space with the potential to 
compress development timelines dramatically. This work is maturing and, 
if confirmed, I will encourage the transition of these concepts to the 
industrial base.
    If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance of 
manufacturing technology and seek creative mechanisms to advance it.
    Question. Do you believe that additional incentives are needed to 
enhance industry's incorporation and utilization of advanced 
manufacturing processes developed under the manufacturing technology 
program?
    Answer. In general, I believe that existing incentives are 
acceptable, but will be strengthened further by steps the Department 
and administration are taking. The Department's competitive acquisition 
and procurement processes incentivize offerors to pursue internal R&D 
investments in manufacturing technology and to employ advanced 
manufacturing processes in response to the DOD's solicitations. The 
recent efforts I have sponsored to create a Department Innovation 
Marketplace include manufacturing technologies. The Manufacturing 
Technology (ManTech) program is a partner in the National Strategic 
Plan for Advanced Manufacturing announced in February 2012 by the 
administration, which states, ``advanced manufacturing is a matter of 
fundamental importance to the economic strength and security of the 
United States.'' This strategy lays out a robust innovation policy, 
which incorporates intensive engagement among stakeholders at the 
national, State, and regional levels, including the DOD ManTech 
program, to promote U.S. competitiveness. If confirmed, I will seek out 
additional ways to provide incentives to industry to incorporate and 
utilize advanced manufacturing technologies.
    Question. What is your view of the utility of the Industrial Base 
Innovation Fund for advancing manufacturing technology and processes?
    Answer. The Industrial Base Innovation Fund (IBIF) has been and I 
believe will continue to be a valuable resource for addressing short 
term, operational needs and issues such as surge and diminishing 
manufacturing sources. The Department currently possesses the 
flexibility to respond to defense industrial base or manufacturing 
needs, such as those identified by the ongoing sector-by-sector tier-
by-tier (S2T2) project, through programs identified in the President's 
Budget. However, in fiscal year 2012, the IBIF program is being 
reoriented to address niche concerns raised through the S2T2 effort, 
when current programs will not support the minimum sustaining rate that 
a niche supplier needs to provide a critical product or service. The 
Department is focused on ensuring the continued health of selected 
essential parts of the defense industry through mechanisms like the 
IBIF. Such interventions are being pursued only when the Department is 
highly likely to need a product in the future, where the product would 
be prohibitively difficult and expensive to obtain after a hiatus, and 
where affordable and innovative mechanisms are available to work with 
the producers in the interim.
                         foreign military sales
    Question. You were recently quoted as saying that the Department 
should facilitate more foreign sales of U.S. weapons to advance 
numerous policy aims including achieving higher procurement rates that 
would aid the U.S. military as it braces for a prolonged period of 
fiscal belt-tightening. Specifically, you were quoted saying, ``we've 
always been supportive of [foreign military sales] but I think we can 
up our game a little bit. . . . Maybe in some cases take a look at 
taking a little bit more risk than we've been willing to take in the 
past.''
    Does this quote accurately reflect your views?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. With regard to your reference to ``taking a little bit 
more risk,'' what types of increased risk would you be prepared to 
accept and why?
    Answer. We are using the new defense exportability features (DEF) 
legislative authority provided by Congress in the NDAAs for Fiscal 
Years 2011 and 2012 to invest a small amount of U.S. RDT&E funding 
early in development to implement pilot program activities that we hope 
will lead to earlier, more successful sales in support of our foreign 
policy objectives. Our recent DEF report to Congress describes ongoing 
efforts. There is risk that these investments may not result in actual 
exports in the future, but we have done our best to choose pilot 
programs that are stable from a U.S. acquisition perspective also have 
a high probability of future export to allied and friendly nations.
    Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe DOD 
generally and the Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics directorate in 
particular should take to facilitate more foreign sales of U.S. weapons 
and equipment?
    Answer. The Department is taking several steps in this area that 
should be continued and strengthened where possible. The administration 
has been working for some time to implement reforms of export controls 
through the so called ``four singles.'' This work is ongoing. In 
particular, the ``four singles'' effort to review and simplify the 
Commerce and State Department export control lists would be 
particularly helpful in facilitating foreign sales. As Principal Deputy 
Under Secretary, I have also worked with USD(Policy) to streamline the 
U.S. Government processes for reviewing proposed sales for technology 
security and foreign disclosure issues. This work is off to a good 
start but should also be completed. The Department should also continue 
to encourage use of the new DEF legislative authority provided by 
Congress in the NDAAs for Fiscal Year 2011 and 2012 in programs that 
have a high probability of future foreign sales. The DEF legislation 
provides the Department authority to invest a small amount of U.S. 
RDT&E funding early in development to implement pilot program 
activities that can lead to earlier, more successful sales in support 
of our foreign policy objectives. Finally, I believe that the senior 
Department officials, including USD(AT&L), should be directly involved 
in providing information about possible sales to foreign governments 
and in removing administrative barriers to foreign sales where that is 
in the interest of the United States. If confirmed I will continue to 
be actively engaged in these and other measures to further foreign 
sales of U.S. military equipment to our friends and allies.
                         science and technology
    Question. What, in your view, is the role and value of science and 
technology programs in meeting the Department's transformation goals 
and in confronting irregular, catastrophic, traditional and disruptive 
threats?
    Answer. I believe that science and technology programs play a 
crucial, indeed essential, role in meeting the Department's 
transformation goals and in confronting all threats to include 
irregular, catastrophic, traditional, and disruptive. To maintain the 
technological superiority the United States has enjoyed for several 
decades, it is essential that the Department pursues a focused, high 
quality, aggressive science and technology program that is responsive 
to the full range of capabilities required by our Armed Forces.
    Question. If confirmed, what direction will you provide regarding 
funding targets and priorities for the Department's long term research 
efforts?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Department's leadership 
to ensure that funding for science and technology investments are set 
at levels that will ensure the Department has adequate resources in 
this area. The Department and the administration have placed a strong 
emphasis on sustaining S&T spending. Secretary Panetta has repeatedly 
indicated that technological superiority underpins the Department's 
recently released Military Strategy Guidance. If confirmed I will 
continue that emphasis and, subject to the Secretary's approval, set 
appropriate targets and priorities, primarily through the Defense 
Planning Guidance.
    Question. What specific metrics would you use, if confirmed, to 
assess whether the Department is making adequate investments in its 
basic research programs?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with ASD(R&E) to ensure that 
adequate investments are made by the military services and agencies in 
basic research. Effective management of this portfolio requires good 
judgment, tight coupling to the research community, and a long-term 
perspective. The key metrics that I would use to assess the adequacy 
and impact of these investments include technology transitions into our 
acquisition programs and the industrial base and longitudinal 
assessment of publications in scientific journals, number of students 
supported, patents granted, and publications in peer reviewed 
conference proceedings.
    Question. Do you feel that there is sufficient coordination between 
and among the science and technology programs of the military services 
and defense agencies?
    Answer. I believe that the Department is performing reasonably well 
in this area, but that there is always room for additional improvement. 
The formal coordination structure is as follows: at the top, there is 
an S&T EXCOM, chaired by the ASD(R&E), and attended by the S&T 
Executives of the military services and defense agencies. This group 
meets quarterly to discuss major science and technology policy issues. 
It also meets once a year for a Strategic Overview where each Component 
presents an overview of the focus of its S&T investment. There are also 
the Deputies to the S&T EXCOM that meet weekly and serve as an action 
group to implement decisions made by the S&T EXCOM. The Department has 
established seven Priority Steering Councils consisting of scientists 
and engineers from the services and agencies, whose job it is to 
develop cross-cutting roadmaps for the Department's recently designated 
S&T Priorities. The councils are complemented by Communities of 
Interest (COIs) populated by scientist and engineers from the services 
and agencies for the purpose of integrating the Departments S&T program 
in specific technology areas. COIs are permanent in nature. There are 
also short-term Technology Focus Teams (TFTs) that perform in-depth 
analysis of specific technology issues and report their findings to the 
S&T EXCOM.
    Question. What is the Department's role and responsibility in 
addressing national issues related to science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematics (STEM) education and workforce development?
    Answer. I believe that the Department should take a strong role in 
supporting the development of world-class STEM capabilities within the 
domains of importance to national security. With the support of 
Congress, the Department engages America's students, educators and 
educational communities to enrich DOD's current and future workforce 
through strategic investments. These investments are designed to create 
access and opportunities to work alongside DOD scientists and engineers 
as well as funding cutting-edge research in areas critical to national 
security. The Department is actively working with the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy, the National Science Foundation and other 
Federal agencies to draft the first 5-Year Federal STEM Education 
Strategic Plan to coordinate its STEM investments to achieve 
Government-wide efficiencies in accordance with Federal policies. If 
confirmed, I will support and participate in the effort to support STEM 
workforce development.
    Question. What steps if any would you take to support efforts to 
ensure that the Nation has the scientific and technical workforce 
needed for its national security technological and industrial base?
    Answer. DOD STEM education, training and outreach programs, such as 
the National Defense Education Program (NDEP), including K-12, the 
Science, Mathematics and Research for Transformation (SMART) program, 
and National Security Science and Engineering Faculty Fellows (NSSEFF) 
program expand the pool and diversity of scientists and engineers 
available to the DOD and the technological and industrial base. If 
confirmed, I will continue to work with the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Research and Engineering) to assess the extent to which NDEP, 
and other similar STEM programs, meet the Department's current and 
future technical workforce needs, are effective and efficient, and are 
synchronized with other Federal Government STEM initiatives. I will 
also continue to support the efforts in this area that non-defense 
organizations within government and industry are conducting.
    Question. How would you use science and technology programs to 
better reduce technical risk and therefore potentially reduce costs and 
schedule problems that accrue in large acquisition programs?
    Answer. Technical risk should be identified during the early 
program planning and analysis phases of the acquisition process as 
alternative solutions to military problems are evaluated. Once the 
candidate preferred solutions and associated risks are identified, the 
program and S&T communities should work together to develop technology 
maturation programs and risk reduction programs that will reduce the 
risk associated with a technology to a level where it can be 
incorporated in an acquisition program, either for technology 
demonstration or for engineering development. The S&T community and the 
program community should work together to identify the most promising 
and high payoff areas for investment for both initial fielding and 
subsequent upgrades or increments.
    Question. Do you feel that the science and technology programs of 
DOD are too near-term focus and have over-emphasized technology 
transition efforts over investing in revolutionary and innovative 
programs?
    Answer. No. The Department has sustained its investments in longer 
term technologies and DARPA is appropriately funded to pursue high risk 
high payoff opportunities. I am concerned about some of the trends in 
the balance of investments in the various R&D accounts, however. As the 
Department has increased the amount of time some programs are being 
kept in the inventory the percentage of the R&D budget being used for 
upgrades has grown. The accounts for basic and applied research have 
been protected and for good reason; however, this has led to reductions 
in the accounts funding prototypes and full scale development. If 
confirmed, I will continue to monitor these trends and recommend 
actions to address it if needed.
    Question. Are you satisfied that the Department has a well 
articulated and actionable science and technology strategic plan?
    Answer. Yes. The current science and technology strategic 
investment strategy is a result of coordinated strategic planning 
activities that have occurred over the past 2 years. In April 2011, the 
Secretary of Defense issued a memo that identified seven S&T priorities 
for investment planning. The Components published S&T strategic plans 
that support the priorities of both the Department and their respective 
organizations' assigned missions. These plans contain actionable goals 
and are available to industry, academia, and other government 
organizations on the Department's web site.
    Question. Do you see a need for changes in areas such as hiring 
authority, personnel systems, financial disclosure and ethics 
requirements, to ensure that the Department can recruit and retain the 
highest quality scientific and technical workforce possible?
    Answer. I have not seen any data that would indicate conclusively 
that the Department has a major problem in the areas of hiring 
authority, personnel systems, disclosure, and ethics requirements; 
however, I am concerned that the Department needs to strengthen its 
workforce in the engineering fields. This includes the military officer 
corps. If confirmed, I will work with the service leadership to assess 
this situation and determine whether any corrective action is needed. 
The Department does have tools such as Interdepartmental Personnel Act 
(IPA) and Highly Qualified Expert (HQE) programs to bring in additional 
talent. I believe the use of these programs could be expanded and I do 
believe more can and should be done to increase the capacity of the 
technical workforce without changes in the administrative areas 
mentioned.
    Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering (ASD(R&E)) has been designated as the Chief Technology 
Officer of DOD.
    In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Chief Technology 
Officer of DOD?
    Answer. The Chief Technology Officer (CTO) is the advisor to the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense for 
research and engineering matters. The CTO should provide technical 
leadership, guidance, and oversight for the Department's R&E program to 
include the identification of critical technology areas and the 
adequacy of the Department's overall R&E investment and program 
content.
    Question. What authority should the ASD(R&E) have over the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)?
    Answer. By DOD Charter the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) is established as an Agency of DOD under the direction, 
authority, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)). DARPA 
also recommends to the Secretary of Defense, through the ASD(R&E), the 
assignment of research projects to DARPA. I would not recommend any 
changes in these authorities and roles.
    Question. What authority should the ASD(R&E) have over other 
Service and agency science and technology efforts?
    Answer. I believe the existing authorities are appropriate. By DOD 
Charter, the ASD(R&E) is to recommend approval, modification, or 
disapproval of programs and projects of the Military Departments and 
Defense Agencies to eliminate unpromising or unnecessarily duplicative 
programs. The ASD(R&E) is also designated to recommend the initiation 
or support of promising projects or programs for the science and 
technology program. These recommendations are usually provided as 
resource and programmatic input to the Department's process for 
developing the President's Budget Request.
    Question. Do you see the need for any changes in organizational 
structure, workforce, or availability of resources to improve the 
effectiveness of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering?
    Answer. Not at this time. The Department is still in the final 
stages of implementing the provisions of the fiscal year 2009 Weapons 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act. To date, progress has been good, and I 
will continue to review whether additional adjustments are needed.
                          defense laboratories
    Question. What is your view on the quality and relevance of the DOD 
laboratories as compared to the DOE national laboratories, Federal 
laboratories, academic laboratories and other peer institutions?
    Answer. During my career, I worked with many of these institutions 
and in general, I have found them to be staffed with competent 
scientists and engineers who are dedicated to their work and performing 
important missions for the DOD or the Nation. A key issue going forward 
is how to operate these Laboratories as an enterprise to meet the needs 
of the Department effectively. The ASD(R&E) is working with the 
Services on this assessment.
    Question. What metrics will you use, if confirmed, to evaluate the 
effectiveness, competitiveness, and scientific vitality of the DOD 
laboratories?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate the DOD labs primarily based 
on their success in developing and transitioning new technologies to 
warfighters, the quality of their technical workforce, and the results 
of external reviews of their effectiveness and innovation. As Acting 
USD(AT&L), I have begun the process of putting in place mechanisms to 
assess the productivity of DOD's acquisition institutions and if 
confirmed I will continue that process.
    Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to 
increase the mission effectiveness and productivity of the DOD 
laboratories?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the 
ASD(R&E) to ensure that DOD labs operate at maximum efficiency and 
productivity. As Acting USD(AT&L), I have begun the process of putting 
in place mechanisms to assess the productivity of DOD's acquisition 
institutions, including laboratories, and if confirmed I will continue 
that process.
    Question. Do you see value in enhancing the level of technical 
collaboration between the DOD laboratories and academic, other Federal 
and industrial scientific organizations?
    Answer. Yes. Technical collaborations across the laboratory system 
are essential to success. Much cooperation already exists. Together 
with the ASD(R&E), I am examining additional incentives to increase 
teaming and partnering such as exchange programs, joint technology 
programs, and participation in cross-agency reviews. In particular, I 
am working with Department of Homeland Security and the Department of 
Energy on areas in which cooperation can be expanded. If confirmed, I 
will continue these efforts.
    Question. Do you believe that past investments in research 
equipment; sustainment, repair and modernization; and facility 
construction at the DOD laboratories have been sufficient to maintain 
their mission effectiveness and their standing as world-class science 
and engineering institutions?
    Answer. I am not certain of the answer to this question. The 
Services are currently not reporting any deficiencies in the DOD 
laboratory infrastructure necessary to carry out leading-edge research 
efforts of which I am aware. However, I do have some questions about 
the overall state of DOD's laboratories. Consequently, I have asked the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to conduct 
a comprehensive review of DOD labs in the context of the entire 
national laboratory system. This review should provide insight into the 
state of the labs. If confirmed, I will use the results of this review 
to determine whether additional investments are needed.
    Question. In your view, have the DOD laboratories struck an 
appropriate balance between investments in near-term technology 
programs that are tied to current battlefield needs and investments in 
longer term, higher risk, and revolutionary capability development?
    Answer. Yes. DOD's laboratory system is a balance of corporate 
research labs (e.g., Naval Research Lab, Army Research Lab) that 
maintain basic science as their primary focus, and engineering centers 
such as the Navy Warfare Centers and the Army's Research and 
Engineering Development Centers that maintain the Department's in-house 
development and engineering expertise. The Services align approximately 
one-third of their basic science budgets to in-house programs. A recent 
review of the labs' basic science program was conducted by the Defense 
Science Board (DSB) and the DSB concluded that the in-house basic 
research program was technically strong and healthy. While not a 
laboratory per se, DARPA does focus much of its work in higher risk 
high payoff technology. In general I think the Department has a 
reasonable balance, however if confirmed I will continue to assess this 
balance to determine if adjustments are needed.
    Question. Do you believe that this balance is likely to change with 
the completion of our withdrawal from Iraq and our ongoing drawdown in 
Afghanistan?
    Answer. I expect the balance between near-term and longer-term 
research will not change dramatically as a result of these events, but 
the portfolio of research topics will shift to support the Department's 
recently released strategic guidance, particularly toward any emerging 
threats.
    Question. Section 219 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 authorizes 
the directors of a defense laboratory to use up to 3 percent of the 
total funds available to the laboratory to fund innovative research, 
technology transition activities, and workforce development.
    What is your understanding of the extent to which the Department 
has implemented section 219?
    Answer. Each of the Services has implemented section 219 programs. 
Though the statute gives authority to lab directors to utilize up to 3 
percent of all available funds for this program, the actual amount to 
date has been in the 1 to 2 percent range. The Department submits a 
Section 219 status report annually to Congress to detail the related 
investment.
    Question. Do you believe that the funding flexibility provided by 
section 219 has been appropriately utilized by the Department?
    Answer. Yes. So far, I believe the flexibilities provided by 
section 219 have been used appropriately by the Department. Lab 
directors have appropriately balanced section 219 investments with 
other programs and procurements. If confirmed, I will continue to 
monitor the use of this flexibility by lab directors.
    Question. Do you believe that it would be feasible or appropriate 
for the Department to use the authority of section 219 to adjust the 
balance between investments in near-term technology programs and 
longer-term, higher-payoff investments?
    Answer. Yes, however, I believe that the current program 
authorities and structure are adequate and are being used 
appropriately, and recommend no changes at this time.
               defense advanced research projects agency
    Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between 
the DARPA and the ASDR&E?
    Answer. By DOD Charter the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) is established as an Agency of DOD under the direction, 
authority, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)) who 
reports to the Under Secretary. DARPA also recommends to the Secretary 
of Defense, through the ASD(R&E), the assignment of research projects 
to DARPA.
    Question. In your view, has DARPA struck an appropriate balance 
between investments in near-term technology programs that are tied to 
current battlefield needs and investments in longer term, higher risk, 
and revolutionary capability development?
    Answer. Yes. The ASD(R&E) completed a comprehensive review of the 
DARPA science and technology program last August and reported that the 
DARPA investment appeared to be properly balanced between near-term and 
long term, higher risk technology and capability development. If 
confirmed, I will continue to review DARPAs balance of investments, 
however one of the most important characteristics of DARPA is that it 
has more independence to invest in high risk high payoff technologies 
than other DOD institutions and I believe this should continue.
    Question. Do you feel that DARPA has adequately invested in the 
academic research community?
    Answer. Yes, however this is a very subjective assessment. DARPA 
basic research investment, which largely goes to academic institutions, 
has more than doubled since 2007, from $150 million per year to the 
current fiscal year 2013 request of $349 million. This investment has 
expanded DARPA and academic interaction. If confirmed, I will continue 
to monitor DARPAs investment in academic research.
    Question. What are the major issues related to DARPA investments, 
management and workforce, and research outcomes that you will seek to 
address?
    Answer. DARPA has been, and will continue to be at the center of 
DOD-funded innovation, particularly for addressing difficult problems 
in creative and often non-traditional ways. Areas I will focus on if 
confirmed include DARPA's cyber investments and potential game-changing 
technologies applicable to emerging threats. If confirmed, I will 
continue to support DARPAs efforts to attract an exceptional technical 
workforce.
    Question. Do you feel that DARPA is adequately transitioning its 
programs to the Services and Defense Agencies? If not, how will you 
address that challenge?
    Answer. DARPA's success in this regard has been mixed, and the 
transition of technologies in some cases could be more effective. I 
recently discussed this issue with the departing DARPA Director who 
indicated that some relationships with the Military Departments could 
be stronger. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Acquisition 
Executives and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering to strengthen transition for the entire R&E enterprise, 
including DARPA.
    Question. Do you believe that there has been an appropriate level 
of interaction between DARPA and its intelligence community analog, 
IARPA, given the overlap in many research areas?
    Answer. I do not have any information that would suggest otherwise, 
and my belief is that there has been appropriate interaction between 
DARPA and IARPA.
                          test and evaluation
    Question. The Department has, on occasion, been criticized for 
failing to adequately test its major weapon systems before these 
systems are put into production.
    What are your views about the degree of independence needed by the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in ensuring the success of 
the Department's acquisition programs?
    Answer. I believe that the independence of the Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) is an important aspect of 
ensuring the Department's acquisition programs are realistically and 
adequately tested in their intended operational environment. I am aware 
of concerns that testing can be perceived as creating additional cost 
and delays in delivering capability, especially in the context of 
pressing real world operations. If confirmed, I will continue to meet 
regularly with and seek the advice of the DOT&E on testing and 
evaluation issues as a partner in the acquisition process, while 
allowing for the necessary independent viewpoints. I have great respect 
for the professionalism, dedication, and integrity of the current 
DOT&E, whom I have known for many years. If confirmed, I will continue 
to welcome his insights on program performance and other issues. 
DOT&E's independence is of great value in the acquisition process and 
is appropriate.
    Question. What are your views about the role of the Director of 
Developmental Test and Evaluation in ensuring the success of the 
Department's acquisition programs?
    Answer. The role of the DASD(DT&E) is to advise the Secretary of 
Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics on all matters relating to developmental test and 
evaluation within the Department. In this role, the DASD(DT&E) mission 
includes helping to improve acquisition outcomes through early and 
continuous engagement with Program Offices in order to verify system 
performance meets requirements and to identify the need for corrective 
actions as early as possible. DT&E also provides confirmation that a 
system is mature enough to proceed to IOT&E. The DASD(DT&E) provides 
support to Program Offices and the DOD T&E community, assists with test 
planning and data analysis, and identifies and shares best practices. 
Additionally, the DASD(DT&E) provides an independent assessment to 
advise milestone decision authorities and the component acquisition 
executives of any risks prior to entering production or initial 
operational test and evaluation. As the Milestone Decision Authority 
for Major Defense Acquisition Programs, I particularly rely on the 
DASD(T&E) for advice on the demonstrated maturity of designs to enter 
initial production and on the adequacy of planned test programs at the 
beginning of Engineering and Manufacturing Development. If confirmed, I 
will continue to rely heavily on the DASD(T&E) for support to these 
decisions.
    Question. Are you concerned with the level of test and evaluation 
conducted by the contractors who are developing the systems to be 
tested?
    Answer. I only have anecdotal evidence at this point that this is a 
concern. I believe that there needs to be Government led DT&E supported 
by contractor testing and that the best mix of government and 
contractor testing varies from program to program based on a variety of 
factors. If confirmed, I will continue to assess this balance to 
determine if adjustments should be made. The ASD(DT&E) is currently 
reviewing all developmental test infrastructure, both government and 
contractor. If confirmed I will use the results of that assessment to 
determine if changes are warranted.
    Question. What is the impact of rapid fielding requirements on the 
standard testing process? If confirmed, how will you work to ensure 
that all equipment and technology that is deployed to warfighters is 
subject to appropriate operational testing?
    Answer. The assessment process for capabilities provided in 
response to the warfighter's urgent operational requirements must be 
appropriately tailored to ensure that the warfighter receives critical 
capabilities that are reasonably safe, perform their basic functions 
successfully, and are provided on a timeline that meets the 
warfighter's expectation. This generally implies initial test regimes 
prior to first fielding of rapid acquisition programs that accept more 
risk than the normal acquisition process. The Department is currently 
revising DODI 5000.02 which governs the operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System to include a provision for rapid fielding 
procedures. Those procedures will provide additional guidance on the 
testing required for rapid acquisition programs. If confirmed, I will 
complete this effort and make adjustments as the Department learns from 
its experience with testing for rapid acquisition programs.
    Question. Do you believe that the operational and developmental 
testing organizations in DOD and the Military Services are adequate to 
ensure an appropriate level of testing, and testing oversight, on major 
defense acquisition programs?
    Answer. Yes, I believe there are adequate resources to ensure an 
appropriate level of testing and testing oversight on major defense 
acquisition programs. That said, however, I am a firm believer in 
continuous improvement, and I have no doubt that the Department can 
improve its performance. Problems that I have identified include the 
need for earlier definition of test requirements so that program 
planning and budgeting are stable, and the need to shift more emphasis 
to early developmental testing to reduce the likelihood of late 
discovery of design or production issues. If confirmed, I will continue 
to work with the DOT&E and DASD(DT&E) to ensure the Department conducts 
effective and efficient developmental and operational testing to 
improve acquisition outcomes.
    Question. Section 102 of the WSARA established a new Director of 
Developmental Testing to help address this problem. Section 835 of the 
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 built on this provision by establishing new 
organizational and management requirements for developmental testing on 
major defense acquisition programs.
    What steps has the Department taken to date to implement these two 
provisions?
    Answer. As Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, I have approved a DOD Instruction (DODI 
5134.17) which assigns responsibilities and functions and prescribes 
relationships and authorities for the DASD(DT&E). We are issuing 
guidelines for implementing the requirements of Section 835 of the NDAA 
for Fiscal Year 2012, and I am in the process of including those 
requirements established in an update to the Defense Acquisition System 
Instruction (DODI 5000.02).
    Question. What steps remain to be taken?
    Answer. If confirmed, I plan to complete the update of the DODI 
5000.02 that incorporates the requirement in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 
2012. I will work with the Services to resolve any unique issues they 
have with the implementation. I will monitor the progress of the 
Services in implementing this new requirement and have DASD(DT&E) 
report the status in the fiscal year 2012 Annual Report to Congress.
    Question. What additional steps will you take, if confirmed, to 
ensure adequate developmental testing on major weapon systems?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance 
of having early and continuous engagement with the Program Offices. I 
will work collaboratively with the Component Acquisition Executives and 
Program Offices to develop adequate test programs, assist with test 
planning and data analysis, and identify and share best practices to 
help improve acquisition outcomes.
    Question. Some have argued that testing takes too long and costs 
too much. Others contest this view pointing out that testing and 
evaluation is an essential tool to assist in the development of weapon 
systems and ensure that they perform as intended. The Armed Services 
Committee has expressed concern that problems with weapons systems have 
been discovered during operational testing and evaluation that should 
have been discovered during developmental testing and corrected during 
subsequent development.
    Do you believe that major defense acquisition programs are helped 
or hurt by cutting tests budgets and reducing the time available for 
developmental testing?
    Answer. In general, they are more likely to be hurt. There is a 
natural tendency, exacerbated by tight budgets, funding cuts, and poor 
execution, to cut corners in test planning (both time and resources) to 
save time and money. In my experience, this is usually a mistake that 
is corrected by reality in the form of more schedule and cost overruns. 
I am strongly committed to ensuring that the Department has development 
programs with appropriate timelines and well resourced, realistic 
testing. I believe the Department should be continuously looking for 
ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our test programs 
to save time and money, but the Department should not be cutting test 
budgets and reducing test activities without a sound specific plan to 
achieve those savings.
    Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure 
that the program management community and the testing and evaluation 
community work collaboratively and effectively in a way that maximizes 
the likelihood that developmental testing and evaluation will detect 
and identify problems timely in software and hardware to provide 
opportunities to correct them before production and before operational 
testing and evaluation begins?
    Answer. My goal is to ensure that the Department discovers 
deficiencies early in programs in order to take corrective action as 
early in development as possible in order to minimize program 
disruption and save time and money. Early identification of problems 
will also increase the probability of programs being found effective 
and suitable in Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). If 
confirmed, I will continue my efforts to ensure that the program 
management community, the systems engineering community, and the 
testing and evaluation community work collaboratively and effectively 
throughout the acquisition process, but particularly at the earlier 
stages of program planning.
                       ballistic missile defense
    Question. When it was created in 2002, the Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA) was exempted from normal acquisition rules and processes in order 
to field an initial set of missile defense capabilities on an expedited 
basis. That fielding has now taken place, although numerous upgrades 
and corrections are being implemented. Each of the elements of the 
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) would normally meet the 
criteria for a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP), but none of 
them has been managed as an MDAP. Furthermore, for most of MDA's 
existence, all its programs were funded with Research, Development, 
Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds, even for non-RDT&E activities. 
Currently, BMDS acquisition programs are overseen by the Missile 
Defense Executive Board (MDEB), chaired by the USD(AT&L).
    What management and acquisition changes or improvements if any do 
you believe are warranted for the ballistic missile defense programs?
    Answer. As Acting Under Secretary I have chaired three MDEB 
meetings and attended a number of others, and through the oversight and 
insight developed during these meetings and the preparation for them, I 
believe that the current management and acquisition approach is 
reasonably effective. I would like to have more experience with this 
management approach, however, before recommending any changes.
    Question. Do you believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should have the same 
responsibilities relative to the ballistic missile defense acquisition 
programs as for all other MDAPs?
    Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, has the same responsibilities, within the current 
departmental guidance, for the ballistic missile defense programs as 
for all MDAPs, with the exception that early acquisition decisions, 
including entry into technology demonstration and entry into 
engineering and manufacturing development, have been delegated to the 
Director of the MDA. In general, I see no reason why these 
responsibilities should be different than those for other MDAPs.
    Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you plan to take to 
ensure that the ballistic missile defense programs of DOD follow sound 
acquisition and management practices and processes?
    Answer. The MDEB has been the forum since 2007 for senior 
departmental review of MDA activity. If confirmed, I will continue to 
review the MDEB efforts, to maintain regular oversight of the MDA 
acquisition and management practices, program progress, and issue 
resolution. The MDEB includes essentially the same membership as the 
DAB that oversees MDAP programs. If confirmed, I will continue to rely 
on the independent advice of these staff offices, as I do for MDAPs, to 
ensure sound decisions are made.
    Question. For many years, DOD and Congress have agreed on the 
principle that major weapon systems should be operationally effective, 
suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a 
credible threat. These elements are all consistent with the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review (BMDR) of February 2010.
    Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that we 
deploy operationally must be operationally effective, suitable, 
survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible 
threat?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure 
that the BMDS and each of its elements meet these criteria?
    Answer. Rigorous and realistic testing of missile defenses is 
imperative. The MDA presently is executing a plan, which includes the 
use of a Development and Operational Testing approach that allows the 
U.S. Strategic Command warfighter community (which includes all 
combatant commanders) and all the Service Operational Test Agencies to 
be integral parts of the test program. If confirmed, I will maintain 
these test activities as an integral part of ballistic missile defense 
program planning, and execution priorities, and review the plans and 
the proposed test activities to determine whether additional steps or 
other emphases are necessary or appropriate.
    Question. For many years, Congress and DOD have agreed on the 
principle of ``fly before you buy,'' namely demonstrating that a weapon 
system will work in an operationally effective, suitable, and 
survivable manner before deciding to acquire and deploy such systems. 
This demonstration requires rigorous, operationally realistic testing, 
including independent Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), to 
provide an accurate assessment of how weapon systems will perform in 
combat conditions. The DOT&E has expressed concerns that the testing of 
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system has not been sufficient to 
provide confidence in its operational capability.
    Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs to be 
operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and 
Evaluation, in order to assess operational capabilities and limitations 
of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to making decisions to 
deploy such systems?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure 
that the BMDS, and each of its elements, undergoes adequate independent 
operational test and evaluation?
    Answer. The BMDS Integrated Master Test Plan serves as the 
departmental contract to perform comprehensive developmental and 
operational independent testing. If confirmed, I will work with the MDA 
and the DOT&E to continue the evolution of BMDS testing to ensure that 
adequate tests are conducted.
    Question. The MDA has developed ballistic missile defense systems 
and capabilities and procured the initial inventories of missile 
defense element weapon systems. However, the Military Departments are 
notionally intended to procure, operate, and sustain operational 
missile defense systems.
    What do you believe is the appropriate role for the Military 
Departments in the procurement, operation, and sustainment of ballistic 
missile defense systems, and at what point do you believe these systems 
should be transitioned and transferred to the Military Departments?
    Answer. I believe that at some point for each program, 
responsibility for operation and sustainment should be transferred from 
MDA to a Military Department. Production may be transferred as well, 
but this will vary from system to system on a case-by-case basis. The 
Deputy Secretary of Defense issued guidance in June 2011, providing 
direction for MDA and Military Department life cycle responsibilities 
and a process to define and schedule management and funding 
responsibility transfer points. If confirmed, I will oversee the 
execution of the guidance as the BMDS elements mature and I will review 
and recommend changes as appropriate. If confirmed, I will work with 
the MDA and the Military Departments to ensure processes and policies 
are in place to accomplish the transition and transfer in a timely and 
effective manner.
    Question. The MDA and the Army have reached tentative agreement on 
transferring Army ballistic missile defense programs to MDA.
    What do you believe are the appropriate roles for the Army and MDA, 
respectively, in the development, management, and funding of Army 
ballistic missile defense programs, and what risks do you see, if any, 
from transferring such programs to MDA?
    Answer. Defining this relationship is still a work in progress, so 
my views at this time may not be final. That said, I generally support 
a model that is similar to the model used by MDA and the Navy in which 
the Military Department retains responsibility for overall system 
performance and is the technical authority for the total system while 
MDA provides defined products for integration into the Army's system. 
The two organizations must work closely together to address integration 
issues and define interfaces and requirements, but I believe this 
arrangement provides the most effective management approach. The 
Patriot system is the only specific system for which this is an issue 
to my knowledge and Aegis is the comparable Navy system that uses this 
model.
                        nuclear weapons council
    Question. If confirmed as USD(AT&L), you will chair the Nuclear 
Weapons Council (NWC).
    In your view, what are, or should be, the highest priorities of the 
NWC?
    Answer. In my view, the highest priorities of the NWC are to ensure 
the continued safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear 
weapons stockpile and to ensure the Nation can field an effective 
nuclear deterrent.
    Question. What improvements, if any, do you believe should be made 
to the operations of the NWC?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense and 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as well as members of the NWC, to 
identify improvements, if any, that would strengthen the partnership 
with the Department of Energy in ensuring a safe, secure, and effective 
nuclear stockpile and a modern supporting infrastructure. As Acting 
Under Secretary, I have chaired several NWC meetings and at this point, 
I believe that it is functioning as intended.
    Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the 
development of the Nuclear Posture Review?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the 
administration's ongoing implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Posture 
Review.
    Question. The 1251 report that accompanied the New START treaty set 
forth a robust plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex and the 
triad of nuclear delivery vehicles.
    Do you support that plan and agree that modernizing the nuclear 
triad and replacing critical infrastructure such as the Chemistry and 
Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) at Los Alamos and the Uranium 
Processing Facility (UPF) at Y-12 should be National Security 
priorities and that they should be built in a timely manner?
    Answer. DOD has fully supported the Department of Energy's efforts 
to sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile and to modernize the 
supporting infrastructure. Today's austere budget environment, however, 
will delay key warhead life extension programs and infrastructure 
modernization relative to the timelines reflected in last year's 
Section 1251 Report. Although UPF construction will proceed mostly as 
planned with some changes in scope, the DOE's current plan is to defer 
construction of the CMRR facility for at least 5 years as a result, 
using existing facilities to meet plutonium needs. Over the coming 
months, the DOD and DOE will work together to firm up cost data on key 
programs, providing a basis to inform alternative approaches to 
mitigate the risk of program delays and further advance the President's 
commitment to safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces.
    Question. Do you share DOD's view regarding the need for 
establishing a capability to produce 50 to 80 pits per year as asserted 
in congressional testimony by DOD and NNSA witnesses?
    Answer. Given current stockpile requirements, I support the DOD 
view regarding the need for the capability to produce 50-80 pits per 
year.
                        logistics and readiness
    Question. If confirmed as USD(AT&L), what steps if any would you 
take to ensure that life cycle maintenance requirements and sustainment 
support are considered in the acquisition process for new DOD systems?
    Answer. Several steps are underway to ensure life cycle 
requirements are addressed in the acquisition process for new DOD 
systems, and if confirmed, I would continue those steps and look for 
other opportunities to integrate life cycle cost considerations into 
the acquisition process. Under the Better Buying Power initiatives, 
each new program is required to establish a sustainment cost cap that 
is intended to drive design trades and investment during development to 
ensure the program is affordable throughout the life cycle. In 
addition, core maintenance determinations are now defined at Milestone 
A and refined at Milestone B to include detailed workload estimates. 
These estimates are used as the basis for determining the level of 
investment required to establish a viable repair capability at our 
organic activities and are included in the acquisition program 
baseline. Additionally, programs are now required to complete a Life 
Cycle Sustainment Plan and Systems Engineering Plan in which specific 
sustainment development, production, and operating resource 
requirements are fully identified and reflected in the respective 
Services' budget submissions. Finally, data from recent studies 
indicate strongly that in many cases Performance-Based Logistics has 
been effective at reducing life cycle costs and if confirmed I will 
look for appropriate opportunities to expand the use of this approach. 
If confirmed, I intend to continue these initiatives and to look for 
additional opportunities to drive life cycle cost down.
    Question. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 requires DOD to conduct 
life-cycle cost analysis for new capabilities including the fully 
burdened cost of fuel during the analysis and evaluation of 
alternatives in the acquisition program design trades.
    Do you believe that the fully burdened cost of fuel is an 
appropriate factor for the Department to consider in the evaluation of 
acquisition alternatives?
    Answer. Yes. Fully Burdened Cost of Energy estimates for 
acquisition programs is a useful component of the total life cycle cost 
estimating process. This process helps the Department understand the 
full long term expenses the Department is signing up to when it commits 
to a new system. While Total Ownership Cost is a long-term estimate 
based on steady-state usage, the Fully Burdened Cost of Energy is 
scenario-based. The Fully Burdened Cost of Energy provides a useful 
operational cost perspective and helps decisionmakers differentiate 
between the fuel and logistics demands of competing system concepts DOD 
is considering.
                           operational energy
    Question. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 created the position of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and 
Programs.
    If confirmed as USD(AT&L), how would you work with office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and 
Programs to advance the objectives of that office?
    Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy 
reports to the USD(AT&L). Energy is a fundamental enabler for the 
Department's mission. I have been and will continue to take steps, 
through and in support of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Operational Energy Plans and Programs, to improve the efficiency of our 
use, the range of energy alternatives available to our forces, and 
energy planning for our future force. This office is an important part 
of the AT&L enterprise, and, if confirmed, I will continue to expand 
and further its efforts.
    Question. With persistent combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and around the globe, combat service support units are constantly at 
risk when transporting supplies.
    What role do you believe the USD(AT&L) should play in developing 
strategies to reduce the logistical footprint of deployed units 
operating in hostile environments?
    Answer. I believe the USD(AT&L), in conjunction with U.S. 
Transportation Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Joint Staff, 
and the Military Services, must ensure that the Department obtain the 
best possible sustainability, maintainability, reliability, and fuel 
efficiency for our deployed weapon systems and contingency bases, as a 
way of lowering the logistical footprint needed to maintain them. If 
confirmed, my office will continue to provide guidance and oversee the 
development of technologies and strategies that focus on managing the 
logistics footprint required to sustain the force safely in any theater 
of operation. If confirmed, I will also continue to emphasize the 
logistics implications of new programs as a major factor in decisions 
about which programs to pursue.
    Question. What is your view of the role that the USD(AT&L) should 
play in developing and pursuing alternative energy sources for DOD?
    Answer. I believe AT&L has a lead role to play in pursuing 
alternative energy sources, both for operational forces through the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and 
Programs, and for facilities energy through the Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense for Installations and Environment.
    Question. Do you foresee a significant role for the use of solar 
and wind energy systems with deployed units operating in remote 
environments?
    Answer. As DOD builds a more agile force, the Department is finding 
that improvements in our energy use, including the use of renewable 
energy, can increase our combat effectiveness. In particular, studies 
and deployed experience indicate that solar technology has promise for 
supplying energy for deployed units, though it depends on the mission 
and the environment. Solar technologies are proving most beneficial at 
the tactical edge, where they can reduce re-supply needs, can integrate 
with batteries, and diminish the noise and heat signature of U.S. 
forces. Wind energy systems for expeditionary units have not been 
deployed because of low average wind speeds in current operational 
environments, but they could be useful in some remote deployment 
situations, particularly as technologies for small, low-wind systems 
improve.
                      base realignment and closure
    Question. The Secretary of Defense has indicated that the 
President's budget request will include a request for two future rounds 
of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), one in 2013 and the other in 
2015. The most recent round of BRAC has just been completed and we are 
awaiting various reports outlining lessons learned and quantifying 
savings. Early indications, however, are that the 2005 BRAC failed to 
achieve the cost savings originally forecast.
    What is your understanding of the Department's rationale for 
requesting two additional rounds of BRAC?
    Answer. The Department has formulated new military strategy 
guidance and a fiscal year 2013 budget intended to implement that 
guidance. This strategy and budget include force structure changes that 
will produce excess capacity. The Department's rationale is essentially 
that these changes should be accompanied by a corresponding reduction 
in the supporting infrastructure including military bases that are no 
longer needed and which impose wasteful costs on the Department.
    Question. Are you aware of any analysis has been conducted to 
justify the request for two additional rounds of BRAC?
    Answer. No specific analysis has been conducted yet. With the 2013 
timeline in mind, the Department has started the initial preparatory 
work regarding internal governance for a BRAC process--inventorying our 
property and evaluating the extent to which the Department needs to 
update its analytical tools. These efforts will allow the Department to 
proceed expeditiously if Congress authorizes BRAC. After congressional 
authorization, the BRAC process begins with a certification that BRAC 
is needed and will produce savings. Specifically, the Department 
prepares a 20-year force structure plan and a comprehensive 
installation inventory. Using those documents, the Department prepares 
a report for Congress in which it: describes the infrastructure 
necessary to support the force structure, identifies areas of excess, 
conducts an economic analysis of the effect of closures and 
realignments on the excess capacity, and certifies that BRAC is needed 
and will generate savings. Only then is the Secretary authorized to 
proceed with the commission itself.
    Question. What is your view on the argument that we should close 
excess installations overseas before new rounds of BRAC are authorized?
    Answer. I would agree that both should be examined, and the 
Department has already begun the process of reviewing its overseas 
bases, particularly in Europe. This does not require a BRAC 
authorization. However, in my view it makes sense to look at our 
domestic and overseas bases at the same time so that the two reviews 
can inform one another.
    Question. What changes if any would you recommend to the BRAC 
statute, if confirmed, to ensure a more efficient and effective BRAC 
process?
    Answer. I would not recommend any changes to the BRAC statute. BRAC 
is a fair, objective, and proven process for closing and realigning 
installations.
                         environmental security
    Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for environmental 
security for DOD.
    What do you see as the most significant challenges facing the 
Department in the area of environmental security?
    Answer. The greatest challenge will be maintaining and improving 
the Department's level of environmental security performance in a 
difficult budget environment. If confirmed, I will continue to look for 
ways to find efficiencies without undermining performance.
    Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans, if any, do you 
have for addressing these challenges?
    Answer. If confirmed, my approach will continue to be twofold. 
First, I will continue the aggressive oversight of environmental 
programs, with the goal of minimizing management costs and making our 
organizational structure and performance contracts as efficient and 
effective as possible. Second, I will continue to emphasize the power 
of strategic R&D investments to lower the costs associated with 
environmental security.
    Question. While the Military Departments have made considerable 
progress addressing environmental contamination at military 
installations, there remains a substantial amount of work to be done, 
including the remediation of discarded munitions and Unexploded 
Ordnance (UXO), at current and former DOD sites. The Military 
Departments have managed to maintain reasonably level funding for these 
cleanup programs over the past several years; however, many of these 
clean-ups will take years to complete and, in the current budget 
environment, the restoration accounts will come under pressure.
    What steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that the 
DOD remediation programs receive adequate funding and make meaningful 
progress, particularly in the detection and clearance of discarded 
munitions and UXO?
    Answer. I believe that the Department needs to continue its 
existing remediation programs as requested in the fiscal year 2013 
budget and that it also needs to continue the programs that are 
developing technologies that have high promise of making the 
remediation programs more cost effective. A decade of investment by the 
Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and 
the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program has yielded 
technologies that can discriminate between UXO and harmless metal 
objects with a high degree of reliability. This is a remarkable 
achievement provides the potential to dramatically accelerate the pace 
of remediation for UXO within available funds. If confirmed I will 
continue to support these programs and work to ensure that they are 
adequately funded and effectively executed.
    Question. How might the SERDP help with the overall progress of the 
Defense Environmental Restoration program, particularly in view of the 
current fiscal environment?
    Answer. SERDP is DOD's environmental science and technology 
program; its mission is to address high priority cross-service 
environmental requirements and develop solutions to the Department's 
most critical environmental challenges. SERDP is an R&D program that is 
aimed directly at reducing DOD operating costs. SERDP has allowed the 
Department to avoid spending billions of dollars for environmental 
cleanup, environmental liability and weapons system maintenance. If 
confirmed, I will continue to support this high payoff investment.
                        congressional oversight
    Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight 
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other 
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, 
briefings, and other communications of information.
    Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before 
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this 
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide 
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, 
with respect to your responsibilities as the USD(AT&L)?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and 
other communications of information are provided to this committee and 
its staff and other appropriate committees?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of 
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by 
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee 
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing 
such documents?
    Answer. Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Webb
               competition in procurement and acquisition
    1. Senator Webb. Mr. Kendall, it is commonly agreed that 
competition is the strongest tool for driving innovation and lower 
prices in defense procurements and acquisition programs. Do you agree?
    Mr. Kendall. I agree and believe that competition is a cornerstone 
of the acquisition system with benefits that are well established. 
Competition provides a powerful tool to drive innovation and lower 
prices. Dr. Carter and I emphasized competition under the ``Better 
Buying Power Initiative'' to promote real competition and obtain 
greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending and if 
confirmed, I would continue to do so. Even in those cases where head to 
head competition isn't economically viable, the Department can create a 
competitive environment as an incentive to industry.

                        common data link systems
    2. Senator Webb. Mr. Kendall, industry representatives assert that 
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Military Departments have 
failed to follow policies created to stimulate competition for 
contracts for Common Data Link (CDL) systems by relying on sole-source 
contracts favoring one company's proprietary, non-standard waveforms. 
Is this an accurate characterization? If so, why did DOD allow an 
environment to evolve that stifles competition?
    Mr. Kendall. I am familiar with the situation with regard to the 
CDL and have been working with the Military Departments to address it. 
It was brought to my attention by industry, and I believe there is a 
legitimate concern here. The Department advocates open competition for 
system acquisitions, and is currently assessing CDL system procurement 
practices in several respects in an effort to improve competition. The 
first is to make certain that no vendor-proprietary or undocumented 
interfaces are being cited as requirements or evaluation criteria in 
the Department's CDL system solicitations. The second is to ensure that 
as DOD advances its CDL standards, the Department maintains a broad 
industry base from which it seeks innovation. Finally when CDL systems 
are procured as a subsystem within a platform, DOD should be confident 
that when the prime vendor investigates suitable sources for CDL-
compliant systems these vendors are competitively selected. Industry 
inputs and suggestions for improvement are being sought as part of this 
assessment.

    3. Senator Webb. Mr. Kendall, what will you do, if confirmed, to 
level the playing field within DOD and the Military Departments to 
ensure there are viable competitors for the CDL systems that are 
mandated for transmitting intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance data?
    Mr. Kendall. If confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure that 
the Department evaluates all future CDL procurement opportunities in 
the Department's plans for competition. DOD is working to ensure there 
are multiple qualified vendors prior to issuing solicitations. For 
example, one of the threshold requirements for many CDL procurements is 
having National Security Agency (NSA) certification of vendors' 
encryption solutions in their products. DOD is working with NSA to 
assist vendors in achieving this Type 1 certification. Also, the 
Department will identify and address any proprietary or undocumented 
interfaces that could limit greater competition. If confirmed, I will 
also ensure that the Department evaluates all future CDL-like 
procurement opportunities for competition. I will continue to work to 
ensure that procurements like CDL, which are intended to be open system 
and open interface based, will in fact be acquired so that proprietary 
restrictions on competition are avoided.

    4. Senator Webb. Mr. Kendall, many CDL terminals, systems, and 
platforms are said to be purchased with proprietary and undocumented 
waveforms and features that create a non-CDL standard and thereby tend 
toward a monopoly. How will you address this impediment to competition 
that DOD has created by purchasing and fielding these proprietary 
features?
    Mr. Kendall. If confirmed, I will use the Department's assessment 
of CDL system acquisitions to identify ways to minimize and potentially 
eliminate the use of proprietary interfaces. If the functions provided 
by these proprietary items are determined to be essential, a DOD 
standard non-proprietary version can be developed. The Common Control 
Interface effort for the terminal control interfaces is an example of 
this approach. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that future CDL 
procurements are based on open standards and interfaces without 
proprietary restrictions. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the 
Department reviews Service CDL solicitations to ensure proprietary 
features are not used to unfairly limit competition.

    5. Senator Webb. Mr. Kendall, in the past, DOD has used dual-source 
mandates and second-source arrangements to spur competition and to 
maintain a healthy industrial base. Can you adopt these practices for 
CDL products?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes, if the business case supports multiple sources. 
If confirmed, I will continue to look for opportunities to reduce cost 
through competitive sourcing including the use of multiple suppliers 
where the procured quantities are adequate to justify multiple sources. 
I will also continue to look for opportunities for commonality across 
platforms that will increase the opportunities for competitive 
sourcing.

    6. Senator Webb. Mr. Kendall, would multiple sources not reduce 
costs and increase competition?
    Mr. Kendall. The use of multiple sources and competition could 
reduce cost if enough CDLs are acquired so that the costs of 
establishing a second source are less than the savings that can be 
achieved through competitive incentives.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
                      domestically produced metals
    7. Senator Hagan. Mr. Kendall, as you are aware, DOD in early 2008 
initiated a rulemaking seeking to weaken longstanding requirements that 
armor steel plate procured by DOD be melted domestically. Specifically, 
DOD put forth and subsequently finalized a definition of ``produced'' 
that allows armor plate to be made with metals melted and rolled 
outside of the United States, yet considers that armor plate domestic 
if it simply goes through finishing processes in the United States. 
Because the new definition disregards the most capital- and labor-
intensive portion of production, the melt stage, it puts at risk 
valuable jobs and technology, jeopardizing the future ability of U.S.-
based armor plate producers to meet the demands of the military. It may 
also lead to increased dependency on unreliable foreign suppliers.
    The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011 
required a review and, if necessary, revision of the existing 
regulation to ensure the definition of ``produced'' is consistent with 
congressional intent. In response to DOD's request for comment in the 
course of its review, seven Senate colleagues and I wrote a bipartisan 
letter to Secretary Panetta reaffirming our support for a return to the 
longstanding requirement that specialty metals be melted in the United 
States. Thirty-three of our colleagues in the House of Representatives 
sent a similar bipartisan letter to DOD. Despite the fact that your 
review was required to be completed by early October 2011, the review 
has not been completed. Can you please tell me when DOD plans to 
finalize its long-overdue review of the definition of ``produced'', as 
it relates to armor plate?
    Mr. Kendall. DOD is reviewing the regulatory definition of 
``produced'' in accordance with section 823 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for 
Fiscal Year 2011. The Department published a Federal Register Notice 
requesting public comment regarding this definition that closed in 
October 2011. The Department is considering all public comments as well 
as communications from Members of Congress before making a 
recommendation on whether a change to the definition of ``produced'' is 
required. The Department's working group will make its recommendation 
by June 2012. If a revision to the definition is recommended, the 
Department will submit a proposed rule for public comment.

    8. Senator Hagan. Mr. Kendall, will DOD revise the definition of 
``produced'' to require that armor steel plate be melted in the United 
States, in light of well-documented congressional intent?
    Mr. Kendall. The Department is considering all public comments and 
the positions expressed by Members of Congress before making a 
recommendation on whether or not a change to the definition of 
``produced'' is required. If a revision to the definition is 
recommended, the Department will submit a proposed rule for public 
comment.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
                          rare earth minerals
    9. Senator Begich. Mr. Kendall, according to the rare earth report 
submitted to Congress by DOD, the United States could have the 
capability to meet all of DOD's rare earth demands by 2013. It's well 
known that only one company expects to have significant U.S. production 
capacity in 2012 and may not produce heavy rare earths, instead sending 
product to China for finalizing the finished product. Heavy rare earths 
are critical for defense systems. I'm very concerned that our strategy 
is to rely on heavy rare earths processed in China and these materials 
will be subject to Chinese export quotas. This is especially disturbing 
since the United States/Japan and the European Union are engaged in a 
World Trade Organization (WTO) case against the Chinese. Please 
describe your position on our reliance on production in China as a 
plausible long-term strategy to meet our rare earth demand for national 
security requirements. What steps is DOD taking to encourage production 
of heavy rare earths here in the United States?
    Mr. Kendall. DOD does not intend to rely on Chinese production of 
rare earth materials as a long-term strategy to meet rare earth element 
needs. As you note, the United States Government has undertaken action 
at the WTO to address concerns about the availability of rare earth 
materials in world markets. Market forces have also been working in 
ways that significantly affect the domestic availability of rare earth 
materials. Over the past 2 years, one U.S. company has established a 
domestic supply chain of rare earth materials from mine to metal/
alloys, another company has begun construction of a neodymium-iron-
boron magnet facility in North Carolina, and a third company just 
announced that it is pursuing the acquisition of land in Louisiana for 
the purpose of producing rare earth oxides from the mine it is 
developing in Canada. The Department is carefully monitoring these 
developments as part of its effort to ensure the availability of rare 
earth materials to the defense industrial base. I believe the 
Department's plan to pursue a three-pronged approach to this important 
issue is the best approach. The three prongs are: diversification of 
supply, pursuit of substitutes, and a focus on reclamation.

    10. Senator Begich. Mr. Kendall, I'm also concerned that DOD isn't 
taking the rare earth issue seriously. The required report was over 8 
months late and the front cover notes it cost $4,230 to provide this 
five-page report. Is this a serious analysis?
    Mr. Kendall. I believe that the Department's analysis of the 
availability of rare earth materials was a serious analysis. Over 80 
organizations and subject matter experts were contacted for information 
for this report. In addition to the Military Services input, the 
assessment included input and consultation with the Department of 
Commerce (DOC), U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and 
the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as a myriad of rare earth 
subject matter experts and industry organizations.
    I believe that the final report should be viewed in conjunction 
with the significantly longer interim report provided to Congress in 
August 2011 and information provided at several related briefings to 
Congress. In my view, taken together, these activities seriously 
addressed the issue of assessing the rare earth material supply chain 
and the availability of material versus demand from the defense 
industrial base.

    11. Senator Begich. Mr. Kendall, what were the man-hours involved 
in this report over the 14 months used to produce it?
    Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that the total level of effort and 
time required for the Department's review of rare earths has been 
substantial and included not just the direct man-hours for preparing 
the final report, which were modest, but a host of other activities 
that were not considered direct costs for the preparation of the 
report. The cost of those other contributing activities is not included 
in the figure cited in the report.

    12. Senator Begich. Mr. Kendall, what were the technology 
requirements, data calls, analysis performed, and the outside expertise 
required under contract?
    Mr. Kendall. Analytic support for the Department's review of rare 
earths was provided primarily by the Institute for Defense Analyses, a 
Federally Funded Research and Development Center. Extensive data were 
received from USGS.
    Over 80 organizations and subject matter experts were contacted for 
information for this report, including the Military Services, other 
defense agencies, DOC, USGS, GAO, the USTR, and DOE, as well as rare 
earth subject matter experts and industry organizations.
    In addition, input was sought from DOD organizations, other Federal 
departments and agencies, and a range of industry representatives 
concerning which rare earth materials met the criteria identified in 
section 843 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011. These organizations were 
also asked to offer recommendations as to how to mitigate 
vulnerabilities for materials they identified as meeting the key 
criteria.

    13. Senator Begich. Mr. Kendall, how did you involve the China 
experts, either inside DOD or outside?
    Mr. Kendall. Outside of DOD, the USGS's rare earth materials expert 
and its China expert were consulted regarding Chinese production and 
consumption patterns, policies and trends. Also, China analysts from 
the Joint Staff and from the intelligence community were directly 
involved in the assessment process, including eliciting their judgments 
as to which rare earths met the criteria of section 843 of the NDAA for 
Fiscal Year 2011.

    14. Senator Begich. Mr. Kendall, how many hours, in reality, did it 
take to produce this five-page report and why was it so late?
    Mr. Kendall. Sixty-seven man-hours are attributable solely to the 
five-page report. This represented a small component of the 
Department's overall review. The extent of that review led to the delay 
in completing the full reporting requirement.
                                 ______
                                 
          Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
              handheld, manpack, and small form fit radios
    15. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Kendall, in this constrained fiscal 
environment it is always important to ensure there is a focus on 
competition and innovation where it makes sense. Given that the network 
is one of the Army's top priorities, can you provide insight into how 
you are structuring the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, 
Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) program so you are able to include 
commercially developed JTRS solutions in a competition?
    Mr. Kendall. The JTRS HMS development contract was originally 
competitively awarded and had a requirement to qualify two Program of 
Record (POR) vendors for competition in full rate production for each 
variant. As the program has proceeded, various vendors have worked on 
their own to develop competitive alternatives to the PORs. These are 
essentially commercially developed alternatives. Where possible, future 
procurements will be conducted using full and open competition so that 
these vendors can offer their products.

    16. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Kendall, is the Navy's RDT&E program of 
record HMS radio on target this year, such that all of the requested 
funding for fiscal year 2013 will be needed?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes. This funding is needed to complete Manpack radio 
development, testing, evaluation and to provide a Mobile User Objective 
System (MUOS) capable terminal. If HMS does not receive full RDT&E 
funding in fiscal year 2013, the program will not be able to complete 
MUOS development or the related MUOS testing. Without this funding 
there will not be a MUOS ground terminal available for the DOD to use 
with the current MUOS satellite on orbit and subsequent satellites due 
to launch in the summer of 2013 and beyond.

    17. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Kendall, a recent article suggests that 
the Manpack Limited User Test (LUT) conducted during the summer 2011 
Network Integration Evaluation did not collect adequate data about the 
Manpack due to inappropriate procedures. Please tell me what the issues 
were, how they will be corrected, and how this delay impacts the RDT&E 
schedule for fiscal year 2012-fiscal year 2013.
    Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that the Army Test and Evaluation 
Command, Operational Test Command, conducted the Manpack Limited User 
Test (Manpack LUT) from June 20-July 9, 2011 at White Sands Missile 
Range, New Mexico in accordance with a Director, Operational Test & 
Evaluation-approved operational test plan. The Manpack LUT proved to be 
adequate for assessing the effectiveness and survivability of the 
Manpack, but inadequate for assessing reliability, availability, and 
maintainability (RAM). I understand that the data collectors did not 
ride in the vehicles with the test radios installed in accordance with 
the approved test plan, so RAM calculations were based on operator 
interviews instead of electronic data collection. I believe that this 
data was called into question because of the data collection process. 
In response, the Army implemented a revised test plan and reliability 
development growth program for the Manpack radio. I understand that the 
Army and program manager have made rapid adjustments to obtain the 
required test data. Based on this recovery plan, no schedule delays are 
currently expected.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                 major weapons procurement contracting
    18. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, from your responses to the 
committee's advance policy questions on excessive concurrency, fixed-
price contracting, and multiyear contracting for major weapons systems, 
you seem to be more confident in the ability of DOD's processes, 
organizations, and people (i.e. skill-sets and core competencies) to 
identify, price, and manage risk than I am. Over the last decade or so, 
however, in terms of technology development, integration, and 
manufacturing, DOD has not been effective or consistent in identifying, 
pricing, and managing high risk in connection with its procuring major 
weapons systems. For this reason, I believe that until DOD 
fundamentally improves how reliably it addresses risk, it should eschew 
procuring high-risk major weapons systems. Then, it could pursue 
contracting strategies and methodologies conducive to procuring major 
systems with more demonstrably manageable degrees of risk.
    If additional capability requiring the government to accept more 
risk must be procured, to the extent possible, DOD could then use a 
spiral development strategy to acquire that additional capability 
incrementally over a longer time horizon while delivering capability 
more directly benefitting the warfighter in the interim. While there 
may be some limited exceptions, like satellites and some ships, would 
you not generally agree with this position? If so, how would you 
affirmatively attempt to implement this view, if confirmed?
    Mr. Kendall. In general, I agree that the Department can frequently 
accept less exquisite, less high risk technological solutions, and that 
in the current budget environment it is essential that the Department 
focus on affordability in all acquisition programs. In cases where 
higher risk profiles are necessary to meet a critical operational need, 
incremental acquisition approaches may be appropriate. At the same 
time, there will continue to be cases where it is necessary for the 
Department to tackle technologically challenging problems to address 
significant new threats to national security. The Department needs to 
retain the flexibility to adopt the acquisition strategy most 
appropriate to the specific program or product. If confirmed, I will 
continue to insist that the Department realistically assess risks, 
tailor its acquisition strategies to appropriately address these risks, 
and support rigorous efforts to ensure the affordability and 
executability of acquisition programs.

                   new army major weapons procurement
    19. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, the Army has two prominent 
programs currently in the early stages of development: the Joint Light 
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). Each has 
had its requirements substantially reduced to help ensure 
affordability. I am concerned that as these programs move forward in 
development, their requirements may change again, resulting--
predictably--in major cost overruns. What confidence do you have that 
the requirements for JLTV and GCV are now stable?
    Mr. Kendall. Requirements definition and stability are key focus 
areas in both the JLTV and GCV programs. Both programs are well aware 
of the overriding need for an agreed set of technologically achievable, 
operationally relevant, sustainable, and affordable requirements. Both 
programs have affordability caps for production and sustainment. Other 
requirements may have to be traded away during the remainder of 
technology demonstration (TD) (for GCV) and engineering and 
manufacturing development (EMD) (for GCV and JLTV) to stay within those 
caps.
    Specifically, the JLTV program executed a technology development 
phase that included competitive prototyping; The Army and the Marine 
Corps learned a great deal about the feasibility of requirements and 
made adjustments that are reflected in the current request for 
proposals. The requirements communities from both the Army and the 
Marine Corps, and supported by the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council, conducted trades on the requirements. In the case of force 
protection, some requirement for JLTV was actually made more stringent. 
If confirmed, I will conduct a final review to ensure that requirements 
are stable prior to approving contract award and entry into EMD.
    Similarly, the GCV program is executing a TD phase and Army will 
establish firm requirements before committing to EMD. As expected for 
this phase, important requirements trades are still in play. By the end 
of calendar year 2012, the outputs from each of the three core TD phase 
activities (AOA Dynamic Update, NDI Evaluation, and Contractor Design 
Teams) should converge and inform senior leadership on the 
operationally relevant requirements that are executable and affordable. 
Throughout the next year, Army teams will synchronize the results of 
all of these activities in a Configuration Steering Board and 
validation of the Capability Development Document (CDD) in support of 
the GCV Acquisition Strategy for EMD. If confirmed, I will ensure that 
requirements are stable before GCV enters EMD.

    20. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, will you allow production 
decisions to be made prior to the prototyping and testing of these 
vehicles and/or their subsystems?
    Mr. Kendall. No. Production decisions will be informed by 
developmental testing including preproduction prototype testing. The 
JLTV program has a 33-month comprehensive EMD phase with 22 prototype 
vehicles per vendor to demonstrate performance. Results from the 
comprehensive test program including user evaluation, blast testing, 
and proof of reliability will inform down select for production. The 
GCV program is in the Technology Development phase. The program 
schedule anticipates a 4 year EMD period to refine designs and build 
and test prototypes before the production decision.

    21. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, what confidence do you have in the 
Army's ability to effectively assess the technological risks associated 
with the maturity of weapons systems and GCV, in particular?
    Mr. Kendall. The Department as a whole, including the Army, still 
has room for improvement in assessing risk and technological maturity. 
However, the Army and the Department have made progress in recent 
years, and the Army does have the ability to effectively assess 
technological risks. If confirmed, it would be my responsibility to 
ensure that risk assessments are effectively conducted on GCV and other 
programs.

                       late military depot report
    22. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, this committee directed your 
office in its report for the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 to provide to 
Congress no later than March 1, 2012, your views on a study conducted 
by the Logistics Management Institute on the capability of military 
depots to support future national defense requirements. When will we 
receive this report?
    Mr. Kendall. The Department provided this report on May 8, 2012.

    23. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, will the report satisfy all 
requirements requested by the committee?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes. The report provides a response from DOD 
addressing each of the major conclusions detailed in the LMI depot 
study. Specific legislative and policy changes are discussed, as well 
as the Department's efforts and approach to improving the efficiency of 
the organic depot maintenance enterprise. Official comments from the 
Military Services are included as an attachment to the report.

               starting major weapons programs off right
    24. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, the main focus of the Weapon 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), which applies to new 
programs and seeks to have major defense acquisition programs start off 
right, requires that early investment decisions be informed by 
realistic cost estimates, sound systems engineering knowledge, and 
reliable technological risk assessments. DOD has indeed started some 
new major programs since WSARA was enacted, or will do so in the near 
future. I would like to review a few of them with you. Please tell me 
what has been done to help ensure that they comply with these very 
important aspects of WSARA or how they are being structured now (or 
will be structured in the future) to minimize excessive cost-growth and 
schedule-delays.

         Ohio-class Ballistic-Missile Submarine Replacement 
        Program--SSBN(X)
         Aerial Refueling Tanker Replacement Program--KC-46A
         Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program--VXX
         Long-Range Strike--LRS (formerly called Next-
        Generation Bomber--NGB)
         Ground Combat Vehicle--GCV
         Joint Tactical Radio System--JTRS, as restructured
         Amphibious Combat Vehicle--ACV (the successor to the 
        cancelled Marine Corps program, Expeditionary Combat Vehicle--
        ECV)
         Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV)

    Mr. Kendall. Since WSARA was enacted, the Department has worked to 
ensure all programs reviewed comply with WSARA and that investment 
decisions are informed by realistic assessments of cost and risk. The 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering, the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and 
Evaluation, and the Director of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation 
influence all new start programs and all major milestone decisions. The 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System incorporates 
combatant commanders' inputs. Acquisition strategies address 
competition strategies and prototyping considerations. The requested 
information about specific programs follows:

         Ohio-class Ballistic-Missile Submarine Replacement 
        Program--SSBN(X)

                 The program received MS A approval in January 
                2011 and the ongoing development of the program is 
                fully compliant with WSARA principles. The Navy is 
                designing to the minimum capability that will satisfy 
                the projected strategic requirement throughout the 
                projected life of this new ship class. At MS A, 
                affordability targets were established for average ship 
                end cost (Hulls 2-12) of $4.9 billion and Operation and 
                Sustainment cost per hull of $110 million (in CY$10, 
                Navy shipbuilding indices). The program has established 
                a dedicated Design for Affordability (DFA) group, 
                consisting of NAVSEA and Electric Boat representatives 
                to promote, review, and track DFA initiatives for Non-
                Recurring Engineering, Construction, and Operations and 
                Sustainment. In PB13, the Navy delayed procurement of 
                the lead ship 2 years from fiscal year 2019 to fiscal 
                year 2021. The overall program cost will increase with 
                inflation effects, however, the Department remains 
                committed to meeting the affordability targets and to 
                accomplishing the design and construction in the most 
                cost-effective manner possible.

         Aerial Refueling Tanker Replacement Program--KC-46A

                 The Department has mitigated the program's 
                risk by structuring the competitive development 
                contract with both fixed price incentive (firm target) 
                and firm fixed price components. The KC-46 development 
                contract has an overall contract ceiling price of $4.9 
                billion. Boeing is fully responsible for any cost 
                growth beyond the $4.9 billion overall contract ceiling 
                price. For production, firm fixed-price contract 
                options are established for the first two low-rate 
                initial production lots. The remaining 11 full-rate 
                production options have not-to-exceed prices with 
                equitable price adjustments. The commercial-derivative 
                nature of the KC-46 also contributes to controlling 
                cost growth by allowing the Government to leverage 
                commercial processes and parts pools. Boeing is 
                strongly incentivized to deliver on its contract 
                commitments and within schedule.

         Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program--VXX

                 The Navy has conducted an extensive Analysis 
                of Alternatives under guidance from Cost Assessment and 
                Program Evaluation (CAPE). Those activities have 
                provided data on cost estimates, systems engineering 
                assessments, and insights into technical risks, ways to 
                leverage In-Service investments to reduce risk and 
                minimize change for the users and operators, and 
                opportunities for in-house risk reduction efforts that 
                will result in ownership of data rights and key 
                interfaces for the communications suite. This analysis 
                will lead to a program strategy for the Presidential 
                Helicopter Replacement Program that is compliant with 
                WSARA and structured to avoid cost growth and schedule 
                disruption.

         Long-Range Strike (LRS)

                 The program has incorporated cost estimation, 
                systems engineering, and technological risk guidance by 
                CAPE, and the Offices of the Deputy Assistant 
                Secretaries of Defense, Systems Engineering (SE) and 
                Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E). The cost cap 
                of $550 million aircraft will be used to control 
                requirements creep and ensure an affordable design.

         Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)

                 GCV was approved for MS A on August 17, 2012. 
                The Defense Acquisition Board considered the 
                requirements, resources, and schedule and established 
                affordability targets for the GCV Program in both the 
                investment and O&S phases of the Program. Additionally, 
                a three-prong strategy that builds towards an informed 
                Milestone B and Engineering and Manufacturing 
                Development Phase. The Department will continue to 
                review the AOA's cost informed trades, evaluate 
                potential Non-Developmental Items (including 
                international sources), and conclude a 24-month TD 
                phase with two potential GCV candidates.

         Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)

                 JTRS is a family of five ACAT I-D acquisition 
                programs established to provide software programmable, 
                networking radios for communication at the last 
                tactical mile--this includes tactical networking 
                communications for airborne, vehicular, maritime and 
                dismounted forces. The JTRS programs have struggled to 
                complete development and enter production, but that 
                process is now well underway. In some cases 
                requirements have been relaxed to permit lower cost 
                competitive products that industry has developed in 
                parallel with the programs of record to be considered 
                for production. Overall, the JTRS program is over 80 
                percent complete in terms of development and with two 
                hardware programs post-Milestone C (HMS Rifleman Radio 
                and MIDS JTRS). MIDS has recently been approved for 
                Full Production and Fielding (FP&F) and HMS is 
                scheduled to have an FP&F decision this year. The JPEO 
                JTRS organization is now following an enterprise 
                business model designed to increase competition. JTRS 
                is moving toward a non-developmental item (NDI) 
                acquisition strategy. The JTRS Ground Mobile Radio 
                (GMR) program underwent a Nunn-McCurdy breach 
                assessment in 2011, resulting in a decision by the 
                Milestone Decision Authority (Mr. Kendall) to terminate 
                the program of record and pursue an NDI acquisition 
                strategy to meet essential requirements at an 
                affordable cost under the auspices of the Army's Mid-
                Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR) Program.

         Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)

                 In January 2011, the Marine Corps formalized a 
                Systems Engineering-Operational Performance Team SE-OPT 
                (SE-OPT) specifically to address affordability in 
                accordance with WSARA principles. The SE-OPT culminated 
                in December 2011, when the Navy entered into the 
                Materiel Solution Analysis phase. The ACV program will 
                follow a highly tailored acquisition approach 
                structured to provide the most cost-effective program.

         Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV)

                 The JHSV received MS B approval in November 
                2008, just prior to enactment of WSARA; however, the 
                program is addressing all applicable (i.e., post-MS B) 
                WSARA principles. The JHSV program was informed by 
                prior high speed vessel experimentation programs (e.g. 
                Swift, Westpac Express) and is a modification to a non-
                developmental commercially derived high speed ferry 
                design, thus reducing developmental risk. Although the 
                lead ship has experienced cost and schedule growth, the 
                shipbuilder's performance on the following JHSVs is 
                improving. Due to investment in a modular manufacturing 
                facility which supports efficient construction, and use 
                of a fixed price incentive contract, follow on JHSVs 
                are expected to deliver as planned at or below target 
                contract costs.

    25. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, while the Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF) is, of course, not a new start, it is critical that it be 
restructured to comply with WSARA's key requirements (on realistic cost 
estimates, sound systems engineering, and reliable risk assessments). 
In what sense has it been restructured along these lines?
    Mr. Kendall. The Department fully supports the organizational and 
policy changes enacted in the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act 
(WSARA) for all DOD acquisition programs, including the F-35 JSF. The 
Department's goals with respect to WSARA are the same for all 
acquisition programs: implement all of the applicable acquisition 
policy measures called out in WSARA and integrate WSARA organizational 
changes into the oversight of the program. The majority of the actions 
required to achieve these goals in the F-35 program have been 
completed.
    Subsequent to the passage of WSARA in May 2009, the F-35 program 
was the subject of numerous reviews, culminating in a Nunn-McCurdy 
critical cost breach certification review that was guided by the 
acquisition reform principles founded in WSARA. The cost and schedule 
assessment reviews were led by the WSARA-formed Office of the Director, 
CAPE. The Nunn-McCurdy review and certification of the F-35 program was 
guided by process improvements institutionalized in WSARA, to include 
the participation and assessments of the Office of Performance 
Assessment and Root Cause Analysis, and the Offices of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Systems Engineering (SE) and 
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E). Additionally, the F-35 
program has instituted a renewed emphasis on sound systems engineering 
principles, realistic cost and schedule estimating, a re-energized 
focus on integrated test and evaluation, and implementation of tighter 
cost control measures; all of which can be traced directly to WSARA 
principles. Following the Nunn-McCurdy certification, and statutorily-
directed rescission of Milestone (MS) B, the F-35 program conducted a 
bottoms-up Technical Baseline Review to determine a realistic cost, 
schedule, and risk basis for completing the developmental phase of the 
program, in which the Offices of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of 
Defense, SE and DT&E, participated. These organizational and policy 
changes in WSARA were instrumental in the completion of the thorough 
review of the F-35 program that resulted in Nunn-McCurdy certification 
on June 2, 2010.
    WSARA-implemented organizational changes were leveraged in the 
November 2011 F-35 Concurrency Quick Look Review (QLR), commissioned by 
the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AUSD) for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (AT&L). This review was led by Performance 
Assessments and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA), SE and DT&E, and found the 
overall F-35 design to be sound, but that there is significant risk 
remaining in the F-35 program. It is necessary to increase confidence 
in the design before production rates can be increased. The Department 
used the result of the QLR to inform the fiscal year 2013 Future Years 
Defense Program, which holds U.S. production at 29 aircraft per year 
through 2014 to permit additional progress on the test program before 
increasing production.
    The enactment of WSARA has directly influenced F-35 program 
planning, documentation and execution that led to the AUSD(AT&L) 
approval of a new MS B in March 2012. Two Defense Acquisition Board 
(DAB) reviews of the F-35 program were conducted in January and 
February 2012 with full involvement of CAPE, PARCA, SE and DT&E. Per 
WSARA, CAPE cost estimators worked closely with the program office as 
they developed the Independent Cost Estimate and reviewed the program 
office estimates. This culminated in concurrence from the Director, 
CAPE, with the AUSD(AT&L) choice of cost estimate for the program. 
PARCA has completed three semi-annual performance assessments of the F-
35 program since 2010. In accordance with WSARA, these assessments will 
occur semi-annually until at least March 2013; the next assessment is 
planned for July 2012.
    The remaining actions to fulfill the overall goal involve continual 
interaction between the WSARA-instituted organizations and the F-35 
program office. To that end, I have planned for an F-35 DAB review in 
September 2012, with annual reviews to follow. Additionally, I have 
directed the AT&L (L&MR) and CAPE to continue to work with the Services 
and the F-35 program office to identify and quantify opportunities to 
reduce operating and support costs for the program's life cycle.

               medium extended air defense system program
    26. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, a few days ago, I sent Secretary 
of Defense Panetta a letter asking him to explain DOD's position on the 
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program. There is ambiguity 
between how I thought DOD was going to approach the program, which 
would comport with the requirements under the NDAA for Fiscal Year 
2012, and Secretary Panetta's recently announced desire to keep our 
contractual obligation with our partner nations. Please provide me with 
an update on MEADS and your plans, if you are confirmed, for 
negotiating with our partners in the program on a lower-cost option 
that limits the program to no more than the funding appropriated in 
fiscal year 2012--as directed under the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012.
    Mr. Kendall. In accordance with the requirements of section 235 of 
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, the Department has repeatedly consulted 
and attempted to negotiate with the German and Italian participants 
regarding development of a plan to restructure the program to make U.S. 
fiscal year 2012 funding the Department's final obligation for the 
program. The Department informed the German and Italian participants 
that there is significant risk that fiscal year 2013 funding may not be 
made available by Congress. In response, they have informed the 
Department that they remain fully committed to their MOU obligations 
and expect that all three participants will provide their 2013 funding 
to complete the PoC effort. The Department has provided the plan 
required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012. The plan relies on the 
provision in the MEADS MOU that limits partner obligations to 
appropriated funding. The administration requested funding in the 
fiscal year 2013 budget to complete U.S. international obligations 
under the MEADS Design and Development Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU), as required by the terms of the MOU, and the administration 
continues to believe that fulfilling this commitment is the best course 
of action.

                   military space procurement policy
    27. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, in your responses to the advance 
policy questions, you indicated that introducing more competition for 
launch as soon as feasible is the key to controlling spiraling launch 
costs. Also, you cited a dual-prong approach the Air Force is taking 
to: (1) implement a block-buy acquisition strategy to purchase economic 
order quantities; and (2) provide a path to qualification of new 
entrants into the National Security Space (NSS) launch market. As a 
general proposition, how is a long-term block-buy from a sole-source 
supplier consistent with the notion of qualifying new entrants?
    Mr. Kendall. At this time, no new entrants have been certified to 
compete for NSS launch missions, and based on market research, the 
Department believes that it will be a number of years before a new 
entrant will be capable of achieving certification for NSS launch 
missions. During this period of time, the Department must continue to 
rely on the sole certified provider, the United Launch Alliance (ULA), 
to inject NSS payloads into their mission orbits. The block-buy 
acquisition strategy is intended to control ULA's costs, while 
potential new entrants achieve certification under the New Entrant 
Certification Strategy. If any new entrants achieve certification 
earlier than currently estimated, requirements above the contract 
commitment will be met through a full-and-open competition among all 
certified providers.
    Only one potential new entrant has stated an intention to qualify 
for future NSS launch missions, and based on their current DOD- and 
NASA-funded launches, combined with their commercial launches and 
assuming the success of these missions, the Air Force expects that firm 
to achieve certification to compete for future NSS missions by 2017. 
This coincides with phase 2 of the EELV acquisition strategy, during 
which launch missions will be competed under existing source-selection 
processes. However, in order to facilitate the certification of 
potential new entrants, the Air Force has identified two opportunities 
that providers may bid on--the Space Test Program (STP)-2 and the Deep 
Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR) missions which were funded by 
Congress in fiscal year 2012. These EELV-class missions have a higher 
risk tolerance and will provide an opportunity for potential new 
entrants to prove their capability for certification.

    28. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, to what extent would DOD be 
subjected to substantial termination liability should it elect to 
procure launch services from new entrants during the duration of the 
block-buy procurement period?
    Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that the Air Force released a 
request for proposal in March 2012 requesting cost proposals that cover 
a range of launch rates and term durations. The contract is structured 
as a requirements contract with variable pricing that recognizes 
Congress may not authorize/appropriate funds for the planned amount. If 
the planned amount is funded, the Air Force must buy the launches from 
United Launch Alliance. If fewer launches are authorized and 
appropriated, there is no termination liability but the Air Force must 
still buy the launches from United Launch Alliance. A new entrant could 
be given launches in excess of the annual planned launches in the 
contract. As with any contract if the quantities are reduced after 
they've been funded, there is termination liability. If confirmed, I 
will work with the Air Force to minimize those liabilities.

    29. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, to what extent could a new entrant 
compete for launches that have been bought during the block-buy?
    Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that only one potential new 
entrant has stated an intention to achieve certification, and an Air 
Force analysis of that firm's manifest suggests that they will likely 
not achieve certification before 2017, which will be after the initial 
block-buy and during the period of new-entrant competition (phase 2) 
under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle acquisition strategy. If 
this potential new entrant or another achieves certification prior to 
the end of the initial block-buy, they would be eligible to compete for 
launch missions over those already committed to in the planned block-
buy contract.

    30. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, to what extent should the Air 
Force contemplate off-ramps from the block-buy?
    Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that off-ramps will be negotiated 
under the initial block-buy contract. The Air Force released a request 
for proposal March 23, 2012 requesting cost proposals that cover a 
range of launch rates and durations. Based on that data and independent 
analysis, the Department plans to award the first block-buy contract at 
the rate, duration, and with termination conditions (i.e., off-ramps) 
that, together, offer the most advantageous terms to the Government.

    31. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if the block-buy results in excess 
inventory, as has historically been the case, what specific launch 
opportunities will be open to competition under those circumstances?
    Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that analysis of satellite 
readiness for launch indicates that the rate of 6-10 cores per year 
over 3-5 years that is anticipated under the block-buy is insufficient 
to meet the expected demand. This makes it likely that there will be 
launches available for competition. Although the Department has 
experienced launch delays in the past, some of the circumstances that 
led to lower than expected launch rates no longer exist. The National 
Security Space enterprise is entering a period where several 
constellations of satellites are now in full-scale production, so a 
full launch manifest is anticipated for the foreseeable future.

    32. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, in your responses to the advance 
policy questions, you cited your decision to reinstate the Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) as a major defense acquisition program 
(MDAP) not in sustainment so that there will be greater visibility into 
the programs status, in compliance with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012.
    Why should I not be concerned that the new acquisition program 
baseline for EELV will not contemplate a large block-buy, which would 
suppress the overall acquisition unit cost estimate for booster cores?
    Mr. Kendall. I have taken action to reinstate EELV as required by 
the NDAA. The Air Force will be required to establish a new 
``original'' acquisition program baseline (APB) for EELV for a 
restructured program. The new APB will be based on the restructured 
program and will most likely include the block-buy approach called for 
in the current Air Force EELV acquisition strategy. If confirmed, I 
will ensure that the APB reflects the Department's best estimate of 
program costs and is consistent with the planned acquisition strategy.

                         developmental testing
    33. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation (DASD(DT&E)) has two 
distinct reporting chains. For DT&E matters the DASD(DT&E) reports to 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD(AT&L)) through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)) and for Test Resource Management 
Center (TRMC) matters the DASD(DT&E) reports directly to the USD(AT&L). 
This appears to be a rather cumbersome management arrangement in which 
the DASD(DT&E) has two masters. Is it your view that this is efficient, 
appropriate, and effectively furthers the underlying intent of WSARA?
    Mr. Kendall. The Department has adopted an organizational structure 
consistent with the intent of WSARA and with most efficient and 
effective performance of the test and evaluation function.
    The DASD(DT&E) has direct access to advise me as the Acting 
USD(AT&L) on all matters relating to developmental test and evaluation 
within the Department, and has acted in this capacity on numerous 
occasions. This includes direct participation in all major program 
milestone decisions. I particularly rely on the DASD(DT&E) for advice 
on the demonstrated maturity of designs and verification that 
requirements are being met prior to entering initial production and on 
the adequacy of planned test programs at the beginning of Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development. The reporting chain through ASD(R&E) 
allows for alignment between DT&E and Systems Engineering efforts 
within the Department. There are similar arrangements for other 
functional leads within AT&L and after 2 years of working with this 
arrangement I believe it is an effective structure.
    The DASD(DT&E) adds a critical capability to AT&L allowing the 
Department to ensure that developmental test programs are properly and 
realistically designed to evaluate performance against requirements, as 
WSARA intended. Likewise, with the dual-hatting of the DASD(DT&E) as 
the Director of the Test Resource Management Center, the DASD(DT&E) has 
direct access to advise me on test resourcing issues.

    34. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if confirmed, what actions, if 
any, would you take to make management of the DASD(DT&E) office more 
efficient?
    Mr. Kendall. The DASD(DT&E) office is operating as an efficient 
operation, including leveraging expertise from the Test Resource 
Management Center (TRMC). In January 2012, I approved a reorganization 
of DT&E and TRMC that formalized these efficiencies. The DT&E office 
has grown substantially since WSARA was passed and I believe it is now 
at an appropriate size, however, if I am confirmed I will continue to 
monitor the effectiveness of this office to see if adjustments are 
needed within the overall USD(AT&L) resources.

    35. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, DOD has over $1,000 acquisition 
programs of which approximately 300 are under DOT&E oversight and less 
than 40 are currently under DASD(DT&E) oversight. The GAO has indicated 
that the DASD(DT&E) requires additional staff to properly fulfill its 
statutory requirements. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you 
take in this time of declining budgets to ensure the DASD(DT&E) has the 
resources it needs to effectively discharge its statutory 
responsibilities?
    Mr. Kendall. All DOD acquisition programs are in a sense under DT&E 
oversight, as is the developmental test career field across the 
Department. DT&E involvement in programs is highest during the planning 
for an execution of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
phase, with which DT&E is most concerned. This applies to a subset of 
all acquisition programs.
    I believe the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request for OSD/
DT&E manpower and funding provides adequate resources to support the 
responsibilities of the office. I also believe that the Department has 
effectively used available resources to add capacity and bring 
technical depth into the office. These resources increased the capacity 
of DT&E and have enabled the office to share best practices across the 
Department, particularly with Military Service test organizations and 
program offices. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the 
effectiveness of this office and make adjustments as necessary.

         joint capabilities and integration development system
    36. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, in your written responses to the 
advance policy questions, you refer to an updated policy for the Joint 
Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS) that in part 
establishes a Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEON) process intended 
to meet the urgent needs for future contingency operations. How do you 
define a ``near-term, high-risk contingency'' that underpins the 
determination for a JEON?
    Mr. Kendall. The Chairman's Joint Capabilities and Integration 
Development System (JCIDS) instruction that I referenced defines a JEON 
as an urgent operational need ``identified by a combatant command as 
inherently joint and impacting an anticipated or pending contingency 
operation.'' Urgent Operational Needs are further defined as capability 
requirements that if left unfulfilled, potentially result in loss of 
life or critical mission failure. My understanding is that JEONs 
provide the combatant commanders (COCOMs) a means of identifying 
capability gaps that they view as urgent but that are not associated 
with a current contingency.

    37. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, how do you distinguish an 
anticipated or pending contingency operation?
    Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that the most critical distinction 
in regards to a JEON in comparison to a Joint Urgent Operational Need 
(JUON), is that a JEON is not associated with a current contingency 
operation as defined in title 10, U.S.C., section 101(a)(13), but 
rather is associated with a possible future contingency. The 
distinction between ``pending'' and ``anticipated'' is purely temporal, 
with ``pending'' being viewed as the nearer-term possibility. I do not 
consider ``anticipated'' to necessarily imply a high likelihood of 
occurrence.

    38. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, how is a requirement that may take 
6 years to obtain considered near-term or urgent?
    Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that the intent of the 
Department's rapid acquisition processes is to deliver capabilities 
needed to satisfy both JUONs and JEONs in less than 2 years. I believe 
that the 5-year mark, 6 if you include the time it takes to conduct the 
assessment, obtain the resources and place a contract, was intended 
simply to allow for consideration of multiple near and midterm 
alternatives in some possible solutions. There may be cases where the 
consequences of a gap are so severe and the likelihood of the risk so 
high, that the leadership of the department needs to initiate actions 
outside of the normal planning, programming, budgeting and execution 
cycle even if the delivery of a capability may take more than 2 years. 
There are examples from my experience during the Cold War where 
technological surprise was achieved by the Soviet Union that motivated 
urgent development programs that took well over 2 years to fielding. In 
those cases the sense of urgency was very real despite the time it took 
to field capability. These instances may be rare, but in my view the 
Department should have an established mechanism for dealing with them.

                better buying power and lifecycle costs
    39. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, section 805 of the NDAA for Fiscal 
Year 2010 regarding lifecycle management, called for product support 
managers to maximize competition and make the best possible use of 
available DOD and industry resources at the system, subsystem, and 
component levels. This provision was implemented through DOD's 
Directive-Type Memorandum on October 6, 2010. Can you provide examples 
where DOD's compliance with section 805 has led to competition at 
subsystem and component levels and a reduction of lifecycle costs?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes.
    The Department of the Navy has pursued competitive strategies for 
major components in restarting the DDG-51 shipbuilding program to 
reduce life cycle cost. The Navy continues to pursue open architecture 
initiatives to achieve design stability, mature technologies and 
affordable solutions. Specifically, the Navy competed the production of 
the main reduction gear for the ships in a breakout strategy. This 
strategy avoided pass-through costs to the shipbuilders and established 
future competitive opportunities for this major component. In addition, 
the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) Program is openly competing 
what has historically been a sole-source program. There are four 
separate contractual efforts: CEC system production; Common Array Block 
(CAB) antenna production; Signal Data Processor-Sierra (SDP-S) 
production; and Design Agent/Engineering Services (DA/ES). The CEC 
program's current ``will cost'' reflects an additional $200 million 
reduction in costs from prior years. CEC reduced the POM 13 CEC budget 
by $32.4 million by transitioning from the current design to a Common 
Array Block (CAB) antenna, which will be a family of common antennas 
across CEC platforms.
    The Army awarded a competitive 5-year/multiple-year Family of 
Medium Tactical Vehicles requirements contract to Oshkosh that resulted 
in an average cost savings of 28 percent over the previous sole-source 
contract. In addition, the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 
Enterprise Business Model is predicated upon fostering and leveraging 
competition in production. The Multifunctional Distribution Information 
System-Low Volume Terminal (MIDS-LVT) radio program initial radios 
started at $426,000 per unit. Through competition between the two 
approved vendor production sources, the radios have decreased steadily 
to a cost of only $181,000 per unit, which is a savings of nearly 60 
percent on each radio. With over 2,600 units purchased by the 
Department, the total savings is almost $500 million.

    40. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if you are confirmed, how would 
you leverage the private sector's investment in commercial technologies 
and certifications to achieve efficiencies?
    Mr. Kendall. The pace of commercial technology development in some 
areas such as computing and wireless communications continues to 
outpace development of military unique technology. If confirmed, I will 
remain committed to implementing Modular Open Systems Architecture 
approaches in major systems, enabling the insertion of commercial 
technologies throughout a system's lifecycle. One key enabler in this 
effort is thorough market research to determine whether the 
Department's technological requirements can be met by industry, small 
business, or by commercially available, off-the-shelf products. Another 
key enabler is well structured acquisition strategies that provide 
effective open architectures and modular systems with well defined non-
proprietary interfaces that are compatible with commercial or 
commercially derived products.

                         excessive concurrency
    41. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, a big problem with how DOD buys 
major systems is this: it has tended to go all in on these procurement 
programs without understanding enough about their technical or systems 
engineering to assess whether developing them may have too much risk. 
So, these programs struggle endlessly in development--where costs grow 
and schedules slip--without needed combat capability delivered. Far too 
often, DOD has tried to execute such programs under cost-plus 
contracts. In my view, this has been an utter disaster. Do you agree? 
If so, how would you address it?
    Mr. Kendall. My view is that there is still substantial room for 
improvement in the Department's management of development risk. The use 
of independent technology readiness reviews has been a positive step, 
however, these reviews alone do not adequately assess engineering and 
integration risks. The Department should not enter into major 
acquisition programs without a clear understanding of the technical 
risk and degree of complexity that the program involves and a well 
structured plan to manage that risk. If the risk is too great entry 
into EMD should be delayed until that risk is reduced. All development 
programs entail some degree of risk because by definition something is 
being created that didn't exist before the program, so there are 
inherent unknowns in every development program. The Department's 
acquisition approach, including contract type, must be tied a realistic 
assessment of the risk factors. The contract type does not by itself 
change the amount of risk; it attempts to allocate the risk between the 
parties. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen the Department's 
technical capacity for assessing risk and managing risk through 
effective program management and systems engineering and through 
acquisition strategies that provide strong incentives to industry but 
also equitably allocate risk between industry and the Government.

    42. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if confirmed, what overall 
approach would you take to ensure that programs with too much 
concurrency are never started?
    Mr. Kendall. I firmly believe that the principal of ``fly before 
you buy'' is a well established best practice. When programs are 
started, I intend to ensure that the risk/benefit of any given degree 
of concurrent production and development is carefully assessed before 
program plans are approved and before production decisions are made. If 
confirmed, I will ensure that major weapons systems' program plans have 
clearly articulated criteria for entering low rate production based on 
design maturity and stability as demonstrated through developmental 
testing.

                          biofuels refineries
    43. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, in March of this past year, the 
President directed the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, and the Navy 
to assist the development of a sustainable commercial biofuels industry 
using authorities in the Defense Production Act. The Navy has pledged 
$170 million as their share of a $510 million effort to construct or 
retrofit biofuel refineries in order to create a commercially viable 
market. You mentioned in your answers to the advance policy questions 
that ``The Defense Production Act Title III authority, the Industrial 
Base Innovation Fund (IBIF), and the Manufacturing Technology Program 
are three such resources to support critical capabilities that are at 
risk. These interventions should only be used in exceptional cases, 
which I believe will be rare.''
    In your opinion, do you consider the intervention of DOD in the 
biofuels refining industry to be an exceptional case? If so, please 
explain why, with specificity.
    Mr. Kendall. In my advanced policy question response I was 
referring to interventions intended to preserve existing manufacturing 
capabilities. Biofuel production is an emerging capability, putting it 
in a different category. Based on initial market research, there does 
appear to be a potential for biofuel projects to meet the Defense 
Production Act's statutory criteria.
    Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 provides the 
President the authority to reduce current or projected shortfalls of 
industrial resources, critical technology items, or essential materials 
needed for national defense. Before any contract under this authority 
can be awarded, a determination must be made that the industrial 
resource, material, or critical technology item is essential to the 
national defense; and that without title III assistance, United States 
industry cannot reasonably be expected to provide the capability for 
the needed industrial resource, material, or critical technology item 
in a timely manner. The determination is required to be made 30 days 
prior to a contract award.
    As a large user of petroleum products, it is in DOD's long term 
interest to ensure that there will be liquid fuels available for DOD 
platforms, particularly for legacy fleets, which will be with the 
Department for decades to come. If confirmed, I will carefully examine 
biofuels proposals submitted for consideration under Defense Production 
Act title III in accordance with the statutory criteria.

    44. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, do you believe a biofuels refining 
capability is a critical capability that is at risk? If so, please 
explain why, with specificity.
    Mr. Kendall. I do not believe biofuels refining capability is an 
existing critical capability that is at risk. However, biofuels 
options, including refining capability, are emerging capabilities that 
are part of the Department's overall energy strategy. I do believe that 
the success of the Department's energy strategy, which focuses on 
improving energy efficiency and diversifying energy supplies, is 
critical to national security. Current processes for producing advanced 
drop-in biofuels are expensive, and the resulting high cost of the end 
product continues to limit market growth. Military and civilian end 
users of fuel have clear strategic incentives to adopt renewable drop-
in fuels, but adoption is only possible when these fuels become cost-
competitive. Proposals to improve the cost competitiveness of biofuels, 
therefore, could have a critical impact on the success of the 
Department's energy strategy.

    45. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if confirmed, would you support 
the continued use of DOD funds to invest in the development of 
commercial refineries for biofuels?
    Mr. Kendall. If confirmed, I will carefully examine any proposed 
biofuels projects in accordance with the statutory criteria contained 
in the Defense Production Act of 1950, as well as other available 
authorities. I would also consider the Department's energy strategy and 
competing priorities before making any investment decisions.

    46. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, do you support the Secretary of 
the Navy's investments in the Great Green Fleet by 2016, which includes 
spending over $12 million last year for 450,000 gallons of biofuels, 
which equates to over $26 per gallon?
    Mr. Kendall. I support investments in improved energy efficiency 
and investments that would reduce the Department's dependency on 
petroleum. Of the $336 million that the Navy has budgeted for 
operational energy initiatives in fiscal year 2013, 86 percent is for 
energy efficiency. It includes efforts such as simulator upgrades, 
advanced engines, propeller coatings to reduce drag and hybrid-electric 
drives for ships. The Navy's proposed investments in alternative fuels 
make up 5.1 percent of their total proposed budget for operational 
energy initiatives. These efforts, which I do support, will fund 
research, development, demonstration, and evaluation of these fuels. 
For the long term, the military will need alternatives to petroleum. 
All the Military Departments have purchased or will purchase test 
quantities--like last year's Navy purchase--to certify their platforms 
for use with advanced alternative fuels. By doing so, the Military 
Services are positioning themselves to take advantage of these fuels 
when they are cost-competitive with conventional fuels.

                           congressional adds
    47. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 
included almost $240 million for three unrequested programs--the 
Defense Rapid Innovation Program, the IBIF, and the Metals 
Affordability Initiative (MAI). Funding for these programs, however, 
has never been requested by DOD in previous budgets. Why has DOD never 
asked for funding to support any of these programs in any of its budget 
requests?
    Mr. Kendall. Congress established the Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF) 
in section 1073 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011, and the 
2011 Defense Appropriation Act appropriated $500 million ($440 million 
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) funds, and $60 
million procurement funds) for the program. The Department implemented 
the RIF as a fully merit-based competitive program in strict accordance 
with Section 1073. The Department intends to evaluate the results of 
the fiscal year 2011 RIF funding before determining requirements for 
future funding of this program.
    My understanding is that Congress established the IBIF in fiscal 
year 2008 as a partnership between the Industrial Policy (IP) office 
and Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) Panel, but funded 
it through a broader Defense Logistics Agency program element. Without 
its own program element, IP lacked infrastructure to build IBIF budget 
requirements for consideration in the Department's budget review 
process until ManTech and IP were realigned as MIBP in 2011. To date, 
IBIF has not appeared in a budget request but the Department recently 
took steps to allow for the consideration of funding in fiscal year 
2014 and future years' budgets by establishing a new program element 
(0607210D8Z) exclusively devoted to applied research for industrial 
base sustainment.
    I believe that the Air Force has requested funding for the MAI in 
every fiscal year since fiscal year 1999 within a program element 
titled ``Advanced Materials for Weapon Systems'' (0603112F). The funds 
requested in the budget were supplemented by congressional increases 
and industry matching in each of those years.

    48. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, why did DOD specifically not 
request funding for any of these programs in fiscal year 2013?
    Mr. Kendall. The RIF is a new effort and the Department did not 
have sufficient data about the program's overall effectiveness to 
warrant inclusion in the President's fiscal year 2013 PBR. Beginning in 
March 2013, the Department plans to conduct a comprehensive assessment 
to examine two areas for the projects funded through the fiscal year 
2011 appropriation--the contractors' progress in meeting the stated 
cost, schedule, and technical goals; and the DOD program manager's 
strategy for transition of the project's technology into an end use 
product or insertion into an existing or planned acquisition program. 
This assessment will yield the necessary data for the Department to 
determine future funding requirements and to assess this program 
relative to other priorities.
    Funding for IBIF was considered in the fiscal year 2013 budget 
review process, but funds were not requested because of the significant 
adjustments required by the Budget Control Act of 2011. Overall, 
funding for previously requested industrial base-related programs were 
maintained, but not increased in this process. The administration did 
include funding for related manufacturing technologies in the 
President's fiscal year 2013 budget request for the interagency 
National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI), which is outside 
the Department's budget.
    I believe that the Department did request $3.9 million for MAI in 
the fiscal year 2013 budget request.

    49. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if no funding is provided in 
fiscal year 2013, what would be the effect on each program and on the 
purposes for which these programs were originally intended?
    Mr. Kendall. Concerning RIF, there would not be an effect to any 
ongoing programs. RIF projects are intended to be executed within the 
available funding.
    Without funding in fiscal year 2013, IBIF would suspend its 
reorientation to address niche concerns raised through the Department's 
Sector-by-Sector Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) effort. S2T2 helps identify when 
programs will not support the minimum sustaining rate that a niche 
supplier needs to provide a critical product. Such an endeavor aims at 
maintaining the health of selected essential parts of the defense 
industry, but is pursued only when: (1) the Department is highly likely 
to need a product in the future; (2) where the product would be 
prohibitively difficult and expensive to obtain after a hiatus; and (3) 
where affordable and innovative mechanisms are available to work with 
the producers in the interim.
    Concerning MAI, it is my understanding that the MAI industrial 
consortium would have to stop seven metal alloy manufacturing 
technology projects prior to their completion if fiscal year 2013 
funding is not provided.

    50. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if confirmed, would you make it a 
priority to review the benefits of each of these programs?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes.

    51. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if you find any of the programs to 
not be useful as to their intended purposes, would you inform this 
committee of such a determination?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes.

                            depot provisions
    52. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 
contained two controversial provisions regarding military depots. Are 
you aware of the provisions?
    Mr. Kendall. I believe so. The first provision is the removal of 
the exception for nuclear refueling of aircraft carriers from the 
definition of depot-level maintenance. The former exclusion from the 
definition allowed for the exclusion of the refueling of nuclear 
carriers from both the Core and 50/50 statutes. With the changes to the 
law, such refueling would now fall within the scope of depot 
maintenance and both Core and 50/50 statutes would apply. However, the 
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 also provided the Secretary of Defense waiver 
authority, on the basis of economic feasibility and national security, 
for the requirement in Core Law. The revised 50/50 statute sets forth 
waiver authority on the basis of national security reasons.
    The second provision is the removal of the exception for major 
modifications in the definition of depot-level maintenance. The 
statutory definition could now be improperly read to apply to the labor 
associated with all software and hardware modifications and upgrades to 
include those not maintenance related.

    53. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, to the best of your knowledge, 
what is the current status of DOD's implementation of these provisions?
    Mr. Kendall. On April 5, 2012, I issued NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 
Implementation Guidance, with regard to these provisions. The purpose 
of this guidance is to ensure a common interpretation and application 
of the statutes across the Military Departments. This guidance was 
intended to assist in avoiding significant shifts in the location of 
ongoing depot activities or in the overall organic depot/industry 
balance.
    Relative to the nuclear refueling of aircraft carriers, the 
Implementation Guidance delegated waiver authority under title 10 
U.S.C. Sec. 2464 to the Secretary of the Navy and suggested that the 
Navy may wish to consider pursuing a Secretary of Defense waiver of the 
50/50 requirement under title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2466(b).
    Additionally, the Implementation Guidance provides a Department-
wide interpretation of ``modifications'' that excludes hardware and 
software modifications which are not maintenance in nature.

    54. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, are you aware of the concerns 
regarding the two provisions expressed by the Services and by industry?
    Mr. Kendall. I believe I am aware of the concerns; the Department 
has been working closely with the Services and Industry since the 
enactment of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 to address concerns 
associated with the revised legislation. Through this close 
coordination, the resulting Implementation Guidance is intended to 
ensure a common interpretation and application of the statutes across 
the Services and to address their concerns.

    55. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, what is your opinion on the 
validity of these concerns?
    Mr. Kendall. I share the concerns of industry and the Military 
Departments with regard to the legislation. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 
2012 Implementation Guidance is intended to address these concerns. 
Through the conduct of depot activities consistent with the 
Implementation Guidance and the execution of waivers available under 
the various depot statutes there should be no significant shifts in the 
location of ongoing depot activities or in the overall organic depot/
industry balance.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
                               50/50 core
    56. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, the well-known 50/50 statute is 
codified in title 10, U.S.C., section 2466, and states that: ``Not more 
than 50 percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year to a 
Military Department or a defense agency for depot-level maintenance and 
repair workload may be used to contract for the performance by non-
Federal Government personnel of such workload for the Military 
Department or the defense agency.''
    The rationale for this statute as well as the companion core 
statute codified in title 10, U.S.C., section 2464, in my opinion, is 
two-fold. First, the United States needs to have the organic capability 
and capacity to carry out critical depot maintenance activity in order 
to respond effectively to a mobilization, national defense contingency, 
or other emergency requirement. Second, if the Government does not have 
the organic capacity--both at the logistics management and depot 
maintenance levels--the Government will not be able to be a smart buyer 
when they partner with industry, and the Government will end up paying 
the private sector more for depot maintenance and logistics support 
because the Government will not be able to offer a competitive price. 
We have seen this several times in relation to depot maintenance--where 
a contractor offers a significantly lower price because the Government 
threatens to bring the work back in-house. If the Government cannot 
bring the work back in-house, we are very likely going to end up paying 
the private sector more for that workload than we should.
    What are your views of the Core and 50/50 statutes, and if 
confirmed, will you be committed to retaining a robust organic 
capability and capacity for depot maintenance and logistics within DOD 
and the Military Services?
    Mr. Kendall. I believe that it is essential that the Department 
maintain an organic depot capability for both national security and 
economic reasons. I am extremely cognizant of the indispensible roles 
the organic maintenance facilities and their dedicated workforce play 
in supporting the demanding operational requirements of the Military 
Services.

                   f-35 operations and support costs
    57. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, it seems that while the focus 
of conversation has been on the $1 trillion operations and support 
(O&S) cost estimate for all three variants of the F-35 over the next 55 
years, there has been limited discussion on the cost of maintaining the 
legacy fleet if we do not move forward with the F-35. We have heard 
that an apples-to-apples cost comparison to operate the legacy aircraft 
could be $3 to $4 trillion over that same period of time. How would 
this estimate account for the fact that legacy aircraft will never be 
as capable or survivable in a 21st century threat environment?
    Mr. Kendall. I do not believe that the estimate takes that fact 
into account and it would be meaningless to attempt to compare 
extending the life of the current fleet 55 years to the cost of 
sustaining the F-35 over the same period as this is not a realistic 
option. Service life constraints will result in most of the legacy 
aircraft having to retire well before the timeframe in question 
elapses. While service life extensions are planned for some legacy 
aircraft, it is simply not practical that their service life be 
extended all the way out to the 2065 timeframe. Even if it could be, 
the aircraft would not be survivable or capable enough to cope with the 
threats that can be anticipated by the end of this period. The concern 
with regard to F-35 sustainment costs has more to do with the 
affordability of an F-35 fleet. As a much more capable and complex 
aircraft, the F-35 will be more expensive to operate than some of the 
aircraft it will replace. For this reason the Department is working 
aggressively to control F-35 support costs and I have placed a cost cap 
on F-35 sustainment that is intended to provide an incentive for 
sustainment cost reductions.

    58. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, what investments have been made 
in the development and design of the F-35 to reduce O&S costs over the 
life of the program?
    Mr. Kendall. The F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) is currently 
implementing an affordability strategy and the Department is developing 
an Affordability Management Plan focused on: reducing the costs of 
support products such as support equipment, spare parts and training 
devices; base-lining requirements with the Services and leveraging 
increased efficiency opportunities provided by F-35; and addressing 
reliability and maintainability. The JPO is creating contract and 
pricing opportunities to reduce the cost of the JSF support products by 
leveraging economic order quantity buys for spare parts in conjunction 
with production buys, and implementing pricing improvement curves that 
leverage learning opportunities. By creating a common sustainment 
baseline harnessing the F-35 support system design, the JPO is 
analyzing the optimum level of infrastructure and products required to 
support operations of the global fleet. By optimizing the amount of 
equipment procured early, the Department can affect the through life 
O&S Costs. In parallel, the program office is actively managing the 
reliability and maintainability of systems/sub-systems and components; 
the implementation of appropriate modifications will enable the 
Department to control cost.
    In 2011, the JPO implemented a number of technical changes and 
affordability initiatives which resulted in an over $30 billion 
reduction, in base year 2002 dollars, in the 2011 O&S estimate which 
helped to offset externally-driven increases in areas such as military 
and contractor labor rates. Additionally, the JPO conducted sustainment 
baseline deep dives into support equipment, spares, and manpower, as 
well as the initial phase of a business case analysis on supply chain 
management, field operations, sustaining engineering, and fleet 
management.
    The 2012 efforts include a manpower review into the appropriate 
labor mix and contractor rates, a review of competitive options for the 
long-term provision of support equipment and spares, enterprise 
software licensing, engine life improvements, reprogramming laboratory 
requirements, and additional Service planning factors such as aircraft 
utilization rates, contingency planning, and squadron manning 
requirements.

    59. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, how will you account for these 
investments in future O&S cost estimates in the Selected Acquisition 
Reports?
    Mr. Kendall. The F-35 JPO works closely with the Office of the 
Director, CAPE. Following completion of the CAPE's Independent Cost 
Estimate (ICE), I directed that the CAPE's O&S estimate be used for 
planning purposes in the new Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) and the 
December 2011 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). As JPO cost estimates 
are updated to reflect the investment made to reduce costs, that 
information is provided to the CAPE and their estimate will be updated 
as well. The annual SAR will continue to reflect the CAPE O&S estimate, 
with updates as required.

    60. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, it seems to me that DOD has 
placed F-35 in a unique disadvantage when it comes to an O&S cost 
estimate for the program. I am not aware of any other DOD program that 
estimates its life cycle costs over a 55-year timeline. Doesn't this 
vastly overstate its cost when compared to other major programs?
    Mr. Kendall. The F-35 is in a unique position in terms of the 
length of time that the Department plans to operate this weapon system. 
The combination of a planned procurement of over 2,400 aircraft over a 
25-year production run and a 30-year service life results in a life 
cycle that extends out to 2065. The Department does estimate life cycle 
costs for all weapons systems based on the planned life cycle of the 
individual program. In terms of the F-35 O&S estimate, the inflationary 
effects on the Then Year (TY) estimate on a 55-year timeline have a 
major impact on the total O&S figure. I believe it is more relevant to 
focus on the elements that constitute the cost per flight hour, and 
result in the annual cost estimates as the appropriate metrics for O&S 
affordability. As a result, I have focused the F-35 Program on a 
sustainment affordability target that uses cost per flight hour.

    61. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, do you have an estimate of what 
the cost of 10 carriers or a fleet of submarines would cost if 
estimated over 55 years?
    Mr. Kendall. Not precisely. Neither carriers nor submarines are 
designed for a 55 year service life. However, the December 2011 SAR for 
the CVN-78 program and SSN 774 program include Operations and Support 
(O&S) estimates over the life cycle of those programs and therefore 
provide an indication of the requested O&S costs. For the CVN-78 Gerald 
R. Ford class of aircraft carriers, the estimate is derived by taking 
the annual costs to operate a planned 11 ship fleet over the projected 
50 year service life. For CVN-78 the total O&S costs in TY$ are $231.3 
billion. For the SSN 774 Virginia-class submarine, the estimate is 
derived by taking the annual costs to operate a representative fleet of 
30 submarines over a service life of 33 years per hull. For the SSN 
774, the total O&S costs in TY$ are $95.6 billion.

    62. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, I believe that we in Congress 
need quality data and a solid methodology to serve as the basis for 
making informed decisions on our major defense programs. I question the 
quality of the estimate that we are currently using for the F-35 
program; this overstated 55-year estimate unnecessarily scares our 
allied partners and in actuality misinforms decisionmakers both in DOD 
and in Congress. We need to do a better job at refining these estimates 
as this program moves forward. I have been told that if you used this 
new 55-year methodology and applied it to the legacy fighter fleet, it 
would cost us $3 to $4 trillion just to keep flying what we have today 
another 50 years--so in effect, we save money by modernizing with F-35s 
which will be both more capable and survivable. Don't you agree the 
cost of the alternative needs to be discussed as well?
    Mr. Kendall. In general I believe that the costs of alternatives 
should be discussed; however extending the legacy fighter fleet to an 
additional 55 years is not a viable alternative to the F-35. The 
discussion of alternatives does take place as part of the annual budget 
review process. Additionally, F-35 affordability was discussed during 
the recent review of the program prior to my decision to award a new 
Milestone B and Acquisition Program Baseline.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                  army armed aerial scout requirements
    63. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, Congress funded an analysis of 
alternatives (AOA) to establish an armed scout replacement program as 
far back as 2009. The fiscal year 2012 budget included $15 million to 
conduct an additional Request for Information (RFI) and Voluntary 
Flight Demonstration (VFD) this year. Little guidance is being shared 
about the Army Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) requirements and how the 
request for information and demonstrations will be conducted. What are 
the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) requirements for the AAS 
program and have you communicated those requirements to industry?
    Mr. Kendall. The July 2009 ICD does not prescribe specific 
threshold and objective requirements for a material solution to achieve 
but rather describes the capability gaps that exist in the mission 
area. Based on open source documentation, industry appears to have 
further developed technology, initially described 2 years ago in their 
RFI responses, that represents a considerable increase in capability 
gap mitigation. However, the Army currently has limited insight into 
these potential improvements. The current approved ICD is under the 
purview of the requirements community (Army Training and Doctrine 
Command) and to my knowledge, has not been released to industry. 
Although the ICD may have not been released to industry, the draft RFI 
does describe the capability shortfalls that currently exist in terms 
of responsiveness, performance margins, and lethality. Additionally, 
the RFI contains a detailed description of the AAS mission sets and 
outlines the specific demonstration maneuvers and tasks requested.

    64. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, were they the same requirements 
used in the original AOA?
    Mr. Kendall. The July 2009 ICD does not prescribe specific 
threshold and objective requirements for a material solution to achieve 
but rather describes the capability gaps that exist in the mission 
area. However, the AOA was focused on the same capability gaps 
addressed in the current ICD.

    65. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, will the ICD requirements be used 
as the baseline for the planned AAS RFI and VFD and your materiel 
solution?
    Mr. Kendall. The AAS RFI and VFD seek to address the same 
capability gaps in the current ICD.

                          flight demonstration
    66. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, upgrades requested to keep to the 
OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter operating safely have become more 
complex and costly. It is important that a final determination is made 
for addressing the Army's validated AAS requirement to assure valuable 
time and resources are invested on a platform that will best meet the 
Army's requirements. Congress anticipates that the upcoming RFI and VFD 
will be conducted with the utmost rigor, objectivity, and fairness in 
order to reach a credible and conclusive AAS acquisition strategy. For 
the VFDs, how will you ensure the process is fair and transparent?
    Mr. Kendall. The Army intends to ensure that its market research is 
conducted fairly by following the prescribed guidance in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The requested maneuvers will be executed 
in accordance with standard test techniques and normalized to standard 
atmospheric conditions. The Army will de-brief industry members at the 
conclusion of their VFD and industry participants will have the 
opportunity to update their RFI response. The VFD is not a source 
selection activity; it is intended to gather information that the Army 
can use to determine if an affordable and cost effective product may be 
available with existing technology.

    67. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, how do you plan to establish 
standardized flight conditions?
    Mr. Kendall. The Army will use Experimental Test Pilots that are 
graduates of the Naval Test Pilot School. The pilots will execute 
maneuvers that are voluntarily agreeable with the industry participant 
as outlined in the request for information. These maneuvers will be 
conducted in accordance with standard test techniques and normalized to 
standard atmospheric conditions.

    68. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, what method or trade basis will be 
used to drive your materiel solution decision in regard to weapons 
systems cost, schedule, and performance considerations?
    Mr. Kendall. The Army will assess the results of the RFI and VFD 
against the known weighted capability gaps defined in the ICD and 
validated by the Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) AOA. The methodology for 
determining cost, schedule, and performance trades will be similar to 
the methodology used in the AAS AOA.

              kiowa warrior service life extension program
    69. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, the Army states that the Kiowa 
Warrior Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) is the basis for 
comparison in the AAS evaluation. I am not aware that a SLEP has been 
established or approved and there is no SLEP in the fiscal year 2013 
budget request. Have you conducted, or do you intend to conduct, the 
required Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) to validate your Kiowa 
Warrior SLEP assumptions?
    Mr. Kendall. Kiowa Warrior SLEP is referenced as RECAP in the 
budget exhibits. The Kiowa Warrior (KW) fiscal year 2013 budget request 
contains funding to execute the SLEP/RECAP requirement if the Army 
decides against a new material solution for AAS. This funding will 
support either course of action without impacting the approved Kiowa 
Warrior Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program (CASUP)/OH-58F.
    The purpose of the Kiowa Warrior SLAP is to investigate and analyze 
various approaches to enhance airframe Reliability and Maintainability 
(RAM) as well as identify safety improvements that could be applied to 
the fuselage structures. The SLAP program is ongoing and will identify 
the specific structures requiring improvement; these changes would be 
implemented via a SLEP/RECAP effort.

    70. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, what are the cost, technical, and 
schedule risk findings of the SLEP?
    Mr. Kendall. The Army view is that the cost, technical, and 
schedule risks of a SLEP/RECAP program are low. The Army has extensive 
reliability and cost data on the 40+ year old OH-58 airframes, a 
trained and capable workforce performing depot-level maintenance via 
the Crash Battle Damage & Overhaul programs, and new cabin production 
lines in the Wartime Replacement Aircraft (WRA) program. Together these 
programs lower the risk involved in executing a SLEP/RECAP initiative.
    Any SLEP/RECAP program would include replacing the aircraft 
structures, which could occur on an already established production line 
such as WRA. The CASUP/OH-58F begins production in 2015 providing a 
good entry point for new metal production that aligns with the approved 
CASUP production schedule.

    71. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, based on the findings of the SLAP, 
is the Kiowa Warrior program in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget 
considered to be low risk for execution? If so, by what measures?
    Mr. Kendall. The initial findings of the SLAP study will be 
available in late summer 2012. Kiowa Warrior has no dependencies on 
SLAP data to execute fiscal year 2013 program requirements. No 
additional risk impacting either fiscal year 2013 budget or program 
execution is anticipated as a result of the SLAP outcomes. The Army 
view is that the Kiowa Warrior program is at low risk for execution in 
fiscal year 2013. The Critical Design Review was successfully completed 
ahead of schedule in April 2012. The first two EMD prototype aircraft 
are being modified and the critical component programs are currently 
executing well.

                    materiel solution determination
    72. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, if performance is validated during 
the flight demonstration, will the Army use the validated performance 
data for the comparative analysis, or will the Army make unilateral 
adjustments and assumptions?
    Mr. Kendall. The Army is conducting market research to determine 
what technology is available from industry that may be able to 
contribute to a material solution option that delivers greater 
capability than the current OH-58. The Army does not intend to compare 
individual results but rather assess demonstrated capability against 
the weighted capability gaps from the AAS AOA.

    73. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, if performance capability is not 
validated by a flight demonstration, how will the claims be treated 
during the evaluation?
    Mr. Kendall. The Army realizes that industry RFI performance 
projections could exceed what is physically demonstrated. In those 
instances or in instances where industry elects not to participate in 
the voluntary flight demonstration, the Army will assess the risk of an 
industry member and evaluate the RFI performance projection based on 
their documented technical progress including company test results, 
readiness levels and technology roadmaps.

    74. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, if performance is validated during 
the flight demonstration, how will the claims be treated in conducting 
the cost/benefit analysis (CBA) to make your materiel solution 
decision?
    Mr. Kendall. Validated performance data mitigates the risk of an 
industry member's ability to achieve their RFI performance projection. 
The Army will conduct a risk assessment on all responses, validated or 
claimed. The end state is to identify an affordable, achievable, 
moderate risk material solution option based on the current state of 
technology in the market.

    75. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, what is your methodology to 
conduct your comparison?
    Mr. Kendall. The Army will not compare individual industry 
responses against each other. Based on open source documentation, 
industry appears to have further developed technology, initially 
described 2 years ago in their RFI responses, that represents a 
considerable increase in capability gap mitigation. However, the Army 
currently has no confirmation of these potential improvements. 
Individual responses to the RFI and the demonstrated capabilities will 
be analyzed to assess the performance, cost and schedule attributes 
needed to procure an improved capability. The Army methodology used to 
determine the capability tradeoffs is consistent with the methodology 
used during the AAS AOA and validated by the AAS AOA Senior Advisory 
Group. The RFI and flight demonstration are not source selection 
activities; they are intended to gather information so that the Army 
can determine what level of capability is attainable with available 
technology.

    76. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, how will the Army determine if the 
AAS materiel solution is deemed unaffordable and is terminated?
    Mr. Kendall. The Armed Aerial Scout program has not advanced beyond 
the material alternatives analysis phase. Ongoing analysis, subsequent 
to the formal Analysis of Alternatives, is further examining cost and 
performance estimates. The Army will make an affordability decision as 
part of the capabilities determination decision at the end of the 
market research effort.

                              f-16 upgrade
    77. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, is the F-16 upgrade being treated 
as one major program (ACAT 1C) or is the avionic upgrade and SLEP a 
separate ACAT program?
    Mr. Kendall. The fiscal year 2013 President's budget established F-
16 Legacy SLEP and Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suite (CAPES) 
as two distinct, separate programs. SLEP is focused on structurally 
extending the life of the airframe. CAPES' purpose is to enhance 
capability of the aircraft as a weapon system. The Legacy SLEP program, 
which began its full-scale durability testing effort in fiscal year 
2011, is a pre-Milestone B program that will be classified as an ACAT 
III. CAPES, a pre-Milestone B effort initiated in fiscal year 2012, is 
likely to be classified as an ACAT II.

    78. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, will the avionic associate with 
the F-16 SLEP, will they be treated as government-furnished equipment 
(GFE), or will the prime handle the upgrade?
    Mr. Kendall. The Air Force Acquisition Strategy Panel will meet 
mid-May 2012 to recommend the formal acquisition strategy to the 
Program Executive Officer, which will include a determination on the 
prime integrator strategy. The avionics associated with the F-16 SLEP 
is referred to as CAPES. CAPES is an umbrella name for four independent 
hardware acquisition programs bundled together for Block 42/50/52 
aircraft. The four programs are Active Electronically Scanned Array 
(AESA) fire control radar, Center Display Unit (CDU), ALQ-213 
Electronic Warfare (EW) system, and Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) 
receiver. Out of these four programs, three programs--CDU, ALQ-213, and 
IBS--are expected to be procured as GFE via existing DOD contracts with 
other Air Force organizations.

    79. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, I understand that the Air Force is 
determining the life cycle costs for the F-16 upgrade; what is the CAPE 
for the overall F-16 upgrade?
    Mr. Kendall. The F-16 upgrade program is comprised of two distinct, 
separate programs: Legacy SLEP and CAPES. Given that SLEP is ACAT III 
and CAPES is ACAT II, CAPE cost estimates are not required for these 
programs.
    The fiscal year 2013 President's budget reflects the latest 
estimate for the programs. However, to support the Milestone B 
decisions in calendar year 2013 for each program, the F-16 Program 
Office will update their estimates for both CAPES and Legacy SLEP. 
Additionally, the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency will develop a Non-
Advocate Cost Assessment (NACA) estimate for both programs.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown
             acquisition and deployment of defense systems
    80. Senator Brown. Mr. Kendall, does the acquisition and deployment 
of area defense systems remain important to U.S. defense strategy, 
especially in regions where our potential adversaries possess 
significant armored or maritime forces?
    Mr. Kendall. Area defense systems do remain important to the U.S. 
defense strategy. The Department is always reviewing current systems 
against emerging technologies and threats to determine what 
improvements can or should be made to existing systems and where the 
Department needs to look at new acquisitions, including in regions 
where potential adversaries possess significant armored or maritime 
forces.

                          sensor-fuzed weapon
    81. Senator Brown. Mr. Kendall, if international advocacy groups 
are successful in breaking the supply chain for the Sensor-Fuzed 
Weapon, what are the materiel, cost, and humanitarian implications for 
U.S. contingency planning and warfighting strategy in the Korean 
Peninsula and Persian Gulf regions?
    Mr. Kendall. I am aware of the movement to impact the supply chain 
of the Sensor-Fuzed Weapon and other weapons that are considered 
cluster munitions under some definitions, however to my knowledge the 
Department has not conducted an analysis of the impact this would have 
in Korean Peninsula or Persian Gulf scenarios. The Department assesses 
a range of future scenarios in order to evaluate the ability of 
programmed forces to accomplish key missions. These assessments include 
evaluations of programmed stocks of munitions. The Department's current 
view is that the inventory of Sensor-Fuzed Weapons is sufficient to 
meet requirements. Although the Department is not currently procuring 
Sensor-Fuzed Weapon, the production line remains open in fulfillment of 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). If the supply chain were disrupted, the 
Department would not be able to restock its current inventory, and if 
the inventory were exhausted, the Department might be forced to use 
less effective unitary weapons which could result in more collateral 
damage than the use of Sensor-Fuzed Weapons.

    82. Senator Brown. Mr. Kendall, what would the implications be for 
U.S. allies that have current, pending, and prospective FMS agreements 
with our Government?
    Mr. Kendall. The Department has not identified any potential 
alternatives for U.S. allies should the United States be unable to 
produce the Sensor Fuzed Weapon.

    83. Senator Brown. Mr. Kendall, is DOD equipped to counter such 
campaigns, whether it is the current one against the Sensor-Fuzed 
Weapon or a looming one against armed drones? If so, how is DOD doing 
this?
    Mr. Kendall. The Department is aware of campaigns which have the 
potential to curtail the availability of needed warfighting 
capabilities. Protecting the U.S. Government's national security 
interest in retaining access to genuinely needed capabilities requires 
DOD to collaborate effectively with other executive branch agencies and 
Congress and to keep the public and media informed of the arguments 
against well meant constraints that might in fact have negative and 
even unintended consequences that are counter to the goals of the 
people mounting the campaign. The Department must ensure that it 
thoroughly understands potential risks and communicates those risks to 
interagency partners, industry, and to the media and public.

    84. Senator Brown. Mr. Kendall, many of DOD's current inventories 
of weapons do not meet the DOD policy of less than 1 percent unexploded 
ordnance. Since the policy states that non-compliant weapons will not 
be employed after 2018, please explain DOD's plans and programs (to 
include budget lines and funding profiles) to replace or upgrade these 
weapons.
    Mr. Kendall. It is my understanding that the Department has one 
current program of record to upgrade a system to comply with the DOD 
Cluster Munition policy. The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System 
(GMLRS) Alternative Warhead (AW) is a precision-guided, area 
suppression weapon system that will replace existing inventories of 
dual-purpose, improved conventional munition (DPICM) rockets with a DOD 
Cluster Munition policy-compliant system. The GMLRS AW will achieve an 
initial operational capability in early 2017. The GMLRS AW is fully 
funded with $159.6 million programmed for development and AW will be 
integrated into the GMLRS rocket production line in 2016 with a 
remaining $1.35 billion programmed for procurement through 2022 in 
order to achieve a GMLRS Army Procurement Objective (APO) of 43,560 
rockets.
    The Department is examining other potential efforts including 
policy-compliant replacements for 155mm DPICM projectiles and Army 
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Anti-Personnel/Anti-Material (APAM) 
missiles; and an upgrade to the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) program 
JSOW-A variant to replace non-compliant sub-munitions with an alternate 
warhead.

    85. Senator Brown. Mr. Kendall, can you reaffirm the U.S. position 
that the BLU-108 is the submunition of the Sensor-Fuzed Weapon, because 
it is a conventional munition released by a cluster munition and 
functions by detonating an explosive charge before impact?
    Mr. Kendall. The Department has assigned a Bomb Live Unit (BLU) 
designation to the Sensor Fuzed Weapon submunition, which is the BLU-
108. The BLU designation identifies a component of a U.S. cluster 
munition as a submunition. The Department has not assigned a BLU, or 
similar, designation to any other component of the Sensor Fuzed Weapon. 
Therefore the U.S. position is that the BLU-108 is the Sensor Fuzed 
Weapon submunition.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
                    contracting with rosoboronexport
    86. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, are you aware of Rosoboronexport's 
activities in Syria and how that company, which is affiliated with the 
Russian Government, has continued to arm the Assad regime and enable 
that regime's murder of its own citizens?
    Mr. Kendall. It is my understanding that Rosoboronexport is a state 
run corporation of the Russian Government and that Russian Government 
policy has been to support the Assad regime. It is also my 
understanding that Russia remains a top supplier of weapons to Syria. 
For example, recent press articles report that several cargo ships used 
by Rosoboronexport have delivered cargo to Syria. Other press reporting 
indicates that Rosoboronexport signed a deal with the Syrian Government 
in January to sell 36 military aircraft.

    87. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, what business is DOD conducting 
with Rosoboronexport?
    Mr. Kendall. Rosoboronexport is a Russian Federation state-owned 
enterprise which, under Russian law, has authority over export of Mi-17 
aircraft that are purchased for military use. DOD has procured Mi-17 
aircraft for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) including spare 
parts for maintenance, and engineering support services from 
Rosoboronexport. This procurement includes technical documentation 
which is available only through Rosoboronexport. This procurement 
supports the U.S. strategy to build the Afghan Air Force and thus 
facilitate a transition to ANSF taking full responsibility for the 
security of Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

    88. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, is it correct that DOD is 
purchasing helicopters from Rosoboronexport for use in Afghanistan?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes, the United States directly purchases Mi-17s 
through Rosoboronexport. Under Russian law, Rosoboronexport is the 
Russian Federation, state-owned, sole entity controlling export of 
military use Mi-17 helicopters. The Army entered into a contract for 21 
Mi-17 helicopters in May 2011. Fifteen of the 21 have been delivered to 
Afghanistan compliant to all contract terms; the remainder will be 
delivered in late June. The contract includes purchase of spare parts 
and engineering support service and an option line for 12 attrition 
replacement aircraft, if needed.

    89. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, do you believe it is appropriate 
to be paying taxpayers' dollars to a Russian company that is arming 
Assad and enabling his murder of over 8,000 civilians?
    Mr. Kendall. While I have not been involved in the administration's 
deliberations over policy towards Syria, it is my understanding that 
the U.S. Government has repeatedly made it clear to senior Russian 
leaders that it does not support Russian arms shipments to the Assad 
regime while the regime engages in violence against the Syrian people. 
I believe that the contractual arrangement with the Russian company 
Rosoboronexport to procure and support ANSF helicopters reflects the 
Department's commitment to balance between the two national security 
priorities of equipping the ANSF with the necessary equipment to 
transition security responsibilities, and finding ways to isolate the 
Assad regime in Damascus.

                          joint strike fighter
    90. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, in your answers to the advance 
policy questions, you state that DOD remains committed to the JSF 
program, and you describe the JSF as a ``critical capability''. Why do 
you believe the JSF is a critical capability?
    Mr. Kendall. Dominance in the air is an essential element of U.S. 
military power. Control of the air is a warfighting capability in which 
the United States cannot accept parity. The fifth generation 
capabilities that the F-35 will provide are essential to accomplishing 
many of the primary missions identified in the National Security 
Strategy. The F-35 will provide the United States with a dominant 
capability in this domain for decades to come.

    91. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, do you agree with the Air Force 
Chief of Staff that the Russians and Chinese are working on their own 
fifth generation fighter capabilities?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes.

    92. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, for our country, is there a fifth 
generation alternative to the JSF?
    Mr. Kendall. No. There is no fifth generation alternative to the 
JSF that provides all three Services the stealth technology, advanced 
sensing, and networked engagement capabilities from flexible basing 
options that the three variants of the F-35 will provide.

    93. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, understanding that procurement 
levels will impact unit cost, what steps are you taking to keep 
international partners committed to the program?
    Mr. Kendall. The Department maintains regular contact with the 
international partner countries at various levels of their respective 
Ministries of Defense. I am routinely in contact with my counterparts 
concerning the F-35 program. The F-35 Program is structured with 
governance boards at various levels that facilitate open dialogue and 
information sharing. The Joint Executive Steering Board (JESB) is a 
forum at the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) level where 
International Partner procurement plans are reviewed and finalized on a 
semi-annual basis. At the JESB, International Partners are provided 
detailed and transparent insight into program health and progress 
metrics. I also chair the F-35 Chief Executive Officer conference which 
includes discussion and dialogue with all partners at the National 
Armament Director level, as well as bi-lateral discussions with 
individual partners on an as needed basis. Earlier this year the 
Department provided the partners a thorough and objective assessment of 
the impacts and outcomes of the revised procurement profile in the 
fiscal year 2013 President's Budget. Additionally, the F-35 Program 
Office is staffed with military officers from each of the partner 
countries and as such is in daily communication concerning all aspects 
of the program ranging from requirements, to development schedule, to 
procurement plans. I believe that maintaining open lines of 
communications with the partners is critical to the success of the 
program and if confirmed I will make open communications with the 
partners a high priority.

    94. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, if the decision were made to 
cancel the JSF, what would be the cost of operating and maintaining the 
legacy aircraft fleet that the JSF is going to replace?
    Mr. Kendall. The JSF is scheduled to replace the AV-8B, F/A-18A-D, 
F-16, and A-10 for the U.S. Services. A portion of the F/A-18A-D and F-
16 fleet is already planned for service life extensions to meet force 
structure requirements. If the JSF were canceled, the Services would 
have to assess the possibility of additional service life extensions, 
but there are practical limits to the degree to which that can even be 
considered. For many of those aircraft with excessive flight hours, 
extending service life would not be an option, and they would have to 
be retired. If JSF were to be canceled the Department would have to 
start other modernization programs to develop one or more fifth 
generation aircraft and the right comparison would be those programs 
and the completion of JSF. In my view, both the delay in obtaining JSF-
like capabilities and the cost of new developments would be 
prohibitive. The cancelation of JSF is not under consideration.

    95. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, over the same period of time, how 
does this compare to the JSF operations and sustainment costs?
    Mr. Kendall. Maintaining the current high performance aircraft 
fleet until 2065 is not a viable option so it isn't meaningful to make 
the requested comparison. While service life extensions are planned for 
some legacy aircraft, it is simply not possible that their service life 
could be extended out to the 2065 timeframe the F-35 is planned to 
operate. Service life constraints will result in the bulk of those 
aircraft having to retire before that timeframe elapses.

    96. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, what investments have been made in 
the development and design of the F-35 to reduce operations and 
sustainment costs over the life of the program?
    Mr. Kendall. From the outset, the F-35 has been designed with 
supportability and affordability as major tenets of the Program; the 
result of which is an overall air system designed to offer greater 
availability and smaller logistics footprint. Within the air vehicle, 
systems including sustainable low-observable coatings as well as a 
prognostic health management system are both examples which will offer 
increased maintainability and availability. Within the sustainment 
system, the commonality of spares between variants and the training 
system were designed to offer significant through-life costs savings. 
Also, as the design continues through the System Design and Development 
phase opportunities for reducing through-life costs continue to be 
investigated. Of 122 current affordability initiatives being pursued 
through production, there are approximately 38 that will have improved 
life cycle cost impacts.
    The F-35 JPO is also currently implementing an affordability 
strategy for which it is developing an Affordability Management Plan 
focused on: reducing the costs of support products such as support 
equipment, spare parts and training devices; base-lining requirements 
with the Services and leveraging increased efficiency opportunities 
provided by F-35; and addressing reliability and maintainability. The 
JPO is creating contract and pricing opportunities to reduce the cost 
of the JSF support products by leveraging economic order quantity buys 
for spare parts in conjunction with production buys, and implementing 
pricing improvement curves that leverage learning opportunities. By 
creating a common sustainment baseline harnessing the F-35 support 
system design, the JPO is attempting to optimize the level of 
infrastructure and products required to support operations of the 
global fleet. By optimizing the amount of equipment procured early the 
Department will be able to affect the through life O&S Costs. In 
parallel, the program office is addressing the reliability and 
maintainability of systems/subsystems and components; where they fall 
short of meeting their design specifications, the implementation of 
appropriate modifications will enable the Department to control cost 
growth.
    Specifically, in 2011 the JPO implemented a number of technical 
changes and affordability initiatives which resulted in an over $30 
billion reduction, in base year 2002 dollars, in the 2011 O&S estimate 
which helped to offset externally-driven increases in areas such as 
military and contractor labor rates. Additionally, the JPO conducted 
sustainment baseline deep dives into support equipment, spares, and 
manpower, as well as the initial phase of a business case analysis on 
supply chain management, field operations, sustaining engineering, and 
fleet management.
    The 2012 efforts include a manpower review into the appropriate 
labor mix and contractor rates, a review of competitive options for the 
long-term provision of support equipment and spares, enterprise 
software licensing, engine life improvements, reprogramming laboratory 
requirements, and additional Service planning factors such as aircraft 
utilization rates, contingency planning, and squadron manning 
requirements.

                 cost-plus versus fixed-price contracts
    97. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, I believe we should minimize using 
cost-plus contracts to procure major weapons systems. In most cases, by 
the time DOD is ready to produce major systems at a low rate, enough 
development risk should have been burned off that contractors should be 
ready to sign a fixed-price contract. Otherwise, cost-plus contracts 
should be used for only those pieces where significant risk is left 
over. This is the thrust of the amendment on cost-plus contracting I 
offered with Senator McCain last year in connection with the NDAA for 
Fiscal Year 2012. What is your view of this issue?
    Mr. Kendall. I generally agree, but I believe the Department needs 
the latitude to make exceptions when merited. The Department should 
minimize the use of cost-plus arrangements under production contracts 
for major weapon systems. Once a program has completed low rate initial 
production the Department's contracts for major weapon systems should 
be firm fixed priced.
    I believe there are circumstances, however, where the Department 
cannot adequately reduce the risk in the low rate initial production 
phase and therefore a form of cost reimbursable contract may be 
appropriate for early production. This could be the case when accepting 
the risk of concurrency and early transition to production is the best 
course of action due to an urgent operational need. Another 
circumstance that might warrant use of a cost-type contract would be 
where the Department requires the contractor to deliver a production 
unit for operational evaluation as a risk reduction measure. For some 
products such as first in class ships and some satellites, the first 
production unit is also the first prototype unit and there is no 
opportunity for the design to be verified through the testing of 
developmental preproduction prototypes.
    In general, however, I am inclined to use firm fixed-price 
contracts for low-rate initial production when the design is stable, 
performance has been demonstrated with production representative 
prototypes, production processes are mature, and the costs are 
reasonably predictable. I have been emphasizing the use of fixed price 
incentive contracts when there is marginally more risk associated with 
production processes and costs, but not risk that can efficiently be 
mitigated by delaying the start of production.
    Optimally structuring acquisition programs is a complicated matter 
that requires sound professional judgment to balance all the competing 
demands, and unfortunately there is no single approach that is 
universally applicable. If confirmed, I would be happy to work with the 
committee on this subject.

    98. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, do you support the floor amendment 
Senator McCain and I offered last year, S.A. 1249?
    Mr. Kendall. I believe that decisions about the appropriate 
contract type to use on a given contract should be made on a case-by-
case basis after a careful examination of the circumstances of the 
program, including the nature of the system being acquired and the risk 
inherent in the program. One of the key aspects of the Better Buying 
Power initiative has been increasing the use of fixed-price type 
contracts, where appropriate. The Department can and is doing more 
fixed-price contracting throughout the acquisition system, particularly 
in the early stages of production. However, I believe it is critical 
that the Department retain the discretion to select the contract type 
most appropriate for the work being performed. I am not personally in 
favor of any provision that would completely prohibit the Department's 
use of cost-type contracts for the production of all major defense 
acquisition programs (MDAPs). I believe that the Department should have 
the latitude to use cost-type contracts during low rate initial 
production of an MDAP, or for some contracts for development of 
incremental improvements to an MDAP entered into after the MDAP has 
passed into the production phase of the program. If confirmed, I am 
committed to working with the committee on this issue.

                         money flow to enemies
    99. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, last year, Senator Brown and I 
introduced legislation that was incorporated into section 841 of the 
NDAA. The intent of this legislation was to make it easier to stop the 
flow of money when it is discovered that U.S. contracting dollars are 
inadvertently being diverted to our enemies. Have these new authorities 
been helpful?
    Mr. Kendall. DOD implemented section 841 on January 26th in Class 
Deviation 2012-O0005--Prohibition on Contracting with the Enemy and 
Access to Contractor and Subcontractor Records in the U.S. Central 
Command (CENTCOM) Theater of Operations. This provides contracting 
officers the tool to take immediate action upon the enemy 
identification by the CENTCOM commander. The CENTCOM is currently 
finalizing the enemy identification process. I am confident that this 
authority will help the Department significantly; however the 
Department has not yet exercised this authority enough to determine how 
positive the impact will be.

    100. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, how many companies or individuals 
have been suspended or debarred since using these new authorities?
    Mr. Kendall. Suspension and debarment are not remedies directly 
provided in the legislation. Rather, section 841 authorizes the head of 
the contracting activity to restrict the award of contracts, grants, or 
cooperative agreements; to terminate for default; or to void a 
contract, grant or cooperative agreement. The authorities provided are 
still in the process of full implementation and they are expected to be 
valuable tools to stop the flow of money to our enemies.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
                   cyber and intelligence acquisition
    101. Senator Graham. Mr. Kendall, recognizing the budget challenges 
faced by DOD, how do you plan to further leverage base realignment and 
closure (BRAC) investments in the Services' joint command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) organizations such as 
Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) Systems Center Atlantic?
    Mr. Kendall. BRAC enables the Department to reconfigure its 
infrastructure to match the demands of leaner, more flexible forces and 
to accommodate the changing strategic emphasis. It is an important tool 
for the Department to use to make the tough fiscal choices necessitated 
by current budget challenges.
    If Congress does authorize the requested BRAC rounds, the 
Department will undertake the BRAC rounds in accordance with the 
statutory directive to consider all installations equally and make 
decisions based on 20-year force structure plan and statutory selection 
criteria which give primary consideration to military value. At this 
point there are no specific closures or consolidations planned.

    102. Senator Graham. Mr. Kendall, how would you approach the 
acquisition process for rapidly changing technologies, such as cyber 
and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), versus those that remain 
relatively constant and mature over long periods of time such as 
airplanes, ships, and automotive land vehicles?
    Mr. Kendall. There are unique characteristics associated with the 
efficient and effective acquisition of Cyber and C4ISR capabilities. In 
order to maximize the operational benefit of the rapidly changing 
technologies associated with these types of programs, the Department 
must use tailored approaches. To keep pace with technology, C4ISR 
programs generally use an iterative, incremental approach that can 
deploy capability quickly. This approach must be based on well defined 
increments of capability that are developed, tested, and often fielded 
in increments structured around 1 to 2 year software builds. The 
Department intends to incorporate this approach as one of the 
acquisition approaches covered by the new DOD Instruction 5000.02 which 
is currently in development.
    Regarding cyber technologies, on March 22, the Department also 
submitted a Report to Congress pursuant to section 933 of 2011 NDAA 
which articulated a new strategy for acquiring cyberspace warfare 
capabilities. Agility and rapidity must characterize cyber 
acquisitions. The new cyber framework allows for alternative 
acquisition processes, identified as ``rapid'' and ``deliberate''. 
These processes will be tailored to the complexity, cost, urgency of 
need and fielding timelines associated with the cyber warfare 
capability being acquired. As cost increases and operational immediacy 
and the tolerance for risk decreases, more disciplined acquisition 
strategies will be employed.

                      common data link procurement
    103. Senator Graham. Mr. Kendall, for several years, congressional 
defense committees have expressed concern that proprietary terminal 
control interfaces are inhibiting competition in CDL procurement, with 
potential missed cost savings opportunities and foregone capabilities. 
DOD has been urged to preserve options for competitive sourcing of CDL 
systems and to advise program offices responsible for CDL procurement 
of the need for competition. What is the status of DOD's efforts to 
enhance competition in CDL acquisition?
    Mr. Kendall. This problem was first brought to my attention by 
industry which I believe has a valid concern. My understanding is that 
the Department was not effective in implementing open CDL systems free 
from proprietary constraints. At my direction, the Department is 
evaluating CDL system acquisition practices with a focus on several 
areas to improve competition. The first area is to have processes to 
make certain that no vendor proprietary or undocumented interfaces are 
being cited as requirements or included as evaluation criteria in the 
Department's CDL system solicitations. The second area is to ensure 
that as DOD advances its CDL standards, the Department maintains a 
broad industry base from which it seeks innovations. Finally when CDL 
systems are procured as a subsystem within a platform, DOD wants 
confidence that when the prime vendor investigates suitable sources for 
CDL compliant systems these vendors are thoroughly considering all 
suppliers. Industry inputs and suggestions for improvement are being 
sought as part of this evaluation.

    104. Senator Graham. Mr. Kendall, since the beginning of fiscal 
year 2012, have any CDL contracts been awarded which were not proceeded 
by a full and open competition, and if so, why?
    Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that no contracts have been 
awarded since the beginning of fiscal year 2012 to acquire CDL systems, 
either sole-source or competitively.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
               syria and contracting with rosoboronexport
    105. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that the Assad 
regime has committed acts of mass murder against its own people during 
the Syrian uprisings that began in March 2011?
    Mr. Kendall. I am deeply concerned about the situation in Syria and 
about the human rights abuses that are occurring there. The situation 
is tragic for the people of Syria and for the region. I am not in a 
position at this time to pass judgment on whether the acts of the Assad 
regime constitute mass murder. However, I agree that the Assad regime's 
actions should be strongly condemned, and that serious violations of 
international law very likely have occurred.

    106. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you believe these actions also 
constitute crimes against humanity?
    Mr. Kendall. I believe that the actions of the Assad regime are 
outrageous. There is no question that violence towards the people of 
Syria has been brutal and devastating. It is my view that the Assad 
regime has lost its legitimacy and that Assad should go. I have to 
defer, however, to the Department of State on specific judgments as to 
whether these actions constitute crimes against humanity.

    107. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware of 
Rosoboronexport's history of arms sales to Syria?
    Mr. Kendall. I am not familiar with all of the transactions between 
Rosoboronexport and Syria, but I am aware that Russia is the top 
supplier of weapons to Syria and that Rosoboronexport is the state run 
export corporation for the Russian Government.

    108. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that the U.S. 
Government has sanctioned Rosoboronexport in the past for providing 
illicit support to Iran's military?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes, I am aware of the State Department sanctions 
against Rosoboronexport that were in place until late spring 2010. The 
Department's efforts to acquire and support Afghan Mi-series aircraft 
were shaped to abide by the sanctions.

    109. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that this firm has 
continued to supply weapons to Syria during the crackdown?
    Mr. Kendall. It is my understanding that the Russian Government has 
continued to supply Syria with weapons and supplies throughout the 
current uprising, and that Rosoboronexport, the state-run Russian 
export corporation, has facilitated these transactions.

    110. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, what types and quantities of 
weapons has Rosoboronexport delivered to Syria, directly or indirectly, 
since the Syrian uprisings began in March 2011?
    Mr. Kendall. I am not familiar with all of the transactions between 
Rosoboronexport and Syria, but I am aware of press reporting on recent 
Russian arms deliveries to Syria. Russia has a series of ongoing 
contracts to provide Syria with advanced conventional weapons.

    111. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you have concerns about DOD's 
ongoing business dealings with Rosoboronexport? If so, what are those 
concerns?
    Mr. Kendall. In my role as Acting Under Secretary, I have been 
working to ensure that the purchases of Russian-origin equipment are 
carried out consistent with U.S. laws and with sound acquisition 
practices. Rosoboronexport has an obligation to deliver the remaining 
Mi-17 helicopters ordered for the ANSF on schedule, within the budget, 
and in the mission-ready configuration as specified in the contract. I 
am also concerned about Russia's provision of arms to the Assad regime 
at a time when they are perpetrating brutal violence against their own 
people.

    112. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, which other Russian entities have 
transferred weapons to Syria since the Syrian uprisings began in March 
2011?
    Mr. Kendall. It is my understanding that Rosoboronexport, as 
Russia's state-authorized exporter of military use equipment and 
technology, is responsible for weapon contracts with Syria. I cannot 
rule out the possibility that other Russian-connected entities have 
also been involved.

    113. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, what types and quantities of 
weapons have these entities delivered during that time?
    Mr. Kendall. I am not familiar with all of the transactions between 
Rosoboronexport and Syria, or of what transactions with other Russian 
entities may have occurred. I am aware of reporting in the press of 
Russian transfers of air defense weapons as well as small arms to the 
Syrian regime.

    114. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, President Obama stated on 
February 3, 2011, that: ``Assad must halt his campaign of killing and 
crimes against his own people now. . . . The suffering citizens of 
Syria must know: we are with you, and the Assad regime must come to an 
end.'' Do you agree with President Obama's statement?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes.

    115. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that Russian arms 
transfers to the Assad regime have been a key enabler of that regime 
maintaining power in Syria?
    Mr. Kendall. I believe that support for the Assad regime from 
Russia and other nations has been significant in its ability to 
maintain power. Any transfer of weapons to the regime from sources 
outside of Syria could help the regime maintain power.

    116. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that the United 
States has an obligation to use all of its leverage to pressure Russia 
and Russian entities to end their support of the Assad regime?
    Mr. Kendall. I support the U.S. Government's decision to pressure 
the Russians through diplomatic channels to help end the violence in 
Syria with a view to a transition of power.

    117. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that DOD has the 
ability to sever all current contractual relationships with 
Rosoboronexport?
    Mr. Kendall. The Department always retains the right to terminate 
any of its contracts. The contract with Rosoboronexport can be 
terminated, however, the United States currently benefits from this 
relationship in two ways. First, the Department is assured of proper 
Mi-17 delivery and support to the Afghan Air Force that enables Partner 
Nation Capability and a timely U.S. withdrawal. Second, the Department 
will obtain accurate engineering information for this aircraft to 
ensure safe air operations for the Afghans as well as for U.S. aircrews 
and passengers when they are onboard these aircraft.

    118. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that continuing to 
do business with Rosoboronexport undermines U.S. policy regarding 
Syria?
    Mr. Kendall. I believe the U.S. Government must carefully balance 
its national security objectives in its dealings with other nations. 
DOD's business with Rosoboronexport is strictly limited to acquiring 
Mi-17 helicopters and sustainment packages for the ANSF. In addition, 
the United States has other interactions with the Russian Government on 
a range of issues that are critical to U.S. national security and the 
mission in Afghanistan.

    119. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, who in the administration 
directed that procurement of Mi-17 helicopters must be done using 
Rosoboronexport as broker?
    Mr. Kendall. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), Dr. Ashton B. Carter, designated 
the Army as the Lead Service for Mi-17 and other non-standard rotary 
wing aircraft in January 2010. The need for these aircraft was 
documented by the Combined Airpower Transition Force/438th 
Expeditionary Wing to support development of an Afghan National Army 
Air Corps (later renamed the Afghan Air Force) capable of sustaining 
long-term security needs of Afghanistan and enabling the U.S. exit 
strategy.
    Prior to May 2010, U.S. efforts to provide and support Mi-17s were 
constrained to purchases of civilian-variant Mi-aircraft in a world 
marketplace, necessitating costly modifications and severe flight 
limitations due to a lack of comprehensive engineering data that slowed 
the stand-up of Afghan capability. From August to December 2010, 
discussions with the Russian Government established that 
Rosoboronexport is the sole entity controlling export of military-use 
Mi-17 helicopters and the Russian manufacturer is the only source of 
complete engineering data. Diplomatic avenues were used to confirm 
these facts. This situation led USD(AT&L) to transfer procurement 
responsibility for 21 Mi-17s from the Naval Air Systems Command to the 
Army in December 2010.
    In compliance with title 10 U.S.C. section 2304(c)(7) and the FAR 
6.302-7, the Secretary of the Army (as Agency Head) authorized award of 
a contract for the required aircraft based on the public interest 
exception to full and open competition. The Secretary's decision was 
based on the need to provide a familiar aircraft to the Afghans to 
support the war effort and the demonstrated capability of the Mi-17 to 
meet the robust requirements of operations in Afghanistan. The 
congressional defense committees were notified, consistent with the 
statute, prior to contract award.

    120. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, the June 1, 2011, Army contract 
was a no-bid contract. What justification existed for not awarding this 
contract through an open and competitive selection process?
    Mr. Kendall. In compliance with title 10 U.S.C. section 2304(c)(7) 
and the FAR 6.302-7, the Secretary of the Army (as Agency Head) 
authorized award of a contract for the required aircraft based on the 
public interest exception to full and open competition. The Secretary's 
decision was based on the need to provide a familiar aircraft to the 
Afghans to support the war effort and the demonstrated capability of 
the Mi-17 to meet the robust requirements of operations in Afghanistan. 
The congressional defense committees were notified, consistent with the 
statute, prior to contract award.

    121. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that the Obama 
administration's policy of trying to reset bilateral relations with 
Russia was a major factor in the decision to award this June 1, 2011, 
no-bid contract to Rosoboronexport, a state-controlled firm that is 
essentially an arm of the Russian Government?
    Mr. Kendall. No. The Department initiated discussions with the 
Russian Federation following the lifting of sanctions in 2010 for the 
primary purpose of obtaining access to authentic engineering data to 
support Mi-17 airworthiness. At that time, the Navy was processing a 
procurement action for additional aircraft. During discussions, the 
Russian authorities raised the issue that exports of aircraft for 
military use must be conducted within Russian law, an interpretation 
that was potentially inconsistent with any contract action that 
involved export of either civilian or military aircraft from Russia, if 
the Russians judged the end use to be military. From August to December 
2010, discussions with the Russian Government established that 
Rosoboronexport is the sole entity controlling export of military-use 
Mi-17 helicopters and the Russian manufacturer is the only source of 
complete engineering data. Diplomatic avenues were used to confirm 
these facts. This situation led USD(AT&L) to transfer procurement 
responsibility for 21 Mi-17s from the Naval Air Systems Command to the 
Army in December 2010.
    In compliance with title 10 U.S.C. section 2304(c)(7) and the FAR 
6.302-7, the Secretary of the Army (as Agency Head) authorized award of 
a contract for the required aircraft based on the public interest 
exception to full and open competition. The Secretary's decision was 
based on the need to provide a familiar aircraft to the Afghans to 
support the war effort and the demonstrated capability of the Mi-17 to 
meet the robust requirements of operations in Afghanistan. The 
congressional defense committees were notified consistent with the 
stature prior to contract award.

    122. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that 
Rosoboronexport is not the actual manufacturer of Mi-17 helicopters, 
but only a broker?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes. In meetings with the Russian Federal Service for 
Military-Technical Cooperation, U.S. representatives were advised that 
Mi-17 aircraft purchased for military end-use can only be purchased 
from the Russian Federation's state-owned enterprise, Rosoboronexport. 
Rosoboronexport and the prime aircraft manufacturer, Kazan, 
participated in subsequent contract negotiations.

    123. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, when will delivery of the initial 
21 Mi-17 helicopters procured under the June 1, 2011, Army contract be 
completed?
    Mr. Kendall. Fifteen of the 21 aircraft have been delivered in 
Afghanistan to the Afghan Air Force. The remaining six aircraft are on 
schedule to be delivered at the end of June.

    124. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, under the June 1, 2011, Army 
contract with Rosoboronexport for the purchase of 21 Mi-17 helicopters 
and spare parts, has the $550 million option for additional Mi-17s been 
exercised? If so, on what date was it exercised?
    Mr. Kendall. The option contract line item provides for up to 12 
aircraft at a range of pre-negotiated prices that depend on the desired 
delivery date. Two aircraft with initial spares, tools, and technical 
publication support were ordered for $33.4 million in February to 
replace two aircraft destroyed in accidents. The NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan has also identified the need for 10 aircraft to replace Mi-
17s that are nearing their life limited flight hours. The DOD 
Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council, established in compliance with 
congressional direction, has reviewed and approved NTM-A's request and 
funding source. Exercise of the 10 aircraft option, including initial 
spares, tools, and technical publications is planned for fourth quarter 
fiscal year 2012 at a projected price of $184.3 million.
    The $550 million cost cited in the question is the ceiling price 
for the entire contract, including the 21 aircraft baseline and the 12-
aircraft option.

    125. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, if the option has not been 
exercised yet, does DOD/Army intend to exercise it? If so, what is the 
approximate timeframe for that?
    Mr. Kendall. The option contract line item provides for up to 
twelve aircraft at pre-negotiated prices. Two aircraft were ordered in 
February this year to replace two aircraft destroyed in accidents. The 
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan identified funding for ten aircraft 
to replace Mi-17s that are nearing their life limited flight hours. The 
DOD Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council, established in compliance 
with congressional direction, has reviewed and approved NTM-A's 
request. Exercise of the option for the 10 is planned for fourth 
quarter of fiscal year 2012.

    126. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, once delivery of the last of the 
initial 21 aircraft to be procured under this contract is complete, how 
many additional Mi-17s does DOD/Army anticipate needing to buy in order 
to round out the Afghan rotary aircraft requirement?
    Mr. Kendall. Delivery of the 21 aircraft meets the planned 
inventory requirement for the Afghan Air Force, although 2 crash-
damaged aircraft are scheduled to be replaced. Additionally, the Afghan 
Air Interdiction Unit, which is being transformed to a Special 
Operations Unit, also operates 30 Mi-17 aircraft. No further purchases 
are planned at this time to increase total inventory for either unit, 
but procurements will be needed to sustain both inventory levels and 
possibly to facilitate the new Special Operations Unit. Sustaining 
inventory levels require additional aircraft procurement because Mi-17s 
must be overhauled at a depot at specific flight hour limits and the 
number of overhauls is limited. Replacement aircraft are, and will be 
needed for aircraft that have no further flight hour availability. The 
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan recently identified 10 Afghan Air 
Force aircraft for funded replacement. Those 10 plus the 2 crash damage 
replacements can be accommodated using the priced option on the 
existing contract. NTM-A has also proposed alternatives to replace 
aircraft for the Special Operations Unit that are being considered by 
the DOD Afghanistan Resource Oversight Council.

    127. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that we have viable 
alternative routes available to buy these same Mi-17 aircraft, 
notwithstanding any Russian claims to the contrary?
    Mr. Kendall. No, I do not agree that there are viable alternatives. 
It is my understanding that the Department has established, with 
assistance from the diplomatic community, that the Russian assertions 
regarding Rosoboronexport's control over exports of Mi-17 aircraft 
intended for military purposes is part of Russian law. While others may 
be able to purchase Mi-17s, delivery from within the Russian Federation 
could be blocked by Rosoboronexport. More importantly, the United 
States needs access to the prime aircraft manufacturer, Kazan, for 
accurate engineering support and data to ensure safe operations and 
maintenance and airworthiness on behalf of Afghan and U.S. personnel 
that operate, maintain, or are transported on these aircraft.

    128. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that in 2009 the 
Navy legally purchased four of these same dual-use Mi-17 helicopters 
through a private U.S. broker after an open and competitive selection 
process?
    Mr. Kendall. It is my understanding that the Navy purchased two Mi-
8 and two Mi-171 aircraft, which are civilian variants of the Mi-17 on 
a commercial-style (FAR Part 12) contract in 2009. These aircraft were 
subsequently modified to a suitable configuration at an additional cost 
and are in service. The transaction was with a U.S. contractor acting 
as a broker. This Navy contract was awarded prior to the assertions by 
the Russians that exports of such aircraft would be in violation of 
their laws and would be blocked.

    129. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that these four 
helicopters are still flying today, presently in service with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Air Training Command-Afghanistan 
(NATC-A)?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes. The Army Program Manager for Non-Standard Rotary 
Wing Aircraft provides maintenance and engineering support for these 
aircraft. (Please note that the command has been renamed, the NATO 
Training Mission-Afghanistan).

    130. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that, after the 
successful 2009 procurement of Mi-17s, the Navy initiated a similar 
effort to procure 21 additional Mi-17s through an open and competitive 
selection process?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes. The Navy was tasked to procure these aircraft 
prior to the decision to establish the Non-Standard Rotary Wing 
Aircraft Program as a special interest program and the Department asked 
the Navy to continue that activity during the time the Non-Standard 
Rotary Wing Aircraft Program was being staffed and beginning 
operations. Following the May 2010 lifting of sanctions and discussions 
with the Russian Federation that established Rosoboronexport's role 
regarding Mi-17 exports, the USD(AT&L) directed the Navy to cease 
efforts to procure the aircraft and transferred responsibility to the 
Army.

    131. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that, on December 
16, 2010, DOD put an end to that by transferring procurement authority 
for these 21 aircraft from the Navy to the Army?
    Mr. Kendall. Yes. USD(AT&L) transferred procurement responsibility 
for 21 Mi-17s from the Naval Air Systems Command to the Army in 
December 2010. The basis for that decision was a determination, 
confirmed through diplomatic channels, that Rosoboronexport is the sole 
entity controlling export of military-use Mi-17 helicopters and the 
Russian manufacturer is the only source of complete engineering data. 
The planned Naval Air Systems Command contract would not be able to 
resolve the need for complete engineering data.

    132. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, how is a no-bid contract with 
Rosoboronexport preferable to a competitively awarded contract with a 
private U.S. broker?
    Mr. Kendall. On balance, consideration of several criteria resulted 
in contracting with Rosoboronexport. Most importantly, the Department 
gains access to the manufacturer's engineering expertise and direct 
support for determinations regarding the operation, maintenance, and 
airworthiness of these aircraft. Airworthiness considerations for both 
Afghan and U.S. personnel are an imperative consideration.
    A contract with a broker not authorized by the manufacturer 
delivers an airworthy platform but the broker is unable to sustain that 
status lacking access to the manufacturer for the latest safety 
updates. Second, the contract with Rosoboronexport delivers aircraft in 
the desired configuration, modified with certain western equipment to 
facilitate interoperability with U.S. platforms. Deliveries from a 
broker in the past have required subsequent modifications at increased 
cost. Third, the Department's experience is that the product from 
Rosoboronexport is less costly than the total cost of purchases from 
brokers and post-delivery modification, without considering engineering 
support costs. The United States is assured that export of these 
aircraft for their intended military use will not be blocked, which 
could be the case when third parties are involved. Finally, the United 
States was advised that under Russian law, Rosoboronexport is the 
Russian Federation, state-owned, sole entity export of military use Mi-
17 helicopters.

    133. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, at your confirmation hearing, 
Senator Blumenthal asked Dr. Miller about DOD's efforts to find other 
helicopters that could be used, specifically asking if there is ``an 
effort underway in development.'' Dr. Miller responded, ``Senator, yes 
there is.'' Please describe what DOD has previously done and is 
currently doing to find alternatives.
    Mr. Kendall. It is my understanding that the Department has briefed 
key members of the congressional defense committees on a 2010 study led 
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff that 
examined the worldwide need for rotary wing aircraft for Security Force 
Assistance, especially in the instances where Building Partner Nation 
Capacity was involved. The study examined alternatives for meeting 
these requirements, including U.S.-source alternatives. Since this 
study was done, there have already been successes in transitioning some 
Partner Nations to U.S. helicopters; Iraq stands out as an example with 
the purchase of an armed variant of the Bell 407 helicopter. Several 
other U.S. firms offer military helicopters that are potentially 
suitable for Security Force Assistance missions.
    In the case of Afghanistan, the Department has recently delivered 
six MD 530F Helicopters to serve as training aircraft for Afghan forces 
to begin a transition to more sophisticated rotary wing aircraft 
training. But the unique situation there precludes a near-term 
transition to any U.S. alternative to the Mi-17. The referenced study 
did compare a wide range of alternatives; however, the Mi-17 has proven 
superior not only in military and civilian operations in the high 
altitudes and hot temperatures of Afghanistan, but also in terms of 
lower procurement and operating cost. Furthermore, the Mi-17 is 
familiar to the Afghan pilots, aircrews, and maintenance personnel. 
Only a small percentage of the population is literate so recruiting and 
training additional personnel is difficult and transition to a more 
sophisticated western aircraft would entail a transition time that does 
not meet the current strategy.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nomination reference of Hon. Frank Kendall III 
follows:]
                    Nomination Reference and Report
                           As In Executive Session,
                               Senate of the United States,
                                                  January 24, 2012.
    Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee 
on Armed Services:
    Frank Kendall III, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, vice Ashton B. Carter, 
resigned.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The biographical sketch of Hon. Frank Kendall III, which 
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 
referred, follows:]
             Biographical Sketch of Hon. Frank Kendall III
Education:
    Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Sept. 1966 to June 1967
    U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, 1967-1971, B.S., June 1971
    California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 1971-1973, MS, 
Aerospace Engineering, 1972, Aeronautical Engineer Degree, 1974
    Long Island University, C.W. Post Center, 1977-1980, MBA, June 1980
    Georgetown University Law Center, 2000-2003, J.D. Feb. 2004
Employment Record:
    Office of the Secretary of Defense

         Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
        Technology, and Logistics)
         October 2011-Present

    Office of the Secretary of Defense

         Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
        (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)
         March 2010-Present

    Renaissance Strategic Advisors

         Partner
         January 2008-March 2010
         Small aerospace and defense consulting firm focused in 
        the areas of strategic planning, merger and acquisition support 
        and support to start-up aerospace and defense companies

    Self-Employed Attorney

         Consultant (human rights issues)
         Represented individual clients, almost entirely on a 
        pro bono basis and primarily individual asylum cases
         January 2004-March 2010

    Self-Employed Private Consultant

         Independent Consultant
         Served various defense contractors, government 
        organizations, and federally funded laboratories in the areas 
        of technical management, program management, systems 
        engineering, systems analysis, and strategic planning
         January 1999-March 2010
Honors and Awards:
    Federal Civilian Awards:

         Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal
         Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service 
        Medal
         Presidential Rank Award of Distinguished Executive 
        (Senior Executive Service)
         Presidential Rank Award of Meritorious Executive 
        (Senior Executive Service)
         Army Commander's Award for Civilian Service

    Military Awards, U.S. Army:

         Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
         Army Commendation Medal
         National Defense Service Medal

    Other Awards:

         Defense Industrial Preparedness Association Gold Medal
         Rodney Smith Memorial Award for Excellence in 
        Engineering (U.S. Military Academy)
         Four-year ROTC scholarship to Rensselaer Polytechnic 
        Institute (used 1 year of scholarship before attending West 
        Point)
                                 ______
                                 
    [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals 
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions 
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a 
form that details the biographical, financial and other 
information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Frank 
Kendall III in connection with his nomination follows:]
                          UNITED STATES SENATE
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              Room SR-228
                       Washington, DC 20510-6050
                             (202) 224-3871
                    COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
      BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
    Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If 
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the 
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation 
of your answer applies.
                    Part A--Biographical Information
    Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in 
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for 
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in 
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

    1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
    Frank Kendall III.

    2. Position to which nominated:
    Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics), Department of Defense.

    3. Date of nomination:
    January 24, 2012.

    4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
    [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the 
committee's executive files.]

    5. Date and place of birth:
    Pittsfield, MA; January 26, 1949.

    6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
    Married to Eva Elizabeth Halpern.

    7. Names and ages of children:
    Scott McLeod Kendall, 35.
    Eric Sten Kendall, 30.

    8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, 
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
    Pittsfield High School, 1963-1966, H.S. Diploma, June 1966
    Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Sept. 1966 to June 1967
    U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, 1967-1971, B.S., June 1971
    California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 1971-1973, MS, 
Aerospace Engineering, 1972, Aeronautical Engineer Degree, 1974
    Long Island University, C.W. Post Center, 1977-1980, MBA, June 1980
    Georgetown University Law Center, 2000-2003, J.D., Feb. 2004

    9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the 
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of 
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
    October 2011 to Present: Acting Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Department of Defense, 
Pentagon, Washington, DC
    March 2010 to Present: Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Department of Defense, 
Pentagon, Washington, DC
    1999 to March 2010: Private Consultant, self-employed, Falls 
Church, VA. Independent consultant to various defense contractors, 
government organizations, and federally-funded laboratories in the 
areas of technical management, program management, systems engineering, 
systems analysis, and strategic planning.
    2004 to March 2010: Attorney, self-employed, Falls Church, VA. 
Worked as a consultant on human rights issues and represented 
individual clients, almost entirely on a pro bono basis and primarily 
individual asylum cases.
    January 2008 to March 2010: Managing Partner, Renaissance Strategic 
Advisors, Arlington, VA. Partner in a small aerospace and defense 
consulting firm. The firm's work is in the areas of strategic planning, 
merger and acquisition support and support to start-up aerospace and 
defense companies.

    10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, 
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, 
or local governments, other than those listed above.
    1967-1982: Active Duty U.S. Army; left Active Duty with the rank of 
Captain
    1982-1999: U.S. Army Reserve; retired with the rank of Lieutenant 
Colonel
    1982-1986: U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, 
various civil service positions in engineering management and systems 
analysis
    1986-1989: Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Defense 
Systems, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.
    1989-1994: Director of Tactical Warfare Programs, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.
    1994-2004: Member and Vice Chairman, Defense Intelligence Agency 
Science Advisory Board
    1995-2004: Member, Army Science Board
    1995-2009: Consultant on the Defense Science Board on various 
studies
    1998 (approximate) Consultant on the Naval Studies Board
    2010-Present: Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (Acting Under Secretary from 
Oct. 2011 to Present)

    11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an 
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, 
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other 
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    None.

    12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in 
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and 
other organizations.
    Associate member, Sigma Xi, Research Society
    Member, Phi Kappa Phi, Honor Society
    Member, American Bar Association
    Member, Virginia Bar Association
    Member, New York State Bar Association
    Member, Association of the U.S. Army
    Member, Association of Graduates, USMA
    Member, Amnesty International, USA
    Member, Naval Academy Sailing Squadron

    13. Political affiliations and activities:
    (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or 
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
    None.
    (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered 
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 
years.
    Participated as a volunteer in the Obama campaign 2007 to 2008, no 
formal affiliation or position.
    Participated the Democratic Voter Protection program in 2008 
election as a volunteer.
    (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign 
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar 
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
2011:

    Congress

         John Douglas, $500

2010:

    Senate
         Russ Feingold, $250
         Joseph Sestak, $250
         Harry Reid, $250
         Joe Manchin, $250
         Alexander Giannoulias, $250
         Michael Bennett, $250
         Jack Conway, $250

    Other

         Progressives United PAC, $250
         DCCC, $2,000

2008:

    President
         Barack Obama, General, $2,917

    Senate

         Kay Hagen, $1,000
         James Martin, $1,000
         Jeff Merkley, $1,000
         Ronnie Musgrove, $1,000
         Jack Reed, $1,000
         Jeanne Shaheen, $1,000
         Mark Warner, $1,000
         Al Franken, $1,000

    House

         Patrick Murphy, $250
         Sharen Neuhardt, $250

    Other

         DNC, $1,003
         Democratic Party of VA, $1,000

2007

    President

         Barack Obama (primary), $2,300

    House

         Judy Feder, $250
         Patrick Murphy, $250

    14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary 
society memberships, military medals, and any other special 
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Military Awards, U.S. Army:
    Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
    Army Commendation Medal
    National Defense Service Medal
Federal Civilian Awards:
    Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal
    Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Medal
    Presidential Rank Award of Distinguished Executive (Senior 
Executive Service)
    Presidential Rank Award of Meritorious Executive (Senior Executive 
Service)
    Army Commander's Award for Civilian Service
Other Awards:
    Defense Industrial Preparedness Association Gold Medal
    Rodney Smith Memorial Award for Excellence in Engineering (U.S. 
Military Academy)
    Four-year ROTC scholarship to Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
(used 1 year of scholarship before attending West Point)

    15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of 
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have 
written.
    ``The Sentry Ballistic Missile Defense System'' with Mr. Tom 
Purdue, Journal of Defense Research (1982) (classified publication, 
best recollection of title)
    ``Exploiting the Military Technical Revolution; A Concept for Joint 
Warfare'', Strategic Review (Spring 1992)
    ``Defense Contractor and Government Relationships'', RDA Magazine 
(1995) (approximate title and date)
    ``Drawing the Line: Three Case Studies in Procurement Ethics'', 
Program Manager Magazine (July-August 1998)
    ``Reclaim American Values; Prisoner Treatment Hands Power to 
Enemies'', with LTG (ret) Charles Otstott, Defense News (April 16, 
2007)
    ``End Impunity for U.S. Contractors in Iraq'' Op Ed, The Topeka 
Capital Journal (August 10, 2007),
    Guantanamo Military Commissions Observer Blog Postings for Human 
Rights First:

          ``Guantanamo: It All Seems So Normal'', Human Rights