[Senate Hearing 112-650]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                        S. Hrg. 112-650

                 OVERSIGHT OF THE CRUISE SHIP INDUSTRY:
   ARE CURRENT REGULATIONS SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT PASSENGERS AND THE 
                              ENVIRONMENT?

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                      ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 1, 2012

                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation





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       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                      ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

            JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii             KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, 
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts             Ranking
BARBARA BOXER, California            OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida                 JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey      ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas                 JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           ROY BLUNT, Missouri
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
TOM UDALL, New Mexico                PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania
MARK WARNER, Virginia                MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
                                     DEAN HELLER, Nevada
                    Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
                   James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
                     John Williams, General Counsel
                Todd Bertoson, Republican Staff Director
           Jarrod Thompson, Republican Deputy Staff Director
   Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator





















                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on March 1, 2012....................................     1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller.................................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     4
Statement of Senator Rubio.......................................     5
Statement of Senator Isakson.....................................     6
Statement of Senator Begich......................................     9
Statement of Senator Nelson......................................    10
Statement of Senator Lautenberg..................................    11
Statement of Senator Klobuchar...................................    99
Statement of Senator Boozman.....................................   102

                               Witnesses

Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno, Deputy Commandant for Operations, 
  Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard..............    12
    Prepared statement...........................................    14
Bill Johnson, Director, PortMiami, Miami-Dade County.............    19
    Prepared statement...........................................    22
Captain William H. Doherty, Director of Maritime Relations, Nexus 
  Consulting Corporation.........................................    25
    Prepared statement...........................................    27
Ross A. Klein, Ph.D., Professor, School of Social Work, St. 
  John's College, Memorial University of Newfoundland............    38
    Prepared statement...........................................    40
Christine Duffy, President and CEO, Cruise Lines International 
  Association....................................................    83
    Prepared statement...........................................    85

                                Appendix

Response to written questions submitted to Vice Admiral Brian M. 
  Salerno by:
    Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV..................................   117
    Hon. Barbara Boxer...........................................   118
    Hon. Amy Klobuchar...........................................   122
    Hon. Tom Udall...............................................   122
    Hon. Mark Begich.............................................   122
    Hon. John Boozman............................................   123
    Hon. Marco Rubio.............................................   124
Response to written questions submitted to Bill Johnson by:
    Hon. Marco Rubio.............................................   124
Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Ross A. Klein by:
    Hon. Barbara Boxer...........................................   125
    Hon. Amy Klobuchar...........................................   128
Response to written questions submitted to Christine Duffy by:
    Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV..................................   129
    Hon. Barbara Boxer...........................................   136
    Hon. Amy Klobuchar...........................................   138
    Hon. Mark Begich.............................................   139
    Hon. Tom Udall...............................................   142

 
                 OVERSIGHT OF THE CRUISE SHIP INDUSTRY:
                   ARE CURRENT REGULATIONS SUFFICIENT
               TO PROTECT PASSENGERS AND THE ENVIRONMENT?

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2012

                                       U.S. Senate,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in Room 
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D. 
Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA

    The Chairman. Good morning. We have, as usual, a 
complicated, potentially fluctuating morning schedule. I know 
that one thing will not fluctuate and that's the 11:00 o'clock 
vote, and I'd like to get as much of this done but will come 
back if more members, I hope, will appear.
    We have Georgia and Alaska and West Virginia, which should 
be enough to cover the country but there ought to be more 
people here and they probably will be here. And I'm very glad 
that you are and first of all, I want to say to the Coast Guard 
that I feel very sad about the helicopter crash that happened 
in Mobile Bay, and it was just Tuesday night, wasn't it?
    Admiral Salerno. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. My thoughts and the Committee's thoughts are 
with the families and also with the Coast Guard on this because 
the Coast Guard is a family unto itself.
    Admiral Salerno. Thank you, sir.
    The Chairman. I got that correct, didn't I? All right. Let 
me give my opening statement. Senator Rubio will be along and 
Senator Isakson has a one-hour-and-three-quarter speech. One 
minute? OK. I knew that actually. It's fun teasing you. He's a 
good friend. He's a Braves fan.
    The cruise ship industry is large, it's successful and it's 
very profitable. The industry's revenues top $25 billion a 
year. Nearly 13 million Americans, including a couple of my own 
children, took a cruise last year, although I think they did it 
the year before. But they enjoyed it.
    The industry is growing with larger and larger ships 
entering service every year. Some ships will carry over 5,000 
passengers and a crew, and I can't speak for Alaska and Georgia 
but in West Virginia terms that would be a modern cruise ship 
carrying the entire population of most West Virginia towns.
    So they're floating private cities. A unique and complex 
set of international rules governs the operations of the ship 
and the safety of the passengers. This is a safety committee, 
the Commerce Committee. We are a safety committee. We do many 
things but safety is always on top.
    I believe that these rules work, really, to protect the 
companies more than to protect their passengers. If there are 
those who disagree with it, I'm sure they will so say. In any 
event, we're here today to examine whether existing regulations 
are in fact sufficient to protect the health and safety of 
passengers and the fragile ocean environment in which they 
operate, and I recognize some of you testified yesterday before 
the House and this is something that I've wanted to do for a 
long time and so please don't be troubled by so much attention. 
Or be troubled by so much attention.
    In addition to reviewing the industry's safety and 
environmental record, I believe that we must ask why an 
industry that earns billions and uses a really very wide 
variety of Federal services from the Coast Guard to the Customs 
Bureau to the Centers for Disease Control pay almost no 
corporate income taxes at all.
    Good morning, Senator. I just started.
    Senator Rubio. Good. I was watching you on TV.
    The Chairman. Trust me, when something goes wrong with a 
cruise ship, it is always the Coast Guard that comes to the 
rescue, and this is a time when the Coast Guard is fighting for 
revenues, has 45-year-old ships which are trying to break up 
ice in Alaska in northern territory and we can't get the money 
to build new ships. It's an embarrassment, and they're strapped 
for cash because they don't get the same attention that the 
Marines do or that the Air Force does.
    But they do in this committee. We care about the Coast 
Guard a lot. And the Coast Guard is struggling. The entire 
Federal Government is struggling to maintain critical missions. 
Everybody's cutting back. All of our offices here are streamed 
into every day by people who are making very legitimate 
requests for projects that need to be funded in our various 
states and we can't always give them very good news. We have to 
tell them the truth about what's happening here.
    But in any event, in spite of all of this, it's 
inconceivable to me that with this amount of Federal help that 
comes to the help of a cruise ship when it runs into trouble 
that this industry doesn't pay some part of a fair share of the 
services they're getting for it. I think it's sort of unique 
that way.
    For any mode of transportation, safety must be priority 
number one. That's the way we look at things here. We're very, 
very glad when companies make a lot of money and we're very, 
very glad when passengers are very safe, and we tend to focus 
more on the second than on the first because that's more of our 
mission.
    The rarity of major cruise ship accidents suggests, in 
fact, that an industry has an excellent safety record, and let 
that be on the record. But the recent sinking of the Costa 
Concordia off the Italian coast is, in fact, a stark and tragic 
reminder that no mode of transportation is 100 percent safe. 
There aren't so many cruise ships around that when you have an 
incident with two or three that it doesn't represent a 
disproportionately large share of difficulties.
    The reports from the survivors of the Costa Concordia do 
not inspire confidence, at least in this Senator, in the 
industry's ability to respond to a major accident. There's a 
wonderful person, Martha Manuel, who is a constituent of mine 
who was a passenger on board this particular ship and she said 
that there was a clear lack of communication from the ship's 
staff.
    She survived the accident because she refused to follow the 
instructions, which were to go back to her room, which could 
have been the end of her, and so she went elsewhere and 
survived.
    But the point, obviously, isn't just what happened to her. 
But is there a pattern of safety? What do you do when there's a 
crisis? Is the crew trained? Do they practice the training?
    There are hundreds and hundreds of crew members, I think 
maybe 900, 800 crew members on these ships, and they have to--
from the captain on down--they have to properly train so that 
passenger evacuation procedures not are only in place but have 
been practiced and therefore do work.
    When accidents do occur and lives are tragically altered, 
passengers have little recourse against the cruise ship 
operators. Complicated ticket contracts limit passenger rights 
and antiquated laws prevent passengers from collecting fair 
compensation. Our laws have not kept up with the changes in the 
industry and I believe that we must revisit them.
    Although major accidents are, in fact, rare, and let that 
be understood, the environmental damage caused by cruise ships 
happens not so rarely. Happens all the time, and it's a 
particular source of angst for me.
    These floating cities produce enormous volumes of sewage 
and solid waste, and just three miles from shore they can do 
that because then they're out of our jurisdiction as a country. 
A cruise ship can discharge thousands of gallons of raw sewage 
and they sp do, and they dump a significant amount of solid 
waste at sea.
    I've often joked without humor about having a hearing on 
one of these floating, you know, two or three square miles of 
just trash and awful things that float in various parts of our 
world's oceans.
    Obviously, I'm not going to do that. That would be unwise 
and I would no longer be Chairman and I like being Chairman. 
But the dumping of all of this waste really gets to me because 
it's against the law, it is not in tune with what a modern 
industry should be doing and a profitable industry should be 
doing.
    So the practices of the industry, I think, have to come 
under scrutiny. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard, as I've 
indicated, has very limited resources to police against these 
discharges. Where in the world would they be happening? They 
can't follow all of these ships. And there may be a possibility 
of seeing them from eyes in the sky, and my guess is you 
probably could see them.
    But the point is we cannot continue to let our oceans fill 
with trash and fill with debris. It's a little bit like space. 
We have so much stuff up in space now that it's dangerous not 
only for our country for falling debris but also for other 
spaceships that are up there. It's just getting dangerous. 
Americans consider debris a part of their heritage and cultural 
pursuit. It's not a wise idea for any of us.
    So I think we have to adopt stronger laws to protect our 
fragile marine ecosystem, which is part of what this committee 
is charged with.
    As taxpayers, we deserve to have the industry pay its fair 
share.
    Without numerous government services, the industry could 
not operate and it's time that they contributed to the cost of 
helping with the expense of the government services they 
receive.
    So just in ending, I think our children and grandchildren 
deserve an ocean environment free of trash--I believe that very 
deeply--and sewage and hazardous materials. The industry needs 
to do more to protect the environment for future generations 
and so we will talk about this and other subjects.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Rockefeller follows:]

             Prepared Statement of John D. Rockefeller IV, 
                    U.S. Senator from West Virginia
    The cruise ship industry is large, successful, and vastly 
profitable. The industry's revenues top $25 billion a year. Nearly 13 
million Americans took a cruise last year. The industry is growing with 
larger and larger ships entering service every year--some ships will 
carry over 5,000 passengers and crew. A modern cruise ship can carry 
the entire population of most West Virginia towns. They are floating 
private cities.
    A unique and complex set of international rules governs the 
operations of the ship and the safety of passengers. I believe that 
these rules work to protect the companies rather than their passengers. 
We are here today to examine whether existing regulations are 
sufficient to protect the health and safety of passengers and the 
fragile ocean environment in which they operate.
    In addition to reviewing the industry's safety and environmental 
record, I believe that we must ask why an industry that earns billions 
and uses a variety of Federal services--from the Coast Guard, to the 
Customs Bureau, to Centers for Disease Control--pays almost no 
corporate income tax. Trust me, when something goes wrong on a cruise 
ship, it is the Coast Guard that comes to the rescue. At a time when 
the Coast Guard and the entire Federal government are struggling to 
maintain their critical missions, it is inconceivable to me that this 
industry doesn't pay its fair share.
    For any mode of transportation, safety must be the number one 
priority.
    The rarity of major cruise ship accidents suggests that the 
industry has an excellent safety record. But, the recent sinking of the 
Costa Concordia off the Italian coast is a stark and tragic reminder 
that no mode of transportation is 100 percent safe. The reports from 
the survivors of the Costa Concordia do not inspire confidence in the 
industry's ability to respond to a major accident. A constituent of 
mine, Martha Manuel, was a passenger aboard the ship. She said that 
there was a clear lack of communication from the ship's staff. She 
survived the accident because she didn't follow instructions to go back 
to her room. Passengers have a right to expect that the crews of these 
ships are properly trained and passenger evacuation procedures are in 
place.
    When accidents do occur and lives are tragically altered, 
passengers have little recourse against the cruise ship operators. 
Complicated ticket contracts limit passenger rights and antiquated laws 
prevent passengers from collecting fair compensation. Our laws have not 
kept up with the changes in the industry, and I believe we must revisit 
them.
    Although major accidents are rare, the environmental damage caused 
by cruise ships happens far too regularly. These floating cities 
produce enormous volumes of sewage and solid waste. Just three miles 
from shore, a cruise ship can discharge thousands of gallons of raw 
sewage. In addition, they dump a significant amount of solid waste at 
sea. The environmental practices of the industry are unconscionable.
    Unfortunately, the Coast Guard has limited resources to police 
against these devastating discharges. We cannot continue to let our 
oceans fill with trash and debris. We must adopt stronger laws to 
protect our fragile marine ecosystems.
    As taxpayers, we deserve to have the industry pay its fair share. 
Without numerous government services, the industry couldn't operate. It 
is time that they contributed to the costs that they impose on the 
government.
    Our children and grandchildren deserve an ocean environment free of 
trash, sewage, and hazardous materials. The industry needs to do more 
to protect the environment for future generations.
    Now, I turn to Senator Rubio for his opening remarks.

    The Chairman. And I turn now to my distinguished colleague, 
Senator Rubio, for his opening remarks.

                STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

    Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to begin by 
thanking you for holding this hearing and for all of you for 
being a part of it, especially Director Bill Johnson from the 
Port of Miami, my hometown. So I appreciate you being here 
today.
    Just want to also let you know I'll be back and forth today 
because there's also a hearing going on in Foreign Relations 
regarding Syria, which is critically important as well but I 
definitely wanted to be here for the start of this and I've 
read all of your testimony on this important issue.
    Let me begin by just offering my condolences to the Heil 
family who lost two family members, Barb and Jerry, on the 
January 13th, 2012, Costa Concordia cruise ship off the coast 
of Italy. The sad thing about it is that from all indications 
it's a tragedy that could have been avoided.
    As Captain Doherty points out in his testimony later today, 
ships run aground because someone made a terrible mistake or 
was negligent, and in this case, while I understand we're still 
waiting for the final report, all the indications point to a 
captain who not only crashed a ship but abandoned it before 
ensuring the safety of any of the passengers.
    Despite this, I commend both the Coast Guard and our 
domestic cruise line industry for their quick response to the 
incident. The Coast Guard immediately offered assistance to the 
government of Italy, and through the Cruise Lines International 
Association the industry immediately made corrections to their 
own mandatory muster drills and continue to search for 
voluntary improvements through their own cruise industry 
operational safety review that was launched in January, late 
January, in response to the incident.
    The industry's quick response I think is a testimony to the 
industry's self-accountability, and rightfully so. This bad 
news hurts the industry more than anyone else. This is whether 
it's bad news from time to time when you turn on the television 
and hear about some people getting food poisoning on a cruise 
to these kinds of things. The cruise industry has always taken 
this stuff seriously because above all else it is about 
customer service.
    And the cruise industry is largely built on return 
customers and people just won't come back if they had a bad 
experience or if they watch the news and think they're going to 
have a bad experience. And so that's why we see such a high 
level of self-accountability in the industry and I think that's 
a very positive thing.
    What we'll hear in today's testimony is that the industry 
has, in addition to its long history of ensuring through 
voluntary policies, the stewardship of both the safety of the 
passenger and also environmental protection, you'll also hear 
that we have a very robust and safe cruise industry that 
supports thousands of jobs in Florida and across the United 
States.
    There are more than 230 ships worldwide in the cruise ship 
fleet and 176 of them, over 75 percent of those cruise vessels, 
were operating in North America in the year 2010. The North 
American cruise industry generated $37.85 billion in the U.S. 
in economic benefits and supported nearly 330,000 jobs here in 
America in the same year.
    That's a bright spot in our bleak economy, and in Florida, 
particularly in our port cities, I can tell you firsthand the 
impact that this industry has on the real lives of real people. 
I'm proud to say that the state of Florida accounts for 60 
percent of all U.S. cruise embarkations and we hope to make 
that 61 percent and growing.
    And so we're excited about that and we're excited about 
expansions in some of our ports that will allow for an 
expansion in this. So as we hear today from Bill, the Port of 
Miami is one of the busiest cruise ports in the world. It 
handled more than 4 million passengers in the year 2011 and the 
Port of Miami is just one of several ports in Florida that 
support the cruise line industry--Port Canaveral, Jacksonville, 
Tampa, and others.
    So overall, the industry accounted for about $6.3 billion 
in my state and direct spending in 2010 that generated over 
123,000 jobs in Florida. It means 123,000 families who make 
their living off the safety, the accountability and the 
prosperity of the cruise industry. So it's an important 
industry. It brings valued and high-paying jobs to it and, 
again, as we all hear this testimony today let's just remember 
that they've consistently shown their willingness to 
voluntarily make themselves one of the safest industries in our 
country.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing 
on an issue so important not just to our country but especially 
to my home state and, again, I've read all the testimony here 
today and look forward to asking some questions and I'll look 
forward to that in a few moments.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio, the 
Ranking Member.
    And now I'm going to call on Johnny Isakson because he 
represents Georgia, which is bigger than our two states. And 
then I'm going to call on you, Senator Begich.
    Senator Begich. Only by population.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA

    Senator Isakson. Absolutely correct. You got a lot more 
mileage at sea than we do too.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. I want 
to commend you on the timely calling of this hearing and I 
think it's a very important hearing for the Commerce Committee 
to conduct.
    Like Senator Rubio, I have another commitment so I will be 
in and out as well. But I started off here because I wanted to 
be sure and submit for the record and ask unanimous consent 
that the testimony of Lynda D. Sanford, a resident of my state 
who lost her mother on the high seas in a cruise in 2001, be 
entered for the record in this hearing.
    The Chairman. Absolutely.
    [The information referred to follows:]





To:                   John Clark Rayfield, Republican Staff Director
                      U.S. House of Representatives
                      Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
                      Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
                       Transportation

From:                 Lynda D. Sanford
                      Survivor of Capsizing on July 13, 2001 with Loss
                       of Life
                      U.S. Coast Guard Report 16732Subject:              Written Testimony of Lynda D. Sanford
                      Hearing on Cruise Ship Safety Lessons from the
                       Costa Concordia AccidentDate:                 February 29, 2012
    It has been more than a decade since I managed to survive the 
boating accident that killed my mother and 2 other cruise ship 
passengers and injured me and 13 other cruise ship passengers. I filed 
charges of negligent homicide against the boat driver and escorted the 
three corpses back to Los Angeles, California where I questioned what 
went wrong. The cruise line told me that our tragedy was a ``freak 
accident''. After burying my mother in Texas, I returned home to 
Atlanta, Georgia and contacted the cruise line attorney who had been 
flown to Cabo San Lucas, Mexico to interrogate me about my mother's 
death. The cruise line would not provide me with any more information 
and ignored my family's requests for answers.
    I was devastated after having flown across the United States to 
meet my mother in California for a 7-day mother-daughter cruise and 
returning with her corpse and no explanation for her death other than a 
``freak accident''. I acquiesced to my family's request to sue the 
cruise line because our mother had died and was horrified to learn that 
we could not do so because all of my mother's children were adults. The 
Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) of 1920 did not allow us to sue for 
negligence resulting in the death of our mother, her pain and suffering 
as she drowned or the loss of her contribution to society as a 
bilingual, special education teacher and mother who raised five 
children without child support from our deadbeat dads. The U.S. 
Congress had allowed the cruise line industry to influence it when 
DOHSA was amended in 2000. Consequently, DOHSA by Wrongful Act entitles 
these legal remedies only to commercial aviation victims. The Death on 
the High Seas Act (DOHSA) of 1920 entitled my mother's corpse to 
receive only burial expenses!
    In 2006 and 2007 my Congressman, Congressman John Lewis of Atlanta, 
Georgia, co-sponsored Death on the High Seas Act amendments introduced 
by Congressman Lloyd Doggett for cruise ship victims. These bills held 
cruise lines accountable for negligent deaths regardless of the age of 
the victims. The amendments became a part of the original legislation 
of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act. However, again, the 
cruise lines' paid lobbyists successfully pressured the U.S. Congress 
to allow the cruise line industry to evade accountability. All of the 
protections of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act were in 
jeopardy in 2010 if DOHSA was not removed. So, DOHSA was removed and 
the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act became law in July 2010--
including the requirement that all cruise ships have a man-overboard 
system within 18 months. The United States Coast Guard acknowledged in 
February 2012 that the cruise line industry has not implemented this 
provision of the law. Freedom of Information Act requests indicate that 
the U.S. Coast Guard spent over $900,000 for just two searches for 
cruise ship passengers whose bodies were never found. American 
taxpayers pay for these searches. The cost to the cruise line is 
nothing.
    Despite cruise line claims of safety, a 2008 U.S. Senate hearing 
divulged that cruise lines did not know how many passengers had died or 
disappeared from foreign-flagged cruise ships using American ports. The 
cruise lines did not keep count of the dead or missing because they 
were not required to do so. Consequently, complaints of negligent death 
when the deceased has no dependents continue to be dismissed from court 
because DOHSA does not allow surviving adult family the right to sue 
for the death of their loved one. The family of the deceased does not 
have the opportunity to have the facts of their loved-one's death heard 
and decided by a jury.
    Unlike DOHSA of 1920, state tort laws have evolved to reflect the 
value of human life in commercial maritime deaths. Every state in the 
United States has laws that allow victims to sue for financial damages 
for wrongful death. Some states also allow surviving family members to 
recover damages for the conscious pain and suffering of the deceased. 
Others also impose punitive damages for serious wrongdoing and to serve 
as a deterrent. In the case of wrongful maritime deaths, state law is 
superior to Federal law.
    It is inequitable, unfair, and inhumane to force cruise ship 
victims to apply the antiquated Death on the High Seas Act of 1920 to 
their loved one's death. My mother's life is no less valuable than an 
airline passenger's life and my family's grief is no less painful than 
the grief of any airline victims' family. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
recommended that Congress correct this inequity for maritime victims 
and there are no costs associated with making this change. By 
continuing to force maritime victims to do so, the U.S. Congress is 
telling survivors that the life of their loved is worthless in 
comparison to that of an aviation victim! The result is that cruise 
ship victims are victimized not only by cruise lines but by the United 
State Congress. I urge Congress to do what is was intended to do--
represent its people--by correcting the injustice of DOHSA of 1920 
during the 100 year anniversary of the RMS Titanic tragedy that took 
more than 1,600 lives.

Respectfully,

Lynda D. Sanford, Vice-President
International Cruise Victims Association (ICV)
http://www.internationalcruisevictims.org/

Lynda D. Sanford, MBA, CIA, CFE, CISA

    Lynda Sanford has been auditing for the public and private sector 
for 25 years. She was an internal auditor, forensic auditor, and 
external auditor for the Federal Government for 17 years. She has 
received numerous awards for her audit work and earned her designations 
as a Certified Internal Auditor, and Certified Information Systems 
Auditor, and Certified Information Systems Auditor through 
examinations. She earned her Master of Business Administration with a 
concentration in international business from Kennesaw State University 
and her Bachelor of Business Administration degree in accounting from 
Texas A&M, Corpus Christi. She has worked in North and South America, 
Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the South Pacific. She has lived in 
Georgia since 1986 and has been a resident of Atlanta, Georgia since 
January 2001.
About Our Mother
    Elizabeth Sanchez Stevens (left) of Anchorage, AK and with her 
daughter, Lynda Sanford (right), of Atlanta, GA in Los Angeles, CA in 
July 2001.



    Elizabeth was a single mother of five children. She began her 
career as a Licensed Vocational Nurse in Corpus Christi, TX. She earned 
her Bachelor's Degree in Secondary Education and Master's Degree of 
Public Administration in her mid-40s. She moved to Anchorage, AK in 
1987, where she continued to teach Special Education and English as a 
Second Language, until her death in July 2001.

    Senator Isakson. And I thank the industry for being 
represented. To Admiral Salerno, thank you for the many things 
the Coast Guard contributes to the safety and security of the 
citizens of our country on the high seas and thanks for what 
you do for the country. And to the others testifying, we look 
forward to hearing your testimony although I, like Senator 
Rubio, read it all last night because I knew I would be in and 
out.
    So Mr. Chairman, this is a very timely hearing on a subject 
that's of great interest to the people of my state and I 
appreciate your letting Ms. Sanford's statement be entered for 
the record.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Isakson. As 
always, you're to the point and effective.
    Senator Begich, followed by Senator Nelson.

                STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

    Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief 
because I'm anxious for the opportunity to hear the testimony 
but also for the questions and answers. I have a state that has 
an enormous amount of impact with the cruise industry, 15,000 
jobs approximately in our state, related to the cruise ship 
industry a $1 billion-plus economic impact. But along with 
that, we have the largest single Coast Guard base in the 
country in Alaska.
    So I'm anxious to have this hearing. I know in Alaska we 
have taken exceptional steps in Coast Guard, relationships with 
our cruise ship industry and our local community in making sure 
we have not only, I think if not the highest standards pretty 
close to the top highest standards of environmental standards 
that the cruise ship industry worked with us on as well as 
safety standards where we were able to do some things where we 
put pilots on the cruise ships, which is very unique to a lot 
of ports.
    So I think we have a lot to talk about today but also from 
Alaska's perspective I think a lot to show off of steps we have 
taken. We consider ourselves a domestic port. Many people 
consider us an international port in a lot of ways because the 
coastline is so diverse and lengthy.
    So, again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity. 
I'm anxious to hear the dialogue and discussion and then, of 
course, as you know, Mr. Chairman, I will always be bragging 
about Alaska's unique steps that we've taken to improve another 
industry that's so important to our country.
    The Chairman. I thank you, and actually Alaska probably 
gets a pretty large percentage of these boats because that's 
spectacular territory.
    Senator Begich. We're getting more every day and that's why 
I was a little concerned when Senator Rubio said he wants to 
grow his to 61 percent. We want him to go down, ours go up. So 
we're working it.
    The Chairman. All right. Well, you two guys work that out 
on your own.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. Senator Nelson.

                STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

    Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, thank you for doing this. 
Senator Rubio and I have the busiest cruise port in the world, 
which is Miami, and when you combine all the cruise ports that 
we have--Everglades, which is at Fort Lauderdale; Cape 
Canaveral, which has become famous because of the Disney 
cruises, although Carnival is there and other lines as well; 
Jacksonville, another major cruise port, as well as Tampa--
these are major cruise lines and ports.
    And so we've got our port director here of Miami, Bill 
Johnson. He's going to be contributing mightily to this 
conversation. And, of course, this cruise industry produces 
120,000 jobs in Florida and untold amounts of economic activity 
because of this phenomenon that cruise guests fly in and they 
stay a night or two, getting ready for the cruise, and then 
they go to the cruise.
    Now, with Disney, of course, they've got this incredible 
thing. They take them to the park. Then they go on the cruise, 
or vice versa, and this just generates phenomenal economic 
activity. Back a couple years ago we passed the Cruise Vessel 
Security and Safety Act, which is going to continue to protect 
the traveling public, and I really appreciate you calling the 
hearing and giving the cruise lines the opportunity. I'm 
looking forward also to the Coast Guard's presentation today. I 
think that will be very, very helpful.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
    And Senator Lautenberg has just arrived and he is Chairman 
of the Subcommittee.
    Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thought I'd 
have a more dramatic entrance than this.
    The Chairman. It was pretty dramatic.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. Sort of threw off the rhythm of the hearing, 
you know.

            STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, everybody, for being here. The 
industry is so important, as we've now learned, and well, we 
may talk about some improvements in safety and security that 
we'd like. When a passenger steps onto a cruise ship, their 
expectations--relax, enjoy time off from the pressures of 
everyday life. No one comes aboard expecting to enter a real 
live nightmare.
    That's what happened in January when the Costa Concordia, a 
950-foot luxury liner, slammed into rocks, capsized off Italy's 
Tuscan coast. More than 4,000 passengers, and if this was said 
before please repeat it--forgive me, I think it's worth 
repeating--more than 4,000 passengers and crew members were 
aboard this ship when it crashed, killing at least 25 people, 
injuring more than 20 others and the survivors included a young 
married couple from Brick Township, New Jersey.
    The couple told reporters the scene was chaotic and 
confusing, that they received little instruction from the 
captain and the crew as they rushed to get life vests, endured 
long panic-filled waits for instructions and information and 
crammed onto lifeboats.
    In chaotic moments like this, passengers look to their 
ship's captain for leadership and that, as we now know, the 
Costa Concordia's captain abandoned ship after the crash. And 
I've got to be clear--crashes like this, though few and far 
between--are pretty significant when a tragedy of this 
magnitude occurs, and we've got to ask the tough questions and 
get honest answers.
    And we owe it to the public to make sure that only the 
safest vessels are allowed to cross our seas and that only the 
best qualified, best trained crew members are operating these 
ships. Additionally, we've got to make sure that passengers 
receive their own proper safety and evacuation training and we 
also need a better understanding of whether international 
standards are being followed and where improvements are needed.
    It's not, after all, the first time the questions have been 
raised about the cruise ship industry. In 2010, Congress passed 
cruise ship safety legislation aimed at protecting passengers 
from crimes on cruise ships, and this legislation recently went 
into effect but we still have serious concerns.
    For example, one of the law's key objectives is to have all 
serious crimes reported and posted online but there are 
indications that it's not happening. So I'm going to have 
questions, Mr. Chairman, for the witnesses about whether the 
public is being informed and made fully aware of the crimes, 
that are taking place. The bottom line is that while cruises 
are intended to be a time of relaxation and fun, safety can 
never take a vacation.
    I took 20 members of my family on a trip last year and it 
was a spectacular trip all and will be remembered for long, 
long years. We felt safe and comfortable and I hope that's the 
way all passengers will feel on cruise ships in the future and 
I trust that you will help us to do that.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg, very much, not 
just for this but for your hard and productive work on your 
subcommittee. You produce a lot of good stuff.
    I'm going to start with the questions and we'll keep it to 
about 3 or 4 minutes each.
    Voice. Testimony.
    The Chairman. Yes, I do that very frequently.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. It's an ego problem, I think.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. But I start asking questions before I've 
listened to you and this is exactly the opposite of what we 
want to present, that we're interested, that we want to hear 
what you have to say and that you probably don't want to hear 
what I have to say.
    So I've been duly corrected. I apologize to all and, 
Admiral, you should start.

          STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL BRIAN M. SALERNO,

        DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF

              HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. COAST GUARD

    Admiral Salerno. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Rubio, distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for 
this opportunity to appear before you and to discuss issues 
related to cruise ship safety.
    Thank you also, Mr. Chairman and committee, for your 
expression of sympathy for the tragedy the Coast Guard suffered 
earlier this week. We continue to search for our three missing 
colleagues and, as you can imagine, in a small service this is 
always a very painful time for us. So thank you.
    Every year over 170 large passenger ships operate from 
United States ports and they embark approximately 11.7 million 
passengers. The safety of these passengers and the crews which 
operate these vessels has been a long-standing focus of the 
Coast Guard.
    Every year, we conduct thorough examinations of these 
vessels to ensure that they comply with all United States and 
international safety, security and environmental standards.
    In my role as the Deputy Commandant for Operations, I'm 
responsible for setting the safety, security, and environmental 
standards for all U.S. flag vessels, commercial vessels, as 
well as for the foreign vessels which operate and visit our 
ports. I'm responsible for conducting investigations when 
accidents or violations of our standards occur and I'm 
responsible for setting policy regarding the conduct of search-
and-rescue activity.
    For all of these reasons, the recent casualty involving the 
Costa Concordia is of great interest to us. We are certain that 
there will be much to learn from this casualty and we are open 
to the possibility that our regulations and the international 
standards produced by the International Maritime Organization 
may need to be strengthened based on the outcome of the 
investigation now being conducted by the Italian government.
    Accordingly, we have offered to assist in Italy's 
investigation as an interested party due to the significant 
number of American citizens who were on board, including the 
two who remain missing. This was a tragic accident and all of 
us in the Coast Guard extend our heartfelt condolences to the 
families and friends of the passengers who are lost and who 
remain missing.
    This year marks the 100th anniversary of the loss of the 
Titanic. Despite a century of technological improvements in 
maritime passenger safety, the Costa Concordia reminds us that 
our new technologies, as beneficial as they are, cannot be 
taken for granted, that they are only as good as the human 
systems that operate and maintain them and the regulatory 
regimes which enforce the rules.
    To improve passenger safety on a global scale, the Coast 
Guard leads the U.S. efforts at the International Maritime 
Organization where world maritime safety standards are set. 
This focus on international standards is important because, 
just as in the Costa Concordia case, American citizens are 
frequently passengers on vessels which otherwise have no U.S. 
connection.
    As the agency responsible for verifying the safety of 
foreign vessels in our ports, the Coast Guard has established 
the most rigorous port state control program in the world. All 
foreign flag cruise ships which embark passengers in the U.S. 
must undergo a controlled verification examination before they 
are permitted to operate.
    This examination is comprehensive in nature. It includes 
preconstruction concept reviews of the ship design. It includes 
examinations of the hull and tests of safety systems during 
construction of the ship followed by annual and periodic 
examinations for however long that ship is operating from a 
U.S. port.
    It is during these examinations that we also verify 
compliance with environmental standards and security 
procedures, including those procedures required under the 
Cruise Vessel Safety and Security Act.
    In 2009, the Coast Guard established a Cruise Ship National 
Center of Expertise. This center is the focal point for 
providing Coast Guard marine inspectors with the in-depth 
technical knowledge of cruise ship design and operations and it 
serves as an indicator of just how seriously we take this 
responsibility.
    One of our greatest safety challenges that we could 
potentially face is a mass rescue operation involving a cruise 
ship. While we work diligently with the cruise lines to 
minimize the risk of such an event ever occurring, we have also 
developed and we continually refine our search-and-rescue and 
mass rescue contingency plans.
    We undertake this level of emergency planning in 
conjunction with the cruise industry. We hold copies of cruise 
ship emergency plans and we periodically test them to ensure 
seamless coordination in the event of an actual emergency.
    Over the last 5 years, the Coast Guard has conducted 36 
mass rescue exercises involving passenger vessels.
    Each Coast Guard district has specific positions 
identified, authorized by Congress, to focus on this 
responsibility. As mentioned, we do not yet have the facts in 
the Costa Concordia accident.
    However, as an immediate measure, I have directed Coast 
Guard field inspectors to witness passenger muster drills 
required by the International Safety of Life at Sea Convention 
whenever they are on board a ship for an annual or periodic 
examination. This contrasts with the international requirement 
for a muster drill within 24 hours of leaving port.
    I'm also very pleased to see that the cruise industry 
itself has announced new emergency drill policies requiring 
mandatory muster drills for embarking passengers prior to 
departing from port. Again, this is exceeding the international 
requirement.
    In closing, I want to assure the Committee that the Coast 
Guard views the safety of passengers as its highest marine 
safety priority. We have the best port state control program in 
the world for verifying the safety of vessels and for safety of 
passengers embarking from our ports, and through IMO we work 
diligently to enhance the safety of U.S. passengers regardless 
of where in the world they may embark a vessel.
    And meanwhile, we've also undertaken measures to implement 
the Cruise Vessel Safety and Security Act and are engaged in 
additional regulatory efforts to give full effect to that law 
and to enhance the personal protection of passengers on cruise 
ships.
    Coast Guard looks forward to working in continued 
cooperation with this committee, with passenger victims groups 
and with the industry itself to maximize cruise vessel safety, 
security and environmental protection.
    So thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and 
I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Salerno follows:]

Prepared Testimony of Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno, Deputy Commandant 
   for Operations, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard
Introduction
    Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hutchison, and 
distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity 
to appear before you to discuss issues related to cruise ship safety.
    In my role as the Coast Guard's Deputy Commandant for Operations, I 
am responsible for setting standards for safety, security, and 
environmental stewardship for commercial vessels, facilities and 
mariners, ensuring compliance with those standards, and conducting 
investigations of violations and accidents. I am also responsible for 
policy regarding the conduct of Search and Rescue (SAR). I'll touch on 
each of these areas in my testimony today in the context of foreign 
flagged cruise ships operating in U.S. waters.
    While it is still too early in the investigation to comment with 
any certainty on the cause of the tragedy involving the cruise ship 
Costa Concordia, or the conduct of the passengers and crew after the 
initial incident and during the evacuation of the vessel, as mariners 
and safety professionals--all of us in the U.S. Coast Guard extend our 
heartfelt condolences to the families and friends of the loved ones 
lost in this tragic event.
Impetus for Safety Requirements
    To understand where we are today with respect to passenger vessel 
safety, we should look at the lessons the past has taught us.
    The 100th anniversary of the sinking of the RMS Titanic in April 
1912 is only weeks away. The Titanic tragedy prompted overwhelming 
international response which resulted in the first Safety of Life at 
Sea Convention, also known as SOLAS 1914. This first version focused on 
lifeboats, emergency equipment, and radio watches. Improvements to the 
Convention made in 1929, 1948, and 1960 added requirements for 
subdivision, stability, machinery, firefighting, lifesaving, 
communications, and navigation systems. SOLAS is the key international 
maritime agreement focused on safety.
    For the most part, large passenger vessels visiting the United 
States before the 1960s were in liner service, with the primary purpose 
of transporting passengers from one part of the world to another. With 
the advent of commercial airlines, the international passenger vessel 
industry evolved from transportation to entertainment, and liners 
became cruise ships.
    In the 1960s, a number of serious cruise ship fires, involving 
heavy loss of life, brought the issue of cruise ship safety to the 
attention of maritime authorities worldwide. These fires involved the 
older passenger ships Lakonia, Yarmouth Castle, and Viking Princess, 
which had superstructures that contained some combustible materials, 
allowing the rapid spread of flames and total destruction of passenger 
spaces.
    In May 1966, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), now called 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), met to consider measures 
to improve the fire safety of passenger vessels. The committee first 
directed its attention to the problem of fire safety in older passenger 
vessels and crafted the 1966 amendments to SOLAS 60, which included 
additional fire protection standards for existing passenger vessels. 
Congress showed great interest in this work, especially since the Coast 
Guard had conducted a Marine Board of Investigation into the 1965 
Yarmouth Castle fire. On November 2, 1968, Public Law 89-777 (R.S. 
4400(c); 46 U.S.C. 362(c)), Fire Safety Standards for Foreign and 
Domestic Passenger Vessels, came into effect, which required the Coast 
Guard to verify that foreign cruise vessels complied with the 1966 fire 
safety amendments.
    In 1968, the United States unilaterally required all passenger 
vessels with overnight accommodations for 50 or more passengers to meet 
the 1966 fire safety amendments or U.S. passenger vessel requirements. 
The Coast Guard promulgated Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 
2-68, which provided implementing guidance on how to conduct a control 
verification examination on foreign flag cruise ships, specifying that 
``this verification may necessitate a degree of plan review, removal of 
panels, ceilings, etc., in addition to the testing of construction 
materials.'' On August 26, 1983, Public Law 98-89 provided additional 
authority for the Coast Guard to verify that foreign flag cruise ships 
embarking passengers in U.S. ports comply with SOLAS convention 
requirements.
    The Coast Guard made improvements to its vessel examination program 
in 1985 and 1993, which further expanded examination requirements and 
provided much more detailed guidelines for control verification 
examination procedures on foreign cruise ships. Since 1993, cruise ship 
designs have continued to evolve, growing in size and complexity with 
the capability of carrying thousands of passengers and crew, and the 
Coast Guard has frequently updated guidance for plan review and control 
verification examinations necessary for foreign cruise ships operating 
out of U.S. ports. Last year, there were 143 cruise ships, sailing 
under foreign registry, that operated out of U.S. ports and carried 
over eleven million passengers.
Modern Standards for Cruise Ships
    Over the past decade, the international shipping community, through 
the IMO and with Coast Guard leadership, has moved decisively toward a 
proactive approach to passenger ship safety. With cruise ships growing 
progressively in size and capacity, in May 2000, the IMO agreed to 
undertake a holistic examination of safety issues pertaining to 
passenger ships, with particular emphasis on large cruise ships. The 
outcome of this proactive initiative is an entirely new prevention and 
survivability based regulatory philosophy for the design, construction, 
and operation of cruise ships.
    The U.S., through the efforts of the Coast Guard, has taken a very 
active leadership role throughout this initiative, putting forward many 
of the recommendations for action taken by the various IMO Sub-
Committees. The effort identified a number of areas of concern related 
to cruise ships, and resulted in substantial amendments to major IMO 
conventions, including SOLAS, International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution From Ships (MARPOL) 73/78, International 
Tonnage, Standards for Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) 
and Load Line conventions. These conventions provide internationally 
accepted standards for the design, construction, outfitting, and 
operation of ships. They address surveys, structures, stability, 
machinery, fire safety, lifesaving equipment, communications, 
navigation equipment, safety management, maritime security, pollution 
prevention, crew competency, watertight integrity, and safe loading.
    Significant improvements under the five main pillars of the 
initiative entered into force in July 2010:

   Prevention: Amendments to the STCW Code and supporting 
        guidelines focus on navigation safety and resource management;

   Improved survivability: New SOLAS requirements for the 
        ``safe return to port'' concept address essential system 
        redundancy, management of emergencies, and casualty mitigation, 
        including the new concept of dedicated shipboard safety centers 
        to manage emergencies;

   Regulatory flexibility: Amendments to SOLAS provide a 
        methodology for the approval of new and innovative safety 
        technologies and arrangements;

   Operations in areas remote from SAR facilities: Guidelines 
        on external support from SAR authorities, as well as guidance 
        to assist seafarers taking part in SAR operations have been 
        developed; and finally

   Health safety and medical care: Guidelines on establishing 
        medical safety programs, and a revised Guide on Cold Water 
        Survival.

    Other recent improvements include stability and survivability of 
cruise ships through new probabilistic subdivision and damage stability 
regulations, and flooding detection systems; improved voyage planning, 
particularly in remote and high latitude areas; and voyage data 
recorders. As a separate initiative, stemming from the 2006 fire aboard 
the Star Princess, significant improvements have been made to the fire 
safety features of external areas on cruise ships. Overall, the past 
decade has been an enormous leap forward in cruise ship safety measures 
and has been largely proactive as opposed to reactive to casualties as 
has generally been the case in the past. Coast Guard's leadership in 
the international community with respect to cruise ship safety measures 
and our support to foreign casualty investigations evidences our 
dedication to U.S. passenger safety whereever our citizens embark on 
cruise ships.
The Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection Net
    The IMO conventions form the bases for the international safety, 
security, and stewardship net designed to ensure consistent standards 
across the worldwide fleet of cruise ships. The owners and operators, 
flag states and port states each have distinct roles in ensuring 
compliance with those standards.
    Flag states have the primary responsibility to ensure vessels of 
their flag meet international and domestic standards. They often 
achieve this through recognized third party organizations who certify 
that vessels meet design, construction, operating, and manning 
requirements throughout the life of the vessel.
    Port states verify substantial compliance with international 
standards and ensuring compliance with applicable domestic requirements 
for vessels of all flags calling in their ports. As the port state 
authority for the U.S., the Coast Guard has established a robust 
control verification program that subjects cruise ships calling in U.S. 
ports to a much higher level of scrutiny than other foreign flag 
vessels, and much higher than any other port states require for foreign 
flag cruise ships in their ports.
Coast Guard Control Verification Program for Foreign Flag Cruise Ships
    The Coast Guard has a very robust port state control program for 
cruise ships. All foreign flag cruise ships arriving in the United 
States that embark passengers or make a U.S. port call while carrying 
U.S. citizens as passengers must participate in the control 
verification process. Cruise ships that return to U.S. service after a 
prolonged absence are treated as if they had never been in service in 
the U.S. and must undergo the entire process again.
    The Coast Guard control verification program includes initial, 
annual, and periodic examinations for foreign flag cruise ships calling 
in our ports. It includes concept review during the very earliest 
stages of design, pre-construction plan review by Coast Guard naval 
architects and fire protection engineers, mid-construction inspections 
at the builder's yard by Coast Guard marine inspectors, an initial 
operational inspection of the vessel upon completion of construction, 
and at least annual inspections while the vessel is in service in U.S. 
ports. This regime allows the Coast Guard to determine that the vessel 
is in substantial compliance with all applicable international and 
domestic standards.
    The engineering review of plans for structural fire protection 
arrangements provides a great level of assurance that shipboard fire 
safety arrangements meet international standards. After review, these 
same engineers visit the ship and confirm that the actual arrangements 
on the vessel are the same as those shown on the structural fire 
protection plans. No other port state provides this level of attention 
to detail for cruise ships. On the basis of this initial examination, 
the Coast Guard issues a certificate of compliance that allows the 
vessel to operate in U.S. ports.
    The annual examination ensures that foreign cruise ships continue 
to maintain all the systems the Coast Guard previously examined during 
the initial exam in proper operating condition and that the flag 
administration has performed annual renewal surveys as required by 
SOLAS. Inspectors focus on firefighting, lifesaving, and emergency 
systems and witness a comprehensive fire and boat drill by the crew. In 
addition, inspectors examine the vessel for modifications that would 
affect the vessel's structural fire protection and means of escape. 
They also check for modifications completed without the vessel's flag 
administration approval. After a satisfactory annual examination, the 
Coast Guard re-issues a certificate of compliance.
    Periodic examinations are also conducted, typically midway between 
the annual examinations. These examinations are limited in scope and 
build on the more comprehensive annuals, and they are intended to 
ensure vessels are being operated in a safe manner. The periodic 
examinations focus on the performance of officers and crew, with 
specific attention paid to their training on and knowledge of the 
ship's emergency procedures, firefighting, lifesaving systems, and 
performance during the drills. To ensure the overall material condition 
of the ship has not appreciably changed since the annual examination, 
inspectors randomly select sample items for examination.
    Inspectors also vary the scope of the examination depending upon 
the material condition of the vessel, the maintenance of the vessel, 
and the professionalism and training of the crew. At every Coast Guard 
examination of a foreign cruise ship, the inspectors will determine 
whether the vessel is in substantial compliance with the international 
convention standards.
    As a result of the Costa Concordia incident, I have directed Coast 
Guard field inspectors to witness the passenger muster required by 
SOLAS whenever they are onboard a cruise ship conducting an initial, 
annual, or periodic examination. Our personnel will witness these 
musters either immediately before or during vessel departure from port. 
I am pleased to see that the cruise industry associations announced a 
new emergency drill policy requiring mandatory muster for embarking 
passengers prior to departure from port.
Investigations
    Foreign vessels operating in U.S. waters are required by U.S. law 
to report accidents immediately. Upon accident notification, we 
proactivly investigate to determine causes and issue safety 
recommendations to prevent recurrences. It is a continuous improvement 
process which incorporates lessons learned from accident investigations 
to enhance cruise ship safety and ensure compliance with national and 
international laws.
    After the Costa Concordia incident, the Coast Guard immediately 
offered technical expertise and support to the Government of Italy's 
marine casualty investigation. The Coast Guard's expertise in marine 
casualty investigations will prove helpful as we move forward with the 
investigation. Currently, Coast Guard teams are conducting interviews 
with the U.S. passengers to ascertain the vessel's crew level of 
preparedness and response. Information gained from the Costa Concordia 
investigation may assist in identifying marine casualty causal factors 
that could have broad application. It is long standing practice to 
cooperate in all manner of accident investigations involving different 
flag and coastal states and the Coast Guard routinely acts in this 
accord.
Search and Rescue (SAR) and Mass Rescue Operations (MRO)
    The Coast Guard has maintained a good relationship with the cruise 
lines regarding search and rescue and medical evacuations. For the 
Coast Guard, a Mass Rescue Operation involving a cruise ship casualty 
offshore, with potentially thousands of passengers and crew forced to 
evacuate into lifeboats and the water, presents our greatest search and 
rescue challenge. Working with cruise line and passenger vessel 
companies, the Coast Guard continues to develop and improve SAR and MRO 
contingency plans. In addition to internal Coast Guard SAR plans, the 
Coast Guard holds a copy of cruise ship SAR plans and is able to 
incorporate the cruise ship plans into our overall SAR planning in the 
event of an emergency. The Coast Guard also meets periodically with 
cruise line medical personnel to discuss plans for medical emergencies, 
which pays dividends during actual medical evacuations. For example, 
many of the 857 medical evacuations performed by the Coast Guard last 
year, were conducted from cruise ships. evacuations last year.
    In addition to working directly with cruise lines, Coast Guard has 
been working in partnership with the passenger vessel industry 
associations, including Cruise Lines International Association and the 
Passenger Vessel Association. Coast Guard works with the associations 
to develop, coordinate and represent Coast Guard policies and positions 
related to passenger vessel mass rescue plans, coordination, and 
exercises.
    Recently, Coast Guard led a Department of Homeland Security 
sponsored interagency table top exercise for Federal agency 
representatives involving a cruise ship emergency in the Arctic. Mass 
rescue planning involves support from many of our Federal agency and 
State partners.
    In 2002, Congress appropriated funding for 22 permanent billets for 
the Coast Guard's Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist/Mass Rescue 
Operation Program. These billets provide the Coast Guard with increased 
capacity and capability to help coordinate and promote passenger vessel 
prevention plans, manage risk and maintain a state of readiness in 
response to the impressive growth in foreign and domestic passenger 
vessels over the past decade. Planning for a mass evacuation of a 
cruise ship carrying thousands of passengers and crew involves intense 
preparation and extensive coordination to meet the varying types of 
emergencies that could arise.
    Coast Guard passenger vessel safety personnel at each of our 
Districts assist in the conduct and coordination of Coast Guard mass 
rescue exercises. Over the last 5 years, the Coast Guard conducted 
thirty-six mass rescue exercises involving passenger vessels, three of 
which involved a cruise ship. The Coast Guard has an agreement with 
CLIA to include an actual cruise ship as part of these exercises every 
2 years. Since 2007, CLIA has fulfilled this partnership agreement by 
providing a cruise ship every other year for a full scale exercise. The 
purpose of these exercises is to assist the Coast Guard, other Federal, 
state and local search and rescue authorities and cruise ship industry 
partners in exercising mass rescue plans, practice interagency/industry 
cooperation and coordination and identify ways to improve the overall 
response to a major maritime disaster.
    Mass rescue exercises have been structured around a 5-year cycle. 
In 2010, the Coast Guard directed that, at a minimum, each Coast Guard 
District conduct and/or participate in one discussion based (e.g., 
seminar, workshop, game, or tabletop) and one operations based (e.g., 
drills, functional, full scale) mass rescue exercise over a 5-year 
period. To meet this exercise requirement, beginning this year, the 
Coast Guard has planned a 5-year mass rescue exercise series known as 
``Black Swan.'' The exercise series will begin this year with a cruise 
ship seminar in New Orleans, followed by a functional drill in 2013, 
also in New Orleans, and full scale mass rescue exercises in Miami in 
2015 and Norfolk in 2017. The scope of these exercises provide a 
valuable opportunity to identify and resolve the difficulties 
associated with rescuing hundreds or thousands of people at once. It is 
also a chance to address the unique challenges posed by off shore mass 
rescues.
    The Black Swan mass rescue exercise series will focus on the 
exercise of Coast Guard mass rescue plans, coordination with other 
authorities and industry partners, notification and information 
processes, personnel accountability, embarking thousands of survivors 
on rescue ships from the water, lifeboats and rafts, and rescued 
passenger and crew support.
Cruise Ship Security and Crime
    September 11, 2001 spurred the development of the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the IMO International Ship and 
Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, both of which are rigorously 
enforced by the Coast Guard. Prior to the MTSA and ISPS, only the 
cruise ships that visited the U.S. and cruise terminals were required 
to have security plans in place. The requirement for cruise ship and 
facility security plans in the United States had come into effect as a 
result of the 1985 Achille Lauro terrorist incident in the 
Mediterranean Sea, resulting in the murder of Leon Klinghoffer--a 
wheel-chair bound U.S. citizen.
    The Coast Guard examines every cruise ship that visits the U.S. for 
compliance with MTSA and ISPS requirements at the same time it carries 
out annual and periodic examinations. Overall, cruise ship compliance 
records have been extremely good, with only three security-related 
detentions in approximately 1,800 security examinations since July 
2004.
    Notwithstanding this security compliance regime, there have been 
serious incidents and crimes that have affected U.S. citizens aboard 
foreign-flagged cruise ships, however, this has led to an increased 
focus on protecting our citizens both in port and while they are at 
sea. In 2010, Congress bolstered passenger safety and security with 
respect to such incidents and crimes by enacting the Cruise Ship 
Security and Safety Act of 2010 (CVSSA). Since then, the Coast Guard 
has worked diligently to implement the provisions of this act.
    The CVSSA prescribes security and safety requirements for 
designated cruise ships and is the authority for a rulemaking now under 
development by the Coast Guard. CVSSA amended Title 46, United States 
Code, by adding passenger vessel security and safety requirements, and 
crime scene preservation training requirements for passenger vessel 
crewmembers. CVSSA addresses many areas that affect personal safety and 
security, including: ship design; better public access to information 
about crime aboard cruise ships; improved precautions, response, 
medical care, support for victims of sexual assault; preservation of 
evidence necessary to prosecute criminals; and more consistent and 
complete reports about criminal activities. A large number of these 
requirements went into effect when the President signed the legislation 
on July 27, 2010; however, there are areas that require implementation 
through the publication of regulations.
    Thus far, the Coast Guard has completed the following actions with 
respect to implementing the CVSSA:

   In June 2011, the Coast Guard published policy establishing 
        guidelines for Coast Guard Marine Inspectors examining cruise 
        vessels for compliance to include physical requirements, such 
        as: rail heights; door peep-holes as one commonly sees on hotel 
        doors, which allow cabin occupants to see who is outside before 
        opening their cabin door; and the passenger security guide.

   The Coast Guard established an Internet-based portal 
        ([email protected]) to facilitate electronic submission of crime 
        reports.

   The Coast Guard established a web link to publish cruise 
        ship sexual assault and criminal activity data received from 
        the the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in accordance 
        with the act: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg2/cgis/.

   An Inter-agency workgroup consisting of Coast Guard, FBI, 
        and the Maritime Administration personnel completed development 
        of a model course addressing crime scene preservation standards 
        and curricula. In July 2011, the Coast Guard published policy 
        promulgating training standards and curricula for the 
        certification of passenger vessel security personnel.
Closing
    As I close, let me emphasize that the Coast Guard places the 
highest priority on vessels that embark passengers in the United 
States; and embark U.S. passengers worldwide. We have a strong and 
effective port state control program for foreign cruise ships and 
ensure that vessels that visit the United States are in substantial 
compliance with applicable international and domestic standards.
    We participate in casualty investigations, even those taking place 
overseas, and we lead efforts at IMO to improve maritime safety, 
security, and environmental protection standards.
    Furthermore, we have one of the best Search and Rescue programs in 
the world and we work closely with the industry on SAR planning and 
medical evacuations. We have efforts underway to plan for mass rescue 
operations.
    We are taking measures to implement the CVSSA. We have accomplished 
much, but additional work must take place.
    As a result of the Costa Concordia incident, we have also put into 
place a regime to witness passenger musters as part of our mandatory 
vessel examination program. As the investigation unfolds, the Coast 
Guard will capture lessons learned and incorporate them into our safety 
regime.
    The Coast Guard also looks forward to continued cooperation with 
this committee, passenger victims groups, and the passenger vessel 
industry to maximize cruise vessel safety, security, and environmental 
protection. Although we are not asking for, or recommending to 
Congress, new legislation at this time, we may do so in the future once 
we have had the opportunity to review the Costa Concordia 
investigation.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I will be 
pleased to answer any questions you may have.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
    And we call now on Bill Johnson, Seaport Director, Port of 
Miami.

        STATEMENT OF BILL JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, PortMiami, 
                       MIAMI-DADE COUNTY

    Mr. Johnson. Good morning. Chairman Rockefeller and 
honorable members of the Committee, first, I want to thank you 
for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am 
especially pleased to be invited to appear before our two great 
senators from the state of Florida, Senator Bill Nelson and 
Senator Marco Rubio.
    Both our senators, as they've stated, are keenly aware of 
the importance of the cruise industry to the state of Florida. 
My name is Bill Johnson and I'm the Director of the Dante 
Fascell Port of Miami, now known as PortMiami. I also serve as 
the Chairman of the Florida Ports Council, which has 
responsibility for coordination with Florida's--all of 
Florida's 15 deepwater ports.
    I also have the privilege of serving as the third Vice 
President of the International Association of Ports and Harbors 
where we work on issues of national and global concern 
including issues pertaining to the cruise industry.
    Believe me, I cannot emphasize enough that safety is the 
cruise industry's number one priority. I underscore that. 
Safety and security is also my highest priority as the director 
of the world's busiest cruise port.
    As a way of some quick background, the Port of Miami, 
PortMiami, we're a small little port. We're about 518 acres 
located right in the beautiful part of downtown on Biscayne Bay 
between the City of Miami and the City of Miami Beach. Our port 
is governed by our county mayor, Carlos Gimenez, and our Board 
of County Commissioners serve as our board of directors. We're 
a public port but we operate with a private sector mentality.
    Last year, PortMiami generated over $18 billion, direct and 
indirect, to the economy of our community, our state and our 
nation, and we generated in excess of 180,000 jobs in south 
Florida, in our state, and these are, I would like to add, are 
high-paying jobs. The average job through the Port of Miami 
with a high school education is approaching $56,000 a year. So 
the maritime industry and, specifically, cargo and crews, are 
very high paying important jobs.
    As stated, PortMiami is the world's busiest cruise port. 
We've just completed our fourth consecutive year exceeding 4 
million passengers. In addition, our community, Miami-Dade 
County, is the global headquarters of five of the world's 
largest distinguished cruise lines including Carnival Cruise 
Line and its parent, Carnival Corporation, Royal Caribbean 
Cruise Limited, Norwegian Cruise Lines, Oceania, Regent.
    The importance of having these global headquarters in 
Florida but, most importantly, in America I cannot stress 
enough, and I'm sure we'll come back to that issue in a few 
minutes.
    PortMiami, again, and its cruising really is the bread and 
butter of the economy of my town and a strong piece of the 
economy of my state. While there are 15 deepwater ports in 
Florida, five of those ports, as indicated I think by Senator 
Nelson, five of those ports have a heavy emphasis on cruise and 
cruise-related business.
    During the recent several years in the downturn of our 
economy, the cruise business in America and in Florida remained 
a strong and a continued, if you will, strong presence to the 
economy, protecting local and state jobs and companies in a 
significant way.
    I'd like to present, if I would, just a few statistics. In 
2011, over 13 million overnight visitors came to Miami --13 
million. The number is growing. In the state of Florida, it was 
over 82 million visitors, in 2011.
    In Miami, those visitors spent over $20 billion last year. 
They stayed an average of almost six nights, those visitors. 
And of this number, over 7 percent were cruise passengers. 
These visitors spent an average of roughly $265 a day while in 
our community and they stay--this is important--an average of 
2.4 nights per cruise. That is the single--the cruise industry 
is the single largest contributor to overnight stays, to 
occupancy of hotels, in our community.
    When you examine how they spend their money, these cruise 
passengers spend approximately 35 percent for lodging in our 
motels and hotels, nearly 26 percent for food, for meals, 15 
percent for entertainment, unfortunately only 10 percent for 
shopping. We'd like that to be higher. Of course, this is just 
the tip of the iceberg.
    Of the more than 4 million passengers last year and, 
literally, within the next 2 years will be at 4.5 million 
passengers and by the end of the decade we're projected to be 
over 5 million cruise passengers at Miami, but of those 4 
million cruise passengers who visited PortMiami last year, 60 
percent--this is very important--60 percent passed through my 
sister agency, Miami International Airport, the second largest 
international gateway into America, obviously infusing 
millions, untold millions of additional revenues to the U.S. 
economy through airlines, OK, and million more, if you will, in 
terms of passenger fees, meals, sales tax, et cetera, et 
cetera.
    PortMiami, obviously, is a critical job creator--a job 
incubator, if you will, for our state, again, generating over 
180,000 jobs just in Miami alone, direct indirect. This number 
will continue to increase.
    Three new lines, including Disney, have announced that 
they're going to call Miami as a home port--three new brands. 
We're clearly excited. Also, the maritime industry workers, as 
I've told you, are some of the highest paid in our state and in 
my community, averaging close to $56,000 a year.
    I'd like to say that, of course, these workers, some of 
these are, again, both in public and private sector employment. 
We have over 1,200 International Longshoremen alone at the Port 
of Miami. In Florida as you've heard over $6 billion a year 
goes to cruise industry service and these are providers,
    This is another benefit, the provisioning of these cruise 
ships. Royal Caribbean--and one of the senators made this 
point, a very strong point, RoyalCaribbean alone uses more than 
2,000 suppliers.
    These are American companies. Two thousand suppliers. Three 
hundred and fifty--in my community, 350 are located in Miami. 
They spend over $400 million in my town, Royal Caribbean alone, 
on shipboard products. Carnival Cruise Line has a fleet of 20, 
just the line--Carnival Cruise Line has a fleet of 23 ships. On 
average, they serve eight meals and snacks a day to between 
2,000 and 3,000 guests, to a crew of between 1,000 and 1,500 
daily.
    When you look at that, as the point was made, they're 
serving--it's like a floating city. There's as many people and 
staff on these ships consuming product. It's huge for the 
American economy.
    The Chairman. Mr. Johnson? Very respectfully----
    Mr. Johnson. Yes?
    The Chairman. If you could kind of begin to----
    Mr. Johnson. Sure.
    The Chairman. OK.
    Mr. Johnson. Moving in the direction in terms of 
provisioning, the point I'm trying to make is it's not just the 
cruise passenger. It's the related industries that impact the, 
if you will, the economy of our state, our nation. And we see 
the opportunity for this to increase even more significantly as 
the cruise industry continues to flourish.
    The comment I'd like to make is that I interact with these 
cruise executives--fortunately, they're headquartered in my 
town--from the CEOs and the presidents of these cruise lines 
all the way down. We are on a weekly basis working with our 
cruise partners, working--and it's incredible support we 
receive from the U.S. Coast Guard.
    I cannot say enough about the importance of the Coast 
Guard, their role, the importance of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection and the safety and security of our ports. I can 
assure you--I can testify about the commitment not just of your 
ports but of the leadership of these cruise lines and these 
executives to safety and to environment, and during the 
question and answer I'd be happy to get into some of the 
responses on both of those issues from the PortMiami 
perspective.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Bill Johnson, Director, PortMiami, 
                           Miami-Dade County
    Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and honorable 
members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 
before you today. I am especially pleased to be invited to appear 
before our two great senators from the State of Florida, Senator Bill 
Nelson and Senator Marco Rubio, who are keenly aware of the importance 
the cruise industry brings to the Sunshine State. My name is Bill 
Johnson, and I am the Director of the Dante B. Fascell Port of Miami, 
now known as PortMiami. I also serve as the Chairman of the Florida 
Ports Council and serve as the Vice President of the International 
Association of Ports and Harbors where we work together on issues of 
national and international concern. Believe me, and I cannot emphasize 
this enough, safety is the cruise industry's top priority.
Background
    The Miami-Dade County Seaport Department, PortMiami, is a 518-acre 
facility located in mid-Biscayne Bay between the City of Miami and 
Miami Beach. PortMiami is governed by Mayor Carlos Gimenez and the 
Miami-Dade County Board of County Commissioners under a strong mayor 
form of government. PortMiami is the busiest cruise port in the world, 
handling more than 4 million passengers in 2011 for the 4th consecutive 
year in a row. In addition, Miami-Dade County is the global 
headquarters for five of the world's largest and most distinguished 
cruise lines: Carnival Cruise Lines, Norwegian Cruise Line, Royal 
Caribbean Cruises Ltd., Oceania Cruises and Regent Seven Seas Cruises. 
Thus, at PortMiami, cruising is our bread and butter and lifeblood of 
the local economy. During the recent downturn in the economy, the 
cruise business in Florida remained strong and at present continues to 
grow, protecting our local and state economy from an even larger 
economic disruption.
Economic Impact
    With your indulgence, I would like to present the following 
numbers--in 2011 Greater Miami had over 13.4 million overnight visitors 
who spent $20 billion dollars and stayed an average of 5.8 nights. Of 
those visitors, 7.1 percent or 951,400 were cruise passengers. These 
visitors spent an average of $264.58 per day and stayed an average of 
2.4 nights. When examining how their money was spent, it breaks down 
as: 35 percent for lodging, 25.6 percent for meals, 15.2 percent for 
entertainment, 10.2 percent for shopping, 7.5 percent for local 
transportation; and 6.3 percent for parking. But that is only the tip 
of the iceberg. Of the more than 4 million cruise passengers who 
visited PortMiami last year, over 60 percent of them passed through our 
sister department, Miami International Airport, infusing millions of 
additional revenue to U.S. airlines and millions more into the state 
and local economy via items such as passenger fees, meals, and sales 
taxes.
    PortMiami is a critical jobs incubator for the state, supporting 
over 180,000 jobs, and that number will increase with three new cruise 
brands coming to our port over the next 22 months. Also, maritime 
industry workers at the port have one of the highest incomes in the 
County. For persons with a high school degree, salaries average around 
$52,000 per year, a good salary for South Florida. Jobs created by the 
port are in both the public and private sectors, including over 1,200 
members of the International Longshoremen's Association.
    In Florida, over $6 billion a year goes to cruise industry service 
providers, suppliers and vendors according to an economic impact study 
commissioned by the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA). 
Royal Caribbean alone uses more than 2,000 suppliers, 350 of which are 
local to South Florida and spends more than $400 million annually in 
South Florida on shipboard products ranging from fuel, food and drinks, 
to furniture. Carnival Cruise Lines, PortMiami's largest cruise tenant, 
has a global fleet of 23 ships, where 8 meals and snacks are served 
every day to 2,000-3,000 guests per ship (along with 1,000-1,500 crew 
members). Celebrity Cruises' Constellation, at full capacity, feeds 3 
meals a day to over 2,000 passengers and more than 1,000 officers and 
crew, comparable to the provisions that any small town might consume in 
1 week. Provisioning of ships gets real money flowing into the 
economy--helping small and medium sized businesses not only survive, 
but thrive.
    Ship Chandlers range in size and product specialization, and 
include nationally recognizable names like Coca-Cola and Cargill, to 
local and state businesses such as the American Fruit and Produce 
Corp., and Sysco. American Fruit and Produce, a fruit and vegetable 
supplier based in Miami-Dade County has 125 employees and over 45 years 
experience working with the cruise industry. With annual revenues of 
over $100 million, they get 30-40 percent of their business from the 
cruise industry, supplying lines such as Norwegian, Carnival and Royal 
Caribbean throughout Florida, in New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast. 
These suppliers support local jobs throughout the South, jobs that 
would disappear if we did not have a robust cruise industry.
    Although standard fare such as bananas and tomatoes are still in 
high demand, more and more ships are changing menus to include organic 
and specialty foods, providing additional new business opportunities 
for U.S. farmers.
    Every cruise ship leaving from PortMiami has a multiplier effect 
that also includes 486 companies providing ground transportation, 
including bus and limousine services, and thousands of taxi trips 
between Miami International Airport, local hotels, and PortMiami on a 
typical cruise weekend. The cruise industry also supports jobs ranging 
from companies involved in refueling ships, harbor pilots guiding ships 
into the harbor, tugboat operators, waste removal, and landscaping, as 
well as terminal security services.
    In Florida as a whole, these numbers expand exponentially. Florida 
is the number one cruise state in the nation, and according to CLIA, 
the industry accounted for $6.3 billion in direct spending in 2010, 
generating 123,255 jobs and wages totaling $5.4 billion. Florida's five 
cruise ports handled 5.8 million embarkations, which accounted for 
nearly 60 percent of all U.S. cruise embarkations. The jobs are not 
just on-port, they include travel and transportation services, hotel 
and hospitality services, food provisioning, ship repair services, 
advertising agencies, engineering companies, manufacturers of machinery 
and metal, interior designers, and computer consultants, just to name a 
few.
Safety and Security
    Safety and security must always be our top priority. While serving 
as director, I have focused on enhancement of our public safety and 
security protocols. I am pleased that our Port is a leader in the state 
and nation regarding security. Ensuring our passengers safety is the 
number one concern at PortMiami. In addition to the separate private 
security hired by cruise lines, we are close partners with U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement, Miami-Dade Police Department and Miami-Dade Fire-
Rescue.
    We take the threat of terrorism seriously, as well as preventing 
crime on port and providing a safe and secure environment for 
passengers, workers and visitors alike. We conduct regular training 
drills with our Federal, state and local partners to ensure readiness 
for any emergency, be it natural like a hurricane, or man-made.
    We also work closely with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Department 
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture as well as the Florida 
Department of Agriculture to protect against entry of insects or 
disease that could harm U.S. interests. For example, PortMiami has 
initiated a ``Don't Pack a Bug'' program with the USDA to protect U.S. 
farms and produce.
    In another innovative program, we have also partnered with a group 
called Kristi House in Miami, implementing a plan to train the 
personnel at the seaport to identify and respond to children in transit 
who may be victims of human trafficking and/or sexual exploitation. In 
addition, the plan includes partnering with the cruise lines and 
private security companies to facilitate the training of their 
personnel as well.
    The Port is compliant with all International Maritime Organization 
standards that govern the operations of cruise vessels. Our lines 
follow the safety standards of the Convention on the Standards of 
Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping which deals with crew 
training regarding safety procedures.
    Our close cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard assures passenger 
safety with the examination of each new cruise vessel when it first 
enters service at a U.S. port, three of which will be coming to 
PortMiami in the coming year. There are also thorough Coast Guard 
examinations of cruise ships when ships reposition from foreign to U.S. 
ports, as well as mandatory quarterly inspections. These inspections 
emphasize structural fire safety and the proper life saving equipment 
along with being present for fire and abandoned ship drills.
    I applaud Congress for passing the Cruise Vessel Security and 
Safely Act of 2010 in furtherance of efforts to carry out the upmost 
passenger safety, including updating ships safety, the installation of 
ship rails, visual identification means on entry doors, integration of 
technology used to detect any passengers fallen overboard, and the new 
protocols regarding reporting crimes aboard.
Environmental
    PortMiami continues to be at the forefront in environmental 
responsibility. Our well-thought-out vision embraces public and private 
input and is consistent with the objectives of County government and 
maritime industry needs.
    Our Port is surrounded by a unique and fragile, maritime ecosystem 
which ranges from sea grass beds to natural coral reefs. These waters 
provide our community with the strong tourism base that South Florida 
thrives on, including the cruise industry.
    The Port has taken steps to ensure that the value of commerce in 
our community is supported by an aggressive and proactive environmental 
program. Just last year, the Port completed over 40 acres of mangrove 
restoration at Oleta River State Park in Northern Biscayne Bay. We have 
also installed storm water treatment systems to improve water quality 
of the Bay.
    To conserve energy, PortMiami has implemented a series of on-going 
projects to reduce energy consumption onsite, including the 
installation of `variable frequency drives' on the air handlers in 
older facilities, retrofitting all lamps from watt reduction throughout 
the Port, along with installing computerized panels for controlling the 
lights in cruise terminals. To reduce our carbon footprint, we have 
replaced cars with hybrids and provided for the separation of cargo and 
cruise traffic to decrease idling time and reduce emissions.
    We also incorporate green performance standards in our Cruise 
Capital Improvement Program, with our most recent renovations using 
furniture manufactured with products using renewable and recycled 
materials and canopies utilizing a fabric that is 100 percent 
recyclable. All re-roofing projects have reflective roof measures, such 
as reflective coating and membranes with a solar reflectance that keep 
terminals cooler, even in our tropical climate.
    Our vision is to continue a tradition of leadership concerning 
environmental issues and to practice sustainable green development. By 
carefully balancing environmental, social and economic factors into our 
business planning and decisionmaking processes, we will ensure a 
favorable workplace today and a healthy environment tomorrow.
Conclusion
    PortMiami is where the modern cruise industry was born starting in 
1972, when cruise shipping pioneer Ted Arison acquired his first 
passenger ship and founded what has become the highly successful 
business called Carnival Cruise Lines. We look forward to continuing 
the growth of the cruise industry in Miami, and welcome new innovations 
and best practices with gusto. The safety and security of our 
passengers is priority number one. I would like to thank you for 
allowing me to speak today and welcome input regarding this most 
important of industries.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson.
    Now, Captain William H. Doherty is the Director of Maritime 
Relations, NEXUS Consulting Group.

            STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN WILLIAM H. DOHERTY,

                DIRECTOR OF MARITIME RELATIONS,

                  NEXUS CONSULTING CORPORATION

    Captain Doherty. Good morning, Chairman, Senators. Thank 
you for having me here today to review the issue of cruise line 
safety.
    From my background, I'm a proud graduate of Massachusetts 
Maritime Academy. I hold two degrees from that institution. I'm 
a master mariner in the United States Merchant Marine and a 
retired commander in the U.S. Navy. I served 49 years in this 
industry including safety manager for one of America's largest 
cruise lines just prior to retirement.
    As my submitted testimony notes, there's a number of issues 
where the international cruise industry has fallen short of its 
responsibility to maintain safety and security of the 
passengers and crew. In recent days, it's become glaringly 
obvious that there are some serious issues within the cruise 
industry pertaining to operating safety and security which need 
to be resolved.
    Just 2 months into 2012, we've already seen at least 34 
deaths--one on the Liberty of Sea, one on Carnival Fantasy and 
at least 32 on Costa Concordia. We've also seen two sinkings--
the Rabaul Queen off of Papua, New Guinea, and the Costa 
Concordia in Italy.
    We've seen hundreds of pounds of illegal drugs seized on 
three cruise ships; most recently, yet another cruise ship 
losing power in the middle of pirate-infested waters due to 
reported engine room fire. That ship left passengers in peril 
on the sea in a terrible place.
    These are only the few known reported incidents on cruise 
ships in 2012. However, what we can reliably assume from these 
reports coming to light only after the Costa Concordia is that 
there is every reason to believe that many more incidents have 
gone either unreported or grossly underreported, making it 
almost impossible to validate incident data and draw an actual 
picture of the state of affairs regarding security and safety 
on today's cruise ships.
    There's no one specific enforcement agency or mechanism 
which regulates or enforces the Law of the Sea in this 
international fleet. The maritime domain is regulated by the 
International Maritime Organization. More particularly, with 
respect to safety, the framework of operational management 
safety and environmental protection is covered through IMO-
mandated International Safety Management, or ISM, standards.
    These mirror the ISO, or International Standards 
Organizations, ashore. That's to say that an industry as a 
whole is expected to establish its own standards. It's 
regulated by how closely they meet those standards. Again, to 
paraphrase would be say what you're going to do, do what you 
say.
    The regulators of these standards are usually in 
administration of the country where the ship is registered, 
otherwise known as the flag state, under the IMO worldwide. 
Unfortunately, quite often the country for which the ship is 
registered, or the flag state, outsources its authority to 
contracted agencies, or classification societies.
    That was the case in the Costa Concordia where Italy 
outsourced its country's compliance program to the private 
entity RINA, and they are a private entity. Sadly, these weak 
checks and balances have led to a sort of the fox guarding the 
henhouse model of governance, you know, at the expense of 
passengers, crew and the environment and the maritime domain as 
a whole.
    What I have called for is a greater focus to be lent in 
three areas--obviously, passenger safety; second, strict 
shipboard compliance and flag state industry oversight, and 
you'll see in my testimony how I've outlined some of those. 
I've noted various specific areas of improvement and change 
which include, for one, zero tolerance with respect to drugs 
and alcohol for everyone, all crew on passenger ships.
    We also recommend a passenger-initiated distress system and 
we strongly recommend worldwide contingency planning, funding 
an organization for future mega cruise ship disasters. Cruise 
ship operators and owners must fully comply not only with the 
letter but the spirit of the IMO standards of training, 
certification and watch standing, otherwise known as STCW, 
specifically, the requirements of Bridge Resource Management, 
or BRM, to prevent navigational disasters.
    While none of us could have ever envisioned the specific 
events leading up to the loss of the Concordia and, tragically, 
32 lives, there was a clear indication that the root cause of 
the grounding was a fatal failure on behalf of the captain and 
his senior officers to follow and comply with the procedures of 
Bridge Resource Management.
    We don't need to reinvent the wheel to bring these 
necessary changes and improvements to maritime safety around. 
You know, we've got the framework already in place with the 
Cruise Ship Security Act and Safety Act of 2010.
    This is good legislation but it lacks strict criminal 
penalties and addresses more individual crimes against cruise 
vessel passengers and as yet does not address strong penalties 
or criminal sentencing for reckless abandonment.
    We have to decentralize the manner in which emergencies are 
reported. The Costa Concordia only lost 34 lives because a few 
passengers and crew members were able to call loved ones and 
report the distress. Mind you, a ship member needed to phone 
out to report the distress, clearly afraid of reporting it, 
clear afraid that it wasn't reported by his own ship and that 
the signal would go unheeded.
    If the survivors weren't lucky enough to be within cell 
range, who knows how much larger the death count would have 
been? The Office of the Costa Concordia was still only 
reporting to the Italian authorities that they had a power 
outage, not that they had run aground within the first few 
calls from the Coast Guard to the ship. That totally should 
have been the other way around.
    We're calling for legislation to mandate passenger distress 
signals. This would empower passengers to alert the outside 
rescue authorities if they feel their lives are in danger and 
they're not sure proper distress messages were sent, for 
whatever reason, by the ship personnel. Passengers able to 
initiate distress signals.
    Thank you, Senators, for your time. I'd be happy to answer 
any questions with this or my written testimony.
    [The prepared statement of Captain Doherty follows:]

Captain William H. Doherty,* Director of Maritime Relations, 

                         Nexus Consulting Group
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \*\ Captain Bill Doherty is a 1967 graduate of the Massachusetts 
Maritime Academy, a licensed U.S. Coast Guard Master-Unlimited tonnage, 
and qualified First Class Pilot, Prince William Sound, Valdez, Alaska. 
Captain Doherty is a retired Commander in the United States Navy 
Reserve, and has served on numerous U.S. Navy warships and was the Head 
of Maritime Affairs for the Chief of Naval Operations during Operation 
Desert Storm. Over the course of his career, he has commanded U.S. 
Naval Ships, as well as tankers, containerships, research vessels, 
high-speed ferries, and was an instructor at his alma mater. Prior to 
retirement, his latest position was as Safety Manager for Norwegian 
Cruise Lines. Captain Doherty now serves as the Director of Maritime 
Relations for Nexus Consulting, a maritime safety and security firm 
based in Alexandria, VA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens) was a Mississippi Riverboat pilot. 
        One day, a woman passenger tried to flatter him saying'' My 
        goodness Captain, you must know where every hazard on this 
        river lies!'' Captain Clemens replied: ``No Madam. That would 
        be impossible. I just know where the good water is and keep her 
        there.''

    Ships run aground because someone made a terrible mistake or was 
negligent.
    A Master (Captain) has a responsibility to navigate in a safe and 
prudent manner, taking into account all circumstances--including but 
not limited to the existing conditions and the limitations of the 
vessel involved. Prudence dictates that the Master allows an ``exit 
strategy'' of all possible contingencies including grounding, 
collision, fire, serious illness and a multitude of unforeseen 
circumstances.
    On January 13, 2012, the Italian flag cruise ship, MV Costa 
Concordia, stranded and capsized off the Italian island of Giglio. At 
least thirty-two lives, (almost all of them passengers) were lost. None 
of the lives appear to have been lost during the stranding, but 
occurred at least 1 hour later when the ship capsized.
Most often in life, we are judged more on how we react to situations 
        and events than the incidents themselves. In the case of the 
        Captain of the Costa Concordia, the lack of planning, training, 
        drilling and preparing for the subsequent events was tragic and 
        disgraceful . . .

    Maritime safety and prudence starts with competence; achieved 
through a combination of training, certification and constant drilling 
as well as the maintenance of operational and safety equipment. 
Leadership on ships, as in life, starts from the ``top down.''
    Abandoning those left in your professional care clearly 
demonstrates the lack of moral fiber of the Master and all those other 
officers and crew who abandoned not only their passengers but their 
fellow shipmates, those ``professional'' mariners, who did in fact 
remain at station waiting for leadership and guidance that was never 
provided by those [cowards] who deserted their responsibilities and 
dignity.
    The fact that the passengers were never mustered and briefed in 
Emergency Stations, evacuation or any other prerequisite safety 
information is not only imprudent, but illegal.
    I have commanded ships of all types for over thirty years, have 
served ashore in management as Port Captain for major oil companies, 
taught navigation at America's finest Maritime Academy, and have served 
as Safety Manager for one of the largest cruise lines in the world.
    Cruise ships--as well as all vessels plying the navigable waters of 
the world--are subject to strict maritime rules and regulations, 
including but not limited to Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations, 
Standards of Training Certification and Watch keeping (STCW), The 
International Safety Management (ISM) rules and most importantly, the 
Rule of the Sea (whereby the Master and officers and crew never abandon 
the ship until all passengers and crew are accounted for and everything 
possible has been done to save them).

On a total lack of leadership and responsibility from the ship's Master 
        and senior officers & serious questions regarding the Captain's 
        sobriety and emotional stability . . .
    There seems to be a clear indication of reckless negligence, 
followed by confusion and chaos in the loss of the Costa Concordia. I 
agree that we have to wait until all the facts are in. However, 
pictures of that boulder stuck in the side of the ship and the fact 
that the Master, and most of the senior licensed officers, abandoned 
their ship and their duties prior to accounting for all souls aboard 
speak for itself. In fact, several reports portray the Captain, his key 
licensed officers and a woman (purported to be his girlfriend) in the 
very first lifeboats scurrying away from the sinking ship and 
abandoning those remaining souls to the perils of the sea. Emerging 
reports paint an ever more bizarre portrait of a ship and crew totally 
out of control.
    On February 18, 2012, television news \1\ reported that traces of 
cocaine were reportedly found on the outside of a hair sample of Capt. 
Francesco Schettino, the Master of the Concordia. Notably, the 
consultant who did the analyses stated that they found no presence of 
the drug in urine samples or within the hair itself.
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    \1\ http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/02/19/lawyers-for-costa-
concordia-request-new-drug-tests-for-cruise-captain-after/.
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    My company, Nexus, has from the very beginning of this 
investigation questioned the ``sobriety'' (be it under the influence of 
drugs and/or alcohol) of the Captain and crew members, and how that 
condition may (and in my opinion most probably) have factored into this 
disaster.
    It is clear that there was no timely or proper post-casualty 
alcohol or drug testing performed on Captain Schettino, or all those 
officers and crew who may have had an emergency duty during this 
disaster. Of course, this type of test must be done in a timely fashion 
to determine blood alcohol content, and this test was not completed.
    Whatever ``drug testing'' was performed, the mere presence of an 
illegal substance (Cocaine) on the Captain while he navigated this 
majestic vessel onto the rocks, taking the lives of thirty two souls in 
the tragedy, is indication enough of the presence of illegal drugs on 
the bridge of this ship when she was wrecked. The fact that traces were 
found on the body of the Captain is nothing less than STRONG 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE of drug use, by either Captain Schettino 
himself at the worst case, or by someone very close to him in the best 
case.
The Solution: A Need for Changes in Cruise Vessel Laws in Light of the 
        Costa Concordia Disaster . . .
    The International standard for proper evacuation, mustering and 
embarkation into lifeboats and life rafts is a maximum of thirty 
minutes from the sounding of the Abandon Ship Alarm, until the boats 
are launched and away from the sinking ship.
    Cruise ships are required, periodically (not less than annually), 
to demonstrate this capability to a governing regulatory body. The 
ability for the entire ship's crew to work as a team in accomplishing 
this standard requires training, drilling and then continued drilling 
and training.
    From the time the Costa Concordia hit the rocks and stranded, there 
was almost no communication and/or any distress signal sent from the 
ship until local authorities were alerted to a problem through cell 
phone conversations between passengers and their family members ashore. 
The Master downplayed and transmitted false and misleading information 
to rescue authorities until the situation became unmanageable and lives 
were lost.
    No alarms were sounded, nor were passenger evacuations conducted in 
a timely manner. Passengers were given false accounts of the extent of 
the damage and ordered to return to their cabin rather than assemble at 
the abandon ship stations. The Master and senior officers abandoned the 
ship and the passengers by boarding the first lifeboats, leaving 
passengers and crew aboard to fend for themselves. The Master and 
ship's crew refused to cooperate with local rescue authorities, and 
there was no muster or accounting for how many souls were left aboard 
to be rescued.
    The limited resources of the local Search and Rescue (SAR) units 
were overwhelmed and unable to affect an expedient and effective 
rescue, causing the loss of life of many. No unified command structure 
was in place, which would have brought maximum resources to bear on 
rescuing trapped souls aboard the ship. Rescue efforts transformed too 
quickly to recovery efforts due to lack of resources, information and 
effective use of an Incident/Unified Command structure. Obviously there 
is a need to insure through proper legislation that no such tragedy 
ever occurs again, affecting not only U.S. citizens but passengers 
around the world.
The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010
    H.R. 3360: The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 was a 
well-intentioned and good piece of legislation, but shortfalls in 
enforcement, financing and prosecution require amendments. The act 
lacks strict criminal penalties and addresses individual crimes against 
cruise vessel passengers. It does not address or provide strong 
penalties or criminal sentencing for the reckless abandonment 
demonstrated in the MV Costa Concordia disaster.
    Our proposed amendments to the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety 
Act of 2010 would provide additional protection to U.S. citizens 
booking passage on any foreign cruise vessels through any ticketing 
agency in the United States and to all travelers aboard cruise ships 
calling on any United States port during any segment of their 
itinerary.
    In summary, the amendments proposed by Nexus Consulting Group 
would:

        Require development and implantation of a Passenger Distress 
        Signal System (PDS). No timely distress signal was transmitted. 
        ``What can passengers do?''

(a)  Passenger Distress Signal

    Passengers need to be empowered with capabilities to alert 
authorities in event they are concerned that ship personnel are NOT 
alerting rescue and responding authorities to situations aboard the 
ship in ``real time.''

(b)  The PDS system will be tied to the ship's Global Maritime Distress 
        and Safety System (GMDSS) \2\ system, with protections to deny 
        interference of distress signal from the ship.
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    \2\ The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) is an 
internationally agreed-upon set of safety procedures, types of 
equipment, and communication protocols used to increase safety and make 
it easier to rescue distressed ships, boats and aircraft. GMDSS 
consists of several systems, some of which are new, but many of which 
have been in operation for many years. The system is intended to 
perform the following functions: alerting (including position 
determination of the unit in distress), search and rescue coordination, 
locating (homing), maritime safety information broadcasts, general 
communications, and bridge-to-bridge communications. Specific radio 
carriage requirements depend upon the ship's area of operation, rather 
than its tonnage. The system also provides redundant means of distress 
alerting, and emergency sources of power.

(c)  Passengers are entitled to let the outside world know if there is 
        something wrong without depending upon people who might have 
        less than honorable motive to delay or interfere with outside 
        response agencies becoming aware of potentially life 
        threatening situations. Can we continue to ask passengers to 
        check their rights in at the dock? We encourage ``See 
        Something/Say Something'' in all kinds of Emergencies. Anyone 
        can dial ``911'' on land; shouldn't passengers have the same 
        rights?
No ``timely'' distress signal was sent
    Aside from a cell phone (which appears to have been the initiating 
factor in the Italian Coast Guard response--and most likely saved 
numerous lives on the Costa Concordia [calls from passengers to 
families worrying about their own safely, resulting in calls to the 
Italian Coast Guard]) there are no methods for passengers to initiate a 
distress call external from the ship. There are systems on-ship which 
allow passengers to contact the officers on watch in the ship's bridge 
to inform them of a fire, or a man-overboard or a crime on ship, but 
these systems are on-ship only.
    These proposed Passenger Distress Systems (PDS) need to be linked 
into the ship's external communication system, in a manner that will 
not allow any ship personnel to tamper or interfere with transmission, 
so that when a passenger ``sees something'' they can ``say something.'' 
This system will need a redundancy false alarm component; a system 
which could work could be tying the on-ship warning system into the on-
ship distress satellite system. The initiation of the passenger 
distress system (PDS) could send a message to company DPA, as well as 
governmental entities, through systems such as the U.S. Coast Guard's 
Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue System (AMVERS)\3\, poised to 
respond, much like the GMDSS.
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    \3\ AMVERS or Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue System is a 
worldwide voluntary reporting system sponsored by the United States 
Coast Guard. It is a computer-based global ship reporting system used 
worldwide by search and rescue authorities to arrange for assistance to 
persons in distress at sea. With AMVER, rescue coordinators can 
identify participating ships in the area of distress and divert the 
best-suited ship or ships to respond. Participating in AMVER does not 
put ships under any additional obligation to assist in search and 
rescue efforts, beyond that which is required under international law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A five-minute window could be afforded to the ship from the 
governmental response entity to the ship to allow for assessment of 
possible false alarm, and if no positive confirmation from the ship 
that the PDS is false or manageable on ship, governmental entities can 
initiate their appropriate response systems.
    Clearly, whether intentionally or unintentionally, there was a 
breakdown in the communication of what the true status of the Costa 
Concordia was and were the incident was heading quickly. At some point, 
and from accounts it seems to be about 20 minutes after the ship ran 
aground, the Italian Coast Guard started to realize they had a listing 
vessel with more than 4200 passengers and crew and a half-million 
gallons fuel 1000m from the coast of Giglio. The Italian Coast Guard 
was well behind the curve with night setting in and limited resources 
to affect the situation.
    From the reports, it does not appear that a ``May-day'' Distress 
call went out to any and all vessels to support the rescue operation. 
It certainly appears the Italian Coast Guard had very limited response 
vessels and staffing to be able to handle the floating city, so what 
can be done when littoral (close-to-shore) response systems reach or 
start to reach critical mass?
Require affirmative port authority documentation, which will require a 
        Captain to verify and report that pre-departure Musters and 
        Evacuation Training has been conducted for all embarked 
        passengers and crew, prior to a ship leaving port
    At this point in time, there is no disputing the fact that the 
passengers aboard Costa Concordia were never provided with proper 
Emergency Muster information, nor were they given any information or 
instruction by any crew members regarding the emergency station, use of 
lifesaving equipment and what to do in the event of foreseeable 
emergencies.
    News reports and real-time videos of the time from when the ship 
initially ran aground, and that period between the grounding and the 
actual loss of the ship (and thirty-two lives), the actions of the 
entire crew could only be described as ``chaotic.''
    There was no proper Emergency Signal sounded. In fact unclear; and 
in most cases downright false and misleading status announcements only 
added to the confusion and chaos.
    Unfortunately; current legal guidelines under the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea decree only that a muster 
drill should take place within 24 hours of embarkation.
    It's proposed that if passengers arrive after the muster has been 
completed, they will be obliged to carry out individual or group safety 
briefings. The new policy is effective immediately.
    Passengers would now need to attend a pre-departure safety drill 
after the industry's governing bodies announced new safety measures 
following the Costa Concordia disaster.
    The Cruise Lines International Association, European Cruise Council 
and Passenger Shipping Association said the muster drills would now be 
obligatory on their ships before departure.
    In a joint statement, the cruise ship associations said: ``The 
formal policy is designed to help ensure that any mandatory musters or 
briefings are conducted for the benefit of all newly embarked 
passengers at the earliest practical opportunity.''
    They also pointed out that the new initiative ``exceed legal 
requirements.''
    While this is a noble and possibly ``knee-jerk'' reaction to the 
Costa Concordia tragedy, this pre-departure muster and training must be 
included as statute in the amended ``Cruise Ships Security and Safety 
Act of 2010.''
    It's time to make Pre-Departure Musters, safety briefings and 
instructions the new ``minimum legal requirements.'' Suitable hard-copy 
documentation and verification must be required prior to any Port's 
Authorities' granting ``clearance'' to depart.
Mandate ``zero tolerance'' aboard cruise ships
    The ship's Captain Francesco Schettino was reported to navigate the 
ship to pass very close by the island to render a ``salute'' to a 
former Costa Cruise Lines Captain retired on the Island. Captain 
Schettino and a Ms. Domnica Cemortan, 25, were seen wining and dining 
together 30 minutes before the disaster. One passenger, Angelo Fabri, 
said: ``the captain was drinking wine''--a claim that contradicts 
Schettino's assertion that he stayed off alcohol. Sr. Fabri went on to 
say . . ..``They were laughing and in high spirits. The last drops of 
wine went into the captain's glass.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ By Rebecca Evans and Arthur Martin The Daily Mail (UK) 20th 
January 2012 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2089052/Domnica-
Cemortan-Was-Costa-Concordia-captain-Francesco-Schettino-trying-
impress-ballerina.html#ixzz1nLWH7jlq.
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    While there does not appear to have been any timely post-casualty 
alcohol testing (which could have proved or disproved whether Captain 
Schettino was drinking or not, or how much he drank), overwhelming 
credible circumstantial evidence and eyewitness passenger reports--
coupled with his behavior, before, during and in particular after he 
ran the Costa Concordia aground causing her to capsize and sink--
clearly indicate and demonstrate the kind of irrational and 
irresponsible behavior we have all come to associate with persons under 
the influence.
    The question then remains; just what was Carnival Cruise Lines Drug 
and Alcohol Program, and just how serious was it taken or complied with 
if the most senior officers were allowed to consume large amounts of 
alcohol in full view of passengers, immediately prior to conducting 
critical maneuvers? Maneuvers conducted aboard Costa Concordia on the 
evening of January 13, 2012 were critical enough in this case to cause 
the deaths of thirty two souls and the loss of one of the world's 
largest and most majestic passenger vessels.
    One would have to wonder just how tolerant airline passengers would 
be if their pilot of a 777 jumbo-jet, consumed a bottle of wine in the 
First-class cabin, immediately prior to returning to the cockpit with 
an attractive passenger to ``buzz'' the tower, to salute the 
controllers. Or, say, their heart surgeon consumed a bottle of wine 
before performing a triple by-pass on them.
    There is an assumption, in any profession, particularly those in 
which we ``license'' professionals such as Ship Captains, surgeons and 
airline pilots, that when we place our trust in our lives and well-
being in there ``competent and responsible'' hands, they will perform 
in a sober and professional manner. From all reports, Captain Schettino 
violated that sacred trust.
    Such a tragedy as the loss of Costa Concordia, and the deaths of 
thirty-two souls should never again be allowed to happen. One of many 
changes lawmakers will need to address is substance abuse and its 
effect on the Safety of Life at Sea.
    There is a need to expand the mandatory alcohol/drug testing 
procedure for post-incidents to put the onus on the Master and all 
persons who were or should have been involved in any actions 
surrounding the incident to be available for timely testing. If a 
Master does not present him/herself immediately to authorities, the 
Master will lose his/her license until reviewed, refusal to submit 
implying presumption of guilt.
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Alcohol Abuse
    Alcohol and drug abuse have been identified both a sea and of 
course ashore as the direct cause of most casualties. In the 
International Labor Organization's (ILO) publication Drug and Alcohol 
Prevention Programmes in the Maritime Industry (A Manual for 
Planners)(Revised)'' they cite ``In 1993 the International Maritime 
Organization adopted the International Safety Management (ISM) Code 
(IMO Resolution A. 741(18)) which ``recognized the need for appropriate 
organization of management to enable it to respond to the need of those 
on board ships to achieve and maintain high standards of safety and 
environmental protection'' \5\.
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    \5\ Further, in November 1995 the nineteenth IMO Assembly adopted 
`Guidelines for the Implementation of the ISM Code by Administrations' 
(Resolution A. 788(19)). The requirements of these resolutions became 
mandatory for certain types of ships on 1st July1998 with the remaining 
types of ships engaged on international voyages being required to 
comply by 1st July 2002.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The publication goes on to cite:

    ``Test Results of Affects of Alcohol Consumption of Job Tasks'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Note: This test was published in the New England Journal of 
Medicine 1990; 323(7) pp. 455-461. Model JG, Mounts, LM. Drinking and 
flying: The Problem of alcohol use by pilots.

   1st test: Before any alcohol ingestion: 10 percent could not 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        perform all tasks correctly

   2nd test: after reaching a blood alcohol concentration of 
        0.10/100ml; 89 percent could not perform all tasks correctly, 
        and

   3rd test: Fourteen hours later, after all alcohol had left 
        their systems, 68 percent could not perform all tasks correctly

    While test was performed on U.S. airline pilots on a flight 
simulator, there is every reason to believe that these findings apply 
equally to seafarers!''
    The term ``seafarer'' should be applied to all persons working on 
ships and not just those in executive or traditional maritime 
positions, including hotel staff and entertainers directly employed by 
the ship operators.
    IMO STCW 2010 ``The Manila Amendments ``regarding Alcohol 
consumption afloat.\7\
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    \7\ The 2010 amendments The Manila amendments to the STCW 
Convention and Code were adopted on 25 June 2010, marking a major 
revision of the STCW Convention and Code. The 2010 amendments are set 
to enter into force on 1 January 2012 under the tacit acceptance 
procedure and are aimed at bringing the Convention and Code up to date 
with developments since they were initially adopted and to enable them 
to address issues that are anticipated to emerge in the foreseeable 
future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Manila Amendments of the STCW convention came into force on 1st 
January 2012. For the first time under STCW, mandatory limits for 
alcohol consumption are also being introduced (a limit of not greater 
than 0.05 percent blood alcohol level (BAC) or 0.25 mg/l alcohol in the 
breath), although individual flag states may choose to apply stricter 
limits.
    In as much as the MV Costa Concordia disaster occurred on January 
1, 2012, these statutory limits were effective and ALL hands aboard the 
MV Costa Concordia from the Master down to the lowest entry level 
seafarers was required to comply with these rules and Costa/Carnival 
cruise lines was required responsible to enforce these statues. It was 
the Master of the Costa Concordia's responsibility to ``enforce'', not 
publically violate these regulations.
It's Time for Zero Tolerance
    There is no argument among informed and concerned consumers (Cruise 
vessel passengers) that they want to be able to ``assume'' with every 
level of confidence, that the cruise ships they are embarked upon are 
being operated responsibly and more importantly, soberly.
    The current practices aboard almost every cruise vessel flies in 
defiance and contrast to the international rules currently in effect 
regarding alcohol consumption by ANY crewmembers. By definition, all 
crew members embarked in any capacity have specific emergency stations 
and duties, and therefore are considered ``on duty'' at all time. We 
can't plan emergencies, and if ever there is a time for sober judgment 
and capacities, it is in emergencies.
    The IMO alcohol regulations must be in effect at all times, twenty-
four hours a day while embarked. Witnessing the . . . ``captain . . . 
drinking wine . . . and in high spirits. The last drops of wine went 
into the captain's glass'' openly contradicts the rules and clearly 
demonstrates Costa/Carnival Lines decision to ignore the Manila 
Amendments to the STCW Convention.
    In fact, there are actually ``crew bars'' aboard these ships, 
specifically for the purpose of facilitating alcohol consumption by 
crewmembers. These crew bars are a very neat little ``profit center'' 
for cruise lines, with crews in excess of 1000. This facilitation, and 
open alcoholic consumption of ships' senior officers and well as all 
crew must be immediately discontinued. We cannot wait for the next 
Captain Schettino to give the ``salute'' to innocent passengers. We may 
not be so lucky next time. The ship might not capsize on rocks--she 
might sink on impact.
    With such large numbers of crew aboard these ``Mega Cruise Ships'' 
and the temptations to violate these statutory regulations of the 
Manila Amendments regarding alcohol consumption, there very well may be 
the need for third party-trained security officers to regularly and 
randomly test the entire cruise vessel's crew, including the Master and 
senior officers while embarked and underway.
    This proposal will definitely be considered radical by many, but 
the question then is this: is the entertainment of the ship's crew 
worth the obvious risks that alcohol consumption brings to the 
passengers?
    It's time for ``last call'' for cruise ship Crew Bars and staff 
alcohol consumption.
Insure greater checks and balances between the IMO, Classification 
        Societies and Flag-States for safety, security and 
        environmental 
        compliance
    In recent years, there has been an ever-increasing homogenization 
of duties, roles and in some cases authority between Flag State Control 
(regulatory body responsible for enforcement of SOLAS Regulations) and 
Classification Societies. Here in the United States, there has been a 
major shift in the hands-on, on-scene inspection roles between United 
Sates Coast Guard Marine Inspection personnel and Classification 
(American Bureau of Shipping, Lloyds' Register, DNV, etc.) Surveyors.
    Here in the United States, many of the actual inspections and 
surveys included in the details of at U.S. Coast Guard Issued 
Certificate of Inspection are carried out by authorized Surveyors for 
Bureaus such as ABS. In essence, licensed contractors are paid to do 
inspections for the Coast Guard by proxy.
    While in most cases here in the USA, the oversight between the U.S. 
Coast Guard and the approved Classification Societies is adequate, the 
policy can sometimes lead to a less thorough and less-than-adequate 
inspection of the safety and materiel condition of the ship.
    When more and more inspection duties and authority is shifted to 
Classification Societies, it leaves the door open for abuse and in some 
cases ``conflicts of interest.''
    Classification Societies are funded in full by ship owners, and 
receive no governmental revenue. This creates a relationship between 
the Society and the ship owner/operator which can influence not only 
the thoroughness of an inspection, but in the worst cases, the validity 
of the Certificates of Inspection issued as a result of their opinions.
    Again, there can be little doubt in anyone's mind, that there is 
SOME relationship between the sudden resignations of President of RINA, 
Gianni Scerni, resigning less than a week after the loss of Costa 
Concordia. RINA, the Italian Naval Register, is the classification 
society that issued the Costa Concordia a certificate of seaworthiness 
and safety management certificate in November 2011.
    It's time to review, and in some case reverse this shifting of 
responsibilities and inspection services from Flag State Inspection 
Agencies to ship owner-funded Classification Societies.
    If nothing else, it gives a perception of the ``Fox guarding the 
Hen House.''
    The International Maritime Organization (IMO) needs to become much 
more proactive in demanding quality control from those flag states 
becoming more and more lax in delivering quality seafarer training and 
certification, and certain classification societies some ship owners 
seek out for less-than-thorough inspection requirements.
    Flag (States) of convenience must be sanctioned for lax standards 
of inspection and certification.
Stricter compliance and audit of International Safety Management 
        policies and procedures, focusing on training, documentation, 
        drills and 
        oversight
    I'd like to take a quick look at the Costa Concordia grounding and 
subsequent mass casualty incident which is still unfolding off the 
coast of Italy a month and a half after running aground and address 
just a few of the failed human elements which delayed the response to 
the grounding and caused over 30 dead or missing passengers.
    A key element of International Safety management and a requirement 
of IMO Standards of Certification Training and Watchkeeping (STCW) 
regulations, is the establishment of procedures for Bridge Recourse 
Management (BRM) sometimes referred to as ``Bridge Team Management'' 
basically synergizing professional personnel and maximum effective use 
of navigation procedures and equipment such as nautical charts, radar, 
and electronic navigation systems such as GPS and Electronic Chart 
Display and Information Systems (ECDIS)\8\
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    \8\ An Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) is a 
computer-based navigation information system that complies with 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations and can be used 
as an alternative to paper nautical charts. IMO refers to similar 
systems not meeting the regulations as Electronic Chart Systems (ECS).

    An ECDIS system displays the information from electronic 
navigational charts (ENC) or Digital Nautical Charts (DNC) and 
integrates position information from the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) and other navigational sensors, such as radar and automatic 
identification systems (AIS). It may also display additional 
navigation-related information, such as Sailing Directions and 
fathometer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Naturally, while understanding how to operate and obtain pertinent 
information from such sophisticated navigation systems is an important 
element of Bridge Recourse Management, the SINGLE most important 
element is the ``Human Factor'' particularly the Master and senior 
Bridge professional licensed officers and rated crewmembers such as 
Helmsman and Lookouts.'
    Obviously, there was a fatal failure in the Costa Concordia's 
Bridge Recourse management program, costing the lives of thirty-two 
innocent souls and the loss of a majestic ship.
    At this point, it looks like no lives were lost upon the grounding 
incident or the immediate minutes following the ship running aground. 
This is important, as it denotes that in this incident, every life lost 
was preventable and directly tied to the response/rescue operation. To 
put it bluntly, passengers on the Costa Concordia died due to a failure 
of ship's Master and key company officials to follow specific elements 
of the International Safety Management (ISM) and the interface with 
local port-state authority.
    Specifically, the loss of lives aboard Costa Concordia was due to 
failure, for whatever motives, to sound internal and external (distress 
signals) immediately after the grounding and early damage assessments 
which clearly indicated at least the possibility of a serious 
emergency.
    The International Safety Management (ISM) system is an interface 
and procedural system established by the governing body for vessels on 
the high-sea, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and is one 
based on ISO (International Organization for Standardization) standards 
which basically mandate that a company must ``say what it will do, then 
do what it says'' to be compliant with ISO certification. The IMO 
doesn't define what or how a company will establish its ISM procedures, 
but rather outlines the items which a company ISM must cover. The IMO 
leaves the details to the company to define how the company safety 
management program will be delivered.
    The IMO mandates that for a ship to operate on the high-seas, the 
company must have a valid ``Document of Compliance'' which is issued by 
an organization recognized by the Administration (which is either the 
government of the country which the ship is registered and ``flagged'' 
in, or a recognized compliance body the government may have contracted 
to perform these task, most often maritime classification societies) 
which allows a ship within that company to be issued a mandatory 
``Safety Management Certificate''. Under the ISM Code of 2002, 
resolution A.443(XI) and resolution A.680(17) the IMO mandates 
companies identify a Designated Person Ashore (DPA) who is the point of 
contact for ship Captains and governing bodies when issues arise on 
ships. The company is further mandated to establish all resources and 
shore-based support to the DPA to support safety and pollution 
prevention.
    These prevention and crisis response systems and procedures must be 
clearly defined and written in the company ISM policies and more 
importantly procedures, which are reviewed by the issuing authority of 
the ``Safety Management Certificate'' (in the case of the Costa 
Concordia, the SMC was issued in November 2011 by the classification 
society Registro Italiano Navale (RINA)). This all leads to the first 
question that must be asked of the incident--``Was the Costa DPA 
contacted?''
    President of RINA, Gianni Scerni, resigned January 18, 2012, less 
than a week after the Costa Concordia was stranded, and capsized, 
taking thirty-two souls with her. RINA, the Italian Naval Register, is 
the classification society that issued the Costa Concordia a 
certificate of seaworthiness and safety management certificate in 
November 2011.\9\
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    \9\ The Maritime Executive: President of RINA Resigns, Possible 
Consequence of Costa Concordia Incident Wednesday, January 18, 2012.
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Mandatory criminal and psychological background checks of senior 
        personnel
    Criminal and psychological background checks of all licensed 
officers, crew and key hotel/staff personnel and established standards 
for refusal to employ those found with certain offenses must be 
mandated.
    At the present time, U.S. Federal laws and regulations require that 
safety-related transportation professionals; including merchant 
mariners, undergo screening to ensure that they can safely perform 
their jobs. Medical certification and background checks are part of the 
requirements for licensing these mariners. Certification or licensing 
also includes testing workers' knowledge and skills required for the 
jobs. These checks are critical because physically or mentally unfit 
Mariners pose a danger to themselves and to the public. This regulation 
must be extended to all cruise ship personnel aboard all ships covered 
by the amended H.R. 3360 Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010.
Scheduled competency testing and recertification of key personnel by 
        external agencies in ISM, IMO, Flag State regulations, 
        procedures, and competencies, particularly regarding safety and 
        lifesaving
    For some time now, there has been International concern regarding 
``inconsistencies'' between the quality and thoroughness of critical 
Safety and Competency Training and Certification, in different flag 
states. The IMO has commissioned studies noting that in one particular 
study, regarding ``Seafarer Certificate Forgery: The Threat Undermining 
the Quality of Training'' the study results found that of a total of 
fifty-four administrations participating, 11808 out of 12703 cases of 
fraudulent documents were from one South Asian Country. Seafarers from 
that same country constituted over 300 of the Costa Concordia's total 
ship's crew at the time of the disaster.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ IMO Fraudulent Documents http://www.imo.org/OurWork/
HumanElement/TrainingCerti
fication/Pages/FraudulentCertificates.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In a recent study published by BIMCO \11\, Andrew Guest reported 
''Fears That the [South Asian Country] may lose its coveted status on a 
list of countries with approved maritime education systems may seem 
far-fetched but are still causing jitters in the Asian country. ''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ BIMCO is the largest of the international shipping 
associations representing ship-owners controlling around 65 percent of 
the world's tonnage and with members in more than 120 countries drawn 
from a broad range of stakeholders having a vested interest in the 
shipping industry, including managers, brokers and agents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ''For months, the country that is the biggest supplier of seagoing 
labour has been under the shadow of an investigation by the European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) that could result in some and perhaps all 
South Asian Country] certificates of competency no longer being 
recognized by the European Union (EU).'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ https://www.bimco.org/News/2012/02/15_Feature_Week_07.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Obviouly, there is concern amoung some of Europe's leading maritime 
nations regarding the quality of training and documentation of 
seafarers from around the world. It's time the United States take a 
proactive position on ensuring the validity and competency standards of 
seafarers responsible for the safety of our U.S. citizens embarked on 
international cruise ships.
    We also propose Universal Criminal Statutes for Masters and Crew 
who leave a serious incident. Minimum sentencing for reckless 
abandonment, causing injury or death to passengers of at least 5-10 
years per death and 3-5 years for injury per passenger should be served 
in the United States' Federal prison system.
No financial limits on responsibilities (Unlimited Liability) to 
        parties 
        involved
    Amid the Costa Concordia tragedy, it seems very likely that cruise 
passengers will have to file any lawsuits in Genoa, Italy, where the 
cases will be subject to Italian law. Courts in the United States have 
consistently upheld the choice of law clauses contained in cruise 
passenger tickets absent evidence that ``enforcement would be 
unreasonable and unjust,'' ``the clause was invalid for such reasons as 
fraud or overreaching'', or ``the enforcement would contravene a strong 
public policy of the forum in which the suit is brought''.
    More importantly, as part of this comprehensive system, the Athens 
Convention allows the carrier to limit its liability for passenger 
personal injury or death in the absence of its reckless misconduct. The 
current monetary limitation in U.S. dollars is approximately $72,000. 
The operative words are ``in the absence of [the carrier's] reckless 
misconduct.'' Specifically, Article 13 of the Athens Convention 
provides that the carrier will lose its right to limit liability where 
it is proven that the damage resulted from an act or omission done with 
intent to cause damage or recklessly and with the knowledge that such 
damage would probably result.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ What are Costa Concordia Cruise Passengers' Rights under the 
Athens Convention? JANUARY 18, 2012 by Leesfield & Partners, P.A. 
(@leesfield)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It seems clear that loss of a human life is worth more than 
$72,000. In 1990; Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) 
lifting any liability limits for oil spills. The question then would 
be, is our environment worth more than human life? The Athens 
Convention has to be dissolved and ANY limitations of liability for 
loss of life or injuries aboard Cruise Ships must be removed in the 
amended H.R. 3360 ``Cruise Ship Security and Safety Act of 2010.''
Ticketing ``Fine Print''
    Cruise lines have made the ``fine print'' contained in the tickets 
too one sided \14\. Passengers are engaging in a ``contract'' between 
themselves and the ship operator. They should not be compelled to 
``waive'' any rights to claims under the jurisdiction o this Act, 
merely to by granted boarding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ (Reuters) By Tom Hals, Andrew Longstreth and Steve Stecklow 
Tue Feb 21, 2012 6:14am GMT ``The cruise business--led by industry 
giant Carnival Corp. & PLC, whose Italian subsidiary owned and operated 
the doomed Costa Concordia--has put in place over the years a legal 
structure that ring-fences operators from big-money lawsuits.

    The rules for seeking redress are spelled out in complex, multi-
page ticket contracts that passengers may not receive until right 
before boarding. Victims are often required to file suits in remote 
jurisdictions. The wording has been the subject of decades of court 
battles. Thomas Dickerson, a New York state judge who has written 
extensively on travel law, says the legal hurdles resulting from the 
industry's victories over the years give operators the upper hand in 
litigation and make the business highly profitable. The industry faces 
``fewer payouts because of all the roadblocks,'' he said. Cruise 
industry officials say their contracts streamline the litigation 
process, prevent frivolous claims and lower cruise costs for 
passengers.

    In the case of the Costa Concordia wreck, the ticket contract 
stated that ``all claims, controversies, disputes, suits and matters of 
any kind whatsoever . . . shall be instituted only in the courts of 
Genoa, Italy.'' Many survivors are now discovering the challenges of 
the Italian court system. Italian lawyers rarely accept cases on a 
contingency basis, so clients may have to pay them up front to take a 
case. And personal-injury cases can drag on for years, especially if 
there is a parallel criminal investigation. The Costa Concordia's 
captain is under investigation for allegedly abandoning ship. That 
probe must be completed before evidence will be made available to 
plaintiff attorneys in civil cases, said Alexander Guttieres, a Rome 
lawyer who has litigated major personal-injury cases.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Tickets purchased in USA through ANY Agent, or sub agent for any 
Cruise Ship, whatever her National Registry, working directly or 
indirectly for Cruise ship operator or owner must include the 
statement: ``All rights and protections under the amended Cruise Vessel 
Safety and Security Act of 2010'' are granted under this contract for 
passage. These rights should extend to any excursions of activities 
purchase or engaged while on the ship during this passage.
    Ticket fine print must be eliminated. Passengers should not be 
forced to surrender ANY rights for claims under the intent of this Act 
(HR3360). Just as we now have warnings on cigarette packages, Cruise 
Ship tickets should advise passengers of the right to retain all legal 
and civil rights.
Cruise Vessel Emergency Response Trust Fund
    The proposed amendment provides funding for responses to Cruise 
Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 events provided certain criteria 
are met. The responsible party is liable for Federal emergency rescue, 
response, salvage and cleanup costs and damages as detailed in Cruise 
Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010. Federal agencies assisting in a 
response action may be reimbursed. Several other Federal agencies may 
provide financial support for removal actions.
    The Cruise Vessel Emergency Response Contingency Plan is the 
Federal Government's blueprint for responding to large cruise vessel 
emergencies. The proposed National Cruise Vessel Emergency Response 
Contingency Plan is the result of our country's efforts to develop a 
national response capability and promote overall coordination among the 
hierarchy of responders and contingency plans. All of these actions 
contribute to providing financial incentives for compliance.
Failure to carry out Rescue Operations, utilizing an adequate 
        Contingency Plan and failure to establish an Incident Command 
        system, utilizing a Unified Command . . . Never Again
    It bothers me very much that 3 days after the tragic grounding, 
local (Italian) rescue agencies quickly shifted from ``rescue'' 
operations to Salvage/Recover operations (shifting priorities and 
resources from any concentrated effort to safe those who may still be 
trapped below decks on this over-turned but not sunken ship, protecting 
the pristine environment of the island). In fact, news reports stated 
that local churches prayed on the Sunday following the tragic disaster 
to ``spare the Island of Giglio from an environmental disaster which 
would destroy their tourism and economy, and `Oh yes,' the souls of 
those lost in the disaster''.
    I am reminded that one and a half years ago, thirty three Chilean 
miners became trapped miles below ground in what seemed to be a 
hopeless situation. Instead, as the world watched, a quiet nation at 
the Southern tip of the Earth mobilized. From their President on down, 
mine officials, engineers, construction workers and others banded 
together with just about the entire Chilean population--and they 
created a miracle.
    The whole world watched and prayed as what appeared to be a 
hopeless situation evolved through little glimmers of hope and tireless 
work on the part of the people of Chile into that miracle.
    There wasn't a dry eye in the world, as the first through the last 
miner came up that elevator to safety, a full SIXTY-NINE DAYS after 
that accident.
    On Friday, the 13th of January, 2012 an Italian flag passenger 
ship, driven by an Italian Captain, went aground off an Italian Island. 
The Captain's actions caused the grounding, his subsequent lack of 
competence, leadership, and most of all courage led to at least thirty-
two souls dead or presumed dead.
    Granted, we all saw a couple of salvage teams diving, as the 
magnificent vessel slides closer and closer to sinking, but there was 
NEVER any national mobilization of forces and resources, both 
governmental or non-governmental, to try to save those remaining souls 
who could be trapped in the hundreds of pockets throughout the ship in 
a timely manner.
    Three days after the sinking, with the ship is lying on its side 
rescues efforts turned to recovery efforts. The Costa Concordia is less 
than 150 feet wide at her maximum beam. Last year the Chileans drilled 
over a mile into the rock and extricated thirty three miners trapped 
for 69 days! It appears that the Italian Captain isn't the only guy or 
responsible party or agency that ran (or fell) away from lives in peril 
on the sea.
    Just a comparison as to how some nations react to tragedy. Some 
turn it into victories; others sit around and wait for time to complete 
the tragedy.
    Never was there any demonstration of an implementation of a 
Contingency Plan; nor the establishment of any kind of Incident Command 
System, which could have maximized rescue recourses through a ``Unified 
Command.''
    If I were asked to give you the very best examples of successful 
examples of ``Unified Command'' response I would be torn between three. 
Probably the most famous would be the rescue of a half million British 
troops off the beaches of Dunkirk, France in 1939; and more recently 
the successful rescue of every single one of the thirty-nine Chilean 
Coal Miners, buried miles beneath the surface of the Earth, and of 
course, our own Incident Unified Command response to last year's 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, utilizing Contingency Planning and 
Response Plans and Finance Structure through the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 (OPA 90). Contingency Planning, the Incident Command and Unified 
Command Systems work. It's time to translate these into a unified 
maritime safety program.
Establish and fund the Cruise Vessel Emergency Response Trust Fund
    Under the proposed amended Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 
2010, the owner or operator of a vessel on which a violation or 
emergency incident occurs (also known as the Responsible Party) is 
liable for all of the costs associated with the incident and any 
damages resulting from the incident (not limited to pollution but for 
the real costs of the rescue efforts, both governmental and non-
governmental).
    Once every possible effort has been made to rescue every person 
involved in a Cruise Vessel Emergency, the USCG and FBI's first 
priority is to ensure that responsible parties pay to effect effective 
and appropriate emergency response to their own emergency incidents. 
However, when the responsible party is unknown or refuses to pay, funds 
from the Cruise Vessel Emergency Response Trust Fund can be used to 
cover removal costs or damages resulting from cruise vessel emergency 
responses.
    The primary source of revenue for the Cruise Vessel Emergency 
Response Trust Fund is a $10.00 per passenger day fee on all U.S. 
citizen passengers aboard any cruise ship on which passage (tickets) 
were sold in the United States, and all passengers aboard all cruise 
ships which embark passengers in United States (or its territories) 
ports, whether passengers are U.S. citizens or foreign Citizens.. Other 
revenue sources for the Cruise Vessel Emergency Response Trust Fund 
include interest on the fund, cost recovery from the parties 
responsible for the Cruise ship emergency incidents and any fines or 
civil penalties collected. The Fund is administered by the U.S. Coast 
Guard's Cruise Vessel Emergency Funds Center (NCVEFC).
    Require adequate Certificates of Financial Responsibility (COFR) 
for ALL cruise vessels where any part of this act applies. COFR shows 
the funding availability and name of Company-Qualified Individual (QI) 
authorized to disburse funds by responsible party (ies).
    The Cruise Vessel Emergency Response Trust Fund can provide up to 
$1 billion for any one cruise vessel emergency incident and claims in 
connection with any single incident. The main uses of Cruise Vessel 
Emergency Response Trust Fund expenditures are:

        State Authority access for response actions.

        Costs incurred in emergency response.

        Payment of claims for uncompensated response and salvage costs 
        and damages, and

        Research and development and other specific appropriations.

        Summation: Paraphrasing Robert Kennedy paraphrasing Bernard 
        Shaw: ``Some men see things as they are and say `Why?' I dream 
        of things as they that never were; and say `Why Not?' ''

    Why not make H.R. 3360; The Cruise Ship Security and Safety Act of 
2010'' strong enough to prevent future Costa Concordia disasters?

    The Chairman. Thank you, Captain. We've been joined by 
Senator Klobuchar and you're welcome to say a couple words.
    Senator Klobuchar. I do not need to.
    The Chairman. OK.
    Now Dr. Ross Klein, who is Professor, School of Social 
Work--I identify with that--St. John's College, Memorial 
University, Canada, welcome.

         STATEMENT OF ROSS A. KLEIN, Ph.D., PROFESSOR,

           SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK, ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE,

              MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY OF NEWFOUNDLAND

    Dr. Klein. Thank you. It is an honor to be asked to share 
my knowledge and my insights with the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation. In my brief oral 
comments I will identify some of the key points in my written 
submission.
    First, I will discuss safety and security issues related to 
cruise ships. There are a number of issues. One issue is on-
board crime. Between October 1, 2007, and September 30, 2008, 
the cruise industry reported 421 incidents of crime to the FBI.
    These include 115 simple assaults, 16 assaults with serious 
bodily injury, 101 thefts and 154 sex-related incidents, more 
than 17 percent of which were against children under the age of 
18, and in that data the rate of sexual assault on Carnival 
Cruise Lines was 50 percent higher than the rate of sexual 
assault in Canada.
    The data was accessed through a request under the Freedom 
of Information Act. Unfortunately, given the wording of the 
Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010, comparable data 
is not available for subsequent years so it is impossible to 
judge whether things are getting better or getting worse. An 
analysis of these crimes is in my written testimony, Appendix 
B.
    A second issue is whether cruise ships, as the industry 
often claims, are the safest mode of commercial transportation. 
Appendix A presents various events at sea--ships that have 
sunk, 16 between 1980 and 2012; ships that have run aground, 99 
between 1973 and 2011; ships that have experienced fires, 79 
between 1990 and 2011; ships that have had collisions, 73 
between 1990 and 2011; and ships that have gone adrift or have 
had other issues that could be seen to pose a safety risk, 100 
between 2000 and 2011. These events speak for themselves.
    A third set of issues comes directly from the Costa 
Concordia disaster, the challenge of abandoning a ship within 
the 30-minute time period after an abandoned ship call, as 
dictated by the Convention on Safety of Life at Sea.
    A large ship in 1974, when this regulation was established, 
accommodated less than 3,000 passengers and crew, one-third the 
number of the largest ships today.
    Also, the ability to comply with the requirement that 
lifeboats can be deployed on a ship listing up to 20 degrees. 
Reports I have seen are that the Costa Concordia was listing 20 
degrees and that lifeboats on one side could not be used. As 
well, changes in the manner in which muster drills are run 
today as compared to earlier times. There is still a question 
whether industry commitments are adequate.
    Other issues worthy of comment are the fact that the Costa 
Concordia did not have a functioning black box when it 
experienced this tragic accident and, thus, much objective data 
is lacking.
    The crew training for dealing with crime scenes is 
inadequate and that onboard security as cruise ship employees 
is not in a position to objectively investigate crimes on board 
cruise ships.
    And finally, the passengers on cruise ships are treated 
differently by the Death on the High Seas Act than passengers 
on aircraft, an anomaly that appears unwarranted.
    The second area I discuss in my written testimony is 
environmental concerns. I compliment the U.S. Congress for its 
endorsement of the North American Emission Control Area and I 
applaud the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for its plan 
to extend regulations pertaining to the discharge of gray water 
in U.S. waters.
    However, I express concern that the U.S. is an anomaly in 
the world by allowing discharge of treated sewage within three 
miles of the coast, untreated sewage between three and 12 
miles.
    I also address shortcomings to the advanced wastewater 
treatment systems and of marine sanitation devices, both of 
which discharge treated sewage so it can discharge in areas 
where discharge or gray water is prohibited; the problem posed 
by permitting sewage sludge dumping at sea, which is often 
considered treated sewage; the lack of adequate regulation of 
onboard incinerators and problems associated with dumping at 
sea of solid waste including incinerator ash.
    Finally, I discuss the patchwork of widely varying 
environmental regulations across coastal states in the U.S. and 
I advocate for reconsideration of the previously introduced 
Clean Cruise Ship Act in order to bring consistency across 
jurisdictions in the U.S.
    The third area I discussed in my written testimony is 
qualifications of medical care staff and medical care provided 
on cruise ships and illness on cruise ships.
    There are four issues. One relates to the qualifications of 
onboard medical staff, something that was supposed to be 
addressed by the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act.
    However, the provisions are inadequate and leave less 
protection to passengers and to victims of sexual assault than 
I believe was the intent of the legislation's authors. A second 
issue is medical malpractice and liability, that a cruise ship 
is not fully responsible or liable for improper medical care 
provided by its medical personnel, a loophole in U.S. law that 
should be addressed.
    The third issue is norovirus and how the industry can more 
effectively deal with the problem with greater transparency and 
without creating incentives that indirectly encourage spread of 
illness. Already this year we've seen 1,725 people reporting 
ill on cruise ships.
    Finally, I discuss the case where potable water on as many 
as 50 cruise ships was potentially contaminated, leaving many 
at risk. Unfortunately, information about the situation was 
sealed in 2006 by the High Court in the U.K., making it near 
impossible to gain full and complete knowledge about the 
problem. It is still difficult to secure reliable information.
    I wish I could go into greater detail in these oral 
comments. I invite questions to allow me to expand further on 
any of these issues. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Klein follows:]

        Prepared Statement of Ross A. Klein, Ph.D. *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \*\ Ross A. Klein, Ph.D., is an international authority on the 
cruise ship industry. He has published four books, six monographs/
reports for nongovernmental organizations, and more than two dozen 
articles and book chapters. He is a professor at Memorial University of 
Newfoundland in St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada and is online at 
www.cruisejunkie.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Table of Contents
Oral Testimony
Written Testimony
I. Safety and Security Issues
        Onboard Crime
        Persons Overboard
        Abandoning a Ship in an Emergency
                Crew Training
                Muster Drills
                Functionality of Life-Saving Equipment
        Shipboard Black Boxes
        Crime Reporting
        Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)
II. Environmental Issues
        North American Emission Control Area
        Regulation of Grey Water
        Regulation of Sewage
        Sewage Treatment
                Marine Sanitation Devices (MSD)
                Advanced Wastewater Treatment Systems (AWTS)
                Sewage Sludge
        Incinerators
        Solid Waste
        Oily Bilge
        Patchwork of Regulations and the Clean Cruise Ship Act
III. Medical Care and Illness
        Malpractice and Liability
        Norovirus and Other Illness Outbreaks
        Potable Water
IV. Labour Issues
        U.S. Congressional Interest
        U.S. Courts and Labor
        Arbitration Clauses
        Crew Member Work Conditions
Appendix A: Events at Sea
Appendix B: Analysis of Crime Reports Received by the FBI from Cruise 
        Ships, 2007-2008
                                 ______
                                 
Oral Testimony
    It is an honor to be asked to share my knowledge and insights with 
the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. In 
my brief oral remarks I will identify some of the key points in my 
written submission.
    First, I will discuss safety and security issues relating to cruise 
ships. There are a number of issues:
    One issue is onboard crime--between October 1, 2007 and September 
30, 2008, the cruise industry reported 421 incidents of crime to the 
FBI. These include 115 simple assaults, 16 assaults with serious bodily 
injury, 101 thefts, and 154 sex related incidents. The data was 
accessed through a request under the Freedom of Information Act. 
Unfortunately, given the wording of the Cruise Vessel Security and 
Safety Act of 2010, comparable data is not available for subsequent 
years, so it is impossible to judge whether things are getting better 
or worse. An analysis of these crimes is in Appendix B.
    A second issue is whether cruise ships, as the industry often 
claims, are the safest mode of commercial transportation. Appendix A 
presents various events at sea: ships that have sunk, 1980-2012 (n=16); 
ships that have run aground, 1973-2011 (99); ships that have 
experienced fires, 1990-2011 (n=79); ships that have had collisions, 
1990-2011 (n=73); and ships that have gone adrift or have had other 
issues that could be seen to pose a safety risk, 2000-2011 (n=100). 
These events speak for themselves.
    A third set of issues comes directly from the Costa Concordia 
disaster: the challenge of abandoning a ship within the thirty minute 
period after an abandon ship call, as dictated by the Convention on 
Safety of Life at Sea (a large cruise ship in 1974 when the regulation 
was established accommodated less than 3,000 passengers and crew, one-
third the number on the largest ships today; the ability to comply with 
the requirement that lifeboats can be deployed on a ship listing up to 
20 degrees (reports I have seen are that the Costa Concordia was 
listing 20 degrees and that lifeboats on one side could not be used); 
and changes in the manner in which muster drills are run today as 
compared to earlier times--there is still question whether industry 
commitments are adequate. Other issues worthy of comment are the fact 
that the Costa Concordia did not have a functioning black box when it 
experienced its tragic accident and thus much objective data is 
lacking; that crew training for dealing with crime scenes is inadequate 
and that onboard security (as cruise ship employees) is not in a 
position to objectively investigate crimes onboard cruise ships; and 
that passengers on cruise ships are treated differently by the Death on 
the High Seas Act than passengers on aircraft--an anomaly that appears 
unwarranted. In my written testimony I discuss several changes that 
need to be considered to the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, 
including the need for public reporting of all alleged crimes on cruise 
ships.
    The second area I discuss in my written testimony is environmental 
concerns. I compliment the U.S. Congress for its endorsement of the 
North American Emission Control Area and I applaud the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency for its plan to extend regulations 
pertaining to discharge of grey water in U.S. waters. However, I 
express concern that the U.S. is an anomaly in the world by allowing 
discharge of treated sewage within three miles of the coast; untreated 
sewage between three and twelve miles. I also address shortcomings of 
Advanced Wastewater Treatment Systems (AWTS) and of marine sanitation 
devices (MSDs), both of which discharge ``treated sewage'' so can 
discharge in areas where discharge of grey water is prohibited; the 
problem posed by permitting sewage sludge dumping at sea (which is also 
often considered treated sewage); the lack of adequate regulation of 
onboard incinerators; and problems associated with dumping at sea of 
solid waste (including incinerator ash). Finally, I discuss the 
patchwork of widely varying environmental regulations across coastal 
states in the U.S. and I advocate for reconsideration of the previously 
introduced Clean Cruise Ship Act in order to bring consistency across 
jurisdictions in the U.S.
    The third area I discuss in my written testimony is qualifications 
of medical care staff and the medical care provided on cruise ships, 
and illness on cruise ships. There are four issues. One relates to the 
qualifications of onboard medical staff, something that was supposed to 
be addressed by the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, however the 
provisions are inadequate and leave less protection to passengers and 
to victims of sexual assault than I believe was the intent of the 
legislation's authors. A second issue is medical malpractice and 
liability--that a cruise ship is not fully responsible or liable for 
improper medical care provided by its medical personnel; a loophole in 
U.S. law that should be addressed. The third issue is norovirus and how 
the industry can more effectively deal with the problem--with greater 
transparency, and without creating incentives that indirectly encourage 
spread of the illness. Finally, I discuss a case where potable water on 
as many as 50 cruise ships was potentially contaminated, leaving many 
U.S. passengers at risk. Unfortunately, information about the situation 
was sealed in 2006 by the High Court in the UK, making it near-
impossible to gain full and complete knowledge about the problem; it is 
still difficult to secure reliable information.
    I wish I could go into greater detail in these oral comments. I 
invite questions to allow me to expand further on any of these issues.
Written Testimony
    It is an honor to be asked to share my knowledge and insights with 
the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. My 
testimony focuses on the parameters I was given when I was invited to 
testify:

   safety and security issues relating to cruise ships (i.e., 
        onboard crime; persons overboard; abandoning ship in an 
        emergency, including muster drills and crew training; shipboard 
        black boxes; crime reporting; and the Death on the High Seas 
        Act (DOHSA)).

   environmental issues related to cruise ships (i.e, the North 
        American Emission Control Area; regulation of grey water, 
        sewage, sewage sludge, and limitations of marine sanitation 
        devices (MSDs) and advanced wastewater treatments systems 
        (AWTS); incinerator air emissions; solid waste; oily bilge; and 
        the patchwork of regulations around the U.S. and the not-
        enacted Clean Cruise Ship Act).

   medical care and illness on cruise ships (i.e., medical 
        malpractice and liability, norovirus and other illness 
        outbreaks, and issues relating to potable water).

   Labor issues (i.e., the absence of labor laws governing 
        hours of work and remuneration, and the use of arbitration 
        clauses to truncate worker rights to use U.S. courts to address 
        injuries and onboard injustice).
I. Safety and Security Issues
    The Costa Concordia disaster has refocused attention on cruise ship 
safety and security. Following this tragic event, the cruise industry 
predictably repeated its mantra that cruise ships are the safest mode 
of commercial transportation. They often cite a 1996 Coast Guard 
``comprehensive safety study that concluded the cruise industry is the 
safest form of commercial transportation.'' \1\ The study was based on 
Bureau of Transportation statistics and compared accidents involving 
occupants of cruise ships with those involving motor vehicles 
(including occupants, pedestrians, and pedacyclists), and U.S. air 
carriers; it compared fatalities (natural deaths and those caused by 
injury), injuries requiring more than first aid, and ``accidents/
incidents'' (left undefined). The study apparently did not consider 
sexual assaults. Since the study period (1990-1994), the number of 
cruise ships and cruise passengers has more than tripled and the 
industry has undergone considerable change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See CLIA website, ``Safety Standards, April 2006.'' 
, Accessed April 11, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rather than accept the industry's claim at face value, it is 
important to consider the history of accidents and occurrences on 
cruise ships. Appendix A provides a list of known incidents where 
cruise ships have sunk; run aground; experienced onboard fires; 
collided with other ships, quays, or objects; and other significant 
problems such as loss of power and going adrift, severe lists, 
encounters with storms, etc. The Appendix does not include the many 
cases where ships operate with engines that are not functioning or have 
``mechanical issues'' such that ports are missed and itineraries 
changed. The reader can judge, after reviewing Appendix A, whether 
cruise ships are truly as safe a mode of transportation as the cruise 
industry claims.
Onboard Crime
    There have previously been hearings on onboard crime, particularly 
sexual assaults and disappearances. I will not rehash what has already 
been presented to these esteemed committees, however I call your 
attention to my previous testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Surface Transportation and Transportation and Merchant Marine 
Infrastructure, Safety, and Security on June 19, 2008. I have also 
attached Appendix B, which presents analysis of reported crimes to the 
FBI from October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008. The data speaks for 
itself: 115 simple assaults, 16 assaults with serious bodily injury, 
101 thefts, and 154 sex related incidents.
    Perhaps the most distressing findings is the number of onboard 
sexual assaults--more than 17 percent against children under the age of 
18--a rate that on Carnival Cruise Lines in 2007-08 is 50 percent 
higher than the rate for sexual assault in Canada (using the same 
definition for sexual assault for ships as on land). Royal Caribbean 
International in the period 2003-2005 had a rate comparable to Carnival 
Cruise Lines, but reduced the onboard rate by about half between 2003-
2005 and 2007-2008. They are to be complemented.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Klein, Ross A. and Jill Poulston. 2011. ``Sex at Sea: Sexual 
Crimes Aboard Cruise Ships,'' Tourism in Marine Environments, 7:2, pp. 
67-80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When one thinks about what can be done it is still timely to refer 
to two reports completed by consultants for Royal Caribbean in 1999. 
They had been charged with making recommendations for preventing sexual 
harassment and assault. The problem was obvious. As one report stated, 
``. . . improper activity occurs frequently aboard cruise ships, but 
goes unreported and/or unpunished.'' \3\ The other report acknowledged: 
``crew members generally understand that if they commit an offence and 
are caught they are most likely going to lose their job and be returned 
home, but not spend time in jail.'' \4\ (Greenwood, 1999: 4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Krohn, Kay. 1999. Unpublished consultant's report examining 
current efforts of Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. In the area of 
preventing sexual harassment and assault. May 26.
    \4\ Greenwood, Don. 1999. ``Reducing Sexual Assaults on Cruise 
Ships: Risk Assessment and Recommendations.'' Unpublished consultant's 
report. June 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The reports make a range of recommendations, including:

   increased video surveillance of high risk areas (including 
        the disco bar and dance area, main service corridors on crew 
        decks and key intersections on passenger decks, and youth 
        activity areas);

   cameras already in place be monitored periodically, at least 
        on a random basis, and be recorded at all times;

   an increase in the number of security staff by two per ship;

   increased training and education of staff and crew members;

   responses to sexual harassment and assault be standardized 
        across brands and ships;

   training for medical personnel include an interview protocol 
        for sexual assault incidents;

   that a staff member be identified and assigned 
        responsibility to serve as an advocate for the target of sexual 
        harassment or assault;

   that a shore side hotline be established to receive 
        telephone reports of wrongdoing and that investigations be 
        consistent and evenly handled.

   better educating passengers and better signage onboard 
        demarcating areas that are ``off limits'' to passengers.

    These recommendations are great, but many had not been implemented 
before passage of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010, 
and many have still not been fully implemented.
    In addition to sexual assaults, Appendix B shows there is a fair 
number of assaults and thefts. Admittedly, many assaults are between 
traveling companions and can be considered a case of domestic violence; 
but not all. Take the case of San Diego grocer Scott Boney who in 
September 2007 went on Carnival Cruise Lines' Elation to celebrate his 
fiftieth birthday with his wife and a number of friends. On the first 
night of the cruise, he was pushed down a flight of stairs by a twenty-
one year old fellow passenger. When he was found he was nonresponsive. 
Seven months later he still couldn't speak or write, couldn't stand on 
his own, was fed through a stomach tube, and didn't appear to recognize 
many family members and friends who visit or help care for him.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ See Boney v. Carnival Corporation, Case No. 08-22299-CIV, U.S. 
District Court, Southern district of Florida, Miami Civil Division; 
Darce, Keith. 2008. ``Rehabilitation Slow, Uncertain for Grocer Hurt in 
Cruise Ship Fall,'' San Diego Union Tribune, April 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I mention the Boney case because two relevant issues are 
highlighted. One is the question of whether there is adequate security 
personnel on cruise ships. This is a theme that has repeatedly been 
raised as concerns incidents of sexual assault.
    Of particular note in those cases is not just the number of 
security staff, but the training of those personnel. Several cases 
indicate security personnel may not be adequately trained to deal with 
crimes and with crime scenes. A model course on ``Crime Prevention, 
Detection, Evidence Preservation and Reporting,'' developed by the U.S. 
Coast Guard, FBI, and Maritime Administration in July 2011, and 
recently implemented, devotes a total of 3.5 hours to actions to 
preserve crime scenes and crime scene reporting and documentation, 
considerably less than the 40 hour course advocated by International 
Cruise Victims Association. The course is taught online; not in-person. 
This might be sufficient as a refresher for already-trained 
individuals, but not for those who appear to serve those roles on 
cruise ships. As related by Laurie Dishman after her 2007 testimony 
before the House of Representatives:

        I didn't know who to call, because my rapist was supposedly 
        ``security''. I told [my friend] what had happened, and we 
        decided to call the Purser's desk, which prompted two officers 
        to come to our cabin. Instead of securing the cabin, they sat 
        on the bed, where the rape occurred. Eventually, I was 
        permitted to go to the ship's doctor, but he told [my friend] 
        and I to go back to our cabin and collect the sheets & clothing 
        from the incident and to place then in plastic bags, which they 
        had provided.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Dishman, Laurie. 2007. ``Laurie Dishman.'' International Cruise 
Victims Association. 

    The other issue is the responsible serving of alcohol. The bar tab 
of Mr. Boney and one of his friends shows the purchase of 24 drinks (at 
a cost of more than $250) and several bottles of wine between ten 
people over dinner from the time they boarded the ship to 11 PM. 
Depositions taken in the court case indicate Mr. Boney was intoxicated. 
There are other cases where intoxication has been a factor in grave 
events. Take the case of Lyndsay O'Brien, an Irish 15-year-old who on 
January 2, 2006, fell overboard from the Costa Magic after being served 
a lethal amount of alcohol. Also consider page 10 of Appendix B, which 
shows alcohol is involved in at least 62.5 percent of onboard assaults 
with serious bodily injury, 35 percent of simple assaults, and 36 
percent of sexual assaults. While this data suggests greater concern 
with responsible serving of alcohol and curtailing alcohol misuse, some 
cruise lines now offer ``all you can drink'' packages at flat rates for 
the duration of a cruise. Bar sales is one of the top sources of 
onboard revenue for cruise ships.
    There is a third issue with regard to shipboard security. Unlike 
police in a community setting, who are objective and are a 
disinterested party in their investigation, shipboard security 
personnel are compromised by the fact that they must investigate crimes 
onboard a ship where their own employer may be complicit in, or party 
to the crime. Can these security personnel truly act in a 
disinterested, objective manner that places the interests of the victim 
above those of the organization from which they receive their paycheck 
and continued employment? It is difficult to imagine that onboard 
security can reasonably be viewed as parallel to the quality and 
objectivity of a land-based, community police force. This is a 
disservice to crime victims on a cruise ship.
Persons Overboard
    The issue of persons overboard has already been discussed at 
previous Congressional hearings in December 13, 2005, March 7, 2006, 
March 27, 2007, September 19, 2007, and June 19, 2008. While the cruise 
industry tends to view these incidents as comprising accidents and 
suicides, this is not supported by the 177 incidents recorded since 
2000.\7\ Admittedly, many incidents are intentional suicides--the 15 
year old child who leaves a note after fighting with his parents, the 
82 year old man who goes missing in the North Atlantic, and cases where 
a spouse jumps overboard after an argument--and some are accidents, 
such as the 23-year-old man who fell overboard while urinating over the 
side as the ship steamed away from San Juan (he swam to shore), or a 
19-year-old man who climbed over a railing and threatened to kill 
himself after an argument with his girlfriend; when his girlfriend 
pleaded with him to climb to safety he complied but slipped and fell 
overboard. However, there are at least two known murders (and a third 
where a body was thrown overboard to hide a murder), a number of cases 
where a severely intoxicated person bent over a railing to vomit, and 
many incidents that are mysterious.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See www.cruisejunkie.com/Overboard.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is the mysterious incidents that raise the most concern. These 
are people who have given no sign of being suicidal, are happy and 
enjoying the cruise (often with family members along), and then go 
missing. Congressional hearings have already heard about some of these 
cases: Merrian Carver, Annette Mizener, and Hue Pham and Hue Tram, to 
name a few. In these cases, video surveillance footage was not made 
available--in the case of Annette Mizener the camera had been covered 
with a map or newspaper. Interestingly, video surveillance footage is 
readily available when it confirms the incident is a suicide or 
accident, but is not available in these incidents that remain a 
mystery. The situation suggests there is need for better video coverage 
of deck areas and that video feeds be monitored in real time, at least 
on a random basis and at times when these incidents most frequently 
occur.
    Another issue is the cost borne by U.S. taxpayers when the U.S. 
Coast Guard is enlisted to search for a missing passenger. This expense 
is not trivial. In just one case--that of Michelle Vilborg who went 
missing 70 miles southwest of Pensacola, Florida on June 15, 2009--the 
total cost incurred during the search was estimated by the Coast Guard 
to be $813,807.\8\ This is on a not-cost-recovery basis. It would seem 
that the cruise corporation (Carnival Corporation in this case) could 
be held liable for a portion these costs. In 2009 the corporation 
earned $1.790 billion in net income. Despite the U.S. corporate tax 
rate of 35 percent, Carnival Corporation's corporate tax paid in the 
U.S. in 2009, as a Panamanian-register corporation, was 0.9 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ The figure is in a response to a FOIA request, #09-4707: Linda 
Griesman Christopherson; Requesting the Coast Guard cost that was 
incurred in the search for Michelle Vilborg, letter dated October 15, 
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One additional issue is proper detection of persons overboard. The 
Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act requires that ``the vessel shall 
integrate technology that can be used for capturing images of 
passengers or detecting passengers who have fallen overboard, to the 
extent that such technology is available.'' \9\ The degree to which the 
cruise industry has complied with this requirement is entirely unclear. 
There may be additional camera surveillance (but no indication that 
this is the case), however there has not been adoption of any of the 
active measures recommended by the International Cruise Victims 
Association in discussions with the industry prior to the legislation 
being passed. There are many systems available, many manufactured and 
marketed in the U.S., but none of these appear to be under 
consideration for adoption, no doubt because of the cost involved.\10\ 
In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard posted a Federal Register Request for 
Input from the Industry, and received a number of proposals, but there 
is no indication that these have been acted upon.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ See Sec. 3507(a)(1)(D).
    \10\ For a description of systems available see ``Man-Overboard 
Devices,'' Motor Boating, April 11, 2011. 
    \11\ It appears proposals were received from Seafaring Security 
Systems and Radio Zealand DMP Americas, along with supporting 
documentation, as posted on the U.S. Coast Guard website.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abandoning Ship in an Emergency
    The Costa Concordia disaster brought to the forefront concerns 
about the ability for a ship to be abandoned within the requisite 30 
minutes from an abandon ship call, as required by the Convention of 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). While the cruise industry might argue 
that larger ships cannot meet the 30-minute requirement and the period 
of time should be extended, this gets at the crux of the matter. A 
catastrophic event, such as seen with the Estonia, which in 1994 sunk 
in 30 minutes with loss of 852 lives, does not allow for a luxury of 
time. On some large ships today it could conceivably take a passenger, 
especially one with mobility issues, 30 minutes to get to a lifeboat 
station.
    There are two issues at play. First, how large can a ship become 
before it is no longer feasible for the number of people onboard to be 
offloaded within a reasonable timeframe. When the SOLAS requirement was 
promulgated a large ship accommodated 2,000 passengers and crew. The 
Costa Concordia had more than twice that number, and the largest ships 
afloat today have more than four times that number--more than 6,200 
passengers and 2,500 crew members. There need to be drills and tests to 
determine whether current systems for abandoning ship can meet the 
SOLAS requirement; they should be required by the U.S., given that 
otherwise compliance with SOLAS is left with the country where the ship 
is registered, most commonly Panama or the Bahamas.
    Second, related to the issue of increasing size is ship design. 
There needs to be consideration for width of passageways, width of 
stairwells, and the ease with which passengers can make their way from 
cabins and entertainment areas to their muster stations. That which is 
practical when people are calm and orderly is quite different, as can 
be seen in video from the Costa Concordia, than what is possible in the 
frenzy of an emergency.
    A related issue also follows from SOLAS requirements. They dictate 
that lifeboats can be deployed when a ship is listing by 20 degrees or 
less. This did not appear to be the case with the Costa Concordia. If 
this requirement cannot be met, then consideration needs to be given to 
alternative methods of evacuation and that there be sufficient life-
saving equipment on both sides of the ship for the full complement of 
passengers and crew. While the Captain of the Costa Concordia has 
shouldered responsibility for the cause of the accident, it has not 
been sufficiently acknowledged that he likely saved 100s or 1000s of 
lives by maneuvering the ship to run aground close to shore, making 
evacuation by helicopter practical.
    Three other issues are brought to the forefront by the Costa 
Concordia: crew training, muster drills, and functionality of life-
saving equipment.
    Crew training. There is no basis on which to say that crew was not 
adequately trained on the Costa Concordia. However, what can be said is 
that the multiple languages used on board led to increased confusion 
and messages were not always clearly available to all passengers. This 
suggests the U.S. Coast Guard pay particular attention to the ability 
for all crew to speak and understand English on cruise operating out of 
U.S. ports of call.
    While there are conflicting reports, it also appears that crew 
members (some at least--there were many others who were notably heroic 
in their efforts) forgot their training and their responsibility by 
failing to keep passengers calm and by not providing sufficient 
assistance with getting to muster stations and getting off the ship. It 
isn't just a matter of some senior officers not remaining onboard until 
all passengers and crew were safely evacuated, but also that there are 
some reports of crew members trading priority on lifeboats for money, 
and others leaving the ship before they had completed all of their 
responsibilities. This underlines the need for additional training and 
additional drills for how to respond when an emergency occurs.
    Muster drills. Cruise ships have appeared to become complacent 
about lifeboat drills. When I was cruising in the 1960s, 1970s, and 
early 1990s there was always a lifeboat drill at the muster station 
(lifeboat) before a ship left port. A senior officer (usually the 
captain) would inspect whether each passenger properly wore their life 
vest (pulling straps tighter and fixing those that had been worn 
improperly), attendance was taken by roll call, and clear instructions 
were given about what to do in an emergency. Often the lifeboat would 
be lowered and a demonstration given on how the boat would be boarded 
and in what order. In the case of the Costa Concordia, the muster drill 
was planned the afternoon after the cruise began, which isn't 
inconsistent with SOLAS requirements, but in hindsight not a good 
decision.
    By the mid-to-late 1990s, roll calls were taken less frequently and 
the inspections became less vigilant. Undoubtedly, with 3,000 or more 
passengers, officers could no longer complete inspections in a 
reasonable period of time, and there may have been a reaction to 
increasing complaints from passengers who didn't see the need for the 
drills. By the late-1990s I began to see virtual lifeboat drills. 
Passengers would muster in a lounge or a bar and be instructed on 
procedures to follow in an emergency. They were instructed how to put 
on a life vest, but there were no longer inspections to ensure they 
wore them correctly. And there were no longer demonstrations on how a 
lifeboat was lowered or boarded, or instruction on the order of 
boarding (children and women first, assist those with mobility issues, 
and able-bodied men last).
    The Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) and some cruise 
lines have now announced there will be mandatory life boat drills 
before a ship leaves port. However, it is still unclear whether these 
will be virtual drills or real drills, whether passengers will be 
inspected as to whether they properly wear a life vest, and whether 
there will be demonstration of life-saving equipment. It appears, based 
on a cruise director's blog, that attendance will not be taken.

        . . . once guests are gathered at the muster stations then the 
        staff will walk around with clickers to count the number of 
        guests at the muster stations. . . . These numbers are then 
        given to each muster station supervisor who will then tell the 
        bridge. . .the cruise director will let guests know this is 
        happening, it will be very obvious and should take 
        approximately 5 minutes to accomplish as the line has multiple 
        staff assigned to this new task.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Young, Susan. 2012. ``Carnival Cruise Lines Adjusts Muster 
Drill,'' Travel Agent Central, February 16. 


    The ``old-fashioned'' lifeboat drills normally took 30 minutes or 
more.
    While I applaud CLIA's requirement for a mandatory muster drill, I 
have to ask what will happen to those members who do not comply. The 
Association has had mandatory environmental standards since 1999, 
however no cruise line has knowingly been sanctioned for violations, 
numbering in the hundreds and leading to more than $50 million in fines 
in the U.S.
    Functionality of Life-Saving Equipment. Reports from the Costa 
Concordia indicate some lifeboats did not easily deploy given corrosion 
and rust. I wasn't there, so I can't say what was the case. However, 
these reports, if accurate, underline the importance for U.S. Coast 
Guard inspections to include a determination that each and every 
lifeboat on a cruise ship freely lowers.
    I also understand from news reports following the accident that 
some cruise ships no longer place life vests in passenger cabins, but 
leave them on the deck where passengers muster to their lifeboat. The 
wisdom of this practice might be worth reconsidering in the aftermath 
of the Costa Concordia accident. What if passengers can't get to their 
muster station? Will there be a sufficient supply on each side of the 
ship to outfit all passengers in the case that one side of the ship 
isn't accessible? These questions need to be seriously considered.
Shipboard Black Boxes
    Like airplanes, modern cruise ships have black boxes that record 
critical information about the ship and conversations on the bridge. 
Following the Costa Concordia accident the captain reported the black 
box on the ship had been broken for more than 2 weeks; that he had 
notified the company and it had yet to be repaired or placed.\13\ 
Without a black box there is limited objective data about the accident. 
Just as an airplane is likely not allowed to knowingly operate without 
an operating black box, the same should be legislated for cruise ships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Kenna, Armorel. 2012. `Concordia Captain Says Black Box Wasn't 
Working, Repubblica Says, January 22.  and Hoskins, Paul and Himanshu Ojha. 2012. ``How the Cruise 
Ship Industry Sails Under the Radar,'' Reuters, January 24. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crime Reporting
    The data in Appendix B was received from the FBI in response to a 
Freedom of Information request. A similar request was made in 2011 for 
data after October 2008. The material returned in response was totally 
unhelpful. All useful information was redacted. As well, the FBI says 
they are not required to keep track of or report crimes committed on 
cruise ships unless they have opened a file of investigation and 
subsequently closed the file. That means that allegations of crime are 
no longer available for analysis (including crimes where the FBI has 
judged a sexual assault to be a ``he said, she said'' situation, and 
thefts of less than $10,000 given that these are not treated as worthy 
of prosecution). One obvious problem is that it is impossible to 
measure whether cruise ships are doing better or worse than the 2007-08 
baseline. Another problem is that it is impossible to compare onboard 
crime rates with crimes on land. On land crime rates are based on the 
number of allegations; these can't reliably be compared to only the 
number of incidents opened for investigation and subsequently closed. 
While this absence of data may serve the interest of the cruise lines, 
which prefer incidence of crime to remain hidden, it is not in the 
interest of the public or in the spirit of the Cruise Vessel Security 
and Safety Act of 2010.
    Unfortunately, the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 
(CVSSA) was amended from what was proposed to what was passed. Here is 
the text of the Act as introduced:

        (4) AVAILABILITY OF INCIDENT DATA VIA INTERNET--

        (A) WEBSITE--The Secretary shall maintain, on an Internet site 
        of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating, a 
        numerical accounting of the missing persons and alleged crimes 
        recorded in each report filed under paragraph (1)(A). The data 
        shall be updated no less frequently than quarterly, aggregated 
        by cruise line, and each cruise line shall be identified by 
        name.

        (B) ACCESS TO WEBSITE--Each cruise line taking on or 
        discharging passengers in the United States shall include a 
        link on its Internet website to the website maintained by the 
        Secretary under subparagraph (A)

    The Act as passed reads:

        (4) AVAILABILITY OF INCIDENT DATA VIA INTERNET--

        (A) WEBSITE--The Secretary shall maintain a statistical 
        compilation of all incidents described in paragraph (3)(A)(i) 
        on an Internet site that provides a numerical accounting of the 
        missing persons and alleged crimes recorded in each report 
        filed under paragraph (3)(A)(i) that are no longer under 
        investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The data 
        shall be updated no less frequently than quarterly, aggregated 
        by cruise line, each cruise line shall be identified by name, 
        and each crime shall be identified as to whether it was 
        committed by a passenger or a crew member.

        (B) ACCESS TO WEBSITE-Each cruise line taking on or discharging 
        passengers in the United States shall include a link on its 
        Internet website to the website maintained by the Secretary 
        under subparagraph (A).

    The change was made in Committee before it was reported back to the 
full Congress and my understanding is that the sponsors of the bill 
missed this. As you can see, there is a huge difference between 
reporting alleged crimes versus reporting crimes no longer under 
investigation. I encourage the Committee to change the language back to 
the original so the public has accessible accurate information about 
crime onboard cruise ships, and so researchers have access to reliable 
data that can be used to accurately measure the industry's progress in 
dealing with crime.
Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)
    Cruise ship passengers are treated differently than airline 
passengers under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) The Act, 
originally passed in 1920, presently does not allow non-pecuniary and 
punitive damages to families of someone who has died while at sea. 
These limits were deemed to be unfair in the context of aviation cases 
and were removed, but they were not changed for passenger ships. House 
Resolution 2989, introduced by Representative Doggett July 11, 2007, 
intended to correct this inconsistency, but it was not approved. Two 
bills were introduced in the 111th Congress, H.R. 5803 (Conyers and 26 
co-sponsors) andS. 3600 andS. 3755 (Rockefeller/Schumer), but they also 
didn't go beyond Committee. Given the obvious unfairness that American 
citizens on cruise ships are treated different on a cruise ship than 
when traveling by airplane, I hope amendments to DOHSA are revisited.
II. Environmental Issues
    Environmental issues and the cruise industry were brought to the 
forefront in the late 1990s after Royal Caribbean International was 
fined more than $30 million for illegal discharges into U.S. and Alaska 
state waters of oil, hazardous chemicals, and for making false 
statements to the U.S. Coast Guard. The incidents date back to the 
early 1990s.\14\ The U.S. General Accounting Office subsequently 
reported in 2000 that between 1993 and 1998 the Federal Government 
confirmed 87 illegal discharges from cruise ships (81 involving oil, 6 
involving garbage or plastic). Seventeen ``other alleged incidents'' 
were referred to the countries where the cruise ships were 
registered.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ See Klein, Ross A. 2002 Cruise Ships Blues: The Underside of 
the Cruse Industry, Gabriola Island, BC: New Society, pp. 88-89.
    \15\ See U.S. General Accounting Office. 2000. Marine Pollution: 
Progress Made to Reduce Marine Pollution by Cruise Ships, But Important 
Issues Remain, February. (Doc #GAO/RCED-00-48)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It wasn't only Royal Caribbean. Holland America Line was fined $2 
million in 1998 for pumping oily bilge into Alaska's Inside Passage, in 
addition to other violations,\16\ Then in April 2002, Carnival 
Corporation entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to numerous 
pollution incidents from 1996 through 2001--discharging oily waste into 
the sea from their bilges by improperly using pollution prevention 
equipment and of falsifying the Oil Record Book on six ships to conceal 
its practices. Part of the plea agreement, in addition to an $18 
million fine, was that the company was required to have environmental 
officers on all its ships; it was also required to file compliance 
reports with the court, which was later found to not comply with.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ See Klein, Ross A. 2009. Getting a Grip on Cruise Ship 
Pollution, Washington, DC: Friends of the Earth. See also Klein, Ross 
A. 2005. Cruise Ship Squeeze: The New Pirates of the Seven Seas, 
Gabriola Island, BC: New Society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A few months later, in July 2002, Norwegian Cruise Line signed an 
agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice pleading guilty to having 
discharged oily bilge water for several years and to having falsified 
discharge logs. The company was fined $1 million and ordered to pay 
$500,000 toward environmental service projects in South Florida. 
Federal prosecutors considered the sentence lenient. There have been 
other fines since, but it is overkill to list them here.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ See Klein, Ross A. 2008. Paradise Lost at Sea: Rethinking 
Cruise Vacations, Halifax, NS: Fernwood. Also see Pollution and 
Environmental Violations and Fines, 1992-2010 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
North American Emission Control Area
    Governments have recently taken action to curtail air pollution 
from ships. The European Community issued Directive 2005/33/EC 
requiring all ships while in European ports to use fuel with sulfur 
content of 0.1 percent or less effective January 1, 2010. Six months 
later, provisions in Annex VI of the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) regarding Sulfur Dioxide 
Emissions Control Areas (Baltic Sea, North Sea, and English Channel) 
placed a limit of 1.0 percent sulfur content; the limit reduces to 0.1 
percent in 2015. Following developments in Europe, the U.S. and Canada 
partnered to establish the North America Emission Control Area 
(extending 200 miles from the coast), which was ratified by the 
International Maritime Organization on March 26, 2010.\18\ It limits 
sulfur content in fuel to 1.0 percent effective August 1, 2012 and 0.1 
percent by 2015.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Lagan, Christopher. 2010. ``IMO adopts 200-mile North American 
Emissions Control Area,'' Coast Guard Compass, March 26.
    \19\ See Klein, Ross A. 2011. ``Responsible Cruise Tourism: Issues 
of Cruise Tourism and Sustainability,'' Journal of Hospitality and 
Tourism Management, 18, pp 107-116. See also Klein, Ross A. 2010. ``The 
Cruise Sector and Its Environmental Impact,'' Tourism and the 
Implications of Climate Change: Issues and Actions Bridging Tourism 
Theory and Practice Volume 3 (ed. Christian Schott), London:Emerald 
Group Publishing, pp. 113-130.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The cruise industry argued against the emission control areas (ECA) 
in Europe. It also voiced concern about increased fuel costs associated 
with the North American ECA and asked that consideration be given to 
``. . . alternative means, such as scrubbers, that ships could use to 
meet emissions goals, and to take a piecemeal, rather than blanket 
approach. `The ECA area should be tuned to prioritize those areas where 
urgency exists and the greatest health and environmental benefits can 
be achieved.' '' \20\ Ironically, while saying they support the health 
and environmental goals behind the creation of the ECA, cruise industry 
associations questioned the research on which the regime is based and 
warned it could hurt the Canadian and North American cruise sector 
insofar as ships relocating elsewhere.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Steuk, Wendy. 2010. ``Clean-fuel Rules May prompt Cruise Line 
to Bypass Canada, Globe and Mail, July 9. Page A4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The North American Emission Control Area is an important step in 
dealing with air emissions from cruise ships. The U.S. needs to stand 
its ground under pressure from the cruise industry to delay 
implementation or to ``water down'' the measure. With air emissions 
from fuel dealt with, it is possible to now shift to other sources of 
pollution from cruise ships.
Regulation of Grey Water
    Except for the Great Lakes, Maine, and Alaska, gray water was until 
2009 largely unregulated. However, effective February 6, 2009, pursuant 
to a Clean Water Act (CWA) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) Vessels General Permit issued by U.S. EPA (VGP), cruise 
ships must meet treatment standards for gray water as well as 25 other 
types of incidental vessel discharges--from ballast water to deck 
runoff. Operational limits in the permit prohibit the discharge of 
untreated gray water within one nautical mile (nm) of shore. Gray water 
discharges are only allowed within one nm if they meet specific 
effluent limits and can not be discharged in waters of marine 
sanctuaries, units of the National Park System, units of the National 
Wildlife Refuge System, National Wilderness areas, and national wild 
and scenic rivers system components. Discharges of untreated gray water 
are allowed between one nm and three nm of shore if the vessel is 
traveling at a speed of six knots or more. The EPA is proposing for 
2013 extending the present grey water treatment standards (the same 
standards that currently exist in Alaska) for large ships out to three 
nautical miles. The extension is to be complemented and encouraged.
    The VGP is a positive step. However, there is room for improvement 
because the VGP only regulates gray water out to three nautical miles. 
As indicated by the U.S. EPA, untreated gray water falls woefully short 
of National Recommended Water Quality Standards and the Title XIV 
Standard for Continuous Discharge in Alaska Waters, in particular for 
fecal coliform, chlorine, biological oxygen demand, suspended solids, 
ammonia, copper, nickel, zinc, and tretrachloroethylene.\21\ This 
suggests the need for upgrading and regular testing of systems treating 
gray water, and for further extending the area in which gray water 
discharges are prohibited. As well, it is necessary to perform system 
inspection and monitoring more frequently than required in the NPDES 
VGP, which only requires annual inspection and evaluation by the U.S. 
Coast Guard or the ship's classification society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ See United States Environmental Protection Agency. 2008. 
Cruise Ship Discharge Assessment Report, Washington, D.C.: EPA. (Report 
#EPA842-R-07-005)
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Regulation of Sewage
    A cruise ship produces more than eight gallons of sewage per day 
per person. The cumulative amount per day for a ship such as Royal 
Caribbean's Explorer of the Seas (4,190 passengers and 1,360 crew) is 
more than 40,000 gallons; almost 300,000 gallons on a 1-week cruise. 
These wastes contain harmful bacteria, pathogens, disease, viruses, 
intestinal parasites and harmful nutrients. If not adequately treated 
they can cause bacterial and viral contamination of fisheries and 
shellfish beds. In addition, nutrients in sewage, such as nitrogen and 
phosphorous, promote algal growth. Algae consume oxygen in the water 
that can be detrimental or lethal to fish and other aquatic life.\22\
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    \22\ See United States Environmental Protection Agency. 2008. 
Cruise Ship Discharge Assessment Report, Washington, DC: EPA. (Report 
#EPA842-R-07-005)
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    Sewage from cruise ships is a critical problem, compounded by the 
fact that it is excluded from the Clean Water Act's (CWA) National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting requirements 
and ignored beyond three nautical miles from shore. The Clean Water 
Act's provision for sewage discharges from vessels sets treatment 
standards that are inadequate, and now outdated, and does not require 
permits or reporting. Further, the discharge of untreated sewage from 
vessels in coastal waters beyond three miles is not regulated.
    It is worth note that the U.S. is one of the few coastal nations in 
the developed world that has not signed Annex IV of the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). While 
its neighbors ban the discharge of treated sewage within four nautical 
miles of shore, and untreated sewage within twelve nautical miles of 
shore, the U.S. permits sewage treated with a Type II Marine Sanitation 
Device to be discharged between zero and three miles of shore, and 
untreated sewage to be discharged anywhere beyond three nautical miles. 
This anomaly in national regulations around the world has led a number 
of jurisdictions to request the EPA for ``no discharge areas'' within 
three miles of shore (such as Maine, New Hampshire, Michigan, Rhode 
Island and California), has led to state legislation (as in the case of 
California and Alaska), and has made necessary Memoranda of 
Understanding in other jurisdictions (such as Washington).
Sewage Treatment
    Marine Sanitation Devices. Sewage from a cruise ship traditionally 
has been treated by a Type II marine sanitation device (MSD). Under 
Section 312 of the U.S. Clean Water Act, commercial and recreational 
vessels (including cruise ships) with installed toilets are required to 
have a MSD. Type II MSDs are the most common type of wastewater 
treatment systems on cruise ships and consist of flow-through devices 
that break up and chemically or biologically disinfect waste before 
discharge. Within three nautical miles of shore vessels must treat 
sewage with an approved Type II MSD prior to discharge. Beyond three 
nautical miles, discharge of raw sewage is allowed. The U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulations governing MSDs have 
not been updated since they were instituted in 1976.
    Type II MSDs are supposed to produce effluent containing no more 
than 200 fecal coliform for 100 milliliters and no more 150 milligrams 
per liter of suspended solids.\23\ Whether MSDs achieve that standard 
was called into question in 2000 when the state of Alaska found that 79 
of 80 samples from cruise ships were out of compliance with the 
standard. According to the Juneau port commander for the Coast Guard, 
the results were so extreme that it might be necessary to consider 
possible design flaws and capacity issues with the Coast Guard-approved 
treatment systems.\24\ A 2008 report from the U.S. EPA suggests 
problems identified in 2000 with MSDs continue today.
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    \23\ 33 C.F.R. Sec. 159.3 (2008); 40 C.F.R. Sec. 140.3(d) (2008).
    \24\ See McAllister, Bill. 2000. ``A Big Violation on Wastewater: 
Some Ship Readings 100,000 Times Allowed Amount,'' The Juneau Empire, 
August 27 .
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    Advanced Wastewater Treatment Systems (AWTS). The cruise industry 
in recent years has adopted the use of AWTS (an advanced form of Type 
II Marine Sanitation Device) on many ships--most often ships visiting 
Alaska's Inside Passage where such systems are required for continuous 
discharge in state waters. A ship with an AWTS avoids the need to 
travel outside Alaska state waters to discharge treated sewage. 
Installation of AWTS for ships visiting other waters with less 
stringent or no regulations has been at a much slower pace. For 
example, Carnival Corporation (which includes Carnival Cruise Lines, 
Holland America Lines, and Princess Cruises) had AWTS installed on 
slightly less than one half of its fleet at the end of 2008. But 
Carnival Cruise Lines, which sends only one ship to Alaska per season, 
has installed an AWTS on only one of its twenty-three ships. The 
corporation's spokesperson says they try to make sure AWTS are included 
on ships that go to Alaska and to other sensitive areas.
    AWTS are a vast improvement over MSDs--yielding what the industry 
refers to as drinking-water quality effluent. However this terminology 
must be treated with skepticism. Such water cannot be recycled for 
onboard human consumption nor can it be used in the laundry because 
sheets and towels apparently turn gray. Both the EPA and Alaska have 
found that even the best systems still had difficulty with a number of 
constituents. A key problem is the AWTS do not adequately address 
nutrient loading, which means they pose similar problems as MSDs with 
regard to nitrogen and phosphorous. In addition, tests in Alaska have 
shown levels of copper, nickel, zinc, and ammonia that are higher than 
the state's water quality standards. The EPA has also found that AWTS 
exceed permitted concentrations of chlorine and tetrachlorethylene. As 
a result, 12 of 20 (60 percent) ships permitted to discharge in Alaska 
waters violated discharge limits in 2008, logging 45 violations 
involving 7 pollutants. These include ammonia, biological oxygen 
demand, chlorine, copper, fecal coliform, pH, and zinc. The year 2009 
was even worse, with 13 of 18 (72 percent) ships permitted to discharge 
in Alaskan waters violating Alaska discharge limits during the season, 
racking up 66 violations involving 9 pollutants. Comparable data is not 
available for 2010 or 2011; the state lowered its limits for waste from 
AWTS under pressure from the industry, so there is no way to reliably 
measure improvement by publicly available data. It is noteworthy that 
nearly 30 percent of ships discharging in Alaska in 2008 and 2009 were 
able to meet the water quality standards.\25\
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    \25\ See Klein, Ross A. 2009. Getting a Grip on Cruise Ship 
Pollution, Washington, DC: Friends of the Earth.
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    Sewage Sludge. Most Type II MSDs and AWTS filter solids from sewage 
as part of treatment. This yields on average 4,000 gallons of sewage 
sludge per day; \26\ cumulatively, it adds up quickly. It is estimated 
that 4.2 million gallons of sewage sludge are produced every year by 
ships as they pass through Washington State waters on their way to 
Alaska \27\--this is small compared to what cruise ships generate 
outside Washington state waters. In some cases (about one in sixteen 
ships with an AWTS), sewage sludge is dewatered and then incinerated. 
In other cases sludge is dumped at sea. Most jurisdictions permit 
sludge to be dumped within three miles of shore; in California a ship 
must be beyond three miles from shore and in Washington beyond twelve 
miles. In either case, these sludges have a high oxygen demand and are 
detrimental to sea life. Sewage sludge poses the same problem as 
sewage, but in a more concentrated form.
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    \26\ National Marine Sanctuaries. 2008. Olympic Coast Marine 
Sanctuary: Condition Report 2008, Washington, D.C.: NOAA. p. 43
    \27\ King County Wastewater Treatment Division. 2007. Cruise Ship 
Wastewater Management Report. Seattle: Department of Natural Resources 
and Parks.
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    A report issued in August 2003 by the California Environmental 
Protection Agency and the California State Water Resources Control 
Board said ``it found `particularly troubling' the discharging of 
sludge twelve miles out to sea.'' \28\ This concern is in stark 
contrast to regulations elsewhere that define sewage sludge as treated 
sewage and permit its discharge within three miles of the U.S. 
shoreline. The need for minimum regulations applicable to the entire 
U.S. coastline is obvious.
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    \28\ Weiss, Ken. 2003. ``Cruise Line Pollution Prompts 
Legislation,'' Los Angeles Times, August 18. Also see: Report to the 
Legislature: Regulation of Large Passenger Vessels in California, 
Cruise Environmental Task Force, August 2003 
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    One option is to require sewage sludge to be dewatered and 
incinerated onboard, however incineration creates an air quality 
problem and the ash must be disposed of somewhere. Dumping the ash 
overboard raises new problems. Another option is to require sewage 
sludge to be held onboard and offloaded for treatment in port. 
Washington State has in recent years explored the commercial use and 
value of sewage sludge as a fertilizer, but no clear plans have yet 
been made.\29\ Clearly, a workable solution to the huge volume of 
sludge being dumped into the waters of the U.S.--28,000 gallons per 
week on an average-sized cruise ship--must be identified and 
implemented.
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    \29\ See Port of Seattle. 2008. Cruise Vessel Biomass Management 
Study, Phase 1A (Draft): Data Compilation and Initial Assessment, Port 
of Seattle, Nov. 18.
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Incinerators
    Cruise ships incinerate and burn a variety of wastes, including 
hazardous wastes, oil, oily sludge, sewage sludge, medical and bio-
hazardous waste, outdated pharmaceuticals, and other solid wastes such 
as plastics, paper, metal, glass, and food.\30\ A cruise ship may burn 
1 to 2.5 tons per day of oily sludge in these incinerators and 
boilers.\31\ The emissions from onboard incineration and its ash can 
include furans and dioxins, both found to be carcinogenic, as well as 
nitrogen oxide, sulfur oxide, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, 
particulate matter, hydrogen chloride, toxic and heavy metals such as 
lead, cadmium and mercury, and hydrocarbons.\32\
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    \30\ California Cruise Ship Environmental Task Force. 2003. Report 
to the Legislature: Regulation of Large Passenger Vessels in 
California, August, p. 54
    \31\ California Cruise Ship Environmental Task Force. 2003. Report 
to the Legislature: Regulation of Large Passenger Vessels in 
California, August, p. 56
    \32\ Bluewater Network's EPA petition on cruise ship incineration, 
April 2000.
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    In contrast to incinerator use on land, which is likely to be 
strictly monitored and regulated, incinerators at sea operate with few 
limits. MARPOL Annex VI bans incineration of certain particularly 
harmful substances, including contaminated packaging materials and 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). There are no national standards 
limiting emissions from ship incineration.
    The State of California has established that air emissions from 
incineration, generated between 27 and 102 miles off the coast, could 
negatively impact the air quality of the state.\33\ The state initially 
introduced legislation in 2003 to prohibit ships from using onboard 
waste incinerators while within 20 miles of the coast, but subsequently 
passed legislation applicable only to waters over which the state had 
jurisdiction. The final California law prohibits incinerator use when a 
ship is within three miles of the coast.
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    \33\ California Cruise Ship Environmental Task Force. 2003. Report 
to the Legislature: Regulation of Large Passenger Vessels in 
California, August, p. 66
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    Clear parameters are needed for operational requirements for 
onboard incinerators, much like on land. In addition, it is wise to do 
as California has done and ban the use of incinerators within a 
specific distance from the coast. Any such law must take into account 
the potential for onshore winds and ocean currents to move incinerator 
pollutants on-shore.
Solid Waste
    A cruise ship produces a large volume of non-hazardous solid waste. 
This includes huge volumes of plastic, paper, wood, cardboard, food 
waste, cans, glass, and the variety of other wastes disposed of by 
passengers. It was estimated in the 1990s that each passenger accounted 
for 3.5 kilograms of solid waste per day. With better attention to 
waste reduction this volume in recent years has been cut nearly in 
half. But the amount is still significant, more than eight tons in a 
week from a moderate sized cruise ship. Twenty-four percent of the 
solid waste produced by vessels worldwide comes from cruise ships.\34\ 
Glass and aluminum are increasingly held onboard and landed ashore for 
recycling, but only when the itinerary includes a port with reception 
facilities.
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    \34\ Copeland, Claudia. 2008. Cruise Ship Pollution: Background, 
Laws and Regulations, and Key Issues. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service (Report #RL32450)
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    Food and other waste not easily incinerated is ground or macerated 
and discharged into the sea. These ``. . . food waste can contribute to 
increases in biological oxygen demand, chemical oxygen demand, and 
total organic carbon, diminish water and sediment quality, adversely 
effect marine biota, increase turbidity, and elevate nutrient levels.'' 
\35\ They may be detrimental to fish digestion and health and cause 
nutrient pollution.\36\ An additional problem with discharging food 
waste at sea is the inadvertent discharge of plastics. Under MARPOL, 38 
throwing plastic into the ocean is strictly prohibited everywhere. 
Plastic poses an immediate risk to sea life that might ingest or get 
caught in it. It poses a longer-term risk as it degrades over time, 
breaking down into smaller and smaller pieces, but retaining its 
original molecular composition. The result is a great amount of fine 
plastic sand that resembles food to many creatures. Unfortunately, the 
plastic cannot be digested, so sea birds or fish can eventually starve 
to death with a stomach full of plastic.\37\
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    \35\ United States Environmental Protection Agency. 2008. Cruise 
Ship Discharge Assessment Report, Washington, DC: Environmental 
Protection Agency (Report #EPA842-R-07-005), p. 5-11
    \36\ See John Polglaze. 2003. ``Can We Always Ignore Ship-Generated 
Food Waste,'' Marine Pollution Bulletin 46:1, pp. 33-38
    \37\ Reid, David. 2007. ``Earth's Eighth Continent.'' The Tyee Nov. 
21. 
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    Solid waste and some plastics are incinerated on board, with the 
incinerator ash being dumped into the ocean. Incinerator ash and the 
resulting air emissions can contain furans and dioxins, both found to 
be carcinogenic, as well as heavy metal and other toxic residues. For 
this reason Annex V of MARPOL recommends, but does not require, that 
ash from incineration of certain plastics not be discharged into the 
sea.\38\ At the very least, incinerator ash should be tested before 
each overboard discharge. This would include analysis and accounting of 
the contaminants typically found in cruise ship incinerator ash to 
determine whether it should be categorized as solid waste or hazardous 
waste.
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    \38\ See MARPOL Annex V, Appendix B, Section 5.4.6.2, referenced in 
United States Environmental Protection Agency. 2008. Cruise Ship 
Discharge Assessment Report, Washington, D.C.: Environmental Protection 
Agency (Report #EPA842-R-07-005), p. 5-12
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    Under MARPOL 44 and U.S. law,\39\ no garbage can be discharged 
within three miles of shore. Between three and twelve miles garbage can 
be discharged if ground-up and capable of passing through a one-inch 
screen. If not ground-up and capable of passing through a screen, most 
food waste and other garbage can be discharged at sea when a ship is 
more than twelve miles from shore.
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    \39\ See 33 C.F.R. parts 151.63, 151.65, 151.67, 151.69, 151.71, 
151.73
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    Although cruise ships have reduced their volume of solid waste, the 
total amount is still significant. Royal Caribbean's stated commitment 
in 2003 to not dump any trash overboard is admirable and should set a 
standard for all cruise ships operating from U.S. ports and in U.S. 
waters. If it is achievable by Royal Caribbean, then there is no reason 
why it is not practical for all cruise lines. This should be 
incorporated in legislation in order to ensure cruise ships can be held 
accountable for any unnecessary dumping of solid waste in the waters of 
the U.S.
Oily Bilge
    A typical large cruise ship will generate an average of eight 
metric tons of oily bilge water for each twenty-four hours of 
operation;\40\ according to Royal Caribbean's 1998 Environmental Report 
its ships produce an average 25,000 gallons of oily bilge water on a 1-
week voyage. This water collects in the bottom of a vessel's hull from 
condensation, water lubricated shaft seals, propulsion system cooling 
and other engine room sources. It contains fuel, oil, wastewater from 
engines and other machinery, and may also include solid wastes such as 
rags, metal shavings, paint, glass, and cleaning agents.
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    \40\ National Research Council. 1995. Clean Ships, Clean Ports, 
Clean Oceans: Controlling Garbage and Plastic Wastes at Sea. 
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
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    The risks posed to fish and marine organisms by oil and other 
elements in bilge water are great. In even minute concentrations oil 
can kill fish or have numerous sub-lethal effects such as changes in 
heart and respiratory rates, enlarged livers, reduced growth, fin 
erosion, and various biochemical and cellular changes.\41\ Research 
also finds that by-products from the biological breakdown of petroleum 
products can harm fish and wildlife and pose threats to human health if 
these fish and wildlife are ingested.
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    \41\ Copeland, Claudia. 2008. Cruise Ship Pollution: Background, 
Laws and Regulations, and Key Issues. Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service (Report #RL32450), November 17, p. CRS-5.
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    Oily bilge water in U.S. waters is regulated by the Clean Water 
Act. The Act prohibits the discharge of oil or hazardous substances, in 
such quantities as may be harmful within 200 miles of the coast. In 
addition, Coast Guard regulations specifically prohibit discharges 
within 12 nautical miles of shore unless it has been passed through a 
fifteen parts per million (ppm) oily water separator and does not cause 
a visible sheen.\42\ The NPDES VGP reinforces the 15 ppm standard and 
it requires large vessels (over 400 gross tons) to discharge oily bilge 
beyond 1 nautical mile from shore if the vessel is underway and the 
discharge is technologically feasible and safe. Beyond 12 nautical 
miles, oil or oily mixtures can be discharged while a vessel is 
proceeding en route so long as the undiluted oil content is less than 
100 ppm. The oil extracted by the separator can be reused, incinerated, 
and/or offloaded in port. Vessels are required to document the disposal 
of oil, oily bilge water or oily residues in an Oil Record Book.\43\
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    \42\ See 33 C.F.R. Sec. 151.10.
    \43\ Copeland, Claudia. 2008. Cruise Ship Pollution: Background, 
Laws and Regulations, and Key Issues. Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service (Report #RL32450), November 17, p. CRS-14
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    To address the deleterious effect of oil to marine life, even in 
minute quantities, the discharge of oily bilge water should be 
prohibited in sensitive areas and in coastal zones out to 12 nautical 
miles. Additionally, consistent minimum water quality standards for 
oily bilge should be set across all waters under U.S. control either at 
the Coast Guard's current level of 15ppm or as low as 5 ppm. The 
reduction to 5 ppm is achievable.\44\
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    \44\ An example of current technology that demonstrates the 
achievability of 5 ppm is a system manufactured by North Carolina-based 
EnSolve Biosystems. The company's PetroLiminator oily water separator 
``is a green technology that consistently achieves effluent levels of 
less than 5 parts per million (PPM).'' See ``EnSolve Biosystems 
Launches Operating Cost Guarantee Program For Bilge Water Treatment 
Program, '' EnSolve Biosystems Inc. News, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 
2008.
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Patchwork of Regulations and the Clean Cruise Ship Act
    There is a patchwork of different regulations in the U.S. Cruise 
ships are permitted to legally discharge waste in one place but not 
another. On the west coast for example, enforceable regulations have 
had a positive effect in Alaska, Washington, and California, but leave 
open for greater environmental harm in neighboring jurisdictions such 
as Oregon and British Columbia. In fact, British Columbia is a good 
illustration of the problem with a patchwork approach. In some circles 
it is referred to as the toilet bowl of the Alaska cruise industry. 
This is because a ship may not discharge wastes in certain areas in 
Washington State (such as sewage sludge, untreated gray water, and 
sewage treated with a MSD) and it is restricted in the waste permitted 
for discharge in Alaska, but it can discharge those same wastes in 
Canada. The reason is weaker Canadian regulations (except for sewage) 
and Canada's failure to enforce the regulations it has. The same 
scenario operates on the east coast where gray water cannot be 
discharged in the waters of Maine, but can be discharged in the waters 
of Canada, and until the extension of the NPDES comes into effect every 
other coastal state.
    Inconsistent regulations permit the cruise industry to argue that 
it meets or exceeds all environmental regulations while at the same 
time showing relatively different regard for environmental protection 
from one place to the next. These differences are even seen in the fuel 
ships use. It was reported in 2007 that when Holland America Line's 
Zaandam operated on the west coast of North America (British Columbia 
and Alaska) it used fuel with a sulfur content of about 1.8 percent; 
while operating during the winter months in the Caribbean the sulfur 
content was as much as 3 percent.\45\ The North American Emission 
Control Area addresses this problem directly.
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    \45\ Montgomery, Christina. 2007. ``Setting Out to Sea in an Eco-
Friendly Ship.'' The Province, May 31.
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    These variations raise to the forefront the need for comprehensive, 
minimum national regulations that maintain uniformly high standards for 
protection of the marine environment. One approach was the Clean Cruise 
Ship Act of 2008 (CCSA) sponsored by Durbin in the Senate (S 2881) and 
Farr with 20 cosponsors in the House of Representatives (HR 6434). This 
was the third session of Congress in which this legislation was 
introduced. In the 109th Congress Farr had 47 cosponsors; Durbin had 5 
cosponsors, and in the 108th Congress there were 42 cosponsors in the 
House and 9 cosponsors in the Senate. Key provisions of the CCSA 
include:

   Prohibits the discharge of sewage, graywater, and bilge 
        water out to 12 miles and in nodischarge zones such as marine 
        protected areas;

   Prohibits the discharge of sewage sludge, incinerator ash, 
        and hazardous waste within 200 miles of the U.S. coastline. 
        Sludge, incinerator ash, and hazardous waste must be offloaded 
        at an appropriate land-based facility;

   Requires EPA to establish effluent standards for sewage, 
        graywater, and bilge water discharges from 12 to 200 miles. 
        These effluent limits must be consistent with best available 
        technology. The ship must be traveling at not less than 6 
        knots;

   Establishes a monitoring, sampling, reporting and inspection 
        program with unannounced annual inspections and samples;

   Establishes an observer program for monitoring discharges 
        (one observer per ship), similar to the ``Ocean Ranger'' 
        program in Alaska;

   Establishes the Cruise Vessel Pollution Control Fund to 
        carry out the programs in the Act. The fund is comprised of 
        reasonable and appropriate fees collected from cruise vessels 
        for each paying passenger. This, too, is modeled after how 
        Alaska pays for its monitoring and enforcement program.
III. Medical Care and Illness
    International maritime law surprisingly does not require a cruise 
ship to provide medical services. The only legal requirement is under 
the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
(SCTW) Convention, which requires certain crew members to have various 
levels of first aid and medical training. Regardless, all modern cruise 
ships maintain an infirmary. Those dispensing medical care are 
concessionaires for whose actions the cruise line assumes no liability. 
Their precise qualifications can vary widely. Some small cruise ships 
may have a nurse but no doctor. Some large ships have two physicians as 
well as two or more nurses.
    In 1996, the International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL) adopted 
industry guidelines for medical facilities and personnel on cruise 
ships. The guidelines were a response to pressure from the American 
Medical Association (AMA) which had that year called on the U.S. 
Congress for the development of medical standards for cruise ships. 
Based on a number of cases of disease, including a recent outbreak of 
gastroenteritis on Carnival Cruise Line's Jubilee in which 150 
passengers became ill and one person died, the AMA also called for 
greater awareness of the limited medical services available aboard 
ships. The AMA position was supported by a survey administered by two 
Florida doctors to eleven cruise lines.

        [T]he doctors found that 27 percent of doctors and nurses did 
        not have advanced training in treating victims of heart 
        attacks, the leading killer on ships, and 54 percent of doctors 
        and 72 percent of nurses lacked advanced training for dealing 
        with trauma. Fewer than half of shipboard doctors--45 percent--
        had board certification, an important credential that is 
        granted after three to 7 years of residency and a written 
        examination in a specialty or its equivalent . . . As for 
        equipment, the survey found that 63 percent of ships did not 
        have equipment for blood tests for diagnosing heart attacks, 
        and 45 percent did not have mechanical ventilators or external 
        pacemakers. ``What we found was that the quality of maritime 
        medical care was less than adequate, from the medical 
        facilities to nurse and physician credentials . . .'' \46\
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    \46\ Frantz, Douglas. 1999. ``Getting Sick on the High Seas: A 
Question of Accountability,'' New York Times, October 31.

    The American Medical Association has continued to lobby for 
government regulation of health care on cruise ships, but with no 
success.
    Some have suggested that Section 3507 (d) (3) of the Cruise Vessel 
Security and Safety Act of 2010 addresses this matter. The section 
states that in the case of a sexual assault the owner of a vessel to 
which the section applies shall make available on the vessel at all 
times medical staff who have undergone a credentialing process to 
verify that he or she----

        (A) possesses a current physician's or registered nurse's 
        license and----

                (i) has at least 3 years of post-graduate or 
                postregistration clinical practice in general and 
                emergency medicine; or

                (ii) holds board certification in emergency medicine, 
                family practice medicine, or internal medicine;

        (B) is able to provide assistance in the event of an alleged 
        sexual assault, has received training in conducting forensic 
        sexual assault examination, and is able to promptly perform 
        such an examination upon request and provide proper medical 
        treatment of a victim, including administration of anti-
        retroviral medications and other medications that may prevent 
        the transmission of human immunodeficiency virus and other 
        sexually transmitted diseases; and

        (C) meets guidelines established by the American College of 
        Emergency Physicians relating to the treatment and care of 
        victims of sexual assault.

    While this section requires a doctor or nurse to be onboard for the 
treatment of a victim of sexual assault, it does not dictate where the 
person has received their training, license, and board certification, 
so there can still be wide variation in the nature and quality of care 
(the original proposals made by the International Cruise Victims 
Association were that these personnel be board certified in the U.S.). 
In addition, the American College of Emergency Physicians' guidelines 
are general enough that they provide little assurance, especially given 
that they are not easily transferable to the setting of a cruise 
ship.\47\ It is relatively easy to comply with this section of the Act, 
however there is less protection to victims than is apparent at first 
blush.
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    \47\ See American College of Emergency Physicians. 2012. Policy 
Compendium, 2012 Edition. Dallas, TX: ACEP. Pages 124-125. 

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Malpractice and Liability
    No doubt there are cases of malpractice on cruise ships. Most 
Americans and Canadians assume they have the same rights and the same 
protections as they would on land when something happens. But that is 
not the case. Even though a physician wears the uniform of a senior-
ranked officer, is introduced to passengers onboard as the ship's 
physician (implying he, like the Captain, is an employee of the cruise 
line), and like other senior officers may host a dinner table for 
invited guests, the cruise lines without exception say the physician is 
a private concessionaire and as such the cruise line accepts no 
liability for mistakes made. It is a hard concept to get one's head 
around given that the service is offered by the cruise ship and the 
cruise ship collects the fees, but one that was supported by the 
Florida Supreme Court in February 2007 and by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
October 2007.
    The case began 10 years before in March 1997. Fourteen-year-old 
Elizabeth Carlisle was on a Caribbean cruise on Carnival Destiny with 
her family. On the second night out of Miami she developed severe 
abdominal pain. She consulted the ship's physician, Dr. Mauro Neri--he 
had finished medical school in his native Italy in 1981, had held nine 
medical jobs in Italy, Africa, and England in the fifteen years before 
joining Carnival Cruise Lines and was earning $1,057 a month from the 
cruise line. Dr. Neri advised that Elizabeth was suffering from the flu 
and sent her on her way. But her pain became worse. On the third visit 
to the infirmary, after Elizabeth's parents specifically asked whether 
the problem could be appendicitis, Dr. Neri conducted his first 
physical exam. He responded that he was sure the problem was not the 
girl's appendix.
    When the pain continued to grow worse Elizabeth's parents called 
their family physician in Michigan and he advised they return home. The 
family took the advice and shortly after arriving home Elizabeth 
underwent emergency surgery to remove her ruptured appendix. The 
infection had rendered the fourteen-year-old sterile and caused 
lifelong medical problems. Elizabeth sued Carnival Cruise Lines in 
Florida state court, a case she lost on Carnival's motion for summary 
judgment. The cruise line claimed it was not responsible for the 
medical negligence of the doctor on board and pointed to the fine print 
in the passenger cruise contract to support its position.
    The family appealed the Circuit Court's decision to Florida's Third 
District Court of Appeal where the parents argued the cruise line was 
vicariously liable for the doctor's negligence. Judge Joseph Nesbitt 
agreed and reversed the lower court's decision. The judge held that the 
cruise line had control over the doctor's medical services for agency 
law purposes; the doctor was to provide medical services to passengers 
and crew in accordance with the cruise line's guidelines. And as it was 
foreseeable that some passengers at sea would develop medical problems 
(and that the only realistic alternative for such a passenger was 
treatment by the ship's doctor) the cruise line had an element of 
control over the doctor-patient relationship. As such, the cruise 
line's duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances 
extended to the actions of a ship's doctor placed on board by the 
cruise line. The doctor was an agent of the cruise line whose 
negligence was imputed to the cruise line. This invalidated the cruise 
ticket's purported limitation of the cruise line's liability for the 
negligence of its agents.
    Judge Nesbitt's decision was groundbreaking. It was likely the very 
first case where a cruise line was held responsible for the care 
provided by a ship's physician. Not surprisingly, Carnival appealed the 
case to the Florida Supreme Court. While the court almost agreed with 
the lower court's assertion that times had changed and that a doctor's 
negligence at sea also shows negligence by the cruise line, it 
ultimately found in favor of Carnival. Justice Peggy Quince wrote in 
her opinion,

        We find merit in the plaintiff's argument and the reasoning of 
        the district court. However, because this is a maritime case, 
        this Court and the Florida district courts of appeal must 
        adhere to the Federal principles of harmony and uniformity when 
        applying Federal maritime law.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Supreme Court of Florida. 2007. Carnival Corporation vs. Darce 
Carlisle, Case No. SC 04-393, February 15.

    The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and the court 
refused to hear it. The Florida Supreme Court's decision was the final 
word. If the Carlisle family wanted to pursue the case they would have 
to sue the physician directly. But this is difficult in their case, and 
in most involving medical malpractice on cruise ships, given that 
they'd first have to locate the physician in his or her present home, 
something with which cruise lines historically have not provided 
assistance. Malpractice cases involving treatment in international 
waters must be filed in the courts of the physician's country of 
origin, which is both difficult and expensive.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ Chen, Stephanie. 2007. ``Trouble at Sea: Free-Agent Doctors,'' 
Wall Street Journal, October 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The bottom line is that cruise lines escape liability for the 
medical errors committed (on a daily basis) of its employed staff and 
it's independent contractor staff/doctors. The decisions are all based 
on a relatively old 5th Circuit Court case, Barbetta.\50\ The court in 
Barbetta said that the cruise line is not in the business of providing 
medical care and that the passenger has alternatives. Neither is 
correct. The cruise lines are in the business of providing medical care 
because (1) they attract passengers by representing that they have 
medical staff onboard, and (2) by having onboard medical care they 
avoid the obligation of diverting the course of the vessel every time 
there is a medical situation onboard. The passenger has no alternative 
for medical care when the vessel is at sea and the passenger gets sick 
or injured. Even when the ship is at or near port, the port is usually 
in a developing world country with developing world medical care. 
Cruise lines know that an overwhelming majority of their business is 
from Americans who expect and deserve first world medical care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is worth noting here that emergency medical evacuations from 
cruise ships are not uncommon. Here again we have the U.S. taxpayer 
often footing the bill for these endeavors, supporting a cruise 
industry that doesn't fall under many U.S. laws and regulations and 
that does not pay corporate income tax to the U.S. Government.
Norovirus and Other Illness Outbreaks
    The complexion of illnesses found on cruise ships has shifted over 
the past two decades. In the 1980s and 1990s outbreaks were commonly 
caused by food borne bacteria such as shigella, salmonella and E coli, 
but these gave way to norovirus as it increased in incidence in 2001. 
Also in 2001 the Food Standards Agency in the United Kingdom announced 
that it would give health officials the statutory right to enter and 
inspect cruise ships (similar to the Vessel Sanitation Program in the 
United States). It was reacting to a report from the Consumers' 
Association which indicated an increase of food poisoning cases among 
cruise ship passengers. The Consumers' Association had received 
complaints about fourteen ships in 2000 and 2001, with illnesses 
ranging from salmonella poisoning to the potentially fatal 
Legionnaires' disease.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ Gadher, Dipesh. 2001. ``Cruise Liners Face Tougher Hygiene 
Tests,'' Sunday Times, May 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With better food processing and refrigeration, and more careful 
testing and treatment of drinking water loaded from shore, incidents 
caused by bacteria have reduced significantly. In fact, from 2002 
through 2011 there are only four known outbreaks caused by salmonella 
and seven caused by E coli. There were four reports of Legionnaires' 
disease during the same 9 year period.\52\ During the same time there 
were 378 outbreaks involving norovirus, plus another nine in 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ See www.cruisejunkie.com/outbreaks2012.html, and other years 
listed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As bacteria-caused illness has decreased, the incidence of illness 
caused by norovirus increased significantly. Between 1999 and 2001, 
there were four or five illness outbreaks per year on cruise ships 
recorded by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) that were 
attributed to norovirus (to be considered an outbreak, 3 percent of 
passengers or 2 percent of crew members must report illness). In 2002, 
the CDC's reported numbers jumped to twenty-nine illness outbreaks 
(most of which were caused by norovirus); in total there were forty-
four cases of gastrointestinal illness reported on cruise ships in 
2002. The CDC's rate of outbreaks increased from 0.65 per 1000 cruises 
in 2001 to 6.45 per 1000 cruises in 2002--a tenfold increase.\53\ The 
number of outbreaks has fluctuated since 2002 with a high of fifty-four 
in 2006 and a low of twenty-three in 2011. The number of passengers 
reporting ill has ranged from a low of 1,970 in a year to 7,215. Thus 
far in 2012, 1,725 passengers and crew have reported illness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ Cramer, Elaine H., David X. Gu, and Randy E. Durbin. 2003. 
``Diarreal Disease on Cruise Ships, 1990-2000,'' American Journal of 
Preventive Medicine 24, 3 (April).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the industry, since 2002, has characterized norovirus as 
something passengers bring onboard with them, this is not entirely 
accurate.\54\ Rather than debate this point there are two points to be 
made here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ For a fuller discussion of the causes of norovirus and how the 
industry has characterized the illness and its response see Klein, Ross 
A. 2008. Paradise Lost at Sea: Rethinking Cruise Vacations, Halifax, 
NS: Fernwood.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First, a cruise ship is a perfect incubator for the spread of 
norovirus and once it takes hold it is difficult to eradicate. A common 
practice is that crew members reporting ill are taken off work (often 2 
days) while they are symptomatic, however this is contraindicated given 
that the virus continues to be shed (and thus a person is potentially 
contagious) for up to 2 weeks. Because crew members are often not paid 
when they are off work, there is an obvious disincentive to report when 
they are ill, increasing the likelihood that the virus will be 
transmitted to others (NB: the virus follows a fecal-oral route and is 
most commonly transmitted by poor personal hygiene: people not washing 
their hands after using the toilet). This needs to be confronted in a 
more vigilant manner.
    Second, most passengers learn that if they report being ill they 
will be quarantined to their cabin until they are asymptomatic--
reportedly a very unpleasant experience. As a result, there are many 
cases where ill passengers do not report their illness in order to 
avoid being quarantined. In other words, there is a disincentive to 
behaving in ways that minimize the spread of the disease. These 
disincentives need to be removed. As well, the cruise lines can do a 
better job of educating passengers about the nature of norovirus and 
steps to be taken to avoid contracting the illness, and its spread if 
one becomes ill. Rather than engaging in media campaigns that attempt 
to state how common the illness is and that it isn't a cruise ship 
virus, the industry can do a better job of accepting the illness as a 
problem they must deal with and confront norovirus as a problem that 
manifests itself on cruise ships (as is the case in many institutional 
settings).
Potable water
    While I don't wish to raise alarm, it is necessary to raise one 
other health concern because it gives some insight into how problems 
may be dealt with by the cruise industry. This is concern based on a 
case about which there is incomplete information (it has been sealed by 
the British courts), about which those involved are not permitted to 
comment for fear of fine or incarceration and about which the lack of 
transparency suggests there is a real basis for fear. Information 
available in October 2005 at  provided a body of 
information about toxicity in potable water aboard certain cruise 
ships. But that material disappeared, as has all information about the 
case that followed (the case, Hempel A/S v. B Bradford [2006] EWHC 
2528, is cited at the website of the attorney for the industry, but 
otherwise no information may be found anywhere).
    Gleaning from what was on the website, and from recent appeals 
filed with the High Court of Justice in the UK and European Court of 
Human Rights, we can extrapolate that a paint coating used in potable 
water tanks on a series of cruise ships built in Pappenburg, Germany 
(at least four ships owned by two major companies serving North America 
and Europe, but perhaps as many as 50) was found to be defective. It 
could purportedly break down and potentially release toxins 
(acrylonitrile, a known carcinogen) into the water system of these 
vessels. The problem was apparently discovered and repairs undertaken. 
Drinking water on these ships could not be certified as safe until 
repairs were completed.
    Rather than take the ships out of service for proper repair, the 
work was done while ships were in service with passengers and crew 
onboard. The work required sanding the interior surface of water tanks 
and then applying a new, safe coating. If done properly, repairs would 
also address contamination that had already occurred and was now part 
of the water delivery system. Regardless, while the problem coating was 
being ``solved'', the repair may have itself produced another set of 
problems. There is no certainty that fine dust produced from sanding 
potable water tanks did not make its way into other areas of the ship, 
including air ventilation and food preparation areas. On one ship the 
fine dust clogged vent pipes that allowed air to escape as water tanks 
were filled, creating a serious and dangerous situation when one of the 
tanks was put back into use.
    The lack of transparency about the case, and the way in which the 
information has been sealed from public knowledge, gives good reason 
for a passenger on any cruise ship to be cautious. The purportedly 
defective paint coating was manufactured by a large-scale provider 
(Hempel A/S) to shipyards building cruise ships and it is hard to know, 
without adequate testing for chemical contamination, on which ships 
there is reason for concern. This isn't a matter of opinion or 
conjecture--there are apparently affidavits admitting to the problem of 
toxicity, but these too are sealed. The cruise lines involved suggest 
there was never any danger to passengers and crew, and that the problem 
has been fully ameliorated. However, given the effective silencing of 
Mr. Bradford and the information he had, it is difficult to be 
confident in those assurances.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ See Foggo, Daniel. 2011. ``Gag Hid Cancer Threat to Cruise 
Ship Passengers,'' Sunday Times, November 13. Page 4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Labor Issues
    Workers on foreign flag vessels generally work without union 
protection and their pay is determined by the employer. They may even 
have to accept arbitrary cuts in pay in order to keep their jobs. In 
the view of Paul Chapman, a Baptist minister who founded the Centre for 
Seafarer's Rights in New York in 1981, the typical cruise ship is a 
sweatshop at sea. ``A ship owner can go any place in the world, pick up 
anybody he wants, on almost any terms. If the owner wants to maximize 
profit at the expense of people, it's a piece of cake.'' \56\ Though 
the requirement to pay minimum wage was extended to ships registered in 
the United States in 1961, Congress left intact the exemption for 
foreign ships. This exemption was further defined in a 1963 Supreme 
Court decision that held that U.S. labour laws, including the right to 
organize, do not apply to foreign vessels engaged in American commerce, 
even if the owners of these ships are from the United States. This is 
the context in which the modern cruise ship industry developed and took 
hold. Foreign labour, whose first language is not English, may be a 
factor in cruise ship safety and security, especially in an emergency 
situation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ Reynolds, Christopher and Dan Weikel. 2000 ``For Cruise Ship 
Workers, Voyages Are No Vacations,'' Los Angeles Times, May 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Congressional Interest
    Working conditions on cruise ships emerged as a momentary concern 
in late 1980s and early 1990s. William Clay, Chairman of the House 
Labor-Management Subcommittee of the Education and Labor Committee of 
the House of Representatives introduced legislation to extend the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) to vessels foreign-flagged cruise ships operating primarily in 
the United States.\57\ At hearings in October 1989, the Committee was 
told of exploitation of sailors, who had no redress for grievances 
about their working conditions. Reverend James Lingren, the Director of 
the New England Seaman's Mission, specifically described conditions in 
the cruise ship industry:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ See House of Representatives, 1994 Coverage of Certain Federal 
Labour Laws to Foreign Documented Vessels (House Report #103-818), 
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994, page 1.

        We have discovered that on several of the largest cruise ship 
        lines calling in U.S. ports a typical seafarer works 100 hours 
        each week with no days off during his 1 year of employment. 
        Many of them work without benefit of anything resembling a true 
        contract of employment. They often earn less than 75 cents an 
        hour . . . I personally saw the contract of . . . [a] seafarer 
        who signed for $192 a month to work for 7 days a week for 1 
        year. He was to be paid overtime for any hours over 8 hours a 
        day, and while he was required to work 12 hours a day, the 
        company refused to pay the overtime. This meant he was 
        effectively making 53 cents an hour. When he complained he was 
        relieved of his duties and sent home.'' \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ House of Representatives, 1994 Coverage of Certain Federal 
Labour Laws to Foreign Documented Vessels (House Report #103-818), 
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994, page 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The subcommittee approved the bill in the summer of 1990 though it 
never went any further. It was reintroduced in the next Congress on 
February 27, 1991 and again died in committee.
    On March 30, 1993 Clay introduced H.R. 1517, another version of the 
same legislation. Hearings were again held; they yielded no new 
information. However, for the first time the cruise industry, through 
its main lobbyist, the International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL), 
threatened that if the House of Representatives passed the legislation 
the cruise industry would be forced to relocate to non-U.S. ports. In 
testimony before the Subcommittee on Labor Standards on May 13, 1993 
the president of the ICCL, John Estes, stated:

        Some have told you that we will not relocate. I am here to tell 
        you that this industry will relocate if the Bill is passed. It 
        won't happen all at once, but it will happen.'' \59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ Estes, John. 1993. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Labor 
Standards, Occupational Health, and Safety of the Committee on 
Education and Labor of the House of Representatives, May 13. 
Washington, D.C.: GPO. (Document # Y4 ED8/1 103-9)

    He pointed out the ease with which cruise ships can be moved from 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
one homeport to another and that:

        . . . in order to keep international costs competitive we do in 
        fact on occasion move from country to country. International 
        shipping will always seek a hospitable economic and political 
        climate from which to operate . . . It would be an unfortunate 
        failure of United States policy not to recognize that homeports 
        are unimportant to passengers.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ Estes, John. 1993. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Labor 
Standards, Occupational Health, and Safety of the Committee on 
Education and Labor of the House of Representatives, May 13. 
Washington, D.C.: GPO. (Document # Y4 ED8/1 103-9)

    The legislation this time made its way to the floor of the House of 
Representatives, but it failed to be heard by the full House and died 
with the end of the Congress.
    Pro-industry legislation introduced in 1995 by Representative Don 
Young had much greater success. He attached a tort reform measure to 
the Coast Guard Reauthorization bill passed on May 9, 1995. The 
amendment, referred to by Young as a `noncontroversial manager's 
amendment;' was for the most part written by the International Council 
of Cruise Lines.\61\ It passed the House by a vote of 406 to 12. Only 
afterwards did people read the final print.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ Glass, Joel. 1996. ``Compromise on U.S. Cruise Tort,'' Lloyd's 
List, October 1. Page 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For one thing, the amendment limited the rights of foreign 
seafarers to sue in U.S. courts for grievances against foreign cruise 
lines. This went against the stream of court cases taken up by the U.S. 
Government several years earlier. In 1991, the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) won two cases against foreign flag cruise 
vessels. In one, the court enjoined a foreign cruise line from 
discriminating on the basis of sex against any actual or potential job 
applicant. In the other, Norwegian Cruise Line (NCL) was charged with 
sex discrimination by an assistant cruise director who alleged she lost 
her job after becoming pregnant, and with discrimination by race and 
national origin by a bar manager who says he was forced to resign. NCL 
disregarded two subpoenas claiming the EEOC lacked jurisdiction. It won 
in the U.S. District Court in Miami but the decision was reversed by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals in Atlanta, which affirmed the EEOC's 
jurisdiction. This was a dangerous precedent for the cruise industry 
and Young's amendment gave them an out. Another provisions in the 
amendment was designed to protect ship owners from unlimited liability 
in suits brought by passengers or crew members who were harmed by 
medical malpractice at a shore side facility.
    The final version of the legislation followed intense lobbying by 
opponents to the amendments and by the cruise industry. In the end, a 
cruise line sued by one of its workers in regard to treatment at a U.S. 
health facility or doctor's office can invoke an award cap allowed 
medical practitioners under the laws of the state in which the care is 
provided. The provision limiting seafarer's use of U.S. courts was 
replaced with a provision that seafarer employment contracts can block 
the worker from seeking legal remedies in U.S. courts.\62\ This 
provision has crept into seafarer employment contracts and has thus far 
been ruled enforceable by U.S. courts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Glass, Joel. 1996. ``Compromise on U.S. Cruise Tort,'' Lloyd's 
List, October 1. Page 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
US Courts and Labor
    There is a long history of court cases where cruise ship workers 
have successfully sought relief in cases of, among other things, breach 
of contract, injury and death. Claims have often been under the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act) or the Federal Seaman's Wage 
Act. But access to the U.S. courts appears to be waning for seafarers 
on foreign-flagged cruise ships that operate out of U.S. ports.
    A Federal court decision issued in October 2003, and upheld on 
appeal in January 2005, ruled that the families of Filipino cruise ship 
workers injured and killed during a 2003 boiler explosion aboard NCL's 
Norway had to resolve claims in the Philippines per their employment 
contract. The decision meant that death claims for the eight crew 
members killed in the accident were limited to $50,000. The U.S. 
National Transportation Safety Board subsequently ruled that the 
accident, which also severely injured about 20 crew members, was the 
result of ``. . . deficient boiler operation, maintenance, and 
inspection practices of Norwegian Cruise Line, which allowed material 
deterioration and fatigue cracking to weaken the boiler.'' \63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ NTSB. 2007. Marine Accident Brief: Boiler Rupture on Bahamian 
Cruise Ship S.S. Norway, Port of Miami, May 25, 2003. NTSB Report 
Number MAB 07/03, November.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The court's ruling had more far reaching consequences. It upheld 
the enforceability of employment contracts that require disputes to be 
resolved through arbitration and only in particular places--for 
Filipino workers the place is Manila. It also lent support to Carnival 
Cruise Lines' desire to have a new clause inserted in its new crew 
member contracts requiring all claims against the employer to be 
arbitrated internationally in London, Manila, Panama City, or Monaco, 
whichever is closer to the crew member's home.
Arbitration Clauses
    Arbitration clauses are now commonplace in cruise ship worker 
contracts. These clauses have dire consequences for crew members. The 
fact is that foreign seaman have no rights to sue in U.S. Courts. 
Because a cruise line can have foreign law apply thereby circumventing 
the Jones Act, it has a disincentive to hire American workers. The 
arbitration clauses, and the opinions enforcing them, are therefore job 
killers for Americans, and they circumvent long standing U.S. Law--the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1920.
    For those who are not familiar with the Jones Act, it provides to 
the worker the right to sue for pain and suffering damages for job 
related injuries. The general maritime law that was inherited from the 
English also provides for the obligation to pay the seaman maintenance 
(expenses of daily living) and cure (prompt and adequate medical care) 
until the seaman reaches maximum medical improvement. Historically, the 
seaman was viewed as a ward of the court because typically s/he is in a 
place where s/he does not know anyone and s/he has little resources. 
Thus the law says that if the shipowner/employer does not pay 
maintenance and cure properly, punitive damages can be awarded. The 
shipowner/employer escapes these obligations with the arbitration 
clauses that apply foreign law. This was seen in a case brought by a 
Filipino worker with Holland America Line, filed in U.S. Federal court 
in Seattle, Washington on April 27, 2007 (Case #C07-0645) and which 
sought class action status. The suit claimed the company illegally 
forced crew members to pay back the cost of airfare to and from the 
ships and fired them if they failed to do so. The worker was a 
bartender who had signed a standard twelve-month contract with the 
cruise line, working a mandatory 77 hour workweek. He received a 
monthly guaranteed salary of $442 per month (inclusive of overtime, 
vacation and allowances) and was required to repay $212 per month for 
``deployment costs''--leaving a net income of $230 per month. 
Deployment costs include round trip air far to/from the ship, uniforms, 
medical exams, visas, recruiting costs, and union dues.
    The U.S. court refused to hear the case given terms of the 
employment contract between the crew member and the cruise line; it 
referred the case to the Philippines for arbitration. The arbitration 
board ruled in favor of the individual claimant, but there was no basis 
on which it could certify a class action claim. The cruise line 
benefits because the penalties assessed by an arbitration board are 
small by comparison to those historically garnered through the U.S. 
courts, and it avoids a payout to other workers in the same situation.
Crew Member Work Conditions
    There are many work conditions I could discuss, but there are only 
three worthy of mention here. The first relates to the normal contract 
from cruise ship employees. The typical workweek is a mandatory 77 
hours--11 hours a day, 7 days a week. The length of a contract 
generally varies by work role (officers typically work 4 months; 
laborers work six to twelve months, depending on whether they work on a 
European contract or a Filipino, Central American, or Asian contract), 
and salary also varies by the worker's national origin within the same 
job category. Whether this is fair is a matter of vantage point; it is 
a matter of fact. With these hours, worker fatigue may also be an issue 
in emergency situations.
    A second issue is the common use of recruiting agents. Though 
International Labor Organization (ILO) regulations prohibit agents from 
collecting fees from the worker--they are supposed to be paid by the 
employer--workers are often required to pay to secure a position. These 
can range as high as $4,000. According to the International Transport 
Workers Federation, Filipinos normally pay $1,500 to join a ship.\64\ A 
1997 story in the Wall Street Journal cites a Croatian worker who paid 
$600 to an agent to confirm his employment. In addition, he started 
work with a $1,400 debt to Carnival Cruise Lines, which had advanced 
the cost of his transportation to the ship.\65\ In February 2000, an 
article in the Miami New Times described a cook on Carnival Cruise 
Line's Paradise who had given a Bombay agency $2,000, which included 
airfare. That sum, much of which he borrowed from relatives, is almost 
one-third of the $7,000 he will make during his ten-month contract.\66\ 
And in 2001 it was reported that an agent in Rumania was charging $500 
to interview for a position with Norwegian Cruise Line; if the person 
is hired s/he paid an additional $1,000 to secure the position.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ ITF. 2000. ``The Dark Side of the Cruise Industry,'' 
Seafarers' Bulletin, no. 14. Page 17.
    \65\ Prager, Joshua Harris. 1997. ``For Cruise Workers, Life Is No 
`Love Boat' '' Wall Street Journal, July 3. Page B1.
    \66\ Nielsen, Kirk. ``The Perfect Scam: For the Workers Life Is No 
Carnival, Believe It or Not,'' Miami New Times, February 3-9, 2000
    \67\ Klein, Ross A. 2002. Cruise Ship Blues: The Underside of the 
Cruise Industry, Gabriola Island, BC: New Society. Page 128.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The final issue is unpaid overtime. This matter was successively 
resolved with each of the major cruise lines through class action suits 
between 2002 and 2006. However the problem re-emerged recently with NCL 
America, a U.S. registered carrier. The company agreed to pay $526,602 
in back wages to 2,059 employees in Hawaii after a Federal labor 
investigation found that the company had violated minimum wage, 
overtime (many employees were working 60 hours a week), and 
recordkeeping provisions for employees on Pride of America between July 
2009 and November 2011. The investigation also found that because NCL 
Amereica took large meal and lodging credits, some employees were paid 
less than the Federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, and that the 
cruise line failed to record and pay the housekeeping staff for 
cleaning the cabins between cruises. Following the investigation, the 
cruise line agreed to bring its pay practices into compliance with the 
law.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ Gale, Kevin. 2012. ``Norwegian Cruise Lines Settles Overtime 
Investigation,'' South Florida Business Journal, February 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. In Closing
    Thanks again for the opportunity to share my observations and 
insights generated from my 16 years as an academic whose research has 
focused on the cruise industry. I welcome your questions.
                 Appendix A: Events at Sea*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \*\ Source: Cruise Junkie dot Com
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A.1--Cruise Ships that Have Sunk, 1980-2012
    A.2--Cruise Ships Running Aground, but not Sinking, 1973-2012
    A.3--Fires Onboard Cruise Ships, 1990-2011
    A.4--Collisions Involving Cruise Ships, 1990-2011
    A.5--Other Significant Events Involving Cruise Ships, 2000-2011

        http://www.cruisejunkie.com/Sunk.html

        http://www.cruisejunkie.com/Aground

        http://www.cruisejunkie.com/fires.html

        http://www.cruisejunkie.com/collides.html

        http://www.cruisejunkie.com/Disabling.html
                                 ______
                                 

               A.1--Cruise Ships That Have Sunk, 1980-2012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Year        Ship (Cruise Line)                Incident
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012            Costa Concordia       Hit submerged rock off Giglio,
                (Costa Cruises)        Italy, partially sunk after
                                       taking on water and severely
                                       listing. 4,200 evacuated; 32
                                       deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Explorer              Ship abandoned near the South
                (GAP Adventures)       Shetland Islands after it hit an
                                       unidentified object (likely ice).
                                       Environmental impact. 154
                                       evacuated; no deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Sea Diamond           Ship abandoned after hitting a
                (Louis Cruises)        reef a half mile from shore in
                                       Santorini. 1,524 evacuated; 2
                                       deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Wilderness            Ship evacuated after striking ice
                 Adventurer            and taking on water in Tracy Arm,
                (Glacier Bay Cruise    AK. All evacuated safely.
                 Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Safari Spirit         Ship hit some rocks about 80 miles
                (American Safari       in SE Alaska. Sank in 30 feet of
                 Cruises)              water. All evacuated safely to
                                       lifeboats.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999            Sun Vista             Engine room fire--Sinks of
                (Sun Cruises)          Malaysia. 1,090 evacuated safely
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998            Fantome               Sinks trying to outrun Hurricane
                (Windjammer Cruises)   Mitch. 30 crew deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995            Club Royale           Gambling ship sinks off Florida
                                       coast trying to outrun Hurricane
                                       Erin. 8 crew rescued; 3 crew
                                       deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994            Estonia               The passenger cruise ferry sunk in
                (Estline)              a storm in the Baltic Sea. Sunk
                                       in 30 minutes. 852 deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992            Royal Pacific         Collided with a fishing trawler in
                (Greek cruise ship)    the Straits of Malacca with 500
                                       rescued; more than 30 deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991            Oceanos               Sunk in a storm off South Africa.
                (Greek cruise ship)    All 571 people onboard were saved
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1988            Jupiter               Sank within 40 minutes after a
                (Greek cruise ship)    collision with a car carrier
                                       outside Piraeus. 581 safely
                                       rescued; 4 deaths.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1986            Admiral Nakhimov      Sank in 7 minutes after colliding
                (Russian cruise        with a large bulk carrier. 811
                 ship)                 safely rescued; 423 deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1986            Mikhail Lermontov     Ran aground on rocks off New
                (Baltic Shipping       Zealand and sank within 3 hours.
                 Company)              More than 1,000 rescued safely; 1
                                       death
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1984            Sundancer             The ship declared a total loss
                (Sundancer Cruises)    after hitting a rock north of
                                       Vancouver. Investigators found
                                       that crew were disorganized and
                                       evacuation was largely
                                       coordinated by passengers. All
                                       evacuated safely.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1980            Prinsendam            An engine room fire forced
                (Holland America       evacuation to lifeboats while 140
                 Line)                 miles from Alaska. All evacuated
                                       safely.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


         A.2 Ships Running Aground (but not sinking), 1972-2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Year        Ship (Cruise Line)                Incident
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012            Poesia                Ran aground near Freeport,
                (MSC Cruises)          Bahamas. Waited for tide to get
                                       high.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Polar Star            Sustained a minor breach of its
                (Polar Star Cruises)   outer hull by grounding on a rock
                                       near Antarctica's Detaille
                                       Island. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Clipper Adventurer    Ship evacuated after it ran
                (Clipper Cruises)      aground 55 nautical miles from
                                       Coppermine, Nunavut. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Zenith                Ship went aground on the approach
                (Pullmantur Cruises)   to Copenhagen having cruised too
                                       close to a wind farm of twenty-
                                       four turbines in the Oresund
                                       Strait.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Ocean Nova            Ran aground about one mile from
                (Quark Expeditions)    the San Martin base (Antarctica),
                                       pushed by ``extremely high
                                       winds'' into craggy rocks. 64
                                       passengers and 41 crew members
                                       aboard. Cruise terminated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Richard With          Ran aground at the port of
                (Hurtigruten)          Trondheim on the west coast of
                                       Norway. Suffered propeller damage
                                       and took on board water through a
                                       leak in a seal. 53 passengers on
                                       board evacuated. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Ushuaia               Ran aground on a rock close to
                (Fathom expeditions)   Wilhelmina Bay in Antarctica
                                       causing a hull breach, and
                                       possibly fuel leak. All 130
                                       aboard safely evacuated. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            QEII                  Ran aground at the Brambles
                (Cunard Line)          sandbank near Calshot,
                                       Southampton, with three tugs
                                       attached to her stern. Five tugs
                                       were sent out to assist her
                                       getting off the sandbank.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Antarctic Dream       Ran aground off Svalbard, just
                (Antarctic Shipping)   east of the island of
                                       Spitsbergen, with 130 passengers
                                       on board. Freed after 6 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Queen Victoria        Ran aground while leaving port.
                (Cunard Line)          Freed in about an hour.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Spirit of Glacier     Grounded in Tarr Inlet near
                 Bay                   Glacier Bay. Refloated the next
                (Cruise West)          day and towed to port. Crack in
                                       hull.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            EasyCruise Line       Ran aground inside the port of the
                (EasyCruise)           Aegean island of Syros with 353
                                       passengers and 105 crew on board.
                                       Freed by tug.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Spirit of Alaska      Touched bottom in Tracy Arm, AK.
                (Cruise West)          It did not take on water and did
                                       not have interior damage but is
                                       having a problem with its
                                       propulsion system Towed to Juneau
                                       for inspection and repairs;
                                       passengers disembarked. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Mona Lisa             Ran aground on a sandbank about 10
                                       miles from the Latvia coast.
                                       Attempts to free itself were
                                       unsuccessful; almost 1000
                                       passengers needed to be evacuated
                                       . Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Sky Wonder            Ran aground in port of Kusadasi
                (Pullmantur)           (Turkey). All 1,029 passengers
                                       evacuated. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Spirit of Nantucket   Ran the vessel aground in Virginia
                (Cruise West)          Beach to prevent it from sinking.
                                       It began taking on water while
                                       passing through the Intercoastal
                                       Waterway after striking something
                                       that left a 2 inch by 12 inch
                                       gash in the hull near the end of
                                       the ship. None of the 61
                                       passengers or five crew members
                                       were as injured. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Spirit of Columbia    Ran aground in Prince William
                (Cruise West)          Sound. Refloated when tide came
                                       up.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Royal Express 4       Ran aground as it was returning to
                (SunCruz)              shore. Several passengers
                                       injured.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Millenium             Drifted onto submerged rocks while
                (Celebrity Cruises)    at Villefranche, France, damaging
                                       propulsion system. Cruise
                                       terminated next day
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Disko II              Ran aground off Greenland and more
                (Albatros Travel)      than 50 people evacuated. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Empress of the North  Ran aground off Alaska coast and
                (Majestic America      began taking on water. 281 of 320
                 Line)                 aboard evacuated. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Regal Princess        Sustained damage after touching
                (Princess Cruises)     bottom. Out of service for 3
                                       weeks for repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Nordkapp              Touched ground near Deception
                (Hurtigruten)          Island in the Antarctic. The ship
                                       sustained an 82 foot long gash to
                                       its outer hull--environmental
                                       damage. All evacuated. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Sky Wonder            Ran aground in Rio de la Plata.
                (Pullmantur)           Freed at high tide.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Lyubov Orlova         Ran aground in Whalers' Bay while
                (Quark Expeditions)    visiting Deception Island in the
                                       South Shetland Islands with 150
                                       passengers onboard. Towed free
                                       after 8 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Statendam             Touched bottom in Port of
                (Holland America       Melbourne with 1,700 persons
                 Line)                 onboard. Found to be traveling
                                       too fast. Minor damage.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Grand Princess        Ran aground while heading out of
                (Princess Cruises)     Livorno harbor. Freed after 30
                                       minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Norwegian Crown       Ran aground in Bermuda. Freed
                (NCL)                  after 10 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Columbus              Scraped bottom during her visit to
                (Hapag-Lloyd)          Sault Sainte Marie, sustaining no
                                       damage.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Celebration           A propeller struck bottom while
                (Carnival Cruise       approaching the dock at Nassau
                 Lines)                spilling an estimated 200 liters
                                       of lubricating oil and affecting
                                       the operation of the engine.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Yorktown Clipper      Ran aground at Matia Island in
                (Clipper Cruises)      Washington state. Company fined
                                       $1000 for placing passengers at
                                       risk because company officials
                                       did not report a dent the ship
                                       sustained on its bottom.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Regal Princess        Became stuck on a sandbar in the
                (Princess Cruises)     Amazon. Freed after 1.5 hours,
                                       ``by using its bow thrusters,
                                       emptying the pools and probably
                                       grey water and some ballast.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Empress of the North  Ran aground on the Columbia River
                 (American West        with 250 people onboard.
                 Steamboat)            Refloated 2 days later. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Queen Mary 2          Touch a submerged object, damaging
                (Cunard Line)          propulsion system. Departure
                                       delayed 41 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Pacific Sky           Suffered engine problems and
                (P&O Princess)         drifted onto a reef. Ship freed
                                       one day later by tugs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Hanseatic             Ran aground near the island of
                (Hapag-Lloyd)          Luroy off the Norwegian, causing
                                       a 5 meter hole in the ships hull.
                                       Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Sapphire Princess     Lost power and out of control for
                (Princess Cruises)     about 5 minutes, which caused it
                                       touching the coral reef at
                                       Moorea. Damage to thrusters.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Clipper Odyssey       Ran hard aground on rocks in the
                (Clipper Cruises)      Aleutian Islands, forcing 153
                                       passengers and crew to transfer
                                       to other ships and spilling an
                                       undetermined amount of fuel from
                                       a ruptured tank. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Mona Lisa             Got stuck in the mud close to St.
                (Holiday               Mark's Square in Venice, Italy
                 Kreuzfahrten)         with 1000 passengers onboard.
                                       Freed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Astor                 Grounded in the shipping channel
                (Transocean Cruises)   after leaving Townsville port.
                                       Detained for 2 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Empress of the North  Hit the gate at Ice Harbor Dam and
                (American West         became stuck in the navigational
                 Steamboat)            lock. 200 passengers bussed back
                                       to Portland. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Empress of the North  Went aground on the Oregon side of
                (American West         the Columbia River. Two crew and
                 Steamboat)            one passenger suffered minor
                                       injuries.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Mona Lisa             670 passengers were evacuated
                (Holiday               after the ship ran on to rocks
                 Kreuzfahrten)         near Sptisbergen. Both propellers
                                       and the hull damaged. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Summit                Hull damaged when the ship hit a
                (Celebrity Cruises)    rock leaving Hubbard Glacier. The
                                       result was a 10-foot-long hole in
                                       the ballast tank midway along the
                                       hull, and a 140-foot-long crease.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Spirit of Columbia    Hit bottom and possibly bent port
                (Cruise West)          shaft and propeller in Prince
                                       William Sound.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Vistamar              Collided with underwater rocks
                (Plantours &           near the port of Ibiza. Towed by
                 Partners)             tugs to Ibiza and all passengers
                                       and crew evacuated. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Safari Spirit         Hit rocks in SE Alaska. All
                (American Safari       evacuated to lifeboats. Cruise
                 Cruises)              terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            Olympic Voyager       Grounded and experienced minor
                (Royal Olympic         damage. Passengers evacuated.
                 Cruises)              Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            Clipper Adventurer    Ran aground in the vicinity of
                (Clipper Cruises)      Deception Island. Freed by a
                                       Chilean icebreaker.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            Holiday               Lodged on a sandy bottom of the
                (Carnival Cruise       Caribbean Sea, a quarter mile off
                 Lines)                the coast of Playa del Carmen.
                                       Passengers evacuated. Freed 3
                                       days later. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            Clipper Odyssey       Went aground on St. Matthew Island
                (Clipper Cruises)      in the Bering Sea in favorable
                                       conditions with 184 persons
                                       onboard.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            Clipper Adventurer    Ran aground on a sand-bank in the
                (Clipper Cruises)      Essequibo River (Guyana's major
                                       waterway). Stuck for more than a
                                       day.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            Black Prince          Ran aground on a sand bank while
                (Fred Olsen Cruises)   leaving Casilda, Cuba. Passengers
                                       evacuated. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Costa Tropicale       Grounded at Venice, towed free by
                (Costa Cruises)        tugboats.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Costa Tropicale       Grounded at Mykonos, towed free by
                (Costa Cruises)        Costa Atlantica
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Wilderness Explorer   Grounded in Alaska
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Regal Princess        Grounded in Cairns. Freed and
                (Princess Cruises)     continues.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Mistral               Grounded off Nevis. Stuck for a
                (Festival Cruises)     day.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000            World Discoverer      Hit rock or reef and holed--Forced
                                       to beach. 100 passengers rescued--
                                       Solomon Islands. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000            Carousel Sun          Ran over rocks causing propeller
                (Sun Cruises)          damage and oil leak (50 ton
                                       spill)--Abandon ship at Calica.
                                       Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999            Norwegian Sky         Grounded in St. Lawrence Seaway.
                (NCL)                  Out of service for 8 weeks.
                                       Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999            Radisson Diamond      Grounded near Stockholm--Refloated
                (Radisson Seven Seas
                 Cruises)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999            Spirit of '98         Grounded in mouth of Tracy Arm (SE
                                       of Juneau)--Holed. Evacuated.
                                       Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999            Wilderness Explorer   Grounded west of Juneau--Refloated
                (Glacier Bay Cruise
                 Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998            Monarch of the Seas   Strikes charted reef at St.
                (RCCL)                 Maarten--holed. 27,000 sq feet of
                                       coral reef damaged. Out for 4
                                       months. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997            Leeward               Collides with Great Mayan Reef
                (NCL)                  near Cancun--damages 460 sq yard
                                       swath of coral
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997            Noordam               Soft grounding off Mexican coast--
                (Holland America       Propeller damage. Passengers sent
                 Line)                 home. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997            Hanseatic             Grounded in Norwegian Arctic--
                (Hapag Lloyd)          Evacuated, refloated, continues.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997            Albatross             Holed while leaving Isles of
                (Phoenix Horizon)      Scilly--Out for 2 weeks. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996            Hanseatic             Grounded in Northwest passage--
                (Hapag Lloyd)          refloated after being evacuated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996            Gripsholm             Grounded 2 miles from Swedish
                (Cunard Line)          port. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996            Royal Viking Sun      Collision with reef in Red Sea--
                (Cunard Line)          Holed. Out for 2 months. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996            Tropicale             Grounded while leaving Tampa--
                (Carnival Cruise       Freed. Harbor pilot complains
                 Lines)                that ship failed to respond to 3
                                       different orders to turn.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995            Sovereign of the      Grounded in mud bank in San Juan
                 Seas                  Harbour--Freed after 80 minutes;
                (RCCL)                 Towed to port, leaves 24 hours
                                       late.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995            America Queen         Grounded in Ohio River for 1 day--
                (Delta Steamboat)      Refloated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995            Star Princess         Grounded in Alaska--40' long, 8''
                (P&O Cruises)          wide gash + 100' gash,modest
                                       pollution. Evacuated by tender.
                                       Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995            Royal Majesty         Grounded off Nantucket--17 mi off
                (Majesty Cruise        course.
                 Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995            Renaissance Six       Grounded, eastern Aegean--
                (Renaissance           Evacuated. Cruise terminated
                 Cruises)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994            Royal Odyssey         Grounded leaving Rome. Cruise
                (Royal Cruises)        terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994            Starward              Grounded in St. John, VI--oil
                (NCL)                  spill of 100 gallons.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994            Nieuw Amsterdam       Grounded in SE Alaska--200 ft
                (Holland America       crease in hull, damaged
                 Line)                 propeller, puncture in ballast
                                       tank, 260 gallon spill. Refloated
                                       in 30 minutes. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994            Sally Albatross       Grounded in Gulf of Finland--Half-
                (Silja Line)           sunk. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993            Yorktown Clipper      Grounded in Glacier Bay--Spills
                (Clipper Cruises)      28,000 gallons of fuel 45 west of
                                       Juneau Evacuated. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993            Ocean Princess        Grounded near Belem--Life boat
                (Pacquet Cruises)      evacuation Declared a total loss.
                                       Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992            Nantucket Clipper     Aground off Maine--4 minor
                (Clipper Cruises)      injuries. Refloated 3 hours
                                       later--Damage to hull and diesel
                                       tank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992            QEII                  Grounded off Cape Cod--74 foot
                (Cunard Line)          gash. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992            Mermoz                Grounded off Scandinavia. Cruise
                (Pacquet Cruises)      terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992            Tropic Star           Ran aground in Freeport.
                (Starlite Cruises)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991            Seaward               Runs aground near Miami after
                (NCL)                  plastic bag caught in an air
                                       intake and engine shut down.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990            Regent Star           Fire and grounded while
                (Regency Cruises)      approaching Philadelphia--
                                       Evacuated. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990            Bermuda Star          Grounded off Nova Scotia--
                (Bahamas Cruise        evacuated. Freed after 13 hours.
                 Line)                 Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1986            Dolphin               Grounded in Bahamas
                (Dolphin Cruises)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1985            Amerikanis            Grounded off Mexico--5 days to
                (Fantasy Cruise        free. Cruise terminated
                 Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1985            Bermuda Star          Grounded off Key West
                (Bahamas Cruise
                 Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1984            Yankee Clipper        Grounded after tearing from
                (Clipper Cruises)      anchorage at St. Martin.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1984            Rhapsody              Grounded off Cayman Islands--
                                       Evacuated after 4 days; freed
                                       after 12 days. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1982            Alaskan Majestic      Grounded--Evacuated 1 dead; 2
                 Explorer              injured. Captain charged with
                (Exploration           negligence. Cruise terminated
                 Cruises)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1978            Kungsholm             Aground for 5 days at Martinique
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1973            Mardi Gras            Maiden Voyage--runs aground
                (Carnival Cruise       leaving Miami Harbour. Stuck for
                 Lines)                24 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


               A.3--Fires Onboard Cruise Ships, 1990-2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Year        Ship (Cruise Line)                Incident
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Amsterdam             Fire in hydraulic unit in
                (Holland America       incinerator room. Put out in 35
                 Line)                 minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Ocean Princess        Fire in one of the generators,
                (Princess Cruises)     contained without serious damage.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Queen Mary 2          Fire in gas turbine rendering it
                (Cunard Line)          useless. Passengers told to get
                                       their children and stay in
                                       cabins.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Nordlys               Fire in engine room. 100
                (Hurtigruten)          passengers and crew evacuated by
                                       lifeboat; 162 evacuated when
                                       towed to port. 2 deaths. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Ocean Star Pacific    Generator fire knocked out power
                (Ocean Star Cruises)   to the ship, forcing the
                                       evacuation of nearly 800
                                       passengers and crew off Mexico's
                                       coast. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Thomson Dream         A starboard engine fire early in
                (Thomson Cruises)      the cruise that departed
                                       Barbados. No impact on itinerary
                                       and no reported injuries.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Musica                Fire in engine room knocked out
                (MSC Cruises)          air conditioning and the water
                                       supply. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Carnival Splendor     Engine room fire disabled the
                (Carnival Cruise       ship's electrical system (3,299
                 Lines)                guests, 1,167 crew). Towed to San
                                       Diego. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Infinity              Electrical fire caused loss of
                (Celebrity Cruises)    power for several hours while in
                                       Alaska.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Deutschland           Fire in engine room while docked.
                (Peter Deilmann        Passengers evacuated. Cruise
                 Cruises)              terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Zenith                All passengers were evacuated when
                (Pullmantur Cruises)   the ship had a major fire while
                                       docked at Stockholm. Sailed one
                                       day late.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Crown Princess        Fire in passenger cabin.
                (Princess Cruises)     Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Royal Princess        Fire in engine room. Passengers
                (Princess Cruises)     called to muster stations. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Sea Cloud             Fire extinguished by fire brigade
                (Sea Cloud Cruises)    before returning to port.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Golden Princess       Fire in main engine room.
                (Princess Cruises)     Contained within 1.5 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Costa Romantica       Fire in the generator room causes
                (Costa Cruises)        brief blackout. 1,429 passengers
                                       and 590 crew members evacuated.
                                       Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Ecstasy               Fire in passenger cabin at 2:30
                (Carnival Cruise       AM--several cabins damaged.
                 Lines)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Zuiderdam             Small electrical fire reported
                (Holland America       overnight--No injuries or known
                 Line)                 damage.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Eurodam               Passengers awakened at 4AM by fire
                (Holland America       alarm. Fire in engine room.
                 Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Norwegian Dream       At about 2:45 a.m. an electrical
                (NCL)                  fire broke out on deck three in
                                       an electrical locker of the ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Azamara Quest         While docked in Chios (Greece)
                (Azamara Cruises)      there was a fire in the ship
                                       laundry room. The fire was
                                       contained quickly and it did not
                                       affect the schedule.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Fantasy               Fire (or smoke) caused by welder.
                (Carnival Cruise       Embarkation suspended; passengers
                 Lines)                onboard moved to Lido Deck.
                                       Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Zuiderdam             Onboard fire while docked at
                (Holland America       Dubrovnik. Firefighters called
                 Line)                 from city. Under control within
                                       45 minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Queen of the West     Fire broke out in the engine room
                (Majestic America      while the ship was near Maryhill,
                 Line)                 WA. Passengers evacuated. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Star Princess         Fire in incinerator room.
                (Princess Cruises)     Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Norwegian Spirit      Fire in engine room. Contained.
                (NCL)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Jewel of the Seas     Fire in laundry room at 2:30AM.
                (Royal Caribbean       Contained.
                 International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Pacific Star          Small fire in an electrical panel;
                (P&O Australia)        mustering of crew to prepare for
                                       a possible emergency. Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Enchantment of the    Fire in closet of unoccupied
                 Seas                  cabin. Contained in less than an
                (Royal Caribbean       hour.
                 International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Mariner of the Seas   Incinerator fire. Contained.
                (Royal Caribbean
                 International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Norwegian Star        Escorted into the Prince Rupert
                (NCL)                  harbor by the a Canadian Coast
                                       Guard vessel following a small
                                       fire in the engine room.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Disney Magic          Fireworks mishap caused fire by
                (Disney Cruise Line)   Palo's restaurant. Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Seabourn Spirit       Small fire in Verandah Cafe.
                (Seabourn Cruises)     Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Radiance of the Sea   Fire at 2AM in Windjammer Cafe.
                (Royal Caribbean       Contained in less than an hour.
                 International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Oosterdam             Engine room fire disables one of
                (Holland America       the Azipod propulsion systems.
                 Line)                 Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Jewel of the Sea      Fire in trash can. Contained.
                (Royal Caribbean       Seven staterooms evacuated and
                 International)        passengers moved.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Statendam             At 5:30AM fire alarm went off.
                (Holland America       Fire in stack of incinerator
                 Line)                 contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Calypso               Disabling fire off UK coast. 462
                (Louis Cruises)        passengers and 246 crew were at
                                       muster stations, but evacuation
                                       was not necessary. Towed to port.
                                       Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Seabourn Pride        Serious fire in engine room.
                (Seabourn Cruises)     Contained
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Star Princess         Fire in passenger accommodations.
                (Princess Cruises)     About 150 cabins damaged. 1
                                       death; cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Costa Classica        Escorted back to Athens after a
                (Costa Cruises)        fire broke out in mooring area,
                                       aft side. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Carnival Legend       Heavy smoke from engine room.
                (Carnival Cruise       Passengers mustered to lifeboats.
                 Lines)                All clear given an hour later.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Infinity              Fire in stateroom 7067 that gutted
                (Celebrity Cruises)    the room.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Seven Seas Navigator  Electrical fire in generator room
                (Radisson Seven Sea    at 1AM caused temporary blackout
                 Cruises)              and propulsion problems. Next
                                       cruise canceled
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Carnival Destiny      Fire in trash incinerator while at
                (Carnival Cruise       St. Thomas. Embarkation delayed
                 Lines)                45 minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Sun Cruz V            Engine room fire extinguished.
                (Sun Cruz)             Towed back to port with 160
                                       passengers onboard.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Majesty of the Sea    Passengers directed to muster
                (Royal Caribbean       stations when a galley fire broke
                 International)        out at 5 AM in the Windjammer
                                       Cafe. Contained in less than an
                                       hour.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Explorer of the Sea   A minor fire at the aft end of
                (Royal Caribbean       Deck 13 extinguished within 15
                 International)        minutes, causing damage to the
                                       inline skating facility and the
                                       top of the waterslide on Deck 12.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            Statendam             Five tugs boats tow ship back to
                (Holland America       Vancouver after a small fire
                 Line)                 knocked out four generators and
                                       two main propulsion motors.
                                       Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            Disney Magic          Smoke stack fire; extinguished
                (Disney Cruise Line)   within an hour. Passengers were
                                       awakened at 5 AM and told to go
                                       to their assembly stations with
                                       their life jackets.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Arkona                Runs into dock after engine room
                                       fire causes loss of power. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Nordic Prince         Engine room fire, loss of power.
                (Royal Caribbean       Passengers flown home from
                 International)        Bermuda. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000            Nieuw Amsterdam       Fire in crew quarters while in
                (Holland America       Glacier Bay--Delayed 12 hours
                 Line)                 until given clearance by U.S.
                                       Coast Guard.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000            Celebration           Fire in generator--Adrift for 6
                 (Carnival Cruise      hours until power restored. No
                 Lines)                toilets or air conditioning.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999            Tropicale             Engine fire--Disabled. Arrives in
                (Carnival Cruise       port 2 days late. Next 6 cruises
                 Lines)                canceled
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999            Sun Cruz              Engine room fire before it left
                                       port--Evacuated. Cruise canceled
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999            Norway                Fire in turbocharger room while in
                (NCL)                  Barcelona mid-cruise. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999            Sun Vista             Fire in engine room--Sinks off
                (Sun Cruises)          Malaysia.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999            Enchantment of the    Engine fire/failure 60 miles from
                 Sea                   St. Thomas. Cruise terminated
                (Royal Caribbean
                 International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998            Ecstasy               Fire in laundry room while leaving
                (Carnival Cruise       Miami--54 injured and 4
                 Lines)                hospitalized. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997            Romantica             Fire 10 mi off Cypress (total
                (New Paradise          loss)--Evacuated. Cruise
                 Cruises)              terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997            Vistafjord            Fire while in Straits of Magellan--
                (Cunard Line)          disabled for 2 days.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997            Vistafjord            Fire in ship's laundry room. 1
                (Cunard Line)          death; cruise terminated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997            Fair Princess         Fire in casino--passengers called
                (P&O Cruises)          to muster stations--fire
                                       contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996            Universe Explorer     Laundry room fire, 67 crew and 6
                (Commodore Cruises)    passengers injured. 5 deaths;
                                       cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996            Golden Princess       Fire in engine room--Towed to
                (Princess Cruises)     Victoria. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996            Sagafjord             Fire--Stranded off coast of Manila
                (Cunard Line)          (listing)--Towed to dock. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995            Regent Star           Engine room fire while in Prince
                (Regency Cruises)      William Sound-Disabled.
                                       Passengers transferred to
                                       Rotterdam. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995            Celebration           Engine room fire when 370 miles
                (Carnival Cruise       south of Miami--Adrift for more
                 Lines)                than 2 days. No a/c or hot food
                                       or elevators. Passengers
                                       transferred to Ecstasy. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994            Regal Empress         Fire when 30 min from NYC--
                (International         Evacuated.
                 Shipping)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994            Pallas Athena         Fire while berthed in Piraeus--
                (Epirotiki)            Total loss.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992            Star Majestic         Fire--Evacuated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991            Pegasus               Fire while berthed in Venice--
                (Epirotiki)            Total loss
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991            Eurosun               Fire off Canary Islands
                (Europe Cruise Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991            Sovereign of the      Fire in lounge while in port at
                 Seas                  San Juan--Evacuated. Cruise
                (RCCL)                 resumed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990            Crystal Harmony       Temporarily disabled from fire in
                (Crystal Cruises)      auxiliary engine room--Drifted
                                       for 16 hours. Evacuated at port.
                                       Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990            Regent Star           Fire--put under control. Possible
                (Regency Cruises)      arson.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990            Scandinavian Star     Fire while in North Sea--
                (International         Evacuated. 159 deaths; cruise
                 Shipping)             terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990            Fairstar              Engine room fire--Not disabled. 1
                (Sitmar Cruises)       death
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                 A.4--Collisions Involving Cruise Ships
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Year        Ship (Cruise Line)                Incident
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Veendam               A container derrick tore off a 50
                (Holland America       foot section of railing on deck
                 Line)                 12 and cracked a window in the
                                       Crows Nest while leaving Buenos
                                       Aires.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Avalon Tranquility    Danube cruise abandoned after
                (Avalon Waterways)     vessel struck by a cargo ship.
                                       Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Oriana                Ship dented after bashing into
                (P&O Cruises)          quay at Kristiansand, Norway.
                                       Ship's stern stoved in.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Emerald Princess      Sustained considerable damage to
                (Princess Cruises)     several lifeboats when a fuel
                                       loading barge collided with the
                                       side of the ship while in the
                                       port of St Petersburg, Russia.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Westerdam             Collision between the ship and ice
                (Holland America       in the vicinity of Yakutat Bay,
                 Line)                 Alaska. Sustained damage
                                       approximately 15 feet below the
                                       water line.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Opera                 Collided twice with the pier as it
                (MSC Cruises)          was leaving Buenos Aires,
                                       damaging several cabins. Detained
                                       in port for 10 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Costa Classica        Collided with a cargo ship near
                (Costa Cruises)        the deep water channel of the
                                       Yangtze River. News images show a
                                       scrape or gash stretching about
                                       20 meters along the starboard
                                       side of Deck 5 midships.
                                       Passengers disembarked. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Sergei Kirov          The cruise ship, carrying hundreds
                (Russian ship)         of U.S. and German tourists,
                                       collided with a barge on the
                                       Volga River. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Black Watch           The ship's port bow collided with
                (Fred Olsen Cruises)   an iceberg off Greenland
                                       resulting in a significant
                                       impact. Superficial damage.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Caribbean Princess    The ship hit the gangway structure
                (Princess Cruises)     and was delayed several hours in
                                       departure.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Columbus              Ship bumped a cargo vessel and hit
                (Hapag-Lloyd)          a steel bar while docking at the
                                       Iloilo International Port in
                                       Loboc, La Paz (Philippines). The
                                       front part of the cruise ship was
                                       damaged. Departure delayed for
                                       repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Costa Europa          Crashed into a pier in the
                (Costa Cruises)        Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-
                                       Sheikh. 3 deaths; cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Ecstasy               While docking at Galveston, hit
                (Carnival Cruise       the elevated gangway used to
                 Lines)                embark & disembark guests. Little
                                       damage to the ship, but several
                                       window panels fell out of
                                       gangway. The $1.8 million
                                       structure was out of commission
                                       for 30 days or more for repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Carnival Splendor     Collided with the pier at Puerto
                (Carnival Cruise       Vallarta causing damage to the
                 Lines)                stern. Departure delayed 20 hours
                                       for repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Saga Ruby             Hit a concrete bollard while
                (Saga Holidays)        berthing in New York, and had to
                                       have emergency repairs to a hole
                                       in the bow before setting off
                                       back to the UK. One day delayed
                                       departure.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Carnival Legend       Two ships collided in Mexican port
                (Carnival Cruise       in an incident that left both
                 Lines) &              vessels with minor damage.
                 Enchantment of the
                 Seas (Royal
                 Caribbean
                 International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Antarctic Dream       While coming alongside the quay in
                                       Longyearbyen the ship collided
                                       with a smaller passenger vessel.
                                       Damage repaired.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Avalon Tranquility    Collided with the tall ship
                (Avalon Waterways)     Schoenbrunn while it was
                                       maneuvering in Linz on the Danube
                                       River. Damage to the Schoenbrunn
                                       was extensive; damage to the
                                       riverboat was minimal.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Golden Princess       A 31-foot-long fishing vessel
                (Princess Cruises)     ``erratically'' crossed within
                                       about 30 feet of the front of the
                                       cruise ship as it entered Los
                                       Angeles harbor. Near miss.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Costa Concordia       Ship hit the dock in Palermo
                (Costa Cruises)        harbor. The bow was damaged.
                                       Repairs were undertaken after the
                                       ship was firmly docked.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Imagination           A minor crash that left a huge
                (Carnival Cruise       dent and needing some paint touch
                 Lines)                up on the front side of the ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Boudicca              Sustained minor damage to bow
                (Fred Olsen Cruises)   whilst in Barbados. The damage
                                       caused a 7ft dent which needed to
                                       be repaired. Held in port for a
                                       day.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Seven Seas Voyager    Hit the quay in Rhodes with her
                (Regent Seven Seas     stern, no injuries but minor
                 Cruises)              damage done to the ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Spirit of Adventure   In Kepez, Turkey the ship hit the
                (Saga Holidays)        quay after tug failed and gashed
                                       hull. It was repaired and
                                       continued cruise.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Crystal               Collided with a ferry at Piraeus
                (Louis Cruises)        port. There were 955 passengers
                                       on board the cruise ship. Only
                                       material damage was caused to
                                       both vessels.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Zenith                Ships collided in Greece's main
                (Pullmantur) and       port of Piraeus causing damage
                Aegean Pearl           but no injuries. Aegean Pearl's
                (Louis Cruises)        cruise canceled.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Costa Classica        Collided in the Adriatic Sea near
                (Costa Cruises) and    the Croatian tourist town of
                Poesia                 Dubrovnik, but no one was
                (MSC Cruises)          injured.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Norwegian Spirit      While docking in NYC the ship
                (NCL)                  rammed into Pier 90 at 50th St.
                                       and 12th Ave. The city Buildings
                                       Department said the accident
                                       damaged beams supporting upper-
                                       level parking lots.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Queen Victoria        Hit the quay of the Valletta
                (Cunard Line)          Waterfront, denting the stern of
                                       the ship. Malta Maritime
                                       Authority officially attributed
                                       the incident to a mechanical
                                       failure in the ship. Detained for
                                       repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Aquamarine            Scraped against a pier as it was
                (Louis Cruises)        leaving Iraklion (Crete) causing
                                       damage to the hull.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            QEII                  A cross-channel ferry had to slam
                (Cunard Line)          on the brakes when the cruise
                                       liner failed to give way at sea
                                       off the Dover coast and sailed
                                       into the passenger ferry's path.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Fram                  Had engine failure and was without
                (Hurtigruten)          power for about 2 hours while
                                       near Brown Bluff on the northern
                                       tip of the Antarctic Peninsula.
                                       Drifted into a towering wall of
                                       ice; bent the railing and a
                                       lifeboat was completely crushed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Norwegian Dream       Collided with a barge being pulled
                (NCL)                  by a tug in Uruguay's main port,
                                       sending several cars and
                                       containers off the barge and
                                       shutting the port down. The ship
                                       received damages above the water
                                       line, which did not appear
                                       serious. Detained for repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Lirica                Damaged in Civitavecchia when it
                (MSC Cruises)          scraped the pier. An area between
                                       the bow and portside bulwarks was
                                       damaged.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Thomson Celebration   Collided in the Greanger fjord
                (Thomson Cruises)      (Norway ) as the two were
                 and                   berthing. The damage was reported
                Ocean Majesty          as slight with some lifeboats and
                (Page and Moy)         davits taking the brunt of the
                                       slow collision. Ocean Majesty's
                                       cruise terminated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Spirit of Yorktown    Collided with a Seattle-based
                (Cruise West)          fishing vesssel, leaving the
                                       seiner ``dead in the water'' with
                                       a disabled steering mechanism.
                                       The cruise ship appeared
                                       undamaged.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Serenade              Slightly damaged when it grazed
                (Louis Cruises)        the pier while docking at the
                                       Greek island of Tinos, leaving a
                                       small hole on the left side of
                                       the ship's bow above the water
                                       line. Repaired.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Kristina Regina       Collided with a timber loaded deck
                (Kristina Cruises)     barge in dense fog south of
                                       Gedser. Only slight damage and
                                       continued to Helsinki.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Fantasy               A barge struck the ship on the
                (Carnival Cruise       Mississippi River near New
                 Lines)                Orleans, leaving a 30 foot gash
                                       (about 5 feet above the
                                       waterline) in its hull. Cruise
                                       canceled
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Enchantment of the    Ship dragged its anchor 300 metres
                 Seas                  before it ran into a moored barge
                (Royal Caribbean       off Pageant Beach Georgetown ,
                 International)        Cayman Islands . Other than two
                                       dents in the port side and a long
                                       100-foot scrape, there was no
                                       damage to the ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Pride of America      Struck a 2,800 pound navigational
                (NCL America)          buoy as it left Honolulu and
                                       dragged the buoy chain all the
                                       way to Maui . Remained in Maui an
                                       extra day for inspections and
                                       repairs of the propeller, to
                                       which the chain became attached.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Freedom of the Seas   Collided with a refueling ship as
                (Royal Caribbean       it was leaving Montego Bay.
                 International)        Damage was not significant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            River Empress         Hit a bridge on the Danube near
                (Uniworld)             Melk at 6 AM. All passengers
                                       (111) were evacuated. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Norwegian Spirit      Collided with the pier as it
                (NCL)                  docked at Juneau , breaking out
                                       windows in 3 or 4 rooms and
                                       making a large dent in the side.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Norwegian Majesty     As the ship moored at St.
                (NCL)                  George's, Bermuda, it knocked
                                       into three yachts moored in
                                       Powder Hall anchorage and almost
                                       sucked one yacht under. The
                                       ship's propeller appears to have
                                       been damaged.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Grandeur of the Seas  Struck the pier in Costa Maya,
                (Royal Caribbean       Mexico while docking causing a
                 International)        puncture 42 feet long and 5 feet
                                       wide at its widest point. The
                                       puncture was in the first deck,
                                       approximately five feet above the
                                       waterline. Delayed 2 days for
                                       repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            River Duchess         Crashed into a dockside restaurant
                (Uniworld)             in Amsterdam on Sunday. Police
                                       said the ship--owned by U.S. firm
                                       Uniworld--went off course due to
                                       technical reasons.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Enchantment of the    While docked at Key West, struck
                 Seas                  by a barge leaving an 8 foot hole
                (Royal Caribbean       in the vessel's hull. Repaired.
                 International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Holiday               Lost engine power and collided
                (Carnival Cruise       with some pilings along the
                 Line)                 Mobile River before dawn.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Van Gogh              Collided with an oil tanker in
                (Travelscope)          foggy conditions off the southern
                                       coast of Spain. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Viking Europe         The ship (135 passengers; 39 crew)
                (Viking River          hit a bridge in Vienna , injuring
                 Cruises)              19 passengers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Diamond Princess      Ship pushed into pier at Victoria,
                (Princess Cruises)     BC, while docking. Damage minor,
                                       except for bent propeller blade
                                       tips, which caused altered
                                       itineraries and missed ports.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            American Glory        Destroyed a 40 foot section of the
                (American Cruise       Downtown Marina dock in Beaufort,
                 Lines)                SC (and damaged two yachts) when
                                       a strong current and tide
                                       combination forced the stern into
                                       the pier. One of the cruise
                                       ship's doors was damaged and two
                                       windows shattered.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Stena Nautica         Collided with a cargo ship (the
                (Stena Line)           Jamaican registered Joanna) en
                                       route from Denmark to Varberg in
                                       Sweden. 91 passengers and 37 crew
                                       were evacuated to another ship.
                                       The collision caused an 11-metre
                                       hole in the ship's hull. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Royal Princess        Collided with the pier when it was
                (Princess Cruises)     docking, causing an 8 foot rent
                                       in the bow of the vessel and
                                       delaying its departure until
                                       repairs were completed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Opera                 Collided with a Yermak icebreaker
                (Silja Line)           stationed at the exit of a St.
                                       Petersburg port. The ship's
                                       lifeboats were damaged but the
                                       ship remained capable of
                                       traveling.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Sundream              Collided with the pier. It
                (Sun Cruises)          required repairs at Tenerife and
                                       returned early to Southampton for
                                       further repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Opera                 Collided with several ships and a
                (Silja Line)           crane at St. Petersberg. Damage
                                       not sufficient to delay
                                       itinerary.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Melody                Ran into the pier at Kusadasi
                (MSC Cruises)          harbor. Ship had to wait several
                                       days for repairs to be completed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Star Flyer            Sustained minimal damage and a
                (Star Clippers)        small section of the wharf
                                       collapsed at Port Klang, Malaysia
                                       after it collided with the wharf.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Asuka                 Collision with cargo ship off
                                       coast of Kobe.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Royal Princess        Broke loose from mooring at Port
                (Princess Cruises)     Said; drifted into the path of a
                                       cargo ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000            Island Breeze         Collision w/tugboat--damaged
                (Premier)              propeller; Tug sinks. 2 cruises
                                       canceled
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000            Carnival Destiny      Propulsion problems--Adrift for 27
                (Carnival Cruise       hours.
                 Lines)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999            Norwegian Dream       Collision with cargo ship in
                (NCL)                  English Channel--Out for 2
                                       months.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998            Rhapsody of the Seas  Hits pier in Curacao causing a 7
                (Royal Caribbean       meter hole above water line--
                 International)        Repaired and continues.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997            Island Princess       Collision with unmarked
                (Princess Cruises)     obstruction at Civitavecchia--2
                                       cruises canceled.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996            Statendam             Near miss with barge carrying
                (Holland America       80,000 liters of propane and
                 Line)                 pallets of dynamite in the
                                       Discovery Passage, British
                                       Columbia. Collision averted by
                                       barge's action.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993            Noordam               Collision with freighter in the
                (Holland America       Gulf of Mexico.
                 Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992            Europa                Collision with freighter 180 miles
                (Hapag-Lloyd)          off Hong Kong.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991            Regent Sea            2 ships collide in strong winds at
                (Regency Cruises)      Skagway--Regent Sea had its steel
                Island Princess        hull plating on the stern ripped;
                (Princess Cruises)     Island Princess had a 50' gash 30
                                       ft above water line and 11 cabins
                                       were exposed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990            Azure Seas            Struck while moored by container
                                       ship in LA harbor.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


     A.5 Other Significant Events Involving Cruise Ships, 2000-2012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Year        Ship (Cruise Line)                Incident
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012            Independence          The starboard engine drive shaft
                (America Cruise        broke on leaving Savanah.
                 Line)                 Returned to port where the
                                       problem was determined. Left port
                                       with blessing of the CG. On one
                                       engine cruised to Brunswick, GA
                                       where the CG withdrew its
                                       approval to continue with the
                                       passengers. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Disney Magic          Loss of power and adrift at sea
                (Disney Cruise Line)   for more than 90 minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Balmoral              Ship detained by Maritime and
                (Fed Olsen Cruises)    Coastguard Agency after finding
                                       fault with life boats and
                                       inconsistent record keeping of
                                       crew hours of rest.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Opera                 Detained in Southampton following
                (MSC Cruises)          an inspection by Maritime and
                                       Coastguard Agency. The MCA said:
                                       ``The ship was not fully
                                       compliant with international
                                       maritime safety regulations.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Opera                 Suffered a failure to an electric
                (MSC Cruises)          panel, causing an initial low
                                       power and afterwards a total loss
                                       while the ship was near Wisby in
                                       Baltic Sea. It was adrift for
                                       more than 9 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011            Radiance of the Seas  The ship is currently operating
                (Royal Caribbean       under USCG Captain of The Port
                 International)        Order (COTP) due to one of two
                                       main propulsion azipods being
                                       inoperative for maneuver and
                                       requires a tractor tug tethered
                                       escort every arrival & departure
                                       from Tampa Bay to insure safe
                                       transit should the one remaining
                                       azipod propulsion fail.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Clelia II             A large wave slammed into the ship
                (Travel Dynamics       with 88 passengers and 77 crew
                 International)        members aboard, but the ship's
                                       crew overcame minor damage and is
                                       heading safely back to its
                                       scheduled port (Ushuaia). The
                                       ship declared an emergency
                                       yesterday, reporting it had
                                       suffered engine damage amid heavy
                                       seas and 90 kph winds when it was
                                       northeast of the South Shetland
                                       Islands and about 845km from
                                       Ushuaia. The International
                                       Association of Antarctica Tour
                                       Operators issued statement saying
                                       the wave that hit the Clelia II
                                       caused a broken bridge window and
                                       some electrical malfunctions that
                                       temporarily knocked out some
                                       communications and affected
                                       engine performance.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Costa Atlantica       The ship experienced steering
                (Costa Cruises)        problems minutes after leaving
                                       Bermuda. The Bermuda Maritime
                                       Operations received a distress
                                       call. The duty officer said:
                                       ``The ship departed Dockyard at
                                       1:10pm. She reported problems
                                       with her steering. The pilot
                                       immediately stopped the ship and
                                       ordered two tugs to come out to
                                       assist. The tugs came alongside
                                       and took her to an area with more
                                       sea room and then the engineers
                                       were able to fix the problem.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Celebrity Century     Passengers were offloaded in
                (Celebrity Cruises)    Villefranche after the ship's
                                       rudders were damaged. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Queen Mary 2          The ship was approaching Barcelona
                (Cunard Line)          when one of 12 capacitors in a
                                       harmonic filter failed,
                                       accompanied by a loud explosion.
                                       The explosion resulted in
                                       extensive damage to the
                                       surrounding electric panels and
                                       caused the vessel to black out.
                                       The ship was adrift for an hour.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Atlantic Star         An electrical problem meant no air
                (Pullmantur)           conditioning and problems with
                                       toilets. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Clelia II             The ship lost all power,
                (Travel Dynamics       apparently the result of human
                 International)        error.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Pacific Dream         Experienced engine failure. Cruise
                (Pullmantur Cruises)   terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Fascination           Lost power for several hours and
                (Carnival Cruise       was adrift at sea. Carnival says
                 Lines)                the ship had a ``technical
                                       malfunction.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Vistamar              The UK Maritime and Coastguard
                (Plantours & artner)   Agency detained the ship at
                                       Belfast Docks after numerous
                                       faults were identified on board
                                       including broken or missing fire
                                       doors and failure to maintain the
                                       vessel in line with International
                                       Safety Management (ISM) code. The
                                       coastguard had said that 10 of
                                       the ship's 100 fire doors were
                                       faulty. It also said that one of
                                       the lifeboat engines would not
                                       start. Cruise canceled
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Prince Albert II      The ship was impounded for several
                (Sliverseas Cruises)   hours in Portsmouth amid safety
                                       fears. One concern was that it
                                       was overloaded. The other concern
                                       was that senior officers had not
                                       had enough rest. The report also
                                       says the ship's lifeboats were
                                       'not ready for use,' there were
                                       three unsafe emergency routes in
                                       case of fire, and there was an
                                       air bubble in the ship's magnetic
                                       compass.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Minerva               The ship broke down in the
                (Swan Hellenic)        Mediterranean and was taken for
                                       emergency dry dock in Syros in
                                       Greece for engine repair. No a/c
                                       or lighting. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Pacific Dawn          A pilot averted a possible
                (P&O Australia)        disaster by bringing the out-of-
                                       control ship to a stop just 700m
                                       away from the six-lane Gateway
                                       Bridge over the Brisbane River.
                                       Two tugboats got the ship under
                                       control, bringing her to a
                                       complete standstill 70m shy of
                                       the bridge.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Caribbean Princess    A steering malfunction caused the
                (Princess Cruises)     ship to list 5 to 9 degrees as it
                                       approached port.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Explorer of the Seas  Human error caused a severe list
                (Royal Caribbean       (10 to 12 degrees) that put
                 International)        passenger windows on Deck 3 under
                                       water. The list lasted 2-3
                                       minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010            Louis Majesty         26-foot waves crashed into the
                (Louis Cruises)        ship off France, smashing glass
                                       windshields and killing two
                                       passengers. Another fourteen
                                       people suffered light injuries. 2
                                       deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Norwegian Dawn        The ship temporarily lost all
                (NCL                   power off the coast of Puerto
                                       Rico. Power was restored much
                                       later in the day.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Silja Europa          With almost 1,700 people onboard,
                (Silja Line)           the ship was towed to the Finnish
                                       port City of Turku due to
                                       problems with its rudder system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Brilliance of the     The ship's departure was delayed
                 Seas                  because of needed repairs after a
                (Royal Caribbean       storm broke out a number of
                 International)        windows on Decks 3 and 4.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Oceanic               The ship (with 848 passengers) was
                (Peace Boat)           detained after U.S. Coast Guard
                                       inspectors found a small hole in
                                       the ship's hull during a routine
                                       safety inspection. About a gallon
                                       of water per hour was coming into
                                       the ship. An additional 16 safety
                                       violations were cited.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Maasdam               The ship severely listed, causing
                (Holland America       damage onboard, when the captain
                 Line)                 took evasive action to avoid
                                       running aground on a sandbar in
                                       the St. Lawrence Seaway.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Seven Seas Voyager    One of the pods was caught in a
                (Regent Seven Seas     fishing net. Attempts to release
                 Cruises)              the pod failed. The ship is on
                                       its way to Dubai where it will be
                                       dry docked to fix the pod. Cruise
                                       delayed; itinerary adjusted.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Costa Europa          The ship underwent repairs in the
                (Costa Cruises)        Kenyan port of Mombasa, before
                                       sailing toward Reunion Island,
                                       but passengers said the vessel's
                                       speed remained ``erratic,'' while
                                       others noticed black smoke coming
                                       from the engines. Itinerary
                                       changed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Aurora                Broke down 4 hours after leaving
                (P&O Cruises)          Sydney. The Port Shaft Thrust
                                       Bearing had gone. Sailed at
                                       reduced speed to Auckland for
                                       repairs (taking 4 days instead of
                                       two). Itinerary changed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009            Explorer of the Seas  A propeller on one of the ship's
                (Royal Caribbean       engines struck an unidentified
                 International)        object and was bent while leaving
                                       Samana. Cruise continued.
                                       Repaired on the next cruise when
                                       the ship was in St. Thomas.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Grand Princess        The ship diverted to safe harbour,
                (Princess Cruises)     anchoring outside English Harbour
                                       (Antigua). It had to be diverted
                                       to that part of the island
                                       because it was having problems
                                       with its bow thruster.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Lyuba Orlova          The ship was detained by
                (Quark Expeditions)    Argentinian officials due to
                                       mechanical problems. Four cruises
                                       were canceled.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Queen Victoria        The ship suffered a severe list of
                (Cunard Line)          about 7 degrees causing damage
                                       onboard, and later in the cruise
                                       had a full power failure that
                                       lasted for some time.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Sea Princess          The ship encountered `technical
                (Princess Cruises)     difficulties' as it attempted to
                                       dock at Port Zante, which
                                       resulted in passengers being
                                       ferried to the nearby marina by
                                       the ship's life crafts. Initial
                                       reports were there had been a
                                       fire onboard that caused engine
                                       damage to the vessel and hindered
                                       its berthing.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Fantasy               There was a minor technical glitch
                (Carnival Cruise       a few hours after the ship left
                 Lines)                New Orleans, leaving the ship
                                       adrift. The problem was fixed and
                                       the ship resumed sailing.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008            Discovery             The ship was detained by Polish
                (Voyages of            and later by UK authorities for
                 Discovery)            safety deficiencies. The ship was
                                       cited for seven deficiencies.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Enchantment of the    The ship had a power failure in
                 Seas                  the early morning and was
                (Royal Caribbean       assisted by a tug into Fort
                 International)        Lauderdale at the cruise's end.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Norwegian Star        A severe list causing damage
                (NCL)                  onboard attributed to human
                                       error.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Island Princess       Engines failed off the coast of
                (Princess Cruises)     France, plunging the ship into
                                       darkness. Passengers were ferried
                                       to shore by the ship's tenders.
                                       Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Black Prince          Propeller damaged. Cruise
                (Fred Olsen Cruises)   terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            QEII                  The ship was delayed in port for
                (Cunard Line)          24 hours, mid-cruise, because of
                                       mechanical problems.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Ryndam                Power failure and propulsion
                (Holland America       failure. Power restored. The
                 Line)                 Coast Guard required the ship to
                                       have 2 tugboats to assist
                                       entering San Diego harbor and
                                       docking.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007            Brilliance of the     A complete power loss, leaving the
                 Seas                  ship adrift for 2.5 hours.
                (Royal Caribbean
                 International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Ryndam                The ship reported engine problems
                (Holland America       about an hour after sailing and
                 Line)                 stalled in the channel between
                                       the port and the Skyway Bridge.
                                       Power was subsequently restored,
                                       but the Coast Guard said the ship
                                       would remain moored overnight
                                       while they investigated the
                                       problem with the engines.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Thomson Destiny       The ship's toilets did not work
                (Thomson Cruises)      for 3 days and there was no hot
                                       water for 24 hours. A series of
                                       blockages in the plumbing system
                                       were blamed for the problem;
                                       experts were dispatched to deal
                                       with the problem.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Crown Princess        Severely rolled (15 degrees) to
                (Princess Cruises)     one side shortly after leaving
                                       Port Canaveral (at 3:25 PM ).
                                       240 passengers were treated for
                                       various injuries; 94 were
                                       transferred to local hospitals
                                       ashore for evaluation and
                                       treatment. The roll was
                                       attributed to a problem with the
                                       auto-pilot.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Costa Allegra         The ship twice lost all power for
                (Costa Crociere)       30 minutes or so (shortly after
                                       leaving Shanghai and again on its
                                       return).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Seabourn Pride        Sailed through very heavy seas on
                (Seabourn Cruises)     way to Bergen . There was a
                                       substantial amount of water
                                       damage on board--forward suites
                                       had broken windows and flooding;
                                       other rooms also had water damage
                                       (including electrical systems).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Vistamar              Ship impounded in London because
                (Plantours &           of serious safety deficiencies,
                 Partners)             including inoperable lifeboats.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Rhapsody of the Seas  The ship listed 10 degrees due to
                (Royal Caribbean       a malfunction with the
                 International)        stabilizing mechanism.
                                       Considerable damage onboard.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Zuiderdam             The ship lost all power and was
                (Holland America       adrift for about an hour
                 Line)                 (midnight to 1 AM) while between
                                       St. Thomas and Tortola.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Sensation             Coast Guard inspectors detained
                (Carnival Cruise       the ship at Port Canaveral until
                 Lines)                the captain and crew could fix
                                       violations related to the ship's
                                       fire-control systems.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Carnival Liberty      There was a complete power failure
                (Carnival Cruise       that lasted approximately 1 hours
                 Lines)                (10--11PM) and it was another
                                       hour or so before everything
                                       appeared ``back to normal``.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Pacific Sky           Five hours after leaving Singapore
                (P&O Australia)        the ship experienced engine
                                       problems, came to a shuddering
                                       halt, and sat anchored in the
                                       Malacca Strait for 30 hours while
                                       crew tried to fix the problem.
                                       The cruise finally resumed on one
                                       engine.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Grand Princess        Two hours after leaving Galveston,
                (Princess Cruises)     a medical emergency required
                                       return to port. The ship made a
                                       sharp turn while traveling at 21
                                       knots, causing 18.5 degree list,
                                       which resulted in considerable
                                       damage onboard. Twenty-seven
                                       passengers and ten crew suffered
                                       injuries
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006            Norwegian Spirit      Several windows were smashed and
                (NCL)                  11 cabins flooded when the ship
                                       encountered a storm.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Funchal               The ship was stuck in Safaga
                (Classic               (Egypt) for a week, mid-cruise,
                 International         while repairs undertaken to the
                 Cruises)              port main engine. Many passengers
                                       canceled the remainder of the
                                       cruise.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Sun Princess          A power outage while docked at St.
                (Sun Princess)         Thomas, USVI, left passengers
                                       mostly in the dark for more than
                                       2 hours. Backup generators
                                       provided limited power. Power was
                                       restored and the ship left port 2
                                       hours late.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Norwegian Jewel       The ship lost power as a result of
                (NCL)                  problems with the port-side
                                       azipod while leaving St.
                                       Petersburg . The ship was
                                       assisted by Finnish tugs to reach
                                       the next port.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Carnival Legend       Heading for NYC a, ``computer
                (Carnival Cruise       glitch'' caused a hard left turn,
                 Lines)                that resulted in a 14 degree list
                                       causing injuries and damage.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Carnival Destiny      The ship lost power and propulsion
                (Carnival Cruise       at 7AM--it was dead in the water
                 Lines)                for 8 hours and without
                                       electricity and air conditioning
                                       for about 2 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Thomson Celebration   600 passengers flown home after
                (Thomson Cruises)      the plumbing in 250 cabins
                                       failed. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Norwegian Dawn        The ship was struck by a 70 foot
                (NCL)                  wave enroute from the Bahamas to
                                       New York . The wave knocked out
                                       windows in two passenger cabins
                                       and on the navigation bridge and
                                       damaged the ships hull. Diverted
                                       to Charleston for repairs. 300
                                       passengers chose to fly home.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Pacific Sky           Problem with the shipboard's
                (P&O Australia)        gearbox ends cruise. Cruise
                                       terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Grand Voyager         A huge wave breached a bridge
                (Iberojet Cruises)     window, resulting in damage to
                                       electrical control systems, a
                                       temporary loss of propulsion, and
                                       loss of all communications. A
                                       distress call was issued. Twenty
                                       passengers reported minor
                                       injuries (including eight with
                                       broken bones).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            Explorer              Lost power in three of its four
                (Semester at Sea)      engines when a 50-foot wave broke
                                       bridge windows and damaged
                                       controls while 650 miles south of
                                       Alaska's Aleutian Islands.. Crew
                                       members were able to start a
                                       second engine and the ship
                                       ``limped'' to Honolulu for needed
                                       repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005            QEII                  The ship lost power in the early
                (Cunard Line)          hours of New Year's Day. Without
                                       power there is no propulsion,
                                       ventilation, lighting or water.
                                       The ship drifted for about an
                                       hour before power was restored.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Pacific Sky           Cruise aborted because of problems
                (P&O Australia)        with the starboard engine.
                                       Departure had been delayed for
                                       more than a day because of a
                                       faulty boiler and a damaged
                                       gerarbox. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Rotterdam             Ambulances greeted the ship in
                (Holland America       Halifax after passengers and crew
                 Line)                 endured monster waves generated
                                       by hurricane Karl in the North
                                       Atlantic . About a dozen
                                       passengers were taken to hospital
                                       with suspected fractures and
                                       severe bruising. 90 people
                                       (including 5 crew) reported minor
                                       injury. Ship lost power and for
                                       3.5 hours was tossed around in
                                       high waves and in total darkness.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Carnival Destiny      The ship lost power and was adrift
                (Carnival Cruise       for several hours while cruising
                 Lines)                to St. Thomas from Dominica.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Caronia               The ship ``suffered a total power
                (P&O Cruises)          failure following a leak from a
                                       swimming pool that took out the
                                       main electric board. Drifted for
                                       approximately 2 hours before
                                       partial power restored.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Norwegian Crown       Fuel fumes filled 50 cabins as a
                (NCL)                  result of a hole in a ventilation
                                       duct in the air conditioning
                                       system, and there were reportedly
                                       power outages.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Black Prince          Enroute to her first journey after
                (Fred Olsen Cruises)   engine repairs, the ship broke
                                       down just off Southampton docks
                                       and lost all power.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004            Diamond Princess      The ship suffered several short
                (Princess Cruises)     power failures on one cruise and
                                       ``technical difficulties'' on the
                                       next cruise.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Brilliance of the     While cruising between Corfu and
                 Seas                  Civitivecchia, the ship was hit
                (Royal Caribbean       by a storm--twice listing hard to
                 International)        the port side approximately 13.6
                                       degrees. After daybreak the ship
                                       had a power blackout that lasted
                                       several hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Norway                A boiler explosion killed 8 crew
                (NCL)                  members and injured dozens of
                                       others. All future cruises
                                       canceled. 8 deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Pacific Sky           The ship had to turn back to
                (P&O Australia)        Auckland on an 11 day cruise to
                                       Fiji. The ship took on 17 tonnes
                                       of water after it sprang a leak
                                       through cracked and corroded
                                       plating on the side of the 19-
                                       year-old ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Ryndam                The ship listed to the port side
                (Holland America       around 6:30 PM, causing injuries
                 Line)                 and considerable damage onboard.
                                       The incident was explained as the
                                       result of a mechanical failure
                                       from going from manual to
                                       automatic pilot
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Carnival Conquest     The USCG investigated a sharp roll
                (Carnival Cruise       that sent passengers running for
                 Lines)                life vests, and glass crashing to
                                       decks. Seven passengers reported
                                       to a newspaper in New Orleans
                                       that they saw the lights of
                                       another vessel silhouetted in
                                       thick fog less than 200 yards
                                       from the ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Radiance of the Seas  Ship struck by strong winds as it
                (Royal Caribbean       crossed a squall line and briefly
                 International         went into a seven degree list. No
                                       injuries.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Marco Polo            After being pushed by wind on to
                (Orient Lines)         shallow waters while in the South
                                       Shetland Islands, the hull of the
                                       ship was found to have three
                                       cracks (4, 3, and 1.7 meters long
                                       by 2 centimeters wide). Eight
                                       millimeter thick plates were
                                       welded over the cracks at Ushuaia
                                       and the cruise continued.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003            Wind Spirit           The ship experienced engine
                (Windstar Cruises)     problems and generator problems
                                       that left it adrift for a night
                                       and part of a day. The ship made
                                       it back to Torotola and underwent
                                       necessary repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            Olivia                With 650 passengers onboard, the
                (Ukraine-registered)   ship was detained for a full day
                                       by the New Zealand Marine Safety
                                       Authority. Safety inspectors
                                       found problems with an emergency
                                       pump and with equipment that
                                       separates oil from water in the
                                       ship's bilges.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            Brilliance of the     A propulsion problem required
                 Seas                  shutdown of the complete
                (Royal Caribbean       propulsion system at sea while
                 International)        technicians worked to repair it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            Radiance of the Seas  USCG reports the ship experienced
                (Royal Caribbean       a 3-minute power outage disabling
                 International)        the ship's steering and
                                       propulsion capability while in
                                       Frederick Sound (preparing to
                                       transit the Gatineau Channel en
                                       route to Juneau).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            Ryndam                A generator stopped running while
                (Holland America       the ship was in the Lynn Canal
                 Line)                 (Alaska) causing it to lose
                                       power--it lost all propulsion and
                                       was adrift for about 20 minutes
                                       (at 1:30 AM). The water was too
                                       deep for the ship to drop anchor.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            QEII                  A large sea water leak was
                (Cunard Line)          discovered in the aft engine
                                       room, caused by the perforation
                                       (from corrosion) of a sea water
                                       inlet pipe. The leak was stopped
                                       after several efforts (over 36
                                       hours), but not before several
                                       hundred tones of sea water had to
                                       be pumped overboard so that
                                       workers could get at the leaking
                                       pipe in the engine room (which
                                       was submerged by water from the
                                       leak).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002            Oriana                While crossing the North Pacific
                (P&O Cruises)          an auxiliary engine failed,
                                       causing the other three engines
                                       to stop. Ship drifted for 2 hours
                                       and proceeded at reduced speed
                                       after it was restored.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Caledonia Star        Damaged by rogue wave--escorted to
                                       port by Argentinean Navy.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Bremen                Hit by rogue wave--wheelhouse
                (Hapag-Lloyd)          windows break and water enters
                                       bridge; detour to Montevideo for
                                       immediate repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Radiance of the Seas  Hit heavy seas--balcony cabins,
                (Royal Caribbean       Seaview and Windjammer cafes
                 International)        flooded
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Norway                Ship detained in port because of
                (NCL)                  safety violations--106 leaks in
                                       fire sprinkler system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001            Norwegian Sky         Autopilot malfunction causes roll
                (NCL)                  70+ injured, 16 hospitalized.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000            Ocean Explorer        Engine failure; world cruise
                                       ended. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000            Sundream              Failing generators; no a/c and
                (Sun Cruises)          limited power for 2 days.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000            Gradeur of the Seas   Loss of electrical power. Towed to
                (Royal Caribbean       port--delayed 12 hours.
                 International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000            Aurora                Hit by 40 foot wave--smashed
                (P&O Cruises)          windows in 6 cabins; 20 cabins
                                       flooded. 6 injured.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000            Oriana                18 hours into maiden voyage--
                (P&O Cruises)          problem with over heated
                                       propeller shaft. Cruise
                                       terminated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Appendix B
    Analysis Of Crime Reports Received By The Fbi From Cruise Ships
                   October 1, 2007-September 30, 2008

                                           Table 1.--Crime by Cruise Ship, October 1, 2007-September 30, 2008
                                                            (based on reports to the FBI) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Cruise       Simple     Assault               Theft      Sexual       Sexual      Sexual
 Line/Ship  Assault \2\  w/SBI \3\  Theft\4\  >10K \5\  contact \6\  assault \7\  harass \8\  Death \9\  Overboard \10\  Drugs \11\  Other \12\   TOTAL
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Azamara
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Journey                                   1                                  1                                                                        2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quest                                     1                                                                                                           1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                                     2                                  1                                                                        3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carnival                                                                                                                                     1        1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Celebratio                                1                                  1            1                                                           3
 n
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conquest             1          1         4         1           4            2            1          1                                               15
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Destiny                                   4                     1            1                                                                        6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ecstasy              1                    3                     1            4                                                                        9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Elation              2                    1                     3            1            1                                                           8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fantasy                         1         3                     1            1                                       1                                7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fascinatio                                4                     2            4                                                                       10
 n
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom                                   6                     2            1                       1                                       1       11
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Glory                1          1         4                     3            1                       1               1                               12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holiday                                   1                     1            1                                                                        3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Imaginatio                      1         6                     3            4                                                                       14
 n
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspiratio           1                    3                     2                                    1                                                7
 n
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend                                    1                                  1            1                                                  1        4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liberty                                   3                                               1          1                                       1        6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miracle                                   4                                                                                                           4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paradise             1          1         4         1           6            3                                                                       16
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pride                1                    3                     2            2                                                                        8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sensation                                 3                     4            4                                                                       11
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spirit                                    1                     2            2                                                                        5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Triumph              1                    7                     2                                                                            1       11
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Valor                                     5                     7            4                                                               1       17
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Victory                                   2         1           2            3                                       1                                9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                9          5        73         3          48           40            5          5               3                       6      197
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Celebrity
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Century              2                              1           2                                                                                     5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Constellat           1                    1                                                                                                  1        3
 ion
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Galaxy                                    1         1           1                                                                                     3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Infinity             1                                          2                                                                                     3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mercury              1                              1           1                                                                                     3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Millennium                      1                                                                                                                     1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summit                                                          1                                                                                     1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                5          1         2         3           7                                                                            1       19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costa
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fortuna                                                                      1                                                                        1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mediterran                                                                                                           1                                1
 ea
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                                                                                                                                                 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crystal
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serenity                                                        1                                                                                     1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discovery
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sun                                                                                                                  1                                1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disney \13
 \
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wonder                                    1                                               1                                                           2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holland
America \1
 4\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amsterdam                                 1                                                                                                           1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maasdam              1                              1                                                                                                 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oosterdam                                                                    1                                                                        1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ryndam                                              1                                                                                                 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statendam                                 1                                  1                                                                        2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volendam                                                                     2                                                                        2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Westerdam                                 2         1                                                                                                 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zuiderdam                                                                    4                                                                        4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                1                    4         3                        8                                                                       16
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCL \15\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dawn                                                                         2                                                                        2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Majesty              1                                          1                                                                                     2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Star                            1                                                                                                                     1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                1          1                               1            2                                                                        5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCLA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pride of                                                                     1                                                                        1
America
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Princess \
 16\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean            2                                          2            1            1          1                                                7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coral                           1                                                                                                                     1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dawn                                                                         1                                                                        1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                2          1                               2            2            1          1                                                9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RCI
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adventure            4                    1                     3                                                                            1        9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brilliance           1                              1                                                                                                 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Empress                                                                                                                                      1        1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enchantmen           5                                          2                                    2                                       1       10
 t
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explorer             4          2                                            2                                                                        8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom             18          1         2                     2            3                       1                                               27
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grandeur             4                                          2                                                                                     6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jewel                                                                                                                                        1        1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liberty              7                                          2            2                                                  1                    12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Majesty              6          1                   2                        1                                                               2       12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mariner              8          1                               2            1                                                                       12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monarch             14          3         1                                  2                                                  2            1       23
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navigator            1                                                       1                                                                        2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radiance             2                                                       2                                                                        4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhapsody                                                                                                                                     1        1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serenade             1                    1                                  1                                                                        3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sovereign           13                    1                     3            1                                                                       18
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Splendor             1                                                                                                                                1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vision               6                    1                     3            1                                                                       11
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Voyager              1                                                                                                                                1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL               96          8         7         3          19           17                       3                          3            8      164
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seabourn
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend                                                                       1                                                                        1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SeaEscape
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Island                                                                                                               1                                1
Adventure
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Windstar
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Windstar             1                                                                                               1                                2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRAND              115         16        89        12          75           75            4          9               7          3           15      421
TOTAL
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Data was secured through a Freedom of Information request by Ken Carver/International Cruise Victims Association.
\2\ Simple assault refers to incidents where there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties may experience minor injuries requiring medical
  attention.
\3\ Assault with Serious Bodily Injury refers to incidents were there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties require medical attention for
  serious cuts, abrasions, concussion, or broken bones.
\4\ Theft refers to incidents where items of value have been stolen or are missing from a cabin, a safe, luggage while in the care of the cruise line,
  or items lost onboard.
\5\ Theft greater than $10,000 refers to incidents where the value of a theft exceeds $10,000.
\6\ Sexual contact refers to incidents of unwanted sexually touching, unwanted kisses, and incidents where a minor has been propositioned or otherwise
  approached by an adult.
\7\ Sexual assault refers to incidents of unwanted sexual contact with genetalia, unwanted attempts to have sexual relations, and forcible rape.
\8\ Sexual harassment refers to incidents of verbal sexual abuse and/or where an employee is asked to trace sexual favors for advancement in or
  continuing in their job.
\9\ Death refers to incidents where there is a natural death or suicide.
\10\ Overboard refers to incidents where a passenger or crew member has gone missing. Three ships had media reports of passengers/crew overboard, but
  these were not reported to the FBI: Celebrity Constellation (non-U.S. crew)--February 18, Carnival Victory--April 22, 2008, Norwegian Dawn--May 11,
  2008.
\11\ Drugs refers to incidents where drugs have been found on the person or in the cabin of a passenger or crew member.
\12\ Other refers to incidents otherwise unclassified, including passengers missing the ship, security breaches, fire, etc.
\13\ Disney Cruises Line has one ship with no crime reports received.
\14\ Holland America Line has five ships with no crime reports received.
\15\ NCL has seven ships with no crime reports received.
\16\ Princess has 13 ships with no crime reports received.


                                           Table 2.--Crime by Cruise Line, October 1, 2007--September 30, 2008
                                                            (based on reports to the FBI) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Cruise       Simple     Assault               Theft      Sexual       Sexual      Sexual
 Line/Ship  Assault \2\  w/SBI \3\  Theft\4\  >10K \5\  contact \6\  assault \7\  harass \8\  Death \9\  Overboard \10\  Drugs \11\  Other \12\   TOTAL
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Azamara                                   2                                  1                                                                        3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carnival             9          5        73         3          48           40            5          5               3                       6      197
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Celebrity            5          1         2         3           7                                                                            1       19
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costa                                                                        1                                       1                                2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crystal                                                         1                                                                                     1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discovery                                                                                                            1                                1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disney \13                                1                                               1                                                           2
 \
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holland              1                    4         3                        8                                                                       16
America \1
 4\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCL \15\             1          1                               1            2                                                                        5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCLA                                                                         1                                                                        1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Princess \           2          1                               2            2            1          1                                                9
 16\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RCI                 96          8         7         3          19           17                       3                          3            8      164
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seabourn                                                                     1                                                                        1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SeaEscape                                                                                                            1                                1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Windstar             1                                                                                               1                                2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRAND              115         16        89        12          78           73            7          9               7          3           15      424
TOTAL
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Data was secured through a Freedom of Information request by Ken Carver/International Cruise Victims Association
\2\ Simple assault refers to incidents where there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties may experience minor injuries requiring medical
  attention.
\3\ Assault with Serious Bodily Injury refers to incidents were there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties require medical attention for
  serious cuts, abrasions, concussion, or broken bones.
\4\ Theft refers to incidents where items of value have been stolen or are missing from a cabin, a safe, luggage while in the care of the cruise line,
  or items lost onboard.
\5\ Theft greater than $10,000 refers to incidents where the value of a theft exceeds $10,000.
\6\ Sexual contact refers to incidents of unwanted sexually touching, unwanted kisses, and incidents where a minor has been propositioned or otherwise
  approached by an adult.
\7\ Sexual assault refers to incidents of unwanted sexual contact with genitalia, unwanted attempts to have sexual relations, and forcible rape.
\8\ Sexual harassment refers to incidents of verbal sexual abuse and/or where an employee is asked to trade sexual favors for advancement in or
  continuing in their job.
\9\ Death refers to incidents where there is a natural death or suicide.
\10\ Overboard refers to incidents where a passenger or crew member has gone missing. Three ships had media reports of passengers/crew overboard, but
  these were not reported to the FBI: Celebrity Constellation (non-US crew)--February 18, Carnival Victory--April 22, 2008, Norwegian Dawn--May 11,
  2008.
\11\ Drugs refers to incidents where drugs have been found on the person or in the cabin of a passenger or crew member.
\12\ Other refers to incidents otherwise unclassified, including passengers missing the ship, security breaches, fire, etc.
\13\ Disney Cruises Line has one ship with no crime reports received.
\14\ Holland America Line has five ships with no crime reports received.
\15\ NCL has seven ships with no crime reports received.
\16\ Princess has 13 ships with no crime reports received.


                                     Table 3.--Crimes Involving Minors, Alcohol, or Domestic Violence by Cruise Ship
                                                            (based on reports to the FBI) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Minors \2\                              Alcohol Involved \3\
                                                -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   Domestic
                  Cruise Line                       Sexual       Sexual         Sexual       Assault w/     Sexual Contact/      Simple     Violence\10\
                                                 Contact \4\  Assault \5\  Harrassment \6\     SBI \7\        Assault \8\      Assault \9\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Azamara
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Journey
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quest
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carnival
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Celebration                                                                             1                                 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conquest                                                  1            1                1             1                   2             1             1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Destiny
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ecstasy                                                                1                                                  2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Elation                                                                                                                   4             2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fantasy                                                                                               1                   2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fascination                                                                                                               4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom                                                                                                                   2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Glory                                                                                                 1                   3             1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holiday
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Imagination                                                                                           1                   5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspiration                                               1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liberty
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miracle
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paradise                                                                                              1                   3             1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pride                                                     2                                                               1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sensation                                                                                                                 5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spirit                                                    1                                                               2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Triumph                                                                                                                   2             1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Valor                                                     1                                                               4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Victory                                                                1                                                  3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                                                     6            3                2             5                  47             6             1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Celebrity
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Century                                                                                                                                 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Constellation
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Galaxy
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Infinity
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mercury
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Millennium                                                                                            1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                                                                                                 1                                 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costa
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fortuna                                                                                 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mediterranea
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crystal
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serenity                                                  1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discovery
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disney \11\                                                            1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holland
America \12\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amsterdam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maasdam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oosterdam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ryndam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statendam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volendam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Westerdam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zuiderdam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCL \13\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dawn                                                                   1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Majesty                                                   1                                                                             1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Star
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                                                     1            1                                                                1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCLA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pride of
America
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Princess \14\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean                                                 2                                                                             1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coral
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dawn
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                                                     2                                                                             1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RCI
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adventure                                                 1                                                                             1             1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brilliance                                                                                                                                            1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Empress
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enchantment                                               1                                                                             2             3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explorer                                                               2                              1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom                                                                                               1                   1             4             4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grandeur                                                  1                                                               1             2             1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jewel
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liberty                                                                                                                                 3             2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Majesty                                                                                                                   1             3             5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mariner                                                                                               1                                               5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monarch                                                                2                              1                   2             6             4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navigator                                                              1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radiance                                                                                                                  1             1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhapsody
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serenade                                                               1                                                                              1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sovereign                                                 1                                                               1             4             8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Splendor                                                                                                                                1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vision                                                                                                                                  3             1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Voyager
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                                                     4            6                              4                   7            30            36
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seabourn
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SeaEscape
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Windstar
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Windstar                                                                                                                                1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRAND                                                    14           11                3            10                  54            40            37
TOTALS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Data was secured through a Freedom of Information request by Ken Carver/International Cruise Victims Association.
\2\ Minor refers to passengers aged 17 or younger.
\3\ Alcohol involved are incidents where the crime reports the victim of perpetrated was intoxicated.
\4\ Sexual contact refers to incidents of unwanted sexually touching, unwanted kisses, and incidents where a minor has been propositioned or otherwise
  approached by an adult.
\5\ Sexual assault refers to incidents of unwanted sexual contact with genitalia, unwanted attempts to have sexual relations, and forcible rape.
\6\ Sexual harassment refers to incidents of verbal sexual abuse and/or where an employee is asked to trace sexual favors for advancement in or
  continuing in their job.
\7\ Assault with Serious Bodily Injury refers to incidents were there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties require medical attention for
  serious cuts, abrasions, concussion, or broken bones.
\8\ Sexual contact/assault refers to any incident of a sexual nature (i.e., it combines the categories of sexual contact and sexual assault).
\9\ Simple assault refers to incidents where there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties may experience minor injuries requiring medical
  attention.
\10\ Domestic violence refers to incidents of spousal abuse or the physical abuse of a child.
\11\ Disney Cruises Line has one ship with no crime reports received.
\12\ Holland America Line has five ships with no crime reports received.
\13\ NCL has seven ships with no crime reports received.
\14\ Princess has 13 ships with no crime reports received.


                                     Table 4.--Crimes Involving Minors, Alcohol, or Domestic Violence by Cruise Line
                                                            (based on reports to the FBI) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Minors \2\                              Alcohol Involved \3\
                                               -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    Domestic
                  Cruise Line                      Sexual       Sexual         Sexual       Assault w/     Sexual Contact/      Simple     Violence \10\
                                                Contact \4\  Assault \5\  Harrassment \6\     SBI \7\        Assault \8\      Assault \9\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Azamara
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carnival                                                 6            3                2             5                  47             6              1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Celebrity                                                                                            1                                 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costa                                                                                  1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crystal                                                  1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discovery
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disney                                                                1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holland
America
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCL                                                      1            1                                                                1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCLA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Princess                                                 2                                                                             1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RCI                                                      4            6                              4                   7            30             36
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seabourn
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SeaEscape
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Windstar                                                                                                                               1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTALS                                                  14           11                3            10                  54            40             37
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As % of                                              18.7%        14.7%            50.0%         62.5%               36.0%         34.8%      32.2% \2\
TOTAL for
CRIME
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Data was secured through a Freedom of Information request by Ken Carver/International Cruise Victims Association.
\2\ Minor refers to passengers aged 17 or younger.
\3\ Alcohol involved are incidents where the crime reports the victim of perpetrated was intoxicated.
\4\ Sexual contact refers to incidents of unwanted sexually touching, unwanted kisses, and incidents where a minor has been propositioned or otherwise
  approached by an adult.
\5\ Sexual assault refers to incidents of unwanted sexual contact with genitalia, unwanted attempts to have sexual relations, and forcible rape.
\6\ Sexual harassment refers to incidents of verbal sexual abuse and/or where an employee is asked to trace sexual favors for advancement in or
  continuing in their job.
\7\ Assault with Serious Bodily Injury refers to incidents were there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties require medical attention for
  serious cuts, abrasions, concussion, or broken bones.
\8\ Sexual contact/assault refers to any incident of a sexual nature (i.e., it combines the categories of sexual contact and sexual assault).
\9\ Simple assault refers to incidents where there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties may experience minor injuries requiring medical
  attention.
\10\ Domestic violence refers to incidents of spousal abuse or the physical abuse of a child.
\11\ Disney Cruises Line has one ship with no crime reports received. \12\ Holland America Line has five ships with no crime reports received.
\13\ NCL has seven ships with no crime reports received. \14\ Princess has 13 ships with no crime reports received.


                                     Table 5.--Crimes Involving Crew Members
                                        (based on reports to the FBI) \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Crew on Crew  (F       Crew on Pax  (F        Pax on Crew  (F
                                 victim : M victim)     victim : M victim)     victim : M victim)       TOTAL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Simple Assault                              6 (1:5)                1 (1:0)                4 (1:3)      11 (3:8)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assault w/SBI                               3 (0:3)                     --                1 (0:1)       4 (0:4)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal                                    9 (1:8)                1 (1:0)                5 (1:4)     15 (3:12)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% of all onboard assaults                      6.9%                   0.7%                   3.8%         11.4%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sexual Harass                               4 (4:0)                     --                     --       4 (4:0)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sexual Contact                            13 (10:3)              12 (11:1)                7 (2:5)     32 (23:9)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sexual Assault                            11 (11:0)              20 (20:0)                2 (0:2)     33 (31:2)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other                                            --                1 (1:0)                     --       1 (1:0)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal                                  28 (25:3)              33 (32:1)                9 (3:6)    70 (60:10)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% of sex-related incidents                    17.9%                  21.1%                   5.8%         44.9%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Theft \1\                                 20 (8:12)                     --                     --            20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Theft of ship property \2\                        3                     --                     --             3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Theft >10K \3\                                    5                     --                     --             5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal                                         28                     --                     --            28
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% of all onboard thefts                       27.7%                     --                     --         27.7%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overboard                                        --                     --                     --             4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% of all persons overboard                       --                     --                     --         57.2%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRAND TOTAL                                      65                     34                     14           117
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Data was secured through a Freedom of Information request by Ken Carver/International Cruise Victims
  Association.
\2\ Total value of theft of crew is $49,600 (average $2,480 per theft).
\3\ Total value of theft of ship property is $8,200 (2 incidents) plus one incident of stealing mail (value
  unknown).
\4\ Total value of theft >10K is $120,000 (average $24,000 per theft)--all were thefts against the cruise ship.


    The Chairman. Thank you very much for that very interesting 
and good testimony.
    And finally, Ms. Christine Duffy, and I apologize. 
Recently, the House had a hearing about women and there were 
all men at the table, and you're at the table but you're just 
barely at the table.
    So I want to apologize on behalf of the Committee. You 
should be right there with those other guys.
    Ms. Duffy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. And you are President and CEO of Cruise Lines 
International Association. We welcome your testimony.

 STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE DUFFY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, CRUISE LINES 
                   INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION

    Ms. Duffy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison and 
respected members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me 
to testify today. My name is Christine Duffy and I am President 
and Chief Executive Officer of Cruise Lines International 
Association, also known as CLIA.
    Before joining CLIA last year, I was President and CEO of 
Maritz Travel Company, one of the largest travel companies in 
the world, working with a variety of corporations.
    I would certainly prefer to be with you today under very 
different circumstances. The Concordia incident has had a 
significant impact on the entire industry and I speak for all 
of our cruise line members in expressing our deepest 
condolences to all of those that were affected by this tragedy.
    As an industry, we are wholly committed to examining what 
happened and to identifying lessons that can be learned from 
this tragic incident. Due to the ongoing investigations by 
Italian authorities, my remarks today will not focus on 
speculating about the causes of the Concordia tragedy.
    Rather, my testimony will provide a broader industry 
perspective on the regulation of the cruise ships, the 
importance we play on our commitment to protecting our 
passengers' safety and security and our efforts and progress to 
protect the environment.
    We applaud the Committee's leadership and interest in 
reviewing cruise industry operations and we welcome the 
opportunity to discuss our practices and procedures.
    CLIA represents 26 major cruise lines serving North America 
and more than 16,000 affiliated travel agents and agencies 
across the United States that sell and promote cruises to their 
customers in their communities across this country.
    Last year, our member lines' 211 ships served 16.3 million 
passengers. That number is up from 7.2 million in the year 
2000. CLIA's mission is to promote the unique benefits of 
cruising and also to promote the policies and practices among 
our members that foster a safe, secure and healthy cruise ship 
environment for all of our passengers and crew onboard.
    As was said, safety is the cruise industry's number one 
priority and there is nothing more important to our business 
than that. Every aspect of the cruise experience is heavily 
regulated and monitored under both U.S. and international law 
for the purpose of protecting the safety of crew and passengers 
onboard our ships.
    These regulations begin with the design and construction of 
ships and extend to the operation and navigation of the vessel, 
the training of the crew, emergency equipment onboard and 
evacuation protocols.
    The International Maritime Organization mandates global 
standards for the safety and operation of all cruise ships. The 
most important of these standards are detailed in the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, or 
SOLAS, which provides the uniform worldwide set of mandates 
regarding safety equipment, crew training, evacuation, 
emergency procedures and navigation safety standards.
    In the United States, the U.S. Coast Guard enforces all 
maritime regulatory requirements through both announced and 
unannounced rigorous inspections. At any time, the local Coast 
Guard captain of a port can prevent any cruise ship from 
departing if a serious violation of any one of these 
regulations is found.
    CLIA's senior staff include four retired U.S. Coast Guard 
officers so we are intimately familiar and work very closely 
with the Coast Guard and are committed to this branch of 
service. Because of the cruise industry's commitment to safety, 
along with a sound regulatory regime and vigorous enforcement 
mechanisms, cruising is one of the safest forms of leisure 
travel in the world.
    In the decade prior to the grounding of the Concordia, 
there were a total of 28 fatalities on cruise ships related to 
an operational casualty out of 223 million guests and crew who 
sailed during these years. Twenty-two of those fatalities 
involved crew members and six were passengers.
    I want to be very clear that not a single fatality is 
acceptable to our industry, and we will work tirelessly and 
continuously to prevent such an incident from occurring.
    Almost immediately following the Concordia incident, CLIA 
members launched a cruise industry operational safety review, a 
comprehensive assessment of the critical human factors and 
operational procedures for maritime safety. This review 
continues a long tradition in our industry and within CLIA of 
taking action proactively by working together across all of our 
member lines to improve and enhance safety procedures.
    I am pleased to report that the industry has already moved 
forward with recommendations from this review. On February 9th, 
CLIA members announced that we had instituted a new passenger 
muster policy that requires the muster drills for embarking 
passengers to be conducted prior to departure from port.
    This new policy does exceed the existing legal 
requirements, which call for muster drills within 24 hours of 
passenger embarkation. This new muster drill policy became 
effective immediately and applies not only to U.S. ships but 
internationally as well for CLIA members.
    Additionally, we worked with members of this committee to 
assist in developing and enacting the Cruise Vessel Security 
and Safety Act, which was signed into law by President Obama 
July 27th of 2010.
    CLIA member lines are already in compliance with the 
effective provisions of the CVSSA, including crime reporting 
procedures, the use of latch and computerized key technology 
and the requirement that log books include all reports of crime 
and thefts over $1,000.
    With regard to environmental stewardship, in the 37 years 
since CLIA was established our industry has made significant 
progress in reducing our environmental impact by implementing 
responsible practices and investing in new technologies.
    We believe it is our responsibility to protect the 
environment in which we operate and, certainly, our industry 
has been at the forefront of wastewater treatment, emissions 
reduction and developing innovative technologies to reduce the 
environmental impact of cruising.
    The management of wastewater is a complex and vitally 
important element of cruise ship operations and our industry 
has adopted its own set of stringent wastewater practices that 
go substantially beyond the rules and regulations.
    As more fuel-efficient ships have come into service, our 
members have been systematically reducing air emissions, 
including sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide and 
particulate matter. In the near future, international 
regulations will further reduce sulfur limits, helping to 
reduce air emissions across all oceans to meet these standards.
    The industry has also invested in new technology that 
manages the use of energy more effectively, such as testing the 
first ever cruise ship engine exhaust gas scrubbers and 
developing engines that run more efficiently.
    Our industry does have a vested interest in protecting the 
environment, not only because it is the right thing to do but 
also the very nature of our product depends on a healthy, 
natural environment. That's what our cruise passengers want to 
see when they experience a vacation onboard a cruise line.
    Clean oceans and beaches are essential to the cruise 
experience and we have made great strides and worked hard to 
become a leader in the maritime industry with responsible 
practices and innovations to reduce our environmental impact.
    Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony. We 
do remain fully and deeply committed to continuous enhancement 
of the safety of our guests and crew members, and it is without 
question our top priority.
    In addition, we have the same commitment to be a leader in 
the environmental stewardship in the maritime community. Thank 
you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Duffy follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Christine Duffy, President and CEO, 
                 Cruise Lines International Association
    Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison and respected 
members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. 
My name is Christine Duffy. I'm President and CEO of the Cruise Lines 
International Association--widely known as CLIA. I became CLIA's 
President last February. Before joining CLIA, I was President and CEO 
of Maritz Travel and I began my career as a travel agent.
    The Concordia incident has had a significant impact on our 
industry. I speak for all our cruise line members in expressing our 
deepest condolences to everyone affected by this tragedy. As an 
industry, we are wholly committed to examining what happened, and to 
identifying lessons that can be learned.
    My remarks today will not focus on speculation over the causes of 
the Costa Concordia tragedy. There are ongoing investigations by 
Italian maritime and law enforcement authorities and we hope to have 
their conclusions as soon as possible.
    Rather, my testimony will provide a broader industry perspective on 
how cruise ships are regulated and the importance we place on our 
commitment to safety. We applaud the Committee's interest in reviewing 
cruise industry operations and we welcome the opportunity to discuss 
our industry's practices and procedures.
    The Cruise Lines International Association represents 26 major 
cruise lines serving North America, more than 16,000 affiliated travel 
agents and agencies across the United States, and 120 Executive 
Partners spanning a broad array of industries--from ports to food 
suppliers--that help make the cruise industry run efficiently and 
effectively. Many of CLIA's travel agent members are small businesses. 
The majority of cruises continue to be booked through travel agents and 
they are an important cruise industry partner and national economic 
engine. Our travel agents play a pivotal role in assuring passengers of 
the safety and security of their cruise vacations. They are often the 
first to hear passenger concerns and first to relay them important 
information. Their tireless work plays an important role in helping 
their clients understand and appreciate that cruising continues to be 
one of the safest of all vacation options.
    In 2010, the North American cruise industry generated $37.85 
billion in U.S. economic benefits including nearly 330,000 U.S. jobs. 
Last year, our member lines' 211 ships served 16.3 million passengers--
up from 7.2 million in 2000.
    CLIA's mission is to promote the policies and practices that foster 
a safe, secure and healthy cruise ship environment for our guests. To 
fulfill that mission our member lines participate in ongoing, 
specialized committees, working groups, task forces and other forums to 
develop and promote industry-wide policies, routinely meeting with 
regulators and enforcement officials to promote efficiency and best 
practices throughout the world. Through these varied groups, and aided 
by a professional technical staff, consultants, and maritime 
authorities, our members share information, review and assist in 
developing applicable national and international legal requirements, 
and identify best industry practices for all members to adopt.
    Safety is the cruise industry's number one priority. Providing a 
safe environment begins with the industry's hiring process and policies 
for crewmember and guest behavior. It continues with training our 
crewmembers on our safety policies and enforcing them.
    Of course, we are not alone in this effort. Every aspect of the 
cruise experience is heavily regulated and monitored under U.S. and 
international maritime law for the purpose of protecting the safety of 
cruise passengers and crews.
    These regulations begin with the design and construction of the 
ship and extend to the operation and navigation of the vessel, the 
training of the crew, the emergency equipment on board, and the 
evacuation protocols. A United Nations agency--the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), mandates global standards for the safety 
and operation of cruise ships. The United States Coast Guard under the 
supervision of the Department of State is the primary agency that 
represents the United States at the IMO.
    The most important of these standards are covered by the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea or SOLAS. This 
treaty has been ratified by the United States, all European Union 
Member States and most other nations, providing a uniform worldwide set 
of mandates regarding safety equipment, crew training, evacuation and 
emergency procedures, and navigation safety standards.
    One of the most vital components of SOLAS is the International 
Safety Management Code or ISM. This Code is the primary mechanism for 
assigning safety responsibilities, functions, and procedures--both 
among the crew onboard an individual vessel, and the cruise line as a 
whole. The purpose of the ISM Code--and the continuous training 
exercises that instill it--is to ensure that every member of the crew, 
from the Captain to the most entry-level hospitality staff member, 
understands his or her precise responsibilities, especially in an 
emergency.
    The stringent standards embodied by the IMO, SOLAS and the ISM Code 
have multiple layers of enforcement. The primary responsibility rests 
with the flag state of the vessel. Secondarily, all ports where the 
vessel calls can and do take additional measures to ensure compliance.
    In the United States, for example, the U.S. Coast Guard enforces 
all maritime regulatory requirements through both announced and 
unannounced inspections and a rigorous annual examination of every ship 
that embarks passengers in the U.S. At any time, the local Coast Guard 
Captain of a Port can prevent any cruise ship from departing if a 
serious violation of any regulation is found. CLIA's senior staff 
includes four retired U.S. Coast Guard officers, so we are intimately 
familiar with the dedication and commitment of this branch of service.
    Additionally, all crewmembers receive training in emergency 
procedures, safety, security, and first aid. This includes but is not 
limited to: emergency signals and alarms; abandon ship procedures; man 
overboard; fire prevention and safety; and the location and donning of 
lifejackets. This safety training is required every 5 years, however, 
all crew are to receive familiarization training each time they report 
on board and each crew member must participate in the ship's weekly 
emergency drills at least once a month. This training ensures the 
crewmember is familiar with the emergency operations and the location 
of emergency equipment on that particular ship.
    Certain members of the crew also will be trained in the operation 
of the lifeboats and other survival equipment. Masters, officers and 
other personnel designated to assist passengers in an emergency are 
also required to have completed specific training in ``crowd 
management'' and ``crisis management and human behavior.''
    Crewmembers are also required to undergo emergency drills provided 
for in SOLAS, Chapter III, Regulation 19 regarding abandon ship 
protocols and firefighting. Instruction and training in the use of the 
ship's fire-extinguishing appliances, life-saving appliances, and in 
survival at sea must be given at the same interval as the drills. This 
training includes a mock search and rescue of passengers trapped in 
their staterooms. SOLAS also addresses record keeping for these drills 
and training sessions. Other crew training is specified in Chapter III, 
Regulation 19.4 as well. Chapter III, Regulation 37 also contains 
detailed requirements for the muster list and emergency instructions. 
All crew must be trained in the performance of their listed emergency 
duties.
    All modern cruise ships are required by SOLAS to have an array of 
electronic navigational instruments that assist in properly navigating 
the vessel. Most cruise ships substantially exceed the regulatory 
requirements in this regard.
    Additionally, the average CLIA ship, of approximately 97,000 gross 
tons carrying approximately 2,700 passengers and 800 crew, typically 
has five firefighting teams whose main members have advanced shipboard 
firefighting training, 4,000 smoke detectors, 500 fire extinguishers, 
16 miles of sprinkler piping, 5,000 sprinkler heads and 6 miles of fire 
hose.
    Because of the cruise industry's commitment to safety, supported by 
strict regulations and vigorous enforcement mechanisms, cruising is one 
of the safest forms of recreation and travel in the world.
    In the decade from 2002 through 2011, prior to the grounding of the 
Costa Concordia, there were a total of 28 fatalities on cruise ships 
related to an operational casualty. Twenty-two of those fatalities 
involved crew members; six were passengers out of approximately 223 
million passengers and crew who sailed during those 10 years.
    Let me be clear: Not a single fatality is acceptable to our 
industry and our industry will continue to work to prevent such 
incidents. One of the reasons fatal casualties are so rare is that we 
treat every one of these tragedies as a profound reminder of our duty 
to put ourselves under a microscope so we can continuously improve our 
practices, procedures and performance.
    Almost immediately following the Concordia incident, CLIA member 
cruise lines launched a Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review--a 
comprehensive assessment of the critical human factors and operational 
aspects of maritime safety. We announced this publicly on January 27, 
2012 on behalf of the global cruise industry. This Review, which is 
well underway, is comprised of four key components:

   First, an internal review by CLIA members of their own 
        operational safety practices and procedures covering issues of 
        navigation, evacuation, emergency training, and related 
        practices and procedures.

   Second, consultation on these issues with independent 
        external experts.

   Third, the identification and sharing of industry best 
        practices and policies, as well as possible recommendations to 
        the IMO for substantive regulatory changes to further improve 
        the industry's operational safety.

   Fourth, a commitment to collaborate with the IMO, 
        governments, and regulatory bodies to implement any necessary 
        changes--but also to act independently and voluntarily where 
        possible to speed safety improvements.

    I'm pleased to report that the industry is already moving forward 
with recommendations from this Review.
    On February 9, 2012 CLIA members instituted a new passenger muster 
policy requiring mandatory muster drills for embarking passengers prior 
to departure from port. This new policy exceeds existing legal 
requirements, which call for muster drills within 24 hours of passenger 
embarkation. It is being undertaken voluntarily and became effective 
immediately. Rather than waiting until the entire Review is completed, 
we will take steps to implement recommendations on industry best 
practices as soon as they are identified and on an ongoing basis.
    The Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review continues a long 
tradition in our industry of taking action proactively and voluntarily 
to improve our safety procedures. Another recent example was CLIA's 
development and adoption in 2008 of a series of best practices related 
to guest care--specifically the need to provide passengers practical 
assistance and emotional support during times of significant stress or 
trauma.
    CLIA's guidelines on guest care practices cover a broad range of 
services. While each situation is different, these services typically 
include assigning a specific care team to work with guests or their 
families in times of need, both on-ship and onshore; meeting 
transportation and logistical needs; providing immediate, complimentary 
communications to shore; serving as a liaison with local governments or 
the U.S. embassy when appropriate; and contacting a guest or family 
once they have returned home to determine if they need additional 
support.
    The cruise industry also has a strong record of working with 
Congress to enact new laws dedicated to advancing passenger safety. In 
2010, CLIA worked with many members of this Committee to assist in 
development and enactment of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, 
which was signed into law by President Obama on July 27, 2010.
    This legislation brought consistency and clarity to the security 
and safety laws and regulations for the cruise industry in the United 
States. CLIA member cruise lines are already in compliance with the 
effective provisions of the CVSSA, including crime reporting 
provisions; the use of latch and computerized key technology; and the 
requirements that log books include all reports of crime and thefts 
over $1,000. To bring further transparency to the industry, the U.S. 
Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) now maintain 
a website with the required reporting of closed case totals by cruise 
line in each category.
    Our members are also in compliance with new mandates that became 
effective on January 27, 2012 requiring 42-inch rail heights in all 
passenger areas and peep holes in all passenger and crew cabins. We 
will continue to work with the U.S. Coast Guard, the FBI and other law 
enforcement agencies both in the U.S. and around the world to ensure 
that all of the bill's provisions are fully implemented.
    Quite simply Americans are extremely safe at sea today. In many 
ways--again, well documented by statistics and other evidence--they are 
even safer in the well-protected environment of a cruise ship than they 
are on land.
    Independent surveys show that the vast majority of cruise 
passengers--95 percent--say they are very satisfied with their cruising 
experience. Nearly half say they are extremely satisfied. And more than 
half of all passengers become repeat customers--cruising for a second 
or third or fourth time.
    I submit that this would not be the case if safety or security were 
perceived as a serious problem. As the Coast Guard has testified, crime 
aboard cruise ships is extremely rare.
    Our position is that even one incident or crime of any kind is one 
too many.
    At the same time, we have to recognize the existence and the 
dangers of exaggeration. Assertions are sometimes made and unofficial 
statistics are sometimes quoted that bear no relation to any known 
reality.
    In contrast, detailed studies by the renowned criminologist Dr. 
James Alan Fox of Northeastern University confirm the safety of 
passengers aboard today's cruise ships.
    In Dr. Fox's words--and I quote--``While virtually no place--on 
land or sea--is totally free of risk, the number of reported incidents 
of serious crime from cruise lines is extremely low, no matter what 
benchmark or standard is used.''
    Now I would like to provide information on the cruise industry's 
efforts to prevent the introduction and/or spread of Gastrointestinal 
illness (such as Norovirus) aboard cruise ships. Historic incidence 
rates of Gastrointestinal Illness aboard cruise ships are low and 
according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
the vast majority of outbreaks occur in land based settings such as 
schools, hospitals, and nursing homes. Nevertheless, CLIA member lines 
regularly communicate with one another, local and state health 
departments, the U.S. CDC and other international public health 
authorities to gather epidemiological information, identify sources of 
infection and share best practices.
    CLIA member cruise lines employ a variety of sanitation practices 
and each line has specific, well-established Outbreak Prevention and 
Response Plans, all designed to keep passengers healthy during their 
cruise vacations. Our members take steps designed specifically to 
prevent sick passengers from bringing norovirus on board a ship and in 
the rare instances of outbreak, CLIA lines immediately employ numerous 
practices to mitigate its spread and treat ill passengers and crew.
    Our lines also communicate with passengers and crew, especially to 
increase awareness of proper hand hygiene practices. Public health is 
an evolving area and new research and information is ongoing, so cruise 
lines are always assessing and updating procedures as appropriate. In 
fact, outbreak prevention methods are typically developed in close 
collaboration with CDC officials.
    Unlike land-based outbreaks, which are generally not reported, the 
robust reporting structure for shipboard cases of norovirus allows 
cruise lines to share information with local and Federal health 
officials. This practice enables these agencies to better identify the 
original source of infection and allows cruise lines to more 
effectively implement mitigation strategies. If at least 3 percent of a 
ship's passengers or crew members report a Gastrointestinal Illness 
(GI), including norovirus, CDC officials have the option to conduct an 
investigation. In addition, thorough and regular inspections by the CDC 
Vessel Sanitation Program (VSP) ensure that cruise ships operating from 
U.S. ports have exceptional food handling and sanitary practices. A 
former VSP Sanitation Chief has said that the CDC program standard to 
which cruise ships are held for sanitation is one of the very the 
highest in the world for public places.
    Another area that I know is of interest to this committee, is our 
industry's commitment to environmental stewardship. In the 37 years 
since CLIA was established, our industry has made significant progress 
in reducing our environmental impact by implementing responsible 
practices and investing in new technologies. CLIA believes that it is 
our responsibility to protect the environment in which we operate. Our 
industry has been at the forefront of wastewater treatment, emissions 
reduction and developing innovative technologies to reduce the 
environmental impact of cruising.
    The management of wastewater is a complex and vitally important 
element of cruise ship operations.
    Blackwater--water from toilets and medical facility drain, and 
graywater--water from cabin sinks and showers, laundry, galleys and 
spas, discharge are often regulated or treated to a higher standard 
than most land based systems. Also, our industry adopted its own set of 
stringent wastewater practices that go substantially beyond the rules 
and regulations. For example, while international regulations permit 
the discharge of untreated blackwater 12 nautical miles from shore, as 
a policy CLIA members treat all blackwater using equipment certified to 
meet the standards set by the U.S. Coast Guard or using an advanced 
wastewater treatment system.
    Cruise ships have adopted rigorous programs to tackle waste 
disposal in an environmentally friendly manner, including doing all we 
can to minimize the potential waste coming on board ships. We also take 
extensive measures to recycle as much waste as possible by using 
segregated on-board collection bins. CLIA lines recycle approximately 
80,000 tons of solid waste annually, comprised largely of paper, 
plastic, aluminum cans and glass. Other waste, such as hazardous waste 
and oily bilge water receive special treatment as well.
    As more fuel efficient ships have come into service, CLIA members 
have been systematically reducing air emissions, including sulfur 
oxides, nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide and particulate matter. In the 
near future, international regulations will further reduce sulfur 
limits, helping to reduce air emissions across all oceans. To meet 
these standards, the industry has been investing in new technologies 
that manage the use of energy more effectively, such as testing the 
first ever cruise ship engine exhaust gas scrubbers and developing 
engines that run more efficiently.
    Cruise lines are also working alongside ports to reduce waste and 
emissions. This is best demonstrated by the use of shore power, a 
relatively new technology in the cruise ship arena, which involves a 
ship connecting to shore-side power and shutting down its own engines 
while in port. A handful of ports on the North American west coast are 
now equipped with the necessary, and technically rather complex, 
facilities for ships to `plug-in' when they are in port. CLIA members 
are involved at the international regulatory level to explore a 
universal approach toward shore power that would overcome current 
obstacles, which involve the source of shore power, the connection 
adapter itself, as well as electrical disparities from one country to 
the next.
    Other innovations help ships conserve energy. Environmentally 
friendly hull coatings make ships' hulls smoother, and a ship's design 
itself can be modified into a bulbous bow, for example, that generates 
a bow wave slightly earlier. Both result in energy savings by reducing 
resistance. Other innovations include heat recovery that allows heat to 
be collected from one system aboard a ship and used for another, and 
innovative air conditioning systems that run more effectively and 
utilize technology that minimizes the amount of energy used to cool a 
room when it is not occupied. Ships are now using energy-efficient 
light bulbs that generate less heat. Because ships spend so much time 
under the bright sun, solar panels are a promising source of 
supplementary energy and are used on many cruise ships.
    Our industry has a vested interest in protecting the environment, 
not only because it is the socially responsible thing to do--but 
because the very nature of our product depends on a healthy natural 
environment--clean oceans and beaches are essential to the cruise 
experience. CLIA has made great strides to become a leader in the 
maritime industry with responsible practices and innovations that are 
reducing environmental impact.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to provide this testimony to 
the Committee. I hope the information is helpful in addressing the 
substantial oversight and accountability of cruise lines, both in the 
U.S. and internationally. CLIA will continue to lead the Cruise 
Industry Operational Safety Review and, as with the recently agreed 
Muster Policy, will look to apply what is learned through that process 
so that future incidents, however rare, can be avoided. We remain fully 
and deeply committed to continuous enhancement of the safety of our 
guests and crewmembers, as it is without question our top priority. In 
addition, we will continue to be a leader in environmental stewardship 
in the maritime community. I look forward to answering your questions. 
Thank you.

    The Chairman. I'm going to start the questioning.
    Ms. Duffy, that's sort of like everything is just working 
wonderfully, and I'm just thinking about those three miles 
beyond which you can dump anything you want, and you do.
    So talk to me about the environment, and I'm willing to 
hear your testimony and I have to accept what you say 
seriously. But don't expect me to be moved by it because 
there's an embarrassment which works at my soul. Genuinely. I 
don't use those words in committee hearings. About the 
irresponsibility of the environmental record and the luck that 
you have, the so-called three miles, that beyond that you're on 
your own.
    You do what you want. You can talk about treated sewage. 
You can talk about untreated sewage. You just pour it out 
there, and there are islands of it in various oceans around the 
world.
    That's not, however, my question. Many Americans don't 
think the corporations pay their fair share of taxes, and I'm 
one of them. We have, actually, when you strip it down, the 
lowest tax rate of anybody in the industrial world. You 
wouldn't think so during all of this political debate. But I 
can't blame them.
    And I read a recent report in The New York Times about your 
industry, Ms. Duffy. According to this report, the largest 
company in your industry, Carnival, which has a lot of 
percentage of the cruise market and which makes about $11.3 
billion in profits over the last 5 years, on this profit the 
company has only paid 1.1 percent in Federal, state, local or 
foreign taxes. True?
    Ms. Duffy. Mr. Chairman, I can't speak to the specific tax 
payments or corporate structures of a specific member. What I 
can say is that all of our members pay taxes both in this 
country and internationally based on the current laws and will 
continue to do so.
    The Chairman. Well, you should be able to say what you pay, 
and if you don't, that's fine. But the fact is that 1.1 percent 
on, you know, 5 years, $11.3 billion in profits, is absolutely 
unthinkable to me. According to SEC filings that my staff has 
reviewed, Carnival actually paid no U.S. corporate taxes at all 
in 2011, which I believe was last year.
    Do you have a comment on that?
    Ms. Duffy. Again, I----
    The Chairman. Do you think that's right?
    Ms. Duffy. Again, I can only say that----
    The Chairman. You're here representing your industry.
    Ms. Duffy. I'm here represent----
    The Chairman. If I'm right, do you think that that's right 
that that happened?
    Ms. Duffy. I think what is appropriate is that the cruise 
industry pays its taxes based on the current laws.
    The Chairman. So if you paid no taxes there must be some 
current law that I'm not aware of.
    Ms. Duffy. Well, the cruise industry--many of our members 
are multinational corporations and are doing business around 
the world. We operate in many countries. We have crew from over 
150 countries. We have passengers that are cruising from around 
the world and----
    The Chairman. I understand that, Ms. Duffy. All I'm saying 
is if you're going to go before congressional committees, and 
particularly this one, you've got to be more prepared. You 
can't just say you're not sure and talk about your 
international nature.
    Most industries, particularly big ones in this country, are 
international and then we're not very happy when they don't pay 
taxes. I think it's amazing.
    Can you explain why a multibillion-dollar company which is 
headquartered in Miami and extensively uses Miami and 
extensively uses up to 20 Federal agencies at various points in 
time should not be paying any U.S. taxes?
    Ms. Duffy. I believe that our members do pay for services 
that we use at the ports----
    The Chairman. You don't. You do not.
    Ms. Duffy.--or per passenger for Customs and Border 
Protection work. And, again, I can only come back to state that 
our members pay taxes.
    The Chairman. Do you want to comment on that, Dr. Klein?
    Dr. Klein. Yes, I would just make one comment because, 
really, it gets into what you were talking about because I also 
have in my written testimony the absence of paying taxes.
    I have from a Freedom of Information request indication 
that a single search for a missing passenger costs the U.S. 
Coast Guard $813,807, which comes out of the U.S. Treasury. 
It's not cost recovered. And I think this is what you're 
getting at. That's just one missing passenger.
    The Chairman. That's part of what I'm getting at. That's 
reimbursing for the services they've been rendered----
    Dr. Klein. Oh, yes.
    The Chairman. Or partly. But I'm talking about corporate 
taxes.
    Dr. Klein. Exactly, the absence, and it's because Carnival 
is registered in Panama as a Panamanian corporation. Royal 
Caribbean Cruises Limited is a Liberian corporation. And as a 
result, between that and flying and using ships that have 
foreign flags, they find themselves exempt from most of the 
U.S. taxes.
    The Chairman. Well, then maybe you should have your 
headquarters in one of those countries and that you just 
wouldn't have the Coast Guard to help you when you run into 
trouble. Don't think I'm being mean. I'm being very fair.
    You are a world unto yourself up to 5,000 people in these 
huge ships which dominate the skylands, which makes the Virgin 
Islands practically disappear in terms of size. And you have 
your own rules and you say you're international and you're 
registered not in the United States and all these things, all 
of which lawyers can work out to reduce your safety 
responsibilities and your payment of taxes and all kinds of 
other things.
    Now, last time we had hearings on this, I believe, Senator 
Lautenberg, that we talked a lot about, rapes and things on 
boats of that size, and when you have that many people you 
can't sort of use the standards of an American community 
because the chances of something happening to somebody are so 
much greater simply because of the compaction of people. 
They're so close. So your standards have to be really, in many 
ways, better than others.
    I'm over my time but I will just end this part of my 
questioning by saying there are at least 20 different Federal 
agencies that help the cruise industry run cruises and you're 
not, evidently, willing to pay for what they do. And I'm 
distressed by that and will continue the questioning, but the 
questioning now goes to Senator Begich.
    Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Senator Begich, will you accept as part of 
the written record that the seventh largest port in the United 
States is Huntington, West Virginia, on the Ohio River?
    Senator Begich. I will consider it.
    Senator Lautenberg. What's the draft on those ships?
    The Chairman. I only----
    Senator Lautenberg. What's the draft on those ships, Mr. 
Chairman?
    Senator Begich. Yes. Twelve inches.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. Anyway, please proceed, Senator Begich.
    Senator Begich. I have a few questions for the Admiral 
first, but let me, Ms. Duffy, I want to follow up on the 
Chairman's questioning. I know this from our work in Alaska--
the cruise ship industry--you know, it's interesting because I 
should be in the Budget Committee also, which is doing tax 
reform right now, matter of fact, but I'm here so it's 
interesting. I get to do both now on this committee so this is 
good for me. I get to do dual.
    But just to give you an example, and I want to make sure 
I'm saying this right, I know we did a study because we have 
also so much cruise ship industry in our state, just in our 
southeast region where a lot of the cruises run. Local sales 
tax revenue is in the millions, in the millions that's paid.
    The dockage fees, and I'll turn to the port, is in the 
millions and I'll just make my comments here. The income tax 
issue is another debate. I'm anxious to have that because I 
think there are a lot of industries that need to be readjusted. 
We have a tax reform bill. Matter of fact, Johnny Isakson, who 
was here earlier, and I have sponsored or have talked about 
issues around tax reform.
    But there is a great need for it global Federal tax reform, 
but on the local end, I know we have passenger fees in Alaska. 
You drop a person off on our dock, we're charging you.
    We appreciate your visit but we want a little of that cash 
in our economy, to be very blunt with you, but also in the 
sales tax generation that occurs by those additional 
expenditures and dock expenditures that the cruise ship 
industry puts into the mix.
    So I want to make sure that's part of the discussion also, 
that for Alaska it's millions and maybe--you know, I don't know 
if I can hold you on that thought because I know in Miami it 
must be tens of millions.
    But I don't know how your port operates. I know how we 
operate. We love the cruise ship industry but we also want a 
piece of the action.
    Mr. Johnson. And it's a great piece of the action. Your 
ports at the local level, again, by state are generating untold 
tens of millions. My port alone--the reason I say this--you can 
look at this many different ways, Senators, but, clearly, we 
charge harbor fees. We charge--you know, we're charging 
dockage. We're charging for water. We're charging for 
electricity.
    My port alone, you know, we're talking--on the cruise side 
I'm generating annually, I call it revenue, $40 million, $50 
million a year just on the cruise side. So they are paying 
fees. It's a combination. Some of that is passed through to the 
cruise passenger. A lot of it is coming from the corporation, 
from the cruise line.
    Security is a huge cost. The cruise lines themselves are 
providing all of the security at their cost inside the 
terminal. I myself, because we're top ranked in my state, one 
of the leaders in America in safety and security, I spend--I 
have a very hefty security budget to keep us in that top 
position because it is our highest priority.
    All of these programs--safety, security, environmental at 
the port level--we look at it as a fee-based structure, whether 
it's in Alaska, California, whether it's in Florida. And so 
yes, to be really honest, I'm generating revenue. I have 
expenses.
    At the end of the day when you balance the book it's a 
public port. I'm generating a profit. This is the direct. The 
indirect is, again, the multiplier, through the creation of 
jobs, through, you know, all of that, through the provisioning. 
You're into the billions and billions and billions.
    So my point is, and again, I understand, you know, Mr. 
Chairman, what you're saying--I think it's extremely important 
for America, and this is just my belief, I think it's extremely 
important for America that these cruise lines are headquartered 
in America.
    I would hate to lose, OK, I'd hate to lose it in Florida 
off my community out of Miami. I'd hate to lose--but I'd hate 
to lose it out of the United States. And I can tell you at the 
CEO level of one of the largest cruise lines in the world--it's 
not Carnival, but another one--I spent a year negotiating a 
renewal on their headquarters, which is on my port, and the 
alternative, quite honestly, was London, all right.
    They can move these headquarters to other places. So 
there's a lot of ways you can look at this and analyze. But, 
Senator, you're absolutely right.
    Senator Begich. Let me hold you there because I do agree on 
the broader suite that there should be this corporate tax 
reform on the general, and I can tell you industry after 
industry. So that's another subject. Let me ask the Admiral. I 
only got a few minutes left.
    I know in 2000 the GAO found that, you know, more 
monitoring was needed in discharging for the cruise ship 
industry, and since then there has been some things changed. 
Tell me kind of how that has progressed.
    I know in Alaska we've done some incredible things 
regarding discharge but we also do some other things for 
example, they use our port power rather than running their 
ships, which is important for emissions, the cruise ship 
industry is part of that equation now. Tell me, how has it 
improved in the last decade on discharge in your ability?
    Admiral Salerno. Well, Senator, we do look at all of the 
environmental requirements as part of our regular annual and 
semi-annual examinations of cruise ships. In Alaska, in 
particular, as you point out, there are some special 
requirements particularly relating to discharges from the 
vessel.
    We have worked with the cruise lines and with the state of 
Alaska to make sure that those requirements are reflected in 
our inspection procedures and that involves, for example, 
sewage discharges. We've----
    Senator Begich. We have a higher standard.
    Admiral Salerno. You do, and that has been, but it's also 
become a Federal requirement to comply with that.
    Senator Begich. Right.
    Admiral Salerno. So as Federal law enforcement officers, we 
do work with the lines. We witness the taking of samples. Those 
samples have to go to approved laboratories or accepted 
laboratories is the technical term, and we verify that 
whatever's going over the side meets the EPA effluence 
standards.
    Senator Begich. Very good.
    Admiral Salerno. And similar, the North American emission 
control area that is, you know, coming into effect, which will 
affect the nature of emissions into the air.
    Senator Begich. I'll stop there, Mr. Chairman. I know we're 
limited on time but I do have other questions. I'll probably 
put them for the record unless we get a second round. I'll 
leave it there.
    The Chairman. No. Why don't you go ahead? You know, the----
    Senator Begich. Can I go ahead?
    The Chairman.--vote has been postponed until 11:30.
    Senator Begich. Can I do one more quick question? And this 
is, I think, important when we look at the accident in Italy. 
We have requirements, and I look toward, again, the admiral. We 
require local mariners or marine pilots to be on the ships as 
they come into our waters.
    Do you think that kind of standard would have made a 
difference? And then the reason I want to ask you is I want to 
then flip back to one quick question to Ms. Duffy. But do you 
think that standard could have had an impact on international 
waters, the incident in Italy?
    Admiral Salerno. Well, it's hard to tell exactly in the 
Italian case, sir, but that's part of why we're so interested 
in the facts in this case. Just looking at the chart, I'm not 
certain that that was pilotage waters for that area.
    Senator Begich. Yes.
    Admiral Salerno. But, clearly, pilots are very much part of 
the safety system in the United States. When pilots, you know, 
guide ships in and out of port they are advisors to the master. 
They're local experts.
    Senator Begich. They know the waters.
    Admiral Salerno. They know the waters. In our view, 
indispensable component to the overall safety structure.
    Senator Begich. Ms. Duffy, if I can ask you one last 
question and that is on--you said the international agreement. 
Is it called SOLIS?
    Ms. Duffy. SOLAS.
    Senator Begich. SOLAS. Do you as an industry review those 
international requirements on a regular basis? How is that 
reviewed and do you take like an incident which has occurred in 
Italy and say as an organization, that international 
organization, we have to review now our standards again? How 
does that work? I don't know.
    Ms. Duffy. CLIA is a nongovernmental organization that 
represents the cruise line industry at the International 
Maritime Organization in London. But there are 170 member 
nations that are also represented----
    Senator Begich. Are part of this agreement.
    Ms. Duffy.--in IMO. And for the United States, that's under 
the State Department. The U.S. Coast Guard is actually our 
delegates----
    Senator Begich. OK.
    Ms. Duffy.--at the International Maritime Organization. 
That is the body that is setting and establishing all of these 
regulations, which SOLAS is one of those. They also establish 
and have the environmental requirements for the maritime 
industry as well. Here in the United States, then, the Coast 
Guard is the enforcement agency for those regulations and, as 
the vice admiral said, the port state control provides that 
enforcement and is obviously delivered through the----
    Senator Begich. But those are reviewed and updated.
    Ms. Duffy. Those constantly--there are committees and 
meetings throughout the year. We actually have a CLIA--our 
environmental director, environmental public health director 
from CLIA, is actually at the IMO right now in London 
participating in an environmental committee meeting.
    Senator Begich. Very good.
    Dr. Klein. May I make one comment? May I?
    I just wanted to say I agree Alaska has some of the most 
stringent regulations with regard to environmental concerns and 
they are really to be admired for that.
    I guess I want to point out in some ways Washington State 
has even more stringent regulations. What's sad, however, is 
the majority of coastal states in the U.S. don't enjoy the same 
level of protection, and that's why I advocate----
    Senator Begich. That was your point about the national.
    Dr. Klein. Yes. Yes, because there's this real patchwork, 
and I think there's no reason why the people of Alaska should 
enjoy a cleaner environment from this industry than Georgia, 
Mississippi, Oregon or other places.
    Senator Begich. We like having the best standard.
    Dr. Klein. And I admire it, most definitely.
    The Chairman. Senator Begich, thank you----
    Senator Begich. Thank you.
    The Chairman.--very much for your question. I want to go to 
Senator Lautenberg, who's Chairman of our Subcommittee here, to 
be followed by Senator Boozman.
    Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much. I think you heard me 
talk about the two constituents from New Jersey who were on the 
Costa Concordia, and they said things were chaotic and 
confusing and had no idea about what to do first. And they said 
they were not given any safety training called muster drills 
before the crash, making the evacuation more chaotic and more 
confusing. In response, the industry voluntarily changed their 
policy to require muster drills prior to leaving port.
    Now, I ask whether Admiral Salerno or Ms. Duffy know that 
these muster drills are taking place and that they're effective 
in the familiarization for the passengers. Are they at this 
point?
    Admiral Salerno. Senator, the international requirement is 
to hold them within 24 hours. We have nothing to suggest that 
that's not occurring. However, we feel that it's important to 
strengthen that.
    So we have directed our inspectors to witness those drills 
whenever they're onboard for a periodic examination, and the 
industry has also voluntarily required their members to conduct 
those drills prior to getting under way. So that's in excess of 
the international requirement and, in our view, that is an 
appropriate interim and first measure even though we don't have 
all the facts in the Costa----
    Senator Lautenberg. Yes. Should we perhaps, Admiral, modify 
the international standards to make the muster drills 
mandatory?
    Admiral Salerno. Sir, I think we do need to look at that, 
and that is on the agenda at the International Maritime 
Organization for the upcoming Maritime Safety Committee, not 
only that particular issue but a review of cruise ship 
standards overall.
    Senator Lautenberg. Yes, because it is amazing, honestly, 
as I look at it, and I like the income that comes from cruises. 
I like the enjoyment that comes with the tour and travel boat 
excursions now and New Jersey has a busy area and near the 
Hudson River the Statue of Liberty stands promptly there. And 
I'm an honorary member of the Pilots Association of Sandy Hook. 
That doesn't mean I go out there and do it--and I wouldn't want 
a boat that I was the pilot for. I wouldn't want to be there.
    But, Ms. Duffy, I commend the industry for changing its 
policy to require the pre-departure muster drills. Now, how 
will the industry enforce the policy so that all the cruise 
ships do conduct these drills before leaving port?
    Ms. Duffy. Many of our members already conduct the drills 
prior to departure from port, and now that we have announced 
this policy it becomes part of the mandate and part of the ship 
system of procedures to ensure. And, obviously, we've made a 
very public announcement. I believe that our members will 
conduct these musters.
    Passengers will be expecting that the musters will be 
conducted prior to departure, and as the Vice Admiral says, 
this is something that the Coast Guard as part of the 
enforcement role that they play to ensure----
    Senator Lautenberg. What's the penalty?
    Ms. Duffy.--inspections.
    Senator Lautenberg. If they fail to do it?
    Admiral Salerno. Senator, the ultimate penalty is they may 
not be allowed to leave port, you know, so that is a very----
    Senator Lautenberg. Are there fines if they don't?
    Admiral Salerno. There are provisions, civil penalty type 
provisions, which I can----
    Senator Lautenberg. Yes.
    Admiral Salerno.--provide to you the exact amount if you'd 
like.
    [The information requested follows:]

    A civil penalty may be assessed only if a vessel fails to comply 
with a law or regulation for which there is a penalty provision. In 
this case, there is no law or regulation that states a cruise ship must 
perform a passenger muster before a vessel departure from port.
    However, as a matter of current policy, the Coast Guard is 
witnessing passenger musters before or upon departure on cruise ships 
concurrent with each control verification examination performed under 
the authority of Title 46 U.S.C. 3505. If the vessel does not perform 
the passenger muster, the control verification examination will be 
deemed incomplete and the Coast Guard will not issue or endorse the 
vessel's Certificate of Compliance. If this were to occur, the Coast 
Guard may order the vessel to remain in port until the passenger muster 
has been performed.

    Senator Lautenberg. The question----
    Dr. Klein. May I make one quick----
    Senator Lautenberg. Yes, Dr. Klein.
    Dr. Klein. I'll make it very quick. I think it's important 
for us to define what we mean by a muster drill. When I used to 
cruise, a muster drill was--it took a half hour. You went to 
the muster station. The captain came by or a senior officer 
made sure you put your lifejacket on properly, made sure people 
knew the procedures, and it was a 30-minute ordeal.
    Today, according to a cruise director from Carnival Cruise 
Lines, they gather at the muster station. A person walks by 
with a clicker to count the number of people there. There is 
not attendance taken, which it used to be, and they're finished 
within 5 minutes. This is according to a cruise director on his 
own blog.
    I guess all I want to raise is I think we need to define 
what we mean by muster drill as opposed to leaving it kind of 
as this sort of, you know, a label that we're not sure what we 
mean.
    Senator Lautenberg. Yes. Well, I would imagine--Captain 
Doherty, did you want to say something here?
    Captain Doherty. With respect to pre-departure musters, you 
asked if the Coast Guard can enforce it. If you don't make it 
the law the Coast Guard can't enforce it.
    It's laudable for the industry to say yes, we're going to 
do this. But there's nothing to measure the penalties against 
unless it's included in the amended Cruise Vessel Act and also 
included in the international standard--International Safety 
Management procedures so you can measure their safety 
compliance against, one, just exactly what a muster is defined 
as, as Dr. Klein said----
    Senator Lautenberg. Yes.
    Captain Doherty. And two, you know, what the penalties are 
under the law, not under an industry association.
    Senator Lautenberg. We know what the intentions are, and I 
leave it to the industry to come up with something that passes 
the taste test here. But it's obvious that despite the great 
safety record, the huge numbers of travelers that you have, 
that something like this is very discouraging. It stands out 
despite the millions of passengers that have passed through 
safely.
    One last thing is----
    The Chairman. Senator Lautenberg, can I just add a thought? 
I think we're getting at it here. I think you have two lives. 
One is at port, and the Coast Guard, which is singing your 
praises here, somewhat to my amazement, what you do in port. I 
come from a state where there are a lot of coal mines and 
there's a lot of talk about safety practices and coal mines 
that are sort of in very remote places. They're, you know, 300, 
500, 2,000 feet underground. And it's a little bit like your 
world. Once you're beyond the three miles, the world is yours.
    Once you go into a coal mine, you can't go into a coal mine 
unless you're a coalminer or a safety inspector, something of 
that sort.
    But they can talk about rules but that has nothing to do 
with whether the rules are carried out and whether enforcement 
is enforced. And how in Heaven's name is the Coast Guard going 
to, just on the environmental basis of dumping sewage, follow 
them around? Because they don't have the resources to do it or 
the time to do it, to follow them around to see what they're 
doing. We know these islands are out there.
    Senator Lautenberg. That's a good thought, Mr. Chairman, 
and I think the one thing that we have to do is get past the 
lack of resources because if anything more happens I think it's 
very damaging to the industry and we don't want to do it. So I 
agree with you. We're on the same wavelength here.
    Ms. Duffy, one of the things that's talked about somewhat 
is crimes aboard ship or connected with the crews in some way, 
and the cruise lines are required to inform the FBI about 
serious crime, the number of crimes supposed to be made public.
    However, according to the FBI data that I obtained, the 
number of crimes posted online is lower than reported by 
industry. For example, last year cruise lines reported more 
than 40 sexual assaults but only 14 are posted publicly. Will 
the industry commit to publicly disclosing the actual number of 
serious crimes that happen on cruise ships?
    Ms. Duffy. Senator, all of our cruise lines and the 
industry overall comply today with all of the reporting 
requirements that were established under the cruise line--the 
Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act.
    The reporting of those crimes are part of what the FBI does 
and we're reporting everything that we are required to report 
to the FBI, who, I believe, is then responsible for working 
on----
    Senator Lautenberg. Yes. OK. We have to make certain that 
not only should it be public but should be timely and I'm going 
to pursue this with you at another time. Thank you.
    Ms. Duffy. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Colleagues, I am embarrassed to tell you--I 
didn't realize time was passing so quickly--that the vote has 
started and there are about 9 minutes left on the vote.
    Senator Klobuchar. Could I just get two questions or----
    The Chairman. No. I mean, I want to come back.
    Senator Klobuchar. OK.
    The Chairman. Can you do that because there's----
    Senator Klobuchar. No, but thank you. It's fine. All right. 
Thank you.
    The Chairman. Well, ask the questions and then we'll 
recess.
    Senator Klobuchar. OK.
    The Chairman. Take the answers. Quickly.
    Senator Klobuchar. OK.
    [Laughter.]

               STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

    Senator Klobuchar. I just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, 
for holding this hearing and, as you know, the tragedy hit home 
in Minnesota. We lost a couple from White Bear Lake, Minnesota. 
And I think whenever you have a tragedy like this happen it 
makes you look at safety, and I'm head of the Tourism 
ubcommittee and care very much about this.
    But I also am concerned about the legal remedies from this, 
and if we are out of time you can put your answers in writing 
later. But I understand that under the Death on the High Seas 
Act families who lost a loved one have limited legal remedies 
that they can pursue for the tremendous loss that they have 
suffered.
    Current law prevents victims' families from recovering 
anything other than lost income or wages. In contrast, if a 
family suffers the loss of a loved one in a plane crash, they 
may choose to pursue non-pecuniary damages in court.
    And I would ask in writing so no one has to wait, whether 
from all of you, what kind of impact you think this disparity 
in the law has on the surviving families of victims. And I will 
also pose a question on----
    The Chairman. Senator Klobuchar, before you do that, she 
will ask her question. After that, we will go into recess. We 
will go vote. We will come back, at least I will. I hope 
Senator Boozman does because I haven't been fair to him. And 
we'll continue this hearing.
    Senator Klobuchar. OK. Very good.
    The Chairman. OK?
    Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Our hearing is adjourned after you've asked 
your question.
    Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Recessed, not adjourned.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Begich. Did you finish the question?
    Senator Klobuchar. OK. I guess I'm going to continue to ask 
my question. So one of the other questions that I have is the 
cruise industry, and you could choose to answer either of 
these, and these are statistics about the--as you know, 
millions of Americans are passengers on a cruise ship.
    They deserve to know if there's transparency and 
accountability for ensuring their safety onboard, and so just 
safety record issues and whether or not the industry should be 
required to report these statistics to a Federal or an 
international entity. Can anyone answer that question? Yes, Dr. 
Klein?
    Dr. Klein. Well, what I find is that there is no 
comprehensive recording of incidents at sea. I've been--I 
started writing about the cruise industry in the late 1990s, 
and at that time went through the media and extracted every 
event I could find.
    As you'll see in my written testimony, Appendix A is a 
reflection of what I've been able to cull from the media and 
from reports from cruise passengers. I get 3,000 visitors a day 
to my website. To my knowledge, there's nowhere else that one's 
going to find a comprehensive list of known accidents at sea, 
and I think it's just worth mentioning.
    Senator Klobuchar. OK. Ms. Duffy?
    Ms. Duffy. There is an authoritative report that is 
produced by an independent party internationally, G.P. Wild, on 
cruise industry casualties, and that is where the numbers came 
from for the 223 million crew and passengers between 2002 and 
through 2011 with 26 deaths due to marine casualty. We'd be 
happy to submit this report to the Committee.
    Senator Klobuchar. OK. Dr. Klein?
    Dr. Klein. If I could just say, in no way to impugn G.P. 
Wild or anything else, my work is truly independent. I'm an 
academic.
    Senator Klobuchar. Yes.
    Dr. Klein. I have no vested interest and I report on my 
website, CruiseJunkie.com, any information that comes to me in 
a dispassionate manner. So when I say information being 
available is not digested. It's there and----
    Senator Klobuchar. And there's--but there's no requirement 
right now to report the stats to a Federal or international 
entity, which is----
    Dr. Klein. Not that I know of.
    Senator Klobuchar. My exact question.
    Ms. Duffy. The International Maritime Organization also 
maintains a database of casualty--marine casualty reports, and 
that is information that is reported to the IMO. I believe that 
Dr. Klein's numbers also include ferries and all kinds of 
other----
    Dr. Klein. Not what I presented here.
    Ms. Duffy.--ships. So----
    Senator Klobuchar. OK. Well, we will--why don't----
    Dr. Klein. The data I presented in Appendix A does not 
include ferries. It only includes cruise ships.
    Senator Klobuchar. OK.
    Dr. Klein. If you want to see the ferry data then you go to 
my website and you'll see considerably more accidents. But I 
purposely extracted those.
    Senator Klobuchar. OK. Anyone else? And then the first 
question that I asked, which is more complicated, on the legal 
questions of the high seas, I'd appreciate answers in writing 
on that. Did you want to add something?
    Admiral Salerno. I would just add to the discussion----
    Senator Klobuchar. Vice Admiral.
    Admiral Salerno. The Coast Guard does track all reportable 
marine casualties for events that occur within our 
jurisdiction. So these are not global numbers but, you know, 
U.S. numbers.
    Senator Klobuchar. OK.
    Admiral Salerno. So if a foreign flag ship has an accident 
in U.S. waters we track that, and that information is publicly 
available.
    Senator Klobuchar. So we have the U.S. numbers. We're just 
not sure about the international numbers, although there are 
arguments about this study, and we'll see that. And then the 
other question that has come up for me before with the BP oil 
spill and other things with the explosion, with the people 
dying and what happens on the high seas. I'm curious about that 
with the difference with the plane crash. So we'll be asking 
that in writing. So very good. I really appreciate it. Thank 
you very much.
    Senator Begich. We'll be back. Thank you.
    Senator Klobuchar. We'll be back.
    [Recess.]
    The Chairman. My apologies, but that was a very important 
vote. I seem to be by myself here so we may be here until about 
7 o'clock.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. But I doubt it.
    I want to just pick up on something that Senator Klobuchar 
made as a question, and she asked about the Death on the High 
Seas Act, DOHSA, before our hearing recessed, and she wanted to 
know why the victims of a cruise accident don't have the same 
legal remedies as victims of plane crashes. And I know that she 
asked for a written response from the witnesses but, frankly, 
I'd like to hear what some of you might think about that, and 
Dr. Klein, you probably have some thoughts. We run into the 
same problem in, you know, deep water.
    Dr. Klein. Yes. Well, I guess the thing is that cruise 
passengers--there was legislation that was passed to provide 
the rights to airline passengers to file lawsuits, and I 
guess--let me back up. The original Death on the High Seas Act 
was passed in 1920 and it does not allow non-pecuniary and 
punitive damages to families of someone who has died while at 
sea.
    These limits were deemed to be unfair in the context of 
aviation cases and were removed but they were not changed for 
passenger ships. There was House Resolution 2989 introduced by 
Representative Doggett back in July 2007, and this was intended 
to correct this inconsistency. But it was not approved.
    Two bills were introduced in the 111th Congress, House 
Resolution 5803 and Senate 3600 and 3755, and, of course, you 
were the sponsor of one of those, but they also didn't go 
beyond committee. Basically, from my perspective, it's unfair 
to American citizens who go on cruise ships to be treated 
differently than when they're traveling on an airplane to get 
to that cruise ship. It makes no sense.
    The Chairman. A little bit like those on land and those on 
oil-drilling platforms at sea.
    Dr. Klein. Precisely. Yes.
    The Chairman. I'm going to bow to Senator Boozman.

                STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BOOZMAN, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS

    Senator Boozman. thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
holding this hearing.
    I agree with the Chairman that, certainly, we need a 
fairer, simpler tax code.
    I would say, though, that I don't think anybody on the 
panel is trying to say that the cruise industry is not paying 
what we as Congress have agreed on what they need to pay, and 
we have a number of prominent individuals that feel like that 
they're not paying enough taxes but I don't see any of them 
voluntarily paying more.
    So if there is blame, again, we need to work on that and 
get a fairer, simpler tax code. And I think the cruise industry 
would agree with that because that would help our economy and 
also be good for a number of different reasons.
    The other thing is--and I appreciate Mr. Johnson and the 
Senator from Alaska--that the cruise industry truly is 
contributing many millions of dollars to the economy. Ms. 
Duffy, what is the size of the industry? What does it represent 
for the United States?
    Ms. Duffy. In 2010, Senator, the North American cruise 
industry generated $37.85 billion in U.S. economic benefits, 
including nearly 330,000 U.S. jobs.
    Senator Boozman. Yes. So it's a huge entity. And the other 
thing too is that, we need adequate rules to make sure there is 
safety and keeping lots of things safe.
    But probably, Mr. Johnson, you know, the risk of having a 
significant car accident driving to the pier in Miami is 
greater than getting on the cruise ship and going to whatever 
destination. The other thing is I'm really interested in is the 
disease aspect of this.
    That's a huge problem, and I know that the industry itself 
is working really hard to figure that out because it's a huge 
negative. We all read about those things. But it is a difficult 
problem.
    I know that if you listed the hospitals throughout the 
country you're probably much more likely to go into the 
hospital with a minor problem and then come out with a 
significant infectious disease, percentage wise, than on a 
cruise ship. So these are things that we all need to be 
committed to grappling with and we would like to work with you.
    Ms. Duffy, in your testimony you talked about how things in 
the continual process of evolving. When you run into a problem, 
a significant problem like an outbreak or something similar, 
what are the steps that the industry goes through to identify 
problems and put procedures in place?
    Ms. Duffy. The cruise lines currently, on the issue that 
you raised about public health, meet or exceed all the Federal 
codes and regulations and the international requirements.
    Every ship undergoes regular inspections and crew training, 
and we are in frequent communication with the CDC directly if 
there is any sort of an outbreak. There are regular inspections 
also under the VSP, or Vessel Sanitation Program, to ensure 
that all of the ships operating from U.S. ports have the 
appropriate and exceptional food handling and sanitary 
practices.
    Actually, one of the former VSP sanitation chiefs said that 
the CDC program standard to which cruise ships are held for 
sanitation is among the highest in the world for any public 
place, I think to your point about hospital outbreaks or 
outbreaks that we've seen in schools.
    So our members are very committed, obviously, to ensure 
that we have a very healthy environment for our passengers and 
crew.
    Senator Boozman. We'll ask Mr. Johnson, then you, Dr. 
Klein, if that's OK.
    Mr. Johnson. This is a good example, perfect example, about 
how a port at a local level works with the Coast Guard, works 
with Customs, works with the Center for Disease Control in 
particular on these issues of a health issue. You have, 
obviously, the issues of disembarking passengers. You have the 
issue of the queuing for embarkation for another cruise.
    You have the importance of sterilizing the cruise terminal 
itself. This is an area, again, to the point of continual level 
of interaction, both at the security level--your ports are only 
secured because of the cooperation of all agencies, Federal, 
state and local, and it starts really with U.S. Coast Guard and 
I can't say enough good things about the Coast Guard, but 
Customs--Federal, state, local interaction--and your level of 
security, your level of safety, is only as good as that level 
of clear communication, clear cooperation. In the health area, 
that's a specific one.
    We're engaged. It could be literally--and to hold a ship 
over, instead of departing my port at 4 p.m. as scheduled, you 
know, it may be a midnight, 1 p.m.--those passengers have to be 
properly handled, dealt with nicely. But, again, it's an 
important issue that we deal with.
    Admiral Salerno. If I could add, Senator, the reference to 
CDC is an important one. The CDC does have the lead for vessel 
sanitation. The Coast Guard has a very close relationship with 
CDC. We rely on them for advice on operational controls that 
are necessary to control any outbreak.
    So if they feel a ship needs to be detained in port or 
prevented from entering port or remain at anchorage, we can 
apply those controls on behalf of CDC and we have protocols in 
place to do that.
    Senator Boozman. Thank you, Admiral.
    Dr. Klein?
    Dr. Klein. I just wanted to say a couple of things. First 
of all, I won't dispute the statements about sanitation. I 
think the VSP does a fine job. I also want to say that I'm 
sympathetic to what the cruise industry deals with. I 
distinguish between sanitation and norovirus, which isn't 
related to sanitation. It has to do with people not washing 
their hands when they go to the bathroom. It follows a fecal-
oral route. We know that.
    The industry, in 2002, in response to a major set of 
outbreaks, came up with the mantra passengers bring it with 
them. They continue to say that today. However, I know of an 
analysis of data from the CDC which indicates there are a fair 
number of incidents where, when there's a passenger outbreak, 
it is preceded by an elevated number of crew members reporting 
ill. This disputes the passengers bring it with them. Also, 
that there are outbreaks on successive cruises suggests 
passengers aren't bringing it with them.
    Need to make two comments because I indicate in my 
written--in my oral statement that there are disincentives to 
reporting. Generally, I understand that crew members who report 
ill are kept off work for 2 days or until they're asymptomatic. 
Makes perfect sense.
    However, one remains, one continues to shed the virus for 2 
weeks. One continues to be contagious if you don't properly 
wash your hands for 2 weeks. But these people are back at work. 
As well, passengers who report ill are quarantined. Again, 
makes sense.
    But there's a disincentive. If you're a worker and you're 
not working, many of them say they're not being paid. If you're 
a passenger, why would you report being ill if you can still go 
out and enjoy your holiday even if you don't feel well? So 
people don't have an incentive to go out of circulation in 
order to deal with preventing the spread of the illness.
    The other thing I want to say, and this is anecdotal so I 
can't stand up and say it's truth, but anecdotally I have heard 
from crew members who say that the chemicals used for 
sanitation, for dealing with the illness, are so caustic that 
it isn't uncommon for them to replace the chemicals with water 
because it's so hard for them to apply.
    Now, that may be happening one in a hundred times, one in a 
thousand. But I think there needs to be a greater attentiveness 
rather than, again, saying passengers bring it with them--we're 
the victim here. I think there can be more of a proactive 
dealing with the problem.
    Senator Boozman. And I know I'm over time, Mr. Chairman. I 
apologize. I guess the only thing I would say, Dr. Klein, is 
that I don't disagree with the problem. So much of that is just 
doing right. It's just hard to get somebody to wash their 
hands. And then the other thing too is that those who are 
watering it down now, it doesn't matter what regulation you put 
on them. They're still going to water it down. Do you see what 
I'm saying?
    I mean, that to me is absolutely crazy because the result 
is that outbreak. You turn a little problem, regardless of the 
cost, into this huge problem, you know. So, again, it's 
difficult things to deal with and----
    Dr. Klein. And I agree and I'm sympathetic to the industry. 
I guess my feeling, and it doesn't need to be reflected in 
legislation, but my feeling is they could go further than they 
currently go, and I'm more than happy to share with them my 
views and my insights.
    Senator Boozman. And I think that's very appropriate, and I 
think that that's what this is all about. It's just trying to 
get some information out so that we can really help each other 
because it is an important resource.
    I've been to Ketchikan and other places. There's nothing 
else like it, and they really are great economic contributors, 
kind of a bright spot in our economy. So thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Boozman.
    I want to continue on a couple of fronts, Ms. Duffy. This 
business of taxation is very important, and I think all of us 
have seen the movie or read the book, Too Big to Fail, and in 
the last administration they did something that had to be done, 
which is to bail out a number of banks so that smaller banks 
would not start to fold and then the whole system would 
collapse.
    But in the making of that deal with the nine major banks in 
the country, the idea was that there was going to be a capital 
injection into these banks, varied according to their size, 
which is odd philosophy to give successful banks the capital 
injection.
    But the point was if you want people to spend money or you 
want them to be able to have credit, you've got to have the 
credit available, and the credit wasn't available. So they got 
whatever it was, $700 billion, and the American people weren't 
very happy about it.
    I thought it was a wise thing to sort of stem what was 
beginning to be a general collapse in the economy until it 
turns out that they got all of this money and didn't spend one 
dime on what they were meant to spend it on, which was 
mortgages. That was the whole thing all the way through. They 
were meant to spend it on mortgages, to bail out homeowners--
not them. It all went into their pockets. It was all used on 
compensation.
    And why do I say that? Because you live in this town and 
you see what people with smart lawyers are able to do. You can 
get pretty cynical, which is why when I'm looking at you, Ms. 
Duffy, I'm thinking of--you know, there's inside the three-
mile--that's one part of your life. Outside, that's all your 
life and nobody else.
    You know, the Coast Guard can't follow you around and you 
don't pay taxes, and then you do that classic American thing 
that a lot of corporations use or a lot of very wealthy 
Americans use, I'm paying everything that I'm required to under 
the law.
    I'm not sure that you do. In fact, I don't think you do. I 
can't prove it right now but I'm going to work at it. But I'm 
asking you just as an American citizen don't you think that as 
profitable as you are that it's really incumbent upon you not 
just to say oh, we're paying everything that we're required to 
under the law, but since I get the feeling that the only people 
that you really reimburse are private sectors like the port. 
Port's doing very well. Coast Guard doesn't get a dime from 
you.
    And so I'd like your thought about how you think you could 
represent your industry. My follow-up question is going to be 
what 5 or 6 things do you think you could be doing better than 
you're doing outside the three-mile limit.
    Senator Boozman's question about the virus is on MRSA. 
There are hospitals who lose their accreditation because of 
MRSA, and that basically comes down to little hospitals or big 
hospitals, busy hospitals, not well-run hospitals not cleaning 
up the bathrooms that Dr. Klein was talking about. And they 
just lose their accreditation.
    Now, have they broken a law? No. But they don't get 
accreditation, which is, you know, a death knell to a hospital 
or for many hospitals would be. So it's not sometimes just a 
matter of doing what the law says but doing what you think is 
appropriate and paying your fair share. I mean, that's sort of 
what this country is about, paying your fair share.
    We're having that argument now. Half the Senate doesn't 
want very wealthy people, millionaires and billionaires, to pay 
any more taxes than they're paying currently, which are at a 
very, very low rate, and others are saying look, this country 
doesn't hold together, either individually or in terms of 
corporate behavior, unless we all do our fair share.
    Do you think you're doing your fair share in terms of taxes 
that your industry pays?
    Ms. Duffy. Again, Mr. Chairman, I represent the industry 
and on behalf of the industry I can say that we pay what is 
appropriate for the business that we conduct. We are a----
    The Chairman. What is appropriate or what is----
    Ms. Duffy. What is--what is required.
    The Chairman. Well, there's a big difference between 
required and appropriate. Which do you mean?
    Ms. Duffy. Well, what is required of us as an industry, and 
the industry does pay over 100 different types of taxes and 
fees. As we've discussed, we provide a lot of jobs. We provide 
a lot of economic benefit, not just to the ports, not just to 
even the states and places that our ships depart from. I also 
represent----
    The Chairman. So did Goldman Sachs.
    Ms. Duffy. I also represent 16,000 travel agents and 
agencies across the country.
    The Chairman. And I'm thrilled about that. That wasn't my 
question.
    Ms. Duffy. And those travel agents and agencies rely upon 
the cruise industry.
    The Chairman. Look, I'm going to be rude. If you're going 
to be effective up here, and you're new to this.
    You've got to speak more truth. I'm not accusing you of not 
speaking truth. I'm just saying you ought to speak more 
credibly if you're going to have credibility with this. We take 
our work very seriously. Yes, we're consumer-oriented.
    We assume that corporations are doing pretty well but we 
also do a lot to help corporations. Your corporations are doing 
very, very well. And so I am going to ask you outside of three 
miles name to me about four or five or six things that you 
think that you could be doing better, that you should be doing 
better.
    Ms. Duffy. I think as part of the operational safety review 
that we announced we are already beginning to explore areas 
where we can improve. We focus specifically on the human 
factors, which includes things like crew training, focus on 
bridge team management, the muster policy, which we talked 
about, continued and ongoing investment in new technology that 
improves the efficiency of the ships in terms of environmental 
impact, the recycling programs that we have onboard ships, the 
investment in advanced waste water treatment systems onboard 
the ships, new technology in scrubbers that reduce emissions, 
shore power and working with some of the port communities 
that--where we are able to use shore power. So there are 
things----
    The Chairman. I don't understand the term ``shore power.''
    Ms. Duffy. Shore power is where our cruise ships can 
actually plug in when they're at port. So these are things that 
we are doing that no one is requiring us by a regulation to do 
that the industry is doing to continue to invest that helps 
passenger safety and health as well as reduce our environmental 
impact.
    The Chairman. Did you notice what we did with automobiles? 
Toyota had a lot of recalls because of problems with brakes. 
And then it turned out that a lot of companies had problems 
with unintended acceleration. I've been through that myself in 
the car where it doesn't matter how hard you put the brakes on. 
The car just shoots ahead.
    The automobile industry's been around for I don't know how 
long, 75 years, whatever, since the Model T, and they've 
changed enormously. They changed in terms of their 
environmental efficiency. They're going to have to change a lot 
more.
    But we fined them and we went after them, even as we're 
thrilled that they're coming out of the recession and they're 
building cars better than ever. I just say that to you because 
I have the feeling that you're kind of a law unto yourself. I'm 
a fair person. I've never been considered, you know, the most 
liberal part of my party or the most conservative. I'm sort of 
in the middle.
    But I'm suspicious of what you do, and you're defending the 
heck out of every single thing that you do and then listing all 
the things that you do and are doing and then say well, maybe 
we could do those better.
    But I would actually like to see more on the tax thing. 
Would you be willing to do that?
    Ms. Duffy. We'll be willing to work with you, Mr. Chairman, 
under any----
    The Chairman. So there's no work that I can do on that. The 
work will have to all be yours. You send in the information and 
then we look at it.
    Ms. Duffy. We will work with you----
    The Chairman. You should say yes. You really should.
    Ms. Duffy. Yes. Yes. I'm sorry if I----
    The Chairman. I don't mean to lead the witness but you 
really should say yes.
    Ms. Duffy. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. I just got a note here that Captain Doherty 
has a perspective on what the industry could do to improve 
itself. You're on, Captain.
    Captain Doherty. Caught me snoozing. There's certainly----
    The Chairman. You can talk.
    Captain Doherty. There are certainly many areas where the 
industry can improve itself.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Captain Doherty. And, you know, the Costa Concordia only 
brought to light, I think, the endemic issues that need to be 
looked at.
    First off, with respect to passenger safety, that's 
primary. Crew safety is right up there with it. A soul at sea 
is a soul at sea, whether you're a passenger or a crew member. 
Each one of them has a right to live.
    With respect to the loss of the Concordia, that hour that 
was lost between the time that ship went aground and she 
subsequently capsized and lifeboats couldn't be launched safely 
was the hour that passengers should have had a lot more 
empowerment to do something.
    You now, a cell phone ashore to a rescue agency isn't the 
way to do it. Passengers should have some 911 system onboard 
the ship, that if they see something wrong they should be able 
to alert shoreside response agencies such as the Italian Coast 
Guard, the U.S. Coast Guard, hook it up through AMVERS, which 
is the Coast Guard's worldwide Automated Merchant Vessel Mutual 
Response System.
    Let people know something's wrong. Give the ship the 
opportunity to confirm or credibly correct the report that 
there's an emergency but get the message out there. The sooner 
the message is out there, the sooner response capabilities can 
begin.
    If those response capabilities aren't there, if they're not 
in place, if the organization and structure isn't in place 
whether the message is out or not, a mass casualty of, say, 
6,000--some of these mega ships going up to 8,000 souls, not 
just passengers, but crew too--it's not going to work. You 
know, we're talking here literally or littorally with respect 
to cruise ship disasters happening along the coast of the 
United States where the Coast Guard has not only jurisdiction 
but also resources.
    But we're sending passengers all over the world, U.S. 
citizens, and that same rescue capability should be in place. 
That costs money. Who's going to pay for it, as you said 
before?
    You know, my recommendation was to take a look at the 
better parts of other legislation, one of them being OPA 1990, 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, where basic--it says you spill it, 
you clean it up. And you put your money where your mouth is, 
and pretty much what we're going to have to do if we're going 
to get the contingency planning that's needed worldwide, not 
just here in the United States, and get the resources 
predisposed, you know, if that ship hits a rock and an hour 
later it's tipped over, it's too late for Italy to call the 
United States, say can you get me some help? That help's got to 
be in place and that's going to call for a worldwide 
contingency plan, some sort of money put aside, that people 
aren't going to be afraid to respond without getting paid.
    You know, Incident Command starts with government 
authorities but breaks down into Unified Command when you bring 
in non-government entities and maximize your resources. 
Somewhere along the line you've got to have an organization, 
planning, drills and some sort of accountability that in the 
event of another accident like that we're going to be ready.
    Another area is--you know, Ms. Duffy talked about bridge 
team management, which in the IMO and in the Standards of 
Watchkeeping is called Bridge Resource Management, and in this 
situation, you know, the chain of errors that happened with 
respect to this particular accident just are exponential. You 
know, was it complacency, you know, shooting from the pants, 
deviating from a voyage plan?
    Did they have a voyage plan? That voyage plan certainly 
didn't bring them that close to a rock, OK, or if that's the 
case, you know, why?
    There were so many different links in that chain of error, 
which is basically what Bridge Resource Management breaks--that 
it wasn't ignored, it just wasn't in place. You can say you're 
going to do something, but unless you've got some teeth, some 
compliance agency that's going to verify that you're meeting 
not only the letter, rubberstamping your audits, but the spirit 
of the regulations, this stuff's going to go on.
    The Chairman. I agree. I think not just with cruise ships, 
not just with corporations, but with human beings, you know, 
that we have thousands and thousands of people dying and many 
more being injured because of something called distracted 
driving, and they're using cell phones, and the average cell 
phone text takes about 4.6 seconds and the car can go the 
length of two football fields in that time. Now, in West 
Virginia there isn't a straight road in the state.
    So, I mean, it's a guaranteed accident. So some things you 
just have to say you're going to be fined if you do this. And I 
just get the feeling that the cruise ships are sort of a law 
unto themselves. They have a lot of smart lawyers. They make a 
lot of people, including two of my kids, very happy, and I'm 
very happy about that.
    But we don't know about the rate of turnover, for example. 
In the coal mines, there's not much rate of turnover so people, 
when they're trained to do things, if there's an explosion 
underground they really know what to do and but still, when 
we've had to toughen the laws on that to make them have--
there's always emergency response teams too available within, 
you know, 20 minutes that can go into--if it's a small mine can 
go into that mine and help.
    And they have very strict standards on how--if they have an 
oxygen problem there have to be oxygen chambers and there have 
to be ropes that they can guide themselves out through the 
explosive smoke.
    In other words, this isn't just something the coal 
companies dreamed up. This was something that the Federal 
government imposed on them to get them to keep people safe. 
Now, coal mines are a dramatic example but, frankly, so are 
cruise ship lines. And so I'm going to end my questioning with 
saying that I respect your success. I'm happy for your success.
    But I think when you have success you have an even greater 
obligation to make sure that you're going the extra mile to 
reimburse the Federal Government for what it does, pay taxes 
according to not just what your lawyers can tell you you can 
get away with but what is fair and right--that's the big fight 
around here now--and that you can't game the system and you 
can't just cruise on your success. Yes, and that'll be the end 
of me, and Senator Begich----
    Dr. Klein. May I just make one quick comment?
    The Chairman. Yes, please.
    Dr. Klein. It's in my written testimony but it didn't quite 
fit into my oral comments, but I think it relates to what we're 
talking about here and that relates to the cruise industry's 
use of arbitration clauses for cruise worker contracts.
    These clauses have dire consequences for crew members. The 
fact is that foreign seafarers have no rights to sue in U.S. 
courts. Because the cruise line can have foreign law apply, 
thereby circumventing the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, it has a 
disincentive to hire American workers.
    These arbitration clauses and the opinions enforcing them 
are therefore job killers for Americans, OK, and I could go on 
describing but I'd just refer you to my written testimony, page 
30, where I discuss these clauses and the implications.
    The Chairman. Do you have a whistleblower system, Ms. 
Duffy?
    Ms. Duffy. Yes.
    The Chairman. In other words, if a crew member reports 
something which is not working properly----
    Ms. Duffy. Yes, I believe we do.
    The Chairman. You believe you do?
    Ms. Duffy. Yes.
    The Chairman. OK. Well, will you let me know precisely----
    Ms. Duffy. I will confirm that----
    The Chairman. Send me the language?
    Ms. Duffy.--all of our members have whistleblower policies.
    The Chairman. OK.
    Admiral Salerno. Senator----
    The Chairman. And I want that in writing.
    [The information referred to follows:]

               Cruise Lines International Association, Inc.
                                                    August 29, 2012
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Rockefeller:

    I am writing in response to your request for information regarding 
whistleblower protections within the cruise industry. We appreciate the 
opportunity to provide further clarification on this matter.
    The cruise industry is subject to much the same system of laws 
protecting whistleblowers ashore in the United States. In some cases 
the protections are even greater on ships. For example, whistleblower 
protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applies to all publicly traded 
companies and their subsidiaries, encompassing the majority of CLIA's 
members and covers violations of law or unethical practices. 
Additionally, under 46 U.S.C. Sec. 2114 seamen are expressly afforded 
whistleblower protections for reporting violations of law or regulation 
to the U.S. Coast Guard, National Transportation Safety Board or other 
Federal agencies, or for refusing to perform dangerous work. 33 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1908(a) affords protection to anyone reporting marine pollution 
violations, entitling whistleblowers to as much as half of any assessed 
fine. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1367 protects employees from retaliation for 
whistleblowing in connection with their employers' violations of the 
U.S. effluent limitation laws. Many states in which cruise lines 
transact business or maintain their headquarters have enacted strict 
whistleblower protection schemes, including Florida, North America's 
largest cruise industry port state. The Florida statute permits suit in 
Florida against any company based in that state for violating 
whistleblower protections.
    In addition to these and many other U.S. Federal and state 
whistleblower protections, other nations have similar laws. 
Prospectively, the new Consolidated Maritime Labour Convention (MLC), 
unanimously adopted by 106 nations including the U.S. and just this 
past week ratified by the required 30 nations, specifically requires 
whistleblower protection for all seafarers for complaints affecting any 
labor or workplace conditions and seafarer rights. The MLC will become 
operative worldwide in August 2013 and has already been ratified by 
flag states that register and oversee our largest members.
    The Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) also maintains 
its own written Whistleblower Policy whose purpose is to facilitate and 
protect the reporting of any violations of law or CLIA policies. 
Individual member policies augment the legal system and CLIA's own 
policy and may include specific hotline instructions and procedures, 
including:

   Global hotline systems that allow for attributed and 
        anonymous reporting via telephone or through an internet-based 
        portal. Reporting through either channel is free and easily 
        accessible to the reporter. These hotlines may be used to 
        report various types of complaints or concerns to the company. 
        This includes environmental, safety or security issues in 
        addition to more traditional hotline subjects such as 
        harassment, retaliation, financial irregularities and fraud.

   Highlighting the hotlines to crewmembers in manuals, conduct 
        and ethics documents, training sessions, posters located in 
        prominent locations onboard and, where applicable, on pay 
        stubs. Also hotlines similarly advised to shoreside employees. 
        Hotlines also are advertised to guests in materials available 
        in or delivered to guest cabins

    Finally, during the Cruise Industry Oversight hearing on March 1, 
2012, Vice Admiral Salerno of the U.S. Coast Guard commented that they 
use information from existing whistleblower provisions to get 
information regarding illegal activity that takes place even beyond the 
three mile boundary. Examples of those existing provisions include 33 
USC 1908(a) and 46 USC 2114. Vice Admiral Salerno further commented 
that Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act has been a very powerful 
instrument for bringing incidents to the attention of the Coast Guard.
    I hope the above information is responsive to your request. Again, 
we appreciate the opportunity to respond.
            Sincerely,
                                           Christine Duffy,
                                                 President and CEO,
                                Cruise Lines International Association.

    Admiral Salerno. If I may, I know you mentioned your time 
is short but if there is time I'd like to comment on the 
whistleblower and the activities that can take place beyond 
three miles. If there's not time now I'd be happy tomeet with 
you.
    The Chairman. No, go ahead. But Senator Begich can cut you 
off at any moment.
    Admiral Salerno. OK.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. Because I'm 15 minutes into my question.
    [Laughter.]
    Admiral Salerno. OK. So I'll make this very quick. You 
correctly pointed out that the bulk of our authorities reside 
within three miles.
    However, we're not powerless beyond three miles. There are 
international systems in place that limit the discharge of oil, 
of hazardous materials and garbage, and we enforce those, 
certainly on U.S. flag ships anywhere in the world, but on 
foreign flag ships that enter our port we still have some 
enforcement authority.
    Every year we refer to the Department of Justice about half 
a dozen to a dozen cases for discharges which originated on the 
high seas but they entered the United States with falsified 
documents as to how they treated those controlled materials, 
and they've been prosecuted.
    In fact, we have been so vigorous in this that in 
international circles we're often accused of being overly 
zealous and, in fact, you may have heard the term 
``criminalization of seafarers.''
    I dispute that term. But sometimes the rest of the world 
looks at us, the United States, as being overly aggressive in 
environmental enforcement on their ships. In my view, we're not 
criminalizing anybody. We're holding people accountable who 
have conducted criminal activity. Typically, what the genesis 
of the court case is the falsification of official records 
entering the United States, and that's what DOJ uses.
    So I did want to correct that. We do look at what takes 
place on the high seas. And as for whistleblowers, there is a 
whistleblower provision. Crew members are often a source of 
information as to illegal activity that has taken place on the 
high seas.
    Passengers can also be whistleblowers. So Congress passed 
that law. I think it's been a very powerful instrument at 
bringing to our attention activities on the high seas where we 
can then take follow-up action.
    The Chairman. OK. I appreciate that.
    And Senator Begich, you'll be the last question.
    Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know it's tight 
so I'll just--I just have one question of a technology and 
this'll be maybe for Captain Doherty and Vice Admiral, and then 
I may have one quick follow-up.
    In Alaska we have a group, the Alaska Marine Exchange, 
helping the Coast Guard by installing automatic identifications 
systems, AIS systems. Very inexpensive compared to doing a 
major contract and trying to do this, basically keeps track of 
where these vessels are and moving throughout our waters. And I 
think it's an incredible way to track. You don't have to be out 
there. In some cases, in a smaller version our Coast Guard has 
to--when people--and I'll use Glacier Bay as an example.
    When some of those boats are going a little too fast for 
the area, what happens now Coast Guard has to be out there with 
a radar gun and kind of monitor them. This you can actually do 
from your desk watching the activity, which we think is 
incredible technology. They're also tinkering with it. These 
guys are tinkering with it to add weather components for it.
    Can you tell me--to either one, Admiral, Captain--is this a 
tool that we should try to see how the cruise ship industry and 
does the cruise ship industry use this, and I've seen the set-
up and it's very impressive to me what they can do from a 
variety of reasons, not only monitoring speed of a ship or 
where they might be going but also if there's an oil spill, for 
example. We know where all the ships are. We can mobilize very 
quickly and utilize in spill response. Can you give me----
    Admiral Salerno. Yes, Senator. It is a requirement not only 
for cruise ships but for all commercial vessels over 300 gross 
tons.
    Senator Begich. Excellent.
    Admiral Salerno. And we're actually driving the threshold 
down. It's enormously----
    Senator Begich. Is there a phase-in or are they all--like 
today what's the----
    Admiral Salerno. Well, all cruise ships today, all ships 
are over 300 gross tons today. We're getting down to smaller 
vessels, which operate closer to shore.
    Senator Begich. Right.
    Admiral Salerno. That is being phased in.
    Senator Begich. Excellent.
    Admiral Salerno. But the larger vessels, certainly all 
international vessels, must have the AIS system. It's very 
useful to seeing who's out there. It was designed, quite 
honestly, as a collision avoidance tool----
    Senator Begich. Correct.
    Admiral Salerno. So that ships can have awareness of each 
other. But it has other port management uses from a safety 
perspective and also from a security perspective. There's a 
nationwide system whereby we receive that data. It goes into 
Coast Guard command centers where we actively track that.
    Alaska's a little bit of a special case because of the 
distances, the remoteness of the ports, where we have exercised 
the ability to work with some private sector providers of those 
receiver capabilities.
    Senator Begich. Right.
    Admiral Salerno. But it's been working very, very well in 
Alaska.
    Senator Begich. And is the system currently set up or could 
the system be set up where a ship that might be potentially in 
waters that they may get grounded in or create a hazard, an 
alarm system can sound? I know the collision piece but can you 
take the technology and do one more level and say, you know, 
when you're hitting certain waters that you may have a capacity 
or you're in the area that you could get grounded that an alarm 
will set off or something will happen? Is there any development 
in this arena or could there be?
    Admiral Salerno. Not currently, although there are----
    Senator Begich. Could there be?
    Admiral Salerno.--a number of ports around the country 
where we have something called the Vessel Traffic System----
    Senator Begich. Right.
    Admiral Salerno.--where we have watchstanders who track the 
position and movement of ships within those systems, and if a 
ship is appearing to veer into areas that would be unsafe, 
approaching some navigational hazard, there'd be communications 
with that ship.
    Senator Begich. It seems like with this technology if you 
can now do collision you can do potential weather tinkering and 
I, of course, would be biased here and say Alaska's always 
tinkering with this technology to figure out that maybe there's 
this next level to determine if you can improve this technology 
to the point where literally an alarm system will engage if you 
are in an area that you may run aground, which seems like if we 
can do the collision. I'm not a tech guy but I know how to use 
the technology but----
    [Laughter.]
    Admiral Salerno. The challenge there is ships of different 
sizes, shapes----
    Senator Begich. Right.
    Admiral Salerno.--drafts and so forth, having the same 
technology and having it applied in the right places.
    Senator Begich. I have great faith----
    Admiral Salerno. But I would agree with you.
    Senator Begich.--in our technology development.
    Admiral Salerno. Technology is getting better all the time 
so----
    Senator Begich. OK. So it's not out of this realm.
    Admiral Salerno.--it's not out of the realm of possibility.
    Senator Begich. OK. Great. Captain, do you have a quick 
comment on it? Then I apologize, Mr. Chairman. I thought this 
was an interesting technology that I think gets to the core of 
one of the concerns that you brought up and that is how do we 
make this industry safer, and are there things--not just the 
cruise ship industry but there's the shipping industry.
    I know in the Bering Sea right now, Coast Guard will tell 
you, as you know, the volume of traffic has dramatically 
increased in the last 10 years. I mean, used to be, you know, 
three to four dozen ships.
    Now, upwards to a thousand ships are moving through there 
in very tough waters, and we have to make sure whatever we're 
doing on the waters is as secure and safe as possible. So I'm 
just excited about technologies like this because it can do 
things.
    Admiral Salerno. Awareness of what's occurring in the 
maritime domain is very high interest to the Coast Guard. So 
we've been working with AIS and another technology called Long 
Range Information and Tracking to improve that visibility. So 
absolutely looking at further improvements.
    Senator Begich. Captain?
    Captain Doherty. Senator, the technology that that falls 
under is the Global Maritime Safety and Distress System, GMDSS. 
That's a broad-spectrum communications system, primarily 
satellites, VHF radio, medium-frequency radio. Every seagoing 
ship must have a GMDSS system aboard. That system is real time. 
AIS is just a part of the GMDSS----
    Senator Begich. Piece of it, yes.
    Captain Doherty. Piece. It's a piece of the GMDSS picture. 
Weather is part of it. Communications is part of it. Most 
importantly is distress. The EPRS, the Electronic Position 
Reporting System, this is all--comes under the umbrella of 
GMDSS. The most important element ashore is the station that 
receives that signal. You know, the United States Coast Guard 
for--I've been going to sea now--next year will be my 50th year 
and I still do go to sea.
    [Laughter.]
    Captain Doherty. I go to sea once a year as a professor at 
the Maritime Academy when they go to sea and I teach safety 
management systems. But, you know, the system is in place. It's 
whether a tree falls in the forest does anyone hear it or not.
    Senator Begich. Right.
    Captain Doherty. We were able to beautifully track the 
departure from the plan on the Costa Concordia. I've seen 
several different TV programs that show exactly what went 
wrong, and that was real-time information.
    Senator Begich. Right.
    Captain Doherty. Somebody has to be looking at it, you 
know.
    Senator Begich. Right.
    Captain Doherty. We put licensed professionals on the 
bridge of ship. We expect them to perform as licensed 
professionals. We expect them to be sober. You know, part of 
the Bridge Resource Management is the health issue, and health 
is not only physical but mental. You know, how do you maintain 
that health status that you're not part of the chain of errors.
    One is to keep yourself physically fit. The IMO January 1st 
instituted two very important, very important laws came into 
effect January 1st, the first being the new increased 
requirements for rest prior to assuming duty.Crew members 
actually have to log the time that they have uninterrupted rest 
between their duty hours.
    The next one, equally important and perhaps even more 
important in this case, was the IMO drug and alcohol mandated 
regulations, which, while not zero tolerance, were .05 percent 
blood alcohol. Again, you can have all the systems. They're 
here.
    GMDSS is an outstanding system. When I went to--I started 
going to sea in 1963. When my first daughter was born I was in 
Vietnam. The communications at that time--my daughter was, I 
believe, 10 days old before I got the message on the ship that 
she was born. Today, in my office I can pick up the phone, hit 
a button, call any place in the world. You know, there was no 
need for that one-hour window. That's human.
    Senator Begich. Right.
    Captain Doherty. And all the technology in the world isn't 
going to solve that. What will solve it is tying a line into 
the GMDSS system which can't be interfered with by anyone on 
the ship that allows a passenger to say, ``I see something 
wrong. Let me tell the world.'' We don't need new technology 
for that. We just need a new line into the transmitter on the 
GMDSS.
    Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. And thank you and I thank all of you for 
this. I think there's the beginning of a process here, and you 
noted my request of you.
    Ms. Duffy. Yes, I did.
    The Chairman. And I thank you and respect you for what you 
do and for the time that you spent with us this morning. The 
hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:51 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                            A P P E N D I X

Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV 
                    to Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno
    Question 1. The Coast Guard is responsible for marine sanitation 
device design and operation regulations and for certifying compliance 
with the EPA rules for MSDs. How often does the Coast Guard inspect and 
evaluate MSDs on cruise ships? Is this enough?
    Answer. The Coast Guard will typically examine non-U.S. flagged 
vessels, including cruise ships, for compliance with international 
sewage treatment plant requirements in MARPOL Annex IV at least once 
per year. For cruise ships that operate in certain Alaskan waters, 
Coast Guard evaluation of the sewage and gray water discharges from 
such vessels increases in both frequency and scope in order to 
determine the non-U.S. vessel's compliance with the requirements with 
Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations Part 159, Subpart E. Under these 
regulations, there are additional requirements, including sampling and 
reporting of sewage and gray water discharges to the Coast Guard. The 
Coast Guard believes the current frequency of examination of cruise 
ships for compliance with sewage regulations for both Alaska and the 
remainder of the United States is sufficient.

    Question 2. How reliable and consistent are MSDs in meeting the 
qualitative standards for sewage treatment?
    Answer. The Coast Guard certifies each make and model of Marine 
Sanitation Device (MSD) before it can be installed on a U.S. flagged 
vessel. The certification verifies compliance with the design and 
equipment standards in 33 CFR Part 159, as well as the discharge 
standards set by EPA in 40 CFR 140. This certification is based on the 
Coast Guard's evaluation of the design and construction of the MSD, as 
well as comprehensive results from evaluation, inspection, and testing 
carried out by an independent laboratory. Accordingly, each make and 
model of MSD has demonstrated the ability to withstand environmental 
testing while providing effective sewage treatment capability prior to 
installation.
    The Coast Guard does not subsequently collect or analyze discharges 
from installed MSDs; Coast Guard efforts are limited to an annual 
external inspection of the MSD. The inspection does not analyze the 
effluent; therefore, there is some uncertainty with regard to the 
equipment's performance over time.
    The one exception applies to passenger ships that operate in 
certain Alaskan waters. These vessels are equipped with advanced 
wastewater treatment systems approved by the ship's Flag Administration 
(the vast majority of these vessels are foreign flagged) and are 
subject to continuous monitoring by the Coast Guard while operating in 
Alaska. However, it is not appropriate to compare these advanced 
wastewater systems with the MSDs that are approved to the standards of 
33 CFR Part 159. There are significant differences in the treatment 
technology, cost, size, etc.

    Question 3. When was the last time the standards for MSD discharges 
were updated?
    Answer. The last time the standards for MSD discharges were updated 
by EPA was in 1976.

    Question 4. In 2000 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
issued a report that was critical of the Coast Guard and other Federal 
agencies for their lax enforcement of cruise line environmental 
standards. GAO found that the government wasn't properly monitoring 
cruise ship discharges. GAO also found that the government wasn't 
adequately investigating whether the cruise industry was properly 
maintaining its pollution prevention equipment, documenting that is was 
properly disposing of garbage and oily sludge. A decade later, does the 
Coast Guard have adequate time and resources to conduct this oversight 
of the cruise ship industry?
    Answer. Since the publication of the 2000 GAO report, the Coast 
Guard has promulgated policies for examining cruise ships for 
compliance with environmental standards, the foremost of which are 
Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 04-04 and the Office of 
Prevention and Compliance Policy Letter 06-01. The Coast Guard 
currently has sufficient resources to examine vessels to these and 
other related policies.
    Additionally, several major environmental crimes cases in the 
previous decade involving some major cruise lines resulted in a new 
awareness of the need for compliance with environmental standards by 
these companies. Environmental compliance by these companies, as seen 
through the Coast Guard's compliance program, has improved markedly 
since the GAO report.

    Question 5. MARPOL Annex IV provides for the prevention of 
pollution by sewage from ships. It first entered into force in 
September, 2003, which means that IMO member-states representing at 
least 50 percent of the world's gross tonnage have ratified it. 
Surprisingly, the United States is not a party to Annex IV. Are there 
any plans for the U.S. to take action on Annex IV?
    Answer. No. The United States has no active plans to take action on 
Annex IV. The last time it was formally considered was in 1998 when the 
United States informed the International Maritime Organization that it 
did not intend to ratify Annex IV given significant differences between 
the Annex and U.S. domestic law. In particular, at that time, the 
United States cited seven specific issues related to Annex IV:

        (1) definition of sewage is broader than U.S. domestic law;

        (2) applicability to smaller vessels which are not typically 
        inspected by USCG;

        (3) discharge of sewage without regard to nutrient sensitive 
        resources, such as coral reefs;

        (4) inability to designate special areas as ``no discharge 
        zones'' to prevent discharges into the sea, including treated 
        sewage;

        (5) lack of adequate facilities to offload sewage ashore in 
        ports and terminals;

        (6) distance offshore for discharging untreated sewage is 
        greater than U.S. domestic law; and

        (7) discharge standards are less stringent than U.S. domestic 
        law.

    Since 1998, several of these issues have been resolved or 
substantially improved through a series of amendments to MARPOL Annex 
IV. For example, a 2004 amendment raised the tonnage threshold and 
resolved issue (2). A separate amendment to the annex allows for the 
designation of special areas and resolved issue (4). And in 2010, 
MARPOL Annex IV standards for discharging treated sewage into the sea 
are now more stringent than U.S. domestic law, thereby alleviating the 
concern with regard to issue (7). The discharge standards are set by 
EPA. There have been no changes to U.S. laws on sewage discharges since 
1976.

    Question 6. How does our failure so far to ratify Annex IV impact 
our position as a leader on marine environmental issues?
    Answer. The United States continues to play an active leadership 
role at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and in other 
international forums in deliberations over the wide range of issues 
related to the marine environment. The Coast Guard has taken the 
necessary steps to ensure that U.S. flagged vessels that sail on 
international voyages demonstrate voluntary compliance with MARPOL 
Annex IV in order to avoid being detained overseas. Furthermore, the 
Coast Guard has also developed port state control policies to ensure 
non-U.S. flagged vessels that call in U.S. ports are checked for 
compliance with appropriate U.S. laws. As a non-party to MARPOL Annex 
IV, the United States will be challenged to be able to directly 
influence IMO negotiations on any proposed changes to Annex IV in the 
future.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to 
                     Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno
    Question 1. The Cruise Line Industry of America and its members 
recently instituted a new policy that requires a muster drill for all 
passengers before departure. As you know, I believe this to be an 
important policy and have written to the Coast Guard asking that they 
change the current regulation for a muster within 24 hours of 
embarkation, to before a ship departs. Do you all agree that all 
passengers should receive muster training prior to departure, while a 
ship is still in a controlled environment? Recently, some cruise lines 
have started giving a muster briefing or virtual muster training using 
a video. How does this conform to the requirement to have a ``muster?'' 
Shouldn't a muster require that passengers go to their assigned 
evacuation point or life boat?
    Answer. The Coast Guard supports changing the requirement for 
cruise ships to hold passenger musters on or before the vessel's 
departure. International Maritime Organization (IMO) members will 
discuss the current requirement in more detail at the next IMO Maritime 
Safety Committee meeting in May 2012, as well as review the potential 
for changing this requirement to hold passenger musters on or before 
vessel departure.
    The Coast Guard supports the Cruise Lines International 
Association's (CLIA) policy to conduct the SOLAS-required passenger 
muster before or upon departure. Additionally, the Coast Guard is 
witnessing passenger musters when our inspectors are onboard and 
performing a certificate of compliance examination.
    The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
currently has a requirement for conducting the passenger muster within 
24 hours of passenger embarkation. This requirement has been in effect 
since at least 1948. Reasons for the current requirement allowing 
passenger musters for up to 24 hours after passenger embarkation may 
include: passenger fatigue (as they may have travelled all day before 
embarking the vessel); late departures from port (conducting the muster 
after sunset); and passenger sobriety.
    A training video also provides an excellent means to give training 
to passengers who neglected to attend the passenger muster. However, a 
training video does not satisfy the requirement for a passenger muster. 
A training video may be used to supplement the passenger briefing 
required by SOLAS Chapter III, Regulation 19.2.3 (a requirement 
separate from the passenger muster requirement).

    Question 2. In Ms. Duffy's testimony, it states that crew members 
receive safety training every 5 years, receive familiarization training 
every time they report on board a ship and must participate in one of 
the weekly emergency drills once a month. By regulation, airline flight 
attendants must undergo training that covers the specific aircraft 
type(s) they fly, their position(s) and duties once every 12 months. 
Additionally, flight attendants must complete emergency drills/
simulations once every 24 months. And as we all know from flying, 
flight attendants brief passengers on emergency procedures on every 
flight. Isn't safety training every 5 years for cruise ship crew 
members too infrequent?
    Answer. The Coast Guard has not conducted an evaluation of the 
differences between the frequency of airline flight attendant training 
against the frequency of cruise ship crewmember training. However, the 
training requirements in the STCW Convention (classroom training and 
familiarization training prior to being assigned duties and 
responsibilities on board a ship), and the drill requirements in the 
SOLAS Convention (abandon ship drills and fire drills) are sufficient 
to ensure that the personnel are competent and current in their 
emergency duties and responsibilities.
    The International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) contains emergency-
related training requirements for seafarers working on board cruise 
ships. The International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 
contains requirements for emergency training and drills. These 
requirements apply to U.S. and foreign vessels. The STCW requirements 
are as follows:

   All seafarers employed or engaged in any capacity on board a 
        cruise ship as part of the ship's complement with designated 
        safety duties shall receive basic ``safety'' training that 
        includes personal survival techniques, fire prevention and 
        firefighting, elementary first aid and personal safety, and 
        social responsibilities. The seafarer must show continued 
        professional competence (refresher training) every 5 years. In 
        addition, all persons employed on board a cruise ship, shall 
        receive familiarization training in personal survival 
        techniques before being assigned shipboard duties.

   Additionally, the STCW Convention includes detailed 
        requirements for training and qualification of masters, 
        officers, ratings, and other personnel on passenger ships based 
        on their duties and responsibilities. These requirements 
        include a multitude of specific topics within major areas of 
        crowd management training; safety training for personnel 
        providing direct service to passengers in passenger spaces; 
        crisis management and human behavior training; and passenger 
        safety, cargo safety, and hull integrity training. The seafarer 
        must undertake refresher training every 5 years.

   The SOLAS Convention requires that: (1) crew members are 
        familiar with their emergency duties before the voyage begins; 
        (2) abandon ship drills and fire drills are conducted 
        periodically; and (3) crew members receive on-board training 
        and instruction on the use of life-saving and fire fighting 
        appliances.

    Question 3. Currently, only certain crew members are trained to 
operate a lifeboat, why is this? Shouldn't every crew member be able 
operate a lifeboat? All flight attendants are trained to operate 
emergency exit doors and slides.
    Answer. Large passenger cruise ships are fitted with a mix of 
survival craft (motorized lifeboats and non-motorized inflatable 
liferafts) to accommodate all on board, plus a substantial reserve. 
SOLAS and Coast Guard regulations require a certificated lifeboatman or 
deck officer is assigned to be in charge of each lifeboat. For 
inflatable liferafts, ``persons practiced in the handling and operation 
of liferafts'' may be assigned in place of certificated lifeboatmen or 
deck officers.
    A typical large cruise ship can have well over 1,000 crewmembers, 
but perhaps several dozen survival craft. Thus, the ratio of available 
personnel to the number of survival craft requiring supervision is much 
higher than on an aircraft, where it is typically on the order of 1:1.
    Courses to obtain formal certification as a lifeboatman run from 
33-36 classroom hours (i.e., a week), and cost an average of $900. 
Thus, a requirement for all crew to be formally certificated would be 
quite costly and likely unnecessary since basic training for all 
licensed seafarers includes launching and operation of lifeboats and 
life rafts, as well as survival techniques to be used while waiting for 
rescue.

    Question 4. Reports have indicated that language barriers between 
crew members on the Costa Concordia contributed to confusion and 
hindered the process for abandoning ship. Are there any U.S. or 
international regulations that require crew members to have language 
proficiency for basic safety terms and instructions?
    Answer. Cruise ships' crews are assembled from many countries and 
it is not unusual for crewmembers to hail from as many as 50 different 
countries. Because of this, various crewmembers are able to speak many, 
if not all, of the languages spoken by the passengers.
    Largely due to the many languages spoken on a cruise ship, a ship 
is expected to establish a working language, providing a common 
language so that all crewmembers can give orders and report back in 
that language (see SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 14.3). In the case of 
Costa Concordia, the working language was Italian, as required by the 
Italian Administration.
    Cruise ships are expected to provide passenger safety briefings in 
one or more languages likely to be understood by the passengers (see 
SOLAS Chapter II, Regulation 19.2.3).
    The International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended (STCW) 
contains a number of language proficiency requirements applicable to 
all personnel working on board the ship based on their duties and 
responsibilities. These requirements apply to U.S. and foreign vessels.

   All officers must be competent in the use of the 
        International Maritime Organization Standard marine 
        communication phrases and use of English in written and oral 
        form applicable to officers to enable them to perform their 
        functions, and communicate with the crew and shore facilities.

   All masters, officers, ratings and other personnel on board 
        passenger ships on international voyages must complete 
        specialized training in accordance with their capacity, duties, 
        and responsibilities. These requirements include a multitude of 
        specific topics within major areas of crowd management 
        training, crisis management and human behavior training, and 
        safety training for personnel providing direct service to 
        passengers in passenger spaces. The requirements include the 
        ability to communicate with the passengers during an emergency 
        taking into account: (1) the language or languages appropriate 
        to the principal nationalities of passengers carried on the 
        particular route; (2) the use of elementary English vocabulary 
        for basic instructions in order to communicate with a passenger 
        in need of assistance; (3) the possible need to communicate 
        during an emergency by some other means, such as by 
        demonstration, or hand signals when oral communication is 
        impractical; (4) the extent to which complete safety 
        instructions have been provided to passenger in their native 
        language or languages; and (5) the languages in which emergency 
        announcements may be broadcasted during an emergency or drill 
        to convey critical guidance to passengers and to facilitate 
        crew members in assisting passengers.

   Finally, the STCW requires that companies ensure the use of 
        effective communications on board ships in accordance with the 
        SOLAS requirements for the use of on-board working language for 
        safety matters, and the use of English as the working language 
        for bridge-to-bridge, bridge-to-shore safety communications and 
        communications with the pilot.

    Question 5. Historically, lifejackets have been located in state 
rooms with additional lifejackets located in public areas. However, in 
an emergency it seems impractical to require passengers to return to 
their staterooms to retrieve lifejackets, and then head to their muster 
stations. Recently, newer ships have begun to store lifejackets at 
muster stations. This solves the problem of requiring passengers to 
return to their staterooms before going to muster stations. However, if 
a ship lists to one side, then the life jackets on that side of the 
ship will no longer be accessible.
    I have heard from a passenger who was aboard the Sea Diamond in 
2007 when it wrecked off the coast of Santorini that when the ship 
listed, access to staterooms was cutoff by the crew, and passengers 
were all directed to the high side of the ship, rendering the life 
boats and life jackets on the low side inaccessible. How do we ensure 
that if a ship lists there are a sufficient number of lifejackets and 
enough life boats for all aboard?
    Answer. Neither SOLAS nor Coast Guard regulations specify where 
lifejackets are to be stowed, only the numbers required and that they 
be ``readily accessible and plainly indicated.'' As noted in the 
question, some newer ships have begun stowing lifejackets at assembly 
stations because it better fits their particular operations. While this 
might appear to preclude the need for passengers to return to their 
staterooms before going to muster stations, invariably a large number 
of passengers can be expected to return to their cabins in an emergency 
to retrieve valuables, identification, essential medications, etc.
    In general, it is not true that ``if a ship lists to one side, then 
the life jackets on that side of the ship will no longer be 
accessible.'' Lifesaving equipment is designed so that in the event of 
a sinking, all such equipment on both sides of the ship should be 
accessible and capable of operation at angles of list of up to 20 
degrees, and angles of trim of up to 10 degrees. For large modern ships 
with modern subdivision, in the great majority of cases, these criteria 
allow for ample time to successfully access and deploy the lifesaving 
equipment. In the great majority of casualties that can reasonably be 
anticipated and planned for, there are sufficient survival craft and 
lifejackets for all aboard regardless of the listing of the ship.

    Question 6. In his testimony, Mr. Klein indicated that the design 
of ever larger cruise ships may hinder the ability of passengers to 
evacuate a ship. Currently, international regulation and U.S. law 
require that a ship can be abandoned within 30 minutes of the call to 
abandon ship. The 1994 sinking of the Estonia in 30 minutes illustrates 
the need for this requirement. How do the U.S. Coast Guard and the 
International Maritime Organization currently ensure that ships are 
designed to accommodate this standard? Are there drills run on ships by 
the Coast Guard to ensure this?
    Answer. The ESTONIA was a roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) type passenger 
ship (car ferry) that was subject to extremely rapid progressive 
flooding and capsizing because it had large bow doors opening into full 
length vehicle decks without the internal subdivision required of 
conventional cruise ships. Because of that internal subdivision, a 
conventional cruise ship would be expected to stay afloat for much 
longer than 30 minutes in a flooding casualty.
    The 30-minute evacuation time specified in SOLAS regulation III/
21.1.3 is for all survival craft to be loaded and launched from the 
time the order to abandon ship has been given, with all persons 
assembled with lifejackets donned. This 30-minute criterion does not 
begin when the passengers become aware of an emergency; it begins only 
after all the passengers have been assembled at the embarkation 
stations. It does not include the time it takes for the passengers to 
travel from their cabins or wherever they may be on the ship to their 
assigned assembly stations.
    Travel time to the assembly stations is generally not evaluated 
with practical drills, which would be impractical and risky for a ship 
carrying thousands of persons. Rather, it is determined during plan 
review of each ship by calculating the travel times for a typical 
population of passengers (i.e., men, women, children, young, aged, 
mobility impaired) to pass through the corridors and stairways on each 
deck. These calculations are performed in accordance with International 
Maritime Organization Maritime Safety Committee.1/Circ. 1238 Guidelines 
on evacuation analyses for new and existing passenger ships, which is 
intended for use by naval architects in the early stages of design to 
optimize the arrangement of escape routes by identifying and 
eliminating congestion which may develop during an abandonment, due to 
the normal movement of passengers and crew along escape routes. This 
planning takes into account the possibility that some portion of the 
escape routes, assembly stations, embarkation stations, or survival 
craft may be unavailable as a result of the casualty.
    Under these guidelines, the maximum total evacuation time for a 
large passenger ship is 80 minutes, which includes the 30 minutes 
needed for loading and lowering the survival craft. The 80 minute limit 
begins when the passengers are notified of an emergency, and includes 
time for the passengers to react to the announcement and travel to the 
assembly stations, board the survival craft and be lowered to the 
water. These calculations are quite complex and are generally done by 
computer software that allows ship designs to be analyzed using an 
iterative calculation technique. All passenger ships reviewed by the 
Coast Guard since approximately 2002 have been designed using such 
evacuation guidelines.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to 
                     Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno
    Question. I understand that under the Death on the High Seas Act, 
families who lost a loved one have limited legal remedies that they can 
pursue for the tremendous loss that they have suffered. Current law 
prevents victims' families from recovering anything other than lost 
income or wages. In contrast, if a family suffers the loss of a loved 
one in a plane crash on the high seas, they may choose to pursue non-
pecuniary damages in court, such as loss of companionship. Can you 
discuss the impact this disparity in the law that has on the surviving 
families of victims?
    Answer. The Death on the High Seas Act is not a statute the Coast 
Guard administers and thus, it is difficult to assess the law's impact 
on victims' family members.
                                 ______
                                 
      Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to 
                     Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno
    Question. Mr. Salerno, I am pleased to hear of the Coast Guard's 
progress in implementing the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act. 
What else can Congress do to help the Coast Guard's efforts to improve 
cruise vessel security and safety?
    Answer. Enforcement of select provisions of the Act (e.g., 46 
U.S.C. 3507(d) (Sexual assault)) may require organic competencies 
beyond those of most Coast Guard personnel and, in time, may warrant 
further congressional deliberation. Similarly, implementation of other 
requirements of the Act (i.e., the 46 U.S.C. 3507(g)(4) (Availability 
of incident date via internet)) may merit a less cumbersome arrangement 
and, in time, also may warrant further congressional deliberation. If 
so, the Administration will communicate as much in the normal course of 
Executive branch recommendations to Congress.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to 
                     Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno
    Question 1. Do cruise ships receive any special treatment under the 
existing regulations or laws, when compared to other types of ships?
    Answer. The Coast Guard conducts very detailed examinations on all 
types of ships subject to examination, including cruise ships. Cruise 
ships, specifically, are subject to a wide variety of vessel-type 
international standards, as well as cruise-ship specific U.S. 
requirements that the Coast Guard confirms during inspections. The 
Coast Guard examines cruise ships at least twice each year, which is 
more often than any other type of ship (cargo ship or tank vessel). 
However, if the ship has a poor compliance record in the United States, 
it could be boarded multiple times, as needed for verification of 
compliance.

    Question 2. Please describe how the U.S. Coast Guard enforces these 
regulations and laws on foreign flagged ships and what are the 
jurisdictional boundaries for that enforcement?
    Answer. The Coast Guard's foreign cruise ship compliance program is 
based upon various statutory authorities, the chief of which are Title 
46, USC sections 3301, ``Vessels subject to inspection'' and 3505, 
``Prevention of departure.'' Further, the Coast Guard implements these 
statutes though policy, as outlined in Navigation and Vessel Inspection 
Circulars (NVIC) 03-08, ``Control Verification Examinations (CVEs) of 
Foreign Passenger Vessels'' and NVIC 06-03, Ch-2, Coast Guard Port 
State Control Targeting and Examination Policy for Vessel Security and 
Safety.
    The Coast Guard's jurisdiction to conduct foreign cruise ships 
examinations is restricted to U.S. internal waters and the U.S. 
territorial sea. The current practice of beginning initial control 
verification examinations overseas should not be construed to mean that 
the Coast Guard has jurisdictional authority overseas in this context. 
Instead, the Coast Guard's examinations of vessels overseas are based 
upon the consent of the cruise vessel owner. By doing so, the Coast 
Guard is allowed to begin a thorough examination of the vessel before 
it comes to the United States in order to ensure compliance with safety 
standards and regulations while the vessel owner minimizes any 
potential delays to ship operating schedules.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Boozman to 
                     Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno
    Question. There are concerns that a national ocean zoning process 
is being developed as part of the National Ocean Policy, calling it 
``marine spatial planning.'' This proposal could significantly impact 
sectors of the economy, including agriculture, offshore energy 
production, transportation, and trade. This zoning proposal has been 
developed at the direction of an executive order, without specific 
Congressional authorization or specific appropriation of funds to 
support its development. What has the Coast Guard's role been in the 
developing this multi-agency policy? How many Coast Guard staff have 
been involved its development? What resources have these efforts 
required so far? Additionally, what resources does the Coast Guard 
expect to spend on the development of this policy moving forward?
    Answer. The National Ocean Policy (Policy) has a broad platform 
providing high-level focus and coordination for improving ocean, 
coastal and Great Lakes management. In addition, the Policy directs 
Federal agencies to work together to support States, regions, Tribes, 
and localities in their efforts to solve problems and support coastal 
communities. The Policy also sets common-sense goals (such as healthy, 
resilient, and productive waters and better science) to support 
national economic, environmental, and national security interests, and 
directs Federal agencies to work together to achieve them. The Coast 
Guard has been actively involved in all aspects of developing and 
implementing the Policy with the goal to improve marine stewardship, 
including coastal and marine spatial planning (marine planning).
    Marine planning is a non-regulatory tool that provides transparent 
information about ocean use, guarantees the public and stakeholders a 
voice in decisions, and creates an inclusive, bottom-up, science-
informed planning approach. The Policy applies existing authorities and 
non-regulatory measures in an economical and coordinated manner. The 
Policy does not involve zoning and imposes no new restrictions. Policy 
is based on the work of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force, which 
met and worked between June 2009 and early 2010 to develop policy 
objectives and other proposals to improve the Nation's stewardship of 
the ocean, our coasts and the Great Lakes.
    The Task Force identified nine priority objectives, recommended a 
National Ocean Council to replace a defunct body the previous 
administration had created, and developed a framework for marine 
planning. The Commandant of the Coast Guard was an active member of the 
Task Force. Following approval of Executive Order 13547 on July 19, 
2010, the National Ocean Council and its members moved forward to 
implement the Task Force's recommendations. Senior Coast Guard leaders 
have participated in various meetings of the National Ocean Council, 
and other officials have briefed Congressional staffers and 
participated in formal outreach events regarding marine planning. 
Overall, marine planning is the means to coordinate Federal action to 
the service of solving specific problems that States, regions, and 
tribes want solved. It also encourages decisionmaking at the regional 
and local levels by providing a process and forum for States, Tribes 
and regions to define what problems need addressing and what outcomes 
to achieve, with the support and participation of Federal agencies.
    Two full-time Coast Guard employees have worked over the last 3 
years (June 2009 to present) on developing and implementing the 
National Ocean Policy. Various Coast Guard military and civilian 
subject matter experts have also supported aspects of the development 
and implementation of the Policy by performing such duties as assessing 
the suitability of waterways and coastal areas for safe navigation, 
promoting port security, and coordinating offshore initiatives.
    Overall, the Policy seeks to reduce bureaucracy, duplication of 
effort, and regulatory uncertainty by making Federal agencies' 
application and interpretation of over 100 existing laws, regulations, 
and policies more coherent and efficient, and foster interagency 
communication and collaboration, thereby resulting in greater 
efficiency and streamlined permitting. As a direct result of the 
Policy, the Coast Guard is now evaluating shipping routes and 
approaches to ports along the entire Atlantic coast from Maine to 
Florida, known as the Atlantic Coast Port Access Route Study (PARS). 
Previously, PARS only examined shipping routes and approaches on a 
regional basis thereby forgoing taking account of the movement of ships 
along the entire Eastern seaboard. This effort promotes comprehensive, 
safe and efficient maritime operations in conjunction with the 
development and production of renewable offshore energy.
    Also of vital importance was the development of a comprehensive 
ocean/coastal data base, ocean.data.gov, to provide a resource for 
science-based and fact-based decisionmaking.
    In 2009-2012, the Coast Guard contributed modest financial and 
personnel resources as part of normal operations to support the work of 
the Task Force, the 2011 Marine Planning Workshop, and outreach 
initiatives. For example, the Commandant invited several other key 
members of the Task Force to join him on an already-planned trip to 
Alaska's Arctic, and Coast Guard commands hosted activities related to 
several regional listening sessions. As the regional planning bodies 
begin to operate under the Policy, there will be additional associated 
expenses the Coast Guard will incur with participating in meetings, 
providing information and related work; these costs will be managed 
within base funding.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Marco Rubio to 
                     Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno
    Question. In his testimony, Captain Doherty proposed the creation 
of a Passenger Distress Signal System that would essentially allow any 
passenger to contact authorities off the ship when the passenger 
believes there is a cause for alarm. What effect would such a system 
have on the Coast Guard's resources?
    Answer. To require all cruise ships calling on U.S. ports to 
develop and implement a Passenger Distress Signal System (PDS) readily 
available to any individual onboard, whether activated deliberately or 
not, could have a substantial impact upon Coast Guard resources, 
especially the Search and Rescue (SAR) program. Additionally, requiring 
PDS aboard foreign cruise ships in international waters could 
potentially cause a significant increase in the number of SAR 
notifications that could overwhelm the current Global and National 
Distress System, supported by the participation of the Coast Guard as 
well as other U.S. emergency response agencies.
    Today's cruise ships are large, complex, technically advanced 
vessels requiring numerous well trained crewmembers to operate the 
ships safely and efficiently. Allowing cruise ship passengers to 
activate a PDS to directly contact rescue authorities without first 
alerting ship's personnel would potentially lead to a major delay in 
the crew's otherwise prepared and effective response, thereby having 
detrimental effects on the outcome of the situation. It would also 
duplicate the pre-existing emergency response capabilities and 
resources that cruise ships already possess. Cruise ships maintain 
state-of-the-art communication capabilities. Thus, cruise ship 
passengers currently have the ability to contact authorities and 
activate the existing SAR System if needed, via global satellite 
phones, wireless internet, and personal cellular phones.
    Finally, a PDS activated by passengers could result in an 
unnecessary increase in the time and effort of emergency resources, far 
removed from the vessel, to process these notifications, verify 
authenticity, and respond. There is also the potential increase in 
false alarm and hoax distress calls. As such, Coast Guard SAR resources 
responding to these `false alarms' onboard cruise ships could 
potentially divert time-sensitive responses and finite resources from 
providing assistance to actual distress cases, thereby endangering 
lives and property that are truly in jeopardy.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Marco Rubio to 
                              Bill Johnson
    Question 1. In your testimony, you mention a program you have 
partnered with Kristi House to train personnel to identify victims of 
human trafficking. I have toured Kristi House and seen the wonderful 
work they have done first hand. Can you please speak in more detail 
about this training program and, in particular, the size and scope of 
this training?
    Answer. PortMiami and Kristi House have partnered in a training 
program to train Seaport staff and affiliated companies (including 
cruise lines) in recognizing signs of children who may be sexually 
exploited. Kristi House and PortMiami opted to utilize the ``train-the-
trainer'' concept. All Seaport trainers have completed training 
directly from the Kristi House staff and follow up training with 
Seaport employees is ongoing.
    The training classes are approximately 45 minutes, which educates 
employees on child sex-trafficking, potential warning signs to identify 
victims, and specific methods that should be employed when responding 
to these situations. In addition, and in conjunction with Miami-Dade 
Police Department, PortMiami has developed internal protocols.
    Currently, 75 percent of Seaport staff has completed the training; 
however, the goal is for 100 percent of Seaport staff to complete this 
training by the end of April 2012.
    The Port's outreach program includes cruise line partners, private 
security companies, and the International Longshoreman's Association. 
The objective is to work with companies who have employees interacting 
with cruise passengers and train them to identify potential victims of 
child sex-trafficking.
    It is important to note that the Port has also collaborated with 
Miami-Dade Aviation Department and Miami-Dade Police Department to have 
uniformity in its training program to identify children who may be 
sexually exploited. Kristi House has been a tremendous partner and has 
committed to providing continuous support in this training initiative.

    Question 1a. What cruise lines and private security companies have 
already agreed to participate in the training?
    Answer. Royal Caribbean Cruise Ltd (``RCCL'') has an on-going 
relationship with Kristi House and has agreed to partner with PortMiami 
in its training efforts. Along with the Seaport, RCCL has completed the 
``train the trainer'' program with Kristi House. They are committed to 
training their staff in the near future.
    McRoberts Protective Agency, a private security firm working with 
several of Miami's cruise line tenants, has also committed to the 
program and has received training. To date, approximately 20 of 
McRoberts employees, serving in a leadership capacity, have completed 
this training. The Port is reaching out to reach out to other private 
security companies to recommend this training.
    The International Longshoreman's Association, representing the 
largest union of maritime workers, has committed to the program. To 
date, ILA Local 1416 employees are scheduled to begin training within a 
few weeks.

    Question 2. Although I know Kristi House specializes in sex-
trafficking, will personnel also be trained on warning signs for 
victims of labor trafficking, which could also be present in these 
situations?
    Answer. Although the main focus of the training session surrounds 
recognizing potential sex trafficking victims, indirectly, the training 
touches on labor trafficking. Child trafficking and labor laws are 
somewhat intertwined, and since updates to this training will be 
continuous, there has been communication to include more on labor 
trafficking in the training module.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to 
                           Dr. Ross A. Klein
    Question 1. Muster Drills--The Cruise Line Industry of America and 
its members recently instituted a new policy that requires a muster 
drill for all passengers before departure. As you know, I believe this 
to be an important policy and have written to the Coast Guard asking 
that they change the current regulation for a muster within 24 hours of 
embarkation, to before a ship departs.
    Do you all agree that all passengers should receive muster training 
prior to departure, while a ship is still in a controlled environment?
    Recently, some cruise lines have started giving a muster briefing 
or virtual muster training using a video. How does this conform to the 
requirement to have a ``muster?'' Shouldn't a muster require that 
passengers go to their assigned evacuation point or life boat?
    Answer. Until the Costa Concordia accident I, like many others, 
assumed it was required that a lifeboat drill be held prior to a ship 
leaving port. This was consistently my experience in 30 cruises taken 
between 1963 and 2002 (27 between 1992 and 2002), and is the experience 
of many who I have spoken with since the accident who have cruised more 
recently. It isn't just a matter of good sense that these drills be 
held before a ship leaves port, but it is consistent with the 
industry's oft-stated commitment to passenger safety. It is 
irresponsible to wait up to 24 hours to instruct passengers on safety 
procedures in case of an emergency. The only logical explanation I can 
come up with for why the drill would be delayed is that having a 
lifeboat drill will disrupt the sale of alcohol as people celebrate the 
start of their vacations (there are significant revenues from sale of 
alcohol from the time passengers board to the ``sail away'' parties 
coinciding with the ship's departure).
    I have experienced a virtual lifeboat drill only once--in 1998 on a 
cruise from Civitavecchia (the same port from which the Costa Concordia 
departed). Even though the virtual drill may technically satisfy the 
requirement under SOLAS (I am not sure that it does) I found the 
experience unsatisfying, however having been on many cruises before I 
knew procedures. The same could not be said for those who were on their 
first cruise or who had had few cruise experiences. The virtual drill 
is particularly problematic for families with children--children are 
not likely to fully understand the information contained in a video; 
they need a more hands-on and concrete experience if we have any hope 
that they will know what to do in an emergency, especially given that 
they may be separated from their parents in a true emergency.
    I am a strong believer in the old style lifeboat drills where 
passengers assemble at their lifeboat stations wearing their 
lifejackets and having a demonstration of how lifeboats are lowered, 
how they are boarded, and are told the priority for women and children 
over adult men. These onsite demonstrations, where a roll call was 
taken to ensure all passengers were present (as would be done if there 
were an emergency), also instructed passengers in a concrete way where 
to find additional lifejackets and advised passengers about alternative 
lifesaving equipment such as zodiacs that could be used if a lifeboat 
were to be disabled. As well, the traditional lifeboat drills included 
a senior officer (normally the Captain) visiting each lifeboat station 
and inspecting whether each passenger had properly put on their 
lifejacket, often correcting mistakes made. It provided personal 
contact between the ship's senior officer and passengers, and also 
reinforced a sense of safety and security. This type of individual 
treatment is impractical with ships carrying more than 6,000 
passengers.
    Not all lifeboat drills today are virtual, but even those that are 
held at lifeboat stations are much less thorough than in previous 
times. Lifeboats are not lowered, instructions are sparse (as related 
to me by a reporter who went aboard a ship after the industry's 
commitments following the Costa Concordia disaster), and attendance is 
not taken. As stated by John Heald, a cruise director with Carnival 
Cruise Lines, ``Once guests are gathered at the muster stations then 
the staff will walk around with clickers to count the number of guests 
at the muster stations . . . These numbers are then given to each 
muster station supervisor who will then tell the bridge.'' Heald said 
the cruise director will let guests know this is happening, it will be 
very obvious and should take approximately 5 minutes to accomplish as 
the line has multiple staff assigned to this new task. In my experience 
of traditional lifeboat drills, they rarely took less than 30 minutes 
to complete, and although they were viewed by passengers as being a 
nuisance and inconvenience, they were necessary.

    Question 2. Crew Training--In Ms. Duffy's testimony, it states that 
crew members receive safety training every 5 years, receive 
familiarization training every time they report on board a ship and 
must participate in one of the weekly emergency drills once a month.
    By regulation, airline flight attendants must undergo training that 
covers the specific aircraft type(s) they fly, their position(s) and 
duties once every 12 months. Additionally, flight attendants must 
complete emergency drills/simulations once every 24 months. And as we 
all know from flying, flight attendants brief passengers on emergency 
procedures on every flight.
    Isn't safety training every 5 years for cruise ship crew members 
too infrequent?
    Currently, only certain crew members are trained to operate a 
lifeboat, why is this? Shouldn't every crew member be able operate a 
lifeboat? All flight attendants are trained to operate emergency exit 
doors and slides.
    Answer. I agree that all crew members need to be better trained, 
and more frequently re-trained in safety procedures. Once in 5 years is 
not enough. Even once a year is pushing it (although that should be the 
minimum requirement), however it is better than current practices. This 
is particularly important as ships have gotten larger and the passenger 
to crew ratio has become larger (many more passengers per crew member--
the passenger crew ratio on Royal Caribbean's Sun Viking in 1996 was 
2:1; the ratio on the company's Oasis of the Seas today is 3:1).
    As we have seen in several ship disasters, including the Costa 
Concordia and Oceanos that sunk off South Africa in 1991, the ship's 
officers and crew have not always been the most active in assisting 
passengers evacuating the ship--in the case of the Oceanos, like Costa 
Concordia, the Captain and senior officer abandoned ship before 
passengers and in the case of the Oceanos the musicians played the key 
role in assisting passengers into lifeboats. There is obviously need 
for training of all staff and crew onboard a cruise ship, and that 
training be frequent and reinforced, including an emphasis on the crew 
member's and officer's ``duty of care'' to passengers. The reality is 
that in an emergency every staff person and crew member should be 
equally versed in safety procedures and protocols, and all should be 
knowledgeable about deployment of lifeboats and deployment of emergency 
zodiacs, as well as all other facets of safety procedures in any type 
of emergency. I am not confident that re-training at 5 year intervals 
is adequate and advocate annual re-training as a minimum.

    Question 3. Reports have indicated that language barriers between 
crew members on the Costa Concordia contributed to confusion and 
hindered the process for abandoning ship. Are there any U.S. or 
international regulations that require crew members to have language 
proficiency for basic safety terms and instructions?
    Answer. Language has been reported as a problem and has led to 
ships occasionally being detained by the U.S. Coast Guard because crew 
members could not understand or communicate in English; however, these 
incidents are infrequent. The problem of communication between crew and 
officers and among officers was perhaps less problematic in the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s when flag states where ships were registered required 
most if not all crew members to be citizens of the flag state, thus 
having a common language. Over the years, crews have become more 
internationally diverse and a common onboard language less assured. I 
believe the U.S. could better enforce the ability for crew members to 
speak and understand English for ships operating out of U.S. ports. The 
problem is quite different for ships, such as Costa Concordia, 
operating outside of North America, especially countries where English 
is not the dominant language. In the case of Costa, it is an Italian 
cruise line catering mainly to Italian and European passengers. It may 
be unrealistic for U.S. passengers to assume that English will be 
spoken or understood onboard Costa ships, and the company should take 
the initiative to advise passengers of this fact. In the absence of 
such advice, it is fair for a passenger to assume that language will 
not be an issue even though it is likely to be problematic, especially 
in an emergency situation. This may be an area where there needs to be 
consumer protection legislation so passengers buying a cruise in the 
U.S. are fully informed of the risks they are exposed to by taking a 
cruise on a foreign carrier (Costa and MSC, another Italian cruise 
line, are both actively marketed in the U.S.).

    Question 4. Lifejackets and Life Boats--Historically, lifejackets 
have been located in state rooms with additional lifejackets located in 
public areas. However, in an emergency it seems impractical to require 
passengers to return to their staterooms to retrieve lifejackets, and 
then head to their muster stations.
    Recently, newer ships have begun to store lifejackets at muster 
stations. This solves the problem of requiring passengers to return to 
their staterooms before going to muster stations. However, if a ship 
lists to one side, then the life jackets on that side of the ship will 
no longer be accessible.
    I have heard from a passenger who was aboard the Sea Diamond in 
2007 when it wrecked off the coast of Santorini that when the ship 
listed, access to staterooms was cutoff by the crew, and passengers 
were all directed to the high side of the ship, rendering the life 
boats and life jackets on the low side inaccessible.
    How do we ensure that if a ship lists there are a sufficient number 
of lifejackets and enough life boats for all aboard?
    Answer. I was amazed when I first heard that lifejackets were no 
longer being placed in passenger cabins and would only be available at 
lifeboat or muster stations. The only possible explanation is that this 
is to save money at the expense of safety. It is obvious that 
passengers spend more time in their cabin than anywhere else on a 
cruise ship (this is where they sleep, and many emergency situations 
occur in the middle of the night) and that this is where lifejackets 
should be kept. At the same time, it has traditionally been a practice 
on cruise ships to have a full supply of lifejackets at lifeboat/muster 
stations given an awareness that passengers may not be able to return 
to their cabins in an emergency (or the need to return to the cabin 
would lose critical minutes that could be the difference between life 
and death). The simple solution to a problem that has been created by a 
change in practice is to return to previous practice. There should be 
adequate lifejackets in each passenger cabin for adults and children 
occupying that cabin, and there should be an adequate supply of 
lifejackets at all lifeboat/muster stations for the number of persons 
(adults and children) assigned to the station. To do otherwise might 
make economic sense, but it shows a disregard for the safety and 
security of passengers, a value that is often stated by the cruise 
industry as the number one priority.

    Question 5. Evacuation and Ship Design--In his testimony, you 
indicated that the design of ever larger cruise ships may hinder the 
ability of passengers to evacuate a ship. Currently, international 
regulation and U.S. law require that a ship can be abandoned within 30 
minutes of the call to abandon ship. The 1994 sinking of the Estonia in 
30 minutes illustrates the need for this requirement.
    How do the U.S. Coast Guard and the International Maritime 
Organization currently ensure that ships are designed to accommodate 
this standard? Are there drills run on ships by the Coast Guard to 
ensure this?
    Answer. To my knowledge, there are no reliable methods to ensure 
that ships are designed to accommodate this standard, and I don't 
believe the U.S. Coast Guard or International Maritime Organization 
have undertaken any concrete empirical research to determine whether 
new ships can comply with the thirty minute requirement. In fact, I 
overheard conversations among cruise industry executives in the early 
2000s, as ships were ballooning in size, that they were skeptical about 
their ability to meet the thirty minute requirement. In contrast, The 
Telegraph reported on March 19, 2012, that Royal Caribbean's CEO, 
Richard Fain, whose company operates some of the world's biggest cruise 
ships, said: ``The truth is the newer, bigger ships are as safe or 
safer than any comparable smaller ships.'' A subsequent article states 
that in cases of emergency these ships offer more ways to evacuate and 
larger lifeboats than any of the smaller ships--they have many more 
exits and lifeboats to accommodate each person, so cruise lines can get 
everyone off the boats well before the 30 minute mark. It is this type 
of thinking, not based on empirical fact or on reliable information, 
that underlies the arrogance leading to less-than-responsible practices 
around passenger safety and security.
    That lifeboats are larger makes no difference if one cannot reach 
the lifeboat, and that there are more lifeboats makes no difference if 
half the boats are inaccessible because a ship is listing. Rather than 
make capricious arguments designed to reassure passengers that they are 
safe, the cruise industry should take visible and concrete measures to 
reassure passengers that evacuation of a cruise ship is possible within 
the 30-minute timeframe, and if it is not possible (which I believe is 
the case) then to retrofit ships so timely evacuation is possible. But 
this isn't going to happen because the company doesn't make money when 
space is devoted to stairwells and hallways rather than to revenue-
generating passenger cabins.
    As I have heard from many who have traveled on the largest ships 
afloat, beginning with Carnival's Destiny-class ships and Royal 
Caribbean's Voyager-class ships, it could take one more than thirty 
minutes to find their way from their cabin on a lower deck to their 
lifeboat station, especially in the dark and without elevators. The 
test of how long it takes is not the length of time one needs in a non-
emergency situation with fully lighted halls and stairways that are 
clear, but the time it takes for someone unfamiliar with the ship to 
find their way in the dark from a cabin on the lowest passenger deck to 
their lifeboat station.
    In addition, it is essential that consideration be given to the 
carrying capacity of hallways and stairways--how many people can pass 
through a stairwell at one time, how many people can pass through a 
hallway at one time, and what is the exponential impact as passengers 
from lower decks are added to passengers from decks above. According to 
the ship diagram for Oasis of the Seas and Allure of the Seas at the 
Royal Caribbean website, there is a pair of stairways forward and aft 
(thus, 4 total) from Deck 3 to Deck 16. The basic question is whether 
6,300 passengers can funnel through these two pairs of stairwells to 
lifeboat stations within 30 minutes. This is an empirical question that 
to my knowledge has not been tested.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to 
                           Dr. Ross A. Klein
    Question. I understand that under the Death on the High Seas Act, 
families who lost a loved one have limited legal remedies that they can 
pursue for the tremendous loss that they have suffered. Current law 
prevents victims' families from recovering anything other than lost 
income or wages. In contrast, if a family suffers the loss of a loved 
one in a plane crash on the high seas, they may choose to pursue non-
pecuniary damages in court, such as loss of companionship. Can you 
discuss the impact this disparity in the law that has on the surviving 
families of victims?
    Answer. As I stated in my written testimony, Cruise ship passengers 
are treated differently than airline passengers under the Death on the 
High Seas Act (DOHSA) The Act, originally passed in 1920, presently 
does not allow non-pecuniary and punitive damages to families of 
someone who has died while at sea. These limits were deemed to be 
unfair in the context of aviation cases and were removed, but they were 
not changed for passenger ships. House Resolution 2989, introduced by 
Representative Doggett July 11, 2007, intended to correct this 
inconsistency, but it was not approved. Two bills were introduced in 
the 111th Congress, H.R. 5803 (Conyers and 26 co-sponsors) and S. 3600 
and S. 3755 (Rockefeller/Schumer), but they also didn't go beyond 
Committee. Given the obvious unfairness that American citizens on 
cruise ships are treated different on a cruise ship than when traveling 
by airplane, I hope amendments to DOHSA are revisited.
    It isn't just a matter that families are prevented from recovering 
anything other than lost income or wages. Many cruise passengers are 
retired and under DOHSA their family can recover nothing other than the 
costs for retrieval and burial of the body. The consequence is seen in 
the death of Richard Liffridge who died at age 72 on a fire aboard the 
Star Princess on March 23, 2006. A subsequent investigation suggests 
the fire was caused by a discarded cigarette end heating combustible 
materials on a balcony on Deck 10, which smoldered for about 20 minutes 
before flames developed. Within 6 minutes the fire had spread up to 
decks 11 and 12 and onto stateroom balconies. The fire also spread into 
staterooms as the heat of the fire shattered the glass in stateroom 
doors but fortunately was contained by each stateroom's fixed fire 
smothering system and the restricted combustibility of the room's 
contents.
    Richard and Victoria Liffridge were onboard and awoke to the short, 
faint sound of an alarm followed by static on the ship's intercom. 
Victoria opened their cabin door and observed a crewmember knocking on 
the door across the hall but he said nothing to her. As she began to 
close the door she heard a friend yelling, ``The ship is on fire . . . 
The ship is on fire! Everyone get out!'' Victoria turned to Richard and 
repeated the words. She says in her statement on the International 
Cruise Victims Association website that he sat there in shock for a few 
seconds. She then called to him to get up and get dressed! As they 
began exiting their cabin the only light shining in the hallway was 
from their room.
    They crawled through thick, black smoke barely able to see their 
hands in front of them, Victoria holding Richard's shirt tail so they 
wouldn't become separated. But the ship suddenly shifted and she lost 
her grip. Victoria found her way to safety and was taken to the 
auditorium, which was being used as a muster station. She asked a staff 
person about her husband and was told forty-five minutes later that 
everyone had been located and they were safe in Muster Station B. Not 
long after she was transported to the infirmary and learned that 
Richard had died. Initial reports from the cruise line were that he 
died of a heat attack. An autopsy indicated he died from smoke 
inhalation. Despite the facts, the cruise line continued to report 
Richard's death as a heart attack.
    In 2007, Richard's daughter Lynette wrote: ``Five months later, we 
still have no answers. What we do know is that my father died 
needlessly from smoke inhalation trying to escape a death trap. The 
death trap was caused by no emergency lighting, no fire extinguishers 
in the corridors and no sprinklers. We do know that the fire originated 
on an external stateroom balcony sited on deck 10 on the vessel's port 
side. We know that the ship was a Bermuda registered cruise ship and 
was not required to have fire extinguishers, sprinklers or smoke 
detectors on the external areas of the ship. We also know that it took 
one to one-and-a-half hours to fight the fire due to the construction 
and partitioning of the balcony areas. We know that highly combustible 
materials were used on the balconies and the balcony partitions were of 
a polycarbonate material that produced large amounts of dense black 
smoke. It should be noted that we still have not received a note, phone 
call or sympathy card from Princess Cruise Line. It is as if this never 
happened.''
    I could cite other cases, but this single case makes the point that 
loss of life at sea is not taken as seriously as it should be by cruise 
lines. It also identifies the need for families to receive adequate 
compensation when a loved one parishes from an avoidable death on a 
cruise ship. It is ageist to discriminate against a person who is 
retired from gainful employment (the message is that if one doesn't 
work, one's life has no value), and it is patently unfair that a cruse 
passenger of any age be treated differently onboard a cruise ship than 
on the airplane they used to arrive at the ship.
                                 ______
                                 
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV 
                           to Christine Duffy
Cruise Vessel Crimes
    Question 1. For the purposes of this question, please query your 
member companies and their subsidiaries. Since the passage of the 
Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, how many deaths, serious 
injuries, sexual assaults, or cases involving missing persons have 
occurred either aboard your vessels or as a part of your cruise-
sponsored excursions? How many of these incidents have been reported to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation or state or local government law 
enforcement, pursuant to the requirements delineated in 46 U.S.C. 
3507(g)(3)? How many of those incidents involved crew members? How many 
of the deaths, serious injuries, sexual assaults, and missing persons 
involved American citizens? What are your member companies' practices 
for reporting all of these incidents to American officials? Are the 
situations in which a serious incident involving an American citizen 
would not be reported to U.S. officials?
    Answer. Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) and its 
members lines worked closely with this Committee and the Congress to 
enact the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA), Public Law 
111-207, which was signed into law just last Congress. Enactment of 
this law was a major undertaking by both industry and the government to 
standardize and expand the existing system of reporting crimes, deaths 
and serious injuries that occur on cruise ships. The law specified how 
and what information must be reported and to which Federal authorities, 
and also required the creation of a website maintained by the U.S. 
Coast Guard (USCG) to make relevant data available to the public. The 
best resources for obtaining this type of data are the public website 
and the Federal law enforcement authorities to whom the reports are 
made pursuant to 46 USC Sec. 3507 (g)(3) (which requires reporting to 
the FBI of serious felonies and missing persons); 33 CFR Sec. 120.220 
(which requires reporting to the FBI and USCG, and in some instances 
the Dept. of Homeland Security, of felonies); and 46 CFR Part 4 (which 
requires reporting to the USCG of marine casualties, including death 
and serious injuries). Our member lines' practice is to report those 
incidents required by law and regulation. U.S. law and regulation 
requires all serious incidents involving American citizens on a voyage 
embarking or disembarking passengers in the U.S. be reported to the 
FBI, USCG, or both, regardless of where the incident took place. 
Furthermore, Federal law, consistent with international law, requires 
the reporting to the USCG of serious marine casualties, including death 
or serious injury of American citizens, regardless of where the 
incident took place.
    The cruise industry takes seriously its responsibility to protect 
its passengers and crew and to provide for their security while at sea. 
There is always room for improvement and the industry will continue its 
efforts to improve in this area. The fact is there are very few crimes 
and serious injuries that occur relative to the millions of passengers 
that travel on cruise ships each year.

    Question 2. For the purposes of this question, please query your 
member companies and their subsidiaries. Do you currently have any 
reporting requirements in terms of deaths, injuries, and missing 
persons for both passengers and crew?

    Question 2a. What are these requirements if any?
    Answer. See the answer to question 1 above.

    Question 2b. To whom do you report?
    Anwer. See the answer to question 1 above.

    Question 2c. Do you have an objection to having a centralized 
database that consumers can refer to? And if you have an objection, 
why?
    Answer. See the answer to question 1 above.

    Questison 2d. What type of remedial measures do you take once you 
have reported such incidents?
    Answer. The safety and security efforts of CLIA members is to focus 
on prevention, training and preparedness, as well as incident response. 
If an incident does occur, CLIA members consistently review the 
incident and seek to improve operations and procedures as the CLIA 
Security Committee and include in their discussions representatives of 
various Federal agencies including the USCG, the FBI and the CBP. These 
post-incident reviews have led to a number of policy and procedural 
changes to enhance the safety and security of our guests and crew.
Health and Safety
    Question 3. What are your standard procedures for passengers and 
crew who require serious medical treatment during the voyage?
    Anwer. Shipboard medical facilities are built, stocked and staffed 
to meet or exceed the guidelines established by the American College of 
Emergency Physicians (ACEP) and passengers and crew are provided 
medical care by licensed medical doctors and nurses in accordance with 
these guidelines which may be found at: http://www.acep.org/
Content.aspx?id=29980&terms=health%20care%20guidelines%20for%
20cruise%20ships.
    Onboard medical capabilities vary among CLIA members but include 
automated external defibrillators (AEDs), ventilators, X-ray machines, 
laboratory equipment, blood transfusions, and minor surgical and 
orthopedic supplies.

    Question 4. What are the qualifications of your medical personnel 
on your vessels?
    Answer. The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 
specifically requires cruise ship medical staff to have a current 
physician or nursing license and at least 3 years of post-graduate or 
post-registration clinical practice in general and emergency medicine 
or board certified in emergency medicine, family practice medicine, or 
internal medicine. In addition, shipboard medical staff meet or exceed 
the requirements of the above-reference ACEP Guidelines (see Guideline 
2).

    Question 5. Do medical professionals receive specialized training 
for the treatment of victims of sexual assault? If so, please provide 
details of the training?
    Anwer. The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 
specifically requires that, on all voyages to or from the U.S., the 
shipboard medical staff must include licensed medical providers that 
are able to provide assistance in the event of an alleged sexual 
assault, have received training in conducting forensic sexual assault 
examination, and are able to promptly perform such an examination upon 
request and provide proper medical treatment of a victim, including 
administration of anti-retroviral medications and other medications 
that may prevent the transmission of the HIV virus and other sexually 
transmitted diseases. The new law also requires cruise ships to 
prepare, provide to the patient, and maintain written documentation of 
the findings of a sexual assault examination, and that such records be 
signed by the recipient. In addition shipboard medical staff must meet 
or exceed the requirements of the above-reference ACEP Guidelines (see 
Guideline 9).
Miscellaneous Legal Issues
    Question 6. In light of your general insurance protections and the 
Limitation of Liability Act, why is it necessary to have limited 
remedies available for passengers who die on the high seas?
    Anwer. The remedies that are available generally are in keeping 
with the remedies that are available in most nations of the world, 
including European nations. As an international industry that is 
carrying and sourcing passengers globally, having an internationally 
uniform liability regime promotes predictability and allows for a level 
playing field for claimants whatever their nationality. Since the high 
seas are, to some degree, under every nation's jurisdiction, U.S. law 
governing deaths on the high seas should reflect international norms. 
U.S. law, as presently written, is appropriately reflective of these 
norms in light of the remedies available in other jurisdictions.
    Moreover, the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act prohibits a cruise 
line from limiting its liability for death or personal injury caused by 
the negligence of a ship's owner, operator, master or any employee or 
agent. Cruise lines are also prohibited from limiting liability for 
emotional distress claims in cases where a passenger was injured, at 
risk of being injured or when the distress was intentionally inflicted. 
The Limitation of Liability Act also requires cruise lines to provide 
passengers with at least 6 months to make a claim, 1 year to file a 
lawsuit to recover in the event of an injury, and up to 4 years to file 
a lawsuit in the case of wrongful death.

    Question 7. In light of the size and financial resources of your 
companies--compared to the financial means and age of your passengers, 
why do you require passengers to resolve disputes through mandatory 
arbitration? Any U.S. passenger on any vessel that calls at a U.S. port 
is protected by Federal statute that mandates an absolute right to a 
court trial for personal injury or death. Arbitration is only available 
for non-personal injury or death claims (e.g., consumer claims) for 
which arbitration is generally acceptable and recognized in all other 
industries.
    Answer. Any U.S. passenger on any vessel that calls at a U.S. port 
is protected by Federal statute that mandates an absolute right to a 
court trial for personal injury or death. Arbitration is only available 
for non-personal injury or death claims (e.g., consumer claims) for 
which arbitration is generally acceptable and recognized in all other 
industries.

    Question 7a. How can a passenger reasonably expect to know and 
understand the requirement of mandatory binding arbitration? The 
requirement of choice of forum? The requirement of choice of law?
    Answer. The passenger ticket is designed to clearly spell out to 
passengers their legal rights, including applicable laws and 
jurisdiction, before they ever step foot on the ship. The goal is to 
provide passengers with clarity and certainty over what laws apply and 
what courts have jurisdiction. Not only is this beneficial to 
passengers, it is required by law. Our goal as an industry is to 
provide a single document that clearly spells out a passenger's legal 
rights. The passenger ticket is the most appropriate document for 
accomplishing this goal.
    U.S. laws require that these legal rights be clearly communicated 
to passengers and the terms are subject to strict judicial scrutiny to 
ensure they are fundamentally fair. Every major cruise line also posts 
the passenger ticket contracts on line on their websites, along with 
appropriate recommendations to read them.

    Question 7b. How is this different than any other consumer contract 
where the consumer has no bargaining power?
    Answer. The U.S. Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute expressly rejected the argument that a non-negotiated forum 
selection clause in a ticket contract is unreasonable, and thus 
unenforceable, simply because it is not the subject of bargaining. 
Moreover, the consumer has the choice of not entering into a contract 
with the cruise line. That is the ultimate bargaining power.

    Question 8. Would the industry support legislation that would 
provide that for any American who boarded a foreign flagged vessel for 
cruising or pleasure purposes, a U.S. District Court of would have 
jurisdiction of their claims, irrespective of any contract provisions? 
If not, why not?
    Answer. No. Such legislation would be entirely unnecessary. U.S. 
passengers already have extensive access to U.S. courts in the event 
they need to file a claim. Every passenger on virtually every cruise 
line whose corporate base is in the United States already has access to 
a U.S. forum, which is expressly stated in the ticket contract, 
including U.S. courts in cases of personal injury and death, if they 
wish to file a claim. This is true regardless of the cruise's itinerary 
or whether it embarks or disembarks in the U.S. or a foreign port. For 
claims against cruise lines based in foreign nations, and that offer 
cruises between foreign ports that do not include the U.S., foreign 
laws may apply and claims may be more appropriately resolved abroad.
Taxes
    Question 9. For the purposes of this question, and consistent with 
your answer at the hearing, please query your member companies and 
their subsidiaries. Over the past 5 years what Federal taxes have been 
paid by cruise line companies and their subsidiaries?
    Answer. CLIA does not have access to the tax returns of its member 
companies, and CLIA cannot request tax returns from its members due to 
limitations on the type of information it may receive as an industry 
trade association.

    Question 10. At the hearing, there was a discussion of the more 
than 20 Federal agencies that work with the cruise lines to provide for 
health, safety and security of passengers. At a recent conference on 
March 13, 2012, you commented that by 2015, 25 new ships will join the 
CLIA member line fleet. You also indicated that since 2000, there has 
been a 125 percent increase in passengers, including a record 16.3 
million in 2011 and the industry has introduced 143 new ships during 
that time. Would your member companies be willing to shoulder more of 
the costs to support its Federal partners who help provide for the 
health, safety and security of the traveling public?
    Answer. CLIA members do provide financial support to our Federal 
partners. For example, for every cruise passenger who is processed into 
the United States the industry pays over $7.00 in Customs and 
immigration user fees. With approximately 12 million passengers 
arriving annually, this equates to more than $84 million in Customs and 
Immigration user fees alone. In fact, in a 1999 report to the Chairman 
of the House Transportation Committee, the GAO determined that maritime 
industry pays over 124 different fees and assessments to various 
agencies of the Federal Government. In addition, agencies of state and 
local government collect user fees and assessments of various types. 
Maritime industry paid over $22 billion dollars in Federal assessments 
during Fiscal Year 1998. Given the growth of maritime industry since 
that time, the number today is undoubtedly much greater than 1998. 
Maritime industry which includes the cruise lines is paying a 
substantial amount of money into the Federal treasury. In addition to 
fees and taxes, the cruise industry either directly or indirectly 
provides jobs for more than 330,000 Americans. Each of these Americans 
pays Federal and state taxes on their income, and the industry pays the 
employers' share of taxes and benefits for those it employs.

    Question 11. CLIA was a strong supporter of the Travel Promotion 
Act, which was primarily funded through both private sector 
contributions (up to $100 million) and a $10 fee on foreign travelers. 
Could the Congress count on CLIA's support for legislation that would 
impose a similar per-passenger or per-vessel fee to pay for some of the 
essential services provided by the Federal Government? What 
recommendations would you provide related to the legislation?
    Answer. The industry pays fair value for services rendered to it by 
government and frequently renders assistance to others at sea, often at 
substantial cost and without reimbursement, upon the request of the 
government. For example, Cruise ships frequently are called upon to 
assist in the rescue of persons at sea. The Florida straits have a 
significant number of persons who attempt to illegally migrate on 
rickety rafts and small boats. As this is a significant cruise ship 
operating area, our vessels are frequently requested to render 
assistance.
Environmental Issues
    Question 12. How many CLIA member line vessels operate in waters 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and how many CLIA 
member line vessels operate worldwide?
    Answer. The cruise industry is global. Vessels routinely cross 
international boundaries and their deployment schedules vary 
frequently. Vessels that are in the U.S./Caribbean market in the winter 
may operate in the Baltic in the summer. CLIA member lines operate 
approximately 200 vessels in the global market.
    With regard to the following questions (13 through 37), in general, 
CLIA members lines are dedicated to preserving the marine environment 
and, in particular, the pristine condition of the oceans and other 
waters upon which our vessels sail. The environmental standards that 
apply to our industry are stringent and comprehensive. Through the 
International Maritime Organization, the United States and flag and 
port states, CLIA has participated in the development of consistent and 
uniform international standards that apply to all vessels engaged in 
international commerce. These standards are set forth in the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL). The international standards of MARPOL have, in turn, been 
adopted by the U.S. and augmented by additional Federal legislation and 
regulation. The U.S. has jurisdiction over both foreign and domestic 
vessels that operate in U.S. waters where U.S. laws, such as the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Act to Prevent Pollution from 
Ships, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, apply. The U.S. Coast Guard enforces 
both international conventions and domestic laws.

    Question 13. How many CLIA member line vessels that operate in 
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are equipped 
with the best available technology that will reduce the silver content 
in photo processing and X-ray development fluid waste discharges, 
consistent with CLIA Industry Waste Management Standard No. 1?
    Answer. Functionally today, most member lines are using digital 
photo and X-ray processing which does not utilize photo processing 
fluid. Members that use fluid are to utilize one or both of methods of 
disposal identified in CLIA Waste Management Practices and Procedures-
either removing all hazardous materials or treating the fluid as 
hazardous material and disposing through a licensed waste management 
company.
    With regard to hazardous waste in general--photo and X-ray 
processing chemicals, fluorescent bulbs, dry cleaning fluids, battery 
chemicals, etc.--CLIA member cruise lines have defined handling and 
control processes for each type of waste. For example, hazardous waste 
products are segregated into leak-proof containers and landed to an 
approved shoreside disposal facility or, for permitted types of medical 
waste, incinerated onboard. Under no circumstance, may hazardous waste 
be disposed of in trash containers or systems for graywater (sinks and 
drains) or blackwater (toilets).

    Question 14. Approximately how many gallons of photo processing and 
x-ray development fluid waste are discharged by CLIA member line 
vessels into waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
annually?
    Answer. We are aware of none.

    Question 15. Approximately how many gallons of dry-cleaning fluids, 
sludge, contaminated filter materials, and other dry-cleaning waste 
products are discharged by CLIA member line vessels into waters subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States annually?
    Answer. We are aware of none.

    Question 16. How are pharmaceuticals that are unused, outdated, or 
both, disposed of by CLIA member line vessels that operate in waters 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States when so operating and 
when operating on the high seas?
    Answer. Pursuant to CLIA's policy adopted by its members, they are 
to be disposed of in accordance with the CLIA Waste Management 
Practices and Procedures. CLIA member lines have agreed to ensure that 
unused and/or outdated pharmaceuticals are effectively and safely 
disposed in accordance with legal and environmental requirements. In 
general ships carry varying amounts of pharmaceuticals. The 
pharmaceuticals carried range from over-the-counter products such as 
anti-fungal creams to prescription drugs such as epinephrine. Each ship 
stocks an inventory based on its itinerary and the demographics of its 
passenger base. CLIA member lines have agreed that all pharmaceuticals 
will be managed to ensure that their efficacy is optimized and that 
disposal is done in an environmentally responsible manner.
    CLIA member lines have further agreed that when disposing of 
pharmaceuticals, the method used will be consistent with established 
procedures, and that pharmaceuticals and medications which are off 
specification or which have exceeded their shelf-life, and stocks that 
are unused and out of date, cannot be used for patients and therefore 
will be removed from the ship. Further, each regulatory jurisdiction 
has a posting of listed pharmaceuticals that must be considered 
hazardous waste once the date has expired or the item is no longer 
considered good for patient use.

    Question 17. CLIA's Industry Waste Management Standard No. 6, 
dealing with fluorescent and mercury vapor lamp bulbs, states that CLIA 
member lines ``have agreed to prevent the release of mercury into the 
environment from spent fluorescent and mercury vapor lamps by assuring 
proper recycling or by using other acceptable means of disposal.''

    Question 18. How does CLIA define the term ``proper recycling'' as 
that term is used in Standard No. 6?
    Answer. Proper recycling means off-loading to a licensed waste 
management company ashore who is certified to handle such waste.

    Question 19. What are the ``other acceptable means of disposal'' 
referred to in Standard No. 6?
    Answer. Used fluorescent lamps can be crushed and content filtered 
through approved lamp crusher equipment. Filters are disposed of as 
hazardous material.

    Question 20. Approximately how many spent lamps are disposed of by 
``proper recycling'' by CLIA member line vessels that operate in waters 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?
    Answer. CLIA does not collect or maintain records of this type and 
they are not in CLIA's possession, custody or control. However, in 
accordance with the members' stated policy and practice, we believe 
that our members are properly disposing of spent lamps.

    Question 21. Approximately how many spent lamps are disposed of by 
``other acceptable means of disposal'' by CLIA member line vessels that 
operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?
    Answer. CLIA does not collect or maintain records of this type and 
they are not in CLIA's possession, custody or control. . However, in 
accordance with the members' stated policy and practice, we believe 
that our members are properly disposing of spent lamps.

    Question 22. Approximately how many spent batteries are prevented 
from being discharged into the marine environment by CLIA member line 
vessels annually, in conformity with CLIA Industry Waste Management 
Standard No. 7, and how many are discharged into the marine 
environment?
    Answer. CLIA does not collect or maintain records of this type and 
they are not in CLIA's possession, custody or control. However, in 
accordance with the members' stated policy and practice, we believe 
that our members are properly disposing of spent batteries.

    Question 23. Approximately how many CLIA member line vessels meet 
the international requirements for removing oil from bilge and 
wastewater prior to discharge, as agreed in CLIA Industry Waste 
Management Standard No. 8?
    Answer. All CLIA member lines are required to meet the 
international and domestic requirements for disposing of bilge and 
wastewater. The procedures are to be included in the members' Safety 
Management System manuals and are subject to internal and external 
audit.

    Question 24. How many CLIA member line vessels that operate in 
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are equipped 
with back-to-back oily bilge water treatment systems?
    Answer. Bilge water is a mixture of liquids, primarily fresh water, 
collected from machinery spaces and internal drainage systems. The 
bilge, located in the engine room at the lowest part of the vessel, 
collects water, cleansers and mechanical fluids from operational 
sources. These sources include evaporators, potable water treatment 
equipment, condensation, technical rooms, seawater cooling systems, 
propulsion systems, and main engines. Although CLIA does not audit or 
supervise the technology that member lines are using for bilge water 
processing, typically bilge water is collected and periodically pumped 
into special holding tanks where it is processed to remove contaminants 
of concern. The resulting water is then treated to levels that meet or 
exceed both U.S. and international regulations and thereafter 
discharged.

    Question 25. Do any CLIA member line vessels that operate in waters 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States discharge bilge water 
or wastewater containing oil in excess of 15 parts per million?
    Answer. Not as far as CLIA is aware. International regulations and 
CLIA policy prohibit such discharges.
    If so, how many vessels do so and approximately how many gallons 
such bilge water or wastewater are discharged annually?

    Question 26. Ms. Duffy's testimony states that CLIA lines recycle 
approximately 80,000 tons of solid waste annually, largely comprising 
paper, plastic, aluminum cans, and glass.

    Question 26a. Approximately how many tons of solid waste do CLIA 
member lines produce annually that is not recycled?
    Answer. By law and regulation, the only solid waste that may be 
discharged at sea is that permitted by MARPOL Annex V, and that is 
restricted to certain areas of the ocean. MARPOL Annex V has recently 
been modified to further minimize the discharge of solid waste. In 
accordance with CLIA's Waste Management Practices and Procedures, the 
vast majority of solid waste is recycled or incinerated onboard. 
Recycled material includes glass, aluminum, plastic, cardboard, and 
metals. Food packing materials are generally incinerated due to 
restrictions on landing ashore and other practical considerations. CLIA 
does not collect or maintain records of this type and they are not in 
CLIA's possession, custody or control.

    Qusetion 26b. Approximately how many tons of solid waste do CLIA 
member lines produce annually that is discharged into the marine 
environment?
    Answer. See response to Question 26(a).

    Question 26c. What types of solid waste typically are discharged by 
CLIA member lines into the marine environment?
    Answer. CLIA is unaware of any, other than comminuted food waste.

    Question 27. CLIA's Industry Waste Management Standard No. 9, 
dealing with glass, cardboard, and aluminum and steel cans, states that 
CLIA member lines have agreed that ``no [such] waste will be discharged 
into the marine environment unless it has been properly processed and 
can be discharged in accordance with MARPOL and other prevailing 
requirements.'' How does CLIA define the term ``properly processed'' 
for purposes of this standard?
    Answer. ``Properly processed'' means, for example, food waste that 
has been comminuted.

    Question 28. Approximately how much incinerator ash do CLIA member 
line vessels discharge into waters subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States annually?
    Answer. We are unaware of any.

    Question 29. CLIA Industry Waste Management Standard No. 12, 
dealing with sewage, reads as follows:

        12. Blackwater: CLIA members have agreed that all blackwater 
        will be processed through a Marine Sanitation Device (MSD), 
        certified in accordance with U.S. or international regulations, 
        prior to discharge. For ships traveling regularly on 
        itineraries beyond territorial coastal waters, discharge will 
        take place only when the ship is more than 4 miles from shore 
        and when the ship is traveling at a speed of not less than 6 
        knots. For vessels whose itineraries are fully within U.S. 
        territorial waters, discharge shall comply fully with U.S. and 
        individual state legislation and regulations.

    Do any CLIA member lines have a more stringent voluntary policy on 
sewage discharges than Standard No. 12--for example, do any member 
lines have a policy that all sewage will be processed through advanced 
wastewater treatment systems, or that ships traveling regularly beyond 
territorial coastal waters will only discharge MSD-processed sewage 
when they are more than 12 nautical miles from shore?
    Answer. Yes, please see corporate sustainability reports of our 
member lines for details of what they have in place.

    Question 30. How many vessels do American Cruise Lines, Carnival 
Cruise Lines, Celebrity Cruises, Crystal Cruises, Cunard Cruises, 
Disney Cruise Line, Norwegian Cruise Lines, Oceania Cruises, Princess 
Cruises, Pearl Seas Cruises, Regent Seven Seas Cruises, Royal Caribbean 
International, Sea Dream Yacht Club, and Seabourn Cruise Line each 
operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and 
how many of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels that operate in 
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States have advanced 
wastewater treatment systems installed?
    Answer. CLIA does not collect or maintain records on when or where 
vessels are operating at any given time or exactly what equipment they 
are utilizing to process wastewater. These documents are not in CLIA's 
possession, custody or control.

    Question 31. Of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels that 
operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and 
do not have advanced wastewater treatment systems installed, how many 
discharge treated sewage within 4 nautical miles from shore while so 
operating?
    Answer. To CLIA's knowledge the only vessels which discharge 
treated wastewater within 4 miles of the coast are those which are 
permitted by local law to do so.

    Question 32. Of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels that 
operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and 
do not have advanced wastewater treatment systems installed, how many 
discharge treated sewage within 12 nautical miles from shore while so 
operating?
    Answer. Under CLIA's express policy adopted by its members, none 
are to do so. CLIA does not collect or maintain records of this nature, 
and they are not in CLIA's possession, custody or control.

    Question 33. Of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels that 
operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and 
do not have advanced wastewater treatment systems installed, how many 
discharge treated graywater within 4 nautical miles from shore while so 
operating?
    Answer. None are to do so except as permitted by law. CLIA does not 
collect or maintain records of this nature, and they are not in CLIA's 
possession, custody or control.

    Question 34. Of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels that 
operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and 
do not have advanced wastewater treatment systems installed, how many 
discharge treated graywater within 12 nautical miles from shore while 
so operating?
    Answer. CLIA does not collect or maintain records of this nature 
and they are not in CLIA's possession, custody or control.

    Question 35. Do any of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels 
that operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
discharge untreated sewage or untreated graywater within 4 nautical 
miles from shore while so operating?
    If so, how many of each line's vessels do so, and approximately how 
many gallons each of untreated sewage and untreated graywater does each 
vessel discharge?
    Answer. No.

    Question 36. Do any of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels 
that operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
discharge untreated sewage or untreated graywater within 12 nautical 
miles from shore while so operating? If so, how many of each line's 
vessels do so, and approximately how many gallons each of untreated 
sewage and untreated graywater does each vessel discharge?
    Answer. CLIA member lines by policy do not discharge untreated 
sewage anywhere. Untreated graywater is to be discharged only when 
beyond 4 miles from the shore.

    Question 37. Do any of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels 
that operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
discharge untreated sewage or untreated graywater beyond 12 nautical 
miles from shore while so operating? If so, how many of each line's 
vessels do so, and approximately how many gallons each of untreated 
sewage and untreated graywater does each vessel discharge?
    Answer. CLIA does not collect or maintain records of this nature 
and they are not in CLIA's possession, custody or control. CLIA member 
lines by policy do not discharge untreated sewage anywhere.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to 
                            Christine Duffy
Muster Drills
    Question 1. I want to congratulate the Cruise Line Industry of 
America and its members for instituting a new policy that requires a 
muster drill for all passengers before departure. As you know, I 
believe this to be an important policy and have written to the Coast 
Guard asking that they change the current regulation for a muster 
within 24 hours of embarkation, to before a ship departs. Do you all 
agree that all passengers should receive muster training prior to 
departure, while a ship is still in a controlled environment?
    Answer. Yes and we have announced as a policy that all member lines 
have agreed to incorporate into their mandatory practices.

    Question 2. Recently, some cruise lines have started giving a 
muster briefing or virtual muster training using a video. How does this 
conform to the requirement to have a ``muster?'' Shouldn't a muster 
require that passengers go to their assigned evacuation point or life 
boat?
    Answer. There is a regulatory requirement to have a muster. 
Passengers are required to attend. In addition there is a requirement 
for a safety briefing that is to be made upon departure in one or more 
languages likely to be understood by the passengers (including the 
language or languages required by the ship's flag State and in the 
English language). This required safety briefing is normally 
accomplished at the muster stations during the drill. An in room video 
or information cards supplement these requirements. Additionally, SOLAS 
Chapter III Regulation 8 requires that illustrations and appropriate 
languages shall be posted in passenger cabins and at other locations to 
inform passengers of: their muster station, essential actions they must 
take in an emergency, and the method of donning lifejackets. These 
instructions are found on a placard on the inside of each cabin door.
Crew Training
    Question 3. Ms. Duffy, in your testimony, you said that crew 
members receive safety training every 5 years, receive familiarization 
training every time they report on board a ship and must participate in 
one of the weekly emergency drills once a month.
    By regulation, airline flight attendants must undergo training that 
covers the specific aircraft type(s) they fly, their position(s) and 
duties once every 12 months. Additionally, flight attendants must 
complete emergency drills/simulations once every 24 months. And as we 
all know from flying, flight attendants brief passengers on emergency 
procedures on every flight.
    Isn't safety training every 5 years for cruise ship crew members 
too infrequent?
    Answer. As indicated in my testimony and above, familiarization 
training is held every time a crew member reports onboard. Since 
contracts for employment extend from 4 to 8 months, crewmembers are 
effectively receiving training according to those intervals. Additional 
training and honing of proficiency is provided by the abandon ship and 
firefighting drills that take place weekly. Additionally, the boat 
crews are required to launch and maneuver their respective lifeboats at 
least once in every 3 months. Additional training is specified in SOLAS 
Chapter III Regulation 19.4 and required to take place at intervals of 
not more than 4 months.

    Question 4. Currently, only certain crew members are trained to 
operate a lifeboat, why is this? Shouldn't every crew member be able 
operate a lifeboat?
    Answer. All flight attendants are trained to operate emergency exit 
doors and slides. Operating a lifeboat requires distinct skills and 
there are a number of crew specifically trained to perform this 
function. There are more than enough crewmembers who are trained to 
perform this function to provide for backup if a crewmember is 
incapacitated in any way. Specifically SOLAS Chapter II Regulation 10 
requires that a deck officer or certified person shall be placed in 
charge of each survival craft to be used. In some instances, the flag 
administration may permit an appropriately trained person to be in 
charge of liferafts. A second in command is to be nominated (appointed) 
in the case of lifeboats. The U.S. Coast Guard and other flag and port 
state inspection authorities regularly, during drills, specify that the 
primary lifeboat/liferaft crew in charge are incapacitated and require 
that the alternate crew demonstrate their proficiency.

    Question 5. Reports have indicated that language barriers between 
crew members on the Costa Concordia contributed to confusion and 
hindered the process for abandoning ship. Are there any U.S. or 
international regulations that require crew members to have language 
proficiency for basic safety terms and instructions?
    Answer. Each ship is required to have a designated language and all 
crewmembers are required to speak this language proficiently. Globally 
English is the predominant language for shipping. As stated previously, 
the safety briefings are to be provided in one or more languages likely 
to be understood by the passengers including the language or languages 
required by the ship's flag State and in the English language.
Lifejackets and Life Boats
    Question 6. Historically, lifejackets have been located in state 
rooms with additional lifejackets located in public areas. However, in 
an emergency it seems impractical to require passengers to return to 
their staterooms to retrieve lifejackets, and then head to their muster 
stations.
    Recently, newer ships have begun to store lifejackets at muster 
stations. This solves the problem of requiring passengers to return to 
their staterooms before going to muster stations. However, if a ship 
lists to one side, then the life jackets on that side of the ship will 
no longer be accessible.
    I have heard from a passenger who was aboard the Sea Diamond in 
2007 when it wrecked off the coast of Santorini that when the ship 
listed, access to staterooms was cutoff by the crew, and passengers 
were all directed to the high side of the ship, rendering the life 
boats and life jackets on the low side inaccessible.
    How do we ensure that if a ship lists there are a sufficient number 
of lifejackets and enough life boats for all aboard?
    Answer. SOLAS Chapter III Regulation 21 requires that each 
passenger ship carry lifesaving appliances for 100 percent of the 
persons onboard. Liferafts may be substituted for lifeboats for up to 
25 percent of the persons carried. These liferafts are typically for 
use by able bodied crew. An additional number of liferafts for 25 
percent of the total persons onboard are also required to be carried.
    Lifejackets are required to be carried in numbers specified by 
SOLAS Chapter III Regulation 7.2, for every person onboard the ship, as 
well as additional lifejackets for children and infants. Additional 
lifejackets are required for certain crew on watch. SOLAS Chapter III 
Regulation 22 also requires an additional 5 percent of the total number 
of lifejackets to be stored at muster stations and other locations. In 
long standing CLIA (previously ICCL) policy, CLIA members have agreed 
to carry an additional number of lifejackets equal to the number of 
passengers berthed in the most populous main vertical zone. These 
additional lifejackets are to be stored in public spaces, at the muster 
stations, on deck, or in lifeboats and in such a manner as to be 
readily accessible to crewmembers for distribution as may be necessary 
in the event of an emergency
Evacuation and Ship Design
    Question 7. In his testimony, Mr. Klein indicated that the design 
of ever larger cruise ships may hinder the ability of passengers to 
evacuate a ship. Currently, international regulation and U.S. law 
require that a ship can be abandoned within 30 minutes of the call to 
abandon ship. The 1994 sinking of the Estonia in 30 minutes illustrates 
the need for this requirement. The ESTONIA was a roll on roll of 
passenger ferry. The cause of the accident was the massive bow doors 
were not properly secured allowing massive amounts of water onto the 
vessel in a very small period of time. This class of vessel, with its 
large and open vehicle spaces, has much different stability 
characteristics than a classic passenger vessel, and is very 
susceptible to rapid capsize
    How do the U.S. Coast Guard and the International Maritime 
Organization currently ensure that ships are designed to accommodate 
this standard? Are there drills run on ships by the Coast Guard to 
ensure this?
    Answer. Ships are routinely exercised and drilled to determine the 
length of time it takes to get passengers and crew to their muster 
stations. This can vary somewhat depending on the number of passengers 
who require assistance and the nature of the assistance. Additionally 
lifeboats are regularly lowered to the water to ensure the operability 
of the lowering mechanisms. Through these regular drills and exercises 
the ships demonstrate their capability to evacuate the ship within 30 
minutes.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to 
                            Christine Duffy
    Question. I understand that under the Death on the High Seas Act, 
families who lost a loved one have limited legal remedies that they can 
pursue for the tremendous loss that they have suffered. Current law 
prevents victims' families from recovering anything other than lost 
income or wages. In contrast, if a family suffers the loss of a loved 
one in a plane crash on the high seas, they may choose to pursue non-
pecuniary damages in court, such as loss of companionship. Can you 
discuss the impact this disparity in the law that has on the surviving 
families of victims?
    Answer. Travel by air and sea is different and requires different 
considerations. While airline passengers may spend up to several hours 
on a flight, the typical commercial maritime passenger spends days, if 
not weeks, sailing aboard a ship. Unlike airline passengers, cruise 
ship passengers will visit many exotic ports and participate in a 
variety of shore excursions and recreational activities during the 
course of their travels.
    Aviation Death on the High Seas (DOHSA) cases primarily involve 
major disasters related to the operation of the aircraft and typically 
involve dozens, if not hundreds, of individuals. By contrast, the 
maritime DOHSA cases primarily involve an individual who perishes from 
natural causes, non-catastrophic circumstances, and/or non-maritime 
hazards. The typical cases include heart attack, drowning, and 
shoreside incidents. It is important to remember that courts have 
applied DOHSA broadly to all loss of life on voyages outside U.S. 
waters, including deaths during shore excursions or in foreign waters. 
In 2000, Congress amended DOHSA to permit recovery of loss of care, 
comfort, and companionship in airline cases. Congress chose not to pass 
a similar reform for the maritime industry, partly because shipping has 
a far superior safety record and maritime deaths primarily involve an 
individual who perishes from a vast array of ancillary activities.
    Since the high seas are, to some degree, under every nation's 
jurisdiction, U.S. law was crafted to reflect international norms 
regarding available damages. DOHSA, as presently written, reflects 
these international norms and provides a strong legal remedy to recover 
significant damages when warranted, including unlimited economic 
damages. Among other things, this includes medical bills, lost wages, 
loss of support, loss of nurture, guidance and training for children, 
loss of services, inheritance and the value of future support from 
children.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to 
                            Christine Duffy
    Question 1. Please provide a summary of environmental innovations 
that the cruise industry has made in recent years?
    Answer. The cruise line industry is committed to protecting the 
fragile natural environments in which we operate and we have a strong 
record of developing and implementing sound environment practices.
    The cruise lines have a variety of environmentally innovative 
programs in place that make a difference, from switching to low energy 
LED lights, using recycled hot water to heat passenger cabins, to using 
special window tinting that keep passageways cooler and utilize less 
air conditioning. Below are a few examples:
    Environmental stewardship videos for passengers. Many cruise lines 
have produced videos for their guests to watch to learn about how they 
can do their part while aboard. This can include information such as 
turning lights off and participating in towel reuse programs.
    Rigorous recycling programs. The cruise line industry is wholly 
committed to reducing the amount of waste produced by passengers aboard 
ships and at ports of call as well as the waste generated through the 
course of operating the ships. Many lines have comprehensive programs 
and crew members who are specially trained and responsible for sorting, 
processing, storing, recycling, and the final disposal of garbage. 
These programs can also include special wastes such as chemicals 
including those from photo processing equipment, collected and disposed 
with licensed contractors ashore. Other recyclable items include: 
paper, glass, plastics, aluminum, scrap metal, fluorescent lamps, 
batteries, toner cartridges and cooking oil, among others.
    Energy saving LED light bulbs. Halogen and incandescent light bulbs 
have either been replaced on many lines or are being replaced with LED 
and fluorescent lights, which last 25 times longer, use 80 percent less 
energy, and generate 50 percent less heat.
    High-Efficiency Appliances. Many cruise lines are installing high-
efficiency appliances onboard their ships in order to minimize their 
impact on the environment. Every type of appliance onboard the ships is 
being evaluated for efficiency, including: TV's, coffee makers, ovens 
and dishwashers.
    One outstanding example is a new type of ice maker, which uses 65 
percent less water than previous machines. By producing and pumping 
less water, more energy is saved. The machine infuses air into the ice 
cubes so the drinker gets the same feel, but there is less water in 
each cube. The machines themselves are higher efficiency in the way 
they freeze the ice, such as more conductive metals where the 
refrigerant contacts the water, and utilize more efficient compressors.
    Ecological Hull Coatings. The industry is working with paint 
manufacturers to deploy innovative and environmentally safe coatings 
that increase the smoothness of ship hulls. By creating smoother hulls, 
we are reducing the amount of energy needed to travel through water. It 
is estimated that these smoother hull coatings will save as much as 5 
percent of fuel usage for propulsion.
    Propulsion and Hull Design. The industry has been working with 
engine and propeller manufacturers to develop a new approach to hull 
shapes and propulsion systems, which has resulted in significant energy 
savings. By bringing together optimal hull shape with advanced 
propeller systems helps to maximize efficiency.
    Window Tinting. Cruise lines have applied window tinting designed 
for the marine environment, which keep the ships cooler and reduces the 
load on air conditioning. This feature also protects our interiors and 
furnishings from sun damage and help cut back on corresponding aging 
and subsequent waste.
    The cruise line industry also works with NGO's, universities, 
regulators and scientists around the globe to continually improve our 
environmental practices.

    Question 2. Please describe CLIA members' wastewater practices. Are 
these enforceable?
    Answer. CLIA INDUSTRY STANDARD
    CRUISE INDUSTRY WASTE MANAGEMENT
    PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
    The members of the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) 
are dedicated to preserving the marine environment and in particular 
the pristine condition of the oceans and other waters upon which our 
vessels sail. The environmental standards that apply to our industry 
are stringent and comprehensive. Through the International Maritime 
Organization, the United States and flag and port states, CLIA has 
developed consistent and uniform international standards that apply to 
all vessels engaged in international commerce. These standards are set 
forth in the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (MARPOL). The international standards of MARPOL have in turn 
been adopted by the United States and augmented by additional national 
legislation and regulation. The U.S. has jurisdiction over both foreign 
and domestic vessels that operate in U.S. waters where U.S. laws, such 
as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Act to Prevent 
Pollution from Ships, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act--which applies to hazardous 
waste as it is landed ashore for disposal, apply. The U.S. Coast Guard 
enforces both international conventions and domestic laws.
    The cruise industry commitment to protecting the environment is 
demonstrated by the comprehensive spectrum of waste management 
technologies and procedures employed on its vessels.
    CLIA members are committed to:

    a.  Designing, constructing and operating vessels, so as to 
        minimize their impact on the environment;

    b.  Developing improved technologies to exceed current requirements 
        for protection of the environment;

    c.  Implementing a policy goal of zero discharge of MARPOL, Annex V 
        solid waste products (garbage) and equivalent U.S. laws and 
        regulations by use of more comprehensive waste minimization 
        procedures to significantly reduce shipboard generated waste;

    d.  Expanding waste reduction strategies to include reuse and 
        recycling to the maximum extent possible so as to land ashore 
        even smaller quantities of waste products;

    e.  Improving processes and procedures for collection and transfer 
        of hazardous waste; and

    f.  Strengthening comprehensive programs for monitoring and 
        auditing of onboard environmental practices and procedures in 
        accordance with the International Safety Management Code for 
        the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM 
        Code).

    INDUSTRY WASTE MANAGEMENT STANDARDS: CLIA member cruise vessel 
operators have agreed to incorporate the following standards for waste 
stream management into their respective Safety Management Systems.

   1.  Photo Processing, Including X-Ray Development Fluid Waste: 
        Member lines have agreed to minimize the discharge of silver 
        into the marine environment through the use of best available 
        technology that will reduce the silver content of the waste 
        stream below levels specified by prevailing regulations.

   2.  Dry-cleaning waste fluids and contaminated materials: Member 
        lines have agreed to prevent the discharge of chlorinated dry-
        cleaning fluids, sludge, contaminated filter materials and 
        other dry-cleaning waste byproducts into the environment.

   3.  Print Shop Waste Fluids: Member lines have agreed to prevent the 
        discharge of hazardous wastes from printing materials (inks) 
        and cleaning chemicals into the environment.

   4.  Photo Copying and Laser Printer Cartridges: Member lines have 
        agreed to initiate procedures so as to maximize the return of 
        photo copying and laser printer cartridges for recycling. In 
        any event, these cartridges will be landed ashore.

   5.  Unused And Outdated Pharmaceuticals: Member lines have agreed to 
        ensure that unused and/or outdated pharmaceuticals are 
        effectively and safely disposed of in accordance with legal and 
        environmental requirements.

   6.  Fluorescent And Mercury Vapor Lamp Bulbs: Member lines have 
        agreed to prevent the release of mercury into the environment 
        from spent fluorescent and mercury vapor lamps by assuring 
        proper recycling or by using other acceptable means of 
        disposal.

   7.  Batteries: Member lines have agreed to prevent the discharge of 
        spent batteries into the marine environment.

   8.  Bilge and Oily Water Residues: Member lines have agreed to meet 
        or exceed the international requirements for removing oil from 
        bilge and wastewater prior to discharge.

   9.  Glass, Cardboard, Aluminum and Steel Cans: Member lines have 
        agreed to eliminate, to the maximum extent possible, the 
        disposal of MARPOL Annex V wastes into the marine environment. 
        This will be achieved through improved reuse and recycling 
        opportunities. They have further agreed that no waste will be 
        discharged into the marine environment unless it has been 
        properly processed and can be discharged in accordance with 
        MARPOL and other prevailing requirements.

  10.  Incinerator Ash: Member lines have agreed to reduce the 
        production of incinerator ash by minimizing the generation of 
        waste and maximizing recycling opportunities.

  11.  Graywater: [For ships traveling regularly on itineraries beyond 
        the territorial waters of coastal states], member lines have 
        agreed that graywater will be discharged only while the ship is 
        underway and proceeding at a speed of not less than 6 knots 
        \1\; that graywater will not be discharged in port and will not 
        be discharged within 4 nautical miles from shore or such other 
        distance as agreed to with authorities having jurisdiction or 
        provided for by local law except in an emergency, or where 
        geographically limited. Member lines have further agreed that 
        the discharge of graywater will comply with all applicable laws 
        and regulations. For vessels whose itineraries are fully within 
        U.S. territorial waters, discharge shall comply fully with U.S. 
        and individual state legislation and regulations.
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    \1\ For vessels operating under sail, or a combination of sail and 
motor propulsion, the speed shall not be less than 4 knots.

  12.  Blackwater: CLIA members have agreed that all blackwater will be 
        processed through a Marine Sanitation Device (MSD), certified 
        in accordance with U.S. or international regulations, prior to 
        discharge. For ships traveling regularly on itineraries beyond 
        territorial coastal waters, discharge will take place only when 
        the ship is more than 4 miles from shore and when the ship is 
        traveling at a speed of not less than 6 knots.1 For vessels 
        whose itineraries are fully within U.S. territorial waters, 
        discharge shall comply fully with U.S. and individual state 
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        legislation and regulations.

    Some member cruise lines are field-testing wastewater treatment 
systems that utilize advanced technologies. These onboard wastewater 
treatment systems, which are currently being referred to as advanced 
wastewater purification (AWP) systems, are designed to result in 
effluent discharges that are of a high quality and purity; for example, 
meeting or surpassing secondary and tertiary effluents and reclaimed 
water. Effluents meeting these high standards would not be subjected to 
the strict discharge limitations previously discussed.
    Each CLIA cruise vessel operator has agreed to utilize one or more 
of the practices and procedures contained in the attached ``Cruise 
Industry Waste Management Practices and Procedures'' in the management 
of their shipboard waste streams. Recognizing that technology is 
progressing at a rapid rate, any new equipment or management practices 
that are equivalent to or better than those described, and which are 
shown to meet or exceed international and Federal environmental 
standards, will also be acceptable. Member lines have agreed to 
communicate to CLIA the use of equivalent or other acceptable practices 
and procedures. As appropriate, such practices and procedures shall be 
included as a revision to the attached document. As an example, when 
improved systems for treating blackwater and graywater are perfected 
and shown to meet the requirements for MSDs and accepted by appropriate 
authorities, the new systems and associated technology will be included 
in the attachment as a revision.
    CLIA and its Environmental Committee will continue to work with the 
U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and other 
appropriate agencies to further implement the above commitments.
    ATTACHMENT: CRUISE INDUSTRY WASTE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND 
PROCEDURES
    Revised: November 12, 2006
    Effective for non-prior ICCL members: [July 1, 2007]
    These practices and procedures have been placed into each members 
lines safety Management systems where they are subject to port state 
control inspection by the U.S. Coast Guard.

    Question 3. What are the U.S. and international regulations that 
govern discharges?
    Answer. The International Standards for discharges from ships can 
be found in the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from ships. This Convention has six annexes:

        Annex I Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil

        Annex II Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious 
        Liquid Substances in Bulk

        Annex III Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by 
        Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in Packaged Form

        Annex IV Regulations for the prevention of Pollution by Sewage 
        from Ships

        Annex V Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Garbage 
        from ships

        Annex VI Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from 
        ships

    The U.S. has ratified all of the Annexes to this Convention except 
Annex IV. The Convention is incorporated into U.S. law through the Act 
to Prevent Pollution from Ships or APPS.
    Ships that operate in U.S. waters are also regulated by the Clean 
Water Act and various Federal and state laws that regulate discharges 
into the water.
                                 ______
                                 
      Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to 
                            Christine Duffy
    Question. Thank you all for your insight on this issue. Losing so 
many lives on the Costa Concordia is devastating and unacceptable. A 
couple from my home state were onboard the Costa Concordia at the time 
of the tragic incident. They spoke of the chaos they experienced while 
trying six times to board a life boat, and once aboard, they 
experienced technical issues operating the life boat. Thankfully, they 
survived and are home safely in New Mexico. Although the incident is 
still under investigation, troubling reports emerged about the crew's 
failure to act in accordance with their safety training, leaving the 
passengers without any coordinated plan or instructions. How could we 
ensure in the future that crew members are adequately prepared for 
chaotic situations, such as crisis management skills?
    Answer. There are a number of safety regulations in place globally 
that require crew to be properly trained and competent at their 
responsibilities including all emergency procedures. These are 
contained in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
and the International Convention for Standards for Training 
Certification and Watchkeeping. In addition the International Safety 
Management Code requires a company to develop a safety management 
system which among other things requires a company to evaluate 
accidents that occur and corrective actions that should be taken to 
enhance safety. There are special requirements that are applicable to 
passenger ships and special duties that the officers on passenger ships 
must undertake.
    All of these international instruments are applicable to ships 
operating internationally. The Costa Concordia accident will be the 
focus of a great deal of scrutiny at the International Maritime 
Organization, where the issue of passenger ship safety is constantly 
reviewed.
    In the days following the Costa Concordia accident, Carnival 
Corporation, the corporate owner of Costa Concordia announced a 
corporate wide operational safety review. Shortly thereafter the 
members of the Cruise Lines International Association announced an 
industry wide operational Safety Review. The purpose of this review is 
as follows:

    To provide coordinated recommendations for industry safety policy 
and procedures related to the safe operations of ships and to recommend 
for consideration any regulatory initiatives considered necessary.

   Provide overview and recommendations for conducting the 
        [industry wide] operations safety review and to discuss and 
        recommend review processes for consideration by cruise line 
        operators' and to ensure that results from individual members 
        safety review efforts are presented in a uniform manner.

   Provide guidance and recommendations to CLIA for response to 
        media and other inquiries regarding the progress of the 
        Operational Safety Review.

   Provide coordinated advice [and consent] to CLIA staff in 
        drafting and submitting papers for consideration at the 
        International Maritime Organization.
    Scope:

   Consider human factors, training, and operational aspects of 
        operations safety during normal operations and in an emergency 
        including:

   Navigation

   Evacuation

   Emergency training

   Related practices and procedures (such as: SMS, damage 
        control, and audit procedures)

   Communications (both internal and external) monitoring of 
        vessel track line and status of ship, and implications for new 
        build and existing ships)

   Emergency response to: Fire, flooding, collision, grounding, 
        or other emergency scenarios.

   Recommend to the CLIA membership any studies, research or 
        other actions which may be necessary to clarify, research or 
        further develop any matters which may be identified or 
        recommended for action and for which sufficient information is 
        not available to form a well-grounded and firmly based 
        recommendation for a policy, procedure or possible regulatory 
        initiative.

   Consider recommendations for inclusion of other or specific 
        matters which may be presented by CLIA, individual members, or 
        outside sources such as: flag states, regulatory authorities, 
        class societies, or other.

    This review has been ongoing for 2 months and has already resulted 
in Industry wide policies on the following:

   Muster the newly embarking passengers for safety 
        instructions prior to the ship departing port.

   Policy on voyage planning requiring the mandatory 
        application of voyage planning guidelines.

   Policy on access to the bridge during special navigational 
        evolutions.

   Policy on extra lifejackets to be stored at muster stations

                                  
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