[Senate Hearing 112-598]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-598
THE NUCLEAR WASTE ADMINISTRATION ACT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
TO
RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON S. 3469, THE NUCLEAR WASTE ADMINISTRATION ACT OF
2012
__________
SEPTEMBER 12, 2012
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Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico, Chairman
RON WYDEN, Oregon LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington MIKE LEE, Utah
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont RAND PAUL, Kentucky
DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan DANIEL COATS, Indiana
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota
AL FRANKEN, Minnesota DEAN HELLER, Nevada
JOE MANCHIN, III, West Virginia BOB CORKER, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
Robert M. Simon, Staff Director
Sam E. Fowler, Chief Counsel
McKie Campbell, Republican Staff Director
Karen K. Billups, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
STATEMENTS
Page
Barron, Henry B., President and Chief Executive Officer,
Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC, Baltimore, MD......... 27
Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator From New Mexico................ 1
Fettus, Geoffrey H., Senior Attorney, Nuclear Program, Natural
Resources Defense Council...................................... 33
Heller, Hon. Dean, U.S. Senator From Nevada...................... 2
Lyons, Peter B., Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy,
Department of Energy........................................... 10
Meserve, Richard A., President, Carnegie Institution for Science. 7
Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator From Alaska................... 2
Scowcroft, General Brent, Co-Chairman, Blue Ribbon Commission on
America's Nuclear Future....................................... 4
APPENDIXES
Appendix I
Responses to additional questions................................ 47
Appendix II
Additional material submitted for the record..................... 63
THE NUCLEAR WASTE ADMINISTRATION ACT
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
chairman, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW
MEXICO
The Chairman. OK. Why don't we start the hearing? The
committee meets this morning to consider S. 3469, the Nuclear
Waste Administration Act of 2012.
S. 3469 is intended to implement the recommendations of the
Blue Ribbon Commission that Secretary Chu appointed to review
the nuclear waste program. The Blue Ribbon Commission issued
its final report in January. This committee heard from the 2
chairs of the Commission, General Brent Scowcroft and
Representative Lee Hamilton on that report in February.
The Blue Ribbon Commission was worthy of its name. It was
made up of 15 highly distinguished individuals from academia,
from industry, from public service. They approached their task
conscientiously and diligently. They produced a very thorough
and comprehensive report.
The Commission presented us with 8 clear, concise and
straight forward recommendations. I've tried to implement those
recommendations in the bill that is now before us for this
hearing. I worked closely with Senator Murkowski and the Chair
and Ranking Member of the Energy and Water Appropriations
Subcommittee, Senator Feinstein and Senator Alexander in the
effort.
Regrettably, we were not as successful as the Blue Ribbon
Commission was in reaching a unanimous bipartisan consensus.
Although we were able to agree on most issues, we could not
agree on the siting process for storage facilities and how to
ensure that temporary storage facilities do not become
permanent substitutes for an underground repository. With time
running out on this Congress, we agreed that I should go ahead
and introduce the bill as it stands and hold this hearing on
the bill. Leave it to the next Congress to continue working on
the issue.
We're very fortunate to have General Scowcroft back with us
this morning. We're sorry that Congressman Hamilton could not
be with us. We extend to him and his family our sincere
condolences on the tragic death of his wife, Nancy, last month.
We appreciate Dr. Meserve stepping in for Congressman
Hamilton today.
We also welcome back Assistant Secretary Lyons to offer the
Administration's views on the bill.
Following this panel we will hear from Mr. Henry Barron,
the President and Chief Executive Officer of Constellation
Energy Nuclear Group.
Mr. Geoffrey Fettus, who is the Senior Attorney at the
National or the Natural Resources Defense Council.
Let me defer to Senator Murkowski for any comments she'd
like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN HELLER, U.S. SENATOR
FROM NEVADA
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Murkowski, I want to start
by thanking you for holding this hearing today. While S. 3469
does not totally take Yucca Mountain off the table, I am
pleased that we are discussing legislation that recognizes the
need for consent-based nuclear waste repository siting and
provides a potential path forward beyond Yucca Mountain.
My home state of Nevada is home to the proposed Yucca
Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository. I have long had serious
concerns about the safety of Yucca Mountain and the suitability
of Southern Nevada as the final resting place of our spent
nuclear material. With the amendment of the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act in 1987, Nevada-a state without any nuclear power
plants-was legally compelled to bear the sole burden of long-
term storage of the nation's nuclear waste. With the stroke of
a pen, objective evaluation of Yucca Mountain as one option
among many ceased and the study of alternative storage methods
and sites was curtailed. Given the politicized history of Yucca
Mountain, I don't trust the federal government to appropriately
manage a repository at the site.
I recognize the need to address the problem of spent
nuclear fuel, but it must be solved through careful
consideration of all alternatives based on credible scientific
information, and not by politicians in Washington. I appreciate
the effort to create a sound solution to long-term nuclear
waste storage that Chairman Bingaman and Ranking Member
Murkowski are seeking through the Nuclear Waste Administration
Act of 2012. It is my hope that the lessons learned from Yucca
Mountain, such as the importance of consent-based siting and
truly objective evaluation of any proposed site, will not be
lost on our future efforts. I look forward to working with my
colleagues to find safe and viable alternatives to Yucca
Mountain for the long-term storage of nuclear waste.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR
FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do thank you
for holding this hearing on a topic that, I think we would all
agree, needs to be resolved in order for nuclear energy to play
the role that, I believe, that it's clearly capable of in
meeting our Nation's energy needs.
I have expressed some skepticism in the past about the need
to delay progress on resolving these issues while the Blue
Ribbon Commission deliberated. But, as you have stated and I
will absolutely concur, the Blue Ribbon Commission is an
extremely credible group. It has produced a thoughtful product
regarding how to move our Nation's spent nuclear fuel program
forward. I fully recognize and appreciate that.
Now there may be little that is actually truly new in the
proposals that came out of the Blue Ribbon Commission. But I am
optimistic that the report has ignited a heightened sense of
urgency and renewed focus on these issues. As the Commission's
report notes the government's failure to address our nuclear
waste issues is damaging to the development of future nuclear
power and simultaneously worsening our Nation's financial
situation.
I think that we need to act on this. I think we need to act
soon.
Mr. Chairman, the legislation that you introduced is
indicative of months of good, productive discussions. As you've
noted, that you led along with Senator Feinstein, Senator
Alexander and myself discussing the ways to end the--to address
the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. I congratulate you on
moving the discussion forward, putting the marker out there and
allowing us to begin the very critical, the very important
discussion that must advance.
While we couldn't ultimately bridge the issue of linking
progress on interim storage and a permanent repository, I want
to be clear to those following these discussions that while
prospects for legislative enactment in this Congress are not
favorable. We're all very honest with that. We will continue
the effort next year and build upon the progress that the
Chairman has begun.
Now I will also note that the Senate Energy and Water
Appropriations bill contains language that seeks to move
interim storage forward in a timely manner. I think we
recognize that we're going to be dealing with a shorter term
CR, perhaps in the next couple days, perhaps next week. I'm
hopeful that the interim storage language will be included when
Congress acts on a full Fiscal Year 2013 spending bill.
In addition we would be remiss if we did not examine the
impact of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's
remand on the NRC's waste confidence decision on new license
applications and license renewals and how that legislation,
along the lines of S. 3469, could help address the court's
concerns.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding the hearing,
advancing the legislation and the discussion and look forward
to the witnesses this morning.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Let me, once again, just introduce this first panel.
General Brent Scowcroft, the Co-Chair of the Blue Ribbon
Commission on America's Nuclear Future.
Dr. Richard Meserve, the President of the Carnegie
Institution for Science.
Dr. Peter Lyons, who is the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear
Energy with the U.S. Department of Energy.
So, General Scowcroft, why don't you go ahead and begin, if
you'd like. Each of you take what time you think you need to
explain the main points you'd like to make about the proposed
legislation.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, CO-CHAIRMAN, BLUE RIBBON
COMMISSION ON AMERICA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE
General Scowcroft. Thank you very much, Chairman Bingaman.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Murkowski, it's a great
pleasure to appear before you today to discuss S. 3469, the
Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012.
I would like at the outset to pass along Co-Chairman
Hamilton's sincere regrets for not being here with us today. As
you said, Mrs. Hamilton lost her life in a tragic accident last
month. Co-Chairman Hamilton is home in Indiana attending to
family matters. It was a great privilege for me to serve
alongside him as Co-Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Commission. We
join you in extending our deepest sympathies to him.
I'm very pleased that Commission member, Dick Meserve is
able to join with me this morning.
We were also most pleased to receive the invitation to
testify today because we believe our Nation simply must craft a
sustainable solution to the nuclear waste management issue. The
legislation that Senator Bingaman has introduced is an
outstanding beginning to what we recognize could be an extended
legislative process.
We are also pleased to be here because it gives us a chance
to publicly thank Chairman Bingaman for his service to the
Nation as he prepares to retire at the end of this session.
Thank you, Senator Bingaman for all you have done to help craft
sensible energy policy for the United States. Your leadership
on the nuclear waste issue and on energy issues in general will
be sorely missed. Thank you for allowing us the opportunity to
testify before you today.
As you know the Blue Ribbon Commission on which we served
was formed by the Secretary of Energy at the direction of the
President. Our task was to conduct a comprehensive review of
policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle
and to recommend a new strategy. We delivered our final report
to the Secretary of Energy in January of this year and made 8
key recommendations.
Your committee was fully briefed on these recommendations
when Co-Chairman Hamilton and I testified in February. So I
will not go into detail about the individual recommendations
again. Rather let me just remind the committee that our
Commission viewed these 8 recommendations as an integrated set
and that they would be most effective if implemented as a
complete package.
Now I will turn the microphone over to Mr. Meserve.
[The joint prepared statement of General Scowcroft and Mr.
Meserve follows:]
Prepared Statement of General Brent Scowcroft, Co-Chairman, and Richard
A. Meserve, Commissioner, Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear
Future
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Bingaman, Ranking Member Murkowski, distinguished members
of the committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to
discuss S. 3469, the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012.
Before we begin, I would like to pass along Co-Chairman Hamilton's
sincerest regrets for not being here with us today. As you may know,
Mrs. Hamilton died in a tragic accident last month and Congressman
Hamilton is home in Indiana tending to family affairs. It was a great
privilege to serve alongside him as co-chairman of the Blue Ribbon
Commission and we extend him our deepest sympathies. I am pleased that
Dick Meserve is available to join me this morning.
We were also most pleased to receive the invitation to testify
today because we believe our nation simply must craft a sustainable
solution to the nuclear waste management issue. The legislation that
Senator Bingaman has introduced is an outstanding beginning to what we
recognize could be an extended legislative process. We are also pleased
to be here because it gives us a chance to publicly thank Chairman
Bingaman for his service to the nation as he prepares to retire at the
end of this session. Thank you, Senator Bingaman, for all you've done
to help craft sensible energy policy for the United States. Your
leadership on the nuclear waste issue and on energy issues in general
will be sorely missed. Thank you for allowing us the opportunity to
testify before you today.
BRC Report Overview
As you know, the Blue Ribbon Commission on which we served was
formed by the Secretary of Energy at the direction of the President.
Our charge was to conduct a comprehensive review of policies for
managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle and to recommend a new
strategy.
We delivered our final report to the Secretary in January of this
year, and made eight key recommendations:
1. A new, consent-based approach to siting future nuclear
waste management facilities.
2. A new organization dedicated solely to implementing the
waste management program and empowered with the authority and
resources to succeed.
3. Access to the funds nuclear utility ratepayers are
providing for the purpose of nuclear waste management.
4. Prompt efforts to develop one or more geologic disposal
facilities.
5. Prompt efforts to develop one or more consolidated storage
facilities.
6. Prompt efforts to prepare for the eventual large-scale
transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste to
consolidated storage and disposal facilities when such
facilities become available.
7. Support for advances in nuclear energy technology and for
workforce development; and
8. Active U.S. leadership in international efforts to address
safety, non-proliferation, and security concerns.
Your committee was fully briefed on the recommendations of our
Commission when Co-Chairman Hamilton and I testified in February of
this year, so I will not go into detail about the individual
recommendations. Rather, let me just remind the committee that our
Commission viewed these eight recommendations as an integrated set, and
that they would be most effective if implemented as a complete package.
Views on S. 3469
We are pleased to see that Senator Bingaman's draft legislation
incorporates many of the changes to existing law that will be required
to implement our Commission's recommendations. In particular, S. 3469
would implement the Commission's recommendations to authorize a
consent-based process for nuclear waste facility siting, to be
conducted by an entity removed from the Department of Energy, with
access to Nuclear Waste Fee payments and the balance of the Nuclear
Waste Fund. The bill's provisions requiring development of generic
radiation protection standards for repositories and a mission plan for
the Nuclear Waste Administration are also consistent with the
Commission's recommendations.
While S. 3469 generally mirrors the Commission's recommendations,
there are a few areas of difference that we believe are worth
highlighting and exploring. In particular:
1. The Commission recommended the establishment of a
congressionally chartered corporation to carry out the waste
program. The draft legislation proposes instead to create a
Nuclear Waste Administration, an agency of the federal
government, to carry out this role. While both approaches would
assure appropriate focus, we recommended a federally chartered
corporation in order to assure the necessary management
stability for the long-term task of advancing the waste program
and to provide a degree of isolation from short-term political
pressures. In particular, a new waste management organization
will need the leadership of a strong chief executive with
exceptional management, political, and technical skills and
experience and tenure that extends longer than the political
cycle--objectives that might be more easily achieved through a
corporation than a federal agency. We urge the committee to
reconsider this aspect of the legislation.
2. The proposed legislation places limits on the amount of
spent fuel that can be accepted for consolidated storage prior
to congressional ratification of a consent agreement for a
repository. We understand that this provision reflects a
concern that any consolidated storage facility could become a
de facto disposal facility, which is why existing law prohibits
the construction of a storage facility before construction
authorization has been issued for a first repository. The Blue
Ribbon Commission concluded that `` the current rigid
legislative restriction . . . should be eliminated,'' but also
emphasized that ``the challenge of establishing positive
linkages such that progress on storage does not undermine, but
rather supports progress on repository development remains an
important one.'' Our review did not lead us to recommend any
specific linkages because we concluded that the volume of fuel
to be accepted in consolidated storage could be one of the many
elements of the negotiation between the nuclear waste
management organization and potential host governments. We
appreciate that the bill allows consolidated storage to begin
at a scale sufficient to provide for acceptance of all of the
spent fuel from shutdown reactors, as we recommended, and that
full scale storage could begin considerably earlier than is
possible under current law. However, we encourage the committee
to give careful consideration to alternative approaches for
ensuring that a storage facility is a complement to a
repository. We suggest that there may be benefits in allowing
the linkage provisions to be the subject of negotiations
between the waste management organization and potential storage
facility hosts, subject to final approval by Congress.
3. And finally, although the Nuclear Waste Oversight Board
called for in Section 205 is generally consistent with our
Commission's recommendation for independent oversight of the
waste management organization, we believe its membership should
be expanded. The oversight board as set forth in Section 205
would only include members from the federal government,
presumably subject to regular turnover on a political cycle. We
believe that broader representation and further assurance of
stability would be appropriate. To achieve this end, we
encourage the committee to consider adding representatives from
outside of government, as called for in our Commission's
recommendations. Non-governmental members could come from
organizations contributing to the Nuclear Waste Fund, state
public utility commissions, the environmental non-governmental
organization community, representatives of workers involved in
the construction or operation of radioactive waste management
facilities, and others. This supplementation of the board's
membership would reinforce the federal commitment to a consent-
based process.
While we think these three differences between S. 3469 and our
Commission's recommendations are important and are worthy of further
consideration, we do not in any way want to imply dissatisfaction with
the efforts of the committee. Chairman Bingaman, Ranking Member
Murkowski and other Senators, particularly Senators Feinstein and
Alexander, have shown great leadership in their willingness to engage
in serious bipartisan discussions about the future of nuclear waste
management in the United States. In a year presenting many demands on
the Congress, we commend your attention to the problem of charting a
new course for addressing nuclear waste.
Concerns about Lack of Administration Action
I am unable to provide you with any insights as to the views of the
Administration to our report because the Administration has not yet
released an implementation plan in response to our recommendations.
That plan was due at the end of July, so we cannot say for certain
whether the Administration will demonstrate the same level of
seriousness that is reflected in your draft legislation. Our Commission
report was issued in January, and despite initial positive signals from
the Administration, we have seen little in the way of concrete action.
We are particularly disappointed to have received no formal reply to a
December 2011 letter we sent the White House in which we urged action
to provide assured access to utility waste disposal fees.
In our letter and in our report we recommended several near-term
actions that could be taken by the administration in cooperation with
key committees in Congress and the Congressional Budget Office to give
greater access to the nuclear waste fees going forward, while waiting
for legislation--such as S. 3469--that would provide a comprehensive
fix to the funding of the program. Failure to fix the funding problem
could undermine key recommendations of the Commission. For example, the
parallel storage and disposal programs we recommend could be in
competition for limited funds instead of being mutually supportive, and
a consent-based siting process that provides assurances to host
communities that a storage facility or repository will be a positive
asset could be undermined if access to a source of funding for promised
benefits is not assured.
Our Commission believed that fixing the funding problem is vital.
We believe that steps towards implementation of near-term proposals
that do not have to wait for comprehensive legislative action would be
a clear and unmistakable signal that the Administration and Congress
are willing to take the difficult yet necessary measures to put our
nation's nuclear waste management program back on track and enable its
success.
Conclusion
In conclusion, and as we said to this committee in February, the
national interest demands that our nuclear waste program be fixed.
Complacency with a failed nuclear waste management system is not an
option and the need for a new strategy is urgent. We believe the bill
that Senator Bingaman has prepared represents a very useful starting
point for an important discussion.
Thank you for having us here today. We appreciate the opportunity
to share our views on S. 3469 and we look forward to your questions.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. MESERVE, PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE
INSTITUTION FOR SCIENCE
Mr. Meserve. Thank you, General.
We are pleased to see that Senator Bingaman's draft
legislation incorporates many of the changes to existing law
that will be required to implement the Commission's
recommendations. In particular, Senate S. 3469 would implement
the Commission's recommendations to authorize a consent based
process for nuclear facility siting being conducted by an
entity removed from the Department of Energy with unfettered
access to nuclear waste fee payments and the balance of the
Nuclear Waste Fund. The bill's provisions requiring development
of generic radiation protection standards for repositories and
a mission plan for the Nuclear Waste Administration are also
consistent with our recommendations.
While the bill generally mirrors the Commission's
recommendations, there are a few areas of difference that we
believe are worth highlighting and exploring.
First, the Commission recommended the establishment of a
congressionally chartered corporation to carry out the waste
program. The draft legislation proposes instead to create a
Nuclear Waste Administration, an agency of the Federal
Government, to carry out this role.
While both approaches would assure appropriate focus, we
recommended a federally chartered corporation in order to
assure the necessary management stability for the long term
task of advancing the waste program and to provide a degree of
isolation from short term political pressures. In particular, a
new waste management organization will need the leadership of a
strong chief executive with exceptional management, political
and technical skills and experience and tenure that extends
longer than the political cycle, objectives that may be more
easily achieved through a corporation than through a Federal
agency. We urge that the committee reconsider this aspect of
the legislation.
Second, the proposed legislation places limits on the
amount of spent fuel that can be accepted for consolidated
storage prior to congressional ratification of a consent
agreement for a repository.
We understand that this provision reflects a concern that
any consolidated storage facility could become a de facto
disposal facility which is why existing law prohibits
construction of a storage facility before construction
authorization has been issued for a first repository.
The Blue Ribbon Commission concluded and I'm quoting,
``that the current rigid legislative restrictions should be
eliminated.'' But we also emphasize and I'm quoting again,
``the challenge of establishing positive linkages such that
progress on storage does not undermine, but rather supports
progress on repository development remains an important one.''
Our review did not lead us to recommend any specific
linkages because we concluded that the volume of fuel to be
accepted in consolidated storage could be one of the many
elements of negotiation between the Nuclear Waste Management
Organization and potential host governments. We appreciate that
the bill allows consolidated storage to begin at a scale
sufficient to provide for acceptance of all the spent fuel from
shut down reactors, as we recommended. That full scale storage
could begin considerably earlier than is possible under current
law.
However, we encourage the committee to give careful
consideration to alternative approaches for ensuring that a
storage facility is a complement to a repository. We suggest
that there may be benefits in allowing the linkage of
provisions to be the subject of negotiations between the Waste
Management Organization and potential storage facility hosts
subject, of course, to final approval by Congress.
Third, we note that although the Nuclear Waste Oversight
Board, called for in section 205, is generally consistent with
our Commission's recommendation for independent oversight of
the Waste Management Organizations. We believe its membership
should be expanded. The Oversight Board, as set forth in
Section 205, would only include members from the Federal
Government, presumably subject to regular turnover on a
political cycle. We believe that broader representation and
further assurance of stability would be appropriate.
To achieve this end we encourage the committee to consider
adding representatives from outside the government, as called
for in our Commission's recommendations. Non-governmental
members could come from organizations contributing to the
Nuclear Waste Fund, state public utility commissions, the
environmental non-governmental organization community,
representatives of workers involved in the construction or
operation of waste management facilities and others. This
supplementation of the board's membership would reinforce the
Federal commitment to a consent based process.
While we think that these differences between S. 3469 and
our Commission's recommendations and are important and are
worthy of further consideration, we do not in any way want to
imply dissatisfaction with the efforts of the committee.
Chairman Bingaman, Ranking Member Murkowski and other
Senators, particularly Senators Feinstein and Alexander, have
shown great leadership in their willingness to engage in
serious bipartisan discussions about the future of nuclear
waste management in the United States. In a year presenting
many demands on the Congress we commend you for your attention
to the problem of chartering a new course for addressing this
important problem.
Now I'll turn the microphone back over to General
Scowcroft.
General Scowcroft. We are unable to provide you with any
insights as to the views of the Administration to our report
because the Administration has not yet released an
implementation plan in response to our recommendations. That
plan was due at the end of July, so we cannot say for certain
whether the Administration will demonstrate the same level of
seriousness that is reflected in your draft legislation.
Our Commission report was issued in January. Despite
initial positive signals from the Administration, we have seen
little in the way of concrete action. We are particularly
disappointed to have received no formal reply to a December
2011 letter we sent to the White House, in which we urged
action to provide assured access to utility waste disposal
fees.
In our letter and in our report we recommended several near
term actions that could be taken by the Administration in
cooperation with key committees in Congress and the
Congressional Budget Office to give greater access to the
Nuclear Waste Fees going forward while waiting for legislation,
such as S. 3469, that would provide a comprehensive fix to the
funding of the program. Failure to fix the funding program
could undermine key recommendations of the Commission.
For example, the parallel storage and disposal programs we
recommend could be in competition for limited funds instead of
being mutually supportive. A consent based siting process that
provides assurance to host communities that a storage facility
or repository will be a positive asset, could be undermined if
access to a source of funding for promised benefits is not
assured.
Our Commission believed that fixing the funding problem is
vital. We believe that steps toward implementation of near term
proposals, that do not have to wait for comprehensive
legislative action would be a clear and unmistakable signal
that the Administration and Congress are willing to take the
difficult, yet necessary measures, to put our Nation's nuclear
waste management program back on track and enable its success.
In conclusion, and as we said to this committee in last
February, the national interest demands that our nuclear waste
program be fixed. Complacency with a failed nuclear waste
management system is not an option. The need for a new strategy
is urgent.
We believe the bill that Senator Bingaman has prepared
represents a very useful starting point for an important
discussion.
Thank you for having us here today. We appreciate the
opportunity to share our views on S. 3469. We look forward to
your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Lyons, why don't you go right ahead?
STATEMENT OF PETER B. LYONS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR
ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Lyons. Thank you.
Chairman Bingaman, Ranking Member Murkowski and Senator
Wyden, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss nuclear waste management issues and S.
3469. Thank you for your leadership on this important issue.
Nuclear power is an integral part of the Administration's
all of the above clean energy strategy. But for nuclear energy
to remain a viable component of the Nation's energy portfolio,
we must develop a sustainable fuel cycle with a well understood
and well accepted fuel management strategy. While used fuel is
safely stored today, the current storage certainly does not
represent a permanent solution. Because acceptance of waste did
not begin in 1998, a substantial cost has been presented to the
taxpayers to reimburse utilities for the cost of ongoing
storage that will continue to grow until the government
fulfills its obligations.
The Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future or
the BRC worked through a public, open and transparent process
on recommendations to support a new strategy for the back end
of the nuclear fuel cycle. Senator Bingaman's bill addresses
many of the BRC's recommendations. While the Administration is
still finalizing its framework for the management of nuclear
waste, there are key elements that any strategy must address.
No matter what organization, funding, storage and disposal
decisions are made moving forward the consent based approach to
siting endorsed by the BRC is critical to success. The
Administration supports working with Congress to develop a
process that is transparent, adaptive and technically sound.
Experiences in other countries indicate that a consent based
process, developed through engagement with key stakeholders and
with significant public involvement offers the greatest
probability for success.
The BRC recommended the establishment of a new, single
purpose organization for management and disposal. The
Administration agrees that some organizational change is needed
to provide the stability, focus and credibility needed to build
public trust and confidence.
The BRC highlighted issues associated with the Nuclear
Waste Fund. A new approach to funding should assure that the
fees paid by taxpayers using nuclear generated electricity
support the Nation's nuclear waste management strategy. In
addition, the organization needs timely access to the funds
necessary to execute its mission.
Any new funding structure must balance increased funding
flexibility with rigorous spending oversight while still
providing accountability to the President and to Congress.
Different models can achieve this goal. This will be an area of
continued discussion between Congress and the Administration.
The BRC recommended that the United States develop one or
more consolidated storage facilities. Building such a storage
capacity could enable the government to move more rapidly to
fulfill its contractual responsibilities and thus reduce future
liabilities. Storage can add security and flexibility to a
system for permanent waste disposal. But as the BRC recommended
some form of linkage between opening a consolidated storage
facility and progress toward a repository is necessary so that
the storage facility does not become a de facto permanent
facility.
The Administration supports exploring this issue with
Congress. In addition the Administration supports the broad
scientific and international consensus that a geologic
repository is the most effective, permanent solution to
disposition of high level wastes.
The Administration agrees with the BRC that the Department
should continue R and D on possible future fuel cycle options.
In the near term the Department will move forward with R and D
activities within the constraints of existing legislation.
The Administration would again like to thank the BRC for
their dedicated work in developing a path forward. They
highlighted a need for changes in current law and the
Administration will work with Congress to define a responsible
and achievable path forward.
In closing, the Administration thanks Senator Bingaman for
his important contribution toward new legislation. It provides
a strong base for mature dialog to continue.
On a very personal note, Mr. Chairman, this may be the last
time that I testify before you. We've interacted for many
years, especially when I served on the staff of this committee.
I've been honored with the opportunity to work with you and
your outstanding staff on many important issues. Your
dedication to public service, your thoughtful consideration of
complex issues provides a superb model for public service.
Thank you for your service to the Nation, sir.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lyons follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter B. Lyons, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear
Energy, Department of Energy
Chairman Bingaman, Ranking Member Murkowski, and Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss nuclear waste management issues and S. 3469, The Nuclear Waste
Administration Act of 2012. Thank you for your leadership on this
important issue.
Nuclear power is an integral part of our ``all-of-the-above''
energy strategy. It provides twenty percent of our nation's electricity
supply, and the Administration is working to expand the safe use of
nuclear power through support for new nuclear power plants
incorporating state-of-the-art passive safety features as well as cost-
shared technical support for licensing two designs for small modular
reactors. Nuclear energy is an important contributor to our nation's
energy security, and promotes clean-energy jobs. Nuclear energy
production also provides important environmental benefits by producing
little carbon dioxide or conventional air pollutant emissions.
The United States must develop a sustainable fuel cycle and used
fuel management strategy to ensure that nuclear power continues to be a
safe, reliable resource for our nation's long-term energy supply and
security. Because acceptance of waste did not begin in 1998, as
mandated by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, a substantial cost has been
presented to the taxpayers to reimburse utilities for the cost of
ongoing storage and will continue to grow until the government fulfills
its obligations.
The Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC)
released its final report on January 26, 2012. The Commissioners worked
collaboratively and constructively--through a public, open and
transparent process--on recommendations to support a new strategy for
the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Nuclear Waste
Administration Act of 2012 addresses many of the BRC's recommendations,
and while the Administration is still finalizing its framework for the
management of nuclear waste, there are key elements that any strategy
must address.
Organization
The BRC recommended the establishment of a new, single-purpose
organization charged with the management and disposal of high level
waste and the associated interface with the waste generators. The
Administration agrees that a new waste management and disposal
organization could have advantages in terms of stability, focus, and
other characteristics that will be important to future success. At the
same time, it is evident that the success of any future waste
management organization will be driven by many factors and unforeseen
circumstances. The organizational form is only one of these factors. Of
equal or greater importance are decisions about other organizational
characteristics to ensure that the organization has adequate authority
and leadership to execute its mission, and balances the need for
independence of the organization with appropriate oversight mechanisms.
Whatever form the new organization takes, organizational stability,
leadership continuity, oversight and accountability, and public
credibility are critical attributes for future success. The
Administration looks forward to working with Congress to design a
governance structure that meets these objectives.
Funding
Following the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), utilities
entered into contracts with the federal government, which agreed to
accept and permanently dispose of utilities' used nuclear fuel in
exchange for a fee that would be paid by ratepayers using nuclear
generated electricity. All NWF spending is subject to annual
appropriations and is required to compete with other priorities within
the budget, even though the funds collected can only be used for
purposes authorized under the NWPA. Since the enactment of the NWPA, $8
billion has been appropriated from the NWF to date. The current balance
of the NWF is estimated at $27 billion. Fee collections of more than
$750 million annually combined with accrued interest will continue to
grow the Fund.
For any organization to be effective in the performance of this
complex mission, it needs timely access to funds in the amounts
necessary to execute its mission. The BRC highlighted this need noting,
``.the success of a revitalized nuclear waste management program will
depend on making the revenues generated by the nuclear waste fee and
the balance in the NWF available when needed and in the amounts needed
to implement the program.''
Any new funding structure for this program will need to balance
increased funding flexibility and rigorous spending oversight to help
assure that the program is implemented in the most cost-effective
manner possible, while still holding the organization accountable to
the President and Congress. The Administration looks forward to working
with Congress to find a solution that meets these objectives.
Disposal and Storage
The Administration supports the broad scientific and international
consensus that a geologic repository is the most effective permanent
solution to dispose of high level waste. While this does not preclude
any decision about future fuel cycle options, it is evident that a
once-through cycle is appropriate for the foreseeable future. Cost,
proliferation risks, environmental concerns, economics, and technology
limitations are some of the issues associated with closing the fuel
cycle in the U.S. through use of recycling. The Administration agrees
with the BRC that any new organization should focus on the development
and operation of storage and repository facilities while the Department
continues R&D on possible future fuel cycle options.
The BRC recommended that the U.S. develop one or more consolidated
storage facilities. Building consolidated storage capacity could enable
the government to move more rapidly to fulfill its contractual
responsibilities and thus reduce future liability costs. While
consolidated storage can add security and flexibility to a system for
permanent waste disposal, some form of linkage between opening a
consolidated storage facility and progress toward a permanent
repository is necessary so that potential host states and communities
for consolidated storage facilities are not saddled with a de facto
permanent facility. The Administration supports exploring this issue
with Congress.
Consent-Based Siting
No matter what organization, funding, and storage decisions are
made moving forward, a consent-based approach to siting is critical to
success. The Administration supports working with Congress to develop a
consent- based process that is transparent, adaptive, and technically
sound. The BRC emphasized that flexibility, patience, responsiveness
and a heavy emphasis on consultation and cooperation will all be
necessary in the siting process and in all aspects of implementation.
Experiences in other countries indicate that a consent-based process--
developed through engagement with states, tribes, local governments,
key stakeholders, and the public--offers a greater probability of
success. DOE is currently evaluating critical success factors in the
siting of nuclear facilities in the U.S. and abroad to facilitate the
development of a siting process.
Activities in FY 2012 and Proposed in FY 2013
There are a number of key R&D areas that the Administration has
recognized as foundational to the nation's nuclear waste management
program, and was pursuing even prior to the release of the Commission's
recommendations. Planned activities in the areas of transportation,
storage, and disposal align with the BRC suggestions and in the near
term, the Department will move forward with R&D in these areas, within
the constraints of existing legislation.
Transportation
The Department is evaluating the inventory, transportation
interface, and shipping status of used nuclear fuel at nuclear power
sites. The Department is re-engaging the regional transportation groups
to understand stakeholder issues as we work to finalize the policy and
procedures for providing technical assistance and funds. The
Administration will also draw from the successful transportation
approaches used to support shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP) in New Mexico.
Storage
The Department is evaluating the possibility of direct disposal of
existing storage containers in various geologic media; understanding
material degradation in storage and transportation systems over
extended periods of time; and the development of standardized canister
concepts for transportation, storage, and disposal.
Disposal
The Department is conducting R&D related to disposal in the
following areas: evaluating back-filled engineered barriers systems and
materials; evaluating geologic media for their impacts on waste
isolation; evaluating thermal management options for various geologic
media; and developing a R&D plan for deep borehole disposal. The role
of retrievability in the geologic disposal of nuclear waste remains an
important issue that may need further consideration.
Closing
The Administration would like to thank the BRC Commissioners for
their dedicated work in developing a path forward in nuclear waste
management. The BRC highlighted the need for changes in current law and
the Administration thanks Chairman Bingaman for his important
contribution to moving the discussion forward with this new
legislation. The Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012 provides a
base from which our dialogue can continue and the Administration
remains committed to working with Congress to define a responsible and
achievable path forward to manage our nation's used nuclear fuel and
nuclear waste.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Thank all 3 witnesses
for excellent testimony.
Let me start with a few questions.
I think all of you have highlighted this issue of linkage
which is a concern that, I think, all of us here in the
Congress, in the Senate who worked on this issue, have tried to
focus on as well.
I think there's an agreement that we need a permanent
geologic repository.
There's an agreement that there's a need to provide storage
until the repository is available.
Third, that there's a need for a mechanism to ensure that
the temporary storage facility does not take the place of a
long term repository and end up becoming a de facto permanent
solution to this problem.
So what we seem to disagree on is what that mechanism ought
to be. I think it's important that Congress identify the
mechanism and put it into the law whether the one that I
propose in this legislation is the best one will be for a
future Congress to decide. But at least this has the advantage,
as I think some of you have acknowledged, of providing more
than 3 times as much storage capacity as the shut down reactors
need and also of allowing full scale storage to begin
considerably earlier than is possible under current law.
You recommend that we leave the linkage question to the
state or community hosting the storage facility to negotiate,
presumably in the form of deadlines or volume limitations. I
guess one obvious question is what happens if a state is
willing to host a storage facility without linkages? Should we
then abandon a repository program if the state is willing to
host a storage facility without requiring any linkage?
Another question is what happens if a host state insists on
linkages but the repository is not built? How would the state
enforce its linkages? By sending the waste back to the
utilities that generated the waste or by fines or by damages?
Would that not just put us right back where we are today with
the taxpayers liable for billions of dollars of damages because
we do not have any repository?
So those are concerns that I have. I'd just welcome
comments from any of the witnesses about how we resolve these
issues. If we don't put something in the Federal law that
establishes a linkage and we just say it's up to each
individual jurisdiction or state to negotiate to require that
linkage, to me that's a very thin read to hang our prospects of
getting a future repository built on.
Dr. Meserve, did you have a perspective on that?
Mr. Meserve. Let me say, I think that, as you've indicated,
the linkage point is a crucial one. It is very important to
evaluate it. It is completely true that a storage facility is
not an alternative to a repository.
We need a repository and storage may well be something that
is safe for an extended period of time. But it is not the long
term answer. So we do need to make sure that we have incentives
and a process by which we achieve a repository.
I think our concern about--with the draft legislation was
in part on the severe constraint that the linkage would impose.
As I understand the draft legislation, there are 2 constraints.
One is that before the passage of the act any repository
that, excuse me, any storage facility that was basically
undertaken would be limited to a limited volume of material.
But that after the act is passed there could not be a storage
facility until a consent agreement is ratified by the Congress.
So you have a situation in which we have something like the
current law that storage just couldn't happen once the statute
passed absent a repository consent agreement actually subject
to ratification.
One of the things that we tried to emphasize in our report
was the crucial importance of adaptability. So I think that I'm
trying to express, although we recognize there were a need for
linkages, I think somewhat more flexibility might be
appropriate. I would be concerned after the statute is passed
of an absolute rigid requirement that holds up a storage
facility given the many benefits that we see of having in terms
of storage.
The Chairman. Let me just ask on that. My impression is
that, what our proposed legislation calls for, is that if there
is in fact a storage facility established under the language
passed in the Appropriations bill prior to the enactment of
this bill, that storage facility could continue to be
constructed. That storage facility could accept waste. But it
could only accept waste up to the limit of the ten million, or
the ten thousand ton number.
Mr. Meserve. That's correct.
The Chairman. So what we are doing is we're saying that at
some point you have to quit moving waste to a storage facility
until you can go ahead and sign an agreement to pursue a
repository. But is that your understanding so we don't have a
disagreement about what the bill calls for?
Mr. Meserve. That is my understanding. Although I think the
legislation goes further than that. That if we do not
establish, you're quite correct, that if under existing law we
build a storage facility the statute would limit the amount of
material that could go to it.
If we don't establish such a storage facility or are unable
to do so within--by the time this statute is passed, my
understanding of the language is that there is an absolute
prohibition on proceeding with the storage facility until there
is a consent agreement that is ratified by the Congress. So
that there is a limited window for a storage facility that the
statute provides, but that window closes if you haven't been
able to exploit the opportunity to establish a storage facility
before enactment.
The Chairman. I think that's wrong. But at any rate, I
appreciate that clarification of the way you're reading it.
Mr. Meserve. But to come back to your basic question. It
seems implausible to me that any community that would enter
into an agreement with a storage, for a storage facility
without some understanding that it is for a limited term. So
you're first hypothetical that of a situation in which a
community agreed for storage and didn't establish any linkage
would seem to me to be unlikely except in the circumstance
where the community also wanted to be a disposal facility.
In that circumstance you'd--and the bill encourages the new
Administration to have a joint facility for both storage and
disposal. In that circumstance I think that, you know, you may
have a need for establishing rigid linkages, maybe less than
otherwise would be the case because it would be in that
community's interest as part of the agreement to make sure that
there is a disposal facility and that their aggressive means
that are included in the consent agreement to assure that that
proceeds.
There also is a--you asked the question well what if there
were linkages and we just didn't have a disposal facility? I
think that the answer for that is that is a situation, of
course, we confront today with regard to government commitments
that have not been fulfilled. The answer to that has been
rather severe penalties that the government pays to proceed to
put pressure to make sure that Federal commitments are
fulfilled.
The Chairman. Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Let's continue talking about the consent
based approach because I think as we've discussed this that's a
logical, certainly more doable way to achieve the goal here
when we're talking about our nuclear waste repository. There's
been a lot of focus on Sweden as an example where consent based
approach was workable. But it's my understanding that within
Sweden the situation there was that the municipalities that
agreed were already host to nuclear facilities.
So it kind of begs the question whether or not we're more
likely to achieve a consent based approach or acceptance from a
state or a government, local government, that has existing
nuclear facilities. So the question to you, Mr.--General
Scowcroft and Dr. Meserve, is when you were considering the
recommendations within the BRC did you, were you, able to
identify locations that currently host nuclear sites that also
have the viable geologic potential to be a repository site? Was
this part of the consideration when you advanced the concept of
a consent based approach?
Mr. Meserve. We did not undertake an examination of any
particular site or of the siting factors. So we did not do any
kind of a study as to the regions which might have appropriate
geology to be a disposal facility. We viewed that as being
outside our charge and was not something that we did.
I think it is, in fact, the case that communities that have
experience with nuclear facilities and have had good experience
with them may be more likely to be prepared to undertake
becoming a storage or disposal facility. But I wouldn't
prejudge that matter. I think that there may well be some other
communities, although perhaps it's an easier task at a place
that already has such experience because we have many such
regions in the United States.
We have, you know, 65 locations where we have nuclear power
plants and many other DOE facilities where the people have
experience. So and the--although there are geologic constraints
on the siting, there are, I think, diverse, my personal view is
that there are diverse geologies that could be appropriate for
a disposal facility in that it's not like there's a unique
region in the United States is the sole one we could consider
for a disposal facility. I think there are many areas that may
well be appropriate.
Senator Murkowski. Dr. Lyons, the comment has been made
that the Administration has failed to meet the timeline for the
implementation plan which I understand was due July 31. Also
has failed to reply to this letter back in December of last
year regarding a waste disposal fee. Can you give me some sense
as to what actions the Administration has taken to date to
follow up on the Blue Ribbon Commission recommendation?
I think the words that you used were you're developing a
framework. What does that mean? When might we expect some kind
of an implementation plan? Where are you?
Mr. Lyons. There's been very substantial work, Senator,
within the Administration, within the Department toward
developing a framework or a strategy for the Administration's
response to the BRC. That work does continue. I think it's at
least nearing the conclusion.
It's a complex issue, a very important issue. We're working
very diligently to make sure that it is done in a very
responsible way. The effort is very much ongoing.
As far as the letter that the General referred to, I'll
need to check on that. I'm not aware of the details of this
letter to which a response was not received. I'll certainly
check on that and be happy to either inform the committee and/
or the General on the status of that.
As far as actions that we are taking. There's a wide range
of R and D activities that we can undertake under existing
legislation ranging from work on characterization on a generic
basis for different repository media, working on some of the
transportation issues, a variety of dry cask issues. But we
are--our R and D now must be framed within the existing
legislation.
Senator Murkowski. If the implementation due date or the
implementation plan due date was July 31 and you have now
missed that by 2 months. When do you expect that you might be
able to produce that?
Mr. Lyons. I can't provide a specific date, Senator, other
than it is under careful review within the Administration. I
think it will be soon. But I am not in a position to provide a
specific date.
Senator Murkowski. Do you know who in the Administration
would be able to give us better guidance on that?
Mr. Lyons. It's a broad process within the Administration
with many people involved. I'm giving you the best information
I can, Senator. I don't know how to provide any more
specificity.
Senator Murkowski. If you can provide us a better estimate.
Are we a month away? Are we 6 months away or a year away? I
think that that would be helpful.
Mr. Lyons. We'll certainly work to provide that level of
detail back to you.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's been an excellent panel. I want to start with you, if
I might, Dr. Meserve. I'm particularly struck.
You have expertise obviously in safety issues as a result
of being at the NRC. I'm also very interested in the work that
you've done with spent fuel pools because this has great
implications. The work you all did after 9/11.
This has great implications for Fukushima. So I'm
interested in following up with you on that as well. But I want
to make my first question, the one that I think is central to
this debate and that's really striking the balance.
You've got safety issues if you keep the waste onsite.
You've got safety issues if you ship it somewhere. You have to
be sympathetic to the fact that rate payers have paid tens of
billions of dollars for a Federal high level waste repository.
They haven't gotten one.
Tell me, in effect, you're in our shoes. How do you strike
that balance between these safety issues which have to be
paramount. There are really 2 types of them as I suggested and
the question of the rate payer issue? How would you strike that
balance?
Mr. Meserve. I would say that I very much appreciate the
question.
It is something with which the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has to grapple all the time in that there's certain
requirements for assuring adequate protection of the public
health and safety that are absolute minimum requirements
regardless of cost that have to be fulfilled. If you--there are
requirements you might impose that are above and beyond that
level, you may well get to sort of looking at the costs verses
the benefit kind of analysis to make those decisions.
With regard to the spent fuel issue, I should say that we
did recommend a storage facility. There would be costs and
risks associated with the transport of the material twice in
the sense that if one sends it first to a storage facility and
then has to transport it a second time. So that there are some
additional risks associated with transporting it twice rather
than just directly to a facility that could take it for
disposal.
The experience has been that after extensive work on
transport that it is a remarkably record--it's a remarkable
record of safety for that transport. DOE has done a lot of it.
There's been some in the civilian sector as well.
That there are--that the benefits of having a storage
facility are sufficiently great. We see that the additional
risk associated with transport, in the view of the Commission,
was vastly outweighed by the benefits of having a storage
facility in order to meet the commitment to those communities
that have, all they have is spent fuel that's sitting on them.
There are sites that may not be the optimal place to
actually store it for long term. There are cost advantages for
centralizing. There's research advantages. There's greater
capability that could be at a centralized storage facility for
monitoring and for undertaking R and D on spent fuel.
So there's lots of things that we think that, in the
tradeoffs, that make that safety balance something that's worth
doing with regard to a storage facility.
Senator Wyden. Let me ask you one other one.
Senator Cantwell and I are particularly concerned in our
part of the world because Hanford adjoins the Columbia River.
The Columbia River is literally, our life blood in terms of
economics and recreation and fish, a whole host of issues.
Folks in our part of the world and also Idaho and South
Carolina and other parts of the country were hoping that high
level waste from the weapons programs, the nuclear weapons
programs at Hanford and other locations, would go to a
permanent repository. Obviously that has not happened. We have
not seen it.
In your view, how important is it to make a priority out of
ensuring that these defense wastes, these dangerous defense
wastes--and by the way, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous
consent at this point to put into the record an article from
Monday's Wall Street Journal which documents the continuing
problems at Hanford.
The Chairman. We will include that.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The question for you, Dr. Meserve, if I could, is how
important is it in your view that you prioritize this question
of cleaning up the defense waste? It's important in our part of
the world, Oregon and Washington. But I think it's important
for many other Americans as well and to ensure that you have
that priority by putting in place a permanent repository for
these dangerous defense wastes.
Mr. Meserve. Let's say that your question goes somewhat
beyond what the Commission examined. I can give you a personal
view, but I can't speak for the Commission.
I think it is very important for many of these DOE
facilities to make sure that you have stabilized the waste in a
fashion that they are not subject to escaping. Your concerns
that you have at Hanford are ones that, of course, I and many
others share that there's a lot of waste that's in single wall
tanks with the tanks deteriorating. The danger that that
material will escape. So it's very important, I think, to be--
to get those materials under control, stabilized, vitrified and
put into a form where they are protected from the environment.
I think the question that's a separate question, in my
view, as to whether one it's essential that you then transport
from someplace for ultimate disposal. If they, I think, that
they could well be, once the material is stabilized could be
stored at the Hanford site in a way that would be safe and
secure.
I realize that there are legal prohibitions on that as a
result of the consent agreements. So there are little
dimensions to this issue. But I don't doubt that there is a way
to be able to store those materials safely at the Hanford site
awaiting their ultimate disposal. I completely agree that we do
have to find a disposal facility.
The important thing is to find a way to stabilize them
first.
Senator Wyden. My time is up. I can assure you that storage
on the banks of the Columbia River is not seen as a permanent
solution in my part of the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meserve. Nor should it be.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Dr. Meserve, I think you're, maybe you're, clarifying your
last. You went from a possibility to not likely to no.
I mean, here's the issue. It's unacceptable for this waste
to be stored at Hanford. It's unacceptable.
So last hearing I think you were here, General Scowcroft
with our former colleague, Senator Domenici and Lee Hamilton
and others, where we started talking about separating the
defense waste from--well we got into a format where we couldn't
get more feedback from the Blue Ribbon Commission. So I just
want to highlight that we are talking about progress at Hanford
in the context of they could have vitrification done by--
starting the process by 2019.
So here is this military waste that is different and is not
made for reprocessing in the context of the witches brew of
materials that's there. So we're not going to reprocess it. So
talking about retrieval of that particular waste is not, in my
mind, a priority.
So why shouldn't we be looking at a separate treatment
process or something that could be disposed of much more
rapidly? Obviously we're, lot of people, are talking about salt
formations is cheaper, readily available, something that could
be done now. Why shouldn't we be looking at that?
General Scowcroft.
Mr. Meserve. In fact our Blue Ribbon Commission report did
recommend that that very issue of whether the defense waste
should be co-mingled with the spent fuel and go to a single
repository is an open question in our view. The current policy
is that all that material should go to a single repository.
We urged in our report that that issue be re-examined.
That, as you indicate, the characteristics of the defense waste
are different from the spent fuel. They would not be retrieved
for possible reprocessing. They're typically much cooler and
therefore the challenge of disposal is much easier. So you can
have options that might be available for that material that are
not appropriate for spent fuel.
We did suggest that this was something that ought to be the
policy that was established in the Reagan era that all these
materials should go to a single repository is something that
should be re-examined because the circumstances are now
different.
Senator Cantwell. General Scowcroft, did you want to add to
that?
General Scowcroft. No, that's basically. We did not raise
all that issue ourselves. We ran out of time, but did suggest
that that be done.
Senator Cantwell. We look at it as we have had this burden
for 7 years in the Tri-Cities.
General Scowcroft. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. Now we'd like to get to move on to the
next chapter of economic development. So here we are about
ready to get caught up in this large debate again when this
could be separated out, dealt with and move forward. It is the
largest cleanup site, probably in the entire world.
So getting it done and getting it tackled in the most
efficient way, in the most cost effective way means not getting
it tangled up in this larger debate. So I hope that we move
forward on this.
I would just say, Mr. Chairman, I can't move forward on any
legislation that doesn't have a path for separating the
military waste and getting this done. This is what we need to
do. We need to move forward on it.
So I thank the Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Franken.
Senator Franken. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Gentlemen.
The Columbia River is a very important river. I appreciate
that both members to my left here are concerned about that. We
have a river that starts in Minnesota called the Mississippi
River and we kind of think that's important too. I don't know
if you've heard of it.
Yes, OK, good.
Prairie Island has a nuclear reactor there. I do want to
acknowledge that the Secretary Ron Johnson of Prairie Island
Indian Community is here today. Their storage is becoming a
very urgent problem.
Dr. Lyons, you studied what was going on at Fukushima.
There is real concern over spent fuel pools. There was a fear
of the loss of the cooling water in those pools could result in
some of the spent fuel catching fire and spreading radiation.
Fortunately it didn't happen in that case.
But it does highlight the need, I think, for better
monitoring of the pools to track the status of cooling water.
Without cooling water there is, of course, the risk of
overheating and a potential catastrophic release. That's why I
think it's important to transfer that spent fuel from pools
into dry cask storage.
My question is typically spent fuel sits in these pools for
at least 5 years, sometimes much longer. But I understand that
some spent fuel has been transferred in less than, sooner than,
the 5 year waiting period. Can the current waiting period be
shortened?
Mr. Lyons. Perhaps several responses, Senator Franken.
You mentioned the concerns at Fukushima on the status of
spent fuel pools. You mentioned that as it turned out the pools
were probably OK, but they did not have instrumentation to
identify that. As you're probably well aware this is an NRC
issue. But the NRC as they issued their first 3 orders post
Fukushima one of those 3 orders demands improved
instrumentation on spent fuel pools in the United States which
I think is a very wise move by the NRC.
I think your specific question is can you transfer sooner
than 5 years?
Senator Franken. Yes.
Mr. Lyons. I might note that Sweden transports its fuel in
dry casks 1 year after it's been moved from the reactor. So can
you do it? Certainly.
Those are very specialized casks in order to maintain
appropriate cooling during the transfer. So if your question
is--to specifically answer your question, can you do it sooner
than 5 years? Yes, but it takes specially developed casks to
handle the cooling.
Senator Franken. But we have those casks? I mean, they
exist.
Mr. Lyons. I am not aware of the existence of those casks
in the U.S. But the design exists.
Senator Franken. The technology exists and OK.
Now I've seen at Monticello these above ground casks, but
they can also be stored underground. Am I right?
Mr. Lyons. I may not have followed that question, sir.
The current--most of the casks in the country are the
vertical, free standing.
Senator Franken. Right.
Mr. Lyons. On a concrete pad. There are some exceptions to
horizontal concrete emplacements as well that are also
acceptable. But whatever they are they, of course, go through
the NRC safety review.
Senator Franken. OK.
Let me ask this. Can we--we're looking for a way to
transport the spent fuel, if it's in casks, to a secondary
location and then from the secondary location to a tertiary
location eventually. Is that the basic?
Any one of you. That's a yes, right? I mean, that's a
possibility that we're looking at.
Mr. Lyons. Yes, except it would be quite possible to
request proposals from locations and States, maybe tribes, that
are interested in providing both storage and repository which
would avoid that interim transportation step. But that would
remain to be seen as we move through siting processes.
Senator Franken. OK.
Is there--I know my time is up. But can I just pursue this
a little bit?
The--and I'm sorry I wasn't here for the other questions
and testimony. Are we prioritizing now finding one enormous
storage facility like Yucca or are we prioritizing a kind of
interim plan to site some of this waste in regional areas and
then ultimately going to one large site?
Mr. Lyons. Senator, I think the way I'd respond is that
remains to be determined through the legislative process. The
different possibilities you outlined, any one of those, would
require a change in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. So Congress
and certainly the Administration looks forward to working with
Congress would define the process that you have questioned
here.
Senator Franken. OK, because it seems to me that there's
becoming some--I mean, there's a time question here. There's a
question of when this stuff is going to happen. We have to
determine what order we do things. What is the most feasible in
the not so long term.
I mean, we have a short term problem. We're beginning to
have a short term problem, certainly Prairie Island and
certainly at other reactors in this country.
Mr. Lyons. Senator, can I respond to that?
Senator Franken. Yes, yes.
Mr. Lyons. I think your comments highlight the importance
of legislation. In order to move forward the Department has
very limited options under the existing legislation.
Senator Franken. Thank you.
The Chairman. Let me just ask a couple other questions
either to this first one would either for General Scowcroft or
Dr. Meserve, whoever would want to respond. I think it's an
obvious point. But I think it's useful to put it on the record.
This consent based process that the Commission is
recommending has the consent of the local jurisdiction and the
State as an addition to the determination of technical
suitability, as I understand it. There is no effort or no
suggestion by the Commission that there should be less of a
requirement for technical suitability either for a storage,
location of a storage facility or location of a repository. We
would not be in any way substituting the consent of the local
jurisdiction for the requirement that it meet all the technical
requirements.
Is that an accurate description?
General Scowcroft. Yes, I think that is an accurate
description. In other words the suitability of the site would
come first and then the consent process.
The Chairman. I appreciate that.
Let me ask Dr. Lyons one other question.
Current law and the Department's contracts with utilities
commit the Department of Energy to dispose of the spent fuel,
not stopping--not storing it until it can be reprocessed, but
rather disposing of it. The Blue Ribbon Commission's report
affirms that view. This legislation that I've introduced
affirms that view.
The Department is clear, as I understand it, that
reprocessing is not a preferable alternative to deep geologic
disposal of spent fuel at this time or in the foreseeable
future. Is that an accurate interpretation of the
Administration's position?
Mr. Lyons. Yes, Senator, that is an accurate
interpretation. We have strong research programs that are
looking at different reprocessing approaches. If reprocessing
were to become possible within the country, I think it would be
based on many considerations certainly environmental, economic,
would be at least some of those considerations. Non-
proliferation would be another important consideration.
With the technologies available today, yes, we see that for
the foreseeable future the once through cycle moving directly
toward disposal is the appropriate one.
If I could add just one comment though, sir, on the
question you just asked about consent basing. One thing I found
fascinating yesterday was the announcement from Canada that as
they went out on a consent based approach for a repository they
had 19 communities volunteer to be evaluated. That's at least--
that's just the start of the process. But I found it very
interesting.
The Chairman. I agree. But it was, as you point out, it's
one of the first steps in a very multi-step process that they
intend to go through to decide where to establish a repository.
Senator Murkowski, did you have additional questions?
Senator Murkowski. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I mentioned in my opening statement the District Court of
Appeals remand on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's waste
confidence decision. Can I ask each of you whether or not you
believe that this decision will have any impact on either new
builds or re-licensing of existing reactors? Where do you think
this puts us?
Mr. Meserve. Of course this action took place after the
Blue Ribbon Commission completed its work. So I can give a
personal view.
I have read in the trade press that the NRC has indicated
it will not proceed with issuing further licenses having to do
with either renewals or for new plants until the waste
confidence issue is resolved. But the expectation was that they
are proceeding expeditiously to try to deal with the issues
that have been raised by the Court of Appeals. The expectation
is that it will not adversely impact the domestic industry,
that they'll be able to take action soon enough that this will
not be an inhibition on the process with regard to renewals and
new plants.
Senator Murkowski. Dr. Lyons.
Mr. Lyons. Yes, Senator. It's my understanding that the NRC
has laid out a 2-year schedule by which, through which they
will be addressing the waste confidence issue. There's
certainly been very strong statements in the trade press about
the consensus within the NRC to move ahead on that schedule.
If that schedule is maintained and I certainly agree with
Dr. Meserve that I don't think there would be a significant
adverse impact on the types of decisions you questioned.
Senator Murkowski. Dr. Meserve, you mentioned the construct
within Senator Bingaman's legislation about the
Administration's set up. You spoke about a corporate approach
verses Federal agency. As we were discussing both on the
appropriators and the authorizers, the 4 of us discussing how
such an entity might be formed. We kept coming back to how do
we insure, to the greatest extent possible that there is an
insulation from politics, from political manipulation.
Are you satisfied that as this is constructed in the
legislation before us that we have found that, the right spot,
in terms of political insulation or is this an issue that we
never be able to separate ourselves from the politics?
Mr. Meserve. Let me say that the thrust of my comments was
directed, in part, at I think that the proposal in the
legislation would have the new waste organization be a Federal
agency which presumably puts it under more direct influence by
political process than otherwise would be the case.
We had recommended a Federal corporation, in part, to
provide greater insulation than would be--a Federal agency
would have. But also there's an element of the task of dealing
with spent fuel is a process that's going to take decades.
Having stability in the policies and the management is
important.
As I indicated in my testimony it was a concern that if
it's a Federal agency then there will be a turnover or likely
turnover of the people on a political cycle of, you know, every
4 years or sooner. That you may not have the kind of stability
that you'd want to have in undertaking a long term task where
you need a consistent strategy and knowledgeable people that
have experience and sort of know where all the bodies are
buried in terms of what problems that can arise.
So we came down on the side of a Federal corporation but I
recognize that there is a need for balancing this independence
verses accountability and, you know, that these are hard
questions. I don't want to--this is an area where I think that
further conversation and exploration would be appropriate.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Cantwell, did you have additional
questions?
Senator Cantwell. Just quickly, Mr. Chairman, if I could
just to ask the panelists, Dr. Lyons or Dr. Meserve about
whether you think cost effectiveness goes hand in hand with
suitability of the site. I mean, I'm assuming that we should be
looking at the cost effectiveness of different formations. I
wanted to ask you specifically if you thought that salt
formations could deliver a potential cost savings compared to
other geological media types.
Mr. Meserve. I think the way the current statute works for
something that I would encourage the continuation is that
there's some absolute minimum requirements that have to be
satisfied regardless of cost. That then there may be some
balancing around the edges of that. But that there are, I think
the public would require assurance that you haven't taken the
cheapest option because it's for reasons that it's cheap. That,
you know, there are minimum.
Senator Cantwell. We definitely know that well in the
Northwest.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cantwell. I think we have argued with every energy
secretary that's come up with an idea of doing something on the
cheap. So anyway.
Mr. Meserve. But and we did not, as I mentioned earlier,
look into the specifics of various types of formations. It is,
in fact, the only successful operating disposal facility for
materials of a general nature, somewhat similar to spent fuel,
is the waste isolation pilot project which is in salt, that's
in New Mexico. Very successful facility.
That certainly might be a--well, one would certainly look
at salt as among the options that would be appropriate for a
disposal facility.
Senator Cantwell. Doctor.
Mr. Meserve. But we did not look into the details of the
geologic materials.
Senator Cantwell. Dr. Lyons, did you have anything to add
to that?
Mr. Lyons. I appreciate your comment--your question,
Senator.
It seems to me that as we launch into any process along
these lines, utilizing the consent base, is the first question
will be which communities respond with which formations. Then
subsequent to that will have to be the detailed evaluation of
that geologic formation. I think the first criteria is
certainly going to have to be the safety evaluations. But I do
agree with you that yes, cost should be folded in.
To me it's not the first order. The first order is going to
be safety. But subsequent considerations, tiebreakers, if you
will, certainly could involve cost as another issue. So
environmental attributes may well be another. There may be many
attributes that come into the evaluation as your proceed down
through any selection process. Cost has to be one of them.
Senator Cantwell. I was assuming suitability first and then
looking at cost.
To Dr. Meserve's point, I mean the National Academy of
Science is, I think, in the 50s recommended salt as one of
the--because of its great attributes of disposal. Now we, as
you said, have this one site that is focused on salt. Somehow
we, because we were on to looking at retrieval as a different
question for, you know, this other kind of waste, we got off of
this track. So I hope that we will bring light to the fact that
it really is a viable option.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Franken, did you have additional
questions?
Senator Franken. Yes.
I, of course, favor a consent based approach. I just want
to go on record as saying that.
I'm just sort of wondering. There were alternatives to
Yucca before Yucca was chosen. Am I right?
Have those sites been considered again or we're not that
far along in this process or where are we in terms of looking
at what were the alternative sites to Yucca?
Mr. Lyons. There certainly were alternative sites that were
evaluated under the original legislation in 1982. It was then
the amendments in 1987 that basically said, thou shalt only
study or consider Yucca Mountain. The geologies of the other
sites would be part of the generic evaluation of geologies that
we're considering.
But under a consent basis we're certainly not evaluating
now any specific site. All we would be doing now is looking at
generic issues associated with different geologies. Hopefully,
in the very near term working with Congress on legislation that
moves forward that allows us to get into the consent process.
Then utilize the consent process to identify prospective sites
and begin the detailed evaluation of the sites that come
through that process, sir.
Senator Franken. OK. Assuming that we do the legislation
that would allow that do we--there must have been very close
scrutiny of these alternative sites. Are any of them
particularly promising?
You know, what I'm kind of wondering about here is
timeline. Because there's permanent and then there is
permanent. You know, 200 years could be looked at as permanent
but some of this stuff sticks around for a million years.
That's really permanent. OK.
So and what I'm really thinking about is, and this is comes
to cost effective. If you find someplace that's cool that works
for 200 years and we've got reactors round the country that
are--have too much waste, that they are storing too much waste
and they are by the Mississippi River or by the Columbia River.
We can say, OK, for the next--what is the process of thinking
about this in terms of what we select.
What do we need first? What do we need to proceed to either
going to regional? What is going to effectively solve the
problems of the reactors that have more waste than they can
deal with?
Mr. Lyons. As the BRC recommended, one can move much more
expeditiously toward consolidated storage than a repository.
The Administration is certainly interested in exploring
consolidated storage options along with repository options.
But on a consent basis I believe the appropriate sequence
of events has to be first, the proposals from the local, State,
tribal entities, followed by the evaluation of the geology.
Now we have generic programs either within the Department,
particularly on salt, where the U.S. is clearly the world
leader on the suitability of salt formations.
We have international agreements where we are trying to
draw on the experience, for example, Sweden and Finland, on
granite based repositories, France and Switzerland on shale
based repositories.
So there's a substantial body of knowledge that already
exists on the utilization of different geologies. We would
bring that information to bear as we move through the
evaluation of sites that are proposed initially through the
consent based process.
Senator Franken. OK.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you all very much. I think this has
been very useful testimony. We appreciate you taking time to be
here.
We do have a second panel. Let me introduce them. Dismiss
this panel. But thank you again for your great service to the
country.
Panel 2 is--consists of Mr. Henry Barron, who is President
and CEO of Constellation Energy Nuclear Group in Baltimore.
Mr. Geoffrey Fettus, who is the Senior Attorney with the
Nuclear Program of the Natural Resources Defense Council.
We appreciate both of you being here. Why don't you go
ahead and tell us the main points you think we need to
understand about this issue. We're anxious to hear your views,
starting with you, Mr. Barron. Go right ahead.
STATEMENT OF HENRY B. BARRON, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, CONSTELLATION ENERGY NUCLEAR GROUP, LLC, BALTIMORE, MD
Mr. Barron. Thank you, Chairman Bingaman, Ranking Member
Murkowski, Senators Franken and Cantwell. I appreciate this
opportunity to speak today about the recently introduced
Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012.
I'm Brew Barron. I'm the President and CEO of Constellation
Energy Nuclear Group and also a member of the Nuclear Energy
Institute's Executive Committee. We welcome the Senate's
leadership in addressing the Federal Government's role in the
safe and secure management and disposal of commercial used
nuclear fuel through this legislation and this year's
Appropriations process.
While the proposed legislation represents a positive start
to restructuring the Federal program, it does not yet fully
address the comprehensive changes we believe are needed. Under
the law the DOE should have begun removing used fuel from
commercial nuclear power plant sites 14 years ago. DOE
continues to collect over $750 million per year from nuclear
utilities and consumers and the fund accrues almost $1 billion
in annual investment income on the remaining balance of over
$26 billion.
The collection of nuclear waste fees continues even though
the DOE, without any technical basis, terminated the Yucca
Mountain repository project in 2010. The industry has sued the
DOE challenging the continued collection of the nuclear waste
fees in the absence of a Federal program. The Blue Ribbon
Commission on America's Nuclear Future recognized the urgency
of addressing the past failures of the Federal program and
developed 8 key recommendations that the industry supports.
It's the industry's view that consolidated storage is the
quickest route to the Federal Government to begin moving used
fuel from commercial and Federal sites around the country and
to limit the increase in damage awards beyond the $20.8 billion
estimated by the DOE through 2020. Consolidated storage would
be an appropriate use of resources and a prudent financial
investment while continuing to preserve geologic disposal.
Industry is confident that if a consolidated storage program
begins in 2013 a consolidated storage facility can be
operational by 2020.
We should not lose sight of the fact that consolidated
storage is not a complete answer. A geologic repository will be
required and should be pursued simultaneously and vigorously
with the development of a consolidated storage facility.
However, repository, regardless of whether it is a restarted
Yucca Mountain project or a new site, will take much longer
than a consolidated storage facility and is highly dependent on
available funding. Once a consolidated storage facility is
operational priorities should be given to removing used fuel
from shut down commercial sites that no longer have an
operating reactor.
A new Federal management entity with the operating
characteristics of a private corporation, with a clear vision
and accountabilities and obligations to its investors should
assume responsibility for this program. Congress and the
Administration should retain oversight authority. But this role
should be structured to avoid creating an impediment to the
efficient operation of a new management entity.
The Board of Directors should be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate for terms that would
span at least 2 Presidential Administrations and the Chairman
of this Board should be elected by its members.
The Chief Executive Officer should be appointed by the
Board and not subject to the political uncertainties associated
with Presidential appointments so that he or she can focus
entirely on the task at hand with the requisite attention to
nuclear safety and security that is expected from all employees
of a nuclear industrial company.
The proposed legislation should be altered in this regard.
To avoid perpetuating the current funding limitations of
the Federal used fuel management program, the new management
entity should be given unrestricted access to the nuclear waste
fees and fund with Congressional oversight of efficient use of
these funds continuing. This will enable the new entity to
manage and fund the development of storage and disposal
facilities consistent with standard industry practices for
other large scale nuclear safety related processes.
A consent based siting process is essential to developing
enduring local and State support for new used nuclear fuel
management facilities. This process should not be
prescriptively defined but permitted to develop organically
among the interested parties. Willing communities and States
should be allowed to reach their own conclusions regarding
whether such a facility is a benefit or a burden and negotiate
accordingly.
Success will be measured with an agreement among the
interested parties that is ultimately legally enforceable.
The proposed Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012 is a
significant step forward and would attract broad stakeholder
support. Immediate action is necessary to establish a
sustainable program and reduce the liabilities that the
taxpayer--to the taxpayer as quickly as possible. Congress must
act.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I'll be pleased
to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barron follows:]
Prepared Statement of Henry B. Barron, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC, Baltimore, MD
Chairman Bingaman, Ranking Member Murkowski, members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak today about the
recently introduced Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012. We
welcome the Senate's leadership in addressing the federal government's
role in the safe and secure management and disposal of commercial used
nuclear fuel through this legislation and this year's appropriations
process. While the proposed legislation represents a positive start to
overhauling the federal program, it does not provide the comprehensive
changes that are needed.
Over the past 70 years, applications of nuclear fission--including
research, medicine, naval propulsion and power production--have
produced immeasurable benefits for our society. They have also resulted
in a large and growing inventory of used nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste. The commercial nuclear industry and the federal
government have demonstrated that they can safely and securely store
used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive material. About 68,000
metric tons of uranium (MTU) of commercial used fuel is safely managed
at nuclear energy facilities, but storing the fuel on site was never
meant to be a long-term solution. By now, the Department of Energy
(DOE) already should have moved more than 25,000 MTU of reactor fuel
from our sites and should be moving an additional 3,000 MTU per year.
Consumers of electricity generated at nuclear energy facilities
have committed more than $34 billion since 1982 to the Nuclear Waste
Fund for the federal program that was supposed to have begun removing
used fuel from commercial nuclear power plant sites 14 years ago. The
Department of Energy continues to collect more than $750 million per
year from consumers, and the fund accrues almost $1 billion in
investment income on the remaining balance of over $26 billion. The
collection of Nuclear Waste Fund fees is ongoing, despite the fact that
the Department of Energy, without any technical basis, terminated the
Yucca Mountain repository project in 2010.
The industry and the DOE had been working for decades with
considerable success on the development of a deep geologic repository
in the United States for used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
waste, until the program was terminated and the Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) dissolved in 2010. These decisions
were not supported by the industry and have resulted in court actions
that would have otherwise been unnecessary. The industry continues to
support the completion of the Yucca Mountain licensing process and as a
result of the administration's actions, the industry has filed suit
against DOE challenging the continued collection of the Nuclear Waste
Fee in the absence of a federal program.
The Path to Success
The Nation would be best served by adherence to the following
principles that will ensure the establishment of a stable used nuclear
fuel management policy and program:
America must have a durable policy supported by a dedicated
and sustainable infrastructure to manage used nuclear fuel
responsibly.
America must have a plan for the ultimate disposal of the
byproducts from nuclear energy.
An ideal technical solution is not required to begin
implementation of a new policy direction. Evolutionary, and
perhaps revolutionary, advances in technology improvements can
be incorporated over time without deferring decisions until
decades of research are completed.
The successes and failures of the past must be understood to
help guide future innovation, especially the need to build
public trust in the systems and facilities ultimately
developed.
Legislative action is needed to put such an enduring policy and
program in place.
The Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC) was
chartered by the Department of Energy in 2010 and was tasked with
developing a path forward for the nation's used fuel and high-level
radioactive waste management program. The Blue Ribbon Commission
concluded that the United States needs a new, integrated strategy for
managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including a new
approach to siting nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities. The
BRC outlined eight key recommendations, which are consistent with the
aforementioned principles for a stable used fuel management policy and
program, and have the potential to create a stable and enduring program
that could be supported by all stakeholders:
Access to the funds nuclear utility ratepayers are providing
for the purpose of nuclear waste management.
Prompt efforts to develop one or more consolidated storage
facilities.
A new organization dedicated solely to implementing the
waste management program and empowered with the authority and
resources to succeed.
Prompt efforts to develop one or more geological disposal
facilities.
A new, consent-based approach to siting future nuclear waste
management facilities.
Prompt efforts to prepare for the eventual large-scale
transport of used nuclear fuel and high-level waste to
consolidated storage and disposal facilities when such
facilities become available.
Support for continued U.S. innovation in nuclear energy
technology and for workforce development.
Active U.S. leadership in international efforts to address
safety, waste management, nonproliferation, and security
concerns.
Growing Federal Liability
Even before the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management was
closed, the urgency for DOE to fulfill its statutory and contractual
responsibilities to manage used fuel and high-level radioactive waste
was growing, as was the associated cost to the taxpayer. The DOE was
required by statute and contract to begin moving used fuel from reactor
sites in 1998. The BRC report describes how taxpayers, through payments
from the taxpayer-funded Judgment Fund, are paying for court-awarded
damages from DOE's partial breach of its contracts with electric
companies. DOE estimates that the damage awards from the Judgment Fund
will total $20.8 billion if the federal government begins accepting
used fuel in 2020. This expense, for which the taxpayer receives no
benefit, is in addition to monies paid by consumers of electricity
produced from nuclear energy into the Nuclear Waste Fund. The BRC
estimates that the damage awards associated with the DOE's breach may
increase by as much as $500 million for each year after 2020 that DOE
does not begin to accept used fuel. It has become virtually impossible
for the DOE to begin to meet its obligation to move used fuel before
2020, given the absence of any federal program.
The industry believes that a multi-pronged approach is necessary if
the federal government's used fuel and high-level radioactive waste
program is to be rebuilt and stakeholder confidence restored. This
multipronged approach should include the following elements:
Legislation instructing and funding DOE or the new
management entity to establish one or more consolidated storage
facilities for used nuclear fuel while simultaneously making
substantial progress towards developing a repository for
ultimate disposal
The establishment of new organization dedicated solely to
implementing the waste management program and empowered with
the authority and resources to succeed
Access to the funds that consumers have provided, and
continue to provide, for the purpose of managing high-level
radioactive material.
The Need for Consolidated Storage
Consolidated storage, as recommended by the BRC, is the quickest
route for the federal government to begin moving used fuel from nuclear
energy facilities and to stem the increase in damage awards beyond the
estimated $20.8 billion through 2020. In addition to storing used
nuclear fuel from commercial facilities, a consolidated storage
facility could also store DOE and U.S. naval reactor fuel. This could
provide a pathway for the federal government to meet its obligations to
remove this material from the various states where it is stored.
Developing consolidated storage would be an appropriate use of
resources and a prudent financial investment that would permit the
federal government to begin meeting its obligations, limiting the
damages paid by the taxpayers, and restoring faith in the federal
program, paving the road for a repository to eventually be opened. By
reducing liability, consolidated storage will free up resources and
better enable the federal government to pursue and complete the
ultimate goal of geologic disposal.
In addition to the industry and the BRC, the National Conference of
State Legislatures, the governors of Maine, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
Vermont and many other organizations and political leaders have all
publicly called for action to implement the BRC recommendations and,
specifically, development of a consolidated storage facility.
A New Federal Used Fuel Management Corporation is Needed
A key element to the long-term success of a federal program is
establishing a new entity to assume program management responsibility
from the DOE. Industry supports the concept of a federal corporation as
outlined in the BRC final report. The operating characteristics of a
new management entity must more closely resemble those of a corporation
with a clear mission and obligations to its investors rather than a
federal agency in order to succeed. Congress and the administration
should retain an oversight authority, but this role should be
structured to avoid creating an impediment to the efficient operation
of a new management entity.
Similar to commercial companies, the chief executive officer of the
new management entity should be selected and appointed by a board of
directors. As the BRC recommends, the board should be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate for terms that
would span at least two presidential administrations and the chairman
of the board should be elected by its members. It is imperative that
the CEO not be subjected to the political uncertainties associated with
presidential appointments so that he or she can focus entirely on
performing the task at hand with the requisite attention to nuclear
safety and security that is expected from all employees of a nuclear
industrial company. The instability that can be created as a result of
the political appointment process is well-illustrated by the now-
defunct Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM). This
office, whose director was appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate, never realized stable long-term leadership because of the
turnover of directors associated with changes at the White House. From
1983 to 2010, OCWRM had six appointed and confirmed directors and nine
acting directors. The incumbent director was replaced with every new
administration.
The Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012 would not sufficiently
insulate the new Nuclear Waste Administration leadership from the
political process since both the administrator and deputy administrator
would be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, as are the members of the proposed oversight committee. If
implemented as proposed, both the Nuclear Waste Administration's senior
management and the members of the oversight board would likely be
replaced with every new administration, and the history of the federal
government's failure to meet its statutory and contractual obligations
would likely be repeated.
Direct Access to Sufficient Funding
Enduring leadership is essential, but not sufficient in its own
right to create a successful and sustainable program. As the Nuclear
Waste Administration Act of 2012 recognizes and addresses, a new
management entity must have direct access to and control over the funds
necessary to implement the program. The industry and consumers have
provided and continue to provide these funds. With a $26 billion
balance in the Nuclear Waste Fund, almost $1 billion accruing in
interest and approximately $750 million in Nuclear Waste Fees being
deposited annually, funding for the government's program should be
secure and available to program managers. Unfortunately, this has not
been the case. The congressional budgeting and appropriations processes
have resulted in appropriations to OCRWM being considered in the
context of the overall DOE and federal government budget and not simply
in the context of the available funds in the Nuclear Waste Fund. The
BRC report, which discusses the Nuclear Waste Fund in great detail,
states that ``a program that was intended to be fully self-financing
now has to compete for limited discretionary funding in the annual
appropriations process, while the contractual user fees intended to
prevent this from happening are treated just like tax revenues and used
to reduce the apparent deficit on the mandatory side of the federal
budget (which deals with expenditures and receipts that are not subject
to annual appropriations).'' Recognizing that these funds were
collected with the indisputable intention of supporting clear statutory
and contractual obligations, there is not a rational basis for
considering their use discretionary.
To avoid perpetuating the current funding limitations, a new
management entity must be given unrestricted access to the Nuclear
Waste Fees and the Nuclear Waste Fund with Congressional oversight of
the efficient use of these funds continuing. This will enable it to
appropriately manage and fund the development of storage and disposal
facilities consistent with standard industry practices for other
largescale nuclear safety related projects. The current legislation
achieves this goal for the Nuclear Waste Fee payments. However, it
could be enhanced with respect to access to the Nuclear Waste Fund.
Geologic Disposal is Critical
The Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012 goes a long way
towards achieving the multi-pronged approach outlined above. Ideally
the elements of that approach (new management entity, surety of
funding, consolidated storage while vigorously pursuing disposal) would
be implemented simultaneously to create a solid foundation for a
sustainable used nuclear fuel management program.
The eventual completion of the Yucca Mountain repository (an
endeavor that will cost more than $13 billion, according to a 2007 DOE
report) or the siting and construction of a new repository will most
likely take more than two decades depending on Congressional funding.
By 2040, the damages paid by the taxpayer could be as much as $30
billion. A consolidated storage facility could be built at a fraction
of the cost of a repository. The Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) estimates a 40,000 MTU storage facility could be built for
approximately $500 million and industry estimates that such a facility
could be opened by 2020 if work begins in 2013. If instructed by
Congress to pursue consolidated storage, DOE or a new management entity
could use this facility to meet DOE's statutory and contractual
obligations by removing used fuel from commercial nuclear power sites,
taking title to the used fuel, and shipping it to the storage facility
where it would be stored until a final disposal or alternate
disposition pathway is available.
We should not lose sight of the fact that consolidated storage is
not a complete answer. A geologic repository will be required and
should be pursued simultaneously with the development of a consolidated
storage facility. Attachment 1* provides a comparison of hypothetical
timelines for the development of a consolidated storage facility and
the Yucca Mountain project assuming that both programs are underway in
2013. As the attachment illustrates, the completion date for Yucca
Mountain would be highly dependent on the rate at which funds are
expended. Despite the fact that the Nuclear Waste Fund has more than
sufficient funding to complete the Yucca Mountain project, it is highly
unlikely that the program could efficiently deploy the funding
necessary (approaching $2 billion annually) to complete licensing and
construction in the near term.
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* Attachment 1 has been retained in committee files.
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Priority to Shutdown Sites
Once a consolidated storage facility has been authorized, the
industry and the federal management entity should collaborate to ensure
that transportation issues, including efficient ordering of used fuel
acceptance from commercial sites, are appropriately addressed. Prior to
removing used fuel from operating plant sites, the industry agrees that
priority should be given to the shutdown commercial sites that no
longer have an operating reactor. This approach, supported by the BRC
and the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012, has numerous
advantages. It would permit the 10 shutdown sites, which in many cases
have only used fuel storage remaining at the site, to be fully
decommissioned and the land to be used for more beneficial purposes. In
addition, the taxpayer, through the taxpayer-funded Judgment Fund,
would no longer be liable for the continued cost of storing used fuel
at these shutdown sites at a cost of approximately $8 million per year
per site.
Consent-Based Facility Siting
Strength of leadership and financial resources alone will not
guarantee success in siting new facilities. As the BRC recommends and
the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012 implements, a consent-
based siting process is essential to developing enduring local and
state support for new facilities. Since the release of the BRC report,
the consent-based siting recommendation has received significant
support as well as questions about how it would be implemented.
A consent-based siting process should not be prescriptively
defined, but permitted to develop organically among the interested
parties. Regardless of the specific process for developing consent,
success will be measured by an agreement among the interested parties
that is legally enforceable. During the process, the parties involved
must negotiate in good faith and be open to creative solutions to
address issues that arise, including oversight, incentives and
compensation. The management entity and the federal government should
not attempt to predetermine the ``burden'' that a community or state
should accept or impose restrictions on the development of a
consolidated storage facility that are linked to milestones related to
a disposal program. To do so would be contrary to the nature of a
consent-based process. Congress and the new management entity or DOE
must be willing to let communities and states reach their own
conclusions about whether or not it is a burden to host a new facility
and to let them identify the framework and restrictions under which
they wish to operate. There are communities that would see hosting such
facilities as a benefit. The siting and operation of the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico is proof that such a process can be
successful.
Closing
The Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012 is a significant step
forward and, with the enhancements as discussed, it could create a
sustainable program that would garner wide stakeholder support. The
most important point, however, is that immediate action is necessary to
establish a sustainable program and reduce the liabilities for the
taxpayer as quickly as possible. Congress must act. Energy companies,
their local communities and states, and American taxpayers deserve to
have confidence in a federal program that will meet its statutory and
contractual obligations to safely and securely accept, transport,
store, and ultimately dispose of used nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Fettus, why don't you go ahead?
STATEMENT OF GEOFFREY H. FETTUS, SENIOR ATTORNEY, NUCLEAR
PROGRAM, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
Mr. Fettus. Good morning.
I'm Geoffrey Fettus, an attorney with the Natural Resources
Defense Council. I want to thank the Chairman and the Ranking
Member for inviting us to share our views on S. 3469. I've
submitted written testimony to be included in the record and
I'll focus briefly today on 4 points.
Point 1.
Chairman Bingaman wisely focused the bill on creating a new
pathway to develop repositories. Repositories are the only
technically, economically and morally viable solution. NRDC
strongly supports that effort for the development of a new and
improved legislative pathway.
Turning to point 2.
We fully support Chairman Bingaman's caution that any
temporary storage facility must not become a permanent one. In
significant measure S. 3469 is well constructed as it bars any
future nuclear waste administration from taking title to and
storing spent fuel before ratification of the consent
agreements described in section 304. A provision that bars
moving forward with interim consolidated storage facilities
before a repository program is under full development wisely
puts the horse before the cart. It ensures precisely the
linkage the Chairman describes as necessary.
But this sensible linkage, we think, is undone by the
current form of section 306(b) which provides an exception for
10,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel. Indeed the only
situation where we see merit in a pilot project for storage and
we do see that there could be merit, is to address stranded
spent fuel at the 9 closed reactor sites or for spent fuel that
fails to meet certain safety thresholds. Such a site would have
to be in a hardened building like the outhouse facility in
Germany.
Potential volunteer sites that have already demonstrated
consent are operating commercial reactors. Far less in the way
of new infrastructure would be required and capacity for fuel
management and transportation is already in place. Along with
the consent necessary for hosting nuclear facilities in the
first instance, nothing like this has been suggested. We urge
the committee that simply providing an expedient storage option
for industry that solves no problem like the stranded fuel or
addresses no serious safety concerns fails to heed the careful
caution expressed by Chairman Bingaman.
Turning to point 3.
The understanding that the polluter pays the bill for the
contamination it creates is properly embedded in S. 3469. This
bipartisan concept has a long history in American law. We
support its inclusion here. Perpetuating this requirement that
the industry must invest in solutions to the problems it
creates is appropriate and any relaxation of any such
requirement would result in immediate objection from NRDC and I
would imagine many others including the taxpayer.
Finally, point 4.
Section 304 is the heart of S. 3469 and is most attentive
to the BRC's strong recommendation of a consent based approach
that we've talked about today. Indeed we applaud the general
thrust. But any consent based approach will enjoy a higher
probability of success if Congress removes the Atomic Energy
Act's exemptions for radio nuclides from our Nation's water and
hazardous waste laws.
These anachronistic exemptions from environmental law are
at the heart of state and public distrust of both government
and commercial nuclear facilities. If EPA and the states had
full legal authority and could treat radio nuclides, as they do
other pollutants, clear cleanup standards could be promulgated.
We could be farther along in remediating the toxic legacy of
the cold war, mentioned by both Senators Cantwell and Wyden
today.
Further, we could avoid some ongoing disputes over
operations at commercial nuclear facilities even the BRC
recognized this as it noted that New Mexico's hazardous waste
regulation of the WIPP facility is a critical element of public
acceptance.
Any regulatory change of this magnitude would have to be
harmonized with NRC licensing jurisdiction over nuclear
facilities and EPA's existing jurisdiction over radiation
protection standards. But such a process is certainly within
the capacity of those Federal agencies. Some states would
assume environmental jurisdiction over radioactive material,
others might not. But in either event improved clarity in
regulatory structure and a meaningful state oversight role
would allow, for the first time, consent based and transparent
decisions to take place in the matter of developing
repositories.
We address closed fuel cycles and other matters in our
written statement. I'm happy to take questions on those as
well.
But I'll close with one over arching premise that we hope
guides congressional work on this matter. Years or decades from
now others will face the precise predicament we face today
unless Congress creates a transparent, equitable process with
strong environmental standards that can't be manipulated in
order to license a site that may not be suitable. Chairman
Bingaman has made a really, in our estimation, a superb and
meaningful start with S. 3469. With the addition of our
recommendations, we are optimistic that meaningful solutions
lie ahead.
As I stated to the BRC almost 1 year ago in Denver, I can't
guarantee that NRDC's recommendations will result in a
solution. But I can point to strong evidence that following a
course similar to the last 2 decades results in failure.
I'd like to close with one personal note. As a former New
Mexican, thank you Senator Bingaman for representing me
brilliantly in Congress for all these years and also for my
time in DC, for your just extraordinary staff.
So, thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I'm
happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fettus follows:]
Prepared Statement of Geoffrey H. Fettus, Senior Attorney, Nuclear
Program, Natural Resources Defense Council
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for providing
the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) this opportunity to
present our views on S. 3469, A Bill to establish a new organization to
manage nuclear waste, provide a consensual process for siting nuclear
waste facilities, ensure adequate funding for managing nuclear waste,
and for other purposes.
NRDC is a national, non-profit organization of scientists, lawyers,
and environmental specialists, dedicated to protecting public health
and the environment. Founded in 1970, NRDC serves more than one million
members, supporters and environmental activists with offices in New
York, Washington, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago and Beijing. We
have worked on nuclear waste issues since our founding, and we will
continue to do so.
NRDC commends the Chairman's focus on three fundamental principles
that must be adhered to if America is ever to develop an adequate, safe
solution for nuclear waste. First, Chairman Bingaman's S. 3469
incorporates the principle that the waste from the nation's nuclear
weapons program and its commercial nuclear power plants must be buried
in technically sound deep geologic repositories, permanently isolated
from the human and natural environments. That principle for disposal is
consistent with more than 50 years of scientific consensus and, most
recently, the views of President Obama's bipartisan Blue Ribbon
Commission (BRC)./1/ No other solutions are technically, economically
or morally viable over the long term and NRDC strongly supports the
development of a science-based repository program that acknowledges the
significant institutional challenges facing spent fuel storage and
disposal.
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\1\ President Obama's ``Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear
Future--Report to the Secretary of Energy, January 31, 2012''
(hereafter ``BRC Report'' or ``Final Report'').
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Second, we support Chairman Bingaman's careful analysis that any
``temporary'' storage facility must not become a permanent one. This is
a powerful principle that should guide the legislative process. NRDC
concurs with the Chairman's caution that whatever case can be made for
interim storage can be done ``only as an integral part of the
repository program and not as an alternative to, or de facto substitute
for, permanent disposal.'' Consistent with thirty years of national
policy and the purpose of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), 42
U.S.C. Sec. 10131(b)(1), Senator Bingaman has provided a crucial
linkage between developing storage facilities and final repositories.
We are, however, concerned that the pilot program offered in S. 3469
upsets this precisely-defined architecture. The evidence of the past 30
years shows that legislative efforts that sever such linkages between
development of storage and final repository sites inevitably doom the
process and virtually guarantee a repeat of the mistakes made in the
failed Yucca Mountain effort.
Third, properly embedded in S. 3469 is the fundamental concept that
the polluter pays the bill for the contamination that it creates. This
bipartisan concept has a long history in American law and it should
remain in full force in any new nuclear waste legislation. Federal
assumption of the waste burden is an extraordinary boon to the nuclear
industry, a benefit enjoyed by no other electricity-producing industry.
At minimum, perpetuating the requirement that the industry must invest
in the solution is appropriate and any relaxation of such requirements
would result in immediate objection from NRDC and a host of others.
Chairman Bingaman has made a laudable effort and turned some of the
stronger ideas in the recent BRC report into legislative language. We
support fundamental components in the proposed bill, dispute other
parts, and have several key suggestions for expansion and refinement of
S.3469. But the Chairman's emphasis on the necessity of repositories
and the need to link any potential storage site with the development of
a disposal site is of lasting value. Any legislation that fails to
adhere to these concepts will prolong the failures of the past 30 years
in developing solutions for nuclear waste.
Five Recommendations
Today, in commenting on specific sections of S. 3469, I offer five
recommendations for ensuring the success of any legislative outcomes-
(1) recognize that repositories must remain the focus of any
legislative effort; (2) create a coherent legal framework before
commencing any geologic repository or interim storage site development
process; (3) arrive at a consent-based approach for nuclear waste
storage and disposal via a fundamental change in law; (4) address
storage in a phased approach consistent with the careful architecture
of S. 3469; and (5) exclude polarizing closed fuel cycle and
reprocessing options from this effort to implement the interim storage
and ultimate disposal missions.
Importantly, our view on each area is premised on a single
overarching caution: in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of the
last three decades, Congress must create a transparent, equitable
process incorporating strong public health and environmental standards
insulated from gerrymandering or other distortions in order to ensure,
at the conclusion of the process, the licensing of a suitable site (or
sites). What follows are NRDC's detailed comments on S. 3469 and
recommended prerequisites for establishing a protective and robust
nuclear waste storage and disposal process.
RECOMMENDATION 1--THE NECESSITY OF REPOSITORIES
Titles I and II--Comments on Sections 101-206
Title I of S. 3469, in significant measure, recognizes our
generation's ethical obligation to future generations regarding nuclear
waste disposal. But we suggest an explicit adoption of the first
purpose of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec.
10131(b)(1), as the decision to isolate nuclear waste from the
biosphere implicates critical issues of security, including: financial
security, environmental protection, and public health. After more than
55 years of failure, policy makers must look with clear eyes at the
history of U.S. nuclear waste policy, an exercise that President
Obama's Blue Ribbon Commission failed to do. The BRC recommended
geologic repositories and S. 3469 suggests a new path to arrive at
them, and we concur with and support efforts to develop geologic
repositories. But we emphasize today that the record created by this
hearing should fully reflect the story of how the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Justice Department, and the U.S. House
and Senate together corrupted the process for developing and
implementing licensing criteria for the Yucca Mountain repository.
Failure to understand that history will doom any new effort.
While the BRC recognized that the 1987 amendments to the NWPA were
``highly prescriptive'' and ``widely viewed as being driven too heavily
by political considerations,'' those observations are insufficiently
critical assessments of what actually occurred. We recommend that
Congress be clear about what happened to avoid repeating the mistakes
of the past. Put bluntly, first DOE and then Congress corrupted the
site selection process leading to Yucca Mountain as the only option.
The original NWPA strategy contemplated DOE first choosing the best out
of four or five geologic media, then selecting a best candidate site in
each media alternative. Next, DOE was to narrow the choices to the best
three alternatives, finally picking a preferred site for the first of
two repositories. A similar process was to be used for a second
repository. Such a process, if it had been allowed to fairly play out,
would have been consistent with elements of the adaptive, phased, and
science-based process to which the BRC referred.
But instead, what happened was that DOE first selected sites that
it had pre-determined. Then in May of 1986 DOE announced that it was
abandoning a search for a second repository, and narrowed the candidate
sites from nine to three, leaving in the mix the Hanford Reservation in
Washington (in basalt medium), Deaf Smith County, Texas (in bedded salt
medium) and Yucca Mountain in Nevada (in unsaturated volcanic tuff
medium). Next, all equity in the site selection process was abandoned
in 1987, when Congress, confronted with cost of characterizing three
sites and strong opposition to the DOE program, amended the NWPA of
1982 to direct DOE to abandon the two-repository strategy and to
develop only the Yucca Mountain site. Not by coincidence, at the time,
Yucca Mountain was DOE's preferred site, as well as being the
politically expedient choice for Congress. The abandonment of the NWPA
site selection process jettisoned any pretense of a science-based
approach, led directly to the loss of support from the State of Nevada,
diminished Congressional support (except to ensure that the proposed
Yucca site remained the sole site), and eviscerated public support for
the Yucca Mountain project.
Briefly, with respect to Title II and the creation of a Nuclear
Waste Administration, as NRDC has expressed numerous times over past
years, the failures of the Atomic Energy Commission and its successor
agencies (Energy Research Development Agency, DOE and the NRC) make the
case that an alternative institutional vehicle for nuclear waste
disposal is necessary. However, we note that any such new federal
entity must be subject to all of the nation's environmental laws,
including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec.
4321, et seq. We presume such is the case for this proposed agency.
Alternative language may be necessary to clarify specific application
of NEPA at certain junctures of the siting process (for example, in
support of the initial guidelines), but it is clear to us that NEPA has
full application to the newly proposed Nuclear Waste Administration.
Additionally, it has long been NRDC's view that independent
oversight is critical to safe and environmentally sound operation of
DOE nuclear weapons production facilities and commercial nuclear
facilities regulated by the NRC. Indeed, the full suite of
environmental laws should have full application. We will address this
issue in more detail when discussing Section 304. As a last note to
this Title, the meaning of Section 102(4) should be expanded and
clarified to remove the word ``centralized'' and the words ``safe,
environmentally sound and publicly acceptable'' storage should be
inserted to address several of the concepts we will detail in the
testimony that follows.
RECOMMENDATION 2--CREATE A COHERENT FRAMEWORK BEFORE COMMENCING THE
NUCLEAR WASTE SITING PROCESS
Title III--Functions, Sections 301-308
A. Comments on Section 305--To avoid repeating the failure of the
proposed Yucca Mountain process, we urged the BRC and we urge this
Committee now to be explicit and state clearly in legislation that both
the standards for site screening and development criteria be in final
form before any sites are considered. We also urge that generic
radiation and environmental protection standards be established prior
to consideration of any sites. S. 3469 has gone much of the way toward
structuring such a result, but we have some specific concerns.
Section 305 directs EPA to adopt, by rule, broadly- applicable
standards for protection of the general environment from offsite
releases from radioactive material in geologic repositories. Further,
Section 305(b) directs NRC to then amend its regulations governing the
licensing of geological repositories to be consistent with any
comparable standard adopted by EPA. These requirements and the phasing
of the agency actions are appropriate (first EPA sets the standards and
then NRC ensures its licensing process meets those standards). However,
the timeline required in S. 3469--not later than one year after the
enactment of this Act and not later than 1 year after the adoption of
generally applicable standards by EPA--provides inadequate time for the
agencies to properly do their work. After repeated and flawed attempts
to establish Yucca Mountain standards, we are optimistic that EPA will
not need two decades and can get the job done in a reasonable amount of
time, if given adequate resources./2/
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\2\ EPA repeatedly issued standards concerned more with licensing
the site than establishing protective standards. EPA's original 1985
standards were vacated in part because EPA had failed to fulfill its
separate duty under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300h,
to assure that underground sources of water will not be ``endangered''
by any underground injection. NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258 (1st Cir.
1987). EPA's second attempt to at setting standards that allow for a
projected failure of geological isolation was again vacated, this time
by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The D.C.
Circuit found EPA's Yucca Mountain rule (and the corresponding NRC
standard), which ended its period required compliance with the terms of
those rules at 10,000 years was not ``based upon or consistent with''
the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences as required by
the 1992 Energy Policy Act and therefore must be vacated. Nuclear
Energy Institute, Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251 (2004).
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As this Committee is aware, at this time EPA has few staffing
resources, consultants, or budget for standards preparation. It would
take at least a year after enactment and subsequent Congressionally-
appropriated funds to properly staff the task. EPA would then have to
do a rulemaking notice, preferably including hearings/meetings, develop
a proposed rule for public comment, and then go about the task of
issuing a publicly informed final rule. A constraint of one year (for
both EPA and NRC) invites a rushed, inadequate job that hamstrings both
agencies and likely denies the states, tribes, and public a meaningful
opportunity to fully inform the process.
Additionally, while the requirement to promulgate generic standards
is welcome, care must be taken to insulate any site standard,
development or regulatory framework from adverse pressures applied by
the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Justice, DOE and
the NRC. Indeed, it is our assessment that past administrations'
failures to protect EPA from just such pressures is why the development
of the EPA standard setting process was so problematic. The one-year
time frames invite just such pressure and we urge, in the alternative,
Congressional attention to ensure EPA has adequate resources and time
for the task.
RECOMMENDATION 3--A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN LAW IS NECESSARY
A. Comments on Section 304--Siting Nuclear Waste Facilities and
Amending the Atomic Energy Act
1. The Necessary Change--Section 304 is the heart of S. 3469 and
there is much to applaud here. The Section is attentive to BRC's
recommendation in its Final Report of a ``consent-based, adaptive, and
phased approach'' for developing geologic disposal options. We agree
with the general thrust of such a conceptual framework for developing
repositories, but any such ``consent-based'' process will enjoy a far
higher probability of success in concert with a simple, but profound,
change in the law. As the BRC's Final Report acknowledges but fails to
meaningfully discuss, current federal law, including aspects of the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA), has the effect of preempting almost all forms
of state regulation over a high level radioactive waste facility and,
indeed, over regulation of radionuclides in general.
Congress should, via S. 3469 and after appropriate hearings on the
proper scope, remove once and for all the AEA's exemptions for
radionuclides from our nation's water and hazardous waste laws. These
anachronistic exemptions from environmental law are at the heart of
state and public distrust of both government and commercial nuclear
facilities. A great deal of the structure of S. 3469 can help build a
better nuclear waste management system, but we submit that decades from
now the Nation will return to the same predicament (no matter how
improved the architecture of said system) unless States are provided
with meaningful regulatory authority under existing environmental laws.
2. Section 304(a)--Section 304(a) sets out the general terms of a
process that reflects the transparent, adaptive, consent based
qualities called for by the BRC. Allowing affected communities to
decide, and on what terms, they will host a nuclear waste facility is
an important step forward that has not heretofore existed in nuclear
legislation.
3. Section 304(b)--Section 304(b) wisely provides for consistency
with Section 112(a) of the NWPA but requires the issuance of guidelines
not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act. As
with Section 305, we think one year an inadequate time frame. We
support such consistency with the enumerated provisions in Section
112(a) and agree that additional attention is important to detailed
considerations such as minimizing impacts of transportation and
handling and to not unduly burden states storing significant volumes of
defense wastes is important. But it is our strong recommendation that
more time should be provided for the agency to get up and running
before final guidelines become statutory time restrictions. Indeed,
such guidelines must comply with NEPA, and ensuring those guidelines
are in place prior to consideration of any storage or disposal site
could go a long way in avoiding the mistakes of the past.
4. Section 304(c)--Section 304(c) sets up a process for determining
candidate sites that, in general terms, could chart a process arriving
at protective disposal solution, if it is: (1) undertaken subsequent to
imposition of sound final site screening and development criteria and
sound final generic radiation and environmental protection standards;
and (2) not hamstrung or corrupted by Congress, other federal agencies
or the Executive Branch. However, the Environmental Assessment required
in Section 304(c)(4) should explicitly be termed an Environmental
Impact Statement to ensure there is no confusion regarding NEPA
obligations. 6
5. Section 304(d)--Section 304(d) sets forth requirements for
characterizing sites and for consulting agreements with potential
nuclear waste recipient states. If performed in a careful, phased
fashion prior to embarking on the final site suitability determination
delineated in Section 304(e), such a characterization process could
allow for the phased and adaptive approach recommended by the BRC. Key
decisions could be revisited and modified as necessary along the way
rather than being pre-determined, and the process itself could be
flexible and produce decisions that are responsive to new information
and new technical, social, or political developments.
6. Section 304(f)--Section 304(f) seeks to provide legislative text
responsive to the BRC's recommendation that any successful approach
must be consent based--in the sense that affected communities will have
an opportunity to decide whether to accept facility siting decisions
and will retain significant local control. Several components in the
proposed text merit attention. If such a provision were enacted into
law, allowances for any recipient state to have regulatory oversight
authority, and authority over operational limitations, are crucial
recognitions of the need for meaningful state oversight that have been
missing from previous efforts at nuclear waste disposal. Equally
important is the statutory requirement that Congress must ratify (and,
assuredly, the President must therefore sign) any consent agreement.
And finally, the statutory direction that neither party (the federal or
state government) may unilaterally amend or revoke the contract is a
concept that NRDC fully supports.
But for all those laudable qualities, we believe the suggested
consent agreements will not solve the fundamental problem facing
nuclear waste disposal. We suggest Congress, with its firm
understanding of federalism, legislate a role for states in nuclear
waste disposal by amending the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) to remove its
express exemptions of radioactive material from environmental laws.
State, local and tribal governments must be central in any
prescription for a successful repository and waste storage program. The
BRC recognized as much and noted federal and state tensions are often
central in nuclear waste disputes. The BRC's Final Report states in
pertinent part:
We recognize that defining a meaningful and appropriate role
for states, tribes, and local governments under current law is
far from straightforward, given that the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction over many
radioactive waste management issues. Nevertheless, we believe
it will be essential to affirm a role for states, tribes, and
local governments that is at once positive, proactive, and
substantively meaningful and thereby reduces rather than
increases the potential for conflict, confusion, and delay.
Final Report at 56 (citation omitted).
Without fundamental changes in the law to address such federal,
state and tribal tensions, we will never approach closure and consent
on transparent, phased, and adaptive decisions for nuclear waste
siting. Indeed, even if such a provision as Section 304(f) is enacted
into law, we think it likely disputes will continue unchecked unless
Congress avails itself of the opportunity to finally suggest a decades-
overdue change in the law which we will now explore in more detail.
A meaningful and appropriate role for states in nuclear waste
siting can be accomplished in a straightforward manner by amending the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) to remove its express exemptions of radioactive
material from environmental laws. The exemptions of radioactivity make
it, in effect, a privileged pollutant. Exemptions from the Clean Water
Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) are at the
foundation of state and, we submit, even fellow federal agency distrust
of both commercial and government-run nuclear complexes.
As this Committee is aware, most federal environmental laws
expressly exclude ``source, special nuclear and byproduct material''
from the scope of health, safety and environmental regulation by EPA or
the states, leaving the field to DOE and NRC. In the absence of clear
language in those statutes authorizing EPA (or states where
appropriate) to regulate the environmental and public health impacts of
radioactive waste, DOE thereby retains broad authority over its vast
amounts of radioactive waste, with EPA and state regulators then only
able to push for stringent cleanups on the margins of the process.
Indeed, the BRC Report discusses the State of New Mexico's efforts to
regulate aspects of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant RCRA as critical
positive element in the development of the currently active site. Final
Report at 21./3/ The NRC also retains far reaching safety and
environmental regulatory authority over commercial nuclear facilities,
with agreement states able to assume NRC authority, but only on the
federal agency's terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The BRC Report omits discussion of the fierce effort New Mexico
waged to obtain RCRA authority over the site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
States are welcome to consult with the NRC and the DOE, but the
agencies can, and will, assert preemptive authority where they see fit.
This has happened time and again at both commercial and DOE nuclear
facilities. This outdated regulatory scheme is the focal point of the
distrust that has poisoned federal and state relationships involved in
managing and disposing of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and spent
nuclear fuel, with resulting significant impacts on public health and
the environment.
If EPA and the states had full legal authority and could treat
radionuclides as they do other pollutants under environmental law,
clear cleanup standards could be promulgated, and we could be much
farther along in remediating the toxic legacy of the Cold War. Further,
we could likely avoid some of the ongoing legal and regulatory disputes
over operations at commercial nuclear facilities. Any regulatory change
of this magnitude would have to be harmonized with appropriate NRC
licensing jurisdiction over facilities and waste and harmonized with
EPA's existing jurisdiction with respect to radiation standards: but
such a process is certainly within the capacity of the current federal
agencies and engaged stakeholders. Some states would assume regulatory
jurisdiction over radioactive material, others might not. But in any
event, substantially improved clarity in the regulatory structure and a
meaningful state oversight role would allow, for the first time in this
country, consent-based and transparent decisions to take place on the
matter of developing storage sites and geologic repositories.
In short, Section 304(f) is a detailed attempt to remedy regulatory
deficiencies that could be more simply and effectively handled by
ending exemptions under the AEA. Removing the ability of the United
States to unilaterally break the terms of the contract could
potentially give a state some measure of comfort that the agreement it
had painstakingly negotiated will hold fast. But there would be nothing
stopping Congress from revisiting this law, ratifying the consent
agreements with conditions, and thereby removing whatever meaningful
restraint a state might assert. Thus, ultimately what is offered as a
thoughtful contract provision could be rendered inoperable, and could
eviscerate a state's protection against altered, less favorable terms.
By contrast, ending the anachronistic AEA exemptions solves the
matter of meaningful state oversight and does not carry with it
substantial likelihood of congressional terms and modifications exacted
from states years into a good faith negotiation on a site. Indeed,
while it would be possible for a future Congress to revisit the AEA and
re-insert exemptions from environmental law, it would have to do so in
a manner that would remove overdue jurisdictional authority from all
states (or Congress would have to single out one state for special
treatment). The difficulty of prevailing over the interest of all 50
states rather than simply amending legislation that affects the
interests of just one state should be apparent.
RECOMMENDATION 4--ADDRESS STORAGE IN A PHASED APPROACH CONSISTENT WITH
THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE BILL
Comments on Section 306
Chairman Bingaman introduced S. 3469 by echoing the BRC and
cautioning that unless there is direct, clear linkage between progress
on a storage facility and progress on a repository, providing temporary
storage could thwart progress toward developing repositories and reduce
incentives to find a long-term solution.'' The Chairman stated:
The Commission makes a strong case for interim storage, but
``only in the context of a parallel disposal program.'' I agree
with that conclusion. Interim storage can play an important
role in a comprehensive waste management program, but only as
an integral part of the repository program and not as an
alternative to, or de facto substitute for, permanent disposal.
We agree. A link between storage and disposal is essential. We
support the precise language in the text that ``[t]he Administrator may
not possess, take title to, or store spent nuclear fuel at a storage
facility licensed under this Act before ratification of a consent
agreement for a repository under Section 304(f)(4).'' Such a provision
wisely puts the horse before the cart and ensures just the linkage the
Chairman understands and the BRC acknowledges is necessary. But this
sensible process is undone by Section 306(b), which provides an
exception for 10,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel.
The exception opens the door to a storage facility that fails to
follow the phased process so carefully constructed in the earlier
sections. Rather than prematurely bypassing a careful process that can
arrive at protective, environmentally sensible and scientifically
defensible solutions, NRDC urges spent fuel storage efforts to focus on
vigorous efforts by industry and by appropriate regulatory authorities
to ensure that all near-term forms of storage meet high standards of
safety and security for the decades-long time periods that interim
storage sites will be in use. While NRDC can agree with the overall
concept of consolidated interim storage for a measured amount of spent
fuel that meets strong safety criteria (moving fuel from seismically
active areas, for example) and removing the stranded fuel from
decommissioned plants, we can only do so after the introduction of a
phased approach, as the general architecture of S. 3469 suggests.
Indeed, the only situation where NRDC sees merit in a pilot
project(s) is to address the current total stranded spent fuel at the
nine closed reactor sites, accommodated in a hardened building at one
or more sites that follows the example of the Ahaus facility in
Germany. Potential volunteer sites that have already demonstrated
``consent'' are operating commercial reactors. Far less in the way of
new infrastructure would be required and the capacity for fuel
management and transportation is already in place, along with consent
necessary for hosting nuclear facilities in the first instance.
Indeed, the BRC cited no evidence for why continued reliance on
densely-packed wet storage should be accepted as adequate in light of
the health, safety and security risks that interim wet storage poses.
Instead, the BRC was negligent in not recommending that Congress
statutorily direct movement of spent fuel from wet pools to dry casks
as soon as practical, i.e., as soon as spent fuel has cooled
sufficiently to permit safe dry cask storage, generally about five
years. Such a legislative direction would go far in addressing a number
of public safety and environmental harms and do less damage to the
careful architecture of this bill. With less fuel in the pool, an
accident scenario in which cooling is lost would be less problematic
through the extended time allotted by the slower boiling rate in the
less crowded pools and the radiation source term would be reduced. The
now standardized practice of onsite, hardened dry-cask storage poses
clear benefits in terms of the mitigation of an accident or act of
terrorism, either of which could lead to the release of quantities of
radiation exceeding a reactor core melt.
Moreover, as we and many others in the environmental and public
health community noted to the BRC, current practice at U.S. reactor
sites allows the spent fuel pools to be filled to near capacity, with
most pools containing five times as much fuel as the reactor itself. We
disagree with the Commission's unfounded conclusion that it sees ``no
unmanageable safety or security issue associated with current methods
of storage (dry or wet) at existing sites in the United States.'' Final
Report at 32. This counter-factual conclusion is not borne out by the
post-9/11 National Academy study of spent fuel storage, or by the
recent post-Fukushima nuclear safety reviews at U.S. reactors that
reveal significant deficiencies in back-up spent fuel cooling and
instrumentation capability under the conditions of a station black-out.
Particularly with respect to the 23 boiling water reactors (BWRs) in
the United States, supplying emergency make-up water to a boiling pool
inside the secondary containment can itself threaten, via excess heat
and condensation, the performance of other critical reactor safety
systems. Further, the elevated pools themselves are vulnerable to
structural damage and debris from hydrogen explosions in a severe
accident scenario, as occurred during the Fukushima accident.
In short, unprotected or lightly sheltered spent fuel pools outside
containment are vulnerable to disabling of their cooling systems in a
severe natural event--such as a tornado, earthquake, fire, or flood--
and to direct destruction via a terrorist attack. On September 11,
2001, Flight 11 passed directly over the Indian Point nuclear reactors
and spent fuel pools, containing tons of discharged fuel in wet
storage. None of the above-enumerated threats could be considered
``well-managed'' under current NRC regulations or current independent
licensee efforts. Congress should confront this matter directly and
require unpacking of excess fuel from the pools and into hardened
onsite storage. A pilot storage project that addresses none of these
issues merely serves to undercut the meritorious sections of S. 3469.
Title IV--Funding and Legal Proceedings
Sections 401 and 402 set forth terms of ensuring the ``polluter
pays principle'' is appropriately enshrined in the law. Section 404
appropriately provides for judicial review of final actions under
S.3469. Section 406(b)(1)--which requires settlement of all nuclear
waste breach of contract claims as a condition precedent before the
Nuclear Waste Administration takes title to and stores any nuclear
waste for the contract holder-merits particular positive notice as a
thoughtful method that will ensure settlements and allow the program to
proceed in an effective fashion. Section 406(d) bars new contracts
before the Commission has licensed the Administrator to operate a
repository or storage facility. This provision wisely sidesteps the
liability issues of the past two decades and creates an incentive for
all parties to work for a strong, protective nuclear waste storage and
disposal program.
recommendation 5--reject closed fuel cycles and reprocessing
As a final matter, we applaud the focus in S. 3469 on storage and
disposal rather than dragging into this proposed legislation the red
herring that is reprocessing. Chairman Bingaman noted:
The Commission wisely resisted the allure of reprocessing,
concluding that there is ``no currently available or reasonably
foreseeable'' alternative to deep geologic disposal. In short,
we need a deep geologic repository. Even if we were to
reprocess spent fuel, with all of the costs and environmental
issues it involves, we would still need to dispose of the
radioactive waste streams that reprocessing itself produces and
we would need to do so in a deep geologic repository.
We concur. We also note that the analysis of advanced fuel cycle
technologies contained in the BRC Final Report was inadequate, and its
broad sweeping conclusions are not supported by a more rigorous
comparison of current once-through versus advanced closed fuel cycles.
As we demonstrated time and again to the BRC in our comments (see NRDC
November 1, 2011 comments at 7-14), one can determine the relative
attractiveness and economic outlook of various reactor and fuel cycle
concepts and the likelihood that various options will be implemented in
the United States.
Consequently, rather than promoting a large research and
development (R&D) program covering a wide range of alternative fuel
cycles, Congress should look at the reality of the federal budget over
the next decade and narrow the options and focus on those that are most
promising. Given that there is no current or prospective closed fuel
cycle that can economically compete with the current open cycle,
Congress should prioritize R&D funding to support technologies that can
mitigate climate change in the near-term at the least cost. This
excludes government funded R&D on closed plutonium fuel cycles.
Additionally, we are opposed to using (or attempts to use) the
Nuclear Waste Fund to support development or deployment of reprocessing
and fast-reactor technologies. Separating responsibility for waste
management/disposal from other fuel cycle functions is key to garnering
support and public trust from NRDC and many others, and we support S.
3469's careful attention to this matter.
Conclusion
S. 3469 has several important provisions that can help build a
better nuclear waste management system, but decades from now others
will face our current predicament unless Congress fundamentally revamps
how nuclear waste is regulated and allows for meaningful State
oversight by amending the AEA to remove its express exemptions of
radioactive material from environmental laws.
Thank you again for this opportunity and I am happy to answer any
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you both for your excellent testimony.
Let me start with a couple of questions.
Mr. Barron, many utilities have filed breach of contract
claims against the Federal Government for failing to take
nuclear waste as they committed to. In your view, are
utilities, nuclear utilities, going to be willing to settle
those breach of contract claims if Congress enacts something
like we're talking about here with a Nuclear Waste
Administration that is able to provide storage for the
utility's spent fuel before a repository is available?
Mr. Barron. What the utilities would like or what they
expect is that the performance of removal and taking title to
fuel in exchange for the fees that pay be accomplished. If that
is being accomplished through transportation to a consolidated
interim storage facility then the utility is no longer
incurring damage. There is no longer an obligation.
It is simply a question of a performance standard that
wasn't met. Damages being incurred by the utility. The rate
payer having to pay those damages.
Once there is performance under the contract such that
there are no longer any damages, there are no more damage
claims to be paid.
The Chairman. I guess you made reference to the importance
of going ahead and insuring that the waste at shut down
reactors be disposed or stored first or disposed of first. Are
utilities willing to renegotiate the fuel acceptance schedule
to achieve that result? Because I understand there's a fuel
acceptance schedule that has already been established that does
not contemplate that order.
Mr. Barron. No, actually to the contrary. Within the
standard contract it provides for the Secretary to give
priority to fuel which is located at reactors that--at sites
that do not have an operating--
The Chairman. So that's already in the----
Mr. Barron. The contract today would permit that to occur
and as utilities, as an industry, we have concurred that we
would not argue with such a determination.
The Chairman. OK.
Mr. Fettus, thank you for your comments. I know you were
instrumental in this litigation that Senator Murkowski has
referred to a few times here about in before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia with regard to the whole
issue of confidence.
I guess I would ask you to elaborate a little bit on this
whole issue of linkage. One of the disputes that we've had or
not disputes but disagreements, I would say, is whether or not
we need to make provision in the law, some type of legal
linkage in the law, that ensures that progress is made toward
establishment of a permanent repository. As work goes forward
with, or even storage of waste goes forward, at a storage
facility or whether that can be left to a negotiation between
the Federal Government and the individual jurisdictions
involved.
Do you have a strong view on that?
Mr. Fettus. I do, Senator.
I think you asked the question to the previous panel in a
precise and correct fashion which is what would the position of
a state be? What would their ability be to enforce if, for
example, they made the deal to be a storage facility through a
consent process and asked for some sort of meaningful oversight
authority. Then the repository process for a whole host of
reasons, that are maybe for example, not dissimilar to the last
2 decades, blows up.
That state, unless they want to take advantage of throwing
fuel over the borders which I don't think is a likely option,
really is in a dreadful position. Why I think your caution
about the linkage must be in the law and not left to
negotiation is absolutely correct because for that precise
reason. States will have no, in our Federal system, states will
have no significant or serious option to protect themselves if
they make such deals without 1, meaningful regulatory authority
and 2, a linkage that you've created in your very sequenced and
adaptive legislation that allows for the process to go forward.
Meaning, you cannot store more than--let's say there's a
deal made on moving some safety, you know, spent fuel near
seismic areas or near the Mississippi River or and if you--and
also the stranded fuel, that's done. But at a certain point it
stops unless there's a repository program ongoing. That has to
be in the law or states will be essentially out of luck.
So I think you've done it precisely right with the
inclusion of what we suggested in our testimony.
The Chairman. Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Mr. Barron, let me ask you the same
question that I asked of the previous panel. That again relates
to the D.C. Court of Appeals remand. What we heard from Dr.
Lyons and General Scowcroft was that they didn't feel that this
decision was going to impact negatively or delay any new builds
or relicensing of existing reactors.
Would you agree with them or do you have a different
opinion?
Mr. Barron. My opinion would be that I would agree with
them. It's not clear. I mean, legally the NRC cannot issue
those licenses that would depend on that waste, the confidence
determination. I think there's still some work going on within
the legal part of the NRC to determine exactly which types of
licenses those are. That's not completely clear yet.
The NRC does recognize that a lot of work has been done
that supports a waste determination process. They think they
can draw on that work. Within the 24-month period that Dr.
Lyons spoke to, the NRC believes that they can produce a new
rule.
That would not surprise me. However if from there, there
were further appeals on that just as the process moves along
but it does not appear at this time that that particular action
will have a detrimental effect. It's conceivable. But at this
time does not appear to be probable.
Senator Murkowski. Senator Cantwell focused on defense
waste. In her opinion the need to address that specifically
can--will either of you comment on her proposal that that be
clearly defined, that the defense waste is addressed in a
manner specific or certain to any legislation that might move
forward.
Mr. Barron. As an industry we have no opposition to the co-
mingling of the waste nor would we necessarily be opposed to a
separation of those. I think at the root of the problem whether
it's defense waste or commercial waste, is the necessary
actions that will take to get a repository open in either case.
Energy is focused on that, on removing whatever impediments
there might be either to implementing the repository program as
is defined under current law or creating a new law that would
create an alternative to repository and have within it those
provisions that would enable it to be successful. That is the
underpinning of the problem that has to be addressed whether
you're talking commercial nuclear waste or defense wastes.
Senator Murkowski. Mr. Fettus.
Mr. Fettus. Thank you, Senator Murkowski.
There was an interesting day during one of the hearings of
the Blue Ribbon Commission where 2 very estimable people from
very disparate sides of the chess board on these issues,
Beatrice Braillsford of the Snake River Alliance in Idaho and
Steve Kraft of the Nuclear Energy Institute. Two very fine
people, both completely agreed that the waste should be co-
mingled, that there's--that while there could be reasons in the
structure of the fuel and the heat loading that there could be
different repositories. What we need to have going is a
repository program.
So we have great faith that the kind of process that
Senator Bingaman has set up here to move forward on the BRC's
recommendations is--meets the needs of both the environmental
community as well as the nuclear industry. That that's where
the focus needs to be. Both high level waste from defense
processes, from spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and spent fuel,
need to go in a repository.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize I was not here earlier. I was hoping to come to
here Brent Scowcroft as well as you gentlemen. If I could just
on the record congratulate General Scowcroft and also
Congressman Hamilton for their good work. Thank them for their
service. Say that I hope that we'll listen to some of the
recommendations which seem so sensible.
One of the ones that they recommended was that Congress get
its act together with regard to the Appropriations process. I
was frankly surprised to learn that the Nuclear Waste Fund
which collects about $750 million bucks a year has a balance of
$26 billion. Really because of the fight over disposal and
specifically over Yucca Mountain, those funds have not been
dispensed.
I assume, Mr. Barron, as you look at the industry and its
future that that's a concern of yours as well. Could you
comment on that?
Mr. Barron. Yes.
The funds have been appropriated for a particular purpose.
They are obligated both by statute and by contract for that
particular purpose. The treatment of those funds as otherwise
discretionary in terms of how they are made available just
doesn't seem to have a rationale to it.
The revolving or the capital waste fund that is suggested
in this legislation, we believe, is the right way to go. But
there shouldn't be the restrictions that subjected to the
annual appropriations and authorizations process that are
proposed in this legislation.
We think it's a good step forward. But it has not quite
arrived in terms of making the funds available that would
enable any entity to meet any obligations that it enters into.
Senator Portman. For you is this a matter of providing more
certainty as to the liabilities and the costs?
Mr. Barron. I think all the pieces have to go together. I
don't think we can separate the waste fund from an effective
management entity that has the wherewithal and continuity of
leadership to be able to deliver it from the need for a consent
based siting. The package of items that were put together and
were put together by the BRC very well, really all fit
together. We can't really isolate one as being key, more key
than the other ones.
Senator Portman. One of the things that they also talked
about was in their report and I assume it's been part of your
testimony today. I apologize I didn't hear it all. But that
there needs to be an implementation plan, the Administration
was supposed to have released its plan in July.
I assume you've talked about this already and again, I
apologize if I didn't hear your testimony earlier and either of
you can respond.
But one, why do you believe that the Administration has not
responded including to the inquiries from the BRC?
Second, what impact does this have on the industry in
particular? Are you looking for more leadership from the
Administration to, again, provide a way forward?
Mr. Barron. I think it's important that we get leadership,
seriousness about this problem from the Administration, the
establishment of the BRC which as was previously stated,
clearly was a Blue Ribbon panel. I think they made a very good
effort in putting that together and charging them to come up
with these recommendations.
My hope that that attention and that priority that they put
on when they established that panel can continue and that we
can get actions and support from this Administration or the
next Administration on those actions.
Senator Portman. Mr. Fettus, are you eager to see the
implementation plan or do you think that's not an important
part of moving forward?
Mr. Fettus. I think it's going to be very important when
the Administration comes forward with it they answered a
substantial number of questions from Senator Murkowski earlier
in the hearing. We'd like to see it too.
Senator Portman. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Murkowski, did you have additional
questions?
Senator Murkowski. I did not, thank you.
The Chairman. Let me thank these 2 witnesses. I think it's
been excellent testimony.
Let me indicate we have 3 statements for the record.
One from the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners.
One from Energy Communities Alliance.
One from the Eddie Lee Energy Alliance.
We will include those in the record.
The Chairman. Again, we appreciate the good testimony. I
think it's been a useful hearing.
That will conclude our hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m. the hearing was adjourned.]
APPENDIXES
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Appendix I
Responses to Additional Questions
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Responses of Henry B. Barron to Questions From Senator Cantwell
I believe a key part of solving our nation's nuclear waste
challenges is to recognize that we need to prioritize addressing
certain types of waste first--such as waste stranded at shutdown
reactor sites and defense waste that has built up for decades. Not all
nuclear waste is the same, and I do not plan to support any legislation
that does not remedy the mistakes of the past that has precluded more
feasible solutions for our nation's defense waste.
As I'm sure you know, Hanford is the largest nuclear cleanup site
in North America. We have been diligently trying to clean up this site,
an incredible complex and costly endeavor. While it is a constant
struggle to keep this monumental effort on track, I proud of incredible
efforts of Hanford workers and we are making real progress. But we need
an end point. Once we clean up and isolate this toxic legacy, we need a
place for it to go.
It is unacceptable to me, and to the constituents I represent, for
Hanford to be the de facto repository for 90 percent of the nation's
high-level radioactive defense waste.
While proud of the service to help secure our nation during World
War II and the Cold War, the Tri-Cities region has contributed and
sacrificed enough during the 70 years in which a large portion of my
state has been put off limits to economic development or other uses.
The problem as I see it is that our nation's nuclear waste policy
treats civilian nuclear waste and defense waste the same, with defense
waste almost as an afterthought. That's a problem for two important
reasons: First, our defense waste is not suitable for on-site storage
and Hanford's Waste Treatment Plant is scheduled to produce vitrified
high level waste in 2019. And second, defense waste is a witch's brew
of nuclear byproducts that can never be reprocessed for electricity
generation. Therefore, it can be disposed of permanently, possibly in
ways that are faster and cheaper than civilian waste.
Question 1a. Do you agree that nuclear waste that we would never
want to retrieve but can be permanently disposed of should be treated
differently?
Answer. Nuclear waste, both commercial used fuel and defense
related materials, must be disposed of and can be disposed of in the
same geologic repository as was the plan with the Yucca Mountain
repository.
There are two issues to consider in the context of retrievability:
nuclear fuel recycle (only applicable to commercial used nuclear fuel)
and safety.
I agree that the geologic disposal facility for defense wastes
should not have a retrievability requirement associated with it other
than for safety considerations. In regards to safety, the very
successful Waste Isolation Pilot Plant addresses this issue in the
governing regulations, 40 CFR 194.4(b)(1), by requiring the DOE to
retrieve as soon as practicable and to the extent practicable any waste
placed in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) if the EPA
Administrator revokes WIPP's certification. A similar approach for the
disposal of the remaining defense related wastes would be acceptable.
Imposing a retrievability requirement on commercial used fuel for
the purpose of recycling is also not necessary for near term disposal
efforts. If the search for a second repository, other than Yucca
Mountain, is conducted it would be unfortunate to reject out-of-hand an
otherwise acceptable site because it would be impossible to retrieve a
waste package from that site for the purpose of recycling.
Lack of retrievability does not eliminate the potential for recycle
of commercial used nuclear fuel. Even if the United States decides to
begin recycling commercial used nuclear fuel after placing it in a
repository, there will still be more than enough used fuel available
for recycling without having to retrieve it from the repository. Given
the time frames involved in restarting and completing the Yucca
Mountain repository, or developing, planning, licensing, and
constructing a new repository, it is doubtful that significant amounts
of used fuel will have been placed in a repository by the time
recycling technologies could be deployed at commercial scale.
Question 1b. Have you studied whether permanent disposal in salt
formations could be a cheaper and more readily available alternative to
other geological storage options?
Answer. Geologic disposal in salt formations is technically
feasible for both defense wastes and commercial used nuclear fuel.
However, I am unable to offer an opinion about whether disposal in salt
could be less expensive in the long term relative to other geologic
formations. At this point, the quickest path to a deep geologic
repository would be the continuation of the Yucca Mountain project.
Extensive studies and testing have already been performed at the site
and the NRC review of the license application should be completed. If
the search for a second repository begins, the total cost to dispose of
both commercial and defense related materials should be one of the
factors used to choose a site in a willing host community and state.
Question 1c. How do we make sure that defense waste does not get
lost in the nuclear waste debate this time around?
Answer. Increased focus on this issue by both the Administration
and Congress is needed to ensure that both defense waste and commercial
used nuclear fuel are properly disposed. The industry believes that
consolidated storage, as recommended by the Blue Ribbon Commission, is
the quickest route for the federal government to begin moving used fuel
from nuclear energy facilities and to stem the increase in damage. In
addition to storing used nuclear fuel from commercial facilities, a
consolidated storage facility could also store DOE and U.S. naval
reactor fuel. This could provide a pathway for the federal government
to meet its obligations to remove this material from the various states
where it is stored.
Question 2. Unfortunately, the requirement that nuclear waste be
retrievable for up to a century blocks many potential sites. There are
communities that would welcome our nation's nuclear waste; but while
they are located near technically-sound, cost-effective geologic
formations, high level waste placed there cannot be retrieved.
So maybe it's time to reconsider this retrievability requirement.
The mere possibility of future uses for the nuclear waste should not
block progress on siting a nuclear repository and geologically
disposing of our nation's nuclear waste. This is especially true for
defense waste, which has even lower prospects for reuse than commercial
waste.
Question 2a. Given the bleak prospects for recycling or otherwise
using nuclear waste, should this retrievability requirement block
siting a repository in a technically-sound, cost-effective place that
is willing to accept waste?
Answer. As discussed above in the answer to question 1a,
retrievability should be a consideration in repository design. However,
retrievability should not be the sole consideration and should not
necessarily block the siting of a repository in a willing host
community and state.
Question 2b. If the insistence on this retrievability requirement
for commercial waste continues, do you think we ought to consider a
separate repository for defense waste without such a restriction--a
potential dual-path forward envisioned by the original Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982?
Answer. The issue of retrievability should not stand in the way of
the disposal of either commercial used fuel or defense wastes and
retrievability should only be one of many considerations in repository
design and should not necessarily block the siting of a repository in a
willing host community and state.
Question 3. After 25 years of getting nowhere with political
wrangling, I believe we need to correct our course and get back to the
basics of science, economics, and consensus-building. We need to find
places with technically-sound cost-effective geologies that want to
host a repository. And we need to ensure that these new places have the
capacity to take all of our nation's nuclear waste, both commercial and
defense.
The Yucca saga illustrates the problem of allowing politics to
overwhelm science and economics. And why we need to get back to the
basics envisioned in the original Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. We
know that the geologic formations at Yucca do not necessarily offer the
most cost effective solution, and there are still questions about
whether they even offer a safe, technically-sound environment for long-
term geologic storage. Yucca is tectonically active, with both seismic
and volcanic activity. Faulting, or shifting of tectonic plates, could
allow water to corrode the waste packages and transport nuclear
material well beyond the repository. Volcanic activity could
potentially disperse radionuclides into the atmosphere and ground
water.
While the risk of volcanic activity at Yucca is highly uncertain,
the Yucca site is bounded by numerous known faults: among others, the
Solitario Canyon and Sundance faults to the west and the Ghost Dance
fault to the east.
In 1992, a 5.6-magnitude earthquake originated just 13 miles south
of Yucca. And in June 2002, a 4.4-magnitude earthquake struck slightly
further to the east of Yucca. These events are not exactly reassuring
to the millions of Americans downstream or downwind of Yucca.
Question 3a. Do you see the Blue Ribbon Commission recommendations
and Chairman Bingaman's legislation as a renewed call to correct our
course? Choosing science, economics, and consensus over the failed
political wrangling of the past 25 years, going back to many of the
principles of the original Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982?
Answer. The industry applauded the efforts of the Blue Ribbon
Commission and believes it successfully outlined a path forward that
Congress and the Administration should follow. The industry also
compliments Chairman Bingaman for proposing legislation that would
implement a portion of the Commission's recommendations and for
continuing the dialogue concerning used nuclear fuel management. The
nuclear industry is committed to participating in this dialogue and to
creating a sustainable federal used fuel and defense waste management
program. The most appropriate path to a science based determination of
the acceptability of the Yucca Mountain repository is to enable the
nation's nuclear safety regulatory body, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, to complete the review of the Yucca Mountain license
application.
Completing the licensing process, regardless of the outcome, would
offer valuable scientific and regulatory insights and data for future
disposal efforts in addition to the vast amounts of scientific data
already accumulated for the Yucca Mountain repository.
Question 3b. For such a complex challenge as disposing of nuclear
waste for millions of years, do you believe technical considerations
should trump political ones to the maximum extent possible?
Answer. As stated in this question, the challenge of used nuclear
fuel disposal is a complex one and isolating the federal program from
undue political influence will be essential to the long term success of
the program. To this end, the industry fully supports the Blue Ribbon
Commission's recommendation for the formation of a new management
entity to assume responsibility for this program. The new management
entity must have guaranteed access to the nuclear waste fund and the
nuclear waste fees, and the authority to pursue options within the
bounds of US laws and regulations.
If additional repositories are sited, technical considerations will
bear heavily on the feasibility of a site. However, political
considerations will also have to be addressed through an open and
collaborative process where the willing host community and state have
the right to shape the program in a consent-based process.
Question 4. I would like to discuss the economics of different
geologic formations. While there are multiple ways and places to secure
nuclear waste safely, the costs of doing so are different. I believe
that these costs should be considered when selecting among technically-
sound sites.
A recent study compared the costs of repositories capable of
holding 83,000 metric tons of heavy metals in different geologic media.
It found that siting a repository in volcanic tuff or crystalline rock
costs two to three times that of a repository in massive salt
formations.
These extra costs came primarily from the development and
characterization of the site, more expensive and complex surface and
subsurface facilities, and extensive packaging, barriers and shields
necessary to keep the waste intact. Because of the potential cost
savings, I think we need to take a hard look at salt formations
throughout the country as potential sites for a repository.
Question 4a. Do you believe that cost should be an important factor
when selecting among sites that can safely dispose of waste and have
support within the community?
Answer. If a second repository siting process is begun, cost should
be considered when looking at various sites, but it is only one of many
considerations. For example, the cost to the taxpayer for the disposal
of defense wastes may be reduced if the cost of developing a single
repository for both commercial and defense wastes is partially offset
with funds from the nuclear waste fund. For this reason, consideration
of a single geologic repository should remain an option.
Question 4b. Do you agree that salt formations could deliver
potential cost savings compared to other geologic media types and
deserve consideration?
Answer. I am unable to offer an opinion on the potential cost
savings of a particular geology compared to another. As previously
discussed, cost should be only one factor in the site determination
process for additional repositories.
Question 5. It is simply unacceptable for Hanford to become the de
facto repository for 90 percent of the nation's high-level radioactive
defense waste. Back in the 1980's when a number of repository sites
were analyzed, Hanford placed last in terms of cost-effectiveness.
These high costs were in part due to the extraordinary technical
challenges. According to a National Research Council report, the high
internal stresses within the basalt formation at Hanford poses a risk
of ``rock bursts'' when opened up to atmospheric pressure. And the U.S.
Geological Survey found that the high water pressure in the deep
aquifer poses the danger of catastrophic flooding.
Question 5a. Do the cost-effectiveness of meeting technical
requirements and inherent suitability of a site go hand-in-hand?
Answer. As previously discussed, cost will only be one factor in
the site determination process if a search for additional repositories
is initiated.
Question 5b. Do you agree that cost-effectiveness is an important
consideration that partially takes the suitability of a repository site
into account?
Answer. I agree that cost effectiveness will be an important
consideration. However, it must be viewed holistically with other
considerations.
Question 6. I am pleased to see that this legislation repeals the
limit on the amount of waste able to be disposed at a repository. This
was a well-kept secret about Yucca. Even if Yucca were licensed under
current law, it would not be able to accommodate all of our nuclear
waste, neither civilian nor defense. I believe a litmus test for any
new federal nuclear waste policy is whether it can dispose of our
nation's nuclear waste--all of it.
This has been one of my biggest concerns with the Yucca proposal.
Of the 70,000 ton limit for waste at Yucca, only 7,000 tons were set
aside for defense waste. Of that 7,000 tons for defense waste, only
4,667 tons would be allocated for high level waste.
Although the total number of tons of high level defense waste is
somewhat uncertain, just three percent of DOE's inventory of vitrified
High Level Waste would be accounted for under the planning basis of
4,667 tons of heavy metal for DOE High Level Waste when compared to
over 170,000 tons of heavy metal DOE reprocessed fuel.
In practice, a higher percentage could probably be accommodated
because a portion of the radioactivity has already been lost. According
to an historical estimation method, the limit of high level defense
waste at Yucca would still not have been able to accommodate the high
level waste at Hanford because this limit accounts for less than half
of all defense high level waste.
An even smaller percentage of Hanford waste would have been able to
go to Yucca under current law. Any way you cut it, there simply is not
enough capacity without a repeal of this limit.
Question 6a. Are there any technical or safety reasons for the
current limit of 70,000 tons? If so, does this mean that we need
multiple repositories to accommodate all of our nation's waste?
Answer. There are no technical or safety reasons for the current
legal limit of 70,000 MTU for the Yucca Mountain repository. Both the
Department of Energy and the Electric Power Research Institute have
estimated that the Yucca Mountain repository could hold more than
125,000 MTU. Therefore, if the Yucca Mountain repository is opened and
the legal limit of 70,000 MTU is lifted, it would be decades before a
second repository would be needed, if at all.
Question 6b. Why do you think over half of our nation's high level
defense waste was left out of the plan at Yucca?
Answer. I am not in a position to offer an opinion as to the legal
capacity of defense related waste in the Yucca Mountain repository.
However, if the Yucca Mountain repository is opened and the legal limit
of 70,000 MTU is lifted, there would be ample space available for both
commercial and defense related wastes.
Responses of Henry B. Barron to Questions From Senator Barrasso
Question 1. In your testimony, you state that a new Federal used-
fuel-management corporation is needed. Specifically, you say that: ``A
key element to the long-term success of a federal program is
establishing a new entity to assume program management responsibility
from the DOE.'' A. Why do you believe a new Federal corporation is
needed to manage the nation's nuclear waste? B. Is there any reason why
DOE couldn't manage the nation's nuclear waste if given sufficient
authorization by Congress? If we pursue a consent-based process, won't
we significantly reduce the likelihood that political pressure will
interfere with siting decisions?
Answer. A. There are two reasons why a federal corporation solely
dedicated to implementing the used fuel management program is needed:
sustainable access to its dedicated funding and sustainability of
dedicated program leadership essential to accomplishing the mission.
The Nuclear Waste Fund, as originally conceived, was intended to be
dedicated to the federal used fuel program. However, since 1982 there
have been changes to the federal budget process that now make the used
fuel management program compete with the rest of the federal
appropriations process for receiving its own funds. Properly written,
new legislation should dedicate the Nuclear Waste Fund, Fees and earned
interest to a new federal corporation for the purpose for which it was
paid.
A dedicated federal corporation where the CEO answers to the Board
of Directors and is not subject to the political appointment process
would be able to create an organization that has a single focus on its
mission, safety culture, management systems and processes. Regardless
of its mission as established under the law, the current administration
has demonstrated that an administrative department is not sufficiently
insulated from the political cycles to support a program of this
importance and duration.
Answer. B. As the history of the federal used fuel management
program demonstrates, further insulation from political uncertainties
is needed. While the consent-based siting approach might help with
reducing political pressures on siting a second repository, it is not
sufficient. For example, the consent-based approach does not address
access to dedicated funding-a key issue for the sustainability of the
program.
Question 2. In your testimony, you state that: ``Industry supports
the concept of a federal corporation as outlined in the [Blue Ribbon
Commission's] report.'' How widespread is industry's support for the
creation of a new organization to manage our nation's nuclear waste?
Answer. Industry support for a federal corporation as outlined by
the BRC is widespread as evidenced by industry testimony to the BRC and
the diverse support from NEI members companies and NEI's board of
directors, as well as the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners.
Question 3. In your testimony, you state that the Federal
government: ``should not attempt to . . . impose restrictions on the
development of a consolidated storage facility that are linked to
milestones related to a disposal program.'' If the Federal government
does not set any conditions on temporary storage facilities, how do we
prevent temporary storage facilities from effectively becoming a long-
term solution?
Answer. Included in my testimony was a comparative evaluation of
the schedules for a consolidated storage facility and a restarted Yucca
Mountain project. This timeline demonstrates that even with the most
ambitious plans for both projects, a consolidated storage facility is
the fastest way to begin to move used fuel and lessens the liabilities
for the federal government. But these two processes need to move ahead
in parallel, as consolidated storage is not the final solution. As
constructed above, a federal corporation dedicated to the achievement
of both these objectives provides the greatest potential for success.
One of the tenets of the consent-based approach is flexibility to
work with interested communities to form an agreement that considers
local concerns, including the fear of becoming a de facto long-term
storage facility. Certain negotiated timelines or incentives could be
included to allay those fears. But any direct linkage between the
siting of repository and the siting of a consolidated storage facility
risks further delays in an already stymied program.
Question 4. In your testimony, you explain that taxpayer liability
for DOE's failure to remove nuclear waste from nuclear energy
facilities will reach $20.8 billion in 2020. You also say that: ``By
2040, the damages paid by the taxpayer could be as much as $30
billion,'' and that: ``Consolidated storage . . . is the quickest route
for the federal government to . . . stem the increase in damage
awards.'' Are there other reasons for the Federal government to develop
consolidated storage facilities? If so, what are they?
Answer. The primary motivation for a consolidated storage facility
is to have a facility where the federal government can move used fuel
to and begin to meet its statutory and contractual obligations until a
repository is available. Once the facility is constructed and
operational for this purpose, I can envision the facility having
additional benefits. For example, there is currently a research effort
underway to study the long term effects on used fuel of extended
storage in dry casks beyond the time periods originally contemplated.
Additional research facilities may be necessary for this effort and a
logical location for such facilities could be the consolidated storage
facility.
______
Responses of Lieutenant General Scowcroft and Richard A. Meserve to
Questions From Senator Cantwell
Question 1. I believe a key part of solving our nation's nuclear
waste challenges is to recognize that we need to prioritize addressing
certain types of waste first-- such as waste stranded at shutdown
reactor sites and defense waste that has built up for decades. Not all
nuclear waste is the same, and I do not plan to support any legislation
that does not remedy the mistakes of the past that has precluded more
feasible solutions for our nation's defense waste.
As I'm sure you know, Hanford is the largest nuclear cleanup site
in North America. We have been diligently trying to clean up this site,
an incredible complex and costly endeavor. While it is a constant
struggle to keep this monumental effort on track, I proud of incredible
efforts of Hanford workers and we are making real progress. But we need
an end point. Once we clean up and isolate this toxic legacy, we need a
place for it to go.
It is unacceptable to me, and to the constituents I represent, for
Hanford to be the de facto repository for 90 percent of the nation's
high-level radioactive defense waste.
While proud of the service to help secure our nation during World
War II and the Cold War, the Tri-Cities region has contributed and
sacrificed enough during the 70 years in which a large portion of my
state has been put off limits to economic development or other uses.
The problem as I see it is that our nation's nuclear waste policy
treats civilian nuclear waste and defense waste the same, with defense
waste almost as an afterthought.
That's a problem for two important reasons: First, our defense
waste is not suitable for on-site storage and Hanford's Waste Treatment
Plant is scheduled to produce vitrified high level waste in 2019. And
second, defense waste is a witch's brew of nuclear byproducts that can
never be reprocessed for electricity generation. Therefore, it can be
disposed of permanently, possibly in ways that are faster and cheaper
than civilian waste.
Question 1a. Do you agree that nuclear waste that we would never
want to retrieve but can be permanently disposed of should be treated
differently?
Answer. The Reagan Administration decided that defense and civilian
waste should be disposed of together with commercial waste
(``commingled'') in ``one or more of the repositories to be developed
under [the Nuclear Waste Policy Act]'' (the default option in the Act)
rather than using a separate defense-only repository developed outside
of the context of the Act. The properties of defense waste and civilian
waste are different from each other, which could open up different
disposal options that would still meet generally applicable regulatory
standards, and, as you note, it is highly unlikely that defense waste
will ever be considered for reprocessing. Moreover, the circumstances
are now different from those at the time of the Reagan Administration
decision, including the facts that the development of a repository
under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act has been delayed and that the
Department of Energy has entered into various agreements requiring the
removal of defense waste by dates certain. These considerations argue
for a reconsideration of the decision to commingle the waste. However,
the difficulty to date of establishing even a single repository and the
cost of licensing two repositories are considerations that point to
maintenance of a commingled repository. The BRC did not make a
recommendation to resolve the issue, but urged the Administration ``to
launch an immediate review of the implications of leaving
responsibility for disposal of defense waste and other DOE-owned waste
with DOE versus moving it to a new waste management organization.''
Question 1b. Have you studied whether permanent disposal in salt
formations could be a cheaper and more readily available alternative to
other geological storage options?
Answer. Geology is a very important factor in disposal and will
affect costs. However, the BRC discussed the various geologic options
in only a general way, without evaluating their relative merits:
The rock types that have been considered for a deep geologic
repository have included bedded and domed rock salts,
crystalline rocks (i.e., granite or gneiss), clay, shale,
volcanic tuffs, basalt, and various other types of sedimentary
rocks. Each of these rock types and their particular geologic
environments have advantages and disadvantages from a strictly
technical perspective, and different geologic settings and
emplacement methods may be better for particular types of
waste. However, many or all of them may ultimately be found to
demonstrate acceptable performance for a wide range of
wastes.''
We note, however, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for defense
transuranic waste is in salt and has been very successful to date.
Question 1c. How do we make sure that defense waste does not get
lost in the nuclear waste debate this time around?
Answer. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, does
address defense wastes. Any future legislation should do so as well.
Moreover, as noted above, the BRC recommended reexamination of the
commingling decision.
Question 1d. By not addressing defense waste specifically, does
that imply that you and the Blue Ribbon Commission believe defense
waste should be treated separately from civilian waste?
Answer. As discussed above, the BRC recognized the potential to
treat defense and civilian wastes separately and urged the
Administration to launch an immediate review of the matter.
Question 2. Unfortunately, the requirement that nuclear waste be
retrievable for up to a century blocks many potential sites. There are
communities that would welcome our nation's nuclear waste; but while
they are located near technically-sound, cost-effective geologic
formations, high level waste placed there cannot be retrieved.
So maybe it's time to reconsider this retrievability requirement.
The mere possibility of future uses for the nuclear waste should not
block progress on siting a nuclear repository and geologically
disposing of our nation's nuclear waste. This is especially true for
defense waste, which has even lower prospects for reuse than commercial
waste.
Question 2a. Given the bleak prospects for recycling or otherwise
using nuclear waste, should this retrievability requirement block
siting a repository in a technically-sound, cost-effective place that
is willing to accept waste?
Answer. The BRC concluded that any decision to pursue recycling
should be deferred, but that the option to recover the energy value of
at least some spent fuel should be preserved for future generations. We
recommended the pursuit of R&D related to recycling so that such an
option could be available in the future. As you note, it is highly
unlikely that defense waste will be recycled and thus the preservation
of the opportunity to recycle is not important for that waste.
Your question points to the challenge of retrievability for up to a
century. Retrievability for some period has generally been viewed as
desirable not only to provide the opportunity for recycling as to
enable the monitoring of the repository in its early years and to
reverse course if necessary if that monitoring reveals unexpected
problems. BRC concluded that retrievability requirements for this
purpose are reasonable, and that the current requirements can be met in
a wide range of media including salt:
Our view is that existing requirements concerning
retrievability at mined repository sites (at 40 Code of Federal
Regulations [CFR] 191 and 10 CFR 60.111 (b)) are appropriate
and should be retained. These requirements are intended to
ensure that emplaced waste can be removed if the repository is
not behaving as anticipated or if its performance is called
into question for any reason prior to permanent closure--they
are not intended for the purpose of retaining easy access to
emplaced materials for possible later recovery and reuse. Past
evaluations have indicated that a wide range of candidate mined
repository sites in different geologic media (including
granite, salt and volcanic tuff) could meet these existing
retrievability requirements. On the other hand, we recognize
that the same level of retrievability may not be practical or
necessary in the context of other disposal approaches, such as
deep boreholes. In that case, related regulatory requirements
and time periods can and should be reassessed as part of a
larger evaluation of disposal system performance objectives.''
Question 2b. If the insistence on this retrievability requirement
for commercial waste continues, do you think we ought to consider a
separate repository for defense waste without such a restriction--a
potential dual-path forward envisioned by the original Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982?
Answer. As noted in response to your previous question, the BRC
recommended the reexamination of the decision to commingle defense with
civilian waste. However, while allowed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,
a defense-only repository would still be subject to the same NRC
regulations that apply to a repository containing commercial waste. It
thus would have to meet the same retrievability requirements. As noted
above, past evaluations indicate that a wide range of geologic media,
including salt, can meet these requirements.
Question 3. After 25 years of getting nowhere with political
wrangling, I believe we need to correct our course and get back to the
basics of science, economics, and consensus-building. We need to find
places with technically-sound, cost-effective geologies that want to
host a repository. And we need to ensure that these new places have the
capacity to take all of our nation's nuclear waste, both commercial and
defense.
The Yucca saga illustrates the problem of allowing politics to
overwhelm science and economics. And why we need to get back to the
basics envisioned in the original Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. We
know that the geologic formations at Yucca do not necessarily offer the
most cost effective solution, and there are still questions about
whether they even offer a safe, technically-sound environment for long-
term geologic storage.
Yucca is tectonically active, with both seismic and volcanic
activity. Faulting, or shifting of tectonic plates, could allow water
to corrode the waste packages and transport nuclear material well
beyond the repository. Volcanic activity could potentially disperse
radionuclides into the atmosphere and ground water.
While the risk of volcanic activity at Yucca is highly uncertain,
the Yucca site is bounded by numerous known faults: among others, the
Solitario Canyon and Sundance faults to the west and the Ghost Dance
fault to the east.
In 1992, a 5.6-magnitude earthquake originated just 13 miles south
of Yucca. And in June 2002, a 4.4-magnitude earthquake struck slightly
further to the east of Yucca. These events are not exactly reassuring
to the millions of Americans downstream or downwind of Yucca.
Question 3a. Do you see the Blue Ribbon Commission recommendations
and Chairman Bingaman's legislation as a renewed call to correct our
course? Choosing science, economics, and consensus over the failed
political wrangling of the past 25 years, going back to many of the
principles of the original Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982?
Answer. The BRC did not render an opinion on the suitability of the
Yucca Mountain site, but instead focused on developing a sound strategy
for future storage and disposal facilities and operations that we
believe can and should be implemented regardless of what happens with
Yucca Mountain. Chairman Bingaman's legislation, which incorporates
many of the changes to existing law that will be required to implement
the Commission's recommendations, is a very helpful step in the process
of revisiting our national policy with regard to the disposition of
high level nuclear waste.
Question 3b. For such a complex challenge as disposing of nuclear
waste for millions of years, do you believe technical considerations
should trump political ones to the maximum extent possible?
Answer. The highest priority should be to ensure that any
repository isolates high level nuclear waste from the human environment
for the necessary long periods of time.
Question 4. I would like to discuss the economics of different
geologic formations. While there are multiple ways and places to secure
nuclear waste safely, the costs of doing so are different. I believe
that these costs should be considered when selecting among technically-
sound sites.
Answer. A recent study compared the costs of repositories capable
of holding 83,000 metric tons of heavy metals in different geologic
media. It found that siting a repository in volcanic tuff or
crystalline rock costs two to three times that of a repository in
massive salt formations.
These extra costs came primarily from the development and
characterization of the site, more expensive and complex surface and
subsurface facilities, and extensive packaging, barriers and shields
necessary to keep the waste intact. Because of the potential cost
savings, I think we need to take a hard look at salt formations
throughout the country as potential sites for a repository.
Question 4a. Do you believe that cost should be an important factor
when selecting among sites that can safely dispose of waste and have
support within the community?
Answer. As noted above, cost should not be the most important
factor in determining an appropriate location for a disposal facility.
It might be one of the factors that serves as a ``tie-breaker'' for
sites that are otherwise acceptable.
Question 4b. Do you agree that salt formations could deliver
potential cost savings compared to other geologic media types and
deserve consideration?
Answer. The BRC did not consider the advantages and disadvantages
of various types of geology for a disposal facility.
Question 5. It is simply unacceptable for Hanford to become the de
facto repository for 90 percent of the nation's high-level radioactive
defense waste. Back in the 1980's when a number of repository sites
were analyzed, Hanford placed last in terms of cost-effectiveness.
These high costs were in part due to the extraordinary technical
challenges. According to a National Research Council report, the high
internal stresses within the basalt formation at Hanford poses a risk
of ``rock bursts'' when opened up to atmospheric pressure. And the U.S.
Geological Survey found that the high water pressure in the deep
aquifer poses the danger of catastrophic flooding.
Question 5a. Do the cost-effectiveness of meeting technical
requirements and inherent suitability of a site go hand-in-hand?
Answer. The suitability of a site is an essential ingredient is
establishing the effectiveness of a site.
Question 5b. Do you agree that cost-effectiveness is an important
consideration that partially takes the suitability of a repository site
into account?
Answer. Yes.
Question 6. I am pleased to see that this legislation repeals the
limit on the amount of waste able to be disposed at a repository. This
was a well-kept secret about Yucca. Even if Yucca were licensed under
current law, it would not be able to accommodate all of our nuclear
waste, neither civilian nor defense. I believe a litmus test for any
new federal nuclear waste policy is whether it can dispose of our
nation's nuclear waste--all of it.
This has been one of my biggest concerns with the Yucca proposal.
Of the 70,000 ton limit for waste at Yucca, only 7,000 tons were set
aside for defense waste. Of that 7,000 tons for defense waste, only
4,667 tons would be allocated for high level waste.
Although the total number of tons of high level defense waste is
somewhat uncertain, just three percent of DOE's inventory of vitrified
High Level Waste would be accounted for under the planning basis of
4,667 tons of heavy metal for DOE High Level Waste when compared to
over 170,000 tons of heavy metal DOE reprocessed fuel.
In practice, a higher percentage could probably be accommodated
because a portion of the radioactivity has already been lost. According
to an historical estimation method, the limit of high level defense
waste at Yucca would still not have been able to accommodate the high
level waste at Hanford because this limit accounts for less than half
of all defense high level waste.
An even smaller percentage of Hanford waste would have been able to
go to Yucca under current law. Any way you cut it, there simply is not
enough capacity without a repeal of this limit.
Question 6a. Are there any technical or safety reasons for the
current limit of 70,000 tons? If so, does this mean that we need
multiple repositories to accommodate all of our nation's waste?
Answer. The BRC did not examine the limitations of the Yucca
Mountain site. However, we did point out that the mass limitation for
Yucca Mountain in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was not based on
technical constraints:.
Recognizing the need for a Congressional mandate to overcome
opposition to the selection of any given site, Congress sought
through the NWPA to establish a fair and technically sound
process for selecting repository locations. In fact, to avoid
the perception that any one state or locale would be asked to
bear the entire burden of the nation's nuclear waste management
obligations, the Act provided for the selection of two
repository sites (though not stipulated in the legislation
itself, it was widely assumed that one of these sites would be
located in the West, the other in the East). And to further
ensure that the end result would not be a single, national
repository, Congress included provisions explicitly limiting
the capacity of the first repository to 70,000 metric tons
until a second repository was opened.''
Question 6b. Why do you think over half of our nation's high level
defense waste was left out of the plan at Yucca?
Answer. The BRC did not examine this aspect of the Yucca Mountain
project.
Responses of Lieutenant General Scowcroft and Richard A. Meserve to
Questions From Senator Barrasso
Question 1. The Blue Ribbon Commission's report advocates a
consent-based approach to siting storage facilities and a permanent
repository for our nation's nuclear waste. You repeat your support for
a consent-based approach in your testimony. However, you go on to
advocate for the creation of a new nuclear waste management
organization--a Federally chartered corporation--that would be less
politically accountable than a new Federal agency as envisioned in S.
3469. If we pursue a consent-based approach, why is there a need to
reduce political accountability?
Answer. The BRC stated that the federally charted corporation
should be politically accountable. Its board should be nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. It should be required to provide
periodic reports to Congress on its activities, expenditures, and
progress, and should be subject to periodic oversight hearings. Its
financial affairs should be subject to examination by the Government
Accountability Office.
The fulfillment of the obligations of the new waste organization
requires the consistent and aggressive pursuit of a long-term strategy.
We did not recommend the establishment of a new federal agency because
that approach would not provide the necessary long-term management
stability that the task requires. We note that there may be
opportunities for more effective consensus building as well by
including representatives of the various stakeholders on the
corporation's board--an opportunity that would not be provided by a
federal agency.
Question 2. In your testimony, you explain that S. 3469: ``places
limits on the amount of spent fuel that can be accepted for
consolidated storage prior to congressional ratification of a consent
agreement for a repository.'' However, you say that the Commission
concluded that: ``the volume of fuel to be accepted in consolidated
storage could be one of the many elements of the negotiations between
the nuclear waste management organization and potential host
governments.'' Are you recommending that Congress place no limits on
the amount of fuel that can be accepted into consolidated storage? If
so, how does Congress ensure that consolidated storage does not
effectively become a long-term solution?
Answer. Storage does not offer a long-term solution to the waste
problem and it should be clear in the legislation establishing the
waste organization that its obligations include the expeditious pursuit
of disposal. Spent fuel is now being stored at reactor sites around the
country in a safe and secure manner. The existence of a consolidated
storage site does not appreciably change the pressures to establish a
clear disposal path for commercial spent fuel from the status quo.
Given the many benefits of consolidated storage, the legislation
should not establish barriers to the establishment and operation of a
consolidated storage site or sites. We anticipate that the negotiation
of the terms with the stakeholders proposing a storage location will no
doubt include terms requiring that the stored waste be sent for
disposal by certain deadlines. We concluded that many states and
communities will be far less willing to be considered for a
consolidated storage facility if they fear they will become the de
facto hosts of a disposal site. This means that a program to establish
consolidated storage will succeed only in the context of a parallel
disposal program that is effective, focused, and making discernible
progress in the eyes of key stakeholders and the public. A robust
repository program, in other words, will be as important to the success
of a consolidated storage program as the consolidated storage program
will be to the success of a disposal program. Progress on both fronts
is needed and should be sought without further delay.
Question 3. The Yucca Mountain project goes back three decades and
it seems we are nowhere near a long-term solution. Do you believe S.
3469 will bring us closer to siting and constructing a permanent
repository?
Answer. We hope that the S.3469 will be an important first-step in
the establishment of an effective long-term strategy for dealing with
high-level waste. Because the 1987 amendments of the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act restrict all repository site investigations to the single
site at Yucca Mountain, new legislation is needed to authorize siting
and development of a repository at any other site.
______
Responses of Geoffrey H. Fettus to Questions From Senator Cantwell
INTRODUCTION
As in initial matter, we share your concerns regarding the state of
cleanup for the nation's high-level radioactive waste (HLW). Indeed,
NRDC has been a leading force for the cleanup of the HLW waste tanks at
the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington and the similar HLW tanks
in Idaho, South Carolina, and New York. We were at the center of the
litigation and legislative battles approximately eight years ago over
the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to obtain the authority to
reclassify HLW as ``waste incidental to reprocessing.'' DOE succeeded
in obtaining this reclassification authority via Section 3116 of the
2005 Defense Authorization Act, but only in South Carolina and Idaho
and not in Washington and New York. Despite this partial victory,
cleanup at the Hanford site remains mired in pressure to cut costs and
rely on expedient shortcuts rather than long term solutions that
address the waste in the tanks. We remain engaged with Washington
allies in working to ensure that the HLW at Hanford site is effectively
cleaned up.
But despite our shared concern over HLW, we are more apprehensive
that shortcuts favoring addressing particular subsets of the national
problem of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and HLW will only add delay and
hamper the development of a sound, protective and publicly acceptable
geologic repository program. In our view the Blue Ribbon Commission on
America's Nuclear Future--Report to the Secretary of Energy (BRC)
included several recommendations that could help build a better nuclear
waste management system, but decades from now others will face our
current predicament unless Congress creates a transparent, equitable
process with strong public health and environmental standards that
cannot be manipulated in order to license a site (or sites) that may
not be suitable. To do that, as it writes our path forward, Congress
must ensure we not repeat the mistakes of the past.
Key to avoiding those mistakes and creating a transparent process
with strong standards is providing states with meaningful regulatory
authority at the outset. I will expand on these thoughts in response to
your specific questions, but as an introductory matter, Chairman
Bingaman has made a laudable effort and turned some of the stronger
ideas in the BRC report into legislative language. As evidenced in our
testimony before the Committee, we support fundamental components in
the proposed bill, dispute other parts, and have several suggestions
for expansion and refinement of S. 3469. But the Chairman's emphasis on
the necessity of repositories and the need to link any potential
storage site with the development of a disposal site is of lasting
value. Any legislation that fails to adhere to these concepts will
prolong the failures of the past thirty years in developing solutions
for nuclear waste.
Question 1. I believe a key part of solving our nation's nuclear
waste challenges is to recognize that we need to prioritize addressing
certain types of waste first-- such as waste stranded at shutdown
reactor sites and defense waste that has built up for decades. Not all
nuclear waste is the same, and I do not plan to support any legislation
that does not remedy the mistakes of the past that has precluded more
feasible solutions for our nation's defense waste.
As I'm sure you know, Hanford is the largest nuclear cleanup site
in North America. We have been diligently trying to clean up this site,
an incredible complex and costly endeavor. While it is a constant
struggle to keep this monumental effort on track, I proud of incredible
efforts of Hanford workers and we are making real progress. But we need
an end point. Once we clean up and isolate this toxic legacy, we need a
place for it to go.
It is unacceptable to me, and to the constituents I represent, for
Hanford to be the de facto repository for 90 percent of the nation's
high-level radioactive defense waste.
While proud of the service to help secure our nation during World
War II and the Cold War, the Tri-Cities region has contributed and
sacrificed enough during the 70 years in which a large portion of my
state has been put off limits to economic development or other uses.
The problem as I see it is that our nation's nuclear waste policy
treats civilian nuclear waste and defense waste the same, with defense
waste almost as an afterthought.
That's a problem for two important reasons: First, our defense
waste is not suitable for on-site storage and Hanford's Waste Treatment
Plant is scheduled to produce vitrified high level waste in 2019. And
second, defense waste is a witch's brew of nuclear byproducts that can
never be reprocessed for electricity generation. Therefore, it can be
disposed of permanently, possibly in ways that are faster and cheaper
than civilian waste.
Question 1a. Do you agree that nuclear waste that we would never
want to retrieve but can be permanently disposed of should be treated
differently?
Answer. As a general matter, NRDC sees no need to dispose of SNF or
HLW in a retrievable manner. If there are concerns about the integrity
of a repository site, an ability to retrieve waste during some interim
period of time before closure might be a useful feature, but we would
hope that concerns over the geologic integrity of a site is a problem
that would be addressed via the technical siting process rather than a
back-end solution like the ability to retrieve waste.
Additionally, while we understand your point that vitrified HLW is
not as easily subject to reprocessing as SNF, we do not think that
should affect the disposal path for either. In the case of both SNF and
HLW, repositories will be necessary. As we noted a number of times
before the BRC, there is no current or prospective closed fuel cycle
(i.e., reprocessing and fast reactors) that can economically compete
with the current open cycle and we see no likelihood of things
changing. Spent-fuel reprocessing and plutonium-fueled fast reactors
are well-proven commercial disasters. The United States, Europe, and
Japan spent tens of billions of dollars in the 1970s and 1980s trying
to develop plutonium fast-breeder reactors (like the Bush
Administration's proposed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership ``advanced
burner reactors,'' but with uranium ``blankets'' added to ``breed''
more plutonium than is consumed in the reactor). These fast reactors
proved to be uneconomical, highly unreliable, and prone to fires due to
leaking liquid sodium coolant, which burns spontaneously when it comes
in contact with air or water. For a full discussion, see http://
www.nrdc.org/nuclear/gnep/agnep.asp.
Question 1b. Have you studied whether permanent disposal in salt
formations could be a cheaper and more readily available alternative to
other geological storage options?
Answer. No. We have neither ruled out nor ruled in disposal in salt
and we think favoring any particular geologic medium invites precisely
the same problems that derailed the efforts to establish a meaningful
repository program over the last three decades.
First, for decades NRC considered bedded salt as suitable for
disposal either of reprocessed HLW or un-reprocessed spent fuel. Now,
however, NRC has stated that salt formations are not being considered
for spent fuel disposal for technical reasons. 73 Fed. Reg. 59,551,
59555 (Oct. 9, 2008). Indeed, disposal in salt, which was the original
basis for the NRC's analysis for estimating the environmental impact of
high-level waste or spent fuel disposal, could only be considered
suitable for HLW from reprocessing, but as noted, reprocessing is not
current policy. Nor should it be. Rather, direct and commingled
disposal of HLW and SNF, for which the NRC would not consider salt
formations, is now the current policy.
Second, as noted, favoring salt or any other specific geologic
media at the outset of this new phase in the repository program effort
would likely derail the process. To be specific, the BRC recognized
that the 1987 amendments to the NWPA were ``highly prescriptive'' and
``widely viewed as being driven too heavily by political
considerations.'' Those observations are insufficiently critical
assessments of what happened. We have recommended that Congress be
clear about what happened to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.
Put bluntly, first DOE and then Congress corrupted the site selection
process leading to Yucca Mountain as the only option by selecting
politically expedient sites long before the science or the standards
were complete.
I refer you to my testimony for the longer explanation of what went
wrong with the development of sites and the applicable standards (see
Fettus Testimony at 2-4), and I reiterate here that Congress must be
explicit and state clearly in legislation that not only the standards
for site screening and development criteria be in final form before any
sites are considered, but generic radiation and environmental
protection standards for any such site be established as well. See BRC
Disposal Subcommittee Report, at 74. The Subcommittee was right to
state that the standard and supporting regulatory requirements to
license a geologic repository should be generic--i.e., applicable to
all sites.
Indeed, not requiring the siting criteria or generic environmental
standards to be in final form prior to developing potential storage and
disposal sites ensures that the same gaming of the system will recur as
played out over the last two decades. Pressing forward with any
distinct 5 solution at this early stage would unravel the carefully
constructed framework achieved by the BRC and Chairman Bingaman's S.
3469.
Question 1c. How do we make sure that defense waste does not get
lost in the nuclear waste debate this time around?
Answer. We do not necessarily agree that it has been ``lost,'' but
we agree that more intensive Congressional oversight is necessary to
ensure a protective cleanup results from the billions of dollars
invested in addressing the toxic contamination left by the Cold War. As
we noted at the outset, we share your concerns with the fact that the
reprocessing of SNF produced approximately 100 million gallons of HLW,
stored at DOE sites in more than 200 steel tanks buried just below the
surface of the earth. These tanks range in size from a few hundred
thousand gallons to more than 1 million gallons. This waste is
primarily divided among three main production sites: Hanford, which has
177 tanks storing more than 50 million gallons of HLW; Savannah River
Site, which has 51 tanks (a few have been closed via the incidental
waste exemption discussed above) storing more than 35 million gallons
of HLW; and the Idaho National Laboratory, which had 11 tanks (7 have
been closed via the incidental waste exemption) storing about 900,000
gallons of HLW. The DOE EM budget includes more than $2 billion a year
to address those HLW wastes.
As you are all too aware as one of Washington's Senators, dozens of
these storage tanks at Hanford have leaked HLW. Radioactive elements
that have leaked out include cesium, strontium, tritium, technetium,
iodine, plutonium and uranium. Some of these materials remain
radioactive for hundreds of thousands of years. Non-radioactive but
hazardous materials that have leaked include nitrates and metals such
as chromium. If the reclassification authority that DOE has under its
incidental waste exemption of Order 435.1 in South Carolina and Idaho
is extended to Washington, DOE could abandon thousands (or potentially
millions) of gallons of HLW near the Columbia River. If that were to
occur, the concentration of radioactivity in abandoned sludges and
sediments in the tanks could be as high, or even higher, than the
concentration of radioactivity in the materials removed.
So we agree with you. The current situation is not tenable and we
support your efforts to ensure the toxic legacy of the Cold War is
addressed at Hanford and at other nuclear weapons production sites. But
to do that properly and not repeat the mistakes of the past, we
encourage you to adhere to several of the principles embodied in
Chairman Bingaman's S. 3469--foremost that waste from the nation's
nuclear weapons program and its commercial nuclear power plants must be
buried in technically sound deep geologic repositories, permanently
isolated from the human and natural environments.
But to ensure once and for all that the cleanup of the nuclear
weapons complex receives the attention it deserves, we urge you to
support our recommendation to amend the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) to
remove its express exemptions of radioactive material from
environmental laws. As we explained at length in our testimony,
exemptions for radioactivity make it, in effect, a privileged
pollutant. Exemptions from the Clean Water Act and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) are at the foundation of state
and, we submit, even fellow federal agency distrust of both commercial
and government-run nuclear complexes. If EPA and the states had full
legal authority and could treat radionuclides as they do other
pollutants under environmental law, clear cleanup standards for DOE
sites could be promulgated and we could be much farther along in
remediating the toxic legacy of the Cold War. Further, we could likely
avoid some of the ongoing legal and regulatory disputes over operations
at commercial nuclear facilities. Any regulatory change of this
magnitude would have to be harmonized with appropriate NRC licensing
jurisdiction over facilities and waste and harmonized with EPA's
existing jurisdiction with respect to radiation standards, but such a
process is certainly within the capacity of the current federal
agencies and engaged stakeholders. Some states would assume regulatory
jurisdiction over radioactive material, others might not. Washington
and Oregon, for example, might choose to work in concert to address the
cleanup at Hanford. But in any event, substantially improved clarity in
the regulatory structure and a meaningful state oversight role would
allow, for the first time in this country, consent-based and
transparent decisions to take place on cleanup of the nuclear weapons
complex and developing storage sites and geologic repositories.
Question 2. Unfortunately, the requirement that nuclear waste be
retrievable for up to a century blocks many potential sites. There are
communities that would welcome our nation's nuclear waste; but while
they are located near technically-sound, cost-effective geologic
formations, high level waste placed there cannot be retrieved.
So maybe it's time to reconsider this retrievability requirement.
The mere possibility of future uses for the nuclear waste should not
block progress on siting a nuclear repository and geologically
disposing of our nation's nuclear waste. This is especially true for
defense waste, which has even lower prospects for reuse than commercial
waste.
Question 2a. Given the bleak prospects for recycling or otherwise
using nuclear waste, should this retrievability requirement block
siting a repository in a technically-sound, cost-effective place that
is willing to accept waste?
Answer. We concur with your assessment for reprocessing and fast
reactors (see above at 3-4).
A retrievability requirement should not block any single repository
site, but any and all sites should go through the process we outlined
above and that Senator Bingaman suggests in S. 3469. As we noted above,
Congress should require the standards for site screening and
development criteria be in final form before any sites are considered.
Congress should also require generic radiation and environmental
protection standards for any such site be established as well. See BRC
Disposal Subcommittee Report, at 74. The BRC correctly stated that the
standard and supporting regulatory requirements to license a geologic
repository should be generic--i.e., applicable to all sites. Failing to
impose such requirements invites the same gaming of the system we have
seen play out over the last two decades. We encourage you to follow the
carefully constructed framework set out by the BRC and Chairman
Bingaman's S. 3469 with our suggested modifications.
Question 2b. If the insistence on this retrievability requirement
for commercial waste continues, do you think we ought to consider a
separate repository for defense waste without such a restriction--a
potential dual-path forward envisioned by the original Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982?
Answer. We do not insist on an ability to retrieve the waste, but
as noted above, we urge following the framework for a transparent,
consent-based process set forth by the BRC, Chairman Bingaman, and with
the modifications we suggest (such as amendments to the AEA). Whether
there will be a need to revisit the commingling decision for SNF and
HLW is a matter far down the road. At this stage, ensuring strong,
protective legislation is passed will do the most to ensure the
problems of the past are not revisited.
Question 3a. Do you see the Blue Ribbon Commission recommendations
and Chairman Bingaman's legislation as a renewed call to correct our
course? Choosing science, economics, and consensus over the failed
political wrangling of the past 25 years, going back to many of the
principles of the original Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982?
Answer. Yes. As we stated to the Senate Committee on Environment &
Public Works in June of this year, we think the BRC delivered a useful,
although limited, report that identified several components of what
could become a successful strategy for the ultimate safe disposal of
commercial and defense spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
waste. NRDC submitted both oral and written comments to the BRC and its
subcommittees during the months the BRC conducted its work. Turning to
the effort by Chairman Bingaman, we think S. 3469 sets a strong
template with several important provisions that can help build a better
nuclear waste management system, but decades from now others will face
our current predicament unless Congress fundamentally revamps how
nuclear waste is regulated and allows for meaningful State oversight by
amending the AEA to remove its express exemptions of radioactive
material from environmental laws.
Question 3b. For such a complex challenge as disposing of nuclear
waste for millions of years, do you believe technical considerations
should trump political ones to the maximum extent possible?
Answer. No. As we outlined in our testimony, NRDC strongly supports
the development of a science-based repository program that acknowledges
the significant institutional challenges facing SNF and HLW storage and
disposal. We have outlined in our testimony how we might achieve
progress on both technical and political/institutional fronts.
Question 4. I would like to discuss the economics of different
geologic formations. While there are multiple ways and places to secure
nuclear waste safely, the costs of doing so are different. I believe
that these costs should be considered when selecting among technically-
sound sites.
A recent study compared the costs of repositories capable of
holding 83,000 metric tons of heavy metals in different geologic media.
It found that siting a repository in volcanic tuff or crystalline rock
costs two to three times that of a repository in massive salt
formations.
These extra costs came primarily from the development and
characterization of the site, more expensive and complex surface and
subsurface facilities, and extensive packaging, barriers and shields
necessary to keep the waste intact. Because of the potential cost
savings, I think we need to take a hard look at salt formations
throughout the country as potential sites for a repository.
Question 4a. Do you believe that cost should be an important factor
when selecting among sites that can safely dispose of waste and have
support within the community?
Answer. Cost is an important, but ultimately a secondary issue. The
BRC Final Report puts an emphasis on the concept of ``intergenerational
justice'' as an ethical framework for a nuclear waste disposal program.
NRDC agrees and views this concept as the principal basis for seeking
geologic disposal of the nuclear waste. This generation's ethical
obligation to future generations regarding nuclear waste disposal
involves critical issues of security, including financial security,
environmental protection, and public health.
Rather than focusing on cost, which is in significant measure the
reason the site-selection process was corrupted, the aim of the program
should be on a transparent, publicly acceptable process of selecting
and arriving at technically suitable sites.
Question 4b. Do you agree that salt formations could deliver
potential cost savings compared to other geologic media types and
deserve consideration?
Answer. Salt, like any other geologic medium, deserves
consideration that is part of a transparent, public process. See our
response above at 4.
Question 5. It is simply unacceptable for Hanford to become the de
facto repository for 90 percent of the nation's high-level radioactive
defense waste. Back in the 1980's when a number of repository sites
were analyzed, Hanford placed last in terms of cost-effectiveness.
These high costs were in part due to the extraordinary technical
challenges. According to a National Research Council report, the high
internal stresses within the basalt formation at Hanford poses a risk
of ``rock bursts'' when opened up to atmospheric pressure. And the U.S.
Geological Survey found that the high water pressure in the deep
aquifer poses the danger of catastrophic flooding.
Question 5a. Do the cost-effectiveness of meeting technical
requirements and inherent suitability of a site go hand-in-hand?
Answer. We agree that the state of Hanford's tanks is unacceptable
as outlined above, but we disagree with your characterization that
Hanford has 90 percent of the nation's HLW. We think that burden is
shared as we described on page 5.
Turning to your direct question, we think there could be a
relationship between the geologic suitability of the site and the costs
necessary to assess the geology's ability to isolate the waste, but
that's a question that presupposes too many factual matters that would
have to be developed in a transparent, public manner. We think if the
focus stays on legislation that develops a science-based repository
program that takes into account the significant institutional
challenges facing SNF and HLW storage and disposal, all will be better
served.
Question 5b. Do you agree that cost-effectiveness is an important
consideration that partially takes the suitability of a repository site
into account?
Answer. As we stated above, we think cost is a secondary issue.
Question 6. I am pleased to see that this legislation repeals the
limit on the amount of waste able to be disposed at a repository. This
was a well-kept secret about Yucca. Even if Yucca were licensed under
current law, it would not be able to accommodate all of our nuclear
waste, neither civilian nor defense. I believe a litmus test for any
new federal nuclear waste policy is whether it can dispose of our
nation's nuclear waste--all of it.
Answer. This has been one of my biggest concerns with the Yucca
proposal. Of the 70,000 ton limit for waste at Yucca, only 7,000 tons
were set aside for defense waste. Of that 7,000 tons for defense waste,
only 4,667 tons would be allocated for high level waste.
Although the total number of tons of high level defense waste is
somewhat uncertain, just three percent of DOE's inventory of vitrified
High Level Waste would be accounted for under the planning basis of
4,667 tons of heavy metal for DOE High Level Waste when compared to
over 170,000 tons of heavy metal DOE reprocessed fuel.
In practice, a higher percentage could probably be accommodated
because a portion of the radioactivity has already been lost. According
to an historical estimation method, the limit of high level defense
waste at Yucca would still not have been able to accommodate the high
level waste at Hanford because this limit accounts for less than half
of all defense high level waste.
An even smaller percentage of Hanford waste would have been able to
go to Yucca under current law. Any way you cut it, there simply is not
enough capacity without a repeal of this limit.
Question 6a. Are there any technical or safety reasons for the
current limit of 70,000 tons? If so, does this mean that we need
multiple repositories to accommodate all of our nation's waste?
Answer. Technical or safety limitations on the amount of SNF and
HLW that can be disposed of at any site will be dependent on site
specific limitations. Whether or not we even get to raise these matters
for particular sites will depend on whether any new legislation avoids
the mistakes of the past.
Question 6b. Why do you think over half of our nation's high level
defense waste was left out of the plan at Yucca?
Answer. Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, there were
supposed to be two repositories and a balancing of the national burden
for the disposal of SNF and HLW.
______
[Responses to the following questions were not received at
the time the hearing went to press:]
Questions for Peter B. Lyons From Senator Barrasso
S. 3469 would establish a new waste management agency. It would
transfer to the agency the functions of the Secretary of Energy,
relating to the siting, licensing, construction, and operation of
nuclear management facilities. The Blue Ribbon Commission has called
for the establishment of a new Federally chartered corporation to
handle these responsibilities.
Question 1a. Does the Administration support the creation of a new
Federal agency to handle nuclear waste management?
Question 1b. Does the Administration support the creation of a new
Federally chartered corporation to handle nuclear waste management?
Question 2. In your testimony, you explain that nuclear waste fee
collections exceed $750 million each year. What benefits are ratepayers
currently receiving in return for these fees?
The Blue Ribbon Commission issued its report in January of this
year. I understand the Administration was supposed to submit a plan to
implement the recommendations by the end of July, but has yet to do so.
Question 3a. What is the reason for the delay?
Question 3b. When can Congress expect the Administration's
implementation plan?
Question 4. Does the Administration support S. 3469 as currently
written? If not, do you recommend specific changes to the bill? If so,
what are those changes?
The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2012 requires the
Department of Energy (DOE) to submit to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees a revised excess uranium inventory management
plan for FY 2013 through FY 2018 ``[n]o later than June 30, 2012.'' DOE
has yet to submit such a plan.
Question 5a. When will DOE submit the plan?
Question 5b. Do you expect the management plan to be consistent
with the May 15, 2012 Secretarial Determination?
Question 6. Section 312(a) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act
for FY 2012 reads as follows:
Any determination (including a determination made prior to
the date of enactment of this Act) by the Secretary pursuant to
section 3112(d)(2)(B) of the USEC Privatization Act (110 Stat.
1321-335), as amended, that the sale or transfer of uranium
will not have an adverse material impact on the domestic
uranium mining, conversion, or enrichment industry shall be
valid for not more than 2 calendar years subsequent to such
determination. (emphasis added)
Pursuant to the May 15, 2012 Secretarial Determination, DOE plans
to transfer up to: (a) 2,400 metric tons of natural uranium per year
between 2012 and 2021 to DOE contractors for cleanup services at the
Paducah or Portsmouth gaseous diffusion plants; and (b) 400 metric tons
of natural uranium equivalent per year contained in low-enriched
uranium (LEU) to National Nuclear Security Administration contractors
for down-blending highly enriched uranium to LEU from 2012 through
2020. Are provisions 2) and 3) of the May 15, 2012 Secretarial
Determination permissible under the two year limitation set forth in
section 312(a)? If so, how?
Question 7. On February 16, 2012, Secretary Chu testified before
this Committee that:
We have to be very careful about whether . . . bartering
[uranium] will affect the markets . . . If we introduce into
the market . . . 10 percent [of domestic fuel requirements] or
below . . . , we feel safe that it won't have a material impact
on the markets.
If fully implemented, the May 15, 2012 Secretarial Determination
would result in uranium transfers that exceed the 10 percent cap set
forth in the DOE's 2008 Excess Uranium Management Plan.
Question 7a. Does DOE believe that the market for uranium changed
from February to May to justify exceeding the 10 percent cap?
Question 7b. If so, what changed in the market for uranium between
the February hearing and the May 15, 2012 Secretarial Determination?
Please be specific.
Question 8. How would DOE respond to changes in the global market
for uranium to ensure that the sales and transfers envisioned under the
May 15, 2012 Secretarial Determination do not have an adverse material
impact on the America's uranium mining, conversion, or enrichment
industry?
Appendix II
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
----------
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners,
September 10, 2012.
Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
Chair, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Lisa Murkowski,
Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Bingaman and Ranking Member Murkowski:
The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC) would like to submit the following comments regarding the
proposed Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012, S. 3469.
NARUC and our member State public utility commissioners have been
actively engaged in the issue of nuclear waste disposal since the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act was enacted in 1983. We followed closely and
participated in the work of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's
Nuclear Future and we want to contribute to implementing its
recommendations so that the troubled program can get on track.
Our interest in this issue centers around the consumers of nuclear
utilities who have been bearing the ultimate cost of fees paid by their
utilities for the electricity that is produced from the Nation's 104
nuclear reactors. Those fee payments represent the ``grand bargain''
set in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Under the Act, the federal
government is responsible for the safe disposal of both government and
commercial nuclear waste, and those who have benefit (i.e. consumers of
nuclear power) shall pay for the cost of disposal of waste products.
Unfortunately, history has proven that the collection of fees has been
the only aspect of the nuclear waste program that began on time and has
functioned as designed.
We should note for the record that NARUC is a party to litigation
before the Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit seeking to
require that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission resume the Yucca
Mountain license application review and come to a final determination
of whether a repository at Yucca Mountain meets regulatory requirements
or not.
The Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future in its
January Report to the Secretary of Energy said all of its
recommendations ``can and should be implemented regardless of what
happens to Yucca Mountain.'' We had expected that the Administration
would have provided some indication of whether and how it will
implement those recommendations or how it intends to ``fulfill the
Federal Government's obligations for managing and ultimately disposing
of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste'' as it pledged
in 2009.
We commend the leadership of this Committee for your collaborative
efforts with members of the Energy and Water Appropriations
Subcommittee to produce the proposed ``Nuclear Waste Administration Act
of 2012,'' S. 3469, as a legislative vehicle to incorporate key
provisions of the BRC Report into a modified Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
We have some comments from the standpoint of ratepayers and in some
instances in comparison with the BRC recommendations.
You will not be surprised that our primary interest is on fixing
the Nuclear Waste Fund. The BRC said it believed that ``the success of
a revitalized waste management program will depend on making the
revenues by the nuclear waste fee and the balance in the NWF available
when needed and in the amounts needed to implement the program.'' The
Commission called for reform in two stages:
Near Term, within existing administrative authority:
Modifying existing contracts with utilities such that total
fees paid to the Treasury would match the amount appropriated
from the NWF in the same year. The balance would be placed in
irrevocable trust accounts (escrow) for future payments. The
fee revenue would be reclassified as offsetting receipts,
subject to concurrence by the Congressional Budget Office and
the Budget Committees.
Congressional action required: The BRC recommended budget
autonomy for the new nuclear waste management organization that
would require legislation (such as S. 3469) to establish.
Specifically, the BRC recommended the legislation include a
``defined schedule of payments to transfer the balance of the
Fund (the corpus) to the new organization over a reasonable
future time period starting 10 years after the organization is
established.''
We are deeply disappointed that the Administration chose not to
move ahead on the near-term action which was so carefully researched by
the Blue Ribbon Commission and placed in their hands. We are not
experts in federal fiscal rules, but given the importance of resolving
this issue, we expected a better effort. This lack of action reminds us
of a baseball saying--``You will never get a hit if you don't take a
swing.''
Thankfully, as it relates to the actions requiring congressional
action, , S. 3469 steps up to the plate. The legislation creates an
independent agency called the Nuclear Waste Administration that would
be given most of the duties and authorities under the NWPA that are
presently assigned to the Secretary of Energy. Still, we are concerned
about how the program will be managed before legislation is enacted and
how transition to the NWA is implemented. For the past two years, about
$770 million in fees have been paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund
annually and no money was appropriated for waste disposal. It appears,
however, that the money was spent for other purposes and more ``IOU's''
were added to the Fund. We are anxious to see if FY 2014 is any
different.
Regarding the organizational form and function, we thought the
federal corporation proposed by the BRC was well considered. We found
the various oversight mechanisms ample, including a role for State
utility commissioners to serve in the review of fee adequacy
determination.
Having seen extended vacancies in the senior DOE waste program
manager's position caused by lengthy confirmation delays in the Senate
during the Yucca period, we find the BRC federal corporation a well
suited approach. This is because having presidentially appointed
directors select the CEO better protects the position and provides
greater program stability than the politically-appointed Administrator/
Deputy Administrator positions the NWA legislation would.
Moreover, the bill does not heed the clear call for financial
reform made by the BRC and it may impede the startup of the new
organization. The Administration (so far) chooses to avoid a rejection
of the near-term fee reclassification, so let us express some
apprehension over how a Nuclear Waste Administration might be difficult
to form if it cannot attract top-tier talent because of concerns over
its financial stability. Potential applicants for the NWA Administrator
position do want to see a secure financial foundation underlying the
NWA or other organization.
Additionally, we are puzzled by the appearance of different degrees
of financial autonomy for the new Administration:
In Sec. 301 the NWA is given authority for the ``collection,
adjustment, deposition and use of fees'' to accomplish waste
functions, yet
Sec. 401 (c) says funds deposited in the Working Capital
Account ``shall be immediately be available. to carry out the
functions of the Administrator, except to the extent limited in
annual authorization or appropriation Acts.''
The Working Capital Fund seems to offer improved access to the fee
revenue, which should be an improvement over the present arrangement.
An even better strengthening of the NWA financial support, though,
would have the interest earned on the balance in the Nuclear Waste Fund
deposited in the Working Capital Fund. In recent years, that interest
has been over $1 billion a year.
The bill gives no indication on any disposition schedule like the
BRC suggested; leaving some doubt about when and under what conditions
the ``corpus,'' reportedly over $26 billion now, will be made available
for the purpose it was collected. No one is saying there is a need to
use that money now, but every calculation of the sufficiency of the
fees rests on the assumption that 100 percent of past fees paid is
available to the waste activities program, including interest. It seems
ironic, then, that Section 403 provides direction that the NWA is to
assume that sufficient funds will be appropriated to the NWA to cover
the cost of defense waste disposal, yet there is no counterpart
assurance that past fee revenue collected and supposedly held in the
Nuclear Waste Fund will also be appropriated.
We agree with the shift to a more co-equal ``consent-based''
approach to siting nuclear waste facilities. We hope that the
implementing organization is given latitude to be adaptive to the
circumstances of the States and localities involved. There are
opportunities to employ the principles recommended by the BRC in
pursuit of a consolidated interim storage facility for spent nuclear
fuel from the decommissioned reactor storage sites. Successful
development of such a facility--whether by DOE or a new organization--
would demonstrate that the government can safely transport and store
spent nuclear fuel while pursuing a geologic repository. There are a
number of cost estimates for building such a facility. One done by DOE
in 2007 indicated a facility for the decommissioned sites could be
built and operated for 15 years for the same amount of fees paid by all
reactors in a single year.
The bill includes many other important elements that we are not
addressing here. Importantly, we want to continue to work with DOE
until a new organization is formed and functional. We must be realistic
about just how quickly we can move forward, even if Congress passes a
bill. Issues such as the radiation standards, siting guidelines and
development of a mission plan within a year, will take time. Indeed,
just building a nucleus staff and creating a new organization will take
time.
As we stand at the threshold of dramatic sequestration reductions
in federal agency budgets, there may be resistance to creating a new
federal agency for any purpose. We considered it unfortunate that the
Administration took credit in the FY 2010 Budget for termination of the
Yucca Mountain program, rather than recognizing that the
Administration--we believe--meant to cancel the Yucca Mountain project
and to reset the development of the program at a different site or
sites. We regret the disbanding of a residual staff within the
Department of Energy that could tend to disposal affairs during the BRC
deliberation and to aid in the establishment of a new waste management
organization.
In conclusion, NARUC appreciates the leadership in creating this
bill-a positive step--although we remain apprehensive about ``limits''
on annual fees and worried over the corpus.
The best media summation comes from July 4 New York Times: ``If
nuclear power is to have a future in this country, politicians,
scientists, and industry leaders need to commit to finding a solution
instead of just hoping everything will somehow work out.''The BRC
expressed much the same appeal in its Report, as its members ``believe
it is long past time for the government to make good on its commitments
to the American people to provide for the safe disposal of nuclear
waste.''
Sincerely,
David A. Wright,
NARUC President, Vice Chairman, South Carolina Public Service
Commission.
______
Statement of the Energy Communities Alliance
Chairman Bingaman, Ranking Member Murkowski and Members of the
Committee, we thank you for accepting our written testimony on S.3469,
a bill to establish a new organization to manage nuclear waste, provide
a consensual process for siting nuclear waste facilities, ensure
adequate funding for managing nuclear waste, and for other purposes. We
would also like to thank the sponsor of this bill: Senator Jeff
Bingaman (D-NM). The Energy Communities Alliance (ECA) is the
association of local governments that are adjacent to or impacted by
Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear activities. Our members are either
neighbors or hosts of DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) sites that currently produce or formerly produced defense
nuclear waste, sites that store and process defense nuclear waste, and
the sites that may potentially host a future interim storage facility,
reprocessing facility or geologic repository.
Founded in 1992, ECA is the only association to bring together and
provide a central voice for local elected and appointed officials on
DOE issues. Our sites are the sender and receiver sites for nuclear
waste, and potential hosts for nuclear waste interim storage, recycling
and disposal facilities. We believe that local governments have a
critical role to play in any waste discussion, and we have stated this
position many times in our testimony before the Blue Ribbon Commission
on America's Nuclear Future (BRC). We applaud the efforts of this
legislation to ensure that local governments are involved in waste
decisions from the beginning.
Our communities are most interested in the disposal of defense
waste currently stored at many of our sites. As you consider this
legislation, we ask you to take into account the impact these decisions
will have on our communities. We would like to offer the following
recommendations and comments on S.3469:
Congress and the Administration Need to Re-Engage
Communities on HLW Issues
ECA Supports the Inclusion of Local Governments in the
Decision-Making Process
The Siting Process Must Allow Affected Communities to Decide
Whether, and on What Terms, the Affected Communities Will Host
a Nuclear Waste Facility
Use a Phased, Adaptive Approach to the Sequence of Waste
Disposition--Move Defense Waste First.
The Impacts of Transportation on Local Governments and
Communities Need to Be Addressed
ECA Can Support a New Organization to Manage Nuclear Waste
Many of our members currently call for Yucca Mountain licensing to
be restarted. However, our organization also supports the Chairman's
initiative to develop legislation to continue to move forward to create
a High-Level Waste (HLW) Policy that can be implemented in the current
political environment.
Our members have jointly prepared the testimony we submit to you
today.
Congress and the Administration Need to Re-Engage Communities on HLW
Issues
ECA communities have been home to federally-owned and operated
nuclear facilities for over half a century. ECA believes that any
legislation must require that DOE, or any new entity responsible for
nuclear waste management, engage these communities in a meaningful
dialogue and take into account the impact on the states, tribes and
local governments.
Many of the local communities ECA represents currently store high-
level nuclear waste were, but were never intended to become permanent
waste storage sites. These same communities have operated in good faith
based on federal law, as codified in the NWPA, that the defense waste
would ultimately be disposed of in a geologic repository. As hosts of
DOE sites where this defense high-level waste has been produced and
stored, our communities have unique health and safety concerns as well
as resource needs.
Several local governments have identified that, if certain
conditions are met, the local community may be willing to accept a HLW
disposal mission. Congress and the Administration should begin to re-
engage with these communities, and begin the process of assisting these
communities and states to study the scientific data to determine if
their communities are suitable for such a mission.
ECA's high-level waste policy is attached as Appendix A.* In
addition, we have attached ``Recommendations for The Blue Ribbon
Commission On America's Nuclear Future To Involve Local Communities''
as Appendix B.* Further, additional ECA positions and meeting summaries
can be found at www.energyca.org.
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* The appendixes have been retained in committee file.
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ECA Supports the Inclusion of Local Governments in the Decision-Making
Process
ECA supports the inclusion of local governments in the decision-
making process outlined in S.3469. We appreciate that the legislation
takes into account the impact that storing, transporting and disposing
of nuclear waste has and will have for communities at the local level.
We agree with the language included in the Sec. 304. Siting Nuclear
Waste Facilities:
In siting nuclear waste facilities under this Act, the
Administration shall employ a process that (1) allows affected
communities to decide whether, and on what terms, the affected
communities will host a nuclear waste facility; (2) is open to
the public and allows interested persons to be heard in a
meaningful way; (3) is flexible and allows decisions to be
reviewed and modified in response to new information or new
technical, social, or political developments; and (4) is based
on sound science and meets public health, safety, and
environmental standards.''
ECA, local elected officials, and many other impacted parties often
highlight how important these four provisions are in successfully
siting nuclear waste facilities. Most significantly to ECA, this
legislation demonstrates an understanding that local communities face
unique health and safety decisions as hosts of storage and disposal
sites--and that they should be allowed to determine what is necessary
to address their unique needs and concerns--an issue of paramount
importance to ensure long-lasting support and concurrence.
ECA also recognizes that states and local governments must work
together meaningfully as early as possible in the process in order to
avoid the pitfalls of the past, maximize positive outcomes and
successfully site nuclear waste facilities.
We also support the language included in the legislation requiring
public hearings in the vicinity of the site and at least one other
location within the state where the site is located. Local governments
want the public to be informed of any proposed site characterization
and have the opportunity to provide comments and recommendations to the
federal government.
Finally, in regards to a consent agreement for making a final
determination of site suitability, ECA agrees with the terms and
conditions outlined in S.3469:
The terms and conditions of the consent agreement ``shall promote
the economic and social well-being of the people living in the vicinity
of the repository or storage facility; and (B) may include----
(i) financial compensation and incentives;
(ii) economic development assistance;
(iii) operational limitations or requirements;
(iv) regulatory oversight authority; and
(v) in the case of a storage facility, an enforceable
deadline for removing nuclear waste from the storage facility.
ECA believes local governments are uniquely positioned to negotiate
these benefits on behalf of the impacted community. A community
volunteering to host a nuclear waste facility should be prepared to
identify what it needs and wants as a potential host.
The Siting Process Must Allow Affected Communities to Decide Whether,
and on What Terms, the Affected Communities Will Host a Nuclear
Waste Facility
ECA supports the process described in S.3469 for siting nuclear
waste facilities. Local governments of affected communities must be
engaged early and actively in any siting process for any new nuclear
facility. Meaningful involvement is critical at all steps in the
process--developing the vision, refining the goals and priorities, and
providing input when conflicts arise. Increased coordination and
cooperation with the federal government will ensure that local
governments and potential host communities better understand the
federal government's approach, and it will keep local communities
informed so they can understand priorities, concerns and goals.
S.3469 states that preference will be given to sites determined to
be suitable for co-location of a storage facility and repository. ECA
would also note that special consideration should be given to sites
that are determined to be suitable for co-location of a storage
facility and a facility for recycling (or reprocessing) used fuel. We
understand that recycling will not eliminate the need for a geologic
repository, but it may allow what we currently consider ``waste'' to be
a new energy resource. Further, several communities have already
identified that they would be unlikely to accept the mission without a
recycling or other similar mission.
Use a Phased, Adaptive Approach to the Sequence of Waste Disposition--
Move Defense Waste First.
As the local government hosts of the vast majority of defense-
related high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel in the country, we
recommend that this Nation's defense-related high-level waste--
especially material that is never intended to be retrieved--be given
priority over, and ``fast-tracked'' ahead of, commercial waste and
moved out of our states and into a repository as soon as possible.
Our Nation has approximately 2,460 metric tons of heavy metal
(MTHM) high-level waste (approximately 2,150 MTHM defense and 310 MTHM
non-defense) consolidated and stored mainly at the Hanford site in
Washington, the Idaho National Laboratory in Idaho, and at the Savannah
River Site in South Carolina--the latter alone has about 4,000
canisters of vitrified high-level waste glass logs ready for disposal.
This legacy defense waste differs from commercial spent nuclear fuel in
a number of ways:
1. It is older and has been awaiting permanent disposal
longer.
2. It has different radioactive properties.
3. Much of the defense high-level waste is being vitrified
and cannot be retrieved for recycling or reprocessing. It is
currently being ``packaged'' to Yucca Mountain standards and
stored in ``temporary'' buildings.
4. It has only one disposition path: a geologic repository.
5. Maintaining the status quo pending a decision regarding
commercial waste increases the risk to human health and the
environment. At Hanford, one million gallons of high-level
waste have already leaked from storage tanks.
6. Maintaining the status quo is compromising other DOE
missions at the affected sites. For example, further delays
will violate legal commitments DOE has with states. Missing
milestones, failing to meet deadlines or failing to honor
agreements will adversely affect DOE's Office of Environmental
Management's cleanup program.
7. There is a smaller volume of defense legacy high-level
waste than of spent nuclear fuel.
8. Funding for management of legacy waste comes from a
different source than funding for management of commercial
waste.
In addition, unlike spent nuclear fuel, defense high-level waste
and storage of defense high-level waste is not regulated by a third
party (the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulates private spent
nuclear fuel). Defense high-level radioactive waste is self-regulated
by DOE. Defense high-level waste was created primarily to support the
defense of our country and not for private energy production and in
some cases has been shipped from one defense site to another for
``temporary'' storage pursuant to agreements with states. Finally,
defense high-level waste is being treated to address United States
international treaty obligations in some cases.
In the future the defense waste and commercial waste can be
comingled in a repository once the commercial waste can move forward.
ECA recommends that the Committee consider establishing a pilot
program first (consistent with National Academy of Sciences'
recommendations for adaptive staging) and the defense waste
transitioned as part of the program. Doing so has several clear
advantages. First, there is a smaller, more manageable scope of work
where disposition may be achieved in a more timely manner. Second,
demonstrating that the legacy waste can be successfully dispositioned
can provide valuable lessons as the shift to commercial waste
disposition occurs. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, public trust
and confidence in the federal government will increase as the federal
government demonstrates an ability to safely manage and dispose of
nuclear waste and to keep its commitment to American taxpayers.
The Impacts of Transportation on Local Governments and Communities Need
to Be Addressed
S.3469 outlines how States and Indian tribes will be provided with
financial and technical assistance if plans are made to transport
nuclear waste through their jurisdictions. Local governments in
affected communities along transportation routes should be included
among these groups as they, too, are responsible for public education
and ensuring the safety of their citizens. Local governments provide
services such as police and fire protection, water and waste water
treatment and public health services. Training, equipment, and
transportation safety programs for public safety officials and other
emergency responders at the local level is extremely important and will
help ensure consistency among all affected parties as waste moves
across the country.
Energy Communities Alliance Can Support a New Organization to Manage
Nuclear Waste
As elected officials at the local level, ECA members have the
responsibility to protect the health, safety, quality of life and
economic future of their citizens and the communities adjacent to DOE
and NNSA sites where nuclear waste waits for final disposition in a
repository.
As ECA previously testified before the BRC, our members could
support the creation of a new organization dedicated solely to
implementing the nuclear waste management program, provided it has
clear legislative authority, appropriate autonomy, appropriate
oversight mechanisms, and access to required funding. Our members are
still evaluating options for the structure of a new nuclear waste
organization. ECA is encouraged that a primary purpose of the Nuclear
Waste Administration will be ``to protect the public health and safety
and the environment'' as it assumes the responsibility of the federal
government to manage and dispose of nuclear waste.
There is concern, however, about the timeline for creating this new
entity given that in 1982, it took four years to begin substantive
implementation of the NWPA. It will also take time to create a new
regulatory structure. Increased delay means continued or even increased
risks to our communities currently hosting ``de facto'' HLW storage
sites with nuclear waste remaining beyond the timeframe originally
committed to by the federal government. ECA recommends that the
Committee consider empowering the Nuclear Waste Administration to
allocate funds from a defense appropriations account to help ensure
that local communities hosting sites with stranded defense-related HLW
can address their unique health and safety concerns until a final
disposition plan is implemented.
ECA agrees that the Nuclear Waste Administration and the Nuclear
Waste Oversight Board should have access to funds in the NWPA
independent of the annual appropriations process. ECA believes the
funds should be used as originally intended and outlined in Section 302
of the NWPA in 1982.
Conclusion
ECA appreciates the opportunity to provide testimony to you on
S.3469, and we appreciated this Committee's work to address nuclear
waste management now and begin to implement the recommendations made by
the BRC. ECA supports the Chairman's efforts to make nuclear waste
management a priority. ECA looks forward to providing any assistance we
can as your work continues.
ECA also thanks the Chairman for his long-term leadership in the
Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Waste Cleanup and Disposition Area. His
actions have made each of our communities and our country a better and
safer place to live.
More information about Energy Communities Alliance can be found at
www.energyca.org.
______
Statement of Eddy-Lea Energy Alliance LLC, Carlsbad, NM
Dear Senators Bingaman, Murkowski, Feinstein and Alexander:
We're writing to you on behalf of the Eddy-Lea Energy Alliance
(ELEA), a limited liability company owned by the New Mexico public
entities of the Cities of Hobbs and Carlsbad, and Lea County and Eddy
County. ELEA is currently pursuing an interim storage facility for
spent fuel on 1,000 acres of land about halfway between Carlsbad and
Hobbs.
We understand legislation is in development that will establish a
new executive branch agency to take responsibility for siting storage
and disposal facilities for the nation's spent fuel and high-level
nuclear waste. We applaud your efforts in attempting to pursue the
spirit of the recommendations made by the Blue Ribbon Commission on
America's Nuclear Future and support many of them; however, we would
like to address some items in the draft legislation that cause us
concern. Our concerns are as follows:
The draft legislation would require significant repository
progress prior to licensure of an interim storage facility.
We believe this wording could put our nation's interim storage
plans (including Sen. Feinstein's existing bill) at risk. If there is
one lesson that has hopefully been learned over the past 30 years, it
is that linking multiple processes that do not have to be connected
runs the risk of causing nothing to ever move forward.
It is our understanding that the impetus for interim storage is the
fact that a repository for high level nuclear waste is 20 to 30 years
away. We need to move nuclear material away from coastal areas, fault
lines and population centers now--not wait for the repository stars to
align themselves. In fact, if a repository is ready, why would interim
storage even be needed?
We realize that there is some concern that interim storage will
become a permanent solution, but there are many more viable ways to
address this concern, such as fines and timetables. Our nation's
primary concerns are that our fuel pools are being over packed and that
there is an incredible surging expense to taxpayers due to a lack of an
immediate solution. Interim storage is meant to be a fast solution, but
linking it to repository development will prevent that from being the
case.
The heart and soul of the BRC's recommendation is that a consent-
based process be put in place. A forced linking between interim storage
and repository development feels like a paternalistic decision that
interferes with a local region's and state's right to make decisions
about the pros and cons of a facility.
The bill does not provide for defense high level waste to go
to an interim storage facility. We strongly believe that the
DOE should retain the option of temporarily using interim
storage for defense high level waste, if needed. Consolidated
interim storage could save the DOE from spending hundreds of
millions of dollars by preventing the building of additional
facilities at its present locations. The DOE could also use
interim storage to reduce oversight costs while waiting for a
repository to be ready. On the other side of the issue, defense
high level waste could be a major, rapid contributor to the
viability of an interim storage facility. Keeping the DOE's
backing is important, and we recommend a revision that includes
provisions for the possibility of defense high level waste
interim storage.
Guidelines that require the administrator to take into
account the extent storage would ``unduly burden a state'' that
already has defense waste or transuranic waste.
Our concern is that the ``unduly burden'' language will be subject
to significant misinterpretation in discussions that follow the
creation of this bill. Our interpretation is that this language simply
requests that these states deserve careful consideration. Many states
may opt not to view storage as any sort of burden due to incentives,
road payments and job creation opportunities. If the determination of
burden vs. benefit is strictly left up to the individual state, such
language could be productive.
However, opponents of a specific storage site may interpret such
language to mean that states that currently have nuclear waste
facilities would not be eligible for storage because ``they have
already done their share'' when it comes to the nation's nuclear waste
needs. This is again a determination that should be made by each
individual state rather than having the federal government decide. An
incentive-based interim storage plan could be quite lucrative for an
interested state--the federal government should avoid any language that
might be somehow used, through misinterpretation, to punish states
already involved in the nuclear waste process by making them less
eligible for a desired facility.
Furthermore, many of the states with existing nuclear waste
facilities (including transuranic) are likely to be some of the
nation's best locations for future storage due to geographic and
geologic considerations, existing trained workforce availability, and
regional socio-political understanding of nuclear waste issues. A
misinterpretation of the ``unduly burden'' line could be used to
eliminate many of the nation's best possible locations for interim
storage.
Senators, we ask that you look to our nation's recent past at some
of the mistakes made during the formation of the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act (and amendments). There were unique provisions, for example, placed
in the NWPA forbidding certain types of future study of specific types
of geology. Those type of misplaced, self-serving laws are still
causing our nation legal difficulties today. When in doubt, we believe
the best path forward in any legislation aiming to capture the spirit
of the BRC's recommendations is to leave interpretations up to
individual states and to avoid any federal language that might obstruct
this process.
In summary, our recommendations to the proposed bill, as it
currently stands, are as follows:
1. Delink interim storage from repository development.
2. Establish language allowing for defense high level waste
to be stored in an interim storage facility.
3. Remove the bill's ``unduly burden'' language as it applies
to states with TRU waste or defense waste to avoid probable
misinterpretation.
We remain inspired by the bi-partisan, sincere efforts the four of
you have displayed in putting together our nation's nuclear plan. We
believe this bill, once complete, may well create a responsible
national stewardship plan that will withstand the test of time. Our
organization thanks you all again for your contributions to solving our
nation's nuclear waste crisis and your decades of service to this great
nation.
______
Statement of David A. Wright, Chairman, South Carolina Public Service
Commission, Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition
Dear Chairman Bingaman & Ranking Member Murkowski:
The Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition (NWSC) thanks the Senate
Energy & Natural Resources Committee for convening a hearing on
important issues pertaining to nuclear waste disposal and submits the
following comments regarding S. 3469, the Nuclear Waste Administration
Act of 2012. Described by its sponsor as a bill to implement the
recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear
Future (BRC), S. 3469 and the related September 12th hearing provide an
opportunity to begin building a record for future Congressional action
on the BRC and other approaches to best meet the needs of our country
with respect to nuclear waste policy reform.
The BRC report contained many recommendations that our members have
long supported, including funding reform to protect consumers'
continuing fee payments and the Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF) balance;
prompt development of consolidated interim storage and geologic
disposal; and an independent waste management organization with the
authority and resources to succeed.
Although not addressed by the BRC, the proposed Yucca Mountain
repository remains the nation's best hope for ``promptly'' developing
geologic disposal. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) should resume the Yucca Mountain licensing
process both as a requirement of law and as a matter of respect to
taxpayers and electricity customers who have invested billions of
dollars in the license application. The NWSC supports Yucca Mountain
and the BRC recommendations, and we emphasize these are not mutually
exclusive positions. Nothing in the BRC report precludes resumption of
work on Yucca Mountain. In fact, the BRC recommendations may be viewed
as complementary steps to address needs in the interim and over the
longer-term. Specifically, consolidated interim storage is needed until
a repository is opened, and an additional repository--perhaps sited
using a consent-based process--will be needed under existing law.
With that context, the NWSC provides feedback regarding certain
provisions of S. 3469:
Independent Waste Management Organization
Following years of budget cuts, management turnover, and missed
deadlines, our members wholeheartedly support the BRC recommendation
for a new, single-purpose organization to develop and implement a
focused, integrated program for the transportation, storage, and
disposal of nuclear waste. Such an organization could be structured
numerous ways. We prefer models that ensure accountability but
reasonably insulate the organization from political interference and
excessive turnover in key positions. Additionally, stakeholders should
serve in some type of oversight or advisory capacity. The proposed
Nuclear Waste Administration in S. 3469 is lacking with respect to some
of the key elements noted here. While not endorsing any one model at
this point, we prefer the government-owned corporation model as
recommended by the BRC over models that set up government agencies with
both politically-appointed leadership and oversight boards that tend to
change with every administration. Finally, regardless of the model
chosen for transferring nuclear waste management functions out of DOE,
guidance to facilitate a smooth transition would be helpful.
Funding Reform
Consistent with the BRC recommendations, the Administration, with
Congressional support, needs to fix the funding for the nuclear waste
program. The BRC eloquently stated the importance of reforming the
existing funding mechanism as follows:
The success of a revitalized nuclear waste management program
will depend on making the revenues generated by the nuclear
waste fee and the balance in the NWF available when needed and
in the amounts needed to implement the program.
In a letter to the President over a month before their report was
issued, the BRC Co-Chairs delineated near-term steps for timely actions
that the current unsustainable situation warrants. Unfortunately, those
recommendations have not been followed. As for S. 3469's creation of a
new Working Capital Fund, we commend the effort to stop future raiding
of consumer payments intended for the program. However, access to the
Working Capital Fund would be subject to appropriations, potentially
limiting the Administrator's ability to carry out necessary program
activities. Also, we support NARUC's suggestion to strengthen financial
support of the new organization by transferring the interest earned on
the NWF balance to the new Working Capital Fund. Finally, we would like
assurance that the balance in the NWF will be made available when
program needs dictate.
Consolidated Interim Storage
Consolidated interim storage (CIS) should be authorized and funded
as a safe, cost-effective option for managing spent nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste from decommissioned and operating plants.
While a permanent facility is being licensed and constructed, one or
more CIS facilities would permit the federal government to begin
meeting its obligations and reduce taxpayer liabilities associated with
the government's delay. As such, we support the BRC call for prompt
efforts to develop CIS with used nuclear fuel from the decommissioned
reactor sites ``first in line'' for transfer. We were delighted to see
that approach in the Senate appropriations language introduced earlier
this year, and we suggest that comprehensive reform proposals such as
S. 3469 expressly include language to ensure that CIS is authorized.
Although well-intentioned, the linkage between CIS and progress on
a permanent disposal facility in S. 3469 prevents site-specific
flexibility and does not need to be legislatively mandated. Recognizing
a need for disposal under any scenario, the country must promptly site
and construct a permanent disposal facility, and we urge Congressional
efforts to properly fund the repository program accordingly. That would
best ensure that current dry cask storage and future CIS facilities do
not become de facto permanent disposal facilities. At the same time, we
need authorization and appropriations for CIS that affords as much
flexibility as possible. In a consent-based siting scenario, potential
CIS facility host communities would be empowered to assess and manage
the risks of becoming de facto permanent facilities, and they will
undoubtedly do so.
Additionally, the bill's requirement that utilities settle their
lawsuits against the federal government in order to be permitted to use
a CIS facility would seem to perpetuate the untenable situation of
prolonged on-site dry cask storage and mounting federal government
liability. We need not remind Congress about which entity has not met
its obligations under the law and per its contracts with utilities. The
federal government still has a roadmap for avoiding future liability
via performance.
Consent-Based Siting
With respect to consent-based siting processes, the NWSC emphasizes
the need for flexibility so as not to limit creative and effective
solutions that may be proposed by potential host communities. With that
in mind, we agree that is important to have an enforceable agreement at
some point.
While many of the BRC recommendations require legislative
solutions, DOE should take action immediately to advance BRC near-term
recommendations under existing authority. Until that happens, DOE
should be held accountable to deliver a plan that reflects a sense of
urgency, outlines specific actions, and takes ownership for the
country's high level radioactive waste. Therefore, we urge you to
remind DOE of the Senate's interest in receiving the implementation
plan.
In addition, it appears likely that the court will soon order the
NRC and DOE to resume the Yucca Mountain licensing process. DOE and NRC
should have executable plans in place to do so. We urge you to request
a specific plan, including the resources required for completing the
licensing process, from DOE and NRC.
Thank you for your leadership in initiating the dialogue pertaining
to certain BRC recommendations. The NWSC stands ready to work with you
and your Congressional colleagues, the Administration, and DOE to
advance meaningful nuclear waste policy reform. Please let us know if
you would like to discuss further.
______
National Conference of State Legislatures,
Washington, DC, September 14, 2012.
Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, 304
Dirksen Senate Building, Washington, DC.
Hon. Lisa Murkowski,
Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
304 Dirksen Senate Building, Washington, DC.
Re: Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012 (S. 3469)
Dear Chairman Bingaman and Ranking Member Murkowski,
On behalf of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL),
I applaud this committee for moving the debate concerning America's
nuclear energy issues forward by building on the recommendations for a
new national radioactive waste management strategy made by the Blue
Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC) in its final report
issued on January 26, 2012.
NCSL is the bi-partisan national organization representing the 50
state legislatures and the legislatures of our nation's commonwealths,
territories and the District of Columbia. NCSL has a long history of
working on nuclear energy issues. Specifically, NCSL's Nuclear
Legislative Working Group, of which I am the chair, is comprised of
state legislators from across the country who discuss issues
surrounding nuclear energy including the safe handling, storage and
transportation of waste. This long-standing group meets twice a year
and also helps to form NCSL policy directives on this and other topics.
I am also a member of NCSL's Executive Committee and serve on NCSL's
Energy Supply Task Force. The task force explores current energy
policies in the United States and makes recommendations for changes to
current NCSL policy related to energy issues.
NCSL has adopted two applicable policies on these topics,
Radioactive Waste Management Policy Directive and National Energy
Policy Directive, which have been submitted as attachments to these
written remarks. These two policies serve as the foundation for these
remarks and our support of congressional efforts to find a solution to
nuclear waste management in the U.S. including:
development and licensing of a high-level waste/used nuclear
fuel permanent disposal facility;
establishment of consolidated interim storage facilities at
technically and scientifically suitable sites;
creation of a public-private partnership to manage the back
end of the nuclear cycle; and
efforts to ensure the Nuclear Waste Fund is used for its
intended purpose of managing radioactive wastes.
NCSL commends the inclusion of state consultation in the consent
based approach to siting radioactive waste facilities, within the
Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2012. However, it is vital that
state legislators, and not just a state's governor, be consulted
regularly to ensure that such a decision is made with the appropriate
levels of support. Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, it is clearly
stated that the Department of Energy will work with states, including
state legislators. NCSL strongly urges this committee, as it moves
forward to develop a program for the long-term treatment and disposal
of high-level radioactive waste, to ensure adherence to this
requirement.
While Congress and the federal government work to develop long-term
disposal solutions, NCSL supports federal action to develop
consolidated interim storage facilities to temporarily house high level
radioactive waste inventories until a permanent repository is
operational. NCSL also supports use of the Nuclear Waste Fund to
provide interim storage financing mechanisms and incentives to
voluntary host communities. Addressing the need for interim storage
facilities will help advance national efforts to address spent fuel
storage and high level radioactive waste management as long term
storage plans are developed.
Finally, NCSL urges enactment of legislative language that would
ensure that the Nuclear Waste Fund is used for its intended purpose to
support the establishment and implementation of a nuclear waste
management program. Additionally, such language should establish a
firewall so that fees deposited in the Nuclear Waste Fund are used for
nuclear waste management purposes and are not subject to non-related
federal discretionary spending.
Thank you for the opportunity to weigh in on this important issue.
NCSL has a long history of working on issues related to nuclear waste
management and welcome the opportunity to continue to work with
Congress to advance this conversation and build on the recommendations
of the Blue Ribbon Commission and the proposals discussed in today's
hearing. Please feel free to contact NCSL staff Ben Husch
([email protected]) or Tamra Spielvogel ([email protected])
for more information.
Sincerely,
Sally Young Jameson,
Maryland House of Delegates, Chair, NCSL Nuclear Legislative
Workgroup.
ATTACHMENT.--RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
The federal government should work with NCSL and similar
organizations in an effort to ensure that state legislators are
included in all aspects of nuclear waste management strategies.
Low-Level Waste--NCSL maintains that states are best prepared to
license and regulate lowlevel waste disposal facilities that operate
within their borders in order to protect the health, safety and welfare
of their citizens. NCSL urges the federal government to continue to
provide states both with support and flexibility in their efforts to
dispose of low-level radioactive waste. States and state compacts
should have authority to limit/allow the import and export of waste to
and from their state or region. The federal government should adopt
policies that clarify the responsibility of the federal government for
federal waste, identify any federal waste that might be disposed at
compact facilities, and ensure that any federal waste disposed of at
compact or unaffiliated state facilities is subject to negotiation and
the same laws, regulations, fees and requirements as nonfederal waste.
The federal government should adopt clear policies with regard to
naturally occurring and accelerator produced radioactive material waste
and mixed wastes that respect states' authority to protect the health,
safety and welfare of their citizens. NCSL encourages the federal
government to work with NCSL toward these ends.
High-Level Waste and Used Fuel Management
NCSL urges the federal government to expeditiously research,
develop and license a high level waste/used nuclear fuel disposal and
consolidated interim storage facilities at technically and
scientifically suitable sites. NCSL favors the creation of a public-
private partnership to manage the back end of the nuclear cycle. The
federal government should consult with states at each step of the
process to ensure they play an integral role in the development of
high-level waste/used nuclear fuel storage and disposal policies and
obtain state, local and tribal government informed consent before
locating permanent disposal or consolidated interim storage facilities.
The federal government should provide fair and equitable compensation
to state and local governments of host states. This should include
funding of independent oversight activities by state executive and
legislative branches so that the host state may participate in and
conduct its own assessments of a proposed waste repository site and
disposal technology. The federal government should comply with state
laws and regulations during the process of site selection and
characterization, and the construction, operation and decommissioning
of permanent disposal or consolidated interim storage facilities.
Consolidated interim storage facilities should be licensed for a
specific, limited period of time not to exceed 25 years. High-level
waste/used nuclear fuel recycling should be a priority waste management
strategy.
Annual funding from the Nuclear Waste Fund should be used for
nuclear waste management and not subject to non-related federal
discretionary spending. These funds should be isolated for developing
permanent disposal and consolidated interim storage facilities.
Transportation of Radioactive Waste and Used Nuclear Fuel
NCSL urges the federal government to ensure safe and reliable modes
of transportation of radioactive wastes. DOE should seek to enter into
a memorandum of understanding with each corridor state to spell out
responsibilities, liability, compensation, response time, cleanup,
shipping, planning and other duties connected with emergency
situations. State, local and tribal governments should be given funding
and technical assistance for ongoing emergency preparedness,
independent safety inspections of drivers, vehicles and shipping
containers, training of state and local public safety officials along
radioactive waste transportation routes, and state emergency management
communications centers. State, local and tribal governments should be
involved in a meaningful manner with regard to radiation emissions
standards, cask designs, support facilities, transportation equipment
and other elements of the transportation system. The federal government
should respect state and tribal authority to assess reasonable fees
which fund activities connected to the safe routine transportation of
high-level waste/used nuclear fuel shipments. The federal government
should assure transportation accident prevention through the use of
superior drivers; carrier compliance with shipping contracts and all
applicable federal, state and local regulations; independent safety
inspections of drivers, vehicles and shipping containers; designation
of safe parking areas during abnormal conditions; advance notice to the
appropriate state and local agencies regarding shipments; and state
access to information on shipments' status (i.e. real-time shipment
tracking information where appropriate). Special criteria should be
applied to the shipment of high-level waste/used nuclear fuel,
including the development of guidelines for routing when shipping by
rail, the use of dedicated trains moving at safe speeds for rail
shipments, safety inspections at origin and enroute, and fullscale
testing of casks used for used fuel transport.
Defense-Generated Transuranic (TRU) Waste
NCSL urges the federal government to appropriate adequate funds and
expedite its responsibilities with regard to disposal of defense-
generated transuranic (TRU) waste. The federal government should
implement a compensation program that recognizes equity considerations
for state and local governments hosting a TRU waste repository and the
federal government's obligation to provide such compensation. Host
communities should be given assistance to subsidize and maintain an
independent environmental monitoring and analytical laboratory to
assure the character of the waste and ensure public confidence and
safety.
Federal Facilities Cleanup
The states insist that the cleanup and disposal programs at the
federal government's network of nuclear weapons production facilities
and national research labs advance in a safe, costeffective and
expeditious manner. The U.S. Department of Energy, the Department of
Defense and any future owners should be subject to all state laws
governing the cleanup of hazardous and radioactive waste materials.
States are also committed to the cleanup and conversion of closed
military and other federal facilities containing hazardous and
radioactive waste materials to other beneficial uses as soon as
possible. NCSL encourages the Department of Defense to lessen the
impacts of closing these facilities by entering into partnerships with
business and other private interests in order to turn them into sites
of commerce and development.
All federal cleanup efforts must be conducted in full consultation
with the affected state, tribal and local governments. An ongoing
dialogue with the states should be maintained to ensure effective state
involvement in critical cleanup related decisions. Cleanup work must be
accomplished in strict compliance with federal facility agreements and
federal and state laws governing the cleanup of hazardous and
radioactive waste materials. The federal government should give state
and federal regulators complete enforcement authority necessary to
ensure such compliance.
The federal government should continue to use the contract review
process to provide effective oversight and to evaluate integrated
contracts for cost accountability. Cost-effective solutions must be
developed and implemented by federal agencies to meet cleanup standards
that protect human health and the environment. State, tribal and local
governments must have a continuing, substantive role in the planning
and oversight activities of the waste-management effort. The Department
of Energy must recognize that cultural resources and artifacts may be
present on DOE sites, and must partner with affected Indian tribes to
identify and mitigate impacts to those resources.
Pollution prevention practices should be followed and whenever
possible recovered materials should be recycled or reused. Action
should be taken to manage federal radioactive, hazardous, and mixed
waste sites as soon as possible, but safety and quality cleanup must
remain the priority. Federal cleanup efforts should enforce priorities
and meet milestones set forth in federal-state consent orders regarding
the cleanup of specific sites. A fully funded and comprehensive long-
term stewardship program for all of the federal facilities must be
developed to ensure that communities are protected in perpetuity.
ATTACHMENT.--NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DIRECTIVE
National Energy Policy Directive NCSL Energy, Transportation and
Agriculture Standing Committee The National Conference of State
Legislatures urges the federal government to continue working
cooperatively with state, local, and tribal governments to develop,
implement and maintain an expansive, integrated, environmentally-
sensitive and cost-effective national energy policy. Principles NCSL
believes the following principles should guide the development and
implementation of a national energy policy:
Promotion of the most efficient and economical use of all
energy resources.
Promotion of energy conservation and efficiency and the
development and use of alternative and renewable energy
supplies.
Promotion and provision of incentives for the development
and optimal use of all energy resources and new facility
infrastructure.
Assurance that various domestic energy sources are
continually developed, maintained and stored to prevent supply
emergencies and promote energy independence.
Consideration and assessment of environmental costs and
benefits for all energy resources, fuels and technologies in
rendering legislative, regulatory and market decisions
regarding energy production and use.
Provision of an affordable and reliable energy supply for
all citizens.
Examine the feasibility of, and where feasible, promote
state-wide or regional minimum storage level requirements for
heating oil for states dependent on this fuel.
Specification and balancing of clear lines of local, state
and federal regulatory authority.
Development of both short and long-term strategies to
provide adequate energy supplies, efficient utilization of
those supplies and optimum cost effectiveness.
Promotion of the education of school-age children regarding
energy resources, consumption, conservation, and production and
regarding environmental protection, safety and risks in energy
production.
Assurance of expanded energy research and development and
broadening of the citizenry's access to energy-related
information.
Assurance of participation of state and local officials in
the development and implementation of a national energy plan
and strategy.
Avoidance of mandates, particularly unfunded mandates, upon
state and local governments as well as avoidance of pre-emptive
federal laws in developing a national energy policy.
Implementation
NCSL believes development of a national energy strategy should
contain at a minimum these components:
An assessment and forecast of our nation's energy future and
its impacts;
An evaluation and ranking of short and long-term energy
options available to the nation;
An evaluation of possible energy futures which provide
greater benefits to our citizens;
The development of recommendations for energy options and
energy futures that the nation should pursue, with the
establishment of national targets or goals;
An evaluation and recommendation of implementation
mechanisms including, but not limited to, incentives, technical
assistance, educational programs, regulatory standards or
guidelines to achieve the targets or goals;
Considers energy sources based on the lowest cost, cost
benefit analysis, revenue loss, cost to consumers, reliability,
and environmental or other impacts. Additionally, energy policy
alternatives that would improve our energy security without
imposing significant new costs, while balancing the need for
environmental protection, should be implemented.
A coordinated effort between state and federal government in
the development of producing a national energy policy where the
federal government consults closely with state legislatures,
devising mechanisms to bring state legislatures into the energy
decision-making process as full participants on a continuing
basis and ensuring the inclusion of representatives of the
legislative branch of state government in all statefederal
working groups dealing with energy policy.
Conservation and Energy Efficiency
NCSL supports a national energy policy that promotes energy
efficiency in a variety of ways including both setting and
strengthening policies as technologies improve while recognizing the
significance of economic costs on various segments of the population
including rural areas. NCSL supports the use of:
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for automobiles and
light duty trucks, including sport utility vehicles and
minivans;
Energy efficiency provisions in model building codes
(including lighting efficiency standards and weatherization);
``Whole-building'' and life cycle costing approaches to
construction and retrofitting that integrate energy efficiency
technologies and practices;
home appliance and heating and cooling unit efficiency
standards;
Waste recycling and reduction standards for industrial
manufacturing;
Standards for conservation in electrical production and
supply including cogeneration;
Use of alternative energy; and
A national transportation policy that emphasizes various
modes of transportation, including passenger rail and transit,
as well as promoting energy efficiency.
New Source Review Program (NSR)
NCSL urges the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to reform the
NSR program to achieve improvements that enhance the environment and
increase production capacity, while encouraging efficiency, fuel
diversity and the use of resources without weakening the requirements
intended to reduce emissions from new or modified sources of air
pollution. Routine maintenance, repair or replacement activities which
are not major modifications should not trigger NSR requirements.
Government Support for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficient Products
and Industries
NCSL believes that federal and state governments' leadership role
in the purchase and use of new energy efficient and renewable energy
technologies and products should be expanded and supports incentives
for consumers to purchase energy efficient products. The federal
government should continue to establish incentives for energy efficient
fleet procurement industries and manufacturers of energy efficient
products as well as continue to encourage the use of innovative
financing technologies to increase energy efficiency in buildings such
as performance contracting and long-term leasing and purchase
agreements for energy efficient products. All government-owned
buildings should make use of economical energy conservation programs,
demonstrating state of the art efficiencies whenever possible.
Renewable Energy
NCSL believes that in recognizing a spectrum of renewable energy
resources including, but not limited to geothermal, hydropower,
biomass, wind, photovoltaics and solar, the federal government should
institute a long-range, stable Renewable Energy Development Program
which identifies and supports development of renewable energy sources
from research and development through demonstration projects and
commercialization in a cooperative effort among industry, higher
education, and national laboratories.
NCSL recommends that:
Federal action should be flexible, allowing for a range of
complementary strategies at the state and federal level
maintaining a strong role for state government in any federal
action.
Federal legislation should provide states the authority and
flexibility to work within a overall framework that affords
states the ability to chose from a range of options & apply the
law effectively in the most cost effective, timely and
efficient manner for each state.
Federal legislation should not preempt state governments
from enacting stricter or stronger measures within their
jurisdiction.
Congress must authorize and appropriate sufficient funds for
state and federal governments to implement any federal
legislation. These funds should be newly authorized
appropriations, not reprogrammed resources.
Energy Emergency Preparedness
NCSL believes that the federal government should support and
enhance energy emergency preparedness in order to reduce the potential
impact of petroleum supply disruptions.
A national energy emergency preparedness program should include the
following principles:
Initial efforts should focus on strategies to reduce the
nation's dependence on foreign oil to avoid future emergencies.
Voluntary conservation, is preference to mandatory measures,
wherever possible;
When any mandatory responses are required, they should be
phased in, beginning with the least stringent measures, with
gasoline rationing reserved for only the most severe shortage;
Minimize undue hardships on states and regions heavily
dependent on motor vehicle transportation with rationing
allotments and allocation plans being based on state and
regional needs and strategies rather than on national averages.
Priority shall be given to home heating needs including home
heating oil and propane, provided homes are adequately
insulated.
NCSL believes changes need to be made at the national level to
ensure that the country has sufficient, affordable supplies of energy,
by encouraging more efficient use of energy to reduce U.S. reliance on
foreign oil. As such, federal investments in both energy efficiency and
research in developing new and alternative energy technologies should
figure significantly in a national energy policy.
Coal
NCSL believes the federal government should support the efficient,
responsible production and utilization of the United States vast
resources of coal, largest reserves of any nation in the world, and the
strategic global economic advantage it provides.
Provide continued support for Clean Coal Technology
research, in partnership with the private sector. Such support,
through additional research and technology development in clean
coal usage, should include work in pre-combustion, combustion,
postcombustion, and coal conversion areas with desulfurization
efforts a top priority.
Jointly address transboundary environmental issues with
Canada and Mexico.
Continue to support the acid rain program of the Clean Air
Act of 1990 that phases--in reductions in emissions from coal
burning power plants.
Seriously consider coal gasification as an alternative to
the use of coal in a conventional manner.
Concurrently reclaim and restore mined lands to an
environmentally appropriate condition.
Consider the effects on local infrastructure needs and the
costs of prime farmland protection and land reclamation in the
development of a national coal program.
Accelerate the financing of activities under the abandoned
mine reclamation fund and a federal commitment to reclamation
should be strengthened.
Avoid adopting federal policy that has implications for land
development or management without accommodating the laws and
policies of affected states.
Crude Oil
NCSL believes the federal government should promote and encourage
domestic production of crude oil in an efficient and environmentally
sound manner in order to both supply United States consumers with a
secure source of petroleum as well as provide a stabilizing influence
to the world price of crude oil. As such, the extraction and
transportation of crude oil must be done only with safeguards for the
protection of the environment. The federal government should consider
incentives for domestic exploration, maintenance of stripper wells, but
excluding other extractions, and technological research for methods of
enhanced oil and gas recovery that are environmentally safe and in
accordance with state policy as well as an increase in research and
development in the area of new energy generating technologies including
but not limited to biofuels, electric cars, fuel cells, hybrid engines,
and alternative fuels particularly for transportation.
The federal government should manage United States imports by
diversifying import suppliers, pursuing a Pan American Energy Alliance
with Western Hemisphere producing nations, and expanding a dialogue
with suppliers worldwide.
Oil Overcharge Settlement Funds
NCSL is appreciative of Administrative and congressional action to
disburse authorized unclaimed overcharge monies to the states, via the
oil overcharge settlement funds.
NCSL believes that the refunded oil overcharge money disbursed to
states should be used for energy-related purposes. As emerging federal
and state emphasis on conservation and energy efficiency programs has
created a state need for additional funds to develop and implement new
programs, some states are unable to meet the growing demands of their
energy programs with state money alone. Therefore, NCSL strongly
supports expeditious pass-through of oil overcharge settlement funds by
the Department of Energy to states only to supplement, and not
supplant, energy related programs. NCSL opposes efforts to reduce or
eliminate or take credit for federal funding of existing energy related
programs such as the Weatherization Assistance Program, the
Institutional Conservation Program, the State Energy Conservation
Program, and programs authorized to be funded by the Energy Policy Act
of 1992, based on the receipt of oil overcharge settlement monies. NCSL
also opposes the diversion of oil overcharge monies from their intended
energy uses.
Additionally, as oil overcharge and settlement funds are depleted,
Congress is encouraged to appropriate replacement or supplemental funds
to facilitate continued state involvement in worthwhile energy
programs.
Natural Gas
NCSL believes the United States should encourage domestic
production of natural gas in an environmentally sound manner. The
federal government should adopt legislation that funds and authorizes
states to assume a more prominent role in the regulation of pipeline
safety. A partnership with the federal government will enhance the
safety of pipelines and the protection of residents by decreasing the
risk of pipeline accidents.
State Primacy in Regulation of Oil and Gas and Production Wastes
Since oil and gas exploration and production occur in several
different states in distinct regions, NCSL believes that primary
responsibility for the regulation of used oil and of oil and gas
exploration and production wastes is best handled by the affected state
to accommodate site-specific conditions and environmental
considerations should not be preempted by federal legislation or
regulation. As such, NCSL supports the continuation of exempting used
oil and waste generated in oil and gas exploration and production from
classification as hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA).
Revenues from On-Shore and Outer Continental Shelf Drilling
The Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982 (30 U.S.C.
1701 et. seq.), requires 50 percent of the revenues from federal on-
shore drilling is paid to the state in which the lease is located and
ensures that state legislatures shall direct the use of these funds.
NCSL supports the state legislatures' role in the
appropriation of these funds.
NCSL opposes any effort by Congress or the Administration to
reduce the revenue share paid to states in an effort to off-set
federal expenditures on a temporary or permanent basis.
NCSL does not support or oppose additional exploration or
production on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). However, to the extent
that mineral extraction occurs, Congress is urged to:
Authorize and appropriate 50 percent of the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) revenues to the states;
Ensure the state legislatures' participation in the
appropriation of these funds; and
Provide state lawmakers the flexibility to target these
funds to their respective state's natural resource priorities.
OCS revenue sharing with the states should be in addition to
and not replace other Federal funding programs.
Preserve state authority to impose moratoriums on or allow
for mineral exploration, development and production activities
on the OCS.
Lift federal fees charged to states for use of sand, gravel
and shell resources taken from the OCS for use in beach
nourishment and other coastal erosion mitigation activities.
Give states full review of development and production of
mineral resources on the OCS.
Nuclear
NCSL believes that,
Nuclear Energy generates an essential share of the nation's
clean, non-emitting, zero carbon baseload electricity.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) should provide
strong, independent oversight of all commercial nuclear plant
operations, including plant licensing (both license extensions,
where appropriate, and over the ongoing construction of new
reactors) and used fuel and radioactive waste management,
transportation and disposal, to ensure public health and
safety. The rigorous NRC safety review process already employed
in certifying new reactor designs should be maintained as
additional designs are considered.
The federally-supported public-private partnership that is
pursuing the design, development and licensing of Small Modular
Reactors should focus on maximizing the economic development
and positive trade balance potential of this emerging
technology. The federal government should assist the ongoing
efforts of various states to establish U.S. leadership in this
promising market.
A federal government program for the long-term treatment and
disposal of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste,
already funded by nuclear utility ratepayers, should be pursued
with the highest priority given to the safe reprocessing or
transportation of waste and to the safety and technical
suitability of storage or disposal sites. Such a program should
be developed in full consultation with all of the affected
states.
Meaningful and effective state participation is necessary in
public safety planning and transportation of commercial used
nuclear fuel and high-level waste.
The recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on
America's Nuclear Future appropriately comport with the
longstanding position of NCSL in favor of a path forward for
used fuel. In particular, NCSL favors: creation of a public-
private partnership to manage the back end of the nuclear fuel
cycle; assurance that ratepayer contributions to the Nuclear
Waste Fund be available solely for their intended purpose;
establishment of one or more NRC-licensed centralized interim
used fuel storage facilities in willing host communities and
states (with consultation of all state, local and tribal
officials and other interested parties).
States must continue to have the right to monitor operating
conditions at nuclear power plants, waste storage and disposal
facilities, and to exercise regulatory authority where
consistent with federal law.
Federal funding should complement private sector investments
in the areas of waste management technologies, nuclear fusion,
and plant retrofit and life extension.
The tax treatment of decommissioning funds should be updated
to ensure that existing funds are treated in the manner
intended by the tax laws and to reflect new business
conditions.
Electricity
NCSL believes that the federal government should promote
Energy efficiency and conservation to lower the demand for
electricity.
The development of sources of electric energy that are
sufficient to meet national needs, secure from external threat,
reliable in availability and delivery, safe relative to people
and the environment, and efficient for use in homes,
businesses, industries, and as an alternative vehicular fuel.
The implementation of aggressive efficiency and conservation
programs are implemented.
Legislation that recognizes the tremendous regional
diversity, especially with regard to capacity of the
electricity sector
Public Benefits/Environment
NCSL believes that:
States should maintain the authority to require public
benefits programs on a nondiscriminatory basis, including those
that support reliable and universal service, energy efficiency,
renewable technologies, research and development, and lowincome
assistance. Additionally, existing federally sponsored public
benefits programs should be maintained in a restructured market
and electric industry restructuring should be consistent with
any federal environmental laws, including the Clean Air Act.
Implementation of Federal legislation that fails to
recognize market mechanisms inevitably penalizes one region or
state or another and that mandate programs are counter to the
concept of restructuring, which encourages the efficiencies of
market competition.
As states are in the best position to evaluate market force
considerations, Congressional legislation should not limit,
through the use of mandates or otherwise, state flexibility in
addressing market mechanisms in electric restructuring plans.
Non-traditional energy production should be encouraged and
that the federal government must maintain and increase its
commitment to cost effective energy conservation and efficiency
while maintaining adequate and reliable energy. As such, power
providers, equipment and appliance manufacturers, and consumers
should be given legislative and regulatory incentives to
promote these goals.
Consumer Protection and Education
NCSL believes that:
The safety, reliability, quality, and sustainability of
services should be maintained or improved and that all
consumers should have access to adequate, safe, reliable, and
efficient energy services at fair and reasonable prices, as a
result of competition.
States should retain the authority, with the assistance of
the federal government as needed, to protect consumers from
anticompetitive behavior, undue discrimination, poor service,
market power abuses, and unfair service practices.
States should maintain the authority to establish or require
comprehensive consumer education and outreach programs to
minimize public confusion and provide information so consumers
are able to make informed choices and participate effectively
in a restructured market.
Regulatory Authority
State regulatory bodies are close to consumers, utilities,
industries, and concerned for state environmental and economic well
being. State regulatory bodies are in the best position to evaluate
consumer needs, and address questions relative to fuel choice, economic
development implications, and system reliability.
NCSL strongly supports and urges the continuation of the state
legislative oversight for the approval and siting of all major energy
conversion facilities, subject to minimum federal standards established
only after the fullest consultation with state governments, both
executive and legislative branch. State authority over the siting of
energy facilities should not be preempted by federal law.
NCSL acknowledges the need for a robust national transmission
system that can support new technology and allow for additional power
production to be brought onto the grid. NCSL urges Congress to allow
provisions included in the 2005 Energy Policy Act relating to state
authority of liquefied natural gas terminal siting to be implemented
and studied before any attempt is made to expand the preemption to
further limit the state role in siting of these energy infrastructure
components. NCSL opposes any such expansion of these provision but
urges Congress at a minimum to allow for the complete implementation of
the new standards before reopening the issue.
Research and Development
NCSL believes that the cornerstone of a national energy policy
should include a broad research and development component.
Specifically, federal government research and development funds for
clean coal, nuclear research, basic science and related efforts ought
to be continued. However, these efforts should be supplemented with
increased long-term incentives and federal funding for research and
development projects emphasizing emerging technologies, including, but
not limited to, renewable resources, energy conservation, efficient use
of energy, alternative fuels, oil and gas recovery, superconductivity,
and fuel cell technology and should be designed to encourage private
sector participation with federal and state representatives. NCSL urges
Congress to provide explicit recognition in the Internal Revenue Code
that sustainable energy (conservation, efficiency and customer sited
renewable) is a private activity serving a public good.
Renewable Energy R&D Market Support
NCSL encourages federal development of alternative technologies
that improve renewable energy efficiencies, cut costs, and assist in
integrating renewable energy into existing energy systems. The
implementation of federal standards for the deployment of these new
technologies should not undermine established programs at the state
level to integrate these resources into existing energy systems. NCSL
also believes in the need for a translation and distribution system for
international technical and marketing papers on renewable energy and
that the U.S. should strive for excellence in the use, manufacturing
and marketing of renewable energy resources and technologies.
Wave Energy and Tidal Energy
NCSL strongly believes that the United States should increasingly
encourage all forms of renewable energy, including avenues of renewable
energy that are not currently in the forefront; specifically wave
energy, wave farms, and tidal energy.
NCSL requests that the federal government demonstrate global
leadership and:
Recognize the importance of wave energy and tidal energy to
the future of the United States;
Support the research and development of advances in wave
energy and tidal energy technology, including the ability to
tow and set up the equipment in the oceans through loan
guarantees, grants and tax incentives;
Research and create a ``Wave Hub,'' or similar
infrastructure necessary for integrating wave- and tidal-energy
production facilities into the national grid; and
Encourage the demonstration and deployment of wave energy
and tidal energy beyond the limited scope of R&D to ensure
competitive and equitable access for wave- and tidal-energy
projects and provide a fair opportunity to supply the nation
with a reliable and renewable energy.
Education and Information
NCSL believes that it is essential that the nation, including its
elementary and secondary school-age children, be made fully aware of
energy use and costs, production processes, alternative energy
resources, the importance of energy efficiency and conservation and the
impact energy usage has on our environment. NCSL recommends that public
and private sector education efforts be initiated, expanded and
appropriately funded.
The federal government should promote both energy conservation
education and fund research into conservation technologies while
federal funding of energy conservation programs, including grants to
states, should be enhanced. Such efforts should emphasize that
significant economic and environmental benefits can be achieved through
increased efficiency and conservation.
NCSL also believes that an essential step in formulating a balanced
energy policy is to develop the necessary data and employ analytical
methods and models to assess the efficiency, productivity costs and
risks of the various energy choices available to the nation. As such,
NCSL recommends the development of this analytic base by the Department
of Energy, with assistance from the Departments of Defense, Treasury
and State, and the Office of Management and Budget, in conjunction with
the states.
Transportation
NCSL believes that national transportation strategies must include
public policy initiatives directed at broadening the efficient use of
our energy resources. As such, policy initiatives should include, but
not necessarily be limited to:
Incentives and adequate funding for mass transit, high speed
rail, magnetic levitation and other emerging transportation
technologies;
Fuel economy standards; and other market incentives for
improving the energy efficiency of automobiles and light
trucks;
Federal, state, and local procurement policies favoring
efficient vehicles;
The encouragement of public-private partnerships.
______
Wall Street Journal Article submitted by Hon. Ron Wyden,
U.S. Senator From Oregon
U.S. NEWS
September 9, 2012, 7:36 p.m. ET
WASTE-PLANT DISPUTE BUILDS
SAFETY AND DESIGN CONCERNS SLOW CONSTRUCTION OF
NUCLEAR-PROCESSING FACILITY
By ANDREW MORSE
The U.S. Department of Energy is slowing construction of a facility
to process the country's largest accumulation of radioactive waste,
amid an increasingly acrimonious dispute about the design and safety of
the $12.2 billion project.
Energy Secretary Steven Chu visited the Hanford site in southeast
Washington state last week, which department officials said was part of
efforts to assess the safety of the nuclear-waste complex. Mr. Chu was
accompanied by an expert panel he assembled following a trip in June to
the plant after concerns were raised about the safety culture at the
facility.
Department of Energy
An aerial view of the Hanford treatment plant in July.
Mr. Chu and the experts are reviewing the safety of rooms that will
hold radioactive waste as it is processed at the vast complex, which
will cover 65 acres and house four nuclear facilities, in addition to
other components.
For decades, the government used the 586-square-mile Hanford site
to produce plutonium for atomic weapons, including the Fat Man bomb
dropped on Nagasaki during World War II. The work turned the land into
one of the most toxic areas in the U.S., so after the Cold War, the
DOE, the Environmental Protection Agency and the state set out to clean
it.
Hanford's problems were highlighted last month when a DOE official
who oversees engineering at the plant faulted the primary contractor,
Bechtel National Inc., for problems, concluding that the company was
``not competent'' to serve as the facility's chief designer.
Frank Russo, who manages the project for Bechtel National, a unit
of Bechtel Corp., said many of the issues raised by the DOE official,
Gary Brunson, are old and that the company had worked to fix problems.
``All of them had been addressed at one time or another,'' Mr. Russo
said.
Separately, the DOE last month discovered radioactive material
between the walls of one of the site's newer double-shelled waste-
storage tanks, which are designed to be superior to older single-shell
tanks. The threat of leaks has been a concern for decades: In the past,
according to a project website, one-third of the 177 underground tanks
have experienced leakage of toxic material.
The DOE has enhanced monitoring of the double-shelled tank and has
declared that it is stable.
Associated Press
Energy Secretary Steven Chu spoke to Hanford workers during a June
visit.
Concerns over key parts of the facility are slowing construction,
because the facility is being designed as it is built; as design issues
crop up, building has to slow until those issues are addressed.
The issues are raising concerns of a delay in the opening of a
project that has attracted the ire of environmentalists, federal
lawmakers and even its own workers. The range of concerns include the
safety and cost of the plant, as well as risks that radioactive sludge
could seep into the nearby Columbia River.
On Aug. 29, Washington Gov. Christine Gregoire, a Democrat, wrote
to Mr. Chu asking that he explain why the plant's schedule was at risk.
Ms. Gregoire sought a meeting with Mr. Chu while he was at the site,
but the two weren't able to coordinate their schedules, her spokeswoman
said.
Expected to start full operations in 2022, the plant would separate
and process 56 million gallons of radioactive and chemical waste. The
waste would then be turned into glass logs-a form that makes it less
likely to spread through the environment-that would be stored at the
site. The plant is expected to operate for roughly 40 years.
The facility, called the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant
has been the subject of controversy for years. Managers on the project
have raised concerns about the design, as well as the safety culture at
the project. Employees have brought lawsuits against Bechtel National.
One issue highlighted by Mr. Chu involves the design of a set of 18
rooms that will hold waste as it is treated for processing. The rooms,
called ``black cells'' because workers won't be able to enter them when
the plant is running, were to be built with limited monitoring
equipment. The DOE now is considering whether more instruments should
be incorporated to monitor how the waste is settling, and whether
openings should be larger so machinery, such as robots, could be sent
in.
As a result, the government has slowed work on pretreatment and
high-level radioactive waste facilities, said David Huizenga, a senior
DOE adviser. Construction of two other buildings, a lab and a low-
activity waste facility, are continuing on schedule, he said. The
agency isn't fundamentally ``changing or questioning the design'' of
the plant, Mr. Huizenga said.
Tom Carpenter, the executive director of Hanford Challenge, a group
that has expressed concerns about the plant's design and that has been
skeptical about the progress of construction, says resolving design
issues takes on a new urgency following the discovery of the
radioactive material last month. ``I want this plant to work,'' Mr.
Carpenter said. ``We have no Plan B.''