[Senate Hearing 112-590, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-590, Pt. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3254
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
----------
PART 1
MILITARY POSTURE
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND
----------
FEBRUARY 14, 28; MARCH 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, 20, 27, 2012
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM--Part 1
MILITARY POSTURE b U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION
COMMAND b U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND b U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND b DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY b U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND b
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY b DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE b U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND
S. Hrg. 112-590, Pt. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3254
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
__________
PART 1
MILITARY POSTURE
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND
__________
FEBRUARY 14, 28; MARCH 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, 20, 27, 2012
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Ann E. Sauer, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Military Posture
february 14, 2012
Page
.................................................................
Panetta, Hon. Leon, Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by Robert
F. Hale, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).............. 12
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..... 26
U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Transportation Command
february 28, 2012
Willard, ADM Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command..... 172
Fraser, Gen. William M., III, USAF, Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command......................................... 182
U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command
march 1, 2012
Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command/
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe............................... 272
Ham, GEN Carter F., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.......... 324
U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command
march 6, 2012
Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central Command..... 394
McRaven, ADM William H. McRaven, USN, Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command............................................. 404
Department of the Army
march 8, 2012
McHugh, Hon. John M., Secretary of the Army...................... 468
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army......... 504
U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command
march 13, 2012
Fraser, Gen. Douglas M., USAF, Commander, U.S. Southern Command.. 608
Jacoby, GEN Charles H., Jr., USA, Commander, U.S. Northern
Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command 625
Department of the Navy
march 15, 2012
Mabus, Hon. Raymond E., Jr., Secretary of the Navy............... 686
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations........ 703
Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps........ 717
Department of the Air Force
march 20, 2012
Donley, Hon. Michael B., Secretary of the U.S. Air Force......... 842
Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air
Force.......................................................... 845
U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command
march 27, 2012
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Defense.. 948
Alexander, GEN Keith B., USA, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, and
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security
Service........................................................ 962
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MILITARY POSTURE
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin,
Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Chambliss,
Wicker, Brown, Portman, Ayotte, Collins, Graham, Cornyn, and
Vitter.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
Travis E. Smith, special assistant.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Jonathan S. Epstein, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research
assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald
J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Thomas
K. McConnell, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Roy F.
Phillips, professional staff member; John H. Quirk V,
professional staff member; Robie I. Samanta Roy, professional
staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K.
Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker,
professional staff member; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority
investigative counsel; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff
member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Elizabeth
C. Lopez, research assistant; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member;
Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; and Diana G. Tabler,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Mariah K.
McNamara, Brian F. Sebold, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Greene,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann
Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant
to Senator Webb; Jason Rauch, assistant to Senator McCaskill;
Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh,
assistant to Senator Begich; Mara Boggs, assistant to Senator
Manchin; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony
Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Tyler Stephens and Clyde Taylor
IV, assistants to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to
Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown;
Brad Bowman and John Easton, assistants to Senator Ayotte; Ryan
Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; Sergio Sarkany,
assistant to Senator Graham; Dave Hanke, assistant to Senator
Cornyn; and Charles Brittingham, assistant to Senator Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee this
morning welcomes the Secretary of Defense, Leon E. Panetta, and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin E.
Dempsey, USA, for our hearing on the Department of Defense
(DOD) fiscal year 2013 budget request, the associated Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP), and the posture of the U.S. Armed
Forces. The committee also welcomes the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller), Robert F. Hale, who has joined the
Secretary and the Chairman at the witness table.
Let me start by thanking all of you for your continued
service to our Nation and to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines here at home and in harm's way around the globe, and to
their families. They are truly deserving of the Nation's
affection and support.
Your testimony today marks the beginning of the committee's
review of the fiscal year 2013 budget request for DOD. This
year's request includes $525 billion for the base budget and
$88.4 billion for overseas contingency operations (OCO). The
fiscal year 2013 base budget request is $5 billion less than
the fiscal year 2012 enacted level of $530 billion, and the OCO
request is $27 billion less than last year's enacted level of
$115 billion.
The fiscal year 2013 budget conforms with the Budget
Control Act (BCA) that Congress passed last summer. The Senate
approved the BCA on a bipartisan basis, with 74 Senators voting
for it. The BCA locked in defense and non-defense discretionary
spending caps over 10 years. The defense caps reduced projected
defense spending by nearly half a trillion dollars over 10
years, and DOD responded with a new strategy and a new program
to meet the Nation's security challenges and preserve our
military capabilities.
The BCA also included language requiring Congress to pass
legislation with additional far-reaching deficit reductions. If
Congress does not come up with a deficit reduction package by
next January, one that locks in another $1.2 trillion in
deficit reduction over 10 years, then automatic spending cuts,
called ``sequestration,'' will be imposed on both defense and
non-defense programs.
The budget the President sent us yesterday avoids
sequestration by meeting the $1.2 trillion additional deficit
reduction target, approximately one-half in further cuts in
spending and one-half in additional revenues.
The defense budget request for fiscal year 2013 not only
conforms to the funding limits of the congressionally-mandated
BCA, it also reflects the results of DOD's comprehensive and
inclusive strategic review initiated by President Obama in
April last year and the strategic guidance that resulted.
We look forward to the witnesses' explanation of the
process that they went through to develop the new Defense
Strategic Guidance, their assessment of this guidance's most
important features and potential risks relative to the current
and anticipated strategic environment, and how this budget
request supports its strategic priorities and manages strategic
risk in the near- and long-terms.
The administration has called for two more base realignment
and closure (BRAC) rounds. In my view, however, before we
consider another round of BRAC, DOD ought to take a hard look
at whether further reductions in bases can be made overseas,
particularly in Europe. While DOD has announced the removal of
two of the four combat brigades currently stationed in Europe,
even after the brigades are withdrawn there will still be over
70,000 U.S. military personnel deployed in Europe. Finding
further reductions and consolidations in our overseas force
posture should be our first priority before another BRAC round.
The fiscal year 2013 defense budget request reflects the
continuing conflict in Afghanistan, but also reflects the fact
that the process of transition has begun and continues apace.
Afghan security forces (ASF) are assuming responsibility for
securing the Afghan people in more and more areas throughout
Afghanistan. Progress on security is real. A second round of
areas to be transitioned to an ASF lead will be completed later
this year. Then approximately 50 percent of the Afghan
population will live in areas where ASF have the lead for
providing security, with coalition forces playing a supporting
role.
I have long-pressed for ASF to move increasingly into the
combat lead and to assume responsibility for securing more and
more Afghan territory and communities as the size and
capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan
National Police (ANP) are built up. The success of our mission
in Afghanistan depends on getting the ASF in the lead, with the
support of the Afghan people, thereby putting the lie to the
Taliban propaganda that the coalition is an occupying force.
The Afghan Foreign Ministry spokesman recently made clear
there was full agreement on transition, saying: ``We have
always maintained that Afghan security is an Afghan
responsibility.''
Last June, President Obama said that the 33,000 U.S. surge
force would be removed from Afghanistan by the end of this
summer. That means that 68,000 U.S. troops would remain in
Afghanistan after the drawdown of the surge. He also said that
after the reduction of the U.S. surge force, U.S. troops will
continue to draw down ``at a steady pace.'' Yet the fiscal year
2013 OCO budget request now before Congress is based on an
assumption that there are no additional reductions in the
68,000 troop level in Afghanistan throughout all of fiscal year
2013.
The question that I hope our witnesses will address this
morning is whether they expect further reductions in U.S. troop
levels in Afghanistan during fiscal year 2013 below 68,000 and
what associated cost savings would result. If that decision has
not yet been made by the President, what is the timetable for
its being made?
I also hope Secretary Panetta will clarify his surprising
statements earlier this month that, ``Our goal is to complete
all of the transition to a training, advisory, and assistance
role in 2013,'' and that he said, ``Hopefully by the mid- to
latter-part of 2013, we will be able to make a transition from
a combat role.''
There are many reports about reconciliation talks with the
Taliban. If Taliban statements are true that they will open a
political office in Qatar, it would have the potential to be a
positive development. I am concerned, however, by reports that
in exchange for the opening of this office, the administration
is considering transferring five Afghan Taliban detainees from
the Guantanamo detention facility to Qatar. Such a significant
step strikes me as premature and should be considered, in my
view, only following positive discussions and not preceding
them.
Another concern I have regarding the progress of the
reconciliation talks is the reported decision by the Government
of Afghanistan to open a second channel in the dialogue with
the Taliban that would be in Saudi Arabia. It seems to me that
this would create the potential for confusion. The United
States has said it is committed to an Afghan-led reconciliation
process. That is another reason that the discussion process
ought to be pursued through a single channel, with both the
Afghan Government and with us, fully coordinated and
participating together, whether it takes place in one or two
venues.
With respect to the realignment of U.S. marines on Okinawa,
Senator McCain, Senator Webb, and I have advocated changes in
the current plan in ways that support the strategic goals of
the U.S. regional military posture while avoiding excessive and
unsustainable costs associated with large and elaborate new
bases. The announcement last week that the United States and
Japan are reconsidering elements of the plan is welcome news,
but the steps are not yet adequate.
There are other challenges, of course. There is strong
bipartisan determination on this committee and in Congress to
do all we can to counter the threat that Iran poses, including
stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. President Obama
has focused considerable diplomatic effort towards that goal
because, in his words, ``America is determined to prevent Iran
from getting a nuclear weapon. And I will take no options off
the table to achieve that goal.'' The administration is
bringing the world together, as it should, to speak with one
voice against Iran's nuclear ambitions.
Relative to Egypt, the decades-old relationship between the
United States and Egypt is under strain. In recent days,
General Dempsey traveled to Cairo to engage the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces of Egypt on the very troubling decision by
the Egyptians to charge 19 Americans and dozens of other
individuals for operating programs in support of Egyptian civil
society. The committee is eager to learn the findings of
General Dempsey's visit because the decision by the Egyptians,
if unresolved, will negatively affect funding decisions that
Congress makes in the coming months.
Relative to Syria, the regime of President Al-Assad is
waging war on the people of Syria and, despite the condemnation
of the Arab League and almost all nations, China and Russia are
preventing the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council from
taking any effective action. If the situation is left as it is,
there is also a significant threat that surrounding countries
could be severely impacted. Our witnesses will, hopefully,
discuss options that we have to help end the slaughter, as
limited as those options might be.
On cybersecurity, the Defense Strategic Guidance notes that
both state and non-state actors pose the capability and intent
to conduct cyber espionage and the capability to conduct cyber
attacks on the United States, with possibly severe effects on
both our economy and our security. The Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) in recent Senate testimony placed the
cybersecurity threat in the top tier alongside terrorism and
nuclear proliferation and other proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.
A recent report from the National Counter-Intelligence
Executive stated that entities operating from within China and
Russia are responsible for the massive theft of U.S. commercial
and military technology that could threaten our national
security and our economy. We should let China and Russia know
in no uncertain terms that cyber economic espionage will have
very negative consequences for normal trade relations and other
relations.
Finally, in the area of personnel, DOD proposes numerous
personnel-related reforms aimed at slowing the increase in
personnel and health care costs, which continue to rise at
unsustainable rates. These reforms include a significant
reduction in military end strength over the next 5 years, other
personnel-related reforms, and a commission to review military
retirement benefits. I agree with General Dempsey, Admiral
Winnefeld, the Service Chiefs, and the Services' senior
enlisted advisers, who urged me in a letter dated January 25,
2011, to grandfather the retirement benefits of those currently
serving. We owe it to our servicemembers and their families to
address any change in their compensation and benefits in a
manner that acknowledges the commitment that we made to them
when they volunteered to serve in our Armed Forces.
Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, and Mr. Hale, we look
forward to your testimony, and I now call on Senator McCain.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
This morning the committee welcomes Secretary of Defense, Leon
Panetta, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin
Dempsey, for our hearing on the Department of Defense (DOD) fiscal year
2013 budget request, the associated Future Years Defense Program, and
the posture of the U.S. Armed Forces. The committee also welcomes Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert Hale who has joined the
Secretary and the Chairman at the witness table.
Let me start by thanking all of you for your continued service to
the Nation and to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines at home
and in harm's way around the globe and to their families. They are
truly deserving of the Nation's affection and support. I also want you
to know that we very much appreciate the positive way you all have
worked with this committee and the relationships you have fostered with
our members.
BUDGET
Your testimony today marks the beginning of the committee's review
of the fiscal year 2013 budget request for DOD. This year's request
includes $525 billion for the base budget and $88.4 billion for
overseas contingency operations (OCO). The fiscal year 2013 base budget
request is $5 billion less than the fiscal year 2012 enacted level of
$530 billion. The OCO request is $27 billion less than last year's
enacted level of $115 billion.
The fiscal year 2013 base budget request conforms with the Budget
Control Act that Congress passed last summer. The Senate approved the
Budget Control Act on a bipartisan basis with 74 Senators voting for
it. The Budget Control Act locked in defense and non-defense
discretionary spending caps over 10 years. The defense caps reduced
projected defense spending by nearly half a trillion dollars over 10
years and the Department responded with a new strategy and new program
to meet the Nation's security challenges and preserve our military
capabilities.
The Budget Control Act also included language requiring Congress to
pass legislation with additional far-reaching deficit reduction. If
Congress does not come up with a deficit reduction package by next
January, one that locks in another $1.2 trillion in deficit reduction
over 10 years, then automatic spending cuts, called sequestration, will
be imposed on both defense and non-defense programs. We need to find a
comprehensive deficit reduction plan that will avoid these drastic and
arbitrary cuts. The budget the President sent us yesterday avoids
sequestration by meeting the $1.2 trillion additional defense reduction
target--approximately one-half in further cuts in spending and one-half
in additional revenues.
STRATEGY
The defense budget request for fiscal year 2013 not only conforms
to the funding limits of the congressionally-mandated Budget Control
Act, it also supports the results of the Department's comprehensive,
carefully managed, and inclusive strategic review initiated by
President Obama in April last year and the strategic guidance that
resulted. The requirement for a new strategic review, following so
closely on the heels of the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review, was driven
in part by the fiscal crisis confronting the Nation. As former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen, cautioned us in August 2010:
``The most significant threat to our national security is our debt.''
Senior military leaders have made it clear that updating and where
necessary adjusting the Nation's security strategy was their first
order of business and the budget they have sent to us this year was
built after and to support that new Defense Strategic Guidance.
In looking more toward the future, the new Defense Strategic
Guidance places emphasis on potentially growing strategic challenges in
the Asia-Pacific region, but intends to do so without ignoring the
enduring challenges of the Middle East. Consistent with this shift, the
Department will place more emphasis on systems that project our
military power, assuring access and freedom of operations in any
region. It sustains the growth in Special Operations Forces (SOF) and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and increases
investment in unmanned systems and cyberspace capabilities. The
guidance deemphasizes stability operations in the near and distant
future and therefore reduces the size of Army and Marine Corps ground
forces to slightly above pre-2003 levels. Finally, as a strategic and
operational hedge, implementation of the reductions in current
capabilities such as end strength and force structure will be
accomplished in a way that allows for stopping or reversing the changes
depending on developments in the strategic environment or the emergence
of an unforeseen crisis.
We look forward to the witnesses' explanation of the process they
went through to develop the new Defense Strategic Guidance, their
assessment of this guidance's most important features and potential
risks relative to the current and anticipated security environment, and
how this budget request supports its strategic priorities and manages
strategic risk in the near- and long-terms.
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE
The administration has called for two more base realignment and
closure (BRAC) rounds. In my view, however, before we consider another
round of BRAC, the Department ought to take a hard look at whether
further reduction in bases can be made overseas, particularly in
Europe. While the Department has announced the removal of two of the
four combat brigades currently stationed in Europe, even after the
brigades are withdrawn, there will still be over 70,000 U.S. military
personnel deployed in Europe. Finding further reductions and
consolidations in our overseas force posture should be our first
priority before another BRAC round.
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
The fiscal year 2013 defense budget request reflects the continuing
conflict in Afghanistan, but also reflects the fact that the process of
transition has begun and continues apace. Afghan security forces are
assuming responsibility for securing the Afghan people in more and more
areas throughout the country. Progress on security is real. The second
round of areas to be transitioned to an Afghan security lead will be
completed later this year. Then, approximately 50 percent of the Afghan
population will live in areas where Afghan security forces have the
lead for providing security, with coalition forces playing a supporting
role.
I have long pressed for Afghan security forces to move increasingly
into the combat lead and to assume responsibility for securing more and
more Afghan territory and communities, as the size and capabilities of
the Afghan Army and police are built up. The success of our mission in
Afghanistan depends on getting the Afghan security forces in the lead
with the support of the Afghan people, thereby putting the lie to the
Taliban propaganda that the coalition is an occupying force.
The Afghan Foreign Ministry spokesman recently made clear there was
full agreement on transition, saying: ``We have always maintained that
Afghan security is an Afghan responsibility.''
Last June President Obama said that the 33,000 U.S. surge force
would be removed from Afghanistan by the end of this summer. That means
that 68,000 U.S. troops will remain in Afghanistan after the drawdown
of the surge.
He also said that after the reduction of the U.S. surge force, U.S.
troops will continue to draw down ``at a steady pace.'' Yet the fiscal
year 2013 OCO budget request now before Congress is based on an
assumption that there are no additional reductions in the 68,000 troop
level in Afghanistan throughout all of fiscal year 2013. The question
that I hope our witnesses will address this morning is whether they
expect further reductions in U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan during
fiscal year 2013 below 68,000 and what associated cost savings would
result. If that decision has not been made by the President, what is
the timetable for its being made? I also hope Secretary Panetta will
clarify his surprising statements earlier this month that, ``Our goal
is to complete all of [the transition to a training, advisory and
assistance role] in 2013'' and that ``Hopefully by mid- to the latter
part of 2013 we'll be able to make a transition from a combat role.''
There are many reports about reconciliation talks with the Taliban.
If Taliban statements are true that they will open a political office
in Qatar, it would have the potential to be a positive development. I
am concerned, however, by reports that in exchange for the opening of
this office, the administration is considering transferring five Afghan
Taliban detainees from the Guantanamo detention facility to Qatar. Such
a significant step strikes me as premature and should be considered in
my view only following positive discussions, not preceding them.
Another concern I have regarding the progress of the reconciliation
talks is the reported decision by the Government of Afghanistan to open
a second channel in the dialogue with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia. It
seems to me this would create the potential for confusion. The United
States has said it is committed to an Afghan-led reconciliation
process. That is another reason that the discussion process ought to be
pursued through a single channel, with both the Afghan Government and
the United States fully coordinated and participating together, whether
it takes place in one or two venues.
The wild card in the peace process is what role Pakistan will play.
In the past few months, our relations with Pakistan have hit a low
point. If Pakistan is committed to peace and stability in the region,
it needs to begin by ending the safe havens in Pakistan for insurgents
who are attacking our forces, the Afghan forces and the Afghan people.
Pakistan cannot expect to have a normal relationship with the United
States until it deals with the threats to us emanating from these
militant sanctuaries for militants in Pakistan.
SECURITY POSTURE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC
The Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizes the U.S. military
presence and posture in the Asia Pacific, and rightly so. The recent
death of North Korea's Kim Jong-il creates new uncertainties about
possible threats to regional security, and questions about China's
rapid military growth. Its increasing assertiveness in areas like the
South China Sea remind us that our presence and constructive engagement
in the region remains important to the security interests of the United
States and the region. The committee remains keenly interested in the
plans for U.S. force posture in the Pacific.
With respect to realignment of U.S. marines on Okinawa, for
example, Senator McCain, Senator Webb, and I have advocated changes to
the current plan in ways that support the strategic goals of the U.S.
regional military posture while avoiding excessive and unsustainable
costs associated with large and elaborate new bases. The announcement
last week that the United States and Japan are reconsidering elements
of the plan is welcome news, but the steps are not yet adequate. For
instance, there is apparently no intention to reconsider the plan to
build the unaffordable Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on
Okinawa, nor does it appear that the U.S. Air Force bases in the region
are being considered as part of the solution although they now have
excess capacity. It is important that any changes be jointly agreed
upon and jointly announced, and that they go far enough that a more
viable and sustainable U.S. presence in Japan and on Guam results.
OTHER CHALLENGES
Iran
There is a strong bipartisan determination on this committee and in
Congress to do all we can to counter the threat Iran poses, including
stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. President Obama has
focused considerable diplomatic effort towards that goal because, in
his own words, ``America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a
nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to achieve
that goal.'' The administration is bringing the world together to speak
with one strong voice against Iran's nuclear ambitions.
The administration has sought to make clear the benefits available
to Iran and its people if it complies with international norms and
obligations, but also to make clear the negative consequences if it
decides to produce nuclear weapons. Concerted, coordinated,
international diplomatic and economic pressure will hopefully make Iran
understand in practical terms the consequences of its actions, and will
convince Iran not to pursue the development of a nuclear weapon.
Arab Spring
The impact of the Arab Spring has had significant implications on
security and stability in the region, including U.S. security
cooperation, military-to-military relations, and counterterrorism
cooperation. The Department's new Defense Strategic Guidance places
considerable emphasis on partnering with foreign nations and their
militaries on matters of mutual interest. The committee will be
interested to hear from the Secretary and the Chairman on the impact of
the Arab Spring, and the problems and opportunities it has created for
our security.
Egypt
The decades old relationship between the United States and Egypt is
under strain. In recent days, General Dempsey traveled to Cairo to
engage the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces on the very troubling
decision by the Egyptians to charge 19 Americans and dozens of other
individuals for operating programs in support of Egyptian civil
society. The committee is eager to learn the findings of General
Dempsey's visit because the decision by the Egyptians, if unresolved,
will negatively affect funding decisions that Congress makes in the
coming months.
Syria
Finally, the regime of President Bashar-al-Assad is waging war on
the people of Syria and despite the condemnation of the Arab League and
almost all nations, China and Russia are preventing the U.N. Security
Council from taking any effective action. If the situation is left as
is, there is also a significant threat that surrounding countries could
be severely impacted. Our witnesses will hopefully discuss options we
have to help end the slaughter, as limited as those options might be.
MISSILE DEFENSE
Given the existing and growing threat of ballistic missiles from
nations such as North Korea and Iran, Congress has been supportive of
efforts to develop and field effective ballistic missile defenses
against these threats. The completion of Phase 1 of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) at the end of 2011 provided an initial level
of protection against Iran's regional missile threat to Europe, and is
expected to be part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO)
initial missile defense capability later this spring. The Department is
continuing to develop additional EPAA capabilities to counter future
Iranian missile threats.
NATO and the United States continue to pursue cooperation with
Russia on missile defense, since it could enhance our security against
the common threat of Iranian missiles. Although this has been a
contentious issue with Russia, a new independent study released at the
Munich Security Conference points the way to a practical and beneficial
approach to such cooperation, similar to the NATO approach. If there is
U.S.-Russian cooperation on this, it would send a powerful signal to
Iran and might help dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons and
missiles to carry them.
CYBERSECURITY
The Defense Strategic Guidance notes that both state and non-state
actors possess the capability and intent to conduct cyber espionage and
the capability to conduct cyber attacks on the United States, with
possibly severe effects on both our economy and on our security. The
Director of National Intelligence, in recent Senate testimony, placed
the cybersecurity threat in the top tier, alongside terrorism and
proliferation. A recent report from the National Counterintelligence
Executive stated that entities operating from within China and Russia
are responsible for the massive theft of U.S. commercial and military
technology that could threaten our national security and economy. We
should let China and Russia know, in no uncertain terms, that cyber
economic espionage will have very negative consequences for normal
trade relations.
In addition to defending its own networks, the Department of
Defense has an important role to play in supporting the Department of
Homeland Security in improving the security of all government networks
and those of the Nation's 17 designated critical infrastructure
sectors, which includes the Defense Industrial Base,
telecommunications, energy, transportation, and banking and finance,
among others. The security of those networks is also vital to the
Department of Defense, which depends on them to mobilize, deploy, and
sustain our military forces.
COUNTERTERRORISM
The Department's strategic guidance continues to place U.S.
counterterrorism activities among its highest priorities. The United
States has had a number of significant successes in the last year--most
notably, operations against Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki--and
U.S. counterterrorism efforts are becoming more global as al Qaeda and
its affiliates disperse to Yemen, Somalia, Iran, North Africa, and
other prospective sanctuaries.
The budget priorities outlined by the Department appropriately
emphasize the capabilities possessed by Special Operations Forces to
conduct counterterrorism, building partnership capacity, and other
missions in support of geographic combatant commanders. The committee
looks forward to learning more about how these forces will be utilized
under the Strategic Guidance to meet demand for engagements with
partner nations, particularly in the Asia Pacific, while continuing to
counter al Qaeda and affiliated organizations elsewhere.
PERSONNEL
Finally, in the area of personnel, the Department proposes numerous
personnel-related reforms aimed at slowing the increase in personnel
and health care costs, which continue to rise at unsustainable rates.
These reforms include a significant reduction in military end strength
over the next 5 years, other personnel-related reforms, and a
commission to review military retirement benefits. I agree with General
Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, the Service Chiefs, and the Services'
senior enlisted advisors who urged me, in a letter dated January 25,
2011, to grandfather the retirement benefits of those currently
serving. We owe it to our servicemembers and their families to address
any change in their compensation and benefits in a manner that
acknowledges the commitment we made to them when they volunteered to
serve in our Armed Forces.
Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, we look forward to your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join in
welcoming Secretary Panetta and Chairman Dempsey to discuss the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2013; his proposal
to reduce the budget for DOD by $487 billion over the next 10
years, and the impact of these reductions on FYDP for DOD.
While the other members of this committee and I will
continue to scrutinize these proposals, I can say today that I
do not fully endorse this budget request. Indeed, I am
seriously concerned about how we arrived at this point. On
April 13, 2011, the President of the United States announced
his intention to reduce the DOD budget by $400 billion through
2023. However, his announcement was unsupported by any type of
comprehensive strategic review or risk assessment. In fact,
then-Secretary Gates testified before Congress that he only
learned the night before about this massive proposed cut in our
defense spending.
Now, the President proposes $487 billion in cuts over 10
years, and we're told that these proposed cuts are not budget-
driven, but based on a thorough strategic review of our defense
priorities. Respectfully, this doesn't add up.
Unfortunately, this defense budget continues the
administration's habit of putting short-term political
considerations over our long-term national security interests.
In Afghanistan, our military commanders initially asked for a
surge of 40,000 troops. The President disregarded their advice,
sent 30,000 troops instead, and announced a date when they
would begin withdrawing. Our commanders then recommended
maintaining the full surge force throughout this year's
fighting season, but the President again disregarded their
advice and announced reductions to our force levels that the
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen,
said were more aggressive and incurred greater risks than he
advised. Finally, in Iraq, the President disregarded the advice
of his commanders again, dragged out negotiations with the
Iraqi Government with no intent to maintain a presence of U.S.
troops. Now, with the political and security situations
unraveling, it is difficult to argue that Iraq today is, to use
the President's phrase, ``stable and self-reliant.''
It seems as though many of the President's most significant
decisions about our national defense have been fundamentally
disconnected from conditions on the ground and the advice of
our military commanders, including commanders that the
President himself selected. I fear that this defense budget and
the broader plan to cut $487 billion from DOD over 10 years
only continues this dangerous and regrettable pattern.
By any objective assessment, the worldwide threats to our
Nation, our interests, and our ideals are not diminishing. They
are growing. Yet the defense budget before us would reduce the
size of our force by more than 125,000 military personnel. It
would jeopardize our nuclear modernization plan by making
critical cuts to our nuclear weapons infrastructure programs.
It would eliminate 20 percent of the Army's brigade combat
teams (BCT), 6 Marine Corps battalions, 4 tactical air
squadrons, 7 Air Force combat squadrons, and 130 mobility
aircraft. Perhaps most concerning of all, in light of the
administration's own identification of the Asia-Pacific region
as the focus of U.S. defense strategy, this budget would
require the Navy to reduce shipbuilding by 28 percent, to
retire seven cruisers and two amphibious ships earlier than
planned, to delay the next generation ballistic missile
submarine, and to postpone the purchases of one Virginia-class
attack submarine, two littoral combat ships, and eight high-
speed transport vessels.
Furthermore, while this defense strategy and its related
budget cuts clearly increase the risks to our national security
objectives, there has been no formal risk assessment provided
to Congress. How can we and the American people determine
whether the additional risks associated with this strategy are
acceptable if we do not know the specific nature of those risks
as defined by the U.S. military?
These cuts pale in comparison to what DOD would face under
sequestration, an outcome that Secretary Panetta has correctly
stated would be ``catastrophic'' for our national defense. Yet,
here too, domestic politics are taking priority over national
security, with the President saying he would veto an effort by
Congress to eliminate sequestration that does not include
raising taxes.
Our message to you, Secretary Panetta, and to the President
of the United States: If it is as catastrophic as you state,
then why don't we sit down? Why doesn't the President sit down
with us and we work out a way to avoid what you and General
Dempsey have described as catastrophic consequences for the
national security of this country, rather than the President
sitting in the Oval Office and saying he'll veto any bill that
doesn't have tax increases in it?
In short, we have come to a critical turning point when
decisions of the utmost importance for our national security
must be resolved, and the consequences of those decisions, for
better or worse, will forever shape our Nation's destiny.
Defense spending is not what is sinking this country deeper
into an unsustainable national debt. If we act under the
assumption that it is, we will create something that is truly
unaffordable, the hollowing out of the U.S. military and the
decline of U.S. military power. We can either take the easy
route of dramatic cuts to force structure and investments,
which diminish our military capabilities and increase risk. Or,
we can balance more modest and strategically-directed
reductions in defense spending with an aggressive plan to
address the broader cultural problems plaguing our defense
establishment, the waste and inefficiency with which DOD buys
goods and services under the undue influence of a
noncompetitive military/industrial/congressional complex.
I believe we must tackle this cultural problem head on. We
must cut congressional earmarks and pork barrel spending on
programs that the military does not request and does not need.
We must have transparent and auditable financial statements,
and we must eliminate the shameless cost overruns that
characterize too many of our largest defense programs.
From my review of these programs, this point is clear: The
phenomenon of acquisition malpractice, which a senior DOD
official publicly described just a few days ago, can be found
in many more programs than just the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
It pervades the entire major defense acquisition program
portfolio, revealing a cultural problem in the acquisition of
goods and services that is unsustainable. Before DOD further
risks force structure to achieve budget savings, practices like
this must end now.
Now is the time to set politics aside for the sake of the
one issue that we can all agree on is nonnegotiable to the
future health and success of our Nation--our national defense.
We need to start with goals, move to strategy, and allow that
rigorous process to inform the budget we create. The
administration's approach thus far has been too defined by
short-term domestic political considerations. The
administration has not led. For the sake of our national
security, Congress should.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of
our witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Secretary Panetta.
STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT F. HALE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMPTROLLER)
Secretary Panetta. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin,
Senator McCain, members of the committee. I ask that my
statement be made part of the record and I would like to
summarize some of the key points.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record and, by
the way, the balance of my statement that I didn't give will
also be made part of the record.
Secretary Panetta. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year 2013.
Let me begin, as always, by thanking you for the support that
you provide to servicemembers and to our military families.
These brave men and women, along with DOD's civilian
professionals who support them, have done everything asked of
them and more, during more than a decade of war. I want to
thank you for the support that you have given them in the past,
the present, and hopefully in the future.
The fiscal year 2013 budget request for DOD was the product
of an intensive strategy review that was conducted by the
senior military and civilian leaders of DOD, with advice and
guidance of the President. The total request represents a $614
billion investment in national defense that includes $525.4
billion for DOD's base budget and $88.5 billion in spending to
support our troops in combat.
The reasons for this review are clear. First, the United
States is at a strategic turning point after a decade of war
and after very substantial growth in defense budgets.
Second, with the Nation confronting a very large debt
problem and deficit problem in this country, Congress passed
the BCA of 2011, imposing a reduction in the defense budget of
$487 billion over the next decade. We at DOD decided to step up
to the plate, and that this crisis provided us an opportunity
to establish a new strategy for the force that we would need in
the future. That strategy has guided us in making the budget
decisions and choices that are contained in the President's
budget.
The fact is, we are at an important turning point that
would have required us to make a strategic shift probably under
any circumstances. The U.S. military's mission in Iraq has
ended. While we still have a tough fight on our hands in
Afghanistan, 2011 marks significant progress in reducing
violence and transitioning to an Afghan-led responsibility for
security, and we are on track to complete this transition by
the end of 2014 in accordance with our Lisbon commitments.
Having just returned from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) ministerial, I can assure you that all of
the NATO nations are in line with the strategy that we are
approaching with regards to Afghanistan. We are in a
transition. We are transitioning security to Afghan forces, and
our hope is that as we make the final transition in 2014, that
they can take the lead on combat operations. We will be there.
We'll be in support. We'll be combat-ready to support them
through that process. I want to assure you that NATO is fully
in agreement with the strategy that we are moving in in
Afghanistan.
Last year, in addition, the NATO effort in Libya also
concluded with the fall of Qadafi, and successful
counterterrorism efforts have significantly weakened al Qaeda
and decimated its leadership.
But despite what we have been able to achieve, unlike past
drawdowns when threats have receded, the United States still
faces a very complex array of strategic challenges across the
globe. We are still a Nation at war in Afghanistan. We still
face threats to our Homeland from terrorism. There is a
dangerous proliferation of lethal weapons and materials. The
behavior of Iran and North Korea continue to threaten global
stability. There is continuing turmoil and unrest in the Middle
East, from Syria to Egypt to Yemen and beyond. Rising powers in
Asia are testing international rules and relationships, and
there are growing concerns about cyber intrusions and attacks.
Our challenge is to meet these threats, to protect our
Nation and our people, and at the same time, meet our
responsibility to fiscal discipline. This is not an easy task.
To build the force we need for the future, we developed a
new Defense Strategic Guidance that consists of five key
elements.
First, the military will be smaller and leaner, but we want
a military that is agile, flexible, ready, and technologically
advanced.
Second, we will rebalance our global posture and presence
to emphasize Asia Pacific and the Middle East, because those
areas represent the threats for the future.
Third, for the rest of the world, we need to build
innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and
partnerships from Europe to Latin America to Africa.
Fourth, we will ensure that we have the capability to
quickly confront and defeat aggression from any adversary, any
time, anywhere.
Fifth, this can't just be about cuts. It also has to be
about protecting and prioritizing key investments in technology
and new capabilities, as well as our capacity to grow, adapt,
and mobilize as needed.
We've developed this new Defense Strategic Guidance before
any final budget decisions were made, in order to ensure that
the decisions that are here, the choices we made, reflect the
new defense strategy. While shaping the strategy, we didn't
want to repeat the mistakes of the past. Our goals are to
maintain the strongest military in the world, to not hollow out
the force, to take a balanced approach to budget cuts by
putting everything on the table, and to not break faith with
our troops and their families.
Throughout this review, we also wanted to make sure that
this was an inclusive process. General Dempsey and I worked
closely with the leadership of the Services and the combatant
commanders and consulted regularly with Members of Congress. As
a result of these efforts, DOD is strongly unified behind the
recommendations that we are presenting today.
Consistent with the BCA, this budget reflects in the next 5
years a savings of $259 billion. That's compared to the budget
plan that was submitted, obviously, to Congress last year.
We think this is a balanced and complete package that
follows the key elements of the strategy and adheres to the
guidelines that we established. The savings come from three
broad areas.
First, efficiencies. We have redoubled our efforts to
discipline the use of taxpayers' dollars, and that has yielded,
we hope, about one-quarter of the targeted savings that we have
in this package.
The second area is force structure and procurement reforms
and adjustments. We've made strategy-driven changes in both
force structure and procurement programs to achieve roughly
half of the savings in this package.
Finally, on compensation. We've made modest but important
adjustments in personnel costs to achieve some very necessary
cost savings in this area. This area represents about one-third
of our budget, but here it accounted for little more than 10
percent of the total reduction that we've presented.
Let me walk through each of these areas. First of all, with
regards to disciplining defense dollars, if we're going to
tighten up the force then I, like Senator McCain, believe very
strongly that we have to begin by tightening up the operations
of DOD. We have to reduce excess overhead, eliminate waste, and
improve business practices across DOD.
The fiscal year 2012 budget proposed more than $150 billion
in efficiencies, and we continue to implement those changes.
But we also identified another $60 billion in additional
savings over 5 years through measures like streamlining support
functions, consolidating information technology enterprise
services, rephasing military construction (MILCON) projects,
consolidating inventory, and reducing service support
contractors.
As we reduce force structure, we also have a responsibility
to provide the most cost-efficient support for the force. For
that reason, the President will request Congress to authorize
the BRAC process for 2013 and 2015. As somebody who went
through the BRAC process in my own district, I recognize how
controversial this process is for Members and for
constituencies. Yet, it is the only effective way to achieve
needed infrastructure savings.
To provide better financial information, we are also
increasing our emphasis on audit readiness and accelerating key
timelines. In October 2011, I directed DOD to accelerate
efforts to achieve fully auditable financial statements. We
were mandated to do it by 2017; what I have ordered is that we
move that up to 2014.
But efficiencies alone are not enough to achieve the
required savings. Budget reductions of this magnitude require
that we make adjustments to force structure and procurement
investments. The choices that we made have to fit the five
elements of the strategy that we developed for the future
military force.
First, we knew that coming out of these wars, as I said,
the military would be smaller, but our approach to
accommodating these reductions has been to take this as an
opportunity to fashion an agile and flexible military that we
need for the future. That highly networked and capable joint
force consists of an adaptable and battle-tested Army that
remains our Nation's force for decisive action, capable of
defeating any adversary on land, and at the same time being
innovative about how it deploys its forces; a Navy that
maintains forward presence and is able to penetrate enemy
defenses; a Marine Corps that remains a middleweight
expeditionary force, with reinvigorated and amphibious
capabilities; an Air Force that dominates air and space and
provides rapid mobility, global strike, and persistent
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and a
National Guard and Reserve that continue to be ready and
prepared for operations when needed.
To ensure this agile force, we made a conscious choice not
to maintain more force structure than we could afford to
properly train and equip. If we do it the other way, we
guarantee a hollow force. We wanted a force structure that we
could effectively train and maintain.
We are implementing force structure reductions consistent
with the new Defense Strategic Guidance for a total savings of
$50 billion over the next 5 years. The adjustments include, as
was pointed out, a resizing of the Active Army from 562,000 to
490,000 soldiers by 2017. This will transition down in a
responsible way.
We'll gradually resize the Active Marine Corps from about
202,000 to 182,000. We'll reduce and streamline the Air Force's
airlift fleet. We'll retire some aging C-5As and C-130s. But at
the same time, we'll maintain a fleet of 275 strategic
airlifters and 318 C-130s, a fleet that will be more than
capable of meeting the airlift requirements of the new
strategy.
The Navy will protect our highest priority and most
flexible ships, but we also will retire seven lower priority
Navy cruisers. The reason we're doing that is that these
cruisers have not been upgraded with ballistic missile defense
capability and would require significant repairs. That's the
reason the Navy chose to do that.
Second, the New Strategic Guidance made clear that we must
protect our capabilities needed to project power in Asia
Pacific and the Middle East. To this end, the budget maintains
the current bomber fleet, it maintains the aircraft carrier
fleet at a long-term level of 11 ships and 10 air wings, it
maintains the big-deck amphibious fleet, and it restores Army
and Marine Corps force structure in the Pacific after the
drawdown from Iraq and as we draw down in Afghanistan, while
continuing to maintain a strong presence in the Middle East.
Our goal is to expand our rotational presence in both areas.
The budget also makes selected new investments to ensure we
develop new capabilities to project power in key territories
and domains. We're going to put $300 million to fund the next
general Air Force bomber. We're putting $1.8 billion to develop
the new Air Force tanker, $18.2 billion for the procurement of
10 new warships, including 2 Virginia-class submarines, 2
Aegis-class destroyers, 4 littoral combat ships, 1 joint high-
speed vessel, and 1 CVN-21-class aircraft carrier. We're also
investing $100 million to increase cruise missile capacity of
future Virginia-class submarines.
Third, the strategy makes clear that, even as Asia Pacific
and the Middle East represent the areas of growing strategic
priority, the United States will continue to work to strengthen
its key alliances, to build partnerships, to develop innovative
ways, such as rotational deployments, to sustain our presence
elsewhere in the world.
To that end, we make key investments in NATO and other
partnership programs. We're putting $200 million in fiscal year
2013 and nearly $900 million over the next 5 years on the NATO
alliance Ground Surveillance System, one that was just approved
by the NATO ministerial in this last meeting; $9.7 billion in
fiscal year 2013 and about $47 billion to develop and deploy
missile defense capabilities that protect the U.S. Homeland and
strengthen regional missile defenses as well.
The new strategy envisions a series of organizational
changes to boost efforts to partner with other militaries.
We're allocating a U.S.-based brigade to the NATO response
force and will rotate U.S.-based units to Europe on a regular
basis for training and exercises, increasing the opportunities
as well for Special Operations Forces (SOF) to advise and
assist our partners in other regions.
Fourth, the United States must have the capability to fight
more than one conflict at a time. But we are in the 21st
century and we have to use 21st century capabilities. That's
the reason this budget invests in space, in cyber space, in
long-range precision strike, and in the continued growth of
SOF, to ensure that we can still confront and defeat multiple
adversaries even with the force structure reductions that I've
outlined earlier.
It also sustains the nuclear triad of bombers, missiles,
and submarines to continue to ensure that we have a safe,
reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent. Even with some
adjustments to force structure, the budget sustains a military
that I believe is the strongest in the world: an Army of more
than 1 million Active and Reserve soldiers with 18 divisions,
approximately 65 BCTs, and 21 combat aviation brigades; a naval
force of 285 ships, the same size force that we have today,
that will remain the most powerful and flexible naval force on
Earth; a Marine Corps with 31 infantry battalions, 10 artillery
battalions, and 20 tactical air squadrons; and an Air Force
that will continue to ensure air dominance, with 54 combat-
coded fighter squadrons and the current bomber fleet.
Lastly, we can't just, as I said, cut. We have to invest.
We have to leap ahead of our adversaries by investments in the
latest technologies. That's why this budget provides $11.9
billion for science and technology (S&T). It includes $2.1
billion for basic research. It provides $10.4 billion to
sustain the continued growth in SOF. It provides $3.8 billion
for unmanned air systems and it invests $3.4 billion in cyber
activities.
At the same time, the New Strategic Guidance recognizes the
need to prioritize and distinguish urgent modernization needs
from those that can be delayed, particularly in light of
schedule and cost problems. Therefore, the budget has
identified $75 billion in savings over 5 years resulting from
cancelled or restructured programs. Some examples: $15.1
billion in savings from restructuring the JSF, by delaying
aircraft purchases so that we can allow more time for
development and testing; $1.3 billion in savings from delaying
development of the Army's ground combat vehicle due to
contracting difficulties; $4.3 billion in savings from delaying
the next generation of ballistic missile submarines by 2 years
for affordability and management reasons.
In addition, we terminate selected programs: the Block 30
version of Global Hawk, which has grown in cost to the point
that it is simply no longer cost-effective; the weather
satellite program, because we can depend on existing
satellites, resulting in a savings of $2.3 billion.
All of this requires that we have to have and maintain the
ability to mobilize and to regrow the force if we have to. That
means we need to maintain a capable and ready National Guard
and Reserve. One of the things we are doing is that the Army is
going to retain more mid-grade officers and noncommissioned
officers so they'll be there with the experience and structure
we need if we have to move quickly to regrow the force. The
Reserve component has demonstrated its readiness and importance
over the past 10 years of war and we must ensure that it
remains available, trained, and equipped to serve in an
operational capacity when necessary.
Another key part of preserving our ability to quickly adapt
and mobilize is maintaining a strong and flexible industrial
base. I'm committed to make sure that our budget recognizes
that industry is our partner in the defense acquisition
enterprise. We have to maintain a base if we're going to be
able to mobilize and be prepared in the future.
Finally, with regards to our most important element of our
strategy and our decisionmaking process: our people. This
budget recognizes that they, far more than any weapons system
or technology, are the great strength of the U.S. military. One
of the guiding principles in our decisionmaking process was
that we must try to keep faith with our troops and their
families. For that reason, we've determined to protect family
assistance programs, to sustain these important investments in
this budget that serve our troops and their families, and
continue to make efforts to ensure that these programs are
responsive to their needs.
Yet, in order to build the force needed to defend the
country under existing budget constraints, the growth in costs
of military pay and benefits must be put on a sustainable
course. This is an area of the budget that has grown by nearly
90 percent since 2001, about 30 percent above inflation, while
end strength has only grown by 3 percent. So this budget
contains a road map to try to address those costs in military
pay and health care and retirement in ways that we believe are
fair, transparent, and consistent with our fundamental
commitments to our people.
On military pay, there are no pay cuts. We've created
sufficient room to allow full pay raises in 2013 and 2014.
However, we will provide more limited pay raises beginning in
2015, giving troops and their families fair notice and lead
time before changes take effect.
The budget devotes about $48, almost $50 billion to health
care costs. It's a big part of our budget, an amount that has
more than doubled over the last decade. In order to continue to
control the growth of these costs, we're recommending increases
in health care fees, in copays and deductibles that are to be
phased in over 4 to 5 years. None of these fee proposals would
apply to Active-Duty servicemembers and there will be no
increases in health care premiums for families of Active-Duty
servicemembers under this proposal.
We also feel that it's important to address the military
retirement costs as well. What we urge is the establishment of
a commission with authority to conduct a comprehensive review
of military retirement. But we have made clear, the President
and DOD, that the retirement benefits of those who currently
serve should be protected by grandfathering their benefits.
Members of the committee, putting this together, this kind
of balanced package, has been difficult, and at the same time
it has been an opportunity to try to think about what force do
we need now and what force do we need in the future. I believe
we, the Service Chiefs, the combatant commanders, have
developed a complete package to try to address our threats for
the future and to try to ensure that we achieve our strategic
aims.
As a result, the fiscal year 2013 request is balanced, it
keeps America safe, and we think it sustains U.S. leadership
abroad. Please take a look at each of the individual parts of
this plan. I encourage you to review this entire budget. This
has to be a partnership. But I ask you also to bear in mind the
strategic tradeoffs that are inherent in any particular budget
decision. This is a zero sum game. There is no free money here.
The need to balance competing strategic objectives is taking
place in a resource-constrained environment. We'll need your
support and partnership to implement this vision of the future
military.
I know these are tough issues. This is the beginning, it's
not the end of this process. But make no mistake, the savings
that we are proposing are significant and broad-based and will
impact all 50 States. But this is what Congress mandated on a
bipartisan basis, that we reduce the defense budget by almost
half a trillion dollars. We need your partnership to do this in
a manner that preserves the strongest military in the world.
This will be a test for all of us of whether reducing the
deficit is about talk or about action.
Let me be clear. You can't take a half a trillion dollars
out of the defense budget and not incur additional risks. We
believe they are acceptable risks, but they are risks. We're
going to have a smaller force. We'll depend on the speed of
mobilization. We have to depend on ingenuity in terms of new
technologies for the future, and very frankly, when you go
through this there is no margin for error.
This is why Congress must do everything possible to make
sure that we avoid sequestration. We are more than prepared to
work with Congress to try to develop an approach that will
detrigger sequestration. This approach would subject DOD to
another $500 billion in additional cuts that would be required
to take place in a meat-axe approach. We are convinced that it
would result in hollowing out the force and inflicting severe
damage to our national defense.
So the leadership of DOD, both military and civilian, is
unified behind the strategy we've presented, behind this
budget, and behind the need to avoid sequestration.
I look forward to working closely with you in the months
ahead. This is going to be a tough challenge, but it's what the
American people expect of its elected leaders, to be fiscally
responsible in developing the force for the future, the force
that can defend the country, the force that supports our men
and women in uniform, and a force that is and always will be
the strongest military in the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Panetta follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Leon E. Panetta
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2013.
Let me begin by first thanking you for your support for our
servicemembers and our military families. These brave men and women,
along with the Department's civilian professionals who support them,
have done everything asked of them and more during more than a decade
of war.
DEFENSE STRATEGY REVIEW
The fiscal year 2013 budget request for the Department of Defense
(DOD) was the product of an intensive strategy review conducted by the
senior military and civilian leaders of the Department with the advice
and guidance of President Obama. The total request represents a $614
billion investment in national defense--including a $525.4 billion
request for the Department's base budget, and $88.5 billion in spending
to support our troops in combat.
The reasons for this review are clear: first, the United States is
at a strategic turning point after a decade of war and substantial
growth in defense budgets. Second, with the Nation confronting very
large debt and deficits, Congress passed the Budget Control Act of
2011, imposing limits that led to a reduction in the defense budget of
$487 billion over the next decade.
Deficit reduction is a critical national security priority in and
of itself. We at the Department decided that this crisis presented us
with the opportunity to establish a new strategy for the force of the
future, and that strategy has guided us in making the budget choices
contained in the President's budget. We are at an important turning
point that would have required us to make a strategic shift under any
circumstances. The U.S. military's mission in Iraq has ended. We still
have a tough fight on our hands in Afghanistan, but over the past year
we have begun a transition to Afghan-led responsibility for security--
and we are on track to complete that transition by the end of 2014, in
accordance with our Lisbon commitments. Last year, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) effort in Libya also concluded with the fall
of Qadhafi. Successful counterterrorism efforts have significantly
weakened al Qaeda and decimated its leadership.
But despite what we have been able to achieve, unlike past
drawdowns when threats have receded, the United States still faces a
complex array of security challenges across the globe: We are still a
nation at war in Afghanistan; we still face threats from terrorism;
there is dangerous proliferation of lethal weapons and materials; the
behavior of Iran and North Korea threaten global stability; there is
continuing turmoil and unrest in the Middle East; rising powers in Asia
are testing international relationships; and there are growing concerns
about cyber intrusions and attacks. Our challenge is to meet these
threats and at the same time, meet our responsibility to fiscal
discipline. This is not an easy task.
To build the force we need for the future, we developed a new
Defense Strategic Guidance that consists of these five key elements:
First, the military will be smaller and leaner, but it
will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced.
Second, we will rebalance our global posture and
presence to emphasize Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.
Third, we will build innovative partnerships and
strengthen key alliances and partnerships elsewhere in the
world.
Fourth, we will ensure that we can quickly confront
and defeat aggression from any adversary--anytime, anywhere.
Fifth, we will protect and prioritize key investments
in technology and new capabilities, as well as our capacity to
grow, adapt and mobilize as needed.
STRATEGY TO FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET
We developed this new Defense Strategic Guidance before any final
budget decisions were made to ensure that the budget choices reflected
the new defense strategy.
While shaping this strategy, we did not want to repeat the mistakes
of the past. Our goals were: to maintain the strongest military in the
world, to not ``hollow out'' the force, to take a balanced approach to
budget cuts, to put everything on the table, and to not break faith
with troops and their families. Throughout the review we made sure this
was an inclusive process, and General Dempsey and I worked closely with
the leadership of the Services and combatant commanders, and consulted
regularly with Members of Congress.
As a result of these efforts, the Department is strongly united
behind the recommendations we are presenting today. Consistent with
title I of the Budget Control Act, this budget reflects $259 billion in
savings over the next 5 years and $487 billion over the next 10 years
compared to the budget plan submitted to Congress last year. Under the
5 year budget plan, the base budget will rise from $525 billion in
fiscal year 2013 to $567 billion in fiscal year 2017. When reduced war-
related funding requirements are included, we expect total U.S. defense
spending to drop by more than 20 percent over the next few years from
its peak in 2010, after accounting for inflation.
This is a balanced and complete package that follows the key
elements of the strategy and adheres to the guidelines we established.
The savings come from three broad areas:
First, efficiencies--we redoubled efforts to make more
disciplined use of taxpayer dollars, yielding about one quarter
of the target savings;
Second, force structure and procurement adjustments--
we made strategy-driven changes in force structure and
procurement programs, achieving roughly half of the savings;
and
Finally, compensation--we made modest but important
adjustments in personnel costs to achieve some necessary cost
savings in this area, which represents one third of the budget
but accounted for a little more than 10 percent of the total
reduction.
Changes in economic assumptions and other shifts account for the
remainder of the $259 billion in savings. Let me walk through these
three areas, beginning with our efforts to discipline our use of
defense dollars.
MORE DISCIPLINED USE OF DEFENSE DOLLARS
If we are to tighten up the force, I felt we have to begin by
tightening up the operations of the Department. This budget continues
efforts to reduce excess overhead, eliminate waste, and improve
business practices across the department. The more savings realized in
this area, the less spending reductions required for modernization
programs, force structure, and military compensation.
The fiscal year 2012 budget proposed more than $150 billion in
efficiencies between fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2016, and we
continue to implement those changes. This budget identifies about $60
billion in additional savings over 5 years. Across the Military
Services, new efficiency efforts over the next 5 years include:
The Army proposes to save $18.6 billion through
measures such as streamlining support functions, consolidating
information technology enterprise services, and rephasing
military construction projects;
The Navy proposes to save $5.7 billion by implementing
strategic sourcing of commodities and services, consolidating
inventory, and other measures; and
The Air Force proposes to save $6.6 billion by
reducing service support contractors and rephasing military
construction projects.
Other proposed DOD-wide efficiency savings over the next 5 years
total $30.1 billion, including reductions in expenses in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the Defense agencies.
Additionally, we are continuing the initiative to improve the
Department's buying power by seeking greater efficiency and
productivity in the acquisition of goods and services. We are
strengthening acquisition support to the warfighter, executing
acquisitions more efficiently, preserving the industrial base, and
strengthening the acquisition workforce. This budget assumes that these
policies produce savings of $5.3 billion over the next 5 years.
In terms of military infrastructure, we will need to ensure that
our current basing and infrastructure requirements do not divert
resources from badly needed capabilities.
As we reduce force structure, we have a responsibility to provide
the most cost efficient support for the force. For that reason, the
President will request that Congress authorize the Base Realignment and
Closure process for 2013 and 2015. As someone who went through BRAC, I
realize how controversial this process can be for members and
constituencies. Yet, it is the only effective way to achieve
infrastructure savings.
Achieving audit readiness is another key initiative that will help
the Department achieve greater discipline in its use of defense
dollars. The Department needs auditable financial statements to comply
with the law, to strengthen its own internal processes, and to reassure
the public that it continues to be a good steward of Federal funds. In
October 2011, I directed the Department to emphasize this initiative
and accelerate efforts to achieve fully auditable financial statements.
Among other specific goals, I directed the Department achieve audit
readiness of the Statement of Budgetary Resources for general funds by
the end of calendar year 2014, and to meet the legal requirements to
achieve full audit readiness for all Defense Department financial
statements by 2017. We are also implementing a course-based
certification program for defense financial managers in order to
improve training in audit readiness and other areas, with pilot
programs beginning this year. We now have a plan in place to meet these
deadlines, including specific goals, financial resources, and a
governance structure.
These are all critically important efforts to ensure the Department
operates in the most efficient manner possible. Together, these
initiatives will help ensure the Department can preserve funding for
the force structure and modernization needed to support the missions of
our force.
STRATEGY-DRIVEN CHANGES IN FORCE STRUCTURE AND PROGRAMS
It is obvious that we cannot achieve the overall savings targets
through efficiencies alone. Budget reductions of this magnitude require
significant adjustments to force structure and investments, but the
choices we made reflected five key elements of the Defense Strategic
Guidance and vision for the military.
1. Build a force that is smaller and leaner, but agile, flexible,
ready and technologically advanced
We knew that coming out of the wars, the military would be smaller.
Our approach to accommodating these reductions, however, has been to
take this as an opportunity--as tough as it is--to fashion the agile
and flexible military we need for the future. That highly networked and
capable joint force consists of:
an adaptable and battle-tested Army that is our
Nation's force for decisive action, capable of defeating any
adversary on land;
a Navy that maintains forward presence and is able to
penetrate enemy defenses;
a Marine Corps that is a ``middleweight''
expeditionary force with reinvigorated amphibious capabilities;
an Air Force that dominates air and space and provides
rapid mobility, global strike and persistent ISR; and
National Guard and Reserve components that continue to
be ready and prepared for operations when needed.
To ensure an agile force, we made a conscious choice not to
maintain more force structure than we could afford to properly train
and equip. We are implementing force structure reductions consistent
with the new Defense Strategic Guidance for a total savings of about
$50 billion over the next 5 years.
These adjustments include:
Gradually resizing the Active Army to 490,000,
eliminating a minimum of 8 BCTs and developing a plan to update
the Army's brigade structure;
Gradually resizing the Active Marine Corps to about
182,100, eliminating 6 combat battalions and 4 Tactical Air
squadrons;
Reducing and streamlining the Air Force's airlift
fleet by retiring all 27 C-5As, 65 of the oldest C-130s and
divesting all 38 C-27s. After retirements, the Air Force will
maintain a fleet of 275 strategic airlifters, and 318 C-130s--a
number that we have determined is sufficient to meet the
airlift requirements of the new strategy, including the Air
Force's commitment for direct support of the Army;
Eliminating seven Air Force Tactical Air squadrons--
including five A-10 squadrons, one F-16 squadron, and one F-15
training squadron. The Air Force will retain 54 combat-coded
fighter squadrons, maintaining the capabilities and capacity
needed to meet the new Defense Strategic Guidance; and
Retiring seven lower priority Navy cruisers that have
not been upgraded with ballistic missile defense capability or
that would require significant repairs, as well as retiring two
dock landing ships.
The strategy review recognized that a smaller, ready and agile
force is preferable to a larger force that is poorly trained and ill-
equipped. Therefore, we put a premium on retaining those capabilities
that provide the most flexibility across a range of missions. We also
emphasized readiness. For fiscal 2013, the Department is requesting
$209 billion in the base budget for Operation and Maintenance, the
budget category that funds training and equipment maintenance among
other aspects of operations. That represents an increase of 6 percent
compared to the enacted level in 2012, even though the overall base
budget will decline by 1 percent. Striking the right balance between
force structure and readiness is critical to our efforts to avoid a
hollow force, and we will continue to focus on this area to ensure that
we make the right choices.
2. Rebalance global posture and presence to emphasize Asia-Pacific
and the Middle East
The strategic guidance made clear that we must protect capabilities
needed to project power in Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. To this
end, this budget:
Maintains the current bomber fleet;
Maintains the aircraft carrier fleet at a long-term
level of 11 ships and 10 air wings;
Maintains the big-deck amphibious fleet; and
Restores Army and Marine Corps force structure in the
Pacific after the drawdown from Iraq and as we drawdown in
Afghanistan, while maintaining persistent presence in the
Middle East.
The budget also makes selected new investments to ensure we develop
new capabilities needed to maintain our military's continued freedom of
action in face of new challenges that could restrict our ability to
project power in key territories and domains. Across the Services, this
budget plan requests $1.8 billion for fiscal year 2013, and a total of
$3.9 billion over the next 5 years, for enhancements to radars,
sensors, and electronic warfare capabilities needed to operate in these
environments.
Other key power projection investments in fiscal year 2013 include:
$300 million to fund the next generation Air Force
bomber (and a total of $6.3 billion over the next 5 years);
$1.8 billion to develop the new Air Force tanker;
$18.2 billion for the procurement of 10 new warships
and associated equipment, including 2 Virginia-class
submarines, 2 Aegis-class destroyers, 4 Littoral Combat Ships,
1 Joint High Speed Vessel, and 1 CVN-21-class aircraft carrier.
We are also requesting $100 million to develop the capability
to increase cruise missile capacity of future Virginia-class
submarines;
$2.2 billion in fiscal year 2013 for the procurement
of an additional 26 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet aircraft;
$1.0 billion in fiscal year 2013 for the procurement
of 12 EA-18G Growler aircraft, the Navy's new electronic
warfare platform that replaces the EA-6B; and
$38 million for design efforts to construct an Afloat
Forward Staging Base planned for procurement in fiscal year
2014. This base can provide mission support in areas where
ground-based access is not available, such as counter-mine
operations, Special Operations, and ISR.
3. Build innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and
partnerships
The strategy makes clear that even though Asia-Pacific and the
Middle East represent the areas of growing strategic priority, the
United States will work to strengthen its key alliances, to build
partnerships and to develop innovative ways to sustain U.S. presence
elsewhere in the world.
To that end, this budget makes key investments in NATO and other
partnership programs, including:
$200 million in fiscal year 2013 and nearly $900
million over the next 5 years in the NATO Alliance Ground
Surveillance system. This system will enable the Alliance to
perform persistent surveillance over wide areas in any weather
or light condition;
$9.7 billion in fiscal year 2013, and $47.4 billion
over the next 5 years, to develop and deploy missile defense
capabilities that protect the U.S. Homeland and strengthen
regional missile defenses. The request includes the Phased
Adaptive Approach that is being deployed first in Europe and is
designed to protect NATO allies and forces from ballistic
missile threats; and
$800 million for the combatant commanders exercise and
engagement program. Jointly with the State Department, we will
also begin using the new Global Security Contingency fund that
was established at our request in the fiscal year 2012
legislation.
The new strategy also envisions a series of organizational changes
that will boost efforts to partner with other militaries. These
include:
Allocating a U.S.-based brigade to the NATO Response
Force and rotating U.S.-based units to Europe for training and
exercises;
Aligning an Army BCT with each regional combatant
command to foster regional expertise; and
Increasing opportunities for Special Operations Forces
to advise and assist partners in other regions, using
additional capacity available due to the gradual drawdown from
the post-September 11 wars.
4. Ensure that we can confront and defeat aggression from any
adversary--anytime, anywhere
The strategic guidance reaffirmed that the United States must have
the capability to fight more than one conflict at the same time. Still,
the strategic guidance recognizes that how we defeat the enemy may well
vary across conflicts.
This budget invests in space, cyberspace, long range precision-
strike and the continued growth of Special Operations Forces to ensure
that we can still confront and defeat multiple adversaries even with
the force structure reductions outlined earlier. It also sustains the
nuclear triad of bombers, missiles and submarines to ensure we continue
to have a safe, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent.
Even with some adjustments to force structure, this budget sustains
a military that is the strongest in the world, capable of quickly and
decisively confronting aggression wherever and whenever necessary.
After planned reductions, the fiscal year 2017 joint force will consist
of:
An Army of more than 1 million Active and Reserve
soldiers that remains flexible, agile, ready and lethal across
the spectrum of conflict, with 18 divisions, approximately 65
Brigade Combat Teams, 21 Combat Aviation Brigades and
associated enablers;
A Naval battle force of 285 ships--the same size force
that we have today--that will remain the most powerful and
flexible naval force on earth, able to prevail in any combat
situation, including the most stressing anti-access
environments. Our maritime forces will include 11 carriers, 9
large deck amphibious ships (although we should build to 10
such ships in fiscal year 2018), 82 guided missile cruisers and
destroyers, and 50 nuclear powered attack submarines;
A Marine Corps that remains the Nation's expeditionary
force in readiness, forward deployed and engaged, with 31
infantry battalions, 10 artillery battalions and 20 tactical
air squadrons; and
An Air Force that will continue to ensure air
dominance with 54 combat coded fighter squadrons and the
current bomber fleet, with the Joint Strike Fighter in
production and the next generation bomber in development. Our
Air Force will also maintain a fleet of 275 strategic
airlifters, 318 C-130s and a new aerial refueling tanker.
5. Protect and prioritize key investments, and the capacity to
grow, adapt, and mobilize
The force we are building will retain a decisive technological
edge, leverage the lessons of recent conflicts and stay ahead of the
most lethal and disruptive threats of the future.
To that end, the fiscal year 2013 budget:
Provides $11.9 billion for science and technology to
preserve our ability to leap ahead, including $2.1 billion for
basic research;
Provides $10.4 billion (base and OCO) to sustain the
continued growth in Special Operations Forces;
Provides $3.8 billion for Unmanned Air Systems by
funding trained personnel, infrastructure, and platforms to
sustain 65 USAF MQ-1/9 combat air patrols with a surge capacity
of 85 by fiscal year 2016. We slowed the buy of the Reaper
aircraft to allow us time to develop the personnel and training
infrastructure necessary to make full use of these important
aircraft. We also protected funding for the Army's unmanned air
system Gray Eagle;
Invests $3.4 billion in cyber activities, with several
initiatives receiving increased funding relative to last year.
The scale of cyber threats is increasing and we need to be
prepared to defeat these threats, mitigate the potential
damage, and provide the President with options to respond, if
necessary. We are investing in full spectrum cyber operations
capabilities to address the threats we see today and in the
future. The Department is also pleased to see progress being
made in Congress regarding cyber legislation and is supportive
of the bipartisan legislation being introduced by Senators
Lieberman and Collins; and
Provides $1.5 billion to fund the Department's
Chemical and Biological Defense program.
At the same time, the strategic guidance recognizes the need to
prioritize and distinguish urgent modernization needs from those that
can be delayed--particularly in light of schedule and cost problems.
Therefore this budget identifies about $75 billion in savings over the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) resulting from canceled or
restructured programs. Key modifications and associated savings over
the FYDP include:
$15.1 billion in savings from restructuring the Joint
Strike Fighter by delaying aircraft purchases to allow more
time for development and testing;
$1.3 billion in savings from delaying development of
the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle due to contracting
difficulties;
$2.2 billion in savings from curtailing the Joint Land
Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System due
to concerns about program cost and operational mobility;
$4.3 billion in savings from delaying the next
generation of ballistic missile submarines by 2 years for
affordability and management reasons; and
$0.8 billion in savings from delaying selected Army
aviation helicopter modernization for 3 to 5 years.
We will also terminate selected programs, including:
The Block 30 version of Global Hawk, which has grown
in cost to the point where it is no longer cost effective,
resulting in savings of $2.5 billion;
Upgrades to High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles; we will focus our modernization resources on the
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, resulting in savings of $900
million; and
The weather satellite program, because we can depend
on existing satellites, resulting in savings of $2.3 billion.
We have also invested in a balanced portfolio of capabilities that
will enable our force to remain agile, flexible and technologically
advanced enough to meet any threat. We will ensure that we can
mobilize, surge, and adapt our force to meet the requirements of an
uncertain future. To that end, ground forces will retain the key
enablers and know-how to conduct long-term stability operations, and
the Army will retain more mid-grade officers and noncommissioned
officers. These steps will ensure we have the structure and experienced
leaders necessary should we need to re-grow the force quickly.
Another key element is to maintain a capable and ready National
Guard and Reserve. The Reserve component has demonstrated its readiness
and importance over the past 10 years of war, and we must ensure that
it remains available, trained, and equipped to serve in an operational
capacity when necessary. We will maintain key combat support
capabilities and ensure that combat service support capabilities like
civil affairs are maintained at a high readiness level. We will also
leverage the operational experience and institute a progressive
readiness model in the National Guard and Reserves in order to sustain
increased readiness prior to mobilization.
In keeping with the emphasis on a highly capable reserve, this
budget makes only relatively modest reductions in the ground-force
Reserve components. Over the next 5 years, the Army Reserve will be
sustained at 205,000 personnel, the Army National Guard will marginally
decrease from 358,200 to 353,200 personnel, and the Marine Corps
Reserve will sustain an end-strength level of 39,600 personnel. The
Navy Reserve will decrease from 66,200 to 57,100 personnel over the
next 5 years. Over the same span, the Air Force Reserve will decrease
from 71,400 to 69,500 personnel, and the Air National Guard will
decrease from 106,700 to 101,200 personnel.
Another key part of preserving our ability to quickly adapt and
mobilize is a strong and flexible industrial base. This budget
recognizes that industry is our partner in the defense acquisition
enterprise. A healthy industrial base means a profitable industrial
base, but it also means a lean, efficient base that provides good value
for the taxpayers' defense investments and increases in productivity
over time.
ENSURING QUALITY OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE
Now to the most fundamental element of our strategy and our
decision-making process: our people. This budget recognizes that they,
far more than any weapons system or technology, are the great strength
of our U.S. military. All told, the fiscal year 2013 budget requests
$135.1 billion for the pay and allowances of military personnel and
$8.5 billion for family support programs vital to the well-being of
servicemembers and their families.
One of the guiding principles in our decisionmaking process was
that we must keep faith with our troops and their families. For that
reason, we were determined to protect family assistance programs, and
we were able to sustain these important investments in this budget and
continue efforts to make programs more responsive to the needs of
troops and their families. Yet in order to build the force needed to
defend the country under existing budget constraints, the growth in
costs of military pay and benefits must be put on a sustainable course.
This is an area of the budget that has grown by nearly 90 percent since
2001, or about 30 percent above inflation--while end strength has only
grown by 3 percent.
This budget contains a roadmap to address the costs of military
pay, health care, and retirement in ways that are fair, transparent,
and consistent with our fundamental commitments to our people.
On military pay, there are no pay cuts. We have created sufficient
room to allow for full pay raises in 2013 and 2014 that keep pace with
increases in the private sector. That means for 2013, we propose a pay
increase of 1.7 percent for servicemembers. However, we will provide
more limited pay raises beginning in 2015--giving troops and their
families fair notice and lead time before changes take effect. Let me
be clear: nobody's pay is cut in this budget nor will anyone's pay be
cut in the future years of this proposal.
This budget devotes $48.7 billion to health care costs--an amount
that has more than doubled over the last decade. In order to continue
to control the growth of these costs, we are recommending increases in
health care fees, co-pays and deductibles to be phased in over 4 to 5
years. None of the fee proposals in the budget would apply to Active-
Duty servicemembers, survivors of servicemembers who died on Active
Duty, or retirees who retired due to disability. Most of the changes
will not affect the families of Active-Duty servicemembers--there will
be no increases in health care fees or deductibles for families of
active-duty servicemembers. Those most affected will be retirees--with
the greatest impact on working-age retirees under the age of 65 still
likely to be employed in the civilian sector. Even with these changes,
the costs borne by retirees will remain below levels in most comparable
private sector plans--as they should be.
Proposed changes include:
Further increasing enrollment fees for retirees under
age 65 in the TRICARE Prime program, using a tiered approach
based on retired pay that requires senior-grade retirees with
higher retired pay to pay more and junior-grade retirees less;
Establishing a new enrollment fee for the TRICARE
Standard/Extra programs and increasing deductibles;
Establishing a new enrollment fee for the TRICARE-for-
Life program for retirees 65 and older, also using a tiered
approach;
Implementing additional increases in pharmacy co-pays
in a manner that increases incentives for use of mail order and
generic medicine; and
Indexing fees, deductibles, pharmacy co-pays, and
catastrophic caps to reflect the growth in national health care
costs.
We also feel that the fair way to address military retirement costs
is to ask Congress to establish a commission with authority to conduct
a comprehensive review of military retirement. But the President and
the Department believe that the retirement benefits of those who
currently serve should be protected by grandfathering their benefits.
For those who serve today I will request there be no changes in
retirement benefits.
FULLY SUPPORTING DEPLOYED WARFIGHTERS
The costs of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) are funded
separately from the base budget in a stand-alone fiscal year 2013
request of $88.5 billion. That funding level represents a decrease of
$26.6 billion from the fiscal year 2012 enacted level.
This year's OCO request, which ensures that deployed troops have
all the financial resources they need to conduct their challenging
missions, primarily supports operations in Afghanistan but also
requests relatively small sums for the Office of Security Cooperation
in Iraq (OSC-I) and the repair or replacement of equipment redeploying
from Iraq.
Our fiscal year 2013 OCO request includes funding for added
personnel pay and subsistence for deployed forces; communications;
mobilizing Reserve component units; transportation; supplies;
deployment and redeployment of all combat and support forces; force
sustainment; and sustainment and replenishment of war reserve stocks.
For fiscal year 2013 we request $5.7 billion in funding for the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). It is critically important that
we maintain sufficient financial support to ANSF so that they can
ultimately assume full security responsibility across Afghanistan.
Much tough fighting lies ahead in Afghanistan, but the gradually
improving situation permits the remainder of the U.S. surge force to
redeploy by the end of September 2012, leaving 68,000 U.S. troops in
Afghanistan at that time. The fiscal year 2013 OCO request assumes a
continued level of about 68,000 troops in Afghanistan. While future
changes in troop levels may be implemented during fiscal year 2013,
those decisions will be based on advice from field commanders about
conditions on the ground.
In Iraq, OCO funding supports continued security assistance and
cooperation with Iraqi Security Forces through the OSC-I in the areas
of common interest, including counterterrorism, counter-proliferation,
maritime security, and air defense. This funding is critical for the
U.S. to strengthen its long-term partnership with Iraq. Additionally,
to ensure that U.S. forces redeployed from Iraq are ready and equipped
for future operations, this funding replenishes equipment and stocks
for these forces.
A BALANCED PACKAGE
Members of the committee: putting together this balanced package
has been a difficult undertaking and, at the same time, an important
opportunity to shape the force we need for the future. I believe we
have developed a complete package, aligned to achieve our strategic
aims. We have achieved buy-in from the Service Secretaries, the Service
Chiefs, combatant commanders, and the senior enlisted leaders of the
Department.
Our strategy review preceded and guided the budgeting process. This
strategy-first approach enabled the Department to balance strategic
priorities, place individual budget decisions within a broader
strategic context, and ultimately, to guide us in making some tough
choices.
As a result, the fiscal year 2013 request is a carefully balanced
package that keeps America safe and sustains U.S. leadership abroad. As
you take a look at the individual parts of this plan, I encourage you
to do what the Department has done: to bear in mind the strategic
trade-offs inherent in any particular budget decision, and the need to
balance competing strategic objectives in a resource-constrained
environment.
Each decision needs to be judged on the basis of the overall
strategy that it supports, recognizing that unwinding any one piece
puts our whole package in jeopardy. The bottom line is that I believe
there is little room for modification to preserve the force and
capabilities we believe are needed to protect the country and fulfill
assigned missions.
Ultimately that means we will need your support and partnership to
implement this vision of the future military. I understand how tough
these issues can be, and that this is the beginning and not the end of
this process. Make no mistake: the savings we are proposing will impact
all 50 States. But it was this Congress that mandated, on a bi-partisan
basis, that we reduce the defense budget, and we need your partnership
to do this in a manner that preserves the strongest military in the
world. This will be a test of whether reducing the deficit is about
talk or action.
My hope is that now that we see the sacrifice involved in reducing
the defense budget by almost half a trillion dollars, Congress will be
convinced of its important responsibility to make sure that we avoid
sequestration. That would be a doubling of the cuts, another roughly
$500 billion in additional cuts that would be required to take place
through a meat-axe approach, and that we are convinced would hollow out
the force and inflict severe damage on our National defense.
So the leadership of this department, both military and civilian,
is united behind the strategy that we have presented, and this budget.
I look forward to working closely with you in the months ahead to do
what the American people expect of their leaders: be fiscally
responsible in developing the force for the future--a force that can
defend the country, a forced that supports our men and women in
uniform, and a force that is, and always will be, the strongest
military in the world.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Panetta.
General Dempsey.
STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
distinguished members of the committee. Thank you, as always,
for this opportunity to discuss the President's defense budget
proposal for fiscal year 2013. This budget represents a
responsible investment in our Nation's security. At its core,
it is an investment in people, the sons and daughters of
America who serve this Nation in our military. Allow me to open
with a few words about them and what they have accomplished.
The last 10 years of war have been among the most
challenging in our Nation's military history. Through it all,
the joint force has persevered and it has prevailed. Our
families have stood with us deployment after deployment after
deployment and so have you. Together, we have fulfilled our
solemn vow to protect and defend America, her citizens, and her
interests.
As I sit with you today, our service men and women remain
globally engaged. They are deterring aggression, developing
partners, delivering aid, and defeating our enemies. They stand
ready, strong, and swift in every domain, every day.
I had the privilege to be with a few of them while
traveling to Afghanistan and Egypt this past week. As always, I
witnessed extraordinary courage and skill--in the young
soldiers just off patrol in the deep snows of the Hindu Kush,
in the men and women of the NATO training mission managing the
development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and
the brave and vigilant Marine Corps security detachment in our
embassy in Cairo, and in the superb junior airmen who flew us
to the right place at the right time.
They exemplify a professional military with a reliable
record of performance. In just the past year, for example, we
further crippled al Qaeda. We helped protect the Libyan people
from near-certain slaughter, while affirming NATO's important
role beyond the borders of Europe. We brought to a close more
than 20 years of military operations in and over Iraq and, like
we did in Iraq, we are steadily transitioning responsibility
for security onto Afghan shoulders. We also helped Japan
recover from a perfect storm of tragedy and destruction.
Of course, these were just the most visible
accomplishments. Behind the scenes and beneath the surface, we
defended against cyber threats, sustained our nuclear deterrent
posture, and worked with allies and partners to build capacity
and to prevent conflict across the globe. We continue to
provide this Nation with a wide range of options for dealing
with the security challenges that confront us.
An increasingly competitive and uncertain security
environment demands that we be alert, responsive, adaptive, and
dominant. This budget helps us do that. It's informed by a real
strategy that makes real choices. It maintains our military's
decisive edge and our global leadership. Moreover, it ensures
we keep faith with the true source of our military strength,
and that is our people.
With this in mind, allow me to add a few additional
comments to those of the Secretary. First, this budget should
be considered holistically. I caution against viewing its
programs in isolation because it represents a comprehensive and
carefully devised set of decisions. It achieves balance among
force structure, modernization, pay, and benefits. Changes that
are not informed by this context risk upending the balance and
compromising the force.
Second, this budget represents a way point, not an end
point, in the development of the joint force we will need for
2020 and beyond. It puts us on a path to restore versatility at
an affordable cost. Specialized capabilities, once on the
margins, become more central, even while we retain conventional
overmatch. It builds a global and networked joint force that is
ably led and always ready.
Third, this budget honors commitments made to our military
families. It does keep faith with them. There are no freezes or
reductions in pay. There's no lessening in the quality of
health care received by our Active-Duty servicemembers and
medically wounded veterans.
That said, we cannot ignore the increasing costs of pay and
benefits. To manage costs, we need pragmatic reform. All of
this can be done in a way that preserves our ability to recruit
and retain America's talented youth.
Finally, all strategies and the budgets to resource them
carry risk. This one is no different. In my judgment, the risk
lies not in what we can do, but in how much we can do and how
often we can do it. This budget helps buy down that risk by
investing in our people and in the joint capabilities they most
need.
To close, thank you. Thank you for keeping our military
strong. Thank you for taking care of our military families, for
supporting those who serve and who have served and who will
serve. I know you share my pride in them. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dempsey follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
committee, it is my privilege to update you on the state of the United
States' Armed Forces and to comment on the President's budget proposal
for fiscal year 2013. The context for this year's posture testimony is
unique. Our military has transitioned many of our major operations, and
we have a new Defense Strategic Guidance that sets priorities. We are
also facing real fiscal constraints and an increasingly competitive
security environment. The President's proposed fiscal year 2013 defense
budget accounts for these realities. It provides a responsible
investment in our Nation's current and future security.
GLOBAL MILITARY OPERATIONS
Today our Armed Forces stand strong. We are proud of the
performance and accomplishments of our men and women in uniform over
the past year. They have carried out far-ranging missions with much
success. They have defended our Homeland, deterred aggression, and kept
our Nation immune from coercion. Despite a decade of continuous combat
operations, our troops and their families remain resilient.
U.S. Forces-Iraq recently completed its mission. More than 20 years
of military operations in and over Iraq came to conclusion. The
security of Iraq is now the responsibility of the Iraqi people,
leaders, and security forces. We have transitioned to a normal
military-to-military relationship. Diplomats and civilian advisors are
now the face of the United States in Baghdad. To be sure, Iraq still
faces challenges to the country's future. But as we look to that
future, we will continue to build ties across Iraq to help the people
and institutions capitalize on the freedom and opportunity we helped
secure.
In Afghanistan, we are seeing the benefits of the surge in combat
forces begun in early 2010. The security situation is improving. By
nearly every measure, violence has declined. The Taliban are less
capable, physically and psychologically, than they were 2 years ago.
Afghan and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) have
maintained persistent pressure on insurgent groups and have wrested the
initiative and momentum from them in much of the country. But these
groups remain determined, and they continue to threaten the population
and the government. Combat will continue.
Key to long-term stability in Afghanistan is the development of the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In 2011, the Afghan National
Army grew by 18 percent. The Afghan National Police grew by 20 percent.
These forces, combined with the nascent but ever more capable Afghan
Local Police, are steadily assuming responsibility for Afghan security.
The process of transition began in July, and today, after nearly
completing the second of five ``tranches'' of transition, Afghan
security forces are now responsible for the day-to-day security of
almost half of Afghanistan's population. Developing the ANSF, degrading
insurgent capabilities, and turning over responsibilities have allowed
us to begin a measured draw down of our forces in Afghanistan. We have
withdrawn over 10,000 of the surge troops and will withdraw the
remaining 23,000 by the end of this summer. By that time, we expect the
ANSF to achieve their initial operating capability and to be
responsible for securing nearly two-thirds of the Afghan population.
They are on track to meet the goal of assuming full lead for security
by the end of 2014.
Sustaining progress in Afghanistan requires dealing with some
significant challenges. The ANSF and other national and local
government institutions require further development. Corruption remains
pervasive and continues to undermine the capacity and legitimacy of
government at all levels. Insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan remain
largely uncontested. Ultimately, much more work remains to achieve the
political solutions necessary to end the fighting in Afghanistan.
Our military has been vigilant and active in other areas and with
other missions to keep America and our partners safe. We decapitated al
Qaeda and pushed this terrorist network decidedly closer to strategic
defeat through the successful special forces operation targeting Osama
bin Laden. We supported NATO in its U.N. mission to protect civilians
in Libya allowing them to end Muammar Qaddafi's tyrannical rule. We
responded quickly to the devastating earthquakes and tsunami that
struck Japan, saving lives and acting on our commitment to this key
ally. We fended off cyber intrusions against our military's computer
networks and systems. We helped counter aggression and provocation from
Iran and North Korea.
A TIME OF TRANSITION
While our military continues to capably and faithfully perform this
wide array of missions, we are currently in the midst of several major
transitions. Any one of them alone would be difficult. Taken together,
all three will test our people and our leadership at every level.
First, we are transitioning from a war-time footing to a readiness
footing. With the end of our operations in Iraq and Libya and the
ongoing transition of security responsibilities in Afghanistan, our
troops are steadily returning home. From a peak of more than 200,000
troops deployed to combat 2 years ago, we have fewer than 90,000 today.
This shift cannot lead us to lose focus on ongoing combat operations.
But, it does mean we must give attention to restoring our readiness for
full spectrum operations. We need to reset and refit, and in many cases
replace, our war-torn equipment. We need to modernize systems
intentionally passed over for periodic upgrading during the last
decade. We must retrain our personnel on skills used less often over
the last decade. We will have to do all of this in the context of a
security environment that is different than the one we faced 10 years
ago. We cannot simply return to the old way of doing things, and we
cannot forget the lessons we have learned. As described in the
Department's recently released strategic guidance, we should adjust our
missions, our posture, and our organizational structure in order to
adapt to ever evolving challenges and threats.
Second, our military is transitioning to an era of more constrained
resources. The days of growing budgets are gone, and as an institution
we must become more efficient and transparent. We must carefully and
deliberately evaluate trade-offs in force structure, acquisition, and
compensation. We must make the hard choices, focus on our priorities,
and overcome bureaucratic and parochial tendencies. In sum, we must
recommit ourselves to being judicious stewards of the Nation's
resources.
Third, tens of thousands of our veterans--and their families--are
facing the transition to civilian life. Many enlistments are coming to
their normal conclusion, but we are also becoming a leaner force. As we
do this, we must help our veterans find education opportunities,
meaningful employment, and first-class health care. We must pay
particular attention to those bearing the deepest wounds of war,
including the unseen wounds. We must help those who have given so much
cope with--and where possible, avoid--significant long-term challenges
such as substance abuse, divorce, depression, domestic violence, and
homelessness. Addressing these issues is not the exclusive
responsibility of the Services or veterans organizations. How we
respond, as a military community and as a Nation, conveys our
commitment to our veterans and their families. It will also directly
affect our ability to recruit and retain our Nation's best in the
future.
I have outlined several priorities for the Joint Force to help us
anticipate and navigate the challenges these transitions present. We
will maintain focus on achieving our national objectives in our current
conflicts. We will begin creating the military of our future--the Joint
Force of 2020. We will also confront what being in the Profession of
Arms means in the aftermath of war. Above all else, we will keep faith
with our military family. In doing all these things, we will provide an
effective defense for the country and strengthen the military's
covenant of trust with the American people.
A RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
The President's fiscal year 2013 Department of Defense base budget
of $525 billion and overseas contingency operations (OCO) budget of $88
billion represent a responsible investment in our Nation's security.
The decisions underlying them flow from the strategic guidance the
Department of Defense issued last month. This guidance set priorities
for assessing our programs, force structure, and spending in the
context of a persistently dangerous and increasingly competitive
security environment. With those priorities in mind, the budget
proposal strikes an appropriate and necessary balance between
succeeding in today's conflicts and preparing for tomorrow's
challenges. It accounts for real risks and real fiscal constraints,
marrying versatility with affordability.
The tradeoffs were complex, and the choices were tough. They will
produce $259 billion in savings over the next 5 years and a total of
$487 billion over the next 10 years. They will not lead to a military
in decline. Rather, this budget will maintain our military's decisive
edge and help sustain America's global leadership. It will preserve our
ability to protect our vital national interests and to execute our most
important missions. Moreover, it will keep faith with the true source
of our military's strength--our people.
The merits of this budget should be viewed in the context of an
evolving global security environment and a longer term plan for the
Joint Force. Coming on the heels of a decade of war, this budget begins
the process of rebalancing our force structure and our modernization
efforts and aligns them with our strategy. Essentially, we are
developing today the Joint Force the Nation will need in 2020, and our
plans to build this force will unfold over the course of several budget
cycles. This budget is the first step--a down payment. If we fail to
step off properly, our recovery will be difficult, and our ability to
provide the Nation with the broad and decisive military options will
diminish.
It is worth addressing head-on some of the major changes we are
planning as we adapt to changing global opportunities and challenges.
Just as this budget must be viewed in the context of a broader plan,
these changes must be viewed in the context of our evolving force. They
represent a comprehensive, carefully devised package of decisions that
strikes a fine balance. They are not, and cannot be viewed as,
individual, isolated measures. In all cases, needed capabilities are
preserved or, when necessary, generated, through one or several
programs.
This budget will make critical investments in our future force.
Certain specialized capabilities, once on the margins, will move to the
forefront. Networked special operations, cyber, and Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance will become increasingly central. The
results will be a Joint Force that is global and networked, that is
versatile and innovative, and that is ably led and always ready. This
force will be prepared to secure global access and to respond to global
contingencies. We will be a military that is able to do more than one
thing at a time--to win any conflict, anywhere.
Particular attention will be placed on our anti-access/area-denial
capabilities. The proliferation of technology threatens our unfettered
access to the global commons--access that is fundamental to global
commerce and security. As we rebalance our global posture to emphasize
the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East, we are adjusting our
operating constructs and the systems we employ. This includes divesting
some outdated ships, planes, and equipment as well as investing in new
programs. We will also commit to our partnerships and to helping
develop our partners' security capabilities.
Similarly, this force will place added focus on our military's
cyber defense capabilities. The threats to the average American's day-
to-day life and our military capabilities that emanate from cyber space
have evolved faster than many could have imagined. We must adapt to
these threats with similar adroitness and capacity. This budget allows
for us to expand many of our nascent cyber capabilities and to better
protect our defense networks. Similarly, bipartisan cyber legislation
being introduced in Congress is a good first step in developing
protection for our Nation's critical infrastructure. With much work to
be done, we look forward to working with agencies across the government
and with our allies and partners to confront this broad range of
emerging threats.
While some additional capabilities for our Joint Force will be
needed, others will not. The Joint Force of the future will be leaner
than today's. We will no longer be sized for large scale, prolonged
stability operations. As a result, we expect to draw down the Army from
562,000 to 490,000 by the end of fiscal year 2017, and the Marine Corps
from over 202,100 to 182,100 by the end of fiscal year 2016. Some of
this reduction was planned several years ago when Congress authorized
temporary end strength increases to support our operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
But in making ourselves leaner, we will not make the mistakes of
previous draw downs. We will not retain organizational structures that
lack the people, training, and equipment necessary to perform the tasks
we expect from them. We will be realistic about the organizations we
keep, while also maintaining our ability to reconstitute and mobilize
forces. We will still be able to respond to any large scale
mobilization against us. To do this, the Joint Force will retain
capacity in our Reserve components and our industrial base should they
be required to surge. We will maintain the Army Reserve end strength at
205,000 and reduce the Army National Guard by only 5,000 down to
353,200. The Marine Corps Reserves will be retain their current
strength.
Another major concern among our troops, their families, retirees,
and with the American public is military compensation and benefits. I
want to make it clear that cuts in spending will not fall on the
shoulders of our troops. There are no proposed freezes or reductions in
pay. There is no change to the high quality health care our Active-Duty
members and medically retired Wounded Warriors receive. But we cannot
ignore some hard realities. Pay and benefits are now roughly one third
of defense spending. Pay will need to grow more slowly in the future.
We are also proposing a commission to review of military retirement. To
control the growth of healthcare costs, we are also recommending
changes to TRICARE. These adjustments include modest, new or phased-in
increases in health care fees, co-pays, and deductibles largely for our
retirees--but not our Active-Duty servicemembers. Even with these
increases, TRICARE will remain one of the finest medical benefits in
the country.
Overall, these proposed changes value both the demands of military
service and our duty to be good stewards of the Nation's fiscal
resources. They will sustain the recruitment, retention, and readiness
of the talented personnel we need. Most importantly, they will sustain
our enduring commitment to our troops and their families--we must never
break faith with them. I want to note, however, that keeping faith with
our service men and women is not just about pay and benefits. It is
also about ensuring we remain the best trained, best equipped, and best
led force on the planet.
The last, and perhaps most critical issue, is risk. This budget and
the strategy it supports allow us to apply decisive force
simultaneously across a range of missions and activities around the
globe. They mitigate many risks, but they accept some as well, as all
strategies must. The primary risks lie not in what we can do, but in
how much we can do and how fast we can do it. The risks are in time and
capacity. We have fully considered these risks, and I am convinced we
can properly manage them by ensuring we keep the force in balance,
investing in new capabilities, and preserving a strong Reserve
component. We can also compensate through other means, such as
effective diplomacy and strong partnerships. I believe that these risks
are acceptable and that we will face greater risk if we do not change
from our previous approaches.
CONCLUSION
In the upcoming year, our Armed Forces will build on the past
year's achievements, adapt to emergent challenges, seize new
opportunities, and continue to provide for our common defense. We will
continue to face threats to our security, whether from aggressive
states or violent terrorist organizations. But our military will be
ready for them, and our response will be a source of pride for the
American people. In all of our efforts, we will aim to maintain
strength of character and professionalism--at the individual and
institutional level--that is beyond reproach.
As we embark on this critical new course, we will need Congress'
support to help us build the Joint Force the Nation needs and to
strengthen our relationship with the American people. As I stated
before, this budget and the choices that underlie it should be
understood in the context of the comprehensive, carefully balanced,
multi-year plan they support. These choices were tough. Some decisions
will be controversial. But they call for an investment that allows our
force to take the steps necessary to ensure our Nation's defense for
years to come. We ask Congress to support this budget and, more
importantly, to avoid the deep and indiscriminant cuts that
sequestration would impose.
I thank this committee, and the entire Congress, for all you have
done to support our men and women under arms and their families. Your
resolute attention to their needs and to our security has been both
invaluable and greatly appreciated.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.
Mr. Hale, do you have any opening comments to make?
Mr. Hale. No, sir, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Okay, let's have a 7-minute round. I doubt
that we'll get to a second round, but if there is any time
after our first round, because I expect a good turnout, we will
try a very short second round.
General Dempsey, let me start with you. Do you and each of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully support the new Defense
Strategic Guidance?
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator, we do.
Chairman Levin. Do you and each of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff fully support the President's fiscal year 2013 budget
request?
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator, we do.
Chairman Levin. Now, can you tell us why?
General Dempsey. Because we addressed it in the order in
which you just presented it. Faced with the reality of a new
fiscal environment, we took a look at our strategy and we made
what we thought were important adjustments to it, not just
based on the new fiscal reality, but also based on the lessons
of 10 years of war and where we thought the security
environment would take us in the out-years.
I'm an advocate of looking beyond this particular budget
submission, out to 2020, and we did that, with not only the
Service Chiefs, but also with the combatant commanders. Then,
having decided on what adjustments to make to our strategy, we
built a budget to support it. So for that reason, we support
it.
Chairman Levin. General, you made reference to the risks
that are increased when there are budget reductions. Would you
expand on that, as you did in your prepared testimony, as to
whether those risks are acceptable and why?
General Dempsey. As I said, Senator, every strategy incurs
risks because there's never--at least I've never in my 38 years
experienced any strategy that was completely unconstrained. So
I think it's important to note that there's always risk in
every strategy and in every budget to support it.
There's two kinds of risk we deal with. One is risk to our
missions: Can we accomplish the tasks given to us by the
national command authority for freedom of access, to defeat our
enemies, to deter aggression? Then the other is risk to force,
which gets at a phrase that would be familiar to you in terms
of operations tempo: How much can we ask of the All-Volunteer
Force in terms of its deployments and redeployments and
redeployments?
In both cases, we assess the risk to mission and the risk
to force. We have found that there are portions of our
capabilities that are more stressed. Again, that's not anything
new to us. What we've been doing now for the past month and
will continue to do is to look for ways to mitigate those
risks.
But we're very confident, because we've worked this
collaboratively, that we can mitigate risks by adapting lessons
from the last 10 years of war, new emerging capabilities. I've
mentioned two notable ones to you in the past, special
operating forces and cyber. The integration of all those and
the interdependence of the joint force is what allows us to
mitigate the risk to our operations plans and to do so at a
sustainable rate.
But there are risks, because there is always uncertainty in
the future.
Chairman Levin. Now to both of you: The OCO funding level
of $88.4 billion is based on the assumption that there will be
68,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan for all of fiscal year 2013.
You reiterated that, Secretary Panetta, in your opening
statement. Now, that assumes that there will be no further
drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan during the 12 months
after the 33,000 U.S. surge forces are withdrawn by the summer
of this year. That's what the budget assumes.
But last June, when the President announced the plans for
the drawdown of the U.S. surge forces, he also said that after
reduction of those surge forces, ``Our troops will continue to
come home at a steady pace, as ASF move into the lead.''
First, General Dempsey, are we on track to complete the
withdrawal of the 33,000 U.S. surge force this summer?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir, we are. If I could just
elaborate a bit, General Allen's already reduced the force by
10,000. I don't yet have his plan for the reduction of the
additional 23,000, but in a visit with him last week he assured
me that he would have that plan to us by about the 1st of
April.
Chairman Levin. Do you continue to support the President's
decision to withdraw the U.S. surge force by the end of the
summer?
General Dempsey. I do and will continue to do so, unless
General Allen comes back in to me and tells me we're incurring
too much risk. But my own personal observation at this point is
yes.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Panetta, how do you square the
fiscal year 2013 OCO funding assumption that the troop level of
68,000 will remain in Afghanistan through fiscal year 2013 with
the President's statement that U.S. troops will continue to
draw down after this summer ``at a steady pace as ASF assume
the lead for security''?
Secretary Panetta. Mr. Chairman, as the President stated,
we'll continue that process. But at this point, no decisions
have been made as to how that will take place, because we're
focusing, obviously, on the drawdown of the surge. The number
that we have there is, frankly, a target number in order to
support the OCO funding that we would need for the future.
Chairman Levin. Will the decision be made as to when
reductions will be made from the 68,000 level--and that level,
again, is going to be reached by the end of this summer. When
will that decision be made on further reductions after the
68,000 level is achieved?
Secretary Panetta. I think the target right now is
obviously to focus on the reduction of the surge. As General
Dempsey pointed out, we haven't received the plan from General
Allen as to how we'll complete the reduction of 23,000. Once
we've done that and we've learned the lessons from that, I
think then we would apply it to deciding the next steps with
regards to further reductions.
Chairman Levin. That will be done by the end of the summer
as currently contemplated?
Secretary Panetta. Right.
Chairman Levin. So when would the next decision be made on
reductions beyond the surge reductions?
Secretary Panetta. I suspect we'll begin that discussion
process in the latter part of this year.
Chairman Levin. Begin it or make a decision by the end of
the year?
Secretary Panetta. I assume we'll begin it, and if we're
fortunate, we'll be able to make that decision. But the first
thing is to discuss the lessons that we've learned and what we
should apply and what level of force are we going to need for
2013.
Chairman Levin. Do you assume there will be further
reductions beyond the 68,000 during fiscal year 2013?
Secretary Panetta. Again, no decisions have been made.
Chairman Levin. You assume that there will be.
Secretary Panetta. I assume that, in line with what the
President said, we'll continue to make transitions downward.
Chairman Levin. Would there be savings then from any
additional reductions below 68,000?
Secretary Panetta. Will there be savings? Of course.
Whatever we decide to do, it will achieve some savings.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I thank the witnesses again.
General Dempsey, were you asked by the administration to
perform a risk assessment to our national security interests as
a result of these cuts?
General Dempsey. I have been asked and it's also codified
in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that I perform
a Chairman's risk assessment annually.
Senator McCain. Is that forthcoming?
General Dempsey. I have completed it. DOD has it, and they
are required to submit with it a risk mitigation strategy.
Senator McCain. So we have not received your risk
assessment yet?
General Dempsey. You have not, sir.
Senator McCain. I want to return just for a second.
Secretary Panetta, you again talk about the cataclysmic effects
of sequestration. We are in total agreement. I hope in your
meetings with the President that you will urge him to sit down
with us and see if there are ways that we can avoid the effects
of this.
Have you made any plans yet to comply with the effects of
sequestration in 2013?
General Dempsey. No, we haven't.
Senator McCain. In your view, Secretary Panetta, is Iraq a
stable and self-reliant nation?
Secretary Panetta. Iraq is a nation that has the capability
to govern and secure itself. Does it continue to face risks in
that process? Does it continue to face challenges in that
process? It certainly does.
Senator McCain. Do we still have U.S. military forces
operating in Iraq?
Secretary Panetta. We have a small number that are assigned
there, approximately, I believe the number we're looking at is
about 600 military and civilians that are assigned to the
security operations there.
Senator McCain. General Dempsey, I know you just returned
from Egypt. All Americans are concerned about the events there
concerning Americans who have had to move to the U.S. embassy
in order to preserve their safety and security. We realize the
absolute criticality of our relationship with Egypt and the
role that Egypt plays in the Middle East. What advice, what
recommendation, do you have as to how the U.S. Government
should be handling this very, very tough situation?
General Dempsey. Senator, I had planned this trip to Egypt
before the nongovernmental organization crisis, and it is a
crisis, occurred. So when I met with Field Marshal Tentawi,
General Annan, and General Mwafi, the key leaders with whom we
interact and have interacted for decades, I explained to them
that I was coming there to talk to them about our military-to-
military relationship, about Syria, about Lebanon, about the
Sinai, but that I couldn't do that because we had this issue
that was an impediment to that. I spent about a day and a half
in conversation with them, encouraging them in the strongest
possible terms to resolve this so that our military-to-military
relationship could continue.
Senator McCain. The result of those conversations?
General Dempsey. I am convinced that potentially they were
underestimating the impact of this on our relationship. When I
left there, there was no doubt that they understood the
seriousness of it.
But I'd like to add, Senator, I know of the amendment
that's being proposed to break our military relationship and
cut off all aid, and I think my personal military judgment is
that would be a mistake.
Senator McCain. I want to assure you that we are discussing
that and ways to certainly avoid that action at this time. But
I hope you explain to the rulers, who are the military and
leftovers from the Mubarak regime, that this situation is
really not acceptable to the American people. Our relationship
with Egypt is vital, but the fact is that the welfare of our
citizens is even more vital.
General Dempsey. We completely agree, sir, and I did make
that clear.
Senator McCain. General, would you think it's a good idea
to trade five high-ranking Taliban as a, ``confidence-building
measure'' to move the negotiations with the Taliban forward?
General Dempsey. I have some issues with the
reconciliation, but generally speaking I'm in support of
reconciliation. But I am concerned about our ability to
maintain vigilance and control of those individuals. So I am
supportive of reconciliation.
Senator McCain. I don't know of any living person who
isn't.
General Dempsey. I join that group.
Senator McCain. Does that mean that you, at this particular
moment in time, would support the trade or the release to
Qatar, understanding that under very loose security conditions,
would be advisable at this time?
General Dempsey. Sir, the Secretary has some certification
requirements by law, and I'm supportive of the Secretary of
Defense's approach to that and supportive of his effort to
ensure we have those certifications.
Senator McCain. Again I ask, with respect, for your opinion
as to whether you think it's a good idea or not at this time?
General Dempsey. Yes, I do.
Senator McCain. Do you agree that it's a good idea,
Secretary Panetta?
Secretary Panetta. Absolutely no decisions have been made
along this line. I can tell you this, that, based on the law
that's passed by Congress, I have to certify that anybody who
leaves Guantanamo cannot wind up going back to the enemy, and I
have to be convinced that those kinds of protections are in
place before I certify that anything like that happens. I have
made very clear that unless I am convinced that in this kind of
situation those steps are taken to ensure that these
individuals do not wind up going back to the battlefield, I'm
not going to certify that kind of transfer.
Senator McCain. Even though approximately a quarter of
those who have been released in the past have gone back into
the fight.
What is the progress of our negotiations with the Afghan
Government, President Karzai, on a long-term security
agreement, which we failed to reach in Iraq? What are the
prospects of that and what are you expecting, and can you give
us a timeframe?
Secretary Panetta. We are continuing to work with President
Karzai and our counterparts in Afghanistan to try to develop
and agree on a strategic agreement. There are two areas that we
still have difficulties with, one of which involves the
transfer of detention facilities. The other involves night-time
raids. We continue to try to see if we can work out some kind
of compromise on those issues.
As far as the basic agreement, I think most of the
elements, frankly, are in place. So I'm confident that,
hopefully within the next few weeks, we'll be able to reach
some kind of agreement.
Senator McCain. I thank you. I thank the witnesses. I would
just add a comment. General, when the enemy thinks you're
leaving, it's very unlikely in my study of history that they're
ready to make an agreement, and they certainly have that
impression throughout that part of the world.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General Dempsey, Mr. Hale, good morning and
thank you for your service and your testimony.
As I look at the budget that's been submitted and I hear
your testimony today, it seems to me that in this budget the
U.S. military and our national security are being asked to pay
the price for the fiscal irresponsibility of our government
over the last decade. The budget that you've submitted to us
certainly in its bottom line is one that you were mandated to
submit by the BCA that Congress adopted and the President
signed last summer. But I must say as one member of this
committee, one Member of the U.S. Senate, that as I look at
what you have had to do to meet the bottom line requirements of
the BCA, it represents, in my opinion, unacceptable risk to our
national security, without proportionate changes in the threats
that we face around the world.
This budget for the coming fiscal year would represent an 8
percent reduction in spending beneath what was planned in the
5-year defense plan for the coming year, a 9 percent reduction
for the 5 years. It, as we've discussed, would require the
reduction of our Army and Marine Corps by 125,000 personnel. It
would call for the termination or delay of several, in my
opinion, critical defense equipment systems.
It's hard for me to conclude that there's any reason you
would make such a recommendation other than the fact that
you're required by law to do it. In other words, what drives
this presentation is the budgetary pressure, as I said, the
accumulated weight of the fiscal irresponsibility of our
government over the last decade, and the specific requirement
of the BCA, not the threat environment in the world.
Mr. Secretary, as you said, and I agree, this morning:
``The United States still faces a complex array of security
challenges across the globe. We're still a nation at war in
Afghanistan. We still face threats from terrorism. There's
dangerous proliferation of lethal weapons and materials. The
behavior of Iran and North Korea threaten global stability.
There's continuing turmoil and unrest in the Middle East.
Rising powers in Asia are testing international relationships
and there are growing concerns about cyber intrusions and
attacks,'' said by you, Mr. Secretary, this morning.
I agree with all that, and I think in that context my
conclusion, I state again, is that there's always risk, but
that the risk involved in this budget is unacceptable.
Therefore, I believe that we have to have the political courage
both in facing the budget for fiscal year 2013 and the threat
of sequestration to work together across party lines and with
the President and the administration to reduce the impact of
these proposed cuts. We have to do it responsibly.
We either have to find savings elsewhere or we have to have
the political guts to raise revenues to pay for an adequate
defense to, in my opinion, fulfill our constitutional
responsibility to provide for the common defense.
You have complied with the BCA in making this budget
recommendation to us, but in my opinion, if we accept it, we're
not fulfilling our responsibility under the Constitution to
provide for the common defense. So I hope we can work together
to essentially alter what we required you to do in the BCA and
to do it in a fiscally responsible way.
There is risk here and I appreciate, General Dempsey, that
in response to Senator McCain's question, you said that you'd
be preparing a Chairman's risk assessment for us. The Defense
Strategic Guidance that DOD did, issued in January, really is
the equivalent of a follow-on to a Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR). In the QDR, of course, we require a Chairman's risk
assessment.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, that we don't act on
this request and that the Appropriations Committees don't act
on a budget request for DOD, before we get your risk
assessment, because I think it's that important.
But for now, since, Mr. Secretary, you said quite directly,
with the directness that we've come to expect of you, that
there is risk here, inevitably. You can't cut this much money
out of the defense budget without risk. So I wanted to ask you
and General Dempsey in advance of the formal report, what are
the two or three top risks that you are concerned about that
this budget places on our military and on our national
strategy?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, first of all, I'm abiding by
the law, the law that was passed by Congress that required the
reductions that we've proposed. I think, just to your comment,
we have tried to step up to the plate and do our duty here. I
think in weighing how you address this issue, you also have to
take into consideration the national security threat that comes
from the huge deficits and the huge debt that we're running.
We're running a debt now that's comparable to our gross
domestic product (GDP). At some point, Congress and the
President have to address that larger issue. What I'm doing
here is basically doing my part, as dictated by Congress.
With regards to the threats, as I said, you can't take a
half a trillion dollars out of the defense budget and not incur
some risks. The main concerns that I see are that we are going
to have a smaller force, and when you have a smaller force the
ability to move that force where you have to is not going to be
as easy as it would be with a larger force, the ability to move
quickly, to be agile, to be able to deploy them. I think we can
do it under the plan we've presented, but it clearly is an
additional risk.
The risk of mobilizing if we face a serious crisis and we
have the need to mobilize, our ability to mobilize quickly, to
pull the force together, as we had to do, frankly, after
September 11, our ability to be able to do that and respond
quickly and be able to deploy that force involves some risks. I
think we've designed the way to do that by keeping a strong
Guard and a strong Reserve, but nevertheless, that's an
additional risk.
We depend an awful lot on technology here. I think
technology is very important, but our ability to develop that
technology, to make sure that it works, to make sure that we
have that leap-ahead capability, is something that involves
some risks.
Lastly, as I said, when you shave the budget by a half a
trillion dollars, it leaves very little margin of error.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Panetta. That, I think, is probably the biggest
risk of all.
General Dempsey. If I have time, Senator, I'd like to
respond, because I will preview my risk assessment for you. I
did not assess unacceptable risk in my assessment, and I don't
believe this budget incurs unacceptable risk. I will tell you
that I am prepared to say that sequestration would pose
unacceptable risk, and here's why it's important to note.
It's pretty clear. There's physics involved. In this budget
we have decided to off-ramp a certain number of service men and
women, and we've about maxed out our ability to do that with
the proper dignity and respect to the force. So 10,000, 15,000
a year is about as many as you can ask to leave and still have
enough influence on how they do that.
That's maxed out right now. It's pretty clear to me that
we're going to have some challenges with infrastructure and
changes to it, whether this committee and others agree with our
recommendation for BRAC. So if we fix those two variables in
sequestration, I can't ask soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines to leave quicker than they're going to leave, and I
can't touch infrastructure--sequestration leaves me three
places to go to find the additional money: operations,
maintenance, and training. That's the definition of a hollow
force.
Senator Lieberman. I thank you both for your answers.
They're helpful to me. With all respect, I consider this budget
to represent unacceptable risk to our national strategy, and I
hope members of this committee across party lines will work
together to reduce that risk in a fiscally responsible way.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just get on the record, Secretary Panetta, that
there will be some of us at this table, and I'd be one of them,
that would be opposing another BRAC round, really for two
reasons: one, I think we've reduced our force, our capability,
to an unacceptable level, and to bring our infrastructure down
to meet what I consider to be as a member of this committee an
unacceptable level, I think, is something I would not want to
do.
Then the second thing is, the problem we're facing right
now is really an immediate problem. Everything is on fire.
We're trying to put out the biggest fires. I'm going from
memory now, but as I recall, all these BRAC rounds--and I've
been here since the very first one--you lose money in the first
5 years. So it's not going to really gain anything in terms of
that. So there's going to be opposition up here.
Secretary Panetta, I saw you on television on 60 Minutes,
and I didn't envy you when you had to answer the question, to
stop and think about how many combat operations there are, and
you started counting on your fingers. So it is something that
we've been talking about here. It is something very serious.
But when you talk about the budget, I just want to get in
here, so that--now that we have the President's new budget, we
keep hearing about inheriting deficits and all of this. During
the 8 years of President Bush, and these are the Office of
Management and Budget's (OMB) figures, it was right at $2
trillion. This President in his budget that he's proposed is
$5.3 trillion in just 4 years. So, obviously, you're talking
about just a huge amount of money.
I saw in this morning's Washington Post they're talking
about everything is growing in government, except--there it
is--the military. I agree with the statements of the two
previous speakers, that this is supposed to be our number one
concern up here, defending our country.
So anyway, I just would like to not press the thing. It's
already been talked about enough on risk. But I only ask the
question: When you actually meet with the Chairman and you come
up with your risk assessment, when did you say that would be?
Secretary Panetta. I anticipate it will be over here by the
end of the month.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
One of the commands that doesn't get a lot of attention is
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and we remember that was divided
into three commands. I think everyone in this room knows that
we have done the right thing. However, I look at it as the
forgotten command. It doesn't seem to get the attention.
One of the things about AFRICOM is it gets its resources
from the U.S. SOF that are in Europe, and right now, excepting
the fact that as the pressure gets on in the Middle East, a lot
of the terrorism, the potential terrorism, is going down
through Djibouti and the Horn of Africa and spreading out
there, so one of the great things that's happening with AFRICOM
is the SOF are training the Africans.
The number breaks down to about one SOF guy or gal is going
to be responsible for 100 forces. I've seen this down there. I
know it's happening. So the question I'd ask you, do you think
there are impacts by moving out of the U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) some of the SOF insofar as Africa is concerned?
Secretary Panetta. First, I agree with you on the benefits
of having an AFRICOM focused on those issues on that continent.
Actually, we source our requirements into Africa and elsewhere
through a global force management process. So it tends to be
that European SOF have a particular habitual relationship, but
there could be SOF and, for that matter, general purpose forces
employed in Africa.
We move the force around where it's needed. So I don't
think the issue you described there with EUCOM will have any
effect on Africa.
Senator Inhofe. I'm glad to hear that. I appreciate that.
This is an issue that no one's talked about yet and I don't
know why I've been so close to it, but a good friend of mine,
Specialist Christopher D. Horton, was killed over there. In
fact, I was supposed to be meeting with him in Afghanistan a
month later, but he was killed. His wife, Jane Horton, has
worked for me and we've become very sensitive to the redacted
investigation reports to families.
I've talked to General Odierno about this. We've made
progress on this. But I'm hoping that you will help us continue
with that, because we have some of them--in the case of one of
them, it went all the way from May 2010 until just about a week
ago. I'd like to have some special attention given to that
issue. The families of Specialist Augustus J. Vacari and Second
Lieutenant Jered W. Ewy were killed in July 2011 and I think
they should have their reports. So we're making progress, but
I'm hoping that that's something that, with all these problems
we're dealing with, that you'll be aware of and want to be of
some help.
General Dempsey. Could I just respond briefly, Senator?
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Dempsey. I'm very aware of that, and in fact, as
you recall, I was at Specialist Horton's funeral with you. I
just want to make two points. One is, this is the first
conflict in which we've done a collateral investigation on
every death, the first time in the history of warfare. We've
learned the hard way, it's very resource intensive and it's
important to get it right.
The timeline on which these investigations are provided to
families has been gradually improving and is the same, it's
important to note, for Active, Guard, and Reserve. So it's not
that the Active families get the investigation done faster than
the Guard and Reserve. It's just a very challenging task, one
which we're addressing.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that. We went back and
checked between the Active and the regular component and that's
right.
My question actually is meant to be a compliment, because
we're making great progress on that.
General Dempsey. Well, then, I withdraw my comments.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. In looking at the reset, we're going to be
looking at a real problem after having gone through this for 12
years, and it's going to be--my concern is that it comes from
the right sources, that it's not going to come from the base
budget. Is it your intention to have this come from the OCO
when this time is before us? Do you think it will have a
deteriorating effect on the base budget, on the reset, the cost
of reset?
General Dempsey. That's exactly why the OCO bill tends to
be as high as it is, because we're not just looking at the cost
of current operating forces. It's the recapitalization
challenge we face beyond that. Is that a fair statement, Bob?
Mr. Hale. Yes.
Senator Inhofe. The last thing, because my time has
expired, I had occasion to go down to Fort Worth and see the
progress, what's happening right now with the F-35. There have
been a lot of delays and I would just hope that we have a
commitment from the two of you to progress on that program,
because that's a very needed platform that we will be pursuing.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, we need a fifth generation
fighter. The F-35 represents that fifth generation fighter.
We're committed to it. We just want to make sure it's done
right.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, General Dempsey, Mr. Hale. We've
talked a lot, and I think appropriately so, about the risks to
the national security of the United States. But those risks are
mitigated, not simply by what's done in the DOD budget; it's
also mitigated by what's done in the Department of State (DOS)
budget, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) budget, TSA,
the FBI, a whole host of agencies that contribute directly and
indirectly to the national security of the United States.
We've talked about the sequester, but to simply shift those
costs in a potential sequester without additional revenue,
strictly do it by cutting more, will invariably catch the FBI,
DHS, TSA, contracting, and other functions that might not be in
the purview of DOD, but significantly contribute to the risk
that we run as a Nation. Is that an accurate perception, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Panetta. Oh, absolutely. I think, Senator,
national security is dependent on all of the things you just
cited, but frankly, it's dependent on more. We're talking about
sequester on defense, but sequester also takes place on the
domestic side of the budget. Very frankly, our national
security is dependent not just on the national defense side of
that ledger; it's dependent on the quality of life that we
provide for our citizens. So all of that could be impacted
through sequester.
Senator Reed. One other aspect of this whole debate, as has
been pointed out, has been, particularly with respect to those
platforms that you've decided are not affordable at this
juncture. But I would presume--and, General Dempsey, you might
comment--that one of your calculations is not just the number
of platforms, but the capability of platforms. As you've made--
particularly when it comes to both aviation platforms and
ships, that you and your colleagues have made careful
calculations about increased capabilities with those remaining
ships versus what you'd have to do with the airplanes; is that
accurate?
General Dempsey. It is accurate, Senator. We mapped the
budget decisions to the strategies. Fundamentally, are we going
to deliver the strategy we've described, given the decisions
we're about to make.
As we've talked for years, we are moving toward platforms
that are both more capable, but also multi-role. So for
example, the A-10, and by the way, the uniform I wear, I'm a
huge advocate of the A-10, the Warthog, because it provides
close air support. But we're at a point where we think it's
prudent to force ourselves into a more multi-role capability in
that regard.
So we did, we mapped the decisions to the strategy.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
One of the other aspects that's been brought up, and I
think it goes to my initial question about the broader scope of
national security, is that proactive engagement. I think one of
the lessons of the last few years, proactive engagement is very
helpful to us. Had we been more engaged in some countries, we
might have mitigated the dangers we faced in the last decade.
When you talk about your meeting in Egypt, when you talk
about your multiple meetings in Pakistan, when you talk about--
a lot of that is, one might argue, just as critical to national
security, but is not measured in terms of brigades or lift,
airlift, et cetera. It goes also to the issue of special
forces, not so much in their counterterrorism mission, but in
their training and their collaboration mission.
Can you comment on, General Dempsey, on how this budget
will encourage proactive engagement at every level?
General Dempsey. We've accepted as a core competency of all
the Services building partner capacity. So when you have a
chance to have Ray Odierno in here, for example, he'll talk
about his desire to meet our strategy by taking general purpose
forces who have been completely consumed in Afghanistan and who
will be less consumed now and applying them in that role, a
regionally aligned brigade, for example. So AFRICOM has a U.S.
Army brigade in the Army Force Generation readiness cycle that
can deploy in any number of ways, as headquarters, or it can
send teams, it can reorganize itself, to go and engage nations
in the particular combatant where it might be needed.
So I think this budget does that and it is one of the ways
that we are mitigating risk, as you suggest.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, you suggested and I think you
said that one of the fastest growing areas of cost in your
budget is personnel costs, particularly health care costs.
You're looking at a very tight budget this year. I think even
if we're able to settle some of our political fights up here,
the idea of the defense growing at the rate it grew over the
last decade is not within anyone's purview.
At some point, if you don't take effective steps with
respect to personnel costs, it becomes so big, in my view, that
it eats into what is the great risk General Dempsey sees in
sequestration: it all comes out of operations, maintenance, and
training, and suddenly you have a force that is there, but it's
not capable.
Do you have a notion of sort of how much time we have left
before this, these uncontrolled, unless we take steps, these
costs eat up all of the operations and maintenance?
Secretary Panetta. As I mentioned, this is an area of the
budget that's grown by 90 percent, and it consumes now close to
half of the defense budget. Right, Bob?
Mr. Hale. About a third.
Secretary Panetta. About a third, about a third of the
defense budget is in the compensation area. The problem is at
that rate of growth that's going on, it's moving more and more
into these other key areas of the defense budget and crowding
them out. So if compensation is not touched, if we don't
control the costs of growth in the compensation area, what it
means is that we're going to have to take it out of force
structure, we're going to have to take it out of training,
we're going to have to take it out of other systems, and it's
going to mean that ultimately we won't have a balanced approach
to dealing with the defense savings that we need to deal with.
So even in talking with members, in talking with the
generals, in talking with the chiefs, they acknowledge that, as
tough as this is--and it is tough, because it affects,
obviously, troops and their families and retirees--but if we
don't begin the process of developing some kind of cost control
in the out-years and limiting the growth that's taking place,
then we're going to pay a very high price within the next few
years.
Senator Reed. Is that your conclusion, General Dempsey?
General Dempsey. Senator, it is. We talk a lot about
keeping faith and oftentimes that's equated to how many dollars
we're putting in a soldier's, sailor's, airman's, or marine's
pocket. But it's a lot more than that. Keeping faith is making
sure they're the best trained, best equipped force on the
planet. To do that, we have to balance the budget against all
of the various levers we have to pull.
Senator Reed. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
to thank both of our witnesses for their service.
Secretary Panetta, I want to ask you about the David
Ignatius article from February 2. Let me just read the way it
begins: ``Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has a lot on his mind
these days, from cutting the defense budget to managing the
drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. But his biggest worry
is the growing possibility that Israel will attack Iran over
the next few months. Panetta believes there is a strong
likelihood that Israel will strike Iran in April, May, or June,
before Iran enters what Israelis describe as a `zone of
immunity' to commence building a nuclear bomb.''
Mr. Secretary, did Mr. Ignatius accurately characterize
your view and would you like to comment on that?
Secretary Panetta. No, I usually don't comment on
columnists' ideas about what I'm thinking. Usually it's a
dangerous game to get into.
But let me just express my thoughts, that Iran is of great
concern. We have common cause with Israel, we have common cause
with the international community with regards to the concerns
about Iran. We have made very clear that they are not to
develop a nuclear weapon. We have made very clear that they are
not to close the Straits of Hormuz. We've also made very clear
that they are not to export terrorism and try to undermine
other governments.
Those are areas that concern us, and it concerns the
international community. As a result of that, the international
community has taken strong steps on sanctions, on economic and
diplomatic areas to bring pressure on Iran and to isolate them.
I guess my preference, my view, is that we ought to keep the
international community together in applying that kind of
pressure.
Senator Wicker. Do you believe there's a strong likelihood
that Israel will strike Iran in April, May, or June?
Secretary Panetta. I think, as the President has suggested,
we do not think that Israel has made that decision.
Senator Wicker. Were you mischaracterized? Did you have a
conversation with Mr. Ignatius?
Secretary Panetta. As I said, the comments that are
included in a column about what I'm thinking or what I'm
possibly worried about is up to the columnist.
Senator Wicker. But did he interview you?
Secretary Panetta. We talked, but we talked about a lot of
things, frankly.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Were you trying to send some sort of
signal to the international community, either to Iran or
Israel?
Secretary Panetta. No.
Senator Wicker. So you do not have a position as to whether
it is likely that Israel will make such an attack this spring?
Secretary Panetta. I do not.
Senator Wicker. All right. Thank you for clearing that up.
I will say that there were no quotation marks in that column,
but it did sound a whole lot like a quote.
As I understand it in the budget, in compliance with the
BCA, Mr. Secretary, there's half a trillion dollars worth of
cuts. If we had the sequestration, that would be another half a
trillion. Now, what was your conversation with the
administration, with OMB, within DOD, about submitting a budget
that doesn't comply with the statute, because sequestration is
the law of the land right now as I understand it?
Did you consider submitting a budget that outlined the
catastrophic results if sequestration does go into effect? Then
what is your strategy to, as you say, detrigger, to work with
this Congress to detrigger sequestration, which is the law of
the land, you will acknowledge?
Secretary Panetta. It is. Obviously, our approach was to
deal with what the BCA had provided in terms of targeted
savings in the defense budget. We frankly developed the
strategy that we presented to based on really trying to lay out
a strategy about where our force structure needed to be between
now and 2020 and do it in a responsible way to protect our
military force and to be able to respond to the threats that
are out there.
Sequestration has this, frankly, mindless formula that's
already built into it, that basically cuts across the board.
It's not as if we can take sequestration and make sense out of
the damn thing. The fact is, it's going to happen the way it's
supposed to happen, through this kind of mindless formula
that's there.
So our approach, frankly, was to not pay any attention to
it. If it's going to take place in January 2013--and I hope
that's not the case--then it will take place under its mindless
procedure. But I don't think we ought to try to bring some kind
of common sense to what is a crazy process.
Senator Wicker. Let me underscore what Senator Lieberman
said, that this budget makes us worry about risks. I understand
what General Dempsey said, that he believes that there are
risks, but they're not unacceptable. But the sequestration
would prove unacceptable, and I hope there's a strategy to get
that through.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for mentioning the industrial
base. We're at 8.3 percent unemployment right now. Undoubtedly
the President is going to send a spending bill to Congress
which he believes and the administration believes will create
more jobs. It makes no sense to me, at a time when there's an
effort to create more jobs with other spending, to cut defense
spending, which gives us the twofer of protecting the country
and protecting the industrial base, which is a whole lot of
Americans out there working to provide us with the
infrastructure we need.
It is a fact, is it not, that this budget will have an
adverse effect on our industrial base? Is that not right, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Panetta. We've taken a lot of steps to try to
protect against that happening, because as I've said, we
absolutely have to protect our industrial base and those
industries that support the defense budget. We can't afford to
lose any more. So for that reason, we've designed an approach
that will keep them in business with regards to the systems
that we're trying to develop for the future.
Senator Wicker. Albeit with fewer industrial manufacturing
jobs.
Secretary Panetta. I understand that, and that does have
some impact.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
I've asked Senator Akaka if he would yield 1 minute of his
time to me and he's graciously said he would, because I want to
clarify this issue of the budget and sequestration. As I read
the budget which was submitted to us, there is additional $3
trillion in deficit reduction above the trillion that has
already been taken, which would, if this budget were adopted as
submitted, avoid sequestration totally.
Now, half of the additional $3 trillion is in revenue
increases, including, as the President's budget says, tax
reform, including the expiration of tax cuts for single
taxpayers making over $200,000, married couples making over
$250,000, by adoption of the Buffett rule. Then the budget
document says that the President is offering a detailed set of
specific tax loophole closures and measures to broaden the tax
base that, together with the expiration of the high income tax
cuts, would be more than sufficient to hit the $1.5 trillion
target, which means if this budget were adopted and the revenue
were included--and the revenue represents about half of the
additional deficit reduction--you avoid sequestration.
Is that your understanding?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, my understanding is that in the
President's budget there is a plan, obviously, to provide for
the kind of additional deficit reduction that the country
needs. But obviously, if it were adopted it would de-trigger
sequestration.
Chairman Levin. Okay, because that's not been stated here
this morning, but I think it's very, very important. I tried to
say it in my opening statement, but I don't know that I said it
clearly enough. The budget that was submitted to us says it
very clearly. That's the strategy. Whether Congress adopts it
or not is a different issue, but sequestration can be avoided
and hopefully will be, and the President has submitted his way
to avoid it in his budget document.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for clarifying
that, and I do look forward to the President's budget being
brought to the Senate floor for an up or down vote.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. I think the Republican
alternative will also be brought to the Senate floor, if there
is one. We look forward to seeing an alternative budget as
well.
So much for that. Back to Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Aloha to Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, and thank
you so much for your leadership and all you do for our country.
Mr. Secretary, my aloha to Sylvia, too. I notice that the PGA
Tour was just at Pebble Beach. Had you chosen a different path
than you're on now, you could have been at home in Carmel
playing in the Pro-Am with your friends. But no, your
dedication to continue serving our country puts you before us
today. That says a lot, a lot about you and who you are. I've
known you, as we know, since we served together in the House.
In all seriousness, I really appreciate your dedication and
your hard work, Mr. Secretary. I add my appreciation to the
brave men and women of the Armed Forces who lead and their
families for their service and sacrifice.
Secretary Panetta, it is impossible to overstate the
importance of our military engagement in the Asia-Pacific
region. It's obvious that there are many challenges in this
area, given the new focus on this vital region. If you look at
continuing developments in the Pacific, our conventional
adversaries are advancing and it is critical we maintain our
superiority in the region.
Given the many demands on the defense budget, as you
mentioned, and the unique mission and environment we have in
the region, my question to you is, how does DOD's fiscal year
2013 budget impact our military readiness in the Pacific
region?
Secretary Panetta. That's obviously a primary concern for
us, because we do believe that it is important to maintain a
strong presence in the Pacific. For that reason, we maintain
the 11 carriers in the Navy in order to ensure that we have
sufficient forward presence. There's nothing like a carrier to
be able to allow for quick deployment in that area, and that
will give us a great capacity to be able to show our force
structure in the Pacific.
In addition to that, we're going to maintain, obviously, a
military presence. We already have one in Korea, but we're
going to maintain an additional rotational presence with our
Marines throughout that area. We've just developed an agreement
with Australia to do a rotational presence there. We're working
with the Philippines on hopefully a similar arrangement there
as well.
In addition to that, obviously, we have our air bases and
the forward deployed air assets that will give us the
capability to cover that area as well. So we feel very good
about the force structure that we have in this budget and our
ability to maintain a real presence in the Pacific.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
General Dempsey, the United States has been attempting to
engage China with military-to-military exercises and other
cooperative opportunities, including humanitarian and disaster
relief operations, and you've done well. General, how do you
foresee these efforts at engagement proceeding as the U.S.
focuses resources in the Pacific?
General Dempsey. I think the strategy is actually quite
sound. By the way, it's important to note we never left the
Pacific, so the idea of rebalancing ourselves globally is just
that, it's rebalancing. It's not a light switch on or off or a
pivot. That word got ahead of me a bit.
We're rebalancing our strategy and we're doing that based
on the trends, demographic trends, economic trends, and
military trends. In so doing, we do have the opportunity to
increase our engagement with the People's Republic of China,
because there are many things with which we have a common
interest. They've been working with us in the Gulf of Aden on
counter-piracy for some time.
We've had military-to-military engagement. It hasn't been
as consistent as we'd like it. We have a chance, I think, now
in the coming months to reemphasize it. I think that will
assist us in implementing our strategy. So this is an
opportunity for us, Senator, and we intend to take it.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I am a true believer in our Special Forces.
Having visited the SEALs conducting training operations, I have
seen firsthand the talent and dedication of our Special Forces
personnel. Special Forces units are likely to do more in the
future. I want to make sure that as an end result, as end
strength numbers are reduced, that the career fields--they
could be fields in communications and logistics as well--which
support and help the Special Forces complete their missions are
not reduced to a point which could limit the overall readiness
of Special Forces units.
General, can you share any thoughts also on this?
General Dempsey. I can, sir. To your point, one of the
lessons of the last 10 years or certainly among the lessons of
the last 10 years is that the SOF have demonstrated their
versatility and their capabilities, not just in the
counterterror realm, but also in the building partner capacity,
security force assistance.
One of the things we've been talking about with the Service
Chiefs is finding a new paradigm where we will partner
differently with SOF to give us greater capability, synergy.
The sum is greater than the individual parts. We're working on
that. The Army, for example, is working on habitual
relationships of the enablers you're talking about--lift,
medical, communications.
So I can assure you there will be no degradation to our
Special Operations community. But I also want to assure you we
cannot put all of our eggs in that basket because, as I've said
in previous testimony, SOF are just that, they're special. If
we go too far in that direction, then the conventional force
becomes the special and the SOF no longer have that capability.
So we just have to find the right balance, and we're working on
it.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, there's no question that
Special Forces--through their agility and their ability to
deploy quickly, represent a very important force for the
future. They've been very effective, as we know, in terms of
terrorism. But as the General has pointed out, they've also
been very effective at developing partnerships with other
countries, working with them, doing exercises, providing
advice. They have a great capability there.
So I think the kind of force we're looking at, obviously,
as the General has pointed out, is to maintain a strong Army
that can confront a land enemy and be able to defeat that enemy
in a land war, but at the same time develop the kind of
rotational capability, using Special Forces, using the Marines,
using elements of the Army as well, to be able to have a
presence elsewhere in the world. That would give us the best of
all things.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator.
Secretary Panetta. By the way, Senator, I should point out
that we are increasing our Special Operations. I think the
numbers, we're going to increase them by 3,000. We're putting
about $10.4 billion more along those lines.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, since you brought up the budget, certainly
I'm looking forward to voting again on the President's budget.
It's been over 1,000 days since the Senate's put out a budget.
I and the American people would like that to be different and
have that come up at some point.
That being said, I have, with 7 minutes, a lot of other
questions. I'm going to submit some for the record. Mr.
Secretary, one of them I will be discussing is the Global Hawk
Block 30 program. I'm going to be asking about the cost
comparisons between the U-2 and the Global Hawk, have they been
reviewed, particularly as it relates to sustainment? Can the U-
2 alone provide the ISR necessary in order to meet the
operational requirements? That will be one of them.
In addition, I live in an innovative State, Massachusetts,
and we have an innovative base, Hanscom, in dealing with the
cybersecurity threat. I agree with the chairman--before we talk
about any BRAC closures, I would hope that we would continue to
work on the cybersecurity emphasis on areas and bases like
Hanscom, because I think that is the next real area where we
need to focus on, as referenced in your earlier testimony.
Taking it a step further, the Air Force has proposed
restructuring its civilian workforce to the tune of about
16,000 civilian contracted employees. I would ask that you keep
in mind these restructuring efforts as it affects the small
businesses, as Senator Wicker and others have referenced and
you referenced in your comments. It affects, obviously,
Hanscom, Westover, and other bases throughout the country. I
know Senator Ayotte and I are deeply concerned about that.
One of the observations I made as I served in Afghanistan
this summer was, obviously, the drawdown. I have felt that we,
if we do it thoughtfully and methodically, can transfer
authority and control over to the Afghans, but if we do it too
quickly, we're going to be in deep trouble and we'll lose all
those benefits that we had.
One of the things that I referenced and acknowledged
through speaking and meeting with all the generals and with
General Allen, is the fact that we have so many audits going on
right now, without referencing any particular directorate, one
general had 75 audits going on at once. So I said to him: ``How
can you actually expect to do the drawdown, as General Allen's
doing, and then continue to do your mission, keep our soldiers
safe and secure, and then complete the audits?'' He says: ``We
can't; something has to give.''
So, General Dempsey and Mr. Secretary, I would ask you to
seriously look at that. If we're going to be doing this
drawdown, we absolutely need to address these audit issues,
there's so much duplication right now, and it's just, I think,
some agencies justifying their existence. So I'm hoping you can
comment on that issue.
General Dempsey. I won't comment on them justifying their
own existence, because they'll audit me if I do that and I
don't want to go there. [Laughter.]
Senator Brown. I hear you.
General Dempsey. But I share your concern, sir. I've been
on the receiving end of it, and there is clearly a need to be
auditable because the Nation is investing incredible resources.
But it has gotten a bit out of control, and my J-8 and the
Under Secretary for Policy are both working to squeeze those
audits to make sure they're not redundant, because some of them
are redundant. They're absolutely duplicates. If you read them,
which I have, you'll see they're the same exact thing. There
has to be a central location or a central effort to do that,
because the troops can't do their jobs and work 24/7 on audits
and then go expect to perform the mission, which is obviously
very serious.
That being said, in Iraq, with obviously us being out of
there, is it accurate that we now have over 100,000 civilian
contractors there doing the job that ultimately our soldiers
did? In fact, if that is so, is the cost two to three times
more than what we were paying our soldiers? If that is the
case, where is that money coming from?
Secretary Panetta. Go ahead.
General Dempsey. Thanks, sir. [Laughter.]
I don't have the exact numbers. At one time towards the end
of the calendar year, I was tracking those numbers on a daily
basis.
Senator Brown. It's substantial.
General Dempsey. Oh, it is substantial, sir.
Senator Brown. We're paying two to three times more, and
we're paying two to three times more than we were paying the
average soldier.
General Dempsey. In some functions we are paying more.
Security force or security details are more expensive, but
other places, logistics, transportation, we're not paying as
much as you would normally pay a soldier.
But we have that information, if you place that question in
the record.
Senator Brown. Yes, I'd like to do that and get that for
the record, because I'd like to know where that money is coming
from and how that's being worked into the budget.
[The information referred to follows:]
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledged that contractors
are part of the total force, providing an adaptable mix of unique skill
sets, local knowledge, and flexibility that a strictly military force
cannot cultivate or resource for all scenarios, permitting our nation
to concentrate military resources on those areas which are inherently
governmental. Contractors provide a broad range of supplies, services,
and critical logistics support in many capability areas, while reducing
military footprint and increasing the availability and readiness of
resources.
Currently, there are 10,967 contractors on the Department of
Defense (DOD) contracts in Iraq. Of that, private security contractors
make up 2,991, 84 percent of which are third country nationals (TCN)
that earn, on average, lower salaries than U.S. servicemen. The average
TCN security contractor earns $17,751 per guard, per year. In
comparison, pay and benefits (annual composite rate) for an E-5 is
$76,381.
DOD funds to support these contracts are requested in the Overseas
Contingency Operations budget.
Senator Brown. In terms of the reverse, General Dempsey, in
terms of the understanding of the term ``reversibility,'' it's
a general concept designed to ensure the total force stays
prepared for unexpected contingencies as the Active component
inevitably gets stronger. How does the Guard and Reserve work
in? I know you referenced it briefly, but I would think,
obviously being in the Guard, that you would get more valuable
dollars, more bang-for-the-buck, so to speak?
Is there an effort, a real sincere effort, to push a lot of
the training responsibilities, mobilization, et cetera, to the
Guard and Reserves?
General Dempsey. This effort, the new strategy and the
budget to support it, has caused each Service to relook at how
they balance across components--Active, Guard, and Reserve.
I'll give you an example why that's an important conversation.
Senator McCain in his opening comment cited that we were
reducing 20 percent of the BCTs in the Army. That's true for
the Active component brigades, but if you look at the totality
of BCTs, which after this change will be 68, then the 8 is
really an 11 percent degradation or decline in BCTs.
So your point is an important one. We have to look at what
this total force and the joint force provide, not strictly what
we're doing to any one of them, and we are doing that.
Senator Brown. I would ask you to pay particular attention
to the Air Guard and take a look at moving some missions into
the Guard portfolio, because you do get a better bang-for-the-
buck, I would argue.
The other big elephant in the room, aside from
sequestration, is the fact that we have approximately 1 million
servicemembers expected to join the veterans ranks in the next
5 years, and unemployment among young veterans is very high,
and it's high also in the Guard and Reserves. Is there a 5-year
plan to meet the expected demand, and how are we working with
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to address these
important issues?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, you've raised a very important
point, because as we go through these additional drawdowns we
absolutely have to make sure that a support system is out there
as our men and women come back from service. We are working
with the VA in a number of areas, number one to try to provide
a jobs pool so that these veterans will have the opportunity to
get jobs in the private sector.
Second, we're working with the VA to try to improve the
seamless approach, so that when it comes to health care and
benefits, that people can move without long delays, without a
lot of bureaucracy, from coverage under the defense budget to
coverage under the veterans budget.
In addition to that, we're providing a lot of counseling
and support systems by all of the Services to make sure that
these families are supported once they come out so that they
can readjust. If they want to go into education, the education
benefits are provided. If they want to get a job, jobs are
provided. If they want to go into small business, we provide
the small business loans to assist them.
So there is a pretty solid package. We have to continue to
work at it and make sure that it's working and that it's
meeting the need. But we are very concerned that we have that
support system for these troops when they get out.
Senator Brown. I'd be eager to offer my assistance on those
very real issues. It's something that we've been working on in
Massachusetts for a very, very long time and have some real
knowledge about that issue.
Mr. Chairman, I'm presuming we'll have an opportunity to
add questions for the record and there will be a time allotted
to do so, the response?
Chairman Levin. Yes, there will be questions that are asked
for the record, and we'll ask our witnesses to promptly
respond.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Right after Senator Nelson's turn, we're going to take a 5-
minute break. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. Currently, progress
is being made toward the new U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
headquarters at Offutt in Nebraska, a new command and control
complex for STRATCOM. Now, the entire project has been
authorized, but because of the nature of this project DOD will
have to request phased-in or incremental funding as we move
along over a multi-year construction project.
Much has been said about cyber today. Mr. Secretary and
General Dempsey, could you explain the basis for, the need for
a new headquarters dealing with almost every aspect of our
military, defense and offense? Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, we think it's extremely
important because STRATCOM is obviously extremely important to
defending the Homeland. In order to defend the Homeland, you
have to develop the capabilities that we're facing right now,
and cyber obviously is one of those areas. Our ability to
develop the latest technology, the latest abilities in order to
not only defend ourselves, but understand what that threat is
about, is extremely important. We have to be able to develop
the kind of communications systems that are the state-of-the-
art, so that they can deal with quick communications.
In that area, any time we face a threat there is an
immediate response that has to take place and has to take place
quickly and effectively. Frankly, we need good systems in order
to make sure that happens. So for all those reasons, it's
important to our future that we develop that kind of capability
there.
Senator Nelson. It's safe to say that what the internal
components are within the structure would be equally important
as the structure itself. In other words, it's going to be a
high tech complex to be able to deal with the modern challenges
we have.
General Dempsey?
General Dempsey. Without talking about the structure
itself, I will tell you that the Service Chiefs, combatant
commanders, and I have begun a series of strategic seminars to
look at ways to better integrate, to learn lessons, and to
ensure that we can deliver our strategy with the force that
this budget will provide.
We know we can. We're looking at now how do we mitigate
change. One of the emerging insights I'll share with you is
that any regional conflict in the future--and we're looking out
in this budget to 2017. So in 2017, any regional conflict will
impact in the continental United States, in the Homeland,
without a doubt. That is to say, the Homeland is no longer a
sanctuary in 2017.
Therefore, commands like U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and
STRATCOM become more important in that environment.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
I have a lot of concerns about our presence in Iraq. We've
had questions raised about the number of contract employees
there, contractors. I also understand that DOS is now in a lead
role trying to decide what the mission is in Iraq. We have the
largest embassy in the world and it's growing, physically
growing, but we don't have an established mission.
I know that part of this will be DOS, but I assume that DOD
also has a vital role in establishing that mission.
Secretary Panetta, might you fill us in on what progress is
being made to establish a mission? It seems like we have the
cart before the horse here, but perhaps you can help us.
Secretary Panetta. Frankly, I think DOD has a pretty good
plan there that we're implementing. We have about eight sites
that we're located in. We're working with foreign military
sales (FMS) that are being provided to the Iraqis. We're
providing training. We're providing support. It's both DOD and
contract individuals that are working in those sites. It's
pretty limited, but it's very helpful to the Iraqis in terms of
their ability to develop security for the future.
In addition, we're open to continuing to discuss with them
additional opportunities, particularly with regards to other
operations, going after al Qaeda, et cetera, that we think are
important to continue as well.
So I think we feel pretty good about the mission that we're
performing right now there.
General Dempsey. Yes, absolutely, sir. We've built the
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq based on the capabilities
that the Iraqi Government wanted us to support them, how they
wanted to be supported, notably with the program of record for
FMS and then institution-building. We have our resources mapped
to those functions, and I'm very confident that we have the
Office of Security Cooperation sized about right for now.
If they were to choose to expand our relationship in any
way, we could do so.
Senator Nelson. There seems to be room within that
structure to expand, because of the size of the structure. I
don't mean to minimize the necessity of having the presence in
Iraq, but it seems like the structure is going to be more than
adequate to take care of our needs. When I emphasize ``more
than adequate,'' it's consistent with the DOD Inspector
General's criticisms or observations about the size of the
structure and continuing to expand without a stated mission. I
hope we can get where we feel like we can state what that
mission ultimately is.
I'd like to turn to Iran for just a minute. It seems like
every time we check any of the news today Iran is involved in
it--questions about Iran engaging in terrorist activities in
two locations around the world in the last day or so, the plot
to take out the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Al-
Jubeir. You said, Secretary Panetta, on 60 Minutes, it's a red
line for us and it's a red line obviously for the Israelis if
they have the ability to deliver a nuclear weapon with a
missile. What are your opinions about that, if you might be
able to enlighten us a bit more?
Secretary Panetta. As I said, we have a number of concerns
here that we worry about with regards to Iran. Those are
concerns that we share not just with the Israelis but with the
entire international community. As the President himself has
stated, we will not tolerate an Iran that develops a nuclear
weapon, and yet they continue, obviously, to try to improve
their nuclear enrichment capabilities. That's something that
concerns us a great deal.
They continue to threaten the possibility of closing the
Straits of Hormuz, and we have made very clear that that is a
red line for us, that that Strait is extremely important to
free commerce and to shipping and to the shipping lanes, and
would have a huge economic impact if that were to happen. That
too is unacceptable and not tolerable for the United States.
We're concerned about Iran and the spread of terrorism, the
fact that they seek to undermine legitimate governments around
the world. That too concerns us. We think that the approach of
the international community to apply sanctions, to apply
diplomatic pressure, is having an impact. It has isolated Iran.
It's made very clear to them that they have to change their
behavior. I think that we need to keep that pressure on. That's
an important effort. I think the international community is
unified in that effort, and I guess my hope would be that we
could all stick together in ensuring that we continue to
isolate Iran and make very clear to them that they should
choose to join the international community, the rules and the
laws and the regulations of the international community, and
become part of that family. If they choose otherwise, then--
that would have serious implications.
Senator Nelson. Our concern is more than just about their
nuclear capacity, although that is a very important part. But
are the actions that they're taking beyond being pesky, in
terms of what they are intending to do?
Secretary Panetta. It's far beyond being pesky. It's
deliberately supplying equipment and arms to others to engage
in terrorist activity, and that too concerns us very much.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
We'll take a short break.
[Recess from 11:46 a.m. to 11:56 a.m.]
Chairman Levin. We'll come back to order.
Senator Portman has yielded to Senator Graham, and then
we'll put Senator Portman back in his order when he returns.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. If we could earmark, I would help Ohio. So
I just want to let Rob know I appreciate this very much.
[Laughter.] I have to run.
Secretary Panetta, do you believe it's a viable strategy
for the United States to try to contain a nuclear-armed Iran?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, indeed.
Senator Graham. The idea of containment. Shouldn't we
prevent them from getting a nuclear capability, not contain
them?
Secretary Panetta. It's not just contain, but it's
obviously doing everything we can to prevent them from
developing.
Senator Graham. Right. I guess my question more correctly
asked is, if they get a nuclear weapon, do you think the idea
of containment is a way to go? Should we prevent them versus
containing them?
Secretary Panetta. No, I think we have to prevent them.
Senator Graham. Because if they got a nuclear weapon the
damage is done. Other nations follow suit. Terrorists are more
likely to get the material. So the Secretary of Defense's view
is that the idea of containing a nuclear-armed Iran is not the
way to go; the idea is to prevent them from doing it.
Hopefully, we can do it through sanctions and diplomatic
engagement. I hope we can.
Okay, China. General Dempsey, there are a lot of media
reports that the Chinese routinely, the People's Liberation
Army (PLA), engages in cyber attacks of our business and
national security infrastructure. Do you believe that is a
reality of the 21st century?
General Dempsey. I believe someone in China is hacking into
our systems and stealing technology and intellectual property,
which at this point is a crime. I can't attribute it directly
to the PLA.
Senator Graham. Let's say if we could find that the PLA was
involved in hacking into our defense infrastructure, would you
consider that a hostile act by the Chinese?
General Dempsey. I would consider it to be a crime. I think
there are other measures that could be taken in cyber that
would rise to the level of a hostile act.
Senator Graham. What would they be?
General Dempsey. Attacking our critical infrastructure.
Senator Graham. That could be a hostile act?
General Dempsey. I think so.
Senator Graham. Allowing us to respond in kind?
General Dempsey. In my view that's right, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. So I'm going to have lunch with the Vice
President of China in about 20 minutes. So what do you want me
to tell him? [Laughter.]
General Dempsey. Happy Valentine's Day. [Laughter.]
Senator Graham. All right, okay. I'll do that.
Chairman Levin. By the way, Senator Graham, in my opening
statement I made it very clear that the cyber espionage going
on from China has to stop and it's mighty serious stuff. So you
can pass along, if you would, that comment as well.
Senator Graham. All right. Would you consider it a hostile
act?
Chairman Levin. I sure would.
Senator Graham. Okay, I would, too.
Chairman Levin. But Happy Valentine's Day. [Laughter.]
Senator Graham. It ought to be an interesting lunch.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Panetta, in 2014 the game plan is to transition
to Afghan security force control; they're in the lead, is that
correct?
Secretary Panetta. That's correct.
Senator Graham. We'll have a training mission, we'll be
providing intelligence gathering, providing capabilities they
are not quite yet capable of doing, like airlift; is that
correct?
Secretary Panetta. That's correct.
Senator Graham. Do you support the concept of a follow-on
force past 2014 that's part of a strategic partnership
agreement, that would have a military footprint post-2014 that
would allow American air power to remain in Afghanistan along
with special forces units, at the Afghans' request? Do you
think that is in our national security interest to consider
such a follow-on force?
Secretary Panetta. I believe, as the President has stated,
that we have to have an enduring presence in Afghanistan. We
need to, obviously, discuss what those missions are, but I
think clearly counterterrorism operations is one of those
missions. Training and advising is one of those missions.
Providing the right enablers is one of those missions.
Obviously providing air support is one of those missions as
well.
Senator Graham. So you would agree with the concept that
post-2014 if we had a configuration of American forces with
adequate air power to assist the Afghan security forces, plus a
Special Forces component, the Taliban days are over in terms of
military conquest?
Secretary Panetta. That ought to be the goal.
Senator Graham. I think that ought to be the goal and I
think you could do this with 15,000 or 20,000 troops, with
several air bases spread throughout the country. To a war-weary
public: We have air bases everywhere. If we leave Afghanistan
and the issue is in doubt about the future of the Taliban, we
will regret it. If we leave Afghanistan in a way to create a
certainty about the Taliban's future, I think we can hold our
heads up high.
Do you think Iran is watching what we're doing in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Panetta. I would think without question.
Senator Graham. General Dempsey, what is your biggest
concern and your best hope about Iraq?
General Dempsey. I'll start with the best hope, and that is
that they appear to be committed to resolving the contentious
issues among them politically, not through violence, with the
exception of a few of the violent extremist organizations which
remain there.
My biggest concern is that they could potentially come to a
decision that they no longer need our help. They might look
elsewhere. That's why our Office of Security Cooperation there
remains a very vital part of our strategy.
Senator Graham. Do you see the security situation in Iraq
getting worse or better?
General Dempsey. I see it as being in a form of stasis
right now. I think it is what it is for the foreseeable future,
with of course the potential for it, based on some political
decisions they might make, with increasing tension, for example
in the Arab-Kurd region.
Senator Graham. When it comes to the military budget, I
don't see DOD as a job creator for America. That's one of the
benefits, but I don't think we should view DOD as a way to just
create jobs to deal with unemployment. I think we should have a
robust defense capability to defend our values. So in that
light, I do believe it's appropriate to reduce defense
spending, and I do believe it's appropriate to consider another
round of BRAC, as hard as that is for my colleagues. So just
count me in in the process of having to make hard decisions,
even in the defense area.
When it comes to TRICARE premiums, is it sustainable--is
the mandatory spending part of the budget sustainable without
reform?
Secretary Panetta. No.
Senator Graham. So the question for the country is, if I
don't get courtmartialed in the next couple of years and get to
be a retired colonel and receive my TRICARE benefits when I'm
60, it is okay to ask a guy like me to pay more. They haven't
been adjusted since the 1990s, is that correct?
Secretary Panetta. That's correct.
Senator Graham. General Dempsey, you're willing to pay
more?
General Dempsey. I am, sir.
Senator Graham. I guess the point is that we're so far in
debt, no one group is off the table. It's hard to ask those
who've done the most to secure our freedom to give more, but
I'm willing to do it. To the retired community, I'm willing to
grandfather the current system, but I'm also willing to look
outside the box, because if we don't do something in terms of
health care growth and entitlement, retiree benefits, you're
going to compete the retired force with operational needs, and
that's just not where we want to go.
So thank you both. I don't know if $487 billion is the
right number, but I'll work with you to get a number that is
robust.
One last question. Do you see a scenario in the next decade
where 100,000 American troops could be involved over a
sustained period of time? If you do, how would reducing the
Army and the Marine Corps by 125,000 affect those operations?
General Dempsey. First of all, I don't know the answer to
that, sir. But I think we wouldn't want to shape a future where
we completely ignored the possibility.
The force we're building on the fiscal year 2013 to 2017
budget is capable, we assess, of stability operations, long-
term stability operations or prolonged conflict, up to a force
of about 50,000. The other 50,000 would have to come out of the
Guard and Reserve.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham. You have my
proxy at lunch, by the way. [Laughter.]
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, first let me just say that as
somebody who spent 5 years in the Pentagon, one of them as a
serving Marine and the other as a defense executive, I
appreciate all of the work that's gone into this presentation.
We're going to have our disagreements, but, having sat on the
Defense Resources Board for 4 years, I know how much effort has
gone into what you brought over here.
There are already reports--I was back in my office--on the
discussion to slash the Army and the Marine Corps. I think for
the record we ought to point out that what we're looking at
here is historically consistent with the end point of sustained
ground operations. In fact, if my numbers are correct, if you
go back to the pre-September 11 military and look at 2017,
which you're projecting in your testimony, Secretary Panetta,
the Army is going to be about 9,000 higher than it was pre-
September 11 and the Marine Corps is going to be again about
9,000 higher than pre-September 11.
So I look forward to working with you on a lot of different
issues, and some on which we may have disagreement. But again,
I have great respect for all of the energy that's gone into
this, preparation of this budget.
I want to talk about basing in the Pacific. Chairman Levin
mentioned this in his opening comments. Chairman Levin, Senator
McCain and I have spent a great deal of effort on this. I
agree, General Dempsey, with what you said. I don't see a pivot
here. I think we've always been there, we've always needed to
be there. I've been speaking for many years about the need for
us to reconfigure our presence in a way not that downsizes or
not that confronts or attempts to contain China, as some people
are saying, but just as a way to strengthen our alliances and
our presence out there.
There's a strong strategic dynamic in the region. There's
also a very important and potentially volatile political
dynamic in Japan if we don't get this right and if we don't get
it right soon. This has been going on for more than 15 years.
We can't kick the can down the road--I'm not asking for your
comment on this, but this is more along the lines of getting
your bank statement. There are a couple things that are due to
us and they're very important in our consideration. One is the
reporting requirement that is scheduled to come out of the
independent study that was mandated by the NDAA. There's a 90-
day period for which the bill was signed, which I think was
December 31, for the study to come to the Secretary of Defense
and then the Secretary of Defense would have up to 90 days, not
necessarily mandated, to report to us on this independent
evaluation of the basing structure.
It's very important. It's going to happen at the same time
that there are environmental statements and other issues taking
place on Okinawa about the basing system there. I'm very
interested in getting this study and seeing if we can't move
forward in a very timely way to resolve this.
The other one is the Marine Corps laydown. I have spoken
with the Assistant Commandant about the numbers that they're
using. I support this transition in concept. I've had many
conversations with the Marine Corps and with others about this
earlier. But we do need to see it. We need to see the laydown.
It's again a part of the NDAA.
The question that I actually have in this short period of
time relates to the evolving situation in Syria. General, I
would like to ask if you might characterize for us, for lack of
a better term, the on-the-ground opposition that now exists to
the Syrian regime? What proportion of this is domestic? What
proportion is foreign? What are your observations?
General Dempsey. My observations, Senator, are that it is a
much different situation than we collectively saw in Libya. I
think that's an important point to make, because we don't have
as clear an understanding of the nature of the opposition.
We're working in the intelligence community to develop it. But
there are some significant differences vis-a-vis Syria. There
is a chemical and biological warfare threat. There's a very
significant integrated air defense system, a very credible
military.
We're watching the trend lines on their military to see if
they are still under the control of the regime. There's also
huge regional implications, big players and actors who have
vested interests there. So this is one where we have to not
only understand what's happening on the ground, but also look
at the regional context in which we're dealing.
Of course, we will, when asked, provide options to the
national command authority. But this is a very different
challenge.
Senator Webb. First let me reiterate that I had serious
concerns about the Libyan operation and the nature in which the
President exercised unilateral authority. But on the Syrian
situation, do you have any indication about the makeup of the
on-ground opposition to the regime, how much of it is domestic
and how much of it is in fact not?
General Dempsey. As I sit here today, the Free Syrian Army,
which is generally speaking the centerpiece of the opposition,
is for the most part domestic, although we also know that other
regional actors are providing support for it. That complicates
the situation.
Senator Webb. There were reports over the weekend that al
Qaeda has been involved as a part of the opposition. Do you
have any confirmation of that?
General Dempsey. No confirmation. I saw the same report.
Senator Webb. But have you discounted it?
General Dempsey. No, not at all. Syria is an issue of a
Sunni majority rebelling against an oppressive Alawite Shia
regime. All of the players--this is what I mentioned a moment
ago--in the region it seems have a stake in this. So those who
would like to foment a Sunni-Shia standoff--and you know who
they are--are all weighing in in Syria. It is the last
remaining piece in the puzzle of what you and I probably months
ago would have described as the Arab Spring, but this is a very
important moment in the region and all the players are weighing
in.
Senator Webb. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General Dempsey, thank you for being here
this morning.
I told Secretary Panetta that I was going back and forth
between the Senate Budget Committee and this committee. It's
been interesting because I'm really seeing two different points
of view and really world views. I commend both of you today and
your comments about the need for us to deal with the
unsustainable growth on the entitlement or mandatory side of
the spending. In response to your question from Senator Graham,
is the mandatory spending for the military sustainable, you
gave a simple answer, no.
I will tell you, to be honest, having just engaged in the
Senate Budget Committee about the President's budget, which was
submitted yesterday, it not only adds another $12 trillion to
our debt, taking it up to over $25 trillion, but it really
takes the pass on any of the tough decisions that have to be
made on the biggest part of the budget and the fastest growing
part of the budget, and that's the entitlements side.
It actually grows, under their own numbers, from about 64
percent of our total budget now--this would be Medicare,
Medicaid, Social Security, interest on the debt. That grows
from 64 percent now, so the largest part of our budget, to 78
percent during the 10-year window of the President's budget and
yet there is no mention of Social Security, no reforms.
On Medicare, the only reform I can see on the beneficiary
side happens after the next term of whoever's President, and
that's on some slight means testing changes.
So my concern is exactly what you have outlined today, and
I quote you from your overview document, where you said: ``Our
growing national debt, if not addressed, will imperil our
prosperity, hurt our credibility and influence around the
world, and ultimately put our national security at risk.''
General Dempsey, you talked about that during your
nomination hearing last year, and I again appreciate the
approach you have taken. I'm very concerned that if we continue
down the path that has been outlined we will all be here many
more hearings like this one, talking not about how to improve
our national security, but instead talking about how budgets
have been crowded out by unsustainable practices elsewhere in
our government and we simply can't afford the force we know we
need.
So, with that, if I could focus on two things in terms of
the defense budget, because I do think there is room, despite
my concern about the bigger budget crowding out defense, within
defense to find savings. Two areas I want to touch on quickly
if I could are personnel and the area of procurement.
On the personnel side, I appreciate the fact that you both
again have focused on compensation, health care benefits.
You've proposed a retirement review. These are all tough
issues. I think we all agree that our men and women in uniform
are our single greatest asset and we need to be very cautious
on the personnel side.
On the other hand, we need to be sure that we are not
crowding out, even within the defense budget, the need for us
to be sure that we have adequate resources for operations and
maintenance.
So I would ask you this. When you look at what you have
proposed, in essence you've taken out one issue to a commission
on the retirement issue, again a very delicate issue, and you
have some suggestions on changing compensation in the military
health system here, although I would suggest more would have to
be done to meet your own criteria you've laid out.
My question to you is, is there a more holistic approach
here, in that this does relate to retention and obviously our
ability to attract the great professional force that we have
now?
General Dempsey. We thought about bundling these issues
together into, as you described it, a holistic look at pay,
compensation, health care, and retirement. The chiefs and I
were of the opinion that we wanted to address the issue we saw
before us that we knew had to be changed, and that was pay,
compensation, and health care, but take the time to study the
impact of retirement change, because one of the things we're
concerned about is, although it's counterintuitive, you know
that about 70 percent of the force retires--not retires, but
separates before retirement, but 100 percent of the force, when
asked, even at the 5-year mark of their career, will say to
you: Don't screw around with my retirement or I may not stick
around, even though they know that the chances of them actually
retiring is only about 30 percent.
So there's a psychological factor with retirement benefits
here that we don't fully understand yet. We want to take some
time to understand what the impact of retirement reform would
be on both recruitment and retention. That's why we all felt,
the chiefs and I, that we should separate these.
Senator Portman. Secretary Panetta, any thoughts with
regard to this, given your background on the budget issues?
Secretary Panetta. I think it's important, as a former OMB
Director that I was, that we have to approach this budget based
on the fact that there's no holy ground here. You have to look
at everything and you have to question everything. We
approached it on that basis.
We talked about allowances, we talked about pay, we talked
about pay raises, we talked about all the health care areas. We
looked at a number of those areas. We felt we have to take a
step to make sure that compensation is part of the answer to
what we have to achieve here in savings. For that reason, we
selected the areas that we looked at.
I think it's important that all of this has to relate to
what it means to the soldier, the uniformed man or woman who is
there on the battlefield. How do we make sure that we provide
the benefits that are necessary to attract the very best?
Frankly, we have the very best operating on behalf of the
United States today. How do we do that, how do we maintain that
benefit base that's important, but at the same time, understand
that we have to control these costs in the out-years?
That was the dilemma that we had to confront. We think we
approached it in the right way. Is there more that can be done?
Probably.
Senator Portman. I know that members of the committee know
this, but maybe for someone watching, this is an increasing
part of your budget, just as it is for the Federal budget, as I
mentioned, if you look at your percent of spending on TRICARE,
for instance, as a percent of your overall budget.
So as one member of the committee--and I think I speak for
a lot of other colleagues, including at least one I heard speak
earlier--we look forward to working with you on that and trying
to be supportive.
On procurement, we don't have time to go into it because my
time is up. But just again, to focus on competition, the need
for us maybe to spend a little more upfront to be sure we have
a competitive process because it'll save so much over time. I
look forward to maybe a follow-up question in writing in that
regard.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your service to our country. As some of
you know, I have spent a lot of time working on contracting
issues as a member of this committee and other committees. I
don't need to tell you what a huge piece of your budget
contracting represents. The Project on Government Oversight
released a report last year that is the first in-depth analysis
that's been done in a while about the cost of personal services
contracts as compared to the costs of a Federal employee.
That study showed that we are paying contractors 1.83 times
more than the government pays Federal employees, and that's
including taking into account the benefits package that goes
along with the personnel costs of hiring a Federal employee.
I think there's been an awful lot of talk around the Senate
about freezing Federal employees' salaries and cutting the
number of Federal employees, but there's been very little real
difficult work of trying to hold down the cost of personal
services contracts.
Secretary Panetta, with the reductions of DOD personnel
contained in this budget, what are you doing to ensure that
reducing--because what's happened over the years is, while
we've tried to hold the line on Federal employees, contracting
has just ballooned. You are by far number one in that. Number
two is DHS. So I'd like you to address that if you could,
either you or Mr. Hale.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, you've provided tremendous
leadership on this issue, and it is of great concern to me
personally because it is an area that has expanded
dramatically. Almost everywhere I go in my new capacity, I see
contract employees obviously providing a lot of services. Some
of them are very important and they perform a very important
role. Some of them I question whether or not we could perform
the same role and be able to do it at a smaller price.
We did look at this area as part of our efficiency approach
to trying to see if we could gain some savings, and I'd like to
ask our Comptroller to speak to that.
Mr. Hale. Just briefly, I think you know, Senator
McCaskill, we had an initiative a couple of years ago to in-
source jobs where it was cost-effective. We are still looking
at where it's cost-effective. I think with these budget
cutbacks we're looking at what the right mix is. Probably both
contractors and civil servants are going to come down over the
next few years in our budget.
We have to try to find the right mix. I don't claim we have
an easy formula, but I think we are looking at it in that
context, which is the right one: What's the most cost-effective
way that we can get the work done?
Senator McCaskill. We're going to have a hearing on this in
the Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight of the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and what I will be
looking forward to seeing is what kind of strict analysis is
DOD embracing to get a handle on contract employees versus
full-time Federal employees? Because it surprised me when I got
here that not only do we not know how many contractors there
were in Iraq, we didn't know how many contractors there were
sitting in government buildings within 5 miles of where we're
sitting right now. That is a huge problem, that the contractors
just became task orders, as opposed to keeping a handle on how
this monster got out of hand.
We also are going to have some legislation coming from the
Wartime Contracting Commission that finished its work. I will
look forward to direct input from you about the legislation
that we will be hopefully filing this week, and we will be
working with this committee to try to get some of its
provisions included in the defense authorization.
As I look at Afghanistan, $16 billion GDP, $2 billion of
that is not from us. That is a huge impact on that country. As
some of you are aware, I've also been looking at the way that
the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds have
been used over there in terms of infrastructure and how for the
first time in the budget there was actually an infrastructure
fund embedded in the budget coming from the military to do the
things that traditionally the DOS had always done. That is,
large infrastructure. It was like CERP on steroids, is
essentially what the infrastructure fund was.
I'm going to quote what the Counterinsurgency Advisory and
Assistance Team (CAAT) said. The CAAT, which provided a report
directly to General Allen, found that the CERP was not
achieving counterinsurgency goals. I'm going to quote this
report:
``Current incentives promote spending CERP funds
without sufficient accountability. There is no system
for determining what projects are likely to advance
counterinsurgency effects and no apparent desire to
objectively evaluate whether counterinsurgency
objectives were achieved. Commanders at various ends of
the spectrum are judged by the amount of funds
committed, obligated, or spent over actual measures of
effectiveness. This situation is not only wasteful, but
allows for corruption, insurgent resource capture, and
delegitimization of the Afghan state. We retain primary
responsibility for project success or failure while the
host government and population are spectators.''
I know that CERP has been something that has been held near
and dear, and now the Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund is an
outgrowth of that because we've gotten beyond fixing window
fronts to large highway construction projects, without the kind
of rigorous analysis in terms of sustainability. As we drop off
the cliff in Afghanistan in terms of what we're giving this
country of GDP, aren't we creating a scenario that a lot of
this money is going to go into the category that it went into
in Iraq, and that is, a lot of wasted taxpayers' dollars on
Afghanistan infrastructure?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, I'll have a general comment on
the actual use of those funds, but let me say this. I share the
concern that you've indicated. As we do draw down and as we
turn over these responsibilities to the Afghans, one of the
issues that we have to think long and hard about is the
sustainability of these efforts.
For example, in the Afghan force that takes over and
provides the principal security for the country, what is the
level that we need? Is it sustainable? Can this country provide
the support system that it has to? What kind of economic base
is that country going to have for the future? The issues that
you've raised all relate to that question. What are we looking
at in terms of the future of this country and can it sustain
itself?
That's going to be something we're going to have to give a
lot of consideration to. Not only the United States, but
obviously all of our NATO allies have to take a hard look at
what we do to try to sustain this country in the future if
we're going to be successful there.
General Dempsey. I'll just add, Senator, I first of all
hope we don't drop off a cliff. One of the things we've been
discussing is the glide slope in every sense. It's our glide
slope, it's the ANSF glide slope. It's our funding glide slope.
If we do drop it off a cliff, it will have the result you
just predicted. That's the reason that I would suggest we can't
fall off a cliff in Afghanistan. We have to transition this
thing responsibly.
As for whether they have the capacity to deal with all of
this, that has been--I've done this in several countries around
the world, to include Iraq most recently, and that is always
the most difficult part of these missions, is building the
capacity, the capability and then the capacity, to--it's really
institution-building. It's pretty easy to build infantry
battalions. It's pretty easy to partner with them and embed
with them. But the institution that sits above it all has to be
developed.
I would suggest to you that we've made some pretty
significant progress in that regard since about 2008, and it is
part of our strategy going forward. But I share your concerns.
I'm not sure that I share the understanding of all of the
results of that study you just cited, because depending on when
it was done and who did it and where they did it, it could have
a very different outcome other places. I'd suggest to you that
we owe you some information on that going forward.
Senator McCaskill. I have to tell you, I think that some of
the stuff that we've built in Afghanistan, we can go ahead and
build the stuff, we can hire the people to build it, our know-
how can provide the leadership to build it, and I think it's
been like wishful thinking that the institutional capacity of
this country will catch up. We have a power generation facility
in Afghanistan that's sitting there as an expensive extra power
generator because they can't even use it, and it was hundreds
of millions of dollars of American taxpayers' money.
That kind of stuff, we just can't afford to do that. I have
a modernization to move some of this money back to the United
States for infrastructure, and I think it's important that we
do that because of the needs of this country, and the real
problem that a lot of this money for security purposes is
ending up in the bad guys' hands, and we know that. There's
been way too many instances that we've found it.
So I appreciate the more information you can give me about
what kind of rigor you're bringing to the sustainability
equation, because I can't find that rigor and I've looked for
it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, Secretary Panetta, Mr. Hale, thank you for
your leadership during very challenging times for DOD.
I appreciate very much that we need to find savings in
defense in a way that does not undermine our national security,
no question. But please count me out when it comes to BRAC, and
here's why. I want to echo concerns that Secretary Panetta
himself, having gone through this process, raised before the
House committee in October, where, Mr. Secretary, you said:
``I went through BRAC. I know that all the dollars
that people looked for huge savings in BRAC, and yet
they didn't take into consideration the cleanup, they
didn't take into consideration all the work that had to
be done. They didn't take into consideration all the
needs that had to be addressed. In many cases it wound
up costing more. In fact, the recent Government
Accountability Office report found that it cost us for
the 2005 BRAC round 67 percent more than we estimated,
and in fact we're not going to see any savings from the
2005 round until 2018, 13 or 14 years down the line. So
I have serious questions whether we save any money from
a BRAC process. Particularly at a time when we're still
making decisions about our global posture and our
force, end strength of our forces, I don't think it's
the right time for a BRAC process where we may not save
a dime, frankly. That's what really concerns me at the
end of the day.''
I want to ask you, Secretary Panetta, about our
reengagement rate at Guantanamo. Director Clapper testified, I
believe it was last year or in the spring, that our
reengagement rate of those who had been released from
Guantanamo Bay was 27 percent. Do you know what the number is
now, and has that percentage of 27 percent getting back into
the fight gone up?
Secretary Panetta. I think 27 percent was over the long
period stretching back into the last administration, where most
of the individuals were transferred. I believe under the ones
that have been transferred under this administration that it's
less. I can't remember the exact percentage.
Senator Ayotte. But overall it's been--whatever
administration released it, Director Clapper said the overall
reengagement rate is 27 percent; is that correct?
Secretary Panetta. That's true, and I think that number is
correct. I'll get back to you on the specifics.
[The information referred to follows:]
Data regarding the reengagement rate of former Guantanamo Bay
detainees is collected and distributed by the Office of the Director
for National Intelligence (ODNI). In March 2012, ODNI released updated
public statistics on detainee reengagement for all detainees
transferred from Guantanamo Bay through December 29, 2011: Out of the
total 599 Guantanamo detainees transferred, 95 or 15.9 percent are
confirmed to have reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activity, and an
additional 72 or 12 percent are suspected of so reengaging.
Senator Ayotte. That would be great. I just want to know if
the overall reengagement rate, regardless of who released them,
has increased at all.
The reason I asked is, in follow-up to Senator McCain's
question earlier about what we've heard could be the
administration's potential release of five Guantanamo prisoners
in exchange to the Taliban, I just wanted to raise concerns
about it on a couple of fronts. Number one, as I see it,
according to the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post,
of these five people--let's be clear. If these reports, public
reports, are accurate, we're talking about individuals who,
senior-most Taliban commander in northern Afghanistan, someone
who is an alleged war criminal in his role for the massacre of
Shiite Afghans. Two of them are potentially involved in killing
of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative, an American
CIA operative. Of the remaining three, one is alleged to have
helped smuggle weapons in to attack U.S. troops and is loyal to
the Haqqani network, another one is directly associated with
Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar and then the final one may
belong to al Qaeda and his release has been called highly
problematic.
All five of these individuals were characterized by the
administration in 2010, if these reports are accurate about who
these individuals are, all five of them were deemed by this
administration in 2010 ``too dangerous to transfer, but not
feasible for prosecution.''
I know that you have to certify, Secretary Panetta. Two
years later, is there something changed about these individuals
that we're unaware of? My follow-up would be, as I understand
the administration's plan, this is in exchange for goodwill
from the Taliban. If we are going to release five, if these
reports are the case, these public reports of who these
individuals are, dangerous individuals who could get back and
reengage with our troops, and who aren't just soldiers, they
appear to be leaders among the Taliban and Haqqani networks,
that if we were to release them in exchange for a measure of
goodwill, it seems to me that, why aren't we getting a
ceasefire if we're going to put out people that are so
dangerous?
So two questions to you: First, has something changed from
2010 of the assessment of these five individuals in terms of
being too dangerous to release? Second, do you think this is a
good deal if we're only going to get a goodwill gesture from
the Taliban?
Secretary Panetta. Let me reemphasize that absolutely no
decisions have been made with regards to reconciliation. There
have been some discussions, but the conditions for
reconciliation have been made very clear, that the Taliban has
to lay down their arms, they have to renounce al Qaeda, they
have to recognize the constitution in Afghanistan. As far as I
know, none of those conditions have been met at this point, and
obviously would be part of the discussions.
As to whether or not as part of whatever these discussions
involve that there was a transfer as part of that, under my
obligations as Secretary, I have to certify that these
individuals will not return to the battlefield, and I have to
be convinced that steps are taken to ensure that that does not
happen. Until I am assured that that's the case, I'm not going
to certify.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. These are
very dangerous individuals if they are as they've been reported
by the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, and in
particular to transfer them for a so-called goodwill gesture. I
appreciate your list of conditions of a ceasefire, laying down
of arms, and I obviously am very concerned to transfer these
individuals at all, given how dangerous they have been in the
past.
Frankly, we haven't always been right about this. We've
been 27 percent wrong, whatever administration we're in. In
fact, Mullah Zakir was assessed as a medium risk--these guys
are all high risk--a medium risk, and he was released, and he's
now leading the Taliban forces fighting the U.S. Marines in the
Helmand Province.
So we do our best in these situations, but as a prior
prosecutor the best predictor of future behavior is usually
prior behavior, and these guys aren't good. So I appreciate
your looking at this certification very carefully.
Thank you all for being here today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. I'm sure you'd rather spend
Valentine's Day with any group other than the Senate Armed
Services Committee, so thanks for being here.
It's apparent that the fiscal challenges that DOD faces are
those that we face across the Federal budget. We've had a
respite given, the end of the war in Iraq. But unfortunately,
more broadly--and I'm not speaking to DOD, but I'm speaking
more broadly--we've mismanaged our finances across the board,
and we've put ourselves in a pretty tough, I would say even
unacceptable, financial position.
If you look at our history, we've leveraged our economic
and military strength to accomplish our goals, and we can't
effectively project our power abroad if we're weak at home.
Then we've also undercut our domestic and strategic goals by
managing our finances so poorly.
You both know in spades that we have to carefully strike a
balance between fiscal responsibility and strategic capability.
We can't hollow out the force, we can't eat our seed corn. We
have to get this right.
Fortunately, I think we have a lot of history to guide us,
and we have to make sure that we incorporate the lessons
learned from our successes and both our failures. As a mountain
climber, I always learned more when I was on the mountains I
didn't climb as the ones I was successfully summitting.
But, General, in that spirit I wanted to turn to the
summary that I've heard that DOD has affirmed its commitment to
Department-wide research and development programs and the
continued development of alternative energy technologies. DOD's
always been an innovator and military research has created a
number of products that we now consider essential to everyday
civilian life.
At the same time, there are concerns that there are
operational needs that need to be addressed now. Can you
discuss the thinking behind this focus on the future and how
that decision affects current operations and those that might
be just over the horizon?
General Dempsey. On the issue of energy, operational
energy, I can.
Senator Udall. Certainly on energy, but then even more
broadly, too--medical advances. I know you have a long list.
General Dempsey. We do, sir. In terms of looking out to
Joint Force 2020, that's exactly why we want to project
ourselves out and then look back and find our way forward. This
budget is the first step in that.
I will use operational energy as an example. We lose
soldiers, marines, notably airmen and soldiers, on the roads of
Afghanistan going from forward operating base (FOB) to FOB, on
resupply missions and so forth. So to the extent we can create
autonomous or semi-autonomous in terms of energy consumption,
power and energy, organizations, net zero in terms of their
consumption of power and energy, we'll actually save lives and
become a lot more agile because we won't be as tied to some
kind of traditional linear line of communications.
So we're all in. The Army has five installations--one of
them is Fort Carson, CO, by the way--where we're trying to
receive a net zero energy situation. But that's kind of the
garrison environment.
Operationally, we're trying to do the same thing with our
tactical units. Every Service, frankly, is working on this
diligently and I think this budget reflects that.
Senator Udall. There have been some compelling stories
about what the marines are doing in theater, on the front lines
at the FOBs. As your predecessor put it well, saving energy
saves lives. So I commend you for what you're doing. I look
forward to working with you in this important area as we move
forward.
Mr. Secretary, if I could turn to you. Congress, as I think
you're aware, worked with DOD to establish an Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) Office within the Air Force to rapidly
field small responsive satellites that are tactical in nature
and tasked by the combat commanders in the field. That's in
comparison to the large national systems that take somewhere 6
to 8 years and literally billions of dollars to field.
As I understand it, in fiscal year 2013 DOD is proposing to
abolish the ORS Office, zero its budget from $111 million last
year, and integrate whatever capability is left into the Space
and Missile System Center. Can you explain DOD's thinking here,
when the first satellite they launched was judged by U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) to be successful? ORS-1 started
sending images back to them in the fall of 2011, almost 3 years
to the day after the program was started.
One additional question. Is there a possibility that this
decision puts the cart before the horse? I assume the budget
was probably put together before CENTCOM started using the
system. Can you explain the reasoning here?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, let me have Bob Hale talk to
that.
Senator Udall. Great.
Mr. Hale. Senator, what we've done, as you said, is
terminate the program office, but not the commitment to ORS
initiatives. It'll be put into Space Command, where it can be
looked at in the broader context. We think that's the right
decision, as opposed to focusing on one particular approach,
but to look more broadly at this initiative. There are a lot of
ways to do it. We need to find a cost effective way. So I think
that's our approach.
Senator Udall. I look forward to working with you to make
sure we continue to get this right. We talked about smaller,
agile forces on the front lines and this is in a way a form of
doing that, but in space.
Let me turn to Iraq and Afghanistan. We've ended our
mission in Iraq. We're drawing down our surge forces in
Afghanistan. We've proposed reducing end strength in all four
Service branches, substantially reducing the number of
aircraft, ships, and Army BCTs. After all that and more, when
adjusted for inflation, the DOD budget for 2017 will still be
at almost exactly the same level as it was in 1986. That's the
height of the Reagan-era buildup against the Soviets.
Can you talk about the major reasons why we're spending the
same amount of money for a smaller force?
Secretary Panetta. Senator, what we have here is that $487
billion was in the planned DOD budget over the next 10 years,
and that included, obviously, a lot of what we've had to reduce
in terms of the budget looking forward. So overall, make no
mistake about it, even though the defense budget shows a slight
increase between now and 2017, the bottom line when you add
what we had proposed in our budget plus the amount that would
be involved in terms of the war costs, we're going to be going
down pretty dramatically, by about 20 percent, which is
comparable to what we've seen in past drawdowns.
So this budget bites. But at the same time, by virtue of
what we've done we've made it much tighter. Obviously, we've
had to take down the force structure. We've had to make cuts in
ships and planes and in other areas, space, as you said. But
the bottom line is we think we have a sustainable budget that
will take us to the kind of force we're going to need in order
to meet the threats that are out there in the world.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, General
Dempsey, for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm sure at this point in the hearing, Secretary Panetta,
that you're contemplating what Danny Akaka said to you and
wondering about your career choice. But we do appreciate your
service and indeed the service of all of you.
General Dempsey, I want to bring up with you an issue that
really troubles me. Since May 2007, Afghan security forces have
killed 70 American and allied troops and wounded many more,
over 100 more, in 45 separate attacks. One of those killed was
a Maine soldier, Private First Class Buddy McLain.
I'm so disturbed by the frequency of these attacks. It
raises questions about our vetting process. It raises concerns
among our troops when here they're risking their lives to train
and assist these Afghan troops, only to have some of them turn
on them and kill them.
It's my understanding that a CENTCOM red team report
concluded that there was a crisis of distrust that permeated
both the Afghan national security troops that we're training
and our own troops as well. So here they're being sent out on
joint missions, they're training side by side, but they don't
trust each other.
Unless steps are taken to stop these attacks on our troops
by the Afghan security personnel, that level of trust that is
so necessary for a successful strategy is going to be
extraordinarily difficult to achieve. After all, these are the
very security forces that we're depending on to take over from
us so that we can come back home.
So I would ask you, what is being done to address this very
serious and destructive problem?
General Dempsey. Thanks, Senator. Yes, I'm well aware of
this issue. In fact, I just recently briefed the President on
it, who shares your concern. As you say, it's actually 47
instances. About 11 of them were related to infiltration or
self-radicalization. The remainder were issues of personnel.
It's stress, it's tribal. It's not related to Taliban influence
or ideological issues. That's an important point. It doesn't
make it any better, but it makes it more understandable.
The other thing I want to mention is, it's not just what we
call--it's not just them attacking us. They're attacking each
other, and probably at a rate of about three times. So we are
interested in this. We have an eight-step vetting process that
includes--I don't have the entire thing memorized, but it
includes things like letters from tribal elders, biometrics,
training, indoctrination, and then the embedding of
counterintelligence agents, both United States and coalition,
but also Afghans themselves.
Recently, because of this recent issue with the French you
may recall, President Karzai and the Ministry of Interior,
Bismillah Khan, agreed to embed some counterintelligence agents
in throughout the Afghan National Army in order to try to get
after this.
So we're seized with it. It is tragic and we are taking
steps to improve it. We are not going to get it to zero. It's
the nature of this kind of conflict.
Senator Collins. It's one thing to tell a family that's
lost a loved one that they did so in support of the Afghan
people to help them have a secure country and to make our
national security better. But it's so different to try to
console a family that has lost a son or daughter as a result of
Afghan security force members killing them. I just think it's a
terrible problem, and the seeming frequency of it is really
disturbing.
I realize we're never going to get to zero, but there are
too many incidents.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, if I could, I share your
concern deeply. I just returned from the NATO ministerial,
where obviously the French were very concerned, having lost
some of their troops to this situation. What we did at the NATO
ministerial was to task General Allen to report back on the
steps that are being taken. Before this, he had actually taken
some of the steps that General Dempsey recommended. They are
moving aggressively to try to do a better review of those that
are going into the Afghan army, better checks, better
background checks, in order to ensure that these incidents are
cut back.
I would say that, even though no killings this way are in
any way justifiable, that it still remains not something that
is something that's endemic. It is sporadic, but nevertheless,
we have to address it and make sure it doesn't happen.
Senator Collins. Thank you. I would ask that your offices
keep me informed as you do try to improve the process.
Secretary Panetta, I share a lot of the concerns that my
colleagues have expressed about some of the cuts in the budget,
particularly those that affect shipbuilding and the size of our
fleet. It seems inconsistent to say that we're going to focus
on the Asia Pacific area and yet not seek to get to what for
years has been the absolute minimum goal of 313 ships.
I am pleased, however, that the budget request indicates
that DOD intends to seek a multi-year procurement plan for the
DDG-51 destroyers between now and 2017. First of all, do you
support that plan, and do you see that as helping to produce
the kinds of efficiencies that will lead to a lower cost per
unit?
Secretary Panetta. Absolutely. I think that's extremely
important. Two things are important. We want to maintain--we
have 285 ships now. We want to be at 285 ships in 2017. In the
next 5 years, our hope is to gradually move up to 300 ships by
2020. So we're clearly intent on having a Navy that is fully
capable to project that forward presence that we're interested
in.
Second, I think we have to do it in order to protect our
economic base. We have to have a strong industrial base here
that supports DOD, and for that reason my instructions are to
do everything possible, not only to obviously get better
competition and better savings, but to make sure that we keep
our industrial base busy serving our needs.
Senator Collins. That is so important, because once that
industrial base is gone, you never get it back. Once those
trained workers go into other fields, you've lost them forever,
and that would greatly weaken our capabilities. I agree.
Thank you for that response.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, Secretary Panetta, and Mr. Hale, thank you
for your service, and it is good afternoon now. Thank you for
your leadership, particularly during this time.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) proliferation is a key
concern of mine and it certainly has been for quite a while. I
support anything that we can do to counter IEDs and obviously
protect our troops, and I also support anything we can do to
improve the detection rates and interdict the flow of caches of
ammonium nitrate.
Reportedly, last year in Afghanistan IEDs caused over half
of U.S. military deaths, and IEDs will continue to pose an
enduring threat to our military men and women. I believe we
need an enduring capability to counter this threat. However, we
have to ensure that our countermeasures effectively deal with
the types of IEDs that we face now and in the future, along
with the environments that they'll likely be utilized in, and
our efforts must be geared toward countering IEDs in any
locale.
My figures show that we've spent approximately $17 billion
on various counter-IED initiatives and equipment, not counting
the $45 billion spent on mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP)
vehicles. I see these, our young soldiers, all the time with
loss of limbs. We host wounded warrior luncheons in my office.
I see them at the airports. I really want to do everything
possible we can to counterdict the IEDs.
But at the same time, we're spending billions of dollars to
fight a technology that currently is costing the enemy tens of
dollars. So I'm wondering, how do we figure out how to alter
this investment ratio? What investments will DOD make in
developing effective IED countermeasures in order to protect
our troops and at the same time avoid restricting their freedom
of movement?
General Dempsey. Senator, the IED challenge is the enemy's
asymmetric tool. I think you're correct in stating that it has
been the biggest killer on the battlefield and is likely to
remain so. That'll be true, I think, by the way, wherever we're
deployed. I think we are so capable that they will find ways to
attack us, and typically now that's through IEDs.
The next challenge, by the way, will be precision rockets
and missiles. But we'll get to that one.
To your point about IEDs, the way we're trying to address
the cost ratio is by expanding--and we have been doing this--
the aperture. So it's not just about trying to find
technological means to defeat the device. Defeating the device
is important--under-armor improvement kits, MRAP, as you say,
mine detection, deep penetration radars, or ground-penetrating
radars. But it's also training to identify signatures, and I'll
explain that briefly in a second, and then also attacking the
network.
So you have to do all three. You have to identify
signatures, and that is to say the components, the chemicals,
and then find ways to identify those components and attack the
supply chain. Then it's attacking the network. That includes
the financiers and includes those who emplace. Then finally,
it's defeating the device.
We've gotten actually quite good at it, but again this is
the enemy's principal munition that he uses against us and it
does continue to incur casualties. So we just have to stay with
it. I don't have any better answer than that.
Secretary Panetta. If I could, Senator, follow up a little
bit on that?
Senator Hagan. Okay, yes, please.
Secretary Panetta. Probably one of the best things that was
developed was the MRAP, and it has saved a lot of lives and it
was done on an expedited basis. So it's a good example,
frankly, of trying to produce something needed by our fighting
men and women on a fast basis. We're continuing to, obviously,
do that kind of research, to try to develop the best ways to
try to protect our young men and women.
I agree with you, anybody who's seen the results of an IED
has to shudder at the devastating wounds that result from that.
The other piece of this, though, relates to the supply
network for these IEDs. In some ways that relates to the safe
haven in Pakistan that continues to supply a lot of this. That
is an area that we believe we've urged the Pakistanis to
address it. We think that whole issue needs to be addressed if
we're going to be effective at trying to cut back on these.
Senator Hagan. That was actually my next question, and I
know we've discussed this before: What is DOD doing to put
pressure on Pakistan's network of the distribution of ammonium
nitrate?
Secretary Panetta. We have made very clear to them where
these threats emanate from. We've identified locations. We've
directed them to specific sites. We've urged them to take
steps. In some cases they have. In some cases they wind up
there too late. But we're continuing to impress upon them that
they have to be part of the answer to dealing with this issue.
Senator Hagan. I think that would help tremendously, and
hopefully lowering the number of the IEDs that are placed.
Secretary Panetta, I also wanted to thank you for lifting
the Marine Corps variant of the JSF off probation. The decision
I believe is essential for the Marine Corps to operate and to
move seamlessly from the sea ashore and in the air. It's also
key to preserving the strategic value of our amphibious
capabilities. Airlift capable of short takeoff and vertical
landing (STOVL), a great example is when the F-15 fighter pilot
crashed in Libya and these airplanes were able to, I believe
within about 90 minutes, take off from a large-deck amphibious
ship, rescue the pilot, and have him back on board. So
obviously there is a critical need.
I also understand that the original JSF procurement was
currently planned at 2,443 aircraft, and in light of the new
Defense Strategic Guidance and budget, the JSF program perhaps
is looking at being restructured, which may include fewer
aircraft spread out over a longer timeframe. According to
Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, DOD will slow its
approach to full rate production of aircraft.
Do we have a projected timeline to complete the necessary
testing and implementation of developmental changes in order to
start buying the aircraft in higher quantities, and how is DOD
conveying this to the defense industrial base, which Senator
Collins was just talking about?
Secretary Panetta. We think it's extremely important to get
these fifth generation fighters out there as soon as we can.
Obviously, it's taken time. There's been a lot of testing.
They've had to readjust. The STOVL is the best example of that.
There were five areas that were identified that put it on
probation. They dealt with all five areas. It's tested well.
Now, we're basically into software testing right now, and one
of the reasons we wanted to slow it is to make sure that we
knew what the problems were and we could get ahead of it,
rather than go ahead producing these things and costing even
more if we're catching up with some of the problems.
So we think we've set the right timeframe. I think our hope
is that by, what, 2017, we'll begin to produce these planes?
Mr. Hale. We're buying them now, some tests. But they will
be operational aircraft as well. We've just slowed the ramp, so
we don't buy so many and then have to fix them later, which is
very expensive. So we're buying them now. We'll buy 29 aircraft
in fiscal year 2013, and I don't have in my head the number in
2017, but it will be substantially higher than that. We've just
slowed down the ramp.
Senator Hagan. My time for questions is over, but I did
want to emphasize that I think it's critically important that
DOD continue to invest in S&T programs and the research and
development initiatives. These are the seeds that we need to
plant and nurture in order to ensure that our military remains
the best and most technologically advanced in the world,
especially when dealing with the emerging threats. I just don't
think we can emphasize enough the need for research and
development.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. You have my respect
and admiration.
You also have a very difficult job, which we've talked a
little about. But let me just start with a quote from the DNI,
James Clapper, who 2 weeks ago said: ``Never has there been in
my almost 49-year career in intelligence a more complex and
interdependent array of challenges than we face today.
Capabilities, technologies, know-how, communications, and
environmental forces aren't confined by borders and can trigger
transnational disruptions with astonishing speed, as we have
seen.''
I doubt you would disagree with his comments. I don't know
anybody who would.
But the challenge we're all struggling with--and Senator
Lieberman, among others, has expressed this--is our heartfelt
desire to have the mission determine the budget and not the
budget the mission. You are, of course, constrained by law that
Congress passes and that the President signs, so we realize
that this is our responsibility. Your responsibility is to try
to minimize risks and to maximize our national security, given
the money appropriated by Congress.
I appreciate, General Dempsey, your talking about looking
beyond the budget window to long-term risk. But let me talk
about a near-term risk and something that's already been
alluded to here. That is, Secretary Panetta, you and others,
have made statements that there are certain red lines with
regard to Iran--such as blockading the Straits of Hormuz,
building a nuclear weapon. Iran is important to us, it's
important to the region, but it's an existential threat to
Israel, our ally. I don't believe they're going to wait on
anyone else in determining what determines their right to
continue to exist and their people's security.
Of course, Iran's already been killing Americans in
Afghanistan and Iraq in a low-grade war against the United
States and other NATO allies. But if Iran is hit by Israel,
what sort of retaliation would you anticipate against not only
Israel, but other countries in the region and American
personnel in the Middle East?
Secretary Panetta. The General suggests that we ought to
look at a closed session to really address all the implications
of what that may or may not mean. Obviously, we're very
concerned about it. We're looking at all of the implications
and consequences that could result. But it really involves
intelligence and we should do that in closed session.
Senator Cornyn. I respect your judgment on that, Secretary
Panetta and General Dempsey, and I look forward to further
briefings on that.
But it strikes me that, we're not saying we're cashing the
peace dividend, but we are certainly making disproportionate
cuts to DOD and our national security expenditures. My view is
that this is the number one responsibility the Federal
Government has--a lot of other things that we do, we could put
off or do without. But this is it; this is the most important
thing that the Federal Government does. There are very real,
not long-term but near-term, potentialities that could embroil
not only the United States, but the Middle East and our allies,
in a full-fledged war that would have dire economic
consequences to our country and obviously to our allies. More
than economic, also matters of life and death and existence.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, without getting into the
particulars, let me just assure you that we have very strong
capabilities in place to deal with any circumstances that could
develop in that region. We feel fully prepared for whatever
might take place.
Senator Cornyn. I'm confident you've done everything that
you know how to do to prepare and our military and DOD has as
well. It will not be without cost. It will not be without
casualties. It will not be without serious consequences, is my
only point.
So it troubles me, at a time when our national security
apparatus is asked to do more with less, in a world that's
getting more dangerous, not less dangerous, that we have a
budget that unfortunately engages in--I guess the most
charitable words I can use is ``phantom savings''--phantom
savings. Some might call it budgetary gimmicks and the like.
For example, the so-called trillion dollars in savings from
a drawdown in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that are not
currently planned, which have been funded by borrowed money in
the past 10 years, and which really represent--here's one
headline in the National Journal, it says: ``Pentagon budget
revives war spending voodoo.'' Like I said, I think ``phantom
savings'' is the most charitable thing I've seen.
It just strikes me as extraordinarily dangerous at a time
when the risk is deadly serious to have a budget proposal which
makes a trillion dollars in savings on expenditures that we
never anticipated spending in the first place. At the same
time, I will grant you, we don't know what the risks will be in
the future.
Let me close on this item. It's a little more concrete. It
appears from my reading of the budget that there is a decrease
of about 50 percent in the budget for training and equipping of
Afghan security forces from 2012 to 2013.
I'd like first, a confirmation that my reading is correct;
and second--Mr. Hale is nodding that it's correct, so I will
just ask you, if our withdrawal from Afghanistan is conditioned
on the ability of the Afghans to defend themselves and maintain
stability there, how is a cutting of the budget by 50 percent
from 2012 to 2013 consistent with that?
General Dempsey. I'll take that one, Senator. The ANSF fund
was front-loaded when we had to develop a lot of their
infrastructure. We front-loaded the purchase of a lot of their
equipment. What you're seeing in this budget is that most of
the capital investments, in our terms, have been made in the
previous years.
So the reduction is a reflection that we have what we need,
and most of the fund now is for replenishment and training and
operations. But the simple answer to your question is we front-
loaded the investments, the capital investments.
Senator Cornyn. In terms of size of the force and
capability, do you see that getting larger or maintaining the
status quo?
General Dempsey. We are committed to building the Afghan
security forces out to 352,000, 195,000 of which is the army.
That will be completed here within the next 90 to 120 days. We
have not yet decided how long we'll keep it at that size, but
that's a question we're looking at as we determine how to get
from here to 2014 and deliver the Lisbon objectives.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Secretary Panetta. I might just add, Senator, to follow up
on that, one of the things that was important in 2011 was that
not only were we able to reduce the level of violence and
weaken the Taliban, but one of the important things that took
place is that the Afghan army really stepped up and started
taking over real responsibility in terms of security.
In the areas that we've transitioned so far--and we're in
the second tranche of those transitions--the Afghan army is
doing a very good job at taking over security. We just have to
make sure we continue to train them, we continue to make them
capable to be able to take that responsibility.
General Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, could I respond?
Chairman Levin. If you can do it quickly.
General Dempsey. I will, very quickly.
Chairman Levin. Very quickly.
General Dempsey. That National Journal article, I don't
ascribe to its conclusions because I've been so involved in the
process. Some of the changes we made definitely will have an
effect on our base budget. Some of those effects will be
mitigated in the near-term by OCO. That's what he's talking
about, that we've papered over the problem. But I don't accept
that.
The Army in particular has 10,000 to 12,000 non-deployable
soldiers directly resulting from the repeated deployments, and
we're going to pay that bill out of OCO because it is related
to OCO.
Senator Cornyn. We don't know what sort of unexpected
challenges and threats our country will face in the future, is
my point.
General Dempsey. We do not, sir, and I accept that. But
that's what contingency funds are for.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Gillibrand, to be followed by, according to my
list, Senator Shaheen, Senator Blumenthal, Senator Manchin.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, General Dempsey. I
appreciate your service. Thank you, Mr. Comptroller, as well.
I understand you touched earlier today on the value of the
Guard and Reserves and how important their service has been,
serving shoulder to shoulder in both Afghanistan and Iraq. With
regard to your Air Force restructuring strategy, about half the
cuts have come out of the Guard, even though they only
represented about a third of the costs. I believe the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs did a report talking about
managing budget issues, and actually made the point that Guard
and Reserves provide capabilities at a lower cost than would be
the case were the Nation to rely solely on full-time forces.
So I have a concern about the decisionmaking with regard to
the Air National Guard, and specifically because of the assets
that New York has. Obviously, we all have specific assets and
strategies and resources in our States that we think are
particularly important for our national security. But one thing
that a lot of our bases and assets have is this National Guard
and Reserve component that has been so effective in both Iraq
and Afghanistan.
So I would like to urge you to look at that restructuring
to see if there are cost savings by maintaining particularly
Air Force National Guard and Reserve components as they are,
whether it's Zebruski or whether it's in Niagara. Those are
important aspects.
The second issue that I want to highlight with regard to
New York specifically is the cyber mission that we do. We do
such an important mission for cyber security and cyber defense
in Rome, Rome Labs, that has been vital, I think, in being at
the cutting edge of both technology and research and
development.
One thing that I want to bring your attention to is what
makes New York so good at doing some of this is the public-
private partnerships that have developed with the private
sector. A lot of the DOD contracts are being done by private
developers, researchers, scientists, that have developed as a
hub in all these areas across New York. We have the nanotech
center in Albany, we have Rome Labs, we have throughout western
New York a lot of research and development that will very much
complement the work that the military is doing.
I understand that there will be interest in consolidations
and cutting, but you will lose that synergy, that effort
towards collaboration and clustering that is so important in
the high tech sector, and I don't want you to underestimate how
valuable that is for the military.
Then last, just to speak to these particular assets in New
York, we are 100 percent staffed. We have no environmental
issues. We have a workforce and communities that are so
dedicated to the mission that the armed services have placed on
these men and women, that you will lose some of that enormous
benefit to the extent you have to consolidate or restructure.
We would love to gain missions, particularly with the
National Guard and Reserve training, with unmanned aircraft and
with cyber. So I wanted to just give you that background.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, there are just a couple of
things and then I'll yield to the General. First of all, on
cyber, we are making increased investments there of about $3.4
billion and even more in the out-years, because we think cyber
is extremely important. So obviously partnering with the
private sector is extremely important, and being able to
develop the technological capability that we're going to need
to have for the future, so I think that's important to
remember.
Second, with regards to the Air Reserve, I understand the
concerns. The Air Force made the decisions. Some of these
planes in the past have come out of the Active-Duty Force and
that's one of the reasons they tried to look at where some of
the reductions could be made based on the age of these planes,
as well as their capabilities. But they are trying to do
whatever they can to mitigate against those impacts, because
again we do need to depend on the Reserves to be there. They've
responded in dramatic fashion over these last few years every
time we've called upon them to come forward and take their
place alongside other fighting men and women in the
battlefield, and they've done a great job.
We want to be able to maintain that for the future. But
that was the reason some of these cuts were made in those
areas.
General Dempsey. The only thing I'd add, you mentioned
cyber and I want to mention for the record that we strongly
support the Lieberman-Collins-Rockefeller legislation, to get
us in the proper place in dealing with the cyber threat, which
is significant and growing, as well as the Senator Feinstein
amendment to that legislation. So I'd like to say that.
Then I'd also say, I'm one of your constituents and how
about them Giants? [Laughter.]
Senator Gillibrand. Go Giants! [Laughter.]
Thank you all for your service.
I wanted to make sure that there's nothing else that you
need in the cyber bill as well, that you have reviewed it, and
that it is providing the assets and resources that you need to
enhance your mission.
Secretary Panetta. I think the General is correct, that the
bill that I know is being put together by Senator Lieberman and
others reflects all of the issues that we think are important
to address. So we'll continue to work, however, with the Senate
and with Congress to make sure that if a bill does emerge it
addresses our concerns about trying to make this country better
prepared to deal with the cyber issues that are growing every
day.
Senator Gillibrand. I would request that you look at the
legislation with an eye towards making sure you have all the
authorities that you need to support this growing mission, and
also the resources necessary to do adequate recruitment,
because obviously we want the strongest pipeline for cyber
defense that we could create and the flexibility to bring in
the talent that you're looking for. We want to make sure that,
whether it's civilian talent or through the normal course, we
want to make sure you have the flexibility and ability to
recruit, train, and keep the best and brightest to do that.
Last, if I have time, Mr. Chairman, it's a very separate
issue, but one I feel very strongly about, that I would like
your commitment. I've heard you already speak to the issue of
sexual assault in the military and the ability of the military
to respond effectively to those concerns, to allegations, and
to making sure we have the best fighting force we can have.
That means that we create the right protocols and the right
ability for women to be able to report such incidents and to be
heard on those issues.
I'd like your comments, your views on that, and I would
like to work with each of you on developing stronger
protections for our women who are serving.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, we look forward to working with
you on this issue.
You've provided great leadership on this issue, and it's an
area that concerns me greatly, that the incidents of sexual
assault have grown. Frankly, my concern is that we have to be
able to take action in these situations.
I announced a series of steps to try to improve our
response to sexual assault. One of the most important things is
to make sure that the command structure responds to these
situations, because the longer they take to respond, it
inhibits the ability to bring a case, and that's what has hurt
us in being able to move aggressively in most of these cases.
So we need to do a broad education effort to make sure that
the command structure understands how important it is to
respond in these situations. We also need a legislative package
and I would like to work with you in trying to address the
legislative needs that we're going to need in order to really
be able to get this problem in control.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, and Mr.
Hale, for your commitment and your stamina. We appreciate it.
I want to begin actually where you began, Mr. Secretary,
that Congress must do everything possible to avoid
sequestration, because I certainly agree with that. I share the
concerns we've heard expressed from my colleagues. I'm not
going to ask you to respond to this, but I would certainly hope
that we in Congress would do what you have been willing to do,
and that is to put everything on the table and put aside our
posturing and come to some agreement that addresses the long-
term debt and deficits of this country.
It is inexcusable that we are in this position now with you
and all of the men and women who are serving in defense and in
our military and across the Federal Government not knowing what
we're going to do because we have been unable to act.
So I would like to start with where Senator Gillibrand left
off, and that is with the Guard and Reserve. I was very
pleased, Mr. Secretary, to see in your statement that you
talked about continuing a National Guard that is equipped and
ready. I know that the decision to transition our Guard and
Reserve units from a strategic reserve to an operational
reserve required a significant investment and a change in
strategy.
So, General Dempsey, I wonder if you could speak to the
original rationale for that transition?
General Dempsey. I think it's important to roll back the
tapes, maybe all the way back to 1973, when, coming out of the
Vietnam war, there were no Joint Chiefs at the time, but the
Service Chiefs all realized that one of the problems we had
during that conflict was we really never got the American
people involved because it was borne on the back of the Active
component, with very little reliance upon the Guard and
Reserve.
So we built a structure that not only allows for the
utilization of the Guard and Reserve, but it makes it
absolutely necessary. So the question is not will we use the
Guard and Reserve, because fully a third of the capabilities
necessary at any given time to do anything reside in the Guard
and Reserve.
So we are committed to it. What we've found in this
conflict as we went forward, we relearned a lot of those
lessons. We made some pretty significant investments and the
Guard and Reserve and the Active component have never been
closer.
Now, as we go forward, of course, and as the demand goes
down, that's going to put some--and the budget goes down--
strain on that relationship. You've seen some of that already.
But I can tell you that each Service has a plan in terms of
the rotational readiness of its formations, that they will
include the Guard and Reserve in that rotation. So the entire
Guard will never be operational, any more than the entire
Active component is always operational. But I think you can
feel secure in the knowledge that we understand and will work
toward this goal in a rotational readiness cycle.
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that. As we look forward this
year, I know that the Air Force is going to be making some
initial decisions on where to base the new KC-46 tankers, and I
would hope that the Air Force and DOD will take a look and
ensure that at least some of those aircraft are based at Guard
bases around the country. I have one particular in mind, but
I'll let you draw your own conclusions.
But can I ask you, is there a commitment on the part of DOD
to base some of those new tankers at Guard facilities?
Secretary Panetta. I think the Air Force is looking at a
whole set of options in order to make sure that we mitigate
whatever cuts have been made and make use of the facilities
that are out there with the National Guard and Reserve. I can
assure you that they'll be in consideration.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department of Defense will make use of the National Guard and
Reserve facilities, consistent with operational needs. Regarding where
to base the KC-46 tankers, I will reiterate that these facilities will
be in consideration.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I appreciate that.
I would also like to go back to BRAC, which a number of my
colleagues have addressed, and I share many of the concerns
that have been expressed. I know, Secretary Panetta, that
you've said you've seen just about every side of the BRAC
process. Can you commit to providing us with a comprehensive
assessment of the savings from the 2005 round, and I assume if
you're looking at 2013 and 2015, that you also have estimates
of savings in those two rounds, and that we would also see
those as we're looking at a decision about what to do about the
next BRAC round?
Secretary Panetta. I'll be happy to give you what
information we have with regards to the past BRAC rounds, and
obviously some ideas about what we would do in terms of future
rounds.
As I said, I've been through the process. Frankly, I don't
wish the process on anybody, having been through it, because it
is tough. 25 percent of my local economy was hit by virtue of a
BRAC closure. But we did use it as an opportunity to develop a
college-university campus there and it's proved very successful
as a reuse.
I think the issue is it did cost a lot more than anybody
anticipated, but the fact is, we are achieving in the long-run
significant savings as a result of that. That's number one.
Number two, I don't know of any other way to deal with the kind
of infrastructure savings we have to achieve here as a result
of reducing the force without going through that kind of
process. That's the problem I have. It's the most effective way
of trying to address that issue.
Senator Shaheen. Certainly in New Hampshire we've seen both
sides of the issue, because Pease Air Force Base was the first
base closed in the country. Fortunately, it's doing very well
now. The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, which is on the border
between New Hampshire and Maine, was actually removed from the
last round by the commission because of their effectiveness.
One concern I have as we look going forward, particularly
with respect to our public shipyards, is that there's a real
backlog of projects that need to be done at those shipyards.
Obviously, the Portsmouth shipyard is not alone in that. They
have been producing, I think, very well despite that backlog.
They just delivered the USS San Juan attack submarine 8 days
ahead of schedule, despite some of the challenges with that.
Senator Collins and Senator Ayotte and I had a
modernization in last year's defense authorization bill that
asks DOD to produce a shipyard modernization plan to address
these shortfalls. I hope that DOD will take that very seriously
and produce that, because as we're looking at our security
going forward, those public shipyards are a critical part of
that.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, as I stated before and I'll say
again, we absolutely have to maintain the industrial base we
have, and the shipyards in your area, the other shipyards we
deal with, are extremely important to our ability to respond to
the needs that we have. So we're going to do everything
possible to work with you, not only to increase, obviously, the
competitive nature of trying to achieve savings, but also to
try to do what we can to provide those upgrades.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
A final question. Secretary Panetta, one of the concerns
that we've heard in a number of reports over recent years has
been the challenge of attracting people with the backgrounds
that we're going to need, with science, technology,
engineering, and math subjects, to be able to continue to do
the jobs that are critical to our defense establishment. I
wonder if either you or General Dempsey could address what
strategy we have for trying to attract those young
professionals when the private sector is offering them so many
more attractive monetary rewards.
Secretary Panetta. Initially I shared the same concern. I
know when I went out to the National Security Agency and when I
look at the people that are involved in that area, not only at
my past agency, but other agencies as well, I have to tell you
we are attracting some very bright, capable, young people to
those jobs. They're very interested, they're very capable, and
with the investment we're making in cyber, I'm absolutely
convinced we're going to be able to attract the talent to be
able to make that work.
Senator Shaheen. I think our challenge as a Nation is to
get enough young people engaged in those subjects, so we're
training the people we need.
General Dempsey?
General Dempsey. I think the Service Chiefs will have a
view on this as well, and it's actually exacerbated by the fact
that--and I think you and I have actually had this
conversation--only about one out of every four American young
men and women can qualify to get into the military, either
based on education or physical issues or issues of making
really stupid Facebook posts in their youth or something.
So we are all competing, as you say, academia, corporate
America, and the military, for the same 25 percent of the
population. So the answer has to be to get after education in
this country as well, it seems to me.
Senator Shaheen. I totally agree.
General Dempsey, I was very disappointed to hear you
mention the Giants. You're fortunate that all the other New
England members of this committee have gone. [Laughter.]
General Dempsey. My condolences, ma'am. [Laughter.]
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Just in fairness, General Dempsey, and
as a New Englander, I interpreted your remark more as an
expression of battlefield admiration than an endorsement. So I
think you're still on fair ground. [Laughter.]
I want to thank all of you for your extraordinarily
effective and persuasive explanation of the President's budget
and thank you for your patience in answering our questions so
effectively.
I want to begin with a subject that the President certainly
emphasized, which is undersea warfare capability, and note the
slipping, postponing, delaying, whatever the correct term is,
of a submarine construction, one submarine from 2014 to 2018. I
have heard from Electric Boat and indeed within the Navy about
the cost savings that can be realized if we stay on schedule
and build two submarines every year. I wonder if there is a
possibility for considering and perhaps your hearing our views
on that issue, Secretary Panetta?
Secretary Panetta. This is all about, obviously, having to
reduce the budget by half a trillion dollars. We have to look
really closely at affordability and cost efficiencies. If
anybody comes forward with a better idea as to how to save
money, I'm more than open to listen to it.
Senator Blumenthal. I think we may come forward if you'd be
willing to consider it.
Secretary Panetta. Absolutely.
Senator Blumenthal. I would appreciate it.
Let me go to what you have really very convincingly said is
the military's greatest asset, which is its people, and you've
been discussing it very movingly and inspiringly, most recently
to Senator Shaheen, talking about keeping faith and providing
many of the men and women, our warfighters who are going to be
coming back from Iraq and Afghanistan, with jobs and transition
assistance, which has been expanded under the most recent
legislation on veterans to be approved by this Congress, an
amendment that I offered in a separate bill.
I want to focus on what can be done to aid those veterans
before they leave the service to more effectively transition
into civilian employment, because as they come back if they
enter the Guard or Reserve, to have an unemployment rate which
is vastly higher, that is, right now in Connecticut, double the
general rate in Connecticut, 15.5 percent as compared to 8.2
percent, will simply be a profound deterrent to anyone going
into the Armed Forces. If that is going to be the kind of
hurdle they face coming out of the service, it will defeat your
best efforts to recruit the brightest and most capable.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, this is a problem that I worry
about a great deal. Frankly, it's one of the risks involved as
we reduce the budget by this level, is how to ensure that we
take care of those that are returning. We already have a
backlog and we're going to be pumping anywhere from 12,000 to
14,000 a year as we go through these drawdowns.
I think it is extremely important that we be able to
provide the services as these men and women come back to really
be able to counsel them, to gather them, to make sure they're
aware of the job opportunities, to make sure they're aware of
the education opportunities, to make sure they're aware of the
funds that are available to help them transition, to make sure
that their families are cared for as well, as we make that
transition.
This has to be a package approach. Each Service now does it
in their own way. They do it pretty effectively. But I think we
have to make very clear that nobody should fall through the
cracks.
Senator Blumenthal. I know the Marine Corps has been doing
it more effectively. I've talked to General Amos about----
Secretary Panetta. They do a great job.
Senator Blumenthal.--his very, very effective work. I
wonder if--and you may already be doing it--there's some
servicewide approach building on the best models and best
practices, would be appropriate.
Secretary Panetta. We are looking at that.
General Dempsey. If I could add, Senator, there are more
initiatives on this issue than we possibly have time to
discuss. As the Secretary mentioned earlier, we're trying to
team ever more closely with the VA to do this. We're starting
to take a view that transition begins when you enter a Service,
not in the last 6 weeks before you leave it.
But the other thing I want to mention here is some of this
can be legislated, some of this can be made a matter of policy,
but this is one of those issues that will be best solved from
the bottom up when corporate America reaches out to embrace the
returning veterans.
By the way, a lot of them are. I can't tell you how many
times I'll go to some conference or something and someone will
tell me that they have a new initiative to hire 10,000
veterans. So I think it's a matter of merging what can be done
at the governmental level, but also what needs to be done at
the grassroots level to help this out.
Senator Blumenthal. I would agree with you, General
Dempsey, that corporate America is stepping forward more often
and more effectively. But I don't believe I'm telling you
anything you haven't heard before in saying that there's still
a lot of employers who look at somebody who's in the National
Guard or the Reserves and who say, not explicitly, but think to
themselves: This person's going to be gone for a year or more
if he or she is deployed, and better to hire someone I know I
can count on to be on the job without interruption.
That is discrimination. It's illegal if it can be proved,
but it has to be surmounted as a matter of practice implicit in
some of the employers. I believe that we need more effective
measures for enforcement to counter that approach, because it
will undermine your best efforts, which I admire, to attract
the best and most capable to the Guard and the Reserve.
So I'm not asking for your comment, but I hope that perhaps
we can work together on the initiatives that we don't have time
to discuss here.
Just one last question. The IEDs that all too often are
maiming and killing our warfighters, I wonder whether there are
new initiatives there that perhaps we can discuss, if not here,
at some other point, because I've been interested in it and
appreciated Secretary Carter's very important work in
accelerating delivery of the so-called biker shorts and the
groin protective gear, and also the work that I hope is being
done to discourage the Pakistanis from permitting the
fertilizer and ammonium calcium nitrate from crossing the
border and going into these roadside bombs.
Secretary Panetta. Yes, Senator. I know that your time is
short on this round, but I'd just assure you that we are seized
with this. Our relations with Pakistan have been somewhat
challenged. They're improving, and this is one of the points of
friction between us that we have to get at.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much and I appreciate
your answers to my questions. I want to associate myself with
the remarks made by Senator Gillibrand and your remarks about
the problem of sexual assault within the military, but also the
issue of suicides, which we will not have time to discuss
today, perhaps I can follow up with you on.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. First of all, I want to commend the three
of you for your endurance. I know you've been through this
before, and a lot of the questions have probably been touched
on that I wanted to ask, but I wanted to go over a few things,
if I may.
First of all, the most defining moment in my short Senate
career was when Admiral Mullen sat there and the question was
asked to him, ``what's the greatest threat the United States of
America faces?'' I thought I would hear some type of a military
response, whether it was al Qaeda, whether it was North Africa,
or China building up their military. He didn't even hardly
hesitate. He came right back and said that ``the deficit and
debt of this Nation is the greatest security risk.'' I know you
all realize that and take it serious, too, and I know we've
talked about it, Mr. Secretary.
I'm looking everywhere I can to cross over the aisle in a
bipartisan way to find out how we can make this financial, the
wherewithals that we have financially, but also get our
financial house in order. I know that we talked about cutting
back, and everybody--I don't know of anybody in here, Democrat
or Republican, that does not support a strong military.
But everybody's afraid of the political ramification if
they say one thing. I can only say this to you, that with the
growth of the contractors in the military--when I looked at
just the period of time, maybe 10 years, and the support of
contractors--and I'm not talking about the manufacturing base
of contracting, and I wanted to maybe mention, if you would, as
I get done with this question, about Buy America and how we can
do more in America to make sure that we are supporting the
manufacturing base.
But with that being said, in a simplistic way I believe
that we could strengthen the military or men and women in
uniform by reducing the contractors who are doing the same. I
hear an awful lot of them that tell me that. I see them in the
airports, and I ask every one of them that are private
contractors that are going back to Afghanistan, and I stop and
I talk to them. I introduce myself. Were most of you previous
military? Yes. Would you have stayed in the military if not for
the large paychecks that you might be able to get from the
contractors? Yes, we would have if this option wasn't there.
So I can't figure this one out. Then it'll dovetail into
the whole thing I'm going to talk to, which I know everybody's
talked about, how do we best use our National Guard? We're all
extremely proud, but I can give you examples of how we say--but
first of all, the purpose of contracting. Can't we cut the
amount of contractors that we have that are doing the same jobs
as military without facing political ramifications of you're
cutting the military? I'm not going to vote to cut the
military, but I will cut the contractors, sir.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, this is an area that we're
paying attention to in the efficiencies that we're looking at,
which are going to be about $60 billion. This is one of the
areas that we are looking at, contract services, number of
contracts that are provided, in order to determine where we can
achieve savings.
Any ideas you have, recommendations along these lines,
we're more than happy to listen to. This is a big job, going
after $487 billion in savings. So I'm willing to look at any
area necessary.
Senator Manchin. Mr. Secretary, there was a report--I want
to make sure of this--that $12 million a day for the past 10
years in Iraq and Afghanistan has been wasted, misspent,
whatever, by contractors. I think that report was given to you,
too. So there's many areas.
But I'm just saying, wherever a uniformed person can do it,
why--I know we're cutting 100,000 troops. That concerns me. If
anything, I'd rather cut 200,000 contractors and keep the
100,000 uniforms and use the support of our National Guard.
I will say this, that they touched on the veterans, all of
us. To me, in the private sector you do the best job of
providing the training for a military person, their discipline,
their ability to come out and they can do it. Why is our
unemployment so high, and what are we doing wrong? We started a
caucus, I started it with Senator Kirk, and it's ``Hire a
Vet.'' I have two vets in my office and we're looking for more
good vets. We always do.
How do we do this to prepare to get them back in? I know
that the Senator from New York touched on that quickly.
Secretary Panetta. I think, and I'll let the General expand
upon this, but we really are--look, part of the problem is the
economy, the overall economy. These kids are coming back and
they go back home, and most of these local economies are having
tough economic times, and you suddenly pour some of these young
men and women back into their communities and there aren't jobs
for the people that are there, much less for these young people
that are coming back.
Having said that, we really have had some impressive
efforts by the private sector because of the reasons you
suggested. These are kids who are disciplined. They usually
have a capability and a talent that is extraordinary that can
be used. Most of the private sector people I talk to really
want to have these kinds of individuals as part of their
workforce.
More and more of these individuals are now coming forward.
We've set up a web site where we list the jobs that are
available in the private sector. More of these private sector
individuals are committing themselves to hire our vets as they
come back. So there is an important effort going forward, but a
lot of it obviously depends on an economy that has to recover
as well.
Senator Manchin. I think, first of all, I want to commend
all of you for working with our office so close on this new
caucus. As I just previously mentioned, we just started it,
``Hire a Vet.'' We would like to even expand on that with you.
If we would know who's cycling out and what skill sets, so we
could network better, we think there's ways that we could
improve on this and work together. So I appreciate that and
we'll be very close.
General Dempsey, my final question would be to you. I
talked about the National Guard. In West Virginia we've been
very blessed by having a highly rated National Guard, one of
the best in the Nation. A lot of people get a lot of good
training, and I'm so proud of them. We saved DOD $27 million
this year alone. If these small town facilities were fully
tasked, we could do that, we think DOD could save $250 million
a year.
We're talking about things that basically is refurbishing
generators, the Humvees, tents, tire assemblies, these are
things that we have been able to do at tremendous cost savings.
I'm sure other Guards are doing them also. Is there a way that
we can network more of that to use our Guard? We've proven that
the savings in just a couple of our little facilities were
quite substantial. I don't know how we can expand on that.
General Dempsey. I don't either, sitting here today with
you, Senator. But certainly we all, to include the Service
Chiefs, who really are the leaders of their particular Guard--
you're going to have General--I'm not throwing him under the
bus here, but you're going to have General Odierno here later
in the week, and I think he would be eager to understand that
and see if we can take advantage of it.
Clearly, anything we can do to in-source, and I mean
Active, Guard, and Reserve--is effort well spent.
Senator Manchin. Yes. The other thing, it gives the
training to the person we're trying to cycle back into the
private sector, so it has a twofold purpose.
I think you all realize the sensitivity of what we're
dealing with here, trying to make sure that we give you what is
needed to keep this safe and free. On the other hand, the
responsibility, when General Mullen said our greatest threat is
basically our own finances, so we're taking all that serious.
We need your help, and we think contracting--if we can downsize
the contracting, reinforce the military and people in uniform,
I think you'll have us all on both sides. You might be able to
bridge the gap that we can't bridge.
Secretary Panetta. Senator, if I could just comment. Look,
I think DOD has stepped up to the plate. What we've proposed
here is real, it's well thought out. We've done a strategy to
back up our decisions, and all of that's contained in our
recommendations.
But I really would urge you and others to engage in the
broader discussion that has to take place with regards to how
we reduce the deficit. That has to include a number of areas
that, unfortunately, have not been on the table, that have to
be on the table if we're ever going to confront the debt crisis
that faces this country. This can't just fall on the backs of
defense. Other areas have to be considered if we're going to be
able to effectively reduce the deficit.
Senator Manchin. There's a group of us in a bipartisan
effort that are looking at ways that--and we know it takes
everything, getting the money that we're not receiving now that
should be paid in revenues, and also make sure we get fraud,
waste, and abuse, and run more efficiently. So I think you're
going to find quite a few of us on both sides willing to meet
with you, sir.
Thank you so much. I appreciate all your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin. As I mentioned
before, I hope all of us will take a look at the proposals in
the budget in front of us to raise an additional $3 trillion
for deficit reduction. It's in the budget that came in
yesterday, but it seems a lot of us are unaware of that. Half
of that is revenue increases. Upper income tax increases,
restoring their bracket, the millionaires tax, a number of
other revenue measures, are in this request. I was surprised by
so many of our colleagues here today talking about the need for
deficit reduction and the importance of avoiding
sequestration--which I think, by the way, is a bipartisan
goal--were unaware of the fact, because I don't think the
administration, frankly, has done a good job of focusing on
what's in their own budget in terms of deficit reduction. It
meets the $1.5 or $1.2 trillion goal.
Senator Manchin. Mr. Chairman, we've had this discussion
and we can raise the revenues without raising taxes, by closing
the loopholes----
Chairman Levin. Exactly right.
Senator Manchin.--changing our corporate laws, changing and
making sure there's a fairness. If the American people think
that we're putting fairness to the system, I'll guarantee you
they're behind us 1,000 percent.
Chairman Levin. They are. It's amazing, when you look at
public opinion polls they say that we have to include revenues
in deficit reduction. We can do it without raising taxes on
middle income Americans.
Senator Manchin. We can cut spending, too, sir.
Chairman Levin. We can cut spending, too. The balance in
this budget that has been given to us yesterday is about 50
percent additional cuts and about 50 percent additional
revenues. But frankly, I don't think the administration in its
rollout yesterday focused on the fact that this would avoid
sequestration. This budget, if we adopted it, avoids
sequestration. It does it because finally they're talking about
additional revenues.
Now, they've talked about it in the administration, but now
they've put it in their budget. We had Republican colleagues
today talking about avoiding sequestration, and when I pointed
out this budget that was given to us avoids sequestration
because there's additional revenues in it, what they were
saying is, well, they hope they can vote on it. Well, my answer
to that is we also ought to have a Republican alternative, if
there is one, so we can see exactly what the options are in
that regard.
So we've had silence on the revenue side from our
Republican colleagues, and it's that silence which needs to be
corrected by the administration, frankly. I would hope that
there would be greater focus on what's in the budget relative
to the revenues which will help us avoid sequestration. We all
want to avoid sequestration.
I think that you are interested in having a bite to eat. We
thank you very, very much, and we thank your staffs.
We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
NONSTANDARD EQUIPMENT
1. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has acquired millions of dollars in
tactical nonstandard equipment to address the evolving threat in
Afghanistan (and previously in Iraq), including the enemy's use of
improvised explosive devices (IED). To what extent are you considering
this nonstandard equipment purchased by Joint IED Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) and others to meet urgent warfighter needs as equipment that
should be added as standard equipment to unit requirements?
Secretary Panetta. DOD has established and utilized processes, such
as Army G-3 Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition and Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Transition, Transfer,
Terminate Process, to review and transfer equipment and capabilities
for service sustainment. A significant amount of equipment (e.g., body
armor, CREW, Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar, radios, et cetera)
is already transitioning to the Services and the standardized equipment
list. Supporting these efforts, DOD is conducting two separate but
related studies to identify and review counter-improvised explosive
capabilities, including nonstandard equipment that are appropriate to
sustain. The studies will also serve to identify a plan to transition
the necessary capabilities funded by overseas contingency operations
(OCO) to programs of record. These ongoing studies will inform DOD's
development of the President's budget for fiscal year 2014.
General Dempsey. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the
Joint Staff, and the JIEDDO work closely with the Services to identify
which of the nonstandard equipment purchased to meet urgent warfighter
needs should be added as standard equipment. JIEDDO assists in the
process by conducting monthly meetings with the Services and Joint
Staff to identify if a JIEDDO-funded program should be transitioned,
transferred, or terminated based on Service and Joint Staff
requirements. This year-long process culminates in direction to the
Services from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to assume responsibility
for JIEDDO initiatives identified for transfer or transition.
2. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, to what
extent has DOD identified future maintenance and other sustainment
costs for these items that will have to be funded in future base
budgets?
Secretary Panetta. The Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the
Under Secretary (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer to study enduring
activities funded through the OCO portion of DOD's budget. This study,
co-led by the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, is in
process. The study is to inform DOD's decisions regarding, among other
items, the approach to fund enduring equipment needs.
General Dempsey. The Deputy Secretary of Defense directs the
Services to assume responsibility for JIEDDO funded programs and
equipment in one of two categories: transferred or transitioned. A
transferred program is a proven counter-improvised explosive device (C-
IED) capability that is not assessed to be an enduring capability for
the Joint Force, but one that requires sustainment for the current
conflict. Maintenance and sustainment costs are shifted from JIEDDO to
the appropriate Service to be funded using OCO funds. A transitioned
program is assessed as an enduring capability for the Joint Force and
ownership, management, funding, and future development becomes a base
capability of the appropriate Service and is requested in the
President's budget.
As part of a larger effort by the DOD, the Joint Staff has
initiated a review of the C-IED portfolio to identify enduring
requirements. This review will be used to inform Services as they
prepare future budgets in the context of DOD's new Defense Strategic
Guidance.
3. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what are
the plans for placing these estimated requirements into the Services'
budgets for fiscal year 2013 and beyond?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. The Joint Staff, Services,
and JIEDDO are conducting a comprehensive C-IED portfolio review to
determine which of the nonstandard equipment programs established by
JIEDDO are enduring and should become Programs of Record. This review
will inform the Services as they incorporate C-IED capabilities into
their respective budgets for fiscal year 2014 and beyond.
AFGHANISTAN DISTRIBUTION CHALLENGES
4. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in a 2011
report to Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found
that although U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has established
some processes for oversight, it does not have full oversight of the
distribution of supplies and equipment to the warfighter in
Afghanistan. In addition, DOD has taken some steps to mitigate
challenges in distributing materiel to forces operating in Afghanistan,
however DOD continues to face challenges in distributing materiel to
forces operating in Afghanistan including: (1) a lack of adequate
radio-frequency identification information to track all cargo
movements; (2) no common operating picture for distribution data and
integrated transportation systems; (3) complex customs clearance
processes in Afghanistan and Pakistan that delay shipments; (4) limited
information on incidents of pilferage and damage of cargo; and (5)
ineffective tracking and management of cargo containers. To what extent
has DOD assessed the impact of supply challenges on unit and equipment
readiness?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. While DOD acknowledges that
challenges remain in the distribution of supplies and equipment, these
challenges have not led to any degradation with respect to supplies or
equipment readiness. As GAO's report indicates, DOD has made great
strides in improving distribution operations in Afghanistan. It is
important to note that GAO's audit occurred during the recent surge of
30,000 additional U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Remarkably, U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan was simultaneously able to increase ration stocks from 30
to more than 60 days and fuel stocks from 30 to 45 days of supply on
hand. This unprecedented growth reflects a robust supply network, not
hampered by delivery timelines. Further evidence of DOD's logistics
resiliency is demonstrated by the fact that in spite of our main supply
route (Pakistan road networks) being closed since November 26, 2011,
our flexible system has allowed us to actually increase on-hand stocks
and sustain our troops at a very high rate of readiness. DOD is
striving to ensure that we meet these distribution challenges in the
most timely, efficient, and effective manner in order to ensure the
best possible support to all of our U.S. Armed Forces personnel.
5. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, to what
extent has DOD improved its visibility over equipment and supplies in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. DOD is engaged in ongoing
efforts to improve visibility over equipment and supplies in
Afghanistan. Steps we have taken in the last 18 months include:
1. Leveraging the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
tags for tracking cargo and providing In Transit Visibility (ITV) and
Asset Visibility (AV). RFID remains the backbone of our tracking
capability.
2. Developed, refined, and fielded tools, such as the Integrated
Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence, Battle
Command Sustainment Support System-Nodal Management, and the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) Logistics Common Operating Picture, to
provide commanders down to the tactical level with a comprehensive ITV
picture.
3. TRANSCOM is developing a contractual means to implement the use
of commercial Active Tracking and Intrusion Detection (ATID) devices on
Pakistan and Afghanistan road networks. The ATID devices will provide
near-real-time tracking of containerized unit cargo and equipment
thereby improving ITV and AV on containerized shipments transiting to
and from Afghanistan via Pakistan.
4. Improved pre-deployment training on the proper methods for
preparing and installing RFID tags.
5. Developed procedures to identify non-compliance with RFID
policy/directives so that the responsible commanders can be notified
and corrective action initiated.
As a result of these steps, the visibility that we have over our
equipment and supplies in Afghanistan has improved.
6. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, to what
extent has DOD developed a common operating picture to improve its
processes for tracking equipment and supplies in Afghanistan?
Secretary Panetta. DOD has improved its capability to track
equipment and supplies by developing, refining, and fielding tools such
as CENTCOM's Logistics Common Operating Picture (LOGCOP), the BCS3-NM,
and other automated information technologies (i.e., RFID/Active
Tracking Intrusion Detection). These improved tools provide
comprehensive ITV of critical DOD assets to commanders and staffs at
all levels of command.
General Dempsey. We have reemphasized to commanders at all levels
the importance of maintaining visibility over equipment and supplies
transiting Afghanistan. We have improved their capability to track
equipment and supplies by developing, refining, and fielding tools such
as CENTCOM's LOGCOP and the BCS3-NM. These improved tools provide a
comprehensive ITV and AV picture to commanders and staffs at all levels
of command.
7. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, to what
extent is DOD anticipating throughput challenges in Pakistan that would
limit DOD's ability to remove equipment from Afghanistan?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. Although loss of access to
the Pakistan ground transportation routes has not adversely affected
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan to date, sole reliance on the
Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and air/multi-modal cargo
operations would affect DOD's ability to efficiently drawdown equipment
and significantly increase costs. Increased NDN usage would maximize
its capacity and, although cargo would continue to move, transit times
would increase. Reliance on the NDN and air/multi-modal movement also
places U.S. Forces and objectives in Afghanistan at significant risk
due to the uncertainties associated with the nations that U.S. cargo
transits. Politically, any one or a combination of countries that
comprises the NDN could halt or impede cargo movement for any reason.
The physically fragile critical infrastructure and weather-dependent
routing along the NDN can create chokepoints, causing congestion and
disruptions and further limiting NDN capacity. Finally, delays in
retrograde can create labor and space problems in terms of securing,
storing, and maintaining equipment in Afghanistan that would otherwise
move out of the theater. Multiple transit routes would provide DOD the
most flexibility and save money and time.
8. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, to what
extent has DOD developed alternatives to the Pakistan routes to be able
to remove equipment from Afghanistan?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. DOD began to move U.S. cargo
to Afghanistan on the NDN in 2009, with established routes utilizing
existing commercial infrastructure through Russia and the Baltic,
Caucasus, and Central Asian states. Current efforts to expand the NDN
include obtaining permission and agreements as necessary to conduct
reverse transit and movement of wheeled armored vehicles. The first
proofs of principle executing retrograde transit began in early 2012.
Additional multi-modal routes have been added to relieve pressure on
the ground distribution system and further increase the velocity of
cargo departing Afghanistan.
9. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what
challenges remain in developing these alternatives?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. Cost and operational
requirements to achieve retrograde velocity to support the projected
2014 drawdown timeline are key factors in considering the alternatives
to the Pakistan ground transportation routes (i.e., NDN and air/multi-
modal). The monthly overall transportation cost to distribute
sustainment cargo, redeploy combat forces, and retrograde materiel is
expected to increase by more than two-thirds due to the Pakistan ground
transportation routes closure. In addition to higher costs, the NDN's
operational drawbacks include longer transit times due to longer
distances and lower cargo velocity due to transit restrictions.
CHANGES IN EQUIPMENT RESET FUNDING
10. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, Congress
has aggressively supported DOD's equipment reset funding requests
throughout our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD has recently
announced plans to reduce the Army and Marines Corps force structure by
100,000 troops. While the proposed budget does not specifically call
for any offsetting reduction in equipment reset funding, it would seem
logical that with a smaller force we might not have as large a
requirement to reset equipment. To what extent is it important to
maintain current funding level for the reset of equipment, despite the
planned reduction of 100,000 Army and Marine Corps troops?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. The level of reset funding
is set by aligning the required Modified Table of Organization and
Equipment (MTOE) to the programmed force structure and by the type and
condition of equipment returning from operations in a given year. As
the Services reduce Active Duty end strength by 103,000 personnel,
units will be identified for deactivation. The deactivated unit's MTOE
equipment will be redistributed throughout the Services. This should
reduce the number of items needed to be reset. However, if we fail to
fully fund the reset required for the programmed force structure, we
would face serious equipment shortfalls as current inventories are used
up, expended, damaged, or worn out, and not replaced and repaired in a
timely manner. These shortfalls would have a direct impact on unit
readiness levels.
Precise reset requirements are dependent on many variables,
including equipment condition upon return; we cannot predict exactly
what total reset costs will be at this point. However, we do know that
the high operating tempo and harsh environments of Afghanistan and Iraq
have a substantial deteriorating effect on equipment.
11. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, if DOD
believes it necessary to retain the same level of reset funding, what
is the rationale for this decision?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. Precise reset requirements
are dependent on many variables, including equipment condition upon
return; we cannot predict exactly what total reset costs will be at
this point. However, we do know that the high operating tempo and harsh
environments of Afghanistan and Iraq have a substantial deteriorating
effect on equipment.
The level of reset funding is set by aligning the required MTOE to
the programmed force structure and by the type and condition of
equipment returning from operations in a given year. As the Services
reduce Active Duty end strength by 103,000 personnel, units will be
identified for deactivation. The deactivated unit's MTOE equipment will
be redistributed throughout the Services. This should reduce the number
of items needed to be reset. However, if we fail to fully fund the
reset required for the programmed force structure, we would face
serious equipment shortfalls as current inventories are used up,
expended, damaged, or worn out, and not replaced and repaired in a
timely manner. These shortfalls would have a direct impact on unit
readiness levels.
12. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, GAO has
previously reported that the Military Services tend to build their
reset budget requirements simply on the basis of the equipment it
anticipates will actually return to the United States in the next year,
rather prioritizing or targeting its reset requirements to address
equipment shortages or other needs. To what extent do you believe
opportunities exist to better focus the requirements for equipment
reset, so that reset dollars go farther to meet equipment shortages,
and better address our home stationed unit readiness rates?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. To better focus the
requirement for equipment reset, DOD considered the MTOE required for
the programmed force structure and the type and condition of equipment
returning from operations in a given year.
The Services also fully consider the future requirement for the
equipment before DOD makes the reset funding request. Equipment reset
is integrated with equipment modernization objectives, long-term
support, and strategic investment plans.
13. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the
administration has called for renewed attention on the Pacific region
and the emerging threats there. To what extent do the reset
requirements in this budget recognize and take into account this shift
and perhaps the different numbers and types of equipment we should be
resetting to improve our readiness to address conflicts in that region?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. DOD's budget request aligned
the programmed force structure to the new Defense Strategic Guidance,
which addresses the Pacific region focus. Reset requirements were then
aligned to MTOE requirements for that force structure and the type and
condition of equipment returning from operations in a given year, while
accounting for a wide spectrum of potential future challenges, many of
which are anticipated in the Pacific area of operations.
14. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, last year
Congress gave the Army $20 million to begin the competition process for
the Humvee capitalization effort known as the Medium Expanded Capacity
Vehicle program. However, DOD's fiscal year 2013 budget request plans
to terminate that program and commit to the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle (JLTV) program with the Marine Corps. Without pushing the
merits of either program, to what extent do we need to lock into some
strategy on our future equipment needs to effectively plan and
economically budget to meet defense strategic equipping goals?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. Given the current fiscal
environment, this was one of many situations where limited resources
drove the need to prioritize areas of overlapping capabilities. The
commitment to the JLTV was based on an analysis of alternatives and
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) deliberation, which
included consideration of the Medium Expanded Capacity Vehicle program
and other modernization options. The JROC reviewed tactical wheeled
vehicles from a holistic portfolio perspective to ensure that the
correct programs were being pursued to support the national strategy.
OVERALL READINESS
15. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, DOD's new
Defense Strategic Guidance, released in January 2012, as well as the
accompanying document, ``Defense Budget Priorities and Choices,'' make
a number of statements which have implications for the readiness of the
force. For example, the strategic guidance states that, ``it (the
guidance) is intended as a blueprint for the Joint Force that will help
guide decisions about force size and shape over subsequent program and
budget cycles.'' It also notes that, ``DOD will manage the force in
ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be
needed to meet future, unforeseen demands.'' What are the specific
capabilities that DOD believes it will be able to regenerate?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. Since September 11, our
forces have developed many specialized skills and capabilities--
language and culture, rule of law, security force assistance. DOD
invested heavily in developing and expanding the supply of these skills
and intends to make sure that those investments aren't inadvertently
lost as we downsize. Also, the current and anticipated security
environment indicates that the demand for this mission set will persist
at some level, further emphasizing the need to ensure that ground force
capabilities developed over the last decade for counterinsurgency,
irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and security force assistance, and
partnership engagement remain viable.
The recent strategic review made clear that a smaller, ready, and
agile force is preferable to a larger force that is poorly trained and
ill-equipped. Therefore, we put a premium on retaining capabilities
that provide flexibility across a range of missions and that require a
long time to generate--in terms of training, equipping, et cetera.
Additionally, other specialized capabilities, often associated with
ground forces, stability operations, counterinsurgency (COIN), security
force assistance (SFA), building partnership capacity (BPC), et cetera,
and most gained over the last decade of conflict, must be carefully
managed. We may reduce our capacity in skill sets where we expect a
reduced demand and experience indicates retraining can occur quickly.
These kinds of skills will need to be retained (the Services are
analyzing), although at lower capacity, by keeping the right number of
experienced people balanced between the Active component and Reserve
component, and the right training curricula and infrastructure to
rebuild these capabilities in a timely manner when needed.
16. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, given
DOD's plans to reduce force structure and decisions to terminate
certain weapons systems, platforms, et cetera, or delay procurement,
how does it expect to be able to regenerate these capabilities and does
it have specific plans that project how long it would take to achieve
such regeneration?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. The Services are shaping
their future force structure in ways that protect their ability to
maintain and regenerate capabilities when needed to meet future,
unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure
that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force. For
those critical skill sets, there will be a need to keep on hand some of
the specialized infrastructure (people, facilities, training
curricula), or seed corn, that will enable a new capability to be
developed in a timely manner. Keeping experienced mid-grade officers
and noncommissioned officers (NCO) will also be key. The seed corn and
the experience will need to be properly balanced between the Active and
the Reserve components.
17. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in
particular, given the current state of personnel readiness,
particularly in the Army, how does DOD propose that it will be able to
regenerate Active component end strength and in what timeframes?
Secretary Panetta. Regenerating Active component end strength is
generally a function of the particular forces being requested and the
time in which the forces are needed. As the Services draw down, each
will analyze their missions--considering the likelihood of need for
various capabilities and the time required to regenerate while taking
into account industrial base and the Reserve component availability--
and make decisions accordingly.
Specifically, it is vital that the Army maintain a strong cadre of
noncommissioned and mid-grade officers to form the core of new
formations when needed. We are also making investments in Army Special
Operations Forces (SOF) to increase their capabilities and provide more
options to the President. It will also require a strong, ready, and
accessible Army National Guard and Army Reserve Forces.
General Dempsey. The new Defense Strategic Guidance released in
January 2012, notes that since we cannot predict how the strategic
environment will evolve with absolute certainty, we need to manage the
force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities
should they be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands. The strategy
also notes that we need to retain intellectual capital and rank
structure that can be utilized to expand key elements of the force. The
Army is examining strategies, policies, and investments that would
posture the Army to slow down and reverse drawdowns of Army end
strength and formations, and regenerate end strength over the course of
a number of years in response to a future crisis.
This will involve reexamining the mix of elements in the Active and
Reserve components, maintaining a strong National Guard and Army
Reserve, retaining a healthy cadre of experienced noncommissioned and
midgrade officers, and preserving the health and viability of the
Nation's defense industrial base.
REBUILDING READINESS
18. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in the
past, this committee, GAO, and others have called for DOD to develop a
plan for rebuilding readiness that clearly identifies requirements,
prioritizes these requirements, and ties them to resources. DOD has
typically pointed to its budget request to reflect such a plan. Given
the current readiness levels of each of the Services and plans to
reduce the force structure and end strength, to what extent has DOD and
the Services developed plans and established priorities for rebuilding
readiness?
Secretary Panetta. DOD is committed to helping the Services
maintain adequate readiness to fight the current fight and respond to
contingencies across a broad spectrum of conflict. The Services have
worked to achieve a balance among their manpower, training, and
equipment requirements given anticipated force structure changes,
evolving military strategies, and emerging resource constraints. Those
decisions on the future force will be reflected to the extent possible
in the President's budget fiscal year 2014 submission. Achieving that
balance will require ongoing evaluation over the next several budget
cycles.
We have addressed full-spectrum training requirements in the
current budget. However, as we implement the new Strategic Defense
Guidance, the processes we have established will closely monitor
whether our current training strategies are sufficient to meet these
requirements and adjust as necessary. For example, as we decrease pre-
deployment training for the current fight, COIN, we will increase the
use of time, ranges, and resources to train for full-spectrum
operations.
General Dempsey. OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services continue
working on programs focused on maintaining and rebuilding readiness.
The Services are reviewing priorities in the context of the new Defense
Strategic Guidance to ensure their resources are focused on the most
critical readiness issues. Key aspects of this planning include
resetting and reconstituting the force, refining force generation
models, prioritizing resources, and determining capabilities gaps and
associated mitigation options. A key component to the viability of
these planning efforts is predictability in resourcing which is
directly affected by the passage of appropriation legislation.
19. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey,
specifically, has DOD assessed the manning, equipping, and training
priorities for a smaller force, and are these priorities reflected in
its fiscal year 2013 funding request?
Secretary Panetta. Yes. The budget decisions represented in the
fiscal year 2013 funding request aligns our investments to the five
major tenets of our strategy:
Rebalance force structure and investments toward the
Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East region while sustaining
key alliances and partnerships in other regions.
Plan and size forces to be able to defeat a major
adversary in one theater while denying aggression elsewhere or
imposing unacceptable costs
Protect key investments in the technologically advance
capabilities most needed for the future, including countering
anti-access threats.
No longer size Active Forces to conduct large and
protracted stability operations while retaining the expertise
of a decade of war.
To the extent possible, structure major adjustments in
a way that best allows for their reversal or for regeneration
of capabilities in the future if circumstances change.
There are many examples in the request, and listed in the Defense
Budget Priorities and Choices document that accompanies the new Defense
Strategic Guidance: maintaining current bomber and aircraft carriers
fleet; retiring some of our oldest aircraft; protecting SOF and
Unmanned Aerial Systems; COCOM Engagement and Exercises; Global
Security Contingency Funding; protecting Reserve component readiness;
sustaining critical segments of the industrial base; and funding for
wounded warriors and transitioning veterans.
General Dempsey. Yes. The new Defense Strategic Guidance set
priorities for assessing our programs, force structure, and spending in
the context of the current and forecast security environment. With
those priorities in mind, the budget proposal strikes an appropriate
and necessary balance between succeeding in today's conflicts and
preparing for tomorrow's challenges. It accounts for real risks and
real fiscal constraints, and begins the process of rebalancing and
aligning our force structure and modernization efforts with our new
strategy.
20. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the new
Defense Strategic Guidance and related defense priorities call for
rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region and puts heavy reliance on
unmanned systems and SOF. Given that DOD plans to reduce the size of
the Army and the Marine Corps, does the new strategy require more
reliance on the Air Force and Navy? If so, how will this shift in focus
be reflected in the fiscal year 2013 and future budget requests?
Secretary Panetta. All Services will play integral roles in
addressing future U.S. security challenges across all domains. The Army
and Marine Corps grew in order to better meet the demands of operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan. As those conflicts wind down, some reductions
in ground forces are appropriate.
The nature of the future strategic environment will require even
greater flexibility and agility in projecting power to accomplish the
Nation's security objectives. Increasing operational focus on enhanced
presence, power projection, freedom of action, and deterrence in the
Pacific and Middle East, will require a range of mutually reinforcing
joint activities in these regions to accomplish priority missions.
To this end, over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), DOD will
fund the next-generation bomber and aerial refueling aircraft.
Additionally, the Navy will invest in a design for Virginia-class
submarines that will allow them to carry significantly more cruise
missiles and potentially provide an undersea conventional prompt strike
capability. The future years budgets also invest resources in
increasing stocks of our most capable cruise missiles, purchasing
advanced maritime patrol aircraft, upgrading avionics and
communications systems in our current bomber fleet, and enhancing
capabilities in space, cyber, electronic warfare, missile defense, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems that will
be particularly well-suited to operations in the Middle East and Asia-
Pacific regions.
General Dempsey. The end strength for ground forces has grown over
the past 10 years due to high operating tempo and extended contingency
operations. As these operations draw down, we are adjusting the size
and composition of the Joint Force to meet the anticipated threat in
the new strategy.
As we rebalance our global posture to emphasize the Asia-Pacific
region and the Middle East, we are adjusting our operating constructs
and the systems we employ. The new strategy requires increased emphasis
on improving joint operational access capabilities as well as programs
that address the proliferation of technology that threatens our access
to global commons. Similarly, cyber threats have evolved faster than
many could have imagined, so this budget request has an added focus on
our military's cyber capabilities. The sourcing of these increasingly
important capabilities spans all components.
21. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, more
specifically, how will resources be divided among the Services?
Secretary Panetta. DOD undertook a comprehensive review to develop
a revised defense strategy and accompanying investment priorities over
the coming decade. We made disciplined decisions based on our
assessment of future global challenges, key missions that we must be
ready to execute, and essential capabilities that we need to perform
those missions. The development of the fiscal year 2013 budget was
truly a strategy-driven process.
The fiscal year 2013 DOD budget reflects tough decisions that will
preserve the strongest military in the world. We made appropriate and
selective cuts in overall capacity and force structure while sustaining
or increasing investments in key capability areas, including SOF, ISR,
long-range strike assets, as well as space and cyber systems, among
others, to preserve a ready, agile, flexible, and capable force.
Decisions on allocating resources are grounded in a careful
assessment of operational needs of the Joint Force working as an
integrated whole to ensure that we have the necessary capabilities to
accomplish assigned missions.
General Dempsey. This budget must be viewed in the context of a
broader strategy to achieve the Joint Force of 2020 and represents an
integrated, carefully devised package of decisions that should not be
viewed as individual, isolated measures.
Excluding OCO funding, there are no major shifts expected in
resources among the Services--the emphasis will be on shifting the
priority of the resources to capabilities such as cyber and anti-
access/area denial, not on individual Services.
22. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, given
current readiness of the Air Force and the Navy, has DOD assessed their
ability to support this shift in focus?
Secretary Panetta. Yes. In the future, our Services will generally
be smaller, but each will develop future force structure that maintains
the agility, flexibility, and readiness to engage a full range of
contingencies and threats. And, as described in DOD's recently released
strategic guidance, we are adjusting missions, posture, and
organizational structure in order to adapt to ever evolving challenges
and threats.
One way in which the Air Force is posturing itself for the future
in light of the strategic guidance is through pursuit of the Air-Sea
Battle (ASB) concept in partnership with its sister Services. The ASB
concept will guide the Services as they work together to maintain a
continued advantage against the global proliferation of advanced
military technologies and capabilities. ASB will leverage military and
technological capabilities and is guiding us to develop a more
permanent and better institutionalized relationship between the
Military Departments that will ultimately shape our Service
organizations, inform our operational concepts, and guide our materiel
acquisitions.
Providing the Nation offshore options to deter, influence, and win
in an era of uncertainty is one of the primary contributions of the
U.S. Navy. We keep the Fleet forward through a combination of
rotational deployments, Forward Deployed Naval Forces, and forward
stationing. We will rely on these basing constructs and strategic
partnerships overseas that provide places for rest, repair, refuel, and
resupply which enable forward presence without increases to the Fleet's
size.
General Dempsey. Yes. DOD continues to meet global demands while
simultaneously conducting a thorough analysis of future force
requirements to successfully implement the new strategy. The Services
are updating their programs and metrics to evaluate current and future
force structure requirements, modernization efforts, force generation
capacity, and the resources required to maximize capabilities in
support of the strategic priorities. DOD has established a forum that
will consider any cross-cutting department management decisions to
ensure DOD actions are substantive, synchronized, and coordinated
across the defense enterprise.
23. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, does DOD
plan to reassess its current operational plans and the types of
scenarios that it will plan for in the future? If so, did DOD take into
account the current readiness levels of the Services?
Secretary Panetta. The President approves the Contingency Planning
Guidance every 2 years, per statutory requirements. DOD frequently
assesses its operational plans to ensure that they are realistic and
that they cover the range of plausible challenges DOD may face. Those
plans on which we place highest priority undergo a detailed review
process to examine force availability and readiness against the
combatant commanders' intent for phasing a specific contingency, the
capability of DOD to project the required force, and competing demands
across the globe. Both General Dempsey and I are involved deeply in
this critical review process.
General Dempsey. The Joint Staff is working with OSD to reassess
the operational and contingency plans directed in the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan. Our shift to rebalance priorities to the Asia-
Pacific region may require the Services and combatant commands refine
or develop plans to meet the new guidance. We are accounting for the
Services' current and projected readiness as we review planning
requirements and potential scenarios.
24. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what kind
of risk assessment did DOD perform, including in terms of the current
force's ability to support the shift in strategic direction?
Secretary Panetta. The new Defense Strategic Guidance and the
decisions in the fiscal years 2013 to 2017 FYDP were informed by risk
considerations. Although there are inherent risks in any defense
strategy, I believe the risks associated with the new Defense Strategic
Guidance are manageable and acceptable.
DOD took several steps to assess and mitigate risk. Preliminary
insights from the 2012 Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA) were
instrumental in the development of DOD's strategic guidance. More
broadly, during the strategic review, we addressed risk through
wargaming, scenarios, trends analysis, and other processes. DOD's risk
mitigation plan (submitted March 2012) underscores active mitigation
efforts for the specific risks identified in the CRA.
Spending reductions of the magnitude directed by the 2011 Budget
Control Act (BCA) require difficult choices that result in additional
risk in some areas. For example, by reducing overall end strength and
aggregate force structure, we are accepting greater risk in undertaking
future prolonged large-scale conventional or stability operations.
But we will mitigate that risk by protecting our ability to
regenerate capabilities as needed--the reversibility principle. This
includes maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could
be called on to expand key elements of the force, ensuring our Reserve
component is well-equipped and well-trained, and preserving the health
and viability of the Nation's defense industrial base.
The Joint Force we are shaping, although smaller and leaner, will
be agile, flexible, and ready to confront and defeat aggression
anywhere in the world. It will have the capability to surge, mobilize,
and regenerate forces and capabilities, enabling us to balance risk
appropriately across the full range of military missions and to counter
any future threats.
General Dempsey. The 2011 CRA which provided the initial baseline
assessment for the Comprehensive Defense Review (CDR) and the analysis
for the 2012 CRA were executed in parallel. During that review, we
conducted an assessment of the nature and magnitude of the strategic
and military risks associated with successfully executing the missions
called for under the current National Military Strategy as required by
Title 10. This assessment leveraged both combatant command and Service
perspectives, as well as independent Joint Staff analysis. Multiple
risk perspectives provided an opportunity to balance the ongoing
operational risks with the force's ability to address future
challenges. Accordingly, the risk assessment provided a reasoned basis
for our enduring emphasis on the broader Middle East and the increased
strategic emphasis on Asia and the Pacific while helping us to focus
additional effort on specific future capabilities like cyber and Joint
Operational Access.
25. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what
analysis did DOD do to support the notion of slowing the pace of
building new ships and accelerating the retirement of some existing
ships, including examining various cost-benefit alternatives?
Secretary Panetta. The underlying analysis that informs the
President's budget for fiscal year 2013 force structure was the
strategic review conducted by DOD in the summer and fall of 2011.
During this review, DOD evaluated, among other things, the Joint
Forces' presence, surge, and shaping demands. For the Navy, the review
identified the number of ships and aircraft required to sustain a
forward presence capable of deterring potential adversaries and
providing options for immediate crisis response while also ensuring
sufficient capacity to execute combatant commanders' plans.
The analysis used to inform the decision to accelerate the
retirement of older cruisers and amphibious ships was predicated on the
need to balance the cost to upgrade and repair less capable older ships
with the cost to procure newer more capable ships. Over the past 10
years, the Fleet has deployed more frequently and sometimes for longer
than planned. Consequently, maintenance and repair have sometimes been
deferred. The life cycle costs of maintaining and repairing ships to
achieve expected service life is normally less expensive than buying
new ships. However, the average age of the Fleet is increasing due to
the high annual procurement rates of the 1980s and 1990s. With an eye
toward sustaining the Fleet's readiness and its capacity and capability
to fight and win at sea, DOD decided to decommission some older, less
capable ships in advance of their expected service life in order to
invest in newer, more capable ships.
General Dempsey. Specific resourcing decisions were made through a
comprehensive strategic review that included detailed analysis by the
Joint Staff, the Services, and OSD. Cost reductions from the early
retirement of some ships will allow DOD to invest in new technology and
ships that specifically address the threats targeted by the
administration's new strategy.
OPERATIONAL ENERGY
26. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in 2009,
to address congressional concerns over DOD's heavy reliance on
petroleum-based fuels to sustain operations on the battlefield in
locations such as Afghanistan, GAO recommended that the combatant
commanders and the Military Services establish requirements and
guidelines for fuel demand management at forward-deployed locations
within their areas of responsibility (AOR). Also, GAO recommended that
DOD's operational energy strategy should establish incentives for
commanders of forward deployed locations to promote fuel demand
reduction at their locations, as well as identify a viable funding
mechanism for pursuing fuel reduction initiatives. While we are aware
that the combatant commands are documenting operational energy
capability gaps, what is the status of combatant commands including
CENTCOM formally incorporating requirements related to fuel demand
management at forward-deployed locations into policy and guidance?
Secretary Panetta. The combatant commands, including CENTCOM, are
establishing requirements related to fuel demand management at forward-
deployed locations into their policy and guidance. On June 7, 2011,
Commander, International Security Assistance Forces (COMISAF) issued
policy guidance directing commanders to take ownership of unit fuel
demand and make energy-informed decisions in their operations. In
October 2011, CENTCOM revised its Contingency Base Camp Development
Standard Regulation 415-1 to integrate fuel demand management best
practices. On December 11, 2011, the new COMISAF issued a policy
memorandum that built upon existing guidance and stated that
``operational energy equates exactly to operational capability.''
This policy and guidance has produced tangible fuel demand
management improvements while capturing critical lessons learned for
application in other combatant commands. The June 2011 COMISAF
requirements memorandum resulted in several power generation and
distribution improvements across Afghanistan. For example, the Army's
Logistical Contract Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Program Management
Office established an Energy Savings Initiative Policy to engage
contractors in fuel demand reduction efforts. This effort has reduced
the fuel requirement in Afghanistan by one million gallons per year.
General Dempsey. The combatant commands, including CENTCOM, are
establishing policy and guidance related to fuel demand management at
forward-deployed locations. In June 2011, COMISAF, issued policy
guidance directing commanders to take ownership of unit fuel demand and
make energy-informed decisions in their operations.
The June 2011 COMISAF requirements memorandum resulted in several
power generation and distribution improvements across the Combined
Joint Operating Area in Afghanistan. Also, in June 2011, the Army's
LOGCAP Program Management Office released its Energy Savings Initiative
Policy to engage contractors in fuel demand reduction efforts.
27. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what has
DOD done to incentivize commanders and units that effectively reduce
fuel consumption?
Secretary Panetta. DOD's primary incentives to reduce fuel
consumption are mitigating operational risk and enhancing combat
capability. These fundamental incentives have led the Army and Marine
Corps to achieve substantial reductions in fuel consumption by deployed
units. DOD also oversees targeted incentive programs such as the Navy's
Incentivized Energy Conservation Program, which recognizes naval
vessels that reduce shipboard fuel consumption. The Navy also has a
similar program for its aviation units called the Navy Air-Energy
Conservation Program. In addition, the Air Force's Air Mobility Command
aviation fuel efficiency incentives program provides high-performing
Mobility Air Force wings financial awards for demonstrating the largest
gains in energy efficiency.
General Dempsey. Incentives in fuel consumption reduction are
mitigating operational risk, thereby enhancing combat capability. DOD
oversees targeted incentive programs such as the Navy's Incentivized
Energy Conservation Program awards to naval vessels that best apply the
program's training to reduce shipboard fuel consumption. The Navy has a
similar program for its aviation units, the Navy Air-Energy
Conservation Program. In addition, The Air Force's Air Mobility Command
aviation fuel efficiency incentives program recognizes high-performing
Mobility Air Force wings that demonstrate the largest gains in energy
efficiency.
28. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how does
DOD plan to track fuel consumption at its forward-deployed locations?
Secretary Panetta. The primary fuel management goal at forward-
deployed locations is to ensure our forces have a reliable, steady
supply of fuel. The Defense Logistics Agency-Energy tracks fuel
supplies to forward operations for that purpose, taking into account
the full range of incidents and factors, including seasonal and
cultural, that can affect fuel availability.
In addition, DOD is taking steps to improve data on fuel
consumption at forward locations for the purposes of managing demand.
The Defense Operational Energy Board, co-chaired by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs and the
Joint Staff Director for Logistics, has chartered a task group to
develop a baseline of operational energy consumption to inform energy
performance metrics. DOD will apply these metrics to measure and manage
improvements in energy security for the warfighter. Each of the
Military Services has taken steps to improve their data collection on
fuel consumption in military operations as well.
General Dempsey. The Defense Operational Energy Board, co-chaired
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and
Programs and the Joint Staff Director for Logistics, chartered a task
group to develop a baseline of operational energy consumption to inform
energy performance metrics. DOD will apply these metrics to measure and
manage improvements in energy security for the warfighter.
DOD is working to employ new systems to automate data collection
down to the tactical level. The Army is undergoing limited fielding of
the Tactical Fuel Manager Defense (TFMD) program at several Afghanistan
bases. TFMD tracks fuel consumption by the individual piece of
equipment to improve fuel efficiency.
29. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, this
committee put into law that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
shall designate a senior official to be responsible for operational
energy plans and programs and be responsible for coordinating with the
Assistant Secretary to implement initiatives. What progress has been
made to date to establish this operational energy element within the
Joint Staff, and how do you anticipate the Joint Staff will assist the
Services on decreasing their reliance on fuel in current and future
military operations?
Secretary Panetta. In August 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff designated the Director for Logistics (DJ-4) as Joint Staff
point of contact for operational energy plans and programs.
I also recently signed DOD's Operational Energy Strategy
Implementation Plan, which established the Defense Operational Energy
Board, co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational
Energy Plans and Programs (ASD(OEPP)) and DJ-4. I chartered the board
to reduce energy demand, expand supply, and balance requirements. The
board provides a mechanism for reviewing, synchronizing, and supporting
department-wide operational energy policies, plans, and programs.
General Dempsey. In August 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff designated the Director for Logistics, DJ-4, as Joint Staff
point of contact for operational energy plans and programs.
The Defense Operational Energy Board, co-chaired by the ASD(OEPP)
and DJ-4, recently published their implementation plan to reduce energy
demand, expand supply, and adapt the future force. The board provides a
mechanism for reviewing, synchronizing, and supporting department-wide
operational energy policies, plans, and programs.
30. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, with the
additional leadership provided by the Joint Staff on operational energy
efforts, what significant changes should we expect regarding how DOD
plans and currently manages fuel demand and energy challenges in
current and future war time scenarios?
Secretary Panetta. DOD is following through on the changes to DOD
force planning, requirements development, and acquisition processes
Congress directed in the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009. My
expectation is that the work of the new Defense Operational Energy
Board and DOD's Operational Strategy Implementation Plan will drive
significant changes in how DOD plans and programs. We see operational
energy, particularly demand reduction, becoming an increasingly
important requirement for our forces because of the inherent
vulnerability of fuel storage and logistics lines of communication and
the growth of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to threaten
them. The recent Joint Operational Access Concept states that DOD
should ``decrease the logistical appetite of joint forces in all
classes of supply, but especially in fossil fuels,'' to decrease the
risk of these A2/AD threats.
General Dempsey. DOD is following through on the changes to DOD
force planning, requirements development, and acquisition processes
directed by Congress in the 2009 NDAA. We believe operational energy
demand reduction is becoming an increasingly important requirement for
our forces due to the inherent vulnerability of fuel storage and
logistics lines of communication, and the growth of A2/AD capabilities
that threaten them.
31. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, have
there been discussions on including specific energy efficiency
strategies into strategic planning documents?
Secretary Panetta. The recently signed Operational Energy Strategy
Implementation Plan includes specific targets that direct changes to
policy, doctrine, and combatant command activities. The Defense
Operational Energy Board established a task group to review relevant
DOD policies and develop a prioritized roadmap for including strategies
to reduce operational demand, assure supply, and adapt the future
force. As overarching strategic planning documents are reviewed, the
board will provide a focal point for coordinating across the defense
components.
General Dempsey. The recently signed Operational Energy Strategy
Implementation Plan includes specific targets that direct changes to
policy, doctrine, and combatant command activities. The Defense
Operational Energy Board established a task group to review relevant
DOD policies and develop a prioritized roadmap for including strategies
to reduce operational demand, assure supply, and adapt the future
force.
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
32. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, the new Defense Strategic
Guidance stated that DOD will ``make every effort to maintain an
adequate industrial base and our investment in science and technology
(S&T).'' DOD's budget for S&T activities decreased from $12.3 billion
in fiscal year 2012 to $11.9 billion in this year's request. While it
appears S&T was spared draconian cuts in an attempt to make a
commitment in our seed corn for the future, I'd like to better
understand what explicit steps DOD is taking. Are there specific areas
DOD is increasing its S&T investments in?
Secretary Panetta. The fiscal year 2013 President's budget request
for DOD S&T is $11.861 billion, which represents a modest decline of
$386 million compared to the fiscal year 2012 President's budget
request of $12.247 billion. This is a decline of 4.73 percent, when
adjusted for inflation. Within this budget request, DOD decided to
strongly support sustainment of Basic Research. While a decline of just
under 5 percent in the S&T program does have an impact, it is
manageable and reasonable when taken in the context of the overall DOD
budget decline of 7.01 percent, adjusted for inflation. Specific areas
where DOD is increasing its S&T investments include promising
technologies to counter other nations' development of A2/AD
capabilities, cyber operations, autonomy, human systems, electronic
warfare, and counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD). S&T funds have
also been aligned with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and
Office of Science and Technology policy priorities in advanced
manufacturing, Army medical research, advanced robotics capabilities,
advanced training technologies, and clean energy programs. Across the
FYDP (fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2017), DOD has increased funding
for high speed kinetic strike ($353 million), electronic warfare/cyber
($195 million), offensive cyber operations ($400 million) and cyber
communications ($382 million). We believe this budget represents a
reasonable reprioritization of the DOD S&T program.
33. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, are there areas that are
facing reductions?
Secretary Panetta. S&T funding declined 4.73 percent against
inflation in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request, with
reductions occurring in all components. While the funding went down, we
believe we are able to manage the risk. Specific technical areas with
greater risk in the Army include: military engineering technology
development for installations and field operations; applied
topographical research for geospatial products; and weapons, munitions,
missile, and rocket technology development for small precision
munitions, such as mortars. Navy reductions were smaller than the other
Military Departments and included technology development to improve
logistics operations and sustainment. Within the Air Force, additional
risk was accepted in the following areas: laser protection for anti-
access standoff munitions and for aircraft pilot visors; novel
navigation techniques for non-permissive environments; space precision
navigation and timing; trusted systems for avionics devices; and
advanced airborne networked and wide-band communications. Funding
reductions also occurred in the following Defense-wide technology
areas: National Defense Education Program; human, social, cultural,
behavior modeling; Joint Experimentation; Joint Capability Technology
Demonstrations; biomaterials technologies; machine intelligence;
cognitive computing; command, control and communication systems; and
advanced electronics. Although the reductions are numerous, most are
below $20 million in magnitude, and funding for DOD's highest priority
technology programs was protected.
34. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, is the DOD laboratory
enterprise facing any potential base realignment and closure (BRAC)
facility and workforce reductions?
Secretary Panetta. BRAC enables DOD to reconfigure its
infrastructure to match the demands of leaner, more flexible forces to
accommodate our changing strategic emphasis. It is an important tool
for DOD to use to make the tough fiscal choices necessitated by current
budget challenges. If Congress does authorize the requested BRAC
rounds, DOD will undertake the BRAC rounds in accordance with the
statutory directive to consider all installations equally and make
decisions based on 20-year force structure plan and statutory selection
criteria, which give primary consideration to military value. In this
context, DOD will examine all its missions and functions, including the
laboratory enterprise.
35. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, what specifically is DOD
doing to maintain an adequate industrial base?
Secretary Panetta. DOD is taking responsible steps to ensure that
the defense industry can support our warfighters' needs, now and in the
future. DOD's primary mechanism for supporting the industrial base is
through the programs that buy the defense industry's products. DOD
chooses what to purchase based on warfighter requirements, but DOD can
sometimes adjust program schedules or capitalize on synergies across
programs to sustain critical industrial base capabilities. In
exceptional cases, in certain niches, when current programs will not
support the minimum sustaining rate that a niche supplier needs to
provide a critical product or service, DOD also uses its industrial
base investment resources like the Defense Production Act Title III
authority and the Manufacturing Technology Program to ensure the
continued health of the selected parts of the defense industry. These
rare interventions should only occur in areas where DOD is highly
likely to need a product in the future, where the product would be hard
and expensive to obtain after a hiatus, and where affordable and
innovative approaches are available to use to retain the producers in
the interim. Additionally, DOD is doing a continuous, systematic, fact-
based review of the defense industrial base, led by the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, called the
Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) project. The S2T2 process, which
is still ongoing, will identify critical and fragile niches in the
industrial base that need additional monitoring. Combined, all of these
efforts help to preserve the dynamic qualities of the industrial base
that supply our warfighters with their technological edge.
36. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, what is the definition of
adequate?
Secretary Panetta. In the context of the defense industrial base,
``adequate'' means sufficient to provide the capabilities that our
warfighters need, including maintaining our technological edge. An
adequate industrial base has the capability to produce top-class
equipment at reasonable cost today, and an adequate industrial base
constantly adapts and invests in future capability.
37. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, according to DOD's statement
of defense budget priorities, ``some domestic manufacturers have key
skills in the design and manufacture of military systems that cannot be
duplicated elsewhere in the economy or regenerated quickly. In support
of the strategic guidance's tenet of reversibility, this budget plan
sustains, where possible, these segments of the industrial base.
However, the industrial base will require careful monitoring in the
future.'' What defense-unique industrial skills in design and
manufacture are at greatest risk of loss given the administration's
budget?
Secretary Panetta. The defense industrial base is very diverse, and
some sectors and tiers of the industrial base are in stronger positions
financially and technically than others. DOD cannot support all parts
of the industrial base equally. Some areas that DOD currently views as
``at risk'' may appropriately decline as new technologies and the
evolving strategic situation change our acquisition requirements. Even
in the areas that DOD does need to sustain, we will take advantage of
competition whenever we can, and we will invest in forward-leaning,
pro-innovation efforts rather than preserving a static, backward-
looking industrial base.
DOD is expanding its systematic investigation to identify critical
and fragile niches that require especially close monitoring, but we
already know of some areas of emphasis. For example, production in the
aircraft sector is fairly robust, but for the first time in decades DOD
does not have an ongoing tactical aircraft design effort, so we are
examining creative and efficient ways to stimulate design capabilities
there. In the production realm, demand for some strategic systems and
space launch is relatively low at present, but we know that it will
return in the future, so we are closely monitoring and investing to
sustain and enhance production capability in solid rocket motors. Over
time, DOD will make responsible choices with our industrial base
efforts, we will rarely single out specific products or suppliers for
support, and we will continuously update and adapt the list of niches
that we monitor to reflect the changing industrial and strategic
environments.
38. Senator Levin. Secretary Panetta, which acquisition programs
will be given the highest priority in ensuring reversibility?
Secretary Panetta. DOD continues to apply ``reversibility'' to
ensure DOD maintains the ability to regenerate, mobilize, and adapt our
capabilities to ensure options for an uncertain future. The concept
applies to our people, our Active-Reserve component balance, our
posture, our partnerships, and our industrial base. As we establish
priorities for acquisition programs, we aim to preserve select
capabilities and critical skills within the industrial base to ensure
we maintain skill sets vital to our ability to regenerate and adapt to
changing threats. DOD's S2T2 initiative is assisting the Military
Services in identifying critical industrial capabilities and skill sets
that are at risk. Our decision calculus will be based upon a
combination of many factors, including shocks or evolutions in the
strategic, operational, economic, and technological spheres.
______
Questions Submitted to Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
39. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, I am
skeptical of DOD's apparent optimism that it will no longer be called
on to conduct large-scale stability operations and worried about the
consequences of declaring that we do not need to prepare for them. I
believe it is important to note that DOD never actually sized the
ground forces for large-scale stability operations, resulting in the
severe dwell-to-boots-on-the-ground ratios that our soldiers have faced
in recent years. It is in light of this skepticism that I am deeply
concerned about the speed and depth of the reductions in ground force
end strength envisioned in this budget request. Could you describe the
specific risks you envision as a result of this decision and how you
will mitigate them?
Secretary Panetta. The new Defense Strategic Guidance states that
our forces will retain the expertise, operational lessons learned,
institutional knowledge, and specialized capabilities required for
stability operations.
In any defense strategy there are inherent risks; we believe the
ones in this strategic guidance are manageable and acceptable. While
U.S. forces will retain the capacity to undertake stability and
counterinsurgency operations on a more limited scale, we are accepting
greater risk in undertaking prolonged, large-scale stability
operations. To mitigate that risk we will retain expertise, operational
lessons learned, institutional knowledge, and specialized capabilities
required for stability operations. Further, we will ensure that we have
the ability to mobilize and regenerate forces should our assessments of
the future scale of stability operations prove inaccurate.
General Dempsey. You are correct that the Active component was not
sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations in the
past; this will carry over to the future. If a large scale force is
needed, risk will exist, as it has in the past, to the Active component
until Reserve Forces can be recalled and trained to accomplish the
mission. To help mitigate the risk, we will continue to rely on the
battle-tested Reserve and Guard components of the Joint Force to
provide the strategic and rotational depth should the Nation require us
to execute a large-scale prolonged stability operation. We further
mitigate operational risk to this mission by ensuring that we size the
Active component to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other
stability operations if required. Institutionally, we will mitigate
risk by retaining the hard-won knowledge and experience in our force
through retention of key leaders and emphasis on full-spectrum
training. We mitigate risk with regard to future challenges by
maintaining the right pace of reductions. If we go too fast, experience
shows we will not do a good job of retaining key people and skills.
Finally, the most comprehensive risk mitigation activity is a
deliberate, comprehensive reset of the Joint Force. If we have fully
trained and ready forces, and we do not exceed the current pace of
reductions, I am confident that we can maintain military risk to that
mission at an acceptable level.
40. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, while
the new Defense Strategic Guidance states that ground forces will not
be sized for large-scale stability operations, it also lists
``stability and counterinsurgency operations'' as one of the ``primary
missions'' of the U.S. military. Why won't the ground force be sized to
conduct one of its ``primary missions?''
Secretary Panetta. Stability and counterinsurgency operations are
primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces. With the transition of
security responsibility in Afghanistan to the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) in 2014, and with sufficient time for U.S. forces to
reset, we can reduce some capacity in the force for prolonged, large-
scale stability operations. U.S. forces will still retain expertise,
operational lessons learned, institutional knowledge, and specialized
capabilities required for stability operations, as well as the capacity
to undertake stability and counterinsurgency operations on a more
limited scale. Further, we will ensure that we have the ability to
mobilize and regenerate forces if necessary.
General Dempsey. It is important to note that stability operations
and counterinsurgency will continue to be primary missions for the
Joint Force. Mission sets are rarely binary--``high end'' or ``low
end''. Missions are generally multi-faceted and tend to cross the full
spectrum of operations. While we will increase emphasis on projecting
power we are not forsaking our hard-won proficiencies in stability
operations and counterinsurgency. The total ground force will be sized
to conduct its primary mission, and we will rely on the battle tested
Reserve and Guard components of the Joint Force to provide the
strategic and rotational depth for all missions.
41. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how
can the force be prepared to conduct this particular ``primary
mission'' without the necessary manpower?
Secretary Panetta. U.S. forces will retain sufficient capacity to
undertake limited counterinsurgency and stability operations, if
required. We will also seek to operate alongside coalition forces,
whenever possible. Recognizing the uncertainties of the international
environment, we will ensure that we have the ability to mobilize and
regenerate forces if a larger-scale stability operation becomes
necessary in the future.
General Dempsey. The force will have the necessary manpower
resident in the total Joint Force--Active and Reserve.
42. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the
new Defense Strategic Guidance and fiscal year 2013 budget request
emphasize investments in SOF. However, SOF personnel are drawn from
general-purpose forces that are slated for reductions, and SOF units
rely heavily on general-purpose forces for support. As General Dempsey
has previously stated, ``The SOF can only be special if there's a
conventional force that allows them to conduct their operations and
shape the environment.'' What are the risks to SOF that will result
from decisions to shrink general-purpose forces so significantly? For
example, the fiscal year 2013 budget request calls for SOF by 3,000
personnel, while cutting general-purpose ground force end strength.
This reduction will impact the pool of personnel SOF can draw from. How
can SOF grow without sacrificing standards with a smaller pool of
manpower to draw from?
Secretary Panetta. The remaining programmed growth for SOF is
primarily focused on enhancing the organic combat support/combat
service support capability in SOF units to provide increased
capabilities in those areas, reducing the requirement for General
Purpose Force (GPF) support to conduct forecasted operations. For long-
duration and large-scale operations, GPF support is necessary, and the
Department is currently undertaking a range of different analyses to
identify GPF support requirements for SOF, such as logistics and
intelligence personnel, and to mitigate potential risks to SOF
operations associated with reductions in the GPF.
There is no requirement or expectation to change SOF's exacting
selection standards, even if the pool from which to draw those
individuals is reduced. GPF reductions will mean that a greater
percentage of the overall force is actually resident in the special
operations community and that we manage our force carefully in order to
maintain the requisite talent pool. We must continue efforts to sustain
the SOF that we already have most effectively. The Service component's
continued support of robust, SOF-focused retention initiatives will
have a positive impact on the retention behavior and readiness of our
SOF personnel. The Department is working closely with U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) to analyze force preservation challenges
carefully.
General Dempsey. Recently, the annual SOF manpower growth of 3-5
percent we have sustained has not diluted the force or outpaced the
required training and support structure. SOCOM has done a magnificent
job of adjusting their processes to maintain the quality of SOF
operators and support personnel during this current era of SOF growth.
As an example, Special Forces soldiers (officers and enlisted) are
drawn from the ranks of the Army's GPF; with the exception of
relatively small number of 18Xs recruited ``off the street.'' Any
future growth of SF will occur during a general reduction in Army end
strength. SF will be recruiting from a smaller pool of candidates, just
as all SOCOM components do. SOCOM will not compromise standards in
selecting and training future SOF operators. It is vital to maintain
the high standards that have been adopted by SOCOM's components since
we have asked and continue to ask SOF operators to conduct National
Level Missions in strategically sensitive environments. the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict
(ASD(SO/LIC)) will work with the Service Secretaries (through OSD) to
ensure that Commander, SOCOMs Special Operations Forces manpower needs
are represented.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY
43. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, DOD has taken a number of
positive steps to address the very serious issue of sexual assault in
our military. Over the holidays, you announced two new policies that
provide greater support for the victims of sexual assault. What action
is DOD taking to protect the men and women who so bravely protect us?
Secretary Panetta. We are committed to doing everything we can to
prevent sexual assault in the first place, provide all necessary care
and services to victims of sexual assault, and ensure our commanders
hold offenders appropriately accountable. Our new Expedited Transfer
policy gives servicemembers who file unrestricted reports of a sexual
assault an option to request quick transfer from their unit or
installation to avoid harassment and separate them from the alleged
perpetrator. For victims who made an unrestricted report we now require
sexual assault documentation be retained for up to 50 years, making it
easier for veterans to file a claim with the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA). For victims who file restricted reports, certain
documentation must be retained for 5 years. In addition, we believe we
have developed a set of initiatives that fundamentally change the way
DOD deals with this problem. Some of the steps that we will work with
Congress in trying to include in our legislative package are: enhancing
training programs for sexual assault prevention, including training for
new military commanders in handling sexual assault matters;
establishing a ``Special Victim's Unit'' capability within each of the
Services; allowing Reserve and National Guard personnel who have been
sexually assaulted while on Active Duty to remain in their Active Duty
status in order to obtain treatment and support; requiring a record of
the outcome of disciplinary and administrative proceedings be centrally
retained; and requiring commanders to conduct annual organizational
climate assessments. Further, in July 2011, we assigned a general
officer to lead our Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office. Some
of our other accomplishments are highlighted below:
a. In April 2011, we activated the anonymous and confidential DOD
Safe Helpline which is a sexual assault crisis support and resources
service for adult servicemembers of the DOD community. Users may call,
click or text anytime, from anywhere for assistance and/or referrals
regarding a sexual assault. Our most recent data confirm that this is a
valuable tool being used by our servicemembers to facilitate care and
reporting.
b. In January 2012, we reissued our DOD Directive that sets policy
for the Department on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR).
The directive expanded support services to military spouses and adult
military dependents, who will now be able to file confidential
restricted reports and receive the services of a sexual assault
response coordinator and victim advocate.
c. This Directive also ensures DOD civilian employees and their
family dependents 18 years of age and older when they are stationed or
performing duties outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) are
eligible for treatment in the military healthcare system at military
installations or facilities OCONUS. Additionally, U.S. citizen DOD
contractor personnel when they are authorized to accompany the Armed
Forces in a contingency operation OCONUS and their U.S. citizen
employees are also eligible for the same emergency care and the help of
a sexual assault response coordinator and a victim advocate, during
that emergency care.
d. We have established the DOD Sexual Assault Advocate
Certification Program which will require our sexual assault response
coordinators and victim advocates obtain a credential aligned with
national standards. This will ensure our victims of sexual assault
receive the best care from a professional who can provide crucial
assistance from the moment an assault is reported through case
conclusion.
e. Sexual assault cases are some of the toughest cases to
investigate and to prosecute and we must increase the number of subject
matter experts in this area. To that end I have increased funding for
military criminal investigators and judge advocates to receive
specialized training. We are also ensuring that eligible victims have
the opportunity to receive expanded legal assistance early in the
process of their case.
f. We now have one integrated data system to track sexual assaults
throughout the Department. The Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database
(DSAID) achieved initial operational capability 30 March 2012, with the
U.S. Air Force and the National Guard Bureau as the first users. By 31
August 2012, it will be fully operational with the integration of the
rest of the military Services. This data base will ensure the
transparency of sexual assault-related data and enhance support
services
g. Furthermore, because commanders are responsible to maintain
good order and discipline of their people, as well as hold offenders
appropriately accountable, I have directed an assessment of how we
prepare and train our commanding officers and senior enlisted leaders
to prevent and respond to sexual assault.
h. We are collaborating with the Departments of Labor and Veterans
Affairs to develop a ``continuum of care'' for sexual assault victims
transitioning out of military service. By leveraging our DOD Safe
Helpline infrastructure, the Department is able to present clear and
easily accessible information on how to get help with counseling,
benefits determinations, transitions and employment. By bridging the
gap from DOD to the VA for sexual assault victims, we provide a
continuum of care from Active Duty to veteran status.
i. I recently introduced a new initiative that will elevate the
disposition authority for the most serious sexual assault offenses to
the ``Special Court Martial Convening Authority'' level. This reviewing
officer is at the colonel or Navy captain level and will ensure these
cases receive a high level of command attention.
These initiatives are just a start. The Department is focused on
building a safe environment for our men and women--I have no more
important mission than to protect the people who protect this country.
MENTAL HEALTH IN THE MILITARY
44. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, ending the stigma associated
with seeking mental health care is critical for the well-being of our
men and women who serve in our military. I applaud the Department's
success in increasing the percentage of those who seek help when
needed. As we go forward, what do you see as the remaining challenges
to further reducing the stigma associated with seeking mental health
care?
Secretary Panetta. Emphasis on the well-being and fitness of the
Force, and the prevention of adverse outcomes for servicemembers, is a
national priority. Early intervention through self-referral for issues
of concern to servicemembers, and the reduction of stigma that may be
associated with self-identification of the need for assistance for
mental health conditions, are of paramount importance to leadership
throughout DOD. To address these aims, a policy was issued in August
2011, Command Notification Requirements to Dispel Stigma in Providing
Mental Health Care to Servicemembers, which emphasizes that mental
health providers are generally not required to notify Command when
servicemembers voluntarily seek alcohol education or mental health
services. This policy is part of the Department's effort to encourage
servicemembers to come forward for evaluation and treatment before
symptoms are serious enough to result in an alcohol related incident or
in situations that might provoke command-directed action.
All of these steps, and monitoring compliance with these measures
at commands, should help reduce the stigma associated with seeking
mental health care. The Deparment recognizes that more needs to be done
to end that stigma, and we will continue to work toward that end. It is
imperative for commanders to reinforce the value of help-seeking
behavior within the military healthcare system. This can be done by
fostering open discussion of mental health problems, making information
regarding the means to access care readily available, and assisting
servicemembers with their return to full duty following treatment.
GUARD AND RESERVE
45. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, as this budget submission
looks to re-shape the military to be more agile, quick, and flexible--
and incorporate the lessons learned in 10 years of war--I appreciate
the attention you give the Guard and Reserve components. Our Guard and
Reserve Forces have been a crucial asset to this Nation and have served
us well. The budget proposes force structure adjustments for our Active
and Reserve Forces. How do you think the changes will impact the
readiness of the Total Force?
Secretary Panetta. Our goal is to develop a versatile mix of
scalable organizations operating on a rotational cycle, to provide a
sustained flow of trained and ready forces for the full range of
military operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies at a
sustainable tempo for our All-Volunteer Force. At the same time,
ensuring access to the Reserve component which is essential to
providing the operational depth and flexibility combatant commanders
require.
As we have stated, our forces will get smaller; this will emphasize
the importance of the Reserve component as an operational reserve. The
Reserve component will also become more important as a steward for
specialized skill sets to maintain expertise critical to regenerating
capabilities when greater capacity is required.
46. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, upon completing deployments
and returning to the civilian world, many in the Guard and Reserve
continue to experience problems which may not have been diagnosed upon
their return. I understand that sometimes post traumatic stress and
other invisible wounds of war do not surface right away. In your
opinion, what can be done to better assess and treat these returning
Guard and Reserve soldiers?
Secretary Panetta. DOD has revised its deployment mental health
assessment process to provide comprehensive person-to-person mental
health assessments before deployment and at 6 months, 1 year, and 2
years after return from deployment. This process applies to Guard and
Reserve soldiers who deploy, as well as to members of the Active
component who deploy. These procedures comply with requirements in the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 (Section 702). The three post-deployment
mental health assessments are performed by licensed mental health
professionals or designated personnel trained and certified in
performance of the assessments. These mental health assessments include
an analysis of self-reported responses to mental health questions
regarding symptoms of depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
and alcohol misuse, detailed follow-up of positive responses regarding
previous mental health diagnoses and medication use, and exploration of
other reported emotional, life stress, or mental health concerns.
During these assessment sessions, providers weigh risks for suicide
or violence, offer education on relevant mental health topics,
administer brief interventions, and, as indicated, make recommendations
for follow-up assessment and care.
After returning home from deployment, help for any mental health
issues, including depression and PTSD, is available through the
Military Health System for Active Duty and retired servicemembers, or
through the VA for all veterans. Active Duty, National Guard, and
Reserve servicemembers who separate and who served in support of a
contingency operation are eligible for TRICARE's Transitional
Assistance Management Program (TAMP), which provides health benefits
for 180 days to assist servicemembers and their families with the
transition to civilian life. For those who may be separating from the
Service due to medical disability, VA Federal Recovery Coordinators and
Service Recovery Care Coordinators assist with servicemember transition
from DOD to VA care, treatment, and rehabilitation. The DOD
inTransition program is a free, voluntary, and confidential coaching
and assistance program that also provides a bridge of support for
servicemembers while they are transitioning between healthcare systems
or providers.
Each Service has a comprehensive program to address the
reintegration needs of wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers,
including the Army Wounded Warrior Program, the Marine Wounded Warrior
Regiment, Navy's Safe Harbor Program, and the Air Force Wounded Warrior
Program. Across DOD, the Military Family Life Consultants address
family distress by providing education and information on family
dynamics, parent education, available support services, and the effects
of stress and positive coping mechanisms. Military OneSource has
counselors standing ready 24/7 by phone and email and are available for
face-to-face counseling. The DOD Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program
was established to address the needs of National Guard and Reserve
servicemembers and their families by facilitating access to support and
reintegration services. The Defense Centers of Excellence for
Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury (DCoE) has a number of
education and outreach programs, including DCoE's Outreach Center,
``24/7 Help,'' which provides information and resources on
psychological health and traumatic brain injury, and the
Afterdeployment.org Web site, which assists servicemembers and their
families in managing post-deployment challenges.
The Military Services have developed training programs to mitigate
the effects of combat-related stress. The Army implemented the
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program Army-wide; the Air Force uses the
Landing Gear program; the Navy has an Operational Stress Control
program; and the Marine Corps uses a program called Operational Stress
Control and Readiness. Each of these programs seeks to prepare
servicemembers to better cope with combat and deployment stress before,
during, and after deployment. On a more holistic level, the Office of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has promoted the Total Force
Fitness model to address the need for a synchronized, DOD-wide approach
to strengthen resilience and maintain optimal military force readiness.
This model fosters leadership interventions throughout DOD that
strengthen the comprehensive health of servicemembers across many
domains: Behavioral, Social, Physical, Environmental, Medical,
Spiritual, Nutritional, and Psychological.
FEMALES IN THE MILITARY
47. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, last week DOD announced that
it would open about 14,000 combat-related positions to female troops.
You also recently announced the President's nomination of the first
female four-star general for the Air Force. These are both positive
steps. Can you give me a sense of where you think DOD is with respect
to diversity initiatives--such as fostering a diverse base of officers
from which to select our future senior leaders?
Secretary Panetta. DOD agrees the future military must be comprised
not only of men and women of different racial and ethnic backgrounds,
but also of individuals with a wide range of talents, experience, and
skill sets. Because the military operates as a closed personnel system,
the demographic diversity of accessions and those retained over the
course of a career directly influences the potential demographic
diversity of future senior leaders; on average it takes 25 years to
``grow'' a General or Flag Officer. As such, given a limited pool of
eligible candidates, outreach, recruiting, and retention strategies
play a critical role in attracting and retaining qualified personnel to
military service.
DOD has committed a significant amount of resources to expand
outreach efforts with affinity groups to strengthen the qualifications
of potential candidates. For example, DOD hosts a number of training
events particularly in the area of Science, Technology, Engineering,
and Math (STEM) to strengthen shortcomings in an area critical to
national security. Currently, a DOD pilot program with an East Los
Angeles school-age population of roughly 20,000 includes programs to
train parents and influencers on how to support STEM education in the
home. The program begins in Kindergarten and ties into the California
university system. The program is in its fourth year and surveys find
that 100 percent of program participants have been positively
influenced by the program. Additionally, DOD supports the STARBASE
Program, a youth outreach program designed to increase student interest
in STEM that will help build and enlarge the talent pool of potential
military and civilian personnel needed by DOD. The DOD STARBASE Program
operates at 60 locations in 34 States, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico. Military Commanders (Active, Guard, and Reserve) have
collaborated with 1,086 schools from 387 school districts, serving
approximately 64,000 students. Since 1993 more than 609,000 students
have participated in the STARBASE Program.
Cooperation and support of affinity groups also positively enhances
diversity ``in-reach'' efforts to enhance career development,
mentoring, and networking resources for those currently in uniform. DOD
continues to work with components' leadership to address integration of
talent management programs process and practices, mentorship, and
succession planning to optimize the ability of all servicemembers to
make informed career choices from accession to retirement.
NORTH KOREA
48. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, in 2011, the United States
and North Korea agreed to restart efforts to search for and repatriate
the remains of U.S. soldiers missing from the Korean War. Please
provide an update on this program.
Secretary Panetta. The United States and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed an arrangement on October 20, 2011, to
resume joint remains recovery operations in the DPRK. The U.S.
Government has worked diligently to comply with the arrangement and as
of this hearing date we are on schedule to resume remains recovery
operations in April.
DON'T ASK DON'T TELL POLICY
49. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, on December 22, 2010,
President Obama signed the law which repealed the Don't Ask, Don't Tell
policy. After required certifications were made, the repeal occurred on
September 20, 2011. Have you encountered any difficulties in
implementing the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell?
Secretary Panetta. The Services and combatant commands continue to
provide monthly progress reports on the implementation of repeal. To
date, and based on these reports, repeal is going smoothly and we have
had no significant repeal-related issues. We attribute this success to
our strong and dedicated leadership, comprehensive pre-repeal training
programs, continued close monitoring and enforcement of standards by
our military leaders, and servicemembers' adherence to core values that
include professionalism, dignity, and respect for all.
50. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, have any new issues or
concerns surfaced since the repeal went into effect?
Secretary Panetta. No. DOD continues to closely monitor
implementation across the Services and combatant commands. Through our
monthly progress reports, we have found that the most common concern
from the field is about benefits-specifically, whether or not benefits
will be extended to same-sex partners.
With regard to benefits, DOD is engaged in a comprehensive review
of the possibility of extending eligibility for additional benefits,
when legally permitted, to same-sex partners of military members.
READINESS CHALLENGES
51. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, some defense experts believe
that, with the withdrawal from Iraq last year and considering our plans
to leave Afghanistan by 2014, the U.S. military will enter a ``post-
counterinsurgency'' era. This view was reinforced by the
administration's January 26 announcement of a strategic shift to the
Asia-Pacific and Middle East region. Can you describe what readiness
challenges U.S. forces will face as we transition to a new era where
engagement and ensuring freedom of access will likely be the strategic
norm?
Secretary Panetta. Our future environment will present an
increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to include:
Transition in Afghanistan
Violent extremism (destabilizing threats)
Building partner security capacity
Addressing challenges to U.S. power projection and
operational access
For the last decade, the United States has been involved in
extensive global operations to secure important national interests. The
focus of these operations has overwhelmingly been counterinsurgency and
stability operations, and we have focused on preparing ground combat
forces for those operations, which means there has been less focus on
training for conventional warfare.
As these operations draw down and returning ground forces reset,
our strategic approach will transition toward an increased emphasis on
meeting future challenges. As it does, our forces will remain ready and
able to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability
operations. We are rebalancing training and equipment and maintaining a
broad portfolio of capabilities that will ensure versatility to deal
with this environment, to include increasing capacity in language,
regional expertise, and associated culture. During this transition, our
people and equipment, having endured maximum stress for extended
periods, must be reset and sustained. To deter and defeat aggression,
we must provide ready forces for current operations as well as prepare
for unforeseen crisis and contingency response.
FOREIGN LANGUAGE SKILLS
52. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, in July 2009, DOD testified
before the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia on its foreign
language capabilities. Concerning foreign languages, DOD testified that
it ``is a priority for the Department of Defense.'' Please discuss how
the DOD's fiscal year 2013 budget request ensures that the men and
women in uniform and civilian workforce have the language skills
necessary to meet DOD's mission.
Secretary Panetta. DOD will continue to focus on expanding,
improving, and strengthening language efforts that began in 2005 as a
result of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. The current
budget request ensures that the Defense Language Institute Foreign
Language Center provides the men and women in uniform and the civilian
workforce the language skills necessary to meet DOD's mission for the
21st century. Our budget request will continue to support our Language
Training Detachments located across the United States for GPF and
Special Operations Forces training. We plan to continue funding
initiatives such as the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands Program, which
create a cadre of professionals with language and regional knowledge
equipped to work in regions of U.S. engagement. My staff is working to
improve and diversify the career paths of our language professionals
and to improve retention and overall linguistic capabilities. At the
same time, we are working to improve the process of identifying
language requirements to better meet the needs of the Services and
combatant commands. On the national level, we will continue to support
the ROTC Project GO Programs and the National Security Education
Program's Boren and Language Flagship programs, which collectively
improve the school and university pipeline for language-enabled
civilian and military personnel.
53. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, the National Language Service
Corps is a pilot program that provides surge language capacity to DOD
and the Federal Government during times of emergency and national need.
Please explain how the National Language Service Corps contributes to
the DOD's mission and provide specific examples.
Secretary Panetta. The National Language Service Corps contributes
to DOD's mission by bringing together 3,300 members who collectively
speak more than 240 foreign languages in addition to professional level
English proficiency. These patriotic individuals can be activated to
meet short-term emergency and surge requirements. The National Language
Service Corps complements the DOD's organic and contracted capabilities
by providing a full range of language services to include
interpretation, translation, participation as subject matter experts in
standard setting for language assessment tools, and delivery of
culturally-attuned language training. The members have supported DOD
operational missions off the Coast of Senegal, critical exercises and
training events in Indonesia, Thailand, Jordan and Germany, and have
filled gaps in language support for the intelligence and law
enforcement communities. We support the National Language Service Corps
and consider it a key component of our strategy to mitigate uncertainty
in current and future national security language needs.
54. Senator Akaka. Secretary Panetta, what key lessons has DOD
learned from implementing the National Language Service Corps pilot
program?
Secretary Panetta. DOD learned through this proof of concept (PoC)
that there is a great deal of interest and need across the Federal
Government for short-term foreign language skills that the National
Language Service Corps (NLSC) provides. NLSC requests have more than
doubled in the last few months and feedback on performance is
excellent. We realize there is a great deal of willingness among the
large number of U.S. citizens who speak more than one language to offer
their skills in service to our Nation in times of need. Without a
doubt, the vast majority of individuals who participate in the NLSC are
professionals and offer more to the Nation than just their high level
of language capability. The program is win-win.
We also know now that proactively engaging in cross-agency
partnerships through the NLSC can lead to increased collaboration and
efficiencies. For example, the Defense Language and National Security
Education Office has leveraged DOD efforts through a relationship with
the Department of Justice and have shared best practices at a recent
interagency working group.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
55. Senator McCaskill. General Dempsey, the National Guard and
Reserves have played a major role in combat operations over the past
decade. National Guard and Reserve Forces have served faithfully in the
Iraq and Afghanistan wars and there is no doubt that our Nation would
not have been successful without the contribution of these citizen
servicemembers. National Guard and Reserve servicemembers are unique in
that they hold full-time civilian positions and jobs in communities
across America outside of their military service. This makes the
National Guard and Reserves an even more precious resource as our
Nation transitions to a new defense strategy.
I have concerns on how this transition will affect our National
Guard and Reserve servicemembers and families. The new Defense
Strategic Guidance calls for a drawdown of Active Duty servicemembers,
which will put more emphasis on the readiness of the National Guard and
Reserves. With a smaller Active Duty military, it is imperative that
National Guard and Reserve Forces are well-maintained, trained, and
adequately equipped to meet the Nation's challenges as they arise. In
our current security environment, we must ensure that the National
Guard and Reserves are postured for success on and off the battlefield.
Over the past decade, servicemembers serving in the Guard and
Reserves have become accustomed to deploying in support of our Nation.
As these deployments become less frequent due to the drawdown in
Afghanistan, how does DOD plan to retain the institutional and
operational knowledge the Guard and Reserves have gained over the past
decade?
General Dempsey. As we implement the new Defense Strategic
Guidance, we must avoid a hollow force and maintain the strongest
military in the world. Although smaller and leaner, our military will
remain flexible and ready to deploy quickly--an integral part of this
agility rests on our ability to mobilize the National Guard and
Reserves expeditiously. A properly trained and equipped Reserve
component makes for a strong, capable, and ready National Guard and
Reserves which is a prudent objective, both operationally and fiscally.
Because of the investments made and operational experiences gained over
the last decade, the Reserve component is well-postured to contribute
valued capacity and capabilities to the Joint Force in the short-term.
To sustain this over the long-term, we will continue rotational
deployments, more extensively integrate Active and Reserve Forces, and
enhance innovative readiness training.
Each Service continues to reassess the rotational deployment plan
of its unit formations, including National Guard and Reserves, to
optimize total force readiness while being responsive to the combatant
commanders' needs. This ongoing evaluation seeks to find the right
balance to ensure readiness without overburdening either component
against the anticipated demand signal. Keeping the Reserve component
ready through periodic, predictable deployments adds value to the Total
Force, distributes stress more evenly on all components, and provides
force structure options in a resource constrained environment.
The Services plan to retain appropriate levels of Reserve component
readiness through continued Active and Reserve component integration of
personnel and equipment. This Total Force integration will provide the
most efficient training opportunities to all personnel, allow for
shared use of resources, and maximize operational benefit and mission
capability.
We are reviewing Total Force training structure and strategies
looking for ways to improve efficiencies and effectiveness. As
deployment opportunities decline, our reliance on training must
necessarily substitute to a greater degree for actual operational
experience. We will continue to explore innovative ways to leverage
technology and our human component as we build and maintain the
readiness of the current and future Total Force.
56. Senator McCaskill. General Dempsey, as we wind down combat
operations in Afghanistan, the Guard and Reserves will transition to a
posture that involves fewer combat operations overseas. As we plan to
maintain the strongest force possible in the coming years, has DOD
identified any problems in future recruitment, as many young men and
women were drawn to service in a Guard and Reserve Force that was
highly likely to deploy because of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
If so, how does DOD plan to address these recruitment challenges?
General Dempsey. In the short-term (3 to 5 years), we expect to
continue to recruit and train some of our Nation's most talented men
and women in numbers sufficient to ensure combat capability. For the
past several years, all of our Military Services met, or exceeded,
their Reserve component recruiting and retention goals with the
exception of the Air National Guard. Today's reservists and guardsmen
expect to deploy and be more operationally engaged than their
counterparts of the 1990s. While the level of combat and other
deployment operations is reduced from a few years ago, opportunities
for Reserve component mobilization still exist. These opportunities
will be on a more periodic and predictable schedule, which is more
conducive to the needs of the Reserve component servicemembers, their
families, and their employers. Programs such as the Post-9/11 GI Bill,
the reduced retirement program, and stressed career field bonuses are a
few examples of how we will be able to continue to maintain a strong
and effective Reserve component.
In the long-term (5 years and beyond), we may face challenges
depending on the state of the economy and changing social norms.
Although we seek only the best to join the Profession of Arms, fewer
than one in four 17- to 24-year-olds are fully qualified for service,
and we must attract over 15 percent of those. Today, only about a third
of that percentage show a propensity to join, and that number may
decrease as our Nation's economic conditions improve. Additionally,
although the Reserve and National Guard bring in accessions directly
from the Active component, not enough Active Duty personnel may be
available. This will be due to several factors, such as reduced
military end strength and the requirement that separation bonuses be
repaid upon entry into the Reserve component. As it has in the past,
DOD will need to count on congressional support to ensure our military
remains the best the world has known.
F-35 PROGRAM
57. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta, for the third year in a
row, DOD has been forced to delay plans for full production of the F-
35. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has stated that the delay is
not a budget issue, but rather a fundamental problem with the F-35
program. Frank Kendall, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, has stated: ``putting the F-35
into production years before the first test flight was acquisition
malpractice.''
While much attention has been given to the problems plaguing the
Marine Corps F-35B variant, the F-35A and F-35C both suffer from
significant design issues. For example, the F-35C has encountered a
problem with its tailhook, a real and significant problem for an
aircraft designed to land on an aircraft carrier deck. Last year, the
Navy requested additional Super Hornets in order to mitigate delays in
the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) procurement schedule. Fiscal year 2013
marks the third delay in 3 years for the JSF program, but, under
current plans, the F/A-18 production line will end in fiscal year 2014,
well before the F-35C is projected to be combat ready. Ending a viable
aircraft production line before the JSF program will be able to meet
full combat capability inevitably assumes a level of risk to the Navy
and to the U.S. military.
Does the DOD find that risk acceptable to our warfighters and our
national security capabilities?
Secretary Panetta. DOD remains committed to the F-35 program. The
Department of the Navy does not currently plan to keep the F/A-18
production line open beyond the final procurement of EA-18G aircraft in
fiscal year 2013 and F/A-18E/F in fiscal year 2014; however, if further
delays or significant development or design issues are discovered
beyond the current F-35 program, as presented in the fiscal year 2013
President's budget request, then DOD may consider all options,
including procuring additional F/A-18 Super Hornets. Currently, the F/
A-18 production line shutdown begins with the key long-lead suppliers
this summer. Regarding EA-18G unique parts, the final orders to support
the final fiscal year 2013 procurement are also being placed this
summer. From a force structure perspective, the Navy projects a
manageable strike fighter shortfall of less than 65 aircraft in the
2020s. DOD finds this risk acceptable to the Navy, and we are confident
that we will have sufficient naval strike fighter capability to meet
our national security requirements.
58. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta, does DOD have plans to
mitigate that risk?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, DOD is mitigating that risk through a
number of means. The Navy is conducting a Service Life Assessment
Program of the F/A-18E/F to define the necessary inspection and
modifications required to extend the currently defined life limits of
the aircraft.
We have mitigated risk to the F-35 program by ensuring that the
completion of the development program is adequately resourced and
supported by realistic planning factors. The production ramp has been
reduced to mitigate cost risk due to concurrency. This allows us to buy
fewer aircraft in the near term that will require modifications while
the design matures through continued testing and discovery.
We believe that this risk is acceptable as we strive to shape a
joint force for the future that is smaller and leaner but will be
agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced.
59. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Panetta, given the uncertainty
that continues to plague the F-35 program, is DOD or the Navy
considering options for keeping the F/A-18 line running beyond fiscal
year 2014?
Secretary Panetta. DOD plans to procure the final F/A-18E/F in
fiscal year 2014. When those aircraft deliver in fiscal year 2016, DOD
will have completed the program of record of 565 F/A-18E/F aircraft.
However, if further delays or significant development or design issues
are discovered beyond the current F-35 program as presented in the
fiscal year 2013 President's budget request, DOD may consider all
options, including procuring additional F/A-18 Super Hornets.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE ISSUES
60. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the Air
Force is proposing to relocate the F-16 Fighter Squadron at Eielson Air
Force Base (AFB) to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in fiscal year 2013
to achieve savings in base support costs. The F-16 squadron is the only
Active Duty mission at Eielson. The Air Force intends to put Eielson in
warm status by 2015. This proposal is the same one put forth by the Air
Force in BRAC 2005 and it was rejected by the BRAC Commission due to
overestimated cost savings and underestimation of the military value of
Eielson AFB. Last week, the Alaska delegation wrote you a letter
expressing concern about the proposal, mainly the fact this proposal is
outside of the formal BRAC Commission process and may be in violation
of statute as a significant number of military and civilian personnel
will be impacted. What is your understanding of this proposal?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. The Air Force must achieve
spending reductions in the current budget cycle regardless of whether
additional BRAC rounds may ultimately be authorized. The Air Force is
therefore making adjustments to its force structure, and the transfer
of the Aggressor squadron from Eielson AFB to Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson is among them. The transfer in fiscal year 2013 garners
manpower and efficiency savings by consolidating operations/maintenance
supervision overhead and base support functions. The Air Force
estimates resultant cost savings to be $3.5 million for fiscal year
2013 and $169.5 million across the FYDP. These estimates are based on
eliminating approximately 640 manpower authorizations that
Headquarters-Pacific Air Forces determined were no longer needed at
Eielson once the Aggressor squadron relocates. Sufficient capability,
however, will remain in place at Eielson to support the remaining Air
Refueling Wing and joint partners at Fort Wainwright. Additionally, the
base will continue to provide critical training through the Joint
Pacific Alaska Range Complex.
DOD has the authority to close and realign military installations
outside of a traditional BRAC round, provided that action does not
trigger the thresholds established in 10 U.S.C. 2687. Section 2687
specifies that DOD cannot take any action to effect or implement the
closure of any military installation at which at least 300 civilian
personnel are authorized to be employed, or the realignment of any such
installation involving a reduction of more than 1,000 or by more than
50 percent of the number of civilian personnel, whichever is less,
unless and until certain requirements set out in the statute are met.
The actions at Eielson do not trigger the thresholds specified in
section 2687. Specifically, Eielson AFB is not being closed, and the
realignment will not relocate either 1,000 or 50 percent of the
permanent DOD civilian positions at Eielson to Elmendorf AFB. Were the
triggering thresholds of the statute to be exceeded, the Air Force
would have to report on the proposal, provide certain specified
analyses, and wait a prescribed period of time before implementing the
action.
Finally, if Congress does authorize the requested BRAC rounds, the
Air Force's currently proposed force structure changes do not
presuppose what will happen to a particular installation during the
BRAC analysis. DOD will consider all installations equally with
military value as the primary consideration.
61. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, both of
you have repeatedly stated the formal BRAC Commission process is the
most objective, thorough, and non-partisan route to pursue with respect
to real property management. In fact, during the 2005 BRAC round, below
BRAC threshold actions were included in the formal process in
recognition of the fact a comprehensive approach allowed DOD to make
better use of real property and make better decisions. Would you agree
with this statement? If so, do you support the Air Force's proposal?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. The statutory BRAC process
is a fair, objective, and proven process for closing and realigning
bases in the United States. I agree that ``below BRAC threshold actions
were included in the formal process in recognition of the fact a
comprehensive approach allowed DOD to make better use of real property
and make better decisions.'' But strategic and fiscal imperatives leave
DOD no alternative but to seek efficiencies at military bases here in
the United States. While the President has asked Congress for BRAC
authority, it is not clear how Congress will act on that request, and
we cannot afford to delay in achieving efficiencies. DOD must use every
tool at its disposal to address strategic and fiscal imperatives--
including acting within its existing authorities pending congressional
action on BRAC authorization. The Secretary of Defense has the
authority to close and realign military installations outside of a
traditional BRAC round, provided that action does not trigger the
thresholds established in section 2687 of title 10, U.S.C. Section 2687
specifies that DOD cannot take any action to effect or implement the
closure of any military installation at which at least 300 civilian
personnel are authorized to be employed, or the realignment of any such
installation involving a reduction of more than 1,000 or by more than
50 percent of the number of civilian personnel, whichever is less,
unless and until satisfying certain study and congressional reporting
requirements and waiting the specified period of time.
The Air Force must achieve spending reductions in the current
budget cycle regardless of whether additional BRAC rounds may
ultimately be authorized. The Air Force is therefore making adjustments
to its force structure. It is important to note, however, that if
Congress does authorize the requested BRAC rounds, the Air Force's
currently proposed force structure changes do not pre-suppose what will
happen to a particular installation during the BRAC analysis. DOD will
consider all installations equally, with military value as the primary
consideration.
62. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how is
the proposal in line with your goal of using the formal BRAC Commission
process?
Secretary Panetta. DOD's force structure changes drove both this
proposal and the request for BRAC authorization. They are consistent.
However, this proposal does not presuppose what will happen to a
particular installation during the BRAC analysis. DOD will consider all
installations equally with military value as the primary consideration.
General Dempsey. DOD's force structure changes are one of the
reasons why the President is requesting BRAC authorization. Simply
stated, the cuts in force structure that we are implementing must be
accompanied by cuts in supporting infrastructure, including military
bases. Absent a process for closing and realigning bases, DOD will be
locked in a status quo configuration that does not match its evolving
force structure, doctrine, and technology. Moreover, given the expense
of our installation infrastructure, if we retain bases that are excess
to strategic and mission requirements, we will be forced to cut
spending on forces, training, and modernization. That said, recently
announced force structure changes do not pre-suppose what will happen
to a particular installation during the BRAC analysis. DOD will
consider all installations equally with military value as the primary
consideration.
63. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, was the
Air Force's proposal to realign the F-16 squadron at Eielson reviewed
by DOD Legal Counsel to ensure it is in compliance with BRAC law in
title 10, U.S.C., section 2687, which mandates a notice and hold period
when closing or realigning installations?
Secretary Panetta. The Air Force's proposal was reviewed by the Air
Force Office of the General Counsel, in consultation with the DOD
Office of the General Counsel.
General Dempsey. The Air Force's proposal was reviewed by the Air
Force Office of the General Counsel in consultation with the DOD Office
of the General Counsel.
DOD has the authority to close and realign military installations
outside of a traditional BRAC round provided that action does not
trigger the thresholds established in title 10 U.S.C., section 2687.
Section 2687 specifies that DOD cannot take any action to effect or
implement the closure of any military installation at which at least
300 civilian personnel are authorized to be employed, or the
realignment of any such installation involving a reduction of more than
1,000, or by more than 50 percent of the number of civilian personnel,
whichever is less, unless and until certain requirements set out in the
statute are met.
The actions at Eielson AFB do not trigger the thresholds specified
in section 2687. Specifically, Eielson AFB is not being closed, and the
realignment will not relocate either 1,000 or 50 percent of the
permanent DOD civilian positions at Eielson to Elmendorf AFB. Were the
triggering thresholds of the statute to be exceeded, the Air Force
would have to report on the proposal, provide certain specified
analyses, and wait a prescribed period of time before implementing the
action.
64. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, last
week, Admiral Locklear, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) commander
nominee, recognized Alaska's strategic location, calling the State and
its installations critical and significant to his mission. Yet, the Air
Force is proposing to place one of the most strategically located bases
in warm status. How is placing Eielson in warm status conducive to
DOD's strategic goals?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. The right-sizing of Eielson
AFB is tied to DOD's strategic goal of reducing the ``cost of doing
business.'' This entails reducing the rate of growth of manpower costs,
finding further efficiencies in overhead and headquarters, and business
practices. Eielson AFB hosts the only single squadron wing in the
Active Duty Air Force. The Air Force proposes moving the 18th Aggressor
Squadron and associated maintenance support to Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson in fiscal year 2013. The movement of the Aggressor squadron
will garner efficiencies by reducing maintenance supervision overhead
and support base functions. Units, such as flightline and backshop
maintenance, will relocate to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson with the
18th Aggressor Squadron. There is sufficient capacity at Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson (hangars, flightline parking, and administrative
space) to beddown the 18th Aggressor Squadron. Further manpower
reductions will be assessed in fiscal year 2014 for fiscal year 2015
and tied to installation restructuring and right-sizing, with remaining
manpower/infrastructure supporting surge/war readiness materiel
requirements, Alaska Air National Guard's 168th Air Refueling Wing, the
Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex, and exercises (e.g., Red Flag and
Northern Edge).
The proposal to retain the 168 Air Refueling Wing at Eielson AFB
and maintain the base and runway operating capability while moving the
training-coded F-16s to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson is directly
tied to the strategic importance of this base and this location. The
robust training capability for Red Flag Alaska exercises will remain at
Eielson, a testament to the quality and capacity for unparalleled,
world-class training and readiness emphasis, which is of particular
importance to the Pacific theater. While the training-coded Aggressor
F-16s are slated to relocate to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, they
will still participate in and support these large force, joint and
combined exercises, the same way the combat-coded units at Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson have done for years. The current training and
readiness focus of effort will remain under the current proposal while
affording the Air Force the opportunity to expand operations, if
necessary, in the future specifically to meet the strategic goals in
the Pacific.
65. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta, please provide more details
regarding DOD's intent to seek authority for BRAC. You have indicated
if Congress authorizes BRAC, DOD wants to move quickly on the process
and implementation. The last BRAC took 5 years to complete; in fact,
DOD sought waivers to extend the deadline for more than five BRAC
actions. DOD will be responsible for environmental remediation at sites
and community redevelopment which takes years and cannot be
circumvented. How does DOD envision completing and implementing BRAC
immediately?
Secretary Panetta. Asking for a 2013 round is aggressive; but given
the magnitude of the cuts we are making in force structure, we cannot
afford to wait. Moving forward quickly will enable DOD to reap savings
quickly and adjust to force structure changes in an effective manner.
With this aggressive timeline in mind, we have started the initial
preparatory work regarding internal governance for a BRAC process--
inventorying our property and evaluating the extent to which we need to
update our analytical tools. These efforts will enable us to proceed
expeditiously once Congress authorizes BRAC. We will be ready to use
the authority effectively and therefore urge Congress to authorize
BRAC.
Additionally, in light of the accelerated timeline, our legislative
proposal provides us additional time to submit the required Force
Structure Plan and Installation Inventory not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of the legislation for the fiscal year 2013
round.
66. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta, BRAC 2005 cost DOD $35
billion to implement. GAO estimated savings from the BRAC 2005 round
will not be realized for at least a decade. DOD has to find savings
now. How did DOD conclude BRAC is a financially sound decision in the
near-term?
Secretary Panetta. Of all the efficiency measures that DOD has
undertaken over the years, BRAC is perhaps the most successful and
significant. The first four rounds of BRAC generated $8 billion in
annual recurring savings, which now total $100 billion. The comparable
figure for BRAC 2005 is $4 billion. The annual recurring savings for
all five rounds ($12 billion) represents the additional costs that DOD
would incur every year for base operating support, personnel, and
leasing costs without BRAC. Enough money to buy 300 Apache attack
helicopters, 124 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, or four Virginia-class
submarines.
Because BRAC is a key priority, DOD will apply the resources
necessary to support both a robust and thorough BRAC analysis and an
efficient and effective implementation process. BRAC begins generating
savings almost immediately, and those savings will partially offset its
initial costs. BRAC will generate recurring savings far in excess of
the upfront investment.
The 2005 round took place during a period of growth in the
military, and it reflected the needs and goals of that time--aligning
our infrastructure with our military strategy so as to maximize
warfighting capacity and efficiency. These efforts contributed
significantly to DOD's effectiveness; but they necessarily required
substantial investments. Because the focus of the BRAC 2005 round was
not on saving money and space, it is a poor gauge of the savings that
DOD can achieve through another BRAC round. The prior BRAC rounds--
which reduced capacity and paid off in 2 to 3 years--represent a better
gauge of such costs and savings. In those rounds, one-time costs
ranging from $2.7 billion to $6.6 billion resulted in annual recurring
savings of $1 billion to $2.7 billion.
67. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta, what is DOD's estimated cost
of another BRAC?
Secretary Panetta. The costs of a potential BRAC round will not be
known until after DOD has developed its recommendations, they have been
reviewed by the independent BRAC Commission and forwarded by the
President to Congress, and, finally, Congress has failed to enact a
joint resolution disapproving the recommendations. It is only at the
end of this process that DOD can develop budget quality estimates of
the costs.
68. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta, the budget is decreasing;
how will DOD pay for BRAC?
Secretary Panetta. Because BRAC is a key priority, DOD will apply
the resources necessary to support both a robust and thorough BRAC
analysis and an efficient and effective implementation process. As a
legal obligation of DOD, the normal internal budget deliberation
process will determine the source of the BRAC implementation costs.
69. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the Air
Force has been the only Service to vocalize strong support for BRAC.
The Army has not made necessary decisions regarding end strength
decrease force structure impacts. The last BRAC Commission determined
another BRAC round would not be required until 2015 at the earliest.
The request for BRAC appears to be preemptive and driven by budget
constraints, not by national security needs. Was an assessment
conducted which determined another BRAC round was required at this
time?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. We have not conducted an
assessment for a future round; however, parametric techniques used to
analyze various capacity measures in 2004 indicated that DOD had 24
percent excess capacity overall relative to the fiscal year 2009 force
structure-based requirements. Because BRAC 2005 eliminated only about 3
percent of DOD's capacity, we believe we have significant excess
capacity, and force structure reductions will only exacerbate this
condition. In accordance with its request for authority to conduct two
new rounds of BRAC, DOD will undertake a similar analysis used in BRAC
2005 to give a sense of its current excess capacity.
70. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, once
infrastructure is lost in the United States, the capacity may never be
gained back. What risk is assumed by more base closures?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. As it has done in prior BRAC
rounds, DOD will develop closure and realignment recommendations that
provide it with the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances,
particularly surge requirements that can arise from contingencies,
mobilizations, or extended changes in force levels. Specifically, DOD
uses a 20-year force structure plan and has specific selection criteria
\1\ that capture the concept of surge capacity. Criterion one requires
DOD to consider ``current and future'' mission capabilities, and
criterion three assesses the ``ability to accommodate contingency,
mobilization, surge and future total force requirements.'' Furthermore,
through execution of prior BRAC rounds, and as verified in a 1999
study, DOD has demonstrated that it will retain within the U.S.
installation infrastructure sufficient difficult-to-reconstitute assets
to respond to surge, accommodate a significant reconstitution of the
force, and support all forces, including those currently based outside
the United States.
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\1\ Congress specified the following criteria for use in the 2005
BRAC round, and DOD has proposed to use the same criteria for the
requested rounds in 2013 and 2015.
Military Value Criteria:
1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on
operational readiness of the total force of DOD, including the impact
on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and
associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by
ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and
terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in
Homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving
locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge,
and future total force requirements at both existing and potential
receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.
Other Criteria:
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings,
including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of
the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of
military installations.
7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and
potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and
personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs
related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and
environmental compliance activities.
71. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey,
according to DOD's Base Structure Report for 2011, DOD has 611 military
sites overseas. Why is DOD not pursuing a more aggressive effort to
identify sites overseas for closure and realignment?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. DOD continuously assesses
U.S. defense posture overseas. The President and Secretary of Defense
led DOD's civilian and military leadership through extensive
deliberations to develop the most recent Defense Strategic Guidance,
which was issued on January 5, 2012. This strategy requires DOD to
sustain a global presence, with a rebalancing of our forces toward the
Asia-Pacific region and a sustainment of our presence in the Middle
East. In Europe, we are sustaining a presence that will meet defense
commitments, deter aggression, and place greater reliance on rotational
presence and partnership.
Over the last several years, we have made significant reductions in
our overseas infrastructure and personnel. Since 2003, DOD has returned
more than 100 sites in Europe to our host nations and reduced our
personnel by one third. Between fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2015,
the Army alone will execute 23 additional site closures that were
previously approved and announced for return to the host nation. But
more can and should be done in light of upcoming force structure
changes.
Our European footprint today consists of more than 300 discrete
sites, ranging from small communications sites to robust Main Operating
Bases. Given the shift in strategic focus to the Pacific, coupled with
force reductions in Europe and decreases in required support to
CENTCOM, the legacy footprint in Europe is a prime focus. To that end,
we are embarking on a European capacity analysis that will seek to
reduce long-term expenses through footprint consolidations, while
ensuring our infrastructure properly supports operational requirements
and strategic commitments.
Our examination will review opportunities across the theater for
more extensive joint and coalition utilization of facilities. We will
gauge the extent to which our installations can shed excess capacity or
absorb new functions from other installations of lesser military value
which, in turn, could be reduced or closed. In doing this, we will be
careful to assess the cost and savings of each action and prioritize
for implementation those initiatives with the highest payback. We
expect to identify some preliminary options later this year.
72. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta, did DOD or OMB assess the
impact of a BRAC in the next few years on the economy and unemployment
rates?
Secretary Panetta. No. DOD did not assess the impact of a BRAC in
the next few years on the economy and unemployment rates. If Congress
authorizes BRAC, DOD will develop recommendations for closures and
realignments based on 20-year force structure plan and statutory
selection criteria \2\ that place priority on military value. Economic
impact is also one of the criteria. Specifically, criteria 6 is ``The
economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military
installations.''
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\2\ Congress specified the following criteria for use in the 2005
BRAC round, and DOD has proposed to use the same criteria for the
requested rounds in 2013 and 2015.
Military Value Criteria:
1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on
operational readiness of the total force of DOD, including the impact
on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and
associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by
ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and
terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in
homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving
locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge
and future total force requirements at both existing and potential
receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.
Other Criteria:
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings,
including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of
the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of
military installations.
7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and
potential receiving communities to support forces, missions and
personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs
related to potential environmental restoration, waste management and
environmental compliance activities.
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
73. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, with our
defense posture shifting to the Asia-Pacific, shouldn't we ensure the
military's global footprint is aligned with our strategy?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, DOD is ensuring that U.S. global defense
posture is aligned with our strategy. We will have a Joint Force with
global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle
East, while still ensuring the ability to maintain defense commitments
to Europe and elsewhere. Wherever possible, we will develop innovative,
low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve U.S. security
objectives.
In the Asia-Pacific region, DOD is pursuing a defense posture that
is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically
sustainable. U.S. defense posture and presence in East Asia, Oceania,
and Southeast Asia demonstrates the fact that the United States is a
resident power in the region. The budget request for fiscal year 2013
funds enhancements to our presence in Southeast Asia, such as the
rotational deployment of U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force units in
Australia, and of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. The Navy will
also rebalance the fleet to establish a greater presence in the Pacific
and all the Services will continue to maintain significant force
structure in the region as we work to increase interaction with
partners and allies.
We are sustaining and, in some cases, enhancing elements of our
defense posture in the Middle East. We will maintain an operationally
responsive posture in this critical region to deter threats, as well as
assure allies and partners in the face of growing security challenges.
We are also evolving our posture in Europe. Although we plan to
withdraw two Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) over the next 2 years, we will
maintain a steady state presence of two BCTs in Europe and allocate a
U.S.-based BCT to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Response Force, including periodic rotation of a battalion task force
and brigade headquarters staff support to Europe for training and
exercises to improve interoperability and coalition operations.
Reflecting the resource-constrained environment, we will also work with
NATO allies to develop a ``smart defense'' approach to pool, share, and
specialize capabilities that address future challenges in Europe and
beyond.
General Dempsey. Absolutely. Global posture actions are
continuously adjusted against requirements to support combatant
commanders, and are designed to position U.S. forces to better conduct
OCO, ease the burden of a high operational tempo on members of the
Armed Forces and their families, and improve the ability of the United
States to meet its commitments, while making these commitments more
affordable and sustainable.
74. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, why not
utilize U.S. locations, like Alaska, as we shift our focus to the Asia-
Pacific region to simultaneously promote economic development and
readiness?
Secretary Panetta. We currently leverage a variety of forces and
capabilities stationed in Alaska to support PACOM assigned missions,
and will continue to do so as we rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific
region. Increasing the utilization of capabilities already stationed in
Alaska, or increasing number of the forces stationed there for
employment in PACOM-assigned missions, must be assessed against the
ability of those forces to provide timely response to crises.
As we implement our strategy, we continually assess the way our
forces are arrayed and their effectiveness in providing the appropriate
range of political, security, and economic benefits to the United
States.
General Dempsey. As we continue to adapt our existing military
force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, we are examining a number of
potential options to ensure that we enhance the Joint Force's ability
to surge and regenerate forces and capabilities to confront and defeat
aggression anywhere in the world.
GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE SYSTEM
75. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, funding
for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) was protected. How does
the fiscal year 2013 request compare to last year's request of $1.2
billion? Please describe the importance of this system in defending the
Homeland and the threat environment.
Secretary Panetta. The fiscal year 2012 appropriated amount, $1.159
billion, included a general congressional reduction of $1.5 million.
Program execution includes Control Test Vehicle-1 (CTV-01) and Flight
Test Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) (FTG)-06b, completion of the Fort
Greeley, AK, power plant, completion of Missile Field 2, delivery of a
second fire direction center node at Fort Greeley, and initiate
manufacturing for GBIs 48 to 52. During fiscal year 2012, GMD will
build up two GBIs to support the return to intercept (RTI) flight tests
in fiscal year 2013. To increase GMD system reliability for Homeland
defense, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will activate the hardened
power plant at Fort Greeley this year and increase firepower of the
fielded GBIs by continuing to test and upgrade the reliability of GBI
components. Of note, on December 2011, GMD awarded the development and
sustainment contract to Boeing, which gained efficiencies and savings
across the Future Years Development Program.
During fiscal year 2013, GMD plans to complete the RTI testing with
CTV-01 and FTG-06b and to restart interceptor manufacturing,
incorporating the corrective actions into the GBIs yet to be delivered.
GMD will continue manufacturing GBIs 48 to 52 and start manufacturing
GBIs 53 to 57. As part of improving Homeland defense, GMD will continue
construction on an east coast in-flight interceptor communications
system data terminal at Fort Drum, NY, planning for FTG-08 in fiscal
year 2014, including the build-up of the second 2-Stage GBI, planning
for the FTG-11 first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and
salvo test in fiscal year 2015, and continuing software development for
both the GBI and ground systems products. The fiscal year 2013 GMD
budget request is $903.2 million. Reductions in fiscal year 2013
include transferring $5.8 million for Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA) to the Command and Control, Battle Management and
Communications Program and transfer $20.7 million to the MDA Program
Wide Support account for facilities and environmental support at
multiple MDA locations. Completing Missile Field 2 and deploying the
Fort Greeley power plant in fiscal year 2012 resulted in lower funding
requirements.
The fiscal year 2013 budget request continues to support the GMD
system as the primary element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS) that provides combatant commanders to defend the U.S. Homeland
against limited attack by intermediate- and long-range ballistic
missiles. The primary components of the GMD system are the GBIs and the
ground systems. The GBI is a solid-fuel boost vehicle integrated with a
single non-explosive exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). There are
currently 30 GBIs emplaced in two missile complexes, at Fort Greeley,
AK, and Vandenberg AFB, CA. The system can negate attacks from the
current and projected threat from Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia.
General Dempsey. DOD requested $903.2 million in fiscal year 2013
for GMD RDT&E funding to buy an additional 5 GBIs for delivery in
fiscal year 2018 and upgrade our current operational fleet of 30 GBIs.
This will complete the total purchase of 57 GBIs.
Today, GMD's operational GBIs protect the United States against a
limited ICBM raid launched from current regional threats. The ballistic
missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and
is likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Current global
trends indicate the ballistic missile systems are becoming more
flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also
increasing in range. Regional actors such as North Korea and Iran
continue to develop long range missiles that will threaten the United
States, but it is not clear exactly when and how this type of ICBM
threat to the U.S. Homeland will mature.
76. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the Sea-
Based X-Band (SBX) radar is critical to GMD system performance and
warfighter confidence in the system. Yet, DOD is proposing to make it a
test asset only. What risk is assumed to GMD system performance by
making the SBX radar a test asset only?
Secretary Panetta. SBX's primary mission is discrimination and it
is not necessary for tracking. Therefore, SBX is not required to be
part of 24/7 operational kill chain today because there is no evidence
of sophisticated countermeasures that require discrimination. With
indications and warnings, SBX could return to full time status.
In the Limited Test Support Status, the SBX radar will retain its
unique contingency operations capabilities and will continue to support
testing. Maintaining SBX in Limited Support Status does not add risk to
GMD performance.
Its technical performance capability will continue, including
connectivity to the GMD Fire Control System. SBX will maintain its
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and Coast Guard certifications, and
will be staffed to maintain the vessel, X-band radar (XBR) and other
critical systems for support to both testing and contingency
activation.
SBX will continue to participate in BMDS ground and flight testing,
while being available to support contingency operations as directed by
OSD and the Joint Staff. The MDA is working with Joint Staff and the
U.S. Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) Joint Functional Component Command
for Integrated Missile Defense to determine the appropriate response
time for contingencies. During contingency operations an unfunded
requirement reimbursement will be requested.
Under the direction of OSD and the Joint Staff, SBX deployed from
Pearl Harbor in less than 72 hours to provide contingency support
during the North Korean space launch. This was the first operation of
the SBX under U.S. Pacific Fleet tactical control and with Navy
ownership and operation of the SBX vessel.
General Dempsey. DOD intends to place SBX radar in a limited test
operations status due to affordability reasons, but we will be prepared
to activate the SBX if indications and warnings of an advanced threat
from Northeast Asia become evident. MDA is working with the Joint Staff
and STRATCOM's Joint Functional Component for Integrated Missile
Defense to determine the appropriate timeline for activation
contingencies.
DOD will begin upgrading the Clear Early Warning Radar in Alaska
for full missile defense capability by 2016. We are requesting $347.0
million in fiscal year 2013 for BMDS sensors development for Homeland
defense, including support of the Cobra Dane Radar and the Upgraded
Early Warning Radars (UEWR) at Beale AFB (California), Fylingdales
(United Kingdom), and Thule (Greenland). We are requesting $192.1
million to operate and sustain these radars and $227.7 million to
procure additional radars and radar spares in fiscal year 2013.
Based on DOD's robust support of current fielded and future
sensors, the ability to reactivate SBX, if the threat warrants,
minimizes the risks to the overall GMD performance.
MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
77. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2012 limited availability of Medium Extended Air
Defense System (MEADS) funds to 25 percent until DOD submitted a plan
to use the funds as final obligations for a restructured program or
termination costs. So why is DOD seeking another $400.9 million in
fiscal year 2013 for this program, a program the United States does not
intend to buy?
Secretary Panetta. The administration has requested funding in the
fiscal year 2013 budget to complete the MEADS Design and Development
(D&D) PoC effort with Germany and Italy. DOD is seeking $400.9 million
in fiscal year 2013 funds to honor the final year of our MEADS D&D
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) commitment that will enable
completion of the MEADS development phase as it is currently planned.
The PoC effort enables all three nations to obtain benefit from our
collective program investment to date and will bring the development
program to an orderly conclusion. Failure to fund our fiscal year 2013
commitment will be viewed by our allies as reneging on our promises.
During the Chicago NATO Summit on May 20, 2012, NATO allies
achieved a major breakthrough on missile defense--10 years in the
making--by declaring an interim ballistic missile defense (BMD)
capability as an initial step toward establishing a NATO missile
defense system. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) will be a
major contributor to NATO missile defense and is designed to protect
the U.S. Homeland, U.S. deployed forces, and our allies against the
increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
Where BMD was once a controversial subject within the alliance, we have
reached consensus to operationalize this capability and have the allies
share the burden of deterring and defending against those who could
threaten us with ballistic missiles. This is a major achievement of
U.S. policy; a decision by Congress to prohibit any additional funding
for MEADS at this late date would diminish the consensus reached in
Chicago.
The United States relies on allies to share the burden of
peacekeeping and defense in coalition activities and the development of
effective defense capabilities that are of direct benefit to the United
States. In this context, I believe it is important to live up to our
commitments to our allies. We made a commitment to two of our closest
allies--Germany and Italy--to develop MEADS cooperatively to achieve
those objectives. Failure to meet our MEADS MOU fiscal year 2013
funding obligations could negatively affect the willingness of our
allies to join future cooperative endeavors, bilaterally or through
NATO, that have been strongly supported by the administration and
Congress at a time when cooperation through concepts, such as Smart
Defense, is critical to ensuring NATO and its members are developing
needed capabilities for the future. In addition, failure of the United
States to provide funding for fiscal year 2013 would likely lead to a
dispute with Germany and Italy, both of which have indicated that they
would assert that the United States has unilaterally withdrawn from the
MOU. On the other hand, full funding of the final year of the MEADS PoC
would ensure that the United States receives a return on its 8-year
investment in the form of a data archival package for future potential
use on other U.S. air and missile defense improvements. We must act now
to avoid a situation that would cause harm to our relationships with
two of our closest allies.
General Dempsey. In accordance with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012,
DOD has repeatedly consulted and attempted to negotiate with our
international partners, Germany and Italy, regarding development of a
plan to further restructure the program in the event that Congress does
not authorize or appropriate fiscal year 2013 funding to complete our
MEADS D&D MOU obligations.
DOD believes that completing the MEADS PoC and securing the benefit
of the development program is the correct course of action under the
current constraints. The MEADS elements (advanced 360 degree radars, a
lightweight launcher with the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE)
missile, and a battle management system), if fully realized and
validated by PoC, would add to the capabilities available to advance
U.S. air and cruise/terminal BMD architectures.
While DOD understands the need to make difficult choices in the
current fiscal environment concerning funding for all of our
activities, we also note that failure to meet our MEADS MOU funding
obligations for fiscal year 2013 could negatively affect our allies'
implementation of current transatlantic projects and multinational
cooperation--as well as their willingness to join future cooperative
endeavors with the United States--that are strongly supported by the
administration and Congress.
78. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what
efforts did both of you personally engage in to terminate or
restructure the program to ensure last year's appropriation was the
final obligation in accordance with the law?
Secretary Panetta. In accordance with the requirements of section
235 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, DOD has consulted with the German
and Italian participants regarding development of a plan to restructure
the program further in the event that Congress does not authorize or
appropriate fiscal year 2013 funding for these purposes. We have
informed the German and Italian participants that there is significant
risk that fiscal year 2013 funding may not be made available by
Congress. In response to our attempts to engage in discussions, the
German and Italian participants have consistently stated that they
remain fully committed to their MOU obligations and expect that all
three participants will provide funding in 2013 to complete the PoC
effort. Although we have engaged with the German and Italian
participants to seek to complete MEADS MOU efforts using only fiscal
year 2012 funding, we cannot force them to agree to this course of
action.
During his recent visit to the United States, I personally
discussed this matter with the German Minister of Defense (MoD). I will
continue to engage my German and Italian counterparts on this issue.
General Dempsey. In accordance with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012,
DOD has repeatedly consulted and attempted to negotiate with our
international partners, Germany and Italy, regarding development of a
plan to further restructure the program in the event that Congress does
not authorize or appropriate fiscal year 2013 funding to complete our
MOU obligations. Secretary Panetta met with the German MoD in February
where the German MoD reiterated his unequivocal support for completing
the MEADS PoC.
We have advised Germany and Italy that there is significant risk
that fiscal year 2013 funding may not be made available. In response,
our partners have made clear to DOD, and Germany has advised Senator
Levin directly, that they remain fully committed to their MOU
obligations and expect that all partner nations will provide their 2013
funding to complete the PoC effort. They have also made clear that we
are too late in the development effort to change course again and that
we jeopardize our ability to realize the benefits of the program if we
withdraw from our 9-year agreement near the end of the eighth year.
79. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in these
austere budget times, how can DOD justify a half a billion dollar
investment in a program the warfighters will not use, and justify a
request in violation of law?
Secretary Panetta. The administration has requested funding in the
fiscal year 2013 budget to complete the MEADS D&D PoC effort with
Germany and Italy. DOD is seeking $400.9 million in fiscal year 2013
funds to honor the final year of our MEADS D&D MOU commitment that will
enable completion of the MEADS development phase as it is currently
planned. The PoC effort enables all three nations to obtain benefit
from our collective program investment to date and will bring the
development program to an orderly conclusion. Failure to fund our
fiscal year 2013 commitment will be viewed by our allies as reneging on
our promises.
During the Chicago NATO Summit on May 20, 2012, NATO allies
achieved a major breakthrough on missile defense--10 years in the
making--by declaring an interim BMD capability as an initial step
toward establishing a NATO missile defense system. The EPAA will be a
major contributor to NATO missile defense and is designed to protect
the U.S. Homeland, U.S. deployed forces, and our allies against the
increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
Where BMD was once a controversial subject within the alliance, we have
reached consensus to operationalize this capability and have the allies
share the burden of deterring and defending against those who could
threaten us with ballistic missiles. This is a major achievement of
U.S. policy; a decision by Congress to prohibit any additional funding
for MEADS at this late date would diminish the consensus reached in
Chicago.
The United States relies on allies to share the burden of
peacekeeping and defense in coalition activities and the development of
effective defense capabilities that are of direct benefit to the United
States. In this context, I believe it is important to live up to our
commitments to our allies. We made a commitment to two of our closest
allies--Germany and Italy--to develop MEADS cooperatively to achieve
those objectives. Failure to meet our MEADS MOU fiscal year 2013
funding obligations could negatively affect the willingness of our
allies to join future cooperative endeavors, bilaterally or through
NATO, that have been strongly supported by the administration and
Congress at a time when cooperation through concepts, such as Smart
Defense, is critical to ensuring NATO and its members are developing
needed capabilities for the future.
In addition, failure of the United States to provide funding for
fiscal year 2013 would likely lead to a dispute with Germany and Italy,
both of which have indicated that they would assert that the United
States has unilaterally withdrawn from the MOU. On the other hand, full
funding of the final year of the MEADS PoC would ensure that the United
States receives a return on its 8-year investment in the form of a data
archival package for future potential use on other U.S. air and missile
defense improvements. We must act now to avoid a situation that would
cause harm to our relationships with two of our closest allies.
General Dempsey. In accordance with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012,
DOD has repeatedly consulted and attempted to negotiate with our
international partners, Germany and Italy, regarding development of a
plan to further restructure the program in the event that Congress does
not authorize or appropriate fiscal year 2013 funding to complete our
MEADS D&D MOU obligations.
DOD believes that completing the MEADS PoC and securing the benefit
of the development program is the correct course of action. The MEADS
elements (advanced 360 degree radars, a lightweight launcher with the
PAC-3 MSE missile, and a battle management system), if fully realized
and validated by PoC, would add to the capabilities available to
advance U.S. air and cruise/terminal BMD architectures.
Failure to meet our MEADS MOU funding obligations for fiscal year
2013 could negatively affect our allies' implementation of current
transatlantic projects and multinational cooperation--as well as their
willingness to join future cooperative endeavors with the United
States--that are strongly supported by the administration and Congress.
DOMESTIC SUPPORT MISSIONS
80. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, Congress
has vocalized concerns about DOD resourcing domestic support missions
repeatedly for the last several years. For fiscal year 2013, the Air
Force is proposing to retire the Joint Cargo Aircraft and the Army will
proceed with divestiture of the Sherpa. These actions leave the
National Guard in many States without needed capability and resources
to fulfill domestic support missions. How is DOD ensuring domestic
support missions are not undermined?
Secretary Panetta. Although the C-27 divestiture and subsequent
Army C-23 divestiture will reduce National Guard airlift, sufficient
airlift capacity remains (over 1,000 rotary-wing and over 400 fixed-
wing aircraft) and is spread across the 10 Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) regions that States may leverage in response to an
emergency. In situations where State resources are overwhelmed, the Air
Force will provide assistance to civil authorities in accordance with
the Stafford Act or as directed by the President. As such, the analysis
which formed the rationale for the force structure adjustment included
supporting civil authorities when requested as part of a larger FEMA-
led Federal response.
The 2013 presidential budget request reduced the C-130 fleet size
to 318 aircraft to meet the requirement that was outlined in the newly-
articulated strategy presented by the President and the Secretary of
Defense. When determining the number of airlift aircraft required to
meet the new strategy, forces are being sized to meet one large-scale
campaign internationally, as well as support two domestic missions, a
major regional disaster, and a Homeland defense event. As a follow-on
measure, the 2012 NDAA-directed airlift study, due at the end of 2012,
will further refine plans to support domestic missions without the C-23
Sherpa.
General Dempsey. Defending the Homeland and providing support of
civil authorities is a primary mission of the U.S. Armed Forces. As
such, DOD carefully considered domestic support missions in our
analysis of requirements for the fiscal year 2013 budget submission.
Although not every State will retain organic airlift capability, the
DOD Total Force remains fully capable of meeting our domestic
requirements while at the same time deterring and defeating aggression
by any potential adversary. When called upon, we will leverage existing
National Guard capabilities along with additional Active and Reserve
Forces needed to ensure the safety and security of our citizens.
81. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how did
domestic support missions factor in to decisionmaking?
Secretary Panetta. One of the primary missions of the U.S. Armed
Forces is to defend the Homeland and provide support to civil
authorities. With regard to airlift, the Air Force routinely conducts
defense support of civil authorities and assists at all levels in
preventing, protecting against, mitigating the effects of, and
responding to manmade or natural disasters when directed by the
President or approved by DOD.
DOD conducted the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016
and Case 3 (270 C-130s) of the study is consistent with the new Defense
Strategic Guidance. This analysis includes airlift to support two
domestic missions, a major regional disaster, and a Homeland defense
event to form the 270 intra-theater aircraft requirements. In support
of the Homeland defense mission, the Air Force continues to meet
mission requirements/taskings through the joint Global Force Management
process that prioritizes all combatant commanders (i.e., Northern
Command, CENTCOM, PACOM, et cetera) requirements.
General Dempsey. In last year's Comprehensive Review of the Future
Role of the Reserve Component, DOD examined Reserve component support
for Homeland defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).
This report concluded that, although Homeland defense and DSCA are
Total Force responsibilities, ``the Nation needs to focus particular
attention on better using the competencies of National Guard and
Reserve component organizations. The National Guard is particularly
well-suited for DSCA missions.'' The report added that ``except in rare
circumstances, the National Guard can be expected to support civil
authorities at the direction of State Governors.''
DOD's response to the BCA was to provide a balanced force that best
protects the Nation, both at home and abroad. Although we necessarily
reduced National Guard forces along with those of Active Duty and
Reserve, we did so in a manner which allows us to provide capabilities
adequate for our domestic support mission. Because many domestic
missions emerge in response to unforeseen crises, when called upon we
can leverage other State capabilities with the consent of those States'
Governors on an as-needed basis. Should a national emergency arise, we
will augment the National Guard using capabilities found within the
Active component as permitted by Title 10 and, as a last resort, the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet.
U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
82. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, do you
support the Law of the Sea Treaty?
Secretary Panetta. I strongly support the United States' accession
to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). DOD's
civilian and military senior leadership have been strong proponents in
favor of U.S. accession for more than a decade.
General Dempsey. I strongly support the United States' accession to
the 1982 UNCLOS.
83. Senator Begich. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how will
accession to the UNCLOS enhance our strategic interests and national
security?
Secretary Panetta. Accession to the 1982 UNCLOS would enhance the
United States' strategic interests and national security in several
ways. These include the following:
As a treaty party, the United States can best protect
the navigational freedoms enshrined in the 1982 UNCLOS that are
key to U.S. global force presence and power projection
capability. The current status of the United States requires us
to assert our rights through customary international law,
subject to change based on state practice.
The United States would have access to the benefits
afforded to treaty parties, which importantly include the
UNCLOS's institutions and meetings. The United States would no
longer be relegated to observer status and could fully
participate in the ongoing development and interpretation of
the 1982 UNCLOS. In fact, nearly every maritime power, our NATO
allies, and the other permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council are already treaty parties. Being a party would allow
the United States to exert a level of influence that is
reflective of its status as the world's foremost maritime
power.
Accession would solidify a truly massive increase in
the United States' resource and economic jurisdiction, not only
to 200 nautical miles off our coasts, but to a broad
continental margin beyond that.
Accession would ensure the United States' ability to
take advantage of the opening of the Arctic, including the
enormous natural resource potential of the Arctic.
China continues to flex its muscles in the South China
Sea at a time when the United States is rebalancing toward the
Asia-Pacific region. Lack of accession continues to put the
United States in a weaker position in critical bilateral and
multilateral discussions--whereas China seeks to use its status
as a treaty party to its advantage. Accession would strengthen
the United States' hand in regional discussions as we seek to
build upon the depth and breadth of regional partnerships and
access.
General Dempsey. Becoming a Party to the UNCLOS would enhance our
strategic interests and national security by preserving our strategic
influence as the world's foremost maritime power and strengthening our
ability to lead developments in global maritime security. The United
States would also be able to reinforce the UNCLOS's freedoms of
navigation and overflight, and the other lawful uses of the sea related
to those freedoms, that are essential to the global presence and
mobility of our Armed Forces. This includes movement of forces and
materiel through strategic international straits such as the Straits of
Gibraltar, Malacca, Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb. In addition, becoming a
party would strengthen combined operations with coalition partners that
are treaty parties and advance important national security initiatives
such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. Accession would also
allow the United States to take better advantage of emerging
opportunities in the Arctic related to navigation, resources, and other
activities, as well as enhance our credibility in a large number of
Asia-focused multilateral venues where we are seeking to diffuse
tensions and encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South
China Sea.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS
84. Senator Manchin. Secretary Panetta, how many contractors does
DOD employ?
Secretary Panetta. DOD provides this data to Congress annually in
the Inventory of Contracts for Services required by section 2330a,
title 10, U.S.C., as amended by section 807 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2008. On August 28, 2011, DOD submitted the Fiscal Year 2010 Inventory,
reporting 622,722 contractor full-time equivalents for the fiscal year.
85. Senator Manchin. Secretary Panetta, what is the average salary
of a DOD contractor?
Secretary Panetta. DOD awards contracts for a wide range of goods
and services. The salaries of DOD contractor employees similarly span a
wide range. Contractor salaries are affected by a number of factors,
including an individual's experience, training, expertise, and the
location of performance. DOD endeavors to maximize use of competitive
procurements. In competitive procurements, the contract award amount is
generally a function of the market price and therefore contractor
salaries are influenced by competitive market pressures. Except in
limited circumstances, such as contracts subject to the Service
Contract Act or the Davis-Bacon Act, DOD does not dictate private
sector salaries. Although DOD does not maintain a database of
contractor employee salaries, our contracting officers use Defense
Contract Management Agency negotiated labor and overhead rate
agreements with DOD contractors as a basis for negotiating contracts at
a fair and reasonable price.
FORCE STRUCTURE
86. Senator Manchin. General Dempsey, having served as a governor,
I have seen firsthand the value of the Total Force Policy and the cost-
effective value of a multi-missioned force such as the National Guard
that is rooted in our Nation's communities where we need support. Have
you effectively evaluated the cost efficiencies of the Army and Air
National Guard?
General Dempsey. Yes, and DOD continues to evaluate the cost
effectiveness of not only the Army and Air National Guard, but all
Active and Reserve components from all Services. While this task is
accomplished primarily within the Services themselves, the Joint Staff
and OSD monitor and provide oversight of the evaluation process, and
frequently coordinate and/or sponsor their own studies to validate the
work performed by the Services.
87. Senator Manchin. General Dempsey, wouldn't it be advisable to
wait on the data from these reports before making any force structure
changes?
General Dempsey. Both OSD and the Joint Staff conducted assessments
of the Joint Force prior to submitting the current budget. The
programmed force structure for 2017, which includes force structure
changes, was assessed against our strategy and we determined that the
resultant military forces would be sufficient to meet the needs of our
Nation.
AIR FORCE BUDGET--GUARD AND RESERVES
88. Senator Manchin. Secretary Panetta, the fiscal year 2013 Air
Force budget disproportionately cuts the Guard and will necessitate
losing the expertise gained by pilots and capabilities over a decade of
war. Are you confident that this budget meets the requirements to
``surge and regenerate forces and capabilities'' that the President
spelled out in your Priorities for the 21st Century Defense?
Secretary Panetta. Yes. The new Defense Strategic Guidance for DOD
articulates priorities for a 21st century defense that sustains U.S.
global leadership. The Air Force approached this challenging task
guided by the following principles: ensure the Total Force can fulfill
surge requirements; maintain a balance between components that allows
us to fulfill continuing rotational requirements at sustainable rates;
retain the recruiting, training, and operational seasoning base
required to sustain the Total Force's needs into the future; and ensure
the Reserve component remains relevant and engaged in both enduring and
evolving missions. Maintaining the appropriate mix of forces between
the Active and Reserve components is critical to sustaining Air Force
capabilities for forward presence, rapid response, and high-rate
rotational demands within a smaller overall force. The Air National
Guard and Air Force Reserve are integrated into all major Air Force
mission areas, train to the same high standards as the Active
component, and are invaluable partners in helping meet the Air Force's
many and varied commitments.
89. Senator Manchin. Secretary Panetta, the Air Force leadership
has called this an effort to balance the size of the Active and Reserve
components. But this seems to work contrary to your plan to ``maintain
a strong National Guard'' to provide the ``concept of reversibility.''
Did the Air Force consider alternative plans that you have said
``reduce the cost of doing business,'' such as relying more heavily on
the National Guard and Reserves?
Secretary Panetta. The Air Force developed a force structure based
on several important objectives, most importantly ensuring the Air
Force can provide the capability to accomplish the missions outlined in
the new Defense Strategic Guidance with a risk-balanced force in the
context of fiscal reductions. It would be ill-advised to make
``proportional'' cuts to the Active component and Reserve component for
the sake of being ``fair'' or return to some Active component/Reserve
component ratio from days gone by. It is important that we build the
force with an Active component/Reserve component ratio that sustains
the symbiotic relationship between the Active component/Reserve
component and is based on maximizing our capabilities and balancing the
risk across the assigned missions in the new Defense Strategic Guidance
with the given funding. This is what the Air Force did in its budget
request. Relying more heavily on the National Guard and Reserves does
not necessarily reduce costs if either the demand cannot be met or the
symbiotic balance to sustain the Total Force cannot be maintained.
The Air Force rigorously evaluated the mix of Active and Reserve
component forces to sustain the symbiotic relationship of the
components while ensuring the Total Force is postured to meet both
surge and post-surge demands in the new strategy as well as the current
and near-term demand for forces from the combatant commanders. This
deliberate and considerable effort provides the best way to set the
conditions for success in the new strategy through a properly sized
Total Force, to include maintaining a strong National Guard, Reserve,
and Active Force.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
DON'T ASK DON'T TELL
90. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Panetta, you may be aware, despite
the repeal of Don't Ask Don't Tell, a number of policies and programs
within DOD continue to exclude same-sex couples. I understand the
limitations imposed by the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), however
there are a number of DOD policies that could be modified immediately
to alleviate many of the lingering inequalities. The Servicemember's
Legal Defense Network (SLDN) has identified 11 of these discriminatory
policies, which I have included here. Please provide DOD's feedback on
the feasibility of altering these policies in a manner consistent with
the spirit of the repeal of Don't Ask/Don't Tell.
Secretary Panetta. Following the effective date of repeal,
September 20, 2011, DOD began a deliberative and comprehensive review
of the possibility of extending eligibility for benefits, when legally
permitted, to same-sex partners. The joint team responsible for this
review is examining the benefits, including those on the SLDN list,
from a policy, fiscal, legal, and feasibility perspective. This review
is ongoing, and the team will report its findings and recommendations
to me once the review is completed.
FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AND EUROPE
91. Senator Shaheen. Senator Panetta, though I understand DOD's
assessment of the geo-political landscape and the need to rebalance our
forces toward the Pacific, I remain committed to working with our
allies to ensure the strength of the NATO alliance and collective
European defense. To that end, I believe the upcoming NATO summit in
Chicago will provide an excellent opportunity to reassure our allies
that despite the realignment of our forces, the United States remains
committed to both NATO and Europe. Will you make that a priority for
the upcoming summit?
Secretary Panetta. Yes. The United States remains committed to both
NATO and Europe.
NATO remains of vital importance, and is a net provider of global
security. As President Obama has said, ``Europe remains the cornerstone
of our engagement with the world,'' and NATO is ``the most capable
alliance in history.'' Our NATO allies are our most reliable and
capable partners for advancing our shared international security
objectives. The transatlantic relationship is critical to confronting
the challenges of a complex, dangerous, and fast-changing world. The
President, Secretary Clinton, and I have been emphasizing this to
allies since we announced our new Defense Strategic Guidance in January
and will continue to do so during the NATO summit in Chicago.
92. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Panetta, in your view, what can
Congress to do help achieve that objective?
Secretary Panetta. DOD appreciates Congress' support for the United
States' commitment to Europe and to working with allies to ensure the
strength of the NATO alliance. The U.S. defense strategy reaffirms the
enduring importance of NATO. We appreciate congressional support for
the upcoming NATO summit in Chicago, including support for achieving
our objectives in the next phase of transition in Afghanistan,
reforming NATO so that it has the capabilities it needs, and
strengthening partnerships beyond NATO's borders.
FORCE FLEXIBILITY
93. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Panetta, obviously, our strategic
shift toward the Asia-Pacific region prioritizes assets in that AOR.
However, as recent operations in Libya highlighted, we must maintain
the capability to quickly respond to contingencies on the Atlantic side
of the country as well. Considering the uncertain and complex world of
threats we face today, how important is it to maintain flexibility and
balance in making sure a renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific region does
not leave us vulnerable on the Atlantic side of the country?
Secretary Panetta. U.S. forces will continue to be capable of
protecting the Homeland--from the Pacific to the Atlantic coasts--and
U.S. security interests in every region of the world.
As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have said, we
are at a strategic turning point. DOD conducted an intensive, strategy-
driven review to guide defense priorities and spending over the coming
decade. One result of this review is that the United States will
emphasize the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. Yet, even in a
resource-constrained era, we remain committed to the strength and
security of our allies and partners across Europe. One example of this
is the increased missile defense capabilities we are implementing in
Europe.
We will maintain a military presence that meets our enduring NATO
Article 5 security commitment, deters aggression, and promotes enhanced
capacity and interoperability. The real measure of U.S. commitment to
Europe is the ability and will to work together to promote shared
regional and global interests, and to build and employ collective
capabilities as an alliance, as we did in Libya.
Additionally, building partnership capacity globally remains
important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global
leadership. We will seek to be the security partner of choice by
strengthening existing alliances and partnerships and pursuing new
partnerships with a growing number of nations--including those in
Africa and Latin America.
94. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Panetta, what are your priorities
and objective capabilities for U.S. forces remaining in Europe?
Secretary Panetta. Even in this resource-constrained era, we remain
committed to the strength and security of our allies and partners
across Europe. The peace and prosperity of Europe are critically
important to the United States, and Europe remains our security partner
of choice for military operations and diplomacy around the world. Our
priorities include promoting regional security and Euro-Atlantic
integration, strengthening NATO, maintaining our Article 5 commitments
to allied security, and promoting enhanced capacity and
interoperability for coalition operations. The evolving inventory of
U.S. forces in Europe will provide the Commander of U.S. European
Command with the needed capability to meet operational and training
requirements, including activities to ensure that European allies and
partners have the capability to conduct expeditionary operations in
defense of our common interests. The allocation of a U.S.-based brigade
to the NATO Response Force to bolster the training and exercises we
conduct with allies is an example of this. Our focus on the evolving
security environment includes investing in BMD capability for Europe in
response to the emerging threats.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
RAPID INNOVATION FUND
95. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Panetta, Congress has been very
supportive of the Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF), which is intended to
increase research and development of new innovative technologies
important for our military. This is such a great program. It is my hope
that it fosters more U.S.-made nano and other chip-related technologies
to address the very serious insecurity in our IT procurement. Yet DOD
has been very slow to roll out contracting for this funding, putting
only about $100 million out, out of $600 million. And this year's
budget has no additional funding. Please explain why DOD does not seem
to support this program to foster American innovation in cutting edge
military technologies.
Secretary Panetta. Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to
establish the RIF in section 1073 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2011, Public Law 111-383, and identified $520 million ($460
million research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E); and $60
million in procurement) for the RIF in DOD and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011, which was signed into law on April 15, 2011.
Section 1073 establishes a funding limitation of $3 million and 24-
month completion per award.
In response to section 1073, DOD issued guidelines in August 2011
for implementation of the RIF, directing the use of open, competitive,
and merit-based processes. DOD subsequently published 4 Broad Area
Announcements (BAA) during the period September to November 2011 to
solicit proposals; more than 3,500 responses were received.
Given the large number of responses, the source selection period
has been justifiably longer than anticipated. Each proposal received a
fair and thorough evaluation using source selection criteria included
in the four public solicitations. However, DOD intends to obligate all
of the fiscal year 2011 $460 million RDT&E funds prior to October 2012.
We anticipate approximately 160 to 180 contract awards. None of the
proposals received in response to the four BAAs met the criteria to use
the $60 million procurement funds, and DOD is assessing plans to
obligate these funds before they expire in September 2013.
Congress identified another $200 million for the RIF in the
Division A-DOD Appropriations, the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2012. DOD intends to issue solicitations this summer to use these
funds.
DOD worked to structure the RIF for success, but it is too early at
this time to determine the overall effectiveness of the program in
meeting the goals outlined in section 1073. Contract awards are a
necessary but insufficient metric; we will also need to assess the
number of RIF-funded projects that are successfully completed and
transitioned to a DOD acquisition program. Early next year, DOD will
assess the performance and transition potential of the contracts
awarded via the fiscal year 2011 funds. At that time, DOD will
determine whether it should program funds for the RIF in future budget
requests.
BARRIERS TO SERVICEWOMEN
96. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Panetta, on February 9, 2012, DOD
announced a change in the combat exclusion policy that bars women from
formally serving in combat roles. The change was in part due to
recommendations made by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission in
their March 2011 report. Women are now able to formally serve in roles
such as intelligence officer and medic at the battalion level, and
receive credit for this service toward promotions; however, women are
still barred from serving in the infantry, armor, and special
operations forces. This new policy has the most direct impact on women
serving in the Army and Marine Corps, as the Navy and Air Force have
already opened up almost all positions to women. As stated in DOD's
report to Congress ``the Department of Defense is committed to removing
all barriers that would prevent servicemembers from rising to the
highest level of responsibility that their talents and capabilities
warrant.'' With this new step forward, what are DOD's future plans for
eliminating all of the barriers to our servicewomen?
Secretary Panetta. The Direct Ground Combat Assignment policy
prohibits the assignment of women to certain units and occupational
specialties. As documented in the Military Leadership Diversity
Commission findings, changes to DOD policies will require time to
implement fully. There are serious practical barriers, which if not
approached in a deliberate manner, could adversely impact the health of
our servicemembers and degrade mission accomplishment. Based on opening
of the new positions to women, DOD will assess the direct ground combat
unit assignment prohibition to inform future policy decisions.
Additionally, DOD will review development of gender-neutral physical
standards for occupational specialties.
I have directed the Services to report back to me on their
assessment of these newly opened positions in 6 months with an
assessment of additional positions that can be opened and barriers to
opening additional positions to qualified women.
97. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Panetta, the Coast Guard
currently allows women to serve in all career fields. Could this be a
model for the other branches of Service?
Secretary Panetta. As the mission of each of the Services is
significantly different, so are the elements of their specific position
restrictions. Additionally, there is a wide variance among the Services
in the number of occupations closed to women. Given the unique
environment of military service, DOD is working to eliminate barriers
with the goal of allowing all servicemembers to serve in any capacity,
based on their ability and qualifications, and not constrained by
gender restrictive policies.
HAZING IN THE MILITARY
98. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Panetta, over the last year,
there have been several high-profile cases of hazing in the military,
including those of Marine Lance Corporal Harry Lew, Army Private Danny
Chen, and allegedly Marine Private Hamson McPherson, Jr. In the cases I
highlighted, the hazing victim committed suicide immediately following
a hazing incident. In the past month, both the Army and Marine Corps
issued statements reinforcing their policy against hazing in their
respective Service. Additionally, last week the Navy discharged eight
sailors after video surfaced of a hazing incident aboard a Navy ship.
What steps has DOD as a whole taken to address this issue and ensure
that all types of hazing cease to occur in our military?
Secretary Panetta. DOD takes hazing very seriously. As a result, we
are examining responsive courses of action in three areas: (1) a
reiteration of existing policy prohibitions of hazing across the chain
of command; (2) increased emphasis in training; and (3) new reporting
options. These proposed actions are all designed to improve our ability
to prevent, identify, and take immediate action to address hazing
before it leads to serious consequences.
DOD's policy prohibiting hazing is unambiguous, and Service leaders
have clearly stated that they take incidents of hazing very seriously.
The following recent leadership statements reiterate that hazing is
contrary to good order and discipline and is unacceptable behavior: the
Secretary of Defense's message of December 2011, the Secretary of the
Army's tri-signed message of January 2012, and the Marine
Administrative Messages and the revised Marine Corps Order 1700.28A of
February 2012. Leadership at all levels will continue to emphasize to
subordinates that such behavior will not be tolerated.
Second, DOD is examining methods of improving training to prevent,
identify, and provide direction on how to respond to possible incidents
of hazing. We are evaluating options including: raising awareness of
both existing hazing policy and the associated offenses under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), training to identify leading
indicators and to prevent or stop incidents from escalating, training
resiliency, training peer groups, and emphasizing this issue at
training courses administered by the Defense Equal Opportunity
Management Institute (DEOMI).
Third, DOD is considering options to identify hazing distinctly in
surveys and reporting mechanisms. Potential courses of action in this
area include: adding hazing to the Services' Serious Incident Report
thresholds, adding hazing to law enforcement reporting codes,
identifying reported incidents of hazing in UCMJ cases, Inspector
General hotlines and databases, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Office's Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database, the DEOMI
Organizational Climate Survey, Defense Manpower Data Center Status of
Forces Survey, and Services' peer programs.
99. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Panetta, given the remote
locations of two aforementioned hazing cases, what systems are in place
to protect a victim of hazing when their chain of command is either the
perpetrator of the hazing or implicit to the acts of hazing?
Secretary Panetta. The military chain of command is designed to
function in remote locations.
A fundamental function of the military chain of command is
communication. Just as the command channel transmits orders from higher
to lower levels, the command channel also extends upward to communicate
official matters from subordinate to senior. If a servicemember
believes he or she has been wronged by his or her superior, then the
servicemember has a right to communicate the problem, or grievance,
through formal or informal processes.
Each Service has formal complaint procedures to bring issues to the
attention of commander. The Services train their members in complaint
and problem solving procedures as part of Initial Entry Training. For
example, Article 138 (the right to request redress of grievances from a
superior) procedures are explained to an Active Duty servicemember
within 14 days after the member's initial entrance on Active Duty,
again after completing 6 months of Active Duty, and again at the time
when the member reenlists.
Protecting servicemembers is also a fundamental function of the
chain of command. If the chain of command believes that a servicemember
may be at risk of retaliation, the chain of command may immediately
apply administrative or operational procedures, including reassignment
or removal of the victim to a safer location.
In less isolated locations, servicemembers have several avenues to
highlight complaints to personnel and offices other than their chain of
command. These include: the Office of the Inspector General hotlines,
legal assistance attorney, or law enforcement.
100. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Panetta, since the repeal of
Don't Ask Don't Tell almost 6 months ago, gay and lesbian
servicemembers have been serving openly without fear of discharge. This
was a wonderful achievement for our military, and I commend DOD for
continually reiterating its commitment that gay and lesbian
servicemembers will be treated with respect and dignity. Are there
plans for DOD to formally add sexual orientation to the DOD Human Goals
Charter?
Secretary Panetta. All servicemembers, regardless of sexual
orientation, are entitled to an environment free from personal, social,
or institutional barriers that prevent them from rising to the highest
level of responsibility possible, dependent only on individual talent
and diligence. Harassment or abuse based on sexual orientation is
unacceptable and will be dealt with through command or Inspector
General channels. Therefore, there are no plans to add sexual
orientation as a class under the Military Equal Opportunity program,
nor to the DOD's Human Goals Charter. Servicemembers will continue to
be treated equally, regardless of sexual orientation.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
IRAQ INSTABILITY
101. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, in your opinion, is al Qaeda
a significant military threat in Iraq?
General Dempsey. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) does not have the capacity
to overthrow the Government of Iraq, but the group has significant
capabilities to strike Iraqi Government targets, including Iraqi
Security Forces, as well as Shia civilians. AQI claims daily small-
scale assassination attacks, primarily using small arms and
magnetically-attached bombs. These attacks suggest an increase in
attack capability following U.S. force withdrawal. We anticipate AQI
will maintain a heightened operational tempo in 2012, absent sustained
increase in Iraqi counterterrorism pressure. Since the conclusion of
Operation New Dawn in late 2011, AQI has claimed responsibility for
multiple coordinated suicide and vehicle-borne IED attacks, including
December attacks across Baghdad and January and March attacks
throughout multiple Iraqi provinces.
102. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, can you assess the threat
posed by AQI, and whether that threat is growing or diminishing?
General Dempsey. The threat from AQI has increased since the
conclusion of Operation New Dawn in late 2011 and is growing. The
absence of sustained effective counterterrorism pressure has allowed
AQI to maintain an increased operational tempo inside Iraq. Although
AQI primarily focuses attacks against the Iraqi Government, the group
remains an active member of the broader al Qaeda associated movement
and is committed to projecting its influence outside Iraq as part of
its long-term strategy. The United States and Europe are standing
targets for potential AQI attacks and are a recurring theme in its
public statements. On 25 January, AQI indicated publicly it would
strike the United States abroad now that U.S. forces have departed
Iraq--an allusion similarly made in AQI's August 2011 video eulogy for
al Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladin.
U.S. FORCE LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN
103. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, the administration's
announcement to end combat operations in Afghanistan in 2013 sends
exactly the wrong signal to our friends and enemies in this conflict.
It continues the administration's policy of publicly telegraphing exit
plans in a way that fundamentally undermines our overall strategy and
our determination to succeed. What incentive can the Taliban possibly
have to negotiate meaningfully with the Afghanistan Government or with
us when they know that the United States is leaving regardless?
Secretary Panetta. In 2013, coalition forces will continue to
transition security responsibilities to the ANSF, and will assume a
supporting role as part of the Security Force Assistance strategy.
Coalition forces will continue to operate side-by-side with their ANSF
counterparts while providing key enabler support to combat insurgent
threats. Coalition forces' transition to a supporting role in
Afghanistan is a critical and necessary step toward mission
accomplishment. Doing this with less coalition combat power on the
ground will increase ANSF confidence and lead to their success while
reducing insurgent capacity. As the ANSF grows in capacity, capability,
and confidence, fewer coalition forces will be required.
At the end of 2014, U.S. forces will complete their drawdown and
end combat operations; however the U.S. Government will continue to
support the ANSF. The Strategic Partnership Agreement, which is
currently under negotiation, will specify the U.S. role in Afghanistan
after 2014, and outline the U.S. Government's long-term commitment to
Afghanistan.
104. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, reportedly, the top
military commander in Afghanistan privately recommended holding off new
U.S. troop reductions until 2014. Is this true and, if so, why did you
decide to announce a plan that does not take the views of our military
commanders into account?
Secretary Panetta. I know of no such private recommendation
concerning U.S. forces reductions. The force reductions that have
occurred and will occur are part of the recovery of the U.S. surge
forces, first ordered into Afghanistan at the time of the President's
2009 West Point speech. DOD's recommendations concerning these
reductions as well as future force reductions will be made in full
cooperation with the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. His
recommendations will be key to any decision regarding U.S. force
strength.
105. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, exactly what conditions on
the ground will be assessed to determine the pace of combat force
reductions?
Secretary Panetta. The campaign plan calls for several conditions
to be met before completion of the transition in Afghanistan. The
ability of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) to provide
suitable and sustainable security for a given area will be a key factor
in determining U.S. and coalition forces presence.
106. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, in your opinion, what is the
military value of announcing a U.S. combat force withdrawal schedule as
it pertains to the operations of the Taliban?
General Dempsey. The administration stated we will reduce 23,000
additional troops by October 2012, thereby fully recovering the surge
force ordered by the President at his December 2009 West Point speech.
Beyond the surge force, we have not specifically laid out the timeline
of further reductions as these will be based on conditions on the
ground. We believe the reductions that have been planned support our
goal of transitioning lead for security to ANSF. Transitioning security
lead will be an orderly process and will ensure the ANSF can retain the
hard fought security gains even in the most contested areas of the
country. The transition must signal to the Taliban that there will be a
capable, indigenous force that will maintain security for the long-
term.
107. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, wouldn't quickly cutting U.S.
troop levels below 68,000 make it harder to clear and hold insurgent
havens and complicate efforts to protect supply lines and bases ahead
of the scheduled 2014 handover?
General Dempsey. General Allen presented the plan to recover the
33,000 member surge force to the President, which will bring the number
of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to 68,000. The plan for further
reductions will be based on conditions on the ground. There are several
initiatives in place that will serve to counter insurgent havens and
protect supply lines. Developing a capable and sustainable ANSF will
provide long-term security for Afghanistan. Pursuing programs such as
the Afghan Local Police will serve to maintain security gains, and
building the Afghan Public Protection Force will provide security at
bases and along supply routes.
108. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, is there a risk of a troop
withdrawal below 68,000 before 2014 negatively affecting the rapid-
response capabilities that now allow the military to evacuate wounded
soldiers to combat hospitals within 1 hour of their injuries?
General Dempsey. We currently plan on drawing down to 68,000 with
no further plans to go below 68,000 until conditions on the ground
allow. Regardless of the number of boots-on-the-ground, enablers such
as medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) will be of key importance not only to
U.S. troops, but our coalition partners as well. In February, MEDEVAC
response times were well below 1 hour in 90 percent of operations.
SEQUESTRATION
109. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, as you may know, the
President's proposal to address sequestration with an alternative of
tax increases and entitlement adjustments may not make it through
Congress. Other than this proposal, this budget proposal does not
account for the current spending cap imposed by sequestration for
defense programs in fiscal year 2013. You have described the
consequences of sequestration as catastrophic. Exactly how would these
consequences be catastrophic? Please be specific.
Secretary Panetta. DOD is concerned that the sequestration process
would have significant consequences due to the uncertainty surrounding
the process and the rigid formula which Congress has prescribed for its
application. Assuming the fiscal year 2013 Defense Appropriations Act
Conference Report contains language similar to the Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference accompanying Division A-DOD
Appropriations Act, 2012, DOD would be forced to reduce each line item
within each procurement appropriation by the same percentage and each
program element within each research and development appropriation by
the same percentage. This percentage would be calculated based on the
total budgetary resources, primarily the enacted fiscal year 2013
appropriation and any unobligated balances carried forward at the end
of fiscal year 2012. Some obvious examples of the problems this method
would cause are found in line items such as those for a ship, where it
is not feasible to buy a fraction of a ship, or in a line item funding
a multiyear contract where a fraction of the funding would not be
sufficient to pay the negotiated cost of the multiyear contract. With
over 1,500 individual line items in these accounts, DOD could not fix
all of these issues with the transfer authority that Congress typically
provides; this would leave broken programs across DOD. Additionally,
sequestration would force an immediate reduction in our operation and
maintenance accounts which could damage readiness. Funding provided for
OCO is also not excluded from sequestration.
110. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, will you exempt military
personnel from sequestration?
Secretary Panetta. The President's budget makes the necessary
budget constrictions to avoid devastating DOD through sequestration. If
sequestration becomes an inevitability, DOD will evaluate all options
available to comply with the law.
111. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, when will you provide to
Congress a detailed impact of sequester on the fiscal year 2013 budget?
Secretary Panetta. Congress should enact comprehensive, balanced
deficit reduction legislation that avoids sequestration. The
President's budget offers one path for doing so. If and when necessary,
the administration will address important technical questions
concerning sequestration. If there were to be a sequester, a detailed
impact of sequester could not be provided until we know what the actual
funding level would be for fiscal year 2013 by account and program.
112. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, when will the Military
Services be able to provide Congress with a list of programs and
accounts to be reduced or terminated as a result of imposing
sequestration caps for the fiscal year 2014 budget?
Secretary Panetta. The fiscal year 2014 budget will be developed
using DOD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process.
This process will be implemented in coordination with the White House
and OMB. Any changes to our budget required by revised caps on the
defense budget will be developed through this process and delivered to
Congress in February 2013.
113. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, in your opinion, what impact
will the cuts have on our ability to carry out operational plans in
support of national security interests around the world?
General Dempsey. The across-the-board cuts called for by
sequestration would pose unacceptable risk in the execution of
operational plans. These cuts would significantly reduce military
readiness, investment, and force structure, hollowing the force and
degrading U.S. military power.
114. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, will you provide the
President with an operational risk assessment on the impact of
sequestration before the end of the fiscal year?
General Dempsey. All strategies and their associated budgets carry
some risk, but sequestration goes beyond the level of acceptable risk.
Sequestration would likely result in a smaller force structure that is
ill-equipped, ill-trained, and ill-prepared to meet future challenges.
Because of its wide-ranging impact on the health of the force,
sequestration would require a complete reevaluation of our defense
strategy and priorities to determine the true operational risks
involved.
115. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, will you also provide this
assessment to Congress so that it will be available to inform debate on
the issue?
General Dempsey. All strategies and their associated budgets carry
some risk, but sequestration goes beyond the level of acceptable risk.
Sequestration would likely result in a smaller force structure that is
ill-equipped, ill-trained, and ill-prepared to meet future challenges.
Because of its wide-ranging impact on the health of the force,
sequestration would require a complete reevaluation of our defense
strategy and priorities to determine the true operational risks
involved.
116. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, the President has indicated
that he will veto any legislation that undoes sequestration without tax
increases. Have you raised your concerns on this matter to the
President?
General Dempsey. The administration and the military and civilian
leadership of DOD are united behind the strategy and budget that we
have presented. Sequestration, however, would subject DOD to roughly
another $500 billion in cuts across all accounts and would hollow out
the force, driving unacceptable risk to national defense.
117. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, do you support proposed
congressional legislation to protect defense accounts from being
affected by sequestration?
General Dempsey. The administration and the military and civilian
leadership of DOD are united behind the strategy and budget that we
have presented. Sequestration, however, would clearly pose unacceptable
risk by significantly reducing U.S. military readiness, investment, and
force structure, hollowing the force and degrading U.S. military power.
We will continue to work with OMB and Congress to properly resource the
capability to defend our Nation and our allies.
118. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, the BCA in August 2011 did
not actually mandate a specific reduction to defense budgets of $487
billion over 10 years. The administration stated on July 31, 2011,
that: ``The deal puts us on track to cut $350 billion from the defense
budget over 10 years. These reductions will be implemented based on the
outcome of a review of our missions, roles, and capabilities that will
reflect the President's commitment to protecting our national
security.'' The reduction of $487 billion in defense budgets was
provided to you by OMB in November 2011 after imposing an arbitrary 10
percent reduction to all Federal agencies. The administration's goal
was for more than half of the first tranche of reductions in total
discretionary spending ($917 billion) imposed by the BCA caps to come
from the national security accounts. Given the significant increase to
the risk to our national security from the cuts to military personnel
end strength and force structure, why do you believe a $487 billion
reduction is acceptable to incur?
Secretary Panetta. The defense budget cuts we are absorbing are
difficult but manageable. Specific reductions were guided by a
comprehensive DOD strategic review which identified missions and
capabilities essential to safeguarding U.S. and allied security
interests in light of the most likely challenges posed by the future
global environment. While U.S. Armed Forces will be smaller in number,
we will ensure that they are ready, agile, flexible, and capable
forces, with a forward presence that positions them to respond quickly
in the event of threats or contingencies. The budget also preserves or
enhances investments in key areas of continuing urgency, such as
counterterrorism efforts and counter WMD, and areas that will grow in
prominence in coming years, such as space, cyber, and missile defense.
119. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, did you have an opportunity
to advocate to the OMB or the President for a smaller reduction than
$487 billion in cuts over 10 years?
Secretary Panetta. The fiscal year 2013 budget reflects the results
of a comprehensive DOD strategic review which identified missions and
capabilities essential to safeguarding U.S. and allied security
interests in light of the most likely challenges posed by the future
global environment. This strategic shift would have occurred regardless
of the Nation's fical situation. DOD's most senior leaders led the
review, which included extensive engagement by the National Security
Staff and the President. Given the size and mandatory missions of the
other national security agencies, the President was limited in making
significant funding allocations among agencies within the security
category cap imposed by the BCA. DOD employed a strategy-based process
in formulating its fiscal year 2013 budget request. OMB and the White
House were represented throughout the process. The budget resulting
from this process is adequate to meet our current requirements.
120. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, aside from the issue of
sequestration, do you anticipate that DOD will be asked by this
administration to cut defense budgets even deeper than you have
proposed in the fiscal year 2013 FYDP or deeper than the $487 billion
in cuts you have proposed over the next 10 years?
Secretary Panetta. We currently do not anticipate a further
reduction in defense spending in future budgets, provided Congress
enacts a deficit reduction package and avoids sequestration and the
further impact of the BCA. If no action is taken to change the
provisions of the BCA, DOD's 2014 budget would be required to be
reduced further to meet the revised security limit provided in the Act.
The fiscal year 2013 President's budget reflects the administration's
national defense plan for the next 10 years. The plan calls for DOD's
base budget to grow, albeit slowly, over that period.
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
121. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, on February 8, 2012, the
Governments of the United States and Japan issued a joint statement on
the U.S. strategic review of its defense posture in Asia. The two
governments have officially started discussions to change the terms the
2006 agreement. What is the new plan and timeline for the relocation of
marines from Okinawa?
Secretary Panetta. Since February, we have been engaged in
intensive discussions with the Government of Japan regarding U.S. plans
to relocate some U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam. The size of the
U.S. Marine Corps force we establish on Guam will be smaller than
previously planned, and this change will be made in the context of our
overall laydown of Marine Corps forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The
new plan and timeline is pending the outcome of our current discussions
with the Government of Japan and the completion of necessary
environmental studies.
122. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, what are DOD's estimates
for costs to build facilities at new locations?
Secretary Panetta. The Navy has provided the response via a
classified briefing to Senate Armed Services Committee staff.
123. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, are all of these costs
included in the current budget or the FYDP?
Secretary Panetta. No. The Marine Corps continues to generate,
revise, and analyze projected costs associated with Marine Corps force
posture revision and bilateral negotiations. As outlined in section
2207 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, we will present a master plan
for construction once completed.
124. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, how is the President's
strategic direction to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region
actually reflected in the budget proposal for fiscal year 2013?
Secretary Panetta. The fiscal year 2013 budget request protects
and, in some cases, increases investments that are critical to our
ability to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, to include our
ability to project power. For instance, this budget funds the
development of next-generation bomber and new aerial refueling
aircraft. Additionally, the Navy will invest in a design for Virginia-
class submarines that will allow these submarines to carry
significantly more cruise missiles, and potentially provide an undersea
conventional prompt strike capability. This budget also invests
resources in increasing stocks of our most capable cruise missiles;
purchasing advanced maritime patrol aircraft; upgrading avionics and
communications systems in our current bomber fleet; and enhancing
capabilities in space, cyber, electronic warfare, missile defense, and
ISR systems.
The strategy envisions more elements of the Joint Force postured
forward in the Asia-Pacific region--reinforcing our stabilizing and
deterrence presence in the region, as well as increasing potential
combat power. The budget request funds the rotational deployment of
marines and U.S. Air Force aircraft to Australia and the potential for
rotational deployment of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. The Navy
will also rebalance its fleet so that a greater percentage is in the
Pacific, and all the Services will continue to maintain significant
force structure in the region as they look to increase interaction with
allies and partners.
125. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, since announced plans call
for Marine Corps forces to rotate to Australia or Guam, 8,700 marines
and their families will be leaving Okinawa to be stationed somewhere
else--where will they go?
Secretary Panetta. Many of the marines based in Okinawa are
rotational. These marines deploy to Okinawa unaccompanied under the
Unit Deployment Program (UDP). Their family members remain behind at
the unit's home base, either in Hawaii or CONUS. Under DOD's current
plan, some of these UDP units will continue to deploy to Okinawa, some
will deploy to Guam, and others will rotate through Australia. These
rotational forces will be supported by small headquarters and logistics
elements that will be permanently stationed at these locations and may
be accompanied by their families. The planned numbers of marines and
their family members at each location is currently under review and has
not been finalized.
126. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, since the U.S. Government
has signaled its intent to delink tangible progress on the construction
of a replacement facility for Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma
on Okinawa from other actions to relocate marines from bases in the
southern part of Okinawa, what is DOD's plan for the future of the MCAS
Futenma?
Secretary Panetta. The February 8, 2012, U.S.-Japan Joint Statement
confirmed the continued mutual support for the current Futenma
Replacement Facility (FRF) plan as the only viable alternative to
continued operation of MCAS Futenma. Recognizing that even under the
best scenario, the realization of that plan is several years away, we
are currently discussing with the Government of Japan conditions under
which they can contribute to the sustainment of operations at MCAS
Futenma until the FRF is complete.
127. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, will DOD abide by the
requirements in section 2207 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012?
Secretary Panetta. We will abide by the requirements in section
2207 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012. I look forward to the
opportunity to update the committee on our progress for these
requirements later in the year.
NAVY FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS
128. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey,
although DOD's new Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizes a rebalance to
the Asia-Pacific region--predominantly a maritime theater--the
administration's plan calls for the Navy to retire seven cruisers and
two other major amphibious ships needed by the Marine Corps earlier
than planned. In addition, the administration plans to delay buying a
large-deck amphibious ship, a Virginia-class attack submarine, two
Littoral Combat Ships, and eight high-speed transport vessels. What
effect will fewer cruisers, submarines, and amphibious ships have in
responding to crises in the Asia-Pacific theater--especially a large-
scale one, with an equal or near-equal peer?
Secretary Panetta. While the fleet size will fall slightly in the
next few years, it will return to its current level by the end of the
FYDP and even grow slightly into the early 2020s. The Navy will
continue to prioritize readiness, and our fiscal year 2013 budget
submission fully funds ship maintenance and midlife modernization
periods. We are also investing in shipbuilding and aircraft
construction to ensure that the Navy will evolve to remain the world's
preeminent maritime force in the face of emerging threats and our
shipbuilding and aircraft construction investments form the foundation
of the future fleet. In developing our aircraft and ship procurement
plans, we focused on three approaches: sustaining serial production of
today's proven platforms, rapidly fielding new platforms in
development, and improving the capability of today's platforms through
new payloads of weapons, sensors, and unmanned vehicles.
The Navy can meet the Defense Strategic Guidance with the current
and projected force structure provided in the Navy's President's budget
submission for 2013. Consistent with the Defense Strategic Guidance,
the Navy will posture continuous, credible combat power in the Western
Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital
interests, assure friends and allies, and deter potential adversaries.
Naval forces remain flexible and agile, able to swing rapidly in
response to emergent high priority requirements in other theaters, as
well as to surge from U.S. homeports in the event of crises. The Navy
can meet these challenges under our current operational tempo and
deployment lengths.
General Dempsey. Specific resourcing decisions were made through a
comprehensive strategic review that included detailed analysis by the
Joint Staff, the Services, and OSD. These decisions were made with
serious consideration of the risk and our ability to mitigate the risk
by balancing fleet forces across the globe.
Planned naval force structure maintains the ability to conduct a
large-scale naval campaign in one region while denying the objectives
of an opportunistic aggressor in a second region. The strategic review
and long-range shipbuilding plan accepted risk in generating the 30
operationally available ships necessary to conduct a two-Marine
Expeditionary Brigade forcible entry operation, but lowered risk by
building to an average active inventory of 32 amphibious ships in the
long-range shipbuilding plan. The 21st Century Battle Force will be
informed by the completion of a formal Force Structure Assessment and
the ongoing DOD review of operational plans for potential regional
contingencies.
129. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the
Marine Corps has a standing requirement for 38 amphibious ships to
support its amphibious assault mission, which has not changed as a
result of the new Defense Strategic Guidance. The Marine Corps and the
Navy have accepted risk by allowing the number of amphibious ships to
remain at 33. Further reductions below 33 amphibious ships is
inconsistent with the Marine Corps mission to maintain a viable
amphibious assault capability and is particularly unjustified with a
renewed focus on a rotational presence in the Asia-Pacific region.
Please describe how decommissioning ships early and delays in buying
new ships--as proposed in the proposed budget request--is consistent
with: (1) the President's new Defense Strategic Guidance; and (2) the
maritime mobility needs of the Pacific and the forces needed to oppose
anti-access area denial strategies in the Asia-Pacific region,
including China.
Secretary Panetta. The decision to decommission seven Ticonderoga-
class cruisers and two amphibious ships was made to ensure sufficient
resources were available for readiness while maintaining the proper mix
of capability in the battle force in a fiscally constrained
environment. The Navy selected ships for decommissioning based on an
analysis of the costs required to sustain their material condition and
update their combat capability. The selected ships had little or no
previous modernization completed, were the oldest ships in their class
and would become increasingly expensive to maintain, operate, and
upgrade to remain relevant to evolving threats.
The Navy has certified to the Secretary of Defense that we will
meet the fiscal year 2013 Global Force Management Allocation Plan and
requirements in the Defense Strategic Guidance. From fiscal year 2013
through fiscal year 2020, the Navy ship inventory and extrapolated
force presence will increase in the Asia-Pacific and Arabian Gulf
regions.
General Dempsey. Resourcing decisions were made through a
comprehensive strategic review that was aligned to the President's
strategic guidance. The review included detailed analysis by the Joint
Staff, the Services, and OSD.
The strategic review focused primarily on sustaining Amphibious
Readiness Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units forward in the Western
Pacific and Arabian Gulf in a crisis response role. It took risk in
generating the 30 operationally available ships necessary to conduct a
two-Marine Expeditionary Brigade forcible entry operation. To lower
risk, the long-range shipbuilding plan strives to maintain an average
active inventory of 32 amphibious ships.
EARMARKS IN THE DEFENSE BILL
130. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, the Fiscal Year 2012
Defense Appropriations Bill contained approximately 100 items and slush
funds that were neither requested by DOD nor authorized in the NDAA.
These programs, earmarked by the Appropriations Committees, totaled
over $3.5 billion. The proposed reductions of $487 billion over 10
years does not include rolling back the earmarks that were not top DOD
priorities. Since you are restricted from reprogramming earmarked funds
to higher DOD priorities by provisions in Defense Appropriations bills
that require you to carry out the earmark at the exact levels of
funding provided, and given the fiscal constraints you are under, will
you work with me to remove these provisions from future appropriations
bills in order to provide the flexibility to spend funds on urgent,
unforeseen requirements actually validated by DOD?
Secretary Panetta. DOD's position is that the President's budget
requests what is required to meet our mission requirements each year.
Upon enactment of an appropriations act, DOD executes the enacted
programs, complying with reprogramming and transfer authorities.
131. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, if you are presented a
request for a formal position on a particular spending item of this
nature, can I expect a firm and unequivocal position from you stating
why you either oppose or support the spending?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, DOD leaders and I are always prepared to
state opposition to unrequested changes to the President's budget
because these changes divert funding from DOD's most pressing
requirements, as detailed in the budget.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
132. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, how well the JSF program
does under its contract for the fourth block of low-rate initial
production (LRIP-4) aircraft by the end of the year was supposed to
indicate how much the program is on track. But, with only about 50
percent of that work completed to date, we are already expecting a
total overrun (including concurrency costs) of almost $500 million. In
addition, on November 29, 2011, DOD's F-35 JSF Concurrency Quick Look
Report called for serious reconsideration of procurement and production
planning. And, just a few weeks ago, DOD's Chief Operational Tester
reported that a team consisting of the Services' operational test
agencies found that the F-35 program is not on track to meeting
operational effectiveness or operational suitability requirements. I
know we don't pay for all of the projected overrun on Lot 4, but with
that estimate and the assessments I just described, how can taxpayers
be confident that we're headed in the right direction?
Secretary Panetta. The strategic and budget reviews carried out
last fall reaffirmed the importance of the JSF program to the future
joint force. A number of steps were taken to align the program with the
outcomes of the these reviews of the Quick Look Report, including the
decision to slow the production ramp rate and align it with advances in
program maturity. Control of production costs is being achieved in part
by movement from cost-plus to fixed-price-type contracts and
developmental maturity progress. The F-35 program team achieved a
number of accomplishments over the past year, including the delivery of
13 aircraft and completion of initial F-35B sea trials on the USS Wasp.
The program completed F-35C static structural testing and improved the
schedule and cost performance of assembled wings and forward fuselage
deliveries to the production line mate station. Production F-35A and F-
35B have started Local Area Flights at Eglin AFB.
The F-35 LRIP Lot 4 contracts were negotiated as fixed-price
incentive-fee (firm target)-type contracts. The prime contractor,
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company (LM Aero), is projected to overrun
LRIP 4 costs by approximately 7 percent. This overrun percentage is
approximately half the overrun experienced on the F-35 LRIP Lots 1 to 3
cost-reimbursement-type contracts. On the LRIP Lot 4 contracts, overrun
costs on the aircraft and engines are shared equally between the
Government and the contractor until the overrun exceeds 20 percent of
the target cost, at which point the contractor is responsible for all
additional overrun costs.
Overall, there is much work ahead, but, through the multiple
successful reviews and corresponding adjustments in the past year, I
believe DOD has put the program on sound footing for the future. DOD's
assessments over the past year give me reason to believe the basic
aircraft designs are sound and will deliver. The remaining development
is focused on testing and integration. Schedule and resource
adjustments made to the remaining development program underpin a
realistic plan to deliver the required capability. While there is still
risk in the program, I have confidence in the resilience of the plan to
absorb expected further learning and discovery and stay on track as
long as it remains sufficiently resourced.
133. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, why, given these recent
developments, did you believe that lifting the F-35B from probation 1
year early was appropriate?
Secretary Panetta. In January 2011, Secretary Gates placed the F-
35B on what he referred to as probationary status because it was
experiencing significant technical issues. F-35B testing was decoupled
from the other two variants, allowing the program to increase focus on
F-35B-specific issues while testing on the other variants progressed.
Of the five specific technical issues identified by Secretary Gates in
2011, two have been resolved and three have temporary fixes in place
while efforts to develop permanent solutions are ongoing. All three
variants improved their testing performance in 2011. In particular, the
F-35B successfully completed more flights (333 completed/293 planned)
and more test points (2,636 completed/2,272 planned) than planned.
I made the decision to lift probation of the F-35B because it is
now demonstrating development, test, and production maturity comparable
to and not substantively different from the other variants. As with the
other variants, some additional technical issues have been identified
on the F-35B since probation began; however, these are consistent with
the kinds of issues to be expected in a development program.
134. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, is there a Plan B for the
F-35 JSF if both procurement and sustainment costs are not controlled
and if so, what could those options be?
Secretary Panetta. Currently, we are focused on reducing
procurement and sustainment costs. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) has directed
procurement affordability targets that will help ensure that, as the F-
35 program reaches the point that it is ready for full-rate production,
DOD will be able to afford to procure the quantities it needs.
Similarly, the USD(AT&L) established sustainment affordability targets
that will allow us to communicate expectations to the contractor so we
can control the cost to operate each aircraft, the annual costs to the
Services, and how much investment will be required over the total life
cycle of the F-35 program.
These affordability targets, and more importantly the actual costs
that we realize over the coming years, will provide us a better
understanding of whether we can afford to buy, fly, and sustain the
current total requirement.
If we are unable to reach affordable F-35 procurement and
sustainment costs, our first option would be to reduce the total
planned procurement quantities. Currently, the total planned
procurement for DOD is 2,443 F-35 aircraft. If the Services and DOD
determine that this plan is unaffordable, we would have to look at a
reduction to the total buy that is affordable. A reduction in the total
procurement quantity would also reduce total sustainment costs. Any
review of the total quantity would be conducted by assessing
affordability projections and capability requirements.
From a capability perspective, there is no alternative to the F-35.
The fifth generation capabilities that the F-35 will provide are
essential to accomplishing many of the primary missions identified in
the National Security Strategy. An affordable F-35 program will allow
DOD to replace legacy aircraft with fewer, more capable multi-role
strike fighter aircraft well-suited to meet the leaner requirements of
the new Defense Strategic Guidance.
HEALTH CARE
135. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the
budget proposes further TRICARE reforms which have been endorsed by
senior military leaders. What are the risks to DOD--in budget and
readiness terms--if Congress fails to enact the administration's
proposed health care reforms?
Secretary Panetta. If Congress does not provide us with needed
support, DOD's new Defense Strategy Guidance will be at risk. Without
the needed authority to implement these reforms, DOD will face further
cuts in forces and investment to be consistent with the BCA. DOD's
budget proposal already makes substantial reductions in the investment
accounts, so further cuts might fall mostly on forces. This could mean
cutting additional Active Duty and Reserve Forces by fiscal year 2017
to such an extent that DOD's ability to carry out the new Defense
Strategic Guidance could be jeopardized.
General Dempsey. If Congress fails to enact the proposed health
care reforms, DOD will be forced to shoulder the increasing cost of
military health care, likely at the expense of force structure and in
modernization. DOD's budget proposal already makes substantial
reductions in the investment accounts so further cuts could mean
cutting additional Active Duty and Reserve Forces, which would impact
DOD's ability to pursue the new Defense Strategic Guidance.
136. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what
additional reforms are necessary to better manage the current and
future costs of military health care benefits?
Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. DOD will continue to
aggressively pursue all possible avenues to better manage the current
and future costs of military health care. Changes in beneficiary cost-
sharing represent only one of the key steps that we are taking to
improve health care and reduce the rate of growth in health care costs.
We are also employing other approaches, including: (1) Moving from
healthcare to health, investing in initiatives that keep our people
well while promoting healthy lifestyle; (2) maximizing internal
efficiencies that reduce the administrative overhead of our military
health system; and (3) reforming provider payments by responsibly
paying private care providers and aligning with Medicare reimbursement
levels, as required by law.
CARE MANAGEMENT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS
137. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, 5 years have passed since
revelations by the press of substandard care management for wounded
warriors at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, which brought disgrace
on our Nation and our Government. Since that time, many reforms have
been instituted, and yet, according to recent testimony by the GAO,
implementation of reforms intended to streamline the care management
for the wounded, especially those transitioning to civilian life,
continue to be plagued by bureaucratic turf battles between DOD and the
VA, such that, according to GAO `` . . . the intended purpose of these
programs--to better manage and facilitate care and services--may
actually have the opposite effect . . . .'' What steps has DOD taken to
respond to the recommendations of GAO, as well as the Wounded Warrior
Care Coordination Summit, and numerous other studies to improve care
management for the wounded?
Secretary Panetta. First, in response to GAO's findings and
recommendations in the March 2011 Report titled ``Federal Recovery
Program Continues to Expand, but Faces Significant Challenges,'' a
majority of them pertained to implementation and oversight of the VA's
Federal Recovery Coordination Program. There are, however, two areas of
the report that directly involve DOD:
Duplication of case management efforts between VA and
DOD
Lack of access to equipment at installations
Duplication of Case Management Efforts between VA and DOD
DOD policy is that recovering servicemembers have the service of a
Recovery Care Coordinator (RCC), and that some may have a Federal
Recovery Coordinator (FRC) closer to when it is known that the
servicemember will transition out of the military and become a veteran.
The Service Wounded Warrior programs, in coordination with the Federal
Recovery Coordination Program, have drafted policy to implement a
referral process that is consistent with the Services desire to retain
responsibility for their recovering servicemembers.
Lack of Access to Equipment at Installations
Currently, there are 11 FRCs located at 5 major military medical
treatment facilities. These FRCs have designated workspaces and
equipment access.
Second, the Wounded Warrior Care Coordination Summit consisted of
four chartered working groups, each focused on a key area:
1. Education and Employment
2. FRC/RCC Collaboration
3. In Pursuit of Excellence--Documenting Best Practices
4. Wounded Warrior Family Resilience
Working group participants included multiple Federal agencies (VA,
Department of Labor, DOD's Offices of Wounded Warrior Care and
Transition Policy (WWCTP), and Military Community and Family Policy
(MCFP)), as well as representatives from each of the Military Services.
Several recommendations are currently being carried out by the
Recovery Coordination Program or its component programs. Additional
recommendations are being carried out by other participating agencies.
The outcomes of the Education and Employment Work Group were
expected to be: the achievement of a comprehensive strategy to provide
recovering servicemembers career-focused transition support early in
their rehabilitation; development of policy and guidance, including the
provision of resources when necessary; and establishment of outcome
measures and synchronization and leveraging of existing efforts to
ensure a consistent experience by all recovering servicemembers who
seek education or employment opportunities.
FRC/RCC collaboration resulted in five recommendations for better
integration and synchronization across these two programs. All have
been implemented as well as better communication among program
leadership and participation in each other's program training venues.
Recommendations of the Best Practices working group are being
implemented with the goal of achieving a consistent experience for all
recovering servicemembers across the continuum of care, including equal
access to resources; and the adaptation of support services to meet the
potential changing needs of servicemembers and families.
The Wounded Warrior Family Resiliency Working Group came up with
several recommendations, most of which are actively being implemented
by the combined efforts of the two DOD offices, MCFP and WWCTP, charged
with coordinating and executing these programs.
138. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, do you have confidence that
the Senior Oversight Committee of DOD and VA is capable of
strengthening and improving these systems of care for our wounded or is
there a more efficient mechanism that should be established in its
place?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, there is a more efficient mechanism that
has replaced the Senior Oversight Committee. On January 19, 2012, the
Joint Executive Committee Co-Chairs, who are the DOD Under Secretary of
Defense (Personnel & Readiness) and VA Deputy Secretary, agreed to
consolidate the SOC and JEC forums based on the recommendation from the
DOD Recovering Warrior Task Force. The new consolidated Joint Executive
Committee was given the guidance to:
Clearly articulate wounded, ill, and injured
servicemember issues
Include the appropriate level of senior leadership
Maintain former Senior Oversight Committee Wounded,
Ill, and Injured programs
In order to maintain a high level of visibility, the membership of
the new Joint Executive Committee now includes the Services Under
Secretaries and Vice Chiefs, Special Operations Command, the DOD
Comptroller, the ASDs for Health Affairs, and Reserve Affairs, and from
the VA the Under Secretaries for Health and Benefits, Principal Deputy
Under Secretary for Benefits, VA Assistant Secretaries for Information
Technology, and Policy and Planning, among other senior level members.
To ensure that systems of care for our wounded, ill, and injured
are maintained, strengthened, and improved:
All ongoing Senior Oversight Committee issues,
programs, and initiatives have been identified and
appropriately handed off to the Joint Executive Committee for
continued oversight and support.
In order to ensure any new and emerging recovery
warrior issues are quickly and adequately addressed, a new
joint Wounded, Ill, and Injured Subcommittee has been created
under the Joint Executive Committee to oversee these matters.
Emerging Wounded Warrior issues are now addressed
bimonthly at Joint Executive Committee meeting and quarterly
with DOD and VA Secretaries.
The integration of DOD and VA into a single team under the Joint
Executive Committee allows a world class continuum of care for our
wounded, ill, and injured warriors in such areas as:
Integrated Disability Evaluation System
Caregivers
Environmental/Toxic Exposures
Integrated Mental Health Strategy
Suicide Prevention
Electronic Health Record
Benefits
Some of the accomplishments to date include:
Increased sharing of health information between DOD
and VA
Implementation of new approaches to support patients,
their families, and caregivers
Development of new approaches to address suicide,
Traumatic Brain Injury, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Developed and implemented a Disability Evaluation
System pilot aimed toward one disability rating system
administered by both DOD and VA
Coordinated health care, rehabilitation, and delivery
of services that resulted in facilitating the highest level of
support ever to the wounded, ill, and injured
Comprehensive legislative and public affairs efforts
to keep servicemembers, veterans, family members, the public,
DOD/VA leadership, and Congress informed of new developments in
care
non-competitive health care contracts
139. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, DOD is required by law to
enter into sole source, non-competitive contracts with six commercial
health plans, known as the Uniformed Services Family Health Plan
(USFHP) that provide health care services to a small portion of DOD
family members and retirees at a cost of approximately $1.2 billion per
year. Do the contracts in effect today comply with the statutory
requirement for cost neutrality? If not, why not?
Secretary Panetta. Based on the most current data available to DOD
(fiscal year 2011), the negotiated rates provided to the USFHP plans
currently exceed the amounts mandated under Sec 726(b) of Public Law
104-201.
Beneficiaries Under Age 65--For beneficiaries under the age 65, DOD
estimates that the average cost per USFHP Prime enrollee was about 13
percent higher than the average cost per non-USFHP Prime enrollee, even
after adjusting for both geography and age/gender mix differences. This
cost difference is due to the fact that the fiscal year 2011 USFHP
rates were based on fiscal year 2009 costs trended to fiscal year 2011.
During the fiscal years 2009 to 2011 period, TRICARE Management
Activity introduced the Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS)
rates which decreased non-USFHP Prime costs significantly. In addition,
TRICARE Management Activity started to receive significant retail
pharmacy rebates which also decreased the costs for Prime enrollees. As
a result, costs for non-USFHP Prime enrollees increased more slowly
from fiscal years 2009 to 2011 than projected. The USFHP rates
incorporate the impact of pharmacy changes like OPPS and policy rebates
on a lagged basis. As a result, the USFHP rates for future years will
reflect these policy changes.
Beneficiaries Age 65 and Over--For beneficiaries age 65 and over,
with adjustments for geography or the age/gender mix, the USFHP costs
per enrollee were about 29 percent higher than the costs of the average
TRICARE For Life (TFL) beneficiary. The key reason for this 29 percent
difference is that the fiscal year 2011 USFHP rates were based upon the
costs of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries, rather than the costs
of TFL beneficiaries. Now that reliable and accurate TFL data are
available for both the DOD and Medicare portions of TFL beneficiary
costs, the government has proposed to use actual TFL experience rather
than non-DOD Medicare experience to calculate the fiscal year 2013
ceiling rates, which we expect will lead to a significant decrease in
rates for this cohort. A second factor is that the fiscal year 2011
USFHP rates were based upon TRICARE pharmacy costs in fiscal year 2009.
Since fiscal year 2009, DOD has started to receive large retail
pharmacy rebates. These rebates are incorporated into the USFHP rates
on a lagged basis.
140. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, please provide a comparison
of the per beneficiary costs for those enrolled to the USFHP with: (1)
those for whom DOD pays for comparable health benefits under TRICARE
Prime for under age 65 beneficiaries under its competitively awarded
TRICARE contracts; and (2) over 65 USFHP enrollees compared to
Medicare/TFL.
Secretary Panetta. After accounting for differences in both
geography and the age/gender mix, the average USFHP cost per enrollee,
both under and over 65, was higher than the average cost per non-USFHP
Prime enrollee in fiscal year 2011. Due to ongoing contract
negotiations, the exact differences are not provided above; however DOD
is willing to provide additional data for the committee's use in a non-
public forum.
141. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, if there is any further
postponement of transition of future Medicare eligible enrollees to
Medicare/TFL, what would be the impact on the DOD budget in fiscal year
2013 and over the FYDP?
Secretary Panetta. The impact on the DOD budget would depend on the
specific period of delayed transition, and whether a pattern of
changing this date is perceived. The Medicare Eligible Retiree Health
Care Fund (MERHCF) Board of Actuaries responsible for approving the
methods and assumptions used to calculate the budget impact must adhere
to professional standards, which requires consideration of
historically-enacted legislative changes and the past practice or
pattern of plan changes. If the Board determines a pattern of delay in
the transition date, it will decide to change assumptions regarding the
impact of the legislation that will result in a significant increase in
cost for the DOD budget in required contributions to the MERHCF.
Additionally, any delay in the effective date of the changes enacted
last year would increase mandatory spending from the MERHCF during the
period of delay.
COST NEUTRALITY OF THE TRICARE PRIME BENEFIT
142. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, under current law, the
TRICARE Prime benefit for retirees is required not to exceed the costs
of civilian care obtained under TRICARE Standard. Does the cost of
TRICARE Prime comply with current law for cost neutrality? If not, why
not?
Secretary Panetta. The Prime benefit is no longer cost neutral
compared to Standard/Extra plans. Under current law, the TRICARE Prime
is supposed to be cost neutral--that is, government costs for Prime
should not exceed the government costs for TRICARE Standard. Section
731(c) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1994 required that the benefit that
became known as TRICARE Prime ``shall be administered so that the costs
incurred by the Secretary under the TRICARE program are no greater than
the costs that would otherwise be incurred to provide health care to
the members of the uniformed services and covered beneficiaries who
participate in the TRICARE program.''
When TRICARE was implemented in 1996, the Prime enrollment fee was
set at a level higher than the standard fee in order to: (1) offset the
substantially reduced out-of-pocket costs, including the elimination of
the Standard deductible, the near-total elimination of the 25 percent
Standard inpatient co-pay, and the substantial reduction of outpatient
co-pays; and (2) make Prime cost neutral to the government. Subsequent
enactments regarding TRICARE for Active Duty family members have
superseded the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1994 requirement for Active Duty
family members, but not for Prime-eligible retirees.
Over the intervening years, a significant disparity in the cost to
government between Prime and Standard developed. This disparity was
recognized in 2005 and resulted in proposals to adjust cost shares to
both Prime and Standard/Extra. DOD was largely prohibited from changing
fees and co-pays until fiscal year 2012. The net result is that Prime
is not cost neutral in relation to the Standard/Extra plans. For a
working retiree family of three, the cost to DOD of providing health
care in fiscal year 2011: Prime--$13,442; Standard--$11,267. Prime
enrollment fees or other cost-sharing would need to be adjusted to make
Prime cost-neutral to Standard.
143. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, is cost neutrality an
appropriate test, and if so, what steps should be taken to restore it?
Secretary Panetta. Cost neutrality is a laudable goal and our
efforts should try to move in that direction. However, we cannot get to
complete cost neutrality without significantly increasing the cost
shares under Prime above the levels proposed in the President's budget.
The proposed increases in the Prime enrollment fee are one part. We
also believe that increases in utilization management envisioned under
the Patient Center Medical Home concept that we are implementing will
bring the cost of Prime closer to Standard.
FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORKFORCE
144. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, this budget requests a
precipitous and dangerous drop in military end strength which I believe
puts our Nation's security at risk. Why is there little or no reduction
planned for DOD's Federal civilian workforce?
Secretary Panetta. DOD's fiscal year 2013 budget reflects a
balanced workforce that decreases overall spending on military end
strength and DOD's Federal civilian workforce, as well as on contract
services. It reflects our best judgment today and represents a
carefully coordinated approach based on DOD's strategy and policy that
balances operational needs and fiscal reality without placing national
security and our overall defense posture at risk. Proposed reductions
in the military personnel levels reflect declines in our current
overseas commitments; revised strategy, posture, and operational
planning; and changes to our force structure. Additionally, the budget
request includes proposed civilian reductions that are proportional, as
a percentage of the overall civilian workforce, to proposed reductions
in the military's end strength. Reductions in civilian personnel are
predominantly associated with ongoing organizational assessments and
mission/function prioritization in an effort to reduce administrative
workload. It is important to note that DOD's civilian workforce
performs key enabling functions for the operating forces, such as
critical training and preparation to ensure readiness, equipment
modernization and reset, medical care, family support, and base
operating and infrastructure services--all vital services that support
our men and women in uniform and help meet the Nation's security needs.
145. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, what is the current policy
for hiring new employees?
Secretary Panetta. DOD fills its positions following Merit Systems
Principles and Regulations developed by the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM). Within these parameters, DOD strives to be a fair and
equitable employer offering equal employment opportunity to all
qualified citizens. Because of its size and the diversity of its
missions, DOD uses a wide range of authorities to fill positions in
both the Competitive and Excepted service in virtually every occupation
imaginable. Our agencies hire applicants from the public and private
sectors, and we place special emphasis on hiring veterans, military
spouses, students, and people with disabilities. We strive to be
innovative and responsive in our efforts to recruit and retain the best
talent available to meet our mission objectives in supporting our
warfighters, and appreciate the support we receive from Congress to
further this effort.
146. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, why is the administration
seeking a pay raise for Federal employees who, according to a January
30, 2012, report from the Congressional Budget Office, are compensated
16 percent higher than their private sector counterparts, and enjoy a
48 percent advantage in benefits?
Secretary Panetta. The pay raise for civilians included in the
budget request is not set by DOD, but rather is based on a government-
wide determination by OPM on behalf of the President. With the current
freeze on salary cost-of-living adjustments for Federal workers, the
Federal Government's benefits package is a necessary factor in
remaining competitive for a variety of occupations and locations. While
the Federal Government may lead the market in the area of benefits, it
still lags the market with regard to salaries for some occupations. It
is important to note that DOD's civilian workforce performs key
enabling functions for the operating forces, such as critical training
and preparation to ensure readiness, equipment modernization and reset,
medical care, family support, and base operating and infrastructure
services--all vital services that support our men and women in uniform
and help meet the Nation's security needs. Further salary freezes are
not in the best interest of DOD and will have an adverse impact on
readiness, mission capability, and could result in increased reliance
on contracted services and increased fiscal obligations.
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS DRAWDOWN
147. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, I am concerned that a rapid
reduction in the end strength of the Army and the Marine Corps will
degrade the readiness of the combat forces and break faith with an All-
Volunteer Force that defeated the insurgency in Iraq, that continues to
fight in Afghanistan, and may be called on again to defend this Nation
against its enemies. I would like you to explain--with specificity,
year-by-year--how you foresee the Army reducing its Active Duty
strength by 70,000 soldiers in 5 years?
General Dempsey. As part of the new Defense Strategic Guidance, the
Army will downsize approximately 79,000 soldiers to 490,000 in the
Active component, and will reduce its Reserve components by 9,000 from
358,200 to 350,200 in the Army National Guard and from 206,000 to
205,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve by the end of the FYDP. Temporary end
strength increase for the Active component was authorized by Congress
in 2009. By the end of September 2013, the Army will reduce the 22,000
temporary end strength increase and return back to a permanent Active
component end strength of 547,400. Generally, the Army will reduce an
average of 11,000 soldiers per year.
148. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, how do you envision achieving
these cuts using the manpower management tools available to shape the
force with incentives and early retirements?
General Dempsey. The Army's preliminary strategy provides a high
quality, mission-capable force, using precision, care, and compassion
to achieve end strength reductions without jeopardizing readiness. A
key precept of planning is that the Army will make the choices, to the
greatest extent possible, on who will remain and who will separate from
service. Although DOD's force reduction objectives include guidance to
maximize the use of voluntary separations, the Army's intent is to
apply lessons learned from the 1990s drawdown when the magnitude of the
voluntary separations made it difficult for the Army to control the
quality of those servicemembers choosing to separate. To ensure a
quality force following the drawdown and maintain faith with soldiers,
the Army intends to meet DOD's force reduction objectives by
selectively offering voluntary incentives (such as Temporary Early
Retirement Act) to soldiers whom the Army deems fully qualified but do
not meet the highest standards for continued service.
149. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, do you have a plan to address
the nondeployable population of our combat forces, such as about 25,000
Active Duty Army soldiers?
General Dempsey. Over 10 years of persistent and protracted
conflict has placed stress on the Army. The strain has increased the
rate of nondeployers at latest arrival date or date of deployment in
our BCT from 10 percent to 16 percent between fiscal year 2007 to
fiscal year 2011. From a tactical perspective, commanders at all levels
are actively engaged in identifying non-deployable soldiers and, in the
case of temporary non-deployable conditions, linking the soldier with
the requisite resources necessary to resolve the non-deployable
condition. From a strategic perspective, the Army staff is focused on
policy and implementation decisions necessary to reduce the non-
deployer rates in our units and to gain better visibility on the health
of the force. The Army established a Non-Deployable Campaign Plan in
April 2011 to develop systemic and policy changes aimed at reducing
this population. While we are only half way through fiscal year 2012
and there remain challenges with the units yet to deploy, we have seen
a reduction to just fewer than 13 percent so far this year. Since
medical issues continue to be the greatest contributor to non-
deployables, we are focusing on the Disability Evaluation System to
enhance, standardize, and establish measures of performance.
150. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, how do you envision Army
leaders will accomplish this without demoralizing the force and
breaking faith with soldiers who have sacrificed greatly?
General Dempsey. The Army is a values-based organization. The basic
values of dignity and respect were integral to its drawdown planning.
First, the Army intends to use reduced accessions and minimize the
number of currently serving soldiers being asked to leave the Service.
Second, the Army will use our proven centralized selection board
processes to identify both commissioned and NCOs with the greatest
potential for continued service as it shapes the force by grade and
specialty. Finally, commanders will be empowered to retain only the
highest quality soldiers. When feasible, fully qualified soldiers
identified as excess due to strength limitations will be afforded the
option to volunteer for reclassification into a shortage skill. In lieu
of involuntary separation, voluntary options (when applicable) will be
afforded to fully-qualified soldiers targeted to leave the Service.
REVERSIBILITY
151. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, I am concerned that returning
to pre-September 11 personnel levels within 5 years may damage
readiness and create structural problems within the Services, while
subjecting military members to an economy that hardly is in a position
to welcome them with open arms. You have indicated that ``the Army will
retain more mid-grade officers and NCOs even as their overall end
strength decreases to ensure we will have the structure and experienced
leaders necessary to regrow the force quickly.'' This has been referred
to as reversibility. I am concerned that at the basic infantry level,
this will degrade combat capability over time. Can you explain what
reversibility means and how it will be achieved?
General Dempsey. The new Defense Strategic Guidance released in
January 2012 notes that since we cannot predict how the strategic
environment will evolve with absolute certainty, we need to manage the
force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities
should they be needed to meet future unforeseen demands. The strategy
also notes that we need to retain intellectual capital and rank
structure that can be utilized to expand key elements of the force. The
Army is examining strategies, policies, and investments that would
posture the Army to slow down and reverse drawdowns of Army end
strength and formations, and regenerate end strength over the course of
a number of years in response to a future crisis.
This will involve reexamining the mix of elements in the Active and
Reserve components, maintaining a strong National Guard and Army
Reserve, retaining a healthy cadre of experienced noncommissioned and
midgrade officers, and preserving the health and viability of the
Nation's defense industrial base.
152. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, how will you avoid the repeat
of the poorly executed drawdown of the 1990s, which slashed recruiting
and first-term soldier strength, thus creating gaps that hurt the
Army--in order to retain more mid-career personnel?
General Dempsey. The Army's intent is to meet the fiscal year 2017
end strength targets with precision (by grade and skill) while
maintaining a high level of readiness and capability with an All-
Volunteer Force. We will minimize induced losses by lowering accessions
without jeopardizing future Army requirements. We will not sacrifice
our investment in leader development and will continue to shape
policies to support the Army's leader development strategy. We will
promote best-qualified soldiers to meet requirements. We will empower
commanders with the ability to retain soldiers with the greatest
potential for continued contributions. We will treat soldiers and their
families (both those who stay and those who leave) fairly.
The Army will target select NCOs (by means of a centralized
selection process) for involuntary separation when their grade/skill is
either projected over-strength or when promotion stagnation jeopardizes
viable career development paths in select career fields. Drawdown of
the force begins in fiscal year 2014 and continues over a 4-year
period. To ensure we prevent talent loss and to retain those
individuals with the greatest potential for future contributions, the
Army will decide who stays and who leaves; offering voluntary
separation options in lieu of involuntary separation when such
authority exists.
We will sequentially apply the levers of reduced accessions,
selective retention, force shaping boards, and voluntary incentives to
ensure that we retain high quality personnel as we achieve mandated end
strengths. We will also pursue qualified soldiers for transition to the
U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard where they can continue to serve.
153. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, would it not make more sense
to plan for a 10-year, conditions-based plan or one that adheres to the
original plan to reduce end strength by 49,000 soldiers?
General Dempsey. As part of the new Defense Strategic Guidance, the
Army will downsize approximately 79,000 soldiers to 490,000 in the
Active component by the end of fiscal year 2017. Initial planning for
the reduction noted three assumptions that must be achieved: (1) the
drawdown in Iraq will continue and that it will be completed by
December 31, 2011, (accomplished); (2) forces in Afghanistan will be
drawn down in accordance with current administration policy (on track);
and (3) Army forces will not be involved in a protracted conflict in
the immediate future (not expected). The Army's deliberate and
responsible drawdown plans will take into consideration operational
demands and unit readiness. It will proceed at a pace necessary to
ensure mission success and retain the flexibility to respond to
unforeseen demands at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for
our All-Volunteer Force. After conducting extensive analysis, the Army
concluded that maintaining end strength at 490,000 will meet the
demands described in the new Defense Strategic Guidance.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX FUNDING
154. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, last October you told the
House Armed Services Committee that you opposed attempts by some to
reduce the funding necessary for achieving the President's nuclear
modernization plan. When asked about a possible cut by the
Appropriations Committee, you stated: ``I think it is tremendously
shortsighted if they reduce funds that are absolutely essential for
modernization . . . if we aren't staying ahead of it, we jeopardize the
security of this country. So, for that reason, I certainly would oppose
any reductions with regards to the funding.'' The fiscal year 2013
budget for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) makes a
number of significant changes to the President's nuclear weapons
complex modernization plan. I understand many within DOD, including
STRATCOM, are opposed to these cuts. Do you still agree that a failure
to honor the carefully crafted modernization plan risks, as you stated
just 3 months ago, jeopardizing the security of this country?
Secretary Panetta. Modernization efforts remain critical to
ensuring a safe, secure, and effective deterrent for the long-term; it
will take years of sustained funding and effort to achieve this goal.
Infrastructure modernization, in particular, will offer opportunities
to reduce the number of reserve warheads needed to hedge against a
potential technical failure of a warhead type. The Nuclear Posture
Review of 2010 and the reports to Congress, pursuant to section 1251 of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 and section 1043 of the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2012, contain detailed and well-supported modernization plans.
Current fiscal realities, however, have driven DOD and NNSA to make
difficult decisions in prioritizing plans and funding for these
efforts, including the deferral or delay of programs and deliverables.
Such decisions were made to allow the two departments to shift
resources to certain projects and programs that meet the Nation's most
pressing nuclear weapons requirements. We are confident that these
decisions allow us to continue the necessary support to achieve the
goal of maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent, while also
supporting the long-term commitment to modernization of the nuclear
weapons enterprise.
2-YEAR DELAY OF THE SSBN(X)
155. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, I understand the budget
proposes delaying the replacement ballistic missile submarine for 2
years and estimates doing so will save $4.3 billion. Given prior year
statements from the Navy claiming that the schedule for procuring the
12 follow-on ballistic missile submarines is ``inextricably linked to
legacy [i.e. Ohio-class] ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)
retirements'' and that there is ``no leeway in this plan to allow a
start or any delay in the procurement plan,'' I am interested in
understanding why you now believe that a delay is possible?
Secretary Panetta. To comply with the BCA, the 2-year delay defers
and extends design efforts, freeing up $4.3 billion in the FYDP, as
well as reduces the available SSBN force to 10 ships during the
transition from the Ohio-class to the Ohio replacement. The absence of
extended overhauls during this transition period (2029 to 2042) helps
mitigate this reduced force level, which will meet at-sea presence
requirements with moderate operational risk during the transition
period. Unforeseen issues with construction of the Ohio-replacement or
emergent material problems with the aging Ohio-class could present
challenges. Full funding for continued design and construction of Ohio-
replacement to ensure on-time delivery and on-time Strategic Patrol
(lead ship in 2029) and properly resourced maintenance of the Ohio-
class will be crucial to minimizing operational risk during the
transition (2029 to 2042).
With the 2-year delay (fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2021) to the
Ohio replacement SSBN, there is no margin for further delay. Additional
delay would prevent meeting current sea-based strategic deterrent
requirements. The Navy will be closely managing risk during the
transition period.
156. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, does a delay instill
additional risk in the Navy's ability to maintain the same at-sea
availability rates required under current nuclear force posture? If
not, please be specific as to why.
Secretary Panetta. There is some additional risk during the
transition from Ohio class to Ohio replacement. To comply with the BCA,
the 2-year delay defers and extends design efforts, freeing up $4.3
billion in the FYDP as well as reduces the available SSBN force to 10
ships during the transition from the Ohio-class to the Ohio
replacement. The absence of extended overhauls during this transition
period (2029 to 2042) helps mitigate this reduced force level, which
will meet at-sea presence requirements with moderate operational risk
during the transition period. Unforeseen issues with construction of
the Ohio replacement or emergent material problems with the aging Ohio-
class could present challenges. Full funding for continued design and
construction of Ohio replacement to ensure on-time delivery and on-time
strategic patrol (lead ship in 2029) and properly resourced maintenance
of the Ohio-class will be crucial to minimizing operational risk during
the transition (2029 to 2042).
With the 2-year delay (fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2021) to the
Ohio replacement SSBN, there is no margin for further delay. Additional
delay would prevent meeting current sea-based strategic deterrent
requirements. The Navy will be closely managing risk during the
transition period.
157. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, does the current strategy
include any margin for design or development challenges?
Secretary Panetta. The 2-year delay (fiscal year 2019 to fiscal
year 2021) allows some additional time to mature designs and address
the programmatic risks associated with designing new systems and
integrating existing technology. To control cost and risk, the Ohio
replacement SSBN is planned to maximize reuse of Virginia- and Ohio-
class components and designs where feasible. Overall design maturity at
construction start will be no less than originally planned,
commensurate with the funding provided. However, any further delay to
Ohio replacement would result in fewer operational ships than necessary
to meet today's at-sea deterrent requirements during the transition
(2029 to 2042) from Ohio-class to Ohio replacement. Full funding for
Ohio replacement design and construction to ensure on-time delivery and
on-time strategic patrol (lead ship in 2029) is essential to preventing
further delays.
158. Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta, does this delay in any way
infuse additional risk in our national ability to meet our current
strategic requirements in the future?
Secretary Panetta. There is some additional risk during the
transition from Ohio-class to Ohio replacement. To comply with the BCA,
the 2-year delay defers and extends design efforts, freeing up $4.3
billion in the FYDP, as well as reduces the available SSBN force to 10
ships during the transition from the Ohio-class to the Ohio
replacement. The absence of extended overhauls during this transition
period (2029 to 2042) helps mitigate this reduced force level, which
will meet at-sea presence requirements with moderate operational risk
during the transition period. Unforeseen issues with construction of
the Ohio replacement or emergent material problems with the aging Ohio-
class could present challenges. Full funding for continued design and
construction of Ohio replacement to ensure on-time delivery and on-time
strategic patrol (lead ship in 2029) and properly resourced maintenance
of the Ohio-class will be crucial to minimizing operational risk during
the transition (2029 to 2042).
With the 2-year delay (fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2021) to the
Ohio replacement SSBN, there is no margin for further delay. Additional
delay would prevent meeting current sea-based strategic deterrent
requirements. The Navy will be closely managing risk during the
transition period.
AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES FUND
159. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, U.S. Forces in Afghanistan
are to draw down to around 68,000 by September of this year. Secretary
Panetta recently announced that the administration seeks to transition
lead combat responsibilities to the Afghan security forces in mid- to
late-2013--an enormous responsibility for a force that still faces
shortcomings in its ability to conduct operations. You have stated:
``Key to long-term stability in Afghanistan is the development of the
Afghan Security Forces.'' Yet, the budget request for the Afghan
Security Forces Fund (ASFF)--the primary tool for the training and
equipping of the Afghan Security Forces--is cut nearly in half from
what was enacted for fiscal year 2012. What is the reasoning behind
such a significant cut to the ASFF, particularly given the increased
role Afghan forces are to assume next year?
General Dempsey. The decrease in the fiscal year 2013 ASFF budget
is due to the fact that we are approaching the end of ANSF force
generation, equipment fielding, and facility construction. We are now
moving to a force development phase. The cost of training required in
the force development phase decreases for the following reasons: we are
no longer building a force from the ground up, so the number of
personnel that require training will decrease; and ANSF training
facilities are almost finished construction, so facility costs will
decrease. We are now beginning to transition ANSF training programs to
Afghan control. All of the ANSF's basic training courses, NCO, and
officer development courses are currently taught by ANSF personnel. The
number of Afghan Master Skill Instructors in the branch schools
continues to grow. The current projection is that the entire Afghan
training system will be under Afghan control with coalition monitoring
by the end of fiscal year 2013. This means that overall cost of
training will decrease dramatically as we move from contract to ANSF
instructors.
160. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, do you believe the Afghan
Security Forces will be capable of assuming lead responsibility for
combat operations in 2013?
General Dempsey. Yes. In 2013 when the ANSF assume the lead, we
will still be standing shoulder-to-shoulder with them. Our forces will
still be present to advise and assist the ANSF. This will allow the
ANSF to expand their capabilities and capacity without losing access to
the resources and enablers that U.S. and coalition forces provide.
161. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what capability gaps pose the
greatest risk to the ability of the Afghan Security Forces to assume
lead responsibility for combat operations in Afghanistan?
General Dempsey. The ANSF logistics system is our greatest
challenge at the moment. Improving their capability in this area is
critical to the long-term success of the ANSF as they assume lead for
security.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
SYRIA
162. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the
situation in Syria continues to deteriorate. Thousands of innocent
Syrians have been brutally murdered and countless have been wounded.
President Obama said in his State of the Union Address that in Syria,
he has ``no doubt that the Assad regime will soon discover that the
forces of change can't be reversed, and that human dignity can't be
denied.'' How do you judge the capabilities of the Free Syrian Army
(FSA)?
Secretary Panetta. (Deleted.]
General Dempsey. The capabilities of the FSA have steadily grown in
recent months; however, the organization remains beset by logistical
shortfalls and lack of unity among its leadership. Several of the FSA's
leaders have taken part in a public feud over the future leadership of
the movement, with some officers backing its founder, Colonel Riyad al-
As'ad, and others pledging loyalty to Brigadier General Mustapha al-
Shaykh. Both men have attempted to put aside their differences in
recent weeks by publicly announcing the unification of their efforts to
overthrow the Asad regime. FSA leadership unity continues to be
evaluated as a bellwether of the movement's capabilities.
The ability, or inability, of the FSA to exercise operational
control over the armed opposition bears continued monitoring. In recent
months, the FSA has issued several calls for the armed opposition
operating within Syria to unite under the FSA's banner, suggesting the
group has had difficulties exercising control over disparate armed
groups throughout Syria.
FSA members are actively seeking military aid from foreign
sponsors, including ammunition, small arms, and advanced weapons
systems.
163. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, members
of the administration have stated that we will exhaust all diplomatic
options in an effort to avoid any military confrontation though there
have been reports that the United States is beginning to rethink its
military strategy and support. What would this entail?
Secretary Panetta. The President has said that Assad must halt his
campaign of killing and crimes against his own people, step aside, and
allow a democratic transition to proceed immediately.
A political solution is the best means to achieve a stable,
democratic transition; military action should always be a last resort.
We are acting along several tracks. First, through the Department of
State and the U.S. Agency for International Development, we are
providing humanitarian relief to the Syrian people. Thus far, we have
provided more than $25 million to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), and both local and international nongovernmental
organizations to provide assistance to those who need it most. Second,
the Department of State is leading diplomatic efforts to isolate and
weaken the regime by building international consensus through the U.N.
Security Council, the Arab League, and the Friends of Syria Group. The
Department of the Treasury is doing its part by cutting off the
regime's revenue through sanctions. Third, we are assisting the
political opposition to strengthen and unite under a clear democratic
transition plan that brings together Syrians of all creeds and
ethnicities.
Even as we continue to examine and revise military options, I would
like to underscore that there are no simple solutions to the situation
in Syria, and that military action is not advisable at this time.
General Dempsey. We remain committed to supporting the
administration's efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to the
situation in Syria. The President has said that U.S. unilateral action
would be a mistake and we do not believe that military operations--such
as air strikes or other forms of intervention--are advisable at this
time. It is important that we continue to shape efforts within the U.N.
Security Council and with our regional partners in order to achieve a
positive outcome. The military, in conjunction with the U.S.
Interagency, continues to explore the provision of non-lethal
assistance to members of the peaceful opposition. We are reviewing all
possible additional steps, including military options, but this
planning does not equate to an intent or recommendation to execute a
particular plan.
164. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what is
the extent of the Syrian chemical stockpile?
Secretary Panetta. Syria's chemical warfare program is well-
established, with a stockpile of chemical warfare agents that can be
delivered by aerial bombs, ballistic missiles, and artillery rockets.
Syria has the facilities and expertise domestically to produce, store,
and deliver chemical agents, and we believe Syria is likely to continue
to seek to improve its chemical warfare capability for the foreseeable
future.
General Dempsey. Syria has a sophisticated chemical weapons program
that dates back several decades. Over that time, Syria acquired the
capability to develop and produce blister and nerve agents, including
mustard gas, sarin, and possibly VX nerve agent. Syria is still
dependent on foreign sources for some dual-use equipment and precursor
chemicals for agent production.
165. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what
can be done to secure the chemical stockpile if the Assad regime loses
control?
Secretary Panetta. We remain very concerned about the security of
chemical and conventional weapons in Syria. We have developed options
to address those concerns, and we are consulting with allies and
regional partners about how to address this potential proliferation
challenge.
General Dempsey. The United States continues to work very closely
with the U.N. to support Kofi Annan's U.N. Six-Point Peace Plan. These
efforts combined with the Friends of Syria Group provide the proper
international context for stability in Syria should the Assad regime
lose control. We have plans in place that cover a wide range of
potential scenarios and options to address those scenarios. We also
continue to work with our allies and regional partners to share
information and coordinate activities as we closely watch the security
and disposition of Syria.
166. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, are we
working with the Israelis to ensure these weapons do not get into the
wrong hands?
Secretary Panetta. This issue is of the highest concern to us, the
Israelis, and the rest of the international community. We are
cooperating with allies and regional partners across a range of
potential options to prevent the proliferation of weapons, both
chemical and conventional weapons. In addition--and in the midst of
growing instability in the region--the United States has continued to
strengthen the U.S.-Israel relationship in all aspects of cooperation.
General Dempsey. Ensuring Syrian chemical and biological warfare
does not fall into the wrong hands is clearly a shared security
interest with Israel. From past dialogues with Israeli leadership, I
know our understanding of the severity of the situation and possible
consequences of proliferation or use, whether inadvertent or
deliberate, is aligned. We are leveraging our longstanding and close
military-to-military cooperation with the Israeli Defense Forces to
make certain both of our militaries have an accurate assessment of
Syrian chemical and biological warfare capabilities and
vulnerabilities. I am confident that should the need to act arise, the
United States will be able to deconflict or to coordinate with the
Israeli Defense Forces as the situation demands.
167. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what,
if any, military options do you see for DOD?
Secretary Panetta. A core function of DOD is to conduct military
planning as crises evolve in order to provide options to the President.
In doing so, DOD looks into a variety of military options for various
contingencies. I cannot get into the specifics of these options in open
session, but I will reiterate that, although we continue to examine and
revise military options, there are no simple solutions to the situation
in Syria, and military action is not advisable at this time.
General Dempsey. U.S. unilateral action or military operations are
not advisable at this time. However, we continue to plan for a wide
range of potential scenarios and provide options to address those
scenarios. The Syrian crisis poses complex challenges ranging from
control of chemical and biological weapons to humanitarian assistance.
It is imperative that we continue to work with our allies and regional
partners to share information and coordinate activities within this
spectrum. The international community is closely monitoring the Syrian
situation and we support shaping any multilateral responses within U.S.
Government objectives.
TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN
168. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, I do
not see any tactical or diplomatic sense in your recent announcement
about telling the enemy the date we are going to pull out troops. This
gives the enemy an advantage on the ground and also eliminates any
incentive for the Taliban to engage in substantive political
negotiations with the Afghan Government. Our strategy in Afghanistan
must be based solely on the conditions on the ground and not on the
politics of the 2012 election. How does DOD plan to execute this
announced withdrawal while not further endangering the lives of our
troops and while still meeting operational demands?
Secretary Panetta. The administration announced that the U.S.
forces surge recovery will be completed by October 2012. We are
currently working with commanders in the field to determine additional
force reductions after October 2012. Plans for further reductions are
developing and not ready for final decision at this time. However,
future reductions will be tied to conditions on the ground and the
ability of the ANSF to provide security as they assume the lead for
security. The safety of our forces and the success of our mission are
the primary concerns in our planning efforts.
General Dempsey. We announced completion of surge recovery by
October 2012. We are currently working with commanders in the field to
determine further troop reductions post October 2012. Further options
are being developed and not ready for final decision. Future reductions
will be tied to conditions on the ground and ANSF capability to provide
security as they assume lead for security. The safety of our troops and
success of our mission are the primary concern in our planning efforts.
ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS
169. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, I recently met with the
senior leadership of the VA to discuss the ongoing integration of the
VA database with the DOD database in order to reduce duplication of
efforts. What current delays is DOD facing on the integration of
electronic medical records with the VA and when do you anticipate this
merger will be completed?
Secretary Panetta. VA and DOD have agreed to an overarching
strategy for the integration of health record data. VA and DOD are
currently working on the specific implementation plan for execution of
the strategy.
TRANSITION OF TROOPS TO CIVILIAN LIFE
170. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, you propose a decrease of
forces by 22,000 in fiscal year 2013 and 102,000 in the fiscal year
2013 FYDP. This reduction will take place amidst an American economy
with a consistent 8 percent unemployment rate. As such, what
initiatives do you plan to initiate in order to ensure a smooth
transition for our servicemembers to civilian careers?
Secretary Panetta. Realizing the state of the economy, the
requirement to decrease the number of our forces, and the need to
ensure a smooth transition of our military members into the civilian
sector, DOD has launched several initiatives that will aid separating
servicemembers. The initiatives include the:
Veterans Employment Initiative Task Force: In August
2011, the President called for the creation of a Task Force led
by the DOD and VA, with the White House economic and domestic
policy teams and other agencies, including DOL, to develop
proposals to maximize the career readiness of all
servicemembers. In coordination with these partners, DOD's role
involves implementing and sustaining a comprehensive plan to
ensure all transitioning servicemembers have the support they
need and deserve when leaving the military. This includes
working with other agencies in developing a clear path to
civilian employment; admission into and success in an academic
or technical training program; and successful start-up of an
independent business entity or non-profit organization. This
effort is fully aligned with 10 U.S.C. Chapter 58 as amended by
the Veterans Opportunity to Work (VOW) to Hire Heroes Act of
2011 and is consistent with DOD's commitment to keeping faith
with all of our military members and their families, providing
them a comprehensive set of transition tools and support
mechanisms as they complete their service to our Nation.
New Transition Service Delivery Model: DOD's long-term
aim for a new transition service delivery model is to embed the
servicemembers' preparation for transition throughout their
Military Life Cycle--from accession through separation, from
Active Duty service and reintegration, back into civilian life.
This will require thoughtful goal setting and planning to apply
military experience to longer-term career goals in the civilian
sector, whether after a single enlistment or a 20-plus-year
military career. Servicemembers and military leadership will be
engaged in mapping and refining development plans to achieve
post-military service goals--a significant culture change.
POST-MILITARY COMMISSION--TRAINING COSTS AND SCHEDULE DELAYS
171. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, my staff has been working
with your staff on determining cost and schedule delays for newly
commissioned military officers. How much money is being spent across
the Services on personnel between their post-commission and pre-
specialty training?
Secretary Panetta. Assessment of a cost of handling the annual
accession surge is not readily available and difficult to calculate
because of the varied number of valid and meaningful assignments, the
large number of military training pipelines, and the number of
personnel within those pipelines who may be delayed due to various
reasons (medical, weather, et cetera) rather than pipeline
inefficiencies.
The wait time a new officer experiences before starting training
does not directly correlate to down time or poor use of the officers.
Each of the Services works to maximize the utilization of officers
awaiting training through meaningful assignments which provide the new
officer with valuable professional experiences. The following methods
are used across the Services to stagger input to training:
Stagger ROTC accessions--law and policy allow the
Services to commission ROTC Cadets/Midshipmen and delay their
Active Duty start for up to 12 months and serve in a non-
drilling status in their Services' Reserve component
Temporarily assign to vacant positions during the time
they are awaiting training
Temporarily assign to supplement recruiting programs
Temporarily assign to augment staffs and operations to
cover work load increases or manning shortages (caused by
deployments)
Assign to ultimate position awaiting training
Permit the use of extended leave (up to 90 days)
Complete administrative training courses required for
future assignment
172. Senator Wicker. Secretary Panetta, additionally, what measures
has DOD implemented to reduce the amount of time and costs associated
with this down time?
Secretary Panetta. About two-thirds of DOD's annual officer
accessions graduate and are commissioned each year in May/June from the
Service Academies and Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) programs.
This presents a huge personnel/training logistical challenge--
sequencing over 8,000 initially accessed officers into constrained
specialty training pipelines without causing a training backlog or
pool. That sequencing execution is not simple and requires many
different methods to attempt to mitigate back-ups. However, the wait
time a new officer experiences before starting training does not
directly correlate to down time or poor use of the officer. The
Services strive to maximize the utilization of officers awaiting
training through meaningful assignments which provide the new officer
with valuable professional experiences. The following methods are used
across the Services to stagger input to training:
Stagger ROTC accessions--law and policy allow the
Services to commission ROTC Cadets/Midshipmen and delay their
Active Duty start for up to 12 months and serve in a non-
drilling status in their Services' Reserve component
Temporarily assign to vacant positions during the time
they are awaiting training
Temporarily assign to supplement recruiting programs
Temporarily assign to augment staffs and operations to
cover work load increases or manning shortages (caused by
deployments)
Assign to ultimate position awaiting training
Permit the use of extended leave (up to 90 days)
Complete administrative training courses required for
future assignment
Training facilities are planned on steady state requirements. Over
the last few years, increases in end strength have caused some
unusually long backlogs in some training pipelines due to facility
limitations. These backlogs are being alleviated and have been reduced
by as much as 50 percent. The most common delay in specialty training
is caused by weather. For example, in aviation training, an unusually
wet season can produce a backlog that may take several months to clear.
Each pipeline and schoolhouse is encouraged to minimize time-to-train,
and each training commander is evaluated on his/her training
efficiency.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown
MEADS PROGRAM
173. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, I understand USD(ATL)
Kendall is currently engaged in discussions with his German
counterparts to negotiate the termination of the MEADS program. When
can I expect a report from DOD on the program's reduced scope?
Secretary Panetta. On April 26, 2012, DOD provided to the
congressional defense committees the plan required by section 235 of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 that describes DOD's use of fiscal year
2012 funds as the U.S. final financial contribution under the MEADS
program.
174. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, last year's NDAA fenced 25
percent of funds for MEADS until such a report was delivered. Roughly,
how much of the fiscal year 2012 funding has been spent to date?
Secretary Panetta. Prior to delivery of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2012 section 235 report on MEADS, DOD provided $85 million to the NATO
MEADS program office, which is less than 25 percent of the $390 million
in fiscal year 2012 funding authorized and appropriated for MEADS. Upon
delivery of the report to the congressional defense committees in late
April, DOD provided an additional $250 million to the NATO MEADS
program office.
GLOBAL HAWK
175. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, with respect to DOD's
decision to terminate the Global Hawk Block 30 program, what were the
findings of sustainment cost comparisons between the U-2 and the Global
Hawk?
Secretary Panetta. When we initially invested in the Global Hawk
Block 30 program, it held the promise of providing essentially the same
capability as the U-2 manned aircraft for significantly less money to
both buy and operate. As the program has matured, these cost savings
have not materialized. In this 5-year budget, the cost of the Global
Hawk program was projected to exceed the cost of the U-2, so we
cancelled Global Hawk Block 30 and extended the U-2 program, avoiding
the cost to complete the Global Hawk Block 30 program and saving
roughly $2.5 billion over the 5 years.
176. Senator Brown. Secretary Panetta, can the U-2 alone provide
the ISR necessary in order to meet current and future operational
requirements?
Secretary Panetta. For high-altitude airborne ISR, the U-2 meets
current and future operational multi-intelligence requirements.
There are two different types of sensors on the U-2
and Global Hawk. When comparing sensors, the U-2 imagery sensor
suites are more capable than the Global Hawk sensors, whereas
the U-2 and Global Hawk Signals Intelligence sensors are
comparable.
High-altitude ISR is only one part of an aggregate
capability of space, airborne, and ground systems. These
systems operate together to sufficiently meet contingency and
enduring ISR needs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman
GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES
177. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, what shortcomings do you
feel exist in our ground combat vehicle fleet to operate effectively on
future battlefields?
General Dempsey. Current legacy platforms are aging and were
originally designed within the construct of linear, force-on-force
battle against conventional threats. They do not possess a sufficient
combination of force protection, survivability, payload,
transportability, command and control (C2), and reliability,
availability, and maintainability (RAM) required to operate in the full
spectrum of potential conflicts against existing and emerging hybrid
threats. Current add-on protection systems reduce payload, RAM, and
mobility needed to meet future operational requirements and add-on C2,
intelligence, and sensor systems exceed the size, weight, power, and
cooling constraints of current vehicle platforms. Development programs
such as ground combat vehicle, JLTV, and amphibious combat vehicle will
address identified shortcomings.
178. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, based upon the development
of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems across the Joint Force,
do our GCVs possess the necessary capabilities to integrate into these
systems?
General Dempsey. The current design of ground combat platforms did
not envision the sophistication of today's C2 systems. Where feasible,
these legacy ground combat systems have been integrated into the C4ISR
network, but are often limited by size, weight, power, and cooling
constraints. With regard to new systems in development, the Joint Staff
has updated the Network Ready overarching Key Performance Parameters to
ensure programs in development are designed to be interoperable and
supportable with existing C2 programs and other programs under
development.
179. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, what risks are associated
with the reduction of Heavy BCTs from the Army?
General Dempsey. The Army is carefully managing the force structure
reduction, ensuring that the resultant force is capable of meeting the
anticipated future requirements. We have assessed the planned reduction
in Army BCTs against the strategic guidance for DOD, and the programmed
inventory of Heavy BCTs is sufficient to meet the demands of our
strategy.
INDUSTRIAL BASE CONCERNS
180. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, the reduced funding profiles
in the President's proposed budget along with proposed program
cancellations will put a strain on different parts of the defense
industrial base across the spectrum, from the largest prime contractors
all the way down to third-tier vendors. You stated in your Defense
Budget Priorities and Choices Guidance, that in support of the
President's strategic guidance tenet of reversibility, the budget
sustains segments of the industrial base to regenerate capability, if
necessary. What criteria did you use to determine which parts of the
industrial base were sustained?
General Dempsey. DOD used information from AT&L's S2T2 assessment
project and insights from other internal and external sources to
characterize industrial base niches according to their criticality
(characteristics that make a product or service difficult to replace,
if disrupted) and fragility (characteristics that make small deviations
in the status quo likely to have substantial effects on the industrial
niche).
181. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, where do you see the
vulnerabilities and what decisions did you make that were particularly
influenced by industrial base concerns?
General Dempsey. Key vulnerabilities that may hinder our global
posture rebalance are: (1) a potential for atrophy and loss of key D&D
capabilities in the aviation industrial base; (2) a potential lack of
engineering and manufacturing skills necessary to support long-range
missile development; (3) low volume production in our Nation's
shipyards making it difficult for U.S. shipyards to match improvements
in technology and productivity seen in international shipyards; and (4)
disruption to the space industrial base related to solid rocket motors
due to the retirement of the Space Shuttle.
The space industrial base is a good example of DOD's efforts to
mitigate industrial base concerns. Multiple DOD components participate
in the Space Industrial Base Council Critical Technology Working Group
(CTWG). The CTWG is an interagency organization tasked to assess
structural issues in key domestic space industrial base sectors and
coordinate mitigation activities in areas of shared concern across
multiple government space agencies. This coherent, systematic effort is
focused on ensuring continued and reliable access to critical cross-
cutting space technologies, including associated launch vehicles and
support systems for the U.S. Government space community. DOD has also
employed authorities of the Defense Production Act to co-finance
capital expenditures to mitigate technical and business risks
associated with niche government-unique capabilities, including certain
batteries, solar cells and arrays, traveling wave tube amplifiers,
focal plane arrays, and star trackers.
182. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, how do you intend to monitor
the health of the industrial base to ensure reversibility, if
necessary, can be implemented in the future?
General Dempsey. DOD has adopted an initiative focused on
developing a more complete understanding of the complexity of the
defense industrial base. This initiative, known as the S2T2 assessment,
is a multi-pronged and comprehensive approach for monitoring the health
of the defense industrial base. It seeks to identify areas of
criticality (characteristics that make a product or service difficult
to replace, if disrupted) and fragility (characteristics that make
small deviations in the status quo likely to have substantial effects
on the industrial niche) that might require DOD intervention and
mitigation.
183. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, as program decisions are
made over the next 5 years, how will the impacts to the industrial base
be taken into consideration and if so, how will the assessment be
incorporated into the overall program decision?
General Dempsey. DOD continuously considers industrial base impacts
and adjusts accordingly. For example, prior to eliminating a defense
contract bidder in our acquisition process, we evaluate the competitive
marketplace and the consequences to the competitors. At Milestones B
and C decisions, through the acquisition strategy, the program assesses
the industrial base's ability to produce, support, and improve/upgrade
products to meet the program's cost, schedule, and performance
requirements--including all key sub-tier suppliers, as well as the
prime contractor. When there is an indication that a necessary
industrial capability is endangered, DOD will determine if it needs to
take action to preserve that capability.
COMPETITION IN PROCUREMENT PRACTICES
184. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, the value of competition in
our procurement practices is critical to achieving the best-value for
our Government and its taxpayers. It has been noted, to achieve the
long-term savings of competition, occasionally near-term investments
are required, something that may be an easy target of the budget axe
with long-term implications. Your documents outline some strategies to
overcome these challenges, like dissimilar competition, self-
competition, competition for profit, and other alternatives to classic
head-to-head, and they also outline some shortcomings in 2011 from
achieving the goals: delays from the contractors; the award of several
major weapon system programs; and delays and greater fidelity in data.
Despite these issues in 2011, we had a high in 2008 of 64 percent of
contracts competitively awarded, with a multi-year trend down to 58.5
percent in 2011. You have some modest goals of increasing this number
by single digit percentages in the coming years. What are the causes of
this downward trend and how do you plan to keep programs to their
competition strategies in the face of budget challenges?
General Dempsey. Much of the drop in the overall competition rate
is due to an increase in non-competitive contract actions involving
requirements with only one responsible source for major systems, such
as the LPD-26, the DDG-1000 ships, the Virginia-class submarine, and
several aircraft programs such as the F-22, C-17, C5, JSF, and P-8.
While these contracts were competitively awarded initially, the
contract actions issued in 2011 were follow-on efforts that were
carefully reviewed and determined to be non-competitive, with approved
sole-source justifications. Despite the drop in the overall competition
rate, there were several high-dollar major-system contracts
competitively awarded in 2011 such as the Littoral Combat Ships and the
DDG 114-116 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
DOD is placing renewed emphasis on promoting real competition and
improving competition rates under the Better Buying Power Initiative.
In order to encourage competition at the prime and subcontract level, a
policy was recently put in place that requires program managers to
present a competition strategy at each program milestone. Senior
leadership in AT&L reviews each of these strategies for Major Defense
Acquisition Programs and requires the Component Acquisition Executives
to do the same for programs under their cognizance. These initiatives
will facilitate DOD's ability to meet the goals established for the
upcoming years.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
SEQUESTRATION
185. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey,
according to recent reports, DOD Comptroller Robert Hale has told
reporters that DOD is not planning for sequestration, explaining, ``I
know nobody believes us, but I'd know if we were.'' According to these
reports, this is due to the fact that OMB has not told DOD to do so.
Can you confirm that DOD has been so directed by the administration?
Secretary Panetta. Consistent with direction from OMB, DOD did not
reflect the effects of the sequestration in its fiscal year 2013 budget
submission. The President's budget proposes over $4 trillion in
balanced deficit reduction, which Congress could enact and avoid
sequestration. DOD is not currently planning for sequestration. OMB has
not directed agencies, including DOD, to initiate any plans for
sequestration.
General Dempsey. Per OMB's direction last fall, this budget
complies with the BCA caps established by Congress. We will continue to
work with OMB and Congress to properly resource the capability to
defend our Nation and our allies.
REVERSIBILITY OF DEFENSE CUTS
186. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in your
strategic guidance announcement last month, both of you highlighted the
need to build in reversibility as these significant cuts to our
Nation's defense budget are made. The strategic guidance document also
states, ``the concept of reversibility--including the vectors on which
we place our industrial base, our people, our Active/Reserve components
balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis--is a key part of
our decision calculus.'' Reversibility sounds like a euphemism for
``we're not totally sure that these cuts represent sound policy.'' Is
it realistic to think that, within a reasonable time frame, we could
reverse decisions as monumental as downsizing our ground forces by
nearly 100,000 troops (close to pre-September 11 levels), delaying or
cancelling major acquisition programs, and retiring significant numbers
of current aircraft and ships?
Secretary Panetta. Reversibility represents a recognition that the
security environment is continually changing. DOD will be responsible
for a range of missions and activities across the globe of varying
scope, duration, and strategic priority. This will place a premium on
flexible and adaptable forces that can respond quickly and effectively
to a variety of contingencies and potential adversaries. The Joint
Force of 2020 will be such a force and I am confident that we will have
the ability to mobilize and regenerate forces and capability as needed.
General Dempsey. Reversibility is intended to deal with evolutions
in the strategic environment. Implementing reversibility will certainly
require vigilance to provide sufficient time to adapt to changes. By
considering the need for flexibility and the mechanisms to execute
future adjustments, we will be better prepared to do what is necessary.
DOD is developing an analytical framework in support of the concept
of reversibility. We are beginning to apply this framework to
investment decisions now and in the future.
DOWNSIZING OF U.S. LAND FORCES
187. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey,
according to the Defense Strategic Guidance document, the new strategy
must ``protect key investments in the technologically advanced
capabilities most needed for the future . . . [and] no longer size
Active Forces to conduct large and protracted stability operations
while retaining the expertise of a decade of war.'' As a result, you
have proposed eliminating about 100,000 soldiers and marines from the
force. Although weapons development can usually be accelerated, there
is no real way to accelerate the development of quality military
leaders during times of crisis. Our force has such leaders in it today,
including many thousands of NCOs who learned the hard lessons of Iraq
and Afghanistan. But once they leave the force, in most cases they
cannot be replaced. Following every war since World War II, the United
States has significantly reduced Army and Marine Corps levels while
focusing on developing air and sea forces. In recent decades, when
confronted with the next crisis--including Korea, Vietnam, and the
Persian Gulf--we have been forced to try to regenerate sizeable land
forces. How do you plan to ensure that we retain the expertise and
experience garnered by our NCOs and other leaders over the past decade,
preserving it for the next conflict, while making such drastic
reductions to our Army and Marine Corps?
Secretary Panetta.
Army
The new Defense Strategic Guidance released in January 2012 notes
that since we cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve
with absolute certainty, we need to manage the force in ways that
protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that may be needed to
meet future, unforeseen demands. The Strategy also notes that we need
to retain intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called
up to expand key elements of the force. The Army is examining
strategies, policies, and investments that would posture the Army to be
able to slow and reverse a planned drawdown of Army end strength and
formations, and rapidly expand over the course of a number of years in
response to a future crisis. To retain intellectual capital and rank
structure, the Army is identifying billets in its Generating Force that
can support such expansion.
Marine Corps
The planned reduction in the end strength of the Marine Corps
results in an increase in the percentage of staff noncommissioned
officers (SNCO), NCOs, and field grade officers. Additionally, we did
not reduce the size of our Reserve Force; this will provide an
opportunity for many to continue to serve and remain prepared for the
future.
These NCOs, SNCOs, field grade officers, and Reserve marines are
exactly the populations that have the expertise and experience garnered
from the last decade. Their expertise and professionalism will ensure
the next generation will receive the best training.
Perhaps as important as retaining the leaders is the plan to reduce
the force in a deliberate measured way that remains committed to
today's warriors. Maintaining the trust and confidence of today's
marines will go a long way to retain the confidence that is held by the
average American citizen. If and when the time comes for growth--
America's sons, daughters, mothers, and fathers will be eager to be
associated with the U.S. Marine Corps.
General Dempsey. Our NCO corps provides a great value to our Joint
Force and in winning our Nation's wars. On the heels of Afghanistan and
Iraq, reshaping our personnel across the Services will impact our
officers and junior enlisted community as well as our NCOs. Over the
next 5 years, as the Services implement their separation and retirement
processes to meet new authorized end strengths, we will ensure that we
maintain levels of experience and capacity in both our Active component
and operational reserve.
The Secretary made it perfectly clear during the budget rollout
strategy that the Services need to ensure mechanisms are in place to
retain our mid-grade NCOs and officers, so our pool of experience
remains balanced, relevant, and ready. My promise to the force in
keeping the faith is to ensure that our men and women are properly
trained and educated to meet any emerging requirements as may be
directed from our Commander in Chief.
188. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, given
that we are still fighting a land war in Afghanistan, coupled with our
historical inability to predict the next conflict, on what do you base
the conclusion that we will rely more heavily on air and sea
capabilities in the future?
Secretary Panetta. All Services will play integral roles in
addressing future U.S. security challenges across all domains.
The new Defense Strategic Guidance noted that, ``given that we
cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve with absolute
certainty, we will maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities
that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across a wide range of
missions.'' DOD's decision not to divest in the capability to conduct
any mission reflects this recognition that the future security
environment is uncertain. Given this unpredictability, the new Defense
Strategic Guidance commits to managing the force in ways that protect
its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet
future, unforeseen demands.
The abilities of our ground forces to ensure access, reassure
allies, deter adversaries, build security capacity and interoperability
with partners, and ultimately, respond to and succeed in crises and
contingencies, are indispensable and distinguishing features of U.S.
military capabilities. The nature of the future strategic environment
will require even greater flexibility and agility in projecting power
to accomplish the Nation's security objectives. As the U.S. Armed
Forces increase their operational focus on enhanced presence, power
projection, freedom of action, and deterrence in the Pacific--while
placing a premium on U.S. and allied military presence and support of
partner nations in the Middle East--air and sea forces offer distinct
strengths in accomplishing these global joint missions, alongside a
range of mutually-reinforcing U.S. ground forces' activities in these
regions. In other regions also, the complementary efforts of all the
Services across land, air, and sea, and increasingly, space and cyber
domains, are necessary to protect U.S. and allied security interests.
General Dempsey. As we draw down from the operation in Afghanistan,
and reduce our budget to help protect our Nation's economy, we have
assessed risks in keeping our Homeland safe and in our ability to
sustain leadership abroad. After weighing numerous options, an area
where we accept additional risk is in the size of our land forces--we
will not be sized to conduct long-term stability operations within the
Active component.
Any campaign we are likely to wage in the future will be fully
joint. After a decade of relying heavily on our ground forces, we must
ensure that we maintain our decisive edge in the air and maritime
domains against future challenges. Many of these sea and air
capabilities you speak of are not combat platforms; they are key
enablers and essential to power projection of the entire Joint Force,
to include ground forces--tankers, high-speed vessels, and ISR
platforms. Many of the air and sea combat systems that are being
fielded will enable cross-domain strike operations or in the case of
BMD, joint protection. In an unpredictable strategic environment, the
ability to project power anywhere on the globe is critical to rapidly
and effectively responding to emerging threats. Robust air and naval
capabilities are, and will continue to be, essential to maintaining
that ability.
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION AND CHINA
189. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, last
month you announced the U.S. military would pivot its focus to the
Asia-Pacific region. Yet, the significance of this announcement seems
to have been undermined by the cuts that were announced simultaneously.
Although the President has said that defense cuts ``will not come at
the expense of the Asia-Pacific,'' this promise seems hollow. These
deep and broad defense cuts will impact every aspect of our Nation's
defense capability and quantitatively reduce the overall capabilities
and forces that are available in the PACOM AOR. At the same time our
defense budget is bearing the brunt of our Nation's fiscal woes, China
is investing substantial funds in the modernization and build-up of its
military forces. According to DOD, China's official defense budget has
grown by an average of 12.1 percent each year since 2000. Analysts at
Jane's Defence have reported they expect China's defense spending to
accelerate substantially in the next 3 years, at a combined annual rate
of 18.7 percent per year. At the same time, Secretary Panetta's
prepared testimony notes that, ``when reduced war-related funding
requirements are included, we expect total U.S. defense spending to
drop by more than 20 percent over the next few years . . . '' What is
your assessment of the risk the United States assumes by making such
drastic cuts to our defense spending while China grows its defense
budget and continues its military modernization efforts at an
unprecedented rate?
Secretary Panetta. The United States is a resident power in the
Asia-Pacific region with enduring interests in the region. We will
maintain, and in some areas enhance, our military presence in the Asia-
Pacific region by making our posture more geographically distributed,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. The United States
will retain the capacity to deter conflict and, if necessary, prevail
in any contingency. We are investing in those capabilities most
relevant to preserving the security, sovereignty, and freedom of the
United States and that of our allies and partners.
Despite reductions in the U.S. defense budget, we are improving
capabilities that maintain our military's technological edge and
freedom of action, in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. We are
increasing investments in both defensive and offensive cyber
capabilities. In terms of power projection, we increased or protected
investment in capabilities such as the development of a new bomber,
cruise missile capacity of Virginia-class submarines, a conventional
prompt strike option from submarines, and electronic warfare
capabilities. We have sustained Army and Marine Corps force structure
in the Pacific, and we are increasing our rotational presence--for
example, through the deployment of marines to Darwin, Australia.
At the whole-of-government level, reducing risk to U.S. interests
is a function of all elements of national power. As stated in the new
Defense Strategic Guidance, we will emphasize our existing alliances
and expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners
throughout the Asia-Pacific region to ensure collective capability and
capacity for securing common interests.
General Dempsey. Given our current economic and fiscal situation,
reduced defense budgets are and will be a fact of life not just for
DOD, but for the U.S. Government as a whole. The defense budget will of
necessity be reduced and everyone will be asked to do as much or more
with fewer available resources. Our military forces are not exempt from
this reality. However, we should also remain aware that managing risk
is not simply a matter of how much money we spend on defense.
Reducing risk to U.S. interests is a function of all elements of
national power, to include our diplomatic and cooperative efforts. Our
relationships with Asian allies and key partners are critical to the
future stability and growth of the region. We will emphasize our
existing alliances, which provide a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific
security. We will also expand our networks of cooperation with emerging
partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability
and capacity for securing common interests. It is primarily through
these efforts that we can best ensure long-term stability in the Asia-
Pacific region and protect U.S. national interests.
However, we are also continuing to make necessary capability
investments and adjustments to our force posture in the Asia-Pacific
region in order to preserve our ability to project power in denied
environments should the need arise. Additionally, we are also
protecting other key components of the Joint Force, including Special
Operations Forces; unmanned air systems; sea-based unmanned ISR
systems; advanced ISR with increased capabilities; and all three legs
of our nuclear deterrent. Our focus is to ensure the we are fully
prepared to meet any threats to the security of the United States, its
citizens, allies, and partners.
190. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey,
according to DOD's 2011 report, ``Military and Security Developments
Involving the People's Republic of China,'' China's long-term,
comprehensive military modernization improves China's capacity to
conduct high-intensity regional military operations, including anti-
access and area denial operations. What is your assessment of the
intent behind China's military modernization, both in the region and
globally?
Secretary Panetta. (Deleted.]
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]
191. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in
recent years, our Nation has experienced an increasing volley of cyber
attacks and cyber theft emanating from China, and this is of great
concern to many Senators. According to an October 2011 report by the
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, ``Chinese actors
are the world's most active and persistent perpetrators of economic
espionage.'' The report goes on to highlight that ``computer networks
of a broad array of U.S. Government agencies . . . were targeted by
cyber espionage; much of this activity appears to have originated in
China.'' What is your assessment of this growing threat?
Secretary Panetta. I agree with the findings of the Biennial Report
to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage,
2009-2010: ``Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in
Cyberspace,'' prepared by the Office of National Counterintelligence
Executive. The threats to our Nation in cyberspace continue to grow at
an alarming rate. In particular, the extensive cyber-enabled
exploitation of U.S. intellectual property and trade secrets is a
direct threat to vital U.S. economic and national security interests,
including DOD's ability to field the most technologically advanced
force. DOD is working closely with its interagency partners, including
the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Justice, and Commerce, to
facilitate a coordinated approach to cyber threats, not only from
China, but from others actors as well. We must develop options to
respond to and impose costs on cyber threat actors to deter future
exploitation and attack. The President stated in his International
Strategy for Cyberspace that the United States reserves the right to
use all necessary means--diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic--as appropriate and consistent with applicable international
law--in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our
interests against hostile acts in cyberspace.
General Dempsey. The number of cyber intrusions appearing to
originate in China is extensive, and U.S. businesses and government
agencies will continue to see this type of activity in the coming
years. China is likely using its computer network exploitation
capability to support intelligence collection against the U.S.
diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors that support
U.S. national defense programs. The targeted information could
potentially be used to benefit China's defense industry, high
technology industries, foreign policy decisionmakers, and military
planners, who likely are building a picture of U.S. defense networks,
logistics, and related military capabilities that could be exploited
during a crisis. Observed intrusions have varied in sophistication and
Chinese cyber actors appear to have the capability to adapt their
methods depending on the cyber defenses of the target.
192. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, do you
agree that such aggression is unacceptable and does serious damage to
U.S.-China relations?
Secretary Panetta. I agree with the findings of the Biennial Report
to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage,
2009-2010: ``Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in
Cyberspace,'' prepared by the Office of National Counterintelligence
Executive. The threats to our Nation in cyberspace continue to grow at
an alarming rate. In particular, the extensive cyber-enabled
exploitation of U.S. intellectual property and trade secrets is a
direct threat to vital U.S. economic and national security interests,
including DOD's ability to field the most technologically advanced
force. DOD is working closely with its interagency partners including
the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Justice, and Commerce, to
facilitate a coordinated approach to cyber threats, not only from
China, but from others actors as well. We must develop options to
respond to and impose costs on cyber threat actors to deter future
exploitation and attack. The President stated in his International
Strategy for Cyberspace that the United States reserves the right to
use all necessary means--diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic--as appropriate and consistent with applicable international
law--in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our
interests against hostile acts in cyberspace.
General Dempsey. As cyber events carry the potential to affect
civilian infrastructure and military readiness, it is important that we
communicate our concerns regarding the negative impacts of ongoing
cyber security risks. We are working to engage China on this issue to
strongly reinforce the potential benefit to our overall relationship by
improving efforts to curtail cyber attacks emanating from the mainland.
ISRAEL AND IRAN
193. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, in terms of meeting the
Iran threat, the United States has certain military capabilities that
Israel and other allies do not. How are we working with Israel to
narrow the gaps between our respective capabilities and helping to
ensure that Israel is able to defend herself against potential threats
from Iran?
Secretary Panetta. The U.S.-Israel defense relationship is strong,
and we are working with Israel more closely than ever before in areas
such as missile defense technology, counterterrorism, and across a
range of military exercises--to ensure that Israel is always secure. We
are engaged in a regular dialogue with senior Israeli officials to
understand their security requirements and maintain Israel's
qualitative military edge. A critical element of this is providing
Israel with the most advanced technology in the region, including the
fifth generation JSF. Through a combination of providing Israel
technology like this, and our extensive work with Israel on missile
defense, we are ensuring that Israel can defend itself.
FUTURE OF EGYPT
194. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, just
over a year ago, the Egyptian people took to the street and overthrew
President Hosni Mubarak. Today, it appears that Islamist factions are
poised to take control of the Egyptian Government and the country's
future. What is your assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood?
Secretary Panetta. (Deleted.]
General Dempsey. (Deleted.]
195. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what
impact will a Brotherhood-led government have on the longstanding
relationship between the U.S. military and the Egyptian military?
Secretary Panetta. DOD and the Egyptian military have been close
partners for many decades, and the United States is committed to a
robust bilateral relationship with Egypt today and following the July
transition to civilian rule. Through annual military exchanges, foreign
military assistance, combined exercises, and other engagement efforts,
we look forward to maintaining and strengthening this partnership for
decades to come. Regardless of political changes, DOD believes that the
fundamentals of this strategic relationship remain strong.
The United States expects that Egypt will maintain its
international security commitments, including its treaty obligations
with Israel. The Muslim Brotherhood has provided public assurances of
its commitment to the international obligations undertaken by the
Government of Egypt.
General Dempsey. This is a new Egypt and we will need to build new
partnerships, even as we sustain the old ones. We intend to engage in a
comprehensive review of how our assistance can best meet the needs of
the Egyptian people and advance our shared interests and aspirations.
This is best accomplished through broad-based consultations with all of
the institutions of the new government. The United States and Egyptian
militaries have been strong partners, and we expect that partnership to
continue.
196. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how are
we strategically adapting to the new role the military is taking within
the Egyptian Government?
Secretary Panetta. The United States is committed to a robust
bilateral relationship with Egypt today and following the July 2012
transition to civilian rule.
We will take steps both to strengthen old partnerships and build
new ones. DOD will engage in close dialogue with Egyptian military and
civilian officials on the wide range of security and defense issues of
mutual interest to our governments.
Events of the Arab Awakening have clearly demonstrated that
military-to-military partnerships are critical for protecting enduring
U.S. security interests, and also for providing a channel through which
U.S. defense officials can discuss the importance of reform. To this
end, we will use annual military exchanges, foreign military
assistance, combined exercises, and other engagement efforts, to
strengthen our partnership with the Egyptian military and promote
reform for years to come.
General Dempsey. The strength of our military relationship with
Egypt is a source of influence. We saw the importance of the
relationship in the early days of the revolution during which the
United States urged Egyptians to refrain from violence. The United
States now supports the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the new
parliament in the successful completion of the transition. We need a
strong, stable Egypt as our partner. From here, the only path to
sustainable stability in Egypt is a successful democratic transition.
Egypt has made important progress toward democracy over the past 12
months. For the first time in 60 years, Egyptians have elected a
representative parliament, which now exercises legislative authority,
and presidential elections are scheduled for May. These are important
milestones in Egypt's transition to civilian government. We look to
Egypt for everything from maintaining its peace treaty with Israel, to
joint counterterrorism and anti-weapons smuggling efforts, to
preferential access for U.S. ships transiting the Suez Canal. The
Egyptian military's role in Egypt will continue to change. As that
happens, we want to ensure that we protect our longstanding
relationships and build new ones.
197. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, there
has been a great deal of discussion in Congress that military
assistance to Egypt should be cut because of the Egyptian Government's
actions against American pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations
(NGO). In your opinion, should this be a factor when determining future
levels of aid to Egypt?
Secretary Panetta. The administration remains concerned about the
ongoing trial of NGO employees, as well as the ability of civil society
organizations to work in Egypt. Both publicly and in private
conversations with Egyptian officials, General Dempsey and I have
discussed the importance of allowing civil society organizations to
operate freely in Egypt.
Our strategic relationship with Egypt remains one of the most
important in the region. U.S. security assistance to Egypt is an
important demonstration of our commitment to supporting Egypt at this
moment of historic challenges and remains a cornerstone of our security
cooperation and partnership on regional security issues.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) plays a critical role in efforts
to professionalize the Egyptian military, so that the armed forces can
better serve the interests of the Egyptian people and jointly advance
our mutual security priorities. Notably, the decision by the Egyptian
military in January 2011 to avoid firing on peaceful demonstrators and
to side with protesters demanding the resignation of former president
Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, was a vital step in allowing Egypt's
democratic transition to take place.
U.S. bilateral assistance to Egypt is guided by the need to
safeguard our strategic interests in maintaining a critically important
bilateral partnership with Egypt and in supporting the success of a
democratic transition for Egypt that meets the aspirations of all
Egyptians.
General Dempsey. First and foremost, our security partnership with
Egypt, reinforced by FMF, remains critical to our interests across the
region. We look to Egypt for everything from maintaining its peace
treaty with Israel to joint counterterrorism and anti-weapons smuggling
efforts, to preferential access for U.S. ships transiting the Suez
Canal. Disrupting FMF right now could put these critical interests at
risk. We also have a powerful interest in a successful democratic
transition. We need a strong, stable Egypt as our partner. From here,
the only path to sustainable stability in Egypt is a successful
democratic transition.
198. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what is
the strategic thinking behind the continued provision of U.S. military
assistance to Egypt?
Secretary Panetta. Our strategic relationship with Egypt is one of
the most important in the region. U.S. military assistance to Egypt
remains an important demonstration of our commitment to supporting
Egypt at this moment of historic challenges, and reflects the vital
U.S. interest in continued security cooperation with Egypt, whose peace
with Israel is a cornerstone of regional stability.
U.S. bilateral assistance to Egypt is guided by the need to
safeguard our strategic interests in maintaining this important
bilateral partnership and in supporting the success of a democratic
transition for Egypt that meets the aspirations of all Egyptians.
General Dempsey. Continued U.S. military assistance allows us to
protect our core national security interests in Egypt. For over 30
years, Egypt's peace treaty with Israel has been a cornerstone of peace
and stability as well as security along the Egyptian-Israeli border.
FMF supports our critical partnership with Egypt on counterterrorism
and their efforts to stop arms smuggling. Lack of success in either
mission has the potential to destabilize the region. Issuing this
waiver allows Egypt's military to maintain its readiness and
interoperability with U.S. forces, which is essential for effective
cooperation on regional threats. The recent FMF waiver supports
America's force posture across the region which relies heavily on
overflight rights and priority access to the Suez Canal.
MILITARY VOTING
199. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, the Military and Overseas
Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act, enacted by Congress as part of the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2010, requires DOD to create a motor voter-style voting
assistance office on every military installation, thereby providing
military servicemembers and their families with critical voting
assistance, regardless of how far they might be from their hometowns.
As the 2012 elections fast approach, I am concerned that the Military
Services have dragged their feet on fully implementing this
requirement. This provision was passed in order to provide
servicemembers the same level of assistance that civilians receive
under the Federal motor voter law--the National Voter Registration
Act--I know you agree that their service and sacrifice demand no less.
Why has DOD failed, to date, to fully comply with this requirement?
Secretary Panetta. The first Installation Voting Assistance (IVA)
Office was established in November 2009 and the final IVA Office was
established in August 2011. Before finalization of the IVA Office
regulations, DOD aggressively moved to support the Services with
training programs and assistance visits. Draft copies of these
regulations were provided to the Services throughout that regulatory
coordination process both for the Services' comment and for their IVA
Office establishment preparation.
DOD also promptly moved to support the Services before finalization
of the regulations with IVA Office-in-a-Box training programs, visiting
36 military concentration areas in August and September 2010, providing
complete IVA Office training packages, templates, and draft documents,
copies of which will be provided to this committee and your office. DOD
also initiated its biennial Voting Assistance Office Workshops this
spring, with a special training module for IVA Office personnel. During
those workshop visits, DOD personnel are also conducting assist-and-
assess visits at local IVA Offices to determine compliance with
departmental regulations and Federal laws, and to provide direct
assistance for IVA Office personnel. Forty assist-and-assess visits
have already been conducted this year, and approximately four more are
conducted every week. A list of those IVA Offices already visited and
to be visited will be provided to this committee and to your office.
Additionally, the Services are reporting quarterly on their IVA Office
utilization, those reports are posted on the FVAP.gov website, and
copies of those reports will be provided to this committee and to your
office.
200. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, are you willing to get
personally involved to ensure the Military Services comply with the
MOVE Act and the motor voter law on every military installation, as
required?
Secretary Panetta. Yes, and I share your desire to provide our
military voters timely and effective voting assistance. I welcome the
opportunity to work with you and this Committee to assess whether to
allow the Services to execute this voting assistance at the unit vice
installation level, increase voter assistance utilization, reducing
costs to the Services, and providing voters a seamless unit level
voting assistance process.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORM
201. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Panetta, you have shown an
unprecedented commitment to making DOD audit-ready. It is my hope that
future Secretaries of Defense will share that impressive level of
commitment on this important issue. DOD was previously required by law
to be audit-ready for the first time in 2017. Last year, you raised the
bar and stated a more ambitious goal for DOD to achieve audit readiness
of the Statement of Budgetary Resources for general funds by the end of
2014. What progress has been made to date in achieving this goal?
Secretary Panetta. In October 2011, I directed DOD to accelerate
achievement of several goals in DOD's Financial Improvement and Audit
Readiness (FIAR) Plan and place greater emphasis on the overall effort.
In response to my October directive, each of the Services and Defense
Agencies has reviewed their FIAR Plans and adjusted them to speed
progress. They are now hard at work implementing their plans to achieve
the accelerated SBR audit readiness date.
The Service Secretary and Chief of Staff for each Military Service
have committed to achieving specific near-term goals in support of
their plans for achieving auditable financial statements. I have
reviewed these commitments and plans and am holding civilian and
military senior leaders from across DOD accountable for progress
against those plans. Senior executives, both inside and outside the
financial management community, now have audit goals in their
individual performance plans and we are working to include them in
General and Flag Officer performance plans as well. Actual performance
against these plans will be assessed each year during annual
performance appraisal cycles. This will ensure those under their
leadership are getting the message that better control over resources
has a big effect on mission success, and everyone has a part to play.
I'd offer some recent accomplishments as examples of both our
commitment and progress:
DISA achieved a clean opinion on its $6.6 billion
working capital fund operations for fiscal year 2011 and it is
moving forward with an audit of its fiscal year 2012 general
fund business.
Contract Resource Management of the TRICARE Management
Activity received an unqualified opinion on its fiscal year
2011 financial statements.
The Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund
received a qualified opinion on its fiscal year 2011 financial
statement.
In November 2011, an examination of five business
processes at the initial General Fund Enterprise Business
Systems Wave 1 sites rendered a qualified opinion, establishing
a benchmark for expanding the Army's audit readiness program.
In November 2011, a commercial audit examination
validated that the Air Force could successfully balance its
Treasury funds at the transaction level.
In January 2012, an examination validated the Navy's
existence and completeness audit readiness assertion for ships
and submarines, Trident missiles, and satellites.
Leadership commitment from the highest level is setting the tone
and priority for audit readiness. Auditability is a goal that every
commander, every manager, and every functional specialist must
understand and embrace to improve efficiency and accountability within
DOD.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE
202. Senator Vitter. General Dempsey, in your statement submitted
today, you say, ``We must retrain our personnel on skills used less
often over the last decade.'' I support this, and I also believe that
in line with this we must make cuts that do not negatively affect the
joint effort of our overall training system that has led the United
States to become the highly effective elite fighting force it is today.
Which brings me to the Air Force announcement to cut all 24 A-10s from
Barksdale AFB (21 eliminated, 3 transferred) according to Air Force
documents. It is my understanding that the Air Force plans to largely
reduce the total number of A-10s. I believe this hugely effects
fundamental joint operations. These aircraft were specifically moved to
Barksdale AFB to support joint training at the Joint Readiness Training
Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk. My concern is that the A-10s slated to be
cut entirely from Barksdale AFB are used to support the joint training
mission of the Army in Fort Polk. Have the joint operational training
aspects been considered in this decision?
General Dempsey. Yes, the Air Force continues to source requests
for close air support (CAS) training at Fort Polk, tasking specific
units to support various exercises, with the 47th Fighter Squadron
fulfilling the requirement once over the last 3 fiscal years. The Air
Force has coordinated with the Army and will continue to provide CAS
capability as required by our Joint Partners at the JRTC.
The new Defense Strategic Guidance states that U.S. forces will no
longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.
Analysis based on scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance
resulted in a reduced requirement for tactical combat aircraft overall
and a greater utility for multi-role fighters to provide the most
flexible capability within each scenario. As a result, A-10 retirements
were selected in greater numbers than other combat aircraft and the Air
Force made the difficult choice to retire 5 A-10 squadrons comprised of
102 A-10 aircraft. Previous reductions in fighter force structure
shifted the Total Force ratio toward Reserve component forces, and Air
Force decisions in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request
rebalanced that ratio to create a more sustainable Total Force
structure over the long term.
To meet this end, our Reserve component used the following four
Capstone principles: (1) ensure aircraft reductions do not negatively
impact operational support to combatant commands; (2) ensure force
structure movements do not create any new Air Force bills; (3) ensure
risk is minimized by optimizing crew ratios to exploit expected
increases in mission capability rates; and (4) consider locations that
continue to have an Air Force mission due to the presence of another
Air Force component. Thus, the Air Force opted to divest A-10s at
Barksdale versus the only other alternative; Whiteman AFB. The Air
Force Reserve maintains a B-52 training wing and classic association
with operational B-52s at Barksdale, and can therefore absorb some of
the A-10 personnel into the B-52 wing. Additionally, since the Air
Force Reserve can absorb personnel into the B-52 mission, it preserves
the potential to migrate them back should the Air Force decide it needs
additional A-10 Formal Training Unit support. At Whiteman AFB, the Air
Force Reserves' only presence is an A-10 wing and if the wing were to
be divested, the personnel assigned to this unit would have limited
possibilities to continue their service.
203. Senator Vitter. General Dempsey, additionally, I would like to
know if you are aware of any consultation between the Army and the Air
Force regarding the removal of this mission from Fort Polk? If so, I
would like to see the cost savings to DOD of bringing A-10s into
Louisiana for training when the nearest planes needed for Army training
would now be located in Georgia, Florida, Idaho, or Arizona.
General Dempsey. The Air Force has coordinated with the Army and
will continue to provide CAS capability as required by our Joint
Partners at the JRTC. The Air Force has not performed a specific cost
analysis of using aircraft outside of Louisiana. The Air Force
continues to source requests for CAS training at Fort Polk, tasking
specific units to support various exercises. Over the last 12 months,
the 47th Fighter Squadron has provided 14 percent of the CAS
requirements for nine JRTC exercises while other CAS was provided from
outside the State of Louisiana.
204. Senator Vitter. Secretary Panetta, as a follow-up on the joint
operations aspect in Fort Polk, this action would appear, instead of
reducing overall military spending, to oppose your own recent guidance
to reexamine our programs in pursuit of greater efficiencies and
affordability to defense operations. I fully understand and support
improving efficiencies within the U.S. Government. However, in your own
words you have stated, while not specifically addressing the A-10s,
that cuts of this nature would do serious damage to DOD's ability to
``protect this country for the future . . . and we must avoid a hollow
force, and maintain a military that will always be ready, agile,
deployable, and capable.'' It is my opinion that we cannot have it both
ways. We cannot strip away the A-10s from Barksdale while also
maintaining the force necessary at Fort Polk without increasing cost of
operations. I am aware there will be A-10s remaining in the inventory
should the Air Force retire the ones stationed at Barksdale AFB. But of
all the units to be disbanded, it appears to me that the A-10s located
at Barksdale AFB were strategically located there to satisfy a specific
requirement that is not going away. Is it fair to say that the A-10
training mission at Fort Polk is an existing requirement that is not
going away anytime in the near future?
Secretary Panetta. The new Defense Strategic Guidance states that
U.S. Forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged
stability operations. Analysis based on scenarios consistent with the
Strategic Guidance resulted in a reduced requirement for tactical
combat aircraft and a preference for multi-role fighters to provide the
most flexible capability within each scenario. As a result, A-10
retirements were selected in lieu of other combat aircraft and the Air
Force made the difficult choice to retire 5 A-10 squadrons comprised of
102 A-10 aircraft. Previous reductions in fighter force structure
shifted the Total Force ratio toward Reserve component forces, and Air
Force decisions in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request (20
A-10s from Active Duty, 61 from the Air National Guard, and 21 from the
Air Force Reserves) rebalanced that ratio to create a more sustainable
force structure over the long term. In conjunction with Air Force
Reserve leadership, the Air Force made the difficult decision to select
Barksdale AFB as the sole Air Force Reserve A-10 unit closure.
The Air Force does not anticipate any impacts to support training
operations at the JRTC. We will continue to fill U.S. Army training
requests for air-to-ground support through the normal Global Force
Management Allocation process, matching requirements with available
CAS-capable units across the Air Force, versus a specific squadron and
type of aircraft.
205. Senator Vitter. Secretary Panetta, Global Strike Command at
Barksdale AFB was stood up in December 2009 to improve the safety,
security, and effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear-capable assets
following the 2007 nuclear weapons incident. As DOD reinvests in key
areas across the nuclear enterprise, I would imagine Global Strike
Command will have a prominent role, including in the development of the
new bomber program. What are your thoughts on the triad in general and
the Air Force's commitment to keeping Global Strike Command as an
independent command at Barksdale AFB, given some of the lessons we have
learned?
Secretary Panetta. Maintaining the nuclear triad is essential to
U.S. national security. Each leg of the triad provides characteristics
that, combined in a balanced manner, create a synergy producing a total
deterrent effect. Air Force Global Strike Command, as the major command
with operational responsibility for land-based ICBMs and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers, plays an essential role in providing the
deterrent effects contributing to strategic stability.
Since Air Force Global Strike Command falls under the Air Force's
Title X organize, train, and equip responsibilities, any decisions
regarding Air Force Global Strike Command as an independent command
would be an internal Air Force decision. With the stand-up of Air Force
Global Strike Command, the Air Force aligned its strategic operational
nuclear units under a single command to best carry out organize, train,
and equip functions. As the Air Force's newest major command, its
positive impact was confirmed by the April 2011 Defense Science Board's
independent assessment of the Air Force nuclear enterprise stating,
``The formation of Air Force Global Strike Command has produced a
nearly universally positive response in the nuclear operating forces.''
[Whereupon, at 1:50 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Webb, Hagan, Blumenthal, Inhofe, Chambliss, Wicker,
Brown, Ayotte, and Cornyn.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Jason W.
Maroney, counsel; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member;
and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Ann E. Sauer, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative counsel; Paul C.
Hutton IV, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member; and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Brian F.
Sebold, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Brian Burton,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Gordon
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Patrick Hayes, assistant
to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator
Shaheen; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony
Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Clyde Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to
Senator Wicker; William Wright, assistant to Senator Brown;
Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; and Dave Hanke,
assistant to Senator Cornyn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today we receive
testimony on the posture of U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific and
the status of the U.S. military strategic global distribution
and deployment capabilities.
On behalf of the committee, I'd like to welcome Admiral
Robert F. Willard, Commander, USN, U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM), and General William M. Fraser III, USAF, Commander,
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). The committee
appreciates your years of faithful service and the many
sacrifices that you and your families make for our Nation.
Likewise, we greatly appreciate the service of the men and
women, military and civilian, who serve with you in your
commands. Please convey to them our admiration and our
appreciation for their selfless dedication.
Admiral Willard, this will be, in all likelihood, your last
hearing before this committee after a full and productive tour
as commander of our forces in the Pacific. On behalf of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, I'd like to thank you for your
service and your leadership in this important assignment.
Before and beyond that, your decades of selfless and
devoted service to our Nation included assignments as Commander
of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, and Commanding Officer of
the air carrier USS Abraham Lincoln.
I note that your wife, Donna, is here this morning, as she
has been in past hearings. I'd also like to especially thank
her for her many contributions and sacrifices. We all know very
well the importance of our military families to the success of
our Armed Forces and we wish you and the entire Willard family
the very best in the future.
This is General Fraser's first hearing as Commander of
TRANSCOM. As we heard from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff earlier this
month, the President's recently unveiled defense strategic
guidance includes a reemphasis on the Asia Pacific, a region
that is impacted by what has been called the tyranny of
distance, which puts a premium on the capabilities provided by
TRANSCOM. Capabilities that have been stressed and honed over
more than 10 years of military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. So we also look forward to General Fraser's
testimony on the status of TRANSCOM and its important global
mission.
Relative to the Asia Pacific, the United States has been,
and will continue to be, present and active in the region
because of our commitments to our allies and our partners, and
also because of the clear U.S. national interests there.
The leadership change in North Korea occasioned by the
recent death of long-time dictator Kim Jong Il opens new
questions about possible future threats from an oppressive
regime that has shown little interest in cooperating with the
international community and little concern for the well being
of its people. We are mindful that the security situation on
the Korean Peninsula remains tense and as of yet there are no
indications that the situation will improve under the new
regime. North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear and
ballistic missile programs and, with its history of deadly
unprovoked military attacks on South Korea, there is little
reason for optimism for a prompt resolution of the tensions on
the peninsula. In fact, over the weekend North Korea issued its
usual threats in response to the military training exercises
conducted by the United States and South Korea every year at
this time.
China's rising global influence and rapid military growth,
coupled with the overbreadth of its claims in the South China
Sea and the East China Sea, and its increasing propensity for
challenging conflicting claims of its regional neighbors,
unsettles the region and raises concerns about the prospects of
miscalculation. There are also growing concerns about China's
exploration of cyber space for military and for nonmilitary
purposes, such as the use of the Internet by Chinese entities
to conduct corporate espionage. In the current National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), we acted against counterfeit
electronic parts in defense systems, most of which came from
China. Nonetheless, it is important that we continue efforts to
engage with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and to attempt
to find common ground and to address common concerns.
There are many other challenges facing PACOM, such as
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), countering violent extremism, providing humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, and protecting critical sea
lanes of communication.
Against the backdrop of these developments, the Department
of Defense (DOD) has been working to realign U.S. military
forces in countries like South Korea and Japan and also to
posture our forces further to the south in countries like
Australia, Singapore, and possibly the Philippines. As we
rebalance and realign our presence in the Asia Pacific, it is
important that we get it right, not only in terms of strategy,
but also in terms of sustainability.
With respect to the realignment of U.S. marines on Okinawa,
Senator McCain, Senator Webb, and I have advocated changes to
the current plan in ways that support the strategic goals of
the U.S. military posture in the region, while also accounting
for the fiscal, political, and diplomatic realities associated
with long-term sustainability. The recent announcement that the
United States and Japan are reconsidering elements of the plan
is welcome news. But the new thinking is not yet adequate.
For instance, there is apparently no intention yet to
reconsider the plan to build the unaffordable Futenma
Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa. Nor does it
appear that the Air Force bases in the region are being
considered as part of the solution. It is important that any
changes be jointly agreed upon and jointly announced, with the
goal of achieving a more viable and sustainable U.S. presence
in Japan and on Guam.
So, Admiral, we will look forward to your testimony on our
strategy in your area of responsibility (AOR) and how the
fiscal year 2013 budget request adequately addresses the
threats that you face and how it reflects the reemphasis on the
Asia Pacific.
General Fraser, we know that things have been busy for you
as well ever since you assumed your job at TRANSCOM. TRANSCOM
continues to play a vital role in transporting our military men
and women and the supplies and equipment that they need to
Afghanistan and other overseas contingency operations. In
carrying out this mission, TRANSCOM faces numerous challenges,
included among them,uncertain lines of supply due to the
disruption or closure of routes through Pakistan. TRANSCOM has
successfully shifted much of the delivery of non-lethal
supplies and equipment headed for Afghanistan to the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) through Eastern Europe, the
Caucasus, and Central Asia.
During the past year, TRANSCOM forces were involved in
supporting forces engaged in operations in Libya and
humanitarian relief efforts such as those supporting victims of
the Japanese earthquake and tsunami. We applaud all of these
efforts.
With the drawdown of U.S. surge forces and further
reductions of U.S. forces in Afghanistan through 2014, TRANSCOM
now faces the daunting task of managing the redeployment home
of these forces and their equipment. We know that TRANSCOM
performed commendably in managing the removal of millions of
pieces of equipment from Iraq by the December 31, 2011,
deadline, consistent with the U.S. obligations under the U.S.-
Iraq strategic agreement. We would be interested, General, in
learning how the lessons learned from the withdrawal from Iraq
inform TRANSCOM's planning and operations as U.S. forces are
drawn down in Afghanistan.
A number of other issues confront TRANSCOM. One is
modernizing the force. One acquisition program supporting
TRANSCOM has received a lot of visibility and that's the
Strategic Tanker Modernization Program. There have been
indications that the contractor may overrun the original
development contract price, which we will discuss with the Air
Force at the Air Force posture hearing later this month.
TRANSCOM has received congressional additions to the budget
to buy C-17 aircraft in excess of what DOD and TRANSCOM said
were needed to support wartime requirements. Last year, the Air
Force was granted authority to retire additional C-5A aircraft
as it was taking delivery of those added C-17s. This year, the
Air Force is seeking authorization to retire all remaining C-5A
aircraft because they believe that they do not need the extra
aircraft under the new DOD strategic planning assumptions and
that they cannot afford to operate them.
We need to be sure that the Air Force's planned retirements
do not leave us short of the strategic lift capability that we
need, and General Fraser, you can speak to that issue.
TRANSCOM is also facing other, less well-known
modernization challenges. The Ready Reserve Force (RRF), a
group of cargo ships held in readiness by the Maritime
Administration, is aging and will need to be modernized with
newer ships at some point in the not too distant future.
Sealift may not be quite as glamorous as airlift operations,
but sealift support is critical to our Nation's capabilities.
We have relied on sealift to deliver more than 90 percent of
the cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan, and that is similar to
previous contingencies.
So, Admiral, General, it's a pleasure to have you with us
this morning. We look forward to your testimony on these and
other challenging topics; and I now call on Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Admiral Willard and General Fraser, for your selfless service
for so many years and your willingness to cooperate and have
personal conversations. Thank you so much.
Admiral Willard, I agree with everything you wrote in your
final assessment of the strategic environment in the Asia-
Pacific region and its significance to the U.S. security.
However, I am concerned about what appears to me to be a shift
in focus to Asia and to the Pacific. The United States is a
global power. We have global threats out there and we need to
be on all fronts. History has taught this Nation that it can't
ignore its global responsibilities and threats.
I am deeply concerned about the proposed $487 billion cut
in defense in the next 10 years. When you stop and think about
it, the possibility of sequestration could double that amount.
It's very disturbing to me. I think these cuts jeopardize reset
of equipment and delay modification and maintenance of key
equipment, cut overall research and development (R&D), delay
modernization, and increase the burden on a shrinking military
force.
Our military must possess the ability to deter aggression
and, if required, aggressively defeat any threat against our
citizens at home and around the world. Both TRANSCOM and PACOM
are essential elements to our national defense strategy and
must be manned, equipped, and maintained to ensure our national
interests throughout the world.
In PACOM's AOR, I am increasingly concerned about North
Korea and the rising power in China, both economically and
militarily. North Korea has historically proved difficult for
the intelligence community to gather information. I will have
some specific questions about that, some of the things that
have happened in the past, and I want to get your assurance as
to where we're going to be going in the future. We're obligated
by law to support Taiwan. We all want to do that anyway. We
have to continue to sell advanced military equipment to them to
ensure their safety and security.
General Fraser, your statement portrays a very active
supporting commander role. TRANSCOM and its components--the Air
Mobility Command (AMC) and the Military Sealift Command (MSC)--
have accelerated the redeployment of over 60,000 troops from
Iraq and Afghanistan. It continues to provide logistical
support to Afghanistan forces and to deploy and redeploy troops
and cargo worldwide. It has supported military operations in
Libya and delivered relief support in response to natural
disasters at home and around the world. No other country could
provide such in-depth support anywhere.
While President Obama's 2013 budget submission represents a
snapshot of the Services' overall requirements, it also raises
several questions about our military airlift and sealift
programs. Is the Air Force taking appropriate action to
mitigate the potential gap in airlift and the operational
implications of that gap? What is the risk in TRANSCOM's
ability along with its maritime component, MSC, to provide
logistics around the globe in response to the combatant
commanders' requirements? How does the proposed force structure
cut fit with the findings of the mobility, capabilities, and
requirements study of 2016, written in 2009?
Given the current climate for fiscal austerity, we have to
do our part in executing our jobs more efficiently. It's very
disturbing to a lot of us that when we have the President's--
now that all the results are in on his budget, that he's
actually given us this $5.3 trillion deficit and the only area
that I can see where we've had reductions in capability and in
funding are in the area of military. So it's something that's
very disturbing to me. I know in these hearings it's hard to
get down to these things, but I do enjoy the personal
conversations and the concern that's been expressed by a lot of
our military that I run into here as well as abroad with what's
happening to our military right now.
So I'm looking forward to this hearing, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Chairman Levin. Mr. Chairman,
in order to accommodate the committee's questions sooner, I'll
keep my remarks brief and ask that my full statement be
included for the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be. All statements will be
included.
Admiral Willard. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe: Thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss PACOM and
the Asia-Pacific region. I'd like to begin by thanking you for
recognizing my wife, Donna, who's present here today and has
been by my side for nearly 38 years. She's an outstanding
ambassador for our Nation and a tireless advocate for the men
and women of our military and their families. Together we've
thoroughly enjoyed this experience with our counterpart foreign
friends and with all of you who advocate for our men and women
in uniform.
I'd like to acknowledge this committee's enduring support
for our joint forces and by your actions their contribution to
our Nation's security. Your visits to the region have been and
will continue to be an important reminder of U.S. interests
there.
President Obama and SECDEF Panetta recently reaffirmed the
strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region and our
Nation's future focus on its security challenges in the
document titled ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, Priorities
for the 21st Century Defense.'' It appropriately addressed the
opportunities and challenges that PACOM faces in a region
covering half the world and containing the majority of great
powers, economies, populations, and militaries.
Importantly, our five treaty allies, Australia, Japan,
South Korea, Republic of the Philippines, and Thailand,
together with many regional partners, represent the greatest
opportunities for the United States and PACOM to contribute to
a broad security association in the region. Of particular note,
we seek to advance our important relationship with India in
South Asia.
We're making progress in adjusting PACOM's force posture
towards Southeast Asia following overtures from Australia,
Singapore, and the Philippines to help enable an increased
rotational U.S. military presence in this important sub-region.
As was evidenced by U.S. support to Japan during their epic
triple disaster last March, close military cooperation,
frequent exercises, and interoperable systems merged to enable
rapid and effective combined military responses under the most
trying conditions.
In contrast, North Korea, the world's only remaining nation
divided by armistice, continues to threaten peace and security
in northeast Asia, now under the leadership of a 29-year-old
son of Kim Jong Il. We're observing closely for signs of
instability or evidence that the leadership transition is
faltering. As General Thurman will attest when he testifies, we
believe Kim Jong Eunto be tightly surrounded by Kim Jong Il
associates and for the time being the succession appears to be
on course. That said, we also believe Kim Jong Eun will
continue to pursue his father's course of strategy that
embraces nuclearization, missile development, WMD
proliferation, provocations, and totalitarian control over
North Korean society.
Management of the U.S.-China relationship continues to be a
challenge at many levels. Our military-to-military relationship
is not where it should be, although a strategic-level exchange
of views with DOD persisted during 2011. The PLA continues to
advance its military capabilities at an impressive rate. It's
growing bolder with regard to their expanded regional and
global presence, and China continues to challenge the United
States and our partners in the region in the maritime, cyber,
and space domains. Nonetheless, we remain committed to evolving
this security relationship, with the objective of coexisting
peacefully and both contributing constructively to regional
security.
Throughout the Asia Pacific, numerous transnational threats
such as violent extremist organizations, proliferation,
trafficking, piracy, and perpetual natural and manmade
disasters challenge our Nation and our allies and partners in
the region. Across this wide spectrum of current and potential
future threats, PACOM must provide persistent overwatch,
ensuring our Nation retains continued strategic access and
freedom of movement in the global commons there.
Amidst these challenges, every day our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and civilians devote their efforts to
contributing to Asia Pacific security. Their success has long
been enabled by this committee's enduring support, including
the resources and quality of life you provide them to
accomplish their important missions.
During the 2\1/2\ years that I've been in command, you've
allowed me and my commanders to share our perspectives with
you, sought to understand the dynamics of this complex region,
and traveled and met with our military families and foreign
partners. Yours has been a powerful message in demonstration of
United States commitment to the 36 nations within the PACOM
AOR. On behalf of the more than 330,000 men and women of PACOM,
thank you for your support and for this opportunity to testify
one final time.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Robert F. Willard, USN
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for this opportunity to present an update on U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM). I consider myself fortunate to have served as
its commander for the last 2\1/2\ years and look forward to providing
what will be my final assessment of the strategic environment in the
Asia-Pacific region. The President has directed his national security
team to make America's ``presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top
priority.'' The testimony that follows will highlight the opportunities
we seek to illuminate and address the challenges we must overcome to
sustain U.S. leadership in this critical area of the world.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN THE ASIA PACIFIC
The security of the PACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) is of vital
national interest to the United States--a fact underscored by the
President's hosting of last year's Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) Leaders Meeting. The region contains the world's three largest
economies and supports over $10 trillion of annual bilateral
merchandise trade, including more than $1 trillion of U.S. commerce.
The Asia Pacific also hosts the world's largest populations,
largest militaries, and includes three nuclear armed states (excluding
the United States) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
which aspires to be a nuclear power. While the Asia Pacific has
remained relatively peaceful and stable for the past 6 decades, myriad
challenges to its future security will try U.S. resolve, raise the
magnitude of our relationships with five treaty allies and many
strategic partners, and test PACOM as a principle guarantor of security
in the region.
Seven major security challenges confront the United States across
this region, which encompasses half of the Earth's surface, including:
Defense of the Homeland, U.S. territories, and compact
states in the Pacific.
The need to continuously manage and optimize U.S.
alliances and strengthen regional partnerships, in particular,
advancing the relationship with India.
The threat posed by the DPRK's nuclear aspirations,
proliferation, provocations, and potential to cause regional
instability.
China's military modernization--in particular its
active development of capabilities in the cyber and space
domains--and the questions all these emerging military
capabilities raise among China's neighbors about its current
and long-term intentions.
Three nuclear armed states, including Russia, China,
and India, and North Korea's nuclear aspirations, together with
the threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation.
Numerous transnational threats, ranging from
proliferation, trafficking of narcotics and persons, and
piracy, to persistent natural and manmade disasters.
Challenges to freedom of access to, and security
within, maritime and air domains, and space and cyberspace, by
both state and non-state actors.
By contrast, the Asia Pacific also affords immense opportunities,
particularly through strong ally and partner associations, that can
lead to a cooperative and constructive security environment for the
foreseeable future. In large measure, cooperative engagement activities
leveraging PACOM posture and presence contribute to advancing military
self-sufficiency and security contributions by our partners in the
region.
Force Posture Assessment
Generally, PACOM has been well served with regard to on-hand, ready
forces with the ability to respond to the demands in the Asia-Pacific
region. This has occurred despite a decade of wars in the Middle East,
to include the Command's continual contributions to those wars. As a
consequence of both history and the nature of challenges in Northeast
Asia, PACOM forward, permanently based forces are concentrated in Japan
and the Republic of Korea. While affording a strong deterrent against
challengers such as North Korea, this has placed a premium on PACOM's
ability to deploy and sustain forces elsewhere in order to maintain the
required presence in sub-regions such as Southeast Asia, South Asia,
and Oceania.
PACOM's input to the most recent Global Posture Review expressed a
need to redistribute postured forces closer to Southeast Asia and South
Asia, in order to more efficiently meet the force presence and response
demands of those Asia Pacific sub-regions. The recent decisions to
rotationally operate a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) from
Darwin, Australia and to operate U.S. air forces from Australia's
northern air bases were initial efforts to rebalance PACOM force
posture for the future.
While the Asia Pacific is often regarded as inherently maritime and
contains some of the world's most expansive archipelagos, strategic
chokepoints and largest seas and oceans, its militaries tend to be
army-focused. For PACOM, this generates posture and presence
considerations to both adapt forces to the maritime challenges of the
region and to account for the necessary and effective role that Army,
Marine Corps, and Special Forces play in engaging with the dominant
foreign services of our regional partners.
NORTHEAST ASIA
Northeast Asia (NEA) contains many of the most significant
economies and militaries in the Asia Pacific and the world, including
Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia. U.S. forward presence, permanent
basing in Japan and South Korea, habitual accesses, and host nation
support in this important sub-region enable PACOM's front line of
homeland defense, extended deterrence for allies Japan and South Korea,
regional deterrence against actors such as North Korea, and rapid
response to natural disasters and other contingencies that occur in the
Asia Pacific.
The DPRK continues to pose one of the most likely and persistent
threats to the United States, its allies, and to peace and security in
Northeast Asia. North Korea's conventional military threat to the
Republic of Korea remains of serious concern and its nuclear program,
missile development, proliferation activities, and asymmetric military
provocations are destabilizing. Collectively, these threats demand that
PACOM Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities
and capacities be sufficiently robust to view across the DPRK's
military apparatus and warn of unfavorable developments. North Korea's
continuing pursuit of nuclear weapons and advanced ballistic missile
systems places a premium on PACOM ballistic missile defenses and close
cooperation with allies. Japan and the Republic of Korea are strong
U.S. allies that host U.S. forces, benefit from U.S. extended
deterrence, and stand with the United States in containing DPRK
aggression in addition to meeting other regional and global security
challenges.
Japan
The 52-year-old alliance between the United States and Japan
remains a cornerstone of security in the Asia Pacific. As was evident
in U.S. support to the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) during the
epic triple disaster in eastern Honshu last year, the extremely close
association and inherent interoperability between tenant U.S. forward
forces and their Japanese hosts enable prompt and extremely effective
contingency responses under the most trying of circumstances.
Despite delays in implementing some elements of the Defense Policy
Review Initiative (DPRI), including the Futenma airfield replacement
facility in Okinawa, which has occupied policymakers for nearly 20
years, the alliance remains strong and is a powerful strategic
stabilizing force in the region. It is important to note that of the 19
separate elements contained in DPRI, the vast majority are on track and
progressing.
In the past year, Japan has increased its regional engagements and
association with partners such as Australia, India, Singapore,
Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, to name a few.
Republic of Korea
The U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance remains a strong and visible
deterrent to war on the peninsula. This alliance is also transforming
in a variety of ways to remain current and relevant in the midst of an
ever-evolving Asia-Pacific region, changing leadership in North Korea
and as a consequence of lessons learned following the deadly
provocations by the DPRK in 2010.
Current alliance initiatives are underpinned by the planned
transition of wartime operational control from the Combined Forces
Command to the Republic of Korea in December 2015. Ongoing
transformation also includes the repositioning of on-peninsula U.S.
forces, headquarters, and bases.
Like the JSDF, Republic of Korea military forces are engaging
throughout the Asia Pacific at an increasing rate, and contributing to
international security initiatives, such as peacekeeping,
counterpiracy, and counterproliferation efforts.
Trilateral Cooperation
While modest in scope, trilateral cooperation between the United
States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea continues to progress. This
important initiative seeks to strengthen the natural synergy among
three powerful and interoperable Northeast Asia allies. While the
countries will have to overcome longstanding historical, cultural, and
political dynamics to fully realize the potential of trilateral
cooperation, policy advances and increasingly frank dialogue among the
three allies are encouraging.
Russia
Russia's Pacific armed forces are very gradually emerging from
their diminishment following the end of the Cold War. Increased naval
and strategic air force operations, cyberspace activities, and arms
sales throughout the Asia Pacific are signaling Russia's emphasis on
improved posture in the region. PACOM enjoys a generally positive
military-to-military relationship with Russia, particularly between
respective Pacific fleets. In coordination with U.S. European Command
and in accordance with the bilateral Military Cooperation Work Plan,
PACOM seeks improved engagement with Russia's Pacific forces in areas
such as counterterrorism (CT), peacekeeping, and search-and-rescue
operations.
Mongolia
Mongolia is a small but important partner in Northeast Asia. Its
active military pursues close engagement with PACOM through our annual
Khan Quest exercise series and contributes effectively to coalition
efforts in Afghanistan as well as global peacekeeping operations. With
Russia to the north and China to the south, Mongolia must finesse its
relationships in NEA with its broader security interests. As a
consequence of its experience as part of the Soviet bloc in the 20th
century, the Mongolian armed forces continue to maintain ties to
European nations such as Germany and even the DPRK, making them a PACOM
partner with unique and insightful perspectives.
The People's Republic of China
China's growing presence and influence in Asia, and the
opportunities and uncertainties that have resulted from it pose the
greatest test for PACOM among its seven challenge areas.
In January 2011, President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao
agreed to ``build a cooperative partnership based on mutual interest
and mutual respect,'' which also included a commitment to develop
``continuous, stable, and reliable military-to-military relations.'' To
meet this mandate, PACOM is effectively positioned to contribute to
advancing military engagement with the PRC. However, military-to-
military relations continue to lag well behind other U.S.-China
engagements for three main reasons: differences in philosophy regarding
the purpose of military-to-military relations in which China emphasizes
strategic dialogue and the United States seeks comprehensive military
contact from the strategic to tactical levels as a way to build
confidence; China's tendency to suspend military-to-military following
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and, more generally, its linkage between
certain U.S. defense policies and continuous bilateral military
relations; and inherent Chinese distrust of U.S. regional intentions
resulting in demands that perceived impediments to the relationship be
conceded before military relations can advance.
Despite these challenges, China's increasing participation in
regional and international security activities and forums such as
multi-lateral exercises, counter piracy operations, and peacekeeping
can foster informal, but useful U.S.-China military engagement.
Improvements in China's military capabilities and the regional
uncertainties this has created also test PACOM's ability to manage the
evolving security dynamics in the Asia Pacific. Areas in which U.S.
national interests or those of U.S. allies and partners are being
challenged include cyberspace and space as well as maritime security in
the international waters around China. China's anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) capabilities extend well into the South China Sea. China
asserts these military developments are purely defensive in nature and
that it poses no threat to neighbors in the region. Yet, combined with
broad maritime and sovereignty claims and incidents with lawful
operators in the South China Sea and East China Sea, there is ongoing
international concern regarding China's activities in the South China
Sea.
Taiwan
Following Taiwan's recent Presidential and Legislative Yuan
elections in January 2011, many analysts are hopeful that improvements
in cross-Strait relations will continue, with a focus on building
economic and cultural ties. This is in the security interests of the
United States and of Asia. It is important to note, however, that
Taiwan remains the most acute sovereignty issue for China and the main
driver of its military modernization programs. The military balance
across the Taiwan Strait continues to shift in favor of China. PACOM
engages regularly with Taiwan's military within policy guidelines and
in accordance with tenets of the Taiwan Relations Act and three
communiques.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Southeast Asia (SEA) is an extremely diverse sub-region, rich in
natural resources, and strategically located at the crossroads of the
Pacific and Indian Oceans. It is host to a mix of democratic and
authoritarian governments, varied economies, contrasting military
capabilities, and mixed cultures. Prospects for continued economic
growth are promising, mainly due to China's substantial economic
influence, steady U.S. regional investment and trade, and universal
global interest, by the European Union and others, in capitalizing on
Asia's rise. Many advancing U.S. partnerships and two U.S. treaty
allies, the Republic of the Philippines and the Royal Kingdom of
Thailand, are concentrated in this sub-region. Further, the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its numerous forums, together
with the East Asian Summit (EAS) and APEC, have advanced to become the
most effective Asia Pacific multilateral organizations.
That said, SEA is not without its challenges. Disputed islands and
features in the South China Sea, including territorial disputes with
China, have generated broad unease in SEA, and maritime security has
become a regular theme in multilateral forums. Transnational threats,
including violent extremist organizations (VEOs) such as Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiya (JI); trafficking in narcotics and
humans; piracy; proliferation; and natural and manmade disasters
regularly combine to challenge PACOM, U.S. allies and partners in this
sub-region. Resources such as water, food and energy are being
pressurized across the region, as illustrated by the Mekong River Delta
crisis. Geography is also a factor as SEA contains some of the most
extensive archipelagos in the world, including Indonesia and the
Philippines, and some of the world's most strategic choke points, such
as the Strait of Malacca. Despite this vast maritime domain where naval
capabilities and capacities are called for, most SEA militaries are
army-centric and assigned internal security responsibilities.
Consequently, few nations are self-sufficient militarily. PACOM's has
focused its engagement on advancing the self-sufficiency of the partner
militaries in the region. Programs such as International Military
Education and Training (IMET) are vital to enhancing the education
level of military leaders and promoting a network of military-to-
military relations that contribute to broader security cooperation in
SEA.
Philippines
Underpinned by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S.-Philippines
alliance is an important strategic icon in SEA. Adjoining the South
China Sea, this vast island nation straddles several strategic sea
lines of communication (SLOCs) and chokepoints, claims a number of
disputed islands and features in the South China Sea, and contends with
several internal insurgent movements and VEOs, such as JI and ASG, with
assistance from U.S. forces. Possessing an army-centric military as a
result of its internal security challenges, the Philippines has
recently begun to focus on improving the ability of its navy and air
forces to secure the vast maritime area defined by the Philippine
archipelago. As a consequence, PACOM security assistance is focused
primarily on supporting the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in CT
efforts in southern Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, and advancing
AFP naval and air capabilities. Improving maritime domain awareness is
another primary focus of U.S. security assistance, and we hope to
provide a second Hamilton-class Coast Guard cutter to the Philippines
this year.
Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines has operated in a
strictly non-combat role in support of the AFP for the past 8 years in
the largely successful efforts to contain ASG and JI VEOs.
Additionally, PACOM engages with the Philippines through the Joint
Staff-sponsored exercise Balikatan, as well as through annual military-
to-military consultations, periodic Pacific Partnership missions, and
numerous Service component-led exercises.
We welcome recent U.S.-Philippine discussions regarding
opportunities to increase joint training with our AFP counterparts,
possibly supported by enhanced rotational access to AFP facilities by
PACOM forces.
Thailand
I would begin by offering my personal condolences to the Thai
people for the losses they suffered in 2011 during the most devastating
flood their country has experienced in 50 years. Their response to this
disaster, particularly with regard to containment of potential
infectious diseases, was a testament to Thailand's resilience and self
sufficiency.
Thailand is an enduring U.S. ally in SEA and a valuable security
partner. They are co-host (with PACOM) to the largest multilateral
exercise series in SEA, Cobra Gold, and provide liberal access and
logistics support for transiting PACOM aircraft and ships at their
military facilities. The United States and Thailand have twice
partnered to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa, deploying Thai naval
vessels with U.S. Navy personnel onboard to Combined Task Force-151,
which Thailand will take command of in the coming year. Additionally,
the Royal Thai Army assisted U.N. humanitarian relief operations in
Darfur with a battalion of peacekeepers.
Despite facing challenges such as land and maritime border disputes
with neighboring, Cambodia, refugee incursions from Burma, a
longstanding ethnic insurgency in the south, and transnational
challenges such as narcotics and human trafficking, the Thai armed
forces are capable and generally self-sufficient.
Singapore
Our bilateral relationship with Singapore continues to strengthen
and broaden. Singapore armed forces comprise a small, but extremely
capable military. Their main focus continues to be security within the
Strait of Malacca and Singapore Strait and they cooperate with
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in conducting security patrols within
the Straits against piracy and other illicit activities. Singapore's
armed forces are also deployed to Afghanistan, working alongside
coalition partners to develop the Afghan National Security Forces.
Within the context of the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement, both
militaries are seeking to increase engagement across all PACOM Service
components. Singapore's offer to host U.S. Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)
at Changi naval station will enhance PACOM's SEA posture.
Indonesia
As the relationship between the United States and Indonesia--the
world's fourth most populous nation, third largest democracy, and
largest Muslim-majority country--continues to advance, the PACOM-TNI
relationship is progressing, as well. Following a decade of political,
economic, and military reform, Indonesia has surfaced as a vibrant
democracy, an emerging economy, and a competent military power. In
areas such as disaster risk reduction, CT, Humanitarian Assistance/
Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and peacekeeping operations, Indonesia is
increasingly recognized for its leadership role. Indonesia and the
United States were recently designated co-chairs of the Experts Working
Group on Counterterrorism for the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus.
This initiative seeks to encourage greater regional CT cooperation,
build capacity, and collectively address regional security issues in an
open consultative forum.
Following a 12-year hiatus, PACOM has reestablished security
cooperation activities with the Indonesian Kopassus army special
forces. The measured pace with which this engagement has advanced has
included key leader dialogues and small-scale subject matter experts
exchanges in areas such as military decisionmaking, medical planning
and law of war/human rights. More activities of this type are planned
for 2012 and will gradually expand at a pace commensurate with the
demonstrated progress in Indonesian Armed Force transparency and
institutional reform.
Vietnam
Military relations with Vietnam continue to grow in areas such as
disaster management, search and rescue, conflict resolution, personnel
recovery and medical operations. Vietnam is modernizing its military
and looks to the United States as a partner in maintaining security and
stability in SEA, particularly in the South China Sea. Vietnam's
successful chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010 affirmed its emerging role as
a leader and spokesman among SEA nations, as has been evidenced by
their current role in lower Mekong River delta HA/DR initiatives.
Vietnam and China have a long history of competition in the South China
Sea. Both nations' disputes over islands and features, as well as
natural resources, have led to confrontations in the past. Vietnam's
continued leadership among SEA nations will be a critical component of
eventual conflict resolution in this highly important and strategic
area. PACOM will carry on working closely with Vietnam to advance our
military relationship and cooperation in providing security across the
Asia Pacific while remaining mindful of concerns about human rights.
Malaysia
Malaysia's vibrant economy, advanced military, strategic position
near Malacca and the Singapore Straits, bordering both the South China
Sea and Indian Oceans, and regional leadership combine to define it as
an important partner for the United States and PACOM, and a key actor
within SEA. Malaysia contributes to Strait of Malacca patrols, maritime
security in the South China Sea, and efforts to contain transnational
threats, such as piracy, and VEOs, such as ASG and JI. Its direct
action against pirates in the Gulf of Aden was evidence of increased
confidence and capability. In 2011, Malaysia conducted its second
deployment of medical support units to Afghanistan and remains
committed to supporting coalition efforts there until 2014. U.S. naval
vessels frequently call in Malaysian ports, and military-to-military
exchanges and joint training have expanded over recent years.
Cambodia, Laos, Brunei and Timor-Leste
The United States has extensive interests across the rest of SEA,
and PACOM seeks to continue advancing military relations with Cambodia,
Laos, Brunei, and Timor-Leste. Cambodia has been a strong supporter of
U.S. military engagement in recent years and demonstrates a strong
desire to increase military-to-military activities with PACOM. Military
engagements with Brunei, Laos and Timor-Leste have expanded, albeit
modestly, over the past year with particular emphasis on relationship-
building and enhanced regional cooperation.
Burma
To the extent that any military-to-military relationship exists
with Burma, it is extremely limited due to U.S. policies and sanctions
directed at the former junta and its actions. However, the Burmese
Government steps towards credible political and economic reform and
working toward ceasefires with armed ethnic groups in the past several
months together have improved U.S.-Burma ties, resulting in several
initiatives announced during Secretary Clinton's December trip to
Burma. Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing in Action (MIA) recovery
operations, is the first opportunity for military-related engagement
with Burma since 2004. It is estimated that the WWII remains of as many
as 730 Americans may be present there. Burma's assimilation into the
broader Asia-Pacific regional security order would be a positive event.
SOUTH ASIA
South Asia as a whole is of major strategic importance to the
United States. Anchored by India and containing major SLOCs for the
transport of energy and other commerce to Asia and the Americas from
the Middle East and Europe, South Asia security partnerships are
increasingly vital to PACOM's mission.
South Asia is home to a confluence of challenges, including nuclear
armed rivals India and Pakistan, numerous transnational VEOs such as
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), piracy, trafficking in narcotics and persons,
disputed borders, and insurgent movements that have plagued India,
Nepal, and Sri Lanka. South Asia is particularly prone to natural
disasters, including cyclones, tsunamis, and earthquakes. Bangladesh
has long suffered from annual cyclones and flooding and Nepal is
expected to suffer a major earthquake in the coming years. PACOM
engages throughout South Asia, assisting its militaries to counter and
contain VEOs such as LeT, cooperating in maritime security activities
such as counter piracy, conducting disaster response planning and
training, and exercising extensively, service-to-service.
India
Pursuing a U.S.-India strategic partnership through a close
alignment of respective regional security interests is a priority for
the U.S. Department of Defense and PACOM. Our security relationship
involves strategic to tactical-level dialogues, increasingly robust
military exercises, security assistance, and personnel exchanges. The
United States and India have made steady progress in military-to-
military cooperation over the past decade.
It is important that the leaderships and staffs of PACOM and U.S.
Central Command continue to coordinate our respective military
activities in this sub-region, especially as they concern India and
Pakistan.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh has emerged as a particularly effective partner in the
fight against terror, cooperating with India as well as the United
States to counter VEO activity by actors such as LeT. Further,
Bangladesh's military is advancing its capabilities and contributes
broadly to U.N.peacekeeping operations. Also, the Bangladesh army is
primarily responsible for and has achieved major advancements in the
protection of its citizens during the annual cyclone season and the
inevitable flooding and related disasters with which Bangladesh
repeatedly contends.
Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka
Although South Asian nations share similar concerns and challenges,
they are uniquely individual.
Due to its proximity to major commercial sea lanes, the Maldives is
concerned with piracy and other illicit activity in its Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). For that reason, it is striving to advance its
maritime security capabilities by reshaping its coast guard, marine and
special operations forces. Further, curbing recruitment of its youth
into VEOs and narcotics trafficking and addiction are Maldives' areas
of focus.
Nepal has emerged from a lengthy Maoist insurgency in 2006 and is
seeking to integrate some of the former insurgents into the Nepal Army.
In partnership with PACOM, Nepal's armed forces are preparing to
respond to a future earthquake.
Sri Lanka, too, is focused on developing its maritime security
capabilities while preventing a resurgence of the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Elam. Sri Lanka's military forces continue to assist in de-mining
and other recovery operations following 25 years of civil war. PACOM's
engagement with Sri Lanka will continue to be limited, until the
Government of Sri Lanka demonstrates progress in addressing human
rights allegations.
Each of these nations' militaries partner with PACOM at varying
levels, including leadership exchanges, exercise series, PACOM Assist
Team CT capacity building actions and activities, and security
assistance.
LeT
While several VEOs conduct facilitation, recruitment, and seek safe
havens throughout South Asia, LeT presents a particularly acute
problem. Responsible for many attacks in India, including the horrific
attacks into Mumbai, LeT is headquartered in Pakistan, affiliated with
al Qaeda and other VEOs, and contributes to terrorist operations in
Afghanistan and aspires to operate against Asia, Europe, and North
America. PACOM's fiscal year 2011 Indian Engagement Initiative that
resourced and hosted Mumbai CT specialists for training, exercises, and
exchanges throughout the United States, together with capacity-building
activities with South Asian partners are mainly focused on containing
LeT and contributing to CT self-sufficiency of the sub-region's
militaries.
OCEANIA
The U.S. alliance with Australia anchors PACOM's strategy in
Oceania. Australia, with additional contributions from New Zealand,
invests extensively in security and assistance efforts in this sub-
region. The Australian continent notwithstanding, most of Oceania is
comprised of Pacific Island nations spread across the vast expanse of
the South Pacific Ocean. Security challenges associated with natural
resources in this sub-region tend to predominate. In particular,
illegal fishing, resource damage attributed to climate change and
global warming, and the susceptibility of low lying island nations to
typhoons and tsunamis define PACOM and U.S. Coast Guard approaches to
engagement in Oceania, often in concert with Australian and New Zealand
actions. Two new Shiprider Agreements with the Pacific Island nations
of Nauru and Tuvalu together with those already in place with the
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Tonga, and Kiribati enable
transiting U.S. ships to assist in characterizing the maritime domains
and providing a mechanism for shiprider-nation responses to
irregularities within these island nations' territories.
Oceania is also home to the Compact of Free Association nations of
the Republic of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, each of which PACOM is obligated to
defend as part of Compact arrangements putting their territory off
limits to all armed forces except those of the United States (and other
countries we have invited). Compact agreements with these three nations
provide PACOM a strategic buffer along the southern flank of the highly
strategic U.S. territory of Guam. PACOM is increasing its collaboration
with the Department of the
Interior which administers Federal policy in U.S. territories in
Oceania and administers assistance funds to the Compact Nations. We
soon expect to have a liaison officer from Interior join the PACOM
staff.
Australia
The U.S.-Australia alliance, our most significant partnership in
Oceania, benefits from two new force posture initiatives, the
rotational deployment of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to
Darwin and enhanced access to airfields in northern Australia. These
initiatives will enable deeper interoperability of our respective
forces, expand training opportunities with third countries in the
region, and improve access to SEA and Oceania. Australia is also the
largest non-NATO contributor of forces to the coalition efforts in
Afghanistan.
A trilateral relationship between Australia, Japan, and the United
States continues to advance and has the potential to enable
multilateral approaches to the region's challenges. Bilaterally, the
U.S. and Australian militaries collaborate extensively in areas such as
information sharing; ISR; HA/DR; combined arms training in exercise
Talisman Saber; and space and cyber security.
New Zealand
New Zealand is also a recognized leader in Oceania. It is a strong
partner of the United States, and in accordance with the forward-
looking spirit of the 2010 Wellington Declaration, PACOM will continue
to look for ways to further strengthen the relationship despite
differences over nuclear policy. The United States and New Zealand
share many security concerns and are cooperative partners in areas such
as intelligence sharing, HA/DR and maritime security. In the interest
of advancing the partnership, New Zealand is participating fully in the
Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise for the first time in 2012.
We value New Zealand's contributions to Afghanistan. New Zealand
also supports stabilization efforts in Timor-Leste and the Solomon
Islands, Armistice enforcement in Korea, and UN peacekeeping efforts
globally.
EXERCISE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS
Exercises
In order to maintain ready forces and to plan, train, and exercise
to accomplish the full range of military contingencies, PACOM requires
annual congressional support for the Combatant Command Exercise and
Engagement (CE2) program. PACOM's portion of this essential program
consists of 18 major exercises involving joint military forces,
interagency activities, and 27 of 36 PACOM partner nations. CE2
directly impacts PACOM's ability to conduct Joint training exercises
and theater security engagement events across the Asia Pacific, and
therefore plays a vital role in contributing to security of the AOR.
Engagement Programs
Two very significant engagement programs are Pacific Partnership
and Pacific Angel. In 2011, the USS Cleveland, with personnel from 11
nations, conducted a 4-month deployment to Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New
Guinea, Timor Leste, and Federated States of Micronesia. Combining
medical, dental, and engineering support, the mission treated over
38,000 patients, conducted scores of community relations projects, and
completed much needed engineering and infrastructure repairs. Likewise,
Pacific Angel 2011, utilizing C-17 aircraft, cared for thousands of
patients and completed numerous civic action projects in Mongolia,
Cambodia, Timor Leste, and Indonesia.
Both of these engagement programs serve to improve regional
partnerships, while enhancing the resiliency of object nations to deal
more effectively with their own humanitarian crises due to natural
disasters or other causes. Moreover, the experience that our Service
components gain by working alongside nongovernmental organizations and
other participating militaries in these controlled conditions improves
their abilities to conduct disaster response when time is of the
essence and lives are on the line. PACOM considers Pacific Partnership
and Pacific Angel to be high payoff engagements in the Asia-Pacific
region.
GLOBAL SECURITY CONTINGENCY FUND
The Global Security Contingency Fund is a new tool available for
PACOM and country teams to develop and deliver security sector
assistance in a coordinated fashion, enhancing the capabilities of
military forces, other security forces, and relevant government
agencies. The fund also supports the justice sector (including law
enforcement and prisons), rule of law programs, and stabilization
efforts.
PACOM ORGANIZATIONS
The following direct-reporting units uniquely contribute to the
PACOM mission:
Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies
Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) fills a unique
role in multi-national security cooperation and capacity-building
efforts by equipping and empowering APCSS fellows and alumni to make
substantive changes to their countries' security architectures. APCSS
brings together communities of interest and influence, comprised of
presidents, vice presidents, ministers of defense and foreign affairs,
chiefs of defense, and ambassadors, to enable collaborative solutions
to critical regional security challenges. Because the APCSS engages
regularly and often concurrently with Chinese on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait, as well as Hong Kong, it is uniquely positioned to
assist in moving the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship
towards a ``sustained and reliable'' level of contact.
Joint Intelligence Operations Center
The PACOM and the U.S. Forces Korea-Combined Forces Command (USFK-
CFC) Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC) deliver
strategically-focused, operationally-relevant, and predictive
intelligence products to support Commander PACOM and our subordinate
commands. The JIOCs operate within a larger PACOM intelligence
federation that capitalizes on national intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities as well as two-way information sharing
activities with allies and partners. The JIOCs serve as a focal point
of intelligence collaboration in close coordination with PACOM
Component Commands; National, Defense, and Service agencies; other
combatant commands; subunified commands; and allies and partners. This
federated approach to intelligence provides for invaluable theater
situational awareness and advanced threat warning to enable
decisionmaking.
Joint Interagency Task Force West
Through the execution of PACOM's counternarcotics program, Joint
Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West) has significantly affected
illicit methamphetamine precursor chemical trafficking originating in
Asia ultimately bound for the Western Hemisphere by focusing its
efforts on Asian, Iranian, Eurasian, and other transnational criminal
organizations in the PACOM AOR. In fiscal year 2011, JIATF West's
support to U.S. and partner nation law enforcement agencies resulted in
the seizure of over 1,000 metric tons of illicit chemicals used in meth
production. The seizures were critical in interrupting distribution
within the United States and contributed to the disruption of Asian and
Mexican drug trafficking organizations.
Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command
Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) successfully accomplished
58 investigation and recovery operations globally last year and is
projected to execute 78 investigation and recovery operations in 2012.
Expanded operations begin in fiscal year 2012 as JPAC resumes
investigation and recovery operations in the DPRK. JPAC is also
preparing to resume discussions with the government of Burma to renew
personnel accounting efforts there during fiscal year 2013. JPAC
accounting operations are ongoing in the People's Republic of China,
while discussions between JPAC and the governments of India and the
Philippines continue in an effort to resume investigation and recovery
operations in those countries.
CONCLUSION
As characterized by the President, the United States ``face[s] an
inflection point.'' The evolving geopolitical climate and shifting
fiscal environment, which are significant factors in this change, point
toward the Asia Pacific and emphasize the ever increasing consequence
of this theater. The preceding testimony highlights the importance of
optimizing U.S. posture in this region and underscores the specific
challenges PACOM faces, as well as the opportunities PACOM seeks. I
have spent the majority of my career in the Asia Pacific and have never
been more convinced of its remarkable nature, partnership capacity, and
criticality to U.S. security.
In closing, your assistance has enabled the more than 300,000
members of PACOM to accomplish their mission. Further, your personal
interest in, and visits to the Asia Pacific have sent a strong signal
to this region regarding U.S. national interests and staying power. On
behalf of every PACOM member, thank you for your enduring support for
our Armed Forces and for this unique and important part of the world.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral. Thanks for your
statement and again for all you and your family have done for
this Nation.
General Fraser.
STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General Fraser. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, and
distinguished members of this committee: It is indeed my
distinct privilege to be here with you today representing
TRANSCOM. We are a total force team of approximately 150,000
men and women, military and civilian, dedicated to deploying,
sustaining, and then returning home our Nation's most precious
resource, our men and women in uniform. TRANSCOM is a lean,
dynamic organization which plays a critical role in supporting
our joint force around the world.
Today I am privileged to be here with my good friend,
Admiral Bob Willard, Commander, PACOM, whom I've had the honor
of partnering with closely over many years. As already
mentioned, I know Admiral Willard will be retiring in the near
future and I would publicly like to personally thank him for
his many years of dedicated service to our Nation and his
wife's continued sacrifices and dedication. Sir, it has been
indeed an honor and a privilege to serve with you.
During 2011, TRANSCOM added a new command, the Joint
Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), led by Rear Admiral Scott
Stearney, to our component command leadership team, which is
comprised of AMC, led by General Ray Johns, MSC, led by Rear
Admiral Mark Buzby, and the Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command (SDDC), led by Major General Kevin Leonard.
Over the last month I have witnessed firsthand the spirit
and ingenuity of our subordinate commands during my travels
throughout the United States, Afghanistan, Central Asia, the
Pacific, and Antarctica, just to name a few. This past year has
been particularly challenging as our team of Active Duty,
Guard, Reserve, civil servants, merchant mariners, and
commercial partners maintain an unusually high operations
tempo, supporting combat operations, sustainment efforts,
humanitarian relief, and crisis action responses both at home
and abroad.
These efforts from the evacuation in Japan following the
devastating earthquake and tsunami, to supporting the
warfighter in Afghanistan, to our withdrawal from Iraq at the
end of 2011, were made possible by the amazing TRANSCOM
professionals, who are committed to ensuring our joint force
maintains global logistics dominance.
As we now enter a very challenging fiscal environment
focusing on capabilities needed for the 21st century, as
defined in the President's defense strategy, our challenge is
to continue to find fiscally responsible efficiencies to
deliver the required capability. TRANSCOM strongly supports
this transition and will remain focused on supporting our
forces around the world. This will not be an easy task. The new
strategic guidance requires a military that is smaller and
leaner, while at the same time being more agile, flexible, and
ready.
Having an integrated distribution system will be important
to our Nation, and TRANSCOM will meet the challenges of this
new environment. We will continue to build our relationships
with the interagency, our other nongovernmental organizations,
commercial, and international partners. Together we will ensure
our Nation's ability to project national military power and be
able to confront other national challenges any time and
anywhere.
Since taking command last fall, I've been amazed to see the
unique capabilities that are inherent in the command. I could
not be prouder of the TRANSCOM team and our partners. No one in
the world can match our Nation's deployment and distribution
capability. The foundation of this enterprise is the
enthusiasm, the dedication, and efficiency of the TRANSCOM
team.
Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, and all the members of this
committee, I want to thank you for your continued superb
support of TRANSCOM and of all of our men and women in uniform.
I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before this
committee today and I ask that my written statement be
submitted for the record. I now look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Fraser follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. William Fraser, USAF
MISSION/ORGANIZATION
It is my privilege as the Commander of the U.S. Transportation
Command (TRANSCOM) to present you my posture statement for 2012. Our
Total Force team of Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian, commercial
partners, and contractors leads a world-class Joint Deployment and
Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) that provides unfailing support to our
warfighters and their families around the globe. Through efficient and
effective execution of our transportation and supply chain distribution
mission, the TRANSCOM team is revolutionizing military logistics to
meet the challenges of the 21st century, while adapting to the
President's Defense Strategy. Our team of dedicated and trained
professionals working in unison with our joint, commercial, and
international partners is ready to meet those challenges today and in
the future.
SUPPORTING GLOBAL OPERATIONS
Our Nation's greatest asymmetric advantage is our ability to
project and sustain our forces across the globe supported by the
political, military, and business relationships that enable this
expansive network. To maintain this advantage, the President assigned
TRANSCOM the Global Distribution Synchronizer responsibility to
synchronize planning for global distribution operations. This new
responsibility enables the Department of Defense (DOD) to shape the
distribution environment to meet growing access challenges and ensure
sufficient distribution lanes across multiple theaters to underwrite
our Nation's ability to successfully project and sustain forces
globally. Collaboratively, we will ``knit the distribution seams''
among multiple Combatant Commands (COCOM) to ensure support for their
theater campaign and contingency plans. To this effort, our vision is
to achieve a global network that anticipates demands, maximizes
strategic flexibility, mitigates potential risks, and provides
resilient end-to-end distribution.
While TRANSCOM leads the enterprise, our component commands execute
the mission. In 2011, Air Mobility Command (AMC) and its Air Force
Reserve and Air National Guard partners maintained a high operations
tempo supporting Operations Unified Protector (OUP), New Dawn (OND),
Enduring Freedom (OEF), and other crises around the world. At the peak
of global air mobility operations in 2011, AMC deployed a rotational
force of over 60 C-130 tactical airlift aircraft, plus 120 KC-135 and
KC-10 aerial refueling aircraft. AMC also employed an additional 21 C-
17s in dedicated support of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
Additionally, across all COCOMs on a daily basis, at least one third of
AMC's air mobility fleet was utilized in support of global operations.
On the surface, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Military
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) moved over 19.9
million tons of cargo worldwide. MSC's tankers delivered 1.6 billion
gallons of fuel to support global operations. SDDC expanded into
multimodal operations by moving over 3,500 pieces of mission essential
cargo by commercial liner sealift with follow-on airlift into
Afghanistan.
Our newest subordinate command, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
(JECC), deployed more than 750 personnel to support four Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations and seven contingency
operations worldwide. The Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and U.S.
Special Operations Command employed the JECC's expertise for a variety
of real-world missions including Odyssey Dawn, Tomodachi, Pacific
Passage, Continuing Promise, Odyssey Guard, OUP, OEF, and OND. Though
the missions were of varying size, scope, and complexity, in each
instance the JECC provided immediate, short-duration support to
increase the effectiveness of joint command and control at the
operational level.
SUPPORT TO U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
In 2011, the President directed the final drawdown in Iraq by 31
December 2011 and the start of the Afghanistan surge recovery. Through
partnership with CENTCOM and aggressive scheduling, TRANSCOM and its
component AMC accelerated the redeployment of over 60,000 troops (over
50,000 from Iraq and 10,000 from Afghanistan) returning 99 percent home
by 24 December and 100 percent by the New Year.
Equipment retrograde was highlighted by the aggressive push to
redeploy over one million pieces of equipment from Iraq in calendar
year 2011. In addition, TRANSCOM and our interagency partners have
received permissions from some governments of European, Central Asian,
and Baltic countries to start retrograding materials from Afghanistan
through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN).
The Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAK GLOC) provide
logistical support through the movement of cargo to Afghanistan. In
2011 more than 35,000 containers were delivered on the PAK GLOC by
surface transportation. When open, the PAK GLOC remains the quickest
and most cost-effective route.
The NDN provides an additional route for cargo to Afghanistan. Over
the past year, we moved an average of 40 percent of all cargo in
support of OEF through the NDN's multiple truck, water, rail, and air
routes in an expanding distribution network. In 2011 a total of 27,000
containers were delivered by surface transportation on the NDN, an
increase of 15 percent from 2010. TRANSCOM will continue to work with
the interagency and governments of the NDN countries to expand NDN
routes and permissions. This expansion will increase velocity and the
number of new routes into and out of Afghanistan.
SUPPORT TO OTHER GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS
TRANSCOM supported all GCCs, responding to their unique
requirements, often testing the ingenuity of the team to develop new
and complex transportation solutions. In March 2011, TRANSCOM provided
a top priority movement to all six GCCs--a TRANSCOM first.
In U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility (AOR), TRANSCOM
continues to support the transport and security of detainees during
detainee movement operations (DMO). Since 2002, TRANSCOM in
coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of
the Secretary of State, Joint Staff, and supported COCOMs has
successfully completed 88 DMO missions, transporting 1,206 detainees
without incident.
In U.S. European Command's (EUCOM) AOR, TRANSCOM deployed and
redeployed more than 3,500 troops and 1,400 tons of cargo in support of
the Kosovo Balkan force, providing a safe and secure environment in the
region.
In U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) AOR, TRANSCOM deployed and
redeployed 2,491 troops and 1,340 short tons of cargo in support of
Commander Joint Task Force Horn of Africa.
Supporting both AFRICOM and EUCOM and in response to the United
Nations Security Council resolution to end Libya's military advance on
its civilian population, TRANSCOM provided tankers and other lift
assets to support Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector.
U.S. tankers flew 435 sorties delivering 23 million pounds of fuel
to coalition strike aircraft. TRANSCOM also directed 63 time-critical
airlift missions delivering 886 passengers and 2,220 short tons of
cargo.
In U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR, TRANSCOM responded within
hours to the immediate needs of the Japanese people, who were
devastated from the earthquake and tsunami and follow-on nuclear
crisis, with Operation Tomodachi. TRANSCOM delivered relief supplies,
nuclear response equipment, a 50-person JECC team, search and rescue
teams, and disaster response experts totaling over 3,400 short tons and
over 6,700 passengers as part of that operation. TRANSCOM
simultaneously supported Operation Pacific Passage, the voluntary
authorized departure of DOD dependents from Japan, by evacuating more
than 7,800 passengers on over 25 missions.
Each year, TRANSCOM provides airlift and sealift assets to
transport personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of the National
Science Foundation's (NSF) research in Antarctica as part of Operation
Deep Freeze. Using unique capabilities such as the Air National Guard's
ski-equipped LC-130s, TRANSCOM delivered more than 3,250 passengers,
10,000 short tons of cargo, and five million gallons of fuel to McMurdo
Station, Antarctica. In 2011, TRANSCOM assets airlifted the King of
Malaysia and the Prime Minister of Norway to Antarctica in recognition
of the 100 year anniversary of man's first expedition to the South
Pole.
In U.S. Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) AOR, TRANSCOM supported
training exercises that provided realistic homeland defense and defense
support to civil authorities training for joint and interagency
partners. TRANSCOM also deployed the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting
System (MAFFS) equipped C-130 aircraft to fight fires in Texas, New
Mexico, Arizona, and Mexico in support of the National Interagency Fire
Center. The MAFFS aircraft flew 396 sorties and released more than 9.7
million pounds of fire-retardant during their 74 days of deployment.
TRANSCOM's WC-130 Hurricane Hunter aircraft flew 129 sorties into
30 storms to collect valuable hurricane data for the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration during the 2011 hurricane season. In
addition to collecting storm data, TRANSCOM airlifted the Federal
Emergency Management Agency Region II Defense Coordination Officer
emergency response vehicle to Puerto Rico to assist with monitoring
Tropical Storm Emily.
IMPROVING BUSINESS PRACTICES
To reduce transportation costs, TRANSCOM continues to pursue both
military and commercial multimodal transportation solutions. Multimodal
transportation solutions use both surface and air assets, e.g., moving
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles by ship to a major port
and using cargo airplanes for the final delivery to the warfighter. By
embracing multimodal transportation solutions, TRANSCOM manages the
supply chain, controls cost, and creates efficiencies.
In 2011, commercial multimodal operations began in the CENTCOM AOR.
Multimodal operations into theater included contracted sealift carriers
and airlift services through the commercial seaports and airports in
Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Aqaba, Jordan. Commercial multimodal
transportation routes maximize the use of commercial carrier
capabilities from origin to destination while ``freeing up'' vital
military capabilities. Multimodal hubs proved invaluable when the PAK
GLOC routes were no longer available for use in late November. Several
hundred containers from 39 different ships bound for forces in
Afghanistan were diverted to Dubai and Aqaba where they were stored and
then airlifted as needed into Afghanistan to ensure sustained support
to combat operations.
Afghanistan's mountainous terrain and poor infrastructure require
an increased reliance on aerial delivery. In 2011, over 80 million
pounds of cargo were airdropped, up 20 million from 2010, making 2011 a
record year. We continue to add new capabilities like Low-Cost, Low-
Altitude Delivery and to explore an extracted container delivery system
capability to improve aircraft survivability and aerial delivery
accuracy.
Piracy continues to threaten our commercial partners, predominantly
in the Horn of Africa region. TRANSCOM and its component, MSC, continue
to be active participants in interagency and industry efforts to reduce
the vulnerability of the U.S. commercial fleet. TRANSCOM is a strong
advocate for the use of private security teams aboard commercial
vessels.
PRESERVING THE JOINT DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS
The DOD supply chain is a vast, interdependent enterprise reliant
on infrastructure availability across the globe. To safeguard this
infrastructure, we work closely with entities across the DOD and
Intelligence Community to stay apprised of threats to our
transportation and distribution assets and to provide global strategic
force protection oversight for these assets. Our relationships and
planning efforts with GCCs facilitate threat mitigation and risk
reduction of vulnerabilities and hostile/criminal activities.
Preserving and improving our strategic en route infrastructure
system remains a critical requirement. A relatively small number of en
route airfields and seaports are available to support global mobility
operations, so we must champion these ``enduring bases'' that enable
seamless movement across the various areas of responsibility. TRANSCOM
advocates for military construction projects that maintain and improve
the capabilities and capacities of the military's deployment and
distribution infrastructure. Using analytical data, TRANSCOM's En Route
Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) identifies construction projects
that will improve the military's global routes. Adequate infrastructure
and access agreements allow the United States to maintain the ability
to project forces globally.
With the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), TRANSCOM continues to lead
DOD supply chain transformation efforts through a series of
Distribution Process Owner Strategic Opportunities (DSO) initiatives.
Since 2009, five focused process improvement initiatives generated $400
million in cost savings and cost avoidance. The initiatives enhanced
readiness, improved velocity, and reduced costs, while delivering
higher levels of service to the warfighter.
BUILDING TOWARD THE FUTURE
As TRANSCOM continues to improve our processes across the
deployment and distribution enterprise, we stand ready to support the
President's Defense Strategy that maintains a full spectrum force ready
to deter conflict, project power, and win wars anywhere on the globe.
In the Pacific, Guam is critical to U.S. national defense as a
strategic security and stability location providing TRANSCOM access to
global lines of communications. Guam is a key multimodal logistics node
to mobility success in the region and has been analytically validated
in the Global Access and Infrastructure Assessment, TRANSCOM's ERIMP,
and AMC's En Route Strategy White Paper. TRANSCOM supports
infrastructure improvements on Guam to ensure successful distribution
operations in East Asia and Oceania. We have partnered with the DLA
and, with congressional approval, invested $101.3 million in the
recapitalization of the fuel hydrant infrastructure and $61 million in
a JP-8 pipeline between Apra Harbor and Andersen Air Force Base.
A key element of the President's Defense Strategy is to strengthen
defense cyber capabilities to operate effectively in cyberspace and to
counter cyber attacks. Because of TRANSCOM's strong reliance on
commercial partners, over 90 percent of the distribution and deployment
transactions are handled in cyberspace. TRANSCOM strives to ensure both
the integrity of our data and availability for our users and
essentially serves as an information broker for deployment and
distribution operations across the globe.
TRANSCOM is partnering with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM),
industry, and educational institutions to introduce innovative new
technologies and methodologies to protect our essential command and
control systems and information from attack. Collaborating with
military and commercial partners to define standards for the process
and handling of data allows us to improve the security of our
information and its accuracy. Implementation of these standards will
streamline our information flow, improve transparency to authorized
users, and leverage new technologies. The result is trusted and timely
information supporting a more responsive transportation enterprise
while reducing costs.
TRANSCOM's Agile Transportation for the 21st Century (AT21)
initiative will use industry best practices plus government and
commercial off-the-shelf optimization and scheduling tools to deliver
best value, end-to-end deployment and distribution. Business process
reengineering will improve transportation planning, forecast accuracy,
and on-time delivery of forces and sustainment to COCOMs at a lower
cost. Corporate Services Vision will align IT systems with reengineered
business processes to create a one-stop IT shop.
TRANSCOM is DOD's lead proponent for In-Transit Visibility (ITV) of
cargo, equipment, and personnel during deployment and distribution
options. ITV enables a more effective and efficient supply chain by
tracking the total volume of supplies moving through the logistics
pipeline. Active Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) remains the
primary automatic identification technology for large consolidated
shipments in the defense transportation system while incorporation of
passive RFID tags provides great benefits in warehousing,
prepositioning, and tracking of DOD materiel. We continue to expand
capabilities with our ITV systems/portfolio.
REALIGNING ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL
The disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command reassigned the
JECC to TRANSCOM on July 1, 2011. The JECC's Joint Planning Support
Element (JPSE), Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), and the
Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) provide mission tailored
joint capability packages to COCOMs. These units facilitate rapid
establishment of Joint Force Headquarters enabling Global Response
Force execution and the bridging of joint operational requirements.
The JECC employs a Total Force mix to deliver scalable mission
tailored packages providing immediate, short duration support
establishing and organizing a joint force headquarters. The JPSE is an
employment package composed of experienced personnel in the planning
and execution of joint military operations. The JCSE delivers secure
command, control, communications, and computer capabilities. The JPASE
provides an early entry capability enabling the Joint Force Commander
to gain and maintain the initiative in the information domain.
TRAINING AND EXERCISES
TRANSCOM Combatant Commander's Exercise Engagement (CE2) program
directly supports U.S. national security interests by increasing
military capabilities, strengthening alliances, and retaining strategic
access around the globe. CE2 enables joint force readiness by enhancing
interoperability of the JDDE. The CE2 program has maintained strategic
access for the DOD in an era where many forward deployed capabilities
are becoming CONUS based. The program allows Combatant Commanders to
exercise quick deploying contingency capabilities in response to real
world crises like contingencies and HA/DR operations and allows DOD's
strategic reserve fleet to remain ready, while saving resources by
reserving operating capabilities.
TRANSCOM participated and supported COCOMs in 20 top priority
command post and field training exercises, including 147 secondary
training events in 2011. During the exercises, TRANSCOM provided
command and control, deployed strategic mobility personnel and assets,
and provided ITV, including patient movement tracking systems and
global air transport. TRANSCOM also partnered with NORTHCOM, Federal
agencies, and State and local emergency planners in the development and
execution of a staff and patient movement exercise as part of the
National Level Exercise.
AIR MOBILITY READINESS
The President's Defense Strategy relies on rapid global reach and
rapid global response to deter aggression and deliver worldwide
capability. An important linchpin to U.S. military dominance in any
conflict is maintaining the airlift and air-refueling capability
required for rapid delivery of the Joint Force Team over long
distances, guaranteeing access to any location in the world. Our
initial analysis shows the planned air mobility force structure meets
the strategic airlift and air-refueling requirements for a single large
scale operation, while maintaining the flexibility and adaptability to
support the Joint Force in another region.
C-17s will continue to meet TRANSCOM's future requirements through
currently funded purchases, upgrade programs, and fleet rotation. The
newest C-17s arrive with the latest capability and reliability
improvements installed, while the older aircraft enter into the Global
Reach Improvement Program to increase their capability and
sustainability. Aircraft are monitored and analyzed for stress and
rotated to maintain structural integrity of the fleet.
The C-5 fleet is critical to our oversized and outsized air cargo
capability and management of the fleet focuses on retirement of some of
the oldest aircraft and increased reliability for the remainder. The
Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP) increases the C-
5 fleet mission capable rate (MCR) from 55 to 75 percent. All C-5 Bs
and Cs and 1 C-5A will undergo RERP for a total of 52 C-5Ms. The Air
Force's new programmed depot maintenance process changed from a
``failure of major components'' to a preventative replacement process.
C-5A retirements will improve aircraft availability by removing
maintenance intensive jets from the fleet.
Last year the Air Force awarded a contract for the engineering and
manufacturing development phase of the KC-46A program. The KC-46A will
replace a portion of the Air Force's aging fleet of KC-135
Stratotankers and will provide the DOD and allied nation coalition
aircraft with more aerial refueling capacity, improved efficiency, and
increased capabilities for cargo, passengers, and aeromedical
evacuation. These 179 KC-46A tankers are the first increment of a
three-phased tanker recapitalization approach driven by fleet size and
fiscal constraints.
The C-130 continues as an in-theater workhorse supporting
humanitarian, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and combat operations.
TRANSCOM supports DOD and Air Force plans to size the tactical airlift
fleet to align with the President's Defense Strategy and to meet the
warfighter's demand for intratheater and Direct Support airlift
missions. Our initial analysis of the planned total purchase of 134 C-
130Js, plus 184 modernized C-130Hs, shows the Air Force fleet of 318 C-
130s will be sufficient to support the warfighter's demands.
To operate our mobility aircraft safely in threat environments, I
strongly support continued defensive systems such as the Large Aircraft
Infrared Countermeasures system and continued development of the
Advanced Situational Awareness and Countermeasures capability for
operations in low to medium threat environments.
The Joint Operational Support Airlift Center (JOSAC) develops and
implements CONUS Operational Support Airlift (OSA) solutions to provide
movement visibility for the DOD. The small passenger aircraft provide
quick, cost-effective transportation for senior officials and special
cargo. Recently, the JOSAC assumed the responsibility of scheduling OSA
aircraft in support of the NORTHCOM AOR, including parts of Alaska,
Canada, and Mexico.
Operational Support Airlift and Executive Airlift (OSA/EA) is a key
component of our Global Air Mobility Enterprise. From the President to
senior civilian and military leaders, immediate airlift is required to
carry out diplomatic and military missions across the spectrum of
activities supporting our National Security, National Defense, and the
National Military Strategies. While we continue to modernize the OSA/EA
fleet, we plan to develop a single scheduling and management system
with a common multiservice database and operational picture. The goal
is to achieve total and real-time asset visibility of worldwide senior
leader and OSA/EA movements to enable all stakeholders, including key
leadership to exercise command and control of their fleet assets within
their area of responsibility.
TRANSCOM's Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a force enabler,
providing us the ability to rapidly deploy forces and equipment in
response to global events. The institution of incentives for commercial
carriers directed in the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act have
proven successful in transitioning the CRAF to a more modern fleet that
increases reliability, improves fuel efficiency, and lowers contract
rates. TRANSCOM continues to incentivize the use of modern CRAF
aircraft while eliminating the aging, less efficient aircraft. The CRAF
Executive Working Group (EWG) of TRANSCOM, AMC and commercial aviation
leaders has been a continuing success by allowing open discussion of
fleet modernization, Federal Aviation Administration flightcrew duty
and rest requirements, fleet reliability, and supporting operations.
Routing mobility airlift over the polar ice cap opens an additional
corridor to the CENTCOM AOR mitigating the threat to single lines of
communication and saves time, fuel, maintenance, and personnel costs.
West coast bases' routing KC-135 swap outs over the North Pole saves 20
percent in time and costs over the traditional European-Caucasus
routing, while long-range cargo aircraft routed over the polar ice caps
save up to 14 percent. In 2011, TRANSCOM directed AMC and its
commercial partners to utilize polar routing in order to improve
operational experience and capability.
Air Force Contingency Response (CR) forces provide an essential
capability to support rapidly evolving contingencies throughout the
world. AMC maintains four Contingency Response Groups and additional
expeditionary Global Mobility forces to support the airbase opening and
Joint Task Force-Port Opening missions. These forces directly support
TRANSCOM and Joint Force Commanders' expeditionary mobility
requirements by expanding options for early entry force application and
sustainment. Rapid response capability along with opening and operating
from distant and austere bases with a small footprint and minimum
support requirements is a tremendous force enabler. CR forces can
deploy within 12-hours notice to quickly assess airbase capabilities
and begin the base opening process to achieve full mission capability
in the shortest possible time. CR forces provide combatant commanders
with initial air base opening and global air mobility support
capability during wartime, contingency or humanitarian assistance/
disaster response operations.
In 2011, TRANSCOM performed 24,410 safe and rapid aeromedical
global patient movements, transporting 14,678 patients to definitive
care. In the days after the liberation of Libya, TRANSCOM, through the
Global Patient Movement Requirements Center, supported a Department of
State request and transported wounded Libyan personnel by military
airlift to medical facilities in Europe and the United States.
TRANSCOM continues to increase its ability to meet the DOD's
expanding patient movement mission requirements. We have matched
advanced in-flight medical care teams to the specific medical needs of
our Wounded Warriors, forged and field tested unique DOD Health and
Human Services deployable air evacuation staging facilities, and
standardized and integrated theater patient movement regulating
centers. These improvements will build a safer, more agile, and
efficient world-wide patient movement system.
SEALIFT READINESS
Sealift is the primary means for delivering the preponderance of
equipment and sustainment for ground forces, and is essential to
building up combat power and seizing the initiative during major combat
operations. In a typical operation, over 90 percent of all cargo is
delivered by sealift. As one of the largest single shippers of ocean
cargo worldwide, DOD spent approximately $2 billion in fiscal year 2011
on commercial transportation through our Universal Services Contract.
By partnering with commercial carriers, we gain beneficial access to
their global infrastructure. In return, they benefit from our long-term
commitment to their ships and networks. When necessary, we activate our
government-owned vessels from the Maritime Administration's (MARAD)
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and MSC's Surge Fleet.
TRANSCOM's partnership with the U.S. commercial sealift industry
and the Department of Transportation (DOT) has been vital in developing
new routes for conveying cargo around the globe, particularly to
regions with undeveloped infrastructure. Through formal programs such
as the Maritime Security Program (MSP), Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement (VISA) and the Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA), DOD gains
critical access to U.S. commercial capabilities, while ensuring the
availability of a viable U.S. flag maritime industry and U.S. citizen
mariner pool in times of national emergency.
The MSP was recently extended an additional 10 years to 2025.
TRANSCOM looks forward to working with members of Congress to continue
to refine the program between now and its implementation date in 2015.
The most critical vessels in our fleets are the Roll-On/Roll-Off (RORO)
vessels. TRANSCOM also looks forward to working with our partners in
developing a joint approach to recapitalize our organic fleet through
the purchase of vessels available at minimal cost due to the declining
worldwide markets. Doing so keeps U.S. citizens operating these
vessels, thereby strengthening our maritime base and generating
business for U.S. shipyards to complete all conversion and life-cycle
maintenance work on these ships. Additionally, preserving DOD's organic
fleet of nine Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSRs) and 48 Ready
Reserve Force ships is vital to having the surge sealift capacity
necessary to meet future contingencies.
TRANSCOM works closely with DLA Energy to meet DOD's fuel
requirements. Early in 2011, MSC assumed operational control of the
second of two U.S. built, U.S. flagged State Class tanker vessels.
These new double hulled 331,000 barrel ships replaced four older T-5
tankers that have served us well for the past 25 years. The Motor
Vessel (MV) Empire State and her sister ship, MV Evergreen State, will
carry refined petroleum products primarily between commercial
refineries and DOD storage and distribution facilities worldwide.
Additionally, I support MARAD's proposed Tank Vessel Security Fleet
which, if approved, would replace the VTA and provide incentives for
U.S.-flagged tankers to operate in U.S. foreign commerce in return for
assured access to DOD in support of worldwide operations.
Finally, I urge continued congressional support of the National
Defense Sealift Fund and the MSP. TRANSCOM is working diligently with
Navy, MSC, and MARAD to instill efficiencies and cost savings in the
way these critical assets are managed. Support of the MSP, in addition
to supporting a U.S. flagged commercial fleet, is critical to
maintaining the U.S. merchant mariner base which provides the manpower
needed for surge operations.
The delivery of fuel to combat forces is an absolutely critical
component to any modern combat operation. As we plan for contingencies
we must always consider the possibility that the normal fuel
infrastructure may not be in place or may be unusable. The Offshore
Petroleum Discharge System on MV Wheeler is one unique way to ensure
fuel support. This system provides up to 1.7 million gallons of fuel
from up to 8 miles offshore. This one of a kind vessel is programmed
for purchase in August 2012, and will become part of the organic fleet
to ensure continued support to the warfighter.
SURFACE READINESS
The declining condition and operation of our highway infrastructure
between military installations and ports is a concern for the DOD.
TRANSCOM will continue to work with DOT to identify DOD's rail,
highway, and port requirements so they are thoroughly integrated into
the civil sector planning cycle and maintained for the JDDE.
In addition to maintaining the infrastructure, DOD must also
maintain railcar capacity to meet military transportation requirements.
We are working closely with industry to ensure contracted railcar
capacity is available to augment government-owned railcar capacity in
the event of any contingency lift requirements.
Infrastructure improvement projects at the U.S. Army Military Ocean
Terminal Concord (MOTCO), in Concord, CA, are essential to TRANSCOM's
support of PACOM's operational plans and DOD's military capability in
the Pacific theater. Due to the nature and size of this military
mission, no suitable alternatives to MOTCO exist on the West Coast. We
continue to work within DOD to find necessary resources to alleviate
any ammunition throughput issues in the Pacific Theater.
TRANSCOM also manages the Defense Personal Property System (DPS).
DPS is a next generation web-based system designed to manage personal
property shipments and help improve the move experience for
servicemembers through procurement of best value transportation
services. In addition, DPS achieves other key Defense Personal Property
Program objectives to include: Full Replacement Value protection,
streamlined direct claims settlement between the customer and the
Transportation Service provider (TSP), faster automated payments to
TSP, 24/7 self-counseling, on-line status tracking, and reduced storage
costs. In fiscal year 2011, DPS executed more than 532,000 shipments
and can now accommodate approximately 90 percent of all household goods
shipments for DOD military and civilian personnel and their families.
DEVELOPING NEW CAPABILITIES
TRANSCOM is overcoming deployment challenges to enhance our global
response capabilities. Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) represent a
transformational sealift capability by offering an enhanced logistics
response to military and civil contingencies around the globe. These
vessels close the gap between high-speed low-capacity airlift and low-
speed high-capacity sealift. Forward deployment of JHSVs in combination
with warehoused stocks of equipment and supplies will leverage their
speed and capacity into quick delivery of needed cargos for Service,
joint, and interagency efforts. We are analyzing ways to further
capitalize on this capability with the Services and other COCOMs.
With delivery by airdrop nearly doubling yearly since 2005,
TRANSCOM's investment in a High Speed Container Delivery System (HSCDS)
will increase airdrop accuracy and payload weights supporting forward
deployed warfighters. This capability also enhances threat avoidance
and tactical maneuverability to aircraft and aircrews. HSCDS has
successfully completed technology demonstrations with a summer
operational assessment planned.
FISCAL STEWARDSHIP
The JDDE generated $786.9 million in cost avoidance predominately
through the use of multimodal operations (the cost-effectiveness of
ships and the flexibility of the C-17s) and forward based warehousing
in fiscal year 2011. A continuing example of multimodal operations is
the movement of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All Terrain Vehicles
(MATVs) to Afghanistan. The vehicles were shipped to seaports in
theater then airlifted five at a time aboard C-17s into country.
TRANSCOM delivered the majority of the 850 MATVs from October 2010
through September 2011 using multimodal operations.
TRANSCOM is committed to being part of the DOD solution to long-
term deficit-reduction challenges by continuing to lead the
certification effort for alternative fuels. AMC C-17s underwent flight
tests and certification on cutting-edge renewable bio-jet fuel blended
with JP-8 in August 2011. Additionally, all aircraft in AMC's fleet are
approved to fly on a synthetic blend of coal or natural gas-based fuel
and regular jet fuel.
Additional efficiency efforts include the Mission Index Flying
Tool, the Next Generation Cargo Capability Program, and other mission
area enhancements. The Mission Index Flying Tool has allowed AMC to
reduce aviation fuel consumption beyond expectations. The Next
Generation Cargo Capability program standardizes air cargo build-up
from depot suppliers and AMC aerial ports to maximize volume/weight
utilization, increasing operational effectiveness, and reducing fuel
costs while meeting the end customer's delivery requirements.
Collaboration with our supported customers has moved more materiel via
surface modes to our CONUS strategic aerial ports, thus minimizing
aircraft costs while effectively meeting warfighter requirements.
Finally, to optimize over-ocean shipments and reduce enterprise
operating costs, we continue to identify opportunities to aggregate
cargo at appropriate locations.
FINAL THOUGHTS
While the Nation and TRANSCOM face significant challenges at home
and abroad, we recognize there are great opportunities for positive
change. Such changes will improve effectiveness and efficiency for the
warfighters and for the citizens who have entrusted us with the
responsible use of our Nation's resources. The dedicated men and women
of the TRANSCOM team take enormous pride in providing the world's best
deployment and distribution support to our great Nation. ``Together, we
deliver.''
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.
Let's try a first round of 7 minutes. We have pretty good
attendance, so we probably won't have time for a second round.
Admiral, let me start with you. The United States and Japan
are reconsidering certain terms of the 2006 roadmap agreement
to move U.S. marines off of Okinawa. Specifically, we
apparently now have agreed to de-link the movement of 8,000
marines off Okinawa from the development of a Futenma
Replacement Facility. However, the plan to build the
replacement facility at Camp Schwab apparently still remains
unchanged.
Senators McCain and Webb and I believe that the plan to
build that replacement facility at Camp Schwab is unrealistic
and is unworkable and unaffordable. Earlier this week the
Japanese Prime Minister met with the Governor of Okinawa and
the Governor apparently has reiterated his opposition to that
replacement facility plan and has repeated his call for the
airfield to be located outside of Okinawa.
So it seems clear that we need an alternative to the plan
to build a replacement facility at Camp Schwab. Otherwise, the
current Futenma Air Station is going to stay open and
operational for the foreseeable future.
Now, in the NDAA we have a number of requirements relative
to this issue that will need to be met before any funds,
including funds that are provided by the Government of Japan,
may be obligated or expended to implement realignment. There is
the Marine Corps Commandant's submission of a report of his
preferred force laydown. There's a requirement that we see a
master plan for the construction of the facilities and
infrastructure necessary to implement the Commandant's
preferred force laydown. We need a certification by the SECDEF
that tangible progress has been made on the replacement
facility, and a number of other requirements.
Are you participating or have you participated in meeting
those requirements that are laid out in our defense
authorization bill?
Admiral Willard. We are participating, yes.
Chairman Levin. In each of them?
Admiral Willard. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you know how far along they are? When do
we expect that that will be filed with us?
Admiral Willard. I don't have a date for you, Senator. I
can tell you that the deliberations have been continuous. In
fact, before those conditions were laid down to DOD we were
offering a variety of options to the SECDEF as events in the
Okinawa area were stalled over the past couple of years. So
PACOM has been involved in sharing about 25 options with DOD
over time and the preferred laydown that you refer to is one of
those. So we are very much engaged and will continue to assist
in determining the final answers to your questions. Obviously,
the Japanese get a vote in this in terms of progress.
Chairman Levin. Right. Whatever we do, we intend to do it
jointly with the Japanese, and that's an important part of our
intent.
Relative to China, you've testified a bit on the growth of
the Chinese military. What do you expect the effect of the
administration's refocus on Asia to be on China's military
growth and posture in the region?
Admiral Willard. We've not seen China's military growth
affected by the announcement, nor do we expect it to be. It has
continued relatively unabated. The Chinese are obviously very
interested in the statement that the United States intends to
focus on the Asia-Pacific region. I think they see themselves
in that statement, perception or not, and will continue to
observe very closely the actions that the United States takes
to back up those words.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, you've made reference to the
strategic guidance that was released by the administration
recently. Do you support that new strategy?
Admiral Willard. I do.
Chairman Levin. Are you satisfied that the fiscal year 2013
budget supports that new strategy?
Admiral Willard. I am. As we look at the budget submission,
the strategy establishes global priorities. The budget
establishes force structure in terms of acquisitions across the
Services. How that acquisition strategy is applied to the
strategic priorities globally will, in effect, answer the
strategy or not. So this is about the application of what we
buy, I think, more than anything.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, you have, I believe, indicated
that you support the United States becoming a party to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). I
would like to press you, because this is your last hearing
before us, a bit more on that. Can you tell us whether, in your
judgment, joining this treaty, this convention, will support
our military operations in the Asia Pacific and whether not
being a party to that convention disadvantages the United
States?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it's a
great question and timely. I do think that not being a signator
disadvantages the United States in a particular way. I would
offer that since 1994 the U.S. Armed Forces have been adhering
to the legal framework that is consistent with the UNCLOS, and
we continue to, and we continue to share UNCLOS issues and
debate UNCLOS legal definitions with our counterparts
throughout the Asia Pacific.
Chairman Levin. ``UNCLOS'' is Law of the Sea?
Admiral Willard. Law of the Sea.
What the United States doesn't have as a non-signator is a
seat at the table when the convention is debated or as the
convention evolves by the various countries that have ratified
it. I think it's important that the United States have a seat
at that table. At the end of the day we believe that the
elements that caused the convention to be set aside in the
1980s, generally in the area of the commercial-related articles
within it, have all been corrected and should at this point be
candidate for ratification. We, again because UNCLOS is so
important as a framework for determining the actions that all
nations take in the maritime domain around the world, believe
strongly that the United States must have a voice in this and a
seat at the table when we debate UNCLOS in the future.
Chairman Levin. Does China have a seat at the table?
Admiral Willard. They do.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me just respond to the last line of questioning.
I want to make sure our witnesses know that I'm probably not
the only one on this side of the table here who disagrees with
the administration's position on UNCLOS. In fact, I'd like to
make a formal request, and I will do so in writing, Mr.
Chairman, that we actually have a hearing on this treaty. I
think that would be very appropriate to have.
I know that about 10 years ago we had two hearings, one by
this committee and the other by the Environment and Public
Works Committee that I was chairing at that time. But I won't
get into that now.
I would like to have you send me something for the record,
Admiral Willard, as to what specific things have changed since
the 1980s, actually in two shifts, since the 1980s and the
1990s, that should change our position on UNCLOS, if you would
do that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The legal regime reflected in United Nations Convention for Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) promotes two fundamental tenets of the U.S. strategic
perspective on security and stability in the world: (1) preservation of
freedom of access and use of the seas, and (2) the rule of law.
The Convention preserves freedom by codifying the
rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea for all nations,
including the United States. This, in turn, promotes our
economic and security interests.
The Convention upholds the rule of law by effectively
balancing the interests of coastal states and user states,
through precise terminology and concise legal rules. As a
coastal state and user state, the United States benefits from a
stable legal regime, immune to easy manipulation by others.
U.S. accession to the Convention would send a strong message to the
world that we are serious about preserving maritime freedoms and
upholding the rule of law.
In the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) area of
responsibility (AOR), nations with longstanding excessive
maritime claims (e.g., Philippines and Vietnam) are modifying
those claims, consistent with UNCLOS.
These member-states cite upholding the rules-based
approach of the Convention to resolving the South China Sea
disputes as a reason for their efforts.
Throughout the PACOM AOR, my staff, my component
commanders, and I are often asked, ``will the United States
ever join UNCLOS?'' We interpret this question as a call by our
allies and partners to support efforts to uphold the Convention
against those who seek to manipulate it and the underlying
customary international law.
U.S. accession would send a strong message to the
nations of the Asia-Pacific region that the rule of law
reflected in the Convention is worth upholding and preserving.
U.S. accession could encourage other nations in the
region to reform their excessive maritime claims as Vietnam and
the Philippines have begun to do.
Continuing to operate as an outsider to the legal regime
significantly undermines our credibility when we attempt, on a
recurring basis, to challenge and protest the failure of other nations
to adhere to international rules governing uses of the oceans.
We routinely cite the rules contained in UNCLOS,
regarding maritime navigation, maritime safety, sovereignty,
and jurisdiction, among others as being universally applicable.
We rely on the rules in UNCLOS when criticizing
nations for various actions that we find inconsistent with
international law in the maritime domain.
The effectiveness of our challenges to violations of
international law regarding uses of the oceans, are handicapped
by the fact that members of UNCLOS respond ``How can you
lecture us about failing to comply with UNCLOS when you are not
even a party to it?''
Consequently, U.S. objections are often ignored or
dismissed.
Becoming a party to UNCLOS would significantly
strengthen our standing and credibility when demanding
adherence to international law in the uses of the oceans.
The United States faces a different world today in which some
rising nations seek to challenge the existing rules-based international
order.
When UNCLOS was negotiated, the United States shared a
converging interest with its leading competitor (i.e., the
Soviet Union) in preserving the rights, freedoms and uses of
the sea.
Today, there are rising nations (e.g., China) that do
not share this converging interest in preserving these
freedoms. Moreover, those nations also do not fully respect the
concepts behind adherence to the rule of law. Instead, they
view the law as a tool to be used when useful and ignored when
necessary. China refers to this concept as ``Legal Warfare.''
In our view, the best way to prevent that manipulation
of the law is to guard it closely from within the system.
So long as the United States remains outside the
established rule-set of the Convention as a non-party, we face
an unnecessary impediment to our ability as a nation,
diplomatically and militarily to preserve the rules embodied in
the Convention.
The United States cannot preserve freedoms and uphold the rule of
law by our military presence or activities alone.
Unlike conventional law, customary law is constantly
subject to change and evolution over time through state
practice of all nations.
Critics of U.S. accession who argue that U.S. military
superiority alone can uphold the legal regime reflected in
UNCLOS as customary law ignore the reality that the United
States cannot depend solely on one element of national power to
protect national interests.
Relying on the U.S. military as the sole means to
protect U.S. interests sends the wrong message to rising
nations, such as China, that they too should rely upon their
militaries to resolve international disputes, such as those in
the South China Sea.
To maximize the likelihood of achieving our strategic
objectives, the United States should leverage all elements of
national power, including diplomatic, informational, and legal.
The primary concern of President Reagan with the final text of the
Convention involved the issue of deep sea-bed mining. According to
President Clinton, and as agreed to by Presidents Bush and Obama, those
concerns were effectively mitigated between the time that President
Reagan decided not to sign the Convention in 1982 and 1994 when changes
to the Convention were agreed.
President Clinton submitted the revised Convention to
the Senate for ratification in 1994, stating that the changes
addressed President Reagan's concerns.
Presidents Bush and Obama implicitly agreed with
President Clinton when they supported Senate ratification.
According to Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama, all of our
national security interests were preserved in the final text of the
Convention.
When the Convention was negotiated in the 1970s and
early 1980s, the United States was a leading nation at the
table throughout.
Three successive Presidents, from both parties and
leaders of the U.S. military have consistently supported U.S.
accession to the Convention.
As described above, U.S. accession would bolster, not impede,
global U.S. military activities.
Codifies rights, freedoms and uses of the sea critical
to the global mobility of our military forces, including the
rights of innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea
lanes passage, the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and
``other internationally lawful uses of the sea'' (e.g.,
military activities, operations, and exercises).
The U.S. military will not be subject to compulsory
dispute settlement procedures (i.e., international courts or
arbitration).
The Convention expressly permits member-states
to opt out of those procedures for ``disputes
concerning military activities.''
The Convention expressly exempts foreign ``warships,
naval auxiliaries, and other vessels or aircraft owned or
operated'' by a member-state from coastal state regulations of
the marine environment.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard, I have always been
concerned about the quality of our intelligence on North Korea.
There have always been a lot of surprises there. I won't repeat
the details: my observation back in August 24, 1998, when we
asked the question how long it would be until North Korea would
pose an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile threat and they were
talking about around 3 to 5 years, and it was 7 days later, on
August 31, 1998, that they actually did fire one. It was a
Taepodong 1.
I'm concerned about their progress now and the three-stage
rocket that they actually were able to launch in 2009. So I
guess I'd just ask you, are you satisfied with the quality of
the intelligence we're getting on North Korea?
Admiral Willard. Senator, we know a great deal about the
various structures in North Korea, including the efforts
they're making to nuclearize and develop ballistic missile
delivery capabilities. That said, there is never perfect
information with regard to North Korea in virtually any area.
I'm also satisfied with the emphasis that's being placed on
North Korea, given the importance of what you've suggested, and
the efforts specifically by the entire intelligence federation
to provide me the kind of information that we require to track
North Korean developments day to day.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, I think that's significant.
In terms of the 29-year-old replacement for Kim Jong Il, my
impression is that it's just more of the same and perhaps not
really going to be a major change in terms of decisionmaking.
What is your opinion of Kim Jong Eun?
Admiral Willard. We think that in general he's a Kim and
he's surrounded by----
Senator Inhofe. He's a Kim, yes.
Admiral Willard. He's surrounded by an uncle and Kim Jong
Il's sister and others that I think are guiding his actions. So
in that sense we would expect, as you suggest, more of the
same. The strategy has been successful through two generations.
It wouldn't surprise us to see an effort to make the strategy
work for a third.
That said, he's a young man and relatively untested and
those around him may have some differences of opinion regarding
the direction that North Korea heads. So we are interested in
seeing the influence of a treaty ally like China or the
direction that they take in various security areas, including
proliferation and nuclearization.
Senator Inhofe. All right, I appreciate it. I'm going to
ask you something about what you said on China, but first I
want to ask General Fraser.
I've had a particular interest in Africa and U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM) for quite some period of time. I'd like to
ask you, what type of support is TRANSCOM able to give AFRICOM
in their AOR today?
General Fraser. Thank you, Senator. As we look to AFRICOM,
we've managed to meet all their requests and their
requirements. That has come in the form of support to the
Libyan operations, where we were able to provide both lift and
tanker support. They had follow-on requests for Libya, which we
provided some support for. We sailed in some ships to provide
equipment into Libya. That's one form. We still provide support
also to the Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa,
meeting those requirements.
But also our new command, the JECC, has had several
requests for our planners. So Admiral Stearney and his folks
have moved forward to help out General Hamm in some of the
planning that he's been doing. So we have not failed to meet
any of the requests from AFRICOM.
Senator Inhofe. Is it your opinion that AFRICOM is getting
adequate resources to carry out the mission?
General Fraser. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Inhofe. If you find that it's not, if you'd let us
know it would be very helpful.
Getting back to something that maybe I misunderstood, in
terms of China's military buildup, we know that it's been an
average of what, 18.75 percent a year now. I remember back
during the Clinton administration when they were even more
aggressive than that. Did I understand you to say that you
don't witness the growth in their capabilities or you do? Would
you clarify your statement as to your observation of China's
threat and capabilities?
Admiral Willard. I think I tried to characterize it as
growth unabated, so they continue to advance their capabilities
and capacities in virtually all areas.
Senator Inhofe. In all areas. That's something significant
because it's conventional forces, and then they seem to be
having it all. I look at that as a great threat. I remember
early on when I was first elected. Actually, that was over on
the House side. There was a book by Anthony Kubek called,
``Modernizing China.'' I don't know whether you've ever read it
or not, but I think for anyone who is dealing with China and
Taiwan, it would be worthwhile reading that.
Let me ask you, do you still feel the same way about my
favorite programs, 1206, 1207, 1208, International Military
Education and Training (IMET) and these programs?
Admiral Willard. We do, very strongly, Senator. 1206 in
particular because of the work that we're doing with the
Philippines and others in counterterror has been very helpful,
and we continue to rely very heavily on those funds.
I would just comment that we think IMET is a most powerful
tool in terms of exposing our foreign counterparts not only to
U.S. education, military education, and standards and values,
but also in bringing the nations, the allies, and partners
together in the region as alumni. So these are very, very
important programs as it relates to strengthening our allies.
Senator Inhofe. The IMET program has been so successful in
our change in focus that we recognize we're not doing them the
favor, really they're doing us the favor. Once an allegiance, a
close relationship, is established, it stays forever.
Admiral Willard. I agree.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, Admiral Willard and General Fraser, for your
service.
Admiral, thanks for all your years of service, and to your
wife also. You've really given great service to our country and
great leadership in the years I've come to know you through my
membership on this committee. I must say that I've been
impressed over the years that you've not only proven yourself
to be an exceptional military leader, but I think you've always
had an ability, while carrying out the details of your military
responsibilities, to see the larger picture in which you and
the United States have been operating, and I've always found my
conversations with you to be very instructive.
So I appreciate that very much and wish you the best in
your next chapter.
Admiral Willard. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. So let me begin, having said that, with
a larger picture statement and question, which is that in the
travels over the last year that I've been able to do in the
PACOM AOR, and meeting people here as they come from the
region, it strikes me that this rebalancing of our foreign and
military policy toward the Asia Pacific is not just an
initiative on our part in pursuit of our economic and security
interests, but it is really a reaction to a kind of demand from
within the region that we be more involved.
It's striking, I think, and perhaps not appreciated enough
by people around the country, at a time when there's a lot of
concern about America being in decline, America the unpopular,
that not only among the more traditional allies has our
relationship grown stronger, but that there are whole new
groups of countries that are seeking stronger relations with
us, such as Vietnam and Myanmar, for instance.
So I wanted to ask you at the beginning if you agree that
that's the case and, if so, why? Is it just about fear of China
and the hope that we will balance China as part of our
rebalancing? Or is there more to it than that?
Admiral Willard. Thank you. I do agree with your statement,
and I think I've testified in the past, the amount of
encouragement that has come from the region, from virtually all
the actors in the region, with regard to their desire for U.S.
staying power and influence in the region and increased
engagement.
There was a perception over the course of the last decade
of warfare that our presence in the Asia-Pacific region was
diminished, and, in fact, our ground force presence was
decremented by about 10 percent as we in PACOM rotated forces
in and out of the theater of wars over the past 10 years. But
our ship presence, and our aircraft presence, remained
relatively steady, albeit working the ships and airplanes hard
to do it. So we've maintained a presence, but there was a sense
in the region that the U.S. commitment to the region had been
somewhat diminished for a variety of reasons.
I think that refrain has not stopped. I don't think it's
just about China. I do think that the fact that China has
advanced its military capacities to the extent that it has
certainly is one element of that. But I think there has been a
desire, a strong desire in the Asia-Pacific region,
continuously for U.S. engagement economically and otherwise.I
think they regard a U.S. presence there as unquestionably
contributing to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific
region.
It's not lost on anyone that for nearly the past 6 decades
we've enjoyed relative security and growing prosperity.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Admiral Willard. So I think there's a desire for U.S.
engagement regardless, and certainly there is, I think, a great
deal of optimism in the region as a consequence of the recent
announcements that have been made.
Senator Lieberman. That, in fact, the role that America has
played in providing stability and security in the Asia-Pacific
region over the last 6 decades, as you've said, has been one of
the preconditions of the enormous growth and prosperity in the
region over that time.
Admiral Willard. Absolutely.
Senator Lieberman. Is it fair to also say that part of what
draws a lot of people and countries in the Asia Pacific toward
us may well be our form of government, that during this period
of time not only has there been an economic prosperity growing
in the Asia Pacific, but democracy has expanded as well?
Admiral Willard. It has. I think when you look at countries
like India and the engagement that's ongoing between the United
States and India; Indonesia, which has a relatively nascent
democracy, that has been very successful, and its desire for
increased engagement with the United States, and others, that
you are right. There are a lot of U.S. values that are highly
regarded in the region and I think our form of governance is
one of them.
Senator Lieberman. So in the midst of all that, I worry
that as we get this move toward us and urging us to be more
involved for mutual economic security, even political
governance interests, that we're sending a message out by the
cuts in defense that are part of the Budget Control Act (BCA),
leaving aside sequestration, that maybe we're not going to be
able really to deliver on our promise of increased involvement
or, at worst, that people in the region and countries will
think it's rhetoric.
So I wonder how you feel about whether the cuts required
under the BCA of last year, not the potential sequestration,
could impose risks on our strategy in the PACOM AOR, and
whether you've heard any of those concerns from political or
military leaders in the region.
Admiral Willard. I think the region broadly recognizes two
things: one, that post-two wars a decade long that, as the
United States has in the past, a reduction in the defense
budget following those wars has generally always occurred and
is occurring once again. I think when you combine that fact
with the fiscal circumstances and challenges that our country
faces in debt and deficit, it does raise questions in the
region regarding what the true extent of cuts to the defense
budget could be.
I think the second dimension to this issue is how in a
reduced budget environment the Asia Pacific will be attended to
with regard to force structure and readiness in the future. So
I think on the one hand it's not particularly surprising to
anyone in the region that our defense budget is being reduced,
sequestration aside, but I think that it has raised questions
and we're asked to clarify how in the reduced budget
environment that's being widely publicized that we will meet
our requirements in the Asia-Pacific region. Again, I would
offer that the answer to that is, regardless of the adjustments
in force structure that take place, how we emplace that force
structure, bias that force structure into regions of the world
that matter most, is I think in the end, what will answer the
mail.
Senator Lieberman. Well, to me that's a significant answer,
and it's one that I hope we will keep in mind as we go forward
with our work on the defense authorization bill and our
colleagues in the Appropriations Committee do the same on the
DOD budget. I hope we can find ways to add on to what the
administration has requested pursuant to the BCA.
I thank you very much again for your service, your
leadership, and your testimony today.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, to you, let me just echo what others have said
with respect to thanking you for your service to our country.
You have certainly served in multiple roles of leadership
during the time that you have served America and you're to be
congratulated for that. Thanks also to your wife for her
commitment. I'm just pleased to hear you've made the wise
decision of retiring to the Atlanta area. I look forward to
continuing to take advantage of you and your expertise since
you'll be close by.
Let me talk to you for a minute about China. You discussed
in your statement the continuing growth of China and their
increasing military power, obviously. Specifically, you comment
that China's military modernization, and in particular its
active development of capabilities in cyber and space domains,
and the question all these emerging military capabilities raise
among China's neighbors about its current and long-term
intentions, is one of the main security challenges confronting
the United States across the region.
China is developing anti-access and area denial
capabilities that may shift the balance of power in the region.
The types of platforms and capabilities that China is
developing have been interpreted by some to limit freedom of
movement by potential adversaries and also to require potential
adversaries to conduct military operations at increasing
distances.
Can you comment on what you believe needs to be done in the
Pacific theater to preserve the United States' and our allies'
freedom of movement and access across the region?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. I think first of all
it needs to be understood that in terms of U.S. military
presence, we remain present throughout the region and in all
areas wherefreedom of action is required. So whether we're
talking the South China Sea, East China Sea regions, Philippine
Sea, or elsewhere in the Asia Pacific, the United States
remains present.
In terms of operations in what could be a potentially
denied environment, I think it's very important that the United
States make the necessary investments to ensure its military
access to those regions. I would just offer that in the South
China Sea alone the sea lines of communication carry $5.3
trillion of regional commerce, of which $1.2 trillion is U.S.
commerce, and the U.S. military must be present there to ensure
the security of those sea lines of communication and that
important economic commerce for the United States and for our
regional allies and partners.
So we will be present, and it's important that we make the
necessary investments to assure that presence even in a denied
area scenario.
Senator Chambliss. In that same vein, part of the assets
that you have in the inventory there now are a limited number
of F-22s, limited by the fact that we only have a limited
number that have been produced. We've maintained air
superiority and air dominance in that region since the Korean
War and it's a vital part of our defensive mechanisms and
posture there. Now, with those limited number of F-22s and it
looks like potentially a slowdown of the production of F-35s,
are you concerned long-term? I realize short-term maybe not,
but long-term do you foresee this as a problem when it comes to
maintaining air dominance and air superiority?
Admiral Willard. Sir, I'm satisfied with, as you suggest,
short-term, the number of F-22s that are on hand and available
to us. I think we're all somewhat concerned long-term to see
that the F-35, in its development, provides the kind of
capabilities to our Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps that it
was designed to. So very interested to see that program remain
healthy and deliver the capabilities that we require out there.
Senator Chambliss. Would you consider that weapons system
imperative for the long-term capability of air dominance and
air superiority?
Admiral Willard. I would. I think fifth generation
capability is mandated. We have others in the world that are
developing those capabilities and, as you suggest, if we
requiredominance in the air in the event of a contingency, then
certainly the fifth generation fighter capability is part of
that equation.
Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, the President's 2013
budget plans to cut strategic airlift and retire over 200
aircraft in fiscal year 2013 and nearly 300 aircraft over the
Future Years Defense Program. The President's budget will
reduce mobility capacity by retiring all C-5As, retiring or
cancelling procurement of all planned C-27Js, and retiring 65
C-130s. After these retirements there will be a fleet of 275
strategic airlifters and 318 C-130s. In addition, the Air Force
will retire 20 KC-135s and maintain a fleet of 453 air
refueling aircraft.
With such a reduction of strategic mobility and airlift and
the cancellation of a whole airplane program, how do you plan
to maintain supply, personnel transport, and logistics chains
that require significant airlift capabilities? What additional
airlift requirements do you foresee in the future for the
various theaters in which TRANSCOM operates, and how confident
are you that you're going to have the airlift capabilities that
you need?
General Fraser. Senator, thank you very much. First off, I
would start by saying that we have a new strategy. The force
structure that is put forth supports that strategy and it is
also backed by some analysis that we have actually completed in
looking at that strategy, and also in working with the
combatant commanders.
With respect to specific platforms that you talked about
there, I would comment first on the tankers. You mentioned a
20-tanker reduction. I certainly support that. What we have
seen that isactually enabling more capability and capacity with
respect to tankers is that depots have gotten better. So as we
look to the future and they have streamlined their processes,
we're seeing fewer aircraft in the depot, which certainly
allows us to take out some of the more costly aircraft there
and therefore the reduction with respect to those tankers.
Historically, as I recall, they've always planned on about
19 percent of the force being in depot and we're seeing
something more along the lines of 10 percent in the future. So
that's added capability, coupled with the contract, the KC-46,
which is key to the future, and bringing that system online,
will give us both air refueling and some lift capability as we
transition that aircraft into the Active Duty and are able to
support the various theaters around the world. So the KC-46 is
a part of that movement to the future and modernizing that
fleet.
There's also a modernization effort on the KC-135s that we
need to continue, which enables them to continue to perform in
the future. They're going to have to bridge to the future
tanker assets as they come aboard.
As I look at the 130s, the numbers that they're talking
about are supportable. When I look at the 318, that also
includes approximately 50 C-130s to continue to provide direct
support to the Army, which is something that the Air Force has
moved in over time and has shown that we can do that in the
theater. I think, based on my discussions with the commanders
in the field, they are very pleased with the support that they
are getting with the assets that are there.
The C-27, I had the opportunity recently to be in the
theater. I talked to the folks there. It's performing well and
I'm very proud of the service and what those men and women are
doing. But I'd also comment that it's a costly platform. It's a
niche platform. So as we look at the strategy and we look to
move into the future in a multi-capable aircraft, something
like the C-130, a modernized C-130J as we look to the future,
something that's going to give us more capability at reduced
cost, which is something that is certainly worth considering.
So when I look at that from a holistic standpoint, it's
certainly supportable. The C-130Hs are going to be modernized.
That's a program that is ongoing and the Air Force needs to do
that as they enter into some items that are on that aircraft
that are going to time out and give them access. So as they
optimize that fleet of the future, it will be a very capable
force, a modernized force of 318 C-130 aircraft.
To the strategic lift, looking at that, I am supportive of
the strategy that's put forth, and as we evaluated those
numbers and looking at the positive things that are happening
with the C-5M, for instance, it has a higher mission capability
rate, which gives us greater capacity and capability. It's
currently the only aircraft that we can actually fly the polar
routes on. You can't do that with the C-5As, for instance, and
load much on it. So there's great capacity in these Ms as we
move to the future.
So modernizing the C-5s and going to 52 C-5Ms in the future
gives us greater capacity and capability, with increased
mission capable rates, from what we're seeing currently on the
As now, around 55 percent, to about 75 percent. So there's
greater capacity there, and so that's very positive with
respect to the strategic airlift.
Also along the same lines, the C-17s continue to perform
magnificently in the theater. Every time we have turned to the
C-17, it has always been there. So as we move to the future
with the C-17s that we have, there will be plenty of them, and
so that's how we're able to come up with the strategic airlift
to be able to support the theaters in the future.
It will support the strategy as I mentioned, and the two-
war construct remains in effect. We just have to manage those
forces, it's what we'll have to do, and that's what you were
talking about there. We in TRANSCOM will ensure that we do that
to support the combatant commanders' requirements.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First let me begin by thanking and commending Admiral
Willard and Mrs. Willard for their extraordinary service to the
Navy and to the Nation. Thank you, sir, for what you've done.
Ma'am, thank you too, and your personal kindness also.
Let me just quickly follow on the point that Senator
Chambliss made, General Fraser, about strategic airlift. I
think it should be noted that Senator Ayotte played a very
critical role last year in addressing this issue of C-5As, and
we lowered the threshold to 301. Now your proposal, as you
indicated, is 275 strategic airlifters.
Just to follow on the points you made, which I thought were
excellent, it is not just a question of supporting current
operations, but also the obligation to reconstitute quickly, if
necessary. Are you prepared to reconstitute and increase
efforts if called upon, given the proposed 275?
General Fraser. Sir, we are postured well to support any of
the requirements that we have. As you are aware, we have had
pop-up requirements, and with the flexibility that we have
within our system as the distribution process owner and
synchronizer we're able to reach in and get assets when we need
them. I could give examples of where we're able to do that,
reaching in with the ability to pull in-service or in-transit
aircraft to do a different mission.
A case in point would be support for aeromedical airlift
that we were asked to do out of Libya. After Libya operations,
we were asked to find the necessary assets and, using those in-
service assets, diverted and utilized a C-17 to actually pick
up some critically injured individuals and bring them back to
the United States with a critical care team. The other thing
that we were able to do was work with U.S. European Command,
utilize some of their assets that they actually had for C-130s,
to bring other injured back.
We have a very flexible, a very resilient system and
process to be able to respond to these pop-ups.
Senator Reed. Is it fair to say that, rather than just the
number of platforms, it's the capability of individual
platforms and the system you use that that gives you advantages
and gives you the comfort that you can reduce the number of
platforms?
General Fraser. It is, sir. It's also the support, the
tremendous support that we actually get through the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. The CRAF and our commercial
partners play a big role. An example of that is how they were
able to turn and support us when we were asked to bring the
troops out of Iraq before the holidays. That's a very busy time
of the year, and with the accelerated timeline that we were
given, we were able to get 99 percent of the troops back to the
United States before the holiday period. That last 1 percent
came home before the end of the year as they were turning in
some final equipment.
So that's the flexibility that we have within the system
for both organic and our commercial aircraft.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me change topics. General Fraser, the NDN is
increasingly key to our operations in Afghanistan. Primarily at
this point it's a one-way system, but you and your colleagues
are trying to make it a two-way system, not only delivering
material into the country, but also planning to withdraw
material out. Can you comment on the status and the potential
importance and growth of the NDN through Kyrgyzstan and other
countries?
General Fraser. Sir, thank you very much. We have had
tremendous support through the NDN. Currently, with the border
closed in Pakistan, we're able to continue to support ongoing
operations in Afghanistan and we can continue to do that
because of the NDN, which is allowing us to bring goods in.
But I would also comment along the same lines, it's not
just the NDN that's allowing us to do that. It's the other
aspects that we have with multi-modal. Multi-modal is allowing
us to move our assets to the theater via surface and then fly
them in there at the end. So we have a resilient system that
gives us more than one way to support the theater, which is not
allowing us to have a single point of failure.
Along the lines of the retrograde, it's a daunting task, I
will admit that. But I'll also say that one of the first trips
that I made was to Central Asia back in December, a very
positive trip, and had a very good outcome from that trip. We
now have two-way approval to move non-lethal equipment back out
of Afghanistan. In fact, we have already set ourselves up for a
proof of principle and have received approval from the
countries to do this through what we call the KKT route, which
is through Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. Also, Russia
has approved this and Uzbekistan recently approved this. Not
only have Russia, et cetera, approved the non-lethal, but we
also have approval to do wheeled armored vehicles. This is
something that we didn't have before.
We continue to develop these relationships, and so that was
a very profitable visit going over there. So now we'll run this
proof of principle to check the processes, to check the
procedures, but also check the velocity of what could be in the
future.
I will also comment, though, that with the amount of
equipment, and working with the folks on the ground there, we
need the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAK GLOC) open
because of the large numbers that we're talking about that we
need to bring out in a timely manner. We're tasked this year to
bring another 23,000 troops out by the 1st of October. We're
already identifying excess equipment now with the commanders on
the ground. We have approval to set up a materiel recovery
element team that's in theater, which is going to help
facilitate this.
The other thing I would comment on is, we're also setting
up some multi-modal operations, where we are now being more
flexible with all aircraft that are flying in the theater. As
every aircraft goes in, if it has pallet positions and it has
capacity on it, then we are making sure that we put something
on that aircraft and bring it back out, in order to maximize
that lift and try to get ahead of it as best we can.
We have a number of things that are going on, two-way
flows, all those other things that I mentioned.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Willard, if I may, you have many challenges in the
Pacific and you can categorize them in general terms in many
different ways. But one is basically access. One impression I
have is that for surface ships access is more problematic
because of the ability to detect ships and engage with
precision weapons, and that as a result submarines in the
Pacific have a greater capability to access places. Is that a
fair generalization?
Admiral Willard. It is.
Senator Reed. So that makes, in your view, the submarine a
key aspect of your strategy and your ability to gain access in
contested areas?
Admiral Willard. It does.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, General Fraser, is it true that we're having difficulty
going through Pakistan to provide transport.Is it more
difficult now?
General Fraser. Sir, the PAK GLOC is shut down at this
time.
Senator Brown. Right. We give them billions of dollars in
aid. That's why, Mr. Chairman, I'm floored that we're giving a
country billions of dollars in aid and they can't accommodate
us to allow for the safe transport of goods through their
country. So that's something I hope, Mr. Chairman, we try to
address. That's not for you, but it's more for us, sir.
I just want to take it a little step further. What level of
risk do we assume by reducing the C-5 fleet, particularly in
the area of oversized air cargo capability?
General Fraser. Sir, backed by analysis and against the new
strategy that has been put forward, we think that any increased
risk is manageable as we look to the future. Oversized/outsized
cargo, when we look at the scenarios that we run, we can meet
the mission.
Senator Brown. Do you believe that having a robust
strategic airlift capability on the east coast is part of that
overall strategy?
General Fraser. Sir, the inherent flexibility that we have
with air is, of course, we can shift and we can swing it to
where we need it. It is not uncommon for us to take forces from
one theater to another dependent upon the operations that are
needed, whether it's supporting a Haiti operation where we have
support of aircraft out of the Pacific, or whether it's in
support of a Libyan operation, where we engaged the total
force, we have a number of volunteers to support the tanker
bridge.
These types of things, the flexibility of our air fleet we
can position it where we need it.
Senator Brown. But in particular with regard to the east
coast of the United States, do you think that it's important to
have a strategic airlift capability in this part of the
country?
General Fraser. Sir, again it's not about where it is
located; it's the inherent flexibility that I have that I'm
able to position it where I need it, and where it comes from is
not something that I focus on.
Senator Brown. Well, it's something that I focus on as a
Senator, and especially when we have a base like Westover, that
has incredible airlift capability, has a long and historic
relationship providing those services, not only with great
honor, but with great capability. So I was wondering if you
could comment on how TRANSCOM's mission is affected if that
capability is degraded?
General Fraser. Sir, we'll still get the support as we work
with AMC no matter where the assets are located. They've always
stepped up and provided what we need.
Senator Brown. Admiral Willard, the Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS), how important is that ship with respect to meeting the
regional threats?
Admiral Willard. I think it will be very important. I think
the ship has attributes that certainly we favor out there,
including its speed, capacity, and shallow draft. So if the
mission modules are properly adapted, I think it will have a
wide range of capabilities that can be used in contingency or
peacetime.
Senator Brown. So do you think your mission will be
affected by going below the acquisition program of 55 ships? If
so, how?
Admiral Willard. Capacity is a capability in and unto
itself. I think it's important that we maintain the capacities
of force structure where we need them. I think the total
acquisition program is less important to PACOM than the number
of LCSs that ultimately wind up in that AOR. So however we bias
those ships, I think it's important that the LCS is there to
meet the needs that PACOM has.
Senator Brown. General Fraser, back to you. How does the
reversibility plan factor into the overall strategy? In other
words, do you feel comfortable that with 275 strategic
airlifters we'd be prepared to transport troops and equipment
to the region in response to unforeseen contingencies? If so,
what sort of risks are involved in that decision?
General Fraser. Sir, I am confident in the number 275. We
also have to understand that we are backed by a tremendous
commercial partnership that we have through the CRAF program
and the ability to move both passengers and cargo. They have
been instrumental in continuing to provide support to the
theater, whether it's direct or actually through multi-modal
operations.
Senator Brown. Admiral, do you agree with that? Do you
think that we need only 275 airlift mobility assets to meet the
mission requirements?
Admiral Willard. I agree with General Fraser's assessment
of how we will make that number work, yes.
Senator Brown. I'm deeply concerned about the Air Guard and
Air Force Reserves, General Fraser. I know it's a big part of
your operations, and as the Air Force begins to downsize some
of the things I've heard from a lot of the Air Guard,
especially concerns about the gutting of that asset--I'm
wondering if you could maybe talk about that and how it
affects, it factors into TRANSCOM's overall strategy, because I
have always felt that that's where the best bang for the buck
is, and I'd just like to get your thoughts on that.
General Fraser. Sir, our Total Force--the Guard, Reserve,
and Active Duty--have always come together to meet the mission.
We very much value the contributions that our Guard and Resere
continue to provide us. They have always been there when the
call went out. I would use the operation in Libya again as an
example, in that when we needed to set up the tanker bridge we
turned to AMC, who then reached out to our Guard and Reserve.
They looked for volunteers. They were ready, they raised their
hand, and they went forward. So they've always been there and
volunteered to support the mission.
Senator Brown. Are you getting a handle on the container
detention fees that resulted in millions of dollars in
penalties, and can you comment on what has been done to
mitigate these fees?
General Fraser. Sir, we're taking a number of different
actions with respect to the container detention fees. We
continue to monitor it very closely. A couple of things that we
have done recently, I have personally engaged the commanders
not only at U.S. Central Command, but also I talked to General
Allen about this when I was in the theater, as well as other
commanders that are in the field in Afghanistan.
We have learned some lessons from the past in Iraq with
respect to our containers and how we manage them. A couple of
things that we're doing is to try and make sure that when we're
in Afghanistan, we try to use as many government-owned
containers as we can and then return those that belong to our
commercial carriers back into the system as rapidly as we can.
There's an accountability process that we're also going
through to make sure that we have a container management system
that more accurately tracks where these containers are.
We're actually going to address it in our next universal
services contract (USC) as we move from what we call USC 6 to
USC 7. So there are some actions that we're taking within that
contracting vehicle to, one, give us more flexibility, in other
words increasing the days of ``free-time'' before detention
charges start accruing. Also, the fact that we'll go from a
minimum of 90 days to 60 days before we can buy the container,
which drives the container purchase price down. So these are
things that we're working with commanders, with education on
how important it is for commanders to get the containers back
into the system. It's a holistic approach.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks, Senator Brown.
Senator Inhofe. Just a unanimous consent request, if I
could, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Go right ahead.
Senator Inhofe. Regarding my opposition to the UNCLOS, I
ask unanimous consent that an article written by John Bolton
that appeared in the Wall Street Journal on September 29, 2011,
be made a part of the record.
Senator Lieberman. Without objection. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Lieberman. Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to express my deep appreciation and thanks
for your service, Admiral Willard and General Fraser, and
particularly, Donna Willard, thank you for all of your
commitment, hard work, and service to our country, too.
Admiral Willard, China continues to assert its claim to the
South and East China seas at the expense of its neighbors.
Would you expand on the excessive maritime claims the Chinese
are making in these waters, to include increases in aggressive
behavior?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, ma'am. I will, although I would
offer that China is not the only claimant in those waters whose
claims are regarded as excessive. So there are, as you'll
recall, six claimants in the South China Sea: Taiwan and China,
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. All lay claim to
features and/or islands in the South China Sea region. Some
have submitted to UNCLOS their continental shelf claims and so
on, and in many cases they're disputed.
What makes China unique is that they've laid claim to
virtually all of it. The assertion that the South China Sea
writ large is China's historical water and that all the
features and islands and consequent resources that are located
there should be regarded as Chinese I think is the contentious
issue within the region and among those contiguous nations that
also claim many of those features.
We've seen fewer confrontations in 2012 than we did in
previous years. 2010 was quite a landmark in terms of the
confrontations that were ongoing. That's not to say they're not
occurring now.
So China continues to challenge any vessels that are
conducting resource surveys, oil and gas surveys for example,
that are within their claimed space. They continue to often
shadow military ships and activities that are occurring within
that claimed space, and they're making continuouslegal
assertions and demarches to reinforce their claims.
So they remain aggressive. I would offer, Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is carrying out discussions
with China and has been effective as a multinational forum in
keeping maritime security and issues with regard to excessive
claims in the South China Sea on the table, and they are in
discussions with China.
Senator Hagan. Why do you think the conflict has been less
in 2012 versus 2010?
Admiral Willard. I think that the reaction by the ASEAN
members, the reaction by the United States in Secretary Clinton
and Secretary Gates' very strong statements at the ASEAN
regional forum and Shangri-La dialogues, combined with many
ASEAN members protesting strongly, and the fact that it was
made somewhat public I think took China aback and has caused
them to reconsider that particular approach to their South
China Sea claims, such that they are endeavoring to continue to
pursue it, but in a more thoughtful manner.
Senator Hagan. Let me follow up on China's impact in
Southeast Asia. Their impact will only grow as its economy and
drive for energy, raw materials, and markets expands. It's
precisely this behavior that challenges various countries in
Southeast Asia to debate their policies and look for regional
and extra-regional allies. In effect, countries in the region
are playing several strategic games at once, with each move
requiring consideration of relationships that they have with
China, the United States, and other regional actors.
How can the United States maneuver in this environment to
develop deeper ties and ensure a positive and organically
integrated presence in the region to contribute to long-term
stability?
Admiral Willard. Thank you. I don't disagree with your
summary statement in terms of the situation in Southeast Asia,
although I would add that China's economic growth has benefited
the entire region and has certainly benefited the United States
and our economic ties to China. So I think it would be unfair
to imply that China's influence in Southeast Asia should only
be regarded from the standpoint of the challenge that it poses.
I think Southeast Asian nations, most of whom now regard
China as their number one trading partner, are benefiting
greatly from that association, as is the United States. So from
a standpoint of regional prosperity, I think China's rise has
benefited us all, and we should continue to promote that rise
and the advance of the Asia region for what it connotes.
That said, the nations, as it relates to security and even
as it relates, I think, to their economic reliance on any
single partner, do desire to strike a balance between China,
the United States, the European Union, and others, rising
economies like India and established economies like Japan and
South Korea.
So there is a balance that has to be struck and the United
States, I think, is accomplished in maneuvering in that space,
where we're attempting to either sustain or obtain a greater
share of market in areas where the United States can affect
trade in either direction. Trans-Pacific Partnership is a
fairly recent initiative to try and advance some of this, and
we have as a consequence of the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation and the East Asia Summit I think advances that have
occurred there.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
General Fraser, in your written statement you speak to a
wide variety of missions, everything from humanitarian response
to obviously supporting our warfighter. Would you highlight
some of these missions and speak to how you are able to
accomplish them, given a very constrained environment?
General Fraser. Thank you, Senator. The mission that we
have is indeed a global mission, and it is one that I am
continually amazed at the flexibility that we have within the
system to respond in many different areas. One area that we
were most proud of was with the accelerated withdrawal out of
Iraq and the ability to be able to partner together with our
commercial partners, with our organic assets, to then
accomplish the mission before the holidays was tremendous.
We've also been able to continue to partner to support
other organizations. I would highlight the National Science
Foundation (NSF) recently. I made mention in my opening remarks
about Antarctica. Something that a lot of people don't realize
is the support that TRANSCOM gives to NSF.
Recently, there were issues with the ice pier at the
McMurdo Station and it was going to put NSF and their
experiments at risk for next year, as well as the winter-over
force that stays both at the South Pole and at McMurdo. Our
people were asked to be innovative and so together we worked
with the Army for a modular causeway system that had not been
used like this before, in such a harsh environment, which we
then used our Surface Deployment Distribution Command, who
worked to move it from the east coast to the west coast. We
worked with MSC to then get on contract with a contractor to
load this onto a ship that also had the containers to take the
supplies and NSF equipment to McMurdo.
We then sailed down, NSF got the icebreaker in there, and
we were able to then deploy the causeway system, offload the
containers, and so we got mission success. That's another
agency that we wind up supporting. So that's one end of the
spectrum.
We talked earlier about other support to operations, but
I'd highlight the support that we give our commercial partners
through piracy operations. This actually goes back to AFRICOM
and support we give there. Working with our commercial
partners, we work to ensure where we have military cargo headed
towards the theater and transiting that area, that we put
security teams aboard.
Since we have been doing that, we have not had one of our
ships pirated, and we are very supportive of the initiative in
the international community to protect the ships. Normally
those that are what they call high-board, above 25 feet, and
moving at high speeds, above 20 knots, are not as much at risk,
but recently we had one hijacked from another country just
within the past week or so. So it's a dangerous environment. So
these are other types of things that we do, not only just
supporting our troops that are engaged in the theater, but a
couple of quick examples of other operations that we're very
proud of, of what we do, all while still supporting the
warfighter, still doing the things that we're asked to do in
the theater. They're not wanting for anything with respect to
the current closure of the PAK GLOC, either. I'm very proud of
them.
Thank you.
Senator Hagan. So supporting the private containers, and
that's only when DOD supplies are on board?
General Fraser. That's correct.
Senator Hagan. As far as security forces on board?
General Fraser. That's correct.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. I really appreciate your help
with the NSF. I think R&D goes a long way in everything we do,
and your support in that area is outstanding.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen. We appreciate the service that both of you have
provided and are providing.
Let me begin with Admiral Willard. You were correct in your
oral testimony to go quickly to the issue of Korea and North
Korea, to mention the transition there and the uncertainty that
it brings. Our allies in the Republic of Korea, South Korea,
have a fleet of F-16s, which is known as the KF-16 in Korean
service. They're eager to replace their mechanically scanned
array radar with active electronically scanned array (AESA)
radar, and you can't blame them for wanting to do that.
Admiral, in case something broke out that involved a
conflict, do you agree that air dominance will be a key
differentiator for allied forces during the first 24 hours of
any potential conflict, including the Korean Peninsula? If you
do, do you then agree that cooperating with the Koreans and
supporting their desire for expeditious Korean procurement of
existing defense technology is a good idea so that they can
meet their operational requirements?
Admiral Willard. I do agree, particularly on the Korean
Peninsula, on the importance of air dominance early in any
particular conflict that would occur. I also agree that we
should strive to maximize the level of cooperation between
ourselves and our Republic of Korea allies with regard to the
acquisitions they require to continue to advance their
capabilities.
Senator Wicker. So you agree that the U.S. Government
should fully support the Republic of Korea's air force
requirements and their acquisition timeline in acquiring United
States export-compliant AESA?
Admiral Willard. I support the level of cooperation that is
required to advance the Republic of Korea's military
capabilities, including their aviation capabilities. With
regard to that, to whether AESA radar and the exchange of that
particular technology is appropriate on Korea's timeline, I
think that should continue to be subject to discussions between
the two countries. There are certainly compliance requirements
on the part of the Republic of Korea, as well as the
releasability requirements on the part of the United States.
This is not the first country we've had this discussion
with. But in general, sir, to your assertion, I truly believe
that we should strive to maximize the potential of our Republic
of Korea ally, including their military capabilities. In fact,
more important now perhaps than in the past, as we strive to
reach December 2015 and operational control transition to the
South Koreans.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. Let me ask you then,
staying with North Korea: U.S. and North Korean envoys met last
week for talks on dismantling North Korea's nuclear
programs;included in that will be discussions of food aid,
economic help, diplomatic concessions from the United States of
America.
What is your current assessment of the humanitarian food
situation in North Korea, and do you believe North Korea is
being sincere and truthful and forthcoming in entering these
negotiations with the United States?
Admiral Willard. I think the food situation in North Korea
is always an issue of global interest. World Food was in there
conducting an assessment early last year, as I recall, trying
to ascertain just what the extent of crop success was in North
Korea. There is always a level of food shortage that exists
there, and always humanitarian need, as we've witnessed it
there.
In terms of the negotiations that have been ongoing, I have
been supportive of them with regard to the United States'
proposals for conditional food aid into North Korea and the
preconditions that have come with it, which now include
discussions of cessation of nuclearization and ballistic
missile testing and the allowance of the International Atomic
Energy Association perhaps back into Yongbyon. So there are
conditions that are going along with the negotiations with
regard to the extent of food aid. They've received food aid
from many other countries this year, and I remain supportive of
the progress that we're making in the talks with North Korea to
the extent that they occur.
Senator Wicker. You don't blame some of us on this side of
the panel for having a healthy degree of skepticism with regard
to North Korea's intentions?
Admiral Willard. I have a healthy degree of skepticism with
regard to North Korea's intentions, and I think we need to
observe both their actions and requests with a great deal of
scrutiny. Certainly we've been through the cycle many times in
the past, and I know, Senator, you're aware that these requests
for concessions often lead into a breakdown and a resulting
next provocation.
So we are skeptical as well. But with regard to the extent
of these current negotiations, I think particularly when
there's a new regime or a new leader in place in North Korea,
it will be important to ascertain any degree of success that we
might obtain through these diplomatic channels.
Senator Wicker. I suppose it's worth a try, but I'm not
holding out much hope and remain very troubled, as I'm sure you
are.
Quickly, let me ask about the 30-year shipbuilding plan and
the minimum sustaining rates contained therein. Many observe
this could pose challenges to fulfilling the force requirements
and possibly give rise to a sealift capability gap and an
aviation lift gap in 2015. With the pivot to this vast Asia-
Pacific region and your AOR and the Navy's inability to meet
its own requirement for 313 ships, how will this minimum
sustaining rate affect your ability to protect American
security interests?
Did you support this in discussions with your superiors,
and are you satisfied that you can fulfill the mission with
this 30-year shipbuilding plan?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. I would fall back on
the statement that I made earlier. The total acquisition
program that the Navy has put down to try and sustain itself
and the capacities of our fleet and eventually grow those
capacities over time is important and certainly as a naval
officer something that I've observed with great interest over
many years.
But as the PACOM commander, it's more important with regard
to how we bias those ships globally and whether or not the AOR
that, as you suggest, is a vast maritime one in the Asia
Pacific, is being adequately serviced. To date, I am well
serviced with regard to the Navy. I think Navy capacities are
very important. Our industrial base capacity is very important
that they be sustained.
These minimum sustained production rates that you're
talking about are intended to maintain our minimum acceptable
industrial base. All of these things are important for our
Nation, certainly.
In terms of PACOM, I think it's important that the right
number of ships and the right type of ships be present there.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to say aloha to the two military leaders before us
today. It's good to see you.
Gentlemen, first I want to say thank you so much for your
dedicated service to our country and also to the communities
that you've served. We have really gained from your
responsibilities and your actions.
Admiral Willard, I would like to add my appreciation to you
and congratulations on your upcoming retirement, which is soon.
I want to tell you that I agree 100 percent with your
UNCLOSposition for our country. It's about time that we become
serious about that. Also, I want to commend you for the balance
which you've brought during your time as PACOM commander, and I
would tell you, you've made a huge difference in the Pacific,
so thank you for that, and to tell you that your departure will
be a significant loss to the Navy and to our country.
I want you to know, and Donna to know, that it has been a
pleasure to work with you in Hawaii and for our country. You've
served Hawaii and you've been there on multiple assignments. I
think you know, I don't have to tell you, that you have a deep
relationship and connection with the community in Hawaii. I
want to congratulate you and wish you well in your future with
Donna and the family.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Admiral Willard, it is impossible to
overstate the importance of our military engagement in the
Asia-Pacific region. As I said, I commend you for your
nurturing of balance there in the entire area. If you look at
continuing developments in the Pacific, our conventional
adversaries are improving their capabilities, too, as we work
together on this balance.
My question to you, Admiral, is, given this rebalance to
the Pacific and the responsibilities we have in the theater,
how would you assess our force structure plans in relation to
military and diplomatic goals for the region as we look to the
future?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Before I answer
your question, I would offer that the State of Hawaii and the
City of Honolulu have been great supporters of the military
families and members that are stationed there. Thank you for
your continued support for us in the region.
I think as we look at force structure there is the issue of
the type of forces that are present in the Asia-Pacific region
and there is the issue of posture and where they're present in
order that we can maintain the continuous presence in the
region that's so important to its security and long-term
stability.
The initiatives, such as the nation of Australia, the
nation-state or city-state of Singapore, and now in discussions
with the Philippines, that are occurring are going to assist us
in the posture-related issue, which is getting the force
structure where it can do the most good in terms of providing a
mechanism to maintain the presence that we need in the region.
As we view the acquisition programs and force structure of
the future in this budgetary environment, we, like every other
combatant, remain focused and guarded as we watch these defense
reductions occur, to ensure that we don't cut into the kind of
forces and the quantity of forces that our strategic priorities
call for.
We spent time very recently walking through a global
laydown of forces and looking at the forces that this current
program will deliver and our ability to meet the strategic
needs of our Nation, including in the Asia Pacific, and I think
collectively as combatant commanders and Service Chiefs we felt
we could do that. I think it's an important study to maintain
ongoing and there are two additional events that are presently
scheduled. But I have been well-served in the Asia-Pacific
region and I'm confident that the force structure that is
envisioned can continue to serve PACOM well.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
General Fraser, the recently announced rebalancing calls
for a shift in focus to the Asia-Pacific region, a vast
geographic area encompassing 9,000 square miles, 36 nations,
and 16 time zones, all of which I'm sure Admiral Willard knows
really well. My question to you, General Fraser, is, while the
details of this strategic balancing, rebalancing, have yet to
be finalized, do you have any preliminary thoughts on how a
refocus to the Asia-Pacific region could impact TRANSCOM?
General Fraser. Senator, thank you very much. As we look at
this shift, we've already seen a lot of engagement in the PACOM
theater of operations as we have continued to support ongoing
exercises, as we've continued to support other types of
engagements within the theater. I think as we come back out or
have come back out of Iraq already, but as we further reduce
the force out of Afghanistan, we'll free up some other assets
maybe for other opportunities for engagement, and then we'll
have the opportunity to do that.
It is one that's going to take balance and it's going to
take a lot of good planning on our part to make sure that we
properly support each of our ground combatant commanders in
their various theaters of operations. They all have theater
engagement plans. We're taking a look at them to ensure that we
provide the necessary support.
One of the things that we are able to do in our command is
not just with our organic assets; it's our commercial partners,
both sea and air, that will allow us that flexibility in
utilizing their networks and their connections to also continue
to provide support. So as those forces are available for
various engagements, it does not have to be just organic. So in
peacetime versus wartime, we're able to utilize those assets,
which is good for the economy, which keeps that industrial base
alive, too, both across the sea and the air side of the
business.
So we're confident that we'll be able to provide that
support.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Admiral Willard, with the new strategy rebalancing our
forces with a focus in the Pacific, the need for strategically
located maintenance facilities, like the Pearl Harbor Shipyard,
appears critical to the readiness of our fleet. Can you discuss
the role you see Pearl Harbor Shipyard playing with this
rebalancing, as well as the importance of continuing the
modernization efforts at the shipyard in order to support the
fleet in the future?
Admiral Willard. I can, thank you, Senator. You know as
well as I do not only the strategic importance of Pearl Harbor
Naval Shipyard, but also the other aircraft depots and
shipyards throughout the Asia-Pacific region that we rely on,
from the west coast of the United States to our ability to
conduct voyage repairs in foreign ports such as Singapore.
But I have stated for the past 5 years and I will continue
to state the vital strategic importance of the Pearl Harbor
Shipyard and what it provides. It's unique in the sense that it
not only conducts the overhauls of our surface ships and our
submarines, but it also conducts day-to-day maintenance and
voyage repairs for the ships that are positioned forward.
It's located, as we all know, in the middle of the Pacific
Ocean, which is the largest ocean in the world, and provides
ready access into the Asia Pacific. The three submarines that
we have homeported in Guam utilize the Pearl Harbor Naval
Shipyard for their maintenance and overhaul activities and
rotate back, and don't have to go all the way back to the west
coast of the United States to obtain that maintenance.
So it is a vital and pivotal strategic asset for us. The
need to keep it continually modernized is as important as any
shipyard that we have in our Nation. It is, I think, a very
important partner. When we talk about the industrial base, not
just production but maintenance, it's a vital part of that
industrial base.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
General Fraser, I wanted to ask you, the Air Force is
finalizing its KC-46A basing criteria for the Air Force. One of
the concerns that I have, and I'm hopeful that the Air Force
will do this, is that the criteria that comes out for the
basing of the KC-46A will be objective and transparent, in
terms of what criteria you're using in deciding who will
receive the KC-46A first. I wanted to ask you about that
process, where it was at, in particular what the balance will
be between the Active Duty and the Guard bases, and whether it
will be taking into account what I think is very, very
important, which is some of our Guard units already have an
existing partnership with the Active Duty, including my own,
that I've been quite impressed with, and I think that will be
important in terms of utilization. So can you help us with
that?
General Fraser. Senator, thank you very much. As you've
stated, it's an Air Force process, which we are not a part of
in TRANSCOM. But, having been in the Air Force when we were
doing this, I think you accurately stated that it is an
objective process, it's open, it's transparent, it's
repeatable. The fact that they are very open about that and
establishing the criteria as to what is going to be needed in
those discussions that go on in a very open manner with a
number of different locations, I think, is something that you
can look forward to as they go through that process.
You asked where the process is. I don't know where the
process is right now. I know they are actively engaged in
working with AMC discussing who will be the lead command for
the KC-46.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I had to raise the issue because
when we were home I went up with our 157th Air Refueling Wing
and had a chance to see them do their work up there, and have
been incredibly impressed. We actually had the highest
utilization rate in the entire Air National Guard at Pease Air
National Guard Base last year for the KC-135, and we already
have an Active Duty partnership established.
So it's one of those situations where, I think, if we do
this in an objective and transparent way to speak to the
accomplishments of our own unit in New Hampshire, they have
quite the objective accomplishments and close proximity to the
refueling track. So I hope that you'll convey, obviously, to
the Chief of Staff and to your commander how important it is
that this be an open and objective process.
General Fraser. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Thanks so much, I appreciate that.
I wanted to ask about, Admiral Willard, an issue that I was
concerned about last year in the National Defense Authorization
Request. It's something that I learned about that was of deep
concern to me, and that's the Maritime Prepositioning Force
(MPF). As I understand it, and this may be a better question
for General Fraser, whichever of you it is the better question
for, but last year the Navy announced plans to place 6 of its
16 ships from the 3-squadron MPFs for the Marine Corps into
reduced operating status beginning in fiscal year 2013.
When I learned about this, I was concerned about what this
would mean in terms of our readiness. I asked the Marine Corps
about it and the Commandant of the Marine Corps felt that it
needed additional analysis. So, in last year's NDAA, there is
actually a requirement that the Marine Corps, as well as the
Navy, submit an analysis about the readiness implications of
reducing our MPFs. As I understand it, there may be further
reductions there in the proposed 2013 budget.
So I just wanted to ask both of you if you were aware of
that portion of the Defense Authorization in 2012 and where
that readiness assessment was and if you can share anything
with respect to where we are with the MPFs?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. From PACOM's
perspective, yes, we're aware of the proposal to put one of the
three squadrons in a reduced readiness status. Of importance,
the two most active squadrons, one located in Guam and one
located in Diego Garcia, are not candidates for that. So those
that are there to respond to the major contingencies in the
Asia-Pacific region remain intact and are, frankly, utilized
frequently and exercised on a periodic basis in order to ensure
their readiness.
So from the standpoint of readiness in terms of Asia
Pacific contingencies and the contingencies in the Middle East
that these prepositioned ships service, we remain in pretty
good shape.
I can't answer to the tasker that the Services come
together on their assessment of how this could impact longer-
term readiness as that third squadron is placed in a limited
readiness status.
Senator Ayotte. I certainly appreciated your answer and I'm
hoping that we'll have a follow-up, which I will obviously
pursue with the Navy, because the NDAA from 2012 requires
thatthe Commandant of the Marine Corps provides a report
assessing the impact of the move on military readiness, and the
SECDEF has to certify that the risks to readiness from such a
move are acceptable. So I think you'll be consulted, I would
think, in that analysis.
My concern is, particularly with what we see happening
around the world right now, having those MPFs becomes very
important because, unfortunately, we've been noticeably bad at
predicting where the next conflict is going to come, and those
MPFs become very, very critical in terms of our readiness
posture.
Admiral Willard. I think we agree with you that the MPFs
are vital to us.
Senator Ayotte. Great. Thank you so much for that.
I just wanted to follow up. I believe at your confirmation,
Admiral Willard, I'd asked you about the fiscal year 2013
budget, and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) had said last
spring that in order for us to meet all of our needs around the
world that we needed a ship force of 313, and this budget
really maintains us at 285. One of the concerns that I have is
it delays, for example, production of one Virginia-class
submarine, as well as some LCSs and some others in terms of
where we are in production.
One of the concerns I have is what the strategic analysis
or strategic thinking was for not meeting the 313 and
maintaining us at 285 and really delaying production of some of
our important assets; and I just would like to follow up on
that and ask you whether you have an answer to that,
particularly with our shift now to the Asia Pacific?
Admiral Willard. As you well know, the Navy surface force
has maintained itself, pretty much sustained itself, at that
280 to 285 number now for numerous years. In fact, for about
the last decade we've been struggling to get above that and
reach the 313 floor, or however it is currently being termed by
our Navy, in terms of what we aspire to have, to meet all the
global requirements that the Navy maritime strategy has
determined we need.
It's important that over time we recognize where we are
decremented in comparison to the overall strategic design for
the Nation as a Navy, as a military. The strategic priorities
that have been established are intended, I think, to guide us
in terms of where the maritime commitment should be and will
pay off the greatest for the United States. The Asia-Pacific
region has been called out as one of those areas, where it's
not only vast and inherently maritime, but as a consequence of
its economic importance to the United States and our allies and
partners and many of the challenges associated there, it places
a particular demand on maritime assets.
So provided that within that body of 285 ships we're able
to bias those forces properly into the right areas of the world
where the payoff is great, then I'm satisfied. I think the CNO
would tell you that in his longer-term view of shipbuilding
that, while the 2013 budget and the programs that it represents
doesn't show the 285 on the increase toward the Navy's goals,
if you look at more than one program, if you look at this long-
term, that he does eventually begin to make some progress as a
Navy in terms of shipbuilding.
So I think it's important to recognize that we've been in
this situation for a while. There is the cost of doing our
business, of acquiring ships, that continually needs attention
and gets great help from this committee. We need to reduce ship
costs and other acquisition costs as we can. But I think what's
most important is that we put the ships where they'll do the
most good, and we think that the Asia-Pacific region is one of
those areas of the world where that will happen. The Middle
East is obviously going to continue to require our attention,
too.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you very much, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral and General, thank you both for being here today.
I want to follow up, General Fraser, with Senator Ayotte's
question about the basing criteria for the KC-46. We share an
interest in that since we both represent New Hampshire. We
don't often get the opportunity to double-team you all in quite
the same way we are this morning, so I have to take advantage
of that.
In New Hampshire we believe that under any objective
criteria our strategic location in the Northeast, our proximity
to operational and training air refueling tracks, our current
tanker task force mission, and our Active Duty association,
that we would be a unique choice and would result in a very
cost-effective utilization of the placement of the KC-46s. So
we hope that it is a very transparent and open process. I won't
ask you to comment on that since you've said you can't.
Senator Ayotte talked about New Hampshire National Guard's
157th Air Refueling Wing, which has been providing continuous
operations since September 11th, both for Homeland defense and
in support of overseas conflicts. Like other Air National Guard
units, they've done so at a fraction of the cost of Active
bases around the country. In fact, the Air National Guard
represents only 6 percent of the Air Force budget, and yet it
provides nearly 35 percent of its capabilities.
We've seen in the last couple of days, concern expressed by
49 Governors about the cuts to the Air Guard as part of the
proposed budget from the Air Force. Again, I know you can't
comment on that, but I wonder if you could comment on the role
that our Air National Guard has played in providing critical
transport for our operations around the world?
General Fraser. Thank you, Senator. I do appreciate that. I
can't tell you how much I do appreciate all that our Guard are
doing. They've always been there when the call came, not only
when they were mobilized, but when they were asked to volunteer
and willing to support any mission that may arise.
As you know and you commented on, we have been heavily
tasked in a number of different areas. That's where I think the
great strength comes, the balance that we have within the total
force and the ability to use the Active Duty, the Guard, and
the Reserve in this manner to meet the mission. Therefore, our
commanders have not had to want for something else and not be
supported.
It's that total team effort to get this done. But you have
to have the right balance. The Guard has been heavily tasked.
They are also doing a lot more with respect to their boots-on-
the-ground (BOG)/dwell, as we call it, the BOG and the dwell
time they get back at home, and it's not at the desired rate.
So, hopefully, if we have the right balance and as we make
some of these necessary adjustments, we'll then be able to get
to the desired rates for both the Active Duty as well as the
Guard and the Reserve. This is something that we're all
striving to do as we look forward to the future. But we very
much value and appreciate all the contributions they've made.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. I
think your point about the total force is an important one. I
do share the concerns of the Governors in looking at the total
budget reductions that would have the Air Guard absorbing 59
percent of those aircraft budget reductions and about six times
the per capita personnel reductions. So again, I know you can't
comment on that, but I'm interested to hear the rationale at
the appropriate time.
Admiral Willard, India has become a much more prominent
partner of the United States and potential ally on military-to-
military issues in the last several years. Last year, the
United States cleared the way for the resumption of high
technology defense and aerospace exports to India. However, it
does seem that there is still room for growth in our
relationship. I wonder if you could talk about what PACOM's
priorities are for the U.S.-India security relationship and how
those are affected by both China and Pakistan, recognizing that
Pakistan isn't part of your purview, but critical, obviously,
to what happens with India?
Admiral Willard. Thank you very much, and thank you for
raising India. It's a very important partner in the region and
one that, as you suggest, there remains room for growth and
advancement in our partnership. It has advanced in the past
2\1/2\ years that I've been at PACOM, and in the previous 2\1/
2\ years as Pacific Fleet Commander we were very much engaged
with India and attempting to advance the relationship then.
If you range back to our history with India, we are in a
fairly nascent stage of engagement nation-to-nation, given that
this is the largest democracy in the world, like-minded in many
ways, and in a troubled region of the world in South Asia, but
a very important partnership.
From a security standpoint, we are engaging across all our
Services with India at an increasing rate every year. There are
challenges in the relationship. We overcome still the trust
deficit as it relates to having departed South Asia years ago
and having terminated relationships with both India and
Pakistan following nuclear tests in the late 1990s. But I think
that the current dialogue that is from the President on down
and certainly at a military level is very robust in overcoming
all of this. There is certainly a China factor in India. They
have a long-term border dispute that continues to be a
challenge for both countries, and they fought a war over it in
1962.
China is a very strong partner of Pakistan and Pakistan-
India have the relationship that we're all aware of, both
nuclear-armed and with a long-term history of animosity between
the two of them.
To India's credit, they're maintaining ministerial-level
dialogue with Pakistan and have for the past nearly 2 years,
even post-Mumbai and all of the tension that that created.
So, I think your emphasis on India and its importance is
exactly the right one. From a security standpoint and a
security assistance standpoint, they remain very important and
a partner of focus for PACOM.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, General, thank you for being here. Thank you for
your service.
I want to tell Senator Shaheen I appreciate her questions
about the U.S.-India relationship, as one of the co-founders of
the U.S.-India Caucus in the Senate, which has a strong and
robust membership and a lot of interaction. I appreciate your
acknowledgment and statement about the importance of that
relationship from a security standpoint, an economic
standpoint, and across the board.
My questions, you'll have to forgive me, General, I'm going
to ask Admiral Willard some questions about China and
particularly Taiwan.
Admiral, you say in your prepared testimony that: ``Taiwan
remains the most acute sovereignty issue for China and the main
driver for military modernization programs. The military
balance across the Taiwan Strait continues to shift in China's
favor.''
Would you agree that were China to launch some sort of
military offensive against Taiwan that such a scenario would
have the potential to draw the United States into a dangerous
large-scale conflict in the region?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. Certainly the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA) and three communiques combined, but the TRA
in particular, establishes the position the United States would
take on such coercion were it to be launched against Taiwan,
and it then becomes a decision by our President and by Congress
to decide what the U.S. reaction to that would be.
But does it have the potential? We regard the defense of
Taiwan as a PACOM responsibility. So, yes, it would have the
potential to draw the United States into conflict.
Senator Cornyn. According to DOD, China's official defense
budget has grown by an average of 12.1 percent since 2001. So
it seems as we are talking about scaling back our defense
budget, China has continued to grow by leaps and bounds.
Would you agree that the likelihood of Chinese aggression
against Taiwan becomes more likely as Taiwan's ability to
defend itself deteriorates?
Admiral Willard. I'm not sure that I would contend that. I
think it's important and we've established the importance
through policy for a long time that Taiwan should have a self-
defense capability, and our responsibility in working with DOD
and in working with you is to ensure that the defense articles
and services that we assist Taiwan with provide for that self-
defense.
As we've seen the administrations change on Taiwan and the
reelection of President Ma and his administration just this
year, we would offer that the tensions across the Strait have,
in fact, relaxed during his administration and that
advancements in relations between the People's Republic of
China (PRC) and Taiwan have occurred. So, I think it would be
presumptive to assume that simply that imbalance in combat
power would necessarily encourage conflict. That said, there's
no question that the balance of combat power resides with the
PRC.
Senator Cornyn. I recently wrote a letter to President
Obama--actually it was last November 18, 2011--and received a
response on February 15, 2012, from James N. Miller, Acting
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Mr. Chairman, I'd like
to ask unanimous consent to have both letters made part of the
record.
Chairman Levin. They will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Cornyn. Let me just quote a couple of sentences
from this letter. Mr. Miller says: ``A key conclusion in the
Report to Congress on Taiwan's Air Defense Force is that
Taiwan's approach to defense cannot match the Mainland one-for-
one. Taiwan defense spending cannot match the Mainland's, nor
can it develop the same type of military the Mainland is
developing. The report concludes that Taiwan needs to focus its
planning and procurement efforts on nontraditional, innovative
and asymmetric approaches, and we are working with Taiwan to do
so.''
That was not a very encouraging letter I received from
Secretary Miller. But let me just get down to some of the
specifics with regard to operational combat aircraft. According
to DOD, the PRC has 2,300 operational aircraft and the
Government of Taiwan has only 490 operational aircraft. The
administration recently notified Congress of its intent to
upgrade some of the existing F-16 A and B versions, 145 of
those, and I support the retrofit for these older F-16s.
But it does nothing to replace the growing obsolescence of
Taiwan's fighter jets. By 2020 it's estimated that virtually
all of Taiwan's fighter jets will have to be retired except for
the 145 F-16 As and Bs that we sold Taiwan during the George
Herbert Walker Bush administration, and which are now the
subject of this upgrade.
Can you give me a little more confidence that we are
meeting our obligations under the TRA and the three communiques
you mentioned? Because it seems to me that China is growing its
military capability while Taiwan is losing its military
capability, and the United States, which is legally obligated
to provide defensive material to Taiwan, is not meeting its
full obligations to equip them with what they need to defend
themselves against the potential of a Chinese attack.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. I've been on the
record in the past acknowledging that eventually Taiwan's
aviation capability will have to be recapitalized. I too was
encouraged when the F-16A-B upgrade was approved. I think that
is the right thing to do. I think it does, in fact, enhance the
reduction of their air forces. It was an upgrade much needed
and it will improve their capabilities.
I'm not sure that a comparison of combat capability or
capacity with the PRC and Taiwan is a fair one to make. Nor do
I believe that there is any reasonable desire for or ability to
achieve parity between the two. China is as big as the United
States, maintains a fighter fleet, as you suggest, of over
2,000 aircraft, but has a lot of territory to cover. Taiwan's
an island 200 miles long, maintains a fighter force of about
450 aircraft.
So an apples-to-apples comparison, I don't think, is
necessarily the argument in this particular instance. The
argument is whether or not Taiwan is sufficiently defensible in
the context of the TRA and what was intended from a policy
standpoint. We contribute to some of that at PACOM in our
engagement with the Taiwanese military and trying to understand
their needs. But we look more broadly than just their aviation
needs and try to look across their armed forces and in all
domains how well they are equipped and manned to defend
themselves.
I think that balance is important for us to recognize and
also sufficiency in that regard across all of those various
areas. So, I see the recapitalization needs having been in the
near-term met. As you suggest, I'm not sure that in the
longest-term it's going to meet all their needs in the aviation
area. But in their other services, they have needs as well, and
I think the defense budget of Taiwan needs to be reflective of
a balanced approach to achieving a sufficient amount of
defense.
Senator Cornyn. If I can conclude, Mr. Chairman, just with
this one comment.
Thank you for your answer, but I'm concerned as I see China
continuing to grow its military, Taiwan's military capability
continues to recede in comparison, that that will cause perhaps
a greater potential that the United States would be required to
come to the aid of our ally under the TRA and the three
communiques you mentioned.
It strikes me that the more capable that Taiwan is to
defend itself, the less the likelihoodthat the United States
might be called upon to share in that defense in the event of
an attack.
Thank you both, gentlemen.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
I just have a few questions for the second round. First, I
was also glad, Admiral, to hear your answers relative to our
relations with India, our security and military relations. It's
a very significant partner in the region. The growing and
robust relationship, I believe, is good news and the right way
to go, and your answer is very reassuring to me, as it was to
other members of the committee.
Admiral, relative to North Korea, has the change in
leadership of North Korea impacted the agreement which was
reached in October 2011 with North Korea to allow U.S.
personnel back in North Korea to resume the recovery of remains
of U.S. servicemembers missing from the Korean War?
Admiral Willard. Senator, there was a pause in discussions,
but no pause in terms of initiative on our part to proceed with
what was agreed to in terms of Joint Personnel Accounting
Command (JPAC) returning to North Korea to seek additional
remains. We currently have a ship in Nampo that has been
offloading a first wave of equipment to support that.
My concern is for the security of the personnel from JPAC
that would execute these missions, and so I continue to view
into North Korea carefully to assure DOD and myself that these
individuals will be treated in accord with the agreement that
we struck in 2011.
Chairman Levin. Is there a timetable for that effort to
take the next step?
Admiral Willard. There is. This particular offload is
occurring. We have another one scheduled. There are a series of
steps that we have planned, and I'd be happy to provide those
to you if that would be helpful.
Chairman Levin. That would be good, if you would do that
for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The attached slide lists Joint Personnel Accounting Command (JPAC)
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) critical milestones.
Chairman Levin. Relative to the record, General, if you
could for the record, give us some detail about the critical
needs of TRANSCOM for cyber security. You made a comment in the
press about TRANSCOM being the most cyber-attacked command in
DOD, and if you could for the record, give us a list of your
critical needs and whether those needs are being met, and
whatever you can tell us in an unclassified way about attacks
on your systems and progress that you might be making in
defending those systems.
It's a large question. It's an important one that we're
grappling with in a major way here in Congress. So if you could
give us kind of a whole review for the record, it would be
helpful.
General Fraser. Sir, thank you very much. I have stated
that we are aggressively attacked. In fact, as we were looking
at the numbers just this last year as it was wrapping up, from
2010 to 2011, we have seen an increase of about 30 percent of
the number of attempts to get within our systems.
As this committee also knows, though, the majority of our
business is done on the unclassified net. We are working very
aggressively on a number of different fronts, though, and it's
not only within TRANSCOM, but also with our commercial
partners. Because of 90 percent of that business being done on
the unclassified net, which is where our commercial partners
are, we need to partner with them to strengthen our defenses.
We're working that through contracting actions and looking
forward to continuing to partner with industry.
Within TRANSCOM, we aggressively have a program whereby we
train all of our individuals. Before they get in and on, they
have to go through initial training. Then there's annual
training. In fact, I just finished completing it. It takes over
an hour and you're not going to get out of it, because once
you're into it you're going to go through the whole thing. It's
very thorough.
So we have to work that aspect of it. So there's a training
piece to this as we harden our people and make them aware of
what's going on.
There's also another piece to this with respect to our
systems. So with a corporate services vision for the future, we
have a number of systems out there that we're trying to bring
into our net so that we can collapse the net and not have as
broad a base so that the bad guys will be able to attack us.
It'll be easier to defend if we're able to collapse the net,
have less hardware out there, and actually be able to control
that.
The other thing is that we're very aggressively certifying
our net defenders. Over 99 percent of our net defenders that we
have within TRANSCOM now have professional certification. So
this is helping us.
So I go back to the 30 percent increase. We do not know of
any known successful attack into our systems this last year. We
are working with our people and with the hardware piece to our
system. There's some business practices out there that we're
also bringing in. We continue to partner with the Defense
Information Systems Agency. We partner with U.S. Cyber Command
and also with U.S. Strategic Command, as well as the National
Security Agency, as we try to strengthen the net as best we
can.
As the distribution process owner, looking forward to what
we call a secure enclave, too. As we partner with these other
organizations, they're very encouraged by what they're seeing
and the initiatives that we're taking. We're working it from a
holistic standpoint and we are properly funded within TRANSCOM
right now.
Chairman Levin. If you could keep this committee informed,
we would appreciate it.
General Fraser. Yes, sir, I will.
[The information referred to follows:]
Sir, during my earlier testimony you had asked for a list of U.S.
Transportation Command's (TRANSCOM) critical needs and whether those
needs were being met, and attacks on TRANSCOM systems and progress that
we are making in defending those systems.
I previously addressed the latter aspect and mentioned that we
noted a 30 percent increase overall from 2010 to 2011 in attempts to
penetrate our network. I had also briefly addressed our approach in
defending against those threats by training and certifying our cyber
defenders and overall workforce. I also mentioned another important
part of our cyber strategy is regular engagement with our commercial
transportation partners to make them aware of the common threat we
face, as well as common solutions.
Regarding your request for a list of TRANSCOM's critical needs and
whether those needs were being met, we are holding the line today, but
are working to improve cyber defense capabilities to ensure we remain
adequately postured for the future. First, we need to ensure our
commercial partners have the tools and business practices necessary to
protect TRANSCOM information residing in their environments. We are
continuing to reduce this vulnerability in partnership with our
commercial partners, our internal cyber defense staff, Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers, and other partner agencies.
Additionally, we need to enhance protection of our high value command
and control systems, and also provide a secure development environment
in which our cleared defense contractors can develop software
supporting our deployment and distribution functions.
We also need to improve the capability to distinguish adversarial
actions from authorized users actions within systems and networks. If
the adversaries are successful in gaining entry to our networks, we
will need more effective mechanisms not only to detect them, but also
to contain and limit their potential damage to our information, and
rapidly rebuild any damage done to our networks or information so we
can continue to execute our mission.
A holistic and unified response to threats across the Department of
Defense and the U.S. Government remains one of our greatest challenges,
and is planned to be a major area of discussion at our upcoming cyber
summit. Cyber security will remain a top priority for TRANSCOM in all
of our engagements with partners, whether they are commercial
companies, the U.S. Government, or DOD entities.
Chairman Levin. This is really a major subject for all
Members of Congress.
Admiral, you were asked, I believe, by Senator Inhofe to
give us for the record in writing, how some of the objections
which were raised to UNCLOS some time ago have been met, and
that is important for all of us. If you can do that, if
possible before you leave, it would be something, another item
on your agenda to complete, I hope that's not too burdensome,
but it would be very helpful.
Admiral Willard. I'll get right on it.
Chairman Levin. Also, you made a comment, Admiral, that I
just want to see if you might wish to clarify. In response to a
question of Senator Inhofe, and this had to do with North
Korea, you indicated that their strategy has been successful
for two generations. I assume that what you meant by that was
that their strategy is to stay in power, essentially, and
that's basically what they care about, and that strategy has
succeeded, but not in terms of any success for their country?
Admiral Willard. That's exactly what I intended. This is a
coercive strategy that has about five dimensions to it, all of
which are bad news for the region and a challenge for our
Nation.
Chairman Levin. Bad news for their own people.
Admiral Willard. Very bad news for their own people.
Chairman Levin. We thank you both, and it's been a very,
very useful hearing. Best of luck to you and your family,
Admiral, again as you take on new responsibilities, new
challenges, new wonders.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Chairman Levin. General, thanks so much.
General Fraser. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. This hearing will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
OPERATIONAL RESPONSIVE SPACE-1 SATELLITE
1. Senator Levin. Admiral Willard, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
recently brought on line a small tactically responsive satellite,
Operational Responsive Space-1 (ORS-1), based on an urgent needs
statement it issued. The satellite was assembled, launched, and brought
on line in less than 32 months for cost below $225 million. My
understanding is that CENTCOM has been very pleased with the capability
of the satellite, which it directly controls with Air Force Space
Command, to satisfy tactical reconnaissance needs in denied access
regions. My understanding is that other combatant commands have tasked
CENTCOM to use this satellite for urgent needs in their area of
responsibility (AOR), offering for the first time the use of a small
satellite outside the normal tasking sequence for space assets with
direct control by the combatant command. Given the success, cost, and
innovation of ORS-1, does U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) believe that a
similar system dedicated to PACOM would have a positive impact on
reducing PACOM's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
collection gaps?
Admiral Willard. PACOM has been working closely with the
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program on a satellite of our own.
ORS-2 is in development and is scheduled to be launched in 2015. While
it has a different payload than ORS-1, the capability will definitely
have a positive impact on PACOM ISR collection gaps.
CENTCOM has shared feedback with us on the utility and quality of
ORS-1 collection. Based on CENTCOM's success with that system, we've
had recent discussions with the ORS program on developing an ORS-1
system for PACOM as well.
These systems will be particularly useful in enhancing PACOM's
ability to collect in denied areas that we cannot reach with airborne
systems.
2. Senator Levin. Admiral Willard, in addition, given the extremely
large denied airspaces in PACOM's theater and widely dispersed land
masses surrounded by large bodies of water, how would a tactical ISR
satellite system dedicated to PACOM compare to a series of airborne ISR
assets?
Admiral Willard. A tactical satellite system dedicated to PACOM
would be very useful, particularly with regards to collection in denied
areas that airborne sensors cannot reach. However, there are
limitations that make a straight comparison to airborne assets very
difficult. Sensor quality, orbit, data throughput, and timeliness of
collection can constrain our ability to answer many intelligence
requirements. Airborne platforms often provide the persistence,
flexibility, and fidelity that cannot be matched by tactical ISR
satellite systems. Airborne ISR also provides a visible presence in the
theater that creates a deterrent effect against potential adversaries
and strengthens our commitment to our partners and allies.
Used together, overhead and airborne systems complement each other
extremely well and serve to mitigate our collection gaps.
3. Senator Levin. Admiral Willard, given the recent statements by
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director, General Burgess,
regarding the counterspace capabilities being developed in the PACOM
theater, could a system of ORS-class satellites help in increasing the
resiliency and responsiveness of PACOM's space capabilities?
Admiral Willard. Yes. The future potential for rapid reconstitution
of overhead systems in the face of adversary counterspace capabilities
is very important to increasing the resiliency and responsiveness of
PACOM's space capabilities. PACOM is a strong proponent of ORS-class
satellites.
4. Senator Levin. Admiral Willard, could ORS-class satellites be
beneficial in reconstituting a thin line, good enough to win, space
layer to support PACOM operations in a campaign in which space was a
contested domain?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
CONTAINER MANAGEMENT
5. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, the Department of Defense
(DOD) is spending nearly $720 million in late fees for leased shipping
containers used for delivery of parts, supplies, and other items for
overseas contingency operations. At times the late fees have even been
more costly than if the containers were bought outright. I realize that
using leased containers makes sense in a number of situations. However,
wasting millions of dollars on late fees is inexcusable. What has U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) done to address this issue?
General Fraser. As mentioned in your question, there are instances
when keeping carrier-owned containers longer than the anticipated time
period to meet operational requirements makes fiscal sense. Whether
containers are required to enhance the force protection of our
warfigthers or required for critical temporary storage capability in an
austere environment, we keep a mindful eye on the fiscal impact of
these decisions. TRANSCOM, in coordination with the Surface Deployment
and Distribution Command (SDDC), is actively working several measures
to mitigate container detention in the CENTCOM AOR. We are taking the
following actions to reduce detention costs: making improvements in
contract provisions in the forthcoming Universal Services Contract-7
(USC-7); transloading from individual carriers to U.S. Government-owned
containers where practical; accomplishing container buyouts earlier
when carrier-owned containers are required to meet mission objectives;
expanding container management training and support for Mobile
Container Assessment Teams; aggressively enhancing key leader
engagement on adherence to established policies and procedures; and
developing a single container management system capability.
6. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, how can the cost of late fees
be reduced in the future?
General Fraser. TRANSCOM, in coordination with SDDC and other Joint
Deployment and Distribution Enterprise stakeholders, are taking several
proactive steps to mitigate container detention. First, we have
included improvements to container-related provisions in the USC-7
tentatively set for an effective date of 15 August 12. Based on
analysis of detention for containers delivered to Afghanistan over the
last 2 years, the additional 5 days of free time in USC-7 would have
represented a 22 percent reduction in detention costs for an annual
$12.6 million in cost avoidance. Second, we continue to implement
successful lessons learned from our experiences supporting operations
in Iraq, most notably increased usage of government-owned containers
where practical. Third, we continue to work with theater leadership to
enhance their cargo reception capability and infrastructure support to
return carrier-owned containers within the prescribed timelines. Last,
we continue to leverage technology to improve our intransit visibility
of cargo and management of our critical distribution assets.
7. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, have steps been taken to
renegotiate container contracts and the leases currently in place?
General Fraser. Yes, TRANSCOM negotiated more favorable container
detention and purchase terms for the USC-7. The contract is due to
start this summer. The terms include lower purchase prices for the
containers, more ``free-time'' before detention charges start to
accrue, and allowing purchase of containers 30 days sooner. The
enclosed fact sheet (in response to previous Senate questions on
container costs) provides the estimated cost impact of the new terms.
More importantly, in addition to the contract terms, TRANSCOM,
through its component, the Military SDDC, is actively engaging the
Military Departments and Government agencies to improve container
management procedures and contractual terms and conditions that will
reduce container detention costs. As DOD's Global Container Manager,
SDDC has decreased container detention charges by instituting improved
processes, such as standing up sites to transload from commercial to
Government containers in theater. SDDC is also working to prioritize
cargo in the carrier holding yards, improve procedures for receipt and
release of containers, and enforce accuracy standards and completion of
monthly inventories. Another significant effort is the development of a
single container management system that will enable better container
tracking and reporting to further decrease detention charges.
Proposed Universal Services Contract (USC)-7 Container Detention and
Purchase Fact Sheet
The following information is provided in response to questions the
Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) received
from Senator Tom Carper's and Senator Scott Brown's staffs during a
December 14, 2011, teleconference.
1. Free time \1\ cost comparison between the current requirements
in USC-6 and the proposed changes for USC-7, which are tentatively
scheduled to take effect June 1, 2012:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Container detention charges are imposed by shipping lines for
containers kept beyond the assigned ``free time'' and not made
available for pickup within that period.
Under USC-6, the U.S. Government is currently
authorized 15 days of free time before detention fees begin for
containers delivered in Afghanistan.
Under USC-7's proposed language, an additional 5 days
would be added, for a total of 20 days free time before
detention charges begin on containers in Afghanistan.
Based on analysis of detention for containers
delivered to Afghanistan over the last 2 years, the additional
5 days of free time would have represented a 22 percent
reduction in detention costs for an annual $12.6 million in
cost avoidance.
2. Containers are often used for storage, force protection, and
other purposes, given the lack of infrastructure in theater. The
Department can purchase containers to mitigate detention costs in one
of two ways.
Deliberate container purchase cost comparison using
the current requirements in USC-6 and the proposed changes for
USC-7:
Currently with USC-6, in order to purchase a
container, 90 days worth of detention costs must be
paid. To purchase a container under the proposed USC-7,
the number of days' worth of mandatory detention costs
drops to 60 days.
On a per container basis, purchase of a 40-
foot dry container under USC-6 at the earliest possible
time (Day 91) would cost $5,100 to purchase the
container plus 90 days of mandatory detention ($35/day)
$3,150, for a total of $8,250.
Purchase of a 40-foot dry container under the
proposed USC-7 at the earliest possible time (Day 61)
would cost $4,590 to purchase the container plus 60
days of mandatory detention ($35/day) $2,100, for a
total of $6,690.
USC-7 proposed changes would have resulted in
a cost avoidance of $1,560 per purchased container
(18.9 percent reduction).
These purchase cost reductions are due to
lowering mandatory detention payment from 90 to 60
days, earlier commencement of credit on day 61 versus
day 91, and the reduced container purchase prices
negotiated by U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
under the proposed USC-7.
Container purchase in the event containers are
indefinitely retained by the U.S. Government (cumulative Credit
Against Purchase (CAP)), using the current requirements in USC-
6 and the proposed changes for USC-7:
Currently with USC-6, daily detention costs
are capped at day 358 for a 40-foot dry container and
day 1,090 for a 40-foot refrigerated container, at
which time credit paid through detention costs equals
the purchase price of the container and the container
becomes the property of the DOD. For example, under
USC-6 the CAP cost of a 40-foot dry container is
$12,530 ($35/day 358).
Under USC-7, daily detention costs are capped
at day 350 for 40-foot dry containers and day 700 for
40-foot refrigerated containers, at which time credit
paid through detention costs equals the purchase price
of the container and the container becomes the property
of the DOD.For example, under USC-7 the CAP cost of a
40-foot dry container is $12,250 ($35/day
350).
This reduction in detention days would have
resulted in a 9 percent reduction in detention costs
for an annual $3.2 million in cost avoidance.
3. SDDC is also actively engaged in reducing commercial container
detention costs through the increased use of U.S. Government-owned
containers, where cost effective. As this business practice proved
extremely successful in Iraq, we continue to look for opportunities to
implement it in Afghanistan, when appropriate.
PAKISTAN GROUND LINES OF COMMUNICATION
8. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, TRANSCOM and our interagency
partners have received permission from governments of some European,
Central Asian, and Baltic countries to start retrograding materials
from Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). As we
begin the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan in the next few years, the
retrograde of materials and equipment from Afghanistan will
increasingly become more important. The Pakistan Ground Lines of
Communication (PAK GLOC) provides logistical support through the
movement of cargo to Afghanistan. When open, the PAK GLOC remains the
quickest and most cost-effective route. If the PAK GLOC is not open for
retrograde operations, what additional cost will the United States
incur in order to move equipment out of Afghanistan?
General Fraser. The financial impact of the PAK GLOC closure
continues to be analyzed as TRANSCOM gains more fidelity on the factors
related to costing. At this time it is difficult to determine with any
degree of confidence what that additional cost will be. TRANSCOM
continues to explore and develop multiple retrograde options in order
to meet warfighter operational requirements in the most cost effective
manner.
9. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, has TRANSCOM conducted an
analysis of what will be necessary to ensure the PAK GLOC is open?
General Fraser. No. TRANSCOM does not control the conditions on the
ground that would be necessary to conduct such an analysis on the PAK
GLOC. However, CENTCOM states Pakistan leadership has made it clear to
us that reopening the PAK GLOC, as well as all other issues related to
Pakistan's relationship with the United States, must go through a
process which begins with recommendations produced by their parliament.
The administration plans to send a negotiating team to Pakistan to
discuss the steps required to reopen the PAK GLOC, consistent with
parliament's recommendations and U.S. laws and interests.
NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
10. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, the NDN provides an
additional route for cargo to Afghanistan. Over the past year, around
40 percent of all cargo in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
was moved through the NDN's multiple truck, water, rail, and air routes
in an expanding distribution network. TRANSCOM continues to work with
the interagency and governments of the NDN countries to expand NDN
routes. However, many of the NDN countries do not want materials from
Afghanistan to retrograde back through their countries. If the NDN is
not open or partially open for retrograde operations, how will this
affect the retrograding of materials and equipment from Afghanistan?
General Fraser. TRANSCOM currently has two-way permissions on all
our NDN routes for commercial-type items. Additionally, one of the NDN
routes (the Russian route) is authorized to move wheeled armored
vehicles. At this time, TRANSCOM is executing multiple proofs of
principle to exercise these permissions. The lessons learned will be
used to determine the best way to employ each route in the overall
retrograde operation. Any additional permissions from countries
supporting the NDN would further enhance retrograde flexibility,
capacity, and redundancy with potential cost savings.
11. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, what additional costs will
the United States incur in order to move equipment out of Afghanistan
if the NDN route is closed?
General Fraser. Assuming the PAK GLOC remains closed and the NDN
closes, the cost to move all equipment out of Afghanistan would be
significantly higher. The only option remaining would be airlift
equipment and supplies direct air back to the States or to multi-modal
locations. While this option is feasible it will not meet the current
departure timelines. TRANSCOM has been working Proof of Principles to
test using the NDNfor limited cargo coming out of Afghanistan, but this
is still in the very early stages and the costs associated with cargo
leaving Afghanistan has not been determined.
STRATEGIC AIRLIFT
12. Senator McCaskill. General Fraser, our defense strategy relies
on rapid global reach and rapid global response to deter aggression and
deliver worldwide capability. An important component of maintaining
U.S. military dominance is maintaining the airlift and air-refueling
capability required for rapid delivery of our forces and equipment over
long distances. C-17s will continue to be the workhorse for strategic
airlift. Even though TRANSCOM is currently funding purchases, upgrade
programs, and fleet rotation, I still have concerns that the stress of
supporting two wars over the past decades will cause our current C-17
fleet to age faster than expected. What is being done to ensure that we
do not have any gaps in our strategic airlift capabilities as the
current C-17 fleet begins to age?
General Fraser. The C-17 fleet averages more than the planned 1,000
actual flight hours per year, but the life-limiting effects felt by the
fleet are within limits. The C-17 fleet will meet its service life of
30 years, and based on historic usage severity, should be available
much longer. Targeted fleet service life extension programs (SLEP) are
being utilized to refresh specific aging aircraft drivers (wing upper
cover, landing gear) as appropriate to enable continued safe/reliable/
economic C-17 operations. A requirement for an overall aircraft SLEP
has not been established.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
ORGANIZATIONAL REVIEW OF ALASKAN COMMAND
13. Senator Begich. Admiral Willard, I understand at your direction
PACOM has been conducting an organizational review of Alaskan Command.
Although I am cognizant the renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific region is
driving a need to shift PACOM resources, I firmly believe Alaskan
Command is and will remain an integral component of enabling PACOM to
carry out its mission. As you may know, Alaskan Command was founded due
to a lack of unity of forces in Alaska during World War II. With more
than 22,000 Active Duty personnel in Alaska, Alaskan Command provides
PACOM mission assurance in the State, ensures a ready force, and
expedites the deployment of forces in support of contingencies. I am
aware that after the creation of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), some
of the missions in Alaska are now under that combatant command, and
organizational challenges have surfaced. Resolution of these
organizational challenges will require coordination between PACOM and
NORTHCOM. Could you please describe the scope of the PACOM
organizational review of Alaskan Command?
Admiral Willard. In accordance with the 2010 Secretary of Defense
efficiencies tasking, PACOM performed a review of all PACOM missions
and associated manpower requirements to identify potential savings and
internal efficiencies. The scope of the Alaskan Command study included
a determination of requirements for manpower support to gain a better
understanding of the roles, missions, and responsibilities that impact
Alaskan Command. The scope of the study also included mission analysis
and functional capabilities analysis as related to wartime requirements
and a review of level of support provided to PACOM missions assigned to
Alaskan Command.
To date, no final decision has been made. PACOM will ensure that
any course of action is fully coordinated with all stakeholders prior
to a final decision being reached.
14. Senator Begich. Admiral Willard, what is the desired outcome?
Admiral Willard. PACOM began looking at Alaskan Command as part of
the Secretary of Defense Efficiency Review in late 2010. During a
detailed examination of Alaskan Command, it was determined that the
operations performed for PACOM in Alaska do not require a permanent
Joint Headquarters and the potential operations performed for NORTHCOM
can be handled by Joint Task Force-Alaska. Based on joint doctrine,
there is no reason to maintain a permanent subordinate unified command
in Alaska. Subsequently, Operation Tomodachi validated an identified
need to operationalize U.S. Forces-Japan (USFJ) to increase the
capacity/capability of USFJ as an operational headquarters to support
the defense of Japan from increasing threats.
This need coupled with the direction in the recently released
``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense,'' PACOM intends to shift some of its joint staff positions to
strengthen relationships with Asian allies and key partners
specifically Japan through a more robust USFJ capability. This
relationship is critical to the future stability and growth in the
Asia-Pacific region. Shifting these joint staff positions from Alaskan
Command to other, more critical priorities is one step in strengthening
these relationships in a period of constrained resources.
PACOM does not intend to move any units, exercises, or activities
out of Alaska, as these are critical to maintaining forces that are
able to respond in a crisis in Alaska or throughout the Asia Pacific.
15. Senator Begich. Admiral Willard, would you please describe
coordination with NORTHCOM to reach an organizational solution mutually
beneficial to both combatant commands?
Admiral Willard. In November 2011, I directed the PACOM staff to
develop a way ahead for achieving the desired end-state of shifting
joint staff billets and civilian positions from Alaskan Command to
higher priorities in the theater. The PACOM staff formed a planning
team which consisted of representatives from the staff directorates,
the Service components (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps),
Alaskan Command, and NORTHCOM. The purpose of the planning team was to
examine the situation and offer recommendations based on competing
priorities.
In February 2012, the planning team offered their recommendation to
retain Alaskan Command as a Subordinate Unified Command to PACOM and
shift 45-50 joint staff billets and civilian positions to higher
priorities with critical allies. Both the Commander of Alaskan Command
and the Chief of Staff for NORTHCOM offered dissenting recommendations
to transfer Alaskan Command and the majority of its 65 joint staff
billets and civilian positions from PACOM to NORTHCOM. I directed my
staff to examine the question of whether Alaskan Command still fits the
criteria of a Subordinate Unified Command and deferred making a final
decision.
ALASKAN COMMAND MANPOWER SUMMARIES
16. Senator Begich. Admiral Willard, would you please provide
manpower summaries (military, contractor, and civilian billets) for
Alaskan Command for fiscal year 2012, and projected for fiscal years
2013 through 2017?
Admiral Willard. The manpower authorizations for fiscal year 2012
are as follows:
Military - 42 (Joint Table Distribution (JTD) shows 43, one
position identified as billpayer for DOS)
Civilian - 23
Total - 65
Fiscal year 2013 through 2017 may or may not be the same as fiscal
year 2012, depending on the outcome of PACOM's Alaskan Command review.
NORTHERN EDGE FUNDING LEVELS
17. Senator Begich. Admiral Willard, Northern Edge is a critical
exercise to prepare forces for contingencies in the PACOM AOR. Would
you please provide funding levels for the exercise for fiscal year 2012
and projected for fiscal years 2013 through 2017?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
MILITARY QUALITY-OF-LIFE CONCERNS
18. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, please identify the top
quality-of-life concerns for military families assigned within PACOM.
Admiral Willard. America's All-Volunteer Force is our greatest
strategic asset and we commit our full support for the 300,000 PACOM
servicemembers and their families. We know quality-of-life for Active
Duty soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and their dependents continues
to be a key enabler and retention factor for these Americans serving in
the PACOM AOR.
We must ensure that the needs of our servicemembers and their
families continue to be met, even during this time of fiscal
constraint. We must sustain critical quality of life programs and make
improvements where needed in the quality-of-life of assigned personnel.
Current key focus areas include:
Military Pay and Compensation
With the numerous challenges that come with
military life, pay and financial difficulties should
not be added stressors. We need to ensure that our
servicemembers and their families are provided with a
comfortable life which includes fair pay and
compensation. The National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 provides an increase of 1.6
percent for military basic pay. This raise is equal to
the Employment Cost Index as of 30 September 2010, as
prescribed by law, and will keep military pay increases
in line with those in the private sector. In addition,
the NDAA funds bonuses and other incentives to meet
recruiting and retention quality and quantity goals--
especially for our most critical skills and experience
levels.
Care for Wounded, Ill, and Injured Military Members
We continue our intense focus on the care of
our wounded, ill, and injured military members--those
who sacrificed so much in defense of our Nation. We are
working to achieve the highest level of care and
management to ensure quality care and as smooth a
transition back to normalcy as medically possible.
Recent key initiatives include:
Achieving a seamless transition to
veteran status for members leaving the military
and superlative cooperation between DOD and the
Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA).
Ensuring a high standard for
facilities caring for wounded warriors, i.e.,
first rate hospitals and trained staff.
Enhancing case management of
individuals needing care and transition to
civilian life.
Establishing an Integrated Disability
Evaluation System--to create a simpler, faster,
more consistent process for determining which
members may continue their military service and
helping them become as independent and self-
supporting as possible.
Working with the DVA to create Virtual
Lifetime Electronic Records--critical to
improve veteran care and services.
Continuing investments to modernize
the Electronic Health Record--to improve
provider satisfaction, system speed,
reliability, and to record all healthcare
encounters from the battlefield through each
phase of treatment.
The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 provides $2.3
billion for enduring wounded, ill, and injured military
member programs. Of this amount, $415 million provides
for the continued support of cutting edge wounded, ill,
and injured medical research. This research is highly
focused on psychological health/post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injuries (TBI), but
also includes prosthetics, vision loss, hearing loss,
and other conditions directly relevant to the injuries
our soldiers are currently receiving on the
battlefield.
Prevention of Sexual Assault
Sexual assault is criminal conduct punishable
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and will not
be tolerated. Our commitment is zero tolerance of
sexual assault or related behaviors within the PACOM
AOR. We will not allow sexual assault to injure our
personnel, our friends, our families, destroy our
professional values, or compromise readiness.
Requirements included in the recently released
DOD instruction 6495.02, Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Program Procedures, are:
Policies and procedures for all
commanders, at all levels, to take action to
prevent sexual assault, protect and support
victims, hold offenders accountable, and to
ensure a safe and healthy environment.
All uniformed members, spouses,
civilians, and contractors are afforded victim
services.
Victim advocates will be well-trained
and credentialed.
Funding will be provided for training
investigators and lawyers.
All commanding officers and senior
enlisted leaders will be fully trained, and
committed to eradicating sexual assault.
Ensure the length of time sexual
assault records are kept is standardized for
all Services.
Victims filing unrestricted cases will
now have the option to request an expedited
transfer from their unit or installation.
Suicide Prevention
The suicide rate among our servicemembers and
their families is at a record high. We have an
obligation and responsibility to take care of the men
and women who volunteer to sacrifice for our country.
Our military servicemembers and their families are
resilient and strong, but we want them to know that
they should not needlessly suffer through depression
and anxiety. Suicide prevention is a leadership
responsibility from the most senior leaders down to
front-line supervisors.
Marine Corps (Marine Forces Pacific
(MARFORPAC)): Improving the Family Readiness in the
Marine Corps has been accomplished by implementing
Behavioral Health programs to protect and strengthen
the health and well-being of Marines and their
families. Behavior Health programs consist of Combat
and Operational Stress Control, Suicide Prevention,
Family Advocacy, Sexual Assault Response and
Prevention, and Substance Abuse Prevention.
Spouse Employment
Maintaining a career in the face of frequent
moves is an issue that has plagued military spouses for
years. Job availability and employer willingness to
hire transient spouses is always a concern. With one in
three working spouses holding jobs that require
licenses or certifications, transferability of
professional credentials from one State to another
complicates the employment issue. In many overseas
locations, availability of these professional jobs can
be limited, resulting in unemployment or under-
employment. Many young spouses don't have the requisite
background for the civil service jobs offered and the
status of forces agreements or other foreign assignment
areas prevent military exchanges and commissaries from
opening all positions to U.S. candidates.
Education
K-12 Education (Hawaii): Data is being
collected at PACOM to interpret if there is a
recruiting or retention issue for military families
with school-aged children stationed in Hawaii.
K-12 Education (DODEA): The Department of
Defense Education Activity (DODEA) Pacific oversees 49
schools in 3 countries and 1 Territory, with a
population of 23,500 students. DODEA is currently
unable to support varied educational options desired by
families, e.g., providing universal preschool within
all DOD overseas schools and home school families'
access to the DODEA Virtual School.
Child Care and Youth Programs
Sufficient, reliable, yet affordable child
care is a key readiness issue for servicemembers and
their families. Our highest priority is ensuring 100
percent availability of child care, especially in
overseas locations. Additional unmet child care needs
include access to care during nontraditional hours to
accommodate servicemembers' work schedules, limited
availability of child care slots for lower priority
families requiring care (i.e., not Single Parent and
Dual Military), and drop-in and respite care for
families with a deployed servicemember.
Army (U.S. Army Pacific): Army Child
Development Centers (CDCs) are available on post with a
full day, part day, and hourly care for children. The
Youth Services are designed specifically for middle
school youth and teens and ensures services such as
sports, fitness and health, life skills, leadership
opportunities, academic, and intervention support and
services are available. Transportation to and from
school to the center is available in various locations.
The Army Family Child Care (FCC) home is another child
care choice for military family members, DOD civilians,
and DOD contractors in which family members work as
independent contractors in individual housing units
located on a military installation. Special services
may include 24-hour and long-term care during
mobilization and training exercises, evening and
weekend care, and care for special needs children and
mildly ill children. Parents can expect to receive the
same quality of care in an Army FCC home as in an Army
CDC or School-Age Program. FCC providers receive the
same training and support as facility-based staff.
An additional program available is the Armed Services
YMCA (ASYMCA), which provides military families, Active
Duty personnel, the National Guard, and military
reservists with access to youth development, family
strengthening, and health and well-being programs. The
Boys and Girls Clubs of America inspires young people
to become responsible citizens. The Clubs create a safe
place for kids to grow, provide mentoring by a
professionally-trained staff and caring volunteers,
nurture character development and life-enhancing
skills, and provide hope and opportunity.
Housing
Housing availability and affordability is a
recurring readiness issue for servicemembers and their
families. Waiting lists for base housing can vary from
immediate occupancy to waits exceeding 24 months,
depending on rank, installation, and required housing
unit size. Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA) or Basic
Allowance for Housing (BAH) is paid to servicemembers
stationed in overseas locations (OHA) or in Hawaii and
Alaska (BAH) and is designed to provide equitable
housing compensation when government quarters are not
provided. However, servicemembers still report
significant out-of-pocket expenses while living off-
base when on-base housing is not available.
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam (JBPH-H):
Public-Private Venture (PPV) housing has improved the
quality of our homes for our servicemembers over the
last few years. There is high demand for PPV homes as
their quality exceeds most of what is available in the
community. PPV only satisfies a portion of our housing
requirement, as we are expected to rely on the local
community. In some instances, we are not keeping up
with the demand for housing for several pay grades,
specifically Senior Enlisted and Field Grade Officers
who are experiencing wait list times of 6 to 12 months.
Navy (Navy Region Hawaii (NRH)): PPV housing
has improved the quality of our homes for our
servicemembers over the last few years. There is high
demand for PPV homes as their quality exceeds most of
what is available in the community. PPV only satisfies
a portion of our housing requirement (4,451 homes), as
we are expected to rely on the local community. NRH
continues to meet the requirements for housing.
However, we are not keeping up with the demand for
housing for several pay grades, specifically Senior
Enlisted and Field Grade Officers who are experiencing
wait list times of 6 to 12 months.
Army (U.S. Army Pacific): Availability of
housing for servicemembers is another top quality of
life concern. Servicemembers pay several hundred
dollars more a month in rent living in the same quality
home off-post when on-post housing is not available
upon their arrival. Additionally, when on-post housing
is subsequently available, some to all costs associated
to the move is the responsibility of the servicemember,
resulting in additional out-of-pocket costs affecting
many of our new military families and creating
financial hardship.
19. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, what progress has been made in
those areas, especially spouse employment opportunities, child care,
and education programs and facilities for DOD dependent school-aged
children?
Admiral Willard.
Spouse Employment
Navy (NRH): The Navy manages the Joint
Employment Management System (JEMS), an online job bank
dedicated to military spouses, dependents, and retirees
of all services. JEMS was first established in
September 1985 to serve as a single point of contact
for the business community to offer employment
opportunities to job seekers from the military
community. JEMS averages 2,000 job openings at any
given time. In fiscal year 2011, over 4,800 spouses,
dependents, and retirees registered in JEMS and were
seeking employment. JEMS holds one job fair per year at
JBPH-H, averaging over 800 attendees and 100 companies.
JEMS also holds one job fair at Marine Corps Base
Hawaii averaging just over 300 attendees with 40
companies.
Navy (Navy Region Singapore): For those
spouses who want to work outside the home, there are
jobs available locally and on base primarily with
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR), the Navy
Exchange (NEX), and Navy Federal Credit Union. Spouses
have also found employment at the American Embassy and
Singapore American School. All civil service jobs are
open for overseas spouses and dependents as local. The
Family Services Office has provided assistance to many
spouses seeking employment.
Navy (Navy Region Marianas): Spouses who meet
the minimum qualifications are always given first
priority when it comes to NAF employment.
Navy (Navy Region Japan): To support
successful job searching, installation Fleet and Family
Service Centers (FFSC) provide Job Search Strategies
and Federal Employment and Resume Writing classes on a
regular basis. On average, more than 3,000 spouses
participate in these one-on-one and group seminar
programs annually. To further enhance spouse employment
opportunity, Navy Region Japan worked with the Navy
Civilian Human Resource chain of command to permit
foreign spouses of uniformed military personnel to
receive special appointment hiring authority to non-
sensitive civil service positions.
Air Force (Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)):
Priority Placement is approved by DOD for employment of
spouses already employed by the U.S. Government prior
to arrival at overseas bases. The DOD Military Spouse
Employment Partnership (MSEP) website and job fair
support programs are now accessible to all PACAF bases.
Army (U.S. Army Pacific): MSEP has helped
military spouses access career resources and connects
with corporations who are ready to help spouses explore
career options for their mobile lifestyles. MSEP has
partnered with numerous companies such as H&R Block,
Army Career and Alumni Program, Army Air Force Exchange
Service, Wal-Mart, Verizon, Dell, et cetera, to smaller
community-based, local companies together working to
aid military spouses in finding and identifying
portable jobs, as well as reducing the wage gap between
military and civilian spouses. In addition, MSEP has
increased the U.S. partnerships by collaborating with
the Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC) to assist
spouses of military members stationed in South Korea
find local positions, gain awareness/education on home
based business options, and awareness of local job
fairs.
Child Care and Youth Programs
Marine Corps (Marine Forces Pacific): To
alleviate the childcare challenge, the Marine Corps
established numerous CDCs over the past several years
and have more planned. Adequate funding will ensure CDC
Military Construction (MILCON) will take place as
planned.
JBPH-H: JBPH-H has made significant progress
in the area of child and youth programs.
CDCs: Peltier CDC reopened on 08 Mar
2012. The Peltier CDC renovation and expansion
enabled the consolidation of children from two
older CDCs and netted 16 additional spaces
bringing the net total to 130. Three additional
CDCs are scheduled to open across JBPH-H. The
Wahiawa CDC (replaces older CDC at Wahiawa) is
scheduled to open on 26 April 2012, increasing
capacity from 46 to 70 spaces. The new Center
Drive CDC opens the end of May this year with a
capacity of 304 spaces.
The new Ford Island CDC is scheduled
to open mid-July this year with a capacity of
304 spaces. When all 4 are opened, JBPH-H will
have a total of 9 CDCs operating on Oahu with a
total capacity of 1,306, including one 24/7 CDC
accommodating 10 children day and night. This
unit is designated for use by swing shift
personnel and has the capacity to expand if
need is identified. Anticipate reducing the
overall wait list by at least 50 percent. There
are no additional projects to increase CDC
capacity on Oahu. Pacific Missile Range
Facility (PMRF) continues to be able to
accommodate all CDC requirements in its 34
space CDC. The new CDCs will result in 230 new
jobs.
School Age Care: JBPH-H has two School
Age Care centers that accommodate 290 children.
The PMRF on Kauai has seven children enrolled
in their School Age Care program. Neither
location has a waiting list.
Navy (Navy Region Singapore): There is no
Child and Youth Program in the region to assist
families with young children. Residents in Family
housing are allowed to hire foreign domestic workers or
live-in-aides. This currently alleviates the need for a
CDC. For parents who would rather have their children
supervised at a facility, they can choose to pay for
care on the economy. Many of these facilities are
within walking distance from the base. For children 5
years and under, the region offer a ``Little Tykes''
program that is provided 3 days a week. The program
offers interactive socialization, crafts, and story
hours. Navy Region Singapore currently does not have
the population to justify a CDC. Funding is another
obstacle if the population increases.
Navy (Navy Region Marianas): Child care is
available for youth of all ages as well as before and
after school care, Child Development Homes, youth
sports, and youth leisure/recreation classes on both
bases.
Army (U.S. Army Pacific): Army CDCs are
available on post with a full day, part day, and hourly
care for children. The Youth Services are designed
specifically for middle school youth and teens and
ensure services such as sports, fitness and health,
life skills, leadership opportunities, academic and
intervention support and services are available.
Transportation to and from school to the center is
available in various locations. The Army Family Child
Care (FCC) home is another child care choice for
military family members, DOD civilians, and DOD
contractors in which family members work as independent
contractors in individual housing units located on a
military installation. Special services may include 24-
hour and long-term care during mobilization and
training exercises, evening and weekend care, and care
for special needs children and mildly ill children.
Parents can expect to receive the same quality of care
in an Army FCC home as in an Army CDC or School-Age
Program. FCC providers receive the same training and
support as facility-based staff.
An additional program available is the ASYMCA, which
provides military families, Active Duty personnel, the
National Guard, and military reservists with access to
youth development, family strengthening, and health and
well-being programs. The Boys and Girls Clubs of
America inspires young people to become responsible
citizens. The Clubs create a safe place for kids to
grow, provide mentoring by a professionally-trained
staff and caring volunteers, nurture character
development and life-enhancing skills, and provide hope
and opportunity.
Education
PACOM's Education Branch is dedicated to
promoting quality education for all military students
in the Pacific. PACOM's goal is to work in conjunction
with the civilian education community to offer a
comprehensive array of high quality educational
opportunities that allow parents to select the option
that matches the needs of each child to include public,
public charter, private, religious, DOD, and home
schools or on-line/virtual schools. PACOM's goal is to
ensure families receive support with their school
choice. For parents with certain school issues that
cannot be resolved by other means, the Interstate
Compact for Educational Opportunities for Military
Children may enlist their military representative.
PACOM has designated representatives for many
educational related boards and committees within the
PACOM theater and specifically, Hawaii. PACOM and all
combatant commands are represented on the DODEA
Dependents Education Council--a forum for the Services
to elevate the matters relating to facilities,
logistics, and administrative support provided to
DODschools. PACOM is also represented on the Pacific
Theater Education Council which identifies educational
concerns of parents, students, military leaders, and
educators within the PACOM AOR.
PACOM has a seat on the Advisory Council on Dependents
Education which recommends programs and practices,
ensuring a quality education system to the Secretary of
Defense and the DODEA Director.
In 2012, the DODEA started virtual courses for
students in Hawaii with a vision to prepare students to
live, learn, work, and serve the public good in a
digital, global society through engaging, synchronous
and asynchronous instruction. DODEA enacted the
Bullying Awareness and Prevention Program, a new
mathematics curriculum for all grades to include more
math unit coursework for graduation, a new attendance
policy providing specific guidance on attendance and
absences, identifies support services for students at
risk for not fulfilling the grade or course
requirements, and established the use of Gradespeed
which is a full-featured web-based grade book for both
parents and teachers. DODEA also utilizes Facebook as a
means to connect with administrators, teachers,
parents, and students.
In Hawaii, the Joint Venture Education Forum
is a partnership that has existed since 1999 between
the military community, business community, and Hawaii
Department of Education. It addresses education
concerns and provides support for children of military
families stationed in Hawaii. It also promotes good
will between the military and public schools.
To continue supporting military families with
school age children in Hawaii, PACOM partnered with
Johns Hopkins University to conduct a 3-year
longitudinal study to understand family members'
preconceptions prior to arrival in Hawaii and how
attitudes and beliefs are impacted and change during
their tour of duty. At the conclusion of the study,
information will be provided to PACOM, the Services,
and civic agencies to improve policy, programming, and
services for children and youth.
Continuous progress was made to Hawaii schools
in 2011 when the National Math and Science Initiative
began which brought advanced placement (AP) courses in
math, science, and English in schools serving a high
concentration of students from military families.
Courses are designed to increase students' potential
for success in college. Schools profit from training
for their APteachers and assistance with building their
AP programs.
Navy (Navy Region Hawaii): Navy in Hawaii will
continue to move toward strengthening relationships
with our military impacted schools, improving our
partnership with our educators and our students. Navy
children attend 59 public schools in Hawaii. We
currently have 35 active school partnerships with
military impacted schools where Navy children are
predominate and are working on establishing
partnerships at 5 schools with Navy children that do
not currently have a partnership. A partnership has
been established for all schools expressing interest.
Our School Liaisons foster relationships between
parents, educators, and the military families. They
also facilitate permanent change of station
transitions. The Commander Navy Region Hawaii (CNRH)
meets frequently with local education leaders to
discuss ways the Navy can assist with educational
improvements. CNRH will continue our robust school
partnership program. K-12 Education will remain a key
focus of the Navy in Hawaii.
Navy (Navy Region Marianas): Three issues were
prepared by Commander Navy Region Japan (CNRJ) at the
2011 PACOM area Dependents Education Council (DEC)
meeting. Specifically:
Need for additional gifted student
services. An evaluation of school offerings in
Japan is being conducted by DODEA and will
provide the DEC with an update at its next
meeting.
Universal Pre-K. The DOD Education
Review has examined the current state of
education for military children and, based on
this analysis, has provided strategies for
improving the quality of DOD's early childhood
programs. When the results of the study are
released, they will be reviewed and discussed
in order to plan the next steps for improving
access to early childhood education for
military associated children.
The effect of DODEA staffing template
use at small DODEA schools. DODEA is currently
examining program offerings and instructional
modalities, based upon student needs and
interests and fiscal guidance. The review is
ongoing and DEC will be given periodic updates.
Marine Corps (Marine Forces Pacific
(MARFORPAC)): DODEA has an extensive MILCON program
planned through fiscal year 2017 that will fund
renovating or replacing DODEA schools in the MARFORPAC
AOR; however, they are not scheduled to begin before
fiscal year 2013. In addition to DODEA schools, the
Office of Economic Adjustment has reviewed and ranked
over 150 public schools located on military
installations by facility quality and capacity issues.
To date (Mar 2012), the funding to improve schools
ranked in the MARFORPAC AOR has not been distributed.
Air Force (Pacific Air Forces): Approximately
$493 million funded for new school construction on Air
Force installations in the PACOM AOR between fiscal
years 2012-2016.
Army (U.S. Army Pacific): Army families in
Hawaii benefit from a strong School Support Program
which is tasked with coordinating and assisting Army
school-age youth with educational opportunities and
assistance, and providing them the information
necessary to achieve success. Tutorial programs offered
to Army students include:
Online tutoring/homework help through
the ``Study Strong'' program (via the Tutor.com
website) available in school-age and middle
school/teen programs, and at home 24-hours-a-
day, 7-days-a-week.
March2Success, an Army-sponsored site
providing free educational content to help
students improve knowledge and test scores.
Army Family Covenant-authorized buses
and vans provide transportation to after-school
care and programs.
School Liaison Officers serve as
installation subject matter experts for youth
education and school transition issues,
championing and working toward achievement of a
``level playing field'' for Army youth
transitioning among installations and school
systems.
20. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, how many command-sponsored
dependents reside within PACOM, by Service, including official
civilians?
Admiral Willard.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
South Other
Hawaii Guam Japan Korea Locations Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army.......................................... 30,823 120 2,029 6,542 435 39,949
Navy.......................................... 15,456 2,445 11,979 224 546 30,650
Air Force..................................... 7,460 3,289 13,168 1,175 314 25,406
Marine Corps.................................. 6,722 10 12,076 125 24 18,957
Civilian...................................... * 290 5,179 4,568 6 10,043
----------
125,005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* No data collected for DOD Civilian Dependents inside the United States.
Note: Japan numbers provided by U.S. Forces Japan. Korea numbers provided by U.S. Forces Korea. Guam numbers
provided by Joint Region Marianas. All other data provided by Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).
21. Senator McCain. Admiral Willard, what do you see as the
greatest challenges to the military command structure regarding
assignment of families within PACOM?
Admiral Willard.
Facilities (Housing)
Hawaii. Housing has improved significantly. Military
Housing has transformed through a privatization initiative. The
housing is now leased to a private managing entity. The company
is responsible for maintenance and renovation. They have since
built hundreds of new houses within Mainland housing standards.
Family and Unaccompanied Housing are expected to meet the OSD
goal for housing by the end of fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year
2017 respectively (90 percent rated Q1/Q2).
AOR. Construction and renovation of inadequate
buildings is ongoing in order to meet OSD housing goals. Family
and Unaccompanied Housing are expected to meet the OSD goal for
housing by the end of fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2017
respectively (90 percent rated Q1/Q2). The current ratings are
as follows:
Navy