NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION, 112TH CONGRESS

HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON NOMINATIONS OF MICHAEL G. VICKERS; DR. JO ANN ROONEY; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; HON. LEON E. PANETTA; GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA; VADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN; LTGEN JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC; MADELYN R. CREEDON; ALAN F. ESTEVEZ; ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN; GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN; LTG CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA; HON. ASHTON B. CARTER; MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN; MARK W. LIPPERT; BRAD R. CARSON; AND KEVIN A. OHLSON

FEBRUARY 15; MARCH 3; JUNE 9, 28; JULY 19, 21, 26, 28; SEPTEMBER 13; NOVEMBER 17, 2011

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
FIRST SESSION, 112TH CONGRESS
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
FIRST SESSION, 112TH CONGRESS

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
NOMINATIONS OF
MICHAEL G. VICKERS; DR. JO ANN ROONEY; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY,
USA; HON. LEON E. PANETTA; GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA; VADM
WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN; LTGEN JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC; MADELYN
R. CREEDON; ALAN F. ESTEVEZ; ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN;
GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER III,
USAF; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; ADM JONATHAN W.
GREENERT, USN; LTG CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA; HON. ASHTON
B. CARTER; MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN; MARK W. LIPPERT; BRAD R. CAR-SON; AND KEVIN A. OHLSON

FEBRUARY 15; MARCH 3; JUNE 9, 28; JULY 19, 21, 26, 28; SEPTEMBER
13; NOVEMBER 17, 2011

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JACK REED, Rhode Island
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
JIM WEBB, Virginia
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
MARK UDALL, Colorado
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director
DAVID M. MORRIS, Minority Staff Director

(ii)
CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

FEBRUARY 15, 2011

Nominations of Hon. Michael G. Vickers to be Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and Dr. Jo Ann Rooney to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness ......................... 1

Statements of:
Hon. Michael G. Vickers, Nominated to be Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence ................................................................. 4
Rooney, Ph.D., Jo Ann, Nominated to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness ............................ 6

MARCH 3, 2011

Nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ......................... 93

Statements of:
Reed, Hon. Jack, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island ............................. 98
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ............................................. 100

JUNE 9, 2011

Nomination of Hon. Leon E. Panetta to be Secretary of Defense .................. 181

Statements of:
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, U.S. Senator from the State of California .................. 187
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California ....................... 188
Panetta, Hon. Leon E., Nominated to be Secretary of Defense ........................ 190

JUNE 28, 2011

Nominations of GEN James D. Thurman, USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces-Korea; VADM William H. McRaven, USN, to be Admiral and Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command; and LtGen John R. Allen, USMC, to be General and Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan .......................... 353

Statement of:
Thurman, GEN James D., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea .................................................................................................................. 358
McRaven, VADM William H., USN, Nominated to be Admiral and Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command ......................................... 359
Allen, LtGen John R., USMC, Nominated to be General and Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan ........................................................................................................ 360
Nominations of Madelyn R. Creedon to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs and Alan F. Estevez to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness ............................................... 505

Statement of:
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from the State of Indiana ................. 508
Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico ................. 513
Creedon, Madelyn R., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs ................................................................. 513
Estevez, Alan F., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness ................................................................. 515

Nominations of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; and Gen. William M. Fraser III, USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. Transportation Command .................................................... 575

Statements of:
Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ......................... 581
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ......................................................... 582
Fraser, Gen. William M., III, USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. Transportation Command ....................... 584
Annex A .................................................................................................................... 764

Nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ................. 783

Statements of:
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ................................................ 788

Nominations of ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Chief of Naval Operations; and LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA, to be General and to be Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command .................................................................................................................. 909

Statements of:
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Chief of Naval Operations ................................................. 913
Jacoby, LTG Charles H., Jr., USA, Nominated to be General and to be Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command ............................................................................................ 915

Nomination of Hon. Ashton B. Carter to be Deputy Secretary of Defense ........ 1007

Statements of:
Carter, Hon. Ashton, Ph.D., Nominated to be Deputy Secretary of Defense .... 1013
Nominations of Michael A. Sheehan to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; Mark W. Lippert to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs; Brad R. Carson to be General Counsel of the Department of the Army; and Kevin A. Ohlson to be a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

Statements of:
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma
Leahy, Hon. Patrick, U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont
Sheehan, Michael A., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
Lippert, Mark W., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
Carson, Brad R., Nominated to be General Counsel of the Department of the Army
Ohlson, Kevin A., Nominated to be a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

APPENDIX
NOMINATIONS OF HON. MICHAEL G. VICKERS TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; AND DR. JO ANN ROONEY TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2011

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Webb, Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Blumenthal, McCain, Brown, and Ayotte.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and John H. Quirk V, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; John W. Heath, Jr., minority investigative counsel; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Hannah I. Lloyd.

Committee members’ assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Jordan Baugh and Elana Broitman, assistants to Senator Gillibrand; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assist-
ant to Senator Brown; and Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee meets today to consider the nominations of two senior officials to serve in important positions within the Department of Defense (DOD). Dr. Michael Vickers has been nominated to be the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. He is currently serving in that position on an acting basis while continuing his duties as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities (SOLIC&IC). Dr. Vickers has served ably in that position, guiding and overseeing major elements of our operations against terrorists and insurgents across the globe.

Dr. Vickers has had a long and distinguished career in Government service, much of which is relevant to the position for which he has been nominated by the President.

In his present position as Assistant Secretary of Defense-SOLIC, he has been deeply involved in intelligence matters across the Government as a policymaker, as a consumer of intelligence, and as a producer of intelligence. He served previously as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations officer in multiple divisions, spanning the Near East, South Asia, and Latin America, and including involvement in covert actions. He also served as an Army Special Forces soldier and officer.

Congress created the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) in 2002 in recognition of the growing importance of intelligence to our military forces, especially in conducting operations after the events of September 11. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the principal staff assistant and adviser to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, and other sensitive matters. In this capacity, the USD(I) exercises the Secretary's authority over the intelligence components of DOD and is responsible for intelligence planning, programming, budgeting, policy formulation, and oversight.

The USD(I) is also responsible for ensuring that DOD intelligence components are responsive to the direction and requirements of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Indeed, by formal agreement between the DNI and the Secretary of Defense, the USD(I) is dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence on the DNI's staff.

Dr. Jo Ann Rooney has been nominated to be the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Department's number two position for military and civilian personnel issues, including recruitment, retention, pay and benefits, health care, readiness, and the quality of life of the members of our Armed Forces and their families. Dr. Rooney comes to us from academia, where she most recently served as the President of Mount Ida College and has served as an instructor at various colleges since 1994.

Dr. Rooney also serves on the board of trustees for the Jewish Hospital and St. Mary's Health Care, a nonprofit health care sys-
tem in Louisville, KY, experience that could serve her well in her new position should she be confirmed.

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness position is vitally important as the Department and Congress continue to wrestle with many challenges, including vastly growing personnel and health care budgets and the proper size of the force. The Department is actively planning a reduction in its ground forces, depending on conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 2012 budget request includes modest reductions in the Army and Navy, while the Department plans greater reductions in future years.

In evaluating the size of the force, we must be mindful of the stress on the force, including inadequate dwell time for many soldiers and a deeply concerning suicide rate.

Finally, the Department is continuing its deliberate progress in implementing the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.

We welcome both our nominees. We thank them. We thank their families for their distinguished public and private service and willingness to serve our Nation in these important positions. When we call upon them for their opening statements, we will ask them to introduce the family members and their friends who are with them as they give those statements.

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN M CCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in welcoming our nominees and their families and friends who are here today, especially our two youngest there [pointing to the audience], who have been working on paperwork in preparation for this hearing. We thank you for that. [Laughter.]

Secretary Vickers has had a distinguished and storied record of service to this country. He served as an Army Special Forces soldier, as a CIA case officer, and since August 2007 as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities.

Dr. Vickers, you must be prepared to streamline the size and cost of the organizations which you’ll oversee. Secretary Gates has announced his initiative to cut costs, eliminate waste and redundancies, and focus defense dollars on the most vital programs. With the rollout of the fiscal year 2012 budget yesterday, we will want to know what parts of the defense intelligence enterprise will be affected.

In the face of an unacceptably high and increasing deficit, we must examine all aspects of defense spending. I hope we can learn from you how you would apply these efficiencies for cost savings for other vital defense priorities. For example, which intelligence functions are redundant and can be eliminated; which intelligence organizations that are bloated can be cut; are there senior civilian positions that could be transferred or eliminated; which contracts for services could be terminated; and which major acquisition programs should be restructured or eliminated to save money?

My questions, however, should not be interpreted as reflecting a lack of concern or support for our ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Obviously, failure is not an option in achieving our
goals in both Operation New Dawn and Operation Enduring Freedom, and robust intelligence-gathering and analysis are critical to our success.

The list of imperatives for the defense intelligence enterprise is lengthy. We must be able to continue to locate and track America's most relentless enemies on the battlefield, to include former Guantanamo detainees who have made their way back into the fight. We must safeguard our Nation's vital secrets to prevent another Wikileaks episode and any further neutralization of our lawful intelligence collection methods. Through sound acquisition practices, we have to ensure our troops and our Nation have the overhead surveillance required for national security and mission accomplishments.

Dr. Rooney, you've had a distinguished career in law, education, and health administration. I expect you'll be called on very quickly to assist Secretary Gates and Under Secretary of Defense Stanley in making progress in several key areas that demand attention. Foremost among these is identifying ways to improve the well-being and quality of life of servicemembers and their families. After 9 years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, our forces, particularly the ground forces, special operators, and the combat support personnel who mobilize and sustain them through multiple deployments, are stressed.

While recruiting is strong and retention levels for experienced noncommissioned officers and officers remain historically high, the Department must continue to ensure that the resources, policies, and programs are in place to guarantee that deploying troops are trained, ready, and focused. For our wounded or injured, there must continue to be world-class care on the battlefield, and when they return home that the procedures for helping them and their families transition seamlessly to the next stages of their military service or civilian life work as rapidly and fairly as possible.

I look forward to hearing your testimony and I wish to congratulate you on your nominations and I look forward to confirming you as quickly as possible.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Let me now call on you for your opening statement, Secretary Vickers.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL G. VICKERS, NOMINATED TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

Dr. Vickers. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee: It is an honor to appear before you here today. Thank you for your consideration of my nomination. I am profoundly grateful for the confidence President Obama has shown in me by nominating me for the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and in designating me as the Acting USD(I) on 28 January. In the brief period I have been Acting USD(I), I have gained a further appreciation of the immense responsibilities of this office.

I am also deeply grateful to Secretary Gates for his support. I had the great privilege of serving with Secretary Gates in the CIA
during the 1980s and he has been the model for me ever since of what a professional intelligence officer should aspire to.

The USD(I) is dual-hatted as the DNI’s Director of Defense Intelligence. I have had the great honor of serving with Director Clapper for the past 3½ years and I am grateful for his support for my nomination.

I would also like to thank my family for their love and support. It is a great honor, Mr. Chairman, to introduce them to the committee today. With me here today are my wife, Melana, and our daughters Alexandra, Sophia, Oksana, and Kalyna. I would be a very poor dad if I did not also introduce in absentia our fifth daughter, Natasha, who is busily studying for her midterms at Ohio State and thus could not be with us today.

Chairman Levin. Which is the youngest of your daughters who are here today, by the way?

Dr. Vickers. Kalyna is our kindergartener, who is 6 years old on February 8th.

Chairman Levin. I was trying to win her vote here by asking which is the youngest. Thank you. [Laughter.]

Dr. Vickers. I’d like to also add that Oksana has the same birthday as President Obama. [Laughter.]

Also with me here today are my mother-in-law, Oksana Hepburn, my brother-in-law, Roman Gila, and his son and my nephew Muletti Gila, and numerous friends and colleagues from the Pentagon.

It has been a great privilege and honor for the past 3½ years to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC&IC under both President Bush and President Obama. Our special operators do much to keep us safe and I am immensely proud of them.

We face many challenges as a Nation, from the war with al Qaeda in Afghanistan to the pursuit of nuclear weapons by rogue states, the development of asymmetric capabilities by rising and resurgent powers, and the continued effects of the global financial crisis. I am confident we’ll be more than equal to these challenges, as Americans before us were to the challenges that confronted them.

Our intelligence capabilities constitute an increasingly critical source of advantage for our Nation. Recent events in the Middle East remind us of the importance of intelligence, but also of the unpredictable and rapid turns developments can take. Our warriors in the field and our policymakers here at home are better served by U.S. intelligence today than at any time since I began my service nearly 4 decades ago. We owe them the best intelligence we can provide. If confirmed as USD(I), I will do my best to ensure that this continues to be the case.

As a CIA officer in the 1980s, I learned first-hand about the importance of congressional oversight of intelligence. Even more important, I learned what an indispensable partner Congress can be.

I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Secretary Vickers, we thank you very much for that opening statement.

Dr. Rooney.
STATEMENT OF JO ANN ROONEY, Ph.D., NOMINATED TO BE
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
PERSONNEL AND READINESS

Dr. Rooney. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am grateful for the confidence that President Obama has shown in me by nominating me for the position of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. I also want to thank Secretary Gates for his support of my nomination. If confirmed, I will be honored to serve.

I want to thank my family and extended family for their support and it's my pleasure to introduce them now. My mom, Patricia Rooney, is with me today and I want to offer her my heartfelt and special thanks. It is because of her support and that of my late dad, John, that I'm here with you today. My dad, an Army veteran, and my mom, a retired public school elementary teacher, taught me that anything is possible, but that I must embrace opportunities to use my experience and talent to help others and leave an organization and people better for my efforts.

I'm also fortunate to have several other people very special in my life here today. My dearest friend of over 30 years and true sister of the heart, Linda Pizzorni, is here. Her daughter Alessia, a high school senior, is also here with us today. She and her sister Veronica, who is home because she has to be in school and she's with her dad, are truly my nieces in many ways.

Father Al Faretra, who is like my big brother, is representing the rest of the extended family in the Boston area. Prior to becoming a priest, Al served in the Navy and spent time aboard the USS Forrestal.

Finally, Father Jim Rafferty, a very dear friend and someone who I've had the pleasure of logging many nautical miles sailing the waters throughout New England, is here lending support.

I have not had the opportunity to serve our Nation in uniform, as did my dad, my uncles, my godfather, and many members of my extended family. They served in peacetime and in wartime, including World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. But like many Americans, I'm aware of the myriad of challenges members of our military, the civilian force, and their families face in supporting their service to our country. It is my desire to serve our country and, if confirmed, I pledge to bring all of my experience, knowledge, energy, and passion to the role.

The responsibilities and functions of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness are vast and challenging. They encompass advising and assisting the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and advising the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense in matters relating to manpower, force management, planning, program integration, readiness, Reserve component affairs, health affairs, training, civilian and military personnel requirements and management, commissary and exchange, morale, welfare, and recreation, quality of life matters, spousal and family support, and dependent education.
By nature, as the needs of our military and civilian members of DOD and their families change the responsibilities of the role must also evolve.

My background in law, finance, business, strategy, organizational change, education, and health care provide me with a broad range of experiences and perspectives to bring to this role, if confirmed.

All of us face daunting challenges, not only within DOD, but throughout the country, in areas of health care, cost containment, efficient use of resources, assessments, and accountability. Yet the goal is to balance these issues in a way to ensure we have the necessary resources so that the men and women in the Department are able to meet our Nation’s requirements for national security.

I understand the importance of working with this committee, the entire Congress, other governmental departments and agencies, and civilian and educational institutions in order to accomplish this goal. I understand the longstanding and daunting challenges associated with these and other aspects of DOD personnel and readiness, enabling the effective recruitment, retention, and training of the people we need. I will take all these responsibilities seriously and, if confirmed, I pledge my best efforts to work with this committee and many others to meet these challenges.

In closing, I would like to again thank President Obama and Secretary Gates for selecting me as the nominee for this position. If the Senate confirms me, I will make every effort to live up to the confidence they and all of you have placed in me.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Rooney.

We give a warm welcome to your families and friends, who are such an important part of who you are and your being here today.

We have standard questions which we ask our nominees, which we’ll ask each of you now. You can answer together. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Dr. Rooney. Yes.

Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Dr. Vickers. No.

Dr. Rooney. No.

Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established or requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

Dr. Vickers. Yes.

Dr. Rooney. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Dr. Vickers. Yes.

Dr. Rooney. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Dr. Rooney. Yes.

Dr. Vickers. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

Dr. Vickers. Yes.
Dr. Rooney. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Dr. Rooney. Yes.
Dr. Vickers. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. I think we'll try a 7-minute round of questions.

Dr. Vickers, we've been making efforts over the years, this committee, to expand the budgets, the production rate, the planned number of orbits, for major unmanned aerial vehicles that have been so critical to our forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, including the Predator and the Reaper. Our current objective is 65 orbits for these aircraft. The budget for fiscal year 2012 that we just received funds these aircraft at the maximum current production rate.

However, the fact is that our troops need more and are asking for more of these assets right now. They're living with significant unfulfilled requirements every day. Now, we were recently told that the limiting factor for accelerating the expansion of that force is operators and linguists rather than the production capacity at factories. My question is, why can't the Services accelerate the recruitment and the training of operators and linguists?

Dr. Vickers. Mr. Chairman, our Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) task force, under Secretary Gates' direction, has been working very hard since 2008 to provide the intelligence capabilities our warriors in the field require. Nevertheless, demand has continually outstripped supply, which is one reason during the recent Quadrennial Defense Review we raised the requirement for Predator and Reaper combat air patrols or for orbits from 50 to 65, and it's not clear at this point that 65, which we'll reach in 2013, will still meet our demand.

To supplement that, we've been adding manned aircraft of various kinds, variations of C-12 aircraft, Project Liberty by the Air Force, and medium altitude reconnaissance and surveillance systems by the ground forces, to address this shortfall.

As you noted, buying the aircraft is not enough. We also have to have operators, linguists, bandwidth, across the intelligence cycle. The Air Force in particular has been working very hard at converting operators to these functions. In fact, there are now more pilots involved in unmanned aircraft in the Air Force than there are flying manned aircraft. But we still have work to do.

Chairman Levin. I recently wrote Secretary Gates about the current requirements for ISR support in the Horn of Africa and about the Department's current acquisition plans for additional ISR assets to support the geographic combatant commands. Now, I've not received a reply to this letter, but I would ask, since less than 10 percent of the requirements are being filled right now, that you pay
Chairman Levin. Dr. Vickers, in your current position as Assistant Secretary of Defense-SOLIC, I think you understand very well how our Special Forces have discovered how to tightly integrate the different sensors to achieve unprecedented capabilities to identify high-value enemy personnel, to locate them, to track them, to identify their broader networks, and attack them.

Signals intelligence, sensors are used to cue airborne video cameras where to look. Radars that can detect moving vehicles or even people walking are used as tip-offs to begin focused collection, and so on.

Now, it's proven a lot more difficult for the regular conventional forces of the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps to achieve the degree of ISR system integration necessary to replicate U.S. Special Operations Command's success because the ISR assets are not under unified control. It's my understanding that the ISR task force and the Joint Staff are focused now on this problem. Do you have any ideas as to how the organizational obstacles can be removed in order to truly integrate our ISR assets operationally?

Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do. As you noted, the technique that our Special Operations Forces have pioneered, which we call “find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze”—to have a recurring intelligence cycle to lead to successive operations to take down an enemy network is something that has been progressively transmitted from our national Special Operations Forces to our theater forces and progressively to our general purpose or conventional forces.

General Petraeus is working this problem with his J–2 very hard in Afghanistan and we're seeing results in that area.

I would add as well that we’re providing additional capabilities in Afghanistan that we only had in very limited numbers in Iraq, for example, very persistent aerostats over all our conventional force positions to provide the kind of persistent surveillance that our forces need, particularly against improvised explosive devices.

There is still some work that needs to be done. If you compare the different organizations, national, Special Operations Forces, theater, and conventional forces, in their ability to rapidly exploit this kind of information, but the gap is narrowing.

When we used to describe a goal in the Department of trying to make conventional forces more special operations-like, we used to mean operating in small groups like special operators. Now we mean the ability to exploit intelligence across the cycle in the manner you described.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Dr. Vickers. General Petraeus in a recent interview discussed what he called the growing friction between local Taliban fighters living in Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban leadership who phone in orders that the local insurgents should continue to fight against Afghan and coalition forces through the winter, while the leadership remains safely in the sanctuaries in Quetta and elsewhere in Pakistan.

According to General Petraeus, Taliban leadership is eager to keep up the fight through the winter because they know they've
suffered losses over the last year. He also said that we’re seeing a
degree of discord among the Afghan Taliban leaders and between
them and the lower level fighters, and a level of discord that we
have not seen in the past. Do you agree with General Petraeus’ as-

Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do agree with General Petraeus’ assess-
ment. I’d be happy to provide more detail in a classified session,

The situation that General Petraeus was describing, where the
Taliban senior leadership wants to continue the fight during the
winter months—a lot of local commanders have been voting with
their feet, essentially, and saying, “I’ve had enough of this,” to
the effects of our increasingly effective operations, but also because of
multiple competing interests within the insurgency. The insurgency
is not a monolithic group. A lot of fighters fight for very different
reasons, including economic ones. So there’s naturally a lot of fric-
tions induced there. But the leadership-warrior divide is a big part
of it.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Before I call on Senator McCain, let me just quickly mention that
I hope we’ll get a quorum here this morning, and when we do we
will offer the committee budget to be approved.

I’m going to turn the gavel now over to Senator Reed and call
upon Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the witnesses. Secretary Vickers, we’ve recently
heard some rather guardedly optimistic assessments of the situa-
tion in Afghanistan. Do you agree with those assessments?

Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator McCain. The main problems still being corruption and
Pakistan?

Dr. Vickers. The strategic problem, sir, as you identified, are the
continued presence of a sanctuary in Pakistan and then the govern-
ance challenge.

Senator McCain. On the issue of Wikileaks, what’s your under-
standing of the status of investigations into the cause of Wikileaks?

Dr. Vickers. Sir, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence has mainly been focused on assessing the damage,
which they’ve done a very good job on, and remedial measures with
our chief information officer in the lead. My understanding of the
investigation is that it is ongoing, but that’s about all I can say at
this time.

Senator McCain. I’ve been interested to hear some in the media
and others say that Wikileaks was a good thing, and that it didn’t
damage our national security or our ability to carry out our missions.

Yet isn’t it true that in Wikileaks some individuals who were cooperating with us were identified?

Dr. VICKERS. Yes, sir, that is true.

Senator MCCAIN. That puts their lives in danger?

Dr. VICKERS. Yes, sir, it does.

Senator MCCAIN. I’m curious about your assessment of the damage that Wikileaks did to your abilities, and particularly in the area of getting people to cooperate with us in the vital aspect of human intelligence.

Dr. VICKERS. Sir, I think it’s had implications from the foreign policy level about governments wanting to ensure that their confidential relationships with the United States are protected, down to operational issues, as you mentioned, of assets that would cooperate with us. Fortunately, we are able to attract the intelligence assets that we require to serve our policymakers and warriors, but the damage should not be understated and the Department has learned many lessons about how to prevent this from ever happening again.

Senator MCCAIN. But the damage especially has been on the operational level. If we disclose an ambassador’s candid assessment of a foreign leader, that’s one thing. But to have operations and individuals disclosed in my view—and more importantly, what is your view—this can be very damaging, and some local individual may think twice before agreeing to cooperate with us if that person’s name is going to be publicized.

Dr. VICKERS. Yes, sir, that is exactly correct. As a former CIA operations officer, your first responsibility is to protect the security of those who would cooperate with the United States through tradecraft and proper information security, and they depend on us to do that.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you have a good sense of how former detainees are making their way back into the battlefield? I saw a news report this morning that another one was apparently killed, just reported today. Do you have a sense on how they’re making their way back to the battlefield?

Dr. VICKERS. Sir, approximately 20 to 25 percent have made their way back in one form or another.

Senator MCCAIN. That we know of.

Dr. VICKERS. That we know of. Some of those have subsequently been killed or recaptured. Others are out there fighting against us as well. The routes that they take depend on the circumstances of their release. But needless to say, it’s been in multiple countries and multiple routes, and I’d be happy to discuss that in more detail at a classified session.

Senator MCCAIN. You would agree it is a problem?

Dr. VICKERS. Yes, sir, it is.

Senator MCCAIN. Because now it seems to be a status symbol for those that return to the battlefield with their compatriots.

Dr. VICKERS. Yes, sir. That’s a very good point, that some mid-level operatives have been elevated to leadership positions by this conferral of status.
Senator McCain. Dr. Rooney, we intend to confirm you, and obviously I believe you're well-qualified, but you don't have a depth of experience with the men and women in the military. If I could suggest—and suggestions are a very cheap commodity around here—that you spend some time traveling around, not only to the bases here in the continental United States, but also our overseas bases and areas, if you can, even forward deployed, so to give you a better depth and understanding of the challenges, particularly of the repeated deployments that our men and women in the military have been making and the strain and stress that puts on their families, I hope you will do that as a very high priority.

Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir. If confirmed, that would be an immediate priority.

Senator McCain. Last year, in a contentious markup, this committee voted 15 to 12 to allow servicemembers, their dependents, and retirees to obtain privately paid abortions at military hospitals. Do you support the administration's position that abortions should be provided in military hospitals?

Dr. Rooney. My position, sir, is to support the law and enforce the law. But I also understand that the abortions are voluntary, they would be outpatient services, and it's not mandatory that any physicians there actually perform the abortions, but it's making the health care available. I would comply to the law.

Senator McCain. Thank you.

Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to join both the chairman and Senator McCain in thanking you, Secretary Vickers, for your service in the past, very distinguished service, and thank you, Dr. Rooney, for undertaking this very challenging, but critically important, assignment.

Secretary Vickers, I'd like to ask about one of the answers that you gave in the advance policy questions about a very important area that I know has concerned the committee in the past regarding the sharing of information, raw intelligence data, where you observed in the past there have been cultural barriers to the full access to this information.

I wonder if you could please describe for the committee what steps you would take to increase the sharing and availability of this data to special operations personnel and others in the field who need it?

Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir. As I indicated in my answers to the committee's advance policy questions, the Intelligence Community was raised throughout the Cold War on the principle of need-to-know, and increasingly in the war with al Qaeda and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the responsibility to share is imperative for our forces on the battlefield. That means not only sharing with our own forces, but in Afghanistan we have 49 nations fighting alongside us and sharing with them as well.

This requires technical solutions to the problem. Until recently in Afghanistan we had 26 different networks, that we're standardizing to facilitate the movement of information into a common network. But it also requires changes in the way we operate and what information can be provided at what level. Particularly, as Chair-
man Levin noted, some of the sensitive information we get in signals intelligence and others, that has typically been very compartmented, is critical on a time-sensitive basis to operators, both to kill or capture their adversary, but also to protect from attack.

We have been working that very hard. There is an inherent tension, however, between the responsibility to share and need-to-know that we always have to weigh to protect sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, while making sure we get timely information in the hands of our warfighters.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Do you feel that the barriers, as has been observed before, are still primarily cultural, or do you think there are procedural barriers that need to be overcome?

Dr. VICKERS. I think there’s a mix, sir. I think some of it is cultural legacy, but others, as I said, are technical challenges, or also, as Chairman Levin noted earlier, having the intelligence structures to rapidly process and move the information. Not all elements of the force are equally equipped in that area and it’s something we’re working to address.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Going to another line of questioning, I wonder if you could give us a more precise view about the extent of the discord and perhaps the magnitude of the phenomenon of these perhaps dissatisfied enemy combatants voting with their feet, as you have put it?

Dr. VICKERS. Sir, you mean those going back into combat?

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Exactly.

Dr. VICKERS. There are different perspectives on this, sir. Some are inherently repeat offenders, in the way that some portion of those from the criminal justice system do the same, particularly if they’re going back into an area where they’re surrounded by those engaged in terrorism, and there are certain ungoverned areas that they’ve made their way back to in Yemen, in Pakistan, that are very conducive to this. I wouldn’t want to ascribe a single motivation, but looking at a number of these cases over the past several years and the recidivism, some have chosen a life of terrorism and their associates have.

In some cases it’s a family business that we’ve seen, that a lot of relatives are all engaged in the same line of work. I think that creates a greater propensity for them to go back. It’s hard to know a priori necessarily which ones will and won’t.

There are those that we have very clear indications that would and therefore they’re not released. But there are others that are in that grey ground that we need to do more to fix.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Are there specific steps being contemplated to do more in that area, as you suggested?

Dr. VICKERS. Yes, sir. We have a Department of Justice-led initiative, with interagency participation, to review release of detainees at the highest levels or to transfer them to another country, and then we have task forces in the field working with local governments to review cases in the zones of armed conflict as well.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Dr. Rooney, you may have seen recent reports about the very unfortunate and tragic perils of perhaps overuse of combinations of pharmaceutical drugs in treating young men and women coming back and suffering from post-traumatic stress and other psychological phenomena. Are you aware of these reports
and do you have thoughts about what can be done to address this problem?

Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir. I am aware of the reports and the issue of particularly psychotropic drugs, whether it’s on the military side or the civilian side, absolutely shares some common factors. I think the lesson that we’re all learning is that—and I’m not a medical doctor—the use of drugs and not understanding the interactions of the drugs actually at times exacerbates the problem. I think we’re getting a lot more intelligent about that. We’re starting to get a lot more research about where those drugs are effective and where they’re not, and also understanding that at times it’s critical to link—sometimes our service people are going outside to civilian providers and then also having service inside the military, and we’re not necessarily connecting and understanding the drugs that have been prescribed by both.

Because of that awareness, there is now much more emphasis on trying to destigmatize the treatment, so that we can have a coordinated basis of care. But it is an ongoing issue.

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. I thank you both for your answers and for your very distinguished service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Ayotte. Secretary Vickers, Dr. Rooney, I first of all want to commend both of you for your career histories. Secretary Vickers, thank you so much for your service to our country. You’re both eminently qualified. I also want to commend your families and thank them for their support for both of you.

Secretary Vickers, I wanted to ask you again; you had cited a statistic in response to Senator McCain that 20 to 25 percent of the Guantanamo detainees have been released and have returned to the conflict. Is that the correct number?

Dr. Vickers. Yes, ma’am. In the case of Guantanamo it’s closer to 25 percent. Of the approximately 600 that have been released, about 150, we either know that they’ve returned or we strongly suspect that they’ve returned. In the case of other detainees that have been released on the battlefield, the number is between 20 and 25.

Senator Ayotte. How is that fact informing release decisions going forward?

Dr. Vickers. It has a strong impact on it, in the sense that remaining cases are scrutinized not just for recidivism, but also the ability in the case of third countries to continue to detain them if they’re transferred. A lot of detainees can’t be transferred because there’s no assurance that they’ll be properly detained and not released.

Part of the recidivism problem breaks down when they’re transferred to another country and then they’re quickly released. So part of it is, as I said, is looking at the transfer problem in itself.

In zones of hostilities, it may be local politics in some cases. Someone with connections is getting someone released and then again there’s a high probability that they’ll be recidivists, but the political system has intervened in the past. We’ve learned from this
experience and are trying to address it, but it's not a foolproof system.

Senator Ayotte. Given the President's Executive order advocating for the closure of Guantanamo, if tomorrow we capture a high-value target in Pakistan or overseas, or perhaps someone you would deem a repeat offender, what are we doing with them?

Dr. Vickers. The administration is in the final stages of establishing its detention policy. But there is a challenge with those picked up outside zones of hostilities. In zones of hostilities, in Afghanistan principally now, there are well-established procedures and mechanisms to detain them for the period as required. If a terrorist were picked up in Somalia, for example—one example of a very ungoverned space—that has been a vexing challenge for both administrations, I would add, both the Bush administration and the Obama administration, there's not an obvious solution that presents itself.

But the USD(I)'s responsibility in this is to work on the intelligence aspects and not the detainee policy. I would defer to my policy colleagues in the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's Office of Detainee Affairs to address your question more fully.

Senator Ayotte. Secretary Vickers, I fully appreciate that there are others that will have more direct impact on this. But given the breadth of experience that you have in this area and the vexing challenges that you've identified, what recommendations would you have to your colleagues in the administration on how we can best address this issue to make sure that if we capture a high-value target in one of these areas that we can make sure that we have the ability to interrogate that individual and also, if they present a continuing threat, that we can detain them?

Dr. Vickers. On the interrogation side, the first step to extract intelligence, the administration has established a high-value interrogation group led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with participation from Defense and the CIA as well. That group has deployed several times and that mechanism should work well for interrogation and debriefing of detainees.

Options range from transferring to another country, provided human rights assurances and access to the detainee and others can be met. But given the problem that many countries are either incapable or unwilling of taking some of these detainees, we require some mechanism to be able to detain them ourselves. That again, others in the administration are working that very hard.

Senator Ayotte. When we transfer to another country, Secretary Vickers, aren't we in a position in which we don't have full control over the situation, even if we get assurances from the country? The level of control we have is much less than if we had them, for example, in a Guantanamo-type facility?

Dr. Vickers. Before we transfer anyone, we want assurances that, in a number of areas, as I said, if they need to be detained the country in question is capable of detaining them; if there is intelligence value to the detainee, that we would have access to that detainee. But countries are sovereign and we do our best to ensure that these conditions are met; they're not always met 100 percent in some of these areas. Again, that's part of the challenge.
Senator AYOTTE. How can Congress help with this issue, because it's obviously of deep concern if we are in a position where we capture a high-value target or a repeat offender and that person still remains a danger, or we need to have them in a position where we can gather important information from them?

Dr. VICKERS. It is critical to have the option of capturing for laws of war, but also for intelligence value as well. Again, this is something that my colleagues in the inter-agency and within DOD are working, and I'm sure they will come to Congress for help on this.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much. I appreciate your answers today. Thank you, Dr. Rooney.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank Secretary Vickers for your past service to our country; and, to Secretary Vickers and Dr. Rooney, thank you for your agreeing to be nominated to these positions and your willingness to serve. Also, kudos to the families and extended families. Thank you for being here and supporting these very well-qualified individuals.

I did want to ask, Secretary Vickers, when confirmed you will be responsible for implementing Secretary Gates' efficiency initiative as it relates to defense intelligence. In particular, you will need to downsize and consolidate the intelligence workforce and ensure that we avoid duplication of work among the respective intelligence agencies. What is your plan to address and implement this plan while still ensuring the timely development of actionable intelligence for our warfighters?

Dr. VICKERS. During the efficiencies process, the principal focus of eliminating redundancies was to look at Service, meaning Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps intelligence organizations and those of the combatant commands. So we have developed an organization called Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC), that every combatant command has, and they've all grown rather large, in the thousands of staff.

We have developed a standardized model, after some experience now, that resulted in the major warfighting command, or Central Command, to have a large JIOC, as we describe it, and Pacific Command, which has a lot of challenges in its region, to also have a very large JIOC. But the other combatant commands have been reduced in some cases or had contractors eliminated to a more standardized model appropriate to their theaters, that is Africa Command, Southern Command, Northern Command, and European Command. There have been some savings in that area.

We've also consolidated missions. The counter-threat finance mission has been, on the intelligence side, assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), so this will develop more focused intelligence to support Treasury and other policymakers who have the lead in this area, but also eliminate some redundancies. We had a lot of counter-threat finance intelligence across the Department.

We've also done the same in counterterrorism intelligence in the Department in empowering our Joint Intelligence Task Force for Counterterrorism in DIA to be the lead.
I would add that we've reduced senior executive service ranks, contractors, and others. I would add that Secretary Gates has been very clear that these rounds of efficiencies are really the first step in looking at eliminating redundancy. Intelligence is increasingly important to our policymakers and to our operators, but it's also an area in which the American people and Congress invest a lot of treasure and we have to make sure it's as efficient as possible. If confirmed as USD(I), it's something that will be on the top list of my priorities.

Senator HAGAN. You've said that a lot of these efficiencies have taken place, but you'll also work to ensure that more efficiencies will go forward in these same areas?

Dr. VICKERS. Let me clarify, Senator Hagan. The decisions have been made to standardize these intelligence organizations. There is an implementation plan that will occur. But yes, additional efficiencies might well be sought. Senator Levin mentioned in his opening comments about intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and Senator McCain as well, that we probably still have some homework to do down the road.

Right now we're trying to give all the support we can to our warfighters in Afghanistan, but over time we will rationalize those as we move forward.

Senator HAGAN. Obviously, we do want to support them in every fashion possible.

Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn has addressed the Department's cybersecurity strategy, which I understand involves five pillars: the first, recognition that cyberspace is a new domain of warfare; two, proactive defenses, avoiding a fortress mentality; three, ensure the safety of critical infrastructure; four, undertake collective defense; and five, sustained technological advantage.

Dr. Vickers, within these pillars, which do you see as the most challenging to facilitate, and why? Just the whole pillars of cybersecurity.

Dr. VICKERS. Let me say, cyber is an increasingly important domain of warfare or competition, used both for intelligence purposes as well as potentially destructive purposes or warfighting purposes. The U.S. Cyber Command is overseen by our Policy Under Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, while the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence really oversees the intelligence aspects of this.

But let me try to address your question in saying that the reason Cyber Command was established was because of the need to have a command for this emerging domain that is so important to our national economy and infrastructure, as well as our warfighting, but also someone to have an organization and a commander that had responsibility for both offense and defense, protecting our networks as well as potentially using this tool.

That integration of offense and defense I think will be very critical to our future, supported by appropriate intelligence in this new area.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Dr. Rooney, let me ask you. When confirmed, you will play an integral role in implementing Secretary Gates' efficiencies initiatives also related to personnel, namely the Army and Marine Corps
end strength reductions, freeze in civilian hire, reduction in contractors in the administration of TRICARE. What do you believe will be the impact of these initiatives?

Dr. Rooney. Yes, the efficiencies initiatives, as you've suggested, cut across many of the areas under personnel and readiness. The first one, from the human resource side, gives an opportunity to really take a look at that mixture of Active Duty, Reserve, civilian, and contractors, and looks at the roles, contractors and civilians, are playing in support services. Are some of those same programs still viable? Do they need to be administered differently? I think I've seen the term used, "good business practices," and that's really just another way of saying, "should we be doing the same thing, and if so should it be done maybe a little bit differently?"

That would be the personnel side and are there ways to cut some of those costs and combine, really assess, programs. If they're not working, then at that point they need to be eliminated and resources shifted to more critical, mission critical-type initiatives.

The health care side again is a myriad of possible initiatives, everything from a slight increase in the premiums, because that hasn't been changed since the mid-1990s, but also changing behaviors—prescription drugs, using mail order instead of the current system ends up saving a tremendous amount over the years. What we call supply chain, which is as you're purchasing, doing similar purchasing and look at how you're purchasing supplies for a hospital setting. You get great efficiencies in that. Contracting, another way that you can also look at your contracts, make sure you're getting not only the best prices, but coordination in those areas.

Then there's some other, longer-term initiatives that end up eventually impacting efficiency, and that would be looking at practice plans. Are there ways to use urgent care facilities so that we're not forcing people to go to emergency rooms? That's also an issue on the civilian side. So there are some opportunities there, and using primary care physicians differently in terms of practice focus, and then also those types of things I've seen also working in mental health areas. It would be those types of things, taking the current proposals and expanding on them.

Senator Hagan. You certainly do have a full plate in front of you. I will say, please look at TRICARE. So many of the individuals are having trouble having TRICARE accepted in places that are outside the actual bases.

My time is up. Once again, I thank both of you for your commitment to our country. Thank you.

Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Webb.

Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Vickers, you're eminently qualified by virtue of your military background, your operational experience, your educational enhancement, and your policy experience. I think this is a great fit and I will be a very strong supporter and hope to be working with you on some of these issues in the near future.

Dr. Rooney, I congratulate you on a very strong career to date, particularly in the academic area, and your willingness to serve. At the same time, I would like to learn more from you about how you
have prepared yourself to take the experiences that you have had and apply them to this position. It’s my understanding from reading your bio that you have not worked with DOD before; is that correct?

Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, that’s correct.

Senator Webb. This is an extremely important under secretaryship. I would like to point out that I recommended the creation of this position in 1985 in a memorandum to Caspar Weinberger. I’m not the only person who’s ever recommended this position, but at the time when I was serving as Assistant Secretary of Defense, we had 11 different stovepipes moving up to the Secretary, which was not a healthy management model. Cap Weinberger’s hesitation at the time was that it was going to consolidate so much of the responsibilities, the day-to-day responsibilities of DOD, under one office, and if you’re going to do that, you need to make sure that the people at the top comprehend the special nature of military service and of DOD.

I’d like to point out, if I may—you may have come across this—that solutions in the military don’t always compute on a traditional civilian model. There are a lot of different factors in military service and across the board. We have these situations in the acquisition side, too, as well, but particularly in the area of personnel.

Your nomination has come forward very fast. It was sent on February 4, which was a Friday, and we’ve had 11 days, most of which last week we weren’t here. I have not had the opportunity to meet with you. I’m the chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee, which is the subcommittee that would have policy jurisdiction over the issues that you’re working on.

Can you give me a better idea of how you have prepared yourself to understand the unique cultures that are involved in the United States military?

Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, I’d be happy to do that. I will step back a bit and say that when I went from being a business executive with a background in finance and tax law into higher education, my first presidency at a doctoral-level institution, I had never been a higher education administrator. I had taught for a number of years, but never ran a college or university. The way I assimilated into that culture was to be a perpetual student, which is what I would also propose here: learn really what happened in the institution and walk around, talk to people, listen, understand. It turned out to be very effective, to the point where I, prior to this, have been at my second presidency.

The same with hospitals. When I first started on a hospital board, quite frankly, the first meeting I sat in I didn’t understand most of the acronyms that were put in front of me. Again, what I really did was took the time to study it, talk to the people, spend time in the traditional form, as they say, walk-around management.

As Senator McCain pointed out earlier, one of the first things I would do would be to continue what have been tremendous briefings, but they have certainly been briefings, sir, and material I’ve been able to read and get a handle on, to understand more clearly the military culture, but also that connection between the military members that this role would have responsibility for overseeing,
personnel and readiness, but also the civilian counterparts in many ways and how that system worked together, and the contractors.

I think it would be the breadth of understanding all of that, and I think my experience in the past shows that I can definitely make that transformation and dive in with that passion and that lifelong education focus, would enable me to prepare and be very effective for this role.

Senator Webb. There are military cultures and there are cultures within the military cultures, and there are expectations that have evolved based on service in different eras, and they all affect the area that you are sitting here waiting to be confirmed on.

When I was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, we had all 4 Active Services, all 7 Guard and Reserve components, plus political civilians and career civilians, and at any staff meeting we had at least 11 different cultural traditions among the uniformed people sitting at that table, with different relationships, quite frankly, with the overarching policies of DOD.

On issues of health care, you just mentioned the notion of increasing the premiums on TRICARE. Would you elaborate on that?

Dr. Rooney. I mentioned that one of the efficiencies initiatives set out for us by the Secretary was a modest increase, and I believe that number was about $5 per month, in the premiums, understanding that we have the duty and obligation to support our Service people—it's what we said from the beginning, that we would take care of our Service people—but on the other hand trying to find a balance of supporting that, but also doing it in a fiscally sound and sustainable manner. I would support the Secretary's position in looking at those modest increases.

Senator Webb. Here's something you want to remember. As someone who grew up in the military, served in the military, have family members in the military, health care—lifetime health care for career military people—was part of a moral contract. I grew up inside that moral contract. On the one hand, if you're applying a civilian model to a DOD medical program, you can say, “well, if you compare a civilian health care plan, this is an incredibly good deal.” On the other hand, these are people who have been told since the day they came into the military that they're going to have health care for the rest of their lives if they give a career to the U.S. military.

It's a moral contract. I'm the chairman of the subcommittee that's going to have to evaluate this proposal, and I hope you will pay strong attention to—again, this is the abstract nature of military service that doesn't come out when you try to compare a model directly with civilian programs.

There are a number of other areas like that. I'm going to ask you to do something. I'm going to ask you to come by and see me. I did not have the opportunity to talk to you, and we can discuss some of these things a bit more.

Dr. Rooney. I would welcome the opportunity, sir.

Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Webb.

I'm next in order, but let me recognize Senator Manchin.

Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me too add to all of my colleagues, our thanks for your service, to both of you, and your willingness to serve. I think it’s admirable.

Dr. Vickers, first with you. I’ve read your bio and I’ve learned a little bit about you and I like everything I see. Also, I’m new. With some of my colleagues, we’re new to this committee, but we’re also new to this process of evaluating where we are in the world, where we’re going and how we get there in the most efficient manner. You seem to have been part of an Afghanistan movement back with the Soviet Union and what you were able to witness, what you were able to be a part of, to see an outcome, and to see how we dropped the ball. I think that was very well-documented.

We’re in a situation now where, if you could for me identify who our enemy is in the Middle East, what the strength of our enemy is, what is the cost to our enemy, what they’re financing their war with, and compared to what we as the United States Government and the people that are supporting our troops, which we will always do, and the comparison between what you saw in the outcome of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to where we are today, and the predicted outcome—it’s the longest war we’ve ever been in and we’re not seeing much change. If you could help me with that, sir, first, your evaluation, because I don’t know of a better person that’s had a bird’s-eye view and can evaluate this than you.

Dr. Vickers. Thank you, sir. As you alluded to, one of the tragedies at the end of the Cold War, one of the great tragedies, is that we, after winning the war in Afghanistan, driving the Red Army out, failed to win the peace and left a sanctuary in which al Qaeda could grow, in partnership with the Taliban, that then led to the events of September 11. Secretary Gates has said repeatedly that we will never make that mistake again.

As part of your second question——

Senator Manchin. I’m sorry to interrupt you on that, but if I could just ask for a further clarification. With that comment that Secretary Gates made and with the failure of before, of the Soviets, then what we’re saying is that we need to have a presence, maybe a different type of a presence, but we will have to have a presence over there. The American people should understand, the citizens of this country should understand, we have to have a presence there.

Dr. Vickers. What form that engagement takes, of course, will be determined based on conditions down the road. But unlike at the end of the Cold War, where we essentially disengaged from that region and allowed an ungoverned area to become very hostile to us and to provide a sanctuary for al Qaeda, it’s something that we don’t want to repeat. A core element of our counterterrorism policy is to deny any sanctuary to terrorists, so that they can’t plan operations against the Homeland or our interests abroad.

You asked about the enemy. Unlike the Cold War, which was a very daunting time for Americans of a previous generation, but it had one virtue, that we had a principal adversary that we could focus on for a long period of time, and we got very good at that by the last decade of the Cold War. Today we face a more complex environment with a number of challenges around the world.

Foremost among those right now is the continued threat that violent extremism poses to us, and specifically al Qaeda. It’s why the
President and his topmost advisors have said we are at war with al Qaeda, and that war spans a number of areas. Al Qaeda and its affiliates do not depend on great sums of financial strength to be able to plot against us in the manner they do. The September 11 attacks, for example, were carried out with approximately $500,000 of investment.

Our Treasury Department, working with our interagency partners and partners around the world, does everything they can to constrict the flow of funds to al Qaeda and other terrorist and insurgent groups, and has had a significant success. But there are still funds flowing to various groups and, as I said, funding is not the critical resource that they depend on. It’s willing people to do these attacks.

Senator MANCHIN. What’s the strength of al Qaeda in Afghanistan?

Dr. VICKERS. Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is largely confined now to mid-level operatives, no senior operatives.

Senator MANCHIN. 10,000, 100,000?

Dr. VICKERS. No, sir. The Taliban insurgency is in the tens of thousands. Al Qaeda would be under 50,000 or so, 50,000 to 75,000, and that is on a part-time basis. Al Qaeda is principally concentrated elsewhere, in Pakistan and then its affiliates in Yemen and elsewhere.

Senator MANCHIN. We have how many troops in Afghanistan now?

Dr. VICKERS. We have just about 98,000 troops, just shy of 100,000, and 40,000-some of our coalition partners, and building up a substantial Afghan National Security Force (ANSF).

The principal challenge in Afghanistan is the Taliban which is still aligned with al Qaeda. They provided sanctuary to them in the past. It is adjacent to Pakistan, where al Qaeda’s senior leadership resides currently. The President’s stated goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and prevent their return to Afghanistan and Pakistan. So Pakistan and Afghanistan are an integrated strategy for the United States. Even though Afghanistan is not principally where al Qaeda is, it could become a future safe haven if we were to repeat the errors we made after the Cold War.

Senator MANCHIN. I think the hardest thing that I have to understand, I know the people in West Virginia have to understand, is the greatest army that history has ever known, the United States, and the greatest trained and equipped soldiers, we’re at 100,000 and let’s say that our enemy may be at 30,000 maximum, probably more 10,000 or 15,000, by every report that I’m receiving.

I’ve also read in your bio that you have a different type of a procedure that you think would have worked there, or maybe you still think that or not, by an unconventional type of war with your special operations. I think that it sounds very intriguing and it seems like we’re not going in that direction.

Dr. VICKERS. Sir, every counterterrorism and counterinsurgency challenge has to be taken on its own merits and time. Ultimately, these are internal conflicts or transnational conflicts. We can’t prevail in these wars without—in the counterterrorism case, it’s a global challenge—a host of international partners. We simply couldn’t do it by ourselves. In any intra-state conflict, in an insur-
emergency, ultimately it’s the locals that have to be able to secure their territory. Sometimes we have to create the time and space for them to be able to do that as we build them up.

After our great success in 2001 of overthrowing the Taliban and kicking al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, we unfortunately did not build up ANSFs to a sufficient level where they could gain control or stabilize their country and secure it. We are rapidly addressing that in the past few years.

Again, I would just caution that some of this is in the range of tactics specific to a portion in time, that may apply to one situation or one country and not another, or for this period of time and not a later period of time. But ultimately we have to empower locals to succeed.

Senator MANCHIN. Mr. Chairman, if I may very quickly just follow up.

If I may request that maybe I can meet with you personally and go into that in more detail, I would appreciate it very much, sir.

Dr. Rooney, just very quickly. I have heard and I know that Senator Webb had mentioned and talked about some concerns he may have. That would be a valid concern when you see the resume, but the bottom line is I also see your private sector experience, too. Would you consider yourself a cost-cutter or efficiency expert?

Dr. Rooney. I think if you ask those that have worked with me, they’d probably say yes.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you.

Secretary VICKERS. Sir, the U.S. Government has intelligence relationships with scores of partners around the world, many scores of partners, including in North Africa and the Middle East. Each of those relationships is important in some right, but they vary in terms of the depth of intelligence sharing and the particular threat that emanates from that country. I would hesitate in this open session to give a general answer, other than it’s very important.

A number of al Qaeda plots are broken up every year and they are done by our local partners with intelligence assistance in some cases from us, in some cases intelligence provided by them. Our relationships with some of these countries that have had instability in recent weeks, we’ve had longstanding ties with them that will transcend this instability, both on the military side and on the ci-
vilian intelligence side. Sir, I'd be happy to talk to you about it in greater detail.

Senator Reed. Let me open up another topic, which Senator Hagan alluded to. That's cyber security. History often suggests that we fight the last war and prepare for the last war. I think we all recognize now that, even in the context of low-intensity conflict, that cyber activities are becoming increasingly more important. Let me pose some issues.

How well do you think we're prepared for it, its coming, to what are the gaps, technological, institutional, and even legal gaps, in terms of your ability to actually deal with this new technology?

Dr. Vickers. Sir, it is critically important and it's a domain that, as you indicated, is employed by both state and non-state actors in both forms of conflict, both for intelligence purposes as well as disruption and others. Cyber poses a number of challenges because it is inherently a global enterprise, so a lot of cyber traffic, of course, comes through the United States, which previous Congresses have addressed, which has been a tremendous help to U.S. intelligence.

I would be guilty of practicing law without a license if I go too far——

Senator Reed. You wouldn't be the first here. [Laughter.]

Dr. Vickers. But in some cases it raises questions when the website or server, for example, raises neutrality questions in law, of where that site is located. So it poses a number of unique challenges for us.

Then of course, there's always intelligence gain-loss when we look at operations in these areas. Is it better to monitor someone or take down? There's always very difficult decisions for policy-makers to weigh in that area as well.

Senator Reed. I think this is again a topic that will consume us, indeed consume us going forward.

But let me ask two basic questions. You have a myriad of responsibilities, from the immediate you've spoken about, but there's one that's continuing, and that is to try to integrate not just the operations within DOD, but DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). I know VA Secretary Shinseki has been working very diligently on this.

We have problems where soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen are injured and then they had disability determinations and then they're transferred to the VA system and there's no continuity of care. Just whatever impressions you have today of how you're going to deal with more fully integrating what the VA does for our veterans with what DOD does for Active Duty and Reserve personnel?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir. While I have not been able to have an entire deep dive, what I can say is what I've learned is you're absolutely correct that the timing—even with the new integrated system—there is the first phase of that's been put in; there's two more phases throughout this year. My understanding is that will proceed on the timeline outlined. But those timeframes are still approaching just under a year, 340 days, I think was the last I saw.

I think any of us sitting here, while we might not know what the exact answer is, if you're looking for those services a day is too long, a week is too long. There are clearly some opportunities where better coordination and being able to understand where that process is bogging down. My understanding is it's in three different areas. What can be done to ensure much better communication and cooperation, building on—yes, a technology infrastructure is one way, so you don't duplicate services, but it's not the only answer at this point.

I concur that what I've seen really points out some improvement, but a dramatic need for some further coordination between all areas.

Senator Reed. Thank you.

One other area. Under the new financial reform legislation, we have created a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and within that Bureau, there is an Office of Servicemember Affairs. In fact, Holly Petraeus is leading that up. I'm sure you will, but I urge you to ensure you link up, because some of the problems that military personnel face in terms of paying bills, in terms of getting appropriate resolution of their rights under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act is a function not only of DOD, but this new bureau. A lot of what you can do and will do through the Services is educating young military personnel about their rights and their responsibilities. That's just some advice as you, I assume, prepare to take these responsibilities.

Dr. Rooney. Thank you, sir. If confirmed, I will.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, doctor.

Dr. Rooney. Thank you.

Senator Reed. Senator Ayotte.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rooney, you were talking with Senator Webb about the health care system within the military and he mentioned to you the moral obligation that we have to the military. Appreciating that we're in a fiscal climate where we do need to look to do things differently, there are still some unmet needs. In my State of New Hampshire, we have approximately the fifth or seventh highest per capita rate of veterans in the country. Yet, effectively we're the only State in the Nation that does not have a full-service veterans hospital. Alaska is similarly situated, but there is an Active Duty military base in Alaska where there is full service available.

I would ask you for a commitment to work with me to look at that need and to come up with a solution so that the needs of veterans in New Hampshire are met, and particularly since we have more and more deploying as well in the Guard and becoming veterans and serving our country.

I would ask you to look at that very carefully, because it is a moral obligation that we have to fulfill and, unfortunately, my
State is one where I don’t believe that moral obligation is being fully met.

Dr. Rooney. Absolutely. If confirmed, I would look forward to that.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.

The other question I have for you, we had talked briefly yesterday about this, but given the multiple deployments of our Guard and Reserve, what is it that you think that we can do to ensure that when our Guard and Reserve deploy and also when they return home that the services are in place to make sure that as they return to civilian life, both they and their families are getting the services that they need? Because with the multiple deployments in the Active Duty, there is usually a base where there is a much more robust set of programs available than in the Guard and Reserve. Yet we’ve asked so much of our Guard and Reserve with these deployments.

I would ask you what thoughts you have on that to make sure that we are serving our Guard and Reserve and so when they come home that they can acclimate back into civilian life and we give them that support that they deserve?

Dr. Rooney. You’re right. I’m glad we had a brief opportunity to have that conversation. But really, the issue does come that this is the first time where we have relied on the Guard and Reserve and their families to the extent that we have with multiple deployments. One of the factors I think everyone is recognizing now is when these people go home it isn’t to a base. They’re scattering throughout their States, they’re scattering throughout the country.

The Department has not always been acutely aware of how to connect those people to services. At times—and we talked about it—there are some good examples where private sector nonprofits are brought in to be able to cover that. But that’s not uniform across the country. So it would be a combination of looking at some of those States and those areas where those services are being connected better and seeing ways to do that across the country.

The other thing would be to close some gaps, where there are benefits being given to Active Duty, but yet there’s some that slip through for education, potentially, to make sure that those again extend to employers; to see how again that reentry process can be either streamlined and also involve the employers in that. Again, it’s uniformity across the country, but there are some good examples out there to build on.

Senator Ayotte. Very good. I appreciate that, and also would point you to a New Hampshire program called the deployment cycle support program that is a partnership between State agencies and also the private sector, as a pilot or one that you could look to, that I think is very effective and one that other States could employ as well.

Dr. Rooney. Absolutely.

Senator Ayotte. Secretary Vickers, we had testimony in February from General Austin and Ambassador Jeffrey about Iraq and our withdrawal from Iraq in December. I wanted to get your assessment, the other day I saw a report of another terrorist incident in Iraq. My question to you is, do you have any concerns about our ability to transfer security as of December to the Iraqis? Also, we’re
going to leave a significant responsibility to protect our own people with the State Department, without the military support. What thoughts do you have on that?

Dr. VICKERS. I am confident that we're on the path toward this transition. There will be a robust civilian mission—as Iraq becomes a normal country, there will still be a large diplomatic mission, with military assistance, intelligence, a range of things to ensure that any threats to the stability of Iraq or threats external there are properly dealt with through our Iraqi partners.

That transition has already been well underway since August 2010 on a path to the end of 2011, and I have no reason to expect that it won't succeed. There is still violence in Iraq, but it is at very low levels compared to what it has been. Some of these attacks of course make news and they will continue to be a challenge for Iraq going forward, but it's something I have high confidence that the Iraqis can handle.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator REED. Senator Blumenthal.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just a couple of quick questions. First, to pursue the very significant questions asked by Senator Reed, and more comment on them than question. If there are any legal impediments to your efforts in this cyber area, I would very much like to know about them and I hope that you will suggest them, because I think, as Senator Reed very importantly observed, this is the next war or it may be even the present war, and if there's anything that you need in that area, meaning you collectively, DOD, our defense efforts, I would appreciate your letting us know.

Then to pursue an answer that you gave to Senator McCain. He asked about the corruption in Pakistan, which you very adroitly referred to as a governance challenge. Do we face the same kind of governance challenge in Afghanistan and, if so, to what extent, and what are we doing about it?

Dr. VICKERS. Yes, sir. In any counterinsurgency, governance and development are essential lines of operation as much as security. Ultimately, of course, it's up to the people of a nation to determine how they'll be governed. Afghanistan's history has been one essentially of decentralized government, a central state that does some functions, but then the provinces and local areas have a lot of autonomy. When Afghanistan has been stable throughout its history, it's been with that model.

The challenge is to make sure that there is governance that first and foremost meets the needs of the Afghan people, but, second, also does not undermine the international coalition's effort through corruption or other areas in providing assistance to the Government of Afghanistan. So governance is a central challenge in stability and it is in Afghanistan as it is in many countries around the world. But in Afghanistan, of course, we have 100,000 troops and so we care very dearly about it.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.

Dr. Rooney, just very briefly. You may be aware that in the past there have been difficulties in some of the treatment of our National Guard and our reservists in terms of recognizing that they have become in effect part of our Active-Duty Force and the failure
to recognize that service in educational benefits and sometimes health care has been a problem. I've observed it in Connecticut, and I would appreciate your commitment that you will do everything possible to make sure that they are given the recognition they deserve in terms of those benefits and fair treatment and keeping faith with them.

Dr. Rooney. Absolutely, sir.

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.

I want to thank Secretary Vickers and Dr. Rooney for your testimony today and, on behalf of Chairman Levin and the Ranking Member, Senator McCain, for your service and your prospective service.

If there are no further questions, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Michael G. Vickers by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**DEFENSE REFORMS**

**Question.** The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

**Answer.** The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have endured for a generation. I do not see a need for any modifications at this time. If confirmed as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), I will be alert to the need for any modifications.

**Question.** If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

**Answer.** N/A.

**DUTIES**

**Question.** What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the USD(I)?

**Answer.** The USD(I)'s primary responsibility is to support the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities under title 10 and title 50 U.S.C. This includes: serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense; exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over all intelligence organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD); ensuring that intelligence organizations in DOD are manned, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of the Department; ensuring that the DOD components, which are also elements of the Intelligence Community, are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that other sensitive activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing Defense Department personnel, facility, and industrial security to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; serving as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program, and ensuring that the DOD components funded by the National Intelligence Program are robust, balanced, and in compliance with the guidance and direction of the DNI; and ensuring that the Department provides the U.S. Congress with intelligence-related information sufficient to execute its oversight responsibilities.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. If confirmed, I believe I have the background and experience to perform the duties of the USD(I). My qualifications include: my training, operational experience, duties, and accomplishments as a Special Forces soldier and officer, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Operations Officer, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC&IC)); my experience as a producer and consumer of intelligence at both the tactical/operational and national levels; my experience executing and overseeing clandestine operations and covert action programs; and my regular interaction and close relationships with the Office of the USD(I), the leadership of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and the leadership of several key foreign intelligence services.

For the past 3 1/2 years as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have had responsibility for overseeing the global operations of DOD, including the war with al Qaeda, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sensitive counterproliferation and counternarcotics operations. I have had responsibility for overseeing a wide-range of intelligence operations, spanning the full range of intelligence priorities and capabilities, and have had responsibility for overseeing and supporting the full-range of special activities conducted by other agencies of the U.S. Government. As a member of the Deputy's Advisory Working Group, I have participated in the major resource allocation decisions of the Department, including many involving national and military intelligence. I have had access to all of the Department's special access programs.

As a policy official, I have participated extensively in Deputy's Committee Meetings, and occasionally, Principals' Committee Meetings and meetings of the National Security Council chaired by the President, and through this experience, I have developed a keen appreciation for how intelligence supports policy. As a result of my oversight of global operations and the operational capabilities of the Department, I have developed a deep understanding of intelligence-driven operations and the Department's intelligence capabilities, including those in the cyber domain.

I am a graduate of the CIA's Career Training Program and a CIA-certified Operations Officer. I have served operationally in three CIA Divisions: Latin America, Special Activities, and Near East and South Asia. I have had extensive interaction and have a close relationship with the Director and Deputy Directors of the CIA, as well as the Chiefs of CIA Centers, Divisions, Offices, and Stations and Bases. I have had extensive interaction and have a close relationship with the DNI and the staff and components of Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). I have had extensive interaction with and have a deep understanding of the intelligence organizations of DOD. I have had frequent interaction and have close relationships with the heads of several foreign intelligence services.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the USD(I)?

Answer. If confirmed, I believe there are actions I would need to take to strengthen OUSD(I)'s oversight of the military intelligence program and clandestine activities and support for the national intelligence program. I also believe there are actions I could take that could achieve further efficiencies across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

Answer. If confirmed, I believe the Secretary would expect me to discharge the duties and functions—both explicit and implicit—as outlined above. I believe the Secretary would expect me to ensure full intelligence support for ongoing operations; to ensure that intelligence operations conducted by DOD are effective and in compliance with all relevant statutes, authorities, directives, and policies; to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to prevent strategic surprise; to ensure, without abrogating the Secretary's statutory responsibilities, that the DNI has visibility and oversight over the full range of intelligence activities in the Department; and to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient as possible. The Secretary may also assign me other duties as his priorities and my background and experience warrant.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will provide my full support to the Secretary of Defense in carrying out my duties as his principal advisor on intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. I will keep him informed, seek his guidance and direction, exercise his oversight authority on intelligence, counterintelligence, and secu-
rity-related matters throughout the Department, and attempt to relieve him of as
many burdens in the intelligence domain as possible.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will keep the Deputy Secretary fully informed
of my activities and will afford him the same support provided the Secretary of De-
fense.

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Each of the Under Secretaries has vital functions to carry out. If con-
formed as USD(I), I will work closely with each of them. A close relationship be-
tween the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the USD(I) is particularly im-
portant. In my current position as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked to forge a close
relationship between Defense Policy and Defense Intelligence and between Policy
and the broader Intelligence Community. I have also worked closely with compo-
nents of the IC on major collection systems. If confirmed as USD(I), I would to con-
continue to build on these relationships.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network and Information Inte-
gration (ASD(NII))/Successor Organization.
Answer. ASD(NII) has had oversight of enabling capabilities which are central to
the conduct of intelligence and security-related activities. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the successor organization to ASD(NII) to ensure that this support re-
mains robust.

Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Policy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DASD for Detainee Policy on
the intelligence aspects of detainee policy and operations.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity
Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC&IC)).
Answer. USD(I) and the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) interact on several important matters,
and this interaction has grown substantially during my tenure ASD(SO/LIC&IC). As
the previous ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I will be well-placed, if confirmed, to ensure that
this close interaction continues. If confirmed, I would seek to further expand the al-
ready close relationships that exist between Defense Intelligence and Special Oper-
ations Forces (SOF) and between the broader Intelligence Community and SOF.

Question. The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence Directors.
Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), as the Program Executive for the Military Intel-
ligence Program, I will work with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and
the Service Intelligence Directors to ensure their intelligence requirements are met,
that the Military Departments and Services develop intelligence capabilities appro-
priate for the current and future security environment, and that the intelligence or-
ganizations contribute to meeting the intelligence needs of their respective Military
Department/Service, the Joint Force, the Department, and the Nation.

Question. The General Counsel of DOD.
Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked very closely with the General Coun-
sel and his staff. If confirmed as USD(I), I will continue to work closely with the
General Counsel, and seek his advice on the myriad legal issues that impact
USD(I)/s duties and functions.

Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked closely with the Chairman and Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a wide range of issues. If confirmed as
USD(I), I would continue this close relationship to ensure that Defense Intelligence
and the Intelligence Community meet the requirements of the Joint Staff and com-
batant commands.

Question. The commanders of the combatant commands, including U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) and U.S. Cyber Command.
Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have had policy oversight of SOCOM, U.S. Stra-
I was involved in the initial planning for the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command.
I have had close relationships with all of the geographic combatant commanders. If
confirmed as USD(I), I will build on these relationships to ensure that the intel-
ligence needs of the commanders of the combatant commands are met.

Question. The Directors of the Defense intelligence agencies.
Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked closely with the Directors of the De-
fense intelligence agencies. If confirmed as USD(I), I will exercise the Secretary of
Defense’s authority, direction, and control over the National Security Agency (NSA),
NGA, NRO, and DIA. In this capacity, I will provide planning, policy, and strategic
oversight over the intelligence, counterintelligence, and security policy, plans, and
programs they execute. I will work with the Office of the DNI to ensure clear and
unambiguous guidance is provided to the Defense intelligence agencies.

Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked closely with the Office of the DNI and its components, and have worked closely with the Director. If confirmed as USD(I), I intend to fully support the DNI in his goal of greater Intelligence Community integration. Dual-hatted as the DNI's Director of Defense Intelligence, if confirmed, I will advise the DNI on Defense intelligence capabilities. I will exercise the Secretary of Defense's authority, direction, and control over the Directors of NSA, NGA, NRO and DIA, and I will consult with the DNI regarding national intelligence and related matters as appropriate.

Question. The Director of Central Intelligence.

Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked to forge a particularly close relationship between the CIA and the Department. If confirmed as USD(I), I will strive to forge an even closer relationship with the Director of CIA, and will fully support him in his role as National Manager for Human Intelligence.

Question. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.

Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked very closely with the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. If confirmed as USD(I), I will build on this already close relationship, and provide policy, oversight, and guidance for all Defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security support provided to the National Counterterrorism Center.

Question. The Deputy and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence.

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will fully support the Deputy and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence to ensure unity of effort in the direction and oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.


Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will serve as the Secretary of Defense's focal point for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security matters for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I will work with DHS to expand our intelligence and law enforcement information-sharing initiatives with state and local authorities.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the USD(I)?

Answer. The major challenges that, in my view, will confront the next USD(I) are the continued unprecedented scope and pace of global operations and unmet demand for intelligence in an era of intelligence-driven operations; the need to adapt to a rapidly changing intelligence environment; the need to address longer-term challenges to prevent strategic surprise while fully supporting ongoing operations; and the need to do all this in a more constrained fiscal environment. Additionally, we must do a better job of protecting intelligence sources and methods and preventing unauthorized disclosure of information.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If I am confirmed, given the importance of intelligence to ongoing operations, I would do my best to ensure that sufficient resources are devoted to the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and that intelligence is shared as widely as possible while also ensuring that it is properly protected. I would also ensure that the clear priorities are established, that actions are taken to mitigate strategic risk, and that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient and adaptive as possible.

Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the USD(I)?

Answer. One of the most serious problems currently confronting the USD(I) is the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The spate of unauthorized disclosures of very sensitive information places our forces, our military operations, and our foreign relations at risk. It threatens to undermine senior leaders' confidence in the confidentiality of their deliberations, and the confidence our foreign partners have that classified information they share with us will be protected.

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. The Office of the USD(I) (OUSD(I)) recently led a comprehensive review of information security policy. If confirmed, I will work with the DOD Chief Information Officer to facilitate immediate implementation of the review's recommendations, as appropriate, and will take additional actions as required.

PRIORITIES

Question. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you were quoted as saying: “I spend about 95 percent of my time on operations” leaving the rest of your time for “Service Secretary-
like" activities including policy, personnel, organizational, and development and acquisition decisions impacting Special Operations Forces.

Do you believe that division of time was appropriate in your position as ASD(SO/LIC&IC)?

Answer. I have been assigned a very broad set of responsibilities during my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC). Per the statutory obligations of ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have oversight of Special Operations Forces. I also serve as the Secretary’s principal advisor on oversight of Special Operations and Irregular Warfare matters across the Department. I help provide oversight of the Department’s global operations, including the war with al Qaeda and its affiliates and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have shared oversight of the Department’s clandestine operations and sensitive activities, including several which have involved the collection of intelligence. I have regularly participated in the national security policy decisionmaking process at Deputies’ Committee meetings, and serve as the Secretary’s principal advisor on special activities conducted by other agencies of the U.S. Government. In my Interdependent Capabilities role, I have had oversight of the Department’s strategic and conventional forces, in addition to the Department’s Special Operations Forces. I also help oversee the Department’s special access programs. I have oversight of the Department counternarcotics and counterthreat finance activities, stability operations, partnership strategy, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and was recently assigned responsibility for overseeing additional aspects of the Department’s information operations (IO).

The time I have personally devoted to each of these areas has varied, consistent with their importance to the Department’s mission and the degree to which I could delegate oversight to my Principal Deputy. During the first 18 months of my tenure, I spent substantial amounts of time on capability and resource allocation decisions across strategic, conventional, and Special Operations Forces. During the 2009–2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, I focused intensely on the Special Operations and Irregular Warfare capabilities of the Department. The unprecedented scale and scope of operations in which U.S. forces are involved, and the strategic importance of and oversight required for sensitive activities conducted by the United States have required increasing amounts of my time since mid-2008. With the war with al Qaeda and its affiliates, the war in Afghanistan, and other sensitive operations for which I have oversight responsibilities, the preponderance of my time in 2010 has been devoted to oversight of operations. This has been in line with the President’s and Secretary’s priorities. Throughout my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), blessed with my exceptionally capable and willing partner in Admiral Eric Olson, I believe that I have provided the strong oversight of and advocacy for Special Operations Forces that Congress intended when it established the position of ASD(SO/LIC). I likewise believe I have been effective in fulfilling my duties across my entire portfolio. Accordingly, I believe that the allocation of my time has been appropriate.

Question. How would you anticipate dividing your time as the USD(I)?

Answer. Although there is some overlap, the duties and functions assigned to USD(I) are very different from those I currently have as ASD(SO/LIC&IC). That said, if confirmed, I would use a similar approach to allocating my time; focusing on the President’s and Secretary’s top priorities and on the most difficult challenges, and delegating other responsibilities where I can to my Principal Deputy or other senior staff. I would anticipate dividing my time broadly between oversight of intelligence operations, the development of intelligence capabilities, and other duties as the Secretary and the DNI may assign.

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the USD(I)?

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I would establish the following broad priorities:

1. Ensuring that the full weight of Defense intelligence capabilities are brought to bear to achieve the President’s objective of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda, creating and sustaining stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, and supporting other ongoing operations in which the Department is engaged or may be engaged; and
2. Ensuring that intelligence operations conducted by DOD are effective and in compliance with all relevant statutes, authorities, directives, and policies; (3) ensuring that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to prevent strategic surprise and fully exploit emerging opportunities; and (4) ensuring that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient as possible. I would expect to pay particular attention to ensuring that we have the right collection and analytical priorities, that we have a robust ISR architecture (both space and airborne), today and in the future, that the Department’s clandestine operations are fully integrated with those of the CIA and National Clandestine Service, that the President’s highest priority intelligence programs are fully resourced, that analysis addresses policymakers and operational commanders’ needs, that intelligence is timely, accessible, and protected,
and, where appropriate, that we aggressively exploit advances in technology to improve our intelligence capabilities.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Department’s comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism (CT), both at home and abroad?

Answer. The Department’s counterterrorism strategy directly supports the President’s stated goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates, first operationally and regionally, and then strategically and globally. Operationally defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates requires actions that render the organization incapable of planning and conducting attacks. Doing this requires, among other things, that the relationship between al Qaeda and groups that support al Qaeda and provide it sanctuary be severed. Strategically defeating al Qaeda requires preventing its resurgence. Achieving these aims requires a sustained global CT campaign involving several mutually reinforcing direct and indirect lines of operation. These include preventing the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups, conducting operations to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist organizations and deny them sanctuary, building the capacity of our partners, and countering radicalization. Within zones of hostilities, the Department has a lead role, along with our international partners. Outside such zones and those areas where named operations authorized by the President are being conducted, the Department plays a supporting role. While al Qaeda and its affiliates remain the most dangerous threat to the United States, my assessment is that we—the Department, the U.S. Government, and our international partners—have the correct strategy, and it is increasingly working, particularly since mid-2008.

Question. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to combating terrorism?

Answer. If confirmed, I will build on the work of my predecessors to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is fully engaged and supportive of all efforts to defeat al Qaeda and combat terrorism. I will work closely with the Military Departments and Services, the Defense intelligence agencies, the combatant commanders, the Intelligence Community, and our international partners to ensure that we have the intelligence capabilities we need to achieve our CT objectives.

Question. How can the Department best structure itself to ensure that all forms of terrorism are effectively confronted?

Answer. During my tenure as the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), it has become increasingly clear to me that close collaboration among U.S. departments and agencies and with our international partners is essential to CT success. Within DOD, we have restructured our organization to ensure full interagency contributions to the fight, through the establishment, for example, of Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF). We have forged an extremely close operational partnership with CIA and the Intelligence Community, and we have substantially strengthened our international capacity building efforts. We have also given top priority to the rapid development of CT and counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities. I believe these actions posture the Department to effectively combat terrorism.

Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal agencies?

Answer. During my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), we have worked hard to achieve unity of effort in CT operations across the U.S. national and homeland security establishment. This has included significant efforts to improve coordination of operations and interagency concurrence. If confirmed as USD(I), I would seek to build on this by moving, for example, from coordination of intelligence operations to integration.

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you had oversight of all section 1208 activities by Special Operations Forces to provide support (including training, funding, and equipment) to foreign regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations to combat terrorism.

What is your assessment of this authority?

Answer. Since its enactment in 2005, Section 1208 has been a critical authority for the war with al Qaeda and for counterterrorism and related COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the specific details of Section 1208 use are classified, it has enabled important human intelligence operations, operational preparation of the environment, advance force operations, unconventional warfare operations, and partnered CT operations.
Question: Do you believe changes to the authority and/or funding restrictions are needed?

Answer: I support the current request for additional funding authority, raising the annual funding level restriction from $40 million to $50 million, and I support extending the authority for the duration of named counterterrorist operations and for other contingencies.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

Question: During your time as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), Special Operations Forces expanded their role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to SOCOM’s title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to SOCOM’s title 10 missions?

Answer. The list of special operations activities in section 167 of title 10, U.S.C. could be updated to reflect SOCOM’s current list of core tasks and the missions assigned to it in the Unified Command Plan. The language in section 167 of title 10, U.S.C. also includes “such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense,” which provides the President and the Secretary the flexibility they need to meet changing circumstances.

Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role of Special Operations Forces in the Department’s IO?

Answer. IOs are a core SOF task. They are a vital instrument in countering violent extremism and other transnational threats. They can greatly enable unconventional warfare operations. IO support special operations from the combatant command level to the tactical battlefield.

Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations personnel different from those carried out by others in the Intelligence Community?

Answer. Some intelligence operations conducted by special operations personnel have unique attributes which are a function of the background, training, and experience of special operators, the missions assigned to their organizations, the intelligence targets they pursue, and the collection methods they employ. Special operations intelligence activities primarily support SOF intelligence requirements. However, when directed, SOF intelligence operations also support Intelligence Community and combatant commander requirements. For certain national collection missions, SOF personnel receive the same training as officers in national intelligence organizations.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by Special Operations Forces are adequately coordinated with other activities carried out by those in the Intelligence Community?

Answer. Special Operations Forces coordinate their intelligence activities with the Intelligence Community as required by applicable law, policy, and agreements, including Intelligence Community Directive Number 304 and the Memorandum of Agreement between DOD and CIA Concerning Operational Activities, July 20, 2005. If confirmed, I would further the operational integration between SOF and the Intelligence Community that has progressively been put in place during my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC).

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you have with respect to military information support operations (MISO)?

Answer. The Defense Intelligence Enterprise plays a crucial role in support of MISOs. Collecting and analyzing the information required to understand complex foreign human environments is the foundation for effective IOs. Additionally, if confirmed, I will ensure that military IOs are properly coordinated and operationally integrated with the IOs of other organizations within the Intelligence Community.

Question. DOD recently announced that it was discontinuing use of the term “psychological operations” in favor of the term “military information support operations.” Why do you believe such a terminology change was necessary?

Answer. Psychological operations as a term had become increasingly anachronistic, and had taken on avoidable, negative connotations. MISO is a more accurate description of the purpose of these operations.

Question. What operational and doctrinal impacts do you believe such a change will have?

Answer. I believe it will have positive operational and doctrinal impacts.
Question. In your experience as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), do you believe the Armed Forces have sufficient personnel and other assets to conduct the range of military information support missions being asked of them?

Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), and as a senior advisor to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review before that, I strongly supported significant growth in our psychological operations/MISOs force structure. MISO forces remain in high demand across our combatant commands. MISOs require specially trained personnel and unique capabilities, and such personnel are important assets not only for the Department, but for other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government as well. Given the rapid rate of change in the information environment and the diverse character of this environment, sustained modernization and a diverse portfolio of capabilities is required. Our long-term goal is measured growth and significant quality improvements for this force.

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Question. Over the past few years, DOD has funded a growing number of psychological operations and influence programs under the rubric of strategic communications programs. While the Department does not have any separate documentation outlining these activities, the Government Accountability Office reports that DOD "spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year" to support these operations, including initiatives funded by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization and the geographic combatant commands. Many of these programs support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Military Information Support Teams from SOCOM are also deploying to U.S. embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. In your capacity as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you had limited oversight of a number of these programs. In the position for which you have been nominated, you will continue to play a role in these programs.

What are your views on DOD’s strategic communications, psychological operations and influence programs, and their integration into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives?

Answer. The effectiveness of Department IOs in the rapidly evolving global information environment is an increasingly important determinant of our ability to achieve U.S. military objectives. DOD has an important role in IOs, particularly, but by no means exclusively, in zones of armed conflict. DOD IOs must be integrated with other U.S. Government efforts—those by the Department of State and other government agencies—to shape information environments to our advantage. They must also reduce our adversaries’ abilities to do the same.

Question. In 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s second-in-command, declared that “We are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking place in the battlefield of the media.” Earlier this year, a non-partisan study highlighted the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment violence (e.g. Islamism or Salafi-Jihadism).

As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), what did you do to further DOD’s strategic appreciation of the ideological basis of al Qaeda and its affiliates?

Answer. DOD fully recognizes the importance of al Qaeda’s ideology and the extent to which it underpins the al Qaeda movement. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I worked to advance this strategic appreciation within DOD and across the interagency. I have strongly advocated for programs and activities, many of which are conducted by other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, to deal with the ideological challenge posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates. In the unclassified realm, my office was recently involved in the establishment of the Department of State-led Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, which will serve as the interagency focal point for U.S. Government counter-radicalization efforts.

Question. In your view, how do we counter radical ideologies that foment violence?

Answer. The most effective counter will be within the affected population and the radical groups themselves.

Question. What do you understand to be the role of the Intelligence Community, as opposed to DOD and the State Department?

Answer. The Intelligence Community has special authorities and capabilities that can be brought to bear. Intelligence collection and analysis informs all IOs.

Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to utilize the results of research being conducted by DOD’s Minerva and Human Social Cultural Behavioral Modeling programs?

Answer. Research from the Minerva program and the applications developed as part of Human Social Cultural Behavioral (HSCB) Modeling program are components of the overall Defense Intelligence effort to improve socio-cultural information.
As currently envisioned by OUSD(I), the socio-cultural analytic effort will integrate social science research, all-source analysis, and regional expertise into fused intelligence products. The modeling capabilities in HSCB will help analysts manage and visualize large volumes of data on economics, infrastructure, demographics, etcetera. Insights developed as a result of enhanced capabilities could also improve the Intelligence Community’s ability to provide warning on emerging crises.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

**Question.** IOs, as currently defined by DOD, include electronic warfare, operational security, computer network operations, psychological operations, and military deception—each of these lines of operations is unique and complex, and, in some cases, interwoven.

**Answer.** The roles and missions for IOs are being addressed by a Front End Assessment. I would expect that the OUSD(I) will continue to play an appropriate role in the oversight of several of these areas.

**Question.** What are your views on the roles assigned to USD(I) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with respect to IOs, and particularly offensive computer network operations? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you consider recommending to the Secretary of Defense?

**Answer.** The Front End Assessment is addressing this question. Some aspects of IO, as currently defined, will likely migrate to Policy, while others will likely remain in USD(I). I would expect that the USD(I) will continue to play an important role in overseeing computer network operations.

**Question.** Given the formation of a separate U.S. Cyber Command, what are your views on retaining computer network operations as a core competency with IOs?

**Answer.** IOs, as currently defined, refer to the integration of various information activities to achieve effects across the information environment, which includes the cyber domain. The formation of U.S. Cyber Command will not change the relationship of computer network operations to the other capabilities necessary for DOD to conduct information and cyber-related operations. It will, however, enhance our ability to conduct IOs in the cyber domain. As noted above, oversight of IO and its components, as currently defined, is being addressed in a Front End Assessment.

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

**Question.** A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence Community have called for applying significantly more resources and attention to identifying, tracking, and halting the flow of money associated with the terrorist networks and the illegal narcotics trade. Comparable efforts have been undertaken by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization against the flow of money and components supporting the construction and employment of improvised explosive devices.

**Question.** What are your views on efforts to invest additional resources into identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorism and narcotics, especially in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Engaging all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the flow of money associated with terrorist networks, the illegal narcotics trade, and other threats to the U.S. Government is critical. The narco-insurgent nexus is a key enabler, for example, of the insurgency in Afghanistan. While DOD is not the U.S. Government lead in counter threat finance (CTF), it does have a role to play. We are in the process of building an appropriate CTF capability within DOD, and will be alert to the need for additional resources.

**Question.** As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you were responsible for a portion of the CTF duties in the Department. What is your assessment of DOD’s current CTF organizational structure?

**Answer.** DOD’s threat finance structure is still developing, but it is headed in the right direction. In August 2009, Deputy Secretary Lynn approved the DOD Directive on CTF Policy, which formalizes CTF as a DOD mission. CTF Interagency Task Forces are making important contributions to our counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. A critical element of success in the CTF area will be DOD’s ability to support the Department of Treasury, which has the CTF lead for the U.S. Government. The ODNI is also working to strengthen the Treasury Department’s capabilities with respect to CTF intelligence.

INFORMATION SHARING

**Question.** There are still strong barriers to sharing, or allowing access to, the mass of raw intelligence data that has not been included in finished reports or anal-
yses and approved for dissemination within the Intelligence Community. As long as these barriers exist, DNI Clapper’s vision of an integrated repository with analytic tools able to connect-the-dots cannot be achieved. The implication is that the Nation will remain more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than it could be. The reasons cited to justify these information access barriers are the need to protect sources and methods and the privacy of U.S. persons.

What are your views about whether it is possible to provide greater access to counterterrorism data to analysts and Special Forces while adequately protecting intelligence sources and properly minimizing exposure of U.S. persons’ information?

Answer. I believe it is possible to provide greater access to counterterrorism data to analysts and Special Forces while adequately protecting intelligence sources and properly minimizing exposure of U.S. persons’ information. While cognizant of the problem we face with respect to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, if confirmed, I will seek, in concert with the DNI, to enable better, faster, and deeper sharing of counterterrorism data. We have already made significant progress in this area. Until very recently, multiple U.S. military, civil, and coalition networks in Afghanistan were unable to communicate with one another. We have moved to a common, integrated network—the Afghan Mission Network—and one common database—Combined Information Data Network Exchange—that supports intelligence, command and control, and logistics across all U.S. entities and 46 partner nations. This approach of establishing a common network and common database has allowed us to ensure that all releasable national, tactical, and commercially available data from across the DOD and IC is available and discoverable.

Question. Do you agree with DNI Clapper that these barriers are mainly cultural in nature?

Answer. Yes, I agree with the DNI. Reflecting upon my own operational experiences and the intelligence support I have received over the years, it is clear that the IC has produced multiple generations of intelligence analysts and leaders inculcated with the philosophy that need-to-know had to be proven before information could be shared. Under that approach, the first and foremost rule was to protect sources and methods, or the result would be loss of sensitive capabilities and lives. While protecting sources and methods must remain a critical concern and need-to-share cannot trump need-to-know, there can be an even greater risk to mission or potential loss of life if information is not shared between government agencies and with our allies. As USD(I), Mr. Clapper initiated and, if confirmed, I will continue to foster policy changes and make investments in training and capability development that will make Responsibility-to-Provide the mindset for the entire DOD enterprise. This is already underway in our schools where Write-for-Release is part of the curriculum, and in our acquisition programs where federated information sharing via common protocols is an integral part of all fielding efforts at the enterprise intelligence architecture level, the combatant commands and the military departments.

Question. What role do you expect to play in addressing this issue, if confirmed, to be USD(I)?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ODNI to ensure that as we build out our information-sharing capability, we do it in full synchronization with the IC. I will also ensure that we have appropriate controls in place to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information.

HOMELAND DEFENSE

Question. With the establishment of the positions of USD(I), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, DOD has been fundamentally reorganized to better address the critical homeland defense mission. In your view, what challenges lie ahead in integrating the intelligence capabilities of DOD with those of the Department of Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local agencies?

Answer. Two of the longstanding challenges to integrating the intelligence capabilities of DOD with those of the Department of Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local agencies have been IT compatibility and guidance on sharing classified information. With the issuance of Executive Order 13549, Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector (SLTPS) Entities, we have made significant progress in the latter. The Executive Order establishes the right balance between sharing classified information with SLTPS entities in support of homeland defense, while ensuring proper safeguards are in place for protecting information from unauthorized disclosure.
OUSD(I) is currently assisting DHS and other agencies in the development of implementation policy, and will have an ongoing role in supporting an integrated approach.

Question. Does DOD’s existing requirements-setting process adequately support the establishment of intelligence requirements for the homeland defense mission?

Answer. The technical solutions needed to inject homeland defense intelligence requirements into the overall DOD requirements-setting process now exist or are in development. Dividing finite resources among existing DOD intelligence requirements, while ensuring adequate support for requirements unique to the homeland defense mission, will present a significant challenge. Adequate intelligence support must be provided, however. Al Qaeda continues to pose a grave threat to the American Homeland, and for at least a decade, intelligence professionals have recognized that the foreign-domestic divide has been shattered by transnational terrorist groups.

EFFECTIVENESS OF USD(I)

Question. The Secretary of Defense took the extraordinary step of establishing an independent ISR Task Force in early 2008 to rectify major shortfalls in support to ongoing military and counterterrorism operations. The Secretary determined that the Military Services had not sufficiently deployed innovative solutions to meet the requirements of combatant commanders. Responsibility for this problem lay not only with the Military Services but also the functional manager for intelligence—the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)).

Do you believe that the Secretary’s initiative suggests that the OUSD(I) lacks expertise, initiative, or clout, or some combination thereof, or do you think that other factors prevented appropriate action?

Answer. The ISR Task Force was established by Secretary Gates to assess and propose options for maximizing and optimizing deployed ISR capabilities in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has been led by an OUSD(I) Deputy Under Secretary, and is primarily staffed by OUSD(I) personnel, though it is also comprised of personnel from OSD(AT&L), the Services, Joint Staff, and Combat Support Agencies. The establishment of the ISR Task Force does not reflect a unique shortfall within OUSD(I). Rather, gaps exist in the ability of the Department to quickly meet the urgent near-term needs of our warfighters, particularly when facing a rapidly evolving threat. This gap is not just confined to ISR or intelligence. The same extraordinary process was required, for example, to rapidly procure mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles and develop additional counter-IED capabilities for Afghanistan. The establishment of the ISR Task Force provided the focus and resources necessary to pursue rapid acquisition of ISR assets. Its efforts are part of a larger departmental effort to expand and institutionalize a rapid acquisition capability led by the USD(AT&L). As a result of the ISR Task Force’s success, it was determined that there is an enduring need for the focus and effectiveness the Task Force has brought to integrating ISR systems into Joint Operations. Accordingly, the Secretary notified Congress on September 16, 2010, that he was institutionalizing the responsibilities of the ISR Task Force within the OUSD(I).

DUAL HAT AS DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

Question. In May 2007, Secretary Gates and DNI McConnell signed a Memorandum of Agreement designating the USD(I) as the Director of Defense Intelligence under the DNI.

What is your understanding of the authorities and responsibilities of this office under the DNI?

Answer. The position of the Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) was established within the ODNI to assist the DNI in the execution of DNI responsibilities for the oversight of Defense intelligence matters. As the principal advisor to the DNI and ODNI for defense intelligence, the DDI is responsible for requirements, intelligence activities, and advice and assistance. This includes:

• Overseeing the development of DOD’s national intelligence requirements on behalf of the DNI;
• Facilitating alignment, coordination, and deconfliction between National and Defense Intelligence activities; and
• Advising and assisting the DNI by synchronizing and integrating Defense Intelligence functions with other IC elements.

By creating this dual-hat arrangement, the DDI can exercise authority on behalf of the DNI, while the USD(I) exercises authorities delegated to him by the Secretary of Defense.
Question. What is your assessment of the relevance or importance of this dual designation, and whether it should be continued?

Answer. I believe strongly in the DDI/USD(I) dual-hat arrangement, and strongly support its continuation. I believe it is the most effective way to serve the Defense intelligence needs of both the Secretary of Defense and the DNI, and it is a key instrument for achieving greater integration of U.S. intelligence. The DDI/USD(I) attends all National Intelligence Boards, all DNI Executive Committee meetings, and all senior ODNI staff meetings. The DDI/USD(I) meets weekly with the DNI in a one-on-one session. A full-time senior liaison officer resides in each staff in an effort to enhance communication and coordination. If confirmed, I would plan to build on and expand the collaboration between the OUSD(I) and ODNI staffs through this arrangement.

USD(I) ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL, ACQUISITION, AND POLICY

Question. DOD senior leaders include Under Secretaries responsible for personnel, policy, and acquisition matters, yet the OUSD(I) includes staff with responsibilities for each of these areas as they apply to the intelligence mission.

In your view, should the OUSD(I) staff continue to duplicate the functions and resources of these other Under Secretaries? If so, why?

Answer. I do not view the OUSD(I) staff functions as duplicative, but rather complementary. The Intelligence components of the Department operate under the authority of the Secretary of Defense in title 10 of the U.S.C. In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and the DNI, the OUSD(I) staff provides oversight on behalf of the USD(I) to ensure these programs are aligned both within the Department and the broader Intelligence Community. The USD(I) is uniquely positioned to provide oversight of sensitive DOD programs that are integral to the Intelligence Community, including those exercised clandestinely, and to ensure that those programs complement the activities of the entire Department and the DNI. These efforts ensure maximum effectiveness and efficiency of the consolidated National Intelligence and Defense Intelligence programs.

The USD(I) is the Principal Staff Assistant responsible for promulgation of intelligence policies within DOD (DODD 5143.01). In this capacity, the USD(I) exercises the authorities to ensure efficient use of resources for the intelligence mission set. DOD routinely interacts with the Intelligence Community, and those interactions require special consideration in order to preserve the necessary division between national and military intelligence activities. The USD(I) provides oversight of training, education, and career development for all Defense intelligence personnel. This oversight enables the Department to develop a cadre of well-rounded and experienced intelligence experts and to horizontally integrate existing and new capabilities for warfighters. Without this focused oversight, the efficiency and effectiveness of the DOD Intelligence Enterprise would be put at risk. The Department also has responsibility to provide specialized oversight of all Military Intelligence Program funding. Congress has recognized the importance of this oversight in the areas of acquisition, security, personnel, and resources.

OUSD(I) provides advice and assistance to OUSD(AT&L) concerning acquisition programs and processes that significantly affect Defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components. Additionally, OUSD(I) works closely with OUSD(AT&L) and ODNI on programs that are funded by the National Intelligence Program and executed in the Department. This advice and assistance is integral to OUSD(I)’s Military Intelligence Program oversight and Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Management responsibilities.

Question. What is your understanding and view of the military departments’ initiatives with respect to their tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence collection and analysis force structure and technologies?

Answer. The military departments understand that we are operating in a resource-constrained environment, and they are developing initiatives and strategies to field comprehensive capabilities providing optimized intelligence to full-spectrum operations. If I am confirmed as USD(I), they will have my full support. These strategies provide a range of investment options to realign and reinvest in existing capabilities, while still providing timely, fused, and actionable intelligence to the Joint Force. I support the Secretary of Defense’s effort to maximize production of ISR capabilities in support of U.S. forces in combat, as evidenced by the ISR Task Force Initiative. If confirmed, I will work with the Intelligence Community, the military departments, and the combat support agencies to ensure an integrated effort. I will meet with the Service Intelligence Chiefs, the Joint Staff J2, the Combat Support
Agency Directors, and the combatant commands to ensure I have a clear understanding of their highest priority initiatives.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities among these initiatives and how would you propose to provide policy and program oversight and support them with appropriate resources?

Answer. If confirmed, my priorities would be nested with the Secretary of Defense’s Planning Guidance and the DNI’s National Intelligence Strategy. I would ensure that the initiatives and strategies of the military departments were also nested with Secretary of Defense priorities, and through my office of Joint and Coalition Warfighter Support, would provide the necessary oversight of their plans and programs. My top priority is to support our forces engaged in combat operations with the best intelligence available. To do that, we need to balance our capabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. We would improve innovation and pursue technological advances in support of information sharing—from policy to hardware to analysts; improving collection and exploitation, countering current and emerging threats, strengthening counterintelligence, and improving our security processes.

EFFICIENCIES ISSUES

Question. The Secretary of Defense has announced his intention to eliminate the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)) and the J-6 from the Joint Staff on the grounds that other organizations in the Department perform similar functions, particularly the Defense Information Systems Agency and U.S. Cyber Command. Similarly, the Department has a number of combat support defense agencies that are totally engaged in intelligence—such as NSA, DIA, NGA, and NRO. There is also the DNI who manages intelligence, including all the national intelligence agencies within the Department. Each Military Service has an intelligence chief as well. U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and each of the other combatant commands have major intelligence components and missions.

In your view, does the logic that led to the decision to eliminate NII and the J–6 imply that USD(I) and the J–2 should also be eliminated in view of the role played by DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, U.S. Cyber Command, and U.S. Strategic Command? Why or why not?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense is examining the Department’s intelligence organization, responsibilities, and authorities as part of his efficiency effort. That endeavor is ongoing, and at this point the Secretary has not made any final decisions. Key members of the OUSD(I) staff are participating in the efficiency effort to inform the larger efficiency team about the intricacies of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. In my view, there is a radical difference between streamlining oversight and management of command, control, and communications functions and those of a diverse intelligence enterprise. The USD(I), on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, coordinates, oversees and orchestrates the multidiscipline components of the global Defense Intelligence Enterprise and its interaction with the Intelligence Community. I believe the creation of the position of USD(I) was a major step forward in the oversight of defense intelligence, and that the dual-hatting of USD(I) as the DNI Director of Defense Intelligence ensures that Defense Intelligence is fully integrated into the U.S. Intelligence Community. I would not support its elimination. I likewise believe that the J–2 provides critical intelligence support to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands.

Question. Do you see an opportunity for the elimination of redundant layers of bureaucracy and greater efficiency in the operation and management of the Defense Intelligence Community, including the combatant commands and the Service component commands?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense initiated an efficiency effort that includes the review of the organizations and functions of Defense Intelligence Enterprise components to identify overlaps and inefficiencies. This effort includes a review of the entire enterprise to include the Defense intelligence agencies, Service intelligence components, and all of the Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers. I anticipate that the efficiency effort will identify some redundancies, and if confirmed, I will work to carry out any decisions made by the Secretary.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM CONSOLIDATION

Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 is the most recent legislative attempt to calibrate the need to centralize management of intelligence across the Federal Government with the need to sustain the benefits of
departmental intelligence answerable to cabinet secretaries. General Clapper, while serving as USD(I), initiated a proposal to separate out the National Intelligence Program (NIP) portion of the Defense budget, establish a new appropriations account within the 050 Defense Function, and expand the ODNI comptroller function to enable ODNI to execute these funds independent of the DOD Comptroller organization.

Does this proposal weaken the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the intelligence components of the DOD?

Answer. This proposal should not weaken the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the intelligence components of DOD. Separation of the NIP portion of the Defense budget, as conceptually proposed, is an administrative action. Thus, it will not affect the Secretary of Defense’s “authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense.” 10 U.S.C. sec. 113(b). It will not affect how the Secretary “prescribes regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, [and] the distribution and performance of its business.” 5 U.S.C. sec. 301.

Question. Is this proposal consistent with the Secretary’s efficiencies initiative, which seeks to avoid duplication and to reduce the overhead burden, by creating a second large financial control system operating within the Department?

Answer. The proposal to separate the NIP portion of the Defense budget was not intended to be an efficiency initiative, but to provide greater visibility and oversight of NIP resources, as well as improve NIP financial management practices. ODNI is leading a collaborative study effort to determine the feasibility of the conceptual proposal, with DOD stakeholders participating. The study team is still assessing possible approaches and implications. No final decisions have been made on removing the NIP from the DOD budget. If approved, I believe the proposal to separate the NIP portion of the Defense budget would not be incompatible with the Secretary’s efficiencies initiative.

SUPPORT FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

Question. In late 2009, Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, who was serving as Chief, CJ2, International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, published an article that criticized the Intelligence Community broadly for focusing excessively on support for kinetic operations against adversary forces in Afghanistan and failing to devote sufficient attention to the counterinsurgency strategy and its emphasis on population protection, tribal dynamics, cultural insight, the rule of law, and the like.

Do you think that General Flynn’s criticism was accurate, and if so, has this imbalance been corrected?

Answer. Major General Flynn was correct in his assessment that in a counterinsurgency environment, focusing our intelligence assets solely on the insurgent forces is not effective. A comprehensive understanding of the socio-cultural environment is absolutely critical to developing and implementing effective strategies to separate the insurgency from any viable base of support in the general population. Developing this comprehensive understanding is clearly an intelligence responsibility as laid out in Service and Joint doctrine within the Department. Mobilizing the local population in rural areas for village stability operations has become a critical element of our strategy in Afghanistan, one that is already showing major gains on the battlefield. Tribal engagement is increasingly central to U.S. strategy in other countries as well. Thus, a detailed understanding of tribal dynamics is a critical intelligence task, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.

The Intelligence Community has worked hard to implement Major General Flynn’s recommendations. The Stability Operations Information Centers he called for have been created and manned by the Defense Intelligence Agency and Service intelligence analysts who are doing the integration and analysis work necessary to generate the comprehensive District Assessment reports that were the cornerstone of Major General Flynn’s approach. Significant challenges remain in developing the integrated information-sharing environment envisioned by Major General Flynn, but the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force and the U.S. Central Command have been doing tremendous work in this area as well. Additionally, the former USD(I) commissioned the Intelligence Task Force of the Defense Science Board in March 2010 to evaluate how intelligence can most effectively support counterinsurgency operations. The Board is currently compiling its findings and recommendations and is scheduled to brief the results in the first quarter of calendar year 2011.

I believe the Intelligence Community has responded well to the challenges laid out by Major General Flynn. One of my first actions, if confirmed, will be to confer
with Brigadier General Fogarty, who has replaced Major General Flynn, to get his assessment of the support currently being provided by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and the Intelligence Community to determine if additional enhancements are required.

Question. In your opinion, has the Intelligence Community devoted enough resources to provide policymakers and combatant commanders with the information on the cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics needed to formulate sound strategies for other critical regions, like Yemen and Somalia?

Answer. As noted above, tribal engagement is an increasingly critical tool in U.S. irregular warfare strategy. It was central to our success in overthrowing the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001, it has been a major factor in our success in Iraq (Anbar Awakening), it is again becoming a critical element of our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, and it offers U.S. policymakers important options in other countries of concern. Information on cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics is likewise needed for effective IOs, as well as enhanced options to deal with power brokers in urban areas. I believe we have made good progress regarding intelligence support in this area, but additional improvements are required. A key part of the required investment is the development of operators—within both the intelligence and the special operations communities—with the requisite language skills. Effectiveness in this area also requires intelligence analysts with very different backgrounds. If confirmed, I would engage the DNI, the Director of CIA, the relevant components of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and the Commander of SOCOM to ensure that we continue to develop the required capabilities.

Question. Is collection and analysis on these subjects in these geographical areas a tier one priority for the Intelligence Community or is it classified as lower-priority general background intelligence information? Do you agree with this prioritization?

Answer. As the committee is aware, our National Intelligence Priorities are classified. As noted above, however, intelligence support in this area is increasingly central to effective strategy and operations. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that it is accorded appropriate priority within both the Intelligence Community and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

NEED FOR INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Question. Intelligence analysis should be independent and free of political pressure that it reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that fits a particular policy preference.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that all intelligence analysts within DOD, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are free from such pressure?

Answer. In my experience, I have found the intelligence analysis that holds up best under scrutiny are those assessments that were reached impartially and independently, using all sources of information available, and which highlight the intelligence gaps that limit the judgments that can be reached by current analysis. Intelligence analysts are inculcated with the importance of “speaking truth to power.” As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have interacted regularly with intelligence analysts across the Intelligence Community, and have found them to be professionals who apply rigorous tradecraft standards to their products. The quality of analysis provided to policymakers today, in my judgment, is substantially better than it was in the Cold War. I have spoken to analysts as they attend their career training programs about the importance of what they do, and the need for objectivity and independence. If confirmed, I would reaffirm the importance of objective and independent analysis from the frontline analyst, to the Directors of analytical organizations, to senior policymakers. There will be zero tolerance for political pressure on analysts to reach certain conclusions.

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you think intelligence officers and analysts should be able to testify to Congress on their professional conclusions regarding a substantive intelligence issue even if those views conflict with administration positions?

Answer. If Congress requires testimony on a substantive intelligence issue, it should be provided, whether or not it conflicts with an administration position.

CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WITHIN DOD

Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 granted the DNI control over the preparation and execution of the National Intelligence Program budget and tasking of national intelligence operations. However, IRTPA also contained language asserting that nothing in the act should be con-
stressed so as to impair the authorities of secretaries of cabinet departments, and the Secretary of Defense has delegated “direction, control, and authority”—the highest form of authority in the executive branch—over the national intelligence organizations within the DOD to the USD(I).

What are your views on the balance of authorities accorded in IRTPA to the DNI and to cabinet secretaries, particularly the Secretary of Defense?

Answer. IRTPA struck a proper balance of authorities, in my view, in that it gave the DNI strong authority over core intelligence functions for the National Intelligence Program, such as setting requirements and budgets, as well as determining priorities for and managing the analysis and dissemination of national intelligence, while leaving the responsibility for execution of DOD intelligence activities to the Secretary of Defense, and assigning primary responsibility for leadership and management functions such as inspector general activities, personnel, information technology, financial management systems, and acquisition within the IC elements outside of ODNI and CIA to the heads of the departments in which those elements are located. The recently-enacted Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 significantly increased the authorities of ODNI over leadership and management functions in the IC elements, and I expect that DOD and the DNI will together devote considerable time and attention to implementing these new ODNI authorities in a manner that gives full effect to the act while avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort and preserving the Secretary of Defense’s ability to execute his statutory responsibilities over DOD’s intelligence components.

Question. What are your views on the extent of the grant of “direction, control, and authority” to the USD(I) over DOD national intelligence organizations?

Answer. Statutory provisions in both title 10 and title 50 of the U.S.C. assign authority, direction, and control to the Secretary of Defense over DIA, NSA, NG, and NRO as components of the Department, consistent with the statutory authorities of the DNI. In my view, this balance of authorities is appropriate.

Question. What type of relationship would you strive to establish, if you are confirmed, with the DNI to ensure that DOD interests in national intelligence are satisfied, that DOD adequately assists the DNI in discharging his responsibilities, and that the defense intelligence agencies are properly managed?

Answer. With the former USD(I) now in place as the DNI, with his extensive experience in both DOD and the Intelligence Community, with the close personal partnership we have forged during my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), and with the close relationships we both have with the Secretary of Defense and with the leaders of the Intelligence Community, I believe there is an unprecedented opportunity to further strengthen the relationship between DOD and the DNI. If confirmed, I expect that together we will look for additional ways to build on the arrangement established by the Secretary of Defense and the DNI under which the USD(I) serves as the Director of Defense Intelligence within ODNI.

Question. Do you believe that the relationships, authorities, processes, and structures in place between the DOD and the DNI provide sufficient influence for the DOD to ensure that the intelligence capabilities DOD will need in the future to prepare for and conduct military operations will be developed and acquired through the National Intelligence Program?

Answer. Yes, I believe that current relationships, authorities, processes, and structures in place between DOD and the DNI have produced highly effective support by NIP resources for military operations.

ROLE IN ACQUIRING SPACE SYSTEMS

Question. If confirmed, what role do you anticipate you would have in the requirements process for, and in oversight of the acquisition of, space systems, including space systems for which milestone decision authority rests with either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics or the DOD Executive Agent for Space?

Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for all intelligence matters, my role in space system acquisition will be to ensure the Defense Intelligence Enterprise meets national and Department requirements. I will ensure that we’ve balanced our investments towards delivering the right mix of intelligence capabilities to support the combatant commanders to accomplish their missions. DOD space systems are one component of a broader architecture of sensors, systems, and capabilities.

As the DOD Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the USD(I) roles to ensure all parts of the ISR architecture, to include space, air, and ground, are integrated into an overall architecture optimized to meet the warfighters’ needs. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DNI to ensure that the
DOD intelligence architecture, including space intelligence capabilities, is integrated with the national architecture, and that we have a mission-focused space enterprise that is affordable, responsive, efficient, flexible, and fully supportive of military operations and national security needs.

As the Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Manager, if confirmed, I will participate in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) requirements and acquisition oversight process by providing intelligence input into the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) requirements process, the Functional Capabilities Board (FCB), the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB), and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), as well as provide input into the DOD acquisition process on the Defense Acquisition Board.

DOD INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATIONS POLICY

**Question.** DOD Directive Number 3115.09 assigns the USD(I) responsibility for providing oversight of intelligence operations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning, and ensuring overall development, coordination, approval, and promulgation of DOD policies and implementation of plans related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning.

Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

**Answer.** Yes, I fully support this policy.

**Question.** Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

**Answer.** Yes, I fully support these standards.

**Question.** If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will ensure that all relevant DOD policies and plans comply with applicable U.S. law and international obligations, including Common Article 3.

**Question.** Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

**Answer.** Yes, I strongly hold the view that the manner in which the United States treats detainees may well impact how captured U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are treated in future conflicts. I believe it has broader national security and foreign policy ramifications as well.

**Question.** Under DOD Directive Number 3115.09, the USD(I) is responsible for developing policies and procedures, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the DOD General Counsel, and the appropriate DOD components, to ensure that all contracts in support of intelligence interrogation operations include the obligation to comply with the standards of DOD Directive Number 3115.09 and exclude performance of inherently governmental functions in accordance with DOD Directive 1100.4 and that all contractor employees are properly trained.

What do you believe is the proper role of contractors in intelligence interrogation operations?

**Answer.** Consistent with Section 1038 of Public Law 111–84, “The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,” October 28, 2009, I believe that in areas where adequate security is available and is expected to continue, contractor personnel with proper training and security clearances may be used as linguists, interpreters, report writers, information technology technicians, and other employees filling ancillary positions (including as trainers of, and advisors to, interrogators) in the interrogation of individuals who are in the custody or under the effective control of DOD or otherwise under detention in a DOD facilities.

Contractors may be used as interrogators only if the Secretary of Defense determines that it is in the interests of the national security to do so and grants a waiver for a 60-day period, and for an additional 30 days if a renewal is approved. If a waiver is granted, contract interrogators must be properly trained and certified to DOD standards, and they must be supervised and closely monitored by properly
trained and certified DOD military and/or DOD civilian interrogators to ensure that the contract interrogators do not deviate from the government-approved interrogation plans or otherwise perform any inherently governmental function.

**Question.** What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that intelligence interrogation operations are performed in a manner consistent with the requirements of the manpower mix and that contractors involved in such operations do not perform inherently governmental functions?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will ensure that all relevant DOD policies and plans comply with Section 1038 of Public Law 111–84, “The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,” October 28, 2009, which delineates the functions that contractors may perform in support of intelligence interrogations. If the Secretary of Defense grants a waiver permitting the use of contractors as interrogators, I will ensure that they are properly trained and certified to DOD standards, and that they are supervised and closely monitored by properly trained and certified DOD military and/or DOD civilian interrogators to make certain that the contract interrogators do not deviate from the government-approved interrogation plans or otherwise perform any inherently governmental function.

**INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT**

**Question.** Over the last 5 years or so, the approved requirement for 24-hour orbits of ISR aircraft has grown from approximately 10 to 65. U.S. Central Command, and specifically the Iraq and Afghanistan areas of operation, has received the overwhelming share of these assets. The other combatant commands, as well as such critically important regions as Yemen and the Horn of Africa, have received little or no additional assets. Even within U.S. Central Command, demand exceeds supply.

Secretary Gates established the independent ISR Task Force partly because the normal requirements and acquisition processes in the Department favored long-term investments in capabilities for waging conventional military operations rather than the needs of deployed forces engaged in irregular warfare.

In your view, is DOD allocating sufficient resources to airborne ISR to protect long-term force modernization preferences?

**Answer.** I believe the Department is now allocating sufficient resources to airborne ISR. Working closely with Congress, the Department has greatly expanded airborne ISR capabilities during Secretary Gates’ tenure. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have consistently and strongly advocated for additional Predator/Reaper CAPs (orbits). These assets are absolutely critical to U.S. strategy in several areas, and demand continues to exceed supply. This is why in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary made the decision to expand the authorized U.S. Air Force force structure goal further by another 15 CAPs/orbits (from 50 to 65). We continue to upgrade the capabilities of our airborne ISR systems as well. The introduction of high definition video capabilities, for example, provides resolution that was not possible just 5 years ago. Combining this capability with recently developed SIGINT capabilities has dramatically improved the effectiveness of our ISR orbits. Other airborne ISR systems are having an equally dramatic impact on the battlefield.

The Secretary has provided very clear guidance. His first defense strategy objective is to “Prevail in Today’s Wars,” and that is where the preponderance of our attention and effort is focused. His strategy also makes it clear that we must continue to “Prevent Future Conflict” and “Prepare to Succeed in a Wide Range of Contingencies.” Maintaining an appropriate balance between winning today and preparing for the future requires tough choices, but they are being made. The President’s budget for 2011 has the balance right, in my view.

**Question.** Is the current focus an appropriate one?

**Answer.** Yes.

**REPORTING OF CYBER OPERATIONS IN THE CLANDESTINE QUARTERLY REPORT**

**Question.** The USD(I) coordinates preparation of the quarterly report on clandestine military operations (Clandestine Quarterly Report) to Congress. In discussions with the Department about actions to establish the U.S. Cyber Command, it became apparent that the Department may have failed to report certain cyber activities in the Quarterly Report that should have been included, since they would legitimately fit the accepted definition of clandestine military activities.

What is your understanding of whether the Department failed to report these activities in the regular Clandestine Quarterly Reports, and why?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the congressional language directing provision of the Clandestine Quarterly Report specifically calls for reporting on clandestine HUMINT activity. Former USD(I) Clapper, in an effort to keep Congress better
apprised of activities within his purview, expanded the report to routinely include
a wide range of activities that exceeded the congressional reporting requirements.
I fully support this expanded approach, and, if confirmed, will review the status and
process for reporting DOD cyber activities. I am committed to appropriate reporting
of all intelligence and intelligence-related activities to Congress.

*Question.* Setting aside the issue of advance notice of certain significant cyber ac-
tivities, what is your view on the appropriateness of reporting cyber activities that
fit the definition of a clandestine military operation in the Clandestine Quarterly
Report?

*Answer.* The USD(I) is charged with keeping the appropriate committees of Con-
gress fully and currently informed on all DOD intelligence and intelligence related
activities. It would be my intent, if confirmed, to fully comply with that responsi-
bility, to include cyber activities.

**SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY**

*Question.* What technical challenges does the Intelligence Community face that in
your opinion are currently not being addressed adequately by DOD science and tech-
nology efforts?

*Answer.* I believe an “Intelligence Revolution” has been underway for some time,
and that technological change is the principal driver of this revolution. This revolu-
tion has already posed, and will continue to pose, significant challenges as well as
opportunities for the U.S. Intelligence Community. I believe that DOD science and
technology programs are enabling the IC to keep ahead of the rapidly-changing in-
telligence environment.

One challenge that we continue to face is making the best use of existing and
planned sensors and then exploiting data coming from those sensors. Although we
are continuing to push the envelope on new and better sensing technologies, the real
challenge has shifted towards integrating data from platforms and sensors into a
common framework. Related technical challenges include layering the data, develop-
ing advanced analytical tools that make sense of the data, and developing tools
that automatically alert analysts or cross-cue other sensors to focus on unique and
potentially dangerous activity. Other challenges include the protection of critical
space systems and data networks.

*Question.* Recently, DOD has been exploring a wide range of airship-related tech-
nologies for ISR purposes, including those for long-duration, high-altitude flight.
What are your views on the specific missions, concepts of operation, technical via-
bility, and affordability of airships as long-duration, high altitude ISR sensor plat-
forms?

*Answer.* I believe these technologies will have an immediate, positive impact on
our operations in Afghanistan, and could play an even greater role in future oper-
ations as the capability continues to evolve. An “unblinking eye and ear” is central
to our ISR strategy for the modern battlefield. Over the last decade, the Department
has significantly expanded our ability to dwell over the battlefield with ISR plat-
forms. We have done this predominantly through procurement of aircraft systems
and sensors. With the advent of long-endurance platforms, the Department is ex-
panding the paradigm of battlefield dwell by developing “game-changing” persistent
capabilities that enable satellite-like endurance at a much lower cost and have the
flexibility to reposition anywhere in the world. These developments will greatly in-
crease the amount of valuable information available to the warfighter. The develop-
ment of long-endurance airborne capabilities, I would add, is much broader than
just airships. DOD is also pursuing other long-endurance fixed-wing medium- and
high-altitude capabilities that can linger for weeks and even months at a time.

**CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT**

*Question.* In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is im-
portant that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able
to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee
and other appropriate committees of Congress?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or des-
ignated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate
and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the
USD(I)?

*Answer.* Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

WIKILEAKS REMEDIES

1. Senator Levin, Secretary Vickers, the imperative after September 11 was a paradigm shift from “need-to-know” to “need-to-share” intelligence and law enforcement information. The Wikileaks fiasco illustrates some of the dangers that can accompany information-sharing practices that are not wisely structured. It seems to me that we have to be smart about this. We can’t go back to the old practice of hoarding information, but we also cannot be wantonly posting sensitive material to hundreds of thousands of people who have no reason to see it. The committee is examining technologies and processes to achieve this balance, and I know that Secretary Gates and his staff have already taken actions and are engaged in long-term planning. What are your views on how we can finally achieve our information-sharing goals while better protecting information from insider threats?

Secretary Vickers. The Department of Defense (DOD) works to manage the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information through good security practices. For example, we vet our personnel for suitability and trustworthiness in the security clearance process. We establish and uphold rules for physical access to secure facilities and to classified information. We also have rules about the use of networked systems and conduct annual training to educate and remind employees about the rules. Security policy and processes are generally effective deterrents when everyone understands and implements them.

The unauthorized transfer of classified information to WikiLeaks was made possible in part because standard security procedures were relaxed in a war zone in order to facilitate the rapid exchange of information critical to operations. In the aftermath of WikiLeaks, the Department is taking a number of mitigation steps, including possible disciplinary action. We are examining technologies that would improve our ability to identify and thwart a threat from inside the Department as well as strengthen information-sharing governance. Some actions were already under way before the WikiLeaks disclosures. For example, the Department has planned and resourced the development of a public key infrastructure that would authenticate users of the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) so we would know exactly who is on the SIPRNet at any given time. Technical subject matter experts in the office of the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) are also reviewing options for developing role-based or attribute-based access control capabilities that would more effectively control who has access to what data—a very large and complex task given the Department’s size and the scope of its responsibilities.

To summarize, we can and must responsibly balance information security and information sharing by managing risk using a number of security and security-related protocols that act together to thwart both intentional and unintentional violations.

2. Senator Levin, Secretary Vickers, in your answers to the committee’s advance policy questions, you stated that the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) had recently completed a comprehensive review. What are the main recommendations of that review, and will you make it available to the committee?

Secretary Vickers. Immediately following the WikiLeaks disclosures, the Secretary of Defense directed the USD(I), in concert with the Joint Staff and the DOD CIO, to review DOD information security policy and procedures for handling classified information in forward-deployed areas. The Secretary was particularly concerned over the appropriate balance between the need to share and the responsibility to safeguard classified information. The report was completed and provided to the Secretary in December 2010. The report itself is an internal DOD deliberative document, but some of the principal findings include the following:
Adequate security policy and procedures exist, but compliance must be better enforced. Forward-deployed units maintained an over-reliance on removable electronic storage media.

- Roles and responsibilities for detecting and dealing with an insider threat must be better defined.
- Processes for reporting security incidents need improvement.
- Limited capability currently exists to detect and monitor anomalous behavior on classified computer networks.

USD(I) Security staff will continue to work closely with the DOD CIO, elements of the Joint Staff and U.S. Cyber Command to address these issues in the months ahead. We stand ready to provide the committee with further details on the report’s main recommendations, if requested.

INFORMATION SHARING

3. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, on a closely related topic, since September 11 the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security communities have struggled to develop effective means to connect and correlate fragmentary information held by multiple departments and agencies to thwart terrorist threats. As we learned in the aftermath of the Christmas bombing attempt, achieving this so-called connect-the-dots capability is not so much a technical challenge; the hardest part is overcoming the resistance of agencies to sharing their sensitive information and resolving the important policy and legal concerns regarding protection of privacy and sources and methods.

This challenge of finding and correlating the proverbial needles in haystacks is not confined to the national-level threat from terrorism. It turns out that our troops face identical types of challenges in discovering the people and networks of the terrorist and insurgent groups they are fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere around the world.

The committee’s examination of this situation reveals that almost every agency and department is developing large-scale search, discovery, and correlation systems, but they are able to apply these tools only to their own data—in their own stovepipes. In other words, there is a lot of duplication going on but no interagency solution. Indeed, there is no enterprise-wide search capability even within DOD. Do you have an appreciation of this situation, and how do you think it can be fixed, both within DOD and throughout the Government?

Secretary Vickers. Many DOD and Intelligence Community organizations have leaned forward to provide improved and impressive services rapidly for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. This challenge has been increased significantly by the breadth of our modern coalitions, by the need to update intelligence disclosure and release policies, and by the need for technology solutions to assist in marking data for release and moving it down to non-traditional networks to support coalition operations. We expect this trend to continue in future contingency operations. I share your view that there is a need to better coordinate and integrate these various contingency efforts, and we are addressing this challenge aggressively in numerous ways.

The Information Sharing and Collaboration (ISC) Team of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force has, over the past year, fielded a number of improvements to intelligence architectures in theater and to data dissemination, discovery, access, and retrieval capabilities. This group has also been focused on identifying gaps, overlaps, and integration opportunities among the Quick Response Capabilities delivered to theater, and on ensuring that sustainment and upgrade decisions are made within the context of integrating duplicative efforts, and migrating capabilities to common enterprise standards. The ISC Team is working to ensure these quick-turn-around efforts are designed and upgraded in ways that increase their interoperability across the intelligence enterprise, and that these investments will work toward enduring long-term solutions that can be applied to global operations and will be reusable in future contingency operations. Specific examples of these efforts include: ensuring any upgrades or expansion of the CENTCOM’s Combined Information Data Network Exchange database and search capabilities are migrated to global enterprise standards; and a just-initiated review of all DOD and Intelligence Community “cloud” efforts to highlight gaps, overlaps, and an enterprise integration way ahead.

Yet another important organization is the Intelligence Community’s Information Sharing Steering Committee (ISSC). DOD participates in the ISSC along with representatives from all Intelligence Community elements to align common information-sharing needs, priorities, solutions, and architectures.
Our approach to accomplishing improvements in information sharing requires that we implement a multi-faceted, layered approach. We recognize explicitly that technology alone will not resolve information-sharing shortfalls. The need to implement improvements in an enterprise approach has led us to develop oversight processes designed to effectively manage and synchronize the many information-sharing initiatives we have underway into one well-orchestrated effort. This focus has led to the establishment of a new Information Sharing and Partner Engagement Directorate within USD(I). This newly created directorate is engaging in a broad range of efforts specifically designed to improve information sharing by addressing policy, foreign relationship management, enterprise architectures, international intelligence sharing architectures and mechanisms, and training and education, and is ensuring we place the appropriate high-level of attention from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on this subject. Among its duties, this new Directorate will support a governance structure to guide Intelligence Community-wide enterprise solutions. It will reconstitute and support the Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise (DIE) Council, and will guide and oversee development of the associated DIE Framework. A Charter for the new DIE Council and Terms of Reference for the DIE Framework have both been drafted and are in review.

U.S. CYBER COMMAND AND CYBERSPACE

4. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, U.S. Cyber Command’s mission is to defend networks and, when directed, conduct offensive operations in cyberspace. Both of these missions are heavily dependent upon intelligence support. From a policy perspective, USD(I) is not responsible for the mission of defending cyberspace, nor for offensive military operations. Those oversight roles are the province of the CIO and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).

However, as we have come to learn, gaining access in cyberspace to adversaries’ networks to collect intelligence is tantamount to establishing a foundation for offensive actions. Thus, the intelligence activities that you oversee inherently have a relationship to potential offensive military operations. These intelligence operations in cyberspace can take on an extraordinarily sensitive cast, since adversaries could or likely would interpret a penetration of important targets as a potentially hostile act if or when they are discovered. How are you planning to monitor cyber intelligence collection operations under title 50 authorities and to coordinate with the USD(P) and the CIO?

Secretary Vickers. Because the cyber mission transcends the various OSD offices which execute a principal staff advisor role, it is imperative that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (OUSD(I)) coordinates and consults with these offices in order to ensure the integration and synchronization of cyber efforts amongst the military and the Intelligence Community to satisfy the requirements of the warfighter. USD(I) oversight of any cyber intelligence collection operations under title 50 authorities is conducted in accordance with applicable laws on reporting requirements for intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities. Oversight is executed in order to promote better cooperation and collaboration amongst the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to ensure efficient and effective use of our limited resources to achieve the Nation’s highest priorities in accordance with the National Security Strategy, the Defense Intelligence Strategy, and the CIO’s priorities.

5. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, are the USD(P) and the CIO going to be consulted about sensitive intelligence operations in cyberspace?

Secretary Vickers. As stated in a previous response, USD(I) consults and coordinates with USD(P) and CIO on significant intelligence and intelligence-related activities in accordance with current DOD policy. Because of the sensitivities that such operations could have across the Department, it is critical that OUSD(I) coordinates and consults with the various OSD offices which execute a principal staff advisory role pertaining to the cyber mission such as USD(P) and CIO. This close cooperation within the Department and within the Intelligence Community has empowered the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to support U.S. national objectives while maximizing our effectiveness.

6. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, the National Security Strategy states that the United States will enhance deterrence in cyberspace by “improving our ability to attribute and defeat attacks on our systems or supporting infrastructure.” If confirmed as USD(I), what role will you play in identifying an effective deterrence strategy and declaratory policy for cyberspace?
Secretary VICKERS. USD(I) is a primary stakeholder in Department-wide efforts to define an effective deterrence strategy and declaratory policy for cyberspace. If confirmed, I will work closely with USD(P) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will participate in National Security Council (NSC)-led fora related to this matter.

7. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Vickers, in your view, what are the elements of an effective deterrence posture for cyberspace that could attribute and defeat attacks?

Secretary VICKERS. An effective deterrence posture is one that would deny aggressors any benefit of an attack through a blend of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools to influence behavior.

8. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Vickers, are those two elements alone really enough to deter attacks, or is it also necessary to have a counter-attack component?

Secretary VICKERS. As we define our deterrence strategy, the challenge is to make our defense effective enough to deny an aggressor the benefit of an attack. In cyberspace, as with other areas, the United States reserves the right to respond using the full range of diplomatic, economic, and military tools at its disposal. Response to a cyber attack, if necessary, does not require a response in like kind.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES

9. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Vickers, in response to the committee's advance policy questions, you advocate for a robust DOD presence in conducting information operations and strategic communications programs more broadly in both theaters of war and globally. According to the Government Accountability Office, DOD spends "hundreds of millions of dollars each year" conducting these operations. This committee and Congress have repeatedly questioned DOD's ability to measure the effectiveness of the dollars spent supporting these operations. In your view, has DOD done enough to explain the measures of effectiveness for these programs?

Secretary VICKERS. The rapidly expanding pace of change in the information environment made global and instantaneous communications possible in ways that were unimaginable just a decade ago. Across the globe, our friends and our adversaries are constantly producing and consuming information that influences their decisions and their actions. Drawing a causal link between a discrete action in today's information environment and an individual or group decision is very challenging. We continue to place great emphasis on obtaining good measures of effectiveness and conducting thorough assessments of all of our information operations. Leveraging lessons learned from commercial enterprises, academia, and our interagency partners, we have made some progress to improve our ability to measure effects in our information programs. That said, we must continue to do much more in this area. As the information environment continues to evolve and its complexity grows, DOD must continue to press for new and innovative ways both to communicate with intended audiences and to measure the effects of communications and engagements.

10. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Vickers, do you believe the programs you authorized while you were Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict have had a measurable impact?

Secretary VICKERS. Yes, although drawing a causal link between discrete acts in today's information environment and an individual or group response is very challenging, we continue to refine and improve our abilities to measure the impact of our operations. We must continue to invest both resources and intellectual energies to meet this challenge. Our measurement efforts routinely demonstrate our impact. Our COCOM-sponsored websites have ever increasing readership, providing frequent and robust feedback. Our small teams supporting embassies abroad are lauded both by the U.S. embassies they support and the partner nations with whom they interact. Advertising for our rewards programs has significantly increased the number and frequency of reports of high value targets and terrorist supporting materials.

As the information environment continues to evolve, and its complexity grows, DOD will continue to press for new and innovative ways both to communicate with its intended audiences and to measure the effects of our communications and engagements.

11. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Vickers, in response to the committee's advance policy questions, you suggest that DOD's information operations and strategic communications programs should support more robustly other government departments
and agencies incountering the message of violent extremists. Given the clear lines
of authority that each government department and agency are given by Congress,
how do you foresee DOD increasing its support of the Department of State (DOS)
and/or the Central Intelligence Agency?

Secretary VICKERS. The purpose of DOD Information Operations is to support our
military objectives. The global nature of modern communications has blurred, how-
ever, traditional lines between agency-specific communications programs, increasing
the need for mutual reinforcement among them. Messages promulgated by one de-
partment or agency which might previously have had effects limited to a single geo-
graphic region or audience now find immediate global resonance. This new commu-
ications paradigm makes cooperation and collaboration within and among the var-
ious departments critical to ensure consistency and efficacy of the U.S. global mes-
sage. DOD maintains unique capabilities to reach audiences in denied areas or to
promulgate information in ways that can support our military objectives. Those ca-
pabilities can also contribute, where appropriate, to the larger U.S. Government
communications and public diplomacy strategies, in furtherance of U.S. national se-
curity objectives. We will continue to strive to provide transparency of our oper-
ations within the interagency environment, but more importantly, we will make our
capabilities available to support other departments and agencies in areas where
those capabilities provide additional options for effective communications and en-
gagement.

12. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Vickers, do you believe DOD has the authority for
expanded support operations?

Secretary VICKERS. We have the authorities to support where and when required.
We will continue to leverage long-established processes and mechanisms for plan-
ing, deconfliction, and partnered efforts to enhance mutually supporting objectives
with our interagency partners.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK UDALL

1208 FUNDING

13. Senator UDALL. Secretary Vickers, the committee has expressed concern that
U.S. Special Operations Command may be using section 1208 funding, which is in-
tended to support counterterrorism operations, for long-term engagement with part-
ner nations. Is this still the case or has it been corrected?

Secretary VICKERS. Section 1208 funds must be used for specific counterterrorism
operations, not long-term engagement. Improved reporting procedures and increased
coordination with and notifications to Congress have helped address past concerns
regarding DOD section 1208 programs. Reviews conducted as part of our annual
process by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Con-
flict and Interdependent Capabilities, U.S. Special Operations Command, and the
Geographic Combatant Commands, have resulted in the termination of several oper-
ations over the last 3 fiscal years. Beginning in 2010, SOLIC&IC began notifying
the congressional committees with a list of approved continuing operations for the
next fiscal year, along with any cost estimate changes. This information is also pro-
vided in the annual report to Congress in accordance with section 1208.

ZONES OF HOSTILITIES

14. Senator UDALL. Secretary Vickers, in your advance policy questions, you state
that outside zones of hostilities, DOD plays a supporting role in combating ter-
rorism. Does that mean that outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, the concurrence of our
ambassadors is required?

Secretary VICKERS. We work closely with our DOS and other government agency
colleagues to support whole-of-government approaches to terrorism challenges both
inside and outside zones of hostilities. When directed by the President and the Sec-
retary of Defense, geographic combatant commanders conduct counterterrorism op-
erations in support of U.S. Government objectives while ensuring appropriate Chiefs
of Mission are consulted and kept informed of all U.S. military activities.

15. Senator UDALL. Secretary Vickers, how does DOD define zones of hostilities
in this context?

Secretary VICKERS. In the context of my response, this term refers to Iraq and
Afghanistan.
16. Senator Begich. Secretary Vickers, in your view, what challenges will you face in integrating intelligence capabilities of DOD with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other Federal, State, and local agencies?

Secretary Vickers. DOD enjoys a very positive relationship with DHS. Our commitment to DHS expands far beyond intelligence integration.

I believe one of our greatest challenges to integrating intelligence capabilities between DHS and DOD is the important policy and legal balance regarding the protection of privacy rights and civil liberties. In fact, this challenge expands beyond the DHS and the DOD relationship and is indicative of the greater information-sharing issues facing the whole-of-government. The protection of privacy and other legal rights of Americans while defending our Homeland is no easy task. As we develop solutions, this protection of civil liberties is a core principle that must be kept in mind.

I recognize the imperative for efficient integration between DOD, DHS, and other Federal, State, and local agencies and believe collaboration is a key driver of effective integration. As such, I am in the process of considering a first of its kind Joint Duty Assignment of a DHS representative to serve as a full-time liaison between DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local Program Office, and the OUSD(I).

In their mission to detect, prevent, and respond to acts of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, State, local, and tribal agencies depend on the relationship between DHS and DOD. This relationship literally provides a critical link to actionable intelligence information. For example, allowing select State and major urban area fusion center personnel with appropriate security clearances access to appropriate classified terrorism-related information residing on DOD’s classified networks is a major step forward. This information will contribute significantly to improving their mission processes supporting Suspicious Activity Reports and Alerts, Warning, and Notifications of potential attacks on our Homeland. This example of a joint initiative has bolstered increased collaboration between DHS, DOD, and other Federal departments and agencies, enabling the trusted and secure exchange of terrorism-related information in order to detect, deter, prevent, and respond to Homeland security threats.

17. Senator Begich. Secretary Vickers, are there steps DOD can take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with other agencies?

Secretary Vickers. DOD extensively coordinates its efforts to combat terrorism with the National Security Staff, Chiefs of Mission, Chiefs of Station, relevant departments and agencies, and field activities to enable the broadest interagency collaboration consistent with maintaining the security of our efforts. We recognize that this is a constant process that requires regular and routine interface at multiple levels within the respective organizations. We have made wide use of the “Joint-Interagency Task Force” model to bring our interagency colleagues into a collaborative planning and execution forum, and are always vigilant for ways to share best practices and make adjustments to the process.

It is critically important that DOD’s counterterrorism activities be fully synchronized and integrated with those of other agencies to develop an optimal whole-of-government response to this vital national security issue. Nowhere is this need for integration more important than in our intelligence and information-sharing activities across the entire Intelligence Community. To support this objective, the DOD focal point for counterterrorism intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism, has recently assigned a senior representative to work at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as a means of improving coordination between Defense and Intelligence Community counterterrorism analytic efforts. Finally, as part of the Secretary of Defense Efficiencies Initiatives, we have directed DIA to conduct a review of the overall Defense relationship with NCTC and develop an appropriate course of action and implementation plan to maximize the integration of analytic capabilities and information-sharing across the national and defense counterterrorism intelligence missions.

[The nomination reference of Hon. Michael G. Vickers follows:]
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
Michael Vickers, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, vice James R. Clapper.

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Michael G. Vickers, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF MICHAEL G. VICKERS

Education:
• Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD (attended Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC)
  • Doctor of Philosophy, International Relations-Strategic Studies
  • 1991–2010 (non-resident since 1995); degree awarded August 2010
• The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
  • Master of Business Administration
  • 1986–1988; degree awarded May 1988
• University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL
  • Bachelor of Arts, International Relations
  • 1980–1983 (New College - External Degree Program); degree awarded June 1983

Employment Record:
• Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities
  • 2011–Present
• Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities
  • 2007–Present
• Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
  • Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies
  • 1996–2007
• Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
  • Acting Co-Director, Strategic Studies, and Professorial Lecturer (part-time)
  • 1996–1997
• Department of Defense
  • Special Government Employee (paid), Defense Science Board Task Force (part-time), 1996
  • Unpaid member, Defense Science Board Task Force (part-time), 1998, 1999
• Independent Consultant
  • Principal clients: Science Applications International (contract work for the Department of Defense); Defense Budget Project (predecessor organization of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments)
  • 1994–1996
• Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense
  • Strategic Studies Fellow (part-time)
  • 1993–1994
• News America Publishing (New York, NY)
  • Editor and Managing Director, The Daily Intelligence Brief (start-up)
  • 1990–1991
• BioAutomation, Inc (Bridgeport, PA)
• Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (start-up)
  • 1988–1990
• Metallic Ceramic Coatings, Inc. (Bridgeport, PA)
  • Vice President, Finance and Strategy
• Central Intelligence Agency
  • Operations Officer
  • 1983–1986
• U.S. Army
  • Special Forces Officer (Captain) and Noncommissioned Officer (Staff Sergeant)
  • 1973–1983

Honors and awards:
• Distinguished Member, 1st Special Forces Regiment, U.S. Army (2010)
• Alexander Hamilton Fellowship (Smith Richardson Foundation) (1993)
• Certification of Distinction, Central Intelligence Agency (1984)
• Honors graduate (cum laude), University of Alabama (1983)
• Meritorious Service Medal (1976, 1983)

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, and certain senior military officers as determined by the committee, to complete a form that details the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Michael G. Vickers in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Michael George Vickers.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).

3. Date of nomination:
   Originally nominated: September 29, 2010; renominated: January 5, 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
April 27, 1953; Burbank, CA.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Melana Zyla Vickers.
Maiden Name: Melana Kalyna Zyla.

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   - Alexandra Novakovic Vickers, age 22.
   - Natasha Novakovic Vickers, age 19.
   - Sophia Novakovic Vickers, age 17.
   - Oksana Elizabeth Vickers, age 9.
   - Kalyna Cecilia Vickers, age 5.

8. **Education:** List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

9. **Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   - Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities); 2500 Defense Pentagon, Room 3C852A; August 3, 2007 to Present (confirmed July 23, 2007).
   - Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; 1667 K Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC; September 1996 to August 2007.

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
    - Classified and unclassified contract consulting work for the Department of Defense, 1994 to 2007 while employed by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (1996 to 2007) and as a self-employed consultant (1994 to 1996).

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    - Trustee, Vickers Family Revocable Trust since December 2004; Melana Zyla Vickers (wife), co-trustee.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    - None.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
    - (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
      None.
    - (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
      None.
    - (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
      None.

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
    - Bachelor of Arts, Cum Laude, University of Alabama, 1983.
Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

My most recent publication is my Ph.D. dissertation, “The Structure of Military Revolutions” (Johns Hopkins University, July 2010), which is available through University Microfilms (UMI).


Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

None.

Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]
SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

MICHAEL G. VICKERS.

This 12th day of January, 2011.

[The nomination of Hon. Michael G. Vickers was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 17, 2011.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Jo Ann Rooney by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?
Answer. Not at this time.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?
Answer. N/A.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. My broad professional experiences, educational credentials, and lifelong commitment to service provide a solid background for me to recognize and contribute positively to myriads of formidable challenges and tasks facing DoD and, in particular, Personnel and Readiness. During my 8 years as president of a doctoral level university, we successfully addressed not only difficult financial challenges, enabling the institution to realize significant operating surpluses after years of deficits, but developed an innovative educational model that directly impacted retention, graduation rates, and student success. By offering courses in a variety of delivery modalities, including blocks sessions, accelerated, low residency, and traditional semesters, we were able to deliver a unique, sustainable solution to the educational needs of traditional, nontraditional, and graduate students while at the same time creating a new business and human resource model for the university. My work on the Jewish Hospital Saint Mary’s Healthcare System Board of Trustees in a leadership role has allowed me to be directly involved in developing policies and procedures impacting patient care, safety, operating efficiencies, and human resource policies across a system encompassing ambulatory, community hospitals and tertiary care facilities, an inpatient psychiatric hospital, a comprehensive rehabilitation facility, and clinical research. My current work as president of Mount Ida College and being a member of the Board of Trustees of Regis University have given me additional opportunities to lead an organization through a period of significant transition and be at the forefront of educational innovation. Other corporate and civic engagements have enabled me to lead organizations through dynamic structural and financial changes enabling them to better serve their constituents. My many years of experience outside of post secondary education in tax law, business, and finance provide me with a solid foundation and breadth of knowledge to deal with complex legal, financial, and policy issues.
MAJOR CHALLENGES

**Question.** In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (P&R)?

**Answer.** There are a number of challenges facing P&R to ensure the human resource systems for civilian and military personnel, Active and Reserve, provide the level of training and high level skills needed to support current as well as potential future engagements. This includes evaluating and providing appropriate compensation and personnel policies commensurate with the skills and sacrifices being made by those in service to our country; ensuring quality, world-class health care, including mental health support, to ill and injured servicemembers; and providing comprehensive support services to families of servicemembers. In addition, there needs to be ongoing evaluation of current policies and procedures to identify opportunities for enhanced efficiencies without impacting service delivery.

**Question.** If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

**Answer.** Although I do not have specific recommendations at this time, if confirmed, I would review the plans currently in place to address these challenges and determine what modifications, if any, need to be made. I would look for opportunities to enhance communication and collaboration with my colleagues throughout DOD to improve effectiveness in delivering programs supporting Personnel and Readiness.

DUTIES

**Question.** Section 136a of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness shall assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in the performance of his or her duties.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense to assign me my duties, through the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, functions, and responsibilities currently mandated by law and specified in the Department’s directives for the position of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

**Question.** In carrying out these duties, what would be your relationship with the following officials:

- The Secretary of Defense.
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)).
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD(RA)).
- The DOD General Counsel.
- The DOD Inspector General.
- The Service Secretaries.
- The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would serve the Secretary as his advisor and advocate for the management of human resources in the Department.

If confirmed, I would serve the Deputy Secretary as his advisor and advocate for the management of human resources in the Department.

If confirmed, ASD(HA) would be my principal advisor for all DOD health policies, programs, and force health protection activities.

If confirmed, ASD(RA) would be my principal advisor for all Reserve component matters in the Department of Defense (DOD).

If confirmed, I would anticipate regular communication, coordination of actions, and exchange of views with the General Counsel and the attorneys assigned to focus on personnel and readiness policy matters. I would expect to seek and follow the advice of the General Counsel on legal, policy, and procedural matters pertaining to the policies promulgated from the USD(P&R).

If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on all matters relating to the management and well-being of military and civilian personnel in the DOD Total Force structure.

If confirmed, I would work through ASD(RA) to ensure effective integration of National Guard capabilities into a cohesive Total Force.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with these officials as partners in carrying out the human resource obligations of the Services.

Question. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force for Personnel, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with these officers to ensure that DOD attracts, motivates, and retains the quality people it needs.

Question. The combatant commanders.

Answer. If confirmed, I would foster mutually respectful working relationships that translate into providing the Total Force capabilities needed to complete combat missions.

Question. The Joint Staff, particularly the Director for Manpower and Personnel (J–1).

Answer. If confirmed, I would seek a close coordinating relationship and open channels of communication with the Joint Staff regarding personnel and readiness policy issues.

SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

Question. Servicemembers who are wounded and injured performing duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from Active Duty, if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007 illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain.

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured servicemembers and their families?

Answer. While I do not have enough information at this time to make a full assessment, I am aware that medical, benefit, and transitional assistance improvements have been made since 2007 to ensure our wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers receive the care and support necessary to either return to Active Duty or to civilian life. However, it is a continually evolving process with ever increasing demands and the Department must regularly evaluate its Wounded Warrior programs and constantly strive to improve.

Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based?

Answer. A significant strength, in my opinion, is the highest level priority the Department has placed on caring for our wounded warriors and their families. The sustained focus and assessment of the needs of the wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers will allow the Department to continue its progress in caring for these members.

Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?

Answer. The Department should better identify opportunities for improvement by putting in place a proactive assessment and evaluation process that corrects weaknesses.

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

Answer. Although I do not have any specific recommendations at this time, if confirmed, I would ensure that current programs and policies are regularly evaluated and outcome assessments conducted with adjustments made, as needed, to ensure necessary resources are in place to take care of our recovering wounded warriors and their families.

Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program, has been established to improve processing of servicemembers.

What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the Integrated DES?

Answer. There are always opportunities for improvements. I believe the Department has an obligation to our servicemembers participating in the Integrated DES to proactively evaluate the program and proactively apply lessons learned.

Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?
Answer. The Integrated DES is a collaborative effort between DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs. If confirmed, I would work in close collaboration with the Department of Veterans Affairs to continually evaluate the process and apply unified solutions to correct identified deficiencies.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS COLLABORATION

Question. Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of Veterans Affairs Shinseki have pledged their support for improving and increasing collaboration between their respective departments to support military servicemembers as they transition to veteran status, in areas of health and mental health care, disability evaluation, and compensation.

If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that DOD and Veterans Affairs achieve the administration’s objectives in DOD and VA collaboration?

Answer. If confirmed, I will be intimately involved in the collaborative efforts between DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs. I share the vision of a model interagency partnership that delivers seamless, high quality, and cost-effective services to beneficiaries and value to our Nation. I will do my utmost to provide leadership that enables the interagency effort and facilitate the completion of those goals. Together with USD(P&R), I will ensure that DOD continues to work closely with the Department of Veterans Affairs to ensure that transitioning servicemembers receive the benefits, care, and transition support they deserve.

DISABILITY SEVERANCE PAY

Question. Section 1646 of the Wounded Warrior Act, included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, enhanced severance pay and removed a requirement that severance pay be deducted from VA disability compensation for servicemembers discharged for disabilities rated less than 30 percent incurred in the line-of-duty in a combat zone or incurred during the performance of duty in combat-related operation as designated by the Secretary of Defense. In adopting this provision, Congress relied on the existing definition of a combat-related disability contained in title 10 U.S.C. 1413a(e)). Rather than using the definition intended by Congress, DOD adopted a more limited definition of combat-related operations, requiring that the disability be incurred during participation in armed conflict.

If confirmed, will you reconsider the Department’s definition of combat-related operations for purposes of awarding enhanced severance pay and deduction of severance pay from VA disability compensation?

Answer. Although I do not know the details, it is my understanding that a review of the policy implementing section 1646 of the Wounded Warrior Act is currently underway. If confirmed, I would look into the status of this review to ensure that any policy change relating to the definition, if warranted, meets the intent of Congress and is consistent with the governing statute.

HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY

Question. The current Homosexual Conduct Policy, commonly referred to as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” went into effect in February 1994 after months of congressional hearings and debate resulting in the enactment of a Federal statute. Although there have been some changes in how this policy has been implemented, the basic policy has not changed. President Obama made it clear that he intends to work with the military and with Congress to repeal the policy. Following their February 2, 2010, testimony recommending repeal of the policy, Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen, initiated a high-level, comprehensive review of the impact of repealing the current law.

What is your view on repealing or changing this policy?

Answer. If confirmed, I would assist the USD(P&R) to work closely with the Military Department Secretaries and the Service Chiefs to provide the Secretary of Defense the best advice possible on the way forward regarding this issue.

Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you anticipate playing in efforts to repeal or change this policy?

Answer. If Congress changes the law and if confirmed, I would assist USD(P&R) in leading the implementation of the change in the policy within DOD. I would work closely with the Services to ensure the revising of this policy is done in a way that maintains our highest state of military readiness.

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. What is your understanding of current policies and programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the military?
Answer. The Department does not endorse the establishment of religion, but it does guarantee its free exercise. The Department and the Military Services ensure servicemembers may observe the tenets of their respective religions, including the right to hold no specific religious conviction or affiliation.

Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith?

Answer. My understanding is that wearing particular articles of faith are permissible so long as the articles are neat and conservative; do not negatively impact the readiness, good order, or discipline of the unit; and the mission is not jeopardized. If confirmed, I would continue to monitor and evaluate this issue.

Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

Answer. Yes.

Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?

Answer. It is my understanding that the military chaplaincy has done an admirable job in ministering amidst the pluralistic environment of the military. Even as chaplains express their faith, they and their commanders also are asked to be as inclusive as possible when ministering to an interfaith group. I believe that as a group, military chaplains work to balance these responsibilities well.

Question. The Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed that “DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization.” Recommendation 2.7 of the Final Recommendations urged the Department to update policy to clarify guidelines for religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the Department to task the Defense Science Board to “undertake a multi-disciplinary study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and self-radicalization . . . ”.

What is your view of this recommendation?

Answer. I cannot make an assessment at this time, but if confirmed, evaluating the adequacy of current policies concerning the safeguarding of our servicemembers would be a top priority.

Question. Will you work to ensure that a scientific fact-based approach to understanding radicalization will drive the Department’s relevant policies on this topic?

Answer. If confirmed, I would review the plans that are currently in place to address these challenges, and determine what, if any, changes should be made to them to address this critical issue. I would intend to collaborate with my colleagues in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Services, and the Joint Staff in charting the right course for the Department.

PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

Question. One year ago, 13 people were slain and scores wounded during a shooting rampage allegedly carried out by a U.S. Army medical corps officer. A DOD review of the attack released in January 2010 concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization among military personnel.

What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at Fort Hood?

Answer. It is my understanding that while the first responders and initial response teams were well-prepared to react to this incident, the proceeding warning signals were not properly recognized and therefore, this tragedy was not prevented. If confirmed, I would work with the USD(P&R) to gain a comprehensive understanding of the lessons learned, corrective actions taken, and the plan moving forward in order to increase our force protection on our installations.

Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with DOD leadership to strengthen the areas identified by the Fort Hood Independent Review to include mitigating violence in the workplace, ensuring commanders/ supervisors have access to appropriate personnel records, and integrating and strengthening force protection policies. Furthermore, I will work closely with our medical community to give commanders a better understanding of how to identify violence indicators.
MUSLIMS IN THE U.S. MILITARY

Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?

Answer. Every servicemember has a right to practice their religious faith without fear of persecution or retribution. If confirmed, I will review policies to ensure that they are adequate to provide physical and emotional safety from religious harassment and will take appropriate action, if needed.

Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the U.S. military?

In order to safeguard the rights of servicemembers, there must be both formal and informal feedback procedures that quickly identify and assess any harassment, should it occur. Responses to grievances, or any identified shortcomings in command climate assessments, must be quick, thoughtful, and effective. If confirmed, I would review the viability of these feedback systems, and take measures to correct them, as appropriate.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Department has in recent years developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However, numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in combat areas of operation are still being reported. Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate treatment for the victim. They assert that their command fails to respond appropriately with basic medical services and with an adequate investigation of their charges followed by a failure to hold assailants accountable.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has put considerable effort into the development of policies and programs designed to address sexual assault. If confirmed, I would review those policies to ensure the Department provides the appropriate care to victims and hold offenders accountable.

Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which this new confidential reporting procedure has been put into operation?

Answer. I have not been informed of any specific problems in the implementation of the confidential reporting option, called restricted reporting. I am aware that the restriction of no investigation when a victim chooses restricted reporting has concerned commanders responsible for the actions of their unit members. I believe that the Department must find a balance between victim care and offender accountability but of the utmost importance is that victims come forward and obtain support they need following an assault.

Question. What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including assaults against contractor personnel?

Answer. I do not have enough information to make a detailed assessment at this time, but I am aware the Department has focused on educating servicemembers deploying to combat zones about how to prevent sexual assault and what to do should it occur. That said, it has been made clear to me that if anyone shows up at a military treatment facility following a sexual assault, he or she will receive care.

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Answer. I know that all Services have been directed to establish guidelines for a 24-hour, 7-day per week sexual assault response capability for all locations, including deployed areas. At this time, I cannot make an assessment of the effectiveness of those guidelines, but if confirmed, evaluating the adequacy of training and resources allocated to sexual assault investigation and response would be a top priority.

Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?

Answer. I strongly believe that anyone who commits a sexual assault in the military needs to know that they will be held accountable. That is how DOD removes perpetrators from our ranks and, at the same time, show victims that taking the difficult step of assisting with an investigation will help their fellow servicemembers. I understand that the Services are working towards increasing the subject matter expertise of those investigating and prosecuting sexual assaults. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that accountability remains a key priority.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults?

Answer. Sexual assault reaches across the Department, and as such, outreach and accountability efforts need to have the same reach. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department has the correct structure in place to engage the departmental leadership, and the leadership of other agencies such as the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Health and Human Services, and Justice, in planning, guiding, and evaluating our efforts.

SERVICE ACADEMIES

Question. What do you consider to be the policy and procedural elements that must be in place at each of the Service Academies in order to prevent and respond appropriately to sexual assaults and sexual harassment and to ensure essential oversight?

Answer. I believe the Department’s sexual assault and sexual harassment policies provide a foundation for combating sexual misconduct at the Service Academies. There must be policies and procedures that encourage victims to come forward and that hold offenders accountable, as well as effective training programs. It is my understanding that the academies have institutionalized prevention and response programs. I further understand that the Department reviews the efforts of the academies annually. If confirmed, I would continue that oversight and determine whether additional measures need to be taken.

Question. What is your assessment of measures taken at the Service Academies to ensure religious tolerance and respect, and to prevent sexual assaults and sexual harassment?

Answer. Regarding religious tolerance, I do not have enough information to make an assessment at this time. I believe it is imperative that leaders, at all levels, must continue to ensure that every member of the DOD respects the spirit and intent of laws and policies surrounding the free exercise of religion.

On the topic of sexual assault, it is my understanding that the academies have institutionalized prevention and response programs. I further understand that the Department reviews the efforts of the academies annually. If confirmed, I would continue that oversight and determine whether additional measures need to be taken.

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. The Navy recently opened service on submarines to women and the Marine Corps recently expanded service opportunities for women in intelligence specialties. The issue of the appropriate combat role of women in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public. Do you believe additional specialties should be opened up for service by women?

Answer. In my opinion, DOD has sufficient flexibility under current law to make assignment policy for women, if needed. DOD should continue to monitor combat needs as Services recommend expanding deployment roles for women.

Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy regarding women in combat are needed?

Answer. I am not aware of any changes necessary at this time. It is my understanding that Department policy and practices are reviewed on a recurring basis to ensure compliance and effective use of manpower. If confirmed, I would take my responsibility to review each proposed policy change very seriously and ensure changes to existing policy move forward only when accompanied by a thorough plan for implementation.

RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that “medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.” In April 2009, Secretary Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force Base that “health care is eating the Department alive.” What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs on future DOD plans?

Answer. I am informed that government estimates indicate these costs could rise to over 10 percent of the DOD budget in just a few years. If confirmed, I would research means to ensure that DOD provides quality care, and it does so in the most cost-effective way that provides the best value for our servicemembers and their families.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or recommend to the Secretary of Defense to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?

Answer. I cannot make specific recommendations at this time. However, if confirmed, I would work closely with our healthcare leadership in DOD to examine every opportunity to assure military beneficiaries are provided the highest quality care possible while managing cost growth and to provide that advice to the Secretary of Defense.

Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of military health care?

Answer. I believe that to control the costs of military health care, DOD needs to research all possibilities. If confirmed, I would examine the costs of the direct care facilities, determining where efficiencies can be gained and investing wisely in infrastructure requirements. I would look at the efficiencies in procuring health care services in the civilian market, and, I would evaluate the benefit structure to see where reasonable changes could occur. In the long term, the promotion of healthy lifestyles and prevention among our beneficiaries will also help greatly reduce the demand for health services.

PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget. What actions do you believe can be taken to control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?

Answer. I am aware that personnel-related costs are consuming an increasing proportion of the Department’s finite resources. At the same time, I believe DOD cannot fail to adequately provide for and support our All-Volunteer Force and their families. This includes maintaining a sufficient rotation base for both our Active and Reserve personnel. If confirmed, I know achieving a right-sized mix of Active Duty, Reserve, civilians, and contractors is imperative. A key part of this challenge will be striking the optimum balance between personnel, recapitalization, and operational and support costs, while ensuring that related entitlements are appropriate and well-reasoned.

Question. In your view, can the Department and the Services efficiently manage the use of bonuses and special pays to place high quality recruits in the right jobs without paying more than the Department needs to pay, or can afford to pay, for others?

Answer. Although I do not have a detailed knowledge of the Department’s and the Services’ special pay programs at this time, I believe the use of targeted pays and bonuses can be effectively and efficiently used in recruiting and retaining specific skills and specialties.

MENTAL HEALTH

Question. Senior military leaders, including the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, increasingly recognize the need to reduce the stigma for military personnel and their families and veterans in seeking mental health care. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in expanding breadth of this message to military personnel and their families?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that existing DOD efforts to combat stigma toward help-seeking behavior among servicemembers be supported and, if necessary, would expand the breadth of the outreach efforts. I fully support the Department’s efforts to improve health and mental health care services, and reduce the stigma of mental health care.

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services has increased in recent years. The Army released a report in June 2010 that analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high-risk behaviors. If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping DOD policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families?

Answer. I believe DOD must support a culture to promote health and resiliency, and reduce high-risk behavior in the force. This requires both military and civilian leaders to be active participants in this effort and have essential roles in providing
the requisite support. If confirmed, I will assure that proper emphasis on suicide prevention is placed through training, reducing stigma, increasing resilience, and increasing access to care. I will focus on providing standardization, integration of best practices, and general oversight, serving as a change agent and providing guidance from which the Services can operate their suicide prevention programs.

Question. What is your understanding of the action that the Office of the Secretary of Defense is taking in response to the June 2010 Army report, and the data in Chapter 3 in particular?

Answer. The Army released a report in June 2010 that analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high-risk behaviors. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army is enforcing existing regulations and policies and has implemented risk mitigation strategies in suicide prevention for the substance abuse and behavior issues (disciplinary and high risk) they identified. In addition, I would support ongoing assessment and monitoring of the impact of these policies and regulations on the suicide rate.

READINESS RESPONSIBILITIES

Question. Section 136 of title 10, U.S.C., gives the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness certain responsibilities for military readiness. Some important issues that affect military readiness, however, such as logistics and materiel readiness, have been placed under the jurisdiction of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in ensuring military readiness?

Answer. I view the responsibilities of the USD(P&R) as to advise the Secretary on all matters related to readiness. These include oversight of civilian and military training and education, personnel and medical readiness, and the analysis of broad mission assessments from the combatant commanders regarding the readiness of key units in support of the Secretary’s deployment decisions. As for readiness responsibilities across the Department, if confirmed, I will work collaboratively with my colleagues in OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services to ensure our forces are ready to execute the National Military Strategy, and I will sustain the readiness synergism and linkages that exist today across the Department, the other Federal Agencies, our coalition partners, and local governments and communities.

Question. What are the most critical objectives to improve readiness reporting and monitoring of the Military Forces, and if confirmed, how would you work with the Military Departments as well as other Office of the Secretary of Defense offices to achieve them?

Answer. I believe the Department needs accurate and timely readiness assessments of our military forces. These are the gauge by which DOD should measure our ability to execute the missions assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense. Accurate assessments allow the Department to effectively plan and manage its forces, and signal where there are capability shortfalls or assets are needed. It is my understanding that the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) provides the means to capture these assessments from our military commanders, and provides a holistic and important view of the Department’s readiness to the senior leadership. If confirmed, I would personally review DRRS implementation to ensure the Department is meeting the needs of the senior leadership and a unity of effort across the Department to drive this important effort to a fully operational capability.

ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH


In your view, what is the appropriate Active Duty end strength for each of the Services?

Answer. While I cannot make an informed assessment at this time, I believe strongly that our forces, both Active and Reserve, must be large enough to not only satisfy deployed demands, but also have a rotation base that recognizes the personal needs of our volunteers and their families. If confirmed, I would devote considerable attention to this important issue.

Question. What challenges will the Services face in maintaining these higher end strengths?

Answer. The foremost challenge will be monitoring and responding to retention and recruiting trends, especially as the economy improves.
MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. DOD continues to face significant shortages in critically needed military medical personnel in both the Active and Reserve components. The committee is concerned that growing medical support requirements will compound the already serious challenges faced in recruitment and retention of military medical, dental, nurse, and behavioral health personnel. What is your understanding of the shortages of health care professionals currently being experienced in DOD and the sufficiency of the plans to meet recruiting and retention goals?

Answer. Regarding military healthcare servicemembers, it is my understanding the current overall manning of the health professions is at or above manning requirements. If confirmed, one of my goals will be to improve the recruitment and retention of health professional specialties which currently fall below manning requirements. To retain our health professionals, Congress has provided DOD broad authority to provide special and incentive pays for all health professional officers. I believe there is an increased need for civilian healthcare providers and DOD must remain competitive to recruit from the civilian labor market.

Question. What legislative and policy initiatives, including bonuses and special pays, do you think may be necessary to ensure that the Military Services can continue to meet medical support requirements?

Answer. In regard to legislative and policy initiatives for the Military Services, I do not have any specific recommendations at this time. However, I believe there may be a need for more flexible recruiting and retention strategies such as the recently granted authority to use bonuses and special pays as needed to recruit, hire, and retain medical specialties.

DWELL TIME

Question. Even though dwell time is improving as our forces draw down in Iraq, many Active Duty military members are still not experiencing the ideal dwell time of 2 years at home for every year deployed. In your view, when will the Active component dwell time goal be met?

Answer. From my perspective, the largest impact to dwell time will come from the balance of the drawdown in Iraq and the President’s decisions regarding Afghanistan. Increases in end strength for the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces over the past several years should translate into dwell times increasing. The Iraq drawdown will also serve to increase the dwell time for our units as fewer forces will need to be deployed. How much this will increase dwell time depends on the level of forces needed for Afghanistan. In all cases, however, DOD must carefully manage our forces across the Department. This involves careful assessment of where and when military forces are needed, and how to structure the force to best meet the projected demands.

Question. In your view, would additional Army end strength in 2011 or 2012 improve dwell time ratios and reduce stress on the force, and if so, what numbers of Active and Reserve component members would be necessary?

Answer. I do not have enough information to make an assessment at this time. I defer to the analysis of the Quadrennial Defense Review as to whether current end strength increases are sufficient in light of anticipated strategy and projected needs.

MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. Over the past 9 years, the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems arose in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening and medical readiness, monitoring, antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and lack of access to members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve Force management policies and systems have been characterized in the past as inefficient and rigid and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies. What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems still exist?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has focused on increasing the alert and mobilization times prior to mobilization; DOD needs to ensure that we provide predictability to servicemembers, their families, and employers. If confirmed, I would continue the efforts of the Department to monitor this issue closely, as we know that predictability is a major factor for all those affected, and I believe
strongly that National Guard and Reserve personnel deserve first-class mobilization and demobilization procedures, health screening, and transition assistance programs.

**Question.** What do you consider to be the most significant enduring changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?

**Answer.** It is my understanding the most significant enduring changes are in the implementation of service force generation plans, which have been created to provide a defined cycle to prepare Reserve component units for employment as an operational force. This enables units to train for a mission prior to mobilization and deploy and redeploy on a predictable timeline.

**Question.** Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would review existing authorities and proposed legislation to ensure that the Department has appropriate authorities in light of the role of the Guard and Reserves in our force deployment plans.

**MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF THE RESERVES**

**Question.** Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee, and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for improved policy oversight and accountability.

If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?

**Answer.** It is essential for DOD and all the Service components to have a single repository of data which accurately reflects the medical and dental readiness of the Reserve components. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Health Affairs and Reserve Affairs in bringing the appropriate parties, including information management, medical, and line personnel, together to examine the reporting processes in detail, to agree on the necessary definitions of what and who should be monitored, and to fill any gaps in the reporting processes.

**Question.** How would you improve upon the Department’s ability to produce a healthy and fit Reserve component?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will closely examine the significant progress in improvement that I understand has been made in medical and dental readiness for the Reserve component and identify what still needs to be accomplished to achieve the goal of a healthy and fit Reserve component force.

**MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE**

**Question.** In January 2009, the Department published its second Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of key quality-of-life factors for military families, such as family support, child care, education, health care, and morale, welfare, and recreation services.

How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment and retention and quality-of-life improvements and your own top priorities for the Armed Forces?

**Answer.** Quality-of-life efforts impact the recruitment and retention of military personnel and are key to maintaining the All-Volunteer Force. A servicemember’s satisfaction with various aspects of military life as well as the servicemember’s family experience influences members’ decision to reenlist. If confirmed, I would review how effectively our programs meet the needs of servicemembers and their families, and ensure that they are contributing positively to recruitment and retention.

**Question.** How would you improve upon the Department’s ability to produce a healthy and fit Reserve component?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will closely examine the significant progress in improvement that I understand has been made in medical and dental readiness for the Reserve component and identify what still needs to be accomplished to achieve the goal of a healthy and fit Reserve component force.

**FAMILY SUPPORT**

**Question.** Military members and their families in both the Active and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns
among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations that go with them.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

Answer. If confirmed, I would make family readiness issues one of my top priorities. I would support, prioritize, and appropriately resource quality physical and mental healthcare, spouse career assistance, childcare, other elements of dependent support, and education needs.

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and growth in end strength?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the Department's current approach to identify and address family readiness needs, to gather information from the Services, commands, servicemembers and families, professional organizations, and researchers about how to best prepare families for rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and other stressful aspects of military life.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department's Yellow Ribbon Program is properly focused and funded to address the issues faced by members of the Active, Guard, and Reserve and their families. The program should provide information, access, referrals, and outreach to military members and their families. This needs to be underwritten by a coordinated, community-based network of care encompassing DOD, VA, State, local, non-profit, and private providers. My goal would be to provide a full range of services for Active, Guard, and Reserve members and their families.

Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to enhance family support?

Answer. If confirmed, I would encourage the implementation of flexible family support programs that meet the needs of our servicemembers and their families, whether they live on military installations, near military installations, or far from military installations.

ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE

Question. One of the major concerns for military family members is access to health care. Military spouses tell us that the healthcare system is inundated, and those stationed in more remote areas may not have access to adequate care.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure complete access to healthcare for the families of servicemembers?

Answer. I agree that access to care for family members is an important concern and, if confirmed, I will work to ensure appropriate access to care is a key feature of our TRICARE program and will continually explore ways to ensure all beneficiaries are provided the appropriate level of care within the established TRICARE Access to Care Standards.

OFFICE OF COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR MILITARY FAMILIES WITH SPECIAL NEEDS

Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (section 563), Congress required the establishment of an Office of Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The purpose of this office is to enhance and improve DOD support for military families with special needs, be they educational or medical in nature.

In your view, what should be the priorities of this Office of Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs?

Answer. I believe the priorities of this office include medical and educational programs to strengthen military families with special needs. If confirmed, I would support the critical efforts of this office to establish consistent policy and monitor its implementation across the Services. I would identify programs already in existence that can provide special services to military families.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure outreach to those military families with special needs dependents so they are able to get the support they need?

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure increased communication efforts to reach families with special needs through the use of webinars, social media outlets, base newspapers, commissaries and exchanges, childcare centers and youth facilities, DOD schools and a variety of DOD and Services' websites. In addition, I would emphasize collaboration with civilian community resources.
MY CAREER ADVANCEMENT ACCOUNTS PROGRAM

Question. The Department established the My Career Advancement Accounts (MyCAA) program, a demonstration project that provides military spouses with funds through “career advancement accounts” to help enable them to pursue portable careers. In February 2010, the Department became overwhelmed by the numbers of program applicants, subsequently ran out of funds, and then temporarily halted the program. The program has now restarted, but the funds, as well as the number of spouses who would be eligible for the program, will be more limited.

What is your understanding of the current focus and objectives of the program?

Answer. I believe the objective of the MyCAA program is to ensure that military spouses have opportunities to pursue and sustain a career while supporting their servicemembers. It is my understanding that the current MyCAA is available only to spouses of Active Duty members in the pay grades of E1–E5, W1–W2, and O1–O2. MyCAA is restricted to $4,000 per eligible spouse and must be used over a 3-year period for an Associate’s degree, a license, or a credential leading to a portable career. I believe these financial parameters will allow the Department to sustain the program. It is my understanding that DOD continues to offer robust career counseling programs to all our spouses.

MEDICAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS

Question. What do you see as the highest priority medical research investment areas for DOD?

Answer. I believe the highest priorities are to address critical research capability gaps related to the treatment and recovery of wounded warriors, such as the diagnosis and treatment of Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and other elements of combat related stress, development of improved prosthetics, treatment of eye injury, and other deployment and battlefield-related injuries.

Question. How will you assess the amount of investment made in these research areas to determine if they are sufficient to meet DOD goals and requirements?

Answer. If confirmed, I would review the current research portfolio to ensure it prioritizes and resources research appropriate to the requirements of the Department.

Question. How will you ensure that DOD medical research efforts are well coordinated with similar research programs within the private sector, academia, the Services, DARPA, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the National Institutes of Health?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support coordination efforts to ensure that research is being conducted jointly, building on and partnering with industry, academia, and other government agencies to ensure the greatest return to our warfighters. I am aware that joint program committees have been established to engage with Federal partners to ensure that our research reflects the best interests of our service personnel.

Question. How will you ensure that new medical technologies (including drugs and vaccines) are independently and adequately tested before their use by DOD organizations and personnel?

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department applies the highest standards of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to ensure new medical technologies, drugs, and vaccines are safe and effective before they are adopted for use in the Department.

Question. There have been growing privacy and security concerns raised about the use of on-line social networks for medical research purposes.

How will you ensure that the increasing use of social networking media for medical research purposes will protect the privacy and security of patients?

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure active application of the Department’s policy, which states that the rights and welfare of human subjects in research sup-
ported or conducted by the DOD components will be protected. This protection is based on the ethical principles of respect for persons and beneficence, and encompasses requirements to obtain informed consent and to do no harm. In implementing this policy, the Department will adhere to the applicable statutory provisions for human protections in research as well as supporting Department policies.

Question. What are your biggest concerns related to the DOD medical research enterprise?

Answer. Although I do not have detailed knowledge of the entire research portfolio, I am especially interested in ensuring the responsiveness of the research program to medical readiness and our warfighters’ medical needs. This will be accomplished by assuring that DOD has a balanced investment in medical science and technology and in medical advanced development leading to timely incorporation into clinical practice in the Military Health System.

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including Active Duty and Reserve personnel and retirees. What challenges do you foresee in sustaining MWR programs (particularly in view of the Secretary’s efficiencies initiatives) and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?

Answer. It is my understanding that the benefits of strong MWR programs are critical to esprit de corps, stress reduction, and personal health and well-being. Although there are very extensive installation MWR facilities and programs, I believe there is an immediate challenge in ensuring that MWR programs for our deployed forces meet their needs, especially free access to the Internet to communicate with family and friends back home and fitness and recreation activities to keep forces fit to fight. Recreation support for our wounded warriors is also critical. In the longer term, I believe the Department needs to understand what programs are valued by servicemembers and their families in order to make wise investments. In addition, the MWR customers need to be involved in expressing their needs and satisfaction with our programs and policies; I understand the Department will conduct the second MWR customer satisfaction survey in fiscal year 2011. If confirmed, these are all areas I would aggressively pursue.

COMMISSARY AND MILITARY EXCHANGE SYSTEMS

Question. Commissary and military exchange systems are significant quality of life components for members of the Active and Reserve Forces and their families. What is your view of the need for modernization of business policies and practices in the commissary and exchange systems, and what do you view as the most promising avenues for change to achieve modernization goals?

Answer. I understand that commissary and exchange programs and policies must continue to evolve to meet the needs and expectations of our changing force and a changing marketplace. I believe efforts should be aimed at reducing overhead and pursuing new avenues to reach our military families who do not live on military installations. The commissary system should deliver customer savings and also achieve high satisfaction ratings. The military exchange resale community must continue to work, individually and collaboratively, to adapt marketing and selling practices, invest in technologies, and improve merchandise availability to be more responsive to military customers.

Question. In the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to establish an executive governing body for the commissary and exchange systems to ensure the complementary operation of the two systems. What is your understanding of the purpose and composition of the executive governing body?

Answer. I am aware the Department established the DOD Executive Resale Board as the governing body to provide advice to the USD(P&R) regarding the complementary operation of the commissary and exchange systems. I have been informed that the Board works to resolve issues and has been instrumental in pursuing matters of mutual benefit to the elements of the military resale system. The Board is chaired by the PDUSD(P&R), and members include both the senior military officers and civilians who oversee and manage the commissary and exchange systems.

Question. If confirmed, what would your role be with respect to the governing body, and what would your expectations be for its role?
Answer. The Secretary designated the PDUSD(P&R) as the chairperson of the Executive Resale Board. If confirmed, I would ensure the Board would continue to meet regularly to review operational areas of mutual interest to the commissary and exchange systems.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SYSTEMS

Question. Section 1113 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 repealed the statutory authority for the National Security Personnel System (NSPS), and required that all NSPS employees be converted to other personnel systems by no later than January 1, 2012.

What is your understanding of the Department’s progress in converting its civilian employees from NSPS?

Answer. I understand during fiscal year 2010, 172,000 employees representing approximately 76 percent of the NSPS population were transitioned from NSPS to the Government-wide General Schedule system. I also understand the transition of all remaining NSPS employees to the appropriate statutory pay and personnel system will be completed by the statutory deadline of January 1, 2012.

Question. Section 1113 also provides DOD with extensive personnel flexibilities for its civilian employees that are not available to other agencies. In particular, section 9902(a) of title 5, U.S.C., as added by section 1113, directs the Department to establish a new performance management system for all of its employees. Section 9902(b) directs the Department to develop a streamlined new hiring system that is designed to better fulfill DOD’s mission needs, produce high-quality applicants, and support timely personnel decisions.

Do you agree that DOD’s civilian employee workforce plays a vital role in the functioning of the Department?

Answer. Yes, DOD’s civilian employee workforce plays an instrumental role in the functioning of the Department.

Question. What is your view of the personnel flexibilities provided by section 1113?

Answer. I understand Congress provided these flexibilities to allow the Department to better meet mission requirements. If confirmed, I will support the work that I understand is under way to develop the flexibilities.

Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement these flexibilities in a manner that best meets the needs of the Department and promotes the quality of the Department’s civilian workforce?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Section 1112 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directs the Department to develop a Defense Civilian Leadership Program (DCLP) to recruit, train, and advance a new generation of civilian leaders for the Department. Section 1112 provides the Department with the full range of authorities available for demonstration programs under section 4703 of title 5, U.S.C., including the authority to compensate participants on the basis of qualifications, performance, and market conditions. These flexibilities are not otherwise available to DOD.

Do you agree that the Department needs to recruit highly qualified civilian personnel to meet the growing needs of its acquisition, technical, business, and financial communities?

Answer. Yes.

Question. In your view, has the existing civilian hiring process been successful in recruiting such personnel and meeting these needs?

Answer. Although I believe the Department currently has a highly talented workforce, I wholeheartedly support the initiatives to streamline and reform the civilian hiring process. There is much work to be done in this area, and if confirmed, I would ensure that the Department actively engages in the Government-wide initiative to reform civilian hiring and aggressively pursues improvements within the Department.

Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement the authority provided by section 1112 in a manner that best meets the needs of the Department and promotes the quality of the Department’s civilian workforce?

Answer. Yes.

HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING

Question. Section 115b of title 10, U.S.C., as added by section 1108 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2010 requires the Secretary of Defense to develop and annually update a strategic human capital plan that specifically identifies gaps in the Department’s civilian workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps. Sec-
tion 115b requires that the plan include chapters specifically addressing the Department’s senior management, functional, and technical workforce and the Department’s acquisition workforce.

Would you agree that a strategic human capital plan that identifies gaps in the workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps is a key step toward ensuring that the Department has the skills and capabilities needed to meet future challenges?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the requirements for a strategic human capital plan under section 115b?

Answer. At this time, I have no recommendations. If confirmed, I would review the strategic human capital planning that the Department has conducted over the past years against the section 115b requirements to determine if any changes may be needed to improve the Department’s overall workforce planning effort.

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that DOD fully complies with these requirements?

Answer. Yes.

BALANCE BETWEEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES

Question. In recent years, DOD has become increasingly reliant on services provided by contractors. Over the past 8 years, DOD’s civilian workforce has remained essentially unchanged in size. Over the same period, the Department’s spending on contract services has more than doubled, with the estimated number of contractor employees working for the Department increasing from an estimated 730,000 in fiscal year 2000 to an estimated 1,550,000 in fiscal year 2007. As a result of the explosive growth in service contracts, contractors now play an integral role in the performance of functions that were once performed exclusively by government employees, including the management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of policies, the development of public relations strategies, and even the collection and analysis of intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions as Federal employees.

Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees and contractor employees is in the best interests of DOD?

Answer. I support the Secretary’s initiative announced with the fiscal year 2010 budget to reduce the Department’s reliance on contracted services contractors. I believe the desired outcome of the Department’s in-sourcing initiative is a balanced total workforce of military, government civilians, and contracted services that appropriately align functions to the public and private sector, and results in the best value for the taxpayer.

Question. In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors to perform its basic functions?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Department’s ongoing efforts to critically examine currently contracted functions. Striking a balance between government and contractor performance that ensures uncompromising government control of critical functions, while providing best value to the taxpayer, is imperative.

SECRETARY GATES’ EFFICIENCIES INITIATIVES

Question. In May 2010, Secretary Gates launched an initiative to strengthen and modernize our fighting forces by eliminating inefficient or duplicative programs. In an August 16, 2010, memo to DOD components, the Secretary directed 20 specific initiatives, many involving military and civilian personnel and DOD contractors.

What is your assessment of the efficiencies announced by the Secretary to date, and if confirmed, what criteria would you use to identify and justify additional opportunities for efficiency in programs within the purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness?

Answer. I understand that Secretary Gates is attempting to identify efficiencies and redundancies within DOD and, if confirmed, I would support the implementation and continuation of this effort. I would use the Secretary’s criteria to divest the Department of missions that are not appropriate or part of our core mission. I would also build on the Secretary of Defense’s work of finding greater efficiencies, with the goal of applying those resources toward higher priority efforts within the Department. From shared services to other process improvements, I would strive to ensure Personnel and Readiness is on the leading edge of efficiencies while still maintaining effectiveness for the Department.
ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Question. Over the past 15 years, DOD has dramatically reduced the size of its acquisition workforce, without undertaking any systematic planning or analysis to ensure that it would have the specific skills and competencies needed to meet current and future needs. Since September 11, 2001, moreover, the demands placed on that workforce have substantially increased. Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 established an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address shortcomings in its acquisition workforce. The fund would provide a minimum of $3 billion over 6 years for this purpose.

Do you believe that DOD acquisition workforce is large enough and has the skills needed to perform the tasks assigned to it?

Answer. While I cannot make an assessment of the size of the workforce at this time, I fully support the Secretary’s goals of increasing the capacity and capability of the acquisition workforce through reducing reliance on contracted services in key acquisition support functions.

Question. Do you support the use of the DOD Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost effective manner for the taxpayers?

Answer. Yes.

LABORATORY PERSONNEL DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM


If confirmed, will you fully implement the laboratory demonstration program and the authorities under these provisions?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the directors of the defense laboratories are provided the full range of personnel flexibilities and authorities provided by Congress?

Answer. Yes.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by the Department on March 30, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at transforming the Department’s foreign language capabilities, to include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities-based requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for both military and civilian personnel.

In your view, what should be the priorities of the Federal Government to expanding the foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel and improving coordination of foreign language programs and activities among the Federal agencies?

Answer. The priorities of the Federal Government to expanding the foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel and improving coordination between foreign language programs and activities among the Federal agencies should be an integrated, holistic, whole-of-nation approach to developing these skills beginning in pre-school and continuing through high school and college graduation. The shortage of language and cultural skills is a national shortfall, not just an isolated DOD problem. If confirmed, I will support and build upon DOD efforts to ensure the education of a broader pool of Americans with skills in critical languages. Early education and skill development in critical foreign languages is paramount and must begin in pre-school and continue through high school graduation. Educating our children must begin in pre-school and continue throughout their educational journey in critical languages will result in globally competitive citizens from which DOD, other Federal Government agencies, and the private sector can recruit.

GI BILL BENEFITS

Question. Congress passed the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act in 2008 that created enhanced educational benefits for servicemembers who have served at least 90 days on Active Duty since September 11. The maximum benefit
would roughly cover the cost of a college education at any public university in the country.

What unresolved issues related to implementation of the post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act (e.g., coverage of additional military personnel) do you consider most important to be addressed?

Answer. It is my understanding that there are two technical fixes needed in the current statute. First, the original statute inadvertently left out some National Guard Active Duty as qualifying time for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. Second, although the statute authorized the Services to offer a supplemental payment for enlistments in critical skills (commonly called "kickers"), it did not include the specific language required to allow the Services to use the Education Trust Fund to pay for these kickers. Both of these provisions are rectified in the current version of S. 3447, recently introduced in the Senate.

**MILITARY RETIREMENT**

Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more resembles the benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement System than the current military retirement benefit; increasing TRICARE fees for retirees; and the adoption of dependent care and flexible spending accounts for service members. The head of a Defense Business Board Task Force has criticized military benefits as "GM-style benefits" describing the military retirement system as a "pre-volunteer force retirement system" and criticizing "taxpayer-subsidized grocery chains and low out-of-pocket healthcare costs."

What is your view of the adequacy of the current military retirement benefit?

Answer. I have not yet formed an opinion on the adequacy of the current military retirement benefit. However, it is only one component of the entire military compensation system. I believe it will be important to consider the impacts of making changes to one part of the system so that DOD maintains their current high quality military force.

Question. How might it be modernized to reflect the needs of a new generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost of the government?

Answer. I don’t have a recommendation at this time, but if confirmed, I would review this issue carefully.

Question. Do you share the Defense Business Board Task Force view of military benefits?

Answer. I have not reviewed this report in detail, but I know that one of its major recommendations was changing the military retirement system.

It is my understanding that the Defense Business Board is considering alternatives to the current military retirement system and alternatives for the Department to consider. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing these and other proposals with the military departments.

**CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT**

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK BEGICH

1. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, there are over 89,000 TRICARE beneficiaries in the State of Alaska. Active Duty military, their families, and retirees face many challenges accessing health care in Alaska. The Military Treatment Facilities (MTF) at Fort Wainwright and Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB) are top quality and provide many services to military members and their families. However, many specialties are neither available at the MTFs or at capacity and cannot accommodate all customers. Many civilian specialists in Alaska do not participate in the TRICARE network. I've worked extensively with TRICARE Management Activity and the Services to improve access to care. I commissioned an interagency working group which identified the need for regulatory flexibility and a single reimbursement rate to improve access to care in Alaska. Are you aware of these challenges? If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve access to healthcare in Alaska?

Dr. Rooney. I am aware of these challenges. I have been advised that throughout Alaska there are roughly 1,783 non-Federal physicians of whom 1,566 are TRICARE Participating Providers. Of the 1,566 TRICARE participating providers, 793 are primary care physicians with specialties in family practice, general practice, internal medicine, and pediatrics. The TRICARE Management Activity's strong support in approving 12 locality-based waivers ranging from 125 percent to 565 percent of the CHAMPUS Maximum Allowable Charge (CMAC) for critical specialty providers, coupled with an existing Rate Reimbursement/Rate Demonstration which sets rates in Alaska at 1.4 times the CMAC allowable charges, has greatly increased acceptance of TRICARE by non-Federal providers. A significant change was noted from early 2008 to February 2011, when the TRICARE Preferred Provider Network increased from 465 to 845 providers.

If confirmed, I would continue to support the TRICARE Management Activity's efforts in this regard. While I was pleased to learn that the Rate Reimbursement Demonstration initially set to expire in December 2010 was extended until December 2012, I will ensure that future changes to the rate structure are done collaboratively with the various Federal agencies that are also exploring options resulting from the Interagency Task Force's recommendation for regulatory flexibility and a single Federal reimbursement rate.

2. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, please describe how you would work with the Army and the Air Force to ensure the MTFs in Alaska meet health care requirements of Active Duty military and their families, especially as the Army increases personnel stationed at Fort Wainwright.

Dr. Rooney. If confirmed, I will meet regularly with the Surgeons General of the Services and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to discuss provider and ancillary support staffing gaps in the three Alaska MTFs. I will encourage support of the MTFs to the maximum extent possible given the high operational tempo and associated deployments. I have been advised that, in all forums, there appears to be strong interest in ensuring access for all. This guided the TRICARE Management Activity's recently approved TRICARE Expansion Plan favorably endorsed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and the Services' Surgeons General in collaboration with the Alaska community leadership. The focus of the Expansion Plan is on improved access for Department of Defense (DOD) beneficiaries without displacing non-DOD beneficiaries. In the context of improving access and protecting non-DOD beneficiaries from DOD overflow, I will encourage the Services' Surgeons General and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to explore opportunities for partnerships with the Alaska community for such programs as Graduate Medical Education, thereby facilitating mutual positive outcomes. In addition, Elmendorf AFB already supports internships in dental, pharmacy lab, physician assistants, medical assistants, Doctor of Osteopathy, and a physician residency. State-wide recruiting efforts are being initiated by the State, hospitals, and our healthcare support contractor.

3. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, please describe how you would work with TRICARE Management Activity as they work to increase the TRICARE network in Alaska to provide for better access to health care for our servicemembers and their families.

Dr. Rooney. Access to care issues in Alaska cannot be addressed merely in terms of access to purchased care services in the community (network or non-network). As the interagency working group which you commissioned confirmed in their Report to Congress of September 2010, I have been advised that some of the issues are not
under the control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) or the Federal Government. These include licensure and certification rules, recruitment of primary care and specialty services, and apprehension on the part of private practitioners regarding changes in the reimbursement environment related to healthcare reform. Similarly, access challenges faced by TRICARE beneficiaries are no different from challenges faced by other beneficiaries covered by the Federal Government health plans or by many Alaskans covered by private pay plans. I was pleased to learn of the TRICARE Management Activity’s recent initiatives in the State of Alaska, which include:

- Establishing a TRICARE Civilian Preferred Provider Network requiring the West Region’s Health Care Support Contractor to develop and operate such a network in designated Prime Service Areas.
- Permitting eligible TRICARE beneficiaries to enroll in Prime with assignment to MTF Primary Care Managers, or, as an alternative, assignment to a civilian Primary Care Manager within the TRICARE civilian preferred provider network. This will allow approximately 250 to 300 beneficiaries to transfer to a civilian Primary Care Manager. This will include family practice, pediatrics, and internal medicine providers.
- Offering this new program, first, to the Prime Service Areas surrounding Fort Wainwright Army Base and Eielson AFB in Fairbanks and then, second, evaluating whether to expand it further into Anchorage surrounding the Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson.

Working jointly with the political leadership, the Services, and the community, the TRICARE Management Activity’s 18-month effort in bringing these initiatives to fruition is notable. If confirmed, I will continue to support these ongoing efforts while closely monitoring the impact these programs have on improving access to health care for our servicemembers and their families.

FAMILY DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT

4. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, one of my priorities is support for our military families, especially those in Alaska. The 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division will deploy to Afghanistan in May and I want to make sure their families are taken care of as their loved ones face yet another deployment. What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issue for servicemembers and their families?

Dr. Rooney. I share your priority of supporting our military families. The impact of a deployment or multiple deployments on military families is the most significant family readiness issue for servicemembers and their families. The challenges to military family readiness and resiliency are numerous stressors related to separation, deployment, geographic isolation, high operational tempo, and financial worries.

The Department has a network of Family Support Programs at all DOD installations worldwide that provide resources to prepare military families to effectively navigate the challenges of daily living experienced in the unique context of military service. Family Support Programs provide information and referral, education and training, and counseling services to educate families about the potential challenges they may face. The goal is to equip them with the skills needed to competently function in the face of such challenges and to increase their awareness of the supportive resources available to them. The focus of the support is to assist families with deployment, relocation, spousal employment, family life education (including parenting skills), personal financial management, volunteer opportunities, and non-medical counseling.

The Family Support Programs are designed to provide training and support to servicemembers and families during all phases of deployment. In particular, to address the impact of deployment on children and youth, the Department augments Family Support Programs with licensed counselors placed in child development centers, schools, and State family programs. The counselors provide specialized non-medical counseling education, and training for parents, teachers, child development staff, and with parental permission, children and youth. Given the frequency and length of deployments, and the impact those separations can have on military children, the support provided by the child and youth counselors throughout the deployment cycle is very important.

5. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, how would you ensure those needs are adequately resourced?

Dr. Rooney. I will ensure funding and trained personnel are provided to support the ongoing needs of the families. I share the Department’s strong commitment to
providing assistance to servicemembers and their families, particularly in light of the unprecedented demands that have been placed on them. Family assistance programs serve a critical need in direct mission support for the mobilization and deployment of both the Active Duty and the Reserve components and I would work closely with the Services to ensure resources are adequate to meet the identified needs.

In meeting the direction and goals of the Secretary of Defense to create a more efficient and effective organization, we will continue to review and assess where we can take offsets from existing programs to meet the high priority requirements and needs of the servicemembers and their families.

6. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, what additional steps will you take to enhance family support?

Dr. Rooney. I will ensure that existing as well as any new programs that serve families are continually assessed so that only those programs that add value and enhance family readiness and resilience are given resources and continued. I will insist that we integrate programs into a delivery system that is easily accessible and that ongoing evaluations focused on obtaining evidence of successful outcomes are developed. Successful support programs are those that respond directly to the needs identified by members and their families.

The promotion and publicizing of these support programs to servicemembers and their families are also priorities. It is critical to make sure the breadth and depth of the programs are known, that they are being used to their full potential, and that they are being recognized as valuable to helping servicemembers and their families cope with the challenges of daily living experienced in the context of military service.

In summary, it is important that:

A. Programs that support our servicemembers and their families which are regularly evaluated and have been shown to add value and enhance family readiness are resourced and continued;
B. Programs that are evidence-based are integrated into a delivery system that is easily accessible and those outcomes that respond to identified support needs of members and families are measured for effectiveness;
C. The support programs are adequately promoted and publicized; and
D. Innovative and effective programs are identified and presented as best practices for others to emulate.

OUTSOURCING VERSUS INSOURCING

7. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, regarding DOD’s outsourcing and insourcing efforts, it seems that the pendulum swings one way and then the other. I recently read an article which indicated the Army put their insourcing efforts on hold, and Secretary Gates has indicated the insourcing is not saving as much money as initially thought. In your opinion, how can DOD strike a balance between civilian and contractor employees that is in the best interest of DOD and the taxpayers?

Dr. Rooney. When issues of sourcing are discussed within DOD, the goal is to consider it from the perspective of Total Force Management. Across the entire Department, it is recognized that continuous improvement to the Total Force Management of Active and Reserve military, government civilians, and contracts for services are critical. We must ensure that our military is not considered a free source of labor by organizations within the Department who rely on the Services to finance their recruitment, training, and development. Rather, the true cost of military, government civilians, and/or contracted support should be determined depending on individual facts and circumstances. To that end, the strategic view of the Total Force continues to evolve as the mission and plan across the FYDP are executed.

Total Force Management requires a holistic analysis and prioritization of the work to be done. It requires identification of and investment in the most effective and efficient component of the workforce to best accomplish the tasks to deliver the required capabilities and level of readiness. The separate decisions that affect each component of the Total Force must be synchronized to achieve the desired outcomes and balance operational, fiscal, and acquisition risks.

The challenge faced with Total Force Management is that it is dynamic and requires judgment informed by sound analysis. This not only includes the development and promulgation of policies, but also requires the Department to provide managers with the tools, resources, training, and information necessary to achieve the desired outcomes, all of which must occur in a difficult fiscal environment. Cur-
rent business processes must be synchronized to ensure the risks associated with decisions made in the context of Total Force Management are fully considered.

There is work being undertaken to improve the Department’s Inventory of Contracts for Services, as recommended by the most recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of DOD processes and in compliance with changes to the governing statute as directed in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. The tools and processes that inform the Department’s inventory of military and civilian workload, the Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activities Inventory, are also being reviewed. Improvements to these tools are critical to achieve a more appropriate balance in the workforce, aligning inherently governmental activities to military and civilian workforces and commercial activities to the most cost effective service provider, whether military, civilian, or contracted support.

8. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, how will you approach this issue?

Dr. Rooney. I will approach this issue by recognizing that there has been a focus over the past few years on insourcing. The Department is committed to meeting the statutory obligations under title 10, which require an annual review of contracted services and identification of those services that are more appropriately performed by the government workforce and should be insourced.

There is no prescribed solution, and neither all insourcing nor all outsourcing is ideal. The private sector and contracted support are, and will continue to be, a vital source of expertise, innovation, and support to the Department’s Total Force.

We also acknowledge the concern express by Congress as related to the A–76 public-private competition program, and the opportunity in the past year to review related policies, tools, and processes. We believe that the A–76 public-private competition process along with insourcing are critical tools for commanders and managers to have available to them for the purposes of validating manpower and other requirements; driving more consistent delivery of mission critical support and services to warfighters and families; and delivering required readiness levels while minimizing fiscal opportunity costs to meet the compelling needs of the Department.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMS

9. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, the United States has come to rely heavily on our National Guard members. Our Guard has experienced the largest and most sustained deployment since World War II. In New Hampshire, we have seen the largest Guard deployments in the history of our State. You mention in your advance policy questions that you believe that National Guard and Reserve personnel “deserve first-class mobilization and demobilization procedures, health screening, and transition assistance programs.” If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers are extended first-class support benefits—before, during, and after their deployments?

Dr. Rooney. I share Congress’ sentiment that our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers deserve first-class mobilization and demobilization procedures, medical and dental screening, and transition assistance programs. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to ensure that they comply with departmental activation policy and that the policy is balanced and effective. I would support current departmental initiatives aimed at providing as much advanced notice to deploying servicemembers and units as possible. This will ensure that servicemembers receive their entitlements in a timely fashion. I also believe that it is imperative that transition assistance be made possible to all redeploying servicemembers of the Reserve component. I will work with the Services to ensure that pre- and post-deployment health assessments are conducted, and any identified medical issues are dealt with as soon as possible and in a compassionate manner. I support the current policy which authorizes medical benefits to our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers before, during, and after their activation. In addition, I fully support the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program that provides access to services and information for our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers and their families throughout the deployment cycle. I am interested in learning more about these initiatives and finding ways to emulate and integrate these best-practice competing programs on a wider scale. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure that our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers receive the benefits they deserve as they are activated in support of the defense of this Nation.
10. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, I'm especially concerned about the unique challenges and factors that affect our returning National Guard members as they reintegrate back to their jobs, homes, and families. Oftentimes, our State's National Guard leadership has a better understanding of the unique support needed on a State-by-State basis, and—in some States like New Hampshire—they have developed their own effective full-cycle deployment support programs. Will you commit to working closely with individual States and their National Guard leadership in order to develop the most effective, first-class programs you mention in your testimony?

Dr. Rooney. Yes. Understanding the unique needs and ensuring the effective reintegration of our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers back into their families, communities, and jobs is one of our most important responsibilities. The Department's Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program has been effective at addressing many of the issues that confront our returning warriors and their families and I am aware of some of the successful programs developed by individual States. I am committed to working with the broad array of Federal, State, and community programs and services to most effectively meet the needs of our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers and their families.

11. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, each of the Services has reported increasing numbers of suicides in recent years. If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping DOD policies to help prevent suicides not only to Active Duty personnel, but also to National Guard and Reserve servicemembers and their families?

Dr. Rooney. If confirmed, I would play a very active role. I have read the DOD Task Force Report on Suicide Prevention and found it to be thorough. I am impressed with the quality of the programs that each of the Services is currently employing and the active role that the Services' senior leaders play in the effort to prevent suicides among their respective members. There is still more that can be done, however. I believe that a single entity in the Department that would serve as a consistent policy and oversight authority DOD-wide, which would include the National Guard and Reserve, could disseminate information and interact with other departments, agencies, or organizations. This could also accelerate the implementation of key policy initiatives. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the recommendations which could have the most impact, as outlined in the report, were implemented in a timely and effective manner.

12. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, are you content with the programs as they are currently structured?

Dr. Rooney. While I believe the current suicide prevention programs among the Services as a whole are effective, there is clearly more that can be done. In early 2000, the overall DOD suicide rate was well below the rate of a comparable sample of the civilian population by almost half. One of the most promising avenues currently being pursued is our increasing emphasis on resilience across the Department highlighted by programs such as the Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF). CSF is a structured, long-term assessment and development program to build resilience and enhance performance of every soldier, family member, and civilian employee. It incorporates the principles of Total Force Fitness that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have populated across the Services. These concepts have also been embraced by the National Guard and Reserve Forces so training has been modified to meet the needs of this population. I believe the Department's focus on getting out ahead of this issue will pay dividends in the future and go a long way towards building a formula for resistance, resilience, and recovery.

13. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what more can we do to reduce the number of these tragedies?

Dr. Rooney. There are two other areas in which I believe we can make some progress. The first is data collection and standardization of reporting. I believe that more accurate and timely data can help us gain a further understanding of the complex issues and identify key leading indicators that we can use to take action before a potential suicide occurs. The second area is peer-to-peer programs that use the skills of our many veterans to directly interact with those in distress. I think this type of personal intervention program has significant potential to reach out to servicemembers particularly in the National Guard and Reserve where recent data has indicated a disturbing increase in suicide rates. Across the States, there are many great examples of National Guard and Reserve suicide prevention programs,
self-assessment programs, and other web-based tools. I believe that it is incumbent upon the Department to ensure that we are aware of these State-led programs and share the information across States so that others can build on their successes.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

14. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Rooney, in a February 15 Federal class-action lawsuit, more than a dozen female and two male current and former U.S. military servicemembers allege that incidents of sexual assault and misconduct were not adequately investigated or pursued. Sexual assault is an extremely grave concern, and all allegations should be taken seriously and investigated immediately. What is your response to this lawsuit and allegations that commanders are failing to respond appropriately to allegations of sexual assaults?

Dr. ROONEY. I cannot comment directly on current litigation. However, clearly, sexual assaults have no place in the U.S. Armed Forces. One sexual assault is one too many, and leadership throughout DOD has expressed this as well. However, when an assault does occur, victims are encouraged to come forward using one of the two reporting options available to get the help and services they need.

The Department reviewed pre-command training and has proposed revised training standards for the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) policy that will be reissued this spring. In addition, all of the Service Chiefs and Secretaries of the Military Departments have aggressively championed the SAPR program at Service summits and through a variety of communication channels. We have and will continue to make it clear that commanders have a duty to take every allegation of sexual assault seriously, to see to the safety and care of the parties involved, and to hold offenders accountable in each and every case where evidence supports such action. There is progress being made. In cases where there was sufficient evidence for commanders to take action and the victim has chosen unrestricted reporting, the percentage of subjects who had court-martial charges initiated against them increased from 30 percent in 2007 to 52 percent in 2010.

15. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Rooney, what specific levels and kinds of training are provided to officers and commanders in the field to respond in an appropriate way to allegations of sexual assault and misconduct?

Dr. ROONEY. DOD Instruction (DODI) 6495.02, SAPR Program Procedures, requires the Military Services to provide periodic, mandatory education at installation and fleet unit commands, during pre-commissioning programs and initial-entry training, and throughout the professional military education (PME) systems. All servicemembers are also required to receive SAPR training when they deploy to locations outside the United States that includes specific information addressing the location's customs, mores, and religious practices.

The Department conducted Policy Assistance Team (PAT) visits in 2009 to review commander training across the Services. Overall, the observed training met the requirements of DODI 6495.02, and the PATs found the training to be implemented in accordance with Department policy. However, the PATs recommended revisions to strengthen commander training by including concrete examples of supportive behavior to the program and the chance to practice skills or answer questions.

The Services have also worked to ensure SAPR commander training is instituted. For example, the Army embedded SAPR training in professional military education at training institutions, including specific training support packages for pre-command courses and senior leaders. Work with Training and Education Command's Ground Training Branch produced an Interactive Media Instruction module on SAPR, targeting mid-level Marine Corps leaders who may be unable to physically attend annual training. The Navy briefs new installation and regional Commanding Officers on SAPR at the Navy’s Senior Shore Station Leaders course a minimum of four times a year. The Air Force provides training to all new wing and group commanders five times a year and squadron commanders also receive training during their new commanders' orientation training. All of these meet DODI 6495.02 requirements.

16. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Rooney, are the levels of training currently in place adequate to address this issue?

Dr. ROONEY. As my response to the previous question indicated, the Department conducted PAT visits in 2009 to review commander training across the Services. Overall, the observed training met the requirements of DODI 6495.02, and the PATs found the training to be implemented in accordance with Department policy. However, the PATs recommended policy revisions to strengthen commander training by
including concrete examples of supportive behavior to the SAPR program and the chance to practice skills or answer questions. These revisions will appear in the reissuance of DODI 6495.02 scheduled for later in 2011. However, the Services incorporated most of these revisions into their commander training programs in fiscal year 2010, as briefly described below:

- In fiscal year 2010, the Army developed training specifically for senior leaders. During fiscal year 2010, the U.S. Army School of Command Preparation (Pre-Command Course) trained 197 brigade commanders, 542 battalion commanders, and 195 command sergeants major. In addition, the Army Reserve reported training 400 brigade and battalion commanders.
- In fiscal year 2010, the Navy revised key SAPR command personnel training to improve response to sexual assaults. Navy installation Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC) reported training on roles and responsibilities for 1,807 commanders in fiscal year 2010, as well as training for 805 new command SAPR program points of contacts, 484 new command liaisons, and 681 new SAPR data collection coordinators.
- Marine Corps provided command team training on SAPR roles and responsibilities to 258 commanders in fiscal year 2010, which included how to perform commander-led discussions during installation orientation for newcomers.
- In the Air Force, senior pre-command training is conducted at Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. In fiscal year 2010, 122 wing and vice wing commanders and 270 group commanders received SAPR training as part of this training. Installation SARCs also provided SAPR-specific training to 3,342 squadron commanders and first sergeants.

The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) is currently working with the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute to develop questions for the Defense Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (DEOCS) that address SAPR. The DEOCS is a commander's management tool that allows him or her to proactively assess critical organizational climate dimensions that impact the organization's effectiveness. These questions are being formulated to specifically assess the extent of knowledge, impact of messaging, and levels of skill associated with SAPR policy within military units. While survey responses for individual units will be provided back to commanders for their use, Service-wide response trends will be analyzed for Service strengths and potential gaps in training effectiveness. These cumulative survey results will be used to improve DOD training requirements for both servicemembers as well as commanders. In addition, commander training will continue to receive attention by SAPRO in its program oversight role. The Services also review commander training as part of their Service Inspector General assessments of the SAPR program at military installations.

17. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Rooney, what additional measures—if any—would you recommend in order to more effectively respond to allegations of sexual assault in the field?

Dr. ROONEY. At this time, the Department is continuing to implement the recommendations of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services—many of which were legislated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. To date, 26 recommendations have been completed or closed, 61 are in progress, and only 4 cannot move forward or are outside the Department’s control. Some of the 26 recommendations that have been completed include:

- Including the SAPR program in the Department Program Objective Memorandum budgeting process to ensure a separate line of funding be allocated to the Services
- Setting forth clear guidance to all commanders that their leadership of their commands’ SAPR program is a non-delegable responsibility
- Ensuring that Sexual Assault Forensic Examination (SAFE) kits are either available or accessible in sufficient time to preserve evidence

Some of the 61 recommendations that are in progress include:

- Developing standardized SARC and Deployable SARC duty descriptions in the SAPR DOD Instruction to ensure qualified personnel are appointed to fill these critical positions and to clarify roles and responsibilities
- Directing SAPRO to develop training policies and exercise oversight of Military Service SAPR training programs
- Note: The Training Subcommittee of the Sexual Assault Advisory Council developed training requirements for servicemembers, commanders, senior...
enlisted members, and first responders, and are included in the SAPR policy scheduled for reissuance in spring/summer 2011. A Working Integrated Product Team has been established to discuss and address this recommendation in regards to SAPR training for Equal Opportunity Advisors.

- Enacting a comprehensive military justice privilege for communications between a victim advocate and a victim of sexual assault.
- Note: The Department has submitted a proposed Executive order that would create a Victim Advocate Privilege to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for formal coordination. This Executive order is currently under OMB Federal Agency review and signature is expected in the coming months. Once signed, it will become part of the Manual for Courts-Martial Military Rules of Evidence and will be included in the Federal Register as a policy change that will extend privileged communication to include all victims of sexual or violent offenses, including domestic violence in all cases arising under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

The four recommendations that cannot move forward or are outside the Department’s control are:

- Establish a Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) protocol. At a minimum, this protocol should include that the SART convene within 24 hours of a reported sexual assault.
  - Under further review. The Department altered this recommendation to meet the intent. It is impractical to mandate a SART meeting within 24 hours of a reported sexual assault especially in a deployed environment.
- Ensure that victims of sexual assault in training environments are provided confidential access to victim support services and afforded time for recovery.
  - On hold. All victims are provided confidential access to victim support services. However, further analysis needs to be given to restricted reporting in the training environment and the impact it may have on an individual’s progress. The Department developed an action plan to implement this recommendation at a later date.
- Enact a law exempting Federal medical personnel from State provisions requiring them to report sexual assaults to civilian law enforcement to ensure all servicemembers have the restricted reporting option.
  - This recommendation lies with Congress. However, the Department is exploring options on how to otherwise implement this recommendation.
- Ensure the Services consistently implement the titling standard.
  - On hold. Military law enforcement organizations already adhere to DOD Instruction 5505.7, “Titling and Indexing of Subjects of Criminal Investigations in the Department of Defense.” The Department developed an action plan to further implement this recommendation at a later date.

In addition to the above, we have received approval to conduct a survey of victim experience with the SAPR program. This survey is expected to produce a measure of victim satisfaction that can be used to assess program effectiveness. This survey is expected to be completed in the fall of 2011. Also, as the Task Force was extremely thorough in its review of the SAPR program, the Department continues to believe greater program effectiveness will be achieved through these recommendations.

18. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Rooney, do you believe that reporting procedures and policies currently in place are effective?

Dr. Rooney. The reporting procedures and policies enacted in 2005 have been effective in bringing additional victims forward for assistance and care. While there are many victims that still do not report the crime, more sexual assault victims are coming forward to make a report and get assistance than at any time in the Department’s history. However, as more information is gathered, current policies and procedures can continue to evolve, further improving victim response and prevention of sexual assault.

Most sexual assaults in civilian and military communities alike go unreported because of victim concerns about the stigma associated with the crime and loss of privacy. However, civilian research shows that when victims report the crime, they are more likely to get care. In 2010, Department policy, training, and messaging brought forward 105 percent more victims than what was received in 2004. Restricted Reports now account for nearly 30 percent of all initial reporting and increase on average by about 8 percent each year. Unrestricted Reports have increased on average by about 5 percent each year. The Department believes that
much of this increase in reports is due to its reporting policy and training. In 2010, more than 93 percent of Active Duty members received training on sexual assault reporting options, how to report, and to whom reports should be made. Increased reports of sexual assault do not mean that more assaults are occurring. Given the historical underreporting of sexual assault, the Department believes that its policies are providing the support necessary to bring a greater proportion of victims forward and to establish a culture of prevention. This belief is supported by Department research in 2010 that found that the incidence rate of sexual assault during the year prior to the survey decreased by one third since 2006, while the number of reports made by victims actually increased. As a result, the Department now has greater visibility over the sexual assaults that occur against service members. We believe that greater visibility leads to improved victim response, more opportunities to provide care, and heightened offender accountability.

19. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what more can DOD do in order to improve its responsiveness to these serious allegations?

Dr. Rooney. When the Department enacted its current SAPR policy in 2005, it created new resources for victims and required specialized training for all first responders, including healthcare providers, investigators, military attorneys, and chaplains. Currently:

- Over 700 SARC s and over 11,000 victim advocates were trained in fiscal year 2010 to assist victims of sexual assault all over the world.
- All first responders get annual and other specialized training on how to assist and treat victims, including unit commanders who receive SAPR program training prior to taking command.
- Victims today have greater access to SAFE s, trained personnel, and follow-up care than before the policy.
- Most victims who make Unrestricted Reports of sexual assault contribute to legal action against the alleged offender. However, a few hundred victims each year decline to participate in the military justice process.

While the Department has improved its response system substantially by establishing a 24/7 response capability at every military installation worldwide, it must continue to improve the professionalism, capabilities, and resources of all who support victims seeking support. In addition, we must continue to create a culture where victims of crime are treated fairly by those with whom they serve. This includes our current policy of training all deployed personnel, including Guard and Reserve. These efforts take continuous time, attention, and resources, as well as patience and resolve, such that widespread victim support becomes a permanent feature of military culture. The Department believes that its current efforts to improve the confidentiality of victim communication with SAPR personnel sends an important message that victim privacy will be respected. In addition, ongoing efforts to teach commanders how to champion the SAPR program will further improve the professionalism of DOD's response to this crime. Ultimately, these efforts contribute to the Department's strategic priority of establishing a climate of confidence such that more victims will want to report the crime.

20. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, sexual assault has been a particular risk in combat areas. In your advance policy questions, you suggested that you “did not have enough information to make a detailed assessment” about steps the Services have taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones. Can you provide a more thorough assessment of the steps the Services have taken in order to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones?

Dr. Rooney. The Department has been diligent in addressing SAPR in combat zones and must be ready for any eventuality when it deploys people into these areas. Over the past 7 years, it has responded directly to the special circumstances that impact sexual assault in combat zones. A number of specific steps have been taken by the Department.

In 2004, the Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force was begun and its recommendations became the framework for the Department’s SAPR policy enacted in 2005. Both of these efforts focused intently on the special circumstances that impact sexual assaults in combat zones. Deployable SARC and Unit Victim Advocate positions were created to ensure that SAPR services were available wherever servicemembers deployed. In addition, a special training requirement was developed to give pre-deployment training to individuals before they arrived in theater. This training addresses reporting procedures in theater, local customs and mores, and prevention skills.
Following a 2008 GAO recommendation, the Department drafted changes to existing directives detailing responsibilities for the commanders of the combatant commands in deployed and joint environments.

In 2009, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services visited forward deployed installations that support Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Task Force recommended that the Department improve access to qualified medical personnel to conduct evidence collection, especially in deployed and remote environments. The Services implemented this recommendation in fiscal year 2010. DOD is also in the process of fulfilling additional Task Force recommendations to improve the training of Deployable SARCs and establish Deployable Victim Advocate positions.

In fiscal year 2010, the Department was tasked by Congress to report on the current availability and adequacy of comprehensive and proper medical care for victims of sexual assault in combat zones, as well as the availability and adequacy of post-mobilization medical and mental health care for victims of sexual assault in the Reserve components. The results of this review were forwarded to Congress in 2010 and the three lines of action identified from this review are currently being pursued.

OSD SAPRO and the Military Services continue to focus on these challenges. In fiscal year 2010, none of the Military Services reported any gaps in supplies, trained personnel, or transportation resources; reported any cases in which lack of an available SAFE kit or other medical supplies hindered care; or had any verifiable reports of victims for whom timely access of laboratory testing resources hindered care. The Marine Corps reported one case in which a victim had to be transported 90 minutes to undergo a SAFE and was addressing the matter at the end of fiscal year 2010. Department research since the SAPR policy was enacted in 2005 has found that, while most sexual assaults occur at one’s home station, 25 percent of women and 27 percent of men indicated the unwanted sexual contact occurred while they were deployed to a combat zone or to an area where they drew imminent danger pay or hostile fire pay. This dictates that SAPR in combat zones must remain a focus of concern.

Prevention of sexual assault in combat zones is challenging. However, the Department's strategy has been to teach skills and techniques that apply universally, regardless of location. The Services have all enacted programs that teach Active bystander Intervention skills that enable members to identify situations that are at risk for sexual assault and safely intervene before the crime occurs. These programs mesh well with the battlefield ethos of ensuring the safety of fellow servicemembers, and the Department believes these strategies have contributed to a reduction of the sexual assault incident rate by one-third since 2006.

When sexual assaults do occur, the delivery of comprehensive care to victims, wherever they are located, requires training care providers with the right skills and having the appropriate equipment at the right time and place. The unique and unpredictable circumstances in deployed environments can make it difficult for SAPR responders to deliver comprehensive and consistent care to victims. Tracking victim services accurately and consistently can also be challenging in deployed environments. Unit rotations and redeployment make it difficult to provide consistent assistance once a report has been made.

The work on both prevention techniques and response effectiveness continues. Most recently, at the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Central Command recommended changes to the policies and procedures of the OSD and Military Departments that they believed may hinder theater operations in a deployed environment. One of its recommendations was for the USD(P&R) to issue enduring guidance describing the SAPR services a combatant command must provide to contractor staff when contractors deploy with U.S. Armed Forces. OSD SAPRO proposed revisions to the SAPR Policy that will fulfill this recommendation when the SAPR Policy is reissued in 2011.

21. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Rooney, what additional measures—if any—will you recommend in order to more effectively prevent sexual assaults in combat zones?

Dr. Rooney. DOD prevention programs appear to be working and have contributed, at least in part, to a decrease in sexual assaults occurring annually against Active Duty servicemembers. The incidence rate of sexual assault has decreased substantially, according to the Defense Manpower Data Center Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of the Active Duty:

- In 2006, 6.8 percent of women and 1.8 percent of men on Active Duty indicated experiencing some form of sexual assault in the year prior to being surveyed.
In 2010, 4.4 percent of women and 0.9 percent of men on Active Duty indicated experiencing some form of sexual assault in the year prior to being surveyed.

This decrease in incidence rate suggests that there were nearly one-third fewer incidents of sexual assault in 2010 than in 2006. The decrease also reflects the fact that prevention concepts are well understood throughout the military community:

- 93 percent of Active Duty received prevention training in 2010 (up from 88 percent in 2006).
- 93 percent of Active Duty believe it their duty to prevent harm to a fellow servicemember.

The Department plans to continue its prevention training initiatives as well as its predeployment briefings to servicemembers traveling to combat areas about prevention and response procedures specific to the area. However, prevention programs used by the Department are universal—the concepts taught apply anytime, anywhere servicemembers are stationed. The Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services also recommended that each installation and operational commander assess the adequacy of installation measure to ensure the safest and most secure living and working environments. This includes installations and forward operating bases in combat zones. Implementation of this recommendation is ongoing, and, if confirmed, I would continue to support these initiatives.

**question submitted by senator kelly ayotte**

**National Guard Youth Challenge Program**

22. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Rooney, the National Guard Youth ChalleNGe Program (NGYCP) works to intervene in and reclaim the lives of at-risk youth by transforming their values and enhancing their skills, education, and self-discipline. The program has distinguished itself as an effective intervention in the lives of troubled youths. Despite this track record of success, I understand that the National Guard Bureau is considering a significant reduction in the national training program for the NGYCP. What is your assessment of the program and what is DOD's plan to fund this program going forward?

Dr. Rooney. The NGYCP training and education program is a direct investment in the ChalleNGe program staff. The aim of the training and education program is to improve the performance of NGYCP staff and provide a cumulative effect of individual staff performance on cadet recruiting, retention, graduation rates, mentoring, and a positive placement following graduation.

Course attendees consistently agree that the course offerings are of great value and benefit. Over 93 percent of the attendees report an increase in their performance and 85 percent of the attendees’ supervisors report the performance for those who complete training and educational offerings as excellent. In summary, trained and educated staff members improve ChalleNGe program’s overall performance in cadet recruiting, retention, graduation rates, mentoring, and positive placement following graduation.

For fiscal year 2011, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided funding and budget guidance for the NGYCP to operate under the ongoing Continuing Resolution. This guidance stated that the priority during the continuing resolution period is to make the necessary funds available to fully support the ChalleNGe programs at the cost share percentage authorized under 32 U.S.C. 509, and to provide funds to increase enrollment at current programs in States that have the fiscal resources to meet the cost share funding requirements. Travel and training for the NGYCP staff should be considered after core NGYCP requirements were funded. While under the continuing resolution, the Department is limited to fiscal year 2010 spending levels which are less than the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request. If and when the continuing resolution is resolved, then we plan to review the entire fiscal year 2011 appropriation for the NGYCP. If the amount appropriated supports the President’s budget request, then additional funding to support training for the rest of fiscal year 2011 will be available.

[The nomination reference of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney follows:]
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Jo Ann Rooney, of Massachusetts, to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, vice Michael L. Dominguez.

[The biographical sketch of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF DR. JO ANN ROONEY

Education:

• Boston University School of Management
  • September 1979–May 1983
  • B.S. Business Administration, Finance Concentration, Summa Cum Laude, awarded May 1983
• Suffolk University Law School
  • September 1984–February 1987
  • Juris Doctorate Degree awarded February 1987
• Boston University School of Law
  • August 1989–May 1991
  • L.L.M. (Master of Laws) in Taxation awarded May 1991
• University of Pennsylvania, Graduate School of Education
  • August 2003–May 2005
  • Ed.D. (Doctorate in Education) in Higher Education Management

Employment Record:

• Jewish Hospital & St. Mary’s HealthCare (uncompensated)
  • Member, Board of Trustees (2007–present)
  • Vice Chair (July 2008–present)
    • System includes primary, ambulatory, in-patient psychiatric, in-patient rehabilitation center, et cetera
    • Approximately $1 billion in revenue
    • Committees:
      • Environment of Care (2006–present)
      • Strategic Planning (2007–present)
      • Investment (2007–present)
      • Management Review (2006–present)
      • Transition Committee (2009–present)
      • Benefits Measurement Committee (2009–present)
      • CEO Search Co-Chair (2009–present)
• Regis University (uncompensated)
  • Member, Board of Trustees
  • 2004–present
    • Executive Committee and Standing Committee Chair (2008–present)
• Mount Ida College
  • President
  • July 2010–December 2010
• Mount Ida College
  • Professor of Business Administration
  • July 2010–December 2010
• Spalding University
  • President
  • August 2002–June 2010
• Spalding University
  • Professor of Business Administration
• August 2002–June 2010
  • The Housing Partnership (uncompensated)
    • Member, Board of Directors
    • 2003–June 2010
      • Chair of the Board (June 2008–June 2010)
      • Chair Elect (2006–2008)
      • Executive Committee-Treasurer (2005–2006)
  • Emmanuel College
    • Adjunct Faculty
    • August 1994–August 2002
  • The Lyons Companies, LLC (and affiliated companies)
    • Corporate General Counsel
    • Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
    • Chief Operating Officer (COO)
    • Partner
    • September 1994–August 2002
  • Maselan & Jones, PC
    • Tax Attorney
    • July 1993–September 1994
  • Steams, Rooney & Associates
    • Partner
    • July 1992–December 1993
  • CIGNA Companies - IFSD
    • Staff Attorney
    • Technical Manager
    • June 1991–July 1993
  • Caprio Law Offices
    • Attorney
    • September 1990–May 1991
  • The Codman Company
    • Vice President
      • Senior Property Manager
      • Regional Marketing Director
      • Director of Residential Market Research
    • June 1984–September 1990
  • Boston University Metropolitan College
    • Senior Lecturer
    • September 1986–December 1987

Honors and Awards:
• Beta Gamma Sigma (1983)
• Lock Honorary Society (1983)
• Mayor’s Citation for Community Service to the City of Louisville, KY (2010)
• Scholar House, Lucy Award (2009)
• Today’s Woman Magazine, Most Admired Woman in Education (2006)
• Business and Professional Women/River City, Woman of Achievement (2006)

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. Jo Ann Rooney in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Jo Ann Rooney.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

3. Date of nomination:
   Originally nominated: September 29, 2010; renominated: January 5, 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   March 23, 1961; Hazleton, PA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Single.

7. Names and ages of children:
   None.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   7/2010–12/2010, President of Mount Ida College, Newton, MA
   7/2010–12/2010, Professor of Business Administration, Mount Ida College, Newton, MA
   8/2002–6/2010, President of Spalding University, Louisville, KY
   8/2002–6/2010, Professor of Business Administration, Spalding University, Louisville, KY
   8/1994–8/2002, Adjunct Faculty, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA
   9/1994–8/2002, Corporate General Counsel/Chief Financial Officer (CFO)/Chief Operating Officer (COO)/Partner, The Lyons Companies, LLC. (and affiliated companies) - Waltham, MA
10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

- Jewish Hospital Saint Mary’s Healthcare (JHSMH), Louisville, KY - Vice Chair, Board of Trustees.
- Regis University, Denver, CO - Board of Trustees.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

- American Bar Association
- Massachusetts Bar Association and Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers
- Rhode Island Bar Association
- Florida Bar Association
- Beta Gamma Sigma Honor Society
- Member - Trustees of the Reservations (MA)
- Member - Boat U.S.
- Member - U.S. Rowing
- Member - Hull Lifesaving Museum
- Penn Alumni Association
- Suffolk University Alumni Association
- Boston University Alumni Association
- St. Paul Parish (Hingham, MA)

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**

   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.

   None.

   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.

   None.

   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

   None.

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

- Beta Gamma Sigma
- Lock Honorary Society
- Today's Woman Magazine, 2006 Most Admired Woman in Education
- Business and Professional Women/River City, 2006 Woman of Achievement
- Mayor's Citation for Community Service to the City of Louisville, February 1, 2010 (presented for distinguished and outstanding service to the City of Louisville)
- Scholar House, Lucy Award 2009 (outstanding achievement supporting educational opportunities for women and families)
- Mayor’s Citation for Community Service to the City of Louisville, February 1, 2010 (presented for distinguished and outstanding service to the City of Louisville)
- Mayor’s Citation for Community Service to the City of Louisville, February 1, 2010 (presented for distinguished and outstanding service to the City of Louisville)

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

December 2007, Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Annual Meeting, “Reaffirmation 101: A Case Study of Spalding University” Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette, and Victoria Murden McClure.

December 2007, Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Annual Meeting, “General Education Assessment ASAP” Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.

November 2007, Council for Accelerated and Experiential Learning (CAEL) International Conference, “Demonstrating the Effectiveness of Accelerated Programs” Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.


May 2007, Educational Policy Institute RETENTION 2007, “How to Use Assessment Data and Accreditation to Develop a QEP focused on Improving Students’ Math Skills and Increasing Retention” Prepared By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.

April 2007, N.C. State Undergraduate Assessment Symposium, “From Assessing for Accreditation to Assessing for Improvement - The Case of Spalding University” Prepared By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.


16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

See attached list.

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]
SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

JO ANN ROONEY.

This 20th day of January, 2011.

[The nomination of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on May 26, 2011.]
NOMINATION OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; John W. Heath, Jr., minority investigative counsel; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Christine G. Lang.

Committee members’ assistants present: Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett and Casey Howard, assistants to Senator Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Jeremy Bratt, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Pam Thiessen, assistant to Senator Portman; and Grace Smitham, assistant to Senator Cornyn.
Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee meets today to consider the nomination of General Martin Dempsey to be Chief of Staff of the Army.

General Dempsey, we welcome you here today, along with members of your family. We look forward to your testimony and to your continuing service.

America’s Army today is as great as it has ever been in its 235 years of service to our Nation. As we are reminded every day, this service continues to come with great sacrifice.

Our Army remains globally committed and overstretched by nearly 10 years of continuous combat. The Army has met the challenges of the last decade with courage, determination, and professionalism for which they and all of us are justifiably proud and profoundly grateful.

The challenges of the decade ahead, however, will be no less daunting. Over the next 4 years, under General Dempsey’s leadership, the Army must deal with many enduring and new challenges. First and foremost, the Army must continue to meet the demand for trained and ready forces in support of operations in Afghanistan and, for a short while, longer in Iraq.

Thankfully, the U.S. drawdown of forces in Iraq has begun. But, nearly 40,000 American soldiers remain there, contributing to the continued strain on our troops and their families.

At the same time, over 60,000 Army troops are committed to operations in Afghanistan. Hard fighting will continue, even as we and our allies continue to build the Afghan security forces so that they may take more and more responsibility for their security.

As adaptable and well prepared as our soldiers are today to support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the future beyond these operations holds real questions about what we will need the Army to do and how it will be structured to do it. In a speech to cadets at the U.S. Military Academy last week, Secretary of Defense Gates outlined what he considers the greatest challenges facing the Army as it takes on board the lessons of the last decade and prepares for the uncertain and dangerous world that lies ahead. Secretary Gates argued that it is unlikely that the Nation will commit large land forces to future conflicts and that the Army must “confront the reality that the most plausible high-end scenarios for the U.S. military will be primarily naval and air engagements.” He cautioned that in a strategic environment where we are unlikely to fight an enemy employing large armored formations the Army will find it difficult to justify the number, size, and cost of its heavy armored brigades.

In a press interview last week, General George Casey, the Army’s current Chief of Staff, seemed to go in a different direction when he said that he expects that over the next 10 years we will still have 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers deployed in combat.

We look forward to hearing General Dempsey’s views on these perspectives and how they may shape the Army’s plans and priorities in the coming years.

In his speech at West Point, Secretary Gates also said that his first concern is how the Army will structure itself—that is, its size and the number and composition of its deployable units, such as
combat brigades—how it will structure itself for the missions it is most likely to perform. In restructuring itself, the Army must find ways, he said, to maintain its hard-won combat-proven current capabilities and invest in the right future capabilities within a fiscally constrained environment.

Budget pressures are already being felt throughout the Defense Department. The Department's sufficiency initiative is intended to take funds away from less important or inefficient programs or activities and give them to higher, more relevant current and future modernization priorities.

As the next Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dempsey will need to find ways to deal with the spiraling growth of personnel costs. In the face of these challenges, additional budget reductions, although still being debated, are more likely than not. We are interested to hear General Dempsey's assessment of the efficiency initiative and any ideas that he may already have for improving processes and systems to ensure that we get the most out of every dollar the Army spends.

More directly related to its force structure, the Army needs to begin planning for the end strength reductions announced by Secretary Gates in January. The Army intends to begin drawing down 22,000 soldiers of temporary excess end strength, which was approved by Secretary Gates in the summer of 2009, and needs to do that between now and 2013. This reduction should not impact Army force structure, as this additional end strength was always temporary and intended to allow the Army to fill its deploying units and to end the use of stop loss that is holding soldiers beyond their enlistment. However, the Army also plans to reduce permanent end strength by another 27,000 people between 2015 and 2017, assuming security conditions are on track with current strategic plans.

This second part of the drawdown plan should result in some reduction of the Army's force structure, likely including the elimination of some combat brigades. Although this reduction is not planned to begin until after 2014, which would be at the back end of General Dempsey's tenure as Army Chief of Staff, he will nonetheless be responsible, at a minimum, for the analysis, planning, and the initial implementation of these end strength and force-structure changes.

The Army needs to rebuild its strategic depth—that is, the desired readiness in the nondeployed force—such that it is capable of responding to any unforeseen contingency. Strategic depth has been sacrificed over the last 10 years by the consuming force requirements of operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. In order to gain and maintain the necessary higher readiness levels in our deployed forces, the readiness of our nondeployed forces has been at historic lows. Although the Army continues to meet the demand for counterinsurgency and support operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world, and despite the amazing resilience of our troops and their families, the Army remains stressed in many ways. Given the planned Army drawdown, budget pressures, and force demands for operations in Afghanistan, we continue to face substantial risk, should we need the Army to respond to another contingency.
As the next Chief of Staff, General Dempsey will have the opportunity, as commitments in Iraq are concluded, to rebuild some degree of strategic depth. We’re interested to hear General Dempsey’s assessment of Army readiness and his views on the prospects for its improvements over time.

The Army needs to continue to rationalize and stabilize its near- and long-range modernization strategies and programs. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not been successful over the last decade or more. But, over the last 2 years, under the leadership of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Chiarelli, and the Under Secretary of the Army, Dr. Joseph Westphal, the Army has worked diligently, through an objective and detailed series of capability portfolio reviews that has started it on a path towards achieving rational, stable, and affordable Army modernization strategies and programs. As a result of this analytical process, the Army has terminated over-ambitious, redundant, or unaffordable weapons systems. We’re interested to hear General Dempsey’s assessment of this review process and to share with the committee what role he might play in sustaining the momentum achieved over the last 2 years.

Finally, the Army must work as long and as hard as possible to deal with the human cost to soldiers and their families of the pressures and consequences of an Army in continuous combat for 10 years. A high priority of the Army’s leadership over the last 4 years has been dealing with the stress of multiple combat rotations and long separations, the stress on soldiers and their families.

The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army set a goal that soldiers in units would have twice as much time at home as they would deployed, and that Army families would enjoy greater stability and less stress. Also, the Army has instituted significant programs for the improved care of our wounded soldiers and their families. Despite the efforts of the Army and leaders throughout the chain of command, heartbreaking incidents of suicide continue in the Active-Duty Force, and are now increasing in the National Guard and Reserves, as well. The committee is interested to hear General Dempsey’s assessment of the Army’s efforts in these areas.

General Dempsey, the Nation could not be more proud of our Army, its soldiers, and their families. We are grateful for your leadership and for your willingness to assume responsibility for the readiness and the care of our magnificent Army. You are extraordinarily well qualified to undertake the position to which you have been nominated.

We are also grateful for the service and sacrifices of your family in supporting you over the years. When we call upon you for your opening statement, we would be delighted if you would introduce your family who are with you here today.

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCaIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, welcome, and congratulations on your nomination. I’m grateful for your extraordinary service and personal sacrifices throughout your career. I’m very appreciative of your family and the support they’ve given to you.
Since the attacks of September 11, soldiers and their families have served under the stressful conditions of active combat for nearly 10 years as the Army has transformed itself into a modular expeditionary force while simultaneously meeting the demands of two wars. We’re enormously grateful for the sacrifices soldiers and their families have made for their Nation, for their units, and for one another. The human costs of combat have been great. But, I applaud the efforts of senior military leaders in DOD and the Army to provide the best medical care possible to respond to the needs of wounded soldiers and to assist the families of all soldiers. If you’re confirmed, there will be no higher priority than continuing this work.

While the cost of defeating al Qaeda and the Taliban, and those who would attack us again if they could, has been great, Army leaders at every level can take pride in their accomplishments. Four years ago, how different the situation was in Iraq. I described it then as dire and deteriorating, and there were those who declared that the war was lost and we should accept defeat. I shudder to think of how the Middle East would look today and what condition the Armed Forces would be in today if the Army had not surged troops to Iraq and not been so decisive in providing the security needed to turn the tide there.

Winning the current fights in Iraq and Afghanistan must continue to be the Army’s priority, and the next Chief of Staff must ensure that soldiers have what they need to succeed. As Chief of Staff, you will have to develop and justify your vision of what the Army should look like in the future.

In his speech last week to the cadets at the U.S. Military Academy, Secretary Gates expressed his predictions about what their future service in the Army would look like. He discounted the likelihood of another land campaign like Operations Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom, and forecast an Army, in coming years, that would most likely engage in short-duration, low-intensity operations engaged in counterterrorism, rapid reactions, disaster response, and stability security-force assistance missions. I’m interested in how much you share Secretary Gates’ views.

The budget plan for the Future Years Defense Plan through 2016 also calls for reducing Active-Duty strength by 47,000 soldiers. I’d like your views on whether such manpower reductions are consistent with the Army’s focus on full-spectrum operations and readiness to conduct missions of any kind.

Debate about the future missions of the Army is a necessary predicate for the weaponry the Army will need to succeed. I am deeply concerned by the Army’s inability to manage successfully its major defense acquisition programs; most prominently, the Future Combat System (FCS). With the arguable exception of the Stryker, the Army has not successfully brought a major system from research and development, through full production since the so-called “big five,” the Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, Patriot missile, and Blackhawk and Apache Helicopters, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. To my knowledge, the Army has yet to negotiate the termination cost for the FCS contract. As such, the total cost of FCS has yet to be fully determined. Unfortunately, this failed 11-year investment in a “modernization program” has served only to
set the Army and the American taxpayer back. I’d be interested to hear from you how we intend to improve the management and oversight of major Army acquisition programs so that something like FCS doesn’t happen again.

On balance, the Army can take great pride in its record of accomplishment, particularly those of its troops and its transformation from a garrison force to an expeditionary, mobile, and highly adaptable fighting force. Many challenges lie ahead, and the fiscal environment we are in will be very unforgiving if we repeat the mistakes of the recent past.

I thank you for your willingness to take this assignment on, and look forward to your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

We’re delighted that Senator Reed is going to be introducing our nominee.

You couldn’t have anyone better to be introducing you. I want you to know that, General. You’re very well served by the person we’re going to hear from next.

Senator Reed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Levin, Senator McCain, my colleagues on the committee.

It is a pleasure and a privilege to have the opportunity to formally introduce General Martin Dempsey to this committee as we consider his nomination as the 37th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

I recognize that many, if not all, of you have had the opportunity to meet and to work with General Dempsey in the various challenging assignments he’s held in recent years in our Army, particularly his command of the 1st Armored Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom, taking a force into the country and then being suddenly told to stay longer than expected, and doing it with superb professionalism; and then his succeeding command as the leader of the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq, responsible for the training, support, and establishment of the Iraqi security forces.

Throughout his more than 36 years of Active service, General Dempsey has demonstrated the professional skill and personal character to lead our Army in challenging times. Our soldiers are engaged in two major operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army has been engaged, since 2003, in the longest sustained combat operations in this history of our country. General Dempsey recognizes this. He also recognizes that his first priority is to support our soldiers in the fight. This support requires the continued training, equipment, and leadership that has made our Army the superb force that it is today.

Support for our soldiers also means support for their families, and General Dempsey knows about Army families. Throughout his career, his lovely wife, Deanie, has been serving with him, by his side, and together they have raised Major Christopher Dempsey, who’s currently assigned to the Department of History at the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point, and daughters, Megan and Caitlin, both veterans of the U.S. Army. The Army is indeed a family affair with the Dempsey family.

But, General Dempsey also has the daunting challenge of shaping a force for the future in a time of increasingly constrained budgets. Dynamic change in technology, in international economic forces, in international institutions—indeed, even the notion of national sovereignty—all of these forces, and more, will shape the future and must, indeed, shape the Army. They must be responded to with innovative and creative proposals, and I am absolutely confident that General Dempsey will meet these challenges as we go forward.

He is superbly prepared to provide this critical leadership at this challenging moment. I would urge my colleagues to confirm him speedily so he can assume these responsibilities.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.

A couple of our colleagues have asked their statements be submitted for the record, I will insert them here.

[The prepared statements of Senator Begich and Senator Gillibrand follow:]

**PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR MARK BEGICH**

General Dempsey, the Small Business 8(a) Business Development Program is a vital economic tool for Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, and Native American Tribes in the lower 48. This program provides for education opportunities, cultural preservation, infrastructure development, and other opportunity for tribal members. The program is directly tied to the U.S. Government’s commitment and policy of the right of self-determination to our first people.

Recently, the 8(a) program has unfairly been subject to criticism. Although some participants have pushed the limits of the opportunity provided to them, the majority of companies in the program have sound business practices and offer critical services and advantages to the Government. Additionally, to address loopholes that undermine the intent of the program, the Small Business Administration recently released the most comprehensive and thorough regulatory reform on the 8(a) program in its history.

A few 8(a) Army contracts have been subject to public scrutiny and criticism in the press. Addressing criticism, valid or not, can result in restrictive guidance undermining the 8(a) program, or a reluctance by contracting officers to contract with 8(a) Alaska Native Corporations, Native Hawaii Organizations, and tribal entities. However, the program itself is still a valid and important tool for Native peoples and for the Government.

Collectively, contract performance for the services rendered by 8(a) companies to their customers, including the Army, has been commendable. In addition, the contracting flexibility provided to the Army under this program has allowed it to address requirements for services in a timely and inefficient manner that could not otherwise be achieved.

If confirmed, I request you continue to utilize this program to contract for appropriate services required by the Army.

**PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND**

Admirals Row, built in the 19th century, consists of 11 brick buildings built to house high ranking Navy officers located in Brooklyn, NY. The buildings, which are architecturally distinguished and of historical importance, have been left mostly abandoned since the mid-1970s and are severely deteriorated and in dire need of repair. The Army National Guard currently controls the property, and has identified the Timber Shed and Building B for preservation. The Brooklyn Navy Yard Development Corporation (BNYDC), the non-profit corporation that manages the Navy Yard under a contract with New York City, has expressed its willingness to execute an emergency stabilization of these buildings prior to the property transfer between the
National Guard and the city. The BNYDC would like to begin construction on the buildings at Admirals Row immediately, but is currently prohibited from starting work because the National Guard will not allow access to the site.

I have written to Secretary McHugh to request that the Army take quick action to allow emergency stabilization of the Timber Shed and Building B in advance of the planned property transfer, while also completing the transfer expeditiously. I appreciate Colonel Fresnell’s response to BNYDC with a promise to expedite the environmental review. I want to reiterate my belief that the Army’s flexibility in allowing the BNYDC to stabilize the buildings coupled with an expeditious review and transfer is in the best interest of both the Defense Department and the local community.

Chairman Levin. General Dempsey, the committee has a series of standard questions that we ask all of our nominees, and I will ask them of you now.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

General Dempsey. I have, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

General Dempsey. I do.

Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

General Dempsey. I have not.

Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

General Dempsey. I will, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

General Dempsey. I will.

Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

General Dempsey. They will.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon request, before this committee?

General Dempsey. I do, sir.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such document?

General Dempsey. I do.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Dempsey.

Now we’re ready for your statement.

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman Levin.

I do this at my great peril, but I’d like to stray from my prepared remarks, just at the beginning here, because I was struck by the, I hope, intended symbolism of having Senator Reed sit next to me during his introduction, because I’ve always felt as though this body, in particular, was a wingman of the Army’s. Senator Reed
has always been a great wingman; that is to say, someone who watches out for you and who helps you see yourself in ways that perhaps you’re unable to see. I’d like to have that relationship with this committee and with the Congress of the United States, because, Mr. Chairman, I think you and the Ranking Member have mentioned the challenges we have before us, and articulated them very well, and we’re going to have to work together to settle those.

Chairman LEVIN. We look forward to working with you, General, on that basis, as a matter of fact. Very eloquently and aptly put.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee today in support of my nomination as the 37th Chief of Staff for the U.S. Army.

Senator Reed, thank you again, and the members of this committee, for allowing me to be part of this process. Thank you for your unwavering support and commitment to the soldiers of the U.S. Army and their families.

I’ve known some of you for a decade or more, and I’ve met some of you only recently, in the last few days. I always welcome the chance to discuss our national security challenges with you, and I sincerely admire what the members of this committee and your professional staffs have done to support those who courageously serve and are resilient in the service of their Nation.

I’d like to take a moment, as you suggested, Chairman Levin, to introduce my wife, Deanie, to you. I know she appreciates your kind words about her, too. We’ve been married, as you noted, for almost 35 years. She has joined me in commissioning all three of our children as officers in the Army, and she’s sent two of them off to war. One of them, our son, Major Chris Dempsey, is here today.

Deanie and I have built our lives both within and around the Army, and I can report to you that there is no greater champion for soldiers and their families than Deanie. If I am confirmed, the Army will receive the great gift of her continued service with, I must be honest, the occasional break to care for our three grandchildren, and soon-to-be five grandchildren. She is my hero, and I love her for many reasons, not least of which is her shared commitment to the U.S. Army.

I’d also like to congratulate my predecessor, General George Casey, who will soon complete 41 years of distinguished service to our Nation.

I’ve always considered service in the Army to be a privilege. That privilege is even more apparent when our way of life is challenged as it has been over these past 10 years. I sit before you today with confidence that whatever challenges confront us in the future, your Army will respond with the same courage and resolve that has characterized it for the past 235 years.

You have seen firsthand the superb performance of our soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Less visible, but equally important, are the contributions of soldiers currently deployed in over 150 nations around the globe. These men and women are fulfilling tasks assigned to us in the National Security Strategy to seek to prevent conflict by representing our Nation and its values and by increasing the capabilities of our international military partners. They are
Active, Guard, and Reserve. We are truly one Army, and we serve America proudly. Here at home, we partner with local communities, schools, and colleges. Each year, 75,000 of America's sons and daughters make a commitment to leave their homes and serve their Nation in the uniform of the U.S. Army. In return, we make a commitment to develop them as soldiers and as leaders. As Commanding General of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), I've met with soldiers serving in the very center and at the very edges of freedom. I've met with their families, living both at home and abroad. I've met with our wounded and with their families.

They are inspirational. They understand the challenges that we face as an Army and as a Nation. Their expectations of us are as simple as they are profound. They trust that we will provide the resources necessary for them to succeed in the fights in which we are currently engaged, and they trust that we will have the wisdom and resolve necessary to prepare them for the missions unknown to us today, but which surely await us.

If you confirm me as the Army's 37th Chief of Staff, you can be sure that I will act to earn their trust every day. I will work to match their drive, their sacrifice, and their resolve. I will partner with the Congress of the United States, and this committee in particular, to ensure we remain worthy of the title “America's Army.”

Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you and the members of this committee that I understand the gravity of the task at hand. The position to which I have been nominated carries daunting responsibilities. I embrace the challenge.

I want to thank President Obama, Secretary Gates, and Secretary McHugh for their trust and their confidence in nominating me. I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.

Let's try a 7-minute first round for questions.

I made reference to Secretary Gates' West Point speech, and quoted from it. I wonder if you could give us your reaction to his remarks, both the ones that I quoted and any other part of that speech that you might like to refer to.

General Dempsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Gates, in his speech at West Point, pulled together themes that he's been discussing with us for some time. It's an aggregate, if you will, of the professional conversations we've had about the current state and the future state of our Armed Forces. It's not a conversation he's had uniquely with the Army. He's challenged the other Services, as well.

It seems to me that, in terms of the reference you made to his discussions about the heavy force, in particular, what he's challenging us to do is to reconsider the way we've proportioned our force—the force mix, if you will—and determine if that's the force mix that best suits our needs today. I don't think he's predisposed to the answer to that question. I think he's encouraging us to confront it. As we confront it, I think he is challenging us equally to look at the institution that supports it and the leaders that we develop. My personal, professional judgment, where I sit today, in
TRADOC, is that we have to become an institution that accepts adaptation as an imperative. It has to be part of our fabric. Where that takes you is, we might develop an Army suitable for 2020 that, consciously, we know will not be exactly the Army we need in 2030, because the current and future operating environments, as we anticipate them, will require an institution that provides what the Nation needs when it needs it. I think that the key to that, actually, is the development of leaders; so, leader development is job one. Systems and processes have to become more responsive to change and allow for the introduction, laterally, of changes to technology, for example. Organizations, which always change in our Army, have to be prepared and embrace change. I think we understand the signal we’re receiving, and I think we can find the answer.

Chairman Levin. One of the points that he made at West Point was his identification of “ongoing and prospective requirements to train, equip, and advise foreign armies and police.” That raised the question, he said, as to how the Army should “institutionalize security force assistance into the Army’s regular force structure and make the related experience and skill set a career-enhancing pursuit.” He flagged the importance of the Army’s doctrine on this new advise-and-assist brigades, which he said have played the role that they’ve played in the last couple years, which is a “key role in the successful transition to full Iraqi security responsibility.”

Now, building the security forces of foreign forces has traditionally been a Special Operation Forces mission. But, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, our general-purpose forces have been performing that mission for some time, in the form of those Advise and Assist Brigades. I’m wondering what your reaction is to the possibility of adding that as a required fundamental capability for general-purpose forces, which would require additional education, training, and readiness challenges for the Army to meet.

General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do think it becomes a core competency for our force in the future, as part of our effort to prevent conflict. I think that we’ve made some dramatic and very successful adaptations at the tactical level in understanding what it takes to partner with indigenous forces and partners. I think where we probably have room to grow and room to learn is in how we partner with institutions, how we accomplish what we formerly called security sector reform at the ministerial level, because it’s not simply enough to partner with international partners at the tactical level; we have to ensure that they have the systems and the institutions that support them so they become viable partners into the future. I do think, if confirmed, that will be an area that I would pay particular attention to.

Chairman Levin. There were plans, some years ago—when Secretary Gates became Defense Secretary, there had been plans to restation two Army brigades currently in Europe back to the United States. Those plans were put on hold when Secretary Gates came into office. The Department has now started a global posture review to reexamine the purposes, locations, and costs of U.S. forces stationed around the world, including the Army’s combat brigades in Europe.
Can you give us your understanding of the status of that review—I believe you're a part of that review, maybe a major part of it—and give us the status of the review and whether or not that will include an assessment of Army forces stationed in Europe, as to whether we should continue them in the current numbers and configurations that they're at?

General Dempsey. Yes, sir. The study that you refer to, of which TRADOC is part, is essentially the force mix and force design—how many types of each brigade and what are the internal capabilities of them. We are involved in that.

We haven't made any decisions, because the recent announcement of the additional 27,000 has put us back to the drawing board, if you will, on trying to understand the implications of that and the assumptions we're making about the demand on us into the future.

But, to your point, if I could knit your previous question and this one together, the issue at hand for us will be, whenever we decide our force structure and its location, is, what purpose does it serve, where it sits? I'm a product of 12 years of the U.S. Army-Europe, and found great benefit in being immersed into that culture. I think that there will always be reason for us to have a forward-deployed force, both for the benefit of our partners, but also for our own benefit. But, I think that the size of that forward presence will be reexamined as we determine what our future force structure will look like.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, congratulations, General Dempsey.

Prior to the Iraq war, there was a no-fly zone imposed as a result of the cease-fire agreement. That went on for, I believe, a decade. Isn't that correct?

General Dempsey. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. We did not take out the Iraqi air defenses?

General Dempsey. Actually, we did, Senator.

Senator McCain. From all parts of Iraq?

General Dempsey. This predates my time at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). I was back in Germany, as it turns out during those years.

Senator McCain. Yes.

General Dempsey. But, I do recall working on the Joint Staff. When there would be issues with Iraqis positioning air defense elements south of the latitude that we had established, we would attack them.

Senator McCain. But, we didn't take out all Iraqi air defenses?

General Dempsey. No, sir.

Senator McCain. Our aircraft were within range of those defenses?

General Dempsey. When they moved into a position that they were in range, we would attack them.

Senator McCain. That wasn't too hard to do.

General Dempsey. Not being part of it, Senator, I can't speak to the difficulty of it.
Senator M CCAIN. Have you seen media reports that Gaddafi is using some of his air assets to attack, or attempt to attack, the pro-revolutionary forces?

General DEMPSEY. I have, Senator.

Senator M CCAIN. You have seen that. You might tell Admiral Mullen that you’ve seen that.

Do you believe that the Arab League and the people on the ground in Libya that are being attacked by Gaddafi’s air assets should be listened to when they are asking for us to see that it is stopped?

General DEMPSEY. I think that they will have voice, and are having voice, inside the government.

Senator M CCAIN. As a veteran of several conflicts, isn’t it true that if you tell the enemy that if they take certain measures, there will be reprisals—what I’m trying to say, if we tell the Libyans and Gaddafi that we are imposing a no-fly zone, that is a strong deterrence to many of their pilots as to whether to fly or not. We’ve already seen pilots defect. We’ve already seen a couple of them land in Malta. Wouldn’t that have a certain deterrent effect on them, psychologically?

General DEMPSEY. Deterrence is always one of the options that we should have available to the national command authority. I will say, of course, that my own personal experience is, sometimes the way our potential adversaries interpret our deterrent actions is not exactly as we’ve planned it. But, deterrence is a valid option.

Senator M CCAIN. The perception of Libyan pilots who now take off and land and attack pro-revolutionary forces might prove rather cautionary to them if they think that we will stop them and shoot them down if they carry out those missions.

General DEMPSEY. We have the finest air force in the world, Senator.

Senator M CCAIN. May I just say, personally, I don’t think it’s loose talk on the part of the people on the ground in Libya, nor the Arab League, nor others, including the Prime Minister of England, that this option should be given the strongest consideration.

I’m very concerned about Wikileaks. Almost daily, we see some additional revelation of the Wikileaks situation. First of all, how did this happen? Second of all, who has been held responsible for this greatest disclosure, frankly, of classified information in the history of this country?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, I can’t answer the question, “How did it happen?” I have been made aware that there’s an ongoing—you know it as a 15–6 investigation—essentially, a commander’s inquiry—commissioned by the Secretary of the Army, to answer that exact question. I know that the individual responsible for the investigation has had a series of meetings with Secretary McHugh. I’m looking forward to learning more about that, as well.

To your point about the protection of information, I think that this will be a wake-up call for us. We have to go forward, but we have to balance our protection of information with the competing requirement to continue to collaborate with interagency partners on information so that we can be as agile as the networks that we fight.
Senator MCCAIN. To my knowledge, no one besides Private First Class Manning has been held responsible for Wikileaks. Is that correct?

General DEMPSEY. To this point, that is correct, Senator. I don’t know that that’ll be the outcome.

Senator MCCAIN. One of your major responsibilities will be the issues of acquisition. A recently completed Decker-Wagner Army acquisition review paints a rather gloomy picture. According to this report, between $3.3 and $3.8 billion of the Army’s research and development budget has been wasted per year, since 2004, on programs that were subsequently canceled.

Do you believe those figures to be accurate?

General DEMPSEY. I do, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. Let me specifically mention one program to you, as I conclude my questioning, that I don’t understand, and maybe you could provide us with some written response, because you may not know a great deal about it. But, the title is, “U.S. to spend $800 million as it leaves MEADS program.” It goes on to say, “Over the next 3 years, the U.S. Government plans to spend more than $800 million on a missile defense proof of concept that Army Secretary John McHugh has little confidence will even work.” In this article, it says the termination costs would be very high. I still don’t quite understand why we would negotiate a contract that, if a contractor fails to meet its goals and we have to cancel the contract, we have to pay off the contractor. Do you know very much about this particular program, General?

General DEMPSEY. I do not, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. Good. Maybe you could provide us with a written response after you are sworn in.

But, this kind of thing—I don’t think there are stronger advocates in support of our defense spending and our need to equip and train our men and women who are serving, but when our constituents read stories like this—and it may not be totally accurate—but, when they read stories titled, “U.S. to spend $800 million as it leaves the MEADS program.” I think they deserve better, or at least a better explanation, at best.

[The information referred to follows:]
cept avoids the expense of termination and allows the best use of remaining funds while maximizing return on investment.

Conversely, if the United States and its partners pursue the proposed Proof of Concept effort using the remaining MEADS MOU funding our cost would be limited to the current MOU commitment of $804 million. In addition to saving money, the United States and its partners would derive substantial benefit in terms of hardware, software, or intellectual property deliverables from the MEADS prime contractor. This would allow Germany and Italy to proceed into production and provide the United States with an expanded array of future choices with regard to future Air and Missile Defense system-of-systems capability.

Senator McCain. I thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

General, you, then, will supply an assessment of that program and of that issue that Senator McCain has just raised, after you are confirmed.

General Dempsey. If I could clarify. The Senator said, "when sworn in." So, sometime after April 11, I will dutifully respond.

Chairman Levin. I will stand corrected.

General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Levin. After you are sworn in, then we would expect an answer.

General Dempsey. Actually I should say, "if I'm sworn in."

Chairman Levin. You are correct.

General Dempsey. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. We assume that. I'm glad you also do not assume that.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think it's a good assumption.

I thank you, General Dempsey, for your career of service. It has impressed me, as I've had the honor to get to know people in our military, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years, that the quality of leadership, really, from top down, is quite remarkable. I would set—and I particularly mean it in your case—the level of capacity against leadership in any other sector of our society. We're very lucky to have had you rise to the position that you've been nominated for by the President. I look forward to working with you in the years ahead.

I wanted to ask you one question about the ongoing situation in Libya, following up with what Senator McCain said. I, too, have felt that the no-fly zone ought to be under active consideration, premised on a request from the opposition, once it established a provisional government, which now seems to have happened. Second, of course, hoping that we would have allies in that effort.

I want to ask you about another alternative here, because this is an ongoing situation and its outcome will determine, I think, not only how the lives of the people of Libya are, and whether more blood is shed there at the hands of a truly maniacal leader, Gaddafi, but also has an impact on the succession or transition to democracy in the rest of the Arab world. That's why we're all focused on it.

Another alternative, obviously, is to try to help the opposition and stop Gaddafi, is to provide them with air defense systems, and train them in those systems. The question of whether we do that
is not what I want to ask you about, because that has to be determined at a higher level. But, am I correct in saying that the Army has had experience in training militaries around the world in the use of air defense systems?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, Senator. If I can respond to that, recalling my experience as the Acting CENTCOM Commander, the answer to that is yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. While we’re considering the no-fly zone—and I hear all the concerns about how it would be—how difficult it would be to implement another alternative that we might provide the Libyan opposition with the capacity to defend themselves from Gaddafi’s aircraft. I assume that, if directed to do so, the Army would be prepared, in your opinion, to carry out that mission, to train the opposition in Libya, to Gaddafi, in the use of better air defense systems.

General DEMPSEY. Internal to TRADOC, we do have coursework and expertise in air defense.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

You’re not going to be surprised to hear that I’m concerned about the proposals to reduce the Army’s end strength, although when Secretary Gates was before us, and when he made the announcement, it was very clear that this is conditions-based, depending on what the demands on the Army are, as we head into 2015, which is the date when the reduction is supposed to occur. All of us are haunted by the phrase “hollow Army”. We don’t want to go through that again. We fought hard, side by side, in the spirit that you suggested earlier, to increase the end strength.

I want to read to you an answer that you gave to one of the advance policy questions submitted to you by the committee. You were asked about the possible impact of decreasing Army end strength, and the Service’s ability particularly to achieve the dwell ratio of 2 years at home for every year our soldiers are deployed. That was a big motivator for the statutory authorization of increased end strength. Your answer was, “The decreases in Army end strength are condition-based, and I’m not in a position, at this time, to assess whether there will be an impact on the dwell goal of 1-to-2, based on these reductions.”

I want to ask you whether you would say that one of the conditions that should be met, before the Army is asked to reduce its current end strength, would be a judgment that the 2-to-1 or 1-to-2 dwell ratio for our Active-Duty Army will not be jeopardized by that reduction in end strength.

General DEMPSEY. I absolutely agree with that, Senator.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that very much.

We don’t know now whether the Government of Iraq will request that any of our Armed Forces remain in Iraq after the end of the current Status of Forces Agreement, at the end of this year. I hope they do, because I think it’s necessary to protect all that we’ve given there to achieve what has been achieved. But, just assuming, for a moment, that the Iraqi Government did ask us to maintain some number of our Armed Forces in Iraq after December 31st of this year, and we decided to do so, I assume that would have an impact on dwell ratios for our Army and on proposals for reducing U.S. Army end strength.
General Dempsey. It may, Senator. It would turn on the depth of that commitment they were asking us to make and our assessment of what common interests we have in doing so. At some point, there is a bit of science to it. We know how big the Army is. We know what we're asking it to do. We know we want to have it on a 1-to-2 boots-on-the-ground (BOG)-dwell, because of the human dimension, and we can figure it out.

Senator Lieberman. Good enough.

One part of Secretary Gates' speech at West Point that's received less attention than other parts—and it was a very important and thoughtful speech—was his focus, not on the Army's hardware, but on the software of training, professional military education, doctrine, career management, and promotions, so much of which you've had a leadership role in, in recent years and overall in your career in the Army.

I wanted to ask you—I know you've been leading a study on the Army as a profession of arms, in your current capacity—whether you could give us any of your initial thoughts on how the Army can best rise to what I describe as the software challenge, particularly the element of leadership, which you referred to in your excellent opening statement.

General Dempsey. Yes. Thanks, Senator.

It won't surprise you, I get a little advice, on occasion, in that regard from the junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) among us. Incidentally, in my office calls, over here with many of you, I tend to have time to chat with your fellows, who, by the way, are just a remarkable bunch. That's across the Services. The question I always ask them is, how are you doing? How are we doing? What are you doing? What do you want to do? Some of your military legislative assistants are recently retired or resigned military. I ask them, was there something we could have done to keep you in the ranks? I get a lot of inputs.

I like the problem we have. We talked about all the challenges we have. But, I'll tell you, I really like the problem we have, in terms of the leaders, and even the individual soldiers; because 10 years ago, Senator, we didn't really know whether we were a courageous, resilient, resolute, inquisitive, adaptable force. We didn't know. We hadn't been tested. We certainly have been tested over the past 10 years. That's the foundation on which we now have to build the future Army.

Our challenge will be that these young men and women have had capabilities, authorities, and responsibilities, as captains, that I didn't have as a two-star general. I'm not exaggerating a bit when I say that. So, continuing their development, from that point, a much higher entry level than I had, is our challenge. We think there are different attributes—inquisitiveness—we think, the ability to adapt. We have to line up our evaluation system with these attributes. We have to relook at our professional military education, how much in the brick-and-mortar schoolhouse, how much can be done through these mobile learning devices. We have to find ways to broaden these young men and women at places like these fellowships.

We can figure this out. But, what we can't do—and I think the message that the Secretary of Defense is sending us is, we can't
simply—if I can use probably a poorly phrased metaphor here—but, if we were a rubber band and have been stretched over the last 10 years, we can’t let ourselves simply contract back to our previous shape, because they won’t stand for that.

Senator Lieberman. Very well said.

Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

We are setting up a briefing on Libya that we will have tomorrow. It will be a classified briefing. We will share with the members of the committee, as soon as we have it, the time of that briefing.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate Senator Lieberman talking about the end strength and the fellowship program. I was going to ask about that, and I appreciate your answers.

The fellowship program, I see a guy sitting, two seats to your left, who was a part of that—the only problem with that program: you learn to love these guys and gals and then they’re gone. I don’t know how we can correct that, though. I appreciate the fact that we started limiting that program, here, about 15 years ago, and it’s been increasing since then. I would encourage you to keep that trend up.

Let me say this. Your predecessor, General Casey—one of the things I liked and appreciated about him—and I know you have those same characteristics, because I’ve already been exposed to them—and that is, he’s very hands-on. He wanted to know for himself what was going on. Of course, you’re interested in the Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System (JFETS) Program and Air Defense Artillery and some of these things that are going on today. I hope that we can continue with that. I’m sure that we can. I appreciate the fact that you have, in our Fires Center of Excellence and all these things.

It’s a whole new concept, this simulation level that we’ve gotten to right now. People are in shock when they come from other countries and see and witness this thing. I’m hoping that you would keep that up.

Do you have any comments about the JFETS program?

General Dempsey. I think it’s game-changing.

Senator Inhofe. Yes.

General Dempsey. For the other members, it’s a simulation, where we can link several different locations around the country. For that matter, we can link forward-deployed forces and have a common, live, virtual, and constructive environment in which leaders can grapple with complex problems, some of which are military, some of which are not.

Senator Inhofe. Yes.

General Dempsey. We’re working to actually impose that model on the rest of the Army, at least in the institutional force. I think, eventually, though, the next training revolution in our Army will be what occurs at home station, because we have to raise the bar at home station. But, JFETS is groundbreaking.

Senator Inhofe. Yes, I agree with that.
Just one quick thing on some of the problems we’re having that are health-related. We know, of course, with the strain, the tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) and all of this, the suicide rates, divorces, and all of this stuff that have gone on—and I know that we are addressing these but, I’d specifically talk about one of them, this traumatic brain injury (TBI). I’ve been interested in this for some time. In fact, the Chairman was good enough, at my request, to hold a hearing. We’ve made another request to hold a hearing that would include not just the vice chiefs, which is what we had the first hearing, but also the medical people, civilians, some of the troops themselves. I would like to be able to have such a hearing. Would you encourage us to get into the TBI and some of the other related problems, health problems that our troops are having?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, anything that this committee will do to remain teamed with us on the issue of care for wounded warriors, I will deeply appreciate and completely support.

We all saw that Frank Buckles, our last World War I veteran, passed away, just a few days ago, at 110. The scars of this war will be with us for the next 90 to 100 years. Shame on us if we forget, when the conflicts dissipate a bit. Shame on us if we reflect that this is a long-term issue for our Army, but also for our Nation.

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that. I don’t mean to imply that this is having that negative an effect on individuals. I spent New Year’s Eve in Afghanistan with the troops, and then again last week. It’s just shocking to me. I was a product of the draft, and so I’d never thought an All-Volunteer Army would be what this is. But, the spirits are so high, and it just seems that, even when the OPTEMPO is high, the spirits are high, and we’ve done a good job. I know you’ll carry that on.

Senator McCain talked about some of the aging equipment that we have. General Casey and General Chiarelli have stated that we’re burning up equipment as soon as we can field them. This is something that is a concern of mine. There was a statement that was actually in the press, and I’ll read it. The study of the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the Army, Gilbert Decker, and retired General Louis Wagner, found that the Army has spent $3.3 to $3.8 billion annually since 2004 on weapons programs that have been cancelled. I am concerned, and you wouldn’t know now, but for the record, I want to see if that has stopped by now. If not, maybe we can address and find out why.

[The information referred to follows:] The Army Acquisition Review Panel submitted its report in February 2011, which includes 76 recommendations in 4 broad areas that extend across various Army organizations. Those broad areas address requirements generation, risk management, organizational alignment, and resources. The Secretary of the Army has directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)) to assess those recommendations. The ASA(ALT) will provide specific recommendations for implementation of those portions of the report which are judged to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Army’s Acquisition process. That initial assessment is due to the Secretary in April. Following that, the Army will determine the path forward on implementation of the recommendations.

Senator INHOFE. On the equipment, and the aging equipment, specifically, I’ve been concerned, as time has gone by—and I think Senator McCain mentioned this—and a good example would have been the Crusader. We needed to increase that non-line-of-sight ca-
pacity that we had. The Paladin, that we’re using today, is the same technology that was there 50-some years ago, when I was in the U.S. Army. Now we have a Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program. But, we went through the FCS and—as has been stated before—we get down the road to these things, then someone comes along and we whack them and start something new.

I hope, and I believe, that you will do all you can—now that we have the PIM program—down the road a little ways, that we can continue to do that. It’s just remarkable that our capability with the old Paladin, there are five countries, including South Africa, that make a better artillery piece than what we’re using now.

Do you have any comments about where we’re going to go in the future and what you’re going to try to keep the discontinuation from happening again?

General DEMPSEY. Simply my commitment, Senator, to work that. I am familiar with the work of Dr. Decker and General Wagner. I think it’s good work. My own professional view is that some of the programs that we aspire to field fail because of the time horizon we establish for them. I have been vocal, within TRADOC, that requirements determination and the acquisition solution to those requirements and capabilities need to be taken on a shorter timeline, a 5- to 7-year time horizon instead of a 10- to 15-year horizon, because if we try to project our needs 10 or 15 years in the future, it’s almost certain we won’t get it right. I think we have some good ideas in that report to work on. You have my commitment, Senator.

Senator INHOFE. Yes. I’m sure that’s right. My time has expired, but I would only tell you that—I remember the last year that I served on the House Armed Services Committee was 1994—we had a witness that came in that said, “In 10 years, we’ll no longer need ground troops.” You’re right. As smart as all the generals are, we don’t know what’s out there in the future. But, I would like to get to the point where, no matter what is there, our kids have the best that there is out there, and I’m sure you feel the same way.

I look forward to serving with you.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Dempsey, welcome.

Let me follow up on a point that you responded to, to Senator Inhofe, in that this 100-year burden for soldiers and marines and sailors and airmen who are bearing the fight now, it has to reflect not only in the DOD budget, but the Veterans Affairs budget. I think you concur. I just want that for the record.

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely.

Senator REED. Thank you.

We’re talking, now, about the future. That is being shaped, or thought about, in terms of several different dimensions. One is a changing context: new technologies, social networking, climate change affecting the natural resources and will be the struggles. That has to be factored in.

But, the other fact is the traditional threat; what other countries or non-state actors have, in terms of weapon capabilities and inten-
tions. Can you talk about that aspect, as you go forward, of how you’re trying to weigh that threat? Does it synchronize well with Secretary Gates’ speech at West Point?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir, I will speak to that. It gets at the reason—I don’t think the Secretary was saying, “Shed the heavy force and invest entirely in the light force and special forces,” because he and I have had conversations, for example, about the Israeli experience in southern Lebanon in 2006, where a non-state actor, a terrorist organization, was as well organized, trained, and equipped as the traditional Israeli defense force that was confronting it: shore-to-ship missiles, air defense weapons, electronic warfare, advanced anti-armor capabilities. I mean really remarkable stuff. So, as the Secretary and I—and this is mostly in my job as acting CENTCOM commander—but, as we talked about the future of conflict, we generally believe that the future will be more a series of hybrid threats, where you have to be prepared to confront your adversary wherever he chooses to confront you.

Sometimes it’ll be very irregular and decentralized, and sometimes it will look a lot like a conventional conflict. So, what we owe the Nation is a force that has capabilities proportional to what we believe we’ll confront but has all those capabilities. We need an institution that’s adaptable enough that if we get it wrong—and, as we’ve said here earlier, we are likely to get it wrong—we have to have an institution that is adaptable enough to rebalance itself on a far more frequent basis than we have in the past. I think the world is a far more dangerous place today than it’s ever been, and we owe the Nation an agile force that can adapt to the future, whatever it finds in that future.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Let me go to another point that was raised in the West Point speech; that is, developing, not just an officer corps, but NCO corps of expertise and flexibility and agility. Part of that goes as a reward structure. Do you have any thoughts or comments now about how you’re going to think about changing the reward structure so that you find people at the upper levels of both the commissioned officer corps and noncommissioned corps who have a cultural awareness, who have a range of skills that are not the traditional tactical operational skills that have in the past been the gate to get into the upper ranks?

General DEMPSEY. Yes. I will say, Senator, that’s really been my life’s work for the last 2 years, has been looking at leader development, really, all four cohorts; and I’ll define the cohorts as officers, NCOs, warrant officers, and civilians as well, working a great deal with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs on civilian development.

I think we’ve done some very good work, in particular, in the NCO corps. When I came in the Army in 1974, a NCO was very likely not to have a high school education. Now, it’s the expectation that, if a soldier rises to the rank of sergeant major, he’ll have a bachelor’s degree before he gets there. By the time he retires, he’ll have a master’s degree.

We haven’t actually adjusted how we use them yet to account for that additional capability. Someone approached me yesterday about the possibility of having NCO fellows here in the Congress of the
United States. You kind of slap your forehead and say, “Why didn’t I think of that?” We haven’t really adjusted the way we use them. But, I have great faith, and I applaud the selection that General Casey made of the new Sergeant Major of the Army, Ray Chandler, who will push us in that regard, in development of the NCOs.

On the officer side, and others, we’re looking at a new personnel management model. You may have heard of the Blue Pages in IBM. We have a prototype, on a thing we call the Green Pages, that allow an individual officer to actually collaborate more on their career development, allows us to understand what they’re interested in, not just the classes we’ve given them, but we might have somebody who worked in Outward Bound as a child or as a military child, spent 18 years in the Pacific Rim. We wouldn’t know that today, but we’d like to know that. There’s a number of programs that are out there. Technology provides huge opportunities to use them.

What I will tell you, in closing this question, is, I am deeply committed to the development of our leaders, because we are likely to get the equipment, sort of right, but not perfect, and the organization sort of right, but not perfect. We’re probably going to give guidance a little late, I’ve found. The person that pulls it together is that leader on the ground, and we have to keep committing to their development.

Senator Reed. Just let me follow up on that and second your comment about the NCOs; they are the heart and soul of any military force, particularly the U.S. Army. In 1971, when I came on Active Duty, the same comment could be made about the NCOs’ education level, and now they’re superbly trained. I think you’re absolutely on target.

Second is that, with the advent of social networking—and this is not going to be a social network—but I was extremely impressed, years ago, when some enterprising young officers set up, sort of, Company Commander, Inc. or CompanyCommander——

General Dempsey. Dot com.

Senator Reed.—dot com. Is that informal learning—how are you going to integrate that into our plans?

General Dempsey. That’s the question that provides the greatest opportunities for us, I think, in terms of leader development.

I have to just back up a second and tell you, when I took the job at TRADOC, Senator, I found a CD of General Donn Starry. Now, he’s a name familiar to you.

Senator Reed. I know.

General Dempsey. But, Donn Starry was considered to be one of the great thinkers of our Army in the 1970s, and helped the Army, under other leaders, build to what it became in 1991, and even what it is today. But, he had a video—it was one of the first VCR tapes ever made in the Army—and it showed him walking into a mall in Hampton, VA, and looking at young men and women playing video games. He turned to the camera and said, “We know they’re in there. They’re in there playing these games. They’re paying for the opportunity to play. They’re learning something. What we don’t know is what they’re learning.” That was in 1981.

I feel the same way today about social networking. We have young men and women playing massive multiplayer online role-
playing games, MMOs as they call them, World of Warcraft and others—I mean, millions of children playing these interactive games. They're learning something about developing as leaders, believe it or not, because of the way these games structure, and you have to impose your own leadership into the game.

We can figure out how to leverage a game like that for leader development, linking schoolhouses across the country—I'm talking about military schoolhouses. I think we'd be onto something in helping these young men and women collaborate, meet their desire to social network, and also facilitate the kind of learning we're going to need by introducing complex problems in that environment, that we can't replicate physically at places like Fort Hood, Fort Bragg, and Fort Carson. I think social networking has enormous opportunities for us.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, General.

Mr. Chairman, if I may, I think I recognize General Gordon Sullivan, the former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army is in the audience today. His distinguished service must be applauded.

Thank you, General Sullivan.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. Thank you for making that reference to General Sullivan.

We are very much intrigued by your answers here, I must tell you, General Dempsey. It's really mind-opening.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Dempsey, let me echo the sentiments of my colleagues in congratulating you on this nomination, and also to thank you and your family for your service to our country and your continued commitment to freedom and democracy around the world.

Also, I want to commend you, likewise, on this fellowship program, and I appreciate your comments and strong support of that. I have been blessed, going back to my days in the House, with outstanding young men and women serving in my office. It's been a privilege to have a chance to dialogue with those folks, one on one, about what really is happening out there which, in addition to the great service they provide from an information standpoint, personally, they're just such an asset. It's a very valuable program.

I want to go back to the question that Chairman Levin asked you about, on this decision regarding personnel serving in Europe. You'll recall, a couple years ago, a decision was made to put three brigades back in the continental United States, one at Fort Bliss, one at Fort Carson, one at Fort Stewart. I'm not sure how the decision can be characterized as a reversal, putting on hold, or whatever. But, I'd like for you to characterize exactly where that is. What kind of importance is that decision being given in your current discussions, relative to what's going to happen, as far as bringing troops back from Europe? Lastly, what's your timetable on that study?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, thank you, Senator.

We, at one point, were going to build 76 brigade combat teams. We took a decision—the Department did—that we would build only out to 73, and we held the 4 brigades in Europe, pending the outcome of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, because we had
them—all of the Army, on such a 1-to-1 BOG-dwell ratio that it would have been too disruptive to move them, under that situation.

Now we’re looking at absorbing, potentially, the 27,000 reduction, and it is inevitable, as Chairman Levin said, that there will have to be some structural changes to account for that 27,000. The analysis is just really beginning on that, and I haven’t been made privy to it.

If confirmed, of course, that will come to the Chief and to the Secretary of the Army to determine which brigades are essentially the billpayers for that 27,000 end strength. I’m not suggesting it will be all brigade combat teams. It’ll have to be some portion of the entire Army, to include the generating force. I think the timeline for that is probably the analysis over the next 6 months, because it’ll be executed in the—in Program Objective Memorandum 13–17 and the timeline for our submission of 13–17 is on or about July 1. That’s about the timeframe for this analysis.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. While impressive gains in security have been made throughout the country of Iraq, Iraq still remains a very dangerous place to live, travel, and work in 2011. Targeted assassinations, corruption, and Iraqi security force, medical, logistical, planning, and transportation shortcomings continue to undermine the Iraqi Government security and infrastructure improvement efforts throughout the country. The security of their oil fields, pipelines, and terminals, while also much improved, remain a critical vulnerability and a prime target of insurgent forces.

As U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq, the Department of State will have to act quickly to significantly increase their security footprint in Iraq so that their diplomats can maintain a significant construction presence in Iraq for years to come, a job required sustained oversight engagement to watch over what remains of the $58 billion in U.S. construction programs. While that ability to find, vet, and hire so many professional security personnel in such a short period is by no means a certainty, neither is continued stability in Iraq. As we’re seeing throughout the Middle East right now, there is all kinds of instability regarding neighbors to Iraq.

My question is, with this sustained instability throughout the Muslim world, is the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Iraq at the end of this year still the right thing to do?

General DEMPSEY. I can’t speak to whether it’s the right thing to do for Iraq. I think that’s the piece of this, Senator, that we would have to examine.

We certainly have interests in Iraq and in the broader region. It will have to be determined whether Iraq’s interests and ours will be matched, and that part of that match will be additional force structure remaining in Iraq. I mean, that’s very much a negotiation that will have to occur between the two sovereign nations.

I will say that some forward presence—U.S. military presence, but, even more specifically, U.S. Army presence—in that region is important to me. I think that’s a very important region of the world, and will be, for the foreseeable future, and I am advocate of a forward presence there.

Senator CHAMBLISS. There’s also been some preliminary discussion and conversation about, when it becomes time to leave Afghanistan, that we may leave that country from a combat stand-
point, but that we will establish at least one base in Afghanistan. What's your thought, with reference to that issue?

General DEMPSEY. I haven't been made aware of that planning. I'm not surprised that someone is—someone should be, in fact, looking beyond the date 2014, which is the commitment we've made with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to provide the kind of support, and to be in the lead. I'm not surprised folks are beginning to look beyond that to determine what is our long-term interest there.

I think the answer to that question, Senator, very similar to the one I gave vis-a-vis the Arabian Peninsula. We are very closely partnered with Pakistan and have some shared interests. We are currently in Afghanistan and have shared interests. How those interests are managed over time, I think, will be dependent upon how the situation on the ground plays out in the next 3 or 4 years.

Senator CHAMBLISS. As my time has expired, General, thanks again for your service. We look forward to continuing to work with you in your new role.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, General Dempsey, thank you for your service, and your family, for their service, as well.

On a visit to Iraq, you and I spent time talking about how you were able to take the processes and procedures of acquisition of the U.S. military and use that to make acquisitions for the Iraqi military, recognizing that, in the absence of those processes and procedures—acquisition procedures in the Iraqi Government—they were basically incapable of getting all the money spent in the right way, 100 percent for the acquisitions. By doing that, using Iraqi money, you were able to acquire their military material for their needs. I thought that was novel at the time. It also showed me that there was a recognition by the Iraqi Government that their responsibility was clearly theirs, not just simply the United States, to provide for the cost of their defense.

As we look toward leaving in December 2011, there is a possibility that we're going, as you and I discussed, that the Iraqis are able to provide for their own defense, but they might decide that they need continuing support for their defense. We understand. If they can't defend, they can't govern. Self-defense and self-governance go hand-in-glove.

What I'm getting to is, they're facing deficits in their budgets, as we're facing deficits in our budgets. On a relative basis, I would take theirs over ours. My point is, can we look to ways in negotiating anything, if we're going to stay and provide assistance, where they can pick up a bigger share of the cost so that the American taxpayer doesn't end up picking up a bigger share of the cost?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, I think General Lloyd Austin, who's in Iraq—would be better positioned to answer whether they—

Senator NELSON. Well, I asked him, too.

General DEMPSEY. Oh, you did?

Senator NELSON. Yes.

General DEMPSEY. I probably should have read their answer before I tried to hazard a guess at my own.
As I said in an earlier answer, Senator, I think this is all about identifying our common interests, and then challenging each of us to invest in those common interests. I think that the proposal would be absolutely appropriate.

Senator NELSON. You may very well be, in your new position, when not only the Iraqi war winds down, but also perhaps, if we're so fortunate, that we would see a reduction in the level of activity and the costs associated with Afghanistan.

While the Army is always engaged in planning, do you believe that we will be in a position to start looking towards some planning for a reduction in forces in Afghanistan? I know this is something we're going to ask General Petraeus, when he's here. But, from your standpoint, if that decision is made, that we are going to reduce forces, that you will take that into consideration, looking at our continuing end strength needs, as well as the rest of the military needs, to support the kind of defense that Secretary Gates has been talking about.

General DEMPSEY. Senator, you will consider me for confirmation both as the Chief of Staff of the Army, but also as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and that last point there is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs, to balance our commitments around the world for our national security. If confirmed, I'll absolutely take that obligation to heart.

Senator NELSON. If we do that, how will this affect the current situation, where we're looking to draw down 27,000 troops from the Army? By 2014, will that be reevaluated, do you believe? Will that have constant reevaluation, or is that a date set and a goal that just must be achieved, or will that have to be constantly reevaluated in the days ahead?

General DEMPSEY. I consider it to be the latter case, Senator, where the assumptions on which those decisions were made need to be reevaluated as we see what occurs with Iraq, post-December 11, and what occurs with Afghanistan post-2014.

Senator NELSON. Now I'm really going to test you on what our Chairman said at the beginning, about giving your opinion, no matter how it might shape up with other opinions with your colleagues.

Chairman LEVIN. He's not confirmed yet, though. [Laughter.]

Senator NELSON. That's true. You can tell me anything——

Chairman LEVIN. But, we still expect that of you.

Senator NELSON. We still expect it.

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, I support Senator Nelson.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you for your first response, Chairman Levin. [Laughter.]

Senator NELSON. If confirmed as the Army Chief of Staff, can we expect that you would be a very strong advocate for our National Guard?

General DEMPSEY. That's an easy one, Senator. Absolutely.

Senator NELSON. Now the tough one. Do you believe that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should become a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? That's the tougher one.

General DEMPSEY. Yes. It's tough, only because I haven't thought about it. I have learned, long ago, not to render an opinion about
something I haven't thought about. What you can count on me to be is openminded about that.

Senator Nelson. I hope that you will be openminded about it. The Guard has established itself as an operational force, no longer as a supply force. It's operational. It's not on the shelf, ready to go. It's active, as active as the Active Duty military. I would hope that you would consider that. Keep an open mind, but consider it. I'm going to keep pushing for it, because I think the importance of the role that the Guard has now taken is something that needs to be at the table all the time. Getting a four-star in charge of it was step number one. But, step number two, as a full partner, I think, involves being a member of the Joint Chiefs. I know it's touchy, but I hope that you and your colleagues will look very carefully at that.

General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Nelson. Thank you, and good luck.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Dempsey, I want to thank you for your distinguished service to our country.

I also want to thank your wife, Deanie, and your son, Christopher. It's wonderful to have a military family here. The sacrifices that your entire family has made, we're deeply appreciative of.

I welcomed the opportunity, also, to sit down with you yesterday. I want to take this moment just to express my deep condolences to the families of the Air Force members who were killed yesterday in Germany on their way to Afghanistan. I think it reminds us that we continue to be at war with terrorists, and the difficulties that we face, and also the sacrifices that our servicemen are making across the branches on behalf of our freedom and democracy in the world.

General Dempsey, in your answers to the advance policy questions, you state that the significant increase in the number of soldier suicides is of greatest concern to you, and I share your concerns. With the number of suicides in the National Guard rising to especially troubling levels, I share your goal of reducing those suicides. In particular, as we discussed yesterday, in New Hampshire we have the National Guard's Deployment Cycle Program which I believe is the model program, because we not only need to make sure that programs are in place for the full deployment cycle for our Active Duty members, but also, we've asked so much of our guardsmen and -women in the Reserve to make sure that we are taking care of our soldiers when they come home from the Guard, as well. This program is a highly effective and fiscally responsible initiative. It's really a public-private partnership that I think is unique across the country.

Yesterday, Senator Shaheen and I wrote a letter to Admiral Mullen, urging him to take a close look at this program, and also to support this program. We have seen the program work to help on retention, to help with the many issues and challenges that our guardsmen and -women face when they return from duty, and also when they are going to duty, as well their families. I would ask you—and I will provide you with a copy of this letter—for your support for this program, and for you to take a close look at it. I think
it's a model for other States across the country, and very important
that we not lose sight of our soldiers when they come home. Particu-
larly in the Guard, when we've asked so much more of the
Guard, with multiple deployments, than we have historically, that
we make sure that those programs are in place.

I just wanted to get your thoughts on what you envision, going
forward, in addressing our guardsmen and -women and the deploy-
ment cycle support for them.

General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for, by the
way, your role as the spouse of an air national guardsman. I know
you've been through a couple of deployments, as well.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you.

General DEMPSEY. You speak with great authority and experi-
ence in that regard.

I have already passed to my staff, as the TRADOC commander,
the task to look at that program you mentioned to me yesterday.

In general, though, I'll tell you that we continue to learn as we go.
We've been reminded, recently by some of those statistics, other
kinds of trends within the force, of the accruing effects of 10 years
of war. The Guard presents a unique problem, because they don't
come back to a central location. They come back, they spend a brief
period of time, and then they dissipate, sometimes within a single
State, sometimes within 10 or 15 States. I can assure you, at this
point, that we are beginning to grapple with understanding the
problem, and we will partner with you and others to solve the prob-
lem. Because, it's one, again, that will be with us for some time.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I very much appreciate that, and
look forward to working with you on solving that problem, which
is so important in supporting not only our Active Duty troops, but
our guardsmen and -women, and Reserve, who we're asking so
much of them at this time.

General Dempsey, Chairman Mullen has also stated his belief
that the national debt represents a preeminent threat to our na-
tional security. Do you share that concern?

General DEMPSEY. I do, Senator. The instruments of national
power—diplomatic, military, and economic—have to be in balance
for us to be the power we need to be.

Senator Ayotte. If we don't restore fiscal sanity to Washington
and reduce our national debt, one of the concerns that I have is
that the rising debt payments will begin to significantly crowd out
the finances we have to be able to protect our Nation and its inter-
ests and, obviously, to fill our commitment to our Active Duty
troops and to our veterans, who have sacrificed so much for us.

I would ask you, as the—hopefully—new Chief of the Army, to
look at two things, and also to get your thoughts on it. One is the
recently released March Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report. In that report, the GAO found that there were instances of
duplication and waste among the branches, where the branches
could better coordinate, where there were redundancies on areas of
equipment and areas where we could work together to reduce costs.
Have you had a chance to review that report yet?

General DEMPSEY. No, I haven't reviewed the actual report, but
I have seen the reporting on it.
Senator AYOTTE. I would ask you to review that report and look for ways to implement some of the recommendations that are made in that report so that we can reduce those duplications and make sure that we are using taxpayer dollars as effectively as possible, given the great challenges that we face right now.

General DEMPSEY. I will.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. I also wanted to follow up on the comments that Senator McCain made about the acquisition programs in the Army. We've seen, in some instances, where there have been billions of dollars that programs have been canceled, programs have been broken. How do you plan to address acquisition in a way that uses taxpayer dollars more wisely? Hopefully we can see some cost savings from that, as well.

General DEMPSEY. Senator, we have to. We can't continue to hemorrhage resources that you'll be increasingly challenged to help provide.

I think that the Decker-Wagner report gives an aperture through which to look at this issue much more seriously.

One of the earlier comments was about these things called “capability portfolio reviews”. I think you're familiar with them. The capability portfolio review process is really senior leadership of the Army, personified now as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army himself, Pete Chiarelli—bringing together the requirement side of the house and the acquisition side of the house periodically to do exactly what you're talking about. I think the first step, in answering your question, is to institutionalize those capability portfolio reviews and then to take the Decker-Wagner report and implement it, or at least determine which pieces of it should be implemented.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much, General.

My time is up. I want to again commend you and your family for your service. I look forward to working with you to make sure that you have the equipment that you need, but also on these issues of where we can save taxpayer dollars and do things more effectively and more efficiently.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

Senator Udall.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before, General, I direct some comments and questions your way, I want to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from New Hampshire. She's on point. The Senate, right now, seems to be the one institution here in Washington that's really working on a long-term deficit and debt-reduction plan. A broke country is a weak country. We have some serious work to do. DOD can help us get the job done.

You've talked about dwell time, General, and you know that, under the current Army force generation cycle, we're not able to provide the goal of 2 years at home. My question is, since the quantity of time at home station is limited, what steps would you take, as Chief, to improve the quality of time at home for soldiers?

General DEMPSEY. That's a interesting way to put it, Senator. I haven't heard it phrased that way, but it's worth thinking about.

Senator Udall. I have great staff, General.
General DEMPSEY. Any of them behind you?
Senator UDALL. Yes.
General DEMPSEY. Okay. Good.
Senator UDALL. He's a retired Army helicopter pilot.
General DEMPSEY. Ah, a retired helicopter pilot. I might have
known. I'm surrounded by helicopter pilots here, it seems.

Senator, just before I talk about the quality issue, I don't want
to walk away from the absolute imperative of the quantity issue,
because every study we can possibly get our hands on suggests that
it takes at least 2 years to fully recover from the experience that
a young man or woman will have in a forward-deployed combat en-
vironment. So, it is quantity. I have to remain firmly committed to
it.

In terms of the quality, the issue, for me, is to determine—it's
back to this best practices. There are some remarkable practices
out there, some of which, by the way, we saw in effect at Fort Car-
son, CO, in a recent visit there. We have centers of excellence in
different programs. One program, in particular, ties it together,
called the “Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program,” that has to be
extended, and is being extended, into families, how to make fami-
lies more resilient, right from the start of their service, not waiting
until some crisis comes their way.

But, what we're trying to do is take the best of ideas out there,
and share them and institutionalize them, because some of the
family care programs have been like a thousand flowers blooming.
With good intentions, we've wanted to do as much as we could.
Now we're in a position where we've seen a thousand things; we
need to decide which 50 of them actually have the impact we're
seeking. We need to invest in those to get at the quality issue
you're talking about. That work is ongoing, generally through our
Installation Management Command, commanded by Lieutenant
General Ricky Lynch, but also in partnership with the Assistant
Secretaries of the Army.

Senator UDALL. I think that fits into, I don't know if you've put
this in a doctrine or not, but I think you have the rule of 5 versus
the lure of 55. I hear you voicing that same kind of an approach
to this.

If I might, let me turn to a question of Civ-Mil jointness, if you
will. We're asking our soldiers to be diplomats, ambassadors, train-
ers, and negotiators—even have an eye for business cycles and dy-
namics—in all these theaters in which they're deployed. They come
back as experts in areas we never could have envisioned a few
years ago. I'm wondering how we can ensure that they share what
they've learned with other agencies before and after future combat
rotations. Is there any joint predeployment training with non-
military agencies, like the State Department, at the National
Training Centers? Would you see any value in such training?

General DEMPSEY. First of all, absolutely, Senator. We are doing
a good bit of it now. We jointly train the Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRT), for example, that are forward-deployed. We train
with them. To the extent we can, we try to get them, as well, to
go through our mission readiness exercises with deploying bri-
gades. Now, sometimes, because those other agencies of govern-
ment are one deep at many of the skilled positions, unlike us, they
can’t make that training. But, we never deploy either a PRT or a brigade combat team without some of that training. Could and should we do more? Yes.

Second, in the educational system of our Army, we have several programs. I’ll mention one. We have an interagency fellowship program at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS, where we take young Army officers who have gone through an abbreviated Command and General Staff College course, and we’ll put them into an agency of government—U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation—displacing one of their folks; that allows that person, then, to come to Fort Leavenworth and go through the 10-month Command and General Staff college experience. We have about 20 of them out there now. We have the capacity to take 36.

But, those are the kind of programs I think we need to take a look at in the future, as well.

Senator Udall. That would be a fantastic way to take advantage of that investment we’ve made. I know those soldiers are keen to share what they’ve learned.

By the way, I wanted to comment on your comments about the NCO-in-residence opportunity here. I had the great privilege of having Master Sergeant Rubio serve for a year in my office in the first year of the NCO fellowship. It was phenomenal. I want to just underline the importance of that approach.

Let me, in my remaining time, move to energy. DOD’s been leading the way in the development of renewable energy programs that will reduce the force’s need for fossil fuels. It’s first and foremost about security. We know that many of the grievous injuries in theater, delivered by improvised explosive devices, are aimed at supply convoys and the like.

The Marine Corps has set up what they’re calling an experimental forward operating base in California. They’re working with private industry to develop and test solar cells, batteries, and other products. Then they’ve taken the most promising approaches to Afghanistan, and they’ve cut their fuel consumption in the process.

Do you have plans, in the Army, to look at this Expeditionary Forward Operating Base model. If you don’t, what can we do to help make that a reality?

General Dempsey. No, we do, Senator.

All the technological advances that we’re introducing into the force all put an increasing demand on the generation of power. So, we have a capabilities-based assessment on the issue of power.

There’s sort of a joke in Afghanistan: You can follow a U.S. Army unit through the mountains of Afghanistan by the trail of batteries they shed, because of the power requirement that all of these systems require.

We have a study in place—a capabilities-based assessment—to try to determine how we can meet those power demands and become more self-sustaining. The aspiration is to eventually, in the out years, develop the capability to have a self-sustaining brigade that can produce its own water, its own power, its own energy. We’re a long way from that, but that’s the right question to be asked to those that partner with us, like Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency, U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command, even the private sector, to try to help us become more self-sustaining.

Senator Udall. That’s exciting news, and count on me to be an advocate for what you’re doing.

Thank you, again. When you’re confirmed, I look forward to further working with you.

General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Udall. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall. Thank you for raising the energy question. It’s a critically important question for the Army. I also talked to General Dempsey about that, and the need for our security, in many ways, to address that issue which you have raised. Thank you for your ongoing interest in that piece.

Senator Brown is next.

Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I’m bouncing back and forth, between hearings, like many others. Sir, I met you yesterday. Obviously, I asked a lot of the questions. I appreciate your candor. I look forward to voting in support of you.

I have a couple of questions. I think you know that I have an interest in Guard and Reserve troops, and I attended the first National Guard Caucus event this year. I agree with many of the priorities referenced by Senator Graham, a dear friend of mine. He drilled down on several key themes that, if implemented, I believe would have a positive impact on our Nation’s operational service and security.

He was in the Reserves and, I just found out, the Guard, as well. I look forward to hearing his perspective on a whole host of issues regarding the Guard and Reserves.

I’m concerned with the fact that our depressed economy is having a terrible effect on our heroes that have served, especially the Guard and reservists. Over 30 percent of our young non-Active-Duty soldiers are unemployed. I’m wondering, what does this mean to you, in your efforts, if any? Is there anything that we can do, and you can help us with, to have employers not only hire, but keep onboard, members of the Guard and Reserves?

General Dempsey. Yes, Senator, thanks. Thank you for your service in the Guard.

We are partnered with the other agencies of government, notably the Veterans Administration, of course, but also with Governors across the country, in trying to raise the interest and awareness of the plight of the returning veteran, if you will.

General Petraeus’ wife, Holly, was appointed to look at the predatory practices of some on trying to take advantage of soldiers, with things like loans and so forth.

Senator Brown. Senator Reed and I actually dealt with that in our Financial Regulation bill, to try to address those.

General Dempsey. Yes.

Senator Brown. I recognize that, as well.

General Dempsey. That crosses all components—Active, Guard, and Reserve.

Senator Brown. Right.
General DEMPSEY. We've partnered with academia, to the extent we can, to find educational opportunities. I won't name them, but there's some remarkable initiatives out there, in academia, where they are reaching out to veterans to allow them to use their GI Bill in a way that is both financially vital for them, but also to account for their unique needs as veterans as they come back from a conflict.

Those are the things we're doing. What I would say to you, in response to your question, is, if confirmed, we have to keep the fire burning in that regard.

Senator BROWN. Right.

General DEMPSEY. Because, again, this is not a 2-year problem or challenge, this is a multiyear challenge.

Senator BROWN. Sir, also, I know that you're dealing with the real issue of not only Active-Duty suicide rates, but, the Guard and Reserves rate seem to be dramatically higher. I'm trusting that you'll continue on with that effort and try to address what the needs are and try to have more intervention.

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely, Senator.

Senator BROWN. Thank you. I'd appreciate that.

Also, I was wondering if you could give any insight as to the M–9 pistol competition, where that will stand in the new go-round. Anything you can share?

General DEMPSEY. In TRADOC, most of my attention to date, in terms of personal weapons, has been on the individual carbine, because TRADOC was tasked by the Secretary of the Army to run an analysis of whether it was time to move away from the M–4.

We're actually doing two things with regard to the carbine. One is, improving the M–4, both its performance, but also the performance of the ammunition. We're looking at whether we need an individual carbine beyond the M–4. That work is ongoing. I think the request for proposal (RFP), in draft, has been released. I think the final RFP will be issued sometime in the third quarter of this fiscal year.

I have not been involved, to date, Senator, on the issue of the M–9. Based on our conversation yesterday, I will look forward to learning more about that, if I'm confirmed.

Senator BROWN. Great. Sir, just in conclusion, I know the challenges are huge. My concern is that we get the best value for our dollars, but also that we can provide the tools and resources to our men and women who are fighting to not only do the job, but come home safely.

One of the issues we talked about yesterday was the rules-of-engagement issue, and making sure that's revisited and updated so we can allow the soldiers to do the job without being handcuffed by attorneys. I'm one of them. But, obviously, I think that's important. Out of all the things I've heard about the morale, the issues, it's that one issue that always seems to come back with us, saying, "You know what? I'd love to do A, B, C, and D, but the JAG says—or this person says—the commander's guidance is"—and I think, in some respects, at times, we may be jeopardizing the safety of our soldiers.

I know you said you were going to look into that, and I appreciate it. Good luck to you and your family.
Thank you.

General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.

Senator Hagan is next.

After Senator Hagan, Senator Shaheen, I believe, will be the last Senator, on this side at least, and she has agreed that she could stay on, if other Senators appear, and take the gavel at that point. I very much appreciate that.

Senator Hagan.

Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome General Dempsey, and really appreciate your service to our country, and your continued service.

I also wanted to welcome your wife, Deanie, and your family. It's obviously a family affair, when somebody spends the number of years that you have with our military. I want to thank you so much. To have three children also having been in the Army certainly is a testament to you and your wife. So, thank you both for that.

I want to ask a question about the sexual assaults. I know you will take this seriously, but I did want to bring this up. Last month, a group of veterans and Active-Duty servicemembers sued the Pentagon, citing military commanders aren't doing enough to prosecute sexual assault cases. If these claims are founded, the failure to provide basic guarantees of safety to women, who now represent 15 percent of the Armed Forces, is not just a moral issue or a morale issue, it is a defining statement about the condition and the approach of our military.

The Pentagon has issued a statement, saying the issue is a command priority and that it is working to make sure all troops are safe from sexual abuse.

In the Army today, what do you foresee as the challenges in implementing a safe and timely reporting system for sexual assaults?

General Dempsey. You have my commitment, as I expressed yesterday, that this issue is foremost in mind, and here's why, Senator. It rubs at the fabric of our profession. You may have heard that we're doing an analysis this year of, what have the last 10 years of war done to our profession? How are we different? How do some of the responsibilities we've pushed to the lower echelons—should they have changed the way we develop leaders? These things are all tied together. One of the things that has come out of the analysis already is that the core of our profession—if we're going to be a profession—and we can't take that for granted—is trust. The reason that an issue like sexual harassment is so important is not just because we should be protecting young men and women from sexual predators, but it tears at the very fabric of our profession. It breaks the bond of trust between leader and led. That's why it's important.

We have made some inroads. You're well aware of our three-phased program. We're well on the way to executing the program. Some of the reporting indicates, in the Active component, that it's steadied out. But, that's not good enough. It needs to nosedive, the number of incidents.

You'll hear folks talk about whether it's better reporting or more incidents. I find that to be somewhat irrelevant, actually, because,
again, it tears at the fabric of the profession. I do think the key is experts inside of brigade combat teams—and we're putting them there; education of our leaders about why it's important—not just because of the gender issues, but because of this issue of trust. We're doing that. But, what you have is my assurances that, if confirmed, I will press down even harder on the accelerator.

Senator HAGAN. I appreciate that. Thank you. I'm sure everybody will appreciate that.

In the last decade, the Army has attempted to field the Crusader, the Comanche, the FCS, the non-light-of-sight missile, and the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. This research and development adds up, I believe, to about over $10 billion of research and development for equipment that was actually never fielded.

The ground combat vehicle (GCV) is the latest possibility that will be added to the Army vehicle fleet. Do you think the requirements for this vehicle are realistic in development? More importantly, is the use of research and development funds being spent on the ground combat vehicle going to transform the battlefield capabilities? Will the ground combat vehicle be superior to the Bradley enough to justify the costs associated with developing and fielding it?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, thank you, Senator.

I am convinced that the requirements for the ground combat vehicle have been articulated in a way that actually begins to get at some of our aspiration for acquisition reform, meaning this: We collaborated, right from the start, among senior leaders, those who do the requirements determination and the acquisition community, on the requirements, as opposed to, potentially, some of the other programs you mentioned, where the requirements were determined, passed to the acquisition community, and the collaboration clearly wasn't adequate.

The other thing we've done with the GCV is, we've said, "Look, if you can't give it to me in 5 to 7 years, I don't need it." Because, we know that if we shoot our aspirations beyond that technology we can see, generally speaking, we will be disappointed in the outcome.

I think that the GCV is actually prototypical, not only of the next generation of ground combat vehicle, but of a process change. That's how we should look at it.

The Bradley has been a venerable part of our inventory. But, it has reached its maximum capacity in weight and energy. As we continue to add technological advances, as we continue to learn more about what it means to protect, when we continue to learn more about the mobility required in urban areas, that's why we think the GCV is an important step in our modernization.

Senator HAGAN. Where are we on that timeline now?

General DEMPSEY. The RFP is out, and I think we're approaching one of the milestones—I don't recall which—in the fall of this year.

Senator HAGAN. Okay. I think the collaboration is obviously very important to getting the right vehicle at the right time for the right price.

As addressed in General Chiarelli's Suicide Awareness Report, published last July, in 2010, the life demands of a soldier today, when you look at the moving, the promotions, the combat stress,
the exposure to trauma—all of these issues are disproportionately high, the suicides are comparatively high, compared to their civilian counterparts of the same age. The Army developed the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness to institutionalize mental resiliency. Although the Army is treating the symptoms of deployments, the larger issue, I believe, is rebalancing the force to allow the soldiers and their families to reset.

As the Army works to teach soldiers to be internally prepared to deal with the challenges of the Army at war, what is the Army doing to create balance within the force, in terms of shorter deployments and longer stability within the assignments? We spoke a little bit about this yesterday.

General DEMPSEY. We did, Senator. But, I appreciate the opportunity to reinforce it.

We must get to a position where we have a minimum of 2 years at home with 1 year deployed in the Active component. It’s 1-to-4 in the Reserve component. I’m not sure that’s going to be enough, to tell you the truth. I don’t know.

As I sit here today, I’m confident that, if we can get to 1-to-2, we will be doing our soldiers and families a great service, that they well deserve, in terms of helping them cope with these life demands that Pete Chiarelli, who, by the way, deserves every accolade we can possibly heap upon him for the work he’s doing in this regard.

As we see these conflicts extend—and again, we’re making some assumptions about Iraq and Afghanistan; and if those assumptions prove true, then 1-to-2 might be adequate to the task. But, if we continue to deploy in the numbers we’re deploying, then we might have to reconsider and seek an even different BOG-dwell ratio. It might have to be 1-to-3. But, I’m not in a position—none of us are, really—to say that, right now.

You know this, Senator, but, we’ll always do what the Nation needs. If we have to break our BOG-dwell because of an emergency for this Nation, we’re there. But, as a routine matter, when these issues become prolonged, we need to have a standard of 1-to-2 so we can address the issues you’re addressing.

Senator HAGAN. It’s so important for the soldiers, as well as their families.

I thank you for your testimony, and I look forward to your confirmation.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN [presiding]. Good morning. It’s still “good morning”.

General Dempsey, congratulations to you on your nomination. Thank you, to you and your family, for all of the service you’ve given to this country.

I’ve been particularly impressed in the parts of your testimony, and questions that I’ve been able to hear this morning, about your work on leadership development. I would suggest that perhaps you could design a course for Members of Congress, because I think that would be helpful.

General DEMPSEY. I think the appropriate response there is, “No comment,” Senator. [Laughter.]
Senator Shaheen. I know that Senator Ayotte, in her remarks, mentioned New Hampshire’s Deployment Cycle Support Program, which we have had in place for several years to help our deploying Guard and Reserves and their families. I would just like to reiterate how important this program is. I think it’s a model for the rest of the country. There’s some very impressive data on the successes of the program. People who have been part of it are four times more likely to stay married when they come back. They’re four times more likely to stay in the military. They’re five times less likely to become homeless. On the very critical issue of suicide prevention, that a number of people have raised this morning, 100 percent of those people considered at risk for suicide are in active prevention with licensed support personnel.

It has been a hugely successful program. With the largest deployment in New Hampshire’s history right now, we think it’s very important. I hope, after you are confirmed, that you will help us figure out how we can continue this program, which had been supported primarily through congressionally directed spending. I hope you will take a look at this.

General Dempsey. I will, Senator. Thank you.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you.

This summer, I had the opportunity to visit Iraq for my first time, and Kuwait. We visited Camp Arifjan. I was truly amazed—and I think most people don’t recognize that the deployment out of Iraq is the largest movement of people and materiel in the military since World War II. It was really quite amazing. General Patton, I know, would be proud of what General Webster and folks there have been able to accomplish.

One of the things that impressed me the most was the way they had integrated savings into the entire operation there so that all of the men and women who were part of that effort are looking at how they can be more efficient in bringing people out and the operations of that unit.

I wonder if you could talk a little bit about how you see integrating that kind of culture into the entire Army, and what’s happening on that right now.

General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Senator, because it gives me the opportunity to point out that I’m deeply committed to supporting the Secretary of the Army and what he’s doing to inculcate that culture that you describe into our Army.

Secretary McHugh has been very clear with us, with the four-stars as we assemble from time to time with him, on that issue. We both respect his judgments and the course that he’s charted for us.

I would also mention that one of those who has accepted that responsibility is General Ann Dunwoody, who, you probably know, is our Army Materiel Command Commander. I’ve often said to her that she is accomplishing this retrograde of equipment out of Iraq in a way that actually almost makes it invisible to the rest of us, and suggested maybe it shouldn’t be. She’s done a remarkable job.

I think what you’re reflecting is, you’ve seen, at the tactical level, the kind of adaptations and efficiencies that we’re capable of. What you’re suggesting is, we have to do the same thing as an institution, and you’re exactly right.
Senator SHAHEEN. How do you make that happen?

General DEMPSEY. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, for the past few years, have pursued a thing that they call the “enterprise approach,” which is a way of suggesting that the stovepipes of the Army—and, sad to say, but not surprising, I suppose, we do have our own stovepipes: TRADOC, Forces Command, Army Materiel Command, the forward-deployed forces—we tend to see things inside of our own, if you will silos.

Senator SHAHEEN. Right.

General DEMPSEY. What the approach encourages is cross-collaboration. Now, I’d be disingenuous to suggest we’re where we need to be. But, where we want to be, and where I think Secretary McHugh will guide us, is to an approach that allows us to see issues right from the start, with a resource-sensitive eye, which, frankly, to our discredit in some ways, we haven’t had to do that because the American people have been so generous with their resources over the last 10 years.

We’ve done fairly well with those resources, by the way. As has been said earlier, today’s Army is the best Army it’s ever been. Thank you for that. But, we have to understand that we also share part of the Nation’s responsibility to be viable and to support the economic instrument of power, not just the military instrument of power. We’re prepared to do that. To do that, we have to be more resource-conscious. We will.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

I want to also follow up on Senator Udall’s question about how we reduce the dependency of our military on foreign oil and on how we are more efficient around energy use. You got into that a little bit, but I wonder if you could elaborate some more on the kinds of things that we’re doing and what kind of support would be helpful from Congress as you’re looking at what you need to do.

General DEMPSEY. You know what I’d like to do, Senator, if confirmed, is take on board the opportunity to actually engage this committee—and you, in particular—on what we’re doing with regard to this issue of power and energy, because we are doing a great deal. Much of it is really nascent. It’s not really very well developed. But, we’re looking at the same things that our civilian counterparts are looking at, in terms of solar and wind and the other noncarbon fuels that we might leverage to make ourselves more reliant. It’s actually a matter of military necessity, because the more you’re reliant on a fuel convoy, the more you’re stuck to lines of communication; and you’ve what that’s—happened to us in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Senator SHAHEEN. Right.

General DEMPSEY. Let me take on board the opportunity to engage you on that more coherently or articulately to let you know what we’re doing and to seek your advice on what more we might do.

Senator SHAHEEN. Good. I will definitely take you up on that.

General DEMPSEY. Okay.

Senator SHAHEEN. At this point, my time has expired. Since I am the last remaining Senator, I would like to again thank you. Thank you for being here, for your candor in your responses, and for your willingness to continue to serve.
QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?
Answer. No.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?
Answer. None. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has worked quite well in making the armed services an integrated joint force.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have over 35 years of experience in Army, Joint, and Coalition organizations from the tactical to the strategic levels of command, all of which have allowed me to see our Army at work in a broad variety of capacities and missions. Some of my most relevant experiences have been during periods of deployment when we have faced significant threats to our Nation’s security. I served as a field grade officer during Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm and then Operation Iraqi Freedom as the Commanding General of 1st Armored Division. Later as the Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq training Iraqi Security Forces, I experienced firsthand the importance of preparing our Army for joint and combined operations. Returning from Iraq, I served as Deputy and then Acting Commander of U.S. Central Command. Most recently, as the Commanding General for Training and Doctrine Command, I have had an opportunity to reinforce the training ethos of our Army as we look toward an uncertain future. I have travelled across our Army and at every turn have seen the sacrifices of our soldiers and their families. Our soldiers are the best the world has ever seen, and they remain fiercely dedicated to our Nation and its security. If confirmed by this Senate, I would be honored to serve as their Chief of Staff.

DUTIES

Question. Sections 601 and 3033 of title 10, U.S.C., establishes the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. The Chief of Staff, Army serves as the senior military advisor to the Secretary of the Army in all matters and has responsibility for the effective and efficient functioning of Army organizations and commands in performing their statutory missions.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that Secretary McHugh would prescribe for you?
Answer. I expect that Secretary McHugh would prescribe the following duties for me if I am confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the Army:

(a) Serve as the senior military leader of the Army and all of its components;
(b) Assist the Secretary with his external affairs functions, including presenting and justifying Army policies, plans, programs, and budgets to the Secretary of Defense, Executive Branch, and Congress;
(c) Assist the Secretary with his compliance functions, including directing The Inspector General to perform inspections and investigations as required;
(d) Preside over the Army staff and ensure the effective and efficient functioning of the headquarters, to include integrating Reserve component matters into all aspects of Army business;

(e) Serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provide independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense, President, and Congress. To the extent that such action does not impair my independence as the Chief of Staff of the Army, in my performance as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would keep the Secretary of the Army informed of military advice rendered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters affecting the Department of the Army. I would inform the Secretary of the Army of significant military operations affecting his duties and responsibilities, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense;

(f) Represent Army capabilities, requirements, policy, plans, and programs in joint fora;

(g) Supervise the execution of Army policies, plans, programs, and activities and assess the performance of Army commands in the execution of their assigned statutory missions and functions; and

(h) Task and supervise the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, the Army Staff and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Army, elements of the Army Secretariat to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

Question. What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?

Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army would be responsible for providing advice and assistance in the execution of my responsibilities for those missions and functions related to manpower and personnel; logistics; operations and plans; requirements and programs; intelligence; command, control and communications; and readiness.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Army?

Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff, I will continually assess my ability to perform my duties and, if necessary, implement measures aimed at improving my ability to lead our Army.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship with:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as the head of the Department of Defense and the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense, issues guidance and direction to the Military Departments. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will serve as a military adviser to the Secretary of Defense as appropriate. I will cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Army properly implements the policies established by his office. In coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Secretary of Defense in articulating the views of the Army.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and exercises such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The Secretary of Defense also delegates to him full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and exercise the powers of the Secretary on any and all matters for which the Secretary is authorized to act pursuant to law. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense, and to his deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. Also, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Deputy Secretary of Defense in articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with them to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance and direction issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries perform responsibilities that require them, from time to time, to issue guidance—and in the case of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direction—to the military departments. If confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Under Secretaries in articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with them to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance and direction issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman plans the strategic direction and contingency operations of the armed forces; advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets identified by the commanders of the combatant commands; develops doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; reports on assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces; provides for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations; and performs such other duties as may be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.

In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the Chief of Staff of the Army assists the Chairman in providing military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will provide my individual military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be my duty to provide frank and timely advice and opinions to the Chairman to assist in his performance of these responsibilities. As appropriate, I will also provide advice in addition to or in disagreement with that of the Chairman. I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the Chairman, and will communicate directly and openly on policy matters involving the Army and the Armed Forces as a whole.

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the Chairman in providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be my duty to ensure that the Vice Chairman is provided my frank views and opinions to assist him in his performance of his responsibilities.

Question. The Secretary of the Army.
Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the Army would be close, direct, and supportive. Within the Department of the Army, a large part of my responsibility as Chief of Staff would be to serve as the Secretary's principal military adviser. My responsibilities would also involve communicating the Army Staff's plans to the Secretary and supervising the implementation of the Secretary's decisions through the Army Staff, commands and agencies. In this capacity, my actions would be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary. In my capacity as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would also be responsible for appropriately informing the Secretary about conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and about significant military operations, to the extent such action does not impair independence in the performance of my duties as a member of Joint Chiefs of Staff. I anticipate that I would work closely and in concert with the Secretary to establish the best policies for the Army in light of national interests.

Question. The Under Secretary of the Army.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's principal civilian assistant and exercises such powers as the Secretary prescribes. His/Her duties include coordinating legal and policy advice to all members of the Army Staff, commands, and agencies.

Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army. His/Her duties include coordinating legal and policy advice to all members of the Army Staff, commands, and agencies.
of the Department regarding matters of interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the Army on any legal question or procedure, other than military justice matters, which are assigned to The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the General Counsel to assist in the performance of these important duties.

**Question.** The Inspector General of the Army.

**Answer.** The Inspector General is responsible for inspections and certain investigations within the Department, such as inquiring into and reporting to the Secretary and the Chief of Staff regarding discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army with continuing assessment of command, operational, logistical, and administrative effectiveness; and serving as the Department of the Army focal point for Department of Defense Inspector General inspections and noncriminal investigations, as well as the Department of Defense inspection policy. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Inspector General to ensure effective accomplishment of these important duties.

**Question.** The Judge Advocate General of the Army.

**Answer.** The Judge Advocate General is the military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and all officers and agencies of the Department of the Army. The Judge Advocate General provides legal advice directly to the Chief of Staff and the Army Staff in matters concerning military justice, environmental law; labor and civilian personnel law; contract, fiscal, and tax law; international law; and the worldwide operational deployment of Army forces. The Chief of Staff does not appoint The Judge Advocate General, and does not have the personal authority to remove him. This enables The Judge Advocate General to provide independent legal advice. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the TJAG as my legal advisor and I will assist him in the performance of his important duties as the legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army.

**Question.** The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

**Answer.** The National Guard Bureau is a joint bureau of the Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force. Appointed by the President, he serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. The Chief, National Guard Bureau is also the principal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on matters relating to the National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, National Guard Bureau to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau, as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army.

**Question.** The Director of the Army National Guard.

**Answer.** The Director, Army National Guard is responsible for assisting the Chief, National Guard Bureau and Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the National Guard Bureau, as they relate to the Army National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Director, Army National Guard to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau. This will be essential as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army to sustain and improve Army National Guard’s operational capabilities.

**Question.** The Chiefs of the Other Services.

**Answer.** The Chief, Army Reserve is responsible for justification and execution of the personnel, operation and maintenance, and construction budgets for the Army Reserve. As such, the Chief, Army Reserve is the director and functional manager of appropriations made for the Army Reserve in those areas. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, Army Reserve as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army to sustain and improve the Army Reserve operational capabilities.

**Question.** The Combatant Commanders.

**Answer.** Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and are directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of their commands to carry out missions assigned to them. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries assign all forces under their jurisdiction
to the unified and specified combatant commands or to the U.S. element of the
North American Aerospace Defense Command, to perform missions assigned to
those commands. In addition, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of Defense and the authority of combatant commanders under title 10,
U.S.C. section 164(c), the Service Secretaries are responsible for administering and
supporting the forces that they assign to a combatant command. If confirmed, I will
cooperate fully with the combatant commanders in performing these administrative
and support responsibilities. I will establish close, professional relationships with
the combatant commanders and communicate directly and openly with them on
matters involving the Department of the Army and Army forces and personnel as-
signed to or supporting these commands.

VISION FOR THE FUTURE

Question. What is your vision for the Army of today and the future?
Answer. The Army will remain a critical component of the Joint Force, providing
an affordable mix of tailorable and networked organizations operating on a rota-
tional cycle, providing a sustained flow of trained and ready land forces for full spec-
trum operations, prepared for unexpected contingencies and at a tempo that will
sustain our All-Volunteer Force.

Question. What roles do you believe the Army should play in contingency, human-
itarian, and stability operations?
Answer. We are capable of executing contingency, humanitarian or stability oper-
ations, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, under the control of
the appropriate Combatant Commander. We are also capable of assisting our inter-
national partners in building their own operational capacity. Through security force
assistance, we can increase the ability of other nations to uphold the rule of law,
ensure domestic order, protect its citizens during natural disasters, and avoid con-
flicts, which would otherwise require U.S. military support.

Question. Do you see any unnecessary redundancy between Army and Marine
Corps ground combat forces, particularly between Army light or medium weight di-
visions and Marine Corps divisions?
Answer. No. We each have unique but complementary capabilities that provide
the National Command Authority with options for dealing with emerging threats
and contingencies.

ARMY ROLE IN THE JOINT FORCE

Question. The U.S. military fights as a joint force and strives to achieve realistic
training in preparation for military operations. The Army provides trained and
equipped forces for joint military operations. How do you believe the Army can best contribute to improved joint military ca-

bilities while preserving its service unique capabilities and culture?
Answer. The Army works our relationships with Sister Services diligently while
maintaining our unique values, culture, and traditions. The Army provides forces
for prompt and sustained combat operations on land as a component of the Joint
Force. Through sustained operations on land and among populations, we make per-
manent the advantages gained by joint forces.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next
Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. We have to win our current conflicts while simultaneously preparing for
future security challenges. We must take care of our soldiers, our wounded, and
their families. We must meet this challenge in an environment that demands more
efficient use of limited resources.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing
these challenges?
Answer. The Army, with support from Congress, is already working to understand
and address many of these challenges. Although we don’t have all the answers yet,
it is clear that to be prepared for an increasingly complex and unpredictable future,
we need thinking, adaptable, and resilient leaders. Investments in our human cap-
ital, both uniformed and civilian, coupled with a sustainable rotational force struc-
ture model, will ensure we are postured to meet the challenges of the future.

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the perform-
ance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. At this point, I am not aware of any problems that would impede the
performance of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
**Question.** If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

**Answer.** I am committed to working to ensure that our management systems are maintained or refined to meet challenges facing the Army. I have not yet determined specific plans to modify systems currently in place or under revision but if confirmed will carefully assess how we execute our management functions to ensure appropriate stewardship of our resources.

**Question.** If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to talk with the Secretary of the Army, to develop priorities for our force. In my current position, I’ve asserted that we must be a learning organization, we must make training credible and relevant at home station so that it replicates more closely the challenges of the operational environment, and we must develop our leaders differently. It’s also clear that we must work to preserve the All-Volunteer Force, care for our Wounded Warriors, continue to work to deliver Full Spectrum Capabilities, and transform systems and processes to build true adaptability into our institution.

**ACQUISITION ISSUES**

**Question.** Major defense acquisition programs in the Department of the Army and the other military departments continue to be subject to funding and requirements instability. Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems?

**Answer.** A variety of factors contribute to increased risks of cost increase and delay, depending on the program, the technologies involved, and the acquisition strategy employed. However, I agree that the foundation for any successful large acquisition program rests on carefully refined requirements, a sound program strategy, and funding stability.

**Question.** What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to address funding and requirements instability?

**Answer.** Requirements must be carefully refined to meet realistic and affordable objectives, and they must account for the rate of technological and scientific change in meeting needed capabilities.

**Question.** What is your view of the Configuration Steering Boards required by statute and regulation to control requirements growth?

**Answer.** I support efforts by Congress to control costs, refine requirements, and reduce program risk in our major acquisition programs. The Configuration Steering Boards play a significant role in oversight of acquisition programs and compliment Army efforts to validate requirements and eliminate redundancies through Capability Portfolio Reviews. In tandem, these oversight processes help the Army avoid cost increases and delays in our programs.

**Question.** What role would you expect to play in these issues, if confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?

**Answer.** If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will work diligently with the Secretary of the Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology to ensure that all oversight mechanisms for acquisition programs are used effectively to reduce cost and schedule risk. In the area of requirements, I will work with TRADOC to refine requirements to meet affordable and achievable acquisition strategies.

**Question.** The Comptroller General has found that DOD programs often move forward with unrealistic program cost and schedule estimates, lack clearly defined and stable requirements, include immature technologies that unnecessarily raise program costs and delay development and production, and fail to solidify design and manufacturing processes at appropriate junctures in the development process.

**Do you agree with the Comptroller General’s assessment?**

**Answer.** I agree that this assessment is valid with respect to some of the Army’s past programs. However, the Army has already adopted different approaches in the development of more recent programs. I understand that prior to the release of the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Request for Proposals (RFP) in November 2010, the program’s requirements were carefully reviewed, prioritized and weighted in the RFP to avoid reliance on immature technologies, mitigate cost and schedule risk, and provide an achievable and affordable framework for a new vehicle. The GCV program involved close coordination between acquisition, requirements and resourcing experts to provide a solid program foundation. The Army is vigorously working to avoid the characterizations in the Comptroller General’s assessment in future programs.
Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the Army should take to address these problems?

Answer. The Department of the Army has already begun taking significant steps to address these concerns. There is a renewed emphasis on collaboration between the requirements and acquisition communities in the development of new programs. Last year, Secretary McHugh commissioned a thorough review of the Army's acquisition process led by The Hon. Gil Decker and Gen (Ret.) Lou Wagner that provides a blueprint for improvements to the acquisition process. I understand the Army is now studying these recommendations and developing a plan to implement those that help our process. As a whole, the Department must continue to build on these efforts to avoid unnecessary cost and delay in our programs.

Question. What role would you expect to play in these issues, if confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?

Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will continue to work with Department of the Army leadership to implement any necessary changes to ensure that the Army's acquisition programs succeed in providing needed capabilities to our soldiers.

Question. Beginning in 2010, the Army began a series of capabilities portfolio reviews that have contributed to the rationalization of the Army's modernization plans and resulted in significant programmatic decisions, including the termination of major weapons programs. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's capabilities portfolio reviews and process?

Answer. The capabilities portfolio reviews have been successful in identifying redundancy and finding efficiencies across system portfolios. The Army is now studying how to best institutionalize the capabilities portfolio reviews process to identify additional efficiencies, and then work to achieve them.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take, if any, to institutionalize the portfolio review process within the Army?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the studies to institutionalize portfolio review process to identify and achieve further Army efficiencies.

Question. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not been successful over the past decade. Since the mid-1990s, Army modernization strategies, plans, and investment priorities have evolved under a variety of names from Digitization, to Force XXI, to Army After Next, to Interim Force, to Objective Force, to Future Combat System and Modularity. According to press reports, a recent modernization study done for the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the Army Gilbert Decker and retired Army General Louis Wagner found that the Army has spent $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion annually since 2004 on weapons programs that have been cancelled. What is your assessment, if any, of the Army's modernization record?

Answer. Over the last 10 years, our Army has achieved a remarkable degree of modernization in areas such as improving soldier protection, increasing battlefield intelligence, and bringing the network to individual soldiers. At the same time, we have nearly completed the modular conversion of over 300 brigade level organizations and to complete the conversion of our division and higher level headquarters to enable mission command in the operational environments we anticipate in the first half of the 21st century. If confirmed, I look forward to studying the Decker-Wagner recommendations to identify areas where we can improve.

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program for the Army?

Answer. I recognize that a stable modernization strategy and program is an important component to both a balanced Army and to exercise good stewardship of resources entrusted to the Services. If confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary McHugh on how to achieve this.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's current modernization investment strategy?

Answer. While it is true that several of our major modernization efforts over the past decade have been unsuccessful, I would submit that the American soldier today is the best equipped and enabled soldier this country has ever fielded. Successes such as the Stryker vehicle, world class body armor, soldier night vision equipment, soldier weapons, precision fire systems such as Excalibur and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and vehicles such as the family of medium trucks all suggest to me that the Army has had some tremendous success in modernization.

I believe the Army has learned a number of valuable lessons and now has both the processes and the mindset to more carefully and rigorously review programs both before
we initiate them and while they are in progress. This will be an area I will assess more deeply if I am confirmed as Chief of Staff and will periodically give this committee my frank assessments.

Question. Do you believe that this strategy is affordable and sustainable?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to closely examine this strategy to ensure it is affordable and sustainable.

Question. In your view does the Army's current modernization investment strategy appropriately or adequately address current and future capabilities that meet requirements for unconventional or irregular conflict?
Answer. From my current position, I believe the current modernization investment strategy strikes an appropriate balance between current and future capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward to studying this further with the Army staff.

Question. Does the investment strategy appropriately or adequately address requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with a peer or near-peer enemy?
Answer. From my current position, I believe the current modernization investment strategy appropriately and adequately addresses requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with the peer or near-peer enemy we can reasonably foresee in the fiscal year 2012–2016 FYDP time horizon.

Question. If confirmed, what other investment initiatives, if any, would you pursue with respect to unconventional or conventional capabilities?
Answer. I have not yet formulated investment initiatives particular to either conventional or unconventional capabilities that are different from those the Army is currently pursuing, but I look forward to doing so, if confirmed.

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to ensure that all these initiatives are affordable within the current and projected Army budgets?
Answer. To be good stewards of the resources provided, the Army must continue to internalize a "cost culture" that considers "affordability" as an essential element of all (not just modernization) initiatives. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Secretary to ensure future initiatives are affordable within current and projected budgets.

Question. In your view, what trade-offs, if any, would most likely have to be taken should budgets fall below or costs grow above what is planned to fund the Army’s modernization efforts?
Answer. While I do not have that information at this time, I believe trade-offs must occur after all areas of risk are carefully considered and coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and Congress.

ARMY WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAMS

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the following research, development, and acquisition programs?

Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).
Answer. In the development of the Ground Combat vehicle—the replacement for the Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle—the Army is fully committed to the "Big Four" imperatives: soldier protection; soldier capacity (squad plus crew); the capability to operate across the Full Spectrum of operations; and Timing (7 years to the first production vehicle from contract award). The Ground Combat Vehicle will be the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to operate in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) environment. Modular armor will allow commanders the option to add or remove armor based on the current threat environment. The Ground Combat Vehicle will be designed with the capacity for Space, Weight, and Power growth to incorporate future technologies as they mature. The Army is using an incremental strategy for the Ground Combat Vehicle with the first increment being an Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Army is currently reviewing proposals from vendors for Technology Development contracts.

Question. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN–T).
Answer. I believe that the Warfighter Information Network Network-Tactical is one of the Army's most important programs. It provides the broadband backbone communications for the tactical Army. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 1 (formerly Joint Network Node) began fielding in 2004 to provide a satellite based Internet Protocol network down to battalion level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2 begins fielding in fiscal year 2012 to provide an initial On the Move capability, extending down to company level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 3 will provide improved capabilities, including higher throughput, three to four times more bandwidth efficiency, and an aerial transmission layer, to all 126 brigades/division headquarters with an on-the-move requirement.
Question. Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E–IBCT) Network Integration Kit (NIK).
Answer. The E–IBCT investment provides the infrastructure that will allow the Army to grow the tactical network capability, and an opportunity for both large and small companies to support the Army’s tactical network strategy.
The NIK is a necessary bridge solution that allows the Army to continue evaluation and development of incorporated network technologies.

Question. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) including the Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) radios.
Answer. Joint Tactical Radio System is the Services’ future deployable, mobile communications family of radios. They provide Army forces dynamic, scalable, on-the-move network architecture, connecting the soldier to the network. Fiscal year 2012 procurement funding supports fielding of Joint Tactical Radio System capability to eight Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to meet fiscal years 2013/2014 network requirements.
The Ground Mobile Radio is the primary vehicular capability using the Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform to meet tactical networking requirements.
The Man Pack and Rifleman Radio are the primary Joint Tactical Radio System capability for battalion and below tactical operations. The man pack supports the Soldier Radio Waveform and interoperates with legacy waveforms (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications). Rifleman Radio primarily serves the dismounted formation and utilizes the Soldier Radio Waveform to provide voice and individual location information from the dismounted soldier to the leader. The combination of the three radios helps the Army to push the network to the individual soldier.

Question. Stryker combat vehicle, including the Double-V Hull initiative, procurement of more flat-bottom vehicles, and the Stryker mobile gun variant.
Answer. The current Stryker vehicle has exceeded its Space, Weight and Power and Cooling (SWaP-C) limits due to add-on applique (armor and devices) required for ongoing combat operations. In the near term, it is imperative to increase crew protection with the Double-V-Hull (DVH) Stryker. In the mid-term, Stryker modernization will improve protection and mobility by recouping SWaP-C, enabling future growth and allowing integration of the emerging network for all Stryker variants. Fleet-wide modernization for all variants upgrades protection, counter-IED, drive train, suspension, electrical power generation and management, and digital communications and network integration.

Double-V Hull: Stryker Double-V Hull (DVH) is on track for June 2011 fielding. The initial DVH test results are positive, indicating the vehicle will be ready for fielding as scheduled.
Non-DVH Hull: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV): The Army will procure 168 Stryker NBCRVs in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 for a total quantity of 284 (an Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model rotation quantity). These vehicles are in normal Hull configuration. The Stryker NBCRV provides a unique capability to the Joint Force including a critical mission of Homeland Defense, for which DVH protection is a lesser consideration.
Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS): The Army has procured and fielded 142 of 335 MGS. In August 2009, the Army decided to not pursue additional MGS procurement at this time with forthcoming fleet-wide modernization.

Question. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
Answer. The JLTV is a joint program with the U.S. Marine Corps, Navy, and the Army; the Australian Army is also currently a partner in the Technology Development phase. I believe that the JLTV is a vital program to fill the force protection and payload gaps not currently satisfied by the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. It will also fill the mobility, transportability and communication architecture gaps not satisfied by the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles being used in Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) roles. The Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy plans for the JLTV to replace about a third of the LTV fleet, which is roughly 46,000 vehicles. The Army is currently examining the attributes of the JLTV program to ensure it meets our needs for the future Army light tactical fleet, especially in terms of protection.

Question. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS).
Answer. I agree the Army has an enduring requirement for an armed aerial scout as was reaffirmed after the termination of the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program.
This requirement will be validated by the ongoing Armed Aerial Scout Analysis of Alternatives whose findings are scheduled for release in third quarter fiscal year 2011.
Question. M1 Abrams tank modernization.
Answer. In my view, the Abrams modernization is necessary and will initially enable integration of the emerging network and provide ability to fire the next generation of 120mm ammunition. Future modernization will provide capability improvements in lethality, protection, mission command, mobility, and reliability intended to maintain the Fleet’s combat overmatch and restore space, weight, and power margins to keep the Tank relevant through 2050. The Abrams modernization program is funded in the fiscal year 2012 budget request. If confirmed, I will be able to offer an assessment as the program matures.

Question. M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization.
Answer. The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) will be replaced by the Ground Combat Vehicle beginning in 2018. Bradley Non-Infantry Fighting Vehicle (Cavalry, Engineer and Fire Support variants) modernization will address recoupment of Space, Weight and Power to provide platform growth and enable improvements in protection, mobility and ability to integrate the emerging network.

Question. Logistics Modernization Program (LMP).
Answer. I understand the LMP is an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system in the Operation and Support phase of its life-cycle.

Based on commercial off-the-shelf SAP Corporation software technology, LMP provides the Army with an integrated end-to-end supply chain solution at the national level that improves overall synchronization of information.

I concur with the Army’s vision to achieve a seamless, end-to-end modernized logistics enterprise and to develop and implement logistics enterprise architecture with joint interoperability. To support that vision, the LMP will integrate with other Army ERPs, including General Funds Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), and Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS–A), to provide a seamless enterprise-wide logistics environment spanning the factory to the foxhole in accordance with the approved Army ERP Strategy.

Question. Paladin Integrated Management Vehicle program.
Answer. I understand that the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program is an effort to address an existing capability gap in the self-propelled artillery portfolio brought about by an aging fleet and the termination of prior howitzer modernization efforts [Crusader and Non-Line-of-Sight-Cannon (NLOS–C)]. The PIM program provides upgrades that allow the Army to meet existing and future needs, and leverages the commonality with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle chassis and automotive components. PIM should provide growth potential in Space, Weight and Power and capacity for network expansion to accommodate future howitzer related needs, to include the addition of such Force Protection packages as add-on armor.

The Army continues to make improvements and upgrades based on operational lessons learned through the M4 Product Improvement Program. The Army’s effort is designed to integrate full automatic firing, an ambidextrous selector switch and a more durable “heavy” barrel. Simultaneously, the Army has initiated a full and open competition to confirm the best possible Individual Carbine solution. Results of the competition are expected in fiscal year 2013.

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

Question. If confirmed, what would you propose should be the Army’s long term strategy for the utilization and sustainment of its large MRAP and MRAP–All Terrain Vehicle fleets?
Answer. The Army needs to continue to provide the best level of protection for our deploying soldiers. Given what we have learned during the last 10 years, I believe we should attempt to provide MRAP levels of protection to deploying forces worldwide commensurate with the mission assigned. The Army will integrate MRAPs into the force.

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

Question. The 2010 report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provides guidance that military forces shall be sized to prevail in ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war against al Qaeda as well as for conducting foundational activities that prevent and deter attacks or the emergence of other threats.

What is your assessment of the Army’s current size and structure to meet the QDR report’s guidance?
Answer. The Army’s size and structure have proven adequate to meet the demands of our defense strategy as we know them today, although a very heavy demand has been placed upon soldiers and their families for nearly 10 years. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the
Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and our combatant commanders to match end strength, structure, and tempo in our ARFORGEN rotational model to meet demands as they change.

**Question.** If confirmed, what size or structure changes would you pursue, if any, to improve or enhance the Army’s capability to meet these requirements?

**Answer.** The nature of the strategic environment requires the Army to continuously assess its capabilities and force requirements. It’s taken 10 years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can reasonably describe as balanced. We are accustomed to change, and we will undoubtedly need to continue to change. As we do we must seek to maintain a balance of capabilities that are available to meet the Nation’s needs at a sustainable tempo.

**Question.** The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement for improved capabilities in the following six key mission areas.

**Question.** For each, what is your assessment of the Army’s current ability to provide capabilities to support these mission requirements? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue to improve the Army’s capabilities to support:

- Defense of the United States.
- Support of civil authorities at home.
- Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations.
- Build the security capacity of partner states (including your views, if any, on the use of general purpose forces in the security force assistance role).
- Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments.
- Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction.
- Operate effectively in cyberspace.

**Answer.** The Army is fully capable of fulfilling its responsibility to defend the homeland through detection, deterrence, prevention, and if necessary, the defeat of external threats or aggression from both state and non-state actors. A specific program recently undertaken to enhance this ability include the fielding of the enhanced Stryker Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle. This provides us with a much improved technical assessment and decontamination capability.

**Question.** Support of civil authorities at home.

**Answer.** The Army is well postured to provide support to civil authorities. We are organized and trained to provide responsive and flexible support to mitigate domestic disasters, CBRNE consequence management, support to civilian law enforcement agencies, counter WMD operations and to counter narcotics trafficking activities. We continue to address the challenges associated with this mission set including unity of command, integration with civilian authorities, and the integration of Title 10 and Title 32 forces.

**Question.** Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations.

**Answer.** We are highly proficient in counterinsurgency, stability and counterterrorism operations. This has been the focus for the Army for much of the last 10 years and we have institutionalized lessons learned across the operating and generating force.

**Question.** Build the security capacity of partner states (including your views, if any, on the use of general purpose forces in the security force assistance role).

**Answer.** General Purpose Forces have a clear role in building sustainable capability and capacity of partner nation security forces and their supporting institutions. Peace time engagement is our best opportunity to shape the future operating environment. General Purpose Forces are well suited to support these activities through Security Force Assistance.

**Question.** Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments.

**Answer.** The Army’s ability to deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments as part of the joint force is adequate to meet the demands of the current security environment. That said, there are some tasks and skills to which we have not trained due to the demands of our ongoing conflicts. We must restore our proficiency in those tasks. We work with our sister Services to assess our capabilities to conduct entry operations as part of the joint force and watch closely the improved anti-access/area denial capabilities being developed by potential adversaries.

**Question.** Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction.

**Answer.** The Army provides highly trained and ready forces with capabilities to support combatant commander requirements to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Current capabilities include operating effectively within a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment, specialized teams to locate and neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and an operational headquarters with expertise in eliminating WMD.

**Question.** Operate effectively in cyberspace.

**Answer.** We are on the right glide path to support U.S. Cyber Command and our geographic combatant commanders to operate effectively in cyberspace. On 1 October 2010, the Army stood up a new three star command (U.S. Army Cyber Command/2nd Army), to direct the operations and defense of all Army networks, and when directed, provide full-spectrum cyberspace operations. The Army is bringing the forces of network operations, defense, exploitation, and attack under one oper-
ational level command to integrate and synchronize global operations for the first time.

**MODULARITY**

**Question.** Modularity refers to the Army’s fundamental reconfiguration of the force from a division-based to a brigade-based structure. Although somewhat smaller in size, modular combat brigades are supposed to be just as, or more capable than the divisional brigades they replace because they will have a more capable mix of equipment—such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment. To date, the Army has established over 90 percent of its planned modular units, however, estimates on how long it will take to fully equip this force as required by its design has slipped to 2019.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s modularity transformation strategy?

**Answer.** The modular transformation strategy reorganizes Army brigades, divisions and corps headquarters, and theater armies and subordinate commands into standardized designs. 98 percent of all Army brigades have converted or are in the process of converting to modular design. The remaining 2 percent are projected to begin modular conversion by 2013. Modular transformation improves the Army’s ability to meet combatant commander requirements and National Security Strategy objectives by providing tailor-able formations and leaders who are accustomed to building teams based on changing requirements.

**Question.** In your view, what are the greatest challenges in realizing the transformation of the Army to the modular design?

**Answer.** The most significant challenge associated with modular transformation is the full fielding of authorized equipment. Although all units will be organized in a modular design by the end of fiscal year 2013, full fielding of some items of equipment will take longer.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions or changes, if any, would you propose relative to the Army’s modular transformation strategy?

**Answer.** If confirmed, we will continue to review Army plans and strategies, including the modular transformation strategy, to ensure the Army continues to provide the joint force with the best mix of capabilities to prevail in today’s wars, engage to build partner capacity, support civil authorities, and deter and defeat potential adversaries. If confirmed, I will continue to assess Army structure against current and potential threats to provide the best mix of capabilities and the highest levels of modernization possible.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of the employment and performance of modular combat brigades and supporting units in Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom?

**Answer.** These modular capabilities increase the effectiveness of the Army by better supporting the needs of combatant commanders across the full spectrum of operations.

**Question.** What changes, if any, would you propose to the modular design, the mix of combat and supporting brigades, or modular unit employment to improve performance or reduce risk?

**Answer.** At Training and Doctrine Command, we are currently working with current and former commanders, to examine our organizations to see if they are the best we can provide. We are continuously looking at alternate force designs and force mixes to see how we can improve, in both effectiveness and efficiency, our force structure.

**Question.** With respect to the Army’s modular combat brigade force structure design, press reports indicate that the Army is reassessing its heavy and infantry brigade structures and may add a third maneuver battalion to each where there are only two battalions now.

If confirmed, how would you propose to implement a decision to add a third maneuver battalion to the heavy and infantry combat brigades?

**Answer.** We are examining the current brigade designs and associated force mix including the number and type of brigades. This will produce alternatives to be analyzed. As the results of this analysis emerge, we will make appropriate decisions on the implementation of any of such proposals and their affect on our available resources. No decisions have been made regarding future force design or force structure changes.

**ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH**

**Question.** The Army has increased its Active-Duty end strength over the last several years to meet current and what was believed to be the demands of future oper-
ational requirements. Authorized active duty Army end strength is now 569,400. The Secretary of Defense has announced Army Active-Duty end strength reductions beginning this year through 2014 of 22,000 soldiers followed by another 27,000 beginning in 2015. The fiscal year 2012 budget starts this reduction by requesting 7,400 fewer soldiers.

In your view, what is the appropriate Army Active-Duty end strength needed to meet today’s demand for deployed forces, increase nondeployed readiness, build strategic depth, and relieve stress on soldiers and their families?

Answer. We are continuously assessing the factors that affect end strength including assigned missions, operational demands, unit readiness, soldier and family well-being, Reserve component capability and capacity, and fiscal constraints in order to determine required Active-Duty end strength. Our Active-Duty end strength is adequate to meet current demand. As future demand is better understood, we will assess its impact.

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate Army Active-Duty end strength needed to meet the likely future demand for deployed forces, maintain nondeployed readiness, ensure ground force strategic depth, and avoid increasing stress on soldiers and their families?

Answer. I am not yet prepared to provide you with an answer on future Army end strength.

Question. Plans for the reduction of Army end strength assumes that the cuts will be made gradually over several years.

What, in your view, are the critical requirements of the management of this end strength reduction to ensure that should strategic circumstances change the cuts can be stopped and, if necessary, reversed?

Answer. End strength reductions are not automatic. They are conditions based and will require periodic assessment. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh and Army Leadership to develop a plan that will allow us to accomplish current and projected missions, balance the well-being of soldiers and families, and keep us prepared to meet unforeseen operational demands.

Question. The gradual reduction of end strength may provide a hedge against an unforeseen contingency requiring sufficient and available Army forces, however, savings from the reduction of forces could be realized sooner and with greater long-term advantages with faster implementation.

What, in your view, are the most important advantages and disadvantages of faster end strength reductions?

Answer. The Army’s deliberate and responsible draw-down plans will proceed at a pace necessary to ensure mission success, the well-being of soldiers and families, compliance with directed resource constraints and flexibility for unforeseen demands.

The advantage of drawing down faster would be the flexibility to invest in other required areas. The disadvantages lie in the reduced flexibility for meeting unforeseen demands and the precision to maintain the skills and quality of the remaining force.

Question. End strength reductions totaling 49,000 soldiers will also require force structure reductions as well.

If confirmed, how would you propose to reduce Army force structure, if at all, to avoid the problems associated with a force that is over-structured and undermanned?

Answer. The Army is coordinating the end strength reductions with its deliberate Total Army Analysis process to ensure Army force structure contains required capability and capacity to meet current and future operational requirements within authorized end strength.

Question. How will these planned end strength reductions impact the Army’s plans for overseas basing of its units?

Answer. In my present position, I have not had a chance to examine the potential impact of end strength reductions on overseas basing.

Question. The Army has had two other major post-conflict end strength reductions in the last 40 years after Vietnam and after Operation Desert Storm.

What, in your view, are the critical elements of the planning and management of a major force reduction to ensure that the health of the Army as a whole is not crippled impacting ongoing operations or general readiness?

Answer. End strength reductions are conditions based and must be deliberate and responsible. The Army’s plan should ensure accomplishment of its assigned missions, operational readiness for future demands, compliance with directed resource constraints while treating soldiers and their families with the dignity and respect they deserve.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the planning and management of an end strength reduction minimize the negative impact on the readiness of the Army and soldier families?

Answer. Throughout my entire career, I have focused on taking care of soldiers and families. If confirmed, I will look carefully at the impact on soldiers and families.

Question. Does the Army have the legislative authority it needs to properly shape the force as part of the personnel drawdown?

Answer. At this time, I am not aware of any additional legislative authority the Army needs to shape personnel drawdown. If confirmed, I will consult with Secretary McHugh and Senior Army personnel leadership to determine if additional authorities are necessary.

STRATEGIC RISK

Question. Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create increased levels of strategic risk for the United States based on the lack of availability of trained and ready forces for other contingencies?

Answer. In my current position, I have not yet had the opportunity to examine strategic risk given our global demand. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs, I will have the opportunity to look closely at this issue.

Question. If so, how would you characterize the increase in strategic risk in terms of the Army's ability to mobilize, deploy and employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of risk acceptable?

Answer. As mentioned in the previous question, I have not yet had the opportunity to examine strategic risk.

Question. What is the impact of the decision to increase Army forces committed to Afghanistan on our ability to meet our security obligations in other parts of the world?

Answer. The impact is manageable as we have available forces in the Train/Ready pool of forces to meet potential future requirements with an acceptable degree of risk. The Army is currently meeting all requirements and mitigates the Afghanistan additional commitment with forces made available commensurate with the drawdown in Iraq. The Army continuously balances meeting current requirements against building/maintaining strategic depth and capacity for contingency, full spectrum operations.

Question. How and over what periods of time, if at all, will reductions to Army end-strength increase or aggravate this risk?

Answer. These projected reductions, as mentioned by the Secretary of Defense in his 6 January announcement, are based on the condition of a decrease in demand. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to ensure our force structure is adequate to meet all future demands.

Question. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?

Answer. The Army has a mature planning process to determine force structure changes within the approved end strength for all Army components. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the full readiness of units generating to deploy to known operations in or in preparation for contingency operations.

"INSTITUTIONALIZING" SUPPORT FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE

Question. A major objective of the Department over recent years has been increasing emphasis on lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability type operations. All of which are areas that place a high premium and demands on Army capabilities. In order to ensure that a rebalance achieves this objective, and perhaps more importantly is then sustainable, Secretary Gates has stressed the need for the Department to "institutionalize and finance" the support necessary for the irregular warfare capabilities that have been developed over the last few years and will be needed in the future.

What, in your view, does it mean to "institutionalize" capabilities and support for irregular warfare capabilities in the Army?

Answer. The Army views Irregular Warfare as an operational theme rather than a particular type of operation. We must be able to conduct Stability Operations, Counter-Insurgency, Counterterrorism, and Foreign Internal Defense and support the Special Operations Forces in unconventional warfare. I understand "institutionalize" to mean that the Army's operating forces and generating forces view operations under the theme of Irregular Warfare as a core capability. We must be able to execute missions across the full spectrum of conflict, to include irregular warfare.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of Army efforts to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?

Answer. The Army has institutionalized Irregular Warfare. We have an Irregular Warfare proponent within Training and Doctrine Command supported by an Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell that synthesizes Army Irregular Warfare efforts including those from the Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Counter-Insurgency centers and others. The Army includes Irregular Warfare in our professional military education. The Army has built four Counter-Insurgency Centers, a Security Force Assistance training brigade, increased the military police, and significantly increased Special Operations and Civil Affairs forces.

Question. In your view, what are the obstacles, if any, to institutionalizing this kind of support, and what will be necessary to overcome them?

Answer. I have not seen any particular obstacles to institutionalizing this kind of support. The Army has to balance risk across the range of missions it may be called on to perform.

Question. While force structure and program changes may be necessary, they are unlikely to prove sufficient to achieve full institutionalization. The greater challenge may be found in changing Army culture, attitudes, management, and career path choices, for example through adjustments to organization, training, doctrine, and personnel policies.

In your view, what are the most important changes, if any, that might be necessary to complement programmatic changes in support of the further institutionalization of capabilities for irregular warfare in the Army?

Answer. We have to retain the flexibility, adaptability, and agility to operate both in missions requiring maneuver over extended distances and in missions requiring the establishment of security over wide areas regardless of what kind of threats populate the battlefield.

Question. Institutionalizing support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability capabilities in the force does not mean ignoring the requirement for the Army to be trained, equipped, and ready for major combat at the high-end of the full spectrum of operations.

If confirmed, how would you propose to allocate the Army’s efforts and resources to ensure that the force is prepared for major combat while at the same time it increases and institutionalizes support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability operations?

Answer. We are training and educating our soldiers and leaders to understand that they must be capable of both combined arms maneuver and wide area security. In training, we replicate the threats and conditions they are likely to face in their next mission. For 10 years, that has meant irregular threats and conditions common in the wide area security role that supports counterinsurgency operations. As the demand for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is reduced, we will introduce threats and conditions in training common in the combined arms maneuver role. The goal however is to avoid the false dichotomy of “regular or irregular” warfare. The future battlefield will be populated with hybrid threats—combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups—and we must train and educate our leaders and units to understand and prevail against them.

Question. Do you anticipate that the Army will continue to train and equip general purpose force brigades for the “advise and assist brigade (AAB)” mission after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to an end?

Answer. I anticipate that there will be an ongoing requirement for Security Force Assistance activities of the type carried out by these brigades into the future. I believe building partnerships and partner capacity will be key roles for the Army in the future. If confirmed, I will continue to assess requirements and work with this Congress to ensure we have the resources and flexibility required to meet them.

Question. If so, what mission essential task list changes do you plan to institutionalize this mission set in training for the general purpose force brigades?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with our joint partners to identify the mission essential tasks for Security Force Assistance and incorporate them into the Unified Joint Task List and Army Unified Task List.

Question. Do you foresee that general purpose force brigades will be regionally aligned to carry out an AAB-type mission?

Answer. I believe it is too early to tell. I believe some brigades may be regionally aligned. The number and type of brigades will depend upon what we have available after the priority requirements in the CENTCOM AOR, and the other COCOM requirements. If confirmed I will work with Secretary McHugh to determine the best allocation to support operational requirements.

Question. If so, what changes to training and equipping of the ARFORGEN model will be necessary for regional alignment?
Answer. The ARFORGEN model and our modular design are well-suited to the kind of adaptations that will be required to meet security force assistance requirements in the future.

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What do you believe are the major lessons that the Department of the Army has and should have learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) regarding its title 10, U.S.C., responsibilities for manning, training, and equipping the force?

Answer. We have learned that soldiers require more than a year to fully recover from extended deployments and to prepare for another deployment. In addition, the ability to adapt rapidly is the key to success in the current and future operational environments. We have also learned that a fully integrated Reserve component is critical to meet force requirements.

Question. If confirmed, which of these lessons, if any, would you address as a matter of urgent priority?

Answer. They are equally important and all must be addressed.

ROTATION CYCLES/SCHEDULES

Question. Although improving recently, the Active Army's ratio of time spent deployed to time at home station has remained fairly steady at 1:1—that is for each year deployed a soldier spends about 1 year at home station. The Active Army objective is 1:2 where soldiers can expect to be home for 2 years for each year deployed. The Reserve component objective is 1:5 where soldiers can expect to be home for 5 years for each year deployed.

What impact do you expect the proposed troop reductions in Iraq to have on the so-called “dwell time” of Army soldiers? Is it possible that the reduction of demand for Army forces in Iraq alone will allow the Army to achieve the 1:2 dwell time goal by the end 2011?

Answer. The proposed troop reductions in Iraq will allow the Army to gradually increase dwell if there is not a significant increase in demand in Afghanistan or in other contingencies. We do not believe that the reduction of demand in Iraq alone will allow the Army to meet the 1:2 dwell goal.

Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact of the decision to decrease Army end-strength on the rotation schedule and meeting the dwell goal of 1:2 for Active-Duty Forces?

Answer. With the proposed troop reduction in Iraq and projected decrease in Afghanistan, we will see improvement gradually in dwell, but the Army has not yet met its dwell goal of 1:2 for Active-Duty Forces. The decreases in Army strength are conditions based and I am not in a position at this time to assess whether there will be an impact to the dwell goal of 1:2 based on these reductions.

How, in your view, will the proposed reductions in Iraq impact the ability of the Army National Guard to respond to Homeland Defense and support to civil authorities?

Answer. The return of these Army National Guard forces to state control should provide the Governors and Adjutants General with increased forces to conduct Homeland Defense, disaster response, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. The National Guard has been able to meet all disaster relief requirements, the return of forces will allow more flexibility to accomplish local missions.

EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

Question. Both deploying and nondeploying Active and Reserve component Army units are training without all their required equipment. Deploying units do not receive some of their equipment until late in their predeployment training cycle or as they arrive in theater.

In your view, has deployment of additional brigades to Afghanistan increased the strain on maintenance systems and further reduce equipment availability for training?

Answer. There have been some challenges with equipment being available for training when it has been fielded directly to theatre. We're beginning to overcome this challenge.

What is the impact of our drawdown from Iraq in this regard?

Answer. The drawdown from Iraq should improve availability of equipment for units to conduct pre-deployment training. For some systems, such as tactical wheeled vehicles, it will have a larger positive impact. For other pieces of more high
demand equipment in short supply across the Army, I anticipate it will have a less-
er impact.

*Question.* Do you believe that the Army has enough modern equipment to fully support the predeployment training and operations of deploying units?

*Answer.* The Army does not have enough equipment to fill all units to their fully modernized capabilities. This means there are some instances in which the most modern equipment is not available until later in a unit’s pre-deployment cycle or until it arrives in theater. However, the Army uses the force generation model to resource units with adequate levels of the available modernized equipment to conduct their pre-deployment training and assigned mission upon deployment.

*Question.* What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for training and operations?

*Answer.* The Army is short unmanned aerial systems and some non-line-of-sight communications equipment. Due to the nature of the warfare in Afghanistan, we face shortages in light infantry specific equipment. As we continue to reset equipment returning from Iraq we will see a steady improvement in on hand equipment for units training for contingency force missions.

*Question.* What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and operate?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will continue our capability portfolio reviews to evaluate our priorities against mission requirements and adjust our resource allocations to ensure the Army continues to strike the critical balance between having enough modern equipment to fully support pre-deployment training and operations in theater. If confirmed, I would support the Army Force Generation Model of phased equipping through which the Army intensively manages our equipment on-hand to ensure next deploying units, from all components, have sufficient equipment for training and deployment.

**EQUIPMENT REPAIR/RESET**

*Question.* Congress provided the Army with approximately $15 to $17 billion annually to help with the reset of nondeployed forces and accelerate the repair and replacement of equipment. However, the amount of reset funding requested for DOD in fiscal year 2012 decreased to $11.9 billion from the fiscal year 2011 request of $21.4 billion.

In your view, is this level of funding sufficient to not only prepare Army forces for operations in Afghanistan but to also improve the readiness of non-deployed forces for other potential contingencies?

*Answer.* My understanding is that the $4.4 billion requested for reset in fiscal year 2012, though lower than requests in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011, is adequate to replace equipment lost in combat and to repair equipment available for reset. If confirmed, I will closely examine this issue.

*Question.* Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity but not at their full capacity?

*Answer.* My understanding is that repair depots are operating at required capacity but not at their full capacity.

*Question.* What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be taken to increase the Army’s capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and training?

*Answer.* There are certain measures, such as contract augmentation or rebalancing workload that could be used to increase capacity at our facilities. At this time, I am not in a position to determine whether these measures are necessary or appropriate.

*Question.* What impact is it likely to have on the ability of Army National Guard (ARNG) units to respond to Homeland Security and support to civil authorities missions?

*Answer.* I understand that the reduction of reset funding for fiscal year 2012 is commensurate with the reduction of troop and equipment levels supporting Operation New Dawn. I believe that the ARNG will still be able to respond to Homeland Defense missions and provide support to civil authorities.

**MISSILE DEFENSE**

*Question.* The Department of Defense recently decided to terminate the Army’s Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, and not to proceed with procurement and fielding of the tri-national Medium Extended Air Defense System, two Army air and missile defense systems.

Do you consider missile defense to be one of the Army’s core missions?
Answer. Yes. The Army has confirmed on many occasions that Air and Missile Defense is a core competency. Protection of our deployed forces is the priority. The Army provides this protection in coordination with our sister Services and coalition partners.

**Question.** How do you believe the Army should manage the risks that result from these decisions?

**Answer.** I believe the Army needs to continue to monitor the threat and prioritize required future capabilities to ensure we provide effective affordable solutions in a timely manner to our forces.

**Question.** The Army has recently proposed transferring a number of its air and missile development programs to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

**In your view, what is the proper relationship between the Army and the Missile Defense Agency?**

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the Army relies on the MDA to develop and produce the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The Army works with MDA to provide those BMDS capabilities to the combatant commanders. The Army maintains a relationship with MDA through the Army/MDA Board of Directors and its four standing committees.

**Question.** The Army has recently completed a review of its air and missile defense portfolio.

**In your view, what are or should be the Army’s responsibilities, if any, with respect to development, procurement, and operation of missile defense systems?**

**Answer.** The Army’s responsibilities depend on the type of missile defense system being developed and guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

**SPACE**

**Question.** The Army Space support to Strategic Command works closely with Air Force Space Command in getting space based communications to the warfighter. Recently the Army has begun to look at the possibility of expanding the scope of data that could be provided to the last tactical mile from space.

**In your view, what are the needs that the Army could address from space, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that this is coordinated with OSD?**

**Answer.** While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment, I understand that the importance of space programs continues to increase across DOD, and the Army needs to keep pace to fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space systems are appropriately prioritized within both DOD and the Department of the Army.

**Question.** If confirmed, what would be your vision for the Army space forces in the future?

**Answer.** While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment, one of my priorities, if I am confirmed, is to position the Army to keep pace to fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space systems are appropriately prioritized and resourced.

**Question.** The Army, as do all the Services, tends to lag behind in the acquisition of ground and other terminals to work with new satellite systems. Acquisition of GPS M-code capable equipment is just one example of where there is needed capability on orbit but terminals will not be available in a timely fashion to utilize the capability.

**What is your view on this lag and, if confirmed, what actions would you propose taking to resolve the lag?**

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would need to examine this issue more closely. While I understand that all of the Services have specific requirements to meet specific needs for their forces and that the Army depends heavily on these systems, I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment.

**LOW DENSITY/HIGH DEMAND FORCES**

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you address the Army’s management of low density units such as Special Operations Forces, military police, civil affairs, and others which are in extremely high demand in this new strategic environment?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would use the Total Army Analysis (TAA) to identify the capabilities necessary, within resource constraints, to achieve the full spectrum of missions expected of the Army. When requirements for additional low density/high demand capabilities are identified through this process, they are resourced within acceptable risk. This process will help determine where these capabilities should reside: the Active component, the Reserve component, or a mix of both. The Army balances the inventory of these low density units to ensure availability of an affordable
mix of flexible forces capable of accomplishing the missions required within the most likely security environment.

**Question.** Are there functional changes among the Active and Reserve components that you believe should be made?

**Answer.** I am not yet aware at this time of any changes that may be necessary.

**ARMS READINESS**

**Question.** How would you characterize Army readiness in its deployed and non-deployed units?

**Answer.** I have some concerns about the readiness levels of deployed and non-deployed units. In the ARFORGEN model, deployed and deploying Army units are given the highest priority for manning, equipping and training to achieve the combatant commander’s wartime/mission requirements. Nondeployed Army units are used to provide the additive resources to ensure that deployed and deploying Army units can meet mission requirements. This requires the Army to continue to do risk assessment so nondeployed units do not fall below an unacceptable level of risk.

**Question.** Do you believe the current state of Army readiness is acceptable?

**Answer.** In my opinion, the Army is prepared to accomplish current missions.

**Question.** How do you see operations in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan impacting the readiness of Army forces that may be called upon to respond to an attack or another contingency?

**Answer.** The current demand for Army forces coupled with the cumulative effect of nearly 10 years of conflict impacts the Army’s flexibility to provide forces to other contingencies.

**IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS**

**Question.** Many soldiers are on their fourth and some their fifth major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Beginning in August 2008 Department of Defense policy has been to limit deployments for Active component soldiers and mobilization of Reserve component soldiers to not longer than 12 months.

**Answer.** The Army monitors retention very closely, given the high operational demand and multiple deployments that soldiers are experiencing. Statistics reveal that multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq are not adversely impacting retention. Continuous improvements to Army benefits, such as world class healthcare advances for wounded soldiers, enhancements in family support programs, and additional monetary bonuses have encouraged large numbers of our soldiers to continue their commitments beyond their obligated service periods.

**Question.** What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and rates of indiscipline.

**Answer.** The indicators of stress on the force that the Army tracks continuously include: Reenlistments, Chapter separations, Divorce, Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault, Enlisted Desertion, AWOL offenses, Drug and Alcohol Enrollments, Drug Positives, Courts-Martial and suicides.

I understand that Army discipline and misconduct rates, including desertion, absence without leave, and courts-martial have remained steady or declined in the past year. Other indicators of stress on the force, such as substance abuse and domestic violence have increased. However, the significant increase in the number of soldier suicides is of the greatest concern. Soldiers and their families continue to make significant personal sacrifices in support of our Nation. If confirmed, I am committed to providing soldiers and families with a quality of life commensurate with their service and to continuing Army efforts to develop multi-disciplinary solutions directed at mitigating risk behaviors and enhancing soldier and family fitness and resilience.

**Question.** For how long do you believe these levels of commitments can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army?

**Answer.** I am concerned about the long-term health of the force if we are unable to achieve the appropriate deployment to dwell ratio for the deploying soldier. Adequate dwell time should help the visible and invisible wounds of this protracted conflict. If confirmed, I will closely monitor indicators of stress on the force and work to ensure that the Army has plans and programs to confront these issues appropriately.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey has stated that the Army is "out of balance". What is your understanding and assessment of the concept and efforts to achieve "balance" for the Army?

Answer. I understand balance to be the Army's ability to sustain the Army's soldiers, families, and civilians, prepare forces for success in the current conflict, reset returning units to rebuild the readiness consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments and contingencies, and transform to meet the demands of the 21st century. With the help of Congress, we have made significant progress over the past 3 years to restore balance.

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to achieve and sustain Army "balance"?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh and Army leadership to adopt measures and strategies to achieve and sustain balance. Building resilience among our forces will be one of my highest priorities.

RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve, as opposed to its longstanding traditional role as a Strategic Reserve?

Answer. The demand for U.S. ground forces over this past decade has required continuous use of Active component (AC) and Reserve component (RC) forces in order to meet the Army's operational requirements. The RC is no longer solely Strategic Reserve. Current and projected demand for Army forces will require continued access to the RC. Mobilization and operational use of the RC will continue for the foreseeable future.

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges to maintaining and enhancing the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as a relevant and capable Operational Reserve?

Answer. In my opinion, the Army must ensure continued access to the Reserves as an essential part of the Total Force. If confirmed, I will work to ensure they have the necessary training equipment to accomplish all missions. Maintaining an appropriate level of resourcing for the Operational Reserve and mobilizing these forces on a predictable and recurring basis will be challenges for the Army.

Question. What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve component forces in meeting combat missions?

Answer. In my view, Reserve component forces play a critical role in enabling the Joint Force Commanders to meet assigned missions. Today's force is structured to balance maneuver capability in the Active component with a majority of the enablers in the Reserve component. This balance should provide capabilities to meet operational requirements.

Question. In your view, should the Department of Defense assign homeland defense or any other global or domestic civil support missions exclusively to the Reserve?

Answer. Reserve component forces are uniquely positioned to be the first responder to these missions; however, the Army's Total Force must be able to execute homeland defense or other global or domestic support missions.

Question. In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1 year mobilized to 5 years at home affect the viability and sustainability of the All-Volunteer Reserve Force?

Answer. Once the Army can restore its balance and stress on the force has been significantly reduced, a predictable cycle that ensures full recovery and training will support the viability and sustainability of the All-Volunteer Reserve Force. I think the exact ratio—whether 1:4 or 1:5—requires further analysis.

MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems arose in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening and medical readiness monitoring, errors caused by antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and lack of access to members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Reserve Force management policies and systems have been characterized in the past as "inefficient and rigid" and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies. What is your assessment of advances made in improving Army Reserve component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems still exist?
Answer. I understand the Army is currently reviewing all of its mobilization policies to ensure that the systems in place are effective and responsive for Reserve component soldiers. I believe Reserve components are a critical part of the Total Force, and if confirmed, I will continue the effort to ensure that Reserve component soldiers are mobilized and demobilized in the most effective and efficient way possible and that their needs and the needs of their families and employers are met.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the sufficiency of current Reserve Force management policies?

Answer. As I understand current Reserve Force management policies, the goal is to manage the force to produce a supply of units to the combatant commanders with a short-term goal of 1 year of mobilization every 5 years with a long-term goal of 1 year of mobilization every 6 years. The challenge the Army has faced has been that demand has been greater than the supply and has caused the need for more frequent mobilizations. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan start to draw-down, the Army should be better able to attain the mobilization to dwell goals.

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?

Answer. The Army Force Generation Model fundamentally changes the way the Army builds unit readiness for mobilization requirements. The ARFORGEN model presents a structured progression of readiness through a multi-year long cycle.

Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?

Answer. At present, I am not aware of a need to modify current statutory authorities to facilitate mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to review the statutory authorities to determine if they are sufficient.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

Question. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has found that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war was problematic, and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning is a failed concept.

What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All-Volunteer Force?

Answer. I believe the IRR has proven an invaluable asset to all Army components to support contingency operations around the world.

Question. What are your views on the proper role of the IRR in Army force management planning?

Answer. The IRR can serve as a source of experienced and highly-skilled soldiers to help the Army meet critical skill and grade requirements.

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, do you foresee making to the Army’s IRR recall policy?

Answer. At this time, I do not have sufficient information to recommend changes to this policy. If confirmed, I will consider input from all components to determine the best IRR recall policy.

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the system in place for members in the IRR receiving orders to active duty to request a delay or exemption for that activation, including the procedures in place for appealing the Army’s decision on that request?

Answer. While this is an important part of the IRR mobilization, I do not have sufficient familiarity with this policy to recommend changes.

Question. Recent studies of Army suicides show higher rates among the IRR. What should the Army and DOD do to address this concern?

Answer. Suicides in the IRR are often more difficult to address because those soldiers are not affiliated with a unit. If confirmed, I will consider all methods to integrate IRR soldiers into the Army’s Health Promotion/Risk Reduction efforts.

PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related entitlement spending continues its steep upward growth and is becoming an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to control the rise in the Army’s personnel costs and entitlement spending?

Answer. We need to strike a balance between preserving the All-Volunteer Force, accomplishing operational missions and retaining an Army that is affordable to the Nation. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense on how best to achieve it.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to avoid a requirement for massive end-of-year reprogramming to cover personnel costs?
Answer. My understanding is the President's budget is adequate to meet current personnel costs.

Question. What would be the impact of a year-long continuing resolution on Army personnel funding?
Answer. If the Army is given the flexibility to manage total resources (both Base and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds) to pay its force, then fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution will have minimal impact on military pay and allowances.

MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE PERSONNEL

Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee, and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for improved policy oversight and accountability.
If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
Answer. I believe the Army should develop and resource mechanisms to routinely identify, screen and assess Reserve component medical readiness. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Army Reserves, the Director of the Army National Guard, and the Surgeon General to develop policies for more effectively identifying personnel that are nondeployable for medical reasons.

Question. How would you improve upon the Army's ability to produce a healthy and fit Reserve component?
Answer. This is a very important issue, and I will work with the Army's Active and Reserve component leadership to assess whether there are challenges in this area. The Army is moving forward with a Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. If confirmed, I would determine how this program applies to Reserve component and National Guard soldiers.

NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, AND READINESS

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of changes in the global and domestic roles and mission of the Army National Guard and the National Guard Bureau?
Answer. The Army National Guard is a component of the Reserve and Total Force. It responds to emergencies within the United States and deploys to support contingency operations overseas. Throughout the last 10 years, the Army National Guard has transformed from a Strategic Reserve to an operational Reserve. The National Guard, with the support of the National Guard Bureau, has proven critical to the Army’s Total Force, and I believe it will continue to do so in the years ahead.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s commitment to fully fund 100 percent of National Guard equipment requirements? In your view, do Army processes for planning, programming, and budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the National Guard?
Answer. I understand efforts are underway to modernize the Reserve components and to ensure they are equipped to fulfill their missions. If confirmed, I will examine the funding of the National Guard to ensure it receives the appropriate level of resources to maintain its role as a vital component of the Total Force.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the resourcing needs of the Army National Guard are fully considered and resourced through the Army budget?
In your view, what is the appropriate role for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to ensure that Army National Guard requirements/needs are appropriately synchronized with Army priorities and resourcing strategy.

Question. What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of increasing the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to General (O–10)?
Answer. The increase in grade reflects the significant responsibilities of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

Question. In your opinion, should the Chief of the National Guard Bureau be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. In my present role, I have not had the opportunity to consider this issue.

Question. What is your understanding of the role and authority of the Director of the Army National Guard?
Answer. The Director of the Army National Guard assists the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, organizing and managing its personnel and other resources
to accomplish the responsibilities and functions. The Director of the Army National Guard assists in carrying out the functions of the National Guard Bureau as they relate to the Army.

**Question.** In your view, should the Director of the Army National Guard be “dual hatted” as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army?

**Answer.** In my present role, I have not had the opportunity to see how these positions would function together and have not formed an opinion.

**ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T)**

**Question.** What do you see as the role that Army science and technology programs will play in continuing to develop capabilities for current and future Army systems?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the Army's science and technology investment strategy is shaped to foster invention, innovation, and demonstration of technologies for the current and future warfighter. The science and technology program should retain the flexibility to be responsive to unforeseen needs identified through current operations.

**Question.** What in your view have been the greatest contributions, if any, of Army science and technology programs to current operations?

**Answer.** I believe the most significant contribution the Army science and technology community has offered to current operations is the ability to use technology to significantly improve warfighter capabilities. Technological innovations have resulted in the rapid development and deployment of lightweight and adaptable Armor solutions that have been critical to addressing emerging threats, enhancing intelligence capabilities, and better protecting our deployed forces.

**Question.** What metrics would you use, if confirmed, to judge the value and the investment level in Army science and technology programs?

**Answer.** To judge the value and investment level in Army science and technology programs, I would use metrics that demonstrate improved warfighter capabilities; improve acquisition programs; and align technology development to warfighter requirements.

**Question.** What new S&T areas do you envision the Army pursuing, for instance to lighten soldier load, and to improve the survivability and combat effectiveness of dismounted soldiers and ground vehicles?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will engage the Army's science and technology program and its stakeholders, including the acquisition community, Training and Doctrine Command and the combatant commanders to discuss the needs of the warfighter and the “art of the possible” for future technology-enabled capabilities to ensure the Army remains the best equipped force in the world.

**ARMY LABORATORIES AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ENGINEERING CENTERS (RDEC)**

**Question.** How will you balance the role of Army laboratories between long-term fundamental research, support to current operations and the development of new capabilities to support current and future Army missions?

**Answer.** The Army laboratories are science and technology performing organizations and as such have and will continue to play a major role in supporting current operations with best capabilities available. Through their broad range of investments in key strategic science and technology areas, they also provide critical new capabilities for soldiers.

**Question.** If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army laboratories and R&D centers have the highest quality workforce, laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so that they can continue to support deployed warfighters and develop next generation capabilities?

**Answer.** Army laboratories and Research and Development Centers need to maintain the resources required to continue initiatives and advancements that support the warfighter. If confirmed, I will learn more about their operations and support efforts to improve best practices and workforce quality necessary for mission accomplishments.

**ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION EFFORTS**

**Question.** In the past, the DOD Test Resource Management Center did not certify the Army's test and evaluation (T&E) budget due to identified shortfalls in T&E range sustainment, operations, and modernization. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army's T&E infrastructure is robust enough to test new systems and technologies and reliably verify their combat effectiveness and suitability?
Answer. Testing is a crucial capability for maintaining the Army's combat edge and modernizing the force. I fully recognize the value of testing to ensure new technologies and equipment address the capabilities our warfighters need. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Army T&E community and the Office of the Secretary of Defense T&E leadership to ensure the Army's T&E infrastructure is adequately resourced to address testing requirements and maintain robust test capabilities.

ARMY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) PROGRAMS

Question. What major improvements, if any, would you like to see made in the Army's development and deployment of major information technology systems?

Answer. I believe the Army needs to implement and enforce technical standards, make acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or near-COTS technology easier, and field new technology to operational forces more quickly. This is in line with the congressional mandate you gave us in section 804 of the 2010 NDAA.

As Commanding General for Training and Doctrine Command, I helped establish a center for network integration at Fort Bliss, TX—the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF). It will serve as the Network's primary test unit with a two-fold intent, to remove the integration burden from the operational units and to provide an operational venue to evaluate new technologies and network capabilities prior to fielding to operational units. The new capabilities they develop should ultimately provide the impetus for future acquisition and equipping decisions.

Question. How will the consolidation of IT systems announced under Secretary Gates efficiency initiative reduce the IT support cost per user to the Army?

Answer. I understand the two primary Army initiatives that fulfill Secretary Gates' mandate are Enterprise Email and consolidation of Army data centers. Implementation of these initiatives should help reduce the cost of information technology support to the Army.

HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEMS

Question. What is your understanding of the Army's plans to institutionalize the Human Terrain System (HTS) program? Given the proliferation of such capabilities across the Services, what are your views, if any, on developing a joint HTS capability?

Answer. The Army has institutionalized the Human Terrain System as an enduring capability assigned to Training and Doctrine Command and funded capability starting in the fiscal year 2011. I believe there is merit to developing a joint capability. In September 2010, I directed a Training and Doctrine Command capability based assessment of all Socio-cultural capabilities throughout the combatant commands and Services. The intent is to identify other ongoing socio-cultural initiatives, to determine potential synergies and best practices in order to develop and evolve an enduring joint capability. The results of this assessment are due in the spring of 2011.

OPERATIONAL ENERGY

Question. Prior to and since the creation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Program, a number of the Services have made progress addressing concerns associated with operational energy. The Army has announced its operational energy aspirations for the future but, unlike the other Services, the Army's five strategic energy security goals appear vague and lack quantitative metrics against which to measure progress.

If confirmed, how would you propose that the Army address its operational energy challenges, requirements, and opportunities in the immediate short-term?

Answer. The most important issue with operational energy is the amount of fuel used to meet our operational needs. Most of our fuel is used in generation of electricity. The Army has implemented, and accelerated deployment, of generators that use less fuel as well as microgrid systems that tie generators together to operate more efficiently. We are developing more efficient motors for helicopters and vehicles to reduce our operational energy footprint and, ultimately, wars are won or lost by dismounted soldiers, so the Army is addressing excessive soldier loads, driven in large part by energy and power constraints. As the Commanding General of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, I'm a charter member of the Army's Senior Energy and Sustainability Council, which is responsible for addressing energy challenges across the Army. If confirmed I will continue efforts currently underway to increase our energy efficient capabilities in theater and emphasize energy awareness through the military chain of command, and across the Army, to foster a more energy-aware culture.
Question. What is your understanding of the Army’s progress with respect to testing and deploying operational energy technologies?

Answer. The Army is taking advantage of every avenue, to include industry, to help us develop technologies that can reduce our operational energy footprint. Renewable energy systems and insulated tentage are some of the systems being piloted and tested. We are also evaluating technologies that will help lighten soldier loads and reduce the amount of batteries and fuel we must procure and deliver to theater. We will continue to pursue more efficient devices and employ energy management capabilities that are essential to retain energy as an operational advantage.

Question. What is your understanding of how the Army is taking advantage of its labs and research, engineering and development centers to further its operational energy and security goals?

Answer. The Army has integrated the national laboratories with Department of Energy and Army laboratories to develop solutions to a range of operational energy, power and security needs. Some of the initiatives include research to reduce the size and weight of components, broadening alternative energy sources, leveraging various emergent energy efficient technologies. These new technologies will increase energy efficiency and improve power supplies for contingency bases, forward operating bases and equipment carried by individual soldiers. If confirmed I will work to ensure that the research conducted at Army facilities continues to focus on meeting the operational energy needs of the current and future Army.

INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. Witnesses appearing before the committee in recent years have testified that the military Services under-invest in their facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-investment in our installations have led to increasing backlogs of facility maintenance needs, created substandard living and working conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies that could increase productivity.

What is your assessment of Army infrastructure investment?

Answer. Since fiscal year 2007, with BRAC, Transformation, and Grow the Army initiatives, the Army has made significant MILCON investments in its infrastructure. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation, Energy and Environment, and the Commanding General at Installation Management Command to assess our infrastructure investments.

If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities?

Answer. Proper stewardship of our facilities portfolio requires the Army to fully sustain the current facilities, dispose of our excess facilities, improve the quality of our worst facilities and build-out our largest and most critical shortages, all at a level adequate to support the mission.

If confirmed, I will evaluate the proper balance of funding, to include evaluating whether the Army should increase operation and maintenance funding for restoration and modernization and Demolition.

ARMY POLICIES REGARDING DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

Question. What is your understanding of the Army’s policy with respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you agree with this policy?

Answer. Army policy directs commanders to initiate administrative separation for all soldiers involved in trafficking, distribution, possession, use, or sale of illegal drugs. While the policy requires initiation of separation, commanders have the authority to retain or separate a soldier.

I concur with this policy.

Question. What is your understanding of the Army’s policy with respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?

Answer. Army policy requires that the separation authority consider a soldier drug offender’s potential for rehabilitation and further military service. For this reason, soldiers who commit drug and alcohol offenses are required to be evaluated by a certified substance abuse counselor through the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP). Commanders consider the recommendation of ASAP counselors when determining a soldier’s potential for rehabilitation and retention.

I concur with this policy.
**Question.** Do you believe that the Army has devoted sufficient resources to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways?

**Answer.** My personal experience at various command levels since 2001 has been that the Army devotes sufficient resources to implement these objectives. If confirmed, I will assess and closely monitor the level of resourcing for this important area.

**Question.** What measures are being taken to improve the Army’s performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?

**Answer.** Army policy requires a comprehensive approach by commanders, law enforcement and the medical community for drug and alcohol abuse. The Army is working diligently to improve its surveillance, detection, and intervention systems for drug and alcohol abuse.

The Army investigates all reported drug and alcohol incidents to assist commanders in properly adjudicating the offense. The Army is also enhancing detection capabilities through the Drug Suppression Teams.

The Army is also working to improve intervention systems. In addition to increasing the number of ASAP counselors to accommodate the increasing demand, the Army continues to expand the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program to build resiliency in the force. The Army is also conducting the Confidential Alcohol Treatment and Education Pilot program at six installations to promote help seeking behavior by allowing soldiers to confidentially seek help for alcohol problems.

**MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION**

**Question.** The Army continues to face significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve components.

What is your understanding of the most significant personnel challenges in recruiting and retaining health professionals in the Army?

**Answer.** There continues to be a national shortage of medical professionals that challenges the Army’s efforts to recruit and retain healthcare professionals. The Army competes with governmental and non-governmental agencies, as well as private healthcare organizations to attract and retain the most skilled and talented healthcare providers, in a uniformed or civilian capacity. The Army continues to evaluate initiatives to provide more flexibility to allow the Army to adequately compete in these areas.

**Question.** If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new requirements for 2011 and beyond?

**Answer.** I believe it is important to review medical support requirements on a regular, recurring basis. With that in mind, if confirmed I will assess whether the Army should undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army.

**Question.** If confirmed, what policies or legislative initiatives, if any, are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill ongoing medical support requirements?

**Answer.** Given the policy initiatives currently underway and the changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 at this time, I do not believe additional legislative authorities are needed to ensure that the Army fulfills medical support requirements. If confirmed, I will closely monitor this area and will work closely with the administration and Congress to seek any additional authorities identified as necessary to maintain this goal.

**WOMEN IN COMBAT**

**Question.** What is your view of the appropriate combat role for female soldiers on the modern battlefield?

**Answer.** Female soldiers have been and continue to be an integral part of our Army team, contributing to its success and overall readiness as they perform exceptionally well in specialties and positions open to them. Women are employed in units and positions and trained in theater—specific roles that often necessitate combat action such as defending themselves or their units from attack or accompanying patrols.

**Question.** In your view, should the current policy prohibiting the assignment of women to ground combat units be revised or clarified in any way to reflect changing roles for female soldiers and the changing nature of warfare?

**Answer.** Existing Army policy is more restrictive than the 1994 Department of Defense policy. If confirmed, I will assess Army policies against the evolving nature and realities of modern combat.
Question. Do you believe that it is appropriate for female soldiers to serve in positions in which they may be exposed to combat?
Answer. Yes. Women are serving in positions that expose them to combat today and continue to make tremendous contributions as well as demonstrate their selfless service and sacrifices in roles and responsibilities critical to the safety and security of our Nation and to the readiness of the Army.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by the Department of Defense in March 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at transforming the Department’s foreign language capabilities to include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for both military and civilian personnel.
What is your assessment of the progress the Army has made in increasing its foreign language capabilities in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. As Commanding General for the Training and Doctrine Command, I witnessed a tremendous increase in foreign language capabilities in support of OIF/OEF. The Army revolutionized its recruiting processes to enlist native and heritage speakers into vital interpreter/translator positions. Pre-deployment training for the General Purpose Force Soldiers and Civilians has transformed to include Afghani stan/Pakistan Hands Program, Language Enabled Soldiers training, the Rapport Program, and other Soldiers and Civilians with Culturally Based Language Training. The Reserve Officer Training Corps has introduced a very successful Culture and Language Program, which provides incentives and immersion opportunities for cadets who take foreign language and related cultural studies. Overall, these initiatives have provided enhanced capabilities for counterinsurgency operations and building partner capacity overseas.

Question. In your view, what should be the priorities of the Department of Defense, and the Army in particular, in responding to the need for improved foreign language proficiency and improving coordination of foreign language programs and activities among Federal agencies?
Answer. In my opinion, one of the highest priorities for the Department of Defense should be the continued support of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, which provides Culturally Based Language Training to all Services and Department of Defense Components. With the increasing demand for Pashto and Dari instructors, and foreign language professionals in general, the Department of Defense must coordinate with Federal agencies to ensure best practices are shared to recruit and retain personnel with these critical skills.

PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

Question. One year ago, 13 people were slain and scores wounded during a shooting rampage allegedly carried out by a U.S. Army Medical Corps officer. A Department of Defense review of the attack concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization of military personnel.
What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at Fort Hood?
Answer. The lessons learned are invaluable to the Army as we strive to improve the Army Protection Program for individuals and units against emerging threats. Through a holistic Protection approach, the Army is aggressively fielding material and nonmaterial solutions to address internal and external threats.

Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to integrate and synchronize the many Army Protection Programs that protect our soldiers, family members, and Department of the Army civilians by ensuring that commanders and leaders have the information and tools needed to address the ever changing threat environment.

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. The DOD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed that “DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization” and recommended that the policy be updated.
What is your view of the need to clarify the policy regarding religious accommodation in the Army?
Answer. The policies for religious accommodation in the Army are published in AR 600–20, Army Command Policy. The policy must be clear and provide appro-
propriate guidance to both soldiers and commanders regarding how the Army accommodates for religious beliefs and practices. To this end, if confirmed, I will assess the current policy and determine if further changes are necessary.

**Question.** Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the Army?

**Answer.** Your question raises a valid concern. However, the Army is a diverse force. As soldiers in the profession of arms, we understand the key role that good order, discipline, morale, and safety have in ensuring units are at all times ready to defend this nation. The Army has long been a place where people from all walks of life can serve proudly and where the many become one—a U.S. Army soldier.

**Question.** If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the Army?

**Answer.** The Army has a longstanding commitment to treat all soldiers with dignity and respect. Treating soldiers with dignity and respect requires continuous leader emphasis and vigilance.

**Question.** Do Army policies regarding religious practices in the military accommodate, where appropriate, religious practices that require adherents to wear particular forms of dress or other articles with religious significance?

**Answer.** Regulations regarding wear of religious clothing or items are found in two regulations (AR 600–20, Army Command Policy and AR 670–1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia). The policy provides the authority to wear religious jewelry, apparel or articles if they are neat, conservative, and discreet and compliant with these regulations.

**Question.** In your view, do these policies accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

**Answer.** In my opinion, current Army policies provide commanders with adequate flexibility to balance accommodation for religious beliefs and maintain good order and discipline.

**Question.** In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?

**Answer.** The Army does not have a policy regarding public prayer by military chaplains. As a matter of practice, however, chaplains are encouraged to be considerate of the audience.

**FAMILY SUPPORT**

**Question.** The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.

**What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?**

**Answer.** In my view the most pressing family readiness issues include sustaining the Army Family Covenant and improving communication and awareness of the extensive range of available support programs and services the Army has to improve soldier and family quality of life.

In 2007, the Army Family Covenant was unveiled to improve quality of life by providing programs and services that enhance soldier and family strength, readiness, and resilience. Since then, the Army has made great progress and continues to fulfill its commitment to provide soldiers and families a quality of life commensurate with the quality of their service.

The Army Family Action Plan, Survey of Army Families, and other studies revealed that soldiers and families may not be aware of the myriad of available support services. To address this concern, the Army is transforming Army Community Service (ACS) to help connect soldiers and families to the right service at the right time. This transformation will create a more streamlined and modular support structure that better supports our modular Army at every installation. The Army has begun piloting ACS transformation and anticipates completion by October 2011.

The Army has made great progress in building a wide range of support capabilities over the last few years, but the strain on the force continues. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen our support services and ensure our programs efficiently meet the needs of the soldiers and families who use them.

**Question.** How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, and lengthy deployments?
Answer. If confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure that Army Family programs reach out to all soldiers and their families, regardless of geographic location or deployment status. I will also work to ensure that family program platforms and delivery systems keep pace with a mobile Army and utilize technological advances and social networking so services are available to the soldiers and families who need them.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as active duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

Answer. I am committed to ensuring soldiers and families remain connected to Army Family services and programs, whether by internet, telephone, or in person regardless of geographic location or Component. Army OneSource (www.MyArmyOneSource.com) is the website of choice for information on Army Family programs and services. Army OneSource highlights Active and Reserve Component Family Programs, is publicly accessible, and thus available to all components and immediate and extended family members.

The State Joint Force Headquarters is the platform for support of geographically dispersed servicemembers and families. This platform projects the Joint Family Support Assistance Program resources, ARNG Family Assistance Centers (FACs), ARNG Family Readiness Support Assistants, and the ARNG Child and Youth program in support of Reserve component families and Active component families who do not reside near the installation. Additionally, Army sponsored programs including Operation Military Kids and Community Based Child Care and Respite Care programs build community capacity for the geographically dispersed Army population. These programs offer similar services and assistance to geo-dispersed Reserve component families as would be available on installations and are connected to local resources that soldiers and families are eligible to use.

MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAMS

Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) studies in Iraq and Afghanistan have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in combat theaters. The most recent report, MHAT VI, stated that multiple deployments were related to higher rates of acute stress and psychological problems, that servicemembers on their third and fourth deployment "reported using medications for psychological or combat stress problems at a significantly higher rate," and that "soldiers with short dwell-time report high mental health problems, high intent to leave the military and low morale."

Based on the findings of MHAT VI that soldiers experience increased stress due to multiple deployments and short dwell time, what actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate mental health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return?

Answer. The MHAT studies play a key role in proactively identifying how changes in the operational environment impact the ability to provide behavioral health care. Since OEF MHAT VI, the number of behavioral health personnel in theater was significantly increased to improve the ratio of behavioral health specialists to soldiers. Specifically, the MHAT team recommended one behavioral health personnel should be deployed for every 700 soldiers, and this ratio was met. Second, the MHAT team recommended a redistribution of behavioral health personnel to ensure that each BCT had one additional dedicated provider to augment their organic provider. This "dual provider" model was designed to ensure that a provider would be available to travel to remote outposts to see soldiers who had limited access to the larger Forward Operating Bases. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to develop and synchronize the expeditionary components of health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention programs and services.

Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of the Army's Mental Health Advisory Teams, and what are the lessons which can be applied to future deployments?

Answer. One of the most valuable findings from the MHATs has been to document that soldiers on multiple deployments report higher mental health problems. This finding was first observed in 2005 (MHAT III), and has been replicated in every subsequent MHAT. Another valuable finding noted in the question was the observation that mental health problems are related to dwell-times. Specifically, short dwell-times are associated with a heightened increase in reports of mental health problems. Other key findings include the observation that deployment length is strongly associated with reports of mental health problems and deployments have put a strain on marital relationships. Overall, the willingness to take a systematic look at the behavioral health care system and the behavioral health status of soldiers
through programs such as the MHATs has ensured that the Army is being responsive to the needs of deployed soldiers to include refining behavioral healthcare delivery models.

SUICIDES

Question. The committee continues to be concerned about the continuing increase in soldier suicides, especially the sharp increase in Reserve component suicides. In June, 2010, the Army released a report on Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention that analyzed the causes of suicides in the Army and reported disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. Chapter III of this report discussed the lost art of leadership in garrison.

In your view, what is the cause of this surge in the number of suicides of Reserve Component members?

Answer. The number of ARNG suicides for calendar year 2009 and calendar year 2010 were 62 and 112, respectively. The increase in suicides is due in part to improved reporting over the past 18 months for the Reserve components. This increase is not directly associated with deployments or unemployment as over 50 percent of ARNG suicides were soldiers who never deployed.

Question. The Army is focusing attention on the differences between our Active-Duty (AD) and non-Active-Duty suicides because there are external variables at play. The Army believes that factors such as the economy (particularly a difficult labor market) are creating stress in our non-AD population. Data indicates that unemployment among our young non-AD soldiers is above 30 percent and we are experiencing an increase in requests for employment assistance through ESGR (Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve). Additionally, Reserve component soldiers do not have the same access to medical care as their AD counterparts.

Answer. We continue to pull all accessible national data to better understand current trends. The CDC has a 3-year lag in reporting. So, while we have anecdotal indication of increased suicide in some civilian sectors, we don't have a clear picture of the national suicide rates for calendar year 2008–calendar year 2010. This is particularly important because these unreported years encapsulate the largest recession since WWII (Dec. 2007–June 2009). The Army is improving awareness of and access to training and resources; working with employers and private sector to mitigate economic stress; and improving the quality and access to health care for all Reserve component soldiers.

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s response to the continuing increase in suicide rates?

Answer. Leaders across the Army have taken aggressive steps to improve the health of the force, decrease high risk behavior and stem the increasing rate of suicides in our formations. This is a very tough issue and it is going to take consistent vigilance to understand the causes for this increase, identify the indicators and implement appropriate intervention measures. After nearly a decade of war, we are working to keep pace with the expanding needs of our strained Army, and continuously identify and address the gaps in our policies, programs and services. The Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention Report 2010, along with the DOD Task Force on the Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces and other strategic reports, serve as the foundation for our systemic effort to improve.

Question. What is the Army doing to address the issues raised in the Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention?

Answer. The Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention (HP/RR/SP) report was a focused 15 months effort to better understand the increasing rate of suicides in the force. This candid report informed and educated Army leaders on the importance of identifying and reducing high risk behavior related to suicide and accidental death, and reducing the stigma associated with behavioral health and treatment. Important issues raised in the HP/RR/SP Report include: gaps in the current HP/RR/SP policies, processes and programs necessary to mitigate high risk behavior; an erosion of adherence to existing Army policies and standards; an increase in indicators of high risk behavior including illicit drug use, other crimes and suicide attempts and an increased operational tempo.

To address gaps in the current HP/RR/SP policies, processes and programs necessary to mitigate high risk behavior, the Army has taken actions such as disseminating policy addressing the issues of polypharmacy, requiring a comprehensive medical review of any soldier who is receiving four or more medications when one or more of those is a psychotropic or antidepressant.

To address the erosion of adherence to existing Army policies and standards, the Army has issued commanders a compendium of Army policies emphasizing the
Army’s current policies and systems for surveillance, detection and intervention of high risk behavior. This has already increased our compliance and utilization rates across numerous proven policies and processes.

To address the increase in indicators of high risk behavior including illicit drug use, other crimes and suicide attempts, the Army has taken actions such as instituting a new online system giving Medical Review Officers improved access to drug and alcohol information systems resulting in enhanced identification of prescription/illicit drug use.

To address stressors associated with an increased operational tempo, the Army has increased the number of Military Family Life Consultants. These consultants work with soldiers and their families to provide them support during transitions and separations. They are available to support soldiers both prior to deployment/mobilization and during reintegration upon return from deployment.

Question. What is your assessment of the status of the Army’s Resiliency program in ensuring the readiness and well being of the Total Force?

Answer. The Army’s Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program is a ground breaking way of addressing stress on the force. We have migrated from treating stress and stress-related outcomes to developing resiliency in our young soldiers to get ahead of the effects of this hazardous occupation. We are shifting our focus from intervention to prevention, from illness to wellness.

It is my view the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness is a critical component to the Army’s holistic approach to the wellness of the Force. As part of our program we have fielded Master Resiliency Trainers into our training base to start early in developing resiliency among our recruits and trainees. We are gradually expanding this fielding to incorporate all units, particularly timed to our deploying forces during pre and post-deployment phases.

Question. National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is currently performing a 5-year study on suicides in the Army. Has the Army received any interim reports from this study that may influence Army suicide prevention programs?

Answer. The Army has received several interim reports from the NIMH and is evaluating the findings. The Army continues to work with our national partners in academia to develop groundbreaking programs and initiatives, in particular the Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers being conducted by the NIMH.

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose that the Army take in the meantime to enhance its suicide prevention program?

Answer. If confirmed, I will sustain the extensive leader focus on this issue and its challenges. This is an enduring problem that requires enduring solutions.

SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

Question. Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from the Army for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Fort Stewart in 2003 and Walter Reed in 2007 revealed, the Army was not prepared to meet the needs of returning wounded soldiers.

In your view, what were the most critical shortcomings in warrior care since 2001?

Answer. The quality of military medical care is in my opinion cutting edge and unequalled. In my opinion, at the outset of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Army’s infrastructure was lacking in the area of housing and managing outpatient care for returning wounded, ill, and injured soldiers received. Additionally, we identified shortcomings in Traumatic Brain Injury, Post Traumatic Stress, Behavioral Health, and Pain Management. Since 2001, we have invested significant research, resources and developed formal programs to improve warrior care.

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s response?

Answer. With the support of Congress, the Army has addressed the issues of housing wounded and injured soldiers, developed well resourced Wounded Warrior Transition Units (WTU) and effectively centralized our Army programs under the Warrior Transition Command.

Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service?

Answer. In 2004, the Army created the Wounded Warrior Care program to provide follow on assistance to wounded personnel who separated from service. Under
the program, the Army maintains contact with soldiers to provide a continuum of care and support.

Question. How effective, in your view, are those programs?
Answer. With more than 170 Advocates stationed around the country in Department of Veterans Affairs medical facilities, at Warrior Transition Units, and everywhere severely injured Army Veterans reside, the Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) Program is where it needs to be to support those who have bravely served this great nation. As part of the Warrior Transition Command, AW2 is now positioned to ease the transition from soldier to veteran as part of a continuum of care and support that stretches from the battlefield to where they reside today.

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continuously assess the efficiency and appropriateness of the Army's support for wounded personnel. I would implement strategies and seek resources as needed to ensure that the Army meets the needs of wounded soldiers.

Question. Studies following the revelations at Walter Reed point to the need to reform the Army's disability evaluation system.
Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine the disability evaluation system to reveal any areas that need to be improved or that could be streamlined. I would also work with Army, DOD and VA stakeholders to decrease the length of time to complete these evaluations and facilitate the transition to civilian life for those determined to be not fit for duty.

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to address any need for changes in this system?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with experts in this area and with the stakeholders in the Army, DOD and VA to identify elements of the current system that should be changed and develop a strategy for accomplishing those changes.

ARMY WARRIOR CARE AND TRANSITION PROGRAM

Question. The Pittsburgh Tribune-Review recently published a series of articles that alleged that the Army's 38 Warrior Transition Units had become "a dumping ground for criminals, malingerers, and dope addicts" creating an imbalance of soldiers who need complex medical case management and soldiers that commanders do not want to take on combat deployment.
Does the Army have adequate guidelines to ensure that only those soldiers with qualifying medical needs are assigned to Warrior Transition Units?
Answer. I am concerned that Warrior Transition units maintain the focus on complex medical care management and support those soldiers with a genuine need. If confirmed, I will continuously assess guidelines to ensure that only soldiers with qualifying needs are assigned to the WTUs.

Question. In your view, are the Warrior Training Units serving the purpose for which they were created?
Answer. Over the past 4 years, the Warrior Care and Transition Program has significantly improved the quality of care and support soldiers and families have received.

Question. If confirmed, do you plan to make any changes to the criteria for assignment to a Warrior Training Unit?
Answer. While I do not have plans to change the criteria for assignment to Warrior Transition Units at this time, this is an issue I will thoroughly assess if confirmed. Also, I will continually assess the effectiveness of the Warrior Care and Transition Program to ensure it provides the level of care and support our wounded warriors deserve.

Question. Staffing of Warrior Transition Units has been a major issue, especially at installations experiencing surges of redeploying troops.
In your view, are the Warrior Transition Units staffed with sufficient numbers of qualified personnel?
Answer. I am not fully aware of the existing staffing levels in the Warrior Transition units. I will, if confirmed, learn more about this area and to ensure appropriate resourcing of Warrior Transition Units to support the soldiers under their care.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REPEAL OF "DON'T ASK DON'T TELL" POLICY

Question. What is your assessment of the Army's readiness and capability to implement the repeal of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy?
Answer. The Army is on track with its implementation plan in accordance with DOD guidance and timelines, and I believe the Army is fully capable of executing the implementation. Our plan includes periodic assessments to review and consider feedback from the field throughout the implementation.

Question. What in your view are the major challenges, if any, that could confront the Army in implementing the repeal of DADT? If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose taking to deal with these challenges?

Answer. The most important challenge is that we educate our soldiers who are in combat situations with a minimum of disruption and risk. We are making every effort to train units prior to deploying. We will also provide the training to currently deployed units and we will follow up with these deployed units to ensure that all soldiers receive the required training upon their return from deployment.

Question. What measures is the Army taking to focus training on combat units and other deployed units and ensure that repeal of the current policy does not adversely affect combat operations?

Answer. The Army is using a Chain Teach methodology, where each commander is responsible for educating his/her subordinates and they in turn train their Soldiers. Commanders and leaders will carefully manage deployed units’ training to minimize impact on the mission. The Army is making every effort to train units prior to deployment.

Question. If confirmed, what conditions or circumstances would you expect to be achieved, if any, before recommending that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs certify that DADT can be repealed without adversely affecting the Army?

Answer. If confirmed, I would base my recommendation on the input I receive from commanders and leaders consistent with the requirements established by Congress and Department of Defense leadership. I would also seek to ensure that the Army completes training according to Army guidance.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving soldiers in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan have been reported over the last several years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They asserted that the Army failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services, including medical attention and criminal investigation of their charges and, ultimately, appropriate disciplinary action.

What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Army has in place in deployed locations to offer victims of sexual assaults the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?

Answer. I am very concerned about reports of sexual assault anywhere in our Army but especially in deployed locations. We cannot tolerate this behavior wherever it occurs. While the deployed theatres pose special challenges, the Army is committed to providing victims in deployed units with appropriate medical care, resources and support. The Army has taken a number of significant steps to improve the assistance to victims of sexual assault, including enhanced recognition of the special circumstances posed by deployed soldiers. The Army’s Sexual Harassment Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program includes medical, advocacy, chaplain, investigative and legal services. This program requires every brigade sized unit to appoint and train a deployable sexual assault response coordinator and every battalion to appoint and train unit victim advocates.

Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to prevent additional sexual assaults at deployed locations as well as home stations?

Answer. In 2008, the Army implemented its I.A.M. (Intervene, Act, Motivate) Strong Sexual Assault Prevention Campaign. The campaign includes strategic, operational and tactical level execution of the I.A.M. Strong Campaign, with heavy emphasis on soldiers’ commitment to intervene and protect their fellow soldiers from the risk of sexual assault and from the risk of sexual harassment. The campaign places additional emphasis on establishing a command climate that deters sexual harassment and assault.

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Army has in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Answer. While increasing emphasis to prevent sexual assaults before they occur, the Army continues to emphasize victim services and response capabilities, to include enhancements to investigation and prosecution resources.

The SHARP Program is a great start to managing strategies, policies and resources necessary to adequately prevent and respond to incidents of sexual assault.
This is a challenging problem that will require leadership and constant vigilance at all levels.

**Question.** Do you consider the Army's current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

Prior to implementation of the I.A.M. Strong Prevention Campaign, the focus of the Army program was primarily on victim response. Part of that response focus was the implementation of confidential reporting, or restricted reporting, which is an effective way to allow a victim to come forward and have their personal needs met without fear that may be associated with a criminal investigation. If confirmed, I will continue to look closely at the Army's sexual assault program.

**Question.** What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?

**Answer.** Getting victims to trust the system and come forward can be challenging; however, I am not aware of any specific problems with the current reporting procedure. Confidential reporting, or restricted reporting, allows a victim to come forward and have their personal needs met without fear that may be associated with a criminal investigation.

**Question.** What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Army staff in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?

**Answer.** Perhaps the most important role of any Senior Army Leader is to ensure there is an adequate assessment of an organizational climate, where such behavior is not tolerated and where victims feel free to report incidents without fear of reprisal.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure senior management level direction and oversight of Departmental efforts on sexual assault prevention and response?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will have an active role in the oversight and implementation of the Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program. I will work with the Secretary and the Army leadership to ensure the Army's SHARP program continues to receive the appropriate level of supervision, guidance, and support needed to drastically reduce incidents of this unacceptable crime.

**MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION**

**Question.** Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including Active Duty and Reserve personnel, and their eligible family members.

**Question.** What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Army MWR programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?

**Answer.** The Army has taken steps to ensure we care for and retain Families through a broad range of meaningful initiatives, to include many family and MWR programs and services. In October 2007, the Army leadership unveiled the Army Family Covenant, which institutionalized the Army's promise to provide soldiers and their families with a quality of life that is commensurate with their service to the Nation. The Soldier Family Action Plan provided the original roadmap to implement the Army Family Covenant, and includes such important programs as Soldier Family Assistance Centers, Survivor Outreach Services, improved services to the geographically dispersed, Exceptional Family Member respite care, Army OneSource, Child, Youth and School Services, Child Development Center and Youth Center construction, and more.

A challenge will be to sustain a consistent level of funding for these programs. If confirmed, I will consult with commanders, soldiers and families to ensure that these programs are adequate and meet their needs.

**DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS**

**Question.** Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

**Answer.** Yes. The U.S. military has always adhered to one simple, enduring principle regarding detainees: they are to be treated humanely, no matter what the circumstances of their capture, and no matter how the conflict is characterized.

**Question.** Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006,
and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes. Both of these documents provide effective, practical guidance and direction to the field on critically important issues relative to detainee treatment, detainee operations training, and the interrogation of detainees.

Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective military operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes. The requirements of Common Article 3 are nothing new to the U.S. military. The protections outlined in this article have been a part of U.S. policy on the law of war and the treatment of detainees for some time.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

Answer. First and foremost, I would set the right tone for the force by taking every opportunity to talk about the importance of ethical conduct on the battlefield. I would stress that the Army earns the trust and respect of the American people by our actions, especially our actions in combat. I would tell them that by adhering to the laws of war, treating detainees humanely, and showing compassion and restraint, we prove to America and to the world that we are what we say we are: a disciplined, professional fighting force.

Second, I would sustain and improve our existing systems for helping our soldiers understand and adhere to the proper standards for detainee treatment, detention operations, interrogations, et cetera.

Finally, the Army is committed to adherence to the Law of War and the humane treatment of detainees. When allegations of wrongdoing by soldiers surface, the Army must continue to fully investigate. If misconduct is substantiated, there are procedures in place to hold soldiers accountable.

Question. In the past 2 years, significant changes have been made in Iraq in the way detention operations have been conducted in a counterinsurgency environment, including through the establishment of reintegration centers at theater internment facilities. What do you consider to be the main lessons learned from the changes to detention operations in Iraq?

Answer. The two primary lessons learned from detention operations in Iraq were the need for centralized command and control and the requirement to nest with the host nation’s correctional system and rule of law.

Centralized command and control of detainee operations is necessary to ensure uniform implementation of policy. The other lesson we learned from Iraq was that detainee operations cannot stand alone; it must nest with the host nation’s correctional system and rule of law. Integration of detainee operations with host nation police, judiciary and penal systems is essential to a smooth transition to host nation control.

Question. What is your understanding of how these lessons are being applied in Afghanistan?

Answer. Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) 435 in Afghanistan incorporated the above lessons learned. The CJIATF incorporates detainee operations, corrections, and rule-of-law concepts that provide assistance to the GIRQ/A to assume full detention and correction responsibilities. The CJIATF works closely with the Department of State and the host nation.

Question. What should be done to incorporate these lessons learned into Department of Defense doctrine, procedures and training for personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations?

Answer. As the DOD Executive Agent for detainee operations, the Army is working closely with DOD and the Services to incorporate these lessons learned into DOD-wide doctrine, procedures and training. The Army continues to compile and assess lessons learned to inform and update policy, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

FUTURE ARMY AIRLIFT

1. Senator Levin. General Dempsey, as the head of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), you were responsible for studying the challenges to rapid deployment of ground forces to distant theaters from the Continental United States, and determining methods for increasing our responsiveness. Afghanistan is a case in point—a distant, landlocked theater that, like most of the Third World, has few airfields large enough to handle our long-range transport aircraft. Moreover, the few large airfields that do exist tend to have very limited space on the ground to park aircraft for unloading or staging personnel and equipment. This means that even when we can get to a region by air, the throughput is very limited. Moving even a single brigade in this fashion can take weeks or even months.

In the ongoing Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) process for a replacement of the C–130, the Army's concern is that the large fleet of C–17s, C–5s, and C–130s has limited utility in the Third World, where airfields are scarce and restricted. In the AOA, the Army favors a replacement for the C–130 that has a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capability much like that of the V–22. U.S. Transportation Command is also very interested in high-capacity alternatives to complement traditional fixed-wing lift assets. What are your views on the need for a C–130-sized VTOL capability to support the Army?

General Dempsey. The Army has in-depth studies substantiating the capability. The promise of the technology represented by the JFTL could address the need for an intra-theater VTOL airlifter for the entire Joint Force. The Army will continue to collaborate directly with the U.S. Air Force to complete the ongoing Joint Technology Study in order to continue to march toward a Milestone Decision Document and 'Milestone A' decision. The development of the JFTL will be a challenge because of the technical and engineering requirements, the reality of rapid deploying expeditionary formations, the costs associated with developing and fielding a truly transformational lift platform coupled with today's fiscal realities—not to mention the challenge in balancing the need for “lift” with “strike” capability to our Sister Services.

2. Senator Levin. General Dempsey, do you think this would be an important capability for the Army and worth the significant investment it would require from the Air Force to develop and produce?

General Dempsey. The Army has in-depth studies substantiating the capability. The promise of the technology represented by the JFTL could address the need for an intra-theater VTOL airlifter for the entire Joint Force. The Army will continue to collaborate directly with the U.S. Air Force to complete the ongoing Joint Technology Study in order to continue to march toward a Milestone Decision Document and ‘Milestone A’ decision. The development of the JFTL will be a challenge because of the technical and engineering requirements, the reality of rapid deploying expeditionary formations, the costs associated with developing and fielding a truly transformational lift platform coupled with today’s fiscal realities—not to mention the challenge in balancing the need for “lift” with “strike” capability to our Sister Services.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK BEGICH

ENERGY SOURCES

3. Senator BEGICH. General Dempsey, energy is vital to the operational capability of the military. However, our current energy dependence puts lives at risk and undermines our operational capability. I know the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Services understand how vulnerable our reliance on oil, especially oil from foreign countries, has made us as a nation and are taking many steps to alleviate dependency. Nevertheless, the bottom line today is the military needs access to fossil fuels for energy needs. I prefer those sources to be domestic instead of overseas to ensure access and strengthen our national security. Please describe your view of how reliance on oil for fuel impacts Army operations and personnel.

General DEMPSEY. The Army's reliance on oil, from domestic and foreign sources, for essentially all operational energy needs impacts our operations and personnel by placing the Army at risk of not meeting fuel requirements when supply chain disruptions occur. The logistical burden of fuel and water convoy operations needed to supply contingency bases has lead to significant loss of personnel and equipment. To the extent we can use energy more efficiently or, in some cases, use alternative energy sources, we can reduce the number of shipments and lessen the risk to our soldiers.

4. Senator BEGICH. General Dempsey, what is your understanding of steps that have been taken to alleviate consumption of oil for current operations and what impact have those efforts had?

General DEMPSEY. The Army is pursuing a comprehensive energy strategy that will reduce consumption across our installations and operational forces. We are developing and deploying advanced technologies and solutions to reduce fossil fuel demand and to increase energy efficiency across platforms, theater base camps, and installations. The Army is also adopting alternative and renewable energy systems, where life cycle cost effective, to expand operational alternatives and help reduce fossil fuel consumption. We're taking action to quantify and analyze the impacts of these initiatives. In the last year especially, the Army has taken definitive steps to more clearly articulate its energy security requirements and accelerate the development, integration, and deployment of capabilities to the field. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on this important area.

5. Senator BEGICH. General Dempsey, in your view, what remains to be done?

General DEMPSEY. I recognize that much more needs to be done. While the Army is already making positive strides, it must continue to pursue and field solutions in the areas of smart micro-grids, renewable energy technologies, and energy-efficient structures. As TRADOC Commander, I was a member of the Senior Energy and Sustainability Council. So I know that the Army's senior leaders are working these issues hard. Part of this effort is for Army leaders, at all levels, to understand the importance of operational energy considerations in mission success.

6. Senator BEGICH. General Dempsey, how does the price of oil impact the Army's budget during these times of constrained resources?

General DEMPSEY. Oil price increases have a definite impact on the Army budget in the year of execution. Since 2007, the Army has spent an average of more than $3 billion per year on fuel and energy, with more than half supporting liquid fuels for operations and the remainder representing power and energy at our installations. Higher oil prices mean higher energy costs and a significant reallocation of financial resources, which could impact the Army's ability to support important mission priorities.

7. Senator BEGICH. General Dempsey, if confirmed, what steps will you take to alleviate dependency on foreign sources of energy, and ultimately decrease reliance on oil for fuel?

General DEMPSEY. The Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy establishes principles that directly address this objective. If confirmed, I will continue to support and advocate for the Army's campaign to reduce consumption, expand energy alternatives, and improve management capabilities. We must curtail our reliance on oil and other imported sources of energy, in order to reduce our vulnerability associated with disruptions of supply or price fluctuations.
IRREGULAR WARFARE

8. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, Army units from Alaska have made a significant contribution to operations overseas. Last week, I visited the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (BCT) at the National Training Center (NTC) in California during their predeployment training exercise. In May, they will deploy to Afghanistan. Due to the operational tempo, their training is focused on capabilities required for the mission in Afghanistan. It is my understanding in fiscal year 2012 the Army will be able to begin full spectrum operations (FSO) training as dwell time increases. However, as Secretary Gates highlighted in a speech at West Point last week, it is imperative the capabilities required for these types of missions are institutionalized. Yet the force must also be trained for the many different types of threats we will face in the future. If confirmed, what action will you take to institutionalize irregular warfare?

General Dempsey. We recently published Change 1 to our capstone operations manual, FM 3–0. This manual explicitly states that the Army’s operational concept is FSOs. FSOs is a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations undertaken simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. FM 3–0 goes on to state that these operations are conducted amid populations, and that shaping the conditions with the civilian population is just as important to campaign success as are offensive and defensive combat operations.

We are currently institutionalizing Irregular Warfare by highlighting it in our capstone doctrine, by inculcating it throughout our professional military education system, and by reshaping our training strategies to include stability and civil support operations in addition to standard offensive and defensive operations.

At our Combat Training Centers (CTCs), the scenarios are developed to enable commanders to train their units on FSO mission essential tasks. These tasks include offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability and civil-support operations. During a typical FSO rotation at a CTC, the training unit will conduct both Combined Arms Maneuver against regular forces, and Wide Area Security against irregular forces and criminal elements. The degree of focus on offense, defense, and stability operations will vary based on unit training objectives and potential missions for the training unit. This wide array of tasks in a very complex operational environment will ensure our forces possess the agility to succeed in FSOs, including irregular warfare.

9. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, how do you propose to sustain the capability currently at the NTC like role players and infrastructure that has been built up in recent years for irregular warfare?

General Dempsey. The CTC Program, based on the TRADOC G–2’s Operating Environment Master Plan and the Army Training Strategy, has identified enduring training enablers (including role players and infrastructure) that are required for training FSOs against hybrid threats. These enduring enablers will be prioritized based on the operational force needs, programmed in the Army’s Program Objective Memorandum, and sustained in a resource-informed manner. For example, we currently use around 800 role players at each CTC per rotation through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to support Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation New Dawn counterinsurgency-focused mission rehearsal exercises. However, our initial estimate is that we will need 466 role players for FSOs training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) and 296 role players at the NTC to conduct full-spectrum operations training against hybrid threats. We will also continue to maintain the Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) villages at the CTCs, though we’ll only man them to the minimal degree required.

ALASKA LAND MOBILE RADIO

10. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, the Alaska Land Mobile Radio (ALMR) system provides interoperable communications for Federal, State, and local government agencies consistent with national interoperability objectives set by the Department of Homeland Security. ALMR is maintained cooperatively through a cost share with all partners. ALMR is used for operational needs of the Army like installation security, radio communication for convoys, synchronization of personnel during deployments and redeployments, transportation management, training support, and communication with other agencies. I understand the Army will be divesting 41 roadway sites in Alaska over a 2-year period beginning this summer. I appreciate
the Army’s proposal to transfer the sites to the State of Alaska at no cost. If con-
firmed, will you fully examine the impact of the divestiture on all partners to ensure
the system will remain viable until it is replaced or upgraded?

General DEMPSEY. We will absolutely continue to examine the impact of our dives-
titure, as I think we have done to this point, and will do our best to ensure that
ALMR remains viable within the limitations we have. The Army no longer has a
sufficient ‘business case’ for continuing to maintain those sites that do not directly
support day-to-day Army requirements. However, we remain fully committed to
being good partners in this arrangement. To that end, we have offered to transfer
the assets at our 41 sites, approximately $18 million in capital investment, to the
State of Alaska at no cost. This will allow the State to continue to benefit from the
Army’s capital investment into ALMR that directly supports public safety and other
State agency missions. We will also maintain our remaining sites in accordance with
the ALMR Cooperative Agreement and will continue to share the use of Federal fre-
quencies with the State, which is a key enabler of this system.

11. Senator BEGICH. General Dempsey, if confirmed, will you work with the other
partners to ensure the divestiture timeline allows for all partners to make the nec-
essary preparations to assume responsibility for the sites if they choose to do so?

General DEMPSEY. We have worked closely with ALMR partners and will continue
to do so as we go through the divestiture process. While the ALMR Cooperative
Agreement requires a 12 month notification for termination, in this case we pro-
vided a 16 month notification through Alaskan Command (ALCOM), our DOD Rep-
resentative to the ALMR Consortium. We also developed a 2-year phased transfer
plan with only one-third of the sites being transferred in the first year in order to
provide maximum fiscal planning opportunity. Additionally, Brigadier General
Scott, U.S. Army Pacific G–6, personally traveled to Alaska in March to meet with
Commissioner Becky Hultberg and her staff to see if there was a way to further
assist. At that meeting, the Army proposed additional accommodations by delaying
start date of the planned divestiture (first 13 sites) until January 2012, with the
Army maintaining the sites in a reduced maintenance (or break-fix) posture for an
additional 6 months before transferring equipment. This allows ALMR partners a
total of 22 months of preparation time from our original notification. We are abso-
lutely interested in being good partners and will continue to do all we can to enable
this transition within our limitations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

ARMY TRANSFORMATION

12. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) reinforced the focus on stability operations as an integral and co-equal ele-
ment of FSOs. As such, the role of Civil Affairs (CA) forces as subject-matter experts
for key stability tasks was elevated in two directives included in the Rebalancing
the Force section of the QDR as enhancements to the capabilities of the U.S. Armed
Forces. The first of these—‘‘expand CA capacity’’—provides resources and potential,
creates opportunity, and presents challenges. The second one—‘‘increase
counterinsurgency, stability operations, and counterterrorism competency in general
purpose forces’’—is an important implied task for CA that presents its own opportu-
nities and challenges.

As the Commander, TRADOC, part of your mission was to: . . . design, develop,
and integrate capabilities, concepts, and doctrine in order to build an Army that is
a versatile mix of tailorable, adaptable, and networked organizations operating on
a rotational cycle for FSOs. During your tenure there, part of TRADOC’s web-based
initiatives included the development or maintenance of a Capabilities Needs Asse-
ssment website, which documented CA capability requirements but never resolved the
gaps in CA capabilities.

How do you reconcile the status of these efforts to close the CA gaps and short-
falls while you were Commanding General, TRADOC, with the elevated status of
stability operations, and by extension the importance of CA, within the 2010 QDR?

General DEMPSEY. CA forces are an important part of Stability Operations. We
identified through our Capability Needs Assessment process that the Army lacked
sufficient resources, specifically CA capabilities, for Building Partner Capacity. Our
analysis identified capability gaps. Our follow-on processes addressed those gaps,
and we implemented solutions like resourcing the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade
to prepare General Purpose Forces (GPF) for conducting Stability Operations. We
have been expanding CA forces to provide the increased level of support required
by both ongoing operations and anticipated future requirements in both the Reserves and the Active Force. In 2007 we had 29 CA Battalions with just 9 percent of the force in the Active component. By 2013 we will have 43 CA Battalions with 32 percent of the force in the Active component. The continued growth and transformation of CA forces is a work in progress.

13. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, in these tight financial times where we actively seek efficiencies wherever we can find them, is creating additional CA force structure (military construction dollars, training dollars, etc.) the best use of taxpayer funds?
General DEMPSEY. The Army regularly assesses its ability to meet the demands of the combatant commanders. We identified the need for additional CA capability in ongoing operations and see the need for these capabilities continuing beyond those operations. CA specialists bring unique capabilities to the force, not only in our current operations, but also in our engagements and activities to build partner capacity. Our growth and transformation of Civil Affairs forces is a work in progress that we will continually assess as part of the Army’s ongoing force modernization and development processes.

14. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, is creating additional CA capacity (soldiers/units) the proper way to solve a capability shortfall?
General DEMPSEY. CA forces provide a unique capability to the whole force, enabling us to better meet the needs of our National Security Strategy. When deciding how to solve a capability shortfall, the Army conducts a formal Capability Based Assessment (CBA) process resulting in a recommendation of how to meet the need. In this instance the recommended solutions broadly included creating additional CA units as well as resourcing the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade to prepare GPFs to conduct Stability Operations. We continuously assess how to maximize our capabilities and reduce shortfalls as part of our strategic reviews and the Total Army Analysis.

15. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, would embedding CA within the Army BCT help resolve some or all of these capabilities gaps while simultaneously conserving precious resources during an era of increasingly constrained budgets?
General DEMPSEY. As we look beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, we see the need to maintain flexibility to task organize our CA forces, which we anticipate may include the ability to operate outside a BCT, in conjunction with other Special Operations Forces (SOF).

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

16. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, section 167, title 10, U.S.C., defines 10 activities as special operations (SO) activities insofar as each relates to SO. While there is a catchall proviso listed as well, designating “such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense” as SO activities, given the 2006 realignment of all Reserve CA and psychological operations/military information support operations (PO/MISO) forces from the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), where they supported both the GPF and SOF, to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), where they now primarily support the GPF. Should CA and PO have remained on this list of SO activities?
General DEMPSEY. Active component CA and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) should remain on the list of Special Operations Activities. However, Reserve component (RC) CA and MISO should be removed for two reasons. First, because RC CA and MISO support the GPF, they should be aligned with them to better facilitate their operational employment. Second, the complexities of managing a force the size and composition of the RC CA and MISO force are best handled by the USARC.
Consistent with section 167, title 10, U.S.C., SOCOM is designated the joint CA Proponent. Within SOCOM, the Army SOCOM is the proponent for CA. It has long been acknowledged, in both design and practice, that CA is not an exclusively special operations discipline. The GPF has a longstanding history of employing CA that certainly extends to operations conducted abroad today.

17. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, given this change of command and control, how do you reconcile the fact that Reserve component CA and PO/MISO soldiers continue to perform what is technically defined as a SO activity without com-
mensurate authorities, training, equipping, or funding every time they deploy in support of combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa?

General DEMPSEY. Per section 167, title 10, U.S.C., "For purposes of this section, special operations activities include each of the following insofar as it relates to special operations . . . Civil Affairs . . . Psychological Operations . . . " Based upon this definition, the CA and MISO missions conducted by the Reserve component (RC) in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa are not Special Operations Activities because they are conducted in direct support of GPFs, not SOFs. The RC CA and MISO soldiers have the appropriate authorities (i.e. Commanders Emergency Relief Program), training (AC and RC CA and MISO forces are trained using the same Program of Instruction and Doctrine, with the exception of language training being optional for the RC), and Major Force Program 2 (MFP2) funding to support their combat operations and other operational employment.

18. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, what can be done to clarify this statutory discrepancy?

General DEMPSEY. If deemed necessary, a decision to clarify any perceived discrepancy would have to be in the form of a recommendation from the Secretary of Defense to Congress to address section 167, title 10, U.S.C.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SCOTT P. BROWN

M9 PISTOLS

19. Senator BROWN. General Dempsey, what is the future of the M9 in the Army?

General DEMPSEY. It is undetermined at this time. The Army is reviewing a current Modular Hand Gun requirement developed by the U.S. Air Force for applicability to the Army and adoption as an Army requirement. The review is still in early staffing so it would be premature to speculate on replacing the M9 at this time. The M9 Pistol has served the Army well over the past quarter century and has proven itself in numerous combat operations, including Panama, Desert Storm, Somalia, as well the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

20. Senator BROWN. General Dempsey, does the Army plan to procure more M9s or to compete for a replacement pistol?

General DEMPSEY. No, the Army is not currently planning to procure any more M9s to include sustainment quantities. Current Army policies allow for 100 percent replacement of parts to include receivers during reset if necessary to maintain the required quantity of pistols in the Army inventory. The M9 Pistol has served the Army well over the past quarter century and has proven itself in numerous combat operations, including Panama, Desert Storm, Somalia, as well the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the Army does not have a current plan to compete for a replacement pistol, the Army is reviewing a current Modular Hand Gun Capabilities Production Document developed by the U.S. Air Force for applicability to the Army and adoption as an Army requirement. The review is still in early staffing so it would be premature to speculate on replacing the M9 at this time.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROB PORTMAN

ABRAMS TANK

21. Senator PORTMAN. General Dempsey, in your written answers to the advance policy questions posed by the committee regarding Army weapon system programs you stated, “In my view, the Abrams modernization is necessary and will initially enable integration of the emerging network and provide ability to fire the next generation of 120mm ammunition. Future modernization will provide capability improvements in lethality, protection, mission command, mobility, and reliability intended to maintain the Fleet’s combat overmatch and restore space, weight and power margins to keep the tank relevant through 2050. The Abrams modernization program is funded in the fiscal year 2012 budget request. If confirmed, I will be able to offer an assessment as the program matures.” Do you acknowledge that the fiscal year 2012 budget request ends U.S. production of the tank for the first time in modern history?

22. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, are you willing to work with this committee to address alternatives that would continue production of Abrams tanks beyond 2012?

General Dempsey. We share your concerns over the viability of the industrial base and recognize the challenges associated with starting and stopping production. Abrams upgrade production will continue fielding 18 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT) equipped with M1A2SEPv2s and 6 HBCTs equipped with M1A1AIM SA by fiscal year 2014. Because of this effort, the Abrams tank will remain a critical part of the Army’s combat vehicle force beyond 2014.

23. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, what is the impact on ending tank production on U.S. industrial capability in our depots, armor facilities, and private companies across our Nation?

General Dempsey. There will be a production break for the Abrams tank in fiscal year 2013. This is the result of the Army completing its objective to field upgraded Abrams tanks to 18 HBCTs. The near-term plan for Abrams modernization sustains government and contractor System Engineering capability. It will not provide the production workload at Anniston Army Depot in Anniston, AL and the Joint Systems Manufacturing Facility in Lima, OH (formerly known as the Lima Army Tank Plant) that would adequately sustain these facilities and key suppliers and subcontractors after fiscal year 2013. We are seeking to minimize the impact of the break with the approval of the requirement for the next package of Abrams tank improvements. At a minimum, the Army anticipates the break to continue for at least 2 years.

24. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, the Army has acknowledged that the Abrams tank will remain in the inventory for the foreseeable future. What is the Army doing to upgrade the current fleet including the Abrams tank in terms of research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and production?

General Dempsey. The Abrams Program is moving towards a Materiel Development Decision in third quarter of fiscal year 2011 that will define the next package of improvements for the Abrams tank. Abrams near-term modernization will focus on leveraging mature technologies to increase power generation, power distribution and fuel efficiency. Long-term modernization will provide capability improvements in lethality, survivability, mobility and reliability intended to maintain the Abrams tank combat overmatch and provide the size, weight, power, and cooling margin to keep the Abrams relevant through 2030 and beyond.

25. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, I understand the Army intends to begin modernizing the Abrams tank with new capabilities including those directly tied to lessons learned from Iraq deployments, but the fiscal year 2012 budget request includes less than $10 million for Abrams RDT&E. How is $10 million sufficient in fiscal year 2012 sufficient for this task?

General Dempsey. The $9.7 million of RDT&E funds requested in the fiscal year 2012 President’s budget is sufficient for Abrams modernization because the Army anticipates that the majority of the $107.5 million in fiscal year 2011 RDT&E funds will carry over to fiscal year 2012, thereby providing sufficient funding to execute all anticipated fiscal year 2012 RDT&E efforts.

26. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, will you please provide a detailed modernization plan for the Abrams tank?

General Dempsey. Abrams tank modernization will be done in two phases: Near term, we will pursue Power Generation and Power Distribution Modernization to enable integration of the Army Directed Requirements along with the ability to fire the next generation of 120mm ammunition. This will be done through field modifications and technical insertions as the vehicles are at the depots. Long term modernization will provide major capability improvements in lethality, survivability, mobility, and reliability intended to maintain the Abrams tank combat overmatch and provide the size, weight, power, and cooling margin to keep the Abrams relevant through 2030 and beyond.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

WEST POINT SPEECH

27. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, in a speech at West Point on February 25, 2010, Secretary Gates stated, “The Army also must confront the reality that the
most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements—whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere ... But in my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should 'have his head examined.' The United States has sent 100,000 or more ground troops into these very regions five times over the last 6 decades. Does our Nation need to maintain its ability to carry out large-scale ground campaigns in order to ensure our national security, or is the requirement for these types of land operations truly a thing of the past?

General Dempsey, The Secretary clarified his statement a week later at the Air Force Academy, stating that it would be wrong to interpret his statement as 'questioning the need for the Army at all, or at least one its present size, the value of heavy armor generally, and even the wisdom of our involvement in Afghanistan.' We believe that the intent is for all the Services to think harder about the entire range of missions and how to achieve the right balance of capabilities in an era of tight budgets, working to ensure the full complement of Army capabilities are available when needed. To meet these requirements we need a consistent flow of forces provided by a balanced and affordable Army comprised of "tailorable" and networked organizations, operating on rotational cycles and capable of providing trained and available forces to conduct full-spectrum military operations.

28. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, Secretary Gates also highlighted that the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan must be "incorporated into the Service's DNA and institutional memory." He went on to say that the Army has always needed "entrepreneurial leaders with a broad perspective and a diverse range of skills." In a recent interview, you said that the Army needs to focus on mastering a few skills that will prepare it for whatever future missions it is given, rather than becoming a "jack-of-all-trades" in a postwar era. In your view, what lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan are most important for the Army to carry forward?

General Dempsey. Our Army is a learning organization—from the accumulation of all our experiences in peacetime and at war. Our Campaign of Learning is evidence of our commitment to learning. Within the Army, leadership remains the multiplying and unifying element of combat power. Our lessons learned garnered from 10 years of war for leader development clearly highlight the need for agile and adaptive leaders who are critical thinkers, innovative and can recognize and manage transitions to exploit opportunities for success on the battlefield. This also drives a requirement for learning systems that facilitate the education and training of our leaders.

Continuation: As campaigns progressed over the last 10 years, U.S. Army forces learned the importance of counter-insurgency and other variations of stability and support operations. Leaders of all echelons, but especially leaders of squads and platoons, had to become masters of negotiation, persuasion and influence with local nationals. They had to bridge cultural barriers with local politicians, foreign security forces, spiritual leaders and citizens and had to learn ways to establish trust across these boundaries. They had to adapt their interpersonal skills to move others to the desired end state with indirect influence, instead of force or use of direct authority. They had to be prepared for rapid transitions between civil support missions to instantaneous response to attacks from insurgents and then back to peaceful interactions. With greater application of mission command, company and higher-level leaders had to learn to operate at greater levels of trust down the chain of command. Awareness of the importance of the alignment of intent and means across echelons was heightened.

Army systems for leader development were required to adapt concurrently to meet the operational demands for more competent and agile leaders of character. This adaptation was deliberately aimed at developing critical and innovative thinkers prepared to meet the evolution of the Operational Environment. CTCs underwent sig-
significant adaptations to provide the conditions to train individuals and units in all aspects of deployed operations. Authentic native noncombatants were introduced in the mission rehearsal exercises, and opposing forces (OPFOR) role played the practices of terrorists and insurgents. Situational training exercises provided exposure to critical tasks and used increased variability to present soldiers with opportunities to practice adaptation. Leader development systems and management practices were updated to steward the effective development of leaders. Professional military education (PME) was modified to push senior- and mid-level learning outcomes down to lower ranks. Senior- and mid-level education addressed the broadened requirements for stability and support operations and operations with joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational forces. PME also adapted to the requirements of modularity and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) in order to man deploying units with qualified leaders. We have learned that we must anticipate change early, to recognize the "weak signals" in order to maintain our learning advantage over our adversaries, and we have learned that we must have training, education and assignment systems in place to develop our leaders that are equally as adaptive as the leaders themselves.

Our experiences have underscored the importance of the role of leadership at all levels in our Army, the Joint Force, and with our partners to accomplish our Nation’s aims. Within the Army, leadership remains the multiplying and unifying element of combat power. Leadership requires influencing others to accomplish the mission while improving our organizations at all levels of the Army to maintain the successful edge as the Nation’s premier land power force. Leadership doctrine, founded on the principle of competent leaders of character supporting and defending the Constitution, subordinate to civilian authority, set the foundation for Army leaders to adapt to the rapid onset of operational requirements following 9/11 and the global war on terrorism. Our leadership requirements model establishes the attributes and competencies expected of all Army leaders. Leaders are responsible for upholding Army values and exercising the discipline necessary in combat as well as garrison to reflect those values to one another, to our citizenry, and to the world. We have learned to emphasize the responsibility for all leaders to influence beyond the chain of command, to operate in a "whole-of-government" approach to the Operational Environment and with our international partners. Increased attention has also been given to the requirement for resilience in leaders and leaders helping others deal with the stresses stemming from complex operations and recurring overseas deployments.

29. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, what specific skills that have fallen by the wayside over the past decade are in need of further development?

General DEMPSEY. To date, the Army has had the opportunity to only conduct one rotation at a CTC focused on FSOs against a Hybrid Threat, which is an insufficient number upon which to draw hard conclusions. However, that rotation indicates several areas within warfighting functions may need improvement. These warfighting functions include: Mission Command on the move, massing the effects of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, fires, and maneuver at a decisive point, optimizing use of engineering assets for mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability, and operating away from protected fixed bases, such as Forward Operating Bases and Combat Outposts. Our next FSO rotations at CTCs are in August at the NTC, and in September at the JRTC. At these training rotations we’ll aggressively work to both validate our initial impressions and gain new insights into skills that have atrophied over the past decade.

ARMY END STRENGTH

30. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, in your advance policy response to the committee, you stated that it has taken the Army "10 years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can reasonably describe as balanced." During this time, the Army has increased its Active-Duty end strength in order to meet current and future operational requirements. However, as part of his cost-saving initiatives, Secretary Gates has proposed reductions to the Army’s Active-Duty end strength of 22,000 soldiers by 2014, followed by an additional 27,000 soldiers beginning in 2015. Over the last 40 years, the Army has conducted two major post-conflict end strength reductions, first after the Vietnam War and then again after Operation Desert Storm. Given that we live in what some senior military leaders, including the current Chief of Staff of the Army and the current Secretary of the Army, refer to as an “era of persistent conflict,” how risky is it to reduce our Army’s end strength so soon?
General Dempsey. Assumptions about future demand for Army forces are critical to assessing potential implications associated with both end strength and force structure adjustments. DOD’s assumption is that the drawdown in Iraq will continue, and that it will be completed by 31 December 2011. DOD also assumes that forces in Afghanistan will moderate to a sustainable level, in accordance with current administration policy. While we cannot predict with certainty when and where crises may occur, we do anticipate that in an era of persistent conflict, Army forces will continue to be required for a variety of missions. The Army does not anticipate that near-term future demands will reach a level of commitment seen in recent years, and we are in the process of conducting deliberate analysis to determine how and when to implement directed reductions. The Army will continue to ensure accomplishment of its assigned missions, improve operational readiness to meet future demands, and care for the well-being of its soldiers and their families.

31. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, extended deployments and the high operational tempo have put a substantial strain on our All-Volunteer Army, resulting in high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder, suicide, and alcohol and drug abuse, as well as other health issues within the force. The Army's increase in Active-Duty end strength was designed, in part, to mitigate these effects and allow for longer dwell-time between deployments. If conditions on the ground in Afghanistan do not allow for the administration’s planned drawdown of U.S. troops by 2014, will the reduction of 22,000 soldiers to the Army's Active-Duty end strength have a negative impact on the quality and resiliency of our force?

General Dempsey. The additional 22,000 end strength has been an integral part of the Army’s ability to meet the manning requirements of deploying units. The planned reduction is based on the assumption that the demand for Army forces will decline by the end of 2013. If that assumption proves to be inaccurate, the Army will re-evaluate its ability to meet the new demand and engage with the Secretary of Defense to determine the appropriate mitigation strategy to meet the new demand signal.

As far as quality and resiliency of the force, the Army will continue its efforts to retain soldiers with the greatest potential to serve and align them with our leadership development strategy. The Army's deliberate and responsible drawdown plans will take into consideration operational demands, individual and unit readiness, and sustainability of the All-Volunteer Force.

32. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, the Pentagon reportedly intends to decide in the near future how many Army BCTs to keep in Europe, which could be as many as four or as few as two. Meanwhile, since 2002, two Germany-based BCTs have essentially been in limbo while the Pentagon debates their fate. It now appears unlikely that these units, which had been scheduled to return to the United States by 2013, will meet that deadline. One of these BCTs has been slated to relocate to Fort Bliss, TX, a post whose role in our national defense has increased greatly in recent years. At Fort Bliss, soldiers are afforded unparalleled training opportunities at its vast ranges, whose conditions accurately replicate those faced by soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, military quality of life at Fort Bliss is high, partly as a result of substantial Federal investment in its expansion. In your view, is delaying the return of these Army units from Europe the right course of action, given that our European allies have their own highly capable militaries?

General Dempsey. The National Security Strategy and the QDR affirm the importance of investing in the capacity of strong and capable states. These efforts further U.S. objectives of securing a peaceful and cooperative international order. The Army’s forces represent the Nation's enduring commitment to the defense of Europe specified in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Article 5, ensure a credible deterrent against all forms of aggression, and provide a robust capability to build Allied and partner capacity for coalition operations such as in Afghanistan. It must also be noted that the majority of nations contributing troops in support of the International Security Assistance Force, the NATO's largest and most complex out-of-area operation, come from NATO members. The relationships needed to support these types of operations can only be developed through long-term, sustained relationships achieved with American servicemembers stationed in Europe.

33. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, why are these Army BCTs still permanently stationed in Europe, and when will the Army bring them home?
General Dempsey. The Office of Secretary of Defense is currently reviewing the disposition of forces in Europe. A decision on the future posture in Europe is expected soon. Army forces in Europe will have better facilities for soldiers and families, access to better training facilities and ranges, and a consolidated footprint that will help U.S. Army Europe operate more cost effectively and efficiently.

PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION POLICIES

34. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, current Army policy requires relatively frequent Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves for most soldiers and their families. At a time when our military is being pressured to find ways to stretch each and every dollar and improve its fiscal stewardship, a thoughtful and sensible revision of the Army's PCS policies could potentially save millions of dollars annually, which the Army could use to meet other requirements. Requiring PCS moves every 5 or 6 years—instead of every 2 or 3—would also reduce the strain on military families. In so doing, you would enable many military spouses to pursue their own careers without facing frequent relocations, and you would ease the stress that frequent moves and school relocations put on military children. Do you see any potential for the Army to rethink its current PCS policies to cut unnecessary expenses and improve the quality of life for military families?

General DEMPSEY. As a general rule, the Army does not require soldiers to move simply because they have remained at one location for a set number of years. Overseas moves are an exception, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense policy. They have established specific tour lengths based on environmental conditions in the overseas locations. Two-thirds of all Army PCS moves result from accessions, separations, and professional development. The remaining third are used to distribute soldiers internal to the Army. They are used to maintain an acceptable match of skills and grades in units to meet operational requirements. Over the past 10 years the requirements for moves has accelerated by the need to meet the demands of filling deploying units. As demand for Army units decreases, we will work to increase the time on station for soldiers and families while maintaining the critical match of skills and grades across the Army.

[The nomination reference of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, follows:]

Nomination Reference and Report

As in Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 7, 2011.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 2033:

To be General

GEN Martin E. Dempsey, 0000

[The biographical sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA

Source of commissioned service: USMA
Educational degrees:
U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
Duke University - MA - English
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College - MMAS - Military Arts and Sciences
National Defense University - MS - National Security and Strategic Studies
Military schools attended:
Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
National War College
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Foreign language(s): French

Promotions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promotions</th>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>5 Jun 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>5 Jun 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>8 Aug 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>1 Sep 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>1 Apr 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>1 Sep 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>1 Aug 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>1 Sep 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>8 Sep 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>8 Dec 08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major duty assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 75 ..... May 76</td>
<td>Platoon Leader, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 76 ..... Sep 77</td>
<td>Support Platoon Leader, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 77 ..... Jun 78</td>
<td>S–1 (Personnel), 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 78 ..... Jan 79</td>
<td>Student, Armor Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 79 ..... Jan 80</td>
<td>Motor Officer, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 80 ..... Oct 80</td>
<td>Commander, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 80 ..... Jun 81</td>
<td>S–3 (Operations), 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 81 ..... Jul 82</td>
<td>Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 82 ..... May 84</td>
<td>Student, Duke University, Durham, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 84 ..... Jul 87</td>
<td>Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of English, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 87 ..... Jun 88</td>
<td>Student, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 88 ..... Sep 89</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 89 ..... May 91</td>
<td>S–3 (Operations), later Executive Officer, 3d Brigade, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 91 ..... Jun 93</td>
<td>Commander, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 93 ..... Jun 95</td>
<td>Chief, Armor Branch, Combat Arms Division, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, VA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 95 ..... Jun 96</td>
<td>Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 96 ..... Jul 98</td>
<td>Commander, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, CO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 99 ..... Aug 01</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 01 ..... Jun 03</td>
<td>Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 03 ..... Oct 04</td>
<td>Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 04 ..... Jul 05</td>
<td>Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 05 ..... May 07</td>
<td>Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-iraq/Commander, NATO Training Mission-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 07 ..... Mar 08</td>
<td>Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 08 ..... Oct 08</td>
<td>Acting Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 08 ..... Present</td>
<td>Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of joint assignments:
Assignments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignments</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Europe and Africa</td>
<td>Jul 98–Oct 99</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Joint Staff, Washington, DC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint</td>
<td>Oct 99–Aug 01</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff, Washington, DC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO</td>
<td>Aug 05–May 07</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Mission-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL</td>
<td>Aug 07–Mar 08</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL</td>
<td>Mar 08–Oct 08</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Officer, 3d Brigade, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and</td>
<td>Jan 91–Feb 91</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Army, Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army</td>
<td>Jun 03–Oct 04</td>
<td>Brigadier General/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO</td>
<td>Aug 05–May 07</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Mission-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. decorations and badges:

- Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Defense Superior Service Medal
- Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device
- Bronze Star Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Joint Service Commendation Medal
- Army Commendation Medal
- Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Combat Action Badge
- Parachutist Badge
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Martin E. Dempsey.

2. **Position to which nominated:**
   Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

3. **Date of nomination:**
   7 February 2011.

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
   March 14, 1952; Jersey City, NJ.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Diane Sullivan Dempsey.

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   Christopher, 32.
   Megan, 31.
   Caitlan, 27.

8. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Member, Veterans of Foreign Wars.
    Member, Association of U.S. Army.

11. **Honors and awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:**
    I, Martin E. Dempsey, agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

13. **Personal views:**
    I, Martin E. Dempsey, agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give my personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power.

   [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

   SIGNATURE AND DATE

   I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

   MARTIN E. DEMPSEY.

   This 1st day of February, 2011.

   [The nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 16, 2011.]
NOMINATION OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 2011

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in room SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Other Senators present: Senators Feinstein and Boxer.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Travis E. Smith, special assistant.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Brian F. Sebold, Bradley S. Watson, and Breon N. Wells.

Committee members’ assistants present: Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Elana Broitman, assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Jeremy Bratt and Ethan Saxon, assistants to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Tyler Stephens,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; William Wright, assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; Taylor Andreae, assistant to Senator Graham; Dave Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn; and Joshua Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.

This morning, the committee meets to consider the nomination of Leon Panetta to be Secretary of Defense. Director Panetta is no stranger to testifying before Congress over the course of his long and distinguished career in public service. We welcome you to the committee today, and we thank you, Mr. Panetta, for your decades of dedicated service to our Nation and your willingness to answer the call once again.

We know your wife, Sylvia, is not able to be here with you today. She has made her own sacrifices over the last 50 years, supporting your efforts in both the public and private sector. I know that I speak for the committee when I say that we would love to thank her in person for the sacrifices that she has made. Director Panetta, please let your wife know of the committee's gratitude for her support and her sacrifice.

If confirmed, Director Panetta will replace Secretary Robert Gates at the helm of the Department of Defense (DOD). When President Obama asked Secretary Gates, then-President Bush's Secretary of Defense, to stay on in that position, it provided welcomed continuity and experience in our defense leadership. Director Panetta's nomination to be Secretary of Defense represents change, but brings an impressive level of continuity as well.

The next Secretary of Defense will face an extraordinarily complex set of demands on our Armed Forces. Foremost among them are the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Between these 2 conflicts, we continue to have approximately 150,000 troops deployed.

The U.S. military is also providing support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Libya. In addition, even after the extraordinary raid that killed Osama bin Laden, terrorist threats against our Homeland continue to emanate from Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere.

The risk of a terrorist organization getting their hands on and detonating an improvised nuclear device or other weapon of mass destruction remains one of the gravest possible threats to the United States. To counter this threat, the Defense Department is working with the Departments of State, Energy, Homeland Security, and other U.S. Government agencies to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, fissile materials, and dangerous technologies.

A number of key national security decisions will have to be made in the coming weeks and months. Even as the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq is on track, recent signs of instability may lead Iraq's political leadership to ask for some kind of continuing U.S. military presence beyond the December 31st withdrawal deadline agreed to
by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki in the 2008 security agreement between our countries.

Another key decision point is looming in Afghanistan regarding reductions in U.S. forces starting in July. President Obama said the other day that, “It is now time for us to recognize that we have accomplished a big chunk of our mission and that it is time for Afghans to take more responsibility.”

The President has also said that the reductions starting in July will be “significant” and not just “a token gesture”. I support that decision. The more that Afghan leaders understand that we mean it when we say our commitment is not open-ended, the more serious they will be in preparing Afghan security forces to assume security responsibility for all of Afghanistan.

I support the so-called “transition strategy”, which calls for Afghan security forces to take more and more of the lead in providing for their country’s security. The more that Afghan security forces do that, the better are the chances of success because the Taliban’s biggest nightmare is a large, effective Afghan Army, an army already respected by the Afghan people, in control of Afghanistan’s security.

Having Afghan security forces in the lead would deprive the Taliban of their biggest propaganda target, the claim that foreign troops are occupiers of Afghanistan. There is nothing inconsistent between transitioning security responsibility to Afghan security forces and a long-term strategic relationship with Afghanistan, which is also important to sustaining a successful outcome.

Another major issue facing the Department is the stress on our Armed Forces after 10 years of nonstop war. The repeated deployments of our military over the last decade has resulted in many of our servicemen and women being away from their families and homes for two, three, four, or more tours. It is not only our force which is stressed, so are our military families.

Our incredible men and women in uniform continue to answer the call, but we must act to reduce the number of deployments and to increase the time between deployments.

The next Secretary of Defense will be required to juggle the competing demands on our forces while Washington struggles with an extremely challenging fiscal environment. The defense budget will not, and should not, be exempt from cuts. But this will require Congress, working with the next Secretary of Defense, to scrub every program and expenditure in the defense budget and to make tough choices and tradeoffs between the requirements of our warfighters today and preparations for the threats of tomorrow.

The administration in February submitted a defense budget for fiscal year 2012, which included some efficiency savings. But in April, President Obama announced he wanted to reduce security spending by $400 billion over 12 years, starting in the next fiscal year, presumably including under the umbrella of security spending the budgets of the Pentagon, Departments of State and Homeland Security.

Now we have asked the administration what part of the $400 billion reduction do they recommend be Pentagon cuts, and how many of those for fiscal year 2012? So far, we have received no answer.
Hopefully, today we will get Mr. Panetta’s understanding of that matter and his opinion on the central fiscal issues. His service as President Clinton’s Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is invaluable because he understands the inner workings of the budget process and because he shaped the decisions that helped achieve the budget surpluses of the late 1990s.

Fortunately for the Nation, Director Panetta brings a compelling record of achievement and experiences well suited to the demands of the position for which he has been nominated.

Leon Panetta has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to work across party lines. Since entering public service in 1966, he worked on the staff of the Republican Whip in the U.S. Senate, and headed the Office of Civil Rights in the Nixon administration. He later won election to the House of Representatives as a Democrat, where he served eight terms and became chairman of the House Budget Committee.

Throughout his time in public service, Leon Panetta has been guided by a clear moral compass. He has said, “In politics, there has to be a line beyond which you don’t go—the line that marks the difference between right and wrong, what your conscience tells you is right. Too often,” he said, “people don’t know where the line is. My family, how I was raised, my education, all reinforced my being able to see that line.”

Finally, Leon Panetta has been intimately involved in the most pressing national security issues of our time during his tenure as President Obama’s Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This includes his having personally overseen the manhunt for Osama bin Laden and the impressive operation that brought an end to al Qaeda’s murderous leader.

This operation epitomizes the way in which the CIA and the Defense Department are finally working together to support each other in the counterterrorism operations. The assault on bin Laden’s hideout is the first significant instance, I believe, of an operation that could have been conducted under Defense Department authorities under U.S. Code title 10 but that was instead executed under the authorities of title 50, with the Director of the CIA exercising operational control over our elite military force.

Now let me conclude by expressing, on behalf of this committee, our gratitude and our deep admiration for the man whose shoes Director Panetta has been nominated to fill, Secretary Robert Gates. Secretary Gates’ service to the country has been extraordinary, having worked in the administration of eight Presidents.

He left the comfort and rewards of private life, following a long career in Government, to serve his country again in the critical post of President Bush’s Secretary of Defense at a difficult time in our history. Throughout his tenure across the Bush and Obama administrations, Secretary Gates’ leadership, judgment, and candor have earned him the trust and respect of all who have worked with him.

Secretary Gates has combined vision and thoughtfulness with toughness and clarity and courageous, firm decisionmaking. I would add that right from the start, Secretary Gates established a direct and open relationship with Congress, and this committee in particular, for which I am personally most grateful.
I believe history will judge Secretary Gates’ time as Secretary of Defense to have been truly exceptional.

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me welcome Director Panetta and congratulate him on his nomination to be the next Secretary of Defense.

I am grateful for his remarkable career of public service and his willingness to serve in this new and very important capacity. I am appreciative of your family and the support they have given to you.

Let me also welcome our colleagues from California today, who will shortly underscore your extraordinary qualifications to assume the position of Secretary of Defense.

Your successes as Director of the CIA over the last 2 years, and there have been many, especially finding and eliminating Osama bin Laden, are a credit to you, and to the men and women of the Intelligence Community. At the same time, you and I know the director would be the first to admit that he has big shoes to fill, if confirmed, in the person of Robert Gates.

I have seen many Secretaries of Defense in my years, and I believe that history will long remember Secretary Gates as one of America's finest, most effective, and most impactful Secretaries of Defense.

One of the key criteria that we should be looking for in the next Secretary of Defense is continuity—the continuation of the wise judgment, policies, and decisionmaking that have characterized Secretary Gates’ leadership of DOD. Thanks to the good work of Secretary Gates, his team, and our men and women in uniform, the next Secretary of Defense will take office with a great deal of positive momentum. But many consequential challenges remain.

Indeed, over the next several years, our country faces decisions related to our national security and defense that will echo for decades to come, decisions that will determine whether we remain the world's leading global military power, able to meet our many commitments worldwide, or whether we will begin abandoning that role.

What will have perhaps the most impact on this outcome is the President’s stated goal of cutting $400 billion in defense spending by 2023, on top of the $178 billion in efficiencies in top line reductions that Secretary Gates has already announced.

In recent weeks, Secretary Gates has been sounding the alarm against misguided and excessive reductions in defense spending that cut into the muscle of our military capabilities. I could not agree with him more. Defense spending is not what is sinking this country into fiscal crisis. If Congress and the President act on that flawed assumption, they will create a situation that is truly unaffordable—the decline of U.S. military power.

I know there will be cuts to defense spending, and some reductions are no doubt necessary to improve the efficiency of DOD. But I also remember, and I think you do also, Director Panetta, when General “Shy” Meyer, then Chief of Staff of the Army, who warned in 1980 after draconian cuts were made, testified before this committee that we had a “hollow army”.

That is not an experience that we can or should repeat in the years to come. We must learn the lessons of history. I would welcome the nominee's opinion on this vital matter, including how the President's proposal could be implemented.

Another major decision involves how we achieve our objectives in the three conflicts in which U.S. forces are now engaged—Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. In Iraq, the key question now is whether some presence of U.S. forces will remain in Iraq beyond the end of this year, pending Iraqi request and approval, to support Iraq's continuing needs and our enduring national interests. I believe such a presence is necessary, as Secretary Gates has argued.

In Afghanistan, the main question is the size and scope of the drawdown of forces beginning this July. Here, too, I would agree with Secretary Gates that any drawdown should be modest, so as to maximize our ability to lock in the hard-won gains of our troops through the next fighting season.

Finally, in Libya, there are signs that Gaddafi may be starting to crack, but the odds of a stalemate remain far too high. I believe U.S. strategy should be to reduce those odds as much as possible and quickly force Gaddafi to leave power, rather than hoping we achieve that objective with minimal effort.

Another significant challenge facing the Defense Department is acquisition reform for its weapons and services. Secretary Gates has made some courageous decisions in attempting to get major weapons procurement programs on track. A similar focus needs to be brought to how the Defense Department chooses to buy billions of dollars in services to maintain the highest degree of readiness.

In addition, especially in this budget environment, it will be important to continue to eliminate weapons programs that are over cost, behind schedule, and not providing improvements in combat power and capabilities. After 10 years of war, we must continue to eliminate every dollar in wasteful spending that siphons resources away from our most vital need—enabling our troops to succeed in combat.

Director Panetta, you are nominated to lead our Armed Forces amid their 10th year of sustained overseas combat. Not surprisingly, this has placed a major strain on our forces and their families. Yet, our military is performing better today than at any time in our history.

This is thanks to the thousands of brave young Americans in uniform who are writing a new chapter in the history of our great country. They have shown themselves to be the equals of the greatest generations before them.

The calling that all of us must answer in our service is to be equal and forever faithful to the sacrifice of these amazing Americans.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe has to leave, and he would like to make just a very brief 10-second comment.

Senator INHOFE. Yes, thank you, Senator McCain.

I only want to say that because of an unavoidable conflict, I have to leave. But I was honored to serve for 8 years with then-Congressman Panetta, and I have always considered him to be a very close friend.
I look forward to supporting his confirmation and serving with him in his new capacity.

Thank you for the opportunity to say that.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

We have our two wonderful colleagues from California here to introduce Director Panetta, and we are delighted to have both of you here and to have you as colleagues. It is a treat for all of us that you are with us.

Senator Feinstein?

Who, by the way, is also chair, may I say, of the Senate Intelligence Committee, so she has a lot of very direct experience now and long before with Director Panetta.

STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

It is really a distinct pleasure for me to introduce the Director of the CIA and distinguished Californian, Leon Panetta, who was nominated by President Obama on April 28 to be the 23rd Secretary of Defense.

As members of this committee well know, in his 47 years of public service, Director Panetta has held the positions of congressman, chairman of the House Budget Committee, Director of OMB, Chief of Staff to the White House, Co-Director with his wife of the Leon and Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public Policy—which I have had the pleasure of speaking before—member of the Iraq Study Group, Director of the CIA, and from 1964 to 1966, a second and then a first lieutenant in the U.S. Army as an intelligence officer.

I would add to that list trusted adviser to the President and respected member of his national security team. In the course of 2 years as Director, he has mastered the intelligence field, led the CIA through a very tumultuous time, restored badly damaged relationships with Congress and with the Director of National Intelligence, and carried out President Obama’s personal instruction to him to find Osama bin Laden.

I have no doubt that his past experience and his capabilities prepare Leon Panetta to meet the major challenges before DOD. With knowledge of CIA operations and analysis, he will come to the Pentagon with a thorough understanding of the situation in Afghanistan, as well as the aggravating factors of our relationship with Pakistan. Through CIA analysis and operations, he is also well aware of the other contingencies around the globe where the U.S. military may be called to deploy.

Director Panetta is also well positioned to guide the Department through the constrained budget environment, which the chairman spoke of, along with the rest of Government. He possesses the credentials and experience to make cuts where needed and where prudent. I am confident that he will do so in a way that keeps the military strong and capable and in a way that maintains the cohesion of the Department and its Services.

Finally, let me recognize that there are many officials in the Government with the intellect and management skill to do this job. Leon brings something more. He has an interesting leadership...
style, with a deft personal touch that really matters to the people in his charge and that greatly benefits the oversight responsibility that we in Congress have.

Let me give you an example. It was early in his tenure at the CIA in 2009 when Director Panetta requested an urgent meeting with the Senate Intelligence Committee to brief us on a program that he had just learned of and that he had learned had never before been briefed to Congress. He found that unacceptable, and we very much appreciated his position.

In the 2 years since, he has never declined to answer a question or provide us with his candid views. I believe the vice chairman of the committee, who is a member of this committee, Senator Chambliss, can testify to this. Leon has been completely forthright and motivated only by what is best for the CIA and, more importantly, this Nation.

Let me conclude. A National Public Radio interview last week with Secretary Gates noted that the healthcare budget of DOD was bigger than the entire budget of the CIA and that no other position can fully prepare someone to be Secretary of Defense.

I have great respect for Secretary Gates and praise him for his service to this country. Beyond all reasonable expectations, he has been an outstanding Secretary of Defense. But I would suggest to you that Leon Panetta, who has served honorably and successfully in Congress, at OMB, at the White House, and now the CIA, is prepared and uniquely qualified to be another outstanding Secretary of Defense in this very challenging time.

I thank the committee.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Feinstein, for a very strong introduction.

Now, Senator Boxer?

STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Senator Boxer. Thank you so much.

I clearly appreciate every word that my colleague Senator Feinstein said about my friend Leon Panetta. What I am going to try to do is add a little bit more of a personal side because I have known this man and worked with him since 1982, when I was elected to Congress, and he became one of my mentors at that time.

Eventually, I served on the House Budget Committee where he was the chairman, and I watched him very carefully reach out across every kind of line that would divide us—Republican, Democratic, liberal, conservative, moderate. We were facing at that time a lot of new, perplexing issues.

One was the AIDS crisis. No one quite knew where this was headed, what it was about. I remember going to Leon and saying there is this new disease, and nobody quite understands it, and we haven't done anything about it. He said, “You know, why don't you hold some hearings on it? It seems to really concern you, and bring in the Republicans,” and we did.

We were able to get the very first funding in that time for AIDS research because Leon was willing to listen. This is someone who is very smart, and he gets it. But he also was willing to listen to
all sides, and I think we have seen that in every single job that he has fulfilled. This is a man who has dedicated himself to public service, and we are so grateful to him.

I won't go through every job he has held. First of all, it would take too much time. Second of all, Senator Feinstein highlighted so many of those. But to be someone who could work as effectively behind the scenes as you can in front of a camera, to be someone who could be such a trusted adviser that two Presidents have chosen him.

I could just go on about Leon. I am sure you don't want me to because you have a lot of work to do. Let me say for the people of California what he has meant to us.

He has recognized the importance of our resources in our State, namely our coast and our ocean. He stepped out in front in the early years and said this is an economic issue for us, and he preserved that coast. That is forever. That Monterey sanctuary is forever. He is visionary.

Then when we saw him move into the national security arena, as he did at the CIA, and the work he did in the latest achievement that he can talk about, and doesn't really do that much, in terms of making sure that Osama bin Laden was finally taken out. This was a brave mission by our military, and Leon Panetta was a part of the decisionmaking.

I think at this time where we are engaged around the world in so many difficult conflicts, so many difficult conflicts, he is bringing now the intelligence perspective to the job.

I would ask unanimous consent that my formal statement be printed in the record.

I just want to turn to Leon at this time, just as a Senator from California and a friend, and say thanks so much for everything you have done throughout your career for this country. I know your origins. I know how proud your family is, and I think we all share that pride in you.

Good luck, and I hope the committee confirms you quickly.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Mr. Chairman and colleagues—good morning.

I am so very pleased to be here today to introduce my former colleague and fellow Californian, Leon Panetta, President Obama’s nominee to be Secretary of Defense. I can think of no better person to fill this critical post at a time when our Nation continues to face threats to our national security.

Mr. Panetta has devoted 4 decades of his life to public service. During that time, he has earned the trust and confidence of his colleagues on both sides of the aisle. The son of Italian immigrants, Mr. Panetta was born and raised in the city of Monterey, CA.

Shortly after earning his bachelor and law degrees from Santa Clara University, Mr. Panetta joined the U.S. Army as an intelligence officer and went on to receive the Army Commendation Medal for his service.

Mr. Panetta came to Washington in 1966 and rose to become the Director of the U.S. Office for Civil Rights, where he fought for the desegregation of public schools even as other government officials were calling for slower enforcement of civil rights laws in the south.

Mr. Panetta does what he thinks is right, and I saw him bring that same strength and passion to his work as a Member of the House of Representatives, where I am proud to have served with him.
He was my chairman of the House Budget Committee and together we worked on the first ever funding to fight AIDS.

Among his many accomplishments, Mr. Panetta authored the Hunger Prevention Act of 1988, worked to extend Medicare and Medicaid to cover hospice care for the terminally ill, and was a critical voice in protecting California coastlines.

As the Director of the Office of Management and Budget during the Clinton administration, Mr. Panetta learned the intricacies of the Federal budget process and, most importantly, how to effectively set and manage a budget.

He also served as President Clinton’s Chief of Staff, engaging at the highest levels on critical national security matters.

For the past 2 years, Mr. Panetta has served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, where he has been responsible for protecting Americans around the world. Most recently, he oversaw the covert mission that located and killed Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda and mastermind behind the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001.

Bin Laden’s death was the result of close coordination between our military and intelligence communities and Mr. Panetta’s deep understanding of our Intelligence Community will be particularly beneficial in this new role.

I think it is clear that Mr. Panetta has the unique experience needed to serve our Nation at this critical time and I know he will continue to work tirelessly to keep America safe.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to speak on behalf of Mr. Panetta. I hope that he will get a favorable vote from your committee.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Boxer, for a very moving introduction and tribute.

You are both welcome to stay or leave. I know you both have committee chairs that you have to fulfill responsibilities.

Senator Boxer, I have a bill on the floor. By the way, we do have a bill on the floor about the Economic Development Act, and I want to remind everybody. So I will be going down on the floor.

Thank you.

Chairman Levin. You never miss an opportunity to make your point effectively. [Laughter.]

Thank you very much.

Let me now call on Mr. Panetta. After your opening statement, we will ask you the usual questions and then turn to our questions.

Thank you very much again for your service. Director Panetta?

STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, NOMINATED TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. Panetta. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, all of the distinguished members of the committee.

I am deeply honored and deeply humbled to be here as the President’s nominee to be Secretary of Defense.

I also want to take this moment to thank my fellow Californians, Senators Feinstein and Boxer, who are not only distinguished Senators who have represented their State well, but are dear friends and dear colleagues.

The role of Secretary of Defense, while, without question, it involves a very large responsibility in size alone, still in a very basic way is similar to the role of the CIA Director in that our first and foremost mission is to protect the country. If confirmed, my number one job will be to ensure that America continues to have the best-trained, the best-equipped, and the strongest military in the world in order to make sure that we protect our country.

As many of you know, I have devoted my career to public service. But it began a long time ago when I served as an intelligence offi-
cer in the U.S. Army. I was proud to wear the uniform of our country, and my respect and my admiration for our Nation’s Armed Forces has only grown in the decades since.

My youngest son, Jim, served in Afghanistan and received the Bronze Star. I have personally witnessed the tradition of service and sacrifice that drives each generation to fulfill a fundamental duty to our country.

In addition to respecting that great tradition of duty, I have done a number of things to try and prepare for this very difficult and challenging job. First, in the weeks since my nomination, I spent a number of hours with Bob Gates. Bob is a dear friend, and he and I first got to know each other as we were building our careers in public service.

We also served together on the Iraq Study Group, and we continue to serve together as members of the President’s national security team. We share a common belief that the national security of this country is the responsibility of all Americans, regardless of party.

I, too, believe that he will be remembered as one of the greatest Secretaries of Defense in our Nation’s history for the way he led the Department during a time of war and for the crucial reforms that he has tried to put in place in the way the Pentagon does business. Those are reforms that I intend to carry on.

Second, I talked with our Service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs. I believe it is important to have a candid, open line of communication between the Secretary and all of the Service Chiefs. They are the ones that are out there leading each of their Services, and I need to know what they are thinking, and I need to know what is important in terms of serving the interests of the troops that they directly lead.

One of those chiefs told me for our troops, there has been no shortage of war. Indeed, we are a Nation at war. Our All-Volunteer Force has been stretched by combat that has lasted nearly a decade. We owe it to them, we owe it to their families to ensure that they have the best leadership, the best training, the best equipment, the best benefits, and the best healthcare that we can give them.

I pledge to them and I pledge to you that every deployment decision that I make will be mindful of the stresses on our men and women in uniform and on their families.

Third, I have reached out to the former Secretaries of Defense, both Democrat and Republican, and asked for their advice. To a person, they impressed upon me how important it was to stay focused on the management of the Pentagon. This is the biggest enterprise in our Government, and it requires focused, hands-on management, which is, frankly, the only way I know how to do business.

Fourth, I have sat down with many of you and have known many of you throughout my career. Because I really do believe that Congress has to be a partner in this role in the protection of our country, I am a creature of Congress and I believe that the Pentagon is made stronger by your oversight and by your guidance.

As a young legislative assistant a long time ago here in the Senate, I had the honor of seeing firsthand the bipartisanship of lead-
ers like Dick Russell and Henry Jackson, John Stennis, and Barry Goldwater. As a Member of Congress, I saw that tradition carried on by other great leaders.

I believe deeply in the tradition of strong, bipartisan national security leadership. You, Mr. Chairman, and you, Senator McCain, have carried on that tradition. I thank you for that.

This is a time of historic change. Unlike the Cold War, when we had one main adversary, we face a multitude of challenges—al Qaeda and other global terrorist networks, places like Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, not just the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. Dangerous enemies spread out across the world.

We face insurgents and militants who cross borders to conduct attacks. We face the proliferation of dangerous weapons in the hands of terrorists, in the hands of rogue nations. We face cyber attackers, a whole new arena of warfare that can take place not only now, but in the future, and something we have to pay attention to.

We face the challenge of rising and changing powers and nations in turmoil, particularly in the Middle East, undergoing enormous political transformation. We are no longer in the Cold War. This is more like the “blizzard war”, a blizzard of challenges that draw speed and intensity from terrorism, from rapidly developing technologies, and the rising number of powers on the world stage.

But despite the times we live in, there is reason to be confident. The operation that killed Osama bin Laden, in my view, has not only made clear to the world that we will do what we have to do, but it has also given us the greatest chance since September 11 to disrupt, dismantle, and to defeat al Qaeda.

But to do that, to be able to finish the job, we have to keep our pressure up. If confirmed, my first task at DOD will be to ensure that we prevail in the conflicts that we are engaged in. In Afghanistan, we must continue to degrade the Taliban. We have to train security forces. We have to help the government take ownership of their country so that they can govern and protect their country.

In Iraq, we must assure that the Iraqi military and security forces are prepared to safeguard their nation so that it can become a stable democracy in a very important region of the world.

As we do that, I am very aware that we must be highly disciplined in how we spend the taxpayers’ precious resources. This committee well knows that the days of large growth and unlimited defense budgets are over. Our challenge will be to design budgets that eliminate wasteful and duplicative spending while protecting those core elements that we absolutely need for our Nation’s defense.

I do not believe, based on my long experience in government and working with budgets, that we have to choose between strong fiscal discipline and strong national defense. I don’t deny that there are going to be tough decisions that have to be made and tough choices that have to be made. But we owe it to our citizens to provide both strong fiscal discipline and a strong national defense.

Finally, and most importantly, it is the job of Secretary of Defense to be a tireless advocate for our troops and for their families. It is their sacrifice and their dedication that have earned the re-
pect of a grateful nation and inspired a new generation to volunteer to wear the uniform of our country.

They put their lives on the line to fight for America, and I will just as surely fight for them and for the families who support and sustain them.

As Director of the CIA, I had no more solemn duty than sending young people into harm’s way to put their lives on the line. After we lost seven of our colleagues in Afghanistan in December 2009, I had to do what my colleagues in the military do all too often—visit the wounded at Bethesda, attend the ramp ceremony at Dover, offer a prayer at the side of an Arlington Cemetery gravesite for a patriot who left this world too young.

I don’t think I will pass when I don’t think of the brave souls who have fought and died and those who fight today for our freedom. As Secretary Gates emphasized in his last trip to the troops, they will always be in my thoughts and prayers.

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I pledge to you that I will always keep our troops foremost in my mind, that I will be a careful, accountable steward of our Nation’s precious resources, that we will have the strongest national defense in the world, and that you will always have my best and most candid advice, and that I will always, always seek yours.

I am the son of Italian immigrants. My father used to say to me time and time again that to be free, we have to be secure. That is the pledge that I make to you, that I will do everything I can to keep America secure so that it can be free. I will do that if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Panetta follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. LEON E. PANETTA

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of the committee.

I am humbled to be here as the President’s nominee to be Secretary of Defense. The role of the Secretary of Defense is similar to the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director—first and foremost to protect the country. If confirmed, my number one job will be to ensure that America continues to have the best-trained, best-equipped, and strongest military in the world.

I have devoted my career to public service—and it began when I served as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Army. I was proud to wear the uniform of my country—and my respect and admiration for our Nation’s Armed Forces have only grown in the decades since. My youngest son Jim served in Afghanistan and received the Bronze Star. So I have personally witnessed the tradition of service and sacrifice that drives the generations to fulfill a duty to our country.

In addition, I have done a number of things to try and prepare for this job. First, in the weeks since my nomination, I have spent a number of hours with Bob Gates. Bob and I first got to know each other as we were building our careers in public service. We also served together on the Iraq Study Group. We share a common belief that national security is the responsibility of all Americans, regardless of party. I believe he will be remembered as one of the greatest Secretaries of Defense in our Nation’s history for the way he led the Department during a time of war, and for the crucial reforms he made in the way the Pentagon does business—reforms that I intend to carry on.

Second, I talked with the Service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs—I believe it is important to have candid, open lines of communication between the Secretary and the Services. One of those chiefs told me, “For our troops, there is no shortage of war.” Indeed, we are a Nation at war. Our All-Volunteer Force has been stretched by combat that has lasted nearly a decade. We owe it to them and their families to ensure that they have the best leadership, the best training, the best equipment,
the best benefits and health care that we can give them. I pledge to them and I pledge to you that every deployment decision I make will be mindful of the stresses on our men and women in uniform and their families.

Third, I reached out to every living former Secretary of Defense—Democrat and Republican—and asked for their advice. To a person, they impressed upon me how important it was to stay focused on management of the Pentagon. This is the biggest enterprise in our government, and it requires focused, hands-on management—which is, frankly, the only way I know how to do business.

Fourth, I sat down with many of you—because Congress is my partner in this role and in the protection of the country. I'm a creature of Congress and I believe that the Pentagon is made stronger by your oversight. As a young legislative assistant, I had the honor of seeing firsthand the bipartisanship of leaders like Dick Russell, Harry Jackson, John Stennis, and Barry Goldwater. I believe deeply in the tradition of strong bipartisan national security leadership that you and this committee carry on.

This is a time of historic change. Unlike the Cold War, when we had one main adversary, today we face a multitude of challenges—al Qaeda and other global terrorist networks, insurgents and militants who cross borders, the proliferation of dangerous weapons, cyber attackers, rising and changing powers, and nations—particularly in the Middle East—undergoing enormous political transformation.

We are no longer in the Cold War. This is the Blizzard War—a blizzard of challenges that draws speed and intensity from rapidly developing technologies and the rising number of powers on the world stage.

But, despite the times we live in, there is reason to be confident. The operation that killed Osama bin Laden, in my view, has given us the greatest chance since September 11 to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda permanently. We must keep up the pressure.

If confirmed, my first tasks at the Department of Defense will be to ensure that we prevail in the conflicts in which we are now engaged. In Afghanistan, we must continue to degrade the Taliban, train the security forces, and help the government take ownership for the country's progress and security. In Iraq, we must assure that the Iraqi military and security forces are prepared to safeguard their nation.

As we do that, I am very aware that we must be highly disciplined in how we spend the taxpayer's precious resources. This committee well knows: the days of unlimited defense budgets are over. Our challenge will be to design budgets that eliminate wasteful and duplicative spending while protecting those core elements we need for our Nation's defense. I do not believe that we have to choose between strong fiscal discipline and strong national defense. We owe it to our citizens to provide both.

Finally, it is the job of the Secretary of Defense to be a tireless advocate for our troops and their families. It is their sacrifice and dedication that have earned the respect of a grateful nation ... and inspired a new generation to wear the uniform of our country. They put their lives on the line to fight for America, and I will just as surely fight for them and for the families who support and sustain them.

As Director of the CIA, I had no more solemn duty than sending young people into harm's way. After we lost seven of our colleagues in Afghanistan in December 2009, I had to do what my colleagues in the military do all too often—visit the wounded at Bethesda, attend the ramp ceremony at Dover, and offer a prayer at the side of an Arlington Cemetery grave for a patriot who left this world too young. Not one day will pass when I won't think of the brave souls who fight for our freedom.

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I pledge to you that I'll always keep our troops foremost in my mind ... that I will be a careful, accountable steward of our national resources ... that we will have the strongest national defense in the world ... and that you'll always have my best and candid advice. To be free, we must be secure. That is my pledge to you if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Director Panetta, for a powerful, moving, and a very straightforward statement.

We have standard questions, which we ask of nominees before we take turns at asking our own questions, and I will put those questions to you now.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.

Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation progress?

Mr. Panetta. No, I have not.

Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.

Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.

Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, they will.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.

Chairman Levin. Finally, do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

I think what we will do is we will be here all morning, and then we will have a break for lunch. Then we are going to go into a classified session this afternoon.

Let us start with a 7-minute first round here for questions.

Director Panetta, in answer to prehearing questions, you said that you support the July 2011 date set by President Obama for the beginning of a process of transferring increasing responsibility for Afghanistan’s security to the Afghan security forces and of drawing down U.S. forces from Afghanistan. President Obama recently said that the size of U.S. troop reductions from Afghanistan will be significant.

Director Panetta, do you agree that the U.S. troop reductions from Afghanistan beginning in July should be significant?

Mr. Panetta. I agree with the President’s statement.

Chairman Levin. There are approximately 100,000 more Afghan soldiers and police today than there were in December 2009. The NATO training mission in Afghanistan is ahead of schedule in meeting the target of 305,000 Afghan security forces by this fall. In addition, a new target of 352,000 Afghan security forces by 2012 has been set to ensure that these forces have the specialized skills needed to sustain these units over the long term, and I very much support that decision. Do you agree, Director Panetta, that training and partnering with the Afghan army and police and getting those forces in the lead on operations is key to the success of our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I do.
Chairman Levin. Now, Pakistani leaders deny being aware of the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. It is counterintuitive to believe that none of their leaders knew of it. But nonetheless, that is not my question.

Pakistan's leaders are well aware and acknowledge their awareness of the sanctuaries in Pakistan by the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban down in Quetta. Now those people are attacking our troops, Afghan troops, coalition troops across the border in Afghanistan and then go back to their sanctuary in Pakistan.

A recent Defense Department report called the extremist Haqqani network “the most significant threat in eastern Afghanistan,” and yet the Haqqanis continue to enjoy open safe haven across the border in Pakistan. I think this is a totally unacceptable situation. I am wondering if you agree, and if so, what should be done about it?

Mr. Panetta. Senator, I share your concern with regards to the safe haven in Pakistan, particularly as it relates to groups like the Haqqanis. I have strongly urged those in Pakistan to take steps to do whatever they can to prevent these kind of cross-border attacks and to prevent the safe havens that do exist on the Pakistani side of the border.

This is a difficult challenge. The relationship with Pakistan is at the same time one of the most critical and yet one of the most complicated and frustrating relationships that we have. It is extremely critical in that we are conducting a war against our primary enemy in the FATA in their country.

It is critical because supply lines, vital supply lines go through their country. It is critical because they are a nuclear power, and there is a danger that those nukes could wind up in the wrong hands.

At the same time, it is very complicated, complicated by the fact that they maintain relationships with certain terrorist groups, that they continue to not take aggressive action with regards to these safe havens, and that their concern about the sovereignty results in criticism of the United States when, in fact, my view is that the terrorists in their country are probably the greatest threat to their sovereignty.

Having said all of that, we have to maintain the relationship. We have to do everything we can to try to strengthen that relationship so that both of us can work to defend both of our countries.

Chairman Levin. Director Panetta, as I mentioned in my opening statement, the President has called for $400 billion in reductions to national security spending over the next 12 years. Now do you have any understanding of the proposed breakdown of that $400 billion as to how much he is proposing for reductions in Pentagon spending, how much in intelligence spending, the intelligence organizations, and how much he is proposing to reduce in the Homeland Security Department?

Mr. Panetta. No, I do not.

Chairman Levin. Can you try to find that out for us? Because we need to find that out, and give us an answer for the record.

Mr. Panetta. I will certainly ask whether or not that decision has been made.

[The information referred to follows:]
The administration has not made final decisions concerning the specific details on the $400 billion reduction.

Chairman Levin. Do you know whether we are going to receive a budget amendment for the fiscal year 2012 DOD budget?

Mr. Panetta. I do not know the answer to that.

Chairman Levin. All right. On the question of torture, you, in your answers to the committee’s prehearing policy questions, said the following, “I will ensure that all interrogations conducted by DOD personnel are conducted consistent with the Army Field Manual and in accord with the Geneva Conventions.”

My question, is waterboarding consistent with the Army Field Manual and the Geneva Conventions?

Mr. Panetta. I have taken the same position as the President of the United States. I believe that waterboarding crosses the line, the use of that tactic with regards to interrogations. The President outlawed the use of that, plus other enhanced interrogation techniques, in an Executive order that he issued when he first came into the presidency.

Chairman Levin. I need to switch gears here on you a lot because time requires that we do that. Senator Webb and I recently went to Okinawa, Guam, and Senator Webb was in Korea before. Senator McCain obviously has great personal experience in this area as well. Senator McCain, Senator Webb, and I proposed changes to basing plans on Okinawa and Guam. We urged a review of the plans in Korea because we believe that the current plans are unrealistic, unworkable, and unaffordable.

Then, independently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that the cost of these military realignments are higher than expected and in many cases largely unknown, a highly critical GAO report of this direction that we are currently moving. I am wondering whether or not you are familiar with this issue. If confirmed, in any event, whether you are familiar with these issues or not in those three places, will you agree to review this matter and work with us to find a solution that helps advance our strategic objectives in the region.

Because we have strategic objectives in the region, but they are currently unaffordable. They are unknown in terms of cost. Would you be willing to review this matter and to work with us?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will, Senator. You discussed this with me when I met with you, and also Senator Webb discussed his concerns about that area. I agree with you that it is a very important strategic area for the United States. We do have to maintain a presence there.

But there are a lot of issues to be resolved and worked on, and I look forward to working with you, Senator McCain, Senator Webb, and others to try to determine what the best and most cost-effective approach would be.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Director Panetta.

What is your assessment of the battlefield situation in Afghanistan since we inaugurated the surge?
Mr. Panetta. I think the assessment is that we have made progress with regards to security in that country. Albeit fragile and reversible, I nevertheless believe that progress has been made to try to advance security.

We also have made good progress in training the forces there in Afghanistan, both their police and military force. I think the area where, frankly, greater progress needs to be made is on the governance side, to try to ensure that they improve their governance so that, ultimately, they can take responsibility for that country.

Senator McCain. When you point out that it is fragile and reversible, I think that is absolutely accurate. So you would agree with Secretary Gates' repeated statements that withdrawals in July should be modest?

Mr. Panetta. I agree that they should be conditions based, and I am going to leave it up to Secretary Gates, General Petraeus, and the President to decide what that number should be.

Senator McCain. If you are the Secretary of Defense when that decision is made, obviously, you will have significant influence. You just came from a position where you have a very good assessment of the military situation. I think it is not inappropriate for you to answer when I ask if you agree with Secretary Gates' assessment that the withdrawal should be modest.

Mr. Panetta. Senator, if I am confirmed, I will have to, obviously, arrive at a decision myself that I will have to ultimately present to the President. But I am not in that position now, and that decision really does rest with General Petraeus, Secretary Gates, and the President.

Obviously, I have tremendous admiration for Secretary Gates. He and I pretty much walk hand-in-hand on these issues. But with regards to specific numbers, I just am not going to——

Senator McCain. I wasn't asking for specific numbers. On the subject of Iraq, if the Iraqi Government and all its elements agree that there should be a residual U.S. military presence in Iraq, particularly in three areas—air defenses, intelligence capability, and security in the areas around Kirkuk and that part of Iraq where there has been significant tensions—would you agree that that would be a wise thing for us to do?

Mr. Panetta. I believe that if Prime Minister Maliki and the Iraqi Government requests that we maintain a presence there, that ought to be seriously considered by the President.

Senator McCain. Do you think it would be in our interest to do that, given the situation?

Mr. Panetta. Senator, I have to tell you, there are 1,000 al Qaeda that are still in Iraq. We saw the attack that was made just the other day. It, too, continues to be a fragile situation, and I believe that we should take whatever steps are necessary to make sure that we protect whatever progress we have made there.

Senator McCain. Do you know of anyone of authority either in Congress or in the administration who believes that we should send ground troops into Libya?

Mr. Panetta. I haven't met anybody yet who supports that. [Laughter.]

Senator McCain. I haven't either. Nor do I. In fact, I think it would be a great mistake.
Do you believe that it is a proper role of Congress to restrict the powers of the President of the United States to act? In other words, you and I were around when there was a vote for cutoff of funds for Vietnam. Whether that was right or wrong, that was the appropriate role of Congress.

Does it worry you if Congress begins to tell the Commander in Chief as to exactly what he can or cannot do, what the President can or cannot do in any conflict?

Mr. Panetta. Senator, I believe very strongly that the President has the constitutional power as Commander in Chief to take steps that he believes are necessary to protect this country and protect our national interests. Obviously, I think it is important for Presidents to consult, and to have the advice of Congress. But in the end, I believe he has the constitutional power to do what he has to do to protect this country.

Senator McCain. I agree. In 2007, the last time we went through a very serious crisis, it was concerning whether we should withdraw from Iraq or not, and I see some parallels as the rising and understandable war-weariness of the American people continues to be manifested.

One of the things that we did at that time was set up some benchmarks that we expected to be met by both the Iraqis and the United States. As I recall, there was 13 or a number of those. Over time, most of those benchmarks were met.

Don’t you think it would be appropriate for us to do the same thing as far as Afghanistan is concerned? We can measure progress by certain metrics, and I think it would be important in order to gain or keep the confidence of the American people that we should set up some benchmarks for progress, both in Afghanistan and as far as Pakistan is concerned, since we are sending billions of dollars of taxpayers’ money to Pakistan as well.

Mr. Panetta. Senator, I think we all know what the fundamental goal here is to try to develop a stable enough Afghanistan that it will never again become a safe haven for al Qaeda or——

Senator McCain. My specific question is——

Mr. Panetta.—for other terrorists.

Senator McCain.—would you agree——

Mr. Panetta. But with regards to achieving that goal, I think that working with the administration, working with the President, working with the Secretary of Defense, establishing some of those areas where we need to make progress and identifying those, I think that is something that would be worth pursuing.

Senator McCain. Thank you. I thank you for your service, and I thank you for your willingness to continue to serve.

My time has expired. But one of the biggest problems that I see—and I apologize, Mr. Chairman—but is this whole issue of acquisition. We have terrible out-of-control costs for literally every weapon system that we have acquired in the last 10 years that I know of.

I believe you have a good team there in the Pentagon. I think that Mr. Carter is doing a good job. But we are going to have to get our arms around this. We cannot afford aircraft that double and triple the original estimated costs and don’t meet the timelines that are set up. The F–35 is just the most outstanding example.
I know you will make this as one of your highest priorities. It is simply not affordable for us to continue business as usual the way we acquire weapons today. It may require some really fundamental changes in addition to the legislation that we have already passed to try to address this issue.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you, sir.

Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator. I agree with you fully on that issue.

Chairman Levin. Thank you. He speaks, I think, for our entire committee in saying that, and I think it is also clear you have the background to really do something about it and to dig into it.

Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Senator Lieberman.

Director Panetta, thank you for answering the call to serve your country again. I have the greatest confidence in your ability and your principles.

I love the quote from your father. Our fathers must have come out of the same cloth, which is to value the freedom that America provides is our unique and distinguishing contribution to governance, but to understand that without security, there is no freedom. I can’t think of anything I would rather hear from a nominee for Secretary of Defense than that.

I want to begin with a few quick questions about Iran. Do you agree that the Islamic Republic of Iran is working very hard to develop a nuclear weapons capability?

Mr. Panetta. Our concern with Iran is that they continue to try to develop some kind of nuclear capability. As to whether or not they have made certain decisions as to how far they should go, those are questions that I would probably have to address in another forum. But there is no question that they continue to work to try to develop some kind of nuclear capability.

Senator Lieberman. Right. Also, to the best of your knowledge, is the Islamic Republic of Iran working to develop increased capacities in intercontinental ballistic missile systems to deliver nuclear or other weapons?

Mr. Panetta. That is correct.

Senator Lieberman. As I am sure you know, there has been a lot of both diplomatic and economic sanctions work being done to attempt to discourage Iran’s nuclear ambitions and really to end them. However, as President Obama has said, all options have to remain on the table.

I wanted to ask you whether, as Secretary of Defense, you will consider it to be one of your responsibilities to have credible military plans to strike and destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities if the President, as Commander in Chief, decides that it is necessary to use that option?

Mr. Panetta. I think in line with the President’s statement that we should keep all options on the table, and that would obviously require appropriate planning.

Senator Lieberman. Thank you.

Let me go to Afghanistan and see if I can approach it this way. I thought the President made not only a correct, but a courageous
decision in 2009 in deciding to raise the number of our forces in Afghanistan by 30,000 plus, a so-called Afghanistan surge. At the time, the statement was made that we would begin to draw those troops down around July of this year, 2011.

There was a lot of anxiety in the region, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan and beyond, about whether that was the beginning of a kind of early withdrawal and, again, a retreat from the region. Discussions were had, particularly between us and the Afghans, and President Obama settled with President Karzai, as you well know, on a plan that will begin the transition around July of this year. But the goal is to remove effectively all of our forces, unless there is a mutual agreement to the contrary before then, by the end of 2014.

You have said today and in the answers to the questions we submitted earlier that you thought we were making measurable progress. The American military are making measurable progress in Afghanistan, but that the progress was reversible. Rather than asking you to adopt an adjective that someone else has put on it, is it fair to say that the standard you would apply to the drawdown of American forces that would begin in July of this year, is it that it not be so great as to risk the gains we have made, which, as you have said, are reversible?

Mr. Panetta. There is no question we ought not to take any steps that risks the gains that have been made, and I have great confidence, frankly, that General Petraeus and Secretary Gates and the President will make the right decision in a transition that has to take place going towards 2014.

Senator Lieberman. Is it fair to say that if you are confirmed as Secretary of Defense, that the goal that you see is to turn responsibility for security of Afghanistan over to the Afghans at the end of 2014 and not to jeopardize our capacity to do that before then?

Mr. Panetta. No, that is absolutely correct. At the Lisbon conference, 48 nations plus President Karzai made the decision that there would be a transition going towards 2014, and it would be then that, hopefully, we would be able to transfer responsibility. We ought to do nothing that jeopardizes that path.

Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. Let me just briefly read you what Secretary Gates said this weekend in Afghanistan. “I think that once you have committed, that success of the mission should override everything else because the most costly thing of all would be to fail.”

Do you agree with that?

Mr. Panetta. Absolutely.

Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answers to those questions.

Let me move to another part of the world. I think at the end of the last century, if you asked most people up here and in the Defense Department, State Department, et cetera, CIA, what would be our focus in this century, they probably would have said that the Asia-Pacific region would be the strategic center of gravity of the 21st century.

We were obviously and necessarily distracted by the attack on us on September 11, and I think we have responded with remarkable
courage and effectiveness. But I think that the Asia-Pacific remains the strategic center of gravity for the 21st century.

As I think you know and those of us who have been there recently have found, there is an anxiety among our friends in Asia about, one, China’s growing military capabilities and, two, about America’s staying power and commitment to the region. I wanted to give you an opportunity to speak to that anxiety that, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding the budget pressures on the U.S. Government, would our strategic involvement in the Asia-Pacific region, in your opinion, continue to be a national security priority?

Mr. Panetta. Absolutely. I think that region is very important to us from a strategic point of view. We have to maintain a presence in the Pacific arena. I think we also, in line with that, have to maintain a relationship with China. Building that kind of relationship for the 21st century, I think, is extremely important.

Obviously, there are concerns, concerns about some of the things they are doing in modernizing their military. At the same time, I think we have to be able to work with them in terms of scale and transparency so that we are working together and not in opposition to one another in order to make sure that we protect the security of that region.

Senator Lieberman. But in your watch as Secretary of Defense, you certainly don’t anticipate any withdrawal or retreat of America’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific region and our allies there?

Mr. Panetta. Not at all. Not at all.

Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Director Panetta, thanks for your willingness to continue to exhibit great public service.

As you and I have had the privilege of working together for many years now since I was a freshman member of the House, and you were a member of the Clinton administration. We don’t need to talk about how many years that has been. But I respect your service and value our friendship.

I would just say that I know you will be the first to credit the many hard-working and very professional men and women in the intelligence and military community that led to the successful take-down of bin Laden, and you would be right to do that. But the fact is without strong leadership at the top, that mission would not have been successful. I give a lot of the credit for that mission to you, and it is well deserved.

You and I had the opportunity to talk about the issue of rising healthcare costs in the DOD budget when we visited a couple of weeks ago. I noticed you had several questions on that issue in your advance policy questions, and I appreciate your responses.

I don’t have a question on this. But as the chairman said earlier, you are going to have a very difficult job when it comes to trying to find savings and become more efficient at DOD. There is no bigger expense, at least from the standpoint of increasing annually, than the healthcare costs.
I just want to reemphasize the fact that this is an extremely important issue, and we need to get our arms around it. I look forward to working with you. I encourage you to continue to think creatively about how we can bring these costs down without negatively impacting the quality of service to those who depend on that system.

I want to go back to the line that Senator McCain was addressing on Afghanistan. Regarding the troop withdrawals, I think it is clear from an operational perspective that the withdrawal of U.S. troops at this point makes no sense. It may make sense from a domestic political perspective. It may make some level of sense in terms of waking up the Afghans to the fact that we are not going to be there forever, and they need to step up to the plate.

But I am concerned that a significant withdrawal of U.S. forces will reverse the progress that we have made in Afghanistan and that the Afghans have made. I am glad to see you say in your responses to questions that you “support a responsible, conditions-based withdrawal”. However, I would prefer there to be no withdrawal until it is clear that the gains that we have made will not be reversed.

My question for you is, as we withdraw troops from Afghanistan, if it becomes clear from an operational perspective that the withdrawal is negatively affecting progress and stability, will you advise the President that the withdrawal should be stopped and that, if necessary, additional U.S. forces be sent back to Afghanistan?

Mr. PANETTA. As I have said and as the President has said, and the Secretary has emphasized, this has to be a conditions-based withdrawal. That means you look at the conditions on the ground as it proceeds, obviously, we need to do everything we can to try to stay, hopefully, on target with regards to the 2014 date.

But again, it is conditions based, and I think based on what changes take place, then obviously the President and the Secretary would have to make adjustments.

Senator CHAMBLISS. I would hope that from a conditions-based standpoint, Leon, that you would give strong consideration to the safety and security of our soldiers. I know they are of number one importance to you.

If withdrawal of troops puts our men and women in greater harm’s way, I hope that we would make it conditions based and that we would cease the withdrawal. I hope that would be your recommendation to the President.

Mr. PANETTA. Yes.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Another issue that I want to bring up with you that we have discussed is the issue of tactical aircraft and fifth-generation fighters. Let me just say that several years ago, Secretary Gates made a push to place the future of tactical aviation on basically one weapon system, and that is the F–35.

He argued that it had stealth and other advanced capabilities that made it the airplane of the future. However, at a recent hearing, last month Secretary Carter indicated, in fact, that DOD has taken money out of the F–35 program to buy fourth-generation fighters.

Not only are these fourth-generation fighters costing billions of dollars, but they are going to be in the inventory for probably 20,
30 years, and we are going to be paying to maintain them at even a greater cost. Yet their utility is greatly limited against any kind of modern threat, and in my view, this does not seem to be a very good way to expend taxpayer dollars.

What is your perspective on this issue? If confirmed, will you absolutely be committed to preserving U.S. supremacy and air dominance and ensuring our resources are spent most wisely towards that end?

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, obviously, I want to make sure that we have the very best in terms of our fighter planes, and I know the F–35 is a plane that is being developed as the next-generation fighter. But I also know that there are extensive costs associated with how that plane is being developed, and I think we have to watch it very carefully.

I want to assure you that one of my responsibilities, in line with what Senator McCain said, is to take a very hard look at all weapon systems to make sure that they are cost effective and that they are, in the end, providing the very best equipment our forces need.

Senator CHAMBLISS. What really concerns me about where we are with that program is exactly what Senator McCain alluded to. That is that we just seem to be out of control and that we keep moving the goalpost with contractors and then blaming contractors for an increase in cost, when, frankly, part of it is due to our inefficient management of the systems.

If we are going to spend the kind of money that we are committed to spend on that fifth-generation fighter, because that is where we are headed, and we all know that. We have to have that airplane in the inventory. The decisions that are going to be made by you, as Secretary of Defense, relative to procurement, to acquisition, as well as to the testing of that airplane, are going to be critical.

You bring a wealth of knowledge from that perspective from your years at OMB, as well as where you are today. Again, we look forward to dialoguing with you, between you and this committee on that issue as well as our other acquisition issues that are going to be before you.

Let me ask you one other matter relative to Libya. I notice that you agree that the Gaddafi regime must go. How are we going to do it? Based on what we are doing today, from our participation in the NATO operation, how are we going to make that happen?

Mr. PANETTA. That is, as the President has said, the objective. It has to be done by a number of means.

Number one, we are bringing strong economic sanctions against them. Number two, we are bringing strong diplomatic pressure against them. We have implemented embargoes and, more importantly, the work that NATO is doing, pursuant to the United Nations (U.N.) resolution.

The NATO forces that are there are bringing tremendous pressure, I believe, on them, not only fighting obviously to protect civilians, but to implement the no-fly zone. But in addition to that, target the command and control elements of the regime. I think all of those factors have to continue in order to put pressure on Gaddafi.
Frankly, I think there are gains that have been made. We have seen the regime weakened significantly. We have seen the opposition make gains both in the east and the west. I think there are some signs that if we continue the pressure, if we stick with it, that ultimately Gaddafi will step down.

Senator Chambliss. Again, thanks for your service, and I look forward to continuing to work with you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Director, for your extraordinary public service, particularly in the last few months for your decisive and courageous advice to the President, which led to the successful raid against bin Laden. It would not have been as successful or as effective without your participation.

Thank you personally for your friendship over many years.

Let me return to the topic of Afghanistan. We are looking at a decision shortly that will be based on conditions on the ground. But it strikes me, and I think implicit in what you said in your testimony, that those conditions on the ground might be more relevant vis-a`-vis Pakistan than Afghanistan.

That, in fact, as long as the Government of Pakistan at least appears to see some of these terrorist groups on their soil as strategic assets and not liabilities, that our operations in Afghanistan are going to be very difficult.

Going to the real conditions on the ground, your comment on whether those conditions are really more about Pakistan than Afghanistan, and whether our effort, our strategy, our focus has to be there as much as Afghanistan. I would also include in this context some type of regional dialogue, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Your comments, Mr. Director?

Mr. Panetta. I would agree with that, Senator. I think it is pretty clear we can't succeed in Afghanistan if we are not succeeding in Pakistan in terms of controlling the safe havens and the cross-border operations. We have to work at both in order to ensure that we are able to stay on path with what we would like to achieve in Afghanistan.

In addition to that, I agree with you this is a regional issue. To the extent that the countries in that region can work together and relate to each other instead of being suspicious of each other and creating the kind of dynamic that, frankly, has not been very helpful, I think it would be in the interest of peace in that region if we could get all three to continue to work together to advance the same goals.

Senator Reed. One of the points that I believe your predecessor made—I, too, will join my colleagues in commending him for exemplary service. Indeed, one of the challenges you have is following an extraordinarily talented, successful, and decent human being. You will do it, I know. But you have a challenge.

Secretary Gates pointed out how important non-DOD operations were at the Department of State, and agricultural programs at the Department of Agriculture. Now we are getting also into the spectrum of these violent climate episodes throughout the globe of scientists in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
and others. Yet there is a real danger here that those budgets might suffer.

In terms of Afghanistan, my colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday released a report criticizing the build stage in the operation. Can you comment upon that partnership and how critical it is?

Again, when we look ahead at the conditions on the ground, we could be successful interdicting terrorist groups, seizing caches of weapons, even interdicting transmissions from Pakistan. But if there is no political capacity or governmental capacity, healthcare, education, or anything, we are going to still have a population that is disgruntled and probably destructive towards us.

Mr. Panetta. Senator, I agree with what you have said. It has to be a whole-of-government approach as we deal with these issues. Clearly, the State Department plays a very important role in providing assistance to individuals to ensure that an area remains secure: the education area. The Justice Department provides assistance. The area of agriculture also provides important assistance.

I know DOD is our primary military weapon in terms of securing areas. But if we don’t follow it up with these other important assets, we will never be able to fully secure these countries.

Senator Reed. Let me change topics for a moment. It strikes me that I am old enough to remember when there were three dimensions of conflict—air, land, and sea. I did some land stuff and technically air because I jumped out of airplanes.

But there is a whole new dimension, cyber. I don’t think we know enough yet to be fully prepared, fully conversant. But can you comment briefly on the strategy that you will try to develop? I presume that strategy will involve some deterrence, preemption, offense, and defense. As was just indicated, there is a policy now within the context of the rules of war, what would constitute some type of casus belli?

I think you are stepping in at a critical moment where we are just beginning to develop a strategy for a new dimension of warfare that we have never really confronted yet, and your leadership will be critical.

Mr. Panetta. There is no question that the whole arena of cyber attacks, developing technologies in the information area represent potential battlefronts for the future. I have often said that there is a strong likelihood that the next Pearl Harbor that we confront could very well be a cyber attack that cripples our power systems, our grid, our security systems, our financial systems, and our governmental systems.

This is a real possibility in today’s world. As a result, I think we have to aggressively be able to counter that. It is going to take both defensive measures as well as aggressive measures to deal with it. But most importantly, there has to be a comprehensive approach in Government to make sure that those attacks don’t take place.

I have a huge responsibility, if confirmed in this new position, in dealing with the cyber area through the National Security Agency (NSA) and others. My goal would be to work very closely with them and with others to develop not only the capability, but also the law that I think we need to have in order to determine how we approach this challenge in the future.
Senator Reed. Just a final topic, and really echoing what Senator McCain said, Senator Chambliss, and others, is that there is an acquisition bow wave coming, as you recapitalize and innovate our military forces, and that has been pushed off a bit. It has been deferred a bit, but it is coming.

One of the aspects, as Senator Chambliss pointed out, is that it is not simply the sheer number of systems that we have to buy—land, sea, air, and others—it is the price tag on each one of these systems. I know Secretary Carter has been working very hard to make affordability part of the design. But all of those efforts are going to be absolutely necessary because there will be no room within even a generous budget to do everything that has to be done unless we make significant progress in that area. Just your comments again, Mr. Director.

Mr. Panetta. In the briefings that I have had, it is obvious that this is an area that we have to pay a lot of attention to because of the efficiencies, because of competition, because of the nature of expanding contracts that have taken place there.

We have seen these weapon systems grow in cost. It takes an extraordinary amount of time to field a system—from the beginning of moving that kind of weapon system to the time it is finally developed, finally deployed, it almost becomes outdated. We have to improve that process.

I know Congress has taken steps in that arena, but I look forward to working with you and with the members of this committee to take greater steps to make sure we are looking at every possible efficiency in the procurement arena in order not only to save dollars, but to make sure we are getting better equipment as a result of it.

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Director.

Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Brown.

Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good to see you again, sir. I appreciate you taking time with me yesterday, I look forward to voting to confirm you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.

I echo a lot of the same thoughts that my colleagues do regarding the cross-border operations, the tremendous amount of aid we give to Pakistan, $4 billion, I think, give or take. I have deep concerns that as we try to move forward with completing our mission and bringing our men and women home from Afghanistan that we are having these areas where you have the safe havens, yet we are giving them billions of dollars in aid.

It is either you are with us or you are not? Either you are helping or you are not. Is there an effort and/or what is your position with regard to carrying that message that people like me and others in Congress are getting a little bit frustrated with that duplicity?

Mr. Panetta. Senator, I want to assure you that Secretary Clinton; Chairman Mike Mullen, who meets with them regularly; myself; my deputy, who was just there; have all made the same point that we need to have their cooperation, we need to have their partnership in confronting what, frankly, is a common enemy here.
Terrorism just isn’t our problem. It is their problem. They are the subject of attacks every day from terrorists. It is in their interest to try to take greater action to control terrorism within their borders, and I think they have to recognize that we expect in a relationship and a partnership that it is a two-way street, that it isn’t just one way. It has to be two ways if we are going to protect both of our countries.

Senator Brown. Right. I mean, the fact that bin Laden was there. Clearly, if they didn’t know he was there then—I, quite frankly, don’t believe them. But I am hopeful that message continues very strongly. I know when I went over there, I conveyed that same message as well.

If you are walking down the hallway and a media group grabs you and says, "Sir, what is the mission in Afghanistan?" What is your response? When I go back home, what should I convey to the people back in Massachusetts as to now that, obviously, we have made progress there? We have done A, B, C, and D. What should I convey and what do you convey, sir, in your everyday conversations, what is the mission in Afghanistan right now?

Mr. Panetta. The fundamental mission in Afghanistan is to provide sufficient stability so that country never again becomes a safe haven for al Qaeda or al Qaeda’s militant allies. I think that is the fundamental mission.

Senator Brown. Is it your plan to achieve that mission by setting benchmarks that will hopefully be attained so we can step back and bring our men and women home? Let me ask you that first.

Mr. Panetta. I think the President has made clear that there are goals that we are continuing to work on. We need to weaken the Taliban. We need to develop the force structure in Afghanistan with the police and the army so they can assume these responsibilities, and we need to develop the governance system there so that it can provide greater security for the future. Each of these areas has to be focused on in order to arrive at our goal.

Senator Brown. Is it your opinion that there is a will in Afghanistan with the people and the government folks there to do that, to ultimately be self-sufficient?

Mr. Panetta. I think there is. I think in the discussions I have had there, I think they really do want their country to succeed. It is not always easy. This is a tribal society. It is not a simple thing to be able to work together.

Senator Brown. You have the tribal society, then you have the central government. There is very little interaction.

Mr. Panetta. It is not easy. It is difficult. Yet, I think they understand that, ultimately, this is their country, and they are going to have to provide the security in their country.

Senator Brown. I am also deeply concerned and I am hopeful that you will look at it, we keep hearing reports that monies that we are providing are going ultimately to terrorists and ultimately being used against our men and women that are serving. Is that something you have a comment on?

Mr. Panetta. I think we have to continually oversee that and make certain that doesn’t happen. I don’t deny that there has been corruption in that country, and I think we have to ensure that one
of their responsibilities as a government is to make sure that doesn’t happen.

Senator **Brown**. Just to shift gears a little bit, what is happening in Egypt and that region of the world, obviously, people are hopeful that they are having an opportunity to share in the freedoms and privileges that we and other countries like us have. Yet there is also deep concern about voids that may be left after these transitional periods.

For example, in Egypt, we have given them billions of dollars, and they have purchased billions of dollars of military equipment and the like. They have upcoming elections at some point. Depending on who gets in power, they still have the equipment. They still are receiving aid.

I am concerned about Israel and its safety and security. I am concerned about other parts of that region. What are your thoughts on the relationship with Israel, the transition we are seeing over in the Middle East?

Mr. **Panetta**. We will and have to continue to maintain a strong relationship with Israel and that part of the world, and we have to reach out to other nations in that part of the world as well if we are going to ultimately preserve peace in that region.

This is an area that is in great turmoil now. I think you have just commented on that. A lot of these countries are going through turmoil—Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen. There are a number of countries that are dealing with uncertainty.

I think the United States has to, on a case-by-case basis, work with each of these countries to ensure that they reduce the violence, to ensure that they are recognizing some degree of universal rights, and that they are implementing economic and political reform. That is not going to be easy. There are tremendous changes going on, but we have to play a role in what is developing in the so-called “Arab spring”.

I think the President spoke to that. The fact is that if we don’t, there are other countries in that region like Iran that are going to try to influence what takes place. We can’t afford for that to happen.

Senator **Brown**. Thank you, sir. Good luck.

Chairman **Levin**. Thank you, Senator Brown.

Senator **Akaka**.

Senator **Akaka**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say aloha and welcome to Director Panetta, who is a dear friend and a former colleague. We have so many things that we can talk about, but I want to tell you, Director Panetta, that I am really impressed with your opening statement. What else can I say, as we consider a person who was nominated by the President to be Secretary of Defense who will be a tireless advocate of our military and will bring about support and sustain them?

For me, this is great and that this will be in your thoughts and prayers and supported by your dad’s principles of having a free country and a country that is secure and that you would continue to bring strong discipline and national defense for our country. With all of this, I want to wish you well and tell you that you certainly have my support.
As we discussed, you will face significant challenges, if confirmed. The men and women of the Armed Forces have served with honor and resolve in two major conflicts that have taken a tremendous toll on our Armed Forces. We must do all we can to care for them. Fulfilling this sacred obligation is dependent on DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) cooperation.

I am glad that you stated in your advance policy questions that you would ensure that DOD continues to work closely with the VA to support servicemembers and their families, and we talked about working on a seamless transition between DOD and the VA. With this, as you carry on into the position of Secretary, you certainly have my support.

Director Panetta, if confirmed, what will be your top priorities as you look to care for men and women in uniform and their families?

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, obviously, my first and foremost priority is to protect this country, but I can’t do it unless we have good fighting men and women who are willing to put their lives on the line in order to defend this country. I think we owe it to them as a result of that, and we certainly owe it to their families, to make sure that we are doing everything possible to meet their needs.

I think, obviously, providing the kind of healthcare, providing the benefits, providing the counseling that is necessary, particularly for wounded warriors, making sure that they can transition to the VA in a seamless way, all of these are areas that I have to pay attention to because I have seen it firsthand that these kids are out there. They are, indeed, putting their lives on the line, and we have asked them to go there time and time again.

We have to make sure that they know that they are fully supported in this effort. It is going to be my job, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, to ensure that we are providing those benefits. Obviously, I want to work with people like yourselves that have been working at this for a long time to make sure that we are covering all of their needs.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

I am impressed as you did tell us just about five steps of what you are planning to do and have social reforms. I thought it was unique where you want the Service Chiefs and the Secretaries to work together and share their concerns as well and that you want to work on the Pentagon management, which I think is so important as well. This is also important, to regard Congress as a partner and to work with Congress as well, and then to deal with the challenge of nations that are rising and changing, as you mentioned.

Director Panetta, the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 required DOD to prepare financial statements, which were found ultimately unreliable. In 2010, the National Defense Authorization Act requires the Department to provide auditable financial statements by 2017. I believe in accountability, and I know you do, too. We owe the American people complete and accurate financial information from the Pentagon.

Additionally, accurate books would allow Pentagon leaders to make better-informed decisions in a resource-limited environment. If confirmed, what will you do to ensure that the Department meets these requirements?
Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I was concerned in finding out that the Department would not be able to achieve full auditability until something like 2017. I understand how areas of the budget developed, the American people should know that, obviously, there is auditing that does go on within each of these areas. But as a department, we should be able to audit that department.

If I am confirmed, one of the first things I am going to do is to try to see if we can’t take steps to try to improve on that timetable so that we can say to the American taxpayer that what we are spending on national defense is being fully audited.

Senator AKAKA. Director Panetta, DOD is one of the few departments that has recognized the importance of developing and maintaining its language and cultural awareness capabilities. A number of steps have been taken to improve these skills within the Department and across the country, such as leading the National Language Service Corps and coordinating its activities with other Federal agencies.

What are your thoughts on the importance of cultural and foreign language capabilities within DOD?

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I am a big believer in language training and getting our people equipped with the ability not only to speak the language, but to understand the culture of the countries that we are dealing with. I say that not only because I think it is good for each individual to be able to have that capability, but I have to tell you it is important to our national defense to have that capability.

At the CIA, I have developed a requirement for analysts, for those that are operations officers to have a language capability. It makes them not only a better individual, it makes them a better intelligence officer to have that capability.

I think at DOD, I think we need to also encourage greater language training so that they understand not only the language, but the culture of the countries that they are involved with. Having that capability makes us much better at doing our job.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka.

Senator Ayotte.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you so much, Director Panetta, for your leadership and distinguished record of service to our country.

I wanted to ask you, the President’s proposal starting in 2013 to cut $400 billion, do you agree with that proposal, and is it a realistic number in terms of preserving our national security?

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, obviously, I agree with the commitment of the President to try to take action to reduce the deficit and the number that he suggested. I do want to say that there is a comprehensive review that is going on that the President himself stated would take place, the Secretary has stated would take place.

That comprehensive review is looking at a number of issues related to the Defense Department in order to determine what is the right pace, what are the right areas, what is the right transition in order to achieve that savings. I look forward to the results of that comprehensive review.
Senator Ayotte. As a follow-up, you have certainly expressed your admiration for Secretary Gates, and I share that admiration for his service to our country. He has made some recent statements expressing concerns over the $400 billion proposal and I think, in fact, talked about it cutting into the meat, in terms of the muscle of our defense. Do you disagree with him on that front?

Mr. Panetta. No, no. I share his concerns. I share his concerns about the possibility of hollowing out our force. I think that would be a terrible mistake. I share his concern about some kind of automatic, across-the-board cuts and just implementing some kind of formulaic approach to cutting defense when we have to look at each area and determine where we are going to achieve savings in order to protect defense.

Obviously, I share those concerns. But what I want to do is to be able to look at that comprehensive review in order to make sure that none of the concerns that Secretary Gates has raised or that I am concerned about take place in seeking those reductions.

Senator Ayotte. In conducting that review, when you get into the position of being the Secretary of Defense, if you disagree that $400 billion is a reasonable number and could jeopardize our national security, would you express your opposition to the President on that?

Mr. Panetta. If the end result of that comprehensive review were to come to that conclusion, then obviously, I would share those concerns. I don’t think it will, but I think that if there was something that indicated that our national defense would be impacted, obviously, I would share that with the President.

Senator Ayotte. Director, I wanted to ask you about the CIA and interrogations. Does the CIA currently conduct interrogations of high-value targets or of terrorists or those that are captured?

Mr. Panetta. Senator, the way it works now is that when a high-value target is captured, there is a high-value detainee interrogation group (HIG) that comes together. That involves the Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the CIA working as a team. They will go and interrogate an individual for intelligence as a team. It works pretty well, but that is the way it works now.

Senator Ayotte. But just to clarify, does the CIA actually do the interrogations themselves? Meaning I understand what the HIG does, but as I understand it, the CIA has really—while participating in the HIG, has not been doing interrogations. Am I wrong on that?

Mr. Panetta. Generally, the CIA individual there can ask questions. Generally, what is done is that they will share with each other what questions ought to be asked by the interrogator. That could be the Army individual. It could be the FBI. But every once in a while, the CIA individual asks questions as well.

Senator Ayotte. Is there anything that prohibits the CIA from taking the lead in conducting interrogations under current policy?

Mr. Panetta. The way the team works now is that, if it is someone where intelligence is the primary objective here, going after and trying to find that out, then the CIA individual becomes pretty central to the questions that are asked. That is the way it works now.
In other words, if there is a real emphasis on that, that is one case. If it is an FBI case and they are looking at trying to prosecute that individual, then obviously FBI takes the lead. If it is a military case or individual that could involve follow-up on the military, then they would take the lead.

It really works as a team. That is probably the best way to say it. It is a team, and they do it on a case-by-case basis.

Senator Ayotte. Nothing currently prohibits the CIA from being the lead in conducting interrogations?

Mr. Panetta. Nothing prohibits that from happening.

Senator Ayotte. Okay. To your knowledge, does it happen now? I understand it is a team. But I am just trying to understand whether the CIA ever takes the lead.

Mr. Panetta. It is not the direct interrogation that used to take place early on in this decade, but it is much more of a team approach right now, and that is the way it works.

Senator Ayotte. I wanted to follow up with respect to the Detainee Treatment Act. Do you agree with all the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act, including the provisions that provide legal authority regarding interrogations?

Mr. Panetta. Obviously, I agree with the law, yes.

Senator Ayotte. You talked about your view on waterboarding. Do you think that all of the enhanced interrogation techniques cross the line, I think, was what you used when you discussed waterboarding.

Mr. Panetta. No, I don’t have the same view with regards to all of the other enhanced techniques that I do with regards to waterboarding.

Senator Ayotte. So, right now under the President’s Executive Order, the interrogations are limited to the Army Field Manual. Is that right?

Mr. Panetta. Correct.

Senator Ayotte. You would agree that there are some enhanced interrogation techniques that don’t necessarily cross the line but wouldn’t be contained within the Army Field Manual. Is that right?

Mr. Panetta. The enhanced techniques that were used early on have now been forbidden by the President’s Executive order. It is the Army Field Manual that is the primary guide with regards to interrogations.

Senator Ayotte. But to the extent that some of those techniques may be permitted under the Detainee Treatment Act, and would you necessarily disagree with the law contained within the Detainee Treatment Act?

Mr. Panetta. If it is permitted under the Army Field Manual, then obviously, I would support that.

Senator Ayotte. My time is up. I appreciate your answering my questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

Senator Nelson.

Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Panetta, thank you for your decades of public service and your willingness to step forward and extend that public service in this new position.
You will inherit 10 years of war, budget belt-tightening, and two wars winding down, if confirmed. You will be tasked with reshaping DOD, including resetting its combat-weary units, drawing down the DOD budget, and taking care of the DOD members and their families. To say that is a set of tall orders is an understatement of giant proportions.

With respect to Afghanistan, there has been quite a bit of discussion about the need for benchmarks to do authentic assessment of where we are in the transition to the Afghanistan capability of defending itself so that it can govern itself going forward. I have been a prime supporter of benchmarks, first with regard to Iraq and now with respect to Afghanistan as well.

I am introducing legislation today that will require benchmarks to evaluate progress being made toward the transition of security responsibility to the Government of Afghanistan. The bill would call for the benchmarks on transition to be included as a part of the already-established reporting requirements for Afghanistan known by I think it was 1230 and 1231 reports to make it consistent.

I am encouraged by your discussion and your support of this method of evaluating progress by some form of metrics so that we are not in a gray area always about whether we are winning or we are losing or making progress. It gives us an opportunity to decide what level of progress have we made, what remains to be accomplished for us in that regard. I am encouraged by many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle talking about the benchmarks as well.

Because if we intend to transfer security responsibility to the Afghan Government by 2014, obviously, it is important to mark our progress. Do you have any preliminary thoughts as to the kinds of things you might look at as part of benchmarking that would help you evaluate conditions on the ground as to whether or not we are making satisfactory progress to where you can say we are 25 percent there, 50 percent there, or we have 50 percent yet to go?

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, with regards to specific intelligence on that, that is probably more appropriate in another forum. But I think it is fair to say that the death of Osama bin Laden, there is no question that it impacted al Qaeda. He was the spiritual leader
of al Qaeda, and I think it did impact on their capability. In addition to that, obviously, there are a number of operations that I think have impacted on their command and control capabilities as well. But having said that, they still remain dangerous, and they are dangerous with regards to the efforts they continue to work at in Pakistan. One of the concerns that I will share with you is that I think we do have to pay attention to these nodes that are developing where al Qaeda has moved some of its operations, places like Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa. Those are areas that I think we have to continue to focus on.

So, yes, it has had an impact. Yes, I think it has weakened them. But they still remain dangerous, and we still have to go after them.

Senator NELSON. I agree with you, and I appreciate that view. We have had a very touchy situation develop with respect to Pakistan in terms of what level of support Osama bin Laden may have had from anyone involved in the Pakistan Government. It is a complicated relationship, we understand. But the American people are really quite concerned about double dealing. You can't have a friend be your friend and your enemy at the same time. Your friend, but working against you.

Do you think that the relationship with Pakistan is transparent enough at the present time? Is there something we can do so that the American public can make a better determination of that relationship that we share with the Government of Pakistan?

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I think we have to continually work at that. We have to work at developing a relationship of trust with the Pakistanis. I don't know that we are totally there. I mean, there are some areas where, frankly, we have good discussions. We have good communications. But there are a number of areas where, frankly, we don't have that level of trust or communication capability.

I think we have to work at that. We have to develop it because, as I have said, it is in the interest of both countries to have a trusting relationship because terrorism is an enemy not just for the United States. It is an enemy for Pakistan.

Senator NELSON. Do you think that an internal investigation with some level of transparency within their government to try to determine responsibility for anyone who may have had involvement in trying to protect the presence of bin Laden in their country, that that will be fruitful? If it is fruitful, that it will be looked as credible by our Government first, but by the American people?

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, at this point, we don't have any intelligence to indicate that there was any relationship here. But having said that, I do believe that the Pakistanis are conducting several investigations at different levels to try to investigate what took place, and I think probably would be important to see what the results of those investigations are.

Senator NELSON. Thank you. Good luck in your new position, which you are about to achieve.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Director, I can’t thank you enough for being willing to do this job after being CIA Director. I just think the President has put together an A-plus national security team, and you are one of the linchpins of that. So now, some hard questions. [Laughter.]

You mentioned to Senator Nelson that you think the killing of bin Laden has created some momentum. I couldn’t agree with you more. What to do with that momentum?

The statement to me that it makes, there is no place you can go and no passage of time that will protect you from justice being delivered by the American people. I think that is a statement that needs to be made. But we also need to make another statement. You can count on America.

My general belief is that this war is more complicated than killing terrorists. Do you agree with that?

Mr. Panetta. Yes.

Senator Graham. We have to make an equal investment in helping those who would fight the terrorists in their own backyard and be our partner. Don’t you agree that takes more time, that it is more costly and, in many ways, more deadly to build up partnerships than just killing an individual?

Mr. Panetta. It absolutely does take more time.

Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the payoff is much more enormous if we can get it right?

Mr. Panetta. Correct.

Senator Graham. What happens if we lose in Afghanistan?

Mr. Panetta. I think if we lose in Afghanistan, we not only create another safe haven for al Qaeda and for their militant allies, but I think the world becomes a much more threatened place because of that loss, particularly in that region.

Senator Graham. I can’t agree with you more. I think that is absolutely dead on.

What do I tell a family in South Carolina who has lost a son or daughter in Afghanistan to an improvised explosive device (IED) that we know was made in Pakistan, and we can’t do a damned thing about it? What do I tell them?

Mr. Panetta. I think that is one of those situations that is frustrating and angering. One where we have to say to that family that we are not just walking away from that responsibility, but we are continuing to put pressure on those countries that are involved with that.

Senator Graham. I couldn’t agree with you more. I don’t think, quite frankly, we are going to be able to sustain our efforts in Afghanistan until we deal with the safe havens. I trust you and General Petraeus to deliver that message.

But on behalf of the people of South Carolina and I think most members of this committee, if you are listening in Pakistan, you need to choose. Because it is in your interest to help fight the people that would undermine Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan.

I am all in for winning in Afghanistan and doing what we need to do in Iraq. But Pakistan needs to get with the program one way or the other.

Now, the Pentagon itself. Do you agree that the general system we have today to buy weapons is that the longer it takes to develop a weapon and the more it costs, the more the contractor makes?
Mr. PANETTA. That is right.

Senator GRAHAM. Isn't that kind of stupid? [Laughter.]

Mr. PANETTA. Not for the contractor.

Senator GRAHAM. I mean, it really is. Yes, yes, yes. I don't blame the contractor. I blame us.

What if we did this? What if we said to the contractors in the future, you are welcome to bid on major weapon systems, but why don't you share 25 percent of the development cost, and at the end of the day, we are going to have a fixed price, not a cost plus. If there are any overruns, you share in the overruns. Do you think that is some idea to at least consider?

Mr. PANETTA. I think that is a suggestion worth looking at.

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, I think it is, too. I think it would save us a lot of money. One thing I would like you to do is go back in the past, and if you had a cost-sharing arrangement, how much money would we have saved in the last 20 years if we had that arrangement versus the longer it takes, the more it costs, the more you make? I think it is a way to save money and actually get weapons done quicker.

When it comes to Iraq, if the Iraqis ask us to provide some troops in 2012, Secretary Gates says he thinks that would be smart. Do you think that would be smart to say yes?

Mr. PANETTA. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Secretary Gates, do you agree that he has a pretty good view of what is going on in the world?

Mr. PANETTA. He sure does.

Senator GRAHAM. He has served our country in an extraordinary manner, I think. If he says 3,000 to 5,000 makes sense when it comes to July withdrawal in Afghanistan, would you give great consideration to that number?

Mr. PANETTA. I don't want to speculate on what the number is. But whatever Secretary Gates recommends——

Senator GRAHAM. Well, that is what he said. It is not speculation. He said 3,000 to 5,000 would be a wise move in July. Would you at least consider that request?

Mr. PANETTA. I think Secretary Gates' position, General Petraeus' position, obviously the President's position, all of that ought to be considered.

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree that between all of us, that probably Gates and Petraeus have the best view of anybody that I know of, if I had to pick two people to ask?

Mr. PANETTA. They have a pretty good view.

Senator GRAHAM. I would put you on that list, too. Okay. Now, when it comes to Libya. If Gaddafi stays, what does that mean for our national security interests after we said he must go?

Mr. PANETTA. I think it impacts on our national security interests in the world if that happens.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think it kills the Arab spring?

Mr. PANETTA. I think it sends a terrible signal to these other countries.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think it tells the Iranians that you really don't have to fear America when it comes to developing nuclear weapons?
Mr. Panetta. I think it tells them that our word isn’t worth very much if we are not willing to stick to it.

Senator Graham. I couldn’t agree with you more. I can’t wait to vote for you. [Laughter.]

Now, when it comes to detainees, if we captured someone tomorrow in, say, Yemen or Somalia, some of these failed states, high-value target, where would we put them as far as a jail? Do we have a jail available to our Armed Forces?

Mr. Panetta. Probably better than anyone here, the——

Senator Graham. Can I tell you what Admiral Mullen said when I asked him that question?

Mr. Panetta. Sure.

Senator Graham. We don’t have an answer for that question. Would you help me come up with an answer?

Mr. Panetta. That is probably not a bad answer.

Senator Graham. I think it is the truth. But do you think that is a smart policy, to be a nation without a jail in the war on terror?

Mr. Panetta. I think we have to have facilities to be able to provide to detainment of these individuals. That is clear.

Senator Graham. To the committee, we don’t, and we need to find one. I think Guantanamo Bay is a good candidate because it is the only one left.

Now, in 2014, everybody is focusing on a transition in Afghanistan. I think, if we do this smartly, we can transition. But I am very interested in making sure, as you said, Afghanistan never becomes a failed state.

Secretary Gates said today, and he said in February when I asked him this question, that he believes that joint basing past 2014, where you would have American air power and counterterrorism units left behind in Afghanistan in a joint environment for training and counterterrorism, if the Afghans request it, would be a very good policy for us. Do you generally agree with that?

Mr. Panetta. I think the President has made clear that we have to make a long-term commitment to stability in that region not just now, but in the future.

Senator Graham. Can I read you what Secretary Gates said to my question in February about joint basing?

Mr. Panetta. Sure.

Senator Graham. “A security agreement with Afghanistan that provided for a continuing relationship and some kind of joint facilities and so on for training, for counterterrorism, and so on beyond 2014 I think would be very much in our interests.” Do you think that is a reasoned statement?

Mr. Panetta. I think that is worth looking at.

Senator Graham. I do, too. Now, at the end of the day, you are taking over at a time when the budget for the Nation has never been more out of whack. We’re in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. You have a very big agenda to fulfill.

At the end of the day, we are a war-weary Nation. What would you tell the American people in terms of the attitude we need to take as a country? Address their war weariness and tell them why, in your view, we should consider staying behind in Iraq, why we
should consider a long-term relationship with Afghanistan. Why is it so important that we continue to stay in the fight after 10 years?

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, it goes back to my father’s statement. If you want to be free, you have to be secure. The only way to ensure that security is to be able to establish some kind of peaceful solution to these challenges abroad.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Graham.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome you and thank you for your service and look forward to working and supporting you in every way possible.

Obviously, part of our mission in counterinsurgency is to secure and stabilize and enhance the infrastructure, and I want to certainly commend to you and ask you to direct the folks that work with you to pay attention to some of the findings of the Commission on Wartime Contracting. They issued a report last Friday, and I think it is full of very basic common-sense information that seems to be escaping us in the area of contracting and contingency operations.

That is two important factors. One on the front end is security, whether or not the security is available and appropriate in order to support the building of projects that we put a lot of money in. We saw this in Iraq over and over again, where we would build a power plant, we would work on an oil refinery, and then 2 months later it would be blown up. So, I think that security piece and, obviously, the cost of the security piece in order to build the projects needs to be taken into account.

But the second one, and this report they came out with Friday is a really important report, Director, and that is sustainability. We have white elephants all over this part of the world, all brought to you courtesy of the American taxpayer. I will read you just one quote from this report. “A project may be carefully planned, well executed, and economical, but become wasteful if the host nation cannot provide trained staff, afford parts or fuel, perform necessary maintenance, or produce intended outcomes.”

We have one of these white elephants we spent $300 million on in Kabul, a power plant that was designed to be dual fuel, and Afghanistan made a commitment to us that they would fuel it. Now they say they can’t afford the fuel. The fact that it is a dual fuel makes it complicated in terms of the technology. So, basically, it is now only being used as a backup, and Afghanistan is buying electricity from another country.

This is a great example, but it can be replicated over and over again. I really think it is time—and I understand the mentality. I respect greatly General Petraeus and his strategies in terms of counterinsurgency, but what happens is there is this almost myopic focus. If we can build this project, we will put people to work. This is good. This is what counterinsurgency is all about.

They don’t think about what is it going to look like in 3 or 4 years. Especially in Afghanistan, you and I discussed the sustainability questions in Afghanistan are particularly acute. This is not a nation that is ready to take over many things, including some of these projects that we are building.
I really think that if we don’t begin analyzing sustainability at the front end—and I am going to make a formal request to you that every project that is being built right now—whether it is a road, whether it is a healthcare center, whether it is a school—every project be analyzed right now for sustainability.

If it is obvious it is not going to be sustained, I really believe you have to pull the plug. I mean, this is hundreds and tens upon billions of dollars have just gone down a rat hole because we didn’t think about what happens when we are finished building it. I think it is really important.

This is the hardest question, and you and I talked about this. What are the conversations that are ongoing and what is the planning that is ongoing about how Afghanistan, with their very meager gross national product (GNP), very meager GNP, how in the world do they afford what we are building them, both in the projects and, more importantly, this army that we are building for them?

It is very difficult for me to figure out what happens to this army when we leave because they can’t afford it.

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, first of all, on your first point, I want you to know that if I am confirmed, I really do want to work with you closely with regards to the contracting issue in order to ensure sustainability. I share all of your concerns. I know why it has happened. I know how that has developed. But at the same time, I don’t think we have paid enough attention to that issue, and I would like to work with you in trying to improve that whole aspect.

With regards to the issue of Afghanistan, again, I share your concern about where are they going to draw the resources they need not only to sustain the army and the police force, but to be a country, to be able to carry on their responsibilities. I think that is going to be part of the governance challenge that we are going to face there is to ensure that, as a nation, they begin to develop the resources, develop the revenues that they need in order to be able to govern that country. That is going to be part of it. Otherwise, it is not going to work.

Senator McCASKILL. Is there a plan in place for short term and long term? Is there some kind of plan that is in the works that we will be putting I think it is $13 billion this year? What is the plan for 4, 5 years from now? Is there a plan that we will continue to spend upwards of $5 billion or $6 billion a year just keeping this army?

We are building them an army with a size and scope that is beyond—they have never had an army, a national army in Afghanistan. So this is new, and is there planning going on, joint planning or anything else that would indicate how this is going to look 2, 3, 4 years down the line in terms of what we have built?

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I have not been fully briefed on what directly is being looked at in terms of that longer term. But let me get into that. If I am confirmed, I would like to look at that and then be able to give you a better answer.

[The information referred to follows:]

The administration is working to ensure a successful transition to the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) having the lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
We are making steady progress in developing the quantity, quality, and operational capacity of the ANSF. We remain on track to reach the envisioned end strength of 195,000 Afghan National Army soldiers and 157,000 Afghan National Police personnel. Our effort now include the development of logistical, engineering, communications, medical, and other enabling capabilities that the ANSF will need to support their own operations, as well as organic training and education capabilities they will need to sustain themselves by developing their future recruits. Our efforts also include the development of ministerial-level management and oversight capabilities necessary to lead and sustain the ANSF.

Detailed planning for long-term ANSF sustainment is an ongoing, active effort. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan is collaborating with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and NATO to analyze the long-term requirements for ANSF capability in light of current fiscal constraints. We envision a continuing role for the United States and expect continued contributions from international donors. To that end, before retiring, then-Secretary of Defense Gates challenged our partners in the International Security Assistance Fund to contribute a combined 1 billion euros annually to the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund.

Although international support for the ANSF will likely be required for some time to come, ultimately, Afghanistan must continue to increase its funding for its own security. This will depend on continued economic growth and governance in Afghanistan, which, in turn, will benefit from the security that a properly sustained ANSF can provide, as well as from the stabilizing effects that can result from a strategic partnership between Afghanistan and the United States and the continued presence of U.S. forces.

As our plans evolve, we will engage you and congressional colleagues on the details of this challenging effort.

Senator McCaskill. That is great. The only other topic is warning you that I will subject you to pop quizzes on the Wartime Contracting Commission's work. They have done some really good work. My colleague Senator Webb and I have worked very hard getting it established, and I think it is like many other commissions. Unfortunately, it is not getting enough attention, and really, where it needs to be front and center is going to be under your purview.

I am hoping that you will make sure that your immediate staff is aware of its work and takes it to heart. Because we have an awful lot of lessons learned that we have never learned. I think it is really important, as we try to do things with less money.

The only other issue I want to bring up with you today that I don't think has been discussed yet is just getting your commitment and your comments about what needs to be done and should be done as it relates to the problem of sexual assault within the military, women in the military that have had a great deal of difficulty accessing some sense of justice.

Mr. Panetta. Senator, we talked about that together in your office, and I totally share your concerns. We have to have zero tolerance for any kind of sexual assaults in the military, and we have to allow the victims of those sexual assaults the ability to be able to complain, to have those complaints listened to, and to have the evidence that is necessary to be able to establish those cases.

There are a lot of steps that need to be taken, and I look forward to working with you and with others in the Department to make sure that we protect women, who have served so well in the military these days.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you so much for your time here today. Most of all, thank you for loving your country so much that you are willing to take on this incredibly big, huge, and important responsibility.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.

Senator Cornyn.

Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Panetta, good to see you.

Mr. Panetta. Nice to see you.

Senator Cornyn. As you and I discussed in my office, and thank you for coming by recently to talk about some of my concerns with the financial management problems at DOD, I think most Americans would find it shocking that DOD is unable to produce timely, accurate, and complete information to support management decisions.

As we also discussed, the law of the land requires DOD to be able to complete a clean audit by 2017. Again, I think that would be shocking to most people.

But I appreciate your response on page 74 of your advance policy questions, the answers you submitted to our questions that you said achieving clean audit opinions would be one of your top management improvement priorities. Certainly, you have the background and experience to move the Department in that direction and to complete that requirement of the law.

I am advised that the Marine Corps actually is doing a relatively good, compared to the other Services, job in this area, and they are experiencing a 3-to-1 return, on for every dollar they spend on improving financial management, actually getting a good return on that investment. I know that it may be the attitude, there may be strong institutional resistance at DOD—believe me, as many do and as I do—that their main job is to fight and win the Nation’s wars, but that this is not a priority.

But you know and I know, we all know, the budgetary pressures the Department and others are going to be under as we deal with this unsustainable debt and these huge deficits is important. I think this is important to me and I know important to you to make financial management reform one of your important priorities.

Having said that, I would just ask you the straight-up question, do you agree with Secretary Gates when he said that the defense budget, however large it may be, is not the cause of the country’s fiscal woes?

Mr. Panetta. I agree with that. I think it isn’t. It is by no means the cause of the deficits, the huge deficits that we are incurring today.

Senator Cornyn. The President has requested $671 billion for fiscal year 2012. That is a lot of money, $671 billion. I know that there is going to be room for the Department to share in some of the budget cuts that are going to be on the table.

But of course, as you and I have discussed, I hope that this is not seen as an opportunity for those who want to whack the Pentagon budget to do so in a way that will impair our ability to defend ourselves or protect our national security interests. I am sure you share that view as well, don’t you?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I do.

Senator Cornyn. Let me just ask a question, you have the benefit of great experience and long experience with Government. But
that also means you have a record that I want to ask you about.
Of course, you were President Clinton’s Chief of Staff and Director
of OMB before that. You played a big role in the budget decision-
making during the presidency of President Clinton, overseeing a
major reduction in DOD procurement spending, including a 13.4
percent decline in fiscal year 1994.
Some have called that a procurement holiday. Others have said
we were cashing the peace dividend, even though we still had
many threats to our country. I want to give you an opportunity, if
you would, to explain your role in those cuts and whether you
think they were deeper than they should have been or just please
give us your perspective. Because, frankly, I hope we don’t try to
cash a peace dividend in 2012 while we are engaged in two and a
half wars.
Mr. PANETTA. As Director of OMB, obviously, I was given the re-
sponsibility by the President to try to achieve significant savings
as part of the economic plan that was adopted by Congress that,
by the way, reduced the deficit by almost $500 billion. I think that,
plus other agreements that were made in the Bush administration
and, ultimately, with the Republican Congress all contributed to
our ability to achieve a balanced budget.
Specifically, with regards to the defense area, my responsibility
as OMB Director was to provide a number to the Defense Secretary
and allow the Defense Secretary and those at the Defense Depart-
ment to determine how best to try to achieve those savings. I do
understand that was part of what they proposed.
But looking at it in hindsight, it might not have been the best
way to achieve those savings, but it was a decision that was made
at the Defense Department.
Senator CORNYN. Turning to Afghanistan, I know there is a lot
of comment and favorable comment about your involvement, and I
think you deserve credit for your part played in taking down
Osama bin Laden. Congratulations to you and the President’s na-
tional security team for that accomplishment.
But I get the sense that people are sort of prematurely declaring
that the fight is over because we have degraded al Qaeda in Af-
ghanistan. I am glad to hear you point out that they have metastas-
sized to other parts of North Africa and the region.
But I just want to ask you in particular, I know there are other
groups that may not be as familiar to Americans as al Qaeda, like
Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups. Could you just talk a little bit
about the Islamic jihadist groups that are out there that could eas-
ily morph into a threat as dangerous as al Qaeda?
Mr. PANETTA. There are a number of terrorist groups that are
out there, Senator. Obviously, al Qaeda is the one that we are prin-
cipally concerned about because they attacked this country, and
they continue to plan to attack this country.
But there are interrelationships that they have with other ter-
rorist groups. The Haqqanis, for example, are a group that has rela-
tions with al Qaeda. They, in turn, obviously are conducting at-
tacks in Afghanistan. There is a group called Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan, which is another group in the FATA that has relation-
ships with al Qaeda that conduct attacks, not only plan attacks
against us, but also have conducted attacks within Pakistan as well.

There is Lashkar-e-Taiba which is a terrorist group that focuses on attacks largely in India but have been known to discuss attacks elsewhere as well.

If you move to the area of Yemen, there, al Awlaki who is associated with al Qaeda, but nevertheless I think represents a real threat on his own because he is very computer oriented and, as a result of that, really does represent the potential to try to urge others, particularly in this country, to conduct attacks here. So that is a concern.

We have Somalia, where al Shabaab operates in Somalia. Although it is primarily located in Somalia, we do have intelligence that indicates that they, too, are looking at targets beyond Somalia. Then if you add to that Hezbollah and Hamas, you can see that you have a pretty good array of terrorist groups to confront.

Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. My time is up. But I think it is important that the American people understand the threat to our country, our national interests, our interests of our allies and American citizens extends beyond solely al Qaeda. I appreciate your answer.

Thank you. I look forward to working with you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.

Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. Thank you so much, Mr. Panetta, for your extraordinary public service to our country. I am extremely grateful.

I want to touch upon three issues, if we have time. I want to explore a little more on Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and then go to a little bit of cyber warfare.

Chairman Mullen stated a few months ago that it is fairly well known that elements of the Inter-Services Intelligence had a long-standing relationship with the Haqqani network. Obviously, addressing the Haqqani network is really important to reaching our goals in Afghanistan.

Yet a week ago, he reported that Pakistan has agreed to go after the terrorist group. How will you judge the seriousness of Pakistan's commitment to that effort?

Mr. Panetta. I think there is probably a simple test, which is whether or not the Haqqanis are continuing to go into Afghanistan and attacking our forces. It seems to me that if they have an influence over the Haqqanis, that they could urge them to cease fire and to stop those kinds of attacks.

Senator Gillibrand. I appreciated your testimony earlier about the nature of al Qaeda, that it has fundamentally metastasized, and in fact, many believe that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is perhaps far more dangerous than any other aspect of al Qaeda today.

You also mentioned that al Qaeda works in a very diffuse way, that oftentimes, it is inspiring groups like al-Shabaab in Africa and AQAP in Yemen. Of the three terrorist attempts on our homeland since September 11, the one on New York came out of Pakistan, the Christmas Day attempt on Chicago from Yemen, and the Fort Hood massacre motivated out of Yemen. Al Awlaki recruits online,
including from Europe and the United States, and we need to focus on a smart strategy to address these threats.

I support your view that we have to take these threats head-on and we have to make them very much part of our mission. I want to understand why in Yemen our approach is so different than that of Afghanistan. Perhaps not in this setting, but to talk a little bit about what some of your long-term strategies are to deal with the fact that al Qaeda has changed so much.

Mr. PANETTA. With regard to specific operations, I would have to do that in another forum. But just generally, I think our approach has been that because of these nodes that have developed, our approach has been to develop operations in each of these areas that will contain al Qaeda and go after them so that they have no place to escape.

So that we are doing that in Yemen. It is obviously a dangerous and uncertain situation, but we continue to work with elements there to try to develop counterterrorism. We are working with Joint Special Operations Command as well in their operations. Same thing is true for Somalia and with regards to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, we are working with both the Spanish and the French to develop approaches there that will contain them as well.

I think we have at the CIA tried to develop a more comprehensive strategy to kind of look at all of those nodes, look at all of those threats, and not just focus on the FATA or Pakistan, but focus on all of those threats in order to try to deal with it.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Right. Now, obviously, Yemen is under substantial turmoil, and we don’t know whether the government survives or not. Do we have strategies in place to make sure that if there is a transition that we are very knowledgeable about what military assets are there, what will happen to them? Have you engaged the Saudis or any other potential allies in what we can do there to protect against future growth of terrorism?

Mr. PANETTA. Again, with regards to specific operations, I really have to discuss that in another forum. But it is a very uncertain situation. It has been destabilized, and yet we are continuing to work with those individuals in their government to try to go after AQAP, and we are continuing to receive cooperation from them.

At this point in time, I would have to say that while, obviously, it is a scary and an uncertain situation, with regards to counterterrorism, we are still very much continuing our operations.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Last, if I still have time, Mr. Chairman, I appreciated the testimony you gave earlier, Senator Reed asked about it and others, about cyber terrorism, cyber crime, cyber attacks, and cyber warfare. I appreciated the fact that the statement was made that a cyber attack could well be a declaration of war, and you and I had a chance to talk about this in some respects.

Can you share with us any of your vision, design, goals with regard to how we create a greater platform for cybersecurity and cyber defense? In particular, I have worked with Senator Hatch on creating some international protocols to create alliances and working relationships with both allies and nonallies on how to begin to have an ability to enforce laws against cyber attacks, cyber crimi-
nals, cyber terrorists, and any other form of cyber mischief. I would love your thoughts on what you can share with us.

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, as we discussed in your office, this is an area of great concern for me because I think what I have witnessed at the CIA and elsewhere is that we are now the target of increasing attacks that go after our systems, and it is extremely important for us to do everything we can to confront that threat.

Obviously, I have a great resource with the NSA that has tremendous expertise and tremendous knowledge in this area. What I would like to do is to develop an even more effective force to be able to confront cyber terrorism, and I would like to work with you on the effort to try to develop those kinds of relationship not only here, but abroad, so that other countries can work with us in this effort.

We talk about nuclear. We talk about conventional warfare. We don't spend enough time talking about the threat of cyber war.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you.

Last, I just want to thank you for your testimony today about your priority to look out for the men and women serving in our armed services and their families. I think not only must that be one of your primary responsibilities, but I appreciate that it is in the forefront of your mind.

My time has expired. I will just leave you with I hope you continue that focus and particularly focus on the issue of housing. Because a lot of troops are coming back from various missions, and Fort Drum and other places around the United States really have inadequate housing supply. I hope that you can address that in a perhaps more aggressive and more nuanced way.

Thank you so much, very much for your testimony.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.

Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director, you certainly deserve the widespread accolades and expressions of gratitude that you are receiving from virtually every member of this committee today, and I want to add my own thanks for your willingness to continue to serve our country during such a difficult time.

But like my colleagues Senator Graham and Senator Brown, now the hard questions start. I want to start with Libya.

You have repeated today the administration's goal that Colonel Gaddafi must go. But what then? If there is any painful lesson that we have learned from our experience in Iraq, it is that if we do not have a plan in place after we have deposed a tyrant, that chaos and violence ensues.

Do you have confidence that we have a plan for dealing with Libya post Gaddafi, and do we even really know who we are dealing with in the opposition?

Mr. PANETTA. I know that Secretary Clinton is spending a great deal of her time working with our allies to respond to that concern, to try to work with those in the opposition who have come together in the consuls that they have developed there, to try to work with them in terms of greater support so that if they do, in fact, have to take control of the country, that they will have that capability.
What you have raised is a legitimate concern, and it is an area that we have a lot more work to do in order to ensure that if Gaddafi does step down that we can ensure that Libya will be a stable country.

Senator COLLINS. It really concerns me, particularly when you look at the leadership of al Qaeda and the Libyan presence there, if you look at the number of foreign fighters in Iraq that have come from Libya. I just don't feel any confidence that we know what comes next.

Mr. PANETTA. The opposition, obviously, has been made up of various tribal groups that have come together, and there are concerns about some of the other influences that are now trying to impact on the opposition. It is something that we are watching very closely, but I do think that if we can get Gaddafi to step down that I am confident that there are enough leaders in the opposition who can provide, hopefully, that continuity.

Senator COLLINS. Let me next turn to Afghanistan. No one wants to lose Afghanistan, and all of us are so mindful of the enormous sacrifices that our military men and women have made in Afghanistan and the enormous amount of taxpayer dollars that have been spent.

Senator Brown asked you a key question today about what is our mission? You talked about the goal of having Afghanistan be a stable state, and that certainly is something that I want also. But to me, that seems to be a never-ending mission. I don't see how we get to a stable state in Afghanistan.

Let me give you an example. A key to our transition in Afghanistan, the key to our troops being able to come home is the development of a competent, aggressive Afghan security force, and we have made a lot of progress in that area.

But I look at the cost of maintaining the Afghan security force. In this year’s presidential budget request, it is $12.8 billion. The total Afghanistan gross domestic product (GDP) is about $30 billion, and 97 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP is derived from spending related to international military and donor community presence.

When I look at that imbalance, I don’t see how Afghanistan is ever going to be able to even afford its own security forces. That says to me that we are going to have to continue to be a major contributor to paying for those security forces forever, virtually. Tell me how this ends. I just don't see how it ends.

Mr. PANETTA. I understand the concerns that you have raised, Senator, and I think we all share those concerns. I guess I can only say, having served on the Iraq Study Group, there was a moment in time when I had a lot of the same concerns about Iraq and whether or not Iraq would ever be stable enough to be able to draw down our forces there.

While Afghanistan is a very different country and has a very different history, the fact is that over the last few years, I have seen progress made with regards to governance in some of the key areas, with regards to security, with regards to the role of the Afghans in participating with our forces to try to secure area. They have gotten better.

Whether or not, in the end they are going to be able to develop the resources, develop the revenues, develop the governance that
needs to be done, those are major questions. But I think if we stick with it, if we continue to provide help and assistance to them, that I think there is going to be a point where Afghanistan can control its own future. We have to operate on that hope.

Senator COLLINS. Finally, let me echo the concerns that my colleagues have raised about whether the budget constraints, which are very real, are going to drive our military requirements rather than vice versa. This is an issue we discussed in my office.

This year, when the independent panel looked at the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), it concluded that the QDR had been molded by the budget rather than being what it is supposed to be, which is an unvarnished assessment of what our military requirements are. I am particularly concerned about the gap when I look at the Navy's shipbuilding budget. The Chief of Naval Operations has testified before our committee that we need, at a minimum, a 313-ship Navy, and we know the 313-ship goal is much smaller than the actual requirement that our combatant commanders have for ships.

Indeed, there was a recent report just 2 months ago from the Navy on the ballistic missile defense (BMD) force structure requirements that states that the Navy currently does not have the capacity to meet the demands of our combatant commanders for BMD capable ships. I am very worried about that gap in this time of budget constraints. I am worried that the Navy has yet to complete the contracts on the DDG–1000, the second and third ships.

What actions do you think need to be taken to help close the gap between the 285-ship Navy today and the, at a minimum, 313-ship requirement?

Mr. PANETTA. I strongly believe that the Navy has to project our force throughout the world and that the Navy is obviously crucial to that mission. I agree with the ship numbers that have to be developed for the Navy in order to be able to do that.

I think the key here is going to be something that has happened in your own State, which is that shipbuilding operations have to develop greater efficiencies. Yours is a great example of having developed those kinds of efficiencies that helps us on the cost control side and at the same time allows us to continue our shipbuilding capability.

I do think that greater competition, greater presence of an industrial base here that deals with these issues will provide the kind of cost savings that we will need in order to fulfill that mission.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, and I look forward to working with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins.

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I don’t know if you are going to take a break. But I just——

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, I think it sounds to me like we are going to take a break. [Laughter.]

But this will not be a lunch break. This will just be a very brief 5-minute break, and Senator Blumenthal will be next. Just take a very quick break and then back here. We will finish the questions, and then we will have a lunch break.

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you. [Recess.]
Chairman Levin. Senator Blumenthal?

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Panetta, thank you for answering all our questions, for your extraordinary service, and for your very powerful and eloquent testimony today and your very responsive answers to all of the issues that have been raised.

I want to second the sentiment that has been expressed by Senator Graham, which is I can’t wait to vote for your confirmation, and I appreciate your willingness and patriotism to take on this very tough assignment. Also to second Senator Graham’s views, and I think they are widely shared, that we need fundamental and far-reaching reform in our methods of acquiring and terminating weapons programs.

Would you agree with that?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I do.

Chairman Levin. I think, Senator Blumenthal, that probably Director Panetta would also agree that Secretary Gates can’t wait for us to vote for Director Panetta’s confirmation. [Laughter.]

Mr. Panetta. I think that is fair to say.

Chairman Levin. That will not be taken out of your time, by the way.

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Speaking of Secretary Gates, I hope and assume you would agree with him that the second engine for the F–35 is unnecessary and should be terminated?

Mr. Panetta. I support that position.

Senator Blumenthal. Also that we need to continue the sub building program at the rate of two per year, which I think is fairly noncontroversial?

Mr. Panetta. That is correct.

Senator Blumenthal. I want to talk for a moment about one of the causes of those costs in both our defense budget and our veterans programs, and they are a cause of cost that is not necessarily in the headlines or even reported, and those costs have to do with tobacco use and tobacco addiction and the costs of tobacco-related diseases.

I know that the Defense Department is very much aware of these costs because, as a matter of fact, it asked all military personnel last year to make their 2011 New Year’s resolution to quit smoking. In fact, about $1.6 billion a year in DOD costs are related to medical care that is provided for tobacco-related diseases. Among the retirees from our military for veterans, about 80 percent of the $5 billion in annual costs of treating pulmonary disease are directly attributable to smoking.
The costs of smoking simply in dollar terms, medical treatment, are at least $5 billion a year, not to mention the impacts on readiness, which are, in effect, less fit, less physically able military personnel, more likely to sustain injuries, more likely to be stressed out, more likely to be dependent and addicted to nicotine. The stark fact is that military personnel are 50 percent more likely to smoke and more likely to use tobacco products than their civilian peers.

My question to you is both an immediate and a longer-range one. First, whether you have any suggestions as to what can be done immediately? Second, would you be willing to commit the resources and interests of DOD to addressing the problems of nicotine addiction and tobacco use and the related medical impacts?

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, if I am confirmed, one of the areas I have to focus on is the health costs that are impacting here. I think the area that you have just defined is one area that we do have to pay attention to in terms of its implications on health and its implications on cost. I would look forward to working with you to try to develop an approach that would allow us to, again, not only deal with smoking, but deal with other threats to healthcare that impact on not only our soldiers but, frankly, that impact on Americans.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. On the families of our soldiers and our veterans?

Mr. PANETTA. That is right.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Because of not only the immediate effects of smoking or other kinds of health problems, but also the related impacts on families.

Mr. PANETTA. No, that is right. I think smoking, good nutrition, good exercise. I mean, there are a number of areas that I think need to be focused on as part of the solution to dealing with healthcare costs.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I would welcome the opportunity to work with you on those issues.

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me say while we are talking about veterans, I have offered a measure, a number of other Senators have, to broaden and deepen the commitment of our country to caring for issues relating to employment, homelessness, healthcare of our veterans and would hope that DOD would also increase its commitment in that area and hope under your leadership, it would, given your very moving and powerful remarks about the need to take better care of our military personnel.

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I really do feel an obligation to those that served, and I don’t treat this like a situation where once you have completed your service and you become a veteran that somehow you are somebody else’s responsibility. I think we have an obligation to make sure that people are treated right once they have served this country not only now, but in the future.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Finally, because my time is close to expiring, let me ask you one last question. The ammonium nitrate fertilizers that are the cause of probably the vast majority of the IED very tragic and unfortunate injuries to our troops are transported from Pakistan, and I wonder what can be done to stop that flow
of fertilizer, the ammonium nitrate substances that are the basis for those explosive devices?

Mr. Panetta. Senator, that is a continuing concern for us, and it is not so much the transfer of the material, but it is actually the development of IEDs, the explosives themselves, that we see taking place in Pakistan that make their way into Afghanistan. We have to take a number of steps not only with the Pakistanis, but also trying to check at the border to make sure that we do everything possible to stop that flow of IEDs. It is a very real threat, and a lot of that is coming across the border.

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, and I look forward to working with you. Thank you once again for your service to our Nation.

Mr. Panetta. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure to have you before the committee. As I told you, Mr. Panetta, when we had the opportunity to speak, I am delighted to see that a former OMB Director could actually make something of himself. You have done a great job as CIA Director, and I know that you have had the opportunity today to answer some tough questions, but also I am sure that the tone has been appreciative and respectful.

I am most concerned on the budget front and particularly with regard to our major acquisitions programs. The cost growth, the time delays have been particularly troubling to me. On this committee over the 4 or 5 months, we have heard lots of testimony, and this is at the same time, of course, that we are talking about not just restraining spending but actually putting everything on the table to deal with our historic deficits and the debt overhang that is affecting our economy so directly and affecting our future.

This concerns me greatly. It also, I think, impacts our national security because our men and women in uniform need the best equipment and they need it in a timely manner, and they are not getting it.

A couple of data points, and you know them well. Cost overruns annually now are, in some years, over $300 billion a year. This is, as compared to just a decade ago, when annual overruns were on average about $40 billion a year. The average delays almost 2 years in delivering initial capabilities for these programs.

The reasons are varied. Sometimes it is internal DOD processes, I think. Sometimes it is these contracting processes that still aren’t working, and these practices have been subject to a lot of GAO reports, directives, and public and private studies. There has been some good work done on it, and the chairman has done some good work on it, but we still have a long way to go.

This would be one of my major concerns. Given your background and experience, I think you are well qualified to address it. I would like to hear a little about that.

Senator Graham apparently talked earlier today about cost-sharing arrangements and the potential for that. I think that is an interesting idea. On the Joint Strike Fighter program alone, we heard testimony before the committee that we are 80 percent over
cost from the original estimates. That is over $150 billion and 30 percent more than the current baseline that was just set in 2007.

After 15 years of development and 2 years into operational production, we still don’t have a stable design. Again, I think that impacts our warfighters as well. I realize the Defense Department is working on implementing the Systems Acquisition Reform Act, and the better buying power initiative is ongoing. But, frankly, there is a lot more that needs to be done.

Could you talk a little about this and particularly the benefits of competition, as we talked about privately, and finding efficiencies?

Mr. Panetta, Senator, because we share a common background, I think we understand the costs that are involved in this area. I think we are dealing with a culture that has developed that somehow we have to change. I know during the period from September 11 there has been an awful lot of money that has been put into the defense budget, a lot of equipment that has been developed during that period. I think at the same time, a lot of it has certainly been worthwhile, been important to our national defense. But a lot of bad habits have developed during that period.

I think there is an assumption that somehow this thing can play out and that the cost can increase as dramatically as you have pointed out in some of these areas and that somehow somebody is still going to pay the bill. I think what we have to do is to make clear that those who are involved—and they are great companies; they are good people; a lot of them do a great job—that they have a responsibility here to be able to work with us to develop better competition, to do some of the things that Senator Graham mentioned in terms of absorbing some of the costs of development.

The work that they are doing is not just money in their pocket. What they are working on is important to the national security of this country, and I think what we have to do is work with them, work with contractors, work with others to try to develop approaches that can try to shape the costs that are involved and the delays that are involved here.

I know this is tough. I know that some of this military technology is extremely intricate. It involves a lot of complicated work. But I am absolutely convinced that there has to be a way to achieve greater cost savings, and I hope to work with you and others to try to see what we can do to do that.

Senator Portman. I am encouraged from our conversations and this testimony today that you are prioritizing that. Ultimately, if we don’t fix it, we will be robbing from some of the fundamental responsibilities you would have as Secretary of Defense to protect our country. Because looking at some of these projections over the next decade or 2 decades, if we don’t begin to figure out how to deal with these overruns on the acquisition programs, they will quickly take the entire current defense budget.

We need to be sure that our men and women in uniform are getting what they need and be sure that this and the healthcare issue, which I know you have also addressed here today, is the other one where I think you look at the huge cost increases there, has to be handled in a way that, again, ensures that the focus is on our national security concerns.
Quickly, on trade agreements, as you are aware, we are hoping soon to be reviewing proposed export opening agreements with the Republic of Korea, with Panama, and with Colombia. This has been increasingly clear in the post Cold War environment, all elements of our national power must be used to provide for our security and build effective allies, and these three countries are great allies.

In response to prepared questions, you noted that the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance remains one of the cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific. I found that interesting, and you have pledged to stay in close contact with your counterparts there and build on the relationships laid by Secretary Gates.

You also noted the importance of the Government efforts to support DOD activities providing training, equipment, and so on to our Central American partners, including Panama, given the importance of the canal particularly and the U.S. Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM) work there.

Also with regard to Colombia, in testimony earlier this year, the commander of SOUTHCOM described our trade agreement with Colombia as “a very positive, beneficial aspect for our cooperation because of a growing capacity to support the capabilities of Armed Forces and law enforcement.”

My question would be to you, how do you assess the value from a security standpoint of building upon these commercial ties through these trade opening agreements with these allies, and do you agree that these enhanced trade and investment agreements is one way to combat the threats that these states face to their security and to the broader region?

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I think that when it comes to protecting our security, there are a number of areas that have to be addressed, and one of those, obviously, it is not just the military responsibility, but there is an economic side of this that plays a very important role in terms of promoting better security.

The ability of these other countries to develop trade with us, to develop their economies creates greater stability within those countries. I think that is a fact. To the extent that we can help promote that kind of trade, that we can promote that kind of economic development, I think it assists these nations in their ability to achieve stability.

Colombia is a good example. They have done a great job going after narco-trafficking. If we can help, be able to help them develop their economy, that could become another added factor in providing greater security in that region. The same thing is obviously true for Korea.

Senator PORTMAN. Do you think ratification of these three agreements would be positive for our national security interests?

Mr. PANETTA. Yes, I would.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Portman.

Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Panetta, again, I appreciate your having come by my office to have detailed conversations on a number of areas. Having had the honor and the privilege of meeting with Caspar Wein-
berger, when he was Secretary of Defense, on a daily basis for 4 years, I am well aware of the challenge of your job. I honestly believe that, other than the presidency itself, this is probably the most difficult and complicated job in our Federal Government, and I wish you the best.

I also appreciate or was gratified to hear your response to Senator Collins with respect to the need to rebuild our Navy, to get the Navy's numbers up. I think as the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq allows us more leeway in terms of how we shape the DOD budget, we really do need to do that.

If you are looking at the size of the Navy right now, I think it is about 282 ships, and the ground floor goal of 313 and all of the interests, the vital national interests that we have with respect to the stability of East and Southeast Asia, it is going to be a very important thing for us to look at. In that regard, I would like to raise two points with respect to the situation in East Asia, and then I also would like to ask you a question about Libya.

First, when we are looking at the tempo in East Asia, we see clearly that Chinese military activities have dramatically increased over the past 15 or 16 months. The two most glaring examples of that were the set-to with Japan in the Senkaku Islands about a year ago, and then most recently, the Chinese naval vessels actually cutting the cable of a Vietnamese ship that was exploring oil, the possibility of oil in the South China Sea.

These incidents are basically related to sovereignty issues, and they are not only national security issues, they obviously have downstream economic consequences. But to me, they clearly talk to the commitments that we have for stability in this region.

We have made these commitments. We are the key, I think, to the strategic balance in that region. I am wondering if you are of the same mind as Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates were last year, a year ago, when they pretty strongly stated that we are not going to be deterred from protecting the interests of countries in international waters in that part of the world?

Mr. PANETTA. Very much. That is an extremely important region. We have to have a presence there in order to protect our own interests and to work with other countries in that area. In order to do that, there has to be respect for international law, and there has to be freedom of the seas so that we can do our job.

I think it is important to have a relationship with China, but they also need to understand that by trying to advance in the China Sea, they can’t interfere with our ability to navigate in that part of the world.

Senator WEBB. Or to unilaterally address sovereignty issues with respect to other countries?

Mr. PANETTA. That is correct.

Senator WEBB. Thank you.

That also gets to the very important question of our basing system in this part of the world. I know Chairman Levin addressed this, and I heard your response to that. I think the timing of addressing these basing issues, particularly with respect to the Japanese, is vital. This has been going on for 15 years, and we keep kicking the can down the road on it.
We are not going to have stability in Asia if we don’t have it in Northeast Asia. It is the only place in the world, as you well know, where the direct interests of Russia, China, Japan, the United States intersect, and the Korean Peninsula is right in the middle of all of that. I hope that we can work with you on the suggestions that Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and I brought forward in order to have a timely solution of that basing issue.

Mr. Panetta. No, I really appreciated the conversation we had in your office. I know this isn’t—it is not an easy issue. That is why the can has been kicked down the road, I guess, all of these years because of the cost and the politics and the diplomatic problems involved with each of these decisions.

I think it absolutely has to be addressed. We have to establish a stable situation there. We can’t have a situation in which we are just playing this year to year. I think we need a long-term solution, and I really want to work with you and the chairman and others to try to find a solution.

Senator Webb. I thank you for saying that. Because I do believe this is fixable and have spent many years thinking about this. I believe what we were able to come up with is at least the right approach, and it could be done in a timely way if we could get people to work with us on doing that.

With respect to the situation in Libya, I take your point during your exchange with Senator McCain that it is the President’s responsibility to ensure national security. At the same time, we have a situation where when the President unilaterally decides to begin a military operation and then continues it, where, clearly, I think as a former Member of Congress, you would agree that Congress needs to be involved in shaping downstream when something like that occurs?

Let me say it another way. No one would disagree that with the President’s authority to unilaterally order military force if the country was under attack, under imminent threat of attack, invoking the inherent right of self-defense, which is actually I think what we are doing in a lot of these strikes, even places like Yemen. Or if we are coming to the aid of an ally based on a treaty commitment, or we are defending Americans, protecting Americans who are in distress.

But when you have a situation like in this case where the justification is humanitarian, you can see the potential for a very broad definition of what a humanitarian crisis is. Once that decision is made unilaterally by the President, it needs to be subject to the review and the direction of Congress, in my view.

Mr. Panetta. Senator, it has been my experience, both as a Member of Congress and member of administrations, while obviously that constitutional power does rest with the President, that once those decisions are made, in order for those decisions to be sustained, that it is very important to work with Congress, seek the best advice and counsel of Congress, and hopefully to get Congress’ support for those actions.

Senator Webb. I did hear you agree with Senator McCain or to his comment that nobody is thinking about putting American ground forces in Libya?

Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
Senator Webb. I assume that also means after the fall of the Gaddafi regime?

Mr. Panetta. As far as I know, no one is discussing any boots on the ground there—at any time.

Senator Webb. The House passed a provision to that effect with 416 votes, and I have introduced a provision here. I just think we have our hands full, and it is not something we should be doing in the future in that part of the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.

Senator Shaheen.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We are almost done, Director Panetta. I was listening to Senator Nelson's litany of the challenges ahead of you once you get confirmed, and I certainly intend to vote for that. I think you will get confirmed. I wondered, "Hmm, why does he want to do that?" But like everyone on this committee, I am very grateful that you are willing to do that and appreciate your patriotism and commitment to the country. Thank you very much for that.

Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Shaheen. I also very much appreciated the opportunity to sit down with you and your willingness to listen to some of our particular concerns in New Hampshire and was very pleased to hear that you are familiar with the work of the men and women at the Portsmouth naval shipyard and was pleased to hear your comments to Senator Collins about your commitment to address the backlog that both the shipyard and other shipyards around the country are facing.

I was also very pleased that you were willing to listen to the good work that has been done by New Hampshire's National Guard deployment support program. Listening to your commitment today to better serve men and women after they get out of the military, I hope you will look at programs like New Hampshire's and some of the other States that have been so successful. Because not only are our National Guard and Reserves going to continue to play a greater role in our defense, but there is some very good data that shows how successful these programs have been.

I think they serve as a good model for the rest of the Military Services to look at. I hope you will do that.

Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Shaheen. One of the reasons that we have been so successful in developing the technology for our national security and have given us really our superiority in terms of our military might around the world is because of our national defense technology sector. New England and New Hampshire have been a knowledge center for that defense technology sector, and I wonder if you could speak to how DOD or what DOD is currently doing to ensure that there is a sustained commitment to that defense technology sector so they will continue to be there as we need them in the future?

Mr. Panetta. Senator, I haven't been fully briefed on all of the efforts to try to deal with preserving that kind of technology. But if I am confirmed, I just want you to know that I am a very strong believer that if we are going to have a strong defense in this country that we have to have industries here that are American. We
have to have technology capabilities that are American. We have to be able to have a base of support in this country in order to maintain our defense systems.

It doesn't mean that we don't deal with our allies. It doesn't mean that we try to negotiate agreements with them in certain areas. But if we are going to protect our national defense, we have to protect our industrial base. We have to protect our technological base. We have to be able to protect the capabilities that we need here in order to make that happen.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much for that commitment. A piece of that is the research and development (R&D) needs, and obviously, DOD has been a very important part of ensuring that that R&D gets done. Given the budget constraints that we are facing, how do you see that affecting our ability to continue to ensure that the R&D that we need is done?

Mr. Panetta. Again, I don't think we can do this job without investing in R&D as part of the process of making sure we are at the cutting edge for the future.

I recognize that, obviously, as part of the effort to look at the entire budget in order to achieve savings that all of those areas will be looked at. But my view is that if we want to protect the weapons systems, if we want to protect our capabilities for the future, we have to be able to have good R&D at the same time.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you.

In talking to some of those New Hampshire and New England companies that are part of our national defense manufacturing base, one of the concerns that I often hear from them, because they are often doing commercial work as well as work for the military, is their frustration with our export control system. As I know you know, International Traffic in Arms Regulations restrictions are onerous. In many cases, they are out of date. They were really designed for a Cold War system that no longer exists, and I know that Secretary Gates has been a real proponent of addressing that system.

I hope that you will be as committed, and I would ask how you see moving forward an agenda that updates our export control system in a way that both protects our national security, but also recognizes that we need to be competitive globally?

Mr. Panetta. I want you to know, Senator, that I share Secretary Gates' attitude here. I think we have to be able to develop 21st century approaches to this kind of exchange in order for us to be able to make sure that the technologies we have are, in fact, technologies that we are working with others to assure and to have.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you.

I know earlier you were asked about Iraq and whether we would continue to stay in Iraq if we are asked. Like others, I have been concerned about increasing violence in Iraq, about the recent casualties. We just lost someone from New Hampshire in the attack over the weekend. I wonder if you could talk to what we need to do to keep our focus on the efforts in Iraq, and assuming that we are not asked to stay, how we will deal with drawing down the remaining troops that are there?
Mr. Panetta. We are, at the present time, on track to withdrawing our forces by the end of 2011. But I think that it is clear to me that Iraq is considering the possibility of making a request for some kind of presence to remain there. It really is dependent on the prime minister and on the Government of Iraq to present to us what is it that they need and over what period of time in order to make sure that the gains that we have made in Iraq are sustained.

I have every confidence that a request like that is something that I think will be forthcoming at some point.

Senator Shaheen. My time has expired. I would like to explore that more later.

Mr. Panetta. Okay.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Director. I was going to say good morning, but I realize it is the afternoon. Thank you for your patience.

I want to also, with everybody else on the committee, acknowledge your tremendous leadership, your personal friendship, and your willingness to take on yet another assignment, perhaps one of the biggest and most important in the Federal Government.

I think you and I share a concern about the country's fiscal trajectory. Of course, Secretary of Defense Gates has pointed out that this is a key threat to our national security, as had the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen.

I know we are going to not support any cuts that will harm our capacity to secure our Nation or the well-being of our troops. But we are going to have to make some tough decisions. A broke country is a weak country. Conversely, a solvent country can be a strong country.

You have had to deal with this at the agency. That is, how do you balance the needs and the resources? I think we have all said, hey, everything has to be on the table. But I am curious what your thoughts are about what the right size is of our military and how do we determine what our mission ought to be?

I have two easy questions for you. What role do you believe that the American military should play in the world? As the senior military adviser-to-be to the President, when you are confirmed—I am going to be that optimistic—what would be a set of guidelines that you would use to recommend to the President whether military action is justified?

Mr. Panetta. Obviously, I think that the United States exercises a unique role in the world by virtue of our leadership in the diplomatic arena, but also because of our military power, we are able to back that up. I think it is extremely important in today's world, where there are so many challenges and so many threats that we are confronting, that we maintain a strong military in order to deal with those kinds of threats.

It is not only the fact that we are involved in wars, but clearly, we are facing increasing turmoil. We are facing terrorism. We are facing other challenges. In my view, the United States plays a very unique role in the world as far as providing the kind of leadership that tries to advance universal rights, a peaceful approach to deal-
ing with the world that tries to advance good economic and political reform.

That is a unique role for the United States, and I think we need to continue to send that message and to continue to exert that leadership. For that reason, I think having a strong military is essential to that larger role that the United States plays in today’s world.

We hope that others would work with us. We do, obviously, work with our allies. We work with NATO. We work with other nations. But there is no question in my mind that the United States is the fundamental leader right now in the world in a number of ways, and having the military strength to back up that kind of leadership is very important.

With regards to how we approach the use of force, I think there are several important guidelines. Number one, what is the threat to our national interests? What is our capability to be able to respond, our military capability to respond to that kind of a threat? Have we exhausted all other remedies and options to the use of force? Lastly, what are the prospects to get the support of not only Congress, but the American people in that effort? I think all of those things are important considerations.

Senator Udall. Thank you for those thoughts, Director Panetta. I think this will be a topic of ongoing conversations, obviously, as we work to consider how, if we need to reconfigure DOD and how we are prepared in a world of insurgencies and cybersecurity needs, satellite systems that are very important to all of us. There is a real change underway.

I also hope that we will continue to do what we can to strengthen our relationship with China as it becomes more of an economic powerhouse. Hopefully, it will shoulder some of the responsibility on a worldwide basis because of its own self-interest, frankly.

Let me turn to energy. I think this has been an area of your interest as well. It is one of a deep concern, but I also think a great opportunity for us. Admiral Mullen has said saving energy saves lives. He recently pointed out that before we buy another airplane or a ship, we ought to look at what we can do to save the lives of our soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors through our dependence on oil and other energy technologies.

What are your thoughts on what DOD can do to continue to push alternative technologies and reducing our dependence on foreign oil?

Mr. Panetta. Senator, this is an area that I want to learn a lot more about in terms of how the Defense Department is approaching this. At least from some of the briefings I have gotten, I think the Defense Department really is a leader in terms of trying to develop better energy efficiency, and we need to be because we use an awful lot of fuel.

My hope is to continue those efforts and to work with you and others to try to determine what additional steps can we take, both in the development of weapons, the development of technologies, how we can better use clean energy, how we can better use some of the new forms of energy in order to reduce fuel costs at the Pentagon. But more importantly, in order to contribute to, hopefully, a cleaner environment.
Senator Udall. I have just introduced a bill along with Congressman Giffords, I should say reintroduced a bill that we had put in the hopper in the last Congress, that would provide more direction to DOD. It has widespread support from particularly retired general officers and others, and I look forward to working with you and the chairman as we move to authorize the Defense Department's activities for 2012.

You are right. DOD's energy bill is about $13 billion a year, and DOD uses more energy than most countries use, which stands out. But it is an opportunity. I don't see it as a burden. I see it as a real opportunity. I think you do, too.

Mr. Panetta. I think it is.

Senator Udall. I see my time has expired. But maybe for the record, I could ask one question and you could maybe give a brief response. Then if you want to expound on it for the record, that would be great.

I know 2014 is our date for Afghanistan, the full handoff. I do worry about and you know all too well about the safe havens and the sanctuary they provide for the Taliban. If we can't reduce those safe havens or, at best, eliminate them, what are your thoughts on what that means for the hopes of a resolution of the situation in Afghanistan?

Mr. Panetta. I think we can only win in Afghanistan if we can win in Pakistan by reducing those safe havens. I think the two go hand-in-hand. The ability to achieve stability in Afghanistan is dependent on whether or not we can limit and, hopefully, stop the transfer of terrorism across that border.

Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Director. You and both the chairman are my heroes because you have both been sitting here for some 4 hours and with great patience and articulate answers.

Thank you. I look forward to serving with you. Thank you.

Mr. Panetta. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Udall.

Let me just, before we break for lunch, try to clarify two parts of your testimony regarding the transition of security responsibility to the Afghan security forces.

First, would you agree that security transition to Afghan security forces is to be completed by 2014, but that the process of transferring provinces and districts to an Afghan security force lead begins in July?

Mr. Panetta. That is correct.

Chairman Levin. That President Karzai in March identified the first group of areas to begin transition this year, including a number of identified provinces, and that has already been presented and approved by NATO?

Mr. Panetta. That is correct.

Chairman Levin. Next, my staff tells me that they have not been able to find any statement of Secretary Gates in which he specifies a number of U.S. troops that he believes should be withdrawn from Afghanistan starting in July. Are you aware of any statement by Secretary Gates identifying such a number, whether it is 3,000 to 5,000 or any other number?
Mr. PANETTA. I have discussed this with the staff at DOD, and they are not aware of any statement that he has made that has indicated a number that would be involved.

Chairman LEVIN. At this point?

Mr. PANETTA. At this point.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

It looks like it is about 5 after 1 p.m. Is that right? We will meet at 2:30 p.m. in a classified session.

Thank you all. Thank you again for your testimony and for your service.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Leon E. Panetta by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. It has been 25 years since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols legislation which has prepared the Department of Defense (DOD) to better meet today's challenges. At this time, I do not believe Goldwater-Nichols should be amended, but, if confirmed, I will continue to evaluate this issue and will work with the committee on this very important topic.

DUTIES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Section 113 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to DOD. Subject to the direction of the President, the Secretary of Defense, under section 113, has authority, direction, and control over DOD.

Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of Defense?

Answer. Current authorities for the Secretary of Defense appear to be clear and appropriate.

Question. What changes to section 113, if any, would you recommend?

Answer. At this time, I have no recommendation for changes to section 113. My view may change based on the perspectives I may gain while serving in the position of Secretary of Defense, if confirmed.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, you will confront a range of critical issues relating to threats to national security and ensuring that the Armed Forces are prepared to deal with these threats.

What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed, with respect to issues which must be addressed by DOD?

Answer. The top priority of the Secretary of Defense is to ensure the security of the American people.

We face a number of challenges: first, prevailing in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the fight against al Qaeda; second, keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations; third, preparing to counter future military threats; fourth, preserving the finest fighting force in the world and taking care of servicemembers and their families; and fifth, continuing the reforms DOD's leadership has initiated which will be crucial in this time of budget constraints.
NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET REDUCTIONS

Question. The President has called for $400 billion in reductions to national security spending over a 10-year period starting in 2013, and has asked Secretary Gates to lead a review to provide recommendations on where to make those cuts.

What is your understanding of the current status of that review?

Answer. Secretary Gates has discussed with me his overall approach for the Comprehensive Review. It is my understanding that the process initiated focuses principally on driving program and budget decisions from choices about strategy and risks. Such a strategy-driven approach is essential to ensuring that we preserve a superb defense force to meet national security goals, even under fiscal pressure.

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in guiding the review and in determining what cuts, if any, should be made to the defense budget?

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to play a large role in the Comprehensive Review and to have it completed in the fall.

Question. Do you believe that a national security spending reduction of this magnitude can be accomplished without significant adverse impact on our national security?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to make disciplined decisions in ways that minimize impacts on our national security. But it must be understood that a smaller budget means difficult choices will have to be made.

Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the objectives of: making needed investments in the future force, addressing pressing requirements for completing the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan, resetting of the force, meeting ongoing operational commitments across the globe, and achieving the level of savings proposed by the President?

Answer. From my years of service in the public sector, I recognize the importance of balancing immediate and future needs. In national security matters, such a balance is essential to keeping America safe both today and tomorrow. Decisions on budget must be carefully made so that none of the listed objectives is compromised.

If confirmed, I will work with both DOD's civilian and military leaders to seek the right balance and I will not hesitate to provide my views on the potential consequences of proposed future changes in the DOD's budget.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct communications to combatant commanders be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function.

Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and effective chain of command?

Answer. Based on my understanding of the existing authorities and the practice I have personally observed while Director of the CIA, I believe there is currently a clear and effective chain of command. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will work to ensure that the chain of command continues to be clear and effective.

Question. In your capacity as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, you were reported to have been in charge of the recent operation against Osama bin Laden, an operation using military forces of DOD, presumably under the authorities in title 50, U.S.C. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority outside the chain of command established under title 10, U.S.C.?

Answer. I believe these provisions enhance or degrade civilian control of the military.

Question. In your capacity as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, you were reported to have been in charge of the recent operation against Osama bin Laden, an operation using military forces of DOD, presumably under the authorities in title 50, U.S.C. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority outside the chain of command established under title 10, U.S.C.?

Answer. I believe the chain of command established by title 10 is the appropriate mechanism for command and control of military operations. Without commenting on the bin Laden operation in particular, I will state that in general there are instances in which military capabilities are temporarily made available to support an activity of a non-DOD U.S. Government department or agency. In those circumstances, it is appropriate for the head of such department or agency to direct the operations of the element providing that military support while working with the Secretary of Defense. In such situations, the President remains at the top of the chain of command and at all times has overall command and responsibility for the operation. The military units supporting such an operation are still governed by the
laws of armed conflict. Military personnel remain accountable to the military chain of command, including the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

**Question.** Can you explain the chain of command for U.S. military forces in the operation against bin Laden, and what role, if any, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense each had in that chain of command?

**Answer.** I cannot comment publicly on the chain of command for the bin Laden operation, in particular. In general, see my answer above.

**Question.** Please explain the pros and cons of utilizing U.S. military personnel for missions under the authorities contained in title 50, United States Code.

**Answer.** Non-DOD Federal departments and agencies may, in carrying out their duties, occasionally require support that only the U.S. Armed Forces can provide. It is therefore sometimes preferable to make an appropriate military capability temporarily available to support the operations of other departments and agencies. A significant advantage of doing so is that it permits the robust operational capability of the U.S. Armed Forces to be applied when needed. A potential disadvantage is that the department or agency receiving the support may not be specifically organized or equipped to direct and control operations by military forces.

**Question.** If the reports mentioned above are accurate, please describe the authorities and agreements which are in place to allow U.S. military personnel to carry out missions under the authorities contained in title 50, U.S.C. Do you believe any modifications to these authorities are necessary?

**Answer.** As noted above, consistent with title 50 of the U.S.C., the President may authorize departments, agencies, or entities of the U.S. Government to participate in or support intelligence activities. I cannot comment publicly on any specific arrangements in this regard. As stated above, military personnel in support of any such activities remain subject to the laws of armed conflict and the Uniform Code of Military Justice while operating under the direction of the head of a non-DOD Federal department or agency. I believe that existing authorities are sufficient to facilitate DOD’s providing appropriate support under title 50 while ensuring necessary oversight.

**Question.** Please explain your views on the preferred chain of command structure for counterterrorism operations conducted outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Answer.** My view is that the chain of command established under title 10 is appropriate for command of U.S. military operations, regardless of the location. The determination of whether a military counterterrorism operation is appropriate will depend on the nature of the contemplated operation and the circumstances specific to the time and place of that operation.

**ADVICE OF THE SERVICE CHIEFS AND THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS**

**Question.** Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., provides, in part, that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense and that if any member of the Joint Chiefs submits to the Chairman advice or an opinion, in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman, the Chairman shall present that advice or opinion at the same time he provides his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Answer. Section 163 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman for the combatant commanders, especially on the operational requirements of their commands.

**Question.** What changes in law, if any, do you think may be necessary to ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs and of the combatant commanders are presented and considered?

**Answer.** At this time, I do not recommend any changes to the law. If confirmed, and after I have been in office for a sufficient time to determine if changes are advisable, I will recommend changes as appropriate or necessary.

**Question.** Do you believe the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

**Answer.** No. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is now a 4 star general and attends Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings and provides invaluable advice. Members of the Guard are members of the uniformed services and adding its Chief to the Joint Chiefs of Staff would introduce inconsistencies among its members and will create the impression that the National Guard is a separate military service.

**GOLDWATER-NICHOLS FOR THE INTERAGENCY (POLICY)**

**Question.** Several groups and individuals have been calling for a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the entire Federal Government. They argue that the U.S. and allied milit-
taries can prevail on the battlefield but that the global war on terror requires a concerted effort by a host of U.S. agencies.

What are your views on the merits of instituting a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the entire Federal Government?

Answer. In the 25 years since Goldwater-Nichols much has changed. In the post-September 11th era, there have been significant benefits due to increased unity of effort and interagency cooperation. Civilian-military collaboration has improved, and our military commanders expect to operate in a coordinated and joint, multi-service environment. Diplomats, development experts, intelligence analysts, and law enforcement must work together in today's complex operations.

At this time, I do not know that instituting such a change across the entire Federal Government is needed. However, there may be additional ways to develop more effective and inclusive approaches to our national security challenges that do not require legislation.

If confirmed, I intend to reiterate to all civilian and military personnel in DOD the important role each interagency partner plays in supporting our Nation's security.

USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Question. The question as to whether and when U.S. forces should participate in potentially dangerous situations is one of the most important and difficult decisions that the national command authorities have to make. Prior Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have proposed criteria to guide decision-making for such situations.

What factors would you consider in making recommendations to the President on the use of force?

Answer. If confirmed, I would consider many of the same factors that previous Secretaries of Defense have evaluated in their recommendations to the President on the use of force, including the threat to our vital interests, the ability to employ non-military methods to respond to the threat, our capability to defeat that threat and improve our strategic situation through the use of military force, and the prospects for sustained public support for military action.

Question. What circumstances should pertain for you to recommend that the President employ preemptive force?

Answer. As the 2010 National Security Strategy discusses, military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies or to preserve broader peace and security, including by protecting civilians facing a grave humanitarian crisis.

While the use of force is sometimes necessary, if confirmed, we will continue to exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction. When force is necessary, if confirmed, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.

The United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our Nation and our interests, yet we must also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use of force.

Question. What degree of certainty do you believe is necessary before the United States would use preemptive force?

Answer. I believe the use of preemptive force should be based on the strongest evidence of the need. It is a decision that must not be taken lightly.

Two years as CIA Director has made me realize that intelligence is often ambiguous. I believe the men and women in the Intelligence Community do their best to get the most reliable intelligence possible. Still, we need to be aware of the caveats that come with intelligence products. We need to continue to ask hard questions about the information presented to policymakers.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS COLLABORATION

Question. Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of Veterans Affairs Shinseki have pledged to improve and increase collaboration between the respective departments to support military servicemembers as they transition to veteran status, in areas of health and mental health care, disability evaluation, and compensation.

If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs achieve the administration’s objectives in DOD and VA collaboration?

Answer. I understand significant improvements have been made in DOD–VA collaboration in the last few years. If confirmed, I will continue the efforts made by
Secretary Gates, and look forward to working with Secretary Shinseki to accelerate current timelines. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD continues to work closely with VA to support servicemembers and their families in all facets of making a seamless transition to veteran status will remain a top priority.

DISABILITY SEVERANCE PAY

**Question.** Section 1646 of the Wounded Warrior Act, included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, enhanced severance pay and removed a requirement that severance pay be deducted from VA disability compensation for servicemembers discharged for disabilities rated less than 30 percent incurred in the line-of-duty in a combat zone or incurred during the performance of duty in a combat-related operation as designated by the Secretary of Defense. In adopting this provision, Congress relied on the existing definition of a combat-related disability contained in 10 U.S.C. 1413a(e)). Rather than using the definition intended by Congress, DOD adopted a more limited definition of combat-related operations, requiring that the disability be incurred during participation in armed conflict. If confirmed, would you review the interpretation of this provision by the Department’s subject matter experts and reconsider the Department’s definition of combat-related operations for purposes of awarding enhanced severance pay and deduction of such pay from VA disability compensation?

**Answer.** I understand this matter is currently being reviewed. If confirmed, I will continue that review and ensure that any policy change, if warranted, meets the intent of Congress.

HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY

**Question.** The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010,” enacted on December 22, 2010, provides for the repeal of the current DOD policy concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces, to be effective 60 days after the Secretary of Defense has received DOD's comprehensive review on the implementation of such repeal, and the President, Secretary, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the congressional defense committees that they have considered the report and proposed plan of action, that DOD has prepared the necessary policies and regulations to exercise the discretion provided by such repeal, and that implementation of such policies and regulations is consistent with the standards of military readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion, and military recruiting and retention. What is your view on repealing the current DOD policy?

**Answer.** I support the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010 and the certification process defined in the law. If confirmed, and in the event Secretary Gates does not sign such a certification prior to his departure from office, I will work closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess whether the elements for certification in the law are met before signing it myself.

PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

**Question.** On November 5, 2009, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, TX, killing 13 people and wounding or injuring 43 others. A DOD review of the attack released in January 2010 concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization among military personnel. What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at Fort Hood?

**Answer.** I understand that the Fort Hood review released by DOD in August 2010 included 79 recommendations on how to improve personnel policies, force protection, emergency response and mass casualty preparedness, and support to DOD healthcare providers. I am told that DOD has completed implementation of half of these recommendations.

If confirmed, I intend to review all the lessons learned, recommendations for improvement, and progress made to date and work closely with Members of Congress to ensure that DOD is prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization among DOD’s military and civilian personnel.

**Question.** If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?

**Answer.** I understand that the findings and recommendations of the Fort Hood Review are the foundation of DOD’s current strategy and leadership and accountability are key. If confirmed, I will review this strategy and how it has been implemented, seek the advice of DOD’s civilian and military leadership, and consult with Congress to ensure that DOD implements the most effective policies to prevent and mitigate such threats in the future.
Question. The Independent Review Related to the Tragedy at Fort Hood observed that “DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization.” Recommendation 2.7 of the Final Recommendations urged the Department to update policy to clarify guidelines for religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the Department to task the Defense Science Board to “undertake a multi-disciplinary study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and self-radicalization . . . .”

What is your view of these recommendations?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Fort Hood Follow-on Review prepared an implementation plan in response to both of these recommendations. If confirmed, I will review that report and the progress that has been made to ensure DOD policies, programs, and procedures appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion while effectively protecting our servicemembers from harm.

Question. What is your understanding of current policies and programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the military?

Answer. It is my understanding that the military places a high value on the rights of servicemembers to observe their respective religious faiths and that policies and programs reflect this.

Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

Answer. I understand each Religious Ministry Professional has committed to functioning in a pluralistic environment and to supporting, both directly and indirectly, the free exercise of religion by all members of the Military Services, their family members, and other persons authorized to be served by the military chaplaincies. If confirmed, I will review the relevant policies, seek the advice of the military leadership, and consult with Congress to ensure that DOD appropriately accommodates the free exercise of religion.

Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?

Answer. I understand current policy appears to strike the proper balance by allowing chaplains to voluntarily participate, or not participate, in settings which conflict with their faith traditions, while also ensuring chaplains performing in an interfaith setting, such as an official dinner or interfaith memorial service, are mindful of the requirement for inclusiveness. If confirmed, I will monitor these policies and practices.

Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that a scientific fact-based approach to understanding radicalization will drive the Department’s relevant policies?

Answer. I understand DOD has commissioned a Defense Science Board study on violent radicalization and plans to commission two additional clinical studies to identify any potential indicators of violent behavior in military personnel. The results of these studies will inform DOD’s policies and programs on radicalization. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that DOD continues to rely on a scientific, fact-based approach to countering radicalization and protecting our force.

Question. Current policy in the Department gives discretion to military leaders to decide whether requests to waive uniform and appearance standards should be granted based on religious beliefs. The Department has submitted a legislative proposal that would clearly exempt the armed services from the requirements of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

In your view, do DOD policies appropriately accommodate religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith?

Answer. I understand the important and delicate balance that must be struck between accommodating religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith and maintaining the military’s uniform grooming and appearance standards. If confirmed, I will work with the leaders of the military services to achieve an appropriate balance between maintaining the military’s uniform grooming and appearance standards and approving requested religious accommodations.

MUSLIMS IN THE U.S. MILITARY

Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?
Answer. I recognize the events related to the attack at Fort Hood are first and foremost a tragedy for all involved. While it is possible that such a tragic act could spur harassment and violence as a means of retaliation, I am informed that military leaders and supervisors at all levels take precautions to prevent such occurrences and maintain good order and discipline in the force. No form of harassment will be tolerated.

Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the U.S. military?

Answer. If confirmed, I would advocate open communications, decisive action on the part of military leaders and supervisors, and command emphasis on the military standard for maintaining good order and discipline. More specifically, this would include safeguarding the rights of servicemembers by exercising the established procedures and processes for addressing all indications of harassment and complaints. If confirmed, I would review the effectiveness of these feedback systems, and take measures to improve them, as appropriate.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Department has in recent years developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assault, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However, numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in combat areas of operation and at home stations are still being reported. Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate treatment for the victim. They assert that their command fails to respond appropriately with basic medical services and with an adequate investigation of their allegations followed by a failure to hold assailants accountable.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential or restricted reporting, to be effective?

Answer. Sexual assault has no place in DOD—and it will not be tolerated. DOD's zero tolerance policy on sexual assault is the right policy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, and the Service Secretaries are continuously and directly engaged in emphasizing the importance of addressing sexual assault. DOD is deeply committed to broad and focused improvements in how it prevents and responds to sexual assault. Advancements in development of policies and programs, such as hiring additional investigators, field instructors, prosecutors, and lab examiners have been made. But there is still work to do to integrate and continue to improve our efforts across DOD and the Services. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure DOD is committed to addressing sexual assault in a comprehensive manner.

Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the restricted reporting procedure has been put into operation?

Answer. I have not been informed of any specific problems in the implementation of the restricted reporting option. It is my understanding that restricted reporting allows victims who wish to remain anonymous to come forward and obtain the support they need following an assault without being identified. I believe that the most important concern in reviewing the reporting procedure should be to ensure that victims are coming forward. If confirmed, I will review DOD's program to gain a clear picture of progress and areas for future improvement in sexual assault reporting procedures.

Question. What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including assaults against contractor personnel?

Answer. Sexual assault against anyone is unacceptable in any location. I do not have enough information to make a comprehensive assessment at this time, but it is my understanding that if any of our deployed servicemembers, civilians, or contractors is assaulted, he or she will receive appropriate and responsive support and care. It is also my understanding that individuals who commit sexual assault are appropriately punished. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure DOD is committed to addressing sexual assault in a comprehensive manner across the Services in all locations. There is no tolerance in DOD for sexual assault in any location or for any personnel who serve in DOD.

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Answer. DOD is committed to addressing sexual assault in a comprehensive, integrated and uniform manner. It is my understanding that all Services have been directed to establish guidelines for a 24-hour, 7 day a week sexual assault response capability for all locations, including deployed areas. I also understand that the
Services recently enhanced their resources for investigating and prosecuting sexual assault cases. While, I cannot make a specific assessment at this time, if confirmed, evaluating the adequacy and efficacy of training and resources allocated to the Services for sexual assault investigation will be a priority.

Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?

Answer. DOD's policies emphasize the command's role in effective response to sexual assault. DOD has taken action to provide training for commanders and to ensure adequate training and resources for prosecutors and investigators. I understand that DOD's policies seek to balance victim care and appropriate command action against offenders, with one of the aims being to build the victim's confidence to assist in an investigation. If confirmed, I will ensure accountability, appropriately balanced with victim care, remains an important focus of DOD's sexual assault prevention and response efforts.

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults?

Answer. I believe that sexual assault has no place in the Armed Forces, and that DOD currently has a zero tolerance policy. I understand DOD has assigned a General/Flag Officer with operational experience to provide direct oversight of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program office. This senior leader will facilitate and integrate a comprehensive and uniformed approach to sexual assault prevention and response policy across DOD. If confirmed, I will continue to make sexual assault prevention and response a priority for DOD and will work closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chiefs of the Military Services to ensure that DOD maintains senior leadership focus on this issue.

MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. In support of the current ongoing conflicts, the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems have arisen over time in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening and medical response to service-connected injuries or illnesses, antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and inefficient policies regarding members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve Force management policies and systems have been characterized in the past as "inefficient and rigid" and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment shortages, cross-leveling, and reset policies.

What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems still exist?

Answer. I understand there have been many changes made in policies governing the utilization of the Guard. There is now a 180-day notification prior to mobilization, dwell ratio standard of no more than 1 year mobilized for 5 years not mobilized, and Guard and reservists can only be involuntary activated for 1 year.

These changes have improved morale by providing a predictable cycle of active duty.

A key problem that remains is there are over 30 different duty statuses for Guard and Reserve personnel. This diversity of duty status is cumbersome and results in mobilization and de-mobilization delays.

MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF THE RESERVES

Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee, and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for improved policy oversight and accountability.

If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?

Answer. In order to fully assess the capability of the Reserve Force, it is critical to measure and report medical and dental readiness in a standardized manner. It is my understanding that over the past several years, small, but steady improvements have been made across the Services, but there is more work to do in confirming the medical and dental readiness of the entire Reserve Force.

Medical and dental readiness is tracked through standardized calculations each quarter. Currently, the medical readiness achievement goal is 75 percent and DOD is at 65 percent. The dental readiness achievement goal is 85 percent, and DOD has met that goal.

While progress can be seen, the medical and dental readiness of the Reserve component remains a priority if I am confirmed.
Question. How would you improve upon the Department’s ability to maintain a healthy and fit Reserve component?
Answer. It’s my understanding that DOD continues to pursue new and improved opportunities to provide flexible options for the Guard and Reserve to improve their overall readiness.
Producing and maintaining a healthy and fit Reserve component requires more than access to health care—it also requires command emphasis and individual accountability.
Recently, the Army Reserve approved and funded two medical/dental readiness days per soldier starting in fiscal year 2010.
If confirmed, I will work with the Services to incorporate the findings and recommendations from the executive-level DOD Prevention, Safety and Health Promotion Council (PSHPC) recently created to advance health and safety promotion and injury/illness prevention policy initiatives to address readiness requirements developed from evidence-based research.

Dwell Time

Question. While dwell time is improving as our forces draw down in Iraq, many Active Duty military members are still not experiencing the dwell time goal of 2 years at home for every year deployed.
In your view, when will the Active component dwell time goal be met?
Answer. I understand that the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, on average, are meeting or exceeding DOD’s dwell time goal of 1:2 for the Active component. The Army is now averaging 1:1 but expects to be 1:2 by October 2011. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor this issue closely.
Question. When will dwell time objectives be met for the Reserve components?
Answer. I understand Reserve component dwell time is improving, but has not reached DOD’s dwell time goal of 1 year of active duty and 5 years at home, or 1:5. If confirmed, I will continue to work toward the goal of a 1:5 dwell time ratio for the Reserve component.

Active-Duty End Strength

Question. Secretary Gates announced this year that the Army would reduce its end strength by 22,000 through fiscal year 2013, including 7,000 in fiscal year 2012. This end strength was part of the temporary increase authorized in 2009 and was intended to enable the Army to cease relying on “stoploss” and to make up for a growing population of non-deployable soldiers. Beginning in fiscal year 2015, depending on conditions on the ground, the Army and Marine Corps plan to reduce their permanent end strength and force structure by 27,000 soldiers and at least 15,000 marines, respectively.
Do you agree with this Active-Duty end strength reduction plan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the plan, but it is my understanding, that based upon what we know today, and the well reasoned assumptions that have been made, that the current plan strikes a prudent balance between serving operational needs and ensuring the funds available for recapitalization which are critical to future readiness. However, I know that ensuring that commanders have the right numbers and right kinds of volunteers to perform their mission is of critical importance. As future national security circumstances could change, if confirmed, our plan will change accordingly.
Question. What is your view of how these planned end strength reductions will affect dwell time ratios?
Answer. The Army and Marine Corps end strength reductions, planned for fiscal year 2015, are based on the assumption of a future draw-down in Afghanistan. If this assumption holds true, the dwell ratio of 1:2 should not be affected.
Question. What effect would inability to meet dwell time objectives have on your decision to implement the planned end strength reductions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take into consideration dwell time objectives and our ability to meet competing strategic objectives before implementing the planned end strength reductions.
Question. In your view, can the Army accelerate to 2012 more of its planned reduction in its temporary over-strength without an adverse impact on national security?
Answer. I am unable to express an opinion on this issue at this time. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Army on appropriate end strength.
Question. What would be the effect on dwell time of accelerating the Army’s force reduction plan?
Answer. That would depend on the Army’s deployment footprint and the period of acceleration. However, I would anticipate that the Army may not be able to achieve the dwell ratio goal of 1:2 on its current schedule. This is an issue that I will need to evaluate, if confirmed.

Question. What are the assumptions regarding “conditions on the ground” that will allow for the planned reductions beginning in 2015 to occur on time?

Answer. Generally speaking, I would consider our progress against the established security objectives at the time. I would solicit the advice of DOD’s senior military and civilian leaders to inform my judgment on such decisions.

Question. The Navy and Air Force have requested congressional authorization of force management tools to avoid exceeding end strength limits and save money. In your view, what tools do the Department and Services need to get down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these require Congressional authorization?

Answer. I understand that some of the authorities used during previous force reductions have expired or are expiring soon. DOD is seeking to renew these authorities and is requesting new legislation to size and shape the force. My view is that DOD should make maximum use of voluntary authorities; however, great care should be taken to ensure those who leave are not going to be needed in the near term. If confirmed, I will study this issue closely and rely on the advice of both civilian and military professionals at the Department.

RECRUITING STANDARDS

Question. Recruiting highly qualified individuals for military service during wartime in a cost-constrained environment presents unique challenges. The Army has been criticized in past years for relaxing enlistment standards in tough recruiting environments with respect to factors such as age, intelligence, weight and physical fitness standards, citizenship status, tattoos, and past criminal misconduct. On the other hand, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G–1, recently testified, less than 25 percent of all 17–24 year olds are eligible to enlist, primarily due to physical and educational requirements.

What is your assessment of the adequacy of current standards regarding qualifications for enlistment in the Armed Forces?

Answer. From my understanding, the current enlistment qualification standards are well-defined and have stood the test of time. They are driven by the need to provide the Services with men and women who are prepared to adapt to the rigors of military life and meet performance requirements. To that end, the Services carefully screen applicants, who come from all walks of life. The traditional high school diploma is the best single predictor of attrition. Some standards may change over time. Medical standards have been revised, for example, as pre-enlistment treatments result in improved outcomes.

Question. In your view, is there any way to increase the pool of eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality?

Answer. From my understanding, the Services are exploring ways to improve our ability to predict attrition. The Services may be able to augment their screening procedures by incorporating other measures, such as personality, to identify applicants who are likely to adapt well to the military. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to continually find new ways to recruit.

Question. Are there any enlistment requirements or standards that are overly restrictive or which do not directly correlate to successful military service?

Answer. I am not aware that DOD assesses that military enlistment standards are overly restrictive. The Services employ fitness, adaptability, and aptitude standards which correlate to the physical, disciplined, regulated lifestyle and cognitive demands needed to succeed in the Armed Forces.

Question. Do you believe that current policies defining three tiers of high school diploma credentials, aimed at minimizing attrition during the initial enlistment term, should be retained?

Answer. My understanding is the Services track the attrition rates of military recruits, by a variety of credential types, and traditional high school diploma graduates have lower rates of attrition than any other type of credential holder.

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. The Navy has opened service on submarines to women, the Marine Corps recently expanded service opportunities for women in intelligence specialties, and the Army is reviewing its assignment policy for female soldiers. The issue of the appropriate role of women in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.
Do you believe additional specialties should be opened up for service by women?

Answer. It is my understanding DOD believes it has sufficient flexibility under current law to make appropriate assignment policy for women. DOD will continue to monitor combat needs as Services recommend expanding combat roles for women and notify Congress accordingly as required by statute (10 U.S.C., § 652 and/or §6035). Any decision regarding opening additional specialties for service by women should be based on our obligation to maintain a high state of mission readiness of our All-Volunteer Force.

Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy or legislation regarding women in combat are needed or warranted?

Answer. I understand DOD policies and practices that restrict assigning female servicemembers are currently under review per section 535 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. If confirmed, I will take my responsibility to thoroughly review any proposed policy change and ensure changes to existing policy move forward after appropriate notice to Congress.

RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February, 2009, the Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that “medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.” In April, 2009, Secretary Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force Base that “health care is eating the Department alive.” The administration has proposed health care efficiencies to save nearly $8.0 billion through 2016.

Do you agree with the proposed health care efficiencies?

Answer. As they have been described to me, I believe that the proposed health care efficiencies are sensible efforts to control DOD’s health care costs while maintaining the same level of care. I also believe the modest increases in beneficiaries’ cost shares are reasonable.

Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of military health care?

Answer. While the proposals included in the fiscal year 2012 President’s budget are a significant first step, I believe that we need to continue to explore all possibilities to control the costs of military health care. In the long term, the promotion of healthy life styles and prevention among our beneficiaries is one way to help reduce the demand for health services.

Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs on future DOD plans?

Answer. I understand that even with the estimated savings from the health care efficiencies proposed in the fiscal year 2012 budget, the cost of the Military Health System continues to increase as a percentage of the DOD budget and will exceed 10 percent of the budget in just a few years.

During a period when there is heavy downward pressure on all Federal spending, including defense spending, we must make smart choices that permit us to maintain a balance between personnel benefits and funding for equipment and readiness.

If confirmed, one of my highest priorities would be to ensure that DOD provides quality care, and it does so in a way that provides the best value for our servicemembers and their families, as well as the American taxpayer.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?

Answer. I cannot make specific recommendations at this time. If confirmed, I would work closely with the health care leadership in DOD to examine every opportunity to ensure military beneficiaries are provided the highest quality care possible while managing cost growth.

PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget.

What actions do you believe can and should be taken, if any, to control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?

Answer. I am aware that an increasing portion of DOD’s limited resources are devoted to personnel-related costs.

I understand there have been many incremental adjustments to military pay and benefits over the years; however, much of the military compensation system remains rooted in structures established generations ago. If we are going to manage costs,
I believe everything must be on the table. It may be appropriate to conduct a comprehensive review of the military pay and benefits structure to determine where costs can be contained.

I believe that it may be possible to restructure our military benefits in a way that reduces costs, but any such effort must continue to attract and support our men and women in uniform and their families in a wide variety of situations.

Question. In your view, can the Department and the Services efficiently manage the use of bonuses and special pays to place high quality recruits in the right jobs without paying more than the Department needs to pay, or can afford to pay, for other elements of the force?

Answer. I understand recruiting and retention bonuses are cost-effective tools to achieve DOD's personnel strength and experience objectives. However, we must continually monitor these tools to ensure they are being used efficiently as well as effectively. A review of the utilization and efficacy of bonuses should certainly be part of any comprehensive review of the military pay and benefits structure.

MILITARY RETIREMENT

Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more resembles the benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement System than the current military retirement benefit; increasing TRICARE fees for retirees; and the adoption of dependent care and flexible spending accounts for servicemembers. The head of a Defense Business Board Task Force has criticized military benefits as “GM-style benefits” describing the military retirement system as a “pre-volunteer force retirement system” and criticizing “taxpayer-subsidized grocery chains and low out-of-pocket healthcare costs”.

What is your view of the adequacy of the current military retirement benefit?

Answer. I understand that the military retirement system was created in an earlier era and, in general, accomplishes the purpose for which it was designed; to provide a strong incentive to attain 20 years of service and then to leave shortly thereafter. To maintain the right military force structure, the comprehensive mix of pay and benefits, which includes military retirement, needs to be adequate. However, over time, the world has changed and private-sector compensation practices have changed, but the military retirement system has remained essentially the same. I believe it may be appropriate to also review the military retirement system for needed changes and efficiencies.

Question. How might it be modernized to reflect the needs of a new generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost of the government?

Answer. I understand there are many proposed alternatives to the current military retirement system. I am unable to make recommendations at this time but will closely study proposals and their impact if confirmed.

Question. Do you share the Defense Business Board Task Force view of military benefits?

Answer. I am aware that the Defense Business Board is reviewing military retirement, but I do not believe it has released their report. I look forward to reviewing it once it is made available. I agree that it may be possible to restructure our military benefits in a way that reduces costs, but any such effort must continue to attract and support our men and women in uniform and their families.

DEPENDENT CARE AND FLEXIBLE SPENDING ACCOUNTS

Question. The 10th QRMC recommended providing dependent care and flexible spending benefits to Active-Duty servicemembers. Providing these benefits would seem consistent with the initiatives of First Lady Michelle Obama and Dr. Jill Biden on behalf of military families. It would appear that no new legislative authority is needed for the Department to provide these benefits to servicemembers and their families.

If confirmed, would you extend these benefits to the active duty servicemembers and their families?

Answer. I understand that in response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, DOD examined and provided a report on the advantages and disadvantages of providing flexible spending accounts to military members. If confirmed, I will review whether flexible spending accounts should be extended to Active-Duty servicemembers and their families.

SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured performing duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest pri-
ority from their Service for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007 illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of significant numbers of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain, including a growing population of soldiers awaiting disability evaluation.

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured servicemembers and their families?

Answer. Although I do not have sufficient information to make a full assessment at this time, I am aware that significant improvements in these areas have been made in the last 4 years. However, it is my opinion that more must be done. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure DOD regularly evaluates and seeks to improve its wounded warrior programs to ensure that the needs of our wounded warriors and their families are met.

Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based?

Answer. In my opinion, one of the most significant strengths is the high priority which DOD has placed on caring for our wounded warriors and their families. In my view, next to the wars themselves, there is no higher priority, and if confirmed, I will continue to place the highest priority on these efforts.

Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?

Answer. A challenge facing DOD in this area, as in other areas, is to ensure that in delivering the highest standard of care for our wounded, ill and injured, we do so in an effective and cost-efficient manner.

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

Answer. I do not have any specific recommendations at this time. If confirmed, I will closely monitor and evaluate this issue to ensure necessary resources are in place to take care of our recovering wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and their families.

Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program, have been established to improve processing of servicemembers.

What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the Integrated DES?

Answer. I have been told that a revised and improved disability evaluation system developed by the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs, known as the Integrated Disability Evaluation System, today serves over half of those in the system, and that its wide adoption is a priority of the VA and DOD leadership. I do not currently have any specific recommendations regarding the Integrated Disability Evaluation System, but I support these ongoing efforts and, if confirmed, will look for opportunities to further improve on them.

Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change, particularly the Army’s growing problem?

Answer. I do not have specific recommendations at this time, but, if confirmed, I will work with DOD and VA to continually evaluate the system and identify opportunities for improvement.

SUICIDE PREVENTION AND MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services has increased in recent years. The Army released a report in July 2010 that analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In addition, studies conducted by the Army of soldiers and marines in theater are showing declines in individual morale and increases in mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced multiple deployments.

In your view, what role should DOD play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members of the Reserve components?

Answer. The rise in suicides in the military and by veterans is tragic and DOD has a responsibility to address the factors that contribute to suicidal behavior among our military men and women whether they are deployed, at a military installation or in their home communities. I understand all of the Services have imple-
mented prevention and resilience building programs. The Final Report of the Department of Defense Task Force on the Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces is being used as a vehicle to review all Departmental policies and procedures related to suicide prevention. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD continues to improve suicide prevention policies and processes.

Question. What is your understanding of the action that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army are taking in response to the July 2010 Army report, and the data in Chapter 3 in particular?
Answer. While I have not had the opportunity to read Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, Suicide Prevention Report 2010, I know that sustaining a force steadily engaged in combat for over a decade has unexpected challenges. Some of those challenges include a rise in “high risk” behaviors and suicides. It is my understanding the Army’s report provided an introspective look at these issues and concluded that suicide and other high risk behaviors must be addressed with a more holistic and multidisciplinary approach. If confirmed, I will work to see the Services share lessons learned to jointly address these risk factors.

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to home station?
Answer. Ensuring that our servicemembers and their families have sufficient access to the mental health resources that they need is critical to the wellness of our total force. I am advised that DOD is working to determine workforce requirements for mental health professionals, and utilizing all the medical, educational, and counseling resources available, but there is further room for improvement. If confirmed, I will monitor how well we are meeting these goals by assessing current utilization rates and further determining ways in which we can leverage more resources for our servicemembers and their families.

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. In January 2009, the Department published its second Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of key quality of life factors for military families, such as family support, child care, education, health care and morale, welfare and recreation services.

How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment and retention and quality of life improvements and your own top priorities for the Armed Forces?
Answer. While I have not had the opportunity to read the Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, I know that quality of life factors, such as those highlighted in the report, contribute significantly to recruiting and retention are key to maintaining the All-Volunteer Force. It is well known that a servicemember’s satisfaction with various aspects of military life, as well as the servicemember’s family’s experience, has a strong influence on a member’s decision to reenlist. If confirmed, I will monitor how effectively DOD programs, in conjunction with community efforts, meet the needs of servicemembers and their families, and ensure that they are contributing positively to recruitment and retention.

Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements to military quality of life would you consider a priority, and how do you envision working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and Congress to achieve them?
Answer. I understand the importance of quality of life programs on the wellness of the total force as well as on recruiting and retention. If confirmed, I will study the key areas such as access to counseling, fitness opportunities, child care support and spouse employment opportunities. I look forward to working with advocacy groups and Congress to efficiently close gaps and reduce overlaps in programs and to communicate effectively with families to ensure that they know how to access available support when they need it.

FAMILY SUPPORT

Question. Military members and their families in both the Active and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations that go with them.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?
Answer. If confirmed, I will study this issue in great detail, but I believe that family readiness is tethered to family resilience. It is DOD’s responsibility to ensure that families are well prepared to meet the challenges that come with deployment
and service. Through focusing on the psychological, social, financial, and educational well-being of military families, DOD can continue to build family resilience. I understand that great strides have been made in improving access to resources for families through such programs as Military One Source, the Yellow Ribbon Program, but DOD can always improve.

*Question.* How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, base realignment and closure, deployments, and growth in end strength?

*Answer.* Given upcoming structural changes across the world, it is DOD’s responsibility to ensure that all resources including those in health care, education and employment are available to families at the level they need wherever they may be located. In order to accurately address the needs of these families in a changing environment, it is also critical to DOD’s success to build community partnerships between all Federal agencies and with local governments, businesses, and non-profit organizations that are stakeholders in addressing the stressful aspects of military life. If confirmed, I will monitor the changing needs of our military families closely.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

*Answer.* DOD has a duty to ensure that every family has access to quality resources, regardless of location. These resources should provide information, access, referrals, and outreach to all military members and their families. This needs to be underwritten by a coordinated, community based network of care encompassing DOD, VA, State, local, non-profit and private providers. It is my understanding that DOD’s Yellow Ribbon Program has been successful in addressing these needs. If confirmed, I will assess this program to ensure that it is properly focused and funded to address the issues faced by Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve servicemembers and their families.

*Question.* If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to enhance family support?

*Answer.* During my pre-hearing office calls, I heard about many excellent State programs that support servicemembers and their families. If confirmed, I would like to explore these further and see if they can be expanded across all States.

*Question.* In your view, are the recent increases in military family support (which have risen to $8.3 billion in the fiscal year 2012 President’s budget) sustainable in future years?

*Answer.* I believe family programs are sustainable in future years. It will be necessary to review family programs with respect to efficiencies just as every other program in DOD will be reviewed against the overall needs of DOD. The focus should not merely be on more resources, but rather on the efficiency and quality of Family Support programs along with the leveraging community-level organizations and citizens who desire to help their military-connected neighbors. DOD efficiency, along with community partnerships and cooperation, are key to allowing DOD to meet the long-term needs of our military families in an ever-increasing fiscally constrained environment.

**DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY**

*Question.* Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
256

Answer. Yes, I believe that DOD's leadership should always be mindful of multiple considerations when developing standards for detainee treatment, including the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts.

Question. Do you consider waterboarding to be torture?

Answer. As I stated at my February 2009 confirmation hearing and prior to that hearing, I believe that waterboarding crosses the line and should not be employed. Having said that, I also believe, as the President has indicated, that those individuals who operated pursuant to a legal opinion indicating that the technique was proper and legal ought not to be prosecuted or investigated. They were acting pursuant to the law as it was presented to them by the Attorney General at that time.

Question. Do you believe that waterboarding is consistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. As stated, I have expressed the view that I believe that waterboarding crosses the line and should not be employed. I therefore believe that waterboarding is inconsistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.

Question. Do you believe that we have obtained intelligence through waterboarding that we would not have been able to obtain through other means?

Answer. As I have stated previously, the Intelligence Community relies on many sources of information. Whether that technique is the only way to obtain certain information is an open question, as I have repeatedly said. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will ensure that all interrogations conducted by DOD personnel are conducted consistent with the Department of the Army Field Manual 2–22.3 and in accord with Geneva Conventions Common Article 3.

Question. Do you believe that the intelligence we received through waterboarding was accurate, or did we receive false leads?

Answer. I cannot generalize about the quality of the intelligence that has been obtained through any particular technique. I am aware of instances in which useful information has been obtained from detainees and other instances in which detainees sought to provide false information.

Question. Are there any circumstances under which you believe the United States should resume waterboarding of detainees?

Answer. As I testified at my February 2009 confirmation hearing, I fully support the President’s decision to establish the Army Field Manual, which does not permit waterboarding, as the single standard applying to all interrogations by U.S. Government personnel and have upheld this standard while I was CIA Director. I will continue to do so if confirmed as Secretary of Defense. I believe we should do everything possible to collect intelligence while remaining in compliance with the law.

Question. Are you familiar with the “enhanced interrogation techniques,” other than waterboarding, that have been applied to so-called “high value detainees” at Guantanamo and elsewhere?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you believe that these enhanced interrogation techniques are consistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. I would refrain to offer a legal opinion on this question as the answer also depends upon the nature and extent of the technique employed.

COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and DOD established the U.S. Northern Command and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs.

What is your assessment of the current situation regarding cooperation and coordination between DOD and DHS on homeland security matters, and what will be your goals in this regard if you are confirmed?

Answer. I understand that DOD has established a strong relationship with DHS. I believe DOD and DHS have a common goal: the protection of the United States. Elements of DOD work very closely with a number of the operational components of DHS including the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Secret Service, Customs and Boarder Protection, and others.

DOD and DHS work hand in hand with the Council of Governors to reach common goals. I understand DOD has a number of liaison and coordination officers throughout DHS and its components. I also understand that there are a number of cyber security related issues on which the Departments are also in collaboration.
If confirmed, my goal would be to continue this strong relationship and build upon a number of these important initiatives.

**Question.** What do you believe is the appropriate mechanism for DOD to respond to the needs of domestic agencies for DOD support—whether through new or modified programs within DOD or otherwise?

**Answer.** I understand the mechanisms for DOD to respond to the needs of domestic agencies appear to be working effectively. During the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, DOD responded to 141 requests for assistance from DHS and the U.S. Coast Guard, by providing ships to skim surface oil, air traffic control capabilities, and other critical assets. DOD has responded to over 50 requests for assistance from FEMA in the past year for a variety of disasters. DOD also regularly assists other agencies in the homeland as well, including the Department of Agriculture for fighting wildfires, and the Secret Service for security during special events such as the Presidential Inaugural. If confirmed, I will work closely with domestic agencies to ensure DOD is prepared to continue to support civil authorities, when appropriate.

**IRAQ LESSONS LEARNED**

**Question.** What do you believe are the major lessons learned from the Iraq invasion and the ongoing effort to stabilize the country?

**Answer.** One of the most important lessons is the U.S. Government must train and plan for post-combat operations. Conflict can occur along a spectrum. Our military must be prepared for combat, but also may have a role in shaping the political, cultural, and economic factors that can fuel conflict. The U.S. military must plan and train with civilian counterparts, be prepared to operate effectively in all phases of conflict, and develop better awareness of political, cultural, and economic factors to ensure that our actions will meet our objectives.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the Department’s adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force structure, or operational concepts based upon these lessons learned?

**Answer.** I understand that lessons learned from Iraq and other recent engagements have led to deep and wide-ranging changes in doctrine, organization, training, and policy. For example, the counterinsurgency doctrine has been completely revised, culminating in the publication of Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3–24. The development of Advise and Assist Brigades and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance units are examples of force structure changes.

**Question.** If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you propose making to policy, programs, force structure, or operating concepts based on the lessons of combat and stability operations in Iraq?

**Answer.** I am not in a position to recommend specific measures at this time. I understand that many of the lessons from Iraq are in the process of being integrated into DOD policy and doctrine, and are contributing to the effort in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will monitor this ongoing process closely.

**LEAD AGENCY TRANSITION IN IRAQ**

**Question.** Responsibility and authority for lead U.S. agency in Iraq is scheduled this year to transition from DOD to Department of State (DOS). By October 2011, DOS is supposed to achieve an initial operating capability as lead agency and achieve full operating capability by December.

What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the planning and progress on executing this transition from DOD to DOS? In your view, what are the sources of greatest risk, if any, to the current plan and successful implementation of this transition?

**Answer.** DOD, State Department, and other agencies and offices have undertaken unprecedented levels of coordination and planning for the transition in Iraq. I understand that DOD has an excellent working relationship with DOS and that the two departments are working together at all levels to achieve a successful transition. As one would expect with a transition of this scope and complexity, challenges exist and DOD is doing everything it can to help set up DOS for success.

The biggest concern I am aware of is that the State Department may not receive the resources it needs for the transition.

**Question.** If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the current plan or actions for implementation of the transition?

**Answer.** I believe the current plans are sufficient, based on what I have been briefed to date. If confirmed, I would review and assess the Iraq transition planning and make recommendations on any necessary changes.
STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Question. The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of stability and support operations in post-conflict situations.

In your view, what are the appropriate roles and responsibilities, if any, between DOD and other departments and agencies of the Federal Government in the planning and conduct of stability operations?

Answer. As seen in recent operations, there is a great need for economic development, governance, and law enforcement experts who work for the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Justice Department. As appropriate, I understand that DOD operates within U.S. Government and international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the deployment and use of the appropriate civilian capabilities and resources. Ideally, I understand that DOD usually will be in a supporting role. But when no other options are available, and when directed, DOD has led stability operations activities to establish civil security and control and to restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, deliver humanitarian assistance, and then transitioned lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, and international governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

Question. In developing the capabilities necessary for stability operations, what adjustments, if any, should be made to prepare U.S. Armed Forces to conduct stability operations without detracting from its ability to perform combat missions?

Answer. I note DOD policy states that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that DOD shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” This represents a significant cultural and programmatic shift in recent years. If confirmed, I intend to familiarize myself with the efforts of the Military Departments to enhance proficiency on these missions and will work with the Chairman, the Military Department Secretaries, and Service Chiefs to ensure appropriate adjustments are made.

Question. Do you believe that the authorities provided under section 1206 (Building the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces) and section 1207 (Security and Stabilization Assistance) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 contribute to a policy of military engagement?

Answer. I believe the authorities provided under sections 1206 and 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 have made the government more agile in its ability to respond to urgent and emergent counterterrorism and stabilization challenges. I am told that the “dual-key” processes established to manage these projects have fostered greater collaboration between the Departments of State and Defense. If confirmed, I intend to apply the lessons learned from our experience with these programs in future security and stabilization assistance efforts with Secretary Clinton and other interagency partners.

Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government needs to establish new organizations or offices to manage stability operations?

Answer. Although I have not studied this issue in detail, my understanding is that the U.S. Government does not need to establish new organizations or offices to manage stability operations. If confirmed, however, I will be open to the advice of others on this issue.

Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government needs to establish new procedures to manage stability operations? If so, why?

Answer. I think one area where we can improve is to strengthen our combined ability to conduct “whole-of-government” planning which will enhance the management and the effectiveness of the U.S. Government’s stabilization and reconstruction activities. If confirmed, I will review how to make such planning a priority.

Question. What role do you believe DOD should play in providing training and advocacy for “rule of law” development in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. Without fair and effective rule of law, neither Iraq nor Afghanistan will be able to prevent the return of terrorists. Both countries require U.S. Government assistance in rule of law capacity building in such areas as civilian police forces, attorneys, and judges. I strongly support the State Department’s lead in this critical endeavor. However, in fragile security environments, my sense is that DOD rule of law practitioners can also play a major and useful role in providing training and assistance.

SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ

Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation in Iraq?
Answer. Iraq still faces dangerous and determined enemies, but these enemies do not have the support of the Iraqi people. Although occasional high-profile attacks still occur, the underlying security situation in Iraq remains stable and these attacks have not sparked a return to widespread insurgency or civil war.

Question. What are the main challenges to stability and security in Iraq over the coming months?

Answer. The main challenges to internal stability and security in Iraq are al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian-backed Shia extremist groups. Moreover, the unresolved status of territories claimed by the Kurdistan Regional Government has the potential to create fissures that can be exploited by extremist groups, and could even lead to an escalation of tension between Kurdish and central government forces. However, with sustained political engagement by Iraqi leaders and a strong U.S. support role, the ISF should be able to handle these challenges.

DRAWDOWN IN IRAQ

Question. Do you support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq consistent with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement of 2008 signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If the Government of Iraq were to ask for the continued presence in Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the end of 2011, would you support the deployment or retention of additional troops in Iraq beyond the current deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?

Answer. Iraqi leaders and U.S. officials have acknowledged that there will be gaps in Iraqi Security Forces’ capabilities after 2011, especially in external defense. I believe the United States should consider a request from the Government of Iraq to remain in Iraq for a limited period of time to provide limited assistance to fill these gaps.

U.S.-IRAQ STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

Question. In your view, what will be the nature of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship after December 31, 2011?

Answer. The nature of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship desired by both countries is articulated in the November 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). The SFA establishes a structure for cooperation and collaboration across a variety of sectors, including commercial, education, cultural, political, energy, and defense.

Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for that relationship over the coming years?

Answer. The greatest challenges will be maintaining U.S. engagement and support for Iraq during a time of change. Recent turmoil in the broader Middle East highlights the importance of active U.S. engagement and maintaining strategic partnerships with regional partners based on mutual interests and mutual respect. We must maintain focus on Iraq in order to advance broader U.S. objectives of peace and security in the region.

AFGHANISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

Question. Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?

Answer. Yes, I support the strategy that the President has set forth and I believe it is the right strategy. We have the necessary resources and strategy in place to succeed in our focused counterinsurgency campaign. This strategy has reversed the insurgency’s momentum and is helping the Afghans increase their governance capacity and build security forces that are capable of providing the security and basic services necessary to achieve a peaceful, stable Afghanistan that does not again become a safe haven for terrorists. The gains made are fragile and reversible.

Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? For example, would you support an increase in counterterrorism action in Afghanistan?

Answer. I believe U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. The administration tracks metrics of progress throughout the year and conducts annual reviews to determine whether adjustments are necessary. Counterterrorism is a significant part of the counterinsurgency strategy, and managing the balance of all aspects of the strategy is an ongoing process.

Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?

Answer. Important gains have been made over the past 18 months, establishing security and Afghan Government authority in former Taliban strongholds such as
Helmand and Kandahar, as well as building the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. Although the gains are fragile and reversible, momentum has shifted to the Afghan Government, and they are on track to begin the transition process by assuming lead security responsibilities in several areas of the country this summer.

**Question.** In your view, how significant an impact does the death of Osama bin Laden have on the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** The death of Osama bin Laden is a significant victory in our campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, which is the core goal of our efforts in Afghanistan. The successful operation does not mean we can rest, but rather we have a unique opportunity to make new gains on al Qaeda while it is in disarray. It is too early to assess the long-term impact of his death, but it clearly conveys our persistence, determination and capability to achieve our goals.

**TRANSITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND U.S. TROOP REDUCTIONS**

**Question.** Do you support the July 2011 date announced by President Obama to begin transferring more and more responsibility for Afghanistan’s security to the Afghan security forces and to begin the drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, with the pace of reductions to be based on conditions on the ground?

**Answer.** I support the July 2011 date to begin the process of transferring lead security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and to begin a responsible, conditions-based drawdown of U.S. forces. Over the preceding 18 months, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its ANSF partners have made significant gains in the overall security environment. Their hard-earned gains have set the necessary conditions to begin the transition of responsibility.

**Question.** Do you support a significant drawdown of U.S. troops starting in July of this year?

**Answer.** I support a responsible conditions-based drawdown as called for by the President. I believe we have made the progress necessary to give the President meaningful options for his decision. Decisions regarding the size and pace of the drawdown will be based on commanders’ assessment of conditions and warfighting requirements.

**Question.** In your view, what impact, if any, does the death of Osama bin Laden have on the size or time table for the reduction of U.S. troops in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** It is too early to know the implications of Osama bin Laden’s death on the region and how it will affect the campaign. While bin Laden’s death sends a clear message to other al Qaeda and Taliban senior leaders about U.S. resolve, there are no indications at this stage of what impact, if any, it might have for decisions regarding the size or time table for reducing forces in Afghanistan.

**Question.** Do you support the goal of transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan security forces by 2014?

**Answer.** Yes. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon, the participants in ISAF endorsed President Karzai’s goal of ANSF assuming lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan by 2014. Although much work is still left, I am confident that this objective can be met.

**AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES**

**Question.** What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional and effective ANSF?

**Answer.** The ANSF have made enormous progress in size and quality over the past 2 years and remain ahead of schedule for their growth targets this year. In addition, both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have made significant gains in effectiveness and professionalism, although more remains to be achieved. The establishment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program has also fostered greater local capability to resist insurgents. U.S. and NATO efforts to recruit, train, equip, and deploy these forces, in conjunction with very capable Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior, are paying real dividends on the ground in Afghanistan. These gains have set the ANSF on a path to be capable of assuming lead security responsibilities across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

**Question.** Do you support the increase in the size of the ANSF beyond the level of 305,000 by the fall of 2012?

**Answer.** Yes. Military commanders, who are closest to the problem and have expert knowledge, have conducted detailed studies on ANSF personnel and capabilities requirements. These requirements were developed by examining the strength of the enemy, and the core goals in the DOD campaign plan. In order to ensure the Afghans have the capabilities they need to secure their country in the
current threat environment, continued ANSF growth is needed. The President has endorsed growth to 352,000 and I support that decision.

Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges?

Answer. Some of the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF include poor literacy rates and low education levels in the Afghan population which constrain the development of more advanced capabilities such as logistics, aviation, medical and communications units. These are capabilities that will be necessary for the ANSF to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorists. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has put a lot of attention on, and resources toward, the literacy problem. Another key challenge is the development of strong and capable leadership, which takes time and experience. If confirmed, I will work with military and civilian leaders and international partners to explore ways to bolster ANSF capacity.

AFGHAN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Question. While improving security for the Afghan people is a key component of our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, the success of that strategy also depends on improving the Government of Afghanistan’s capacity to provide governance, better services and economic development. Significant concerns remain over the performance of the Government of Afghanistan in meeting the needs of the Afghan people and fighting corruption.

What do you see as the role for DOD in building the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to deliver services, provide better governance, improve economic development and fight corruption in Afghanistan?

Answer. I strongly agree that improving governance and economic development is as crucial to our strategy in Afghanistan as is improving security. While DOS and USAID are the lead agencies within the U.S. Government on governance and development initiatives in Afghanistan, the DOD contributes to this effort and must cooperate closely with State and USAID. Coordinating DOD stabilization projects with civilian reconstruction and development efforts ensures that the military and civilian activities work together to support longer-term development objectives, as well as near-term stabilization.

In areas where civilians cannot operate independently due to an insecure environment, they regularly collaborate with military counterparts. Recognizing that corruption erodes the legitimacy of the Afghan state and fuels the insurgency, the Commander, ISAF, created Task Force Shafafiyat (“Transparency”) to foster a common understanding of the corruption problem and coordinate anti-corruption efforts among ISAF, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, the Afghan Government, and the international community. The task force has enabled ISAF to begin helping the Afghans address corruption and has improved U.S. contracting practices to ensure our funds are not being used in ways that contribute to the corruption that enables the insurgency.

RECONCILIATION

Question. Under what conditions should reconciliation talks with the Taliban leadership be pursued?

Answer. The President has clearly outlined our support for an Afghan-led process to achieve a political resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan. I support Afghan Government efforts to achieve the reconciliation of groups and individuals who agree to cut ties with al Qaeda, cease violence, and accept the Afghan Constitution.

Question. What is your assessment of the likelihood that such conditions may be achieved in the near future?

Answer. The clear successes we have seen in the military campaign are helping to create the conditions for reconciliation. The insurgency does not represent a clear hierarchy, and includes a variety of competing and affiliated groups. Resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan will likely require a process that includes both national and local dispute resolution. I am optimistic that the sustained combination of our military, governance, and diplomatic efforts is helping to set the conditions for the Afghan Government to build the political consensus that will ultimately bring about a resolution to the conflict.

U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to Pakistan?
Answer. Most importantly, the core national security goal remains, to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its militant allies, and eliminate their capacity to threaten the United States and its allies in the future. U.S. strategic interests in Pakistan encompass both our relationship with Pakistan itself and Pakistan’s role in the campaign against al Qaeda. Al Qaeda and other extremists use safe-havens in Pakistan to plot and prepare attacks against the U.S. and our allies and partners, and it is essential to continue working with Pakistan to eliminate these safe havens.

In addition, Pakistan’s civilian-led government requires international support to maintain political stability and to work toward the ability to govern all of its territory effectively. The fact that Pakistan is a nuclear state that faces internal threats from extremist organizations adds to the urgency of these requirements. Furthermore, U.S. economic interests in South Asia require stability in the region. Preventing, if possible, a potential Pakistan-India conflict is another important and strategic interest. For these reasons, it is in the United States’ interest for Pakistan to have a strong civilian-led government and an open society, to live in peace and security with its neighbors, and to ensure its nuclear assets remain secure, in accordance with international standards. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress as we pursue these strategic interests with Pakistan.

Question. U.S. and Pakistan officials have been working together for years to counter the threat of terrorism. However, the revelation that Osama bin Laden has been hiding out apparently for years at a spacious, highly-secure compound in Pakistan, less than 35 miles from the capital, has raised disturbing questions about the nature of Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism.

What in your view are the key lessons from the operation to kill Osama bin Laden for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship?

Answer. The operation against Osama bin Laden was a vital element of the President’s comprehensive strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, but it is far from the only element in this strategy. One of the key lessons from this operation is that we have seen no clear evidence to indicate that senior Pakistani leaders were involved in harboring Osama bin Laden or knew of his whereabouts. Although the relationship with Pakistan is not always easy and we have our differences, continuing cooperation with Pakistan is critical to keep a tremendous amount of pressure on al Qaeda’s leadership and the networks that provide it support and safe haven at a time when it is most vulnerable. The operation presents a historic opportunity not only for us, but also for Pakistan, to advance our shared interests and strengthen our cooperation in eradicating terrorist networks that threaten both nations. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our partners in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to achieve our goal of eliminating terrorist networks that threaten the United States and our allies and partners and continue to seek Pakistan’s unambiguous support in the fight against al Qaeda and the regional syndicate of terrorist networks.

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-military relations?

Answer. Our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, like our overall relationship, has featured ups and downs and is challenged by a long-term lack of trust within Pakistan about our intentions. If confirmed I will continue to focus on building the trust that is necessary for the effective partnership we need with Pakistan.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant military assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing and training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to conduct counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the United States has provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and other support provided in connection with Operation Enduring Freedom.

How effective, in your view, has this assistance been in improving Pakistan’s efforts and commitment to counter terrorists in Pakistan?

Answer. Security assistance, Coalition Support Fund reimbursements, and cross-border coordination with ISAF and Afghan forces have helped enable Pakistan’s counterinsurgency campaign. Since 2009, Pakistan has undertaken counterinsurgency operations against extremist organizations in the northwest, including in Swat, South Waziristan, Mohmand, and Bajaur, with varying levels of success. Pakistan’s level of commitment is reflected in the enormous casualties it has suf-
fered as a result of terrorism in the last few years, including more than 11,000 military personnel killed or wounded in action and more than 30,000 civilian causalities in recent years, most recently in significant attacks following the bin Laden operation. However, Pakistan continues to lack the necessary military and civilian capacities to “hold” and “build” in cleared areas. If confirmed, I will work Congress to ensure that the support we provide is yielding the results we seek.

OSAMA BIN LADEN AND AL QAEDA

Question. What changes, if any, should the United States make to its security assistance policy regarding Pakistan in light of the revelation of Osama bin Laden’s hideout within Pakistan?
Answer. The current “train-advise-and-equip” programs with the Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an important component in pursuing the near-term objective of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries and disrupting the al Qaeda network. It is vital, however, that Pakistan live up to its end of the bargain, cooperating more fully in counterterrorism matters and ceasing to provide sanctuary to Afghan Taliban and other insurgent groups. Therefore, in the wake of the Osama bin Laden raid, we have asked Pakistan to take a number of concrete steps to demonstrate cooperation and counter-terrorism. Future requests for security assistance will be informed by Pakistan’s response to the counter-terrorism steps we have proposed.

Question. In your view, will the death of Osama bin Laden have a significant impact on the conflict against al Qaeda and if so, how?
Answer. The death of Osama bin Laden is a significant blow to al Qaeda and brings us closer to its strategic defeat. However, al Qaeda remains a potent, dangerous, and adaptable foe. Its close allies, such as Pakistan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, have increasingly adopted al Qaeda’s jihadist vision and, as core al Qaeda is weakened, there is a risk that decentralized affiliates may pose an increased threat to the United States. To achieve the President’s objective of defeating al Qaeda and preventing its return to either Pakistan or Afghanistan, it is vital that we continue to aggressively pursue our accelerated counterterrorism campaign in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda affiliates to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?
Answer. Al Qaeda and its adherents are diverse, dispersed, and decentralized. They are present in the Arabian Peninsula, North and East Africa, South Asia, Iraq, and elsewhere around the globe, including within the United States. Intent and ability to attack the United States varies by group, but such attacks are a common theme in their propaganda and planning. Bin Laden himself remained very focused on attacking the Homeland. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has already demonstrated both the intent and the capability to conduct attacks against the United States. Despite the death of Bin Laden, core al Qaeda and its adherents in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region remain a very dangerous threat.

ARAB SPRING

Question. The Arab Spring has changed—and will likely continue to change—the political dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa for many years to come. These changes will require the United States to adjust our military-to-military and defense civilian relations in this region. Some observers argue that the United States should reduce significantly our military-to-military contact in countries as a result of the ongoing changes and others advocate more robust and stepped-up contact with our partners in this region.

In your view, what should be the posture of the U.S. Government on military-to-military and defense civilian relations in the region?
Answer. The DOD’s military-to-military and defense civilian relations with our partners in the Middle East and North Africa have played a critical role in advancing U.S. strategic interests: defeating extremists, countering weapons of mass destruction, countering terrorist organizations, ensuring the free flow of commerce, preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, disrupting smuggling and piracy, supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and securing Israel. Engagement with our key Middle Eastern and North African partners’ defense ministries and militaries, building partner capacity to meet common challenges, having a forward presence to enable operations and deter potential threats, and being able to access regions—and when necessary for future contingencies—require considerable effort on the part of many organizations within DOD working in tandem with DOS. During this time of change and uncertainty in the region, I understand that DOD will
continue to evaluate and re-calibrate the nature and substance of our relationships to ensure they are consistent with U.S. values and advance U.S. vital national interests.

LIBYA

Question. Do you support the limited U.S. military mission in Libya?

Answer. Yes. DOD is supporting operations against Libya as a part of an international coalition that is enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973. The coalition’s combined efforts have prevented the mass killing of civilians in Libya. The President was clear from the beginning that the United States would bring its unique set of capabilities to bear on the front end of this conflict to stop the advance of Qadhafi’s forces, take out regime air defenses, and set the stage for the NATO mission. While our role is now to support and assist, the U.S. military can provide unique capabilities to this effort that our NATO allies and other partners cannot provide either in kind or at the levels required, such as electronic warfare, aerial refueling, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support, and unmanned aerial vehicle strikes.

Question. Do you support broadening the military mission to include regime change?

Answer. No. While I do believe that the Qadhafi regime has lost all legitimacy and must go, the goal of our military effort, and the mandate of the United Nations (U.N.) resolution, is very clear: protect the Libyan people. We must continue to use a range of diplomatic and economic tools to apply further pressure on the Qadhafi regime. Ultimately, however, it will be up to the Libyan people to decide their future.

Question. Should the United States provide arms and training to the Libyan rebels?

Answer. The purpose of our military action is grounded in UNSCR 1973, to protect the Libyan people in population centers like Benghazi from a massacre at the hands of Qadhafi’s forces, and any assistance will be for that purpose. The administration has chosen not to provide arms or training to the rebels at this time, but it is my understanding that DOD has authorized up to $25 million of non-lethal support which includes medical equipment, protective vests, binoculars, and radios.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Question. Over the past few years, DOD has funded an increasing number of psychological operations and influence programs. While the Department does not have any separate documentation outlining its strategic communication activities, GAO reports that DOD “spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year” to support its information operations outreach activities. Many of these programs are in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) from United States Special Operations Command are also deploying to U.S. embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of DOS and the USAID. Further, the geographic combatant commands are moving into this operational space.

What are your views on DOD’s psychological operations and influence programs and its integration into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives?

Answer. I understand that DOD’s capability to effectively operate in the information environment is essential to the U.S. Government’s ability to engage foreign audiences and adversaries to service our strategic and operational interests and objectives. It is particularly important to counter the rise of violent extremism, reduce the influence of those who challenge our interests and military operations, and it is a critical element of Combatant Command strategies for security and stability in their respective geographic regions. To be effective, these activities must be nested in U.S. foreign policy objectives and integrated across government and with our allies. I have seen much improvement in the coordination and de-confliction of these activities across the interagency and, if confirmed, will seek to build on these relationships.

I am aware that there has been acute interest from Congress in this area as budget requirements have risen sharply in recent years based on the growing realization of our military leaders that we must effectively operate in the 21st century information environment. Over the last year, DOD has taken significant steps to improve and ensure appropriate and focused management and oversight of all influence programs including psychological operations (now re-named Military Information Support Operations). If confirmed, I will continue this effort fully cognizant of both its importance to our military strategy and the requirements to ensure that DOD oper-
ates as a mutually supporting partner in a cooperative effort to advance our Nations objectives.

**Question.** You were reportedly a strong supporter of the creation of the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. In your view, what—if any—support should DOD provide to this Center?

**Answer.** As the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I supported the creation of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) and it will continue to have my support should I be confirmed as Secretary of Defense. Both DOD and CIA support the Center with personnel. DOD currently provides three military servicemembers in support of the CSCC, and I understand that DOS has requested several additional personnel. This request is undergoing review and consideration within DOD.

**Question.** In 2005, al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that “We are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking place in the battlefield of the media.” Last year, a non-partisan study highlighted the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment violence (e.g. Islamism or Salafist-Jihadism).

What is the role of DOD versus the Intelligence Community and the State Department?

**Answer.** I understand DOD participates in several interagency efforts to counter violent extremism and works closely with not only DOS, but also CIA, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and others to ensure DOD programs are synchronized and deconflicted with programs of the other departments and agencies. Due to DOD’s global presence, DOD personnel often encounter the effects of radical ideologies and the violence propagated by Islamist extremists on a daily basis. DOD personnel are thus well situated to contribute to U.S. Government efforts to counter the messages of violent extremists. DOD seeks to reduce support for violent extremist organizations by engaging foreign local populations, countering adversary propaganda, and developing relationships with key leaders and credible local interlocutors across the globe.

**Question.** In your view, how do we counter radical ideologies that foment violence?

**Answer.** The efforts of the U.S. Government to counter radical ideologies must be persistent and long-term, and should be developed in order to shape and support collaborative regional security initiatives. One critical area of focus is those populations that are most vulnerable to extremist messaging. The U.S. Government should work within the interagency framework to build and implement programs and activities that address these at-risk audiences, which are predominantly under 30 years of age and mostly, but not exclusively, male. We have learned from experience that one of the most effective ways of countering such messaging is by seeking to amplify the credible voices of our Muslim partners.

**Question.** Defense Secretary Gates launched the Minerva Program in 2009 to develop deeper social, cultural and behavioral expertise for policy and strategy purposes.

Do you support this program and its goals?

**Answer.** I have not had an opportunity to be briefed on the program and its specifics. In general, I agree that understanding the dynamics of social, political, economic, and cultural systems is critical not only for national security policy makers and strategic planners, but also for commanders down to the lowest tactical level.

**Somalia**

**Question.** Somalia is a collapsed state with a weak government unable to project either power or stability or to provide services to its people. Somalia is also a training and operations hub for: al Shabaab and other violent extremists; pirates operating in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Peninsula; illicit traffickers of weapons, humans, and drugs; and remnants of the al Qaeda East Africa cell that was responsible for the destruction of our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August of 1998.

What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Shabaab to the U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa and to the U.S. Homeland?

**Answer.** The threat from al-Shabaab to the U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa and to the U.S. Homeland is significant and on the rise. Al-Shabaab leaders, who have claimed affiliation with al Qaeda since 2007, are developing ties with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and are showing an increasing desire to stage international terrorist attacks in addition to their acts of violence inside Somalia. Al-Shabaab employs several hundred foreign fighters and regularly tries to recruit fighters from Somali diaspora communities in the United States and Europe.

The Kampala bombings last July, which killed 79 innocent civilians, were a wake-up call and a reminder that al-Shabaab is willing to operationalize its rhetoric. As
al-Shabaab faces increasing international pressure, we may see the group increase its international attacks. Al-Shabaab continues to repress the Somali people and remains the main adversary to the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers in Mogadishu.

Further, Somalia’s lack of governance and sparse population could make it appealing as a safe haven for al Qaeda. As al Qaeda undergoes leadership changes and regroups from counterterrorism operations in Pakistan, we need to ensure that it does not relocate its center of operations to Somalia.

Question. Given your knowledge of the role of the various U.S. Government departments and agencies in the Horn of Africa, what changes, if any, would you make to DOD’s current role in the Horn of Africa?

Answer. I understand the DOD mission in the Horn of Africa is to build partnership capacity in order to promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. interests. I believe this mission is appropriate. I am informed U.S. Africa Command is undertaking a review of East Africa to determine how our military efforts in the region work in concert with our interagency partners to achieve our collective regional goals and counter al Qaeda’s linkages to elements of al-Shabaab. DOD’s ultimate goal is a fully integrated strategy under which security assistance, capacity building, operational collaboration with regional partners, and counter-terrorism actions are synchronized to provide the regional security and stability that is in the interest of both the United States and our regional partners.

This review of DOD’s East Africa strategy will also review the status of Joint Task Forces to determine if any should be considered for transition to a more permanent Joint Interagency Task Force—including recommendations on basing and funding for Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) based at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti. If confirmed, I will work to ensure our strategy is developed as part of a coordinated U.S. national security policy towards the Horn of Africa, and to determine how the DOD can and should best support this policy.

YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Question. A number of senior U.S. officials, including you, have indicated the most significant threat to the U.S. Homeland currently emanates from Yemen.

What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen?

Answer. U.S. goals in Yemen are to ensure Yemen is stable, unified, and economically viable, and to help Yemen deny al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) a safe-haven and operational platform. We do not yet know how the current crisis will play out.

The ongoing unrest has weakened an already fragile economy and allowed AQAP to expand its influence and to make some tactical gains in the tribal areas—in several cases seizing and holding territory now outside of Republic of Yemen Government control. However, despite AQAP’s limited gains, they remain distant from, and largely counter to, the current anti-government movement in Yemen.

AQAP is intensely focused on conducting a near-term attack against the United States, and poses an immediate terrorist threat to U.S. interests and the Homeland. The Christmas Day attempted bombing of the Detroit-bound airliner in 2009 and the failed package bombing attempt in October 2010 were the more recent attempts by al Qaeda to attack the U.S. Homeland. Despite these setbacks, al Qaeda and its affiliate, AQAP, are still actively plotting attacks, with the principal goal of successfully striking the U.S. Homeland. If confirmed, I will continue to work to achieve U.S. objectives in Yemen.

Question. Given the ongoing political upheaval and splintering of the military in Yemen, what are your views on the United States continuing to provide security assistance—most significantly DOD section 1206 funding—to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?

Answer. In consideration of the ongoing political environment in Yemen, I understand DOD is constantly evaluating our security assistance and capacity building programs—particularly those provided under section 1206. The Republic of Yemen Government currently remains a critical partner in the war against al Qaeda, and DOD remains particularly mindful of the continued and growing threat to the Homeland from AQAP.

NATO

Question. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon last November, NATO members adopted a new Strategic Concept setting out the Alliance’s vision for the coming decade. In their communiqué from that Summit, NATO countries envisioned a more agile, capable and cost-effective alliance, able to defend against a full range of threats and
to operate effectively with other international organizations and non-NATO nations. At the same time, many NATO members have significantly reduced their national defense budgets in response to the global economic crisis.

What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next 5 years?

Answer. The United States has enormous stakes in a strong, mutually supportive NATO alliance, and the President has stressed his strong desire to rebuild and adapt transatlantic security relationships to meet 21st century security challenges. NATO’s new Strategic Concept is an important step in ensuring that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring the common security of its members and it will guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution. Over the next 5 years, top-tier NATO-related challenges include, first and foremost, achieving durable progress on a successful transition in Afghanistan, implementing missile defense in Europe, and stemming the deterioration in European military capability. It is my sense that a number of our NATO allies, while fulfilling their current commitments, have been underperforming in terms of their own investments in defense capabilities, especially when it comes to deployable expeditionary forces. Many are planning further cuts to defense investment in order to sustain their operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere while coping with the financial crisis. The challenge will be for allies to work together to determine which capabilities must be sustained and how that can be done in a more cost-effective manner, while also identifying other capability or mission areas where a higher degree of risk is acceptable.

Question. Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the next 5 years?

Answer. The President has stated that NATO enlargement should continue so long as new candidates are democratic, peaceful, and willing to contribute to common security. Precisely which countries and within what timeframe NATO would undertake further enlargement are important questions which the administration would need to address in close consultation with Congress and our allies. It is important that each NATO aspirant should be judged on its individual merits and progress in implementing political, economic and military reforms.

Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?

Answer. NATO’s New Strategic Concept stated NATO’s commitment to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, but made clear that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. At Lisbon, NATO also initiated a review of its overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance. I am informed that this review will recommend an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities for the Alliance. This provides an opportunity to adapt NATO’s nuclear posture to the realities of the 21st century. NATO’s new Strategic Concept reflects allies’ commitment to NATO as a nuclear alliance and to nuclear burden sharing as fundamental to deterrence and assurance in Europe. NATO has rightly made clear that it will not unilaterally eliminate its nuclear capabilities absent an agreement with Russia on non-strategic nuclear weapons. The administration is exploring negotiations with Russia to address the disparity in non-strategic weapons, and will consult with allies on those negotiations.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and enablers that directly support their operations. Do you believe that we should further increase the number of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?

Answer. I believe that the current growth in special operations personnel is appropriate. I understand that U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is programmed to meet the growth mandated by the last two QDRs. If confirmed, I will examine if additional growth of Special Forces is needed, but only after that programmed growth is complete.

Question. In your view, how can the size of Special Operations Forces be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for special operators?

Answer. Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced. Special Operations Command leaders have stated that Special Operations growth should not exceed 3 to 5 percent per year in order to ensure quality of the manpower being produced. I have been informed that this is the pace SOCOM has sustained to great effect over the past several years and is on track to sustain over the next several years.
Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to SOCOM’s title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.

What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by SOCOM, and why? Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM should assume, and if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?

Answer. I understand that DOD uses a range of processes, such as the Unified Command Plan, to review the mission sets and responsibilities it assigns to SOCOM on an ongoing basis. Additionally, the law provides the President and the Secretary of Defense flexibility needed to meet changing circumstances. At this time I would not advocate significant changes to SOCOM’s title 10 missions. If confirmed, and after I have been in office for a sufficient time to determine if changes are advisable, I would consider making any recommend changes as appropriate or necessary.

Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?

Answer. The activities of Special Operations Forces are quite varied, from high-risk strikes and counterterrorist raids to working by, with, and through local partners, whether training and advising foreign counterparts or providing support to civilian authorities abroad. I believe that each of these missions is highly valued within the special operations community. However, as the security landscape has changed, the demands for these kinds of missions have begun to exceed the ability of the Special Operations community alone to meet them. As a remedy to this situation, Secretary Gates advocated that the conventional forces be prepared to take on more of the kinds of missions that used to fall exclusively to SOF, including, for example, Security Force Assistance. I agree that broadening the spectrum of irregular missions that our conventional forces are able to take on will alleviate some of the demands being placed on the SOF community and ensure that the Total Force is adequately prepared to undertake both direct and indirect missions.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. What is your understanding of the Department’s strategy for combating terrorism?

Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and agencies?

Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD strategy for combating terrorism is comprised of three elements: antiterrorism—defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts; counterterrorism—offensive actions to disrupt, dismantle and defeat terrorists, and resolve terrorist incidents; and consequence management—measures to recover from terrorist attacks. Each of these components of combating terrorism has its own policies and strategies, developed in close coordination with interagency partners.

While I served as Director of the CIA, I worked closely with my interagency counterparts on strategies to defeat terrorism around the globe and will bring that experience to bear if confirmed as Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will continue to work with my interagency partners and the National Security Council and Staff to ensure the best coordination possible.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR INDIRECT ACTIVITIES

Question. Some observers contend that the national intelligence agencies focus their assistance to the Defense Department in Afghanistan and Iraq on special operators engaged in direct action operations. As a consequence, it is alleged, general purpose forces and Special Operations Forces engaged in indirect activities, including foreign internal defense and population protection, receive less intelligence support.

Do you believe this is true?

If so and if confirmed, how would you ensure Special Operations Forces engaged in indirect activities receive adequate intelligence support?

Answer. The Intelligence Community (IC) supports a range of DOD customers to include those involved in foreign internal defense and population protection. Especially in light of efforts over the last several years, the IC and DOD are appropriately providing intelligence support to all warfighters across the board. For example, DOD created the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task
Force to field ISR platforms rapidly and, with the committee's support, has continued to work to expand airborne ISR capabilities. Over the past year, the IC has also provided significant support to the surge of forces to Afghanistan through Attack the Improvised Explosive Device Network capabilities that support both general purpose and Special Operations Forces. DOD and the IC are also substantially increasing intelligence support to Village Stability Operations and to the Afghan local police. The IC has also put greater emphasis on developing a comprehensive understanding of the socio-cultural environments within which terrorist networks and insurgent forces operate, which has enabled all warfighters to effectively engage the local population during stability operations. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that such programs, which support all warfighters, remain robust.

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

What is your assessment of this authority?

Answer. I understand that section 1208 authority is a key tool that combatant commanders have repeatedly confirmed as essential to combating terrorism in their areas of responsibility. It enables the Special Operations Forces under their control to leverage willing partners that possess access to areas, people, and information that are denied to our forces, but critical to tactical and strategic success. The authority has allowed DOD to respond immediately to emergent global challenges. Section 1208 requires appropriate civilian oversight, including Secretary of Defense approval and congressional notification.

CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Question. The 2010 QDR called for increased counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces. What is your assessment of the QDR with regard to the mix of responsibilities assigned to general purpose and Special Operations Forces, particularly with respect to security force assistance and building partner military capabilities? Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to become more like Special Operations Forces in mission areas that are critical to countering violent extremists?

Answer. I concur with Secretary Gates that America’s dominance in traditional warfighting has created powerful incentives for adversaries to use alternative methods to counter U.S. influence and interests. I also agree that, for the foreseeable future, the most likely contingencies the United States will face will involve irregular threats. Therefore, I believe the 2010 QDR’s strategic shift toward expanding general purpose forces’ capabilities and capacity for these contingencies makes sense. The overall flexibility of our Armed Forces can be greatly improved by investing in key enablers within our conventional force, such as strengthening and expanding capabilities for security force assistance; increasing the availability of rotary-wing assets; expanding manned and unmanned aircraft systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; improving counter-improved explosive device capabilities; and enhancing linguistic, cultural, counterinsurgency, and stability operations competency and capacity.

Question. Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for Special Operations Forces only?

Answer. Special Operations Forces are a unique component of our U.S. Armed Forces that are trained to conduct operations in areas under enemy control or in politically sensitive environments, including counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In such environments, Special Operations Forces provide a unique and essential capability.

U.S. FORCE POSTURE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

Question. The Defense Department’s 2010 report of the QDR states that the United States needs to “sustain and strengthen our Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region,” and that, to accomplish this, DOD “will augment and adapt our forward presence” in the Asia-Pacific region. Do you agree that the U.S. needs to augment and adapt our presence in the Asia-Pacific?
Answer. Yes. DOD must keep pace with changes in the Asia-Pacific security environment that pose profound challenges to international security, such as the rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-state actors, and the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

DOD should maintain an enduring military presence in the Asia-Pacific region that provides a tangible reassurance that the United States is committed to Asia’s security, economic development, and the prosperity essential to the region’s success.

Question. If so, what specific capabilities or enhancements are needed in your view?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review DOD’s posture in Asia and make appropriate recommendations on any enhancements. In general, our regional allies and partners must remain confident in the continued strength of our deterrence against the full range of potential threats.

Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the Asia-Pacific region?

Answer. As outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy, the United States must develop a positive security agenda for the region. DOD’s priorities include protecting U.S. territory, citizens, and allies; deterring aggression and maintaining regional stability; maintaining free and open access to the maritime, air, and space domains; deterring and defeating violent extremism; and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their associated materials.

NORTH KOREA

Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near term threats to regional security and stability. This seriousness of the threat is seen by North Korea’s continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and ballistic missile program, and particularly, over the past year, by North Korea’s unprovoked and deadly attacks against South Korea—specifically the attack on the Republic of Korea navy ship Cheonan in March 2010 and the artillery attack on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

Answer. North Korea’s large conventional military, pursuit of asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, including the newly revealed uranium enrichment activities, and proliferation behavior, underscores that North Korea poses a growing and direct threat to the United States, our allies in the region, and to the international community. If confirmed, I intend to monitor the security situation on the Korean Peninsula closely, work for the continued transformation of our alliances and partnerships in the region, and maintain the military capabilities necessary to protect our interests, defend our allies, and deter North Korea from acts of aggression and intimidation.

Question. In your view does the lack of progress in diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program inform or guide U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy in the region?

Answer. I understand that U.S. strategy toward the Korean Peninsula is centered on maintaining peace through deterrence and diplomacy. The U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy has helped to prevent renewed war on the Korean Peninsula for more than half a century through escalation dominance, secure second-strike capabilities, and robust extended deterrence commitments to regional allies. Successful deterrence creates the space within which diplomacy can operate. The success of diplomatic efforts, however, will ultimately hinge on the willingness of North Korea to comply with the agreements it makes.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of those capabilities?

Answer. North Korea’s missile and WMD programs pose a serious threat to U.S. regional allies and partners, and increasingly, are becoming a direct threat to the United States itself. The United States must continue to monitor carefully North Korea’s WMD and missile development programs and related proliferation activities. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD continues to work closely with other parts of the U.S. Government to address these and other emerging threats, reduce our vulnerabilities and those of our allies and partners, and work cooperatively with our allies to ensure our contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.
Answer. I understand that DOD, with its interagency partners, has taken several measures to prevent North Korea’s proliferation of weapons-related technology, to include working to advance international nonproliferation norms, and cooperating with partner nations to inspect and interdict vessels and aircraft suspected of carrying illicit cargo. If confirmed, I would continue to work to strengthen international consensus against proliferation, invest in capacity building programs with partner nations, and find ways to increase WMD-related information sharing with international partners.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Question. Since the end of World War II, the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change. What is your understanding of the current U.S. security relationship with the ROK?

Answer. In my view, the U.S.-ROK Alliance remains one of the cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia Pacific and is as strong and viable today as it has ever been. A mutual commitment to common interests, shared values, continuous dialogue, combined planning, and a recognition of the need to transform the relationship in light of the changing regional and global circumstances provide a strong underpinning to the Alliance and can serve to inform U.S. and ROK efforts going forward as the Alliance becomes a more equal military partnership.

Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?

Answer. As I understand it, DOD and the ROK continue to work closely to realign U.S. forces on the Peninsula and prepare for the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK by December 2015. As part of these efforts, for example, DOD is repositioning U.S. forces to bases south of Seoul. This will make the U.S. presence less intrusive to the Korean people, will remove U.S. forces from the center of Seoul, and result in a U.S. force posture that enhances U.S. forces’ readiness and quality of life. If confirmed, I would maintain close contact with my ROK counterpart and build upon the solid foundation laid by Secretary Gates to continuously improve and transform this important security relationship.

Question. What is your view regarding the timing of turning over wartime operational command to the ROK?

Answer. I understand that the United States and ROK have an understanding on a comprehensive way forward for the transfer of wartime operational control by December 2015. If confirmed, I will continue to work with my ROK counterpart to complete this process.

Question. Do you believe that current planning regarding tour normalization in the ROK should be reconsidered in view of the high cost of the plan and the risks associated with significantly higher numbers of dependents on the Korean peninsula?

Answer. I understand tour normalization in Korea was designed to further our commitment to support our forward-stationed forces and family members. It was to be implemented on an “as affordable” basis and not according to any specific timeline. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the cost of implementation and our proposed force posture to determine the best way forward.

CHINA

Question. Much has been made about the economic and military growth in China and what that growth might mean in terms of regional and global security.

From your perspective, what effect is China’s expanding economy and growing military having on the region at-large and how is that growth influencing the U.S. security posture in Asia and the Pacific?

Answer. China’s sustained economic growth is in the United States’ interest and has contributed to the Asia-Pacific’s economic growth and development in recent years. In terms of regional security, China’s economic growth has increased China’s international profile and influence, and has enabled China’s leaders to embark upon and sustain a comprehensive transformation of its military forces. The pace and scale of China’s military modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency, raises many questions, both within the United States and the region as a whole, about China’s future.

From my perspective, DOD has a special responsibility to monitor China’s military and to deter conflict. Through a robust forward presence, prudent capability developments, and, sustained action to strengthen alliances and partnerships, DOD
can support our national interest in promoting a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.

**Question.** What do you believe are the objectives of China’s military modernization program?

**Answer.** China appears to be building the capability to fight and win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. Its near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, including possible U.S. military intervention. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area capabilities. China is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China’s immediate periphery. Beijing’s growing focus on military missions other than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrence and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through modernization of its nuclear forces and improving other strategic capabilities such as space and counter-space operations and computer network operations.

**Question.** How do you believe the United States should respond to China’s military modernization program?

**Answer.** I believe that we should continue to monitor closely the growth of China’s military capabilities while continuing to encourage Beijing to be more transparent about its military and security affairs. Our strategy must be designed to preserve peace, enhance stability, and reduce risk in the region. Our response to China’s military modernization should be flexible and supported by the continued transformation of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific, the maintenance of our global presence and access, the modernization of our own capabilities, and the strengthening of our Alliances and partnerships.

**Question.** U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue has been strained over the past several years and efforts to establish and maintain mutually beneficial military relations has been hampered by China’s propensity for postponing or canceling military engagements in an apparent effort to influence U.S. actions. What is your view of the relative importance of sustained military-to-military relations with China?

**Answer.** President Obama and President Hu Jintao have expressed that a healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relationship is an essential part of their shared vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. I fully agree with that assertion. The complexity of the security environment, both in the Asia-Pacific region and globally, calls for a continuous dialogue between the Armed Forces of the United States and China to expand practical cooperation where we can and to discuss candidly those areas where we differ.

**Question.** Do you believe that we should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

**Answer.** I understand that our two Armed Forces have made progress in recent months to build toward a more sustained—and sustainable—relationship. I was informed the recent visit of General Chen was a success. We can build on that progress to improve the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship, both in terms of the quantity of exchanges, but more importantly, the quality of the dialogue. I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can only truly work if China is willing to reciprocate with transparent and substantive discussions. If confirmed, I will look for ways to deepen and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS**

**Question.** On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department’s CN operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that DOD “does not have an effective performance measurement system to track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.” This is the second such finding relating to DOD CN in the last decade.

**What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?**

**Answer.** Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are a multidimensional threat to the United States. In addition to the impact on our Nation’s public health and economy, drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime provide a funding source for terrorists and insurgents, undermine legitimate government institutions, and contribute to international instability.
I have not had an opportunity to assess the DOD counternarcotics program. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress and the Office of National Drug Control Policy to ensure that these programs achieve measurable results and that those results are clearly aligned with the goals of the National Security Strategy and the National Drug Control Strategy.

Question. In your view, should DOD continue to play a role in attempting to stem the flow of illegal narcotics?

Answer. Based on my experience with this issue from my time in Congress, in the Clinton administration, and in my most recent assignment, all agencies must work to confront the flow of illicit narcotics. This whole-of-government approach has been critically important to the progress we have made since the 1980s and should continue.

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS

Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the United States “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations.”

What is your view on whether the United States should contribute more military personnel to both military observer and staff positions in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations?

Answer. The United States has a stake in the success of U.N. peacekeeping operations. I believe that, where practicable, the United States should continue to provide military personnel for U.N. peacekeeping operations, especially for key staff positions that can help shape the direction and success of the mission. However, as with any investment, there are associated costs. If confirmed, I will carefully evaluate any proposals to contribute military or civilian personnel to a U.N. peacekeeping operation, weighing the potential positive impact of U.S. participation in the mission against other military commitments we have around the globe and the proposed cost of U.S. involvement.

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC) have called for investing significantly more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking. The objective would be to identify key individuals, as well as individuals enabling the flow of money outside of certain countries of interest.

What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance activities?

Answer. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other adversaries rely heavily on legal and illegal funding sources to support their activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests. It is critical to engage all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the flow of money associated with these organizations. It is my understanding that DOD has capability to identify and disrupt our adversaries’ finances while working with its interagency counterparts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD is not the U.S. Government lead agency in counter threat finance but, it plays a supportive role by working with other departments and agencies, and with partner nations, to fight our adversaries’ ability to use global financial networks.

CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO

Question. During a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, the Commanders of U.S. Northern Command and Southern Command discussed the increasingly dangerous region along the northern and southern borders of Mexico and the devastating impact transnational criminal organizations are having on the people and security of southern Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador. The United States has increased its assistance in this region, but—to date—DOD has had only a small role.

What are your views on the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations in this region?

Answer. These threats are real and are felt throughout Mexico, Central America, and elsewhere in the region. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) threaten the security and prosperity of the United States’ neighbors and have the resources to impact the stability of some of the more vulnerable nations in the region. To confront these threats effectively, it is necessary to harness the talents and resources
of DOD, in coordination with those of DOD’s Federal partners and the governments of Mexico and Central American nations.

**Question.** What is your assessment of DOD’s current activities in Mexico and Central America?

**Answer.** I have not yet had an opportunity to make a thorough assessment but generally speaking, DOD activities such as training, equipping, information sharing, infrastructure support, operational support, and related cooperation with Mexican and Central American militaries and security forces complement other U.S. Government security efforts under the Merida Initiative and the Central America Regional Security Initiative. I am mindful, however, that DOD plays a supporting role to its law enforcement partners in the fight against TCOs and that DOD-led efforts alone are not enough in the long term. I believe a long-term solution will require a whole-of-government effort.

**Question.** What changes, if any, would you propose to the DOD’s current activities in this region?

**Answer.** As I noted above, I have not had an opportunity to make a thorough assessment of DOD’s current activities in the region. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with DOD’s Federal partners and the U.S. Government’s partners in the governments of Mexico and the Central American nations, in consultation with Congress, to shape the scope and scale of continued DOD efforts in the region.

**INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION**

**Question.** The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature. What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?

**Answer.** Our Nation has learned many hard lessons about the importance of whole-of-government approaches in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations over the past several years. One of the most important lessons of our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq is that success in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and post-conflict stability operations depends upon the integrated efforts of both civilian and military organizations in all phases of an operation, from planning through execution. Sustainable outcomes require civilian development and governance experts who can help build local civilian capacity. DOD supports civilian agency lead in areas such as fostering political reconciliation, building accountable institutions of government, restoring public infrastructure, and reviving economic activity, so that DOD can focus on providing a safe and secure environment and assisting in building accountable Armed Forces. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to ensure that interagency collaboration is as robust and effective as possible.

**Question.** How do you believe these efforts can be improved? How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured in military doctrine and adopted as “best practices” for future contingency operations?

**Answer.** I believe interagency collaboration can be improved by continuing to ensure that the U.S. military plans and trains with our civilian counterparts and is prepared to operate effectively in all phases of conflict, including post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. In addition, improving the interagency planning process would ensure that optimal use is made of all national instruments of statecraft, while also enhancing the ability to conduct comprehensive assessments, analysis, planning, and execution of whole-of-government operations. Robust civilian capabilities are critical to realizing any improvements in interagency efforts and best practices for future operations.

**INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004**

**Question.** The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), among other actions, realigned the responsibilities for budgeting for and management of intelligence organizations between the Secretary of Defense and the head of the Intelligence Community, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

What do you believe is the role of DOD in intelligence under IRTPA?

**Answer.** I believe the role of DOD, including its intelligence components, is spelled out clearly in law. Under title 50 of the U.S.C., the Secretary of Defense has responsibility for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by DOD components. DOD contains a number of elements of the Intelligence Community, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. Consistent with the statutory authorities of the DNI under the IRTPA, the Secretary of Defense
is responsible for the continued operation of these elements as effective unified organizations within DOD for the conduct of their missions in order to satisfy the requirements of the Intelligence Community. The Secretary is also responsible for ensuring that the budgets of these elements are adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the geographic combatant commanders, and other departments and agencies, as well as ensuring that such elements are responsive and timely in satisfying the needs of operational military forces. In the period since IRTPA’s signing, a tremendous amount of integration has occurred within the Community and I believe the elements of the Intelligence Community, including those within DOD, are working together more closely than ever.

Question. Do you believe that the IRTPA strikes the correct balance between the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary and the DNI?
Answer. Yes. Based on my understanding of authorities granted under IRTPA, I believe the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary and the DNI are sufficiently balanced. The IRTPA gave the DNI strong authority over core intelligence functions for the National Intelligence Program, such as setting requirements and budgets, as well as determining priorities for and managing the analysis and dissemination of national intelligence, while leaving the responsibility for execution of DOD intelligence activities to the Secretary. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office of the DNI which helps ensure the equities of both the DNI and Secretary of Defense are taken into account. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will maintain the current strong working relationship with the DNI to address any issues that might arise over the balance of responsibilities.

Question. What changes in the IRTPA, if any, would you recommend that Congress consider?
Answer. At this point, I do not recommend any change to the current law. If confirmed, I will wait until I have sufficient time to weigh options, should I discover a reason to recommend a change.

QUALIFICATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OFFICIALS AND SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

Question. During the Bush and Obama administrations, there has been significant criticism about the appointment of active duty and retired military officers to senior positions in the Intelligence community, including as Director of National Intelligence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Some have referred to this as the “militarization” of the CIA and the Intelligence Community. With your nomination to be Secretary of Defense, we now have the situation where the last two nominees to be Secretary of Defense have been CIA Directors.

Is there reason to be concerned about current or former military officers serving in senior positions in the Intelligence Community?
Answer. No. I have served alongside many current or former military officers and have been impressed with their knowledge, professionalism, and effectiveness. While it is important to maintain a military and civilian balance across the Intelligence Community, in my view, there is no reason to be concerned, as a general matter, about current or former military officers serving in senior positions in the Intelligence Community. The challenges facing the Intelligence Community are enormous and require the most capable leaders available. Our military possesses a considerable pool of talented leaders who have proven experience within, or related to, the Intelligence Community. The wealth of experience and leadership these military officers bring with them is invaluable in meeting the Community’s challenges.

Question. Is there reason to be concerned about civilian heads of Intelligence Community elements serving in senior positions in the Defense Department, including as Secretary of Defense?
Answer. No. I think it is fair to say that DOD and IC integration has never been better. This is a product, in part, of people like Secretary Gates, who brought his wealth of experience as a CIA officer and National Security Council official to DOD. Both the head of an Intelligence Community element and the Secretary of Defense strive to achieve the same central objective: keeping the American people safe. I believe that the knowledge and experience obtained as a senior leader in the Intelligence Community is extremely valuable and will improve my ability, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, to successfully prevail in this mission.

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

Question. The 2010 report of the QDR provided that military forces shall be sized to prevail in ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war against al Qaeda as well as for conducting foundational activities that prevent and deter attacks or
the emergence of other threats. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement for improved capabilities in key mission areas such as counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations, as well as building the security capacity of partner states.

What is your understanding and assessment of the current ability of each Service to provide capabilities to support these mission requirements and, if confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue to improve these capabilities?

Answer. Our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan attests to the fact that U.S. forces have made tremendous strides over the past decade in developing capabilities and doctrine for effective counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and stability operations. This is true across the board, but particularly in our Army and Marine Corps forces, which have borne the brunt of the burden of bringing stability to these two countries.

Further improvement is always possible and it will be important that we continue to gather and assess "lessons learned" from our forces in the field. If confirmed, I will continue to press for enhancements in our capabilities for all-source intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination; rapid, secure communications to units in remote areas; defeating improvised explosive devices; training, advising, and assisting host-country forces; and cultural understanding.

Question. A major objective of the Department over recent years, as well as guidance in the QDR report, has been toward increasing emphasis on and institutionalization of lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability type operations. In your view, what does it mean to "institutionalize" capabilities and support for irregular warfare capabilities in each of the Services? What is your understanding and assessment of Department’s efforts to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?

Answer. Institutionalizing these capabilities means working to ensure that our forces actively maintain and continue to improve effective capabilities for counter-insurgency and stability operations even after we have achieved our goals in the current conflicts. This will entail not only retaining much of the equipment that has been fielded over the past decade for ongoing operations but also sustaining the improvements in doctrine and training of experienced warfighters that has been central to the successes we have achieved.

I understand DOD has taken steps to accomplish this. For example, as units rotate back to home station from deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, they have been resetting equipment for operations that include COIN and stability operations. Furthermore, military education and training programs have been revised to place much greater emphasis on counter-insurgency and stability operations.

The United States will continue to face challenges from non-state adversaries and regions threatened by terrorist and insurgent violence. Our Armed Forces must, therefore, retain the ability to counter these threats effectively.

Question. Institutionalizing support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability capabilities in the force does not mean ignoring the requirement to be trained, equipped, and ready for major combat at the high-end of the full spectrum of operations. If confirmed, how would you propose to redistribute the Department’s efforts and resources, if at all, to ensure that the force is prepared for major combat while at the same time it increases and institutionalizes capabilities and support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability operations?

Answer. The 2010 QDR recognized the imperative to improve capabilities for operations against both irregular adversaries and states equipped with advanced anti-access and area-denial weapons. Accordingly, DOD is allocating resources to both ends of the spectrum of operations. This is appropriate, given the array of threats and challenges facing our Nation, but it is also difficult to accurately predict future threats and, accordingly, allocate sufficient resources, particularly in an era of fiscal austerity. Secretary Gates has pointed out that it may be necessary to shrink the force and accept that we will have less overall capacity in order to ensure that the forces we field are superbly trained and equipped for the most important missions. If confirmed, this is a set of issues to which I will devote priority attention.

TACTICAL FIGHTER PROGRAMS

Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will face over the next several years is the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program to modernize our tactical aviation forces with fifth generation tactical aircraft equipped with stealth technology. Based on current and projected threats, what are your views on the requirements for and timing of these programs?
Answer. I understand that the F–35 will replace a range of legacy tactical aircraft in the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps with a fifth generation fighter. Based on the current and projected threats, I believe it is important that we transition to a fifth generation tactical aviation capability across the U.S. military services as soon as practical. I understand that one F–35 variant, the Marine Corps’ Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) F–35B is on “probation” while technical issues are addressed. Overall, I believe we should maintain sufficient legacy inventory to support the force structure needed to prevail in the wars we are currently engaged in, as well as in possible future conflicts, while we field the F–35.

Question. What is your assessment of whether the restructuring of the JSF program that we have seen over the past 2 years will be sufficient to avoid having to make major adjustments in either cost or schedule in the future?

Answer. It is my understanding that the F–35 program restructuring was intended to put the program on solid ground, with realistic development and production goals and significant reduction in concurrency. I support DOD’s current effort to focus on and reduce F–35 sustainment costs. If confirmed, I will review the overall F–35 program’s status and health.

NAVY SHIPBUILDING

Question. Today’s Navy is at its smallest size in decades and could decline further without additional shipbuilding efforts. The Chief of Naval Operations has concluded that the Navy requires a fleet of at least 313 ships to perform its mission. What are your views regarding the CNO’s conclusions about the appropriate size and composition of the fleet, and the adequacy of the Navy’s current and projected plans to deliver that inventory of ships?

Answer. A strong naval force is essential to project U.S. military power and ensures a global presence. I am not familiar with all of the analysis performed in the Chief of Naval Operations’ assessment to reach a minimum number of 313 ships. However, if confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to ensure that the appropriate force structure requirements are fully identified and supported.

INFORMATION ASSURANCE

Question. Protection of military networks, information, and communications is critical to DOD operations. The Department has not yet provided Congress with a comprehensive legislative proposal that would allow the Department to implement the President’s guidance on dealing with current and future cyber threats. What is your assessment of the cyber security posture of the Department’s critical information systems?

Answer. From my understanding, DOD is developing a solid foundation for securing critical information systems. Given the lack of strong security features in today’s commercial information technology, however, DOD’s critical information systems, like other critical financial, energy, transportation information systems, contain vulnerabilities that are at risk of being exploited by a sophisticated adversary. To mitigate these vulnerabilities I understand that DOD has implemented and continues to improve a capability for protecting and defending its networks. Among other actions, the recent stand-up of U.S. Cyber Command has brought increased operational focus to these tasks.

Going forward, an enormous amount of work is required to keep pace with technology and capabilities, and to stay ahead of system vulnerabilities that put our information and communications technology systems at risk. If confirmed, I will continue the efforts to secure DOD’s information and communications technology, address cyber challenges, and ensure DOD can defend against network adversaries.

Question. What Department-wide policies, guidance, or changes in legislation do you believe are necessary to address information and cyber security challenges for current and future systems?

Answer. I am not in a position to recommend specific policies, guidance, or changes to authorities at this time. The administration is currently working with Congress to fashion new cyber legislation, and DOD is an active participant in these ongoing discussions. If confirmed, I will be studying this issue and if I determine any recommended changes in legislation to address information and cyber security challenges, I will work with the administration to provide those recommendations to Congress.

FUTURE ARMY

Question. In a speech at West Point last February, Secretary Gates argued that it is unlikely that the Nation will commit large land forces to future conflicts, and
that the Army must “confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military [will be] primarily naval and air engagements.” Accordingly, the Army will find it difficult to justify the number, size, and cost of its heavy forces. On the other hand, former Chief of Staff of the Army, General George Casey Jr., said he expected that over the next 10 years we will still have 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers deployed in combat. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Michael Mullen said that for planning purposes the Department assumes 6 to 10 combat brigades will likely be deployed.

Do you agree with Secretary Gates assertion that the commitment of land forces, on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan, is unlikely in the future? Why or why not?

Answer. I think our historical experience argues for humility in predicting the shape or direction of future conflicts. Dismissing the prospect of a particular type of warfare could lead to unpreparedness or strategic surprise. Therefore, we must be prepared to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict, and our forces, including the Army, need the ability and flexibility to adapt to a changing security environment. However, I believe that we should employ the full range of diplomatic, economic, and informational tools to achieve national security objectives with reduced reliance on military force whenever possible.

Question. Do you agree that high-end military operations will primarily be naval and air engagements such that the Army will have difficulty justifying the size, structure, and cost of its heavy formations?

Answer. It is always difficult to predict the characteristics of future conflict, but I think DOD must be prepared to confront potential adversaries armed with advanced technologies, such as integrated air defense systems, long-range ballistic missiles, and anti-ship cruise missiles. Given the importance of power projection for U.S. operations, naval and air assets will undoubtedly play a key role in these future military engagements. However, robust Army capabilities, which provide an unquestioned and essential ability to find and defeat opposing ground forces and establish security over wide areas, also serve as a deterrent to potential aggressors. Our experience in Iraq and recent military operations by our allies and partners has informed our thinking on the role of heavy forces across the spectrum of conflict, including in urban areas and the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Of particular concern for ground forces are not only the modernization efforts of nation-states but also the proliferation of increasingly advanced weaponry, such as precision-guided anti-tank weapons, manportable air defense systems, and precision-guided rockets, artillery, and mortars, to non-state actors. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Services to assess current and future challenges and adjust the size and focus of each Service accordingly.

Question. In your view, what are the most important considerations or criteria for aligning the Army's size, structure, and cost with strategy and resources? If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to properly align the Army’s size and structure with the requirements of security strategies and the likely availability of resources?

Answer. I understand that our Nation needs an Army that can win on conventional battlefields, that can conduct effective counterinsurgency and stability operations, and that can partner with the ground forces of partner states to impart skills that can help them bring security and stability to their own countries and regions. Maintaining skills across this broad mission set while ensuring excellence will be a challenge, particularly in a period of budget austerity, and may require some tradeoffs across the force. If confirmed, I will work closely with military and civilian leaders to balance these risks.

ARMY MODERNIZATION

Question. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not been successful over the past decade. According to a recent study done for the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the Army Gilbert Decker and retired Army General Louis Wagner the Army has sunk $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion annually since 2004 into weapons programs that have been cancelled. The report states that, “The Army lacks a credible, quantitative model and process for determining realistic, achievable requirements for modernization and recapitalization given reduced budgets.”

What is your assessment of the Army's modernization record?

Answer. I understand that many of the Army's development and procurement problems stemmed from pursuing programs that ultimately did not match the needs of DOD, were cost prohibitive or were technologically infeasible. I understand that the Army has been working to rapidly review and implement many of the innovative recommendations of the Decker-Wagner panel. If confirmed I will review current Army programs to ensure this history is not repeated.
Question. What actions, if any, would you take to ensure that the Army achieves a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program?

Answer. If confirmed, I will closely monitor and oversee the Army modernization efforts. This will include reviewing the steps that the Army is taking to improve the effectiveness of its requirements and acquisition systems. Moreover, as the Army implements changes to its acquisition system, I will encourage that the lessons learned from the Army’s efforts are infused into other programs across the Services and DOD.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the Army’s capabilities portfolio review process and its current modernization priorities and investment strategy?

Answer. I understand that as part of his comprehensive efforts to reform Army acquisition, in February 2010, Secretary McHugh ordered an Army-wide “capability portfolio reviews” to scrutinize requirements, identify potential redundancies and if appropriate, recommend program changes, including terminations. These portfolio reviews appear to be sound steps toward improving the results of the Army’s requirements and acquisition systems; however, I have not had the opportunity to review this initiative in detail.

Question. What actions, if any, would you take to sustain the momentum of these reviews in stabilizing the Army’s modernization strategy and priorities?

Answer. As noted above, if confirmed, I will closely monitor Army modernization efforts. In doing so, I will encourage the Army to continue its capability portfolio review process and share its lessons learned from this effort throughout DOD.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles, starting this year and increasing in capability with each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability to defend against long-range missiles that could reach the United States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense capability.

Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe and, if confirmed, will you implement it?

Answer. I support the President’s policy on European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and, if confirmed, I will ensure DOD supports the program’s full implementation.

Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans, programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging against future uncertainties.

Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you implement them?

Answer. I will need to further study the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), if confirmed, but as I understand the issue currently, I support the administration’s policies, strategies, and priorities as set forth in this review. If confirmed, I will implement the policy priorities of the BMDR, including sustaining and enhancing defense of the homeland, while increasing our capability against the growing regional threats.

Question. The two most recent flight tests of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has formed a Failure Review Board to determine the root cause of the most recent failure and will devise a plan to correct it, including two flight tests to confirm the correction. Until the second flight test confirms the correction, probably sometime in late 2012, the Director of MDA has suspended production of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKVs) of the type that failed last year’s flight tests, in order to ensure that those EKVs do not contain a flaw that would need to be corrected later.

Do you agree that it is prudent to verify that the flight test failure problem has been corrected before continuing production of the EKVs, and before building more
Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) or deciding how many additional GBIs may be needed in the future?

Answer. Verifying and correcting the problems with the EKVs prior to continuing production is prudent and supports the administration’s policy to “fly before you buy” in order to improve reliability, confidence, and cost control of U.S. missile defense systems.

Question. Do you support the continued modernization and sustainment of the Ground-based midcourse defense system?

Answer. Yes. The United States is currently protected against the threat of limited ICBM attack from States like North Korea and Iran. It is important we maintain this advantage by continuing to improve the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.

Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.

Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from nations such as Iran?

Do you agree that irrespective of Russian objections, the United States is committed to the continued development and deployment of United States missile defense systems worldwide, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems?

Answer. Yes, I believe that missile defense cooperation with Russia can enhance U.S., NATO, and also Russian security. The United States is committed to sustaining strategic stability with Russia, and it is my understanding that neither current nor planned U.S. missile defenses will impact this stability. The United States is committed to continuing to develop and deploy missile defenses, including qualitative and quantitative improvements.

Space

Question. China’s test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a turning point for the United States in its policies and procedure to ensure access to space. As a nation heavily dependent on space assets for both military and economic advantage, protection of space assets became a national priority.

Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of space assets should be a national security priority?

Answer. Yes. Space situational awareness underpins our ability to operate safely in an increasingly congested space environment and enables the protection of space assets. Maintaining the benefits afforded to the United States by space is central to our national security.

Question. In your view should China’s continued development of space systems inform U.S. space policy and programs?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed would you propose any changes to National Security space policy and programs?

Answer. I am not in a position to recommend any proposed changes at this time. If confirmed, I would continue implementation of the President’s 2010 National Space Policy and the supporting National Security Space Strategy. The two offer pragmatic approaches to maintain the advantages derived from space while confronting the challenges of an evolving space strategic environment.

Question. The Federal Communications Commission is currently considering licensing a telecommunications provider who plans on using a signal that has the potential to disrupt GPS signals.

If confirmed, would you look into this matter to understand the impact on GPS signals?

Answer. Yes. I understand DOD is currently addressing this issue. If confirmed, I will work with the FCC to ensure GPS remains accessible to support national security, public safety, and the economy.

Question. The management of national security space and space systems appears to be more fragmented than ever.

If confirmed, would you commit to reviewing the overall management and coordination of the national security space enterprise?

Answer. It is my understanding that DOD recently took steps intended to clarify and streamline space management, by amending the Secretary of the Air Force’s responsibilities as the Executive Agent for Space, and by establishing a Defense Space Council. If confirmed, I will assess what further steps may be required within DOD...
and in the interagency to ensure effective management of the National Security Space Enterprise.

Question. What is your view on weapons in space and the merits of establishing an international agreement establishing rules of the road for space operations?

Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, including that all nations have a right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes, and that all nations should act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. I understand that the Joint Staff is conducting an operational assessment of the European Union’s proposed Code of Conduct for Outer Space; if confirmed, I look forward to reviewing this assessment and considering appropriate steps to establish clear rules of the road for space operations.

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

Question. Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next 15 plus years, DOD will also have to sustain the current strategic nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking.

Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to afford the costs of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the rest of the DOD commitments?

Answer. I share the President’s commitment to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. Sustaining our nuclear deterrent requires life extension programs for warheads and modernization of delivery systems. I believe that providing necessary resources for nuclear modernization should be a national priority.

IRAN

Question. Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and has failed to provide full and open access to all aspects of its current and historic nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition the P–5 +1 talks have stalled, with Iran setting unreasonable preconditions to resume the talks.

Do you believe it would be in the United States’ interest to engage Iran in a direct dialogue regarding stability and security in Iraq?

Answer. The United States continues to reject Iran’s destabilizing behavior towards Iraq and calls on Iran to meet its international obligations. The Iran and Iraq relationship is an issue that should be negotiated by their respective governments, especially as the United States draws down. However, I also believe we should continue the current strategy of engagement and pressure and remain open to additional talks with Iran through the P5+1.

Question. What more do you believe the United States and the international community could be doing to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program?

Answer. I believe that we should explore ways to increase the pressure on Iran, including through additional sanctions, and make it as clear as possible that Iran’s failure to meet its international obligations will make it less—not more—secure. At the same time, we should leave open the door for diplomacy, since it is not too late for Iran to provide commitments and take steps that ensure that its nuclear program will remain peaceful.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Iran?

Answer. Iran remains a significant threat to the United States, its allies, and its interests in the region. Iran continues to enrich uranium and pursue an illicit nuclear program, support terrorist groups that attack U.S. forces and interests, and aggressively exert its influence throughout the region. There is a real risk that its nuclear program will prompt other countries in the region to pursue nuclear options or threaten the broader global non-proliferation regime.

Question. In your view, what has been the effect of sanctions against Iran—have they been effective and should additional unilateral or multilateral sanctions be levied against Iran?

Answer. The increasing economic pressure that the Obama administration has brought to bear on Iran has caused surprise and anxiety in Tehran. I do not believe that Iran’s leaders believed that we could generate the level of international support that we have for sanctions. Iranian behavior has not changed, as Iran’s leadership continues to flout U.N. resolutions and has failed to meet its international obligations. I believe, however, that we must continue to increase the economic pressure on Iran in an attempt to change Iran’s behavior.

DOD’S COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

Question. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which is focused primarily on eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the
states of the former Soviet Union, has several key objectives that include: (1) eliminating strategic nuclear weapons; (2) improving the security and accounting of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile material; (3) detecting, eliminating and preventing the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons and capabilities; and (4) encouraging development of capabilities to reduce proliferation threats.

In your view, what needs to be done to reduce the proliferation threat from the residual Cold War stockpiles of WMD weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union?

**Answer.** I believe the countries of the former Soviet Union have made appreciable strides in the past two decades to reduce the threats associated with the extensive Soviet WMD programs, facilities and stockpiles in their territories—in many cases with the support and assistance of DOD’s CTR program. While much has been done, residual Cold War stockpiles of WMD and materials continue to pose a threat to U.S. national security, especially in light of the potential for WMD terrorism. Where and when host governments are unable to mitigate this threat on their own, CTR and other U.S. programs should work with these nations to reduce this threat.

**Question.** Are Russia and the former Soviet Union countries making a significant contribution to efforts to reduce the proliferation threats they inherited?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that Russia and states of the Former Soviet Union are making important contributions to reduce proliferation threats they inherited and to address new ones. These contributions include direct national funding as well as collaboration with U.S. agencies and other international partners.

I understand that DOD’s principal vehicle to support these efforts is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which is executed in close coordination with related activities of the Departments of State and Energy. As examples, I understand that Kazakhstan is partnering with U.S. agencies to reduce a variety of nuclear and biological threats that were left by the Soviets on its soil. Similarly, Georgia is taking a leading role, with U.S. assistance, to eliminate Soviet-era biological threats and to turn itself into a regional bio-defense leader. I am also told that we have maintained a strong non-proliferation partnership with Russia in a number of areas.

**Question.** Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in Russia, e.g., DOD, the Department of Energy, and the State Department?

**Answer.** I understand that DOD’s CTR mission is executed with essential support from DOS, and in cooperation with the Department of Energy and other interagency partners. Robust collaboration across U.S. agencies and interagency coordination is a hallmark of the program and key to its effectiveness. If confirmed, I will evaluate whether interagency coordination can be improved.

**Question.** As the CTR program expands to geographic regions beyond the states of the former Soviet Union, in your view what proliferation and threat reduction goals should the DOD establish?

**Answer.** Expanding the geographic reach of the CTR program beyond the former Soviet Union strikes me as an important step toward preventing and reducing WMD threats and building global partnerships. The President has highlighted the threats posed by nuclear and biological terrorism as key proliferation concerns requiring international attention. In line with these priorities, I am informed that DOD’s goals for the program are: (1) reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons threats; (2) improving the security and accounting of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile material; (3) detecting, eliminating and preventing the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons and capabilities; and (4) encouraging development of capabilities to reduce proliferation threats among key partners and regions. I believe that these goals make sense.

**PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE**

**Question.** The 2010 QDR concluded that the United States will continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has been no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the effort is early in the technology and testing phase.

In your view, what is the role for a conventional prompt global strike capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national security in the near future?

**Answer.** Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons would provide the Nation with a unique conventional capability to strike time-sensitive targets, so that distant, hard-to-reach places will no longer provide sanctuary to adversaries. It is my understanding that the only current prompt global strike capability in the U.S. inventory is a nuclear armed ballistic missile. CPGS would be a valuable option for the President to have at his disposal.
CPGS systems could be useful in scenarios involving regional adversaries considering an attack using weapons of mass destruction or against high-priority non-state adversaries. More broadly, CPGS may be the only systems available in situations where a fleeting, serious threat was located in a region not readily accessible by other means.

Question. What approach to implementation of this capability would you expect to pursue if confirmed?

Answer. I understand that DOD is developing and testing technologies relevant to both land-based and sea-based CPGS. It would be premature to make any decisions regarding a future deployed system until the results of these tests are in-hand.

Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike capability?

Answer. Like other weapon systems, effective employment of CPGS weapons would depend on the availability of timely and accurate intelligence on the nature, location, and disposition of a potential target. If confirmed, I will consider what specific improvements in intelligence capabilities may be needed to enable effective use of CPGS systems for various types of targets. I believe that it is important to pursue continued enhancements in our capabilities to collect, analyze, and distribute intelligence irrespective of the development of CPGS systems.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest challenges with respect to assuring the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile?

Answer. It is my understanding that stockpile stewardship is effective; today's stockpile appears to be safe, secure, and reliable and not require further nuclear testing. But the stockpile is aging. I understand that there are challenges in identifying and mitigating the effects of aging on the stockpile. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Department of Energy to maintain the critical skills, capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile, all in a constrained budget environment.

Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing?

Answer. As stated in my answer above, my understanding is that today's nuclear stockpile appears to be safe, secure, and effective and does not require a return to nuclear testing. I understand that nuclear testing is not currently anticipated or planned. It is my understanding that the Stockpile Stewardship Program has demonstrated an ability to resolve problems that in the past would have been resolved with testing, and I believe that if the Stockpile Stewardship Program is adequately funded to maintain critical technical and manufacturing capabilities, it can continue to fulfill this role. My recommendation on a course of action in the event that I was unable to certify the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable would depend critically on the root causes of problems in the stockpile.

Question. What considerations would guide your recommendation in this regard?

Answer. The dominant considerations would be the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile and our ability to sustain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Technical and military considerations would guide my recommendation to the President. I would certainly take into account the expert technical judgment of the three nuclear weapons laboratory directors, coupled with the military judgment of the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, as well as the judgment of other experts. I would also ask for the best military judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?

Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review this report. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to do so. I do believe that maintaining a safe, reliable, and secure nuclear stockpile is a critical national security priority. At the same time, I believe that nuclear modernization, as with all DOD’s efforts, must be undertaken in a cost-effective manner. I am informed that Secretary Gates took steps to reduce the estimated costs of the Ohio-class replacement ballistic missile submarine...
and the new Long-Range Strike Family of Systems. If confirmed, I would continue to work to ensure affordability while sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START treaty limits for either the deployed or non-deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?

Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the timeframe of the modernization program or to assess its relationship to reductions below the New START treaty limits. I agree with the Senate’s resolution of ratification for the New START treaty in calling for negotiations with Russia to “secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.” I understand that the administration has suggested bilateral negotiations with Russia on this matter, after consultation with our allies. I believe that any proposed further reductions should take into account the status of the stockpile of nuclear weapons, and that our investments and these negotiations should be pursued in parallel.

MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES INITIATIVE (MCM)

Question. The administration has produced an interagency strategy for the advanced development and manufacture of medical countermeasures (MCM) to defend against pandemic influenza and biological warfare threats. In this strategy, DOD will be responsible for the development and manufacture of medical countermeasures to protect U.S. Armed Forces and DOD personnel.

Do you support this interagency strategy and the MCM Initiative and, if confirmed, would you plan to implement them?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to establish this important capability that is needed to support our forces and sustain our global operations.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM

Question. Two years ago, Congress enacted the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), without a dissenting vote in either House. WSARA is designed to ensure that new defense acquisition programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the acquisition process.

What are your views regarding WSARA and the need for improvements in the Defense acquisition process?

Answer. I support the improvements in the areas of defense acquisition organization and policy that are addressed in the WSARA. WSARA mandated needed improvements in the defense acquisition process. I support the law’s requirements that DOD examine trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance to significantly reduce cost growth in major defense acquisition programs. I am aware that DOD has undertaken significant further acquisition reform. If confirmed, I will continue the effort to improve the acquisition system consistent with the direction provided in WSARA.

Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of the acquisition process—requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?

Answer. I believe that the acquisition process must be closely coordinated with the requirements and budget processes. Since enactment of WSARA, progress appears to have been made in coordinating these three processes, but I understand there remains room for improvement and that DOD can reduce costs to get better value for its defense dollar. I understand DOD is currently engaged in a comprehensive initiative designed to reduce cost throughout the defense acquisition system. I understand that a major part of this “Better Buying Power” initiative is to coordinate the requirements, acquisition, and budget processes in a way that mandates affordable requirements and full funding into weapon systems up front. I support these efforts.

I also believe that it is necessary to create a “Fast Lane” for acquiring and fielding systems in response to urgent operational needs, as was done with the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, DOD has engaged in rapid acquisition through a variety of largely ad hoc processes. Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD to consider a formal process for rapid acquisition. If confirmed, I will make creating a formal process for rapid acquisition a priority.

Question. If confirmed, how would you improve acquisition accountability?

Answer. Goldwater Nichols established a chain of command for the acquisition process, which provides for clear accountability. However, the acquisition process must be operated in close coordination with the requirements process and the budget process, and this requires active participation by DOD’s senior leadership to en-
sure all three processes are properly coordinated and held accountable. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring accountability in all aspects of acquisition during my tenure.

**Question.** Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?

**Answer.** I have not reviewed DOD’s investment budget in detail. However, it is clear that in this current fiscal environment, pursuing affordability and cost control are critical. In recent years, Secretary Gates has cancelled a number of programs that were unneeded, were not delivering affordably, or had been procured in adequate numbers already. These efforts have gone a long way towards paring down DOD’s portfolio of major weapons systems to those that are truly needed. Existing programs must be managed so that cost growth does not make them unaffordable. If confirmed, I will continue to examine the investment budget closely for affordability and for opportunities to achieve cost savings.

**Question.** If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?

**Answer.** Clearly, continued implementation of WSARA is a critical element in controlling cost growth. If confirmed, I will support this and other ongoing efforts to control and reform the acquisition system. In particular, I will review DOD’s major programs to determine if they are affordable and I will direct the Services to do the same for programs under their direction.

**SERVICES CONTRACTING**

**Question.** Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic increase in the volume of services purchased by DOD. According to a recent report by the Defense Science Board, the Department now spends substantially more for contract services than it does for all products, including weapon systems. Yet, the Department is still struggling to establish a management structure for services contracts comparable to the structure in place for the acquisition of products. What is your view of the Department’s reliance on service contractors?

**Answer.** I recognize that the private sector is, and will continue to be, a vital source of expertise, innovation and support and that DOD, which relies on an All-Volunteer Force, simply cannot operate without the support of service contractors. These contractors do account for more of the defense budget than contractors who provide products to DOD. I believe that properly managing service contractors is just as important as managing DOD’s contractors who provide weapon systems and other products.

**Question.** If confirmed, how do you plan to address the issue of cost growth in services contracting and ensure that the Department gets the most for its money in this area?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will review the processes DOD is using to manage service contractors to ensure that they are providing good value for the funds they receive.

**Question.** Over the last decade, the Department has become progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result, contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the management and oversight of weapon programs, the development of personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions as DOD employees. In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors to support the basic functions of the Department?

**Answer.** At this time I do not have enough information to make this assessment. However, I believe that reliance on contractors is something that must be assessed function by function. Many functions are appropriate for contractor support, however some, such as program management, are more appropriately performed by government personnel. Some functions are inherently governmental and should not be performed by contractors. If confirmed I will assess this issue to determine whether or not DOD’s reliance on contractors has become excessive.

**Question.** Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal services contracts is in the best interest of DOD?

**Answer.** Although I am not familiar with the various types of functions acquired through personal service contracts, or the extent to which DOD acquires these functions through personal services contracts, I understand there are statutory restrictions. In my view, the basis for those restrictions is as applicable to DOD as to that of other Federal departments and agencies. If confirmed, I will ensure that personal services contracts are not used inappropriately.
286

Question. What is your view of the appropriate applicability of personal conflict of interest standards and other ethics requirements to contractor employees who perform functions similar to those performed by government employees?

Answer. When it is appropriate for contractors to perform work that is similar to work performed by government employees, my view is that those contractor employees should be subject to appropriate ethics and conflict of interest requirements. Contractor employees should be held to similar ethical standards as the Government employees they support, and in particular, should not be allowed to misuse the information which may be available to them as a result of their performance under a DOD contract.

Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have relied on contractor support to a greater degree than previous U.S. military operations. According to widely published reports, the number of U.S. contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan has often exceeded the number of U.S. military deployed in those countries.

Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on contractor support for military operations?

Answer. I am not in a position to offer such an assessment at this time. While DOD's use of contractors is high relative to previous conflicts, current levels may be warranted. DOD now has several years of experience with the widespread use of contractors to support the All-Volunteer Force engaged in counter-insurgency and stability operations. It is my understanding that the increased level of reliance on contracted support in contingency operations is highlighted in a recent study conducted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Furthermore, it is my understanding that based on a recommendation by the Chairman, Secretary Gates recently issued a memorandum to DOD regarding a wide range of initiatives associated with contractor support in contingencies. This memorandum requires the military departments to assess opportunities for insourcing contracted capabilities that represent high risk to the warfighter. If confirmed, I will review this study and the military departments' assessments.

Question. What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on such contractor support?

Answer. Reliance on contractor support can lead to operational problems if contractors fail to perform. Experience has shown that a number of other problems can arise including a potential for increased fraud, waste and abuse, problems that arise from contractor interaction with local communities, and issues with the use of force. It is also possible that skills needed in the military in the future will atrophy or disappear due to reliance on contractor support.

Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to mitigate such risk?

Answer. I believe the first step in mitigating such risk is to gain a thorough understanding of any risks we have with the current workforce mix of military, civilian and contractors. The aforementioned study led by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the assessments being conducted by the military services will provide me with a baseline level of understanding. If confirmed, I will review and continue ongoing efforts to conduct effective oversight of service contracts in contingencies.

Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?

Answer. It is my understanding that originally DOD was not properly organized and staffed to effectively manage contractors in the ongoing contingency operations, but that corrective actions have been taken over the last several years. If confirmed, I will review ongoing efforts to ensure DOD institutionalizes its contingency contracting capabilities and the lessons learned from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan are applied to future conflicts.

Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?

Answer. It is my understanding that DOD has made significant progress in implementing effective management of contractors during contingency operations through several ongoing efforts. If confirmed, I will review and ensure these efforts are adequate and effective and I will work to institutionalize the effective management processes that have been developed over the last several years as appropriate.

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

Question. Federal agencies, including DOD, have spent more than $5 billion for private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade. Over this period, there have been numerous reports of abuses by private security contractors,
including allegations of contractors shooting recklessly at civilians as they have driven down the streets of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. In September 2007, employees of Blackwater allegedly opened fire on Iraqis at Nisour Square in downtown Baghdad, killing more than a dozen Iraqis and wounding many more. More recently, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported on questionable activities by private security contractors in Afghanistan.

Do you believe DOD and other Federal agencies should rely upon contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations?

Answer. Without a substantial increase in the force structure committed to contingency operations, the use of contractors for some security functions in contingencies is a necessity. However, these contractors must be properly regulated and supervised and their mission must be carefully limited. Contractors cannot engage in combat operations. Their use of force is limited to self-defense and the defense of others against criminal violence and the protection of critical property. Under these circumstances, I believe that the limited use of security contractors in contingency operations is acceptable. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on their use by other departments. If confirmed I will ensure that proper limitations on private security contractors are in place and enforced.

Question. In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. The use of force by contractors or military personnel can, if misapplied, undermine our policy objectives. Contractors for physical security missions have been a necessity in Iraq and Afghanistan and will continue to be so. My understanding is that, over time, DOD has established procedures to manage these contractors effectively to prevent unnecessary violence that would be detrimental to our policy objectives. This is an area that requires constant attention and continued supervision and policy refinement is required. If confirmed, I will focus on providing that supervision.

Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that two actions are taken. First, the use of private security contractors in any area of combat operations must be fully coordinated. There must be unified and consistent procedures for all such contractors, regardless of which U.S. agency hires them. Our commanders on the ground must have authority to restrict security contractors' operations as the situation requires.

Second, there must be assured legal accountability for the actions of private security contractors. In a given circumstance, the host nation will have responsibilities in this regard as well, such as rigorous licensing procedures and enforcement of its own laws.

Question. Do you support the extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of all Federal agencies?

Answer. I support steps to ensure that there is legal accountability for the actions of all contractors performing work for the U.S. Government in an area of combat operations. If confirmed, I will consult with my interagency partners concerning appropriate mechanisms to ensure such accountability.

Question. What is your view of the appropriate application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to employees of private security contractors operating in an area of combat operations?

Answer. There must be assured legal accountability for the actions of all contractors deployed to an area of combat operations. The application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is one tool to do this.

Question. OMB Circular A–76 defines “inherently governmental functions” to include “discretionary functions” that could “significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons.”

Answer. In your view, is the performance of security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations an inherently governmental function? In your view, is the interrogation of enemy prisoners of war and other detainees during and in the aftermath of hostilities an inherently governmental function?

I am not familiar with DOD policies governing the use of contractors in detention operations, but if confirmed, I will review them to ensure they properly separate inherently governmental functions from work performed by contractors. I am aware that Congress spoke to the issue of interrogation by contractors in section 1038 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 which prohibits the interrogation by contractor personnel of detainees or others in the custody or under the effective control of DOD in connection with hostilities. If confirmed, I will ensure this provision is enforced.

Question. Do you see a need for a comprehensive reevaluation of these issues now?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review these issues to determine whether there is a need to reevaluate these policies.

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Question. Over the last 15 years, DOD has reduced the size of its acquisition workforce by almost half, without undertaking any systematic planning or analysis to ensure that it would have the specific skills and competencies needed to meet DOD's current and future needs. Since September 11, 2001, moreover, the demands placed on that workforce have substantially increased. Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 established an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address shortcomings in its acquisition workforce. Over the last year, Secretary Gates has stated that the Department must continue to rebuild its acquisition workforce, even as it seeks efficiencies in other areas.

Do you agree that the Department would be "penny-wise and pound foolish" to try to save money by cutting corners on its acquisition workforce at the risk of losing control over the hundreds of billions of dollars that it spends every year on the acquisition of products and services?
Answer. Yes. I am aware that DOD is expending far more today on goods and services with an acquisition workforce substantially reduced in size from the 1990s. If confirmed, I will support a properly sized and highly capable acquisition workforce.

Question. Do you believe that the Acquisition Workforce Development Fund is needed to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost effective manner for the taxpayers?
Answer. Yes. It is my understanding that DOD has used the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund, which originated in this committee, to resource a number of initiatives to attract, develop, and retain individuals with critical acquisition skills. DOD must continue to fund these initiatives which are critical to achieving a properly sized and highly capable acquisition workforce.

Question. If confirmed, what steps if any will you ensure that the money made available through the Acquisition Workforce Fund is spent in a manner that best meets the needs of DOD and its acquisition workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct that the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics monitor the implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to ensure that it focuses on rebuilding critical skills in the workforce, without which our goals for affordability, cost control, and reform of the acquisition system cannot be met.

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. The Government Performance and Results Act is intended to provide managers with a disciplined approach by developing a strategic plan, establishing annual goals, measuring performance, and reporting on the results by for improving the performance and internal management of an organization.

What do you consider to be the most important priorities and challenges facing DOD as it strives to achieve these management goals?
Answer. I share Secretary Gates' concern, as noted in his recent speech to the American Enterprise Institute, that the current systems for managing people and money across the DOD enterprise are inadequate. It is my understanding that the defense agencies, field activities, joint headquarters, and support staff functions of DOD operate without centralized mechanisms to allocate resources, track expenditures, and measure results relative to DOD's overall priorities. If confirmed, I look forward to addressing this issue.

Question. What are your views on the importance and role of financial information in managing operations and holding managers accountable?
Answer. I believe that having access to the appropriate financial information, as well as other key performance indicators, is critical towards managing operations and holding leaders accountable for results.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Question. DOD spends billions of dollars every year to acquire, operate, and upgrade business systems needed to support the warfighter, including systems related
to the management of contracts, finances, the supply chain, and support infrastructure. Despite these expenditures, the Department’s business systems are stovepiped, duplicative, and nonintegrated. As a result, the Department remains unable to produce timely, accurate, and complete information to support management decisions.

If confirmed, will you ensure that the financial management problems of DOD receive priority attention at the senior management level?
Answer. Yes.

Question. What priority do you believe the Department should place on achieving a clean financial statement, as required by section 1003 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010?
Answer. Achieving clean audit opinions is one of my top management improvement priorities. A clean financial audit opinion is important to demonstrate that DOD is a responsible steward of public funds and to ensure management has accurate and timely information for decisionmaking. I understand DOD has a plan for achieving audit opinions that includes goals, a governance process, and resources; and that this plan depends in part on modernizing its business systems.

I expect senior leaders across DOD to work together to continue progress towards meeting the legal requirement to be ready for audits by the end of 2017, and will ensure that the Comptroller, in partnership with the Chief Management Officers, devotes time and resources to leading this effort.

HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING

Question. DOD faces a critical shortfall in key areas of its civilian workforce, including the management of acquisition programs, information technology systems and financial management, and senior DOD officials have expressed alarm at the extent of the Department’s reliance on contractors in these areas. Section 115(b) of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Department to develop a strategic workforce plan to shape and improve its civilian employee workforce.

Would you agree that the Department’s human capital, including its civilian workforce, is critical to the accomplishment of its national security mission?
Answer. Yes. DOD’s human capital, including its civilian workforce, is not only critical, but an essential element to the successful accomplishment of its national security mission. It is my understanding that the civilian workforce is viewed as one entity throughout DOD. Given the intent to have civilians be capable and ready to move to where an emerging requirement exists within DOD, collaboration is an ongoing process amongst the Services, Defense Agencies, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense. This process ensures that DOD is speaking in one voice for its civilian workforce to ensure transparency, develop enterprise policy, and support the overall lifecycle. DOD employs a robust system of talent management to ensure it possesses and plans for future workforce needs. If confirmed, I will ensure that this ready and capable civilian force has the support it needs through programs that foster ideas, methods, and procedures for lifecycle management.

Question. Do you share the concern expressed by others about the extent of the Department’s reliance on contractors in critical areas such as the management of acquisition programs, information technology and financial management?
Answer. If confirmed, I will monitor whether or not DOD is too reliant on contractors. The private sector will continue to provide vital support to DOD. There are areas in acquisition, IT and financial management where support from contractors is an appropriate and cost effective solution to perform work that does not require government personnel discretion. If confirmed, I will be committed to proactively managing the Total Force of military and civilian personnel, and support provided by contractors.

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the Department undertakes necessary human capital planning to ensure that its civilian workforce is prepared to meet the challenges of the coming decades?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that a comprehensive workforce plan provides strategies for recruitment, development, and retention of a mission-ready civilian workforce is in place. Planning is critical as fiscal constraints impact workforce capabilities and sustainment.

TEST AND EVALUATION

Question. A natural tension exists between major program objectives to reduce cost and schedule and the test and evaluation (T&E) objective to ensure performance meets specifications and requirements.
What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between the desire to reduce acquisition cycle times and the need to perform adequate testing?

Answer. I support rigorous independent testing and evaluation to provide accurate and objective information on the capabilities and limitations of defense systems to both acquisition executives and warfighters and to ensure contractors deliver products that meet their requirements. When systems are urgently needed in the field, the imperative for accurate and objective testing is still just as important but should be addressed through efforts to expedite the T&E process. I understand this has been accomplished successfully for such urgent efforts as the MRAP vehicle program. In those urgent cases I believe that some risk can be taken, but safety and basic performance must be verified prior to fielding. Testing is needed to validate system performance and I believe it is a necessary part of the acquisition process. That said, there may be opportunities to achieve this goal through more efficient processes than those currently in practice.

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe we should procure weapon systems and equipment that has not been demonstrated through T&E to be operationally effective, suitable, and survivable?

Answer. In a limited number of urgent circumstances it might be necessary to field a system prior to operational testing in order to address an urgent need for a critical capability. But even in such cases, operational evaluation should still be conducted at the earliest opportunity to assess the system's capabilities and limitations and identify any deficiencies that might need to be corrected.

Question. Congress established the position of Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to serve as an independent voice on matters relating to operational testing of weapons systems. As established, the Director has a unique and direct relationship with Congress, consistent with the statutory independence of the office. Do you support the continued ability of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to speak freely and independently with Congress?

Answer. Yes.

FUNDING FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS AND WORKFORCE

Question. In his State of the Union speech earlier this year, the President said that “maintaining our leadership in science and technology (S&T) is crucial to America's success.” In the fiscal year 2012 budget submission, despite the significant efforts to find efficiencies, the DOD’s basic research investments grow by 2 percent per year and other S&T activities remain constant taking into account inflation.

Do you support maintaining growth in the DOD’s S&T investments?

Answer. I understand and appreciate the valuable role government investment in S&T has had for the Nation and DOD. As Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I noted that many of that agency’s key capabilities emerged from long-term S&T funding. I have seen the results and I support long-term S&T investments. I am also aware that the President has challenged S&T funding levels for all government components. While S&T investment will be a high priority if I am confirmed, all defense appropriations must be considered during this time of budget constraints.

Question. How will you assess whether the S&T investment portfolio is adequate to meet the current and future needs of the Department?

Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate conducting an early review of DOD’s capabilities to support the administration’s goals, including S&T investment. DOD’s budget must balance a number of competing needs and, if confirmed, I will have to assess all those needs, and the risks associated with various levels of funding.

Question. Well over half of all graduates of U.S. universities with advanced degrees in S&T are non-U.S. citizens. Due to a variety of reasons, many return to their home countries where they contribute to competing against the United States in technology advancement.

What is your view on steps that the Department should take, if any, to ensure that DOD and the defense industrial base are able to recruit and retain scientists and engineers from this talent pool?

Answer. The issue of enabling and encouraging foreign students to remain in the United States to pursue careers in science and engineering is one that affects the Nation as a whole. If confirmed, I would work within the administration and with Congress to find ways to retain this talent pool.

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Question. The latest QDR addressed the need for strengthening the defense industrial base. Specifically, it said: “America’s security and prosperity are increasingly linked with the health of our technology and industrial bases. In order to maintain
our strategic advantage well into the future, the Department requires a consistent, realistic, and long-term strategy for shaping the structure and capabilities of the defense technology and industrial bases—a strategy that better accounts for the rapid evolution of commercial technology, as well as the unique requirements of ongoing conflicts.

What is your view on steps that the Department should take, if any, to strengthen the defense industrial base?

Answer. I believe a strong, technologically vibrant, and financially successful defense industrial base is in the national interest. I understand that national policy for many years has been to let market forces adjust the defense industrial base to our evolving threats and requirements, and to changing technology. The government specifically supports defense S&T, and small businesses entering the defense market. Occasionally, specific industrial policies are used to assure the long-term health of particular sectors of the defense industry. If confirmed, I will ensure DOD uses a sector-by-sector approach to the defense industrial base, with productivity growth and long-term health as its goals.

ENCROACHMENT

Question. Some of the most significant issues that impact the readiness of the Armed Forces are categorized as outside encroachment upon military reservations and resources. This encroachment has included, but is not limited to environmental constraints on military training ranges, local community efforts to obtain military property, housing construction, and other land use changes near military installations, restrictions to accommodate civilian airlines, and transfer of radio frequency spectrum from DOD to the wireless communications industry. Unless these issues are effectively addressed, military forces will find it increasingly difficult to train and operate at home and abroad.

In your opinion, how serious are encroachment problems for the U.S. military? If confirmed, what efforts would you take to ensure that military access to the resources listed above, and other required resources, will be preserved?

Answer. I believe that encroachment is a serious issue for the U.S. military. I am aware that DOD has a number of key programs to influence activities outside our installations so that they do not conflict with our training and operations. I strongly support such efforts and, if confirmed, will work closely with Congress to ensure that these efforts are effective.

LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION


What is your view on whether or not the United States should join the Law of the Sea convention?


Question. How would being a party to the Law of the Sea convention help or hinder the United States' security posture?

Answer. Being a party to the Law of the Sea Convention would not hinder the U.S. security posture, nor would it have any adverse impact on our sovereignty. In fact, becoming a party would enhance our security posture by enabling the United States to reinforce the Convention’s freedom of navigation and overflight rights, including transit passage in strategic straits, and preserve our rights and duties in the Arctic. In addition, becoming a Party to the Convention would support combined operations with coalition partners and support the Proliferation Security Initiative; establish undisputed title to our extended continental shelf areas; and bolster our leadership in future developments in the law of the sea. Accession would also add to DOD’s credibility in a large number of Asia-focused multilateral venues where Law of the Sea matters are discussed.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Secretary of Defense?
Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

**EXPORT CONTROL REFORM**

1. Senator Levin. Mr. Panetta, the outgoing Secretary of Defense has been a leading proponent of the administration’s effort to reform our export control system. One element of that effort is a review of the U.S. Munitions List (USML), which is expected to result in the transfer to the Commerce Control List (CCL) less sensitive items that do not require USML controls. What is your view of the administration’s effort to reform export controls?

Mr. Panetta. I fully support the reform efforts because I believe they are absolutely necessary to meet 21st century national security challenges. Secretary Gates played a key role in setting the administration’s export control reform objectives: a single list, a single licensing agency, a single enforcement coordination agency, and a single U.S. Government-wide information technology licensing system. The administration has made significant progress in most areas. The Department of Defense (DOD) has been fully engaged in revising the USML and continue to focus on completing this important work with our interagency partners to produce a single export control list that is more transparent and predictable for government and industry.

2. Senator Levin. Mr. Panetta, if you are confirmed, do you plan to continue the review of the USML, and to transition items, as appropriate, to the CCL?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will work to ensure that DOD continues to be the key driver in revising the USML into a positive list, tiering controls based on the criticality of items and technologies for military and intelligence applications, and identifying items that should be moved to the more flexible licensing policies under the CCL.

3. Senator Levin. Mr. Panetta, what is your understanding of the timing for this effort?

Mr. Panetta. With respect to revising the USML and moving items to the CCL, DOD has developed initial drafts of 19 categories of the USML. My understanding is that following interagency deliberations, the plan is to incrementally publish these re-built categories for public comment in the latter part of 2011 and early 2012.

With respect to establishing a single information technology system, DOD is leading this critical step. Using DOD’s U.S. Exports System (USXPORTS) program, for the first time, all agencies will have access to a full licensing dataset that will facilitate fully informed and timely decision making. The Departments of State and Commerce will be connected to USXPORTS this year; the Treasury Department is expected to have connectivity in 2012.

My understanding is that the administration is working to finalize the rules for the Export Enforcement Coordination Center (EECC) as directed by Executive Order 13558, signed by the President in November 2010. The EECC is a key pillar of export control reform.

Finally, the administration will need to work with Congress on legislation that would allow the President to establish a single U.S. export control licensing agency.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK BEGICH

**BUDGET**

4. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen have recently been vocal about DOD being unable to sustain any more cuts to force struc-
ture. I do not agree that DOD is in a position where it cannot achieve additional cost savings and efficiencies through elimination of poor performing programs and a reassessment of priorities and requirements, especially in light of some requests made this year by DOD which do not make fiscal sense and are not in the best interest of the force. For instance, DOD is requesting $804 million to continue developing the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). Yet we will not procure this system and based on the programs past performance we will not get anything viable out of continued development. Additionally, DOD intends to carry out tour normalization in Korea. Moving dependents to this increasingly volatile area will cost billions in military construction and basic housing allowance over the long term. It doesn’t make fiscal sense or common sense. Another example is the realignment of marines to Guam. The cost is astronomical and the agreement may not be executable and need re-examining as Chairman Levin has pointed out this year. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also identified several actions DOD could take to eliminate redundancy and save money. If confirmed, will you closely examine previous decisions and agreements that are costing taxpayers billions of dollars and are not enhancing national security or providing for our military?

Mr. PANETTA. The Department has begun a comprehensive review of the defense programs in light of the current fiscal environment. Everything is on the table and we will assess each program in terms of the contribution the program makes to our national security strategy.

5. Senator BEGICH. Mr. Panetta, what type of review will you conduct?

Mr. PANETTA. I will continue the comprehensive review begun by Secretary Gates and bring it to a conclusion by this fall.

6. Senator BEGICH. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, how will you manage/prioritize DOD’s budget in this time of scare resources to ensure the readiness of our forces but eliminate wasteful spending?

Mr. PANETTA. During both the current comprehensive review and the development of subsequent budgets, I will ensure we protect our essential military capabilities while continuing to pursue additional efficiencies, streamline operations, control acquisition cost growth, and identify lower priority efforts that can be eliminated or curtailed. That said, difficult choices will have to be made to operate within reduced resources.

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

7. Senator BEGICH. Mr. Panetta, I support eliminating the threat to U.S. national security in Afghanistan and Pakistan by defeating al Qaeda and preventing those countries from harboring again. However, like many of my colleagues, after a decade in the country I am concerned about an indefinite U.S. presence. In light of the recent killing of Osama bin Laden and elimination of many terrorists and insurgents, I believe we need a thorough threat assessment and to concisely define a realistic and achievable end-state. What is your assessment of our current strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Mr. PANETTA. Our strategy is working, but much work remains. Although the death of Osama bin Laden was a significant achievement in our Nation’s effort against al Qaeda, his death does not mark the end of our efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates. Al Qaeda and other extremist groups continue to threaten the United States and U.S. allies and partners from safe havens in Pakistan, and wish to reestablish safe havens in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, the progress that we have made over the past 16 months in driving the Taliban from their home territory in Helmand and Kandahar is evidence that the insurgency is under intense pressure and that their capabilities are being degraded. We have reversed the insurgency’s momentum in many key areas and are now making strides with the Afghans to enable a government capable of providing basic services and security. The implementation of this strategy has moved us closer to our desired end-state of an Afghan state capable of repelling insurgent threats to the central government, and of denying the reestablishment of a safe haven for al Qaeda.

Although our relationship with Pakistan is a challenging one, continued cooperation with Pakistan is important to maintaining necessary pressure on al Qaeda leadership and the networks that provide it support and safe haven, at a time when it is most vulnerable. Al Qaeda vulnerability in the wake of the death of Osama bin Laden presents an historic opportunity not only for us, but also for Pakistan, to advance our shared interests and strengthen our cooperation in eradicating ter-
terrorist networks that threaten both nations, as well as our partners in the region and the world. I will continue to seek Pakistan’s unambiguous support in the fight against al Qaeda and the regional syndicate of terrorist networks.

8. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what is your assessment of the threat to U.S. national security in the region?

Mr. Panetta. [Deleted.]

9. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, how do you view the United States’ long-term commitment—financially, reconstruction, and security-wise?

Mr. Panetta. The United States and the international community have sacrificed an extraordinary amount—in lives and resources—for the Afghan people. We remain committed to assisting Afghanistan in seeking a secure Afghanistan that is free of al Qaeda safe-havens. Ultimately, however, the Afghans must be responsible for taking the lead for security in their country, and the transition process through 2014 will support this.

President Obama and President Karzai have agreed that the United States and Afghanistan should have an enduring strategic partnership beyond 2014. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the international community have also made clear that their commitment to Afghanistan is enduring and will continue beyond the completion of the transition to Afghan security responsibility. We are currently engaging with the Afghans to outline in broad terms a vision for our long-term cooperation and presence.

Afghanistan will require international assistance for many years to come; this is the reality of over 30 years of war. Our assistance, however, must be focused on helping the Afghans take full responsibility for their own future. We need to ensure that as a nation they begin to develop the capacity and the resources they need to reduce their reliance on international aid.

10. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what is your assessment of President Hamid Karzai as a partner?

Mr. Panetta. President Karzai is the democratically elected leader of Afghanistan, and we are committed to working with him to achieve our shared objectives. U.S. policy toward Afghanistan is not contingent on a single leader; our commitment is to the people of Afghanistan, based on the core interests that we share.

President Karzai faces a difficult situation in Afghanistan. He is fighting an insurgency with the assistance of more than 140,000 foreign forces. The burden of this war has been great on the Afghan people. They have been traumatized by some 30 years of war. Inevitably, there will be times of tension or disagreement, and just as President Karzai needs to listen to our concerns, we also need to listen carefully to his. President Karzai sometimes airs these concerns in ways we find unhelpful. But ultimately, he appreciates what the United States is doing and the sacrifices made by our forces.

11. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what do you see as the role for DOD in building the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to deliver services, provide better governance, improve economic development, and fight corruption in Afghanistan?

Mr. Panetta. Although the Department of State (DOS) has the lead for governance and economic development activities in Afghanistan, DOD brings capabilities and resources that augment civilian efforts, particularly in contested areas. As part of the counterinsurgency strategy, U.S. military forces also support developing Afghan governance and economic capacity, particularly at the district and provincial levels. U.S. military forces use Commanders’ Emergency Response Program funds to carry out small-scale projects designed to meet urgent humanitarian relief requirements or urgent reconstruction requirements of the population, with a focus on short-term stability rather than long-term development. Military commanders provide co-leadership of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and generally are key partners of Afghan Government officials at the district level.

Further, the President’s December 2009 strategy review designated DOD as having primary responsibility for building capacity within the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. This includes a range of responsibilities to help build ministerial capacity to recruit, train, equip, and sustain their own forces. DOD also contributes to anti-corruption efforts through its Shafafiyat task force and its support to the Ministry of Interior’s law enforcement activities.

12. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, do you have concerns with the Afghan Government’s ability to sustain our efforts—like funding their own security forces? What more can we be doing?
Mr. Panetta. After 30 years of war, the institutional and economic capacity of Afghanistan is badly damaged. Nonetheless, Afghanistan has several areas with great potential for economic development and revenue generation, but we expect that the Afghan Government will require international assistance for years to come to realize that potential. A key aim of U.S. assistance, therefore, must be to help the Afghans take full responsibility for their own future, and we need to ensure that as a nation they begin to develop the capacity and the resources they need to reduce their reliance on international aid. This is why the design of U.S. Government-funded projects is increasingly focused on Afghan capacity to sustain those projects.

Projects to help build the Afghan Government’s capacity include improvements to the Afghan energy sector (a major catalyst for economic development), transportation and associated infrastructure to facilitate regional trade, improvements to the agricultural sector, and efforts to improve the Afghan Government’s ability to collect customs revenue. In addition DOD has implemented programs through its Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) to connect outside investors to potential Afghan producers and to help Afghanistan build the capacity to develop its mineral and other natural resources in environmentally sound and sustainable ways.

Aside from increasing the Afghan Government’s capacity and revenue to sustain the current joint efforts with the United States, we anticipate that costs for Government services, such as the funding the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), could be adjusted over time. Detailed planning for long-term ANSF sustainment is an ongoing, active effort. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan is collaborating with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and NATO to analyze the long-term requirements for ANSF capability in light of current fiscal constraints. We envision a continuing role for the United States and expect continued contributions from international donors. To that end, before retiring, then-Secretary of Defense Gates challenged our partners in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to contribute a combined 1 billion Euros annually to the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund. The Department is working with our international partners to pursue that initiative.

13. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you support the drawdown in July?  
Mr. Panetta. I will support the President’s decision.

14. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, how long should the drawdown take?  
Mr. Panetta. The pace and scope of the drawdown should take into account security and other conditions on the ground. I will listen to the recommendations from the commanders and provide my best military advice to the President. A successful transition of security lead to ANSF requires careful planning and implementation.

15. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional and effective ANSF?  
Mr. Panetta. Progress in developing professional and effective ANSF has been steady. One hundred thousand have been added to the rolls of the ANSF since the establishment of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM–A) in November 2009. NTM–A has set the conditions for enhancing professionalism by the opening of twelve branch schools in the past year, implementing an aggressive literacy program, and establishing leadership training for officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). The focus this year is on training Afghan trainers to train their own. A sign of progress in this regard is the graduation 2 weeks ago of 26 new Sergeants Major from the Sergeant Major Academy—the first class trained solely by Afghan Instructors and leaders. Similarly the Commander of ISAF Joint Command (IJC) has led improvements in the operational effectiveness of the ANSF through partnering. Ninety-Five percent of all Afghan Kandaks (battalions) are partnered with coalition forces. In the ISAF’s main effort operation in Kunduz Province, HAMKARI, ANSF comprise 60 percent of the total forces and are increasingly taking the lead in planning and executing operations. The response to the recent Taliban attacks in Kunduz City on 7 May 2011 was an example of the improving effectiveness of the ANSF. They dealt with the attackers in a deliberate manner, eliminating the threat with minimal casualties and limited ISAF support. Clearly there are challenges and issues as we continue to grow and develop the ANSF, but commanders at all levels are working shoulder to shoulder with their Afghan counterparts to resolve them. I am confident that we can proceed with transition of security responsibilities in designated areas to the ANSF, and meet our goal of ANSF lead for security countrywide in Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
16. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you make it a goal to transfer the security mission to the Afghans sooner than 2014?

Mr. Panetta. President Karzai established the 2014 transition goal, which NATO subsequently endorsed based on joint assessments with the Afghan Government about the state of the insurgency, the rate at which the ANSF can develop their capability to take over security lead, and the level of governance capacity and development throughout the country. Actual conditions on the ground will drive the ultimate rate and sequence of transition, but the 2014 goal remains a realistic target for a responsible transition.

17. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-military relations?

Mr. Panetta. I would continue to seek Pakistan’s unambiguous support in the fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Pakistan, however, must choose what kind of partnership it seeks. Pakistan’s own security depends on its civilian and military efforts to deny safe havens in the tribal and border regions and to extend economic opportunity and the government’s writ to those areas. It is also in the United States’ interest that Pakistan take these steps. Strong military-to-military relations and assistance can be an important means of building Pakistan’s capabilities for this effort, but it will also require a mutual effort to build and sustain trust in a commitment to achieving shared objectives.

LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

18. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (CLOS) is pending consideration in the U.S. Senate. I support ratification of this treaty and know the Arctic is an increasingly important region. What is your view on whether or not the United States should join the CLOS?

Mr. Panetta. I support U.S. accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOS Convention). The rights guaranteed under the LOS Convention are essential for the global presence of U.S. forces, enabling large-scale movement of materiel through the Straits of Gibraltar, Malacca, Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb and into the Persian Gulf to sustain our combat forces into Iraq and Afghanistan. These rights also permit the U.S. submarine fleet to transit submerged through key choke points on critical missions and allow the U.S. Air Force to conduct global missions without overflying foreign national airspace. Finally, freedom of navigation and overflight rights ensure the uninterrupted flow of commerce to and from our shores.

19. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, how would being a party to the CLOS help or hinder the United States’ security posture?

Mr. Panetta. Becoming a Party to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOS Convention) would enhance our security posture by enabling the United States to reinforce the LOS Convention’s freedom of navigation and overflight rights, including transit passage through strategic straits, and preserve our rights and the duties of all States in the Arctic. In addition, becoming a Party to the LOS Convention would: support combined operations with coalition partners; support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); establish undisputed title to our extended continental shelf areas; and bolster our leadership in future developments in the law of the sea. Accession to the LOS Convention would also add to DOD credibility in a large number of Asia-focused multilateral venues where law of the sea matters are discussed.

20. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what will you do to get this treaty to the Senate for approval?

Mr. Panetta. I look forward to supporting the administration’s continued engagement with the Senate toward favorable consideration of U.S. accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOS Convention).

I have been and remain a strong advocate of the LOS Convention. I will support the administration’s goal of ratification of this treaty.

GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE

21. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system in Alaska and California is the only missile defense system that protects the U.S. Homeland from long-range ballistic missile attacks. This is an extremely complex program that was simultaneously fielded and developed. It is our only line of
defense and it is imperative there is confidence in the system and the appropriate resources are allocated. If confirmed, will you support the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review which established GMD as a priority and ensure the program is resourced to be able to protect the U.S. Homeland against evolving threats?

Mr. Panetta. I support the priority given to GMD in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review.

22. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what role do you see GMD playing in the long-term security of the Nation?

Mr. Panetta. The protection of the United States against a ballistic missile attack remains a vital security priority. As the Secretary of Defense, I will work to ensure United States citizens have the best possible defenses against such an attack. With GMD and a successful intercept, the United States retains a broader range of response options than without. I also believe that threat nations will be less inclined to prosecute a ballistic missile attack against the United States if they believe that we have the capability to destroy the ballistic missile in flight, before it reaches its target. For these reasons, we must continue to maintain a viable defense and continue to evolve our capability so that it is effective against future threats.

RARE EARTH-DEPENDENCY ON FOREIGN SOURCES

23. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, I am concerned about a potential threat to U.S. national security and military operability: the issue of rare earth elements and our military’s dependence on unreliable foreign nations for our supply. China produces approximately 97 percent of the world’s rare earth supply and has restricted export quotas of rare earth elements based on their own internal demand. Rare earths are essential components to clean energy technologies. They are also critical to many modern defense applications, such as radar and sonar systems and precision-guided munitions. DOD comprises a small segment of aggregate rare earth demand, but we cannot function effectively without these elements. Our most critical weapons systems rely on these elements. Please share your view on the importance of rare earths and our current dependency on China for them.

Mr. Panetta. I share your concerns that access to certain individual rare earth elements and components may be an issue. We must work to ensure that the U.S. has adequate supplies of the needed elements and carefully monitor supply and demand.

24. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you ensure DOD adequately and appropriately evaluates near-, mid-, and long-term supply-chain availability, determines aggregate defense demand, and establishes a plan to address potential supply chain vulnerabilities?

Mr. Panetta. Yes. While it appears expected domestic production of rare earth elements should be substantial by the end of next year, I remain concerned that access to certain individual rare earth elements and components may be an issue and will continuously monitor the situation.

25. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, where do you see it in the list of priorities of DOD?

Mr. Panetta. Given the fact that rare earth elements are a critical component of our defense capability, availability of these elements will be one of my priorities and areas of focus.

26. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, how long should it take to develop a plan?

Mr. Panetta. Identifying individual rare earth elements of concern to the defense industrial base is the focus of the rare earth materials assessment required by Congress under section 843 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. Depending upon its findings regarding defense demand and market supply for the individual elements, the assessment will include, as appropriate, options for mitigating risk in order to ensure the availability of the necessary rare earth materials or components. It should be possible to identify strategy options within months after identifying the elements of concern.

RESERVE COMPONENT

27. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, the National Guard and Reserves are critical to our force. For the last decade they have performed alongside their Active Duty
brethren with honor and distinction as an operational force instead of a strategic Reserve. If any lesson was learned it is that they are critical to a ready force and during times of high operational tempo. Over the last several years there has been a total force approach to better incorporate the Reserve component. I worry, however, business will go back to usual and funding and support for the Reserve component will dramatically be reduced by the Services thereby compromising their readiness. If confirmed, how will you approach the Reserve component force structure role as operations decrease?

Mr. PANETTA. I agree that the Guard and Reserve have made major contributions to the Department’s efforts over the last 10 years, and have been integral to the Total Force. Our Reserve component is a valuable, highly experienced and well-trained element of that force, and continuing to support their readiness is critical. Given the current era of conflict and the broad range of security challenges on the horizon, sound decisions regarding the rebalancing of capabilities and aggregate capacity of the Total Force are essential to defending and advancing our national interests. It will be my approach to make the most efficient use of the Total Force—Active, Guard, Reserve, civilians, and contractors. In order to reduce stress on the overall force, maintain an All-Volunteer Force, and leverage the skills and experience resident in the Guard and Reserve, their continued contribution in the future is critical.

28. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, how will you ensure total force integration initiatives, like associate units in the Air Force, undergo a thorough requirements scrub and are properly resourced to reflect the steady state requirements of the unit?

Mr. PANETTA. In order to ensure Total Force integration, I would work to use the Guard and Reserve in partnership with the Active Forces to best advantage, increasing the capacity of, and reducing the burden on, all our military personnel and their families. I will work to ensure that the gains made in readiness, training, and equipping in the Reserve components over the last decade are preserved and maintained, reflecting the steady state demands on our Armed Forces.

We must adequately resource and effectively employ all elements of the Total Force, consistent with their assigned missions. Accordingly, I will continue the significant work by the Department and the Services to sustain and refine the effectiveness of our total Force.

To this end, Secretary Gates approved a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)-directed Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components, which outlined the organizational and operational benefits of initiatives such as the associate units in the Air Force, along with other effective employment options, which use the Guard and Reserve to best advantage. As this review was approved by Secretary Gates, it will be my approach to take these important recommendations under my review. In addition, we have defined the accepted use of Reserve component units and personnel in response to unforeseen outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS) events, which I will ensure that the Department embraces as the United States continues to act as a stabilizing force throughout the world.

DWELL TIME

29. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, when you visited me we talked about the high operational tempo of the brigades and units in Alaska. Currently, the 1/25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team is deployed to Afghanistan and the other brigade—the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team—will deploy at the end of the year. The brigades have not yet had a 1:2 dwell time. Dwell time is crucial to an all-volunteer healthy force. Please discuss your view on the importance of dwell time to the force.

Mr. PANETTA. I agree-dwell time is critically important to the sustainment of the all-volunteer force. The Department struggles with balancing critical operational requirements and the burden we are asking some of our servicemembers to bear.

Six years ago, DOD established business rules designed to protect dwell time. The Service Chiefs, combatant commanders, OSD, the Chairman, and ultimately the Secretary of Defense review any deployment order that exceeds dwell time goals; extends a unit in theater more than 14 days beyond what they were originally told; or is longer than 365 days. These individual reviews look for other ways we can meet the requirement without breaking a given unit’s dwell. Frequently, options include similarly capable units, volunteers, and task organizing units to shield components that were deployed more recently than their parent unit.

We currently have a deploy-to-dwell time of 1:1 and that will increase to 1:2 by October 2011 for all Active Duty members. The goal for reservists is 1:5.
Senator BEGICH. Mr. Panetta, in your view, will the Army and Marine Corps planned manpower decreases facilitate the attainment of DOD’s dwell time objectives? If so, how? If not, do the cuts make sense?

Mr. PANETTA. The dwell times for our deploying forces are primarily driven by our commitment in Afghanistan and other operations around the world. I will take into consideration the conditions on the ground and our ability to meet our strategic objectives before deciding the appropriate course of action for force reductions. I will continue to monitor dwell times and future manpower reductions as we move forward.

In the meantime, the Department will continue to use existing processes to carefully vet all deployment orders that unduly burden our servicemembers. This series of individual reviews, from the Service Chiefs up to me, carefully considers all viable options for mitigating deployment stress. Where there are no viable alternatives I ultimately consider the criticality of the requirement, relative to the harmful effects of the deployment. Unfortunately, we have not been able to eliminate dwell shortfalls completely and this concerns me. The Department must continue to look for solutions in order to maintain this superb force.

Senator BEGICH. Mr. Panetta, what should be the goal for dwell time?

Mr. PANETTA. The Department goal for dwell time for our Active component is a ratio of 1:2. The goal for our Reserve component is a ratio of 1:5.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS COLLABORATION

Senator BEGICH. Mr. Panetta, Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of Veterans Affairs Shinseki have pledged to improve and increase collaboration between their respective departments to support military servicemembers as they transition to veteran status, in areas of health and mental health care, disability evaluation, and compensation. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs collaborate?

Mr. PANETTA. I understand significant improvements have been made in DOD–VA collaboration in the last few years, but much work remains to be done. I will ensure that DOD continues to work closely with VA to support servicemembers and their families, and I look forward to working with Secretary Shinseki.

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Senator BEGICH. Mr. Panetta, the number of suicides in each of the Services has increased in recent years. The Army released a report in July 2010 that analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In addition, studies conducted by the Army of soldiers and marines in theater are showing declines in individual morale and increases in mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced multiple deployments. The 4/25 in Alaska has experienced one confirmed suicide and two suspected suicides within the last month. This brigade has experienced a high operational tempo and will deploy again late this year. These incidents are tragic, unfortunate, and impact the entire unit. In your view, what role should DOD play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members of the Reserve components?

Mr. PANETTA. The Department should play an active role in shaping policies to help prevent suicide no matter where it may occur and whether they are Active, Reserve, or Guard. Suicide prevention is a very important issue within the Department. Each Service acknowledges the important role that leaders, both officer and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO), play in building resilience among those under their command. At the OSD level, we have established a working group to better integrate the efforts and programs across Services. To this end, we are specifically looking at training leadership, effective peer-to-peer programs, and outreach to Guard and Reserve members. As Secretary, I will ensure the Department is fully engaged on this issue.

ENERGY SECURITY

Senator BEGICH. Mr. Panetta, the 2010 QDR identified energy security as one of four key priorities for reform because doing so will reduce risks to military personnel, safeguard strategic interests, and ensure troop readiness. Recognizing this, General Petraeus recently issued guidance to the troops in Afghanistan asking them...
to reduce energy consumption. I know DOD and the Services understand how vulnerable our reliance on oil, especially oil from foreign countries, has made us as a Nation and are taking many steps to alleviate dependency. However, the bottom line is the military needs access to fossil fuels for energy needs. I prefer those sources to be domestic instead of overseas to ensure access and strengthen our national security. Please describe your view of how reliance on foreign oil for fuel impacts the military and national security.

Mr. Panetta. America’s dependence on foreign oil and fossil fuels puts our national security at risk. For DOD, our reliance on oil shapes our missions—both strategically and tactically. This is especially true because we seek to purchase fuel as close to the fight as possible—for both financial and operational reasons. Because assured access to energy is a core part of fighting and winning the Nation’s wars, we can and must do better as a Department in improving the efficiency of our use and the range of energy alternatives available to our forces.

Success in this area will not come easily for DOD. But global energy trends make success imperative. They include the rising global demand for energy, changing geopolitics, and new threats, which mean that the cost and availability of conventional energy sources will be less certain in the future. By changing the way we power the force now and in the future, America will have a military that is better able to project and sustain power around the world for the full spectrum of military missions.

35. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what is your understanding of steps that have been taken to alleviate consumption of oil for current operations and what impact have those efforts had?

Mr. Panetta. DOD components are taking steps to include energy as a consideration in how they organize, train, and equip the Nation’s warfighters. In June 2011, the Department released its initial “Operational Energy Strategy.” The Strategy is the DOD roadmap for transforming energy use in military operations and improving energy security for the warfighter. Additionally, the Services have each produced mission-specific energy strategies. Components are implementing these strategies to improve their energy use.

The Department is taking steps to better track energy use, and is testing and fielding systems to reduce the energy demand of our forces and use alternate sources. Our technical initiatives include smart micro-grids; energy-efficient shelters; solar energy; fuel cells; waste-to-energy systems; hybrid engines; lightweight and low drag materials; improved power generation and distribution; and energy storage solutions. In addition, the Department is making non-materiel changes, such as better aircraft routing and loading.

Many of these efforts are being fielded now and are making immediate operational gains.

36. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, in your view, what remains to be done?

Mr. Panetta. DOD is the Nation’s single largest user of energy. In 2010, the Department consumed over 5 billion gallons of petroleum fuels for military operations.

For the long term, if we are to significantly reduce our volume of fuel use, we must systematically consider the risks and costs associated with our energy use as we build the future force. As our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, we cannot assume secure logistics. The Department must integrate energy security considerations into the full range of planning and force development activities, including the requirements and acquisition processes.

Congress has given the Department the statutory tools it needs to implement this change, and we are beginning to do so. If the Department requires additional authority, I will not hesitate to seek the necessary Congressional authorization.

37. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, what steps will you take to alleviate dependency on foreign sources of energy, and ultimately decrease reliance on oil for fuel?

Mr. Panetta. While the Department is a significant consumer of energy, it only accounts for about 1 percent of the energy all Americans use. The cost of America’s national energy consumption, particularly oil, is too high, both in the billions of dollars the Nation sends overseas, the geostrategic consequences, and costs to the warfighter. The solutions to the Nation’s energy challenges require action at every level of Government as well as from the private industry and every American. The Department has an opportunity to reduce these costs by achieving energy efficiencies while leading the way for the Nation by focusing on warfighter requirements.
PRIORITIES AND CHALLENGES

38. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, what priorities will you establish?

Mr. Panetta. My top priority as Secretary of Defense is to ensure the security of the American people.

We face a number of challenges: first, prevailing in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the fight against al Qaeda; second, keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations; third, preparing to counter future military threats; fourth, preserving the finest fighting force in the world and taking care of servicemembers and their families; and fifth, continuing the reforms DOD's leadership has initiated which will be crucial in this time of budget constraints.

39. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, what do you believe will be your greatest challenge? Do you have a plan for addressing that challenge?

Mr. Panetta. We must ensure that we prevail in the conflicts in which we are now engaged. In Afghanistan, we must continue to degrade the Taliban, train the Security Forces, and help the government take ownership for the country's progress and security. And in Iraq, we must assure that the Iraqi military and security forces are prepared to safeguard their nation.

As we do that, I am very aware that we must be highly disciplined in how we spend the taxpayer's precious resources. The days of unlimited defense budgets are over. Our challenge will be to design budgets that eliminate wasteful and duplicative spending while protecting those core elements we need for our Nation's defense. I do not believe that we have to choose between strong fiscal discipline and strong national defense. We owe it to our citizens to provide both.

I will also be a tireless advocate for our troops and their families. It is their sacrifice and dedication that have earned the respect of a grateful nation, and inspired a new generation to wear the uniform of our country. They put their lives on the line to fight for America, and I will just as surely fight for them and for the families who support and sustain them.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

40. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Panetta, in conflicts around the world, rape of women and girls has become one of the most horrific weapons of choice used systematically to attack civilians, devastate families, and destabilize societies. Violence against women and girls is frequently an early indicator of repressive regimes and instability and it is often an obstacle to security, stabilization, and the development of a sustainable peace. Despite the recognition of rape as a war crime, a crime against humanity, and a form of genocide, over the years the brutality and frequency of this crime has only increased.

Could you describe the steps taken by DOD to:

• incorporate training on prevention and response into the basic training curricula of foreign military forces and judicial officials;
• ensure that U.S. assistance to units involved in regional or multilateral peacekeeping operations includes such training; and
• incorporate training on preventing and responding to violence against women and girls when U.S. military personnel, military contractors, and military observers are to be deployed in humanitarian relief, conflict, and post-conflict settings.

Mr. Panetta. DOD recognizes that sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), particularly when used as a tactic of war, is not only a human rights issue, but also an obstacle to conflict resolution and lasting security. DOD has taken important steps to build the capacity of partner militaries, as well as DOD personnel, to prevent and respond to SGBV. The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) provides training on prevention and response to SGBV to foreign military units receiving security assistance from the United States. DIILS addresses SGBV as part of seminars such as “Human Rights and the Law of Armed Conflict” and “Developing a Professional Military Force.” In addition, geographic Combatant Commands provide targeted training to address specific country contexts. For example, DIILS and U.S. Africa Command train military judicial personnel in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to investigate and prosecute SGBV crimes.

As part of its efforts to build the capacity of partner countries to participate in international peacekeeping operations, the Global Peace Operations Initiative
(GPOI) provides training to peacekeepers to protect civilians from SGBV. Geographic Combatant Commands implement half of GPOI activities, which are funded by DOS.

U.S. personnel also receive pre-deployment training on preventing and responding to SGBV. Training on combating trafficking in persons (TIP) and on sexual assault prevention and response are required, including risk-reduction factors in specific deployment locations. Combatant Commands and the Military Departments also provide mission-specific pre-deployment training that addresses SGBV. For example, all personnel who deploy to U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility are required to take the “Human Rights Awareness Education” training prior to deployment. U.S. Southern Command’s training module includes TIP specific scenarios, information on identifying victims, and appropriate responses.

DOD is developing an action plan on women, peace, and security to build on current efforts, including integration of prevention and response to SGBV into training of partner militaries, peacekeepers, and DOD personnel. This will be integrated into the National Action Plan that the National Security Staff is developing with DOS, USAID, and DOD.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

ENERGY REQUIREMENTS

41. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Panetta, section 526 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110–140) stated:

“Procurement and Acquisition of Alternative Fuels. No Federal agency shall enter into a contract for procurement of an alternative or synthetic fuel, including a fuel produced from nonconventional petroleum sources, for any mobility-related use, other than for research or testing, unless the contract specifies that the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions associated with the production and combustion of the fuel supplied under the contract must, on an ongoing basis, be less than or equal to such emissions from the equivalent conventional fuel produced from conventional petroleum sources.”

This provision effectively prevents DOD from procuring petroleum from Canadian tar sands sources, a vital energy supplier for the DOD mobility-related uses at our military bases along the northern tier of the United States. DOD has apparently ignored this provision as it has proven unworkable and completely unresponsive to the budgetary constraints and wartime needs of DOD. I might add that President Obama at Georgetown on March 30, 2011, stated: “I set this goal knowing that we’re still going to have to import some oil. It will remain an important part of our energy portfolio for quite some time, until we’ve gotten alternative energy strategies fully in force. And when it comes to the oil we import from other nations, obviously we’ve got to look at neighbors, like Canada and Mexico that are stable and steady and reliable sources.” If confirmed, would you support DOD’s current actions to receive and use oil from Canada, a strategic ally and trading partner?

Mr. PANETTA. My understanding of this issue is that this particular provision has not prevented the Department from meeting our energy needs. I am also told that this is an area of active litigation for the Department, so it would be inappropriate for me to comment further on this issue.

42. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Panetta, in your view, what would be the burden placed on DOD from a fiscal perspective and on DOD contracting personnel if required to enforce a strict compliance to section 526 of EISA?

Mr. PANETTA. My understanding is that the Department is already in strict compliance with the provision.

43. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Panetta, would you support legislative action that would repeal section 526 of EISA?

Mr. PANETTA. This is an issue I look forward to learning more about. I can say that energy security and, increasingly, climate change are key issues for the 21st century defense missions. As the 2010 QDR stated, “although they produce distinct types of challenges, climate change, energy security, and economic stability are inextricably linked.” Climate change and associated extreme weather events act as an accelerant of instability around the world, which places demands on civil and military institutions. As we make decisions about how we assure that U.S. forces have a reliable supply of energy, now and in the future, the Department must balance both energy security and climate security considerations.
44. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in your answers provided to the committee prior to this hearing, you responded to a question about the impact of defense spending reductions on our national security by stating “I will work to make disciplined decisions in ways that minimize impacts on our national security. But it must be understood that a smaller budget means difficult choices will have to be made. DOD is in the process of working through fiscal year 2011 with about $20 billion less than what was requested by the President.” If confirmed, what priorities will guide the comprehensive review and these difficult decisions?

Mr. Panetta. I will ensure that we protect our essential military capabilities while continuing to pursue additional efficiencies, streamline operations, control acquisition cost growth, and identify lower priority efforts that can be eliminated or curtailed. That said, difficult choices will have to be made to live within a reduced Defense topline.

45. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, how would you propose reining in spending in the short-term?

Mr. Panetta. Each defense program must be assessed in terms of its contribution to the national security strategy. I will continue the effort begun by Secretary Gates to seek efficiencies, eliminate overhead, control costs, and identify lower priority efforts.

46. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, is it time to stop the spending sprees that mark the end of each fiscal year for DOD program managers trying to spend every dime they have before funds expire?

Mr. Panetta. I will vigorously investigate any indication of wasteful year-end spending.

47. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what would you do to eliminate wasteful spending?

Mr. Panetta. I will build on the efficiencies identified by Secretary Gates and work with the Department’s leadership to manage defense spending prudently. Reducing spending on any lower priority programs, or programs that are no longer needed, will be a key component of that management effort.

48. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, Admiral Mullen stated recently that in the search for $400 billion in savings that “two of the big places the money is, is in pay and benefits.” He warned against the “relatively easy” choice of cutting hardware while maintaining the increasing costs of pay and health care for military personnel, retirees, and their dependents and asserted that “all things are on the table.” In your advance policy questions, you talked about the need for a “comprehensive review of the military pay and benefits structure to determine where costs can be contained.” Do you agree with Admiral Mullen that personnel costs have to be included in the search for a solution to the response to a smaller DOD budget?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, everything must be on the table. Any such effort should take into consideration that the Nation must continue to attract and support our men and women in uniform and their families in a wide variety of situations.

BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES

49. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, as you may know, DOD is required by law to complete base realignments and closures (BRAC) resulting from the 2005 BRAC round by September 15, 2011. Are you committed to DOD’s compliance with the BRAC deadline established by law to the maximum extent practicable?

Mr. Panetta. Yes. Of the 222 recommendations forwarded by the Commission to the President, the Department has a handful of recommendations facing scheduling challenges. The Department is working diligently to ensure we satisfy our BRAC legal obligations.

In order to ensure no disruption to the full and complete implementation of each of the recommendations facing scheduling challenges, as well as continuity of operations, the Department has requested legislation that would provide the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense with limited authority to extend the BRAC implementation period for up to 10 recommendations, for up to a year, when such an extension is necessary to ensure the operational readiness of units or functions being relocated as part of the recommendation. This legislation would not modify the substance of any BRAC recommendation nor would it eliminate the legal obligation to fully implement each recommendation; it merely would provide the Sec-
Secretary or Deputy Secretary with limited authority to extend the implementation period.

50. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in your opinion, given the need to find another $400 billion over the next 12 years, should DOD conduct another round of BRAC to reduce excess infrastructure?

Mr. Panetta. It is my understanding the Department has not asked for authorization for another Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) and is very single-mindedly focused on the current one and meeting current deadlines. Whether another round of BRAC is needed is something I will assess.

DEFENSE FUNDS EARMARKED FOR NON-DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS

51. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in these times of fiscal austerity where DOD is making hard decisions about savings and efficiencies, DOD should not be spending DOD funds on non-DOD requirements like local roads, financial support for parks and recreation areas, and many other worthy causes that have no connection to military readiness. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure that funds provided to DOD are spent only on essential defense and national security requirements?

Mr. Panetta. If confirmed, I will ensure that the President’s Budget requests will reflect the level of funding that is required to meet essential defense and national security requirements each year. Once funds are appropriated, I will ensure that the Department will execute funds in accordance with the legislative direction provided in the annual appropriations acts.

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

52. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, the current DOD policy of relying on market forces to sustain the health of the industrial base may not account for instances where DOD is the sole customer for military unique weapons. Do you intend to continue the current initiative to develop an industrial base strategy?

Mr. Panetta. The Department recognizes the defense industrial base is more global, commercial, and financially complex than ever before.

The Department regularly addresses specific industrial-base concerns within programs and services and has also embarked on a more comprehensive sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier analysis of the industrial base. This approach will help inform future programmatic decisions, expand the scope of the Department’s industrial base assessments, and create a database on industry for use as an input to many decision-making processes across the Department.

53. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, such a strategy will work best if there is open communication between defense officials and industry leaders so that industry can shape itself to meet the needs of DOD. Secretary Gates began a Secretary/Chief Executive Officer (CEO) dialogue to facilitate that communication. Do you intend to continue that dialogue?

Mr. Panetta. I am committed to maintaining an open dialogue with industry and increasing the transparency within which we operate to the maximum extent permitted by law.

54. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, the current export control regime is seen by some as reducing U.S. industries’ global competitiveness. What actions do you believe are necessary to be taken to improve the export control regime?

Mr. Panetta. There are compelling national security arguments for fundamentally changing the regulations and procedures we have had in place since the Cold War for determining what weapons and dual-use equipment and technology may be exported and under what terms. Over the years, we have made incremental changes—but this has not been adequate. We need to establish new rules, organizations, and processes that deal effectively and efficiently with 21st century challenges. This is the basis for the “four singles” of the administration’s export control reform effort: a single export control list, a single licensing agency, a single enforcement coordination agency, and a single information technology system for export licensing. The export control reform initiative is focused on protecting sensitive items and technologies that are the U.S. “crown jewels.” By doing so, we would be better able to monitor and enforce controls on technology transfers with real security implications, while helping to speed the provision of equipment to allies and partners who fight alongside us in coalition operations. This revised export control system,
based on revised controls and new licensing policies and procedures, would allow
U.S. companies to compete more effectively in the world marketplace.

MILITARY SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION

55. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, DOD is currently embarked on a $4.0 billion
investment plan over the next 5 years to address the deteriorated facilities conditions
of K–12 schools maintained and operated by DOD Education Activity
(DODEA). The urgent requirement was revealed in a study requested by this com-
mittee which assessed the condition of DODEA schools worldwide and the impact
of underinvestment of funding for replacements and renovations. As a result, Sec-
retary Gates established a priority to ensure that the children of our military per-
sonnel are provided the best education opportunities in world-class facilities with
the most current technology available. If confirmed, will you continue this firm and
comprehensive commitment of funds over the next 5 years to upgrade DODEA
schools?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will continue to commit to funds for upgrading DODEA
schools. As Secretary Gates recognized, I too believe we have an obligation to pro-
vide a quality education to dependents of our servicemembers, and part of this is
ensuring the facilities are in good condition.

56. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what goals would you expect DODEA to main-
tain in carrying out the upgrade and modernization of K–12 schools owned by
DODEA?

Mr. Panetta. The Department’s goal is to provide schools that will best showcase
a 21st century education. We can do this by enhancing the curriculum to better sup-
port Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) programs, and use tech-
nology to create a teaching environment that would increase student performance.
Our future schools will focus on how to best improve student learning and incor-
porate features that can transition schools to a facility that incorporates various
teaching tools to accommodate differentiated learning to benefit all students.

57. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, should our commitment to quality K–12 edu-
cation facilities extend to the use of DOD funds to improve schools owned and oper-
ated by local school districts?

Mr. Panetta. It is DOD policy to first rely on local education agencies to provide
for the education of military children. In some locations, the Department has been
able to make property on its installations available for local educational agencies to
construct, operate, and maintain local schools. While the Department continues to
believe that school maintenance and repair is a local responsibility, it cannot ignore
the fact that its children are currently being educated in less than ideal facilities.
Recognizing this, Congress recently appropriated $250 million “to make grants, con-
clude cooperative agreements, or supplement other Federal funds to construct, ren-
ovate, repair, or expand elementary and secondary public schools on military instal-
lations in order to address capacity or facility condition deficiencies at such schools.”

The Department is reviewing needs of local schools on bases to determine which
have the most serious facility deficiencies.

58. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what guidelines for DOD investment would you
establish to manage the funding provided to local districts?

Mr. Panetta. As required by section 8109 of Public Law 112–10, the Department
will give “priority consideration to those military installations with schools having
the most serious capacity or facility condition deficiencies.” We are implementing
this requirement and will manage the Department’s investment accordingly.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

59. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, the business processes and systems at DOD
lack the controls and discipline necessary for DOD to produce auditable financial
statements. This impacts the quality and timeliness of information you will be re-
ceiving for critical decisions around how to best utilize taxpayers’ money. Secretary
Gates recently conveyed his frustration on this issue in a speech before the Amer-
ican Enterprise Institute. What specific actions do you plan to take to ensure DOD
achieves the September 2017 date for obtaining an audit opinion of DOD’s financial
statements?

Mr. Panetta. I intend to ensure the DOD financial statements are audited as
soon as possible. Financial statement audit opinions provide the public a measure
of confidence in the financial management of Federal agencies. They provide an independent assessment of the accuracy of financial information that management relies upon to make critical decisions.

I understand DOD has a plan to improve processes and systems in order to provide reliable and accurate financial information and financial statement audit opinions. I plan to ensure this effort receives the right amount of leadership attention and resources across all functional areas.

60. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, Secretary Gates set in motion a focus on eliminating inefficiencies in DOD. The reductions he levied across the Services may not achieve their intended results in view of the fact that DOD did not assess how they could do business more efficiently and with less cost, but instead levied budget cuts in areas with the least resistance or complexity. It is imperative in the current and foreseeable future of downward budgets that DOD makes reductions in their spending in areas where solid business cases justify the reductions. We cannot afford to have decisions made without understanding the impacts of reductions on the overall mission of DOD. What actions will you take to ensure that any decline in DOD’s budget is achieved in a responsible manner that supports DOD’s mission?

Mr. Panetta. I will be guided by the objective of ensuring the Department continues to meet its responsibility to support the national security strategy. A strategy-driven approach is essential and the ongoing comprehensive review seeks to do that. I will continue the initiative to find additional efficiencies and eliminate lower priority programs. However, it must be understood that difficult choices will have to be made.

61. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what are the opportunities you envision to consolidate administrative and leadership functions of the various agencies or DOD enterprises? One example could be the consolidation of the Defense Contract Management Agency and Defense Contract Audit Agency under one leadership function with two operating arms.

Mr. Panetta. I intend to continue Secretary Gates’ effort to make the Department more efficient. As part of this effort, I will explore ways to consolidate functions in a manner that will still support defense requirements.

MILITARY UNIFORM AND APPEARANCE POLICIES

62. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, military leaders have expressed concern about the provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and whether it should apply to the uniform and personnel appearance standards of military members. The requirements of military discipline, unit cohesion, use of emergency protective equipment, and so on, have produced insistence on uniform standards over many years. Out of concern about the ability of DOD to prevail in litigation challenging the applicability of the RFRA to the Armed Forces, the administration forwarded a legislative proposal that would amend title 10 to specify that the language of the RFRA does not apply to the military. What are your views about the importance of this issue and the need for legislation to address this problem?

Mr. Panetta. I understand the important and delicate balance that must be struck between accommodating religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith and maintaining the military’s uniform grooming and appearance standards. I will work with the leaders of the Military Services to achieve that balance.

HEALTH CARE COSTS

63. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in response to the advance policy questions you stated: “In the long term, the promotion of healthy life styles and prevention among our beneficiaries is one way to help reduce the demand for health services.” Do you agree that tobacco use adversely affects military performance and the health of DOD’s beneficiary population?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I agree. The negative health effects that are commonly known about tobacco use, such as lung cancer and heart disease, certainly adversely affect those military and civilian beneficiaries who use these products. As such, I understand the Department offers programs to assist servicemembers and their families in quitting this habit.
64. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what is the rationale for DOD selling tobacco products to servicemembers, retirees, and their families at a discounted rate in military exchanges and commissaries?

Mr. Panetta. While DOD policies recognize that tobacco use is detrimental to health and readiness, the rationale for the discount is similar to other discounts we provide the servicemembers: to provide savings on products they use.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 directed the Department to develop a smoking cessation benefit to encourage users to quit or reduce their tobacco use. Moving forward, we will build strategic partnerships with all the Military Services to support the smoking cessation benefit. DOD continues to actively encourage servicemembers to quit tobacco and many military treatment facilities offer treatment and classes to assist with quitting.

65. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, is it time to reassess this policy in order to achieve your goal of healthy lifestyles and prevention for DOD beneficiaries, and if confirmed, would you pledge to do so?

Mr. Panetta. I will ensure that the Department undertakes a thorough policy review to identify the best strategies to reduce the impact of tobacco products on our servicemembers and their families. The Department must support healthy lifestyles as a means of sustaining the health of our servicemembers and their families.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

66. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, the National Guard provides unique capacity-building capabilities through its State Partnership Program (SPP). SPP specifically supports both combatant commanders’ and U.S. ambassadors’ strategic objectives by establishing sustainable relationships with critical partner nations around the world. SPP started back in the early 1990s as part of European Command’s engagement plan with former Warsaw Pact nations; SPP has grown and is now engaged with 62 nations around the world. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) has been developing an updated overall strategic plan for SPP that looks at the world today and where we should be engaging with SPP. One of those areas is the continent of Africa which currently has only eight active partnership programs. Although the SPP has great potential, cumbersome statutory limits and unsteady funding streams have hamstrung positive efforts. I have been working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), NGB, DOS, and others to deconflict the statutes currently severely limiting how and where guardsmen can operate when operating in the SPP. What are your views of our SPP?

Mr. Panetta. The SPP is an excellent security cooperation tool that provides valuable training and experience to National Guard members through interactions with foreign counterparts. The SPP contributes significantly to achieving U.S. national security goals by building partner capacity globally, and by providing unique, niche capabilities in direct support to the Geographic Combatant Commanders and U.S. Chiefs of Mission in fulfilling their theater and country engagement objectives. In addition to building a partner nation’s capacity, the SPP forges personal relationships between the individual National Guard members and foreign government personnel, creating an enduring bond that, over time, fosters trust between the organizations involved.

67. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you continue to work on improving and expanding this program, to include statute and funding changes?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will. Over the past 2 years, OSD has been working on a Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) that describes the use of DOD appropriated funds for State Department Partnership Program activities. They are in the final stage of completing the DTM which will be the basis for a new DOD Instruction on the State Department Partnership Program. During the creation of the DTM, we discovered that there are a few limitations that need to be addressed in legislation to allow us to conduct State Department Partnership Program engagements more effectively in the area of defense related activities. We will work to propose legislation that will allow us to expand our ability to conduct these State Department Partnership Program activities to build and strengthen our partner capabilities and relationships.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS

68. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, I have been one of the strongest supporters of our security assistance and engagement programs, whether it is foreign military financing and sales (FMF and FMS), international military education (IMET), or our train-and-equip programs. These programs have been extremely effective programs, executed predominantly by DOD in close coordination with DOS. Our military-to-military (1206), civilian-to-civilian (1207), small-scale Special Forces (1208), Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), and Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (CCIF) have proven to be vital resources in aiding developing countries in the professionalization of their militaries, fighting terrorism, and providing resources for emergency situations. A key to these programs has been that the engagements are worked by both DOS and DOD, chiefs of mission, and combatant commanders working together to increase the capabilities of our partner nations to provide for their own security, increasing stability in their region and around the globe. Are you familiar with these programs? If yes, what is your opinion of them?

Mr. PANETTA. Yes, I am familiar with these programs. Building our foreign partners’ capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations and creating an environment inhospitable to terrorists and insurgents are among the major elements of Geographic Combatant Commanders’ strategies to counter terrorism and instability around the world. Enabling our foreign partners to provide for their own security and contribute to multilateral security efforts is an investment that pays immediate and long-term dividends by reducing the need for costlier U.S. interventions in response to turmoil in regions critical to U.S. interests. As you note, collaboration between the Departments of State and Defense in formulating and implementing these programs is a key factor in their success, and promotes effective use of taxpayers’ dollars by combining the expertise and abilities of personnel from across the Executive Branch. The security challenges facing partner countries are linked to multiple parts of the security sector, including the military, police, and judiciary. I look forward to working with Congress and my counterparts in the administration to fulfill this shared responsibility to build partner nation security capability and capacity.

69. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, would you continue to support investment by DOD in these programs?

Mr. PANETTA. Yes, I believe that continuing to engage with foreign partners through counterterrorism and capacity-building efforts, and maintaining strong international security relationships, will continue to be an imperative for DOD. Enabling other countries to provide for their own security and contribute to multilateral security efforts is an investment that pays immediate and long-term dividends by reducing the need for costlier U.S. interventions in response to turmoil in regions critical to U.S. interests. As you note, collaboration between the Departments of State and Defense in formulating and implementing these programs is a key factor in their success, and promotes effective use of taxpayers’ dollars by combining the expertise and abilities of personnel from across the Executive Branch. The security challenges facing partner countries are linked to multiple parts of the security sector, including the military, police, and judiciary. I look forward to working with Congress and my counterparts in the administration to fulfill this shared responsibility to build partner nation security capability and capacity.

70. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, DOD and DOS are working on a proposal to pool funding for security assistance into three long-term funds totaling as much as $2 billion. This proposal would provide long-term funding vice the year-to-year funding that has had a negative impact on our current engagement programs. However, there are issues with how the funding is pooled by the two departments, who has oversight in Congress, and how will the funds get executed in a timely and consistent manner. If confirmed, can you provide an update on the status of this proposal and how you will resolve funding, oversight, and execution issues?

Mr. PANETTA. I would be happy to update the committee regarding this proposal and the administration’s efforts to resolve the issues you mention.

The proposal to create a Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) was included in the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request. The proposal represents more than a year’s work within the administration to develop a new business model for addressing security sector assistance requirements within the budget cycle. It also reflects an appreciation for the degree to which defense, diplomacy, and development must be better integrated so that U.S. assistance programs are more effective and targeted in an era of transnational challenges and rapidly changing dynamics.
I look forward to working with Congress to address any outstanding concerns regarding the GSCF.

AFGHANISTAN

71. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, various press reports state that administration officials are considering withdrawing from Afghanistan more rapidly than currently planned. Secretary Gates said this weekend in Afghanistan that pulling out of Afghanistan too fast would threaten the gains made in the 18 months since the surge of 30,000 troops. Secretary Gates told marines in Afghanistan on Sunday, “If you guys and everybody keeps the pressure on, we can hang onto everything we’ve gained over the last year to 18 months, we can expand the security bubble beyond that. . . . We have succeeded in stopping the Taliban’s momentum . . . but we’ve just kind of turned that corner and I think we need to keep the pressure on.” In Kabul, he appealed for patience and said that only modest U.S. troop reductions would make sense this summer in a still unstable Afghanistan. U.S. and coalition commanders I met on the ground in Afghanistan have repeatedly told me that it’s too early to make major changes on the ground, and some believe it will take until the end of this fighting season to get a true assessment of the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan. I trust our military leadership to make the right decision based on their assessment of the conditions on the ground. Some argue that, with Osama bin Laden dead, our mission in Afghanistan is complete. The killing of Osama bin Laden was a great victory, but our mission in Afghanistan is to ensure that it can never again become a staging area for terrorist attacks against the American Homeland.

What conditions must be met in July 2011 to determine the extent of a U.S. troop drawdown?

Mr. PANETTA. The conditions for determining the extent of the drawdown include progress on several interrelated aspects of our counterinsurgency strategy, such as reversing the Taliban’s momentum, denying the Taliban access to and control of key population centers and lines of communication, disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and denying al Qaeda safe haven, and developing the ANSF and their capability to manage a degraded insurgency. We have made progress in each of these areas sufficient to enable the President to make his decision about the drawdown and its extent.

72. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, which conditions have been met?

Mr. PANETTA. There has been progress across the range of factors and in some cases substantial progress. For example, the momentum has shifted to the Coalition & ANSF and together we have degraded the Taliban’s capability and achieved significant security gains, especially in the Taliban’s heartland in the south. These security gains are enabling key political initiatives to make progress. We have begun a transition process that will ultimately put Afghans in the lead for security nationwide by 2014. The growth in the quantity and quality of the ANSF—which have fielded more than 100,000 additional forces over the past 18 months—is one of the critical conditions that is enabling the drawdown of U.S. surge forces. We are beginning to see reintegration and reconciliation processes gain traction, and we are discussing a strategic partnership with the Afghans to signal our enduring commitment to regional peace and stability.

73. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, what conditions would cause you to ask President Obama to delay the withdrawal of troops?

Mr. PANETTA. At this time, the progress that has been achieved has established conditions necessary for the President to make his drawdown decision on schedule.

74. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, are there future planned decision points after July 2011 that will be used to determine further reductions in U.S. troop commitments?

Mr. PANETTA. Beyond the President’s immediate drawdown decision, commanders will need to make recommendations for decisions regarding the overall pace and shape of the transition to Afghan security. Those decisions will depend upon continued progress and conditions on the ground.

75. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, what conditions must be met in 2014 to transition to Afghan control?

Mr. PANETTA. Transition will begin this July in seven districts and provinces and then spread throughout the country by the end of 2014. The exact conditions for en-
tering and completing the transition process in a given area will vary across the
country, reflecting the differences across Afghanistan. The ability of the ANSF's to
carry out lead security responsibilities effectively is a central consideration as are
the abilities of Afghan institutions of government, especially at the provincial and
district levels, to meet the basic needs of citizens for dispute resolution and eco-
nomic development.

76. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what are the minimum conditions that must be
achieved in Afghanistan, in order for Afghans to be able to sustain stability with
relatively limited international assistance?

Mr. Panetta. One of the most critical preconditions for Afghans to maintain a
stable, secure Afghanistan will be capable, professional ANSF. Although support for
the ANSF will continue to require international assistance for many years, security
forces continue to make significant progress, with increases in quantity, quality, and
operational capacity. Over time, as U.S., Coalition, and Afghan forces continue to
degrade the Taliban insurgency, the Afghan Government may be able to reduce the
size, and therefore cost, of the ANSF to address a diminished threat.

Another essential condition to build sustainability will be increased Afghan fiscal
self-sufficiency. External support will likely continue to be critical in the near and
medium-term to help mitigate shortfalls in infrastructure, human capacity, and se-
curity concerns. However, over time, as economic growth continues and Afghanistan
tax revenues increase, levels of required assistance should decline.

77. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what impact would a failure in Afghanistan
have on U.S. national security in the long term?

Mr. Panetta. Failure in Afghanistan would mean a return of the conditions that
resulted in Afghanistan becoming the safe haven from which al Qaeda plotted the
September 11 attacks against the United States. It would mean a perilous increase
in the security threats the United States faces from violent extremists, as well as
in the threats these groups pose to other countries in the region. Moreover, failure
in Afghanistan would undermine the credibility of U.S. security commitments else-
where around the world and jeopardize the national interests they are meant to pro-
tect.

78. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, during my visit over New Years, Afghan and
coalition personnel unanimously told me that setting the July 2011 timeline to begin
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan had a devastating effect on operations—
its sent the wrong signal to the Afghan people, our coalition partners, and the
Taliban. Do you believe the announcement of a July 2011 withdrawal date nega-
tively impacted operations?

Mr. Panetta. No. Establishing the July 2011 timeline to begin a conditions-based
drawdown of U.S. surge forces struck an appropriate and responsible balance be-
tween giving our commanders the resources they need to carry out the strategy and
communicating to the Afghans that they must step forward and take on the respon-
sibility for their own security. The timeline additionally undercuts claims that we
are occupiers and assures the American people that the mission is not open-ended.
The date also provided ample time for our forces to turn back the Taliban’s momen-
tum while building up capable ANSFs that are increasingly taking on responsibility
to hold and expand on the security gains achieved thus far.

MILITARY SPENDING

79. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, the Office of Management and Budget has
asked DOD for $400 billion in cuts through 2023 ... a 21⁄2 percent annual decrease
from current spending rates. These cuts would come solely out of base budget. On
May 25, 2011, Secretary Gates said at the American Enterprise Institute, “The
Reagan build-up of the 1980s fielded a new generation of weapons platforms that
continue to be the mainstay of the force today ... In contrast, the 1990s represented
basically a procurement holiday ... What remains are much-needed capabilities ... that our Nation’s civilian and military leadership deem absolutely critical. For ex-
ample: we must build a new tanker ... field a next generation strike [fighter] ... recapitalize the ground forces ... replace our ballistic missile submarines.” How will you
balance the pressure to cut defense spending with the military’s readiness and
acquisition priorities?

Mr. Panetta. I will ensure that future spending decisions are based on the De-
partment’s priorities, national security strategy, and a clear understanding of asso-
ciated risks. It is an important process where we must identify options for the Presi-
dent and Congress, to ensure that the Nation consciously acknowledges and accepts additional risk in exchange for reduced investment in its military.

80. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, what do you see as DOD's top readiness and acquisition priorities?

Mr. PANETTA. My top priority is ensuring that the warfighters have what they need to accomplish their missions and to provide for the national security of the United States.

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

81. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, throughout the post-World War II era, the United States has maintained its military leadership in large part as a result of its industrial leadership—particularly in aerospace and other defense industries. That leadership is due in large part to the employees of that industry—the engineers, scientists, and machinists. Maintaining this leadership in the future will require that DOD identify and communicate what it needs to counter future military threats. If confirmed, what will you do to map out the industrial policy and needs of DOD?

Mr. PANETTA. As Secretary of Defense, I will ensure DOD policies, procedures, and actions: (1) stimulate and support vigorous competition and innovation in the industrial base supporting defense; and (2) establish and sustain cost-effective industrial and technological capabilities that assure military readiness and superiority.

I will do so by: (1) monitoring industry readiness, competitiveness, ability to innovate, and financial stability as the Department moves to capabilities-based acquisitions; (2) leveraging DOD research and development, acquisition, and logistics decisions to promote innovation, competition, military readiness, and national security; (3) leveraging statutory processes (for example, the Defense Priorities and Allocations System; Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust evaluations; Exon-Florio Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States evaluations) and promoting innovation, competition, military readiness, and national security; (4) leading efforts for the Department to engage with industry to ensure openness and transparency; and (5) continuing our long history of supporting science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education initiatives in a collaborative process at local, regional, and national levels.

NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS

82. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, during the New START hearings, General Chilton was asked by Senator Feingold whether the New START treaty allowed the United States to “maintain a nuclear arsenal that is . . . more than is needed to guarantee an adequate deterrent.” General Chilton replied, “I think the arsenal that we have is exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent. . . . It is sized to be able to allow us to hedge against both technical failures in the current deployed arsenal and any . . . changes in the geopolitical environment that might cause us to need more weapons deployed.” Do you agree with General Chilton?

Mr. PANETTA. Over the last 50 years, U.S. nuclear strategy and force structure have continually evolved with the global-strategic environment. DOD will continue to assess the proper force size and capabilities required for an effective nuclear deterrent. The DOD is committed to sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent in an efficient and cost effective manner that maintains strategic deterrence and stability, strengthens regional deterrence, and assures our allies and partners.

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

83. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and during the discussion on the New START treaty, the administration made substantial commitments to the sustainment and modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Secretary Gates was a strong supporter of the nuclear triad and a robust modernization program: “In many ways, the primary threat to the effectiveness and credibility of the American deterrent is one that we control ourselves, and that is failing to invest adequately in our Nation’s nuclear weapon infrastructure, a point I have made a number of times in recent years.” Will you commit to the nuclear modernization plan (referred to as the 1251 plan) that was the basis for Senate support for the New START treaty?
Mr. PANETTA. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration’s plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.

84. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, will you support decisions for a follow-on nuclear bomber, air-launched cruise missile, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)?

Mr. PANETTA. I will continue the DOD commitment to sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that supports strategic deterrence and stability, strengthens regional deterrence, and assures our allies and partners in an efficient and cost-effective manner.

85. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, will you support modernization of our nuclear weapons laboratories and characterize such funding as “national security activities” as opposed to regular Department of Energy funding?

Mr. PANETTA. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration’s plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. As described in the 2010 NPR and in the Report pursuant to section 1251, modernization of the nuclear weapons infrastructure is a key element of the administration’s nuclear policy. This is exemplified by the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR–NF) and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), which, when fully operational, will support production of critical components needed to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile.

Funding for these activities is currently part of the Weapons Activities Account in the National Nuclear Security Administration budget; accordingly, it is already considered national security funding.

U.S. NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

86. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, the administration is reviewing nuclear deterrence requirements and nuclear targeting guidance with a goal of further nuclear reductions. This could precipitate a move away from longstanding nuclear doctrine characterized by a second-to-none approach, with flexible nuclear forces capable of providing the President a wide array of targeting options, to a minimum deterrence approach with too few forces that may lack credibility. The administration has called for a study of current nuclear deterrence requirements and nuclear targeting guidance. As the study progresses, will you make yourself and your staff available for regular briefings to describe the study?

Mr. PANETTA. Over the last 50 years, U.S. nuclear doctrine and targeting strategies have continually evolved with the global strategic environment. Every President since the beginning of the nuclear age has asked DOD to conduct such analyses and has used that information to inform updated planning guidance provided to DOD. We would be remiss if we did not re-examine our nuclear strategy in today’s dynamic security environment. It is my intention to keep Congress fully informed of U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy.

87. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, will you ensure that a thorough assessment is conducted, including analysis of the implications for reductions on stability and preserving a second-to-none capability?

Mr. PANETTA. Any future nuclear reductions must strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, maintain strategic deterrence and stability vis-a-vis Russia and China, and maintain the reliability and effectiveness of our security assurances to our allies and partners. In the NPR Report follow-on analysis, we will identify the force levels required to support those objectives and any potential risks associated with each.

88. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, will you commit to a careful consideration of the advice provided by our military leaders?

Mr. PANETTA. It is my intention to work with the military leadership to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

89. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, do you agree it is important to determine deterrence requirements and the types of forces necessary to achieve those requirements before engaging with the Russians in another round of nuclear reductions?
Mr. PANETTA. As noted in the 2010 NPR Report, any future nuclear reductions must strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, maintain strategic deterrence and stability vis-a-vis Russia and China, and maintain the credibility and effectiveness of our security assurances to our allies and partners. In the NPR Report follow-on analysis, DOD will identify the force levels needed to support those objectives and any potential risks associated with each. The analysis will help shape our negotiating position as further arms reduction agreements are considered.

90. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, will you pledge to provide detailed briefings to Congress on any future analysis in support of a future arms control negotiation?

Mr. PANETTA. It is my intention to keep Congress fully informed about developments in U.S. nuclear strategy and arms control policy.

91. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, in 1992, you voted as a Member of the House of Representatives to eliminate all U.S. non-strategic nuclear warheads. The policy of this administration is to maintain non-strategic weapons in Europe until such time that NATO consensus supports their removal. Will you confirm your support for the administration position?

Mr. PANETTA. As noted in the 2010 NPR Report, reassuring U.S. allies and partners is one of the key objectives of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and force posture. Any change in our nuclear posture will be considered in the context of our continuing need to assure our allies and partners of our commitment to their security. Any decision to change the status of U.S. nuclear forces committed to the defense of NATO would be after thorough review and consultations with NATO. I fully support the administration’s policy on this issue.

92. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, will you work to ensure that a nuclear-capable F–35 is developed to allow the continuation of that commitment?

Mr. PANETTA. Yes, I am committed to the development of a dual-capable F–35 fighter. DOD will carry out the direction stated in the 2010 NPR Report, that “the Air Force will retain a dual-capable fighter (the capability to deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons) as it replaces F–16s with the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter.”

As set out in the Report to Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the Air Force will continue to conduct the dual-capable aircraft mission with existing fighter aircraft until the F–35 is fielded.

SHIFT IN MISSILE DEFENSE

93. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, while directing that we sustain and enhance our ability to defend the Homeland against limited numbers of long-range ballistic missiles, the administration has made defending against regional threats “a top priority of our missile defense plans,” according to Secretary Gates. As a result, funding for the GMD system has steadily declined, while the two test failures of the GMD system in 2010 suggest the Missile Defense Agency is not doing nearly enough to sustain and enhance the system. GMD reductions include:

- Cutback deployment from 44 to 30 GBIs and cancellation of 10 GBIs in Poland;
- $500 million reduction to the GMD program in the fiscal year 2010 budget request;
- Fiscal years 2011–2015 funding for GMD declines by $600 million when compared to President’s budget last year; and
- Obama GMD budget for fiscal years 2010–2013 is $4 billion less than Bush fiscal years 2010–2013 planned budget.

Will you pledge to end this neglect of the GMD system and provide the attention and funding necessary to return the GMD system to full operational reliability and ensure the system is improved and modernized over time?

Mr. PANETTA. I will support the continued sustainment and improvement of the GMD system as a key priority. I share Secretary Gates’ view that the “protection of the United States from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical national security priority.” The current ballistic missile defense posture for the United States protects against ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea or Iran. Improvements to the existing sensors and software, in addition to the procurement of additional ground-based interceptors (GBIs) and radars, and the development of the
SM–3 IIB interceptor, will continue this protection against future ICBM threats from states like North Korea and Iran.

MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

94. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, will you commit to share with Congress, no later than 30 days after your confirmation:

- Missile defense and threat information provided to Russia, including in the NATO context;
- The draft Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement, including the Bush administration’s draft;
- The Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement that had been discussed with the Russians; and
- Analysis of the location of the AN/TPY–2 radar being considered for deployment in Turkey, and any other locations being considered by this and past administrations.

Mr. PANETTA. DOD and DOS have briefed Congress on cooperation efforts with Russia and efforts to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), including the deployment of the AN/TPY–2 radar, and will continue to do so.

Discussions on the draft Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement (DTCA) were initiated in 2004 at President Bush’s direction to establish a legal framework for purposes of conducting with Russia a broad range of defense-related cooperative research and development activities, which could include missile defense. The Obama administration has continued these efforts to negotiate and conclude a DTCA with Russia. A draft Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement (BMDCA), which Russia declined to negotiate, would have been a more limited form of the DTCA. These agreements were briefed in detail to Senate staff members in December 2010 during discussions as part of the Senate’s consideration of the New START treaty advice and consent to ratification. Finally, the United States only shares sensitive information with foreign countries in accordance with Foreign Disclosure laws and regulations.

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

95. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, in the 2010 NPR and during the discussion on the New START treaty, the administration made substantial commitments to the sustainment and modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Enhanced safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons stockpile, modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, and maintenance of the nuclear delivery systems are key to enabling maintaining our nuclear deterrence. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission stated it was alarmed by the disrepair and neglect of the nuclear weapons stockpile and complex. Secretary Gates warned in October 2008, there’s “no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.” We are the only major nuclear power not modernizing its’ weapons. Our weapons are an average of 26 years old and most are 15 or more years beyond design life. Secretary Gates was a strong supporter of the nuclear triad and a robust modernization program. Secretary Gates said, “In many ways, the primary threat to the effectiveness and credibility of the American deterrent is one that we control ourselves, and that is failing to invest adequately in our Nation’s nuclear weapon infrastructure, a point I have made a number of times in recent years.” Do you support the triad of bombers with gravity bombs and nuclear cruise missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and ICBMs?

Mr. PANETTA. I will continue the DOD commitment to sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that supports strategic stability in an efficient and cost-effective manner, deters regional threats, and assures allies and partners.

96. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, is it important to maintain a nuclear triad?

Mr. PANETTA. As stated in the 2010 NPR Report, each leg of the triad has unique advantages. I will continue the DOD commitment to sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that supports strategic stability in an efficient and cost-effective manner, strengthens regional deterrence, and assures our allies and partners.
315

97. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, are you committed to the nuclear modernization plan, referred to as the 1251 plan, that was the basis for Senate support for the New START treaty?

Mr. PANETTA. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration’s plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.

98. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, do you support modernization of our nuclear weapons labs?

Mr. PANETTA. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration’s plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. As described in the 2010 NPR Report and in the Report pursuant to section 1251, modernization of the nuclear weapons infrastructure, including the nuclear weapons laboratories, is a key element of the administration’s nuclear policy.

99. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, would you characterize this funding as national security activities?

Mr. PANETTA. Funding for activities needed to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile is currently part of the Weapons Activities Account in the National Nuclear Security Administration budget; accordingly, it is considered national security funding.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE GLOBAL THREAT

100. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, on January 6, 2011, Secretary Gates told Jim Lehrer that “I think [the thing] people need to remember is that providing for the common defense is an unambiguous Federal responsibility…. I would argue that defense is not the problem when it comes to the deficit. If you look at defense as a percentage of Federal expenditures or as a percentage of gross national product, we’re at a lower level, particularly for wartime, than we have been during any previous war, and as a percentage of the overall Federal budget, about where we have been for a number of years.” DOD is executing several efficiency initiatives to make the most of the limited budget it has been given but even those efficiencies will not allow the military to fully sustain operations, maintain the force, and modernize our equipment. DOD needs to fully fund current operations…. not just in Iraq and Afghanistan but at home and around the globe … this includes training and exercises. It needs to take care of its people … an exponentially growing cost. And it needs to modernize its aging fleet of ships, vehicles, and aircraft or spend increasing amounts of DOD dollars to sustain old equipment. The $400 million across-the-board cut favored by the administration next year does not take into account the risks to our national security or our ability to execute the national security strategy. During questioning about postponing weapon systems acquisition and maintenance at a hearing in front of the Senate Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Vice Admiral Burke said: “you can pay for it now or pay more for it later.” If confirmed, how will you ensure our military is postured to counter the full spectrum of national security threats?

Mr. PANETTA. This spring, President Obama announced a framework for deficit reduction. As part of that effort, the President set a goal of holding the growth in base national security spending slightly below inflation for the next 12 years, which would save about $400 billion. Although defense spending is not the source of the Nation’s current fiscal condition, it will have to be part of the national solution.

In April, Secretary Gates launched a comprehensive review to ensure that future spending decisions are focused on priorities, strategy, and risks, and are not simply a math and accounting exercise. He said, and I agree, that the choices we make in terms of reductions in defense and security spending must be made with a clear understanding of the potential risks and consequences of those choices.

The overarching goal of the comprehensive review is to preserve a U.S. military capable of meeting crucial national security priorities across the range of potential threats. This process seeks to inform and support decisions by the President and Congress and to ensure that the Nation consciously acknowledges and accepts the implications, including additional risk, of reduced investment in its military in an uncertain and still dangerous security environment. The defense of the United States and the American people is a sacred trust. I take the Nation’s defense very seriously, as I know all Members of Congress do. I look forward to working with
Congress to maintain a highly capable military that will protect and defend the United States and preserve security abroad, now and in the future.

101. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, are we on a path to continue acquiring the best systems and enough of those systems to meet the current requirements or does there need to be a change in our National Security Strategy modifying those requirements?

Mr. PANETTA. As Secretary Gates has stated, we must ensure that future defense spending decisions are strategically informed and focused on priorities and risks. With regard to capabilities, the Department over the past 2 years has cancelled acquisitions or curtailed modernization programs that were badly over budget, behind schedule, dependent on unproven technology, supplied a niche requirement that could otherwise be met, or were impractical in a rapidly changing security environment.

Particularly, amid declining resources, it is critically important that we continue the Department’s commitment to developing technology and fielding weapons systems that are affordable, versatile, and relevant to the range of threats in the decades to come. This approach is consistent with the 2010 National Security Strategy, which notes that “we will scrutinize our programs and terminate or restructure those that are outdated, duplicative, ineffective, or wasteful. The result will be more relevant, capable, and effective programs and systems that our military wants and needs.”

102. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, overall funding for procurement is down $6 billion in fiscal year 2012 (base budget and Overseas Contingency Operations) compared to the fiscal year 2011 Continuing Resolution. Research and development is down $5 billion and military construction is down $4 billion. What impact does this have on our future forces and the cost to recapitalize our infrastructure, vehicles, ships, aircraft, and other equipment 5 to 10 years down the road?

Mr. PANETTA. The impact is not precisely known at this time. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that limited Defense resources are used on those programs that will provide the warfighter with equipment and support that is needed to accomplish the national security mission of the United States. The Department will have to continue to identify ways to become more efficient so that scarce Defense resources are not wasted and the highest priorities are funded.

103. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, what impact will delaying modernization have on the cost of future weapons systems?

Mr. PANETTA. Any cost impacts associated with the pace of modernization would be highly dependent on the specific choices and implementation. This is an area I will be looking at closely.

FORCE REDUCTIONS

104. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, in January 2007, the end strength of the Army grew by 65,000 because we did not have enough ground forces to sustain operations. Two years later Congress approved a temporary increase in Army end strength of another 22,000. At the same time, we also grew the size of the Marine Corps by 27,000. DOD is projecting cutting the Army by 27,000 and Marine Corps by 20,000 between 2015 and 2016. Secretary Gates said this week that “… the worst thing in the world would be what was done in the 1970s and 1990s … give everybody in the military a same percentage cut across the board. That’s the way you hollow out the military. That’s the way you don’t have enough money for exercising or training, you don’t have enough money for tank miles or steaming days or flight hours … if we have to reduce the size of the military in some way, I want the level of excellence when we’re done to be at the same standard it is today.” I felt we cut our force too deep during the Clinton administration which resulted in our need to increase the force in 2007. In your answers to the advance policy questions, you state that “2 years as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director has made me realize that intelligence is often ambiguous.” I agree. Our crystal ball has been cloudy at best when it comes to anticipating impacts to our national and global security. Do you support cuts in Army and Marine Corps end strength?

Mr. PANETTA. Any reduction will need to be monitored and will be affected by security considerations around the globe and the readiness of our military.
105. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, do these cuts assume zero forces in Iraq in 2012 and zero forces in Afghanistan in 2014?
Mr. PANETTA. Any reductions in the Army and the Marines Corps will be based on security considerations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as around the globe.

106. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, are these personnel cuts being driven by budget constraints or based on national security requirements?
Mr. PANETTA. DOD has increased U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps end strengths in order to meet the demands generated by simultaneous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The planned cuts in their end strengths are deferred until after fiscal year 2015 to reflect our expectation that ground force requirements for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will be markedly lower after fiscal year 2015. Although realistic force planning must be mindful of resource constraints, it is driven by strategic considerations that assess the nature of challenges likely to be confronted in the future, the types of missions the U.S. Armed Forces will be required to perform, and the capabilities and capacities needed to execute those missions successfully.

GUANTANAMO BAY

107. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, I returned from my most recent visit to Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) on May 20, 2011. It was important for me to return to get an update on the operations and see firsthand the current conditions of the detention facilities and the detainees. I took six members who had never been to GTMO before. Each of them, regardless of party, came away with a greater appreciation for the work that is being done there. GTMO is the single greatest repository of human intelligence in the war on terror. This intelligence has prevented terrorist attacks, saved lives, and helped lead us to Osama bin Laden. You said that “enhanced interrogation techniques” yielded some of the intelligence information that ultimately led to Osama bin Laden. You said that “whether we would have gotten the same information through other approaches I think is always going to be an open question.” Do detainees at GTMO pose a threat to U.S. national security?
Mr. PANETTA. As I have stated before, I fully support the President’s decision to establish Army Field Manual 2–22.3 as the single standard applicable to all interrogations by U.S. Government personnel. This decision was based on the results of a careful review conducted by the President’s interagency Interrogation and Transfer Policies Task Force which was charged with evaluating the sufficiency of the interrogation practices and techniques in the Army field manual. The Task Force found that additional techniques were not necessary. I believe we should do everything possible within the law to gather information, and I agree with those who state that information can be obtained without resorting to measures such as waterboarding. I do not support a set of classified interrogation methods that are not open to public scrutiny.

108. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, do you believe the United States will continue to capture terrorists around the world?
Mr. PANETTA. Yes. When it comes to protecting the American people from al Qaeda and its associated forces, intelligence is critical to identifying and disrupting their plots, as well as to dismantling their networks. Among our greatest sources of information about al Qaeda, its plans, and its intentions have been the members of its network who have been taken into custody by the United States and our partners overseas. Wherever possible, we must maintain a preference to capture terrorists and take advantage of the opportunity to gather information through interrogation that is vital to the safety and security of the American people.

109. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, where will you put existing detainees and future detainees?
Mr. PANETTA. The United States will continue to hold detainees in accordance with the authority provided by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, as informed by the law of war. DOD’s ability to detain the enemy and interrogate them for intelligence in prosecuting the war against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces is essential to U.S. national security. The United States has been detaining individuals in this war for nearly a decade and has learned that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to the complex issue of law of war detention in a 21st century conflict with a transnational terrorist group.
DOD currently holds detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. We are transitioning our detention operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, with the...
intent of moving from a law of war detention framework to a peacetime domestic legal framework where each respective nation takes responsibility for its own citizens. I fully support the President’s commitment to close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay because it is in our national security interest to do so. I do acknowledge, however, that the United States needs a place to hold individuals whom we capture abroad. This is a very serious issue for our country, and it is one I believe policymakers need to address expeditiously. The decision to capture an individual outside an active theater of combat operations is a complex issue, involving a range of factors unique to the individual and the place and circumstances of capture. With respect to future detainees, disposition recommendations would be informed by the unique circumstances of each capture, with decisions made on a case-by-case basis among policymakers.

110. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, if held at locations in other countries such as Afghanistan or Yemen, isn’t there a greater risk of escape, attack on the prison, or release of these terrorists?

Mr. Panetta. The United States does not ask other nations to detain on its behalf. When we transfer detainees to another nation, that individual becomes subject to the laws of the receiving nation. In certain cases, detainees have been held and/or tried by the receiving nation for crimes they have committed. There have been instances where former detainees, or dangerous individuals held by other nations, have escaped or have been released. We take these instances very seriously, and certainly factor them when assessing the transfer of a detainee to the control of another government.

As we strengthen our own detention policies and procedures, we must continue to work with our partners around the world to build their capacity to confront this common challenge. Specifically, we must deepen our cooperation with our international partners to develop credible rehabilitation and reintegration programs as part of a durable counterterrorism strategy. We must ensure that our detention policies remain principled and consistent with the rule of law, that they evoke credibility with our public and the international community, and that they can be sustained into the future as a useful tool in our counterterrorism fight.

IRAQ

111. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, there continues to be concerns about our ability to safely withdraw forces out of Iraq by the end of the year. Four days ago, several servicemembers were killed in eastern Baghdad in a rocket attack. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure our forces can safely withdraw from Iraq?

Mr. Panetta. The current security agreement gives us the right to defend ourselves and Iraqi forces all the way through our drawdown. We will approach our security posture throughout the drawdown in partnership with Iraqi forces. We continue to ensure both U.S. forces and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are prepared for this period of transition by continuing to provide training for our Iraqi partners. This includes training for Iraqi Police, ISF, and Iraqi Special Operations forces. Additionally, we will continue to closely monitor external malign influences and refine our deterrent options to address any threat posed to our forces. Finally, we will maintain robust self defense capabilities throughout the drawdown and address potential threats through a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic actions.

We will maintain a full spectrum of land, air, and naval forces, supported by a total complement of Special Operations Forces (SOF), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), logistics, and other enablers throughout the drawdown. The plan to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq has been thoroughly briefed and rehearsed, and we will retain flexibility to react to changing circumstances.

112. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Panetta, do you think there will be a U.S. military presence in Iraq after 2011?

Mr. Panetta. I believe some U.S. military personnel would be appropriate to support Iraq’s continuing needs and enduring U.S. national interests, as Secretary Gates has stated. However, any post-2011 U.S. military mission would require a formal request from the Iraqi government, which we would be willing to consider. To date no request has been received.
INVESTIGATION INTO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

113. Senator Inhofe, Mr. Panetta, you have opposed Attorney General Holder's investigation of possible incidents of abuse by CIA personnel during interrogations that went beyond guidelines imposed by the Bush administration. You stated: “I think the reason I felt the way I did is because I don’t believe there’s a basis there for any kind of additional action.” What is the current status of the investigation and your opinion of it continuing?

Mr. PANETTA. I refer you to the Department of Justice with respect to the status of any investigation. My views are stated in the record.

U.S.-GEORGIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

114. Senator Inhofe, Mr. Panetta, there have been multiple terrorist acts and several terrorist attempts in the territory of Georgia orchestrated by the Russian Federation. The last one happened just 2 days ago when Georgian police prevented a terrorist plot targeting the NATO Liaison office in Tbilisi. The Obama administration is aware of these developments. On April 15, 2011, at a meeting in Berlin between the foreign ministers of Georgia and NATO, Secretary Clinton stated, “… We share Georgian concerns regarding recent Russian activities that can negatively affect regional stability.” Despite the ongoing reset policy with the Russian Federation and the attempts of the Obama administration to engage Russia positively, Moscow persistently continues to undermine the security of Georgia. While the timeline for Georgia’s NATO membership remains unclear, what is your opinion on the steps the United States should undertake to enhance the security and stability of Georgia, including any possibilities of supporting acquisition of defensive capabilities from the NATO countries?

Mr. PANETTA. The United States steadfastly supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, and is committed to maintaining a strong bilateral defense relationship with Georgia.

Our security assistance and military engagement with Georgia focuses on two areas. First, we are focused on strengthening defense institutions and providing comprehensive defense assistance covering doctrine, personnel management, logistics, education, and training to support Georgia’s defense reform and modernization efforts along Euro-Atlantic lines. This approach will ensure the lasting institutional transformation of the Georgian Armed Forces and provide the foundation for a secure Georgia.

Second, the United States is assisting the Georgian Armed Forces with training and equipping infantry battalions to deploy and operate alongside U.S. forces in a counter-insurgency environment in Afghanistan. Georgian forces are currently deployed, without caveats, as part of the ISAF in Helmand Province.

In addition to these bilateral efforts, we also encourage our international partners to demonstrate support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Through NATO, we work with our allies to assist Georgia with implementing its Annual National Program and to encourage Georgia to use tools available through the NATO-Georgia Commission.

HUAWEI AND THE IT SUPPLY CHAIN

115. Senator Inhofe, Mr. Panetta, as CIA Director, you must have been concerned about the threat of foreign technology (i.e., hardware, software, and services) in the U.S. information system supply chain, especially where that technology originates from companies under the control of the People’s Republic of China. Would you be comfortable with Huawei (or a companion company, ZTE) being significant vendors to the CIA or DOD? If not, why not?

Mr. PANETTA. Continued globalization marks today's information and communications technology (ICT) marketplace. Moreover, DOD represents a small portion of the commercial ICT market, and it is unlikely its unique high assurance requirements can drive the development of commercial off-the-shelf products. Yet the leveraging of the rapid technology advancement of the commercial marketplace remains a key DOD advantage. While globally sourced technology provides innumerable benefits to the Department, it also provides foreign sources with increased opportunity to compromise the supply chain by inserting malware into ICT in order to access or alter data, and intercept or deny communications. Even though the risk of such a supply chain attack may be tolerable for many consumers of commercial ICT, the DOD cannot ignore these risks to its national security missions.
In this setting, use of Chinese or other foreign-sourced equipment in the absence of adequate risk management would concern me. The DOD is taking a proactive risk management approach to address this issue, enhancing the acquisition process in light of the changing global market to ensure rigor in addressing foreign sourcing risks.

In response to these risks, DOD is in the process of institutionalizing the Trusted Defense Systems/Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) strategies described in the Report on Trusted Defense Systems in Response to National Defense Authorization Act, section 254, delivered to Congress in January 2010. The Department’s strategy for achieving trustworthy defense information and weapons systems in light of supply chain risk contains the following core elements:

1. Prioritize scarce resources based on mission dependence—Allocate the Department’s systems assurance resources based on their criticality and risk of attack.
2. Plan for comprehensive program protection—Employ comprehensive program protection planning, including systems engineering, supply chain risk management, hardware and software assurance, counterintelligence, and information assurance to identify and protect critical components, functions, technologies, and information using a full range of tools, resources, and practices.
3. Detect and respond to vulnerabilities in programmable logic elements—Invest in enhanced vulnerability detection research and development, and transition such analytical capabilities to support acquisition.
4. Partner with industry—Collaborate with industry to develop commercially reasonable standards for global sourcing and SCRM and to identify leading edge commercial practices and tools.

The forgoing strategy is being implemented to protect DOD systems from supply chain risk. Through the application of these processes, any particular proposed use of Chinese or other foreign-sourced equipment would first be evaluated for the supply chain risk to DOD Systems and Networks in light of system criticality, all source intelligence, and the feasibility of adequate mitigation measures.

116. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, do you feel the private sector also needs to make better procurement decisions, and also needs additional information in order to make better decisions?

Mr. Panetta. Through the course of developing its Trusted Defense Systems Strategy, it became increasingly clear that the DOD was exposed to risk through the supply chains of the commercially-owned and operated telecommunications infrastructures upon which DOD depends, and that the forgoing strategy does not directly address these broader risks. To address this gap, DOD and DHS are co-leading an Interagency Task Force that will in partnership with industry develop a more complete understanding of the relevant technical risks to the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure and will assess the dependency of vital governmental and economic operations upon that infrastructure. It will then evaluate a range of potential technical risk mitigations strategies. Central to this activity is an assessment of information sharing deficiencies within the telecommunications sector. These deficiencies inhibit effective risk management of supply chain risk within that sector. While the Task Force is studying these issues, DOD in cooperation with other parts of the national security community is monitoring specific risks to the broader telecommunications infrastructure posed by foreign sourcing.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

MISSILE DEFENSE

117. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, the Obama administration’s Phased-Adaptive Approach for ballistic missile defense in Europe has been criticized because it leaves a gap between Iran’s movement towards ICBMs that can threaten Europe and the United States, and on the other hand, the deployment of an American missile defense system that is capable of protecting the continental United States from ICBMs. Do you see Iran’s ICBMs as a threat to the United States and, if so, what should be done to close the gap?

Mr. Panetta. The United States is currently protected against any attacks from North Korea or Iran if those countries were able to develop and deploy an effective ICBM capability today. This protection is a result of investments made over the past
decade in a system based on GMD. Because of continuing improvements in the GMD system and the number of GBIs now deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the United States possesses a capability to counter the projected threat from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future.

In order to maintain this advantageous position, the administration is taking several steps to improve the protection of the United States from the potential ICBM threat posed by Iran and North Korea. These steps include the continued procurement of GBIs, the deployment of additional sensors, and upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications system.

118. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, while directing that we sustain and enhance our ability to defend the Homeland against limited numbers of long-range ballistic missiles, the administration has made defending against regional threats “a top priority of our missile defense plans,” according to Secretary Gates. As a result, funding for the GMD system has steadily declined, while the two test failures of the GMD system in 2010 suggest the Missile Defense Agency is not doing nearly enough to sustain and enhance the system. GMD reductions include:

• Cutback deployment from 44 to 30 GBI and cancellation of 10 GBIs in Poland;
• $500 million reduction to the GMD program in the fiscal year 2010 budget request;
• Fiscal year 2011–2015 funding for GMD declines by $600 million when compared to the President’s budget last year; and
• Obama’s GMD budget for fiscal years 2010–2013 is $4 billion less than Bush fiscal years 2010–2013 planned budget.

Will you pledge to complete the deployment of an effective GMD system?

Mr. Panetta. I will support the continued sustainment and improvement of the GMD system.

I share the view of Secretary Gates, who said that the “protection of the United States from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical national security priority.”

The current ballistic missile defense posture for the United States protects against ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea or Iran. Improvements to the existing sensors and software, in addition to the procurement of additional GBIs and radars, will continue this protection against future ICBM threats from states like North Korea and Iran.

119. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, should we support the emphasis on regional missile defense at the expense of Homeland defense?

Mr. Panetta. The administration has put in place a balanced program, which addresses both the short-range and longer-range threats in a timely manner and is responsive to development of the threats. The forward-based radar that will be deployed as part of Phase 1 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and the deployment of the SM–3 Block IIB to Europe in Phase 4 of the EPAA, will improve the missile defense coverage of Europe while also enhancing protection of the United States from a potential ICBM attack from Iran.

In addition, the administration is making improvements to the existing GMD sensors and software and is procuring additional GBIs. The United States must also be well hedged against the possibility of rapid threat developments or delays in U.S. technological advances. The administration has already made several decisions to strengthen the U.S. hedge posture, including the construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK, mothballing six GBI silos at Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely instead of decommissioning them, and the development and assessment of a two-stage GBI.

NUCLEAR POLICY

120. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, President Obama identified a “world without nuclear weapons” as a long-term national security goal in an April 2009 speech. However, when asked in the advance policy questions about your assessment of the threat posed by Iran and North Korea, you responded that there is a real risk that Iran’s nuclear program will prompt other countries in the region to pursue nuclear options. In addition, you stated that North Korea’s newly revealed uranium enrichment activities underscores that it poses a growing and direct threat to the United States, our allies in the region, and the international community. Do you share the goal of a world without nuclear weapons?
Mr. PANETTA. As stated in the NPR Report, the greatest threat facing our Nation is nuclear proliferation. The NPR Report also stated that the United States is committed to the long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons exist, however, the United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrence force. The nuclear deterrence force will continue to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and partners around the world of the U.S. commitment to their security. Therefore, without jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and reassurance goals, we are now able to shape our nuclear weapons policy and force structure in ways that will better enable us to meet our most pressing security challenges.

121. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Panetta, do you believe that this goal is realistic? If so, how does this square with the reality of the threat posed by Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs?

Mr. PANETTA. As the President stated, such a goal is ambitious and will not be reached quickly. Presently, changes in the nuclear threat environment have altered the hierarchy of our nuclear concerns and strategic objectives. In coming years, we must give top priority to discouraging additional countries from acquiring nuclear-weapons capabilities and stopping terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons or the materials to build them. At the same time, we must continue to maintain stable, strategic relationships with Russia and China. We must also counter threats posed by any emerging nuclear-armed states, thereby protecting the United States and our allies and partners against nuclear threats or intimidation, and reducing any incentives that any emerging nuclear-armed states might have to seek their own nuclear deterrents.

122. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Panetta, given that the nuclear age has had an absence of great power conflicts like World War II, what are the risks and dangers of a "world without nuclear weapons"?

Mr. PANETTA. Nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and partners around the world. Until such time as the administration's goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, the maintenance of nuclear capabilities will remain a core mission of DOD. Our defense posture will continuously adapt to changes in the strategic environment. Credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments in a world without nuclear weapons will demand an increased reliance on tailored approaches to deterrence that integrate all aspects of national power. This includes land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited and large-scale conflicts in environments where anti-access weaponry and tactics are used, as well as forces prepared to respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state groups.

The United States is positioned with capabilities across all domains to deter a wide range of attacks or forms of coercion against the United States, its allies, and partners. If deterrence fails and adversaries challenge our interests with the threat or use of force, the United States must be prepared to respond in support of U.S. national interests. The range of plausible future challenges is significant. Potential adversaries of the United States are likely to employ a diverse array of approaches and capabilities if and when they choose to oppose the United States, its allies, or its partners. In the future, U.S. forces must be sized and shaped to provide the maximum possible versatility for the broadest plausible range of conflicts. A deliberate, continuing assessment of national interests, military requirements, and the strategic environment should guide U.S. global defense posture planning. In the emerging security environment, the United States will tailor its defense posture to mitigate foreseeable security risks and manage future security challenges effectively.

123. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Panetta, what are your views about future nuclear force levels?

Mr. PANETTA. As stated in the 2010 NPR Report, any future nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, maintain strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China, and maintain the reliability and effectiveness of our security assurances to our allies and partners. We will continue to assess the force size required for an effective deterrent. DOD is committed to sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent in an efficient and cost-effective manner that supports strategic stability.

124. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Panetta, are you committed to supporting, maintaining, and modernizing America's triad of nuclear delivery systems—that is, America's ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-armed long-range bomber aircraft, in addition to spe-
cifically meeting the commitments President Obama made in his letter during the START debate?

Mr. PANETTA. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration's plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. I will continue the DOD commitment in an efficient and cost-effective manner.

125. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Panetta, as a Congressman, you voted against nuclear testing and voted for a nuclear test ban. You also voted for funding cuts and against the development of numerous missile systems, including the MX missile, Pershing II, and Trident II, as well as voting for funding reductions and cuts to the B–1 and B–2 bombers. Will you support and fulfill policies even if you personally disagree with them?

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. As my record of service in the Executive Branch demonstrates, I am fully committed to executing the President's policies and complying with all legal requirements enacted by Congress, while offering my own candid advice to the President.

RUSSIA COOPERATION

126. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Panetta, in your response to the advance policy questions, you state that you agree with missile defense cooperation with Russia. What evidence have you seen in the past that would demonstrate that Russia is a reliable partner for cooperation in missile defense?

Mr. PANETTA. The United States and Russia conducted a robust and successful missile defense exercise program, with five exercises conducted between 1996 and 2006. This cooperation, unprecedented at the time, contributed to the understanding of our respective missile defense capabilities and interests and demonstrated our countries' shared interest in and ability to work together to address common security threats.

With our new push for deeper missile defense cooperation, we seek to responsibly foster and sustain a stable relationship with Russia. As the pace of military-technical innovation increases and the global security environment evolves, we believe it is important to enlist Russia's help in addressing common 21st century security challenges, specifically regional actors seeking illicit capabilities.

Appropriate levels of cooperation with Russia on missile defense would send a powerful signal to regional actors, such as Iran, that Russia and the United States are working together to counter the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities. Our goal is a level of cooperation that will improve U.S. and Russian security and the security of our NATO allies while increasing transparency to reduce Russia's concerns about U.S. missile defense efforts.

127. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Panetta, what does cooperation mean to you? Does it include a joint area where Russians have their hand on a launch trigger?

Mr. PANETTA. The administration has been clear that Russian objections will not change or limit our missile defense system capabilities or missile defense deployments, nor will Russia have a “launch trigger” that will control any U.S. or NATO missile defense systems.

The administration's concept for missile defense cooperation stems from the conviction that NATO must be responsible for defense of NATO territory and that Russia should be responsible for defense of Russian territory. We would operate our respective systems independently but cooperatively, including sharing of sensor data that may enhance the ability of both systems to defeat missile attacks by regional actors such as Iran.

128. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Panetta, in 2009, the administration initiated a reset in relations with the Russians. I would like to understand your assessment of the impact of this so-called “reset” of U.S.-Russian relations, especially in light of how they have threatened their neighbors and invaded Georgia. Specifically, has the “reset” resulted in an improved Russian strategic, diplomatic, and economic posture toward our allies in Central Europe, including Georgia?

Mr. PANETTA. Our approach in transforming our defense relationship with Russia has been to work to integrate Russia more closely into the fabric of the international community to ensure that parties on all sides have more of a stake in keeping the
relationship on the right track. Our goal has been to cooperate with Russia where we have common interests but not at the expense of our principles or our friends.

Through interactions with Russia, we hope we can build the infrastructure for future collaboration, identify and clarify the extent of agreement and disagreement, counteract narratives of "zero-sum" competition, and reform existing structures, such as the NATO–Russia Council and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, to meet new challenges.

We have seen some key successes over the course of the past 2 years on Afghanistan, strategic arms control, Iran, and bilateral defense relations. Military-to-military relations were revitalized in 2009, including the resumption of regular consultations between Chiefs of Defense and their staffs; military exchanges, visits, and exercises, and a broadening and deepening of cooperation in such areas as armed forces reform, defense policy and national security priorities, transparency and confidence-building measures, and regional and global security.

In all our engagements, we remind our Russian counterparts of Russia's obligation to respect the security, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its neighbors. We are open about our defense engagement with those countries and make clear that we welcome the opportunity to work with Russia's neighbors as well as with Russia.

129. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, in addition, has the "reset" resulted in improved Russian cooperation on the nuclear proliferation challenges posed by Iran and North Korea? Please explain specific improvements.

Mr. Panetta. In general, the "reset" has resulted in greater cooperation by the Russian Federation. For example, Russia agreed to United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1874 and 1929 against North Korea and Iran, respectively. After the adoption of UNSCR 1929, Russia cancelled the delivery of the S–300 missile defense system to Iran.

AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

130. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, the United States cannot give away the work of its magnificent military in Afghanistan and Iraq by a too precipitous withdrawal. How will you monitor the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure that stability remains during and after the withdrawal of U.S. forces?

Mr. Panetta. I completely agree that the withdrawal from Afghanistan must be meticulously planned and not precipitous in order to not risk the gains we have made at great sacrifice of our blood and treasure. I will monitor the situation through the eyes of our commanders on the ground and by personally visiting Afghanistan to assess for myself. Preserving our recent gains will be my top priority, as we begin to transition security lead to the ANSF.

Regarding Iraq, General Austin and his staff have a number of systems in place to monitor the situation in Iraq during the drawdown. He will report regularly to me, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Mattis on issues relating to security, politics, rule of law, and training and readiness for foreign military and police forces. Additionally, my office and the Joint Staff participate in National Security Staff led weekly updates at the deputies' committee to discuss Iraq from a broader interagency perspective. Finally, DOD maintains active involvement in a robust interagency process of weekly working groups covering a variety of topics including security, rule of law, transition, international engagement, and strategic communications.

131. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, what contingency plans do you have in place in the event that a redeployment is required during the drawdown to ensure stability?

Mr. Panetta. Contingency planning is an ongoing effort by our military to ensure we are ready for rapidly changing situations. I will work closely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military commanders to ensure we remain ready for any contingency.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

LOANS AND CREDIT FOR SERVICEMEMBERS

132. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Panetta, I understand that DOD regulates interest rates on short-term loans that do not amortize when made to its uniformed servicemembers, capping them at 36 percent. Traditional, amortizing installment
loans are exempt from such interest rate caps. What is DOD’s current position on short-term loans that do not amortize and those that do amortize?

Mr. PANETTA. DOD does not have a position on any specific types of loans given to servicemembers. The Department proposes to help ensure that servicemembers and their families receive fair protections by working with Federal and State governments on existing and proposed policies impacting all consumers. The goal is to try to eliminate the need to identify servicemembers and their families separately for protections, which may create unintentional barriers to credit.

133. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Panetta, how does DOD propose to balance consumer protection for its members without creating unintentional barriers to credit for them in the future?

Mr. PANETTA. The Department proposes to help ensure that servicemembers and their families receive fair protections by working with Federal and State governments on existing and proposed policies impacting all consumers. The goal is to try to eliminate the need to identify servicemembers and their families separately for protections, which may create unintentional barriers to credit.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

FUTURE THREATS

134. Senator WICKER. Mr. Panetta, the United States faces a number of national security challenges today and our forces—our resources—are stretched thin to meet those challenges. However, we also know that the future will bring its own set of challenges and threats to the security and prosperity of the next American generation. In order to prepare for those threats and meet our responsibilities to those who follow us, we must ensure the actions we take will give future generations the flexibility and resources they need, including an industrial base capable of sustaining our future military forces. As Secretary, what actions will you take to examine the industrial base at all levels, develop an industrial base policy and communicate that policy with the private sector, to ensure that we maintain a robust and capable aerospace and defense industrial base capable of meeting the threats of the future?

Mr. PANETTA. I understand the Department is examining the industrial base by conducting a sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier (S2T2) research effort. S2T2 is a process to expand the scope of the Department’s industrial base assessments beyond their traditional programmatic perspective and to create a database on industry for use as an input to many decision-making processes across the Department.

I am committed to maintaining an open dialogue with the private sector and increasing the transparency within which we operate to the maximum extent permitted by law.

EXPORT CONTROL

135. Senator WICKER. Mr. Panetta, it is widely accepted that the current export control regime is antiquated and reduces U.S. industries’ global competitiveness. Since the addition of commercial satellites to DOS’s technology control list, we have seen the U.S. global share of that industry reduced from over 70 percent to less than 30 percent as the Europeans and others have marketed their products as International Traffic in Arms Regulations compliant. What actions are necessary to be taken to improve the export control regimen?

Mr. PANETTA. On May 6, 2011, DOD and DOS transmitted a joint interim report to Congress in response to section 1248 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. The report, entitled “Risk Assessment of United States Export Control Policy,” is a conservative starting point for transferring satellite and related items from the USML to the CCL. It recommends that, under certain conditions, commercial communications satellites, systems, subsystems, and components be controlled on the CCL.

A more comprehensive assessment of controls on satellites, related items, and technology is currently underway, as part of the administration’s Export Control Reform (ECR) initiative. DOD, with its interagency partners, is expected to complete this review of USML Category XV (Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment) in the coming months. The draft will include recommendations for what items should remain on the USML and those that can be moved to the CCL. No items controlled on the USML by statute will be removed from the USML unless and until the authority to do so is provided by Congress.
I understand that DOD expects to provide the final section 1248 report to Congress later this year, based on the findings from work underway in the ECR initiative. Since the administration has not completed its revision of controls on spacecraft in the USML, I cannot provide any conclusions at this time regarding its recommendations. However, consistent with our overall approach to ECR, I expect that the administration will consider how to provide “higher fences around fewer items,” and increase transparency and predictability so that the U.S. space industry will be able to compete globally and more efficiently.

I am aware that current U.S. law limits the flexibility of the President and requires control of these items on the USML per section 1513 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on the legislative changes that would be required to implement any proposed changes.

TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY

136. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, U.S. defense policy since World War II has been to rely on advances in technology rather than force size for our national security. Do you believe that the Pentagon should strive to maintain our technological superiority in all mediums of combat?

Mr. Panetta. I fully understand the role advanced technology and technological superiority has on the strategic options available to the President, including the size and shape of our forces. We live in an era where nations have increased their investments in space and technology talent and facilities. While much of this investment is centered on commercial applications, there are significant national security implications. These investments provide nations with options to develop new military capabilities and non-state actors the opportunity to build asymmetric capabilities to challenge our forces.

Given this environment, the Department must continue to build upon the technical strengths it has developed over the decades since World War II. The combined scientific, technical, and engineering talent in our universities, the defense industrial base, other parts of commercial industry, and Government labs are second to none in the world. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department’s investments in research, development, test and evaluation protect this technical advantage while providing the taxpayer with the greatest return on their tax dollars in ensuring the technical superiority of our forces.

INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND LEADERSHIP

137. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, throughout the post-World War II era, the United States has maintained its military leadership in large part as a result of its industrial leadership—particularly in aerospace and other defense industries. That leadership has only been possible by tremendous work on the part of the employees of that industry—the engineers, scientists, and machinists. Maintaining this leadership in the future will require that DOD identify and communicate what it needs to counter future military threats. As Secretary, what will you do to map out the industrial policy and needs of DOD?

Mr. Panetta. As Secretary of Defense, I will ensure that Department policies, procedures, and actions: (1) stimulate and support vigorous competition and innovation in the industrial base supporting defense; and (2) establish and sustain cost-effective industrial and technological capabilities that assure military readiness and superiority.

I will do so by: (1) monitoring industry readiness, competitiveness, ability to innovate, and financial stability as the Department moves to capabilities-based acquisitions in an era of increasingly sophisticated systems; (2) leveraging Department research and development, acquisition, and logistics decisions to promote innovation, competition, military readiness, and national security; (3) leveraging statutory processes (for example, the Defense Priorities and Allocation System; Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust evaluations; Exon-Florio Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States evaluations) and promoting innovation, competition, military readiness, and national security; (4) leading efforts for the Department to engage with industry to ensure openness and transparency; and (5) continuing our long history of supporting science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education initiatives in a collaborative process at local, regional, and national levels.
Senator WICKER. Mr. Panetta, do you believe that our aerospace and defense industrial base are essential strategic assets and that strategic assessments must include the impact on the industrial base from policy decisions?

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. In order for DOD to develop, field, and maintain high-quality equipment, it must rely on a robust and capable defense industry. We must understand, therefore, the impact of the actions we take on the industrial base and consider those impacts when making strategic decisions.

Senator WICKER. Mr. Panetta, as defense budgets flatten, how do you think rapidly rising personnel and operations accounts can be prevented from driving the investment accounts below 35 percent of the defense top line needed to modernize the forces for future threats?

Mr. PANETTA. The Department will need to continue to look for ways to become more efficient to accomplish the core Defense mission. The Department is conducting a comprehensive review of the Defense programs in light of the current fiscal environment. I will ensure that everything is on the table and assess each program in terms of its contribution to our national security strategy.

Senator WICKER. Mr. Panetta, alone among major nations, the United States does not have a defense industrial base policy. The current DOD policy of relying on market forces to sustain the health of the industrial base ignores the fact that DOD is the sole customer for military-unique weapons. Do you intend to continue the current initiative to develop an industrial base strategy?

Mr. PANETTA. The Department recognizes the defense industrial base is more global, commercial, and financially complex than ever before. I understand the Department regularly addresses specific industrial-base concerns within programs and services and has also embarked on a more comprehensive sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier analysis of the industrial base, which will help inform future programmatic decisions, expand the scope of DOD industrial base assessments, and create a database on industry for use as an input to many decisionmaking processes across the Department.

Senator WICKER. Mr. Panetta, such a strategy will work best if there is open communication between defense officials and industry leaders so that industry can shape itself to meet the needs of DOD. Secretary Gates began a Secretary/CEO dialogue to facilitate that communication. Do you intend to continue that dialogue?

Mr. PANETTA. I am committed to maintaining an open dialogue with industry and increasing the transparency within which we operate to the maximum extent permitted by law.

PAKISTAN

Senator WICKER. Mr. Panetta, I am taking a close look at the $1.1 billion requested by the administration for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). I am of two minds: on the one hand, I understand the importance of Pakistan if we are to succeed in Afghanistan and in the region; on the other hand, Pakistan has received a lot of U.S. assistance over the past few years (nearly $6 billion combined in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 and over $5 billion alone in the fiscal year 2012 request). My initial thinking is that the funding needs additional benchmarks and criteria which ensure that our money is spent wisely and that the Pakistanis are cooperating with us. I am interested in your perspective on this subject, both broadly and specifically, on what Pakistan is doing or not doing to ensure accountability for any aid we provide to the country.

Mr. PANETTA. The PCCF and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF), jointly implemented by DOS and DOD, is the cornerstone of our efforts to enhance the Pakistani military’s ability to conduct effective military operations against militants operating within the country’s borders.

Since 2009, DOD has executed PCF/PCCF to train and equip those forces that Pakistan has committed to the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. Unlike traditional security assistance, PCF is structured such that DOD’s field element in Pakistan, the Office of the Defense Representative-Pakistan (ODRP), plays the lead role in identifying the Pakistani military’s COIN capability shortfalls. ODRP also identifies the requirements for training, equipment, and infrastructure that would address these capability shortfalls. These requirements have focused on enhancing COIN-specific capabilities like intelligence-driven operations; air mobility; close air support, night operations, and countering improvised bombs.
PCF/PCCF is structured so that the delivery of equipment is tied to our ability to train Pakistan's security forces. In the weeks and months ahead, continued delivery of PCF/PCCF training and equipment will require resolution of issues like the Pakistan Army's ordered drawdown of U.S. military personnel, the primary implementers of this program.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LINDSEY GRAHAM

DEFENSE SPENDING

143. Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Panetta, Secretary Gates has previously identified the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark for defense spending. Admiral Mullen previously stated that GDP should serve as a reference to “stimulate discussion relative to the affordability of increased defense spending in a challenging security environment.”

Since 2003, GDP as a percentage of defense spending has increased from 4.34 percent to 5.78 percent in 2010. As a percentage of our Nation's wealth, these figures are on average markedly lower than spending in other times of war:

- World War II (5.72 percent to 42.04 percent);
- Korean Conflict (8.25 percent to 15.01 percent); and
- Vietnam War (7.65 percent to 10.86 percent).

Do you agree with Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and others that the GDP should act as a marker for defense spending? If so, what does the lower percentage average spent during the war on terror as compared to other times of conflict lead you to conclude about future defense spending as a percentage of GDP?

Mr. PANETTA. Defense expenditures are currently at a much lower percentage of GDP than during previous major wars. Defense consumed more than half the Federal budget, and the portion of the Nation’s economic output devoted to the military was about 9 percent in 1961. By comparison, this year’s base defense budget of $530 billion—the highest since World War II adjusted for inflation—represents less than 15 percent of all Federal spending and equates to roughly 3½ percent of GDP—a number that climbs to about 4½ percent when the war costs in Iraq and Afghanistan are included. I do not believe the Department is likely to return to Cold War levels of defense expenditures, at least as a share of national wealth anytime soon—a sentiment also expressed by Secretary Gates.

LIMITING INTERROGATIONS

144. Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Panetta, I understand that you support the Obama administration’s policy of limiting the interrogation techniques of U.S. military and CIA personnel to those consistent with a U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 2–22.3. I am concerned that President Obama’s restrictions on interrogations are misplaced, unnecessarily hamper our interrogators, and provide an advantage to our enemies.

Should a U.S. Army Field Manual be the single standard for governance on interrogation methods for the U.S. intelligence community or should the Intelligence Community have its own, possibly classified, standard?

Mr. PANETTA. As I have stated before, I fully support the President’s decision to establish Army Field Manual 2–22.3 as the single standard applicable to all interrogations by U.S. Government personnel. This decision was based on the results of a careful review conducted by the President’s interagency Interrogation and Transfer Policies Task Force which was charged with evaluating the sufficiency of the interrogation practices and techniques in the Army field manual. The Task Force found that additional techniques were not necessary. I believe we should do everything possible within the law to gather information, and I agree with those who state that information can be obtained without resorting to measures such as waterboarding. I do not support a set of classified interrogation methods that are not open to public scrutiny.

145. Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Panetta, do you believe there is any risk in limiting all government interrogations to the U.S. Army Field Manual, a publicly available document?

Mr. PANETTA. No. I fully support the President’s decision to establish Army Field Manual 2–22.3 as the single standard applicable to all interrogations by U.S. Government personnel. This decision was based on the results of a careful review conducted by the President’s interagency Interrogation and Transfer Policies Task Force which was charged with evaluating the sufficiency of the interrogation practices and techniques in the Army field manual.
RAIL ASSETS

146. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, the use of rail to move, mobilize, and reset our Nation's military personnel and assets has proven to be a cost-effective, efficient, and environmentally-friendly mode of transportation. Do you agree that the use of rail to move DOD's assets is a “must-be included” in any mobilization or reset plan developed?

Mr. Panetta. Rail as well as air, sea, and road are needed to deploy and redeploy forces, and for the movement of sustainment requirements. The effective use of the different modes must be integrated to support and synchronize timely and cost-effective deployment of personnel, their equipment and the associated sustainment.

Surface (both ship and rail) are the most cost efficient modes for moving large volumes of military equipment and sustainment/resupply requirements. The Department relies heavily upon commercial rail, truck, ocean and air assets, and through the partnerships that are developed, to meet national security objectives. It is our desire that commercial industry maintains these critical capabilities.

147. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, with the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is critical to have a logistics infrastructure capable of moving DOD's vehicles and assets to and from their reset and storage facilities. Do you feel the required rail assets are currently in place to support the surge in reset and storage requirements that will come from the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Mr. Panetta. Currently, the numbers of DOD and commercial rail assets available are sufficient to meet requirements. However, over the next decade commercial rail assets will reach federally-mandated retirement timelines. DOD is currently studying this issue and is assessing courses of action designed to ensure significant commercial rail assets are available to meet the Department's future needs.

RADIATION AND MEDICINE

148. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, in light of the recent situation in Japan, coupled with the ever-present threat of terrorist attacks on our Nation, where do you rank the importance of our military's capability to provide the best possible protection against radiation exposure?

Mr. Panetta. Protecting our military forces from radiation exposure is one of the Department’s highest priorities. It is an integral part of our overall emphasis on protecting the warfighters and our Nation against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) events, whether intentional or accidental. The Department has a well-established strategy designed to deter and deny our adversaries the ability to threaten our Nation with weapons of mass destruction. Should our forces face the dangerous effects of CBRN weapons or materials, their protection and ability to mitigate those effects are essential to our success. Currently, I see our radiation protection priorities as being within larger CBRN defense efforts to: (1) strengthen our capability to respond and recover from a CBRN incident; (2) provide the necessary U.S. Food and Drug Administration-approved prophylactics (vaccines and other preventative products) and therapeutics (treatments) that protect against CBRN hazards; (3) provide comprehensive situational awareness necessary to counter the threat, along with the ability to share information and data analysis to guide the appropriate response to a CBRN incident; (4) provide the necessary detection and diagnostics to keep people safe and identify those affected; and (5) maintain and improve current individual and collective protection capabilities.

149. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, in your opinion, are our Nation's first responders currently equipped with the best possible pre- and post-exposure radiation therapeutics and, if not, would you agree that we would be remiss in not ensuring that our government was doing everything in its power to develop and stockpile the most advanced and clinically-tested drugs presently available?

Mr. Panetta. It is DOD’s policy to provide the best possible medical countermeasures, including prophylaxis and therapeutics, to protect our military and civilian personnel. To this end, I will continue to work with the Service Chiefs to ensure our installation emergency managers continue to reach out to their civilian counterparts to ensure we are doing the right planning to meet any radiological hazard. In addition, we will continue cooperating with the Departments of Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security to maintain in the National Strategic Stockpile adequate supplies of the best countermeasures available.

150. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, are you aware that the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute has committed years of research and millions of dol-
lars toward developing a very mature prophylactic radiation protection drug and that it has received positive test results and garnered widespread support across Government agencies?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I am aware of the efforts by the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute to develop new drugs that could be used for protection against radiation. I understand that they have been working on a promising candidate, which is in clinical testing according to Food and Drug Administration protocols.

151. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, that despite all this, inter-departmental procedures and roadblocks have inhibited such a drug from being stockpiled by our military which has, in fact, repeatedly been the request of the Office of Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs?

Mr. Panetta. We will work with the Food and Drug Administration as it conducts clinical tests according to its protocols.

152. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, would you be willing to further investigate this issue in order to determine what roadblocks have halted the procurement of such a promising drug, and how best to remove such hindrances?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I would be willing to look into this issue.

153. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, would you commit to further dialogue on this issue and to provide regular updates to ensure our government and the American people are as protected as possible against these imminent threats?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will certainly look into this issue.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

DOD BUDGET CUTS

154. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, in his April speech on debt reduction, the President targeted security spending for $400 billion in cuts over the next 12 years, the preponderance of which is expected to come from the DOD budget. If confirmed, will you pursue cuts to the defense budget that go even further than that?

Mr. Panetta. It is premature to provide an assessment of additional defense cuts until we complete our review associated with the President’s target.

PAKISTAN

155. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, in your written responses to the advance policy questions, you note that “U.S. strategic interests in Pakistan encompass both our relationship with Pakistan itself and Pakistan’s role in the campaign against al Qaeda.” What is absent from your response is any mention of the major terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Director of National Intelligence Clapper recently testified before this committee that LeT is becoming “an increasing threat to U.S. forces in Afghanistan.” What is your assessment of the threat that LeT poses to U.S. interests, as well as our allies?

Mr. Panetta. [Deleted.]

OVERDUE DOD REPORTS

156. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, the Senate-passed version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 included an amendment I sponsored that required DOD to report to Congress within 90 days on the status and capabilities of Taiwan’s current air force, as well as an analysis of the specific weapons systems Taiwan would need in order to defend itself. That report is now 16 months overdue. Likewise, DOD is also overdue in submitting the required annual “China Military Power Report”, which is mandated for delivery no later than March 1 of each year. The failures by DOD to submit timely reports, as mandated, undermine Congress’ oversight role. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring that these two important reports are submitted to Congress without further delay?

Mr. Panetta. Yes. I am committed to providing these and other reports to Congress in a timely manner.
VIOLANCE IN MEXICO

157. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, I remain extremely concerned by the intense cartel-driven violence occurring in Mexico, just a stone's throw from my own home State, and also what I consider to be a lack of focus on this problem by the current administration. This administration does not seem to have a coherent, meaningful strategy in place to help the Government of Mexico regain control over its country and defeat the cartels. Instead, momentum seems to be moving in the opposite direction. Mexican President Felipe Calderon has boldly taken on the cartels, but I'm concerned about whether his successor will share his commitment to fight the cartels and restore law and order in Mexico. What do you see as the risks to our own national security if the Mexican cartels are not defeated?

Mr. PANETTA. I share your concern about the increased violence levels in Mexico and the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) operating there and, increasingly, throughout the region. Although concerned about the escalating violence, the U.S. Government remains confident that Mexico's democracy is strong and its government maintains control over its territory.

As I understand it, the U.S. Government began coordinating assistance to Mexico under the Mérida Initiative in 2008 with the goal of supporting the Government of Mexico's efforts to build capacity to combat TCOs, strengthen the rule of law, and respect for human rights, reduce violence, and stem the flow of drugs north and arms and illicit money south. DOD is working with its counterparts in Mexico to assist their efforts to dismantle TCOs. The Department recognizes that, moving forward, U.S. efforts should reinforce the progress made in disrupting cartels. The United States should also reinforce Mexico's move toward institutionalizing its capacity to act on public safety and security issues, transform its borders to respond to security threats while at the same time remaining competitive globally, and ensure that communities see the benefit of respecting human rights and the rule of law and adopting a culture of lawfulness.

It does not appear that TCO violence is spilling across the border into the United States. Still, the Department recognizes that TCOs have linkages to illicit groups operating inside the United States, including drug traffickers and gangs that pose health, law enforcement, economic, and security challenges to cities and towns throughout the United States. Although Mexico has called upon its armed forces to support Mexican law enforcement efforts in combating TCOs, they continue to see the problem as law enforcement in nature, and support Mexican efforts should reinforce the progress made in disrupting cartels. The United States should support their efforts to dismantle TCOs, and if confirmed, in coordination with interagency partners, support the Department's efforts to provide assistance as requested by the Government of Mexico.

158. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, could Mexico become a failed state?

Mr. PANETTA. [Deleted.]

159. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, what would a failed state mean for the United States?

Mr. PANETTA. [Deleted.]

160. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, I am encouraged by your written response acknowledging that, in order to confront the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations in Mexico, “it is necessary to harness the talents and resources of DOD, in coordination with those of DOD’s Federal partners and the Governments of Mexico and Central American nations . . . . I believe a long-term solution will require a whole-of-government effort.” What would you do to leverage DOD resources in confronting this growing threat on our southern border?

Mr. PANETTA. U.S.-Mexico relations have grown significantly in recent years. The increased military-to-military engagement between our two nations is especially valued. DOD is working closely with interagency partners to provide support and deliver assistance, as requested by the Government of Mexico. As I understand it, DOD representatives meet and speak regularly with Government of Mexico officials to assess the progress we have made to date, and to identify priorities moving forward through established forums such as the U.S.-Mexico Defense Bilateral Working Group and other ongoing meetings with Government of Mexico officials. As the force directly confronting the TCOs, the Government of Mexico is best positioned to identify resources and support needed to challenge the organizations operating in Mexican territory. The most important step DOD can take is to be prepared to respond quickly when assistance is requested. I look forward to working closely with
U.S. national security agencies, Mexico, Central American Governments, and Congress to shape the scope and scale of continued DOD efforts.

161. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, how would you improve interagency cooperation in this area?
Mr. PANETTA. DOD has been engaged with its Mexican counterparts on exchanges and training, providing equipment, and information sharing for many years. But as I mentioned previously, defense assistance is a small part of the U.S. whole-of-government support to Mexico, which focuses on building civilian institutions and capacity and for which DOD is in complete support.

I will ensure that DOD continues to work closely with other U.S. departments and agencies and foreign partners to integrate our cooperation with Mexico. DOD has unique capabilities within the U.S. Government, but it must ensure that its policies are complementary rather than duplicative, and that those agencies with the right tools have a seat at the table. Although the Government of Mexico has called upon its armed forces to support Mexican law enforcement efforts against drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations, as I understand it, Mexico continues to see the problem as law enforcement in nature, and the U.S. Government agrees with this assessment.

In addition to DOD’s engagement with its Mexican counterparts, if confirmed, I will ensure that DOD remains prepared to provide support to U.S. law enforcement agencies in their work with Mexico.

THE FUTURE OF IRAQ

162. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, the recent killing of five American soldiers served as a chilling reminder that security in Iraq remains fragile. The radical Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, is attempting to reinsert himself into Iraq’s political process through demonstrations and threats of violence. Several military and civilian leaders have expressed serious concern regarding the Iraqis’ limited military capabilities in the key areas of logistics, intelligence, and aviation, and what those shortfalls will mean for Iraq once U.S. forces withdraw as planned, by December 31, 2011. How concerned are you about stability in Iraq following the departure of U.S. Armed Forces?

Mr. PANETTA. Although the ISF are currently functioning well as a counter-insurgency force and demonstrating the capability to maintain internal security, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF–I) assesses that gaps, particularly in the capability to defend against external threats, will exist. USF–I assesses that the broad categories of projected gaps are cross-ministerial intelligence sharing; combined arms capability; integrated air defense and air sovereignty enforcement; and sustainment and logistics. USF–I will focus its efforts on these areas between now and the end of the mission.

Additionally, USF–I will continue to assist the Iraqis in the fielding of modernized equipment, providing advice during maneuver training, conducting advanced specialty skills training, and working to mature maintenance and supply operations.

163. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, can the Iraqis adequately prevent terrorist organizations from taking root and growing in Iraq?

Mr. PANETTA. [Deleted.]

IRAN

164. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, it remains clear that Iran plans to influence the future of Iraq. The ongoing Iranian meddling in Iraqi affairs is very concerning. In your opinion, how would a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces impact Iran’s relations with Iraq?

Mr. PANETTA. We remain troubled by Iran’s continued support to and training of militant groups that target both Iraqi and U.S. personnel. We encourage Iran to maintain constructive and peaceful relations with its neighbor Iraq, with which it shares a long history of cultural, religious, and economic ties. Iran should respect Iraqi sovereignty and end its support to those who promote terrorism in Iraq. In addition, Iraq is a sovereign country and has proven resistant to Iranian meddling.

165. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, would this give the Iranians more opportunity to influence Iraq’s future course?

Mr. PANETTA. Iran has pursued a multi-pronged strategy in Iraq consisting of political outreach, soft-power initiatives, and lethal support for surrogate groups. Iran often seeks to fill power vacuums, real or perceived, in order to gain leverage. It is therefore possible that Iran could view the U.S. draw down as an opportunity to
gain such leverage. However, Iraq is a sovereign country that, in its own interest, would be expected to resist efforts by any of its neighbors to exert improper influence.

INDIA’S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN

166. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, as of February, there was a shortage of 740 trainers in Afghanistan needed to train Afghan soldiers and police. Last summer, Secretary Gates signed an order sending 850 military personnel to Afghanistan as a stop-gap measure to fill vacancies in the high-priority effort to train local security forces. Administration officials continue to reaffirm that the trainers’ mission is essential for preparing Afghan forces to take over the security mission and remains a central tenet of the transition strategy in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, India has proven its willingness to support the effort in Afghanistan, playing an important role in the ongoing reconstruction efforts. To date, India has committed some $1.3 billion to this cause, in addition to some 3,500 Indian personnel working on relief and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Given the clear and immediate demand for more trainers and training options in Afghanistan, as well as India’s willingness to help thus far, should we invite India to play a greater role in training the Afghan security forces?

Mr. PANETTA. India provides scholarships for ANSF personnel to study in India, and the Indian Government is currently exploring options to train Afghan women police in India. We welcome these efforts and have encouraged India to coordinate its efforts with the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM–A).

We also encourage India to consider further assistance in Afghanistan through priority infrastructure projects and additional training and education assistance and technical assistance to the agriculture sector. As Prime Minister Singh’s recent visit to Afghanistan illustrated, India continues to work bilaterally with the Afghan Government to identify additional areas of cooperation.

During President Obama’s visit to India in November 2010, he and Prime Minister Singh committed to intensify consultation, cooperation, and coordination to promote a stable, prosperous, and independent Afghanistan. They agreed to collaborate closely to assist the people of Afghanistan by identifying opportunities to leverage our relative strengths, experience, and resources, including joint projects on agriculture and women’s economic development. Eighty-five percent of Afghans derive their income from agriculture, and Afghan women continue to lack economic, social, and political opportunities.

PERSONNEL COSTS

167. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, in your written responses, you note that the portion of DOD’s budget devoted to personnel-related costs continues to grow. You acknowledge that the current military compensation system “remains rooted in structures established generations ago,” and that you “believe it may be possible to restructure our military benefits in a way that reduces costs.” Likewise, Secretary Gates, in his last major policy speech delivered on May 24, stated that we may need to consider “reexamining military compensation levels in light of the fact that—apart from the U.S. Army during the worst years of Iraq—all the Services have consistently exceeded their recruiting and retention goals . . . ” If confirmed, do you intend to direct a comprehensive review of military pay and benefits?

Mr. PANETTA. The fiscal environment requires us to look at all areas to meet the savings target including compensation, but we will take care of our personnel and their families, particularly our Wounded Warriors whose sacrifices demand that we deliver on our promises.

168. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, what overarching changes and modifications do you believe are necessary to control rising personnel costs, while continuing to adequately provide for servicemembers?

Mr. PANETTA. We need to examine all aspects of compensation in a manner that recognizes the unique nature of military life and the need to attract and retain needed personnel. While I don’t yet have any specific proposals, I do recognize the importance of this review.

169. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, do you agree with the recent recommendation of Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that when implementing President Obama’s call for $400 billion in cuts to security spending, savings
should be identified within military pay and benefits before cuts are made to force structure, such as weapons programs, equipment, and end strength?

Mr. PANETTA. I look forward to working with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about priorities and potential areas for savings. Finding the $400 billion sought by the President will require us to make disciplined decisions in a number of areas, and we will need to find the right balance between military pay and benefits, weapons programs, equipment, and end strength.

MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM

170. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, your written responses also evidenced your concerns regarding the military retirement system, including that it was "created in an earlier era," and that it "may be appropriate to also review the military retirement system for needed changes and efficiencies." Secretary Gates also stated in his May 24 speech that we currently have a "one-size-fits-all approach to retirement, pay, and pensions left over from the last century." He went on to say, "a more tiered and targeted system—one that weighs compensation towards the most demand and dangerous specialties—could bring down costs while attracting and retaining the high quality personnel we need ... " If confirmed, do you intend to direct a comprehensive review of the military retirement system?

Mr. PANETTA. I expect that, if confirmed, I will need to direct a review of all aspects of military compensation including retirement. That review needs to recognize the unique nature of military life. If retirement changes are proposed, I am committed to grandfathering those currently serving.

171. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, what overarching changes and modifications do you believe are necessary to control rising costs while continuing to attract the high-quality personnel we need for our national defense?

Mr. PANETTA. Controlling rising costs will require us to make disciplined decisions in a number of areas. We will need to find the right balance between military pay and benefits, weapons programs, equipment and end strength and understand the impact of any pay changes on our ability to recruit and retain the future force.

MILITARY VOTING

172. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, in a letter to me dated December 16, 2009, Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn wrote, “I am pleased to inform you that I will designate all military installation voting assistance offices as National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) agencies . . . Those designations will be advertised to State and local election officials, as well as Uniformed Service voters, when implemented.” This action was taken under section 7(a)(2) of the NVRA. Please provide a detailed status on the implementation of this decision.

Mr. PANETTA. Since July 2010, the Department has accomplished the following:

• Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) provided an Installation Voter Assistance (IVA) Office Training Handbook including specific step-by-step voting assistance decision trees for both military and civilians entering the IVA office.
• In-person training was provided in 36 military concentration areas, and three webinars were conducted to assist installation personnel who were unable to attend the in-person training.
• The Under Secretary for Personnel & Readiness issued Directive-Type Memorandum 10–021, directing the Services to establish IVA Offices at all military installations.
• The Department is completing the revision of DOD Directive 1000.04, FVAP, which includes instructions to the Services for fulfilling all aspects of the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act. This is scheduled for completion later this year.
• The Service Senior Voting Representatives report quarterly to the Director, FVAP, on the implementation of IVA Offices and on other voting assistance metrics. The Services expect to have 100 percent Voter Assistance Office and NVRA implementation by the end of fiscal year 2011.

173. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, what is your opinion on the proper role of DOD in ensuring that our military personnel and their families have a meaningful opportunity to vote in Federal elections, regardless of whether they are stateside or overseas?
Mr. PANETTA. The role of DOD is to assist uniformed servicemembers, their families, and overseas voters to exercise their right to vote.

CIA LEGAL EXPENSES

174. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, Attorney General Eric Holder reopened the investigations of several CIA interrogators in August 2009, after their cases had been formally closed in 2007 following thorough consideration by Federal prosecutors. Has the CIA paid for any of the legal expenses incurred by these interrogators as a result of these re-investigations? If so, how much Federal funding has the CIA spent on these efforts to date?

Mr. PANETTA. The CIA’s expenditure of its appropriations for legal expenses incurred in connection with investigations of CIA interrogators, and the Agency’s potential need for additional Federal funding for such expenses, are matters beyond this Department’s purview. Accordingly, I defer to the CIA for response.

175. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, how much additional Federal funding does the CIA anticipate needing to spend on this?

Mr. PANETTA. The CIA’s expenditure of its appropriations for legal expenses incurred in connection with investigations of CIA interrogators, and the Agency’s potential need for additional Federal funding for such expenses, are matters beyond this Department’s purview. Accordingly, I defer to the CIA for response.

UNITED KINGDOM

176. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, what are the implications of the United Kingdom’s reductions in military spending for the future of the NATO alliance?

Mr. PANETTA. We are concerned about the implications reductions in defense expenditure across the Alliance will have on NATO’s future viability. The Department continues to engage in frank discussions with all of our NATO partners, in public and private, regarding the challenges associated with declining defense expenditures.

The United Kingdom faces an austere budget environment coupled with an unsustainable defense program that needs to be overhauled. It will implement a number of cuts as a result of its Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) reducing the size and some of the capabilities of its armed forces. Nevertheless, we expect that the United Kingdom will maintain its position as a leading NATO partner for the long term.

Although these are challenging economic times and many countries have significant fiscal challenges, all allies will need to find ways to spend limited funds more wisely through pooling, specialization, and multinational procurement. Although not a panacea, these practices should help our NATO allies to get more capability out of their defense investment.

177. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, are there any lessons from the United Kingdom’s reductions that can be applied to the current U.S. debate about defense spending reductions?

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. The United Kingdom undertook a SDSR last year to tackle the very difficult problem of an austere fiscal environment and a defense program that was overspent, overstretched, and in need of new strategic direction. It is important to note that, even after the SDSR, the United Kingdom was able to maintain 2 percent of GDP expenditure on its military, sustain its commitment to NATO operations in Afghanistan, and respond to the situation in Libya as a leading partner in the effort.

Our own defense establishment must also address an increasingly austere budgeting environment, a complex set of security challenges, and an uncertain future. We are consulting with the British on shared lessons and experiences as our defense establishments continue to explore efficiencies and best practices in our respective defense models.

F–22 EXPORTS

178. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Panetta, Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz has previously indicated that having a fleet of only 187 F–22 fighters creates a high risk for the U.S. military in meeting its operational demands. Given China’s development of a stealth aircraft and Russia’s development and export of air defense systems, the F–22 Raptor has taken on even greater importance. If con-
firmed, will you consider creating an export variant of the F–22 for sale to allied air forces?

Mr. Panetta. I will review the F–22 program, along with my planned review of all of the Department's major weapons systems. However, it is my understanding that export versions of U.S.-made weapons systems are the result of interest from foreign countries through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) requests. At this time I am not aware of any official requests for F–22 FMS.

WEAPON SYSTEM CODEVELOPMENT WITH INDIA

179. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, there are eight partner nations committed to the development and production of the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter. These partnerships are the source of extra investment for development of the aircraft, help drive down per-unit cost, and support the industrial base through foreign military sales. I believe there is potential for the United States and our strategic partner India to co-develop one or more military weapon systems, such as the replacement aircraft for the Air Force's 40-year old T–38 trainer aircraft. Co-development of a trainer jet would also expand the opportunities for U.S. Air Force pilots and Indian Air Force pilots to train side-by-side, which would be of great value. Do you agree that co-developing a weapon system with India would be in both our strategic and fiscal interest? Do you support this idea?

Mr. Panetta. The Department accrues significant benefit from cooperative research and development projects with our NATO partners and friendly foreign nations. 10 U.S.C. 2350a requires our acquisition community to provide an assessment of cooperative opportunities prior to the first acquisition milestone or decision point. I agree that co-development is in both our strategic and fiscal interest and support the idea. If an opportunity for co-development with India were to arise, we would certainly pursue it if practically feasible.

180. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, what other future programs would be good candidates for DOD to embark on similar joint development efforts with India?

Mr. Panetta. The Department identifies assessment of cooperative opportunities for co-development at or before the first acquisition milestone or decision point. During that analysis we identify good candidates for joint development. I do not, at this point, know of any specific candidates identified for co-development programs with India, although there is an ongoing cooperative research and development engagement with India.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

181. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, Iran continues to maintain a rapid pace in its progress towards a nuclear weapons capability. The International Atomic Energy Agency continues to report that Iran conducts illicit nuclear activity. Iran's missile program also shows progress towards a nuclear weapons capability that demonstrates prospective increases in proficiency and range. In fact, Iran has already enriched a sufficient quantity of uranium to produce multiple nuclear warheads if it further enriched that material to weapons-grade level. In response, the United States and our allies have imposed significant sanctions on Iran, with the hopes that these steps will press Tehran to change course. Do you agree that the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran and the persistent threat posed by Iran's proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, demonstrate the need for the development and deployment of missile defenses for the protection of the United States, as well as our deployed forces, allies, and partners?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, the ballistic missile threat from Iran and its continued defiance of international obligations regarding its nuclear program demonstrate the need for the development and deployment of missile defenses for the protection of the United States, as well as our deployed forces, allies, and partners.

182. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, do you agree that Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons poses an unacceptable risk to the United States?

Mr. Panetta. We remain committed to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran would be highly destabilizing for the Middle East, and could have significant implications for U.S. interests. No one can say with certainty how the situation might unfold, but a nuclear-armed Iran could cause other states in the Middle East to pursue nuclear programs. It could also embolden Iran in its actions throughout the region—most notably by expanding
its support for proxies. A nuclear-armed Iran could also cause strategic instability that could eventually lead to a regional conflict.

183. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, do you agree with the President that all options must be on the table to address Iran’s illicit activities?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, I agree with the President that all options should remain on the table to address Iran’s illicit activities. It is DOD’s responsibility to plan for all contingencies, and through prudent military planning we continue to refine options to protect U.S. and partner interests from Iranian aggression. However, we continue to believe that diplomacy and economic pressure are the most effective tools for changing Iranian behavior at this time.

184. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you ensure DOD is prepared to carry out any orders the President may give to address the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon?

Mr. Panetta. It is DOD’s responsibility to plan for all contingencies, and through prudent military planning we continue to refine options to protect U.S. and partner interests from Iranian aggression. However, we continue to believe that diplomacy and economic pressure are the most effective tools for changing Iranian behavior and achieving our objectives. I will continue to ensure the Department is prepared to carry out any orders given by the Commander in Chief.

MILITARY PERSONNEL LOANS/CREDIT

185. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, I would like to raise an issue regarding lending to military personnel that has come to my attention and which I find very concerning. The North Carolina legislature is considering legislation (HB 810) that would increase interest rates charged by installment finance lenders. DOD has clearly defined regulations governing lending to military personnel (32 CFR Part 232) which imposes a 36 percent rate cap on short-term loans which do not amortize. Yet, during a hearing military officers testified against the bill indicating that the Office of Secretary of Defense “found the bill objectionable.”

Further, when Congress passed the Wall Street Reform Act, despite the opportunity to do so, DOD did not recommend any changes to the statute governing these regulations nor did Congress enact any changes. When DOD reviewed and considered the regulation in place that imposes a 36 percent rate cap on short-term payday loans which do not amortize, it found that amortizing installment loans should not be covered by the regulation. 72 Federal Register 5058 (August 31, 2007), at page 50582, reads: “Likewise, there are installment loans with favorable terms and some with terms that can increase the interest rate well beyond the limits prescribed by 10 U.S.C. 987. Isolating detrimental credit products without impeding the availability of favorable installment loans was of central concern in developing the regulation. Consequently, installment loans that do not fit the definition of ‘consumer credit’ in section 232.3(b), including the definition of ‘payday loans,’ ‘vehicle loans,’ or ‘tax refund anticipation loans’ are not covered by the regulation. The Department’s intent is to balance protections with access to credit. The protections posed in the statute assist servicemembers, when applied with precision to preclude unintended barriers.’’

However, I have seen reports of local commanders and civilian representatives of DOD advocating at the State level against the very types of loan instruments that DOD’s own regulations call a favorable form of credit for servicemembers and their families.

I am very concerned about continued credit availability to military families. Has DOD changed its policy to include other lenders within the coverage of the regulation?

Mr. Panetta. No, DOD has not changed its policy and does not intend at this time to include other lenders within the coverage of the regulation. The Department proposes to help ensure that servicemembers and their families receive fair protections by working with Federal and State governments on existing and proposed policies impacting all consumers. The goal is to try to eliminate the need to identify servicemembers and their families separately for protections, which may create unintentional barriers to credit.

186. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, has there been any study finding abuse in this area?

Mr. Panetta. There have been no DOD-directed studies of installment lending practices.
Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, is it still the position of DOD to balance consumer protection while preventing unintended barriers to obtaining credit?

Mr. Panetta. Yes, this is still DOD's position. The Department proposes to help ensure that servicemembers and their families receive fair protections by working with Federal and State governments on existing and proposed policies impacting all consumers. The goal is to try to eliminate the need to identify servicemembers and their families separately for protections, which may create unintentional barriers to credit.

[The nomination reference of Hon. Leon E. Panetta follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
May 26, 2011.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Leon E. Panetta, of California, to be Secretary of Defense, vice Robert M. Gates.

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Leon E. Panetta, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

RÉSUMÉ OF CAREER SERVICE OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA

Education:

• Santa Clara University, 1956–1960
  • Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science awarded 1960
  • Santa Clara University School of Law 1960–1963
  • Juris Doctor Law Degree awarded in 1963

Employment Record:

The following are positions for which I received compensation:

• Central Intelligence Agency
  • Director
  • 2009–present

• Santa Clara University
  • Presidential Professor
  • 1999–2009

• California State University Office of the Chancellor
  • Distinguished Scholar
  • 1997–2009

• Joint Ocean Commission Initiative
  • Commissioner and Co-Chair (compensation from Meridian Institute)

• Meridian Institute
  • Board of Directors (no compensation) Member, Policy Planning Staff
  • 2008–2009

• Blue Shield of California
  • Director
  • 2001–2009

• International Advisory Board, Fleischman-Hillard,
  • Member
  • 1998–2009

• Corinthian Colleges Inc.
  • Director
  • 2008–2009

• BP Corp. North America, Inc.
  • Member of Advisory Board
2005–2009
- Zenith Insurance Company
  - Director
  - 2000–2009
- California Forward
  - Co-Chair
  - 2007–2009
- Inns of Monterey LTD & Inns of Cannery Rd LTD
  - Director
  - 2003–2009
- Pacific Maritime Association
  - Governmental Advisor
  - 1998–2009
- IDT Corp.
  - Director
  - 2004–2006
- Connetics Corp. (Stiefel Laboratories)
  - Director
  - 2000–2006
- New York Stock Exchange
  - Director
  - 1997–2003
- New York Stock Exchange
  - Co-chairman, Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee
  - 2002–2003

The following are uncompensated positions in which I have served, although in some cases I was compensated for my necessary expenses associated with my work in the organization:
- Leon & Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public Policy
  - Founder and Co-Director
  - 1998–2009
- Pew Oceans Commission
- Bread for the World
  - Director
  - 2001–2009
- National Marine Sanctuary Foundation
  - Director
  - 2004–2009
- Close Up Foundation
  - Director
  - 1999–2009
- Junior Statesmen Foundation, Inc.
  - Trustee
  - 2003–2009
- Public Policy Institute of California
  - Director
  - 2005–2009
- National Review Board, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
  - Member
  - 2002–2004
- National Steinbeck Center
  - Director
  - 1998–2001
- U.C. Santa Cruz Foundation
  - Director
  - 1998–2001
- Santa Clara University Law School Board of Visitors
  - Member
• 1998–2009
  • Santa Clara University Board of Trustees
    • Member
    • 2000–2009
  • Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula
    • Trustee
    • 2000–2007
• Center for National Policy
  • Chairman of the Board
  • 1999–2003
• Power Up
  • Director
  • 1999–2000
• Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future
  • Member
  • 2005–2007
• Monterey Bay Aquarium
  • Director
  • 2004–2008
• National Leadership Roundtable on Church Management
  • Director
  • 2005–2009
• Citizens Advisory Group of the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector
  • Member
  • 2005
• National Advisory Council for Aspen Rodel Fellowship Program, Aspen Institute
  • Member
  • 2005–2009
• Aspen Security Group, Aspen Institute
  • Member
  • 2008–2009
• Marks Ranch Advisory Committee, Big Sur Land Trust
  • Co-Chair
  • 2005–2007
• Bretton Woods Committee
  • Member
  • 2001–2009
• California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy
  • Director
  • 2000–2009
• National Advisory Committee, Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools
  • Trustee
  • 2008–2009
• Caring Institute
  • Honorary Trustee
  • 2001–2009
• Center for the Study of the Presidency
  • Member, Strengthening America’s Future Initiative Steering Committee
  • Member, National Commission to Unite a Divided America
  • Trustee
  • 2008–2009
• Children’s Neurobiological Solutions Foundation
  • Member, Board of Advisors
  • 2001–2009
• Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget
  • Trustee
  • 2000–2009
• Making Washington Work Committee, Committee for Economic Development
In addition to the compensated activities mentioned above, prior to my confirmation as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I had conducted much of my pre-2009 independent writing (such as my column in the Monterey Herald), speaking (including my Washington Speakers Bureau work), and other professional business through Panetta & Associates, an unincorporated sole proprietorship. I received no salary from Panetta & Associates, but I did receive through it compensation for writing and speaking.

Honors and Awards:

- Army Commendation Medal, 1966
- NEA Lincoln Award, 1969
- A. Philip Randolph Award, 1984
- The Farm Bureau’s Golden Plow Award, 1991
- The American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages President’s Award, 1991
- The Peter Burnett Award for Distinguished Public Service, 1993
- The Distinguished Public Service Medal from the Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1995
- The Special Achievement Award for Public Service from the National Italian American Foundation, 1997
- John H. Chafee Costal Stewardship Award, 2001
- Special Achievement Award, Santa Clara University School of Law Alumni Association, 2002
- Julius A. Stratton Award for Coastal Leadership, 2003
• Exemplary Leadership Award from the American Leadership Forum, Silicon Valley, 2004
• Aquarium of the Pacific Ocean Conservation Award, 2006
• Lifetime Achievement Award for the National Marine Sanctuary Foundation, 2006
• Smithsonian Institution National Portrait Gallery Paul Peck Presidential Award, 2006
• Natural Resources Defense Council Forces for Nature Award, 2007
• National Hospice Foundation Silver Anniversary Honoree, 2007
• Lifetime of Service Award, City Year Silicon Valley, 2007
• Distinguished Public Service Award, Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities, 2007
• The Santa Clara University School of Law Social Justice and Human Rights Award, 2008

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, and certain senior military officers as determined by the committee, to complete a form that details the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Leon E. Panetta in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Leon Edward Panetta.

2. Position to which nominated:
Secretary of Defense.

3. Date of nomination:
May 26, 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
June 28, 1938; Monterey, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Sylvia (Varni) Panetta.

7. Names and ages of children:
Christopher Panetta, age 48.
Carmelo Panetta, age 46.
James Panetta, age 41.

8. **Education:** List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

9. **Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

   The following are positions for which I received compensation. Note that the dates are my best recollection.
   
   - Director, Central Intelligence Agency, McLean VA, 2009–present
   - Presidential Professor, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, CA, 1999–2009
   - Distinguished Scholar, California State University Office of the Chancellor, Monterey CA, 1997–2009
   - Commissioner and Co-Chair, Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, 1996–2009 (compensation from Meridian Institute)
   - Director, Blue Shield of California, San Francisco CA, 2001–2009
   - Director, Corinthian Colleges Inc., Santa Ana, CA, 2008–2009
   - Co-Chair, California Forward, Sacramento CA, 2007–2009
   - Director, Inns of Monterey LTD & Inns of Cannery Rd LTD, Monterey CA, 2003–2009
   - Director, IDT Corp., Newark, NJ, 2004–2006
   - Director, Connetics Corp. (Stiefel Laboratories), Research Triangle Park, NC, 2000–2006

   The following are uncompensated positions in which I have served, although in some cases I was compensated for my necessary expenses associated with my work in the organization. Dates are to the best of my recollection.
   
   - Leon & Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public Policy, Founder and Co-Director, 1998–2009
   - Director, Bread for the World, 2001–2009
   - Director, National Marine Sanctuary Foundation, 2004–2009
   - Director, Close-Up Foundation, 1999–2009
   - Trustee, Junior Statesmen Foundation, Inc., 2003–2009
   - Director, Public Policy Institute of California, 2005–2009
   - Director, National Steinbeck Center, 1998–2001
   - Director, U.C. Santa Cruz Foundation, 1998–2001
   - Member, Santa Clara University Law School Board of Visitors, 1998–2009
   - Member, Santa Clara University Board of Trustees, 2000–2009
   - Trustee, Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula, 2000–2007
   - Chairman of the Board, Center for National Policy, 1999–2003
   - Director, Power Up, 1999–2000
   - Member, Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future, 2005–2007
   - Director, Monterey Bay Aquarium, 2004–2008
   - Director, National Leadership Roundtable on Church Management, 2005–2009
   - Member, Citizens Advisory Group of the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, 2005
   - Member, National Advisory Council for Aspen Rodel Fellowship Program, Aspen Institute, 2005–2009
   - Member, Aspen Security Group, Aspen Institute, 2008–2009
• Co-Chair, Marks Ranch Advisory Committee, Big Sur Land Trust, 2005–2007
• Member, Bretton Woods Committee, 2001–2009
• Director, California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy, 2000–2009
• Trustee, National Advisory Committee, Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools, 2008–2009
• Honorary Trustee, Caring Institute, 2001–2009
• Member, Strengthening America’s Future Initiative Steering Committee; Member, National Commission to Unite a Divided America; and Trustee, Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2008–2009
• Member, Board of Advisors, Children’s Neurobiological Solutions Foundation, 2001–2009
• Trustee, Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, 2000–2009
• Member, Making Washington Work Committee, Committee for Economic Development, 2006–2009
• Member, National Advisory Board, Commission on the Future of America’s Veterans, 2006–2009
• Co-Chair, Committee on the Constitutional System, 1999–2009
• Member, Leadership Council, Competitive Clusters, 2003–2009
• Trustee, Consortium for Ocean Leadership, 2008–2009
• Principal, Council for Excellence in Government, 2000–2009
• Honorary Director, Friends of Long Marine Lab, 2006–2009
• Selected Advisor, Heartland Democracy Center, 2007–2009
• Director, Meridian Institute, 2008–2009
• Member, National Commission on Federal Reform, 2001
• Senior Advisor, Next Ten, 2003–2009
• Advisory Committee, Ocean Champions, 2003–2009
• Member, Advisory Board of Governors, Partnership for Public Service, 2004–2009

In addition to the activities mentioned above, prior to my confirmation as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I had conducted much of my pre-2009 independent writing (such as my column in the Monterey Herald), speaking (including my Washington Speakers Bureau work), and other professional business through Panetta & Associates, an unincorporated sole proprietorship. I received no salary from Panetta & Associates, but I did receive through it compensation for writing and speaking and I paid my wife, Sylvia, a salary as its single employee. Note that Panetta & Associates, the sole proprietorship through which my wife used to receive a salary, is a different entity from The Panetta Institute, where she currently serves as the Director in an unpaid capacity (see Part B, Question 5).

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
   - Iraq Study Group, 2006
   - Co-chair, Council on Base Support and Retention, Office of the Governor of California, 2004–2005
   - Chief of Staff, The White House, 1994–1997
   - Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1993–1994
   - Executive Assistant, Mayor of New York City, 1970–1971
   - Special Assistant to Secretary, U.S. HEW, 1969
   - Officer, U.S. Army, 1964–1966

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

    I resigned from all previously held positions upon becoming Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

    None other than my regular attendance at the Our Lady of Mount Carmel Catholic Church in Carmel Valley, CA.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.


(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.

I have been a member of the Democratic Party for many years.

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

I have contributed to Democratic candidates over the years. Below is what has been identified from my recollection and records, as well as from a search of internet databases. Despite my searches, there may be other contributions I have been unable to identify, find or remember.

Federal:

- McCloskey for Congress, $250, 5/12/2006
- Murtha for Congress Committee, $500, 5/15/2006; $1,000, 3/16/2007; $250, 2/21/2008
- America’s Opportunity Fund, $250, 10/11/2007
- Hillary Clinton for President, $1,000, 11/28/2007; $1,000, 3/14/2007; $1,000, 4/30/2008
- Larocco for Senate, $250, 6/26/2007; $500, 10/16/2008; $250, 2/20/2008
- Slattery for Senate, $1,000, 6/29/2008
- Matsui for Congress, $250, 8/7/2008
- Obama for America, $2,300, 10/24/2008
- Spratt for Congress Committee, $500, 6/27/2006
- DCCC, $250, 10/31/2006
- DNC, $2,300, 10/20/2008

State:

- Anna Caballero for Assembly, $100, 3/21/2006; $250, 11/3/2008; $200, 2/26/2008

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

During my tenure as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I have been privileged to receive recognition from various organizations and foreign governments in the course of my official duties.

As a Member of Congress, executive branch official in the Nixon and Clinton administrations, and as a public figure since leaving government, I am honored to have received more awards and other recognitions from civic organizations than I can recall. Examples that we found while searching my files prior to my confirmation as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency included:

- Army Commendation Medal, 1966
- NEA Lincoln Award, 1969
- A. Philip Randolph Award, 1984
- The Farm Bureau’s Golden Plow Award, 1991
- The American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages President’s Award, 1991
- The Peter Burnett Award for Distinguished Public Service, 1993
- The Distinguished Public Service Medal from the Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1995
- The Special Achievement Award for Public Service from the National Italian American Foundation, 1997
- John H. Chafee Coastal Stewardship Award, 2001
- Special Achievement Award, Santa Clara University School of Law Alumni Association, 2002
- Julius A. Stratton Award for Coastal Leadership, 2003
- Exemplary Leadership Award from the American Leadership Forum, Silicon Valley, 2004
- Aquarium of the Pacific Ocean Conservation Award, 2006
- Lifetime Achievement Award for the National Marine Sanctuary Foundation, 2006
- Smithsonian Institution National Portrait Gallery Paul Peck Presidential Award, 2006
- Natural Resources Defense Council Forces for Nature Award, 2007
- National Hospice Foundation Silver Anniversary Honoree, 2007
• Lifetime of Service Award, City Year Silicon Valley, 2007
• Distinguished Public Service Award, Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities, 2007
• The Santa Clara University School of Law Social Justice and Human Rights Award, 2008

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

In my official capacity as Director of the CIA, I have written multiple messages to my workforce, some of which have been made available on the cia.gov website and have been picked up by the press. Additionally, in that same official capacity, I have written two op-ed pieces:

• The CIA is Proud to Be on the Front Lines against al Qaeda, Leon Panetta, Washington Post, 10 January 2010, Page A13.

I wrote one book, Bring Us Together: The Nixon Team and the Civil Rights Retreat (1971).

As a Member of Congress and executive branch official in past administrations, I authored many articles, reports, and pieces of legislation—too many to list or recall.

The following are items published between my departure from the White House in 1997 and my arrival at the CIA in 2009, to the best of my recollection.

Commission Reports


Book Chapters


Articles and Essays

2009

• Governance, Budgeting Require Full Overhauls—and We Can Do It, The Sacramento Bee, January 4, 2009

2008

• Obama’s Ultimate Legacy Will Be Forged on Capitol Hill, Roll Call, January 20, 2008
• Beyond Winning, The Ability To Govern, The San Francisco Chronicle, November 9, 2008
• Obama Faces Challenges of Change, The Monterey County Herald, November 9, 2008
• What Binds America Is Values In Our Constitution, The San Francisco Chronicle, September 17, 2008
• Five Points for the Next President, The Monterey County Herald, September 7, 2008
• Protect Our Oceans, San Jose Mercury News, August 30, 2008
- Nonprofits Are the American Dream, Commonfund, Summer 2008
- Protecting the Jersey Shore Together, New Jersey Times, June 25, 2008
- If Leaders Can’t Lead, the People Must, The Monterey County Herald, July 13, 2008
- Americans Reject Scare Tactics, The Monterey County Herald, March 9, 2008
- We Need Real Change Not Campaign Talk, The Monterey County Herald, January 13, 2008
- Bringing Order to the Ocean, Boston Globe, November 18, 2007
- What’s Missing in ’08 Run—Candidates’ Core Beliefs Buried in Campaign Rhetoric, The Monterey County Herald, November 11, 2007
- “Surge” Not Working as Hoped, The Monterey County Herald, September 9, 2007
- An Empire in Decline, The Monterey County Herald, July 18, 2007
- Preserving the Ocean For Our Children, The Good Times, June 19, 2007
- Consensus on Iraq Exists—Build on It, The Monterey County Herald, May 13, 2007
- A Renaissance in Ocean Science, Sea Technology Magazine, April, 1, 2007
- Government a Plague of Incompetence, The Monterey County Herald, March 11, 2007
- States’ Map For Saving The Oceans, The Washington Post, February 3, 2007
- The Wrong Message To Iraq, The Monterey County Herald, January 14, 2007
- A Last Chance for Consensus on Iraq, The Monterey County Herald, December 17, 2006
- Iraq Clock Ticking, the Monterey County Herald, December 6, 2006
- We Won, Now What?, The New York Times, November 12, 2006
- Now Parties Must Govern Together, The Monterey County Herald, November 12, 2006
- Time For a Budget Summit, The San Francisco Chronicle, November 5, 2006
- Facing Reality in Iraq, The Monterey County Herald, September 10, 2006
- Doing Justice: The Core of a Jesuit Education, Explore, Fall 2006
- Policymakers should look to Californians for decisions, The Monterey County Herald, July 20, 2006
- “A republic … if you can keep it”, The Monterey County Herald, July 9, 2006
- Price of Gas—Curse or Blessing, The Monterey County Herald, May 7, 2006
- Immigration Reform Challenging, The Monterey County Herald, March 12, 2006
- Lobby Reform is Overdue in Congress, The Monterey County Herald, January 15, 2006

2005
- After the Hurricane: What will we learn from Katrina?, The Monterey County Herald, September 11, 2005
- Looking for Honesty in Our Leaders, The Monterey County Herald, June 10, 2005
• Where is the Battle for Ideas?, The Monterey County Herald, May 8, 2005
• California: The Key to Transforming America’s Military, The Report of the California Council on Base Support and Retention, April 7, 2005
• California is Key to Transformation of Nation’s Defense, The San Francisco Chronicle, March 28, 2005
• Time for a Party That Can Govern, The Monterey County Herald, March 13, 2005
• The Vulnerability of Modern Society, The Monterey County Herald, January 16, 2005
• New Commerce Chief Must Protect Collapsing Oceans, The Monterey County Herald, January 12, 2005

2004
• Political Crossroads: Heal or Divide, The Monterey County Herald, November 7, 2004
• Healing the Nation, The San Francisco Chronicle, October 25, 2004
• The Price of Truth, The Monterey County Herald, September 12, 2004
• The State of Democracy in America, The Monterey County Herald, July 11, 2004
• American Democracy at Risk, The Monterey County Herald, May 9, 2004
• Deja vu all Over Again in Washington, The Monterey County Herald, March 7, 2004
• A Report On the Crisis in the Catholic Church in the United States, National Review Board for the Protection of Children and Young People, February 27, 2004
• Federal Deficit A Nightmare For Our Children, The San Jose Mercury News, February 8, 2004
• Talking with Americans, The Globe and Mail (Canada), February 5, 2004
• From Athens to Iowa: Let The Games Begin, The Monterey County Herald, January 11, 2004

2003
• Reform Must Follow Recall, The Monterey County Herald, November 16, 2003
• Summer of Our Discontent, The Monterey County Herald, September 7, 2003
• Saving Our Seas Requires Leadership at Home and Abroad, Ambassador Review, Fall 2003
• This is Direct Democracy Run Amok, The Los Angeles Times, July 27, 2003
• Mortgaging Our Children’s Future, The Monterey County Herald, July 13, 2003
• America’s Living Oceans—Charting a Course for Sea Change: Summary Report Recommendations for a New Ocean Policy, Pew Oceans Commission, May 2003
• The End of Fighting—But What Is Victory?, The Monterey County Herald, May 11, 2003
• The deafening Sound of Silence, The Monterey County Herald, March 9, 2003
• The Economy Needs Certainty, Not Stimulus, The Monterey County Herald, January 12, 2003
• Lessons Not Learned: California’s $35 Billion in Red Ink Calls for Fearless Leaders, The San Jose Mercury News, January 12, 2003

2002
• But Can They Govern?, The Monterey County Herald, November 10, 2002
• Did September 11 Really Change America?, The Monterey County Herald, September 1, 2002
• Restoring Trust in Corporate America, The Monterey County Herald, July 14, 2002
• Washington Turf Wars Take Teeth Away from Ridge’s Office, The Monterey County Herald, May 12, 2002
• Ocean Dimension of Earth Day, The Washington Times, April 22, 2002
• A Time to Ask “Who Can We Trust?”, The Monterey County Herald, March 10, 2002
• Can Congress Discipline Itself?, The New York Times, February 8, 2002
• Davis’ Budget Has Flaws, but Works, Los Angeles Times, February 5, 2002
• Did Sept. 11 Change Washington?, The Monterey County Herald, January 20, 2002

2001
• The Attack on Our Economic Security, Roll Call, December 2001
• America Must Not Lose Focus in Its War on Terrorism, The Monterey County Herald, November 11, 2001
• The Politics of Geography, The San Jose Mercury News, September 10, 2001
• The Price of ‘Spin’ Versus the ‘Truth’, The Monterey County Herald, September 9, 2001
• Back to ‘Borrow and Spend’, The Monterey County Herald, July 8, 2001
• Reinventing the Energy Wheel, Christian Science Monitor, May 18, 2001
• A Nation of All, Not of One?, The Monterey County Herald, May 13, 2001
• You Can’t Fool All the People All the Time, The Monterey County Herald, March 18, 2001
• The Clinton Paradox, The San Jose Mercury News, January 1, 2001
• To Succeed As President, Bush Must Learn from Lessons of the Past, The Monterey County Herald, January 1, 2001
• To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral Process, Report for the National Commission on Federal Election Reform, 2001

2000
• Can He Govern, The Monterey County Herald, November 12, 2000
• Big Money Undermines Democracy, The San Jose Mercury News, October 15, 2000
• Modern Political Conventions are All Script, No Drama, The San Jose Mercury News, July 30, 2000
• High Cost of Housing Threatens Economy, The Monterey County Herald, July 9, 2000
• A Government By and For All the People, Buon Giornio, June/July 2000
• The Initiative Process? Undermining our Representatives, The Monterey County Herald, May 14, 2000
• What Went Wrong With Reformers?, The Monterey County Herald, March 12, 2000
• The Key to the Last Century is the Key to the Next, The Monterey County Herald, January 9, 2000

1999
• Not a Time for Jokers or Games, The Monterey County Herald, November 14, 1999
• Young Bush’s Credibility is on the Line, The Monterey County Herald, September 12, 1999
• How Congress Was Cornered, The New York Times, October 21, 1999
• The Wide Open Race for Money, The Monterey County Herald, July 11, 1999
• How Not to Spend the Surplus, The New York Times, June 30, 1999
• Service in the Age of Information, The Monterey County Herald, May 21, 1999
• What the Hell is this War Really About?, The Monterey County Herald, May 16, 1999
• A National Nightmare is Ended … Or is it?, The Los Angeles Times, February 14, 1999
• Impeachment has Weakened the Appeal of Public Service for Young Americans, The Monterey County Herald, January 7, 1999

1998
• Time to Rise Above Petty Politics, The Monterey County Herald, November 8, 1998
• Censure Makes Sense, The Washington Post, September 17, 1998

1997
16. **Speeches**: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

As Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I addressed my workforce in my official capacity on a regular basis. In addition to these internal speeches, I made the speeches listed below. I am providing two copies of each of these speeches, either in transcript (T) form or as prepared for delivery (APFD).

- Pacific Council on International Policy, Los Angeles, CA, May 18, 2009 T
- University of Maryland Commencement Ceremony, College Park, MD, May 21, 2009 APFD
- National Italian-American Foundation, Washington, DC, June 11, 2009 APFD
- White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges & Universities, Washington, DC, September 1, 2009 T
- Arab-American Iftar Dinner, Dearborn, MI, September 16, 2009 APFD
- Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, CA, October 23, 2009 APFD
- Fall of the Berlin Wall Commemoration, CIA Headquarters, November 9, 2009 APFD
- CIA Officers Memorial Foundation, Arlington, VA, January 29, 2010 APFD
- In-Q-Tel CEO Summit, San Francisco, CA, February 9, 2010 APFD
- University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, March 8, 2010 T
- Congressional Black Caucus, Washington, DC, April 28, 2010 APFD
- California State University—Stanislaus Commencement, Stanislaus, CA, June 4, 2010 APFD
- National Association of Asian-American Professionals Convention, San Francisco, CA, August 14, 2010 APFD
- Hispanic Association of Colleges & Universities Conference, San Diego, CA, September 1, 2010 APFD
- Santa Clara University Class of 1960 Reunion, Santa Clara, University, October 8, 2010 APFD
- Foreign Language Summit, College Park, MD, December 8, 2010 T
- Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA, March 15, 2011 APFD
- CIA Officers Memorial Foundation, Arlington, VA, March 30, 2011 APFD
- Commonfund Address, March 12, 2006, video recording
- National Marine Sanctuary Foundation Leadership Awards Dinner video tribute to Leon Panetta, June 13, 2006, video recording
- CSU Monterey Bay Master of Public Policy open house address, January 9, 2007, video recording
- Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget annual conference and dinner, March 13, 2007, video and transcript on website
- Marine Economy Forum co-hosted by Roger Williams University and the New England council, April 2, 2007, video recording
- Santa Clara University President’s Speakers Series: Is There Light at the End of the Tunnel? address regarding the report of The Iraq Study Group, May 31, 2007, video on website
- Union University scholarship banquet video introduction, October 23, 2007, video recording
- National Marine Sanctuary Program West Coast Regional Office Sustainable Tourism Symposium: Monterey Bay—Riding the Wave, November 29, 2007, video recording
- Commonfund address, March 10, 2008, video recording
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget annual roundtable and dinner, April 2, 2008, video and transcript on website
Center for the Study of the Presidency address re: challenges facing the next president, April 11, 2008, summary of remarks
Panetta Institute Monterey County Reads Volunteer Recognition Ceremony remarks, May 8, 2008, video recording
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget forum: Toward Fiscal Responsibility, May 20, 2008, video recording
Carlyle Investment Management LLC, September 9, 2008, video recording
Smithsonian Institute forum: An Evening with the Presidential Chiefs of Staff, September 15, 2008, video recording
California Forward forum: Getting Past Gridlock—Achieving Budget Reform, September 24, 2008, video broadcast (Cal. Channel)
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget forum: What Comes Next? The Economic and Budgetary Consequences of the Bailout, October 8, 2008, video and transcript on website
California Credit Union League address, November 6, 2008, video recording
Brookings Institution Memos to the President, November 7, 2008, transcript on website
Governors' Global Climate Change Summit: Finding Solutions Through Regional and Global Action, November 18, 2008, video webcast.

Additionally, prior to my confirmation as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I had often made a short introduction for speakers who participated in the Panetta Lecture Series at the Panetta Institute and then moderated discussion. A list of recordings of many of these events may be found on the Panetta Institute’s Web site at http://www.panettainstitute.org.

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

LEON E. PANETTA.
This 26th day of May, 2011.

[The nomination of Hon. Leon E. Panetta was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 14, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 21, 2011.]
NOMINATIONS OF GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/U.S. FORCES–KOREA; VADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN, TO BE ADMIRAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND; AND LTGEN JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE(COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES–AFGHANISTAN

TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 2011

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang and Breon N. Wells.

Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhita, assistant to Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, as-
sistant to Senator Manchin; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brent Bombach, assistant to Senator Portman; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; Sergio Sarkany, assistant to Senator Graham; and Dave Hanke and Russ Thomasson, assistants to Senator Cornyn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.
The committee meets this morning to consider three military nominations for command of some of the most critical and challenging missions facing our Nation.

Our witnesses this morning on what is truly a joint panel are General James Thurman, U.S. Army, nominated to be Commander, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea; Vice Admiral William McRaven, U.S. Navy, for appointment to the grade of admiral and nominated to be Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM); and Lieutenant General John Allen, U.S. Marine Corps, for appointment to the grade of general and nominated to be Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.

Thank you all for your many years of great service to this Nation and your willingness to serve once again.

Let me also extend our thanks to your families, whose support is so essential to your and our Nation's success. As is the tradition of this committee, I would invite each of you to introduce any family members or friends who may be here with you when you make your opening remarks.

General Thurman's nomination as the next Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea comes at a time of significant change and simmering tension on the Korean Peninsula. Our commitment to peace and stability in the region remains steadfast, and our alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) is as strong as ever.

The strength of that alliance will be particularly important over the next few years, as we embark on an ambitious realignment of our forces on the peninsula and need to deal with the unpredictable and aggressive behavior of a North Korean regime that continues to follow the destructive path of an international pariah.

General Thurman's long experience in positions of leadership and with maintaining well-trained, equipped, and ready soldiers provides the kind of foundation and professional skills that will be required of the U.S. commander in Korea.

Vice Admiral William McRaven is nominated to be the ninth Commander of SOCOM. Admiral McRaven has commanded at every level in the special operations community, most recently as Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and served in various staff and interagency positions, including time with the National Security Council. Incoming Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has credited Admiral McRaven with being the “real commander” of the extraordinary operation that killed Osama bin Laden.
Admiral McRaven has been nominated to be Commander of SOCOM at a time of exceptionally high operational tempo and growth for Special Operations Forces (SOF). As the current Commander of SOCOM, Admiral Eric Olson, told the committee earlier this year, “Since September 11, our manpower has roughly doubled, our budget has roughly tripled, and our overseas deployments have quadrupled.” Admiral Olson has also indicated that the force is beginning to show signs of “fraying around the edges.”

Admiral McRaven, the committee looks forward to hearing your thoughts on how the stress on special operations personnel can be mitigated, given the demand for their unique skills. The committee is also interested in your views on the future of special operations and the challenges that special operations personnel are likely to face. Will the announced drawdown of forces in Afghanistan impact SOF, given that SOF depend heavily on their counterparts in the general purpose forces for many of the enabling capabilities that they need to be successful?

In addition, the committee would be interested in your thoughts on the employment of the range of special operations capabilities against al Qaeda and associated groups outside of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Director Panetta has expressed concern about al Qaeda’s shifting to other places, most notably in Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa, and I hope that you will address what you see as the appropriate role for SOF in those areas.

In announcing Lieutenant General Allen’s nomination, President Obama called him “the right commander to take over the vital mission in Afghanistan.” If confirmed, Lieutenant General Allen will have some big boots to fill in succeeding General Petraeus as Commander of the 49-member ISAF coalition and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.

Like General Petraeus, General Allen brings an in-depth understanding of the complexities of the counterinsurgency (COIN) effort based on his own experience as the commander in Anbar Province in Iraq. Working with the Sunni Awakening, the marines in Anbar succeeded in getting local Sunni tribal leaders to reject the insurgency and instead support the Iraqi Government.

As the Deputy Commander at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General Allen has developed a regional perspective on issues affecting the mission in Afghanistan. He will be the first marine to serve as the top commander in Afghanistan.

General Allen’s number-one priority will be implementing President Obama’s decision last week to accelerate the transition of security responsibility to Afghan forces and to start bringing U.S. surge forces home. As outlined by the President, 10,000 U.S. troops will be withdrawn by the end of this year, and the remaining 23,000 U.S. surge forces will be drawn down by September of next year.

The President’s decision keeps the pressure on Afghan leaders to assume more and more responsibility for their security, just as the establishment of a date to begin reductions had the effect of creating a sense of urgency on the part of the Afghan Government to take responsibility for Afghanistan’s security. The assumption of that responsibility by the Afghans is the path to a successful mission and a stable, non-Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
The President’s transition decision was buttressed by the significant gains that coalition and Afghan forces, partnered together, have made in the last year in reclaiming former Taliban strongholds, particularly in the south.

Another major change in the last year is the surge in Afghan Security Forces. There are now 100,000 more Afghan Security Forces than 18 months ago when President Obama announced the U.S. surge, and another 70,000 Afghan soldiers and police who will be trained and equipped by the end of next summer, when all 33,000 U.S. surge troops will have withdrawn.

In his testimony to Congress last week, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen characterized the President’s decision as “more aggressive and incurring more risk” than Admiral Mullen had initially recommended. However, Admiral Mullen felt that, “Only the President in the end can really determine the acceptable level of risk that we must take,” because, as he put it, “The truth is, we would have run other kinds of risks by keeping more forces in Afghanistan longer.”

Among those other risks, Admiral Mullen said, are the risks of perpetuating greater Afghan dependence on our forces and inhibiting the growth and capability and confidence on the part of Afghan forces. The committee will be interested in hearing from General Allen as to his views of the President’s decision.

Again, gentlemen, our great thanks and our gratitude go to each of you and to your families.

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank our very distinguished witnesses, who are each nominated for a military command that is essential to the security of our Nation and our allies. I want to thank each of them for their many years of dedicated service and for stepping forward again when called upon to serve when and where their Nation needs them most.

All of you will help lead a force that has been at war for 10 years. We honor the service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform, and we pray that they will return safely and successful in their missions.

General Thurman, you have been nominated to lead our forces on the Korean Peninsula at a tense time in this long-running conflict and a critical time for our alliance with the ROK. We thank General Sharp for his leadership over the past few years.

The U.S.-ROK alliance has never been better and stronger. But the situation on the peninsula has rarely been as dangerous as it is today. The transition of power in North Korea from father to son has contributed to a series of provocative acts of aggression against our South Korean allies.

It is clear to me that if there is another such provocation, South Korea will not turn the other cheek. This has serious implications for the United States as we are bound as treaty allies to the defense of South Korea. We remain as committed as ever to our responsibilities. It is for this reason, and especially in light of the heightened state of alert and increased tensions, that we need to
take a hard look at our current plans for U.S. force realignment and tour normalization on the Korean Peninsula.

This committee needs a better understanding of this major undertaking, the costs of which are significant and growing. But ultimately, what must guide U.S. defense policy vis-a-vis the ROK is our obligation to ensure our mutual security and success.

Admiral McRaven, what you have achieved in your distinguished career was already extraordinary before May 2, 2011. But on that day, by leading the mission that killed Osama bin Laden, you and your men won an enduring place in American military history. To say that I am confident in your ability to lead SOCOM is an understatement.

Admiral Olson has done an exceptional job, and I am confident that you will build on his great work, if confirmed. The leader of al Qaeda is dead, but a new one has taken his place. Your mission will be to help ensure he meets the same end.

At the same time, a series of deadly franchises, especially al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, continues to threaten the security of our Homeland, our interests, our friends, and our allies. We look to SOCOM to continue planning and synchronizing our global operations and to continue building up the capacity of our partners to defeat our enemies far away from our Homeland.

Finally, General Allen, you have perhaps the biggest boots to fill in General David Petraeus, but we know that General Petraeus personally recommended you and supported you as his successor to lead our mission in Afghanistan. I can think of no higher compliment to pay a military officer.

The challenge that you will face in Afghanistan was always going to be significant. But I fear this challenge has only been increased unnecessarily by the drawdown of U.S. forces that the President announced last week.

I agree with the President that we are making amazing progress in Afghanistan. This progress is real, and it is remarkable. But as our commanders on the ground all point out, it is also fragile and reversible.

Our commanders also say that next year's fighting season will be decisive. This will be our opportunity to consolidate our gains in southern Afghanistan while increasing numbers of U.S. forces shift their main effort to eastern Afghanistan, where the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and other regional militant groups are still present and operating actively.

However, under the President's plan, which calls for having all of our surge units out of Afghanistan by September, these troops will begin flowing out of Afghanistan right at the time that the Taliban, al Qaeda, and their terrorist allies begin to step up their operations next spring and summer. At the moment when our troops could finish our main objective and begin ending our combat operations in a responsible way, the President has now decided to deny them the forces that our commanders believe they need to accomplish their objective.

I hope I am wrong. I hope this decision will not endanger the hard-won gains that our troops have made or the decisive progress that they still need to make next year. But I am very concerned that the President's decision poses an unnecessary risk to the
progress we have made thus far, to our mission, and to our men and women in uniform.

After all that we have given to this mission—the money we have committed to it, the decade we have devoted to it, and the precious lives we have lost in it—why would we do anything now that puts our mission at greater risk of failure? By drawing down U.S. forces those several months early so that they miss the next fighting season, how much additional risk are we incurring, and how could it negatively affect our mission? Those are just some of the questions we must answer at this critical moment.

It is a pleasure to have all of you before the committee today. You all make me proud of America’s Armed Forces and confident about their future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Let me now call on our witnesses for their opening statements.
General Thurman?

STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/U.S. FORCES KOREA

General Thurman. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and other distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today.

I would like to thank the Secretary of Defense and the President for nominating me to be the next Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command; and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this committee, as well as our alliance partner, the ROK, to address the challenges and opportunities we face together on the strategically important Korean Peninsula. Recognizing that a strong U.S.-ROK alliance is one of the most important factors for maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region at large, I will, if confirmed, continue the work of my predecessors directed at sustaining strong ties with our Korean partner.

I would also like to thank this committee for the support it has provided to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, our Department of Defense civilians and their families, who selflessly serve our great Nation both at home and abroad. As the Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command, which is the Army’s largest organization, I am all too aware of the support this committee has provided and the difference this support has made to the men and women who serve our country in the Armed Forces.

If confirmed, I will make every effort to ensure that those serving us in the ROK will receive the very best working, living, and training environment that can possibly be provided. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee to achieve this commitment.

I would also like to thank my wife, Dee, for over 37 years. She has been magnificent in raising our two daughters, Jaime and Carey, who are now both married to Army officers and bringing up our four grandchildren.
Dee has also selflessly supported our soldiers and their families. Like other military spouses, she is truly an unsung hero. I am blessed to have her love and commitment as I continue to serve our Nation.

With that, I thank the committee again for allowing me to appear before you today. I look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much.

Admiral McRaven?

STATEMENT OF VADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN, TO BE ADMIRAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Admiral McRAVEN. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to appear here today.

I am deeply honored that the President has nominated me to serve as the next SOCOM commander. If confirmed, I promise you that I will work tirelessly to ensure that SOCOM continues to provide the American people the finest SOF in the world.

Joining me today is my wife, Georgeann. She has been a constant source of strength to me and to the men and women and their families with whom I have served. I have been extremely lucky to have her by my side for the past 33 years.

I have three children as well. My oldest son is a captain in the Air Force. My number-two son is completing his Ph.D. in California, and my daughter is going into her junior year in college.

I have been very fortunate to have spent the past 34 years in special operations, and I can tell you from my personal experience that the decision by Congress to establish SOCOM was the best thing that ever happened to SOF. As a result of your efforts and your interest in the well-being of U.S. special operations soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians, we have the best-trained, the best-equipped, and the most experienced SOF in the history of the United States and possibly the world.

The special operations soldier’s unparalleled contributions to the security of this great Nation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world are a direct reflection of the support SOCOM has received from Congress over SOCOM’s 24-year history. I want to personally thank you for that support.

If confirmed, I will continue to train, organize, equip, deploy, and, when directed by the Secretary of Defense, employ this force across the spectrum of conflict. We will at all times be prepared to answer the Nation's call with experienced forces whose intellect, maturity, and courage allows them to operate in politically and militarily complex environments—men and women who relish challenges and who willingly go where the threat to America is at its greatest.

However, as good as this force is, I know that, if confirmed, one of my primary responsibilities will be to ensure the SOF members and their families are well taken care of, both physically and emotionally. In his 2011 posture hearing, Admiral Eric Olson noted that as a result of 10 years of continuous combat, the force is frayed at the edges.
Admiral Olson and his wife, Marilyn, were exceptionally engaged in the welfare of the SOF soldiers and their families, particularly our wounded warriors. If confirmed, Georgeann and I will follow their lead and put forth every effort to ensure the well-being of the individuals under my command and the families that support them.

It has been my privilege to serve my entire career in special operations. In all those years, I have never ceased to be amazed by the courage and sacrifice of the men and women in special operations. I am humbled to be considered for assignment as their commander.

Thank you very much, and I am standing by for any questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral.

General Allen?

STATEMENT OF LTGEN JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE/COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES–AFGHANISTAN

General Allen. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today.

I am truly honored to be nominated by the President to command the International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. I am grateful to the Members of Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their confidence, the support, and assistance extended to me since my nomination.

Of course, I am and have always been humbled by the incredible sacrifice of our servicemembers and their families, who have continued to serve our Nation despite many hardships.

Mr. Chairman, at this point, I must note the vital role of this committee and its leadership in providing crucial support to our men and women who have so honorably served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thank you for that support.

I would also like to start by acknowledging and thanking General David Petraeus, whose outstanding service as the Commander of ISAF has been so essential to generating the progress that we have seen in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will seek to emulate his principled and resolute leadership. If he is confirmed to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I look forward to a very close working relationship with him and with the rest of the Intelligence Community.

I would also like to express my admiration for Ambassador Eikenberry and his team in Kabul for their untiring dedication to the mission. If confirmed, I look forward to working with my friend, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, with whom I served in Iraq, and the NATO senior civilian representative, Ambassador Simon Gass, to ensure that our military and civilian efforts are closely synchronized.

I would also like to express my profound admiration for all of the partner nations and their forces in Afghanistan. With 49 ISAF nations from all over the globe currently serving in Afghanistan and supporting that mission, the scale of this coalition is truly historic.
As General Petraeus has noted, Afghan and ISAF forces have halted the insurgency’s momentum in much of the country and reversed it in key areas. Based on my work as the Deputy Commander of CENTCOM, numerous visits to the theater over the past 3 years, including last month, and extensive discussions with senior military and civilian leaders, I share in that assessment.

Afghan and coalition forces now largely control the battle space in strategically important areas such as Kabul, where one-fifth of the Afghan population lives; in and around Kandahar, the spiritual and historic sanctuary of the Taliban; and in Helmand, a former Taliban stronghold; and in many other key areas.

Meanwhile, we are continuing to exert unprecedented pressure on the insurgency, with a variety of efforts, including the Afghan Local Police initiative, which is mobilizing communities to defend themselves; Afghan-led efforts to reintegrate former fighters, with nearly 1,900 reintegrated to date having joined the peace process; and a variety of governance and development initiatives focused on establishing the conditions to achieve long-term security.

Much of this progress has been enabled by and increasingly led by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), who are conducting their own surge. They are currently on track to meet the 2011 goal of 305,000 troops, and substantially more and more capable Afghan forces will be trained and fielded over the next year as well.

Although there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic, there are also many challenges remaining. Insurgents still maintain lethal capabilities, and the fighting will continue to be intense in some of the areas as the enemy seeks to recover lost territory. Transnational terrorist groups like al Qaeda will seek to establish new bases and safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and corruption and other challenges to good governance will still need to be addressed.

Still, none of these challenges are insurmountable. As the President announced last week, and in fulfillment of his West Point commitments, we will begin the drawdown of surge forces next month. Although I was not a participant in those discussions, I support the President’s decision and believe that we can accomplish our objectives.

If confirmed, I will offer my candid assessment to the chain of command on the current state of the conflict, as well as provide options with respect to the President’s goals in accomplishing this strategy.

Even once the security surge forces have been removed, there will still be some 68,000 U.S. troops and thousands of international forces in Afghanistan, not to mention some 70,000 more Afghan forces, which will join the fight in the next 15 months, at the same time the United States and NATO are both discussing long-term strategic partnerships with Afghanistan. This reality sends an important message of commitment to the Afghan people, as well as a sense of urgency that Afghans must take more responsibility for their security.

I would like to close by thanking my family and, most importantly, my wife, Kathy, who is with me here this morning, for her years of dedicated and loyal service to our magnificent troops and
their families. Kathy raised our two daughters, Betty and Bobbie, often alone, during a career where we have been married for 34 years. They have grown up, those two young ladies, to be wonderful and independent women and citizens.

I would also like to add that Kathy and I understand the sacrifices of war, with both our families having experienced conflicts firsthand across the span of American history. If confirmed, I assure you and all the military families that I will do everything I can to provide our forces in Afghanistan with the resources they need to accomplish the mission and to return home safely.

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee, it has been a great honor to appear before you this morning. I am prepared to answer your questions.

Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Allen. Now, let me ask the three of you the standard questions that we ask of our witnesses.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? [All witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power? [All witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation outcome? [All witnesses answered in the negative.]

Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? [All witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? [All witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? [All witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee? [All witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents? [All witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Okay, let us try a 7-minute first round of questions. We have three votes at noon, which may complicate this a bit. We will see how it works out.

General Allen, let me start with you. You indicated in your advance policy questions and your testimony that you agree and support the President’s decision on U.S. troop reductions in Afghanistan. Can you tell us a little more why you do agree with this decision?

General Allen. Mr. Chairman, the President, in December 2009, enunciated the strategy, a result of a deliberate process of the review of the situation in Afghanistan, which was to be resourced in a number of different ways, but in particular with the surge forces. At that time, he announced that those surge forces would begin to be withdrawn in July 2011.
There were two points, I think, that were made importantly in that speech. One was that the nature of this resourcing of that strategy was a clear signal of U.S. support to Afghanistan and our intent to provide Afghanistan the opportunity and the time to begin to develop its ANSF to provide for the security of the country.

But also the other aspect of his announcement was that by beginning to withdraw those surge forces in July 2011, it sent a message of urgency to the Afghans that they must begin to take ownership of their security themselves. The President’s announcement in West Point set the schedule ultimately for the withdrawal of those forces.

This was augmented ultimately in the meeting in Lisbon, the conference in Lisbon in November 2010, where the schedule for transition was developed, where our security forces would provide ultimately the cover for the Afghan forces as the transition of terrain in Afghanistan proceeded from 2011 to 2014. In essence, at the end of 2014, Afghan forces being in the lead across the country.

That brings us to the President’s announcement. We expected that he would begin the process of the withdrawal. He has made that announcement. As General Petraeus and the Chairman said last week, we are accounting for that number.

We will begin the implementation. He has begun the implementation in Afghanistan with his ISAF staff to implement the President’s decision. I support that because that decision was timely. It provides a full accounting for the President’s commitments in December 2009.

As we begin the implementation, we will continue to have 68,000 American forces on the ground, an upswing of about 70,000 ANSFs, and we anticipate that this decision by the President can be accounted for within the current strategy, sir.

Chairman Levin. How important, General, is it to the success of the mission in Afghanistan that the Afghan Security Forces take ownership of the responsibility for their security?

General Allen. Mr. Chairman, it is essential. In the end, our strategy has envisioned that the Afghan Security Forces would take ownership all along.

In the aftermath of the Lisbon conference, the intent was, as agreed to by the member nations of the coalition and by President Karzai, that transition would be completed by 2014, where ISAF forces would support the development and the deployment of the ANSFs and by the end of 2014 be in a position to provide strategic overwatch of that. It is essential to the strategy, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Now let me ask you, Admiral, do you see the President’s announced reductions as creating problems for SOFs in Afghanistan?

Admiral McRaven. Sir, I do not. As General Allen mentioned, there is still going to be a sizable U.S. force and coalition force there. For SOF to operate effectively in Afghanistan, we need to make sure that we continue to have the infrastructure, which will remain in place and, frankly, the enablers, which are always critical to us.

If confirmed, I will work with General Allen to make sure that we balance the counterterrorism and the SOF requirements with
the conventional requirements so that at the end of the day, we are still able to put pressure on the enemy. So, no, sir, I do not think the drawdown will affect SOF.

Chairman Levin. Admiral, what is the role of Afghan Special Forces in the counterterrorism operations that have been carried out? How would you assess the capability of the Afghan forces?

Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. There is a number of different Afghan SOF forces, if you will. There are the Afghan commandos, which are trained by U.S. Army Special Forces personnel, and they are clearly some of the elite Afghan forces. They are magnificent soldiers.

There are Afghan Special Forces, which are the Green Beret counterpart. Then with the force that I operated with, we had what we referred to as the Afghan partner unit. These were Afghans that went on target with the JSOC forces forward to ensure that we had an Afghan that was, if you will, going through the door first, that was making first contact with the locals, in order to make sure that we kind of protected the culturally sensitive issues or items that were on target.

The Afghans that we have worked with are top notch, to be honest with you, sir.

Chairman Levin. How important is it to our counterterror effort and to our counterinsurgency effort that they be in the lead in that way, the Afghan Special Forces be in the lead?

Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. I think it is very important. As General Allen mentioned, at the end of the day, the Afghans have to take ownership for the security of Afghanistan, and I would say the same thing applies to special operations.

At the end of the day, we have to make sure that the Afghans take the lead in special operations, recognizing that, right now, we still need to maintain a fair amount of overwatch. But over time, hopefully, that overwatch will diminish and the Afghans will take a larger role in that.

Chairman Levin. You feel they are capable of doing so?

Admiral McRaven. I do, sir.

Chairman Levin. Let me ask both of you, Admiral, General Allen, the safe haven enjoyed by the Haqqani Network in Pakistan continues to provide the freedom for that group to launch attacks against the United States and coalition troops in Afghanistan.

You both, I believe, have talked to Pakistani military leaders. Why does Pakistan refuse to take on the Haqqani Network? In your judgment, is that going to change?

Let me start with you, General Allen.

General Allen. Sir, I think it is a complex answer that we would receive from them. It is a function probably of capacity. But it might also be a function of their hedging, whether they have determined that the United States is going to remain in Afghanistan, whether our strategy will be successful or not.

At some point, as we have emphasized to the Pakistanis, we have to bring pressure to bear on this insurgent safe haven. In the end, what we would hope is that they would listen to our desires for them to do that, would muster the capacity and the capability, and ultimately put pressure on the Haqqani Network to deny them that safe haven from which that element of the Taliban can move across
the border and conduct operations against ISAF and against the ANSFs as they take over more of the security.

Chairman Levin. Admiral, do you want to comment? Is this likely to change in the near term?

Admiral McRaven. Sir, I don’t think it is likely to change. I would agree with General Allen. It is a very complex situation, obviously, in Pakistan.

As both General Allen and I have had an opportunity to talk to military leaders in Pakistan, again, it is both a capacity issue for the Pakistanis and I think potentially a willingness issue, recognizing that the situation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is difficult for them to deal with.

Chairman Levin. Something has to give, something has to change because it just can’t continue this way, for them to expect that we are going to have a normal relationship with them, which we all hope for. But it can’t continue this way with that expectation in place.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Allen, do you know of any military leader that recommended in 2009 that the President make an announcement in 2011 of drawdown of troops?

General Allen. I do not, Senator.

Senator McCain. Do you know of any military leader that recommended the drawdown plan that the President announced last week?

General Allen. I do not, Senator.

Senator McCain. Does it surprise you that after the President’s announcement, that President Sarkozy, the British, other of our allies have now announced that they will be withdrawing from Afghanistan?

General Allen. It does not, Senator.

Senator McCain. Did you see the picture in the paper over the weekend of President Karzai and the Ayatollah Khamenei sitting down at a meeting, pledging friendship, support for one another?

General Allen. I didn’t see the picture, sir, but I was aware of the meeting.

Senator McCain. Is it true that improvised explosive devices (IED) manufactured in Iran are still coming across the border into Afghanistan and killing Americans?

General Allen. I believe they are, sir.

Senator McCain. Did you hear of the statement the Taliban field commander, Jamal Khan, told the Daily Beast of his reaction to Mr. Obama’s speech? “My soul and the soul of thousands of Taliban who have been blown up are happy. I had more than 50 encounters with U.S. forces and their technology, but the biggest difference in ending this war was not technology, but the more powerful Islamic ideology and religion.”

Are you aware of that statement by the leader of the Taliban?

General Allen. I am, Senator.

Senator McCain. Does the President’s announcement of this withdrawal make your job—if you are confirmed, and I am sure you will be—more difficult and more challenging or easier?
General Allen. Senator, that is a difficult question to answer, sir.

Senator McCain. I am sure it is. That is why I asked it.

General Allen. Not being confirmed yet and not being the commander, I have no ability to assess it with great accuracy at this particular moment. As the Chairman said, the announced decision was a bit more aggressive than we had anticipated. But he supported the decision. General Petraeus supports the decision.

General Petraeus is working now to begin the implementation of that decision. We had anticipated that those forces would be coming out. There is a lot that has to happen between now and the end of this year, sir, and the end of the period of the drawdown.

Senator McCain. General, I understand why it would be difficult for you to answer that question. I appreciate that, and I appreciate your answer.

I have talked to probably 20 retired and Active Duty military leaders since the President's announcement was made, and it is very obvious that the challenges are now enormous. The question is whether we will still be able to succeed or not. I appreciate your willingness and your patriotism to take on what is obviously a dramatically increased risk.

The Economist states again this week, "Mr. Obama would only have himself to blame if, for entirely domestic political reasons, he undermines the conditions for a security transition to Afghan national forces by 2014 that still looks just about doable. His rush for the exit could yet end up delaying the very thing he is hoping for." I think that summarizes the views of most.

Admiral McRaven, do you believe that the United States should have a residual force in Iraq in order to assist particularly with special operations functions, intelligence?

Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think that it would be mutually beneficial to us and the Iraqis if, in fact, that was the case. Obviously, it remains to be seen whether the Iraqis will want us to stay past the intended drawdown time. But clearly, there is still a threat in Iraq, and a small, soft presence there I think would be advisable.

Senator McCain. If you look at recent U.S. casualties, the situation, at least in some respects, politically as well as militarily, has shown some deterioration. Would you agree?

Admiral McRaven. Sir, I would. Statistically, that appears to be the case. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. General Allen, do you believe that we ought to have an enduring military presence, for example, a base, an air base in Afghanistan? Everything that I know and hear is that President Karzai is very interested in such an arrangement.

General Allen. Sir, I believe we should have an enduring military relationship with the Afghans. How ultimately that would be negotiated, how ultimately those missions, roles, and functions would be determined I think remains to be determined by discussions with the Afghans and certainly our own discussions and our determination.

With regard to a permanent base, I don't believe that we need a permanent base in Afghanistan. We could probably conduct operations over the long term from a shared basing concept within Afghanistan.
Senator McCain. I guess we are getting into semantics here. A shared basing concept is, I think, fairly agreeable.

General Thurman, this committee has shown some serious concerns about the cost and the policy of the base realignment. I hope you will work with us closely on that issue, and I think we are going to ask for a pause until we can get a full evaluation.

My question, though, is that there has been recent public reports about a North Korean ship that was turned around that may have had materials in it which would have had some—again, press reports are it had, perhaps some nuclear technology onboard. It was headed for Burma. It was turned around by the United States and headed back to port in North Korea.

Can you tell the committee anything about that?

General Thurman. Senator, only what I have read in the open source. I do know there are two United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 1718 and 1864, that the purpose of that is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear or weapons of mass destruction from North Korea.

I believe it is very important that we continue to monitor that carefully. I believe it needs to be dealt with in a whole-of-government approach.

Senator McCain. I thank you.

I say congratulations to the three of you, and you make all of us extremely proud that the United States is blessed with such leadership, dedication, and sacrifice; and that includes your families as well.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I would pick up where Senator McCain left off and say that listening to the opening statements that the three of you made and hearing you respond to the questions of Chairman Levin and Senator McCain, which I would not describe as softballs, I think the cumulative effect is that you are really a very impressive group.

Today, I think you have shown us your intelligence and that you are well spoken. Your records speak really with extraordinary power to a career of patriotism, bravery, and leadership capacity. You remind us about how much every American has to be grateful to you and everyone else in uniform for all you do every day to protect our security and our freedom. I thank you very much for that.

General Allen, I want to get into the decision that the President made last week and announced about Afghanistan, let me just ask you this question. As I understand what was announced, one way to look at it is that this calendar year, we will withdraw from Afghanistan 10,000 of the 33,000 troops we surged as a result of the President’s decision in December 2009. Next year, we will withdraw the remaining 23,000 by sometime in September.

But here is what I want to ask you. My understanding is that within those parameters this year and next year, you, as ISAF commander, will be given latitude to determine both the pace of the withdrawal that will begin in July and which of our forces are withdrawn. Is that correct?
General ALLEN. That is correct, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. The second question I want to ask is this. In your response to the questions submitted to you by this committee, you state, “I will constantly monitor and assess the situation on the ground, and should I determine the situation has changed, I will so advise my chain of command through the proper channels.”

My understanding of what you are saying there is that if, as we go through this year into next year, you find that the pace of the withdrawal is having an effect on what is happening on the ground in Afghanistan that you think is really negative, that you will exercise your authority to report that up the chain of command and, if necessary—this is a hypothetical—would ask that the pace of withdrawal be slowed down?

General ALLEN. Senator, that is a very important question. If confirmed, and if I take command of ISAF, I am going to monitor the operational environment and the conditions constantly, not just as it relates to the drawdown of the forces with respect to the surge, but throughout the entire period of time I command during this campaign.

It is my responsibility to the chain of command and to our Commander in Chief to ensure that should I be concerned over the progress of the execution of the campaign, that I so advise the chain of command with my forthright advice. I will make that obligation now. I state that obligation now, and I see that as an important responsibility, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that reassurance and I thank you for it.

Admiral McRaven, with regard to Afghanistan, obviously, the SOF has been playing an extraordinarily important role in the counterinsurgency strategy that we are carrying out there with significant success. Is it your expectation as the drawdown of our forces overall, pursuant to the President’s decision last week, goes forward, that the SOFs are likely not to be drawn down in number? I think you know what I am asking.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. Sir, I think that remains to be seen. Again, if confirmed, I will work very closely with General Allen and General Mattis to take a look at what the right balance is for SOFs.

We have to strike a good balance between the conventional piece and the various elements of SOF in order to be successful, I think.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, I accept that answer. My own sense of it is that as the forces, our overall number is drawn down, it may be that the special operating forces are going to be even more critical. So that they, in some sense, would be not the last, but you would want to have a critical mass of SOF there as this goes on.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. General Allen, do you have an opinion going in about that?

General ALLEN. I do, Senator, thank you.

We are currently engaged in a comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency campaign of which counterterrorism and the role of SOF forces play a very important role.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.
General ALLEN. As this campaign continues to mature, as we continue to look at the progress on the ground, we may well see that the role of SOF may increase, in fact, as time goes on within the context of the counterinsurgency campaign.

SOF does more than simply direct action or strike operations. SOF is critical to the development of capacity, as Admiral McRaven has already said, with respect to the Afghan Security Forces. But also SOF is playing a vital role on the ground in the establishment of the Afghan Local Police program and the Village Stability Operations program.

All of that together constitutes an enormously powerful contribution by special operating forces to the campaign today, and we would see that an enduring contribution over the long term, out to 2014 and beyond.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

General Thurman, arguably, you will be assuming command in Korea at the most dangerous time in quite a while. I say that based on the continuing provocations by North Korea of our allies in the ROK, by the statement that the President of the ROK has made that if there is another provocation, there will be a response in measure from South Korea, our allies.

But also because we are watching a pattern of aggressive behavior by the People's Republic of China in the region generally that is quite different than what we have seen for a while, really staking claims to territory and a kind of extended sovereignty that we haven't seen in quite this way.

I wondered, going in, whether you would, first, give us your reflections on the state of mind of the leadership of the two countries that most worry me anyway, in the region now, very different, obviously. One is North Korea and the second, of course, is the People's Republic of China, with which we have ongoing comprehensive relations, and we try very hard to manage our relations in a constructive way. The North Koreans, of course, are in a very different place.

General Thurman. Thank you, Senator.

I have the same concerns going in. I believe Kim Jong Il is an unpredictable leader. He continues to antagonize through his coercive diplomacy to protect his nuclear capability, I believe. There is no question there is a deteriorating economy. Reports I have read is there is a food shortage.

I think he will continue this cycle of provocations. I believe it is important for us to work closely with the ROK, their military, to counter these provocations in a responsible manner.

Having said that, I think it is very important for us to also maintain relations with China. I intend to work close, if confirmed, with Admiral Willard, the U.S. Pacific Command Commander, as we look at and assess the whole security posture and stance, particularly on the peninsula.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, General. Thanks to the three of you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Ayotte.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to say we are blessed and grateful to have the service of all three of you for our country. I want to thank your families and all that have served underneath you for what you have done. We have great confidence in all of your qualifications. I wanted to ask Vice Admiral McRaven, in your advance policy questions, you were asked what are the weaknesses and shortcomings in the current effort to combat terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan. In one of your answers, you said, “Those weaknesses and shortcomings will arise not from the strategy or the efforts of our soldiers, marines, airmen, and civilians on the ground, but from diminished resourcing, lack of long-term commitment, and any decrease in international assistance.”

Vice Admiral, can you elaborate for me what you meant by that statement in terms of the concerns about diminished resourcing or lack of long-term commitment?

Admiral McRAVEN. Yes, ma’am. This is basically focused on what we refer to as the enablers. For us, special operations, to continue to be successful in Afghanistan is going to be a function of ensuring that we continue to have the airlift we need, the rotary-wing support, the fixed-wing support, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in terms of unmanned aerial vehicles. That is the aspect of the support that is critical now and for the long run in order for special operations to be effective.

Senator AYOTTE. Does the President’s recent withdrawal announcement, in your view, impact the lack of a long-term commitment—one of the issues that you raise?

Admiral M CRAVEN. No, ma’am. I would contend it doesn’t affect SOF directly. The reason it doesn’t is because it is a function of how you balance the withdrawal. Again, in discussions with General Allen and General Mattis, I will make it clear that as General Allen looks at that withdrawal, that he takes into consideration the critical enablers necessary to continue to support special operations across the battlefield. While it is not just about the direct action piece, which is important—and in my former role as a JSOC commander, that was vitally important—but it is about all the other enablers that support the broader SOF effort in Afghanistan.

Senator AYOTTE. Are there any other concerns you have about diminished resourcing, based on what you highlighted in your statement, that we should be aware of?

Admiral McRAVEN. No, ma’am. Again, the two primary ones are the airlift support and the ISR support.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Admiral.

Lieutenant General Allen, the fighting season in Afghanistan is roughly from April through October. The President has decided on September 2012 as the deadline for withdrawal of the surge forces. Is there any strategic, operational, or tactical advantage to a September deadline for withdrawal during the fighting season, as compared to waiting through the fighting season?

General ALLEN. Senator, I think that the value of a second fighting season, as was expressed by the Chairman and General Petraeus in their testimony last week, is important. But as General Petraeus said in his recommendations, those recommendations are forwarded to the CENTCOM Commander, ultimately to the Sec-
Secretary of Defense. The discussions, which ultimately generated the President’s decision, account for the President’s unique role and unique position in terms of his national security views and his views as President of the United States and the Commander in Chief.

He has made the decision at this juncture with respect to when the end of the drawdown of the surge forces should occur. We support that decision. We will implement that decision. We are in the planning process for it now, Senator.

As I said before to Senator Lieberman, it is my intention, obviously, as the commander to monitor the progress, the operational environment, the progress, and the situation with respect to the accomplishment of our objectives and missions respect to the campaign plan. Should I become concerned that our ability to accomplish those objectives are threatened, I will ensure that I give forthright and prompt advice to the chain of command.

Senator Ayotte. We deeply appreciate that, General. I just wanted to follow up, just so I am clear. I certainly appreciate the President’s unique role as Commander in Chief. But in your view, is there any strategic, operational, or tactical reason to withdraw in September versus at least allowing us to finish the fighting season?

Because you are going to be in the middle of the fighting season. Can you think of any reason of a strategic nature or operational nature why we would withdraw then?

General Allen. Senator, again, the forces that are at work during that particular time are not just about the presence of U.S. forces on the battlefield. Even as those forces come down, we will still have some portion of the surge throughout most of the fighting season.

We will have the 68,000 U.S. forces that will be persistent in the presence, tens of thousands of ISAF forces, about 50,000 more Afghan national security police and army forces, and some 20,000 or so Afghan Public Protection Force. They will all be joining the fight. They will all become part of the process during that period of time.

Again, the President was presented recommendations by the Commander of ISAF, forwarded by the CENTCOM Commander, and the discussions were held in the White House, and the President applied his view ultimately as the President of the United States and the Commander in Chief and made the decision.

Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that, General. I understand that you didn’t participate in those discussions, but their recommendations were different than the ones that the President adopted in terms of timing after the fighting season. Is that right?

General Allen. The Chairman said that the President’s decision was a bit more aggressive than was recommended.

Senator Ayotte. One of the concerns with a more aggressive recommendation, of course, is, as Senator McCain has outlined, given the progress we have made in Afghanistan, that that progress, we could see a regression of that progress. Is that right?

General Allen. We are going to take advantage of the opportunity between now and the end of the year to assess where we are with the progress of the campaign. We have made really spectacular progress in the south. I wish all Americans had the oppor-
tunity to see the great work that has been done by the forces at work, ISAF forces in the south and southwest.

We are going to consolidate that progress and, at some point, take other actions, which I won't get into the great details here. But we will take other actions as necessary. The President's decision will be accounted for, obviously, in the planning that will go forward. We anticipate that we will continue to achieve the objectives of the campaign.

But we must account for the decisions that the President has made, and we will go forward with those—accounting for those decisions, we will go forward with every intention of accomplishing the objectives. We believe that can be done now, and we are moving forward with the planning with the ISAF staff now.

Senator Ayotte. General, I want to thank you for your testimony. My time is up.

I had the opportunity as a new Senator to go to Afghanistan in January, and I was very impressed with the progress that has been made. I remain concerned and appreciate the challenges that you face with having to withdraw a significant number of our troops during that fighting season.

Thank you for your testimony.

General Allen. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

Senator Udall.

Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your presence, and I want to associate myself with the remarks of my colleagues on the dais as to your service and particularly acknowledge your families who are here, and what wonderful Americans.

General Allen, if I could turn to you, and I know you are going to have some challenges. You have a leadership record that is exemplary. But I would like to focus on some specific items today that I hope then gives us an understanding of your priority and needs.

In that spirit, let me turn to the success that you had and we had in Anbar, in Iraq. You reached out to a population that had been previously pretty hostile and worked with them to then turn their focus to al Qaeda and the elements of terrorism that had really created enormous chaos. In the process, the COIN doctrine was validated.

I don't want to imply that the two countries are alike. But could you talk about the primary lessons that we learned in Anbar and how we are going to apply those lessons in Afghanistan?

General Allen. Senator, much of what was accomplished in the Anbar Province, of course, needless to say, much of it was accomplished on the shoulders of the sacrifice of many terrific soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen. We honor that service and their sacrifice in having accomplished that really remarkable outcome.

But what was accomplished in the Anbar Province was really the result of a comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency strategy. It was a strategy that leveraged every aspect of military capacity that could be brought to bear in the battle space, civil affairs, conventional military capabilities, advisory capacity to build the Iraqi
police, the Iraqi Security Forces, the two divisions of Iraqi infantry that we had.

Special operators, who worked both as advisers and mentors, but also, euphemistically, the term “black SOF”, the strike forces that would enter the battle space to attack the insurgent network. We pressurized the insurgent network constantly.

While we were pressurizing and shredding the insurgent network and blunting their capabilities with the use of conventional forces, we worked very hard to build the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces, both the army—those two divisions—and we went from about 4,000 police to almost 30,000 police in the year that we were there, in 2007 and 2008.

All of that was complemented by a comprehensive plan with respect to civilian outreach as well. The U.S. Agency of International Development resourced three embedded provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) and resourced our PRT, our provincial PRT in Ramadi. I believe that the wise outreach to the sheiks in the tribe, the wise expenditure of tax dollars with respect to both the stabilization projects and development projects, our efforts to build governance capacity, where the governance has been completely shattered as a direct result of the efforts of al Qaeda and other of the insurgent efforts, that comprehensive effort paid off in the end.

It built up governance which had the capacity to stand up on its own two feet and extend the writ of the provincial government out into the districts and down to the municipalities and even to the tribes. It incorporated the tribes into the solution rather than have the tribes be on the outside of governance and part of the problem.

It ultimately built the capacity for the people of that province, the beleaguered people along the Euphrates River to ply their trade, to engage in economic development. That, in conjunction with the persistent governance, all overwatched by U.S. forces, but eventually overwatched by Iraqi Security Forces, provided the trade space necessary ultimately for the persistence of governance and the success, frankly, that we have seen in the aftermath in the Anbar Province to this very moment, sir.

Senator Udall. Let me jump to Afghanistan in that context, General. We have been talking here about the withdrawal numbers and the concern that some have about the effect on the fighting season next year. I know we have a full complement for this fighting season.

Do you think you are going to have to shift to a counterterrorism (CT) model, or can you blend the two strategies? I know we throw those acronyms around casually. But can CT and COIN be implemented simultaneously in different provinces depending on the needs of those populations and the strategy that you have in place?

General Allen. Indeed, Senator, it is occurring now. There is an active counterterrorism capability that is underway within the larger counterinsurgency campaign.

As Vice Admiral McRaven knows so well from his time as JSOC and our task force commander in the CENTCOM, the capabilities of those strike forces have really been spectacular in getting at the enemy’s network. As well, the use of SOF, as I previously mentioned, will have an important role in developing the training, supporting the training of the Afghan special operators, as well as fa-
The development of CT will become even more important as time goes on. So there will be an important role, sir.

Senator Udall. Would you talk about reintegration? Do we have enough formal structure around what we are trying to do there? There have been some stories recently that there is more we could do, that we have sent some mixed messages to the fighters in the Taliban forces who want to come out of the cold.

General Allen. Reintegration is an essential dimension to a counterinsurgency strategy. It helps us to begin to decompose the base of the insurgency.

The Afghans ultimately will be responsible for reintegration. It is their program. They are ultimately to be responsible for accepting these fighters out of the insurgency and reintegrating them back into Afghan society.

To that effect, the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Committee has been formed at a national level. There are provincial peace committees that have been formed throughout the country. In that process, we are working closely with our Afghan counterparts to facilitate the reintegration process, which ultimately is that local fighters and many of the fighters are, in fact, close to their villages, close to their homes.

Local villagers who desire ultimately to leave the insurgency and to become part of the future of Afghanistan will put down their weapons, renounce violence, sever their ties with al Qaeda and the insurgency, and become part of the solution, become part of the peace process. In return, the village elders and the village benefits ultimately by bringing them back into the fold. Through the use of funds, which are cycled through the Afghan Government through the Peace and Reconciliation Committee councils, projects are performed in those villages which benefit everyone, and the quality of life improves for everyone.

So the village leadership vouches for that young fighter who has come off the battlefield. They embrace him. They bring him back into the community. They make him a reintegrated, productive element within the committee. The whole village benefits as a result.

To your question specifically, the issue with respect to what we can do better, we are just getting started. The infrastructure within the Afghan side is really just beginning to gain purchase at this particular time.

As we recognize as a persistent shortfall in Afghanistan in a number of different areas, the ability to flow resource from the central government down to the provinces and ultimately into the projects for the reintegration program, that is the challenge at this particular moment. I know that our civilian colleagues are working very closely with their Afghan counterparts to improve the ability to get this money on budget and get it flowed in an expeditious
manner to take advantage of the opportunities as these fighters come off the battle space.

We are at about 1,900 soon of those individuals who have formally reintegrated, and there are about 3,000 in the pipeline. So getting this process accelerated has the effect of providing another option if you are a fighter. You can fight U.S. or Afghan forces and potentially be killed. You can fight U.S. or Afghan forces or be detained. Or you can put your weapon down and become part of the future of Afghanistan, be reintegrated into your village, and the whole village will benefit because of it. I think that is a pretty stark option in reality.

Senator Udall. Thank you, General.

My time is expired. General, I look forward to working with you, particularly on this initiative because this is the key element to bringing our forces home and successfully concluding our operations in Afghanistan.

Thank you.


Senator Udall. Thanks.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.

Senator Collins.

Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me thank each of you for your service and your willingness to accept these new challenges.

General Allen, the people of Maine have paid a heavy price for the war in Afghanistan. Our State has suffered the highest rate of casualties of any State in the Nation.

We have seen lots of discussion at this hearing and others last week about the number of troops, the pace of withdrawal, and the timetable. But I have for you a more fundamental question and that is, is there any number of troops that can ensure a stable Afghanistan that is going to be able to take responsibility for its own security, given the safe havens and turmoil in Pakistan and the lack of a competent central government that is not plagued by corruption?

In other words, are these such insurmountable obstacles that no matter how many troops we have, for how long, and how brave and skilled they are, are those two facts—the safe havens in Pakistan, the corruption and incompetence of the central Afghan Government—insurmountable obstacles?

General Allen. Senator, I don’t believe so. There are challenges. There are significant challenges. Those have been explained by both the current ISAF Commander, by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. But I believe that the campaign, as we currently envisage its unfolding, has the development of the ANSFs ultimately to be in the lead of security out to 2014 as an objective which is attainable, with U.S. forces in a strategic overwatch position.

Your question about the safe havens, it complicates the process. There is no question of that. We would recommend to our Pakistani friends that they take those measures that are necessary to reduce those safe havens because, in many respects, those safe havens are not only safe havens that generate the opportunity for those insurgent elements to attack into Afghanistan, but they have also turned out to be safe havens that provide a springboard for the as-
sault directly upon the Pakistani Government and the Pakistani military.

We will encourage and we will continue to encourage our Pakistani friends to bring pressure to bear upon those safe havens. It is not just good for the outcome of our strategy and for the President's vision on the outcome in Afghanistan. It is good for Pakistan as well.

I might add that our relationship with Pakistan, while strained at this particular moment, there is a bright spot, frankly, in the many different facets of the relationship that I will touch. That bright spot is the tripartite planning committee, where on a regular basis U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani military officers sit down and go through the process of planning for how they will conduct cross-border operations in a way that limit the operations across the border.

So there is a bright spot in that regard, and I think it is an opportunity for us to continue through that contact to leverage our relationship with Pakistan, to emphasize, as you point out correctly, Senator, the difficulties that these safe havens provide to the accomplishment of our strategy, but also how they endanger Pakistan as well.

To that part of your question that relates to corruption and incompetence, we have been partners with President Karzai for a long time. In the course of this long-term partnership, and in particular in the last couple of years, we have seen our civilian colleagues operating within the context of the civilian surge, which accompanied President Obama's military surge, provide efforts to increase capacity within the Afghan Government, within key ministries, to provide better, predictable, uncorrupt governance.

That process has been accompanied by activity within ISAF, the formation of Task Force Shafafiyat, which stands for transparency in Dari, which is supported by Task Force 2010, which seeks to get at corruption and difficulties associated with contracting that can create additional corruption, as well as Task Force Spotlight, which seeks to control the evolution of private security companies.

There are a number of measures that we have put in place through the civilian surge with our colleagues in the embassy, through Ambassador Eikenberry and soon-to-be Ambassador Crocker, as well as measures that have been put in place through ISAF with the task forces associated with corruption, that seek to build both capacity, at the same time we address the particular issues associated with corruption.

Today, we do face the dilemma of the safe havens. Today, we do work with an Afghan Government that embraces the desire ultimately to reduce corruption and increase competency. We will remain in close partnership with the Afghan Government to get at both of those issues, and we will continue to work with the ANSF.

Even if the safe havens are not reduced, it is our strong desire and hope that in the end, as the Afghan Security Forces ultimately take to the field in the numbers that we anticipate, with the capabilities that we are building into those ANSF forces, that they will be able to provide the cover for Afghanistan so it can have a secure and stable future.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Reed.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the Nation and for your families’ service. Your service to the Army, to the Navy, to the Marine Corps, and—Admiral McRaven, because of your son—the Air Force. I can get all the principal Services in. So thank you very, very much.

Let me begin with General Allen. You talked very eloquently, in response to Senator Collins, about the need to work closely with the Pakistanis. Have you had the occasion to meet on a regular basis yet or do you intend to meet on a regular basis with General Kayani and your counterparts on the Pakistani Armed Forces?

General Allen. Senator, I have met General Kayani on a number of occasions. It is not a relationship yet. That, I hope to develop. It is, in fact, the intent for General Petraeus and I, should I be confirmed, to pay a call on General Kayani so that the relationship that he has enjoyed with General Kayani can ultimately be passed to me.

I look forward to the opportunity to work closely with General Kayani and the senior Pakistani military leadership in partnership, in the context, as I said before, of the tripartite planning committee because, in the end, we have so many common objectives that we need to get after. I look forward to that opportunity to work with the Pakistani military.

Senator Reed. I think from your comments, General, from both sides, their perspective and our perspective, it is a complicated and sometimes frustrating relationship. But it is a relationship that is essential to our continued operations in Afghanistan. I would commend your efforts and urge you, as General Petraeus has, to establish at least lines of communication to the leadership.

There is another aspect, too, that you touched upon in your testimony. That is the development of the Afghan National Security Forces. In the several visits I have made there, they have made some progress over the last year, after 7 or 8 years of fits and starts and not being particularly impressive. But I think over the last few years, we have gained momentum.

It seems to be one of the major building blocks of our strategy, our reduction is really almost directly related to their ability to field competent forces. I wonder if you might comment briefly, if you already had, on that aspect.

General Allen. It is central to the strategy, Senator. As you correctly point out, as we have developed the real capacity in the last couple of years—and here I must mention Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell and his terrific team in both Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A) and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTMA), for the work that they have done. It has been a comprehensive approach with respect to the development of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

He has put in place a number of training initiatives that are paying big dividends, not the least being literacy training. Where in a country where the literacy, depending on statistics, varies between 10 percent and 20 percent, it is not surprising that many of those who seek to be soldiers or police are illiterate. That alone has
given the members of the ANSFs a different feel about who they are and the role that they could potentially play in their country. That, plus many of the other initiatives which are underway, which are gaining purchase now and traction, leave me confident that our end state, which is an Afghan Security Force which has both capability and staying power, will be successful in the end.

It is not just about NTMA and Bill Caldwell’s efforts. General Rodriguez in the ISAF joint command and all of our conventional forces on the ground that are so closely partnered with Afghan units in the field have become also vital to this process as well, the professionalization of units, as well as the individual preparations of Afghan national security police and army troops in the training pipeline as well, sir.

Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.

Admiral McRaven, again, like all of my colleagues, I salute you, your colleagues, and the SEALs for extraordinary operations, and thank you. I think your decisiveness and your feel for every level of the conflict, from the villages of Afghanistan and Pakistan all the way up here to the more complicated rooms in Washington was amply demonstrated.

Thank you for your service.

Admiral McRaven. Thank you, sir.

Senator Reed. Let me touch on a point I am sure has also been raised. You have a force that is small, very select, can’t expand overnight because of criteria, can’t be lowered to accommodate size. It is under significant pressure after 10 years.

Your efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan are significant, but you also look to other places—Yemen particularly of concern at the moment; Somalia, there is indication of operations there.

Then just a further point is that you, I think, will be, as we go forward, strategically the force that is called upon sort of right out of the box, if you will, which is a change, a slight change in strategic thinking. Given this, the pressure on your SOCOM, your comments about what we have to do to give you the resources. Are you prepared and capable to expand your operations at a moment’s notice worldwide or in different parts of the world? I would appreciate your comments.

Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator.

We are not prepared to expand immediately worldwide. The problem, as you point out, is that it is very difficult to grow SOF’s overnight.

Admiral Olson, in his capacity as Commander of SOCOM, has gone on record as saying that he wants to try to grow the manpower within SOCOM at the rate of about 5 percent to 5 percent per year, which I think is about right as well.

Part of this is making sure that the standards that we have set at our various special operations training elements for the special forces officers, the SEALs, the marines, and the aviators remains very high. We don’t want to come off those standards because, at the end of the day, the American people expect us to put forth a world-class special operations operator.

I think expanding the force rapidly will be difficult. One of the greatest challenges I think we will have for the future is there will be a greater demand on SOF. As we have talked about today, intu-
itively, we think as the drawdown occurs in Afghanistan in terms of the conventional force, there will probably be some additional requirements for SOFs to cover down, if you will, in Afghanistan.

I don’t think we know exactly what the size of that will be yet. I think these are going to have to be discussions between myself, if confirmed, General Allen, General Mattis, and the Secretary to find out what is the right amount of forces we need to put into Afghanistan.

As we look out from Iraq, Afghanistan, and, frankly, across the globe, and, as you are well aware, sir, SOFs any day of the year are in about 60 to 80 countries around the world. Sometimes in very small numbers, but those small numbers can have very large effects in other areas. They are building host nation capacity, hopefully putting forth those values, those American values that the other forces can see and want to replicate. Frankly, that allows us to kind of get ahead of some of the conflict in other countries.

As we look at the hotspots in Yemen, where you have al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or Somalia, where you have East African al Qaeda and al Shabaab, these are clearly areas of concern. We are looking very hard right now—at least from my standpoint as a former JSOC commander, I can tell you we were looking very hard at Yemen and at Somalia.

Our shortfall, as always, in a lot of these areas, for kinetic strikes is always our ISR, our unmanned ISR or our manned ISR. It is a critical enabler for us to be able to do our mission if it is a direct action mission.

However, having said that, I will tell you that both CENTCOM and U.S. Africa Command have been terrific about kind of apportioning that ISR as required, depending upon the missions that pop up. To get to the crux of your question, sir, it will be difficult to expand, manpower wise. I think any expansion of manpower is going to have to come with a commensurate expansion of the enablers.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. My time is expired.

General Thurman, let me just congratulate you on a great service to the U.S. Army, and I look forward to working with you, should you be confirmed.

You are all very correct about that term, but I have a certain hope for all of you gentlemen. Thank you.

General Thurman. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.

Senator Brown.

Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It’s good to see you all, and congratulations to you and your families.

General Allen, something that has always bothered me is the lack of other countries fulfilling their commitment with regard to helping train and get up to speed, the Afghan army and police. How do you think that with the current shortfall of about almost 500 institutional trainers, the withdrawal of 10,000 troops will affect that training mission?

General Allen. We will continue, Senator, to ask our partners for trainers. We are going to continue to work, if I am confirmed,
through NATO and through ISAF, to the non-NATO troop-contributing nations to continue to provide the kinds of trainers necessary to build the capacity of the ANSFs that we all need in the end to accomplish our objective.

It is no secret that has been difficult to do. It is no secret that we have made it very clear. The current commander has made it very clear, the current Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, Admiral Stavridis, and the NATO leadership has made it very clear that we need more trainers. As you are correct, Senator, we are still short about 480 trainers.

If confirmed and if I become the Commander of ISAF, I will continue to emphasize that we have to have trainers in order, ultimately, to bring to bear the kinds of quality training in the velocity that we need in order to get this ANSF stood up.

Senator BROWN. Is it a higher level? Does it go to the President's level where he goes to the other leaders and says, "Listen, in order to get out of here, we need to train these folks and get them up. And you made a commitment."

It seems like we have been making that request forever, but there hasn't been a heck of a lot of return, reciprocity in providing them.

General ALLEN. Senator, I can't speak to whether the President has asked that question specifically. But I know the Secretary of Defense, this Secretary, has been unambiguous in calling on NATO and the other non-NATO troop-contributing nations to provide trainers.

If confirmed and if I become the Commander of ISAF, I will be unambiguous in that requirement as well. I believe Admiral Stavridis has been beating that drum very loudly and regularly, sir.

Senator BROWN. What do you think the ratio is? Is there a ratio between trainer and trainee that works? Are we at that, or how far below are we on that?

General ALLEN. I would have to get back to you on that, sir.

Senator BROWN. If you wouldn't mind, that would be helpful.

General ALLEN. I would be happy to.

[The information referred to follows:]

The current overall coalition trainer to Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) trainee ratio is approximately 1:14, which is sufficient to produce the Army combat and police formations required for the Afghans to transition to security lead. However, the critical shortage of 65 air coalition trainers hinders the development of the Afghan Air Force (Mi–17 and C–27 pilots). The Afghan logistics and medical systems are also short trainers, but these have been identified and are scheduled to be "boots on the ground" by the end of the year. This should allow the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM–A) to reach the ANSF growth objective of 352,000 by October 2012 and should complete the training and fielding of the Afghan Army and Police by December 2013. Additionally, NTM–A is training and certifying Afghan trainers to be able to take the lead for basic training of army and police. The goal by the end of 2011 is to have 4,400 Afghan trainers to assume the lead for training to allow coalition trainers to shift focus to professionalizing the force and developing systems that will endure past transition at the end of 2014.

Senator BROWN. How about the flexibility? Do you think you have the flexibility you need to keep the enemy on its heels and also train the Afghan Security Forces from now until the end of the summer? Even though the enemy now has the timeline for our departure, does it affect those two things at all?
General ALLEN. I believe we do have the flexibility.

Senator BROWN. General Thurman, in looking at your new job, when you are confirmed, how do you deal with a lot of the insecurity over there?

Let us say, hypothetically, that North Korea makes another probe and tries to instigate things, and South Korea responds. What role, then, do we play? How do you envision that potentially working out?

General THURMAN. Senator, thank you.

I think the number-one point is we have to maintain a strong presence on the peninsula. There is no question, based on what I have reviewed, that the ROK military is a very professional and competent force.

I think the other important point is making sure that all our plans that we have are current, they are exercised frequently, and we have the right training programs in place. I think the other important thing is maintaining the alliance and continuing the transformation efforts.

If confirmed, I fully expect to look at and review our capabilities and make sure they are the right capabilities and we are positioned properly to support any type of aggression. But I do feel it is very important to maintain a strong presence with our Korean partner and continue to work close with them and to make sure that we have the right strengths and can counter any type of aggression.

Senator BROWN. Thank you.

Back to you, General Allen, I agree with the chairman when he was talking about our relationship with Pakistan. I also feel, we have given them $4 billion, and yet sometimes we don't know if they are in or they are out. Are they with us, are they not?

How do you view your role in dealing with that situation over there, that country building or country pushback? What do you think your role will ultimately be, if any?

General ALLEN. I think there is a role, Senator. The role, as has been demonstrated by both General McChrystal and, after him, General Petraeus, was to seek ways and opportunity across the border with the Pakistani military to try to have effect upon the nature of the border, the safe havens, those elements of the insurgency where we can focus our efforts.

General Petraeus has established, I think, a productive relationship with General Kayani. I hope to follow in that process where, leveraging the role of the ISAF Commander, we can continue to place the kind of emphasis that we need to with the Pakistani Government, the Pakistani military to continue to pressurize those insurgent safe havens.

In the end, it is a decision that they will make. But in my role as the operational commander, I am going to leverage every possibility that I can for cooperation across the border, to build habits of cooperation, habits of partnership. Hopefully, from there, as we continue to evolve our relationship overall with Pakistan, this will be a mechanism that can provide a bright spot for additional cooperation later. I think here is an important opportunity with Pakistan.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, sir.
Admiral McRaven, I noted that you said that there is some fray-
ing at the edges, potentially, with everything that is happening,
and that is rightly understandable. It is not like you can, all of a
sudden, just press the button and you get a special ops guy ready—or
gal ready to go. What do you anticipate trying to do to deal with
that problem?

Admiral McRAVEN. Yes, sir. In fact, Admiral Olson has put to-
gether a Pressure on the Force Task Force and has done really an
amazing job of getting out to the various operational units to talk
to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, their families, to find out
what are the stresses on the force. That task force is continuing to
gather its data and information. If confirmed, I will come in, take
the recommendations of that task force and then aggressively pur-
sue programs that make sense in order to take care of the families
and their soldiers.

We have to take a hard look at not just making sure that this
force is sustainable for the next couple of years, but what is it
going to look like in 5 years, in 10 years, in 15 years. If we don’t
get ahead of this and if we don’t get on top of the concerns and the
pressures that are on the families and the soldiers, I have great
concerns about what this force will look like 10 years from now.

Senator BROWN. Great. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Brown.

Senator Begich.

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Again, thank you all for your willingness to serve. Like many of
my colleagues here, I anticipate and hope that you are all con-
firmed and look forward to your additional service to this country.

First, General Thurman, let me ask you, if I can, I know the
President has delayed the transition of operational control
(OPCON) of South Korea I think until 2015. If you could give me
some thoughts of your understanding how this additional time will
allow the United States and the Republic of South Korea to con-
duct a successful transfer.

Can you give me kind of a feel? It has been delayed, but what
does this mean?

General THURMAN. Yes, sir, Senator. Based on what I have been
briefed on, it was delayed until 2015. There has been a Strategic
Alliance 2015 that was agreed upon by our Secretary of Defense
and the South Korean Minister of Defense. It was the two Presi-
dents that agreed to delay the OPCON transition.

What I believe is this allows the ROK military to continue to
transform their efforts. They have several transformation efforts
ongoing. They are a highly capable and competent force.

What I have reviewed, there is a timeline and a set of well-de-
fined milestones through the exercise program that will get us on
the road to OPCON transition in 2015. If confirmed, I will review
the Strategic Alliance 2015 and those milestones and work closely
with the ROK Chairman and the ROK Minister of Defense and the
ROK military to help progress them along on that timeline.

Senator BEGICH. Let me also ask you, I know you have heard a
little bit of discussion—this is more of a yes or no. But if you want
to expand, feel free. The security concerns and fiscal realities that
you have heard some questions already on the feasibility on tour normalization.

Assuming you are confirmed, are you willing and obviously going to reexamine the plans for the tour normalization and how that all will work in the future?

General THURMAN. Senator, if confirmed, I will review the overall concept of tour normalization. I am well aware of the fiscal constraints we are under as a Nation. I am also aware of some of the proposed legislation that has been perhaps provided, if the National Defense Authorization Act is approved.

I will work very close with the Department of Defense and this committee to make sure that we are doing the right thing and to make the recommendations.

Senator BEGICH. Very good. Thank you very much.

I will look forward to that as it progresses. Assuming we actually pass an authorization bill, that will be good, and it will have some guidance, hopefully. So thank you.

If I can, Vice Admiral McRaven, this year the Cold Weather Maritime Training Facility will be built in Kodiak, AK, which, of course, we would invite you to Kodiak—not in the summer, but in the winter because that gives you great extra points, to be frank with you.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir.

Senator BEGICH. But Kodiak is a great place. You have answered this a little bit already through your conversation with other members, but how important is facility infrastructure investment really for the readiness that you need for your special operations?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. I will tell you, the Kodiak cold weather training facility is kind of a great topic to look at in terms of the effect on the operators and then, frankly, the rest of the infrastructure across SOF.

But right now, when SOCOM was stood up, the legislation was passed in 1986 and really got going in 1987, a lot of the military construction (MILCON) that was in place—when the money flowed from the Services, a lot of the recapitalization money for a number of the MILCON projects did not flow with that.

Now, 24, almost 25 years into SOCOM, we have a number of facilities out there that are in need of repair or, in fact, we need new facilities. I know Admiral Olson has come forth in his posture hearing and made it clear that he is looking for additional support from Congress in order to recapitalize some of this infrastructure.

As with any force, sir, our readiness is a direct reflection of the amount of equipment and infrastructure we have to do the job, to train with both in garrison and forward. The infrastructure is critical to our special operations operators.

Senator BEGICH. As you review that—again, assuming you get confirmed—I am assuming you will share your analysis on where those gaps are and prioritize those based on funding.

Sometimes around this place, the funding occurs based on who yells the loudest. But my view would be what is the most critical elements of infrastructure investment that is necessary for your operations to continue at the level you are at, plus, obviously, growing itself?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. Great.
Admiral McRaven. Thank you.

Senator Begich. One other piece. You had mentioned—I may be abbreviating this—you called it the something-something stress task force?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.

Senator Begich. What is the timetable that you anticipate some results? The reason I say this, for all the reasons, I want to echo what you said. That is the readiness of our forces and the impacts on them as individuals and the families that are being impacted because of the amount of deployments and the speed. What is your timetable, do you think you might have?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, the Pressure on the Force Task Force—

Senator Begich. There we go.
Admiral McRaven.—that Admiral Olson has implemented has been in place for many months now. They have gone around the country talking to the special operations operators and their families.

Having said that, we have had a number of programs at all the units in place for quite some time. The units, down to the O-5 level, to the lieutenant colonel and the commander level, have programs supported by SOCOM to take care of the families and the operators.

The real question I think for SOCOM is, is that enough? I think as the Pressure on the Force Task Force begins to look at what 10 years of fighting has done, we realize that the current programs are not enough. We have a number of programs that are being implemented daily across the force. But we think, based on the results coming back from this task force, that we are going to need to apply additional resources to support the families and the soldiers.

Senator Begich. Will you share that with us?
Admiral McRaven. Absolutely, sir.

Senator Begich. Okay. My time is expired, but I want to end with one question to Lieutenant General Allen, and that is the whole issue of corruption in the Karzai Government. You seem optimistic. I don't, to be very frank with you. It seems it has gotten worse.

I was there a year and a half ago, maybe longer now, 2 years ago. Again, time flies around this place. But without solving the corruption issue, from Karzai down, how are we ever going to get the system—and you talk about reintegrating people back in—the peace and reconciliation committees and the cash flow that goes through there. But the corruption is layer upon layer upon layer, generational upon generational upon generational.

Give me some thoughts on how that is ever going to get resolved because, honestly, it seems like every dollar we send over there, everyone is taking a piece of it until it gets to the end, and there is very little then utilized for the Services. I will say it here, as I have said publicly, I think from the Karzai Government on down, he is not exempt from this.
Give me your thoughts on how we are dealing with a corrupt government and a corrupt system. There is the easy question for the day. [Laughter.]

General ALLEN. Thank you, Senator.

It is a daunting problem, as you have indicated. But we are working closely with the institutions of government that are emerging, seeking to create patterns of conduct, systems of accountability, the process of responsible budgeting, the execution of the budget, accountability within the execution of the budget, in ways that can reduce these problems associated with corruption.

It is an effort with which we will, if I am confirmed as Commander of ISAF, I will partner very closely with Ambassador Crocker in his efforts and his great civilian team. I will work very closely with Ambassador Simon Gass, who is a senior civilian representative of NATO, and other elements within the interagency to do all that we can to build capacity which holds people accountable, that creates systems and provides mechanisms for predictability and accountability within the government.

But it is a problem, Senator. You have correctly identified that as a difficulty. Corruption, of course, is corrosive to any democratic process and any hope of democracy. It is our very strong hope that in partnership with the Afghan Government, we can get at this issue.

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much.

Again, I want to thank all of you for your willingness to serve and to your families that I know are the backbone to your service. So thank you all very much.

General ALLEN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Begich.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to compliment the President for making the selections of each of you. You are good choices by the President.

These hearings are not so much about getting you confirmed as it is about allowing us to understand what we can do to help you and what your challenges are. I am completely okay and very much support the idea of civilian control of the military. I think that is essential. That is what has made America great for all these years.

But politicians are accountable to the voters. The generals are accountable to their troops, to their chain of command, and to Congress. I just want to make sure those of us who make decisions in politics that affect the war, that we are accountable. If it turns out well, we get the credit. If we have done some things to undermine the effort, then people will notice where the blame lies. That is my view of what we are trying to do here in the next few months.

Admiral McRaven, is Mullah Omar in Pakistan?

Admiral McRAVEN. Sir, we believe he is.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Let us just stop for a second. We believe that the leader of the Taliban after the fall of the Russians, Mullah Omar, who invited bin Laden to come in to be the honored guest in Afghanistan, who empowered Osama bin Laden to attack the country, is still in Pakistan.

So do we believe he is there with the knowledge of the Inter-Service Intelligence and the upper echelons of the army?
Admiral McRAVEN. Sir, I believe that the Pakistanis know that he is in Pakistan. Whether or not there is a——

Senator GRAHAM. Let me ask you this. If they tried for about a week, do you think they could find him?

Admiral McRAVEN. Sir, I can’t answer that question. I don’t know whether they could or not because I don’t know exactly where Mullah Omar is.

Senator GRAHAM. Have we asked them to find him?

Admiral McRAVEN. Sir, I believe we have.

Senator GRAHAM. I am asking. I think that Senator Levin and I both will ask together today. We are asking the Pakistan Government to help us find Mullah Omar, who has tried to destroy Afghanistan, who has formed an allegiance with al Qaeda.

Along those lines, General Allen, are we certain that IEDs being used against American troops in Afghanistan and coalition forces in general are coming out of Pakistan?

General ALLEN. Senator, I believe, yes, we are.

Senator GRAHAM. As a matter of fact, we have given the Pakistanis information about buildings where we can see these things being put together. Is that not true?

General ALLEN. That is correct, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Have they responded effectively?

General ALLEN. They have not, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. I am with Chairman Levin on this. This has to stop.

Now let us talk about corruption. Have you read the article that has come out—I know you have been busy—about the Afghan head of the Central Bank flees to the United States—Central Bank chief flees to the United States? Are you familiar with that at all?

General ALLEN. Sir, I have read many articles at this juncture about that issue.

Senator GRAHAM. I know. I know you——

General ALLEN. I don’t recall that one specifically.

Senator GRAHAM. I would like to put this in the record, if I may, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]
Afghan central bank chief flees to US

By Katherine Haddon | AFP — 12 hrs ago

Afghanistan’s central bank governor has resigned and fled to the United States, saying his life is in danger over a corruption probe targeting influential figures connected to the government.

President Hamid Karzai’s government on Tuesday dismissed the claims made by Abdul Qadir Fitrat, chairman of Da Afghanistan Bank, insisting his life was not under threat and calling him a "runaway governor".

"I announce my resignation from the position of governor of the central bank of Afghanistan immediately," Fitrat said in a statement issued as he visited the United States, where he reportedly has permanent residency.

"Unfortunately, central bank’s independence on regulatory and supervisory matters has recently been undermined by the repeated interference of high-level political authorities," he said.

The governor has claimed his role in an investigation into the near-collapse last year of Kabul Bank, the war-torn country’s largest private lender, had put him in peril.

"My life was completely in danger and this was particularly true after I spoke to the parliament and exposed some people who are responsible for the crisis of Kabul Bank," he was quoted as saying by the BBC.

In April, Fitrat named in parliament high-profile figures who were allegedly involved in corruption scandal amounting to nearly $1 billion at Kabul Bank, which handles the pay of thousands of Afghan civil servants.

The bank was founded in 2004 by Sherkhan Farnood, a leading international poker player. Its co-owners included Mahmood Karzai, a brother of President Hamid Karzai, and a brother of Vice President Mohammad Qasim Fahim.
The scandal has highlighted chaos and corruption in Afghanistan's financial system at a time when US-led combat troops are due to start leaving the country, a decade after ousting the fundamentalist Taliban regime.

Some foreign troop withdrawals are due to start next month, with 10,000 United States forces scheduled to leave by the end of this year.

President Karzai's spokesman Waheed Omer angrily dismissed Fitrat's claims.

"We don't think that's very valid. He never actually told anyone in the government that his life was in danger," Omer told AFP.

"This is basically an escape, not a resignation... the formal procedures have not been adhered to. He's not a governor but a runaway governor."

Omer indicated that Fitrat may have been trying to escape from "legal implications" surrounding the Kabul Bank scandal, without giving any details.

The spokesman insisted that Fitrat's departure was "not going to have a major impact" on Afghanistan's ability to resolve the Kabul Bank crisis.

Last year's near-collapse of the bank led to long queues of nervous investors forming outside banks across Kabul and news of Fitrat's resignation prompted anxiety about the state of the financial system among some Kabulis.

"I will not withdraw my money yet, but I am concerned," said Fazull Rahman, a teacher and foreign currency exchanger, speaking outside a branch of Kabul Bank in the city.

"The fact that the chief of the central bank has been threatened and been forced to quit shows that corrupt strongmen are still in control, they will not allow reforms in the banking system. I am disappointed and worried."

The lender was taken over last year by Afghanistan's central bank after claims that executives granted themselves off-the-book loans worth a reported $900 million that were partly used to buy luxury properties in Dubai.
I am convinced. I met with the gentleman when I was over there, as Senator Graham, and I met with him extensively. He went to the floor of the Afghan parliament, and he started naming names about Kabul Bank, about who was involved in setting up this bank. The bank was used to pay Afghan Government bills, depositing coalition currency as well as Afghan currency.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) called it the biggest abuse or rip-off of a bank they have ever seen. For the IMF to say that, that is something because they have seen a lot.

I want to associate myself with Senator Begich. I really do believe that they are trying to cover up, the Karzai Government and other people in Afghanistan are trying to cover up the extent of the fraud and manipulation in this bank.

General Allen, I would ask you to report back to us as soon as you can, to the committee, about your view of the Kabul Bank situation and how it affects our efforts to stop corruption.

US State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland confirmed Fitrat was in Washington, adding: "If there were to be a change of leadership at the Afghan central bank, we would continue to encourage that government to take all the necessary steps to reform and strengthen the financial sector."

Senator Graham. I am convinced. I met with the gentleman when I was over there, as Senator Graham, and I met with him extensively. He went to the floor of the Afghan parliament, and he started naming names about Kabul Bank, about who was involved in setting up this bank. The bank was used to pay Afghan Government bills, depositing coalition currency as well as Afghan currency.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) called it the biggest abuse or rip-off of a bank they have ever seen. For the IMF to say that, that is something because they have seen a lot.

I want to associate myself with Senator Begich. I really do believe that they are trying to cover up, the Karzai Government and other people in Afghanistan are trying to cover up the extent of the fraud and manipulation in this bank.

General Allen, I would ask you to report back to us as soon as you can, to the committee, about your view of the Kabul Bank situation and how it affects our efforts to stop corruption.

General Allen. I will, Senator.

[The information referred to follows:]

The level of corruption across Afghanistan's public and private sectors represents a threat to the success of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and the viability of the Afghan state. The issues we have seen at Kabul Bank are representative of the problems we face as we seek to enhance transparency and reduce corruption in Afghanistan. While other agencies have the lead on Kabul Bank, I agree that we must support the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as it works with Afghan authorities to address the prior actions they stipulated as necessary to establish a new assistance program. These actions include resolving the issues related to Kabul Bank as well as addressing broader weaknesses in the Afghan banking system. While the Afghan Government has taken some positive steps for-
ward, additional progress on the IMF prior actions is essential to restoring public and international confidence in Afghan financial institutions.

As the Kabul Bank situation highlights, we must continue to work with Afghan leaders to insulate critical institutions from criminal capture and support efforts to investigate and prosecute criminals that divert development and security force assistance; obstruct justice; and engage in or protect illicit activities that strengthen the insurgency and undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government. In coordination with the international community and in support of the Afghan Government, ISAF’s Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Shafafiyat leads ISAF’s effort to foster a common understanding of the wider corruption problem, plan and implement ISAF anti-corruption efforts, and integrate ISAF anti-corruption activities with those of key partners. This is done to support the development of what President Karzai has called an “active and honest administration” in Afghanistan.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Now let us talk about counterinsurgency. I have learned more about this than I ever thought I would know. As a military lawyer, I find the whole concept fascinating.

Since December 2009 to now, I want, from my point of view, the country to know that I believe that General Petraeus and all under his command—Admiral McRaven, all of your forces—have done a fantastic job of going from defense to offense, that the 33,000 surge forces have been used effectively and that we have really put the enemy on the run in many places.

My question, General Allen, if we withdraw the 33,000 by September of next year, will this still be a counterinsurgency operation? Does the math work out? Will there be enough people left behind next year to effectively do counterinsurgency?

General ALLEN. I believe there will, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Now walk me through that. If we needed 33,000—if 70,000 wasn’t enough and we had to add 33,000 to make this a counterinsurgency mission, next summer how can we maintain counterinsurgency if all the surge forces have gone? Have we improved that much?

General ALLEN. I think the surge forces, Senator, are a part of the overarching counterinsurgency mission.

Senator GRAHAM. Now, there were 40,000 requested. The President authorized 30,000. It has been my understanding that the strategy was to go into Regional Command (RC)-South, take the Taliban on, and next summer, 2012, reinvest some of those surge forces to RC-East. Have we had enough people in RC-East since December 2009 to have an effective counterinsurgency?

General ALLEN. I believe that the RC-East forces have been conducting an effective counterinsurgency.

Senator GRAHAM. Is the counterinsurgency a mathematical formula?

General ALLEN. To some extent.

Senator GRAHAM. To some extent. Would you run the math and report back to the committee as to whether or not RC-East has been adequately resourced to have an effective counterinsurgency program? Also report back to the committee if you take the 33,000 troops out, what does that do to counterinsurgency operations going forward? Could you provide us with that information?

General ALLEN. I certainly will, Senator.

[The information referred to follows:]

Although Regional Command-East is currently a supporting effort in the overall campaign, it is already achieving some local successes. As I assume command, I will
examine the campaign and operational environment and provide any concerns to my chain of command. My early impression is that it is too early to determine the detailed implications of the drawdown on the current campaign plan, in terms of where geographically, we might accept more or less risk; the general impact is that the Afghan National Security Force will have to take an increasingly leading role in counterinsurgency operations. The Afghan National Security Force are growing in capability that will facilitate their security lead. At the same time, International Security Assistance Forces will also have to assess our way ahead to maintain or even increase momentum of our hard fought gains. This is an expected evolution as we move toward Afghan security lead and continue to use our resources as wisely and discriminately as possible.

Senator Graham. Okay. Admiral McRaven, I can’t thank you and those under your command enough for what you have been able to achieve, particularly with bin Laden. If you caught someone tomorrow in Yemen, Somalia, you name the theater, outside of Afghanistan, where would you detain that person?

Admiral McRaven. Sir, right now, as you are well aware, that is always a difficult issue for us. When we conduct an operation outside the major theaters of war, Iraq or Afghanistan, we—and again, I will defer to my time as a JSOC commander—put forth a concept of operation (CONOP).

The CONOP goes up through the military chain of command and is eventually vetted through the interagency, and the decision by the President is made for us to conduct a particular operation. Always as part of that CONOP are options for detention. No two cases seem to be alike.

There are certain individuals that are under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), and those are easier to deal with than folks that may not have been under the AUMF. In many cases, we will put them on a naval vessel, and we will hold them until we can either get a case to prosecute them in U.S. court or——

Senator Graham. Are we going to have a second round, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Levin. Depending on how long the first round lasts and when that vote starts, but I hope so.

Senator Graham. I would like to inquire into this in a second round. So I don’t want to intrude——

Chairman Levin. Yes, I do hope that we will have at least a few minutes each.

Senator Graham. Okay. To be continued.

Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. You could finish your answer, however, if you want.

Senator Graham. Absolutely. So we put a guy on a ship?

Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. The bottom line, Senator, is there are——

Senator Graham. How long do we keep him on the ship?

Admiral McRaven. Sir, there are a number of different options, based on——

Senator Graham. What is the longest we can keep somebody on the ship?

Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think it depends on whether or not we think we can prosecute that individual in a U.S. court, or we can return him to a third-party country.

Senator Graham. What if you can’t do either one of those?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, again, if we can’t do either one of those, then we will release that individual. I mean, that becomes the unenviable option, but it is an option.

Chairman Levin. Okay. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator Hagan?

Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to say we are mighty proud of each and every one of you and thank you for your service and your commitment to our country.

I wanted to ask a question about the U.S.-Afghanistan relationship. We have to ensure that Afghanistan does not reemerge as a safe haven for al Qaeda and transnational terrorism.

Though the initial phase of the drawing down of our forces from Afghanistan is limited, we must ensure that the ANSF are capable enough to preserve the tactical gains. It is important that as we transition to the ANSF responsibility, that they are enabled with the appropriate capability, such as intelligence planning, logistics, and maintenance.

General Allen and Admiral McRaven, what should an enduring U.S.-Afghanistan strategic partnership look like beyond 2014? What type of training, advising, and SOF’s presence should we have there, if any?

General Allen. We are in discussion with the Afghans about what the long-term, enduring relationship will look like. In the course of that discussion, we will ultimately identify the roles and missions and functions which conceivably the U.S. forces could bring to this enduring relationship.

I think while much remains to be discussed, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that some advisory capacity will be required, some enabling capacity will be required for ANSF operations. Some intelligence capacity would be required, both to build the intelligence capabilities of the Afghan forces, and then some counterterrorism capabilities to address any reemergence or any potential terrorist hotspot that could conceivably emerge in Afghanistan in the period beyond 2014.

But much of this discussion remains to be had. We are nowhere near talking numbers yet or specific units. But in very general terms, based on the discussions that we had in Iraq, for example, those kinds of broad roles and functions could conceivably be discussed over the long term.

Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma’am, and I would agree with General Allen’s comments.

Senator Hagan. Thank you.

A few weeks ago I met with General Barbero, the Director of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to discuss the interagency effort to interdict the flow of the IED caches. I want to do everything possible to improve the detection rates and stem the flow of ammonium nitrate from Pakistan coming into Afghanistan, and I think we need to put serious pressure on the Pakistani network distribution of ammonium nitrate.

We know who the key facilitators are in Pakistan. They are pushing these caches of IEDs made with the ammonium nitrate across the Afghan border, which ultimately is killing or injuring our troops. General Allen, how do you plan to incentivize the Paki-
General ALLEN. The Pakistanis have recently, I think to their credit, issued a counter IED strategy. We will continue to work with them to build their capacities to do that themselves with respect to protecting themselves from IEDs.

But I think that at multiple levels within our government, we have to make very clear to the Pakistani national leadership, to the military leadership that the continued production of ammonium nitrate, for the purposes of this discussion—the fact that it is unregulated, the fact that it gets into the hands of those who would move it across the border, we have to make it very clear to the Pakistanis. I know we are doing that.

I personally said this to the secretary of defense of Pakistan, we need their help in that regard. They have to control this. They have to do what they need to, to regulate the production and the sale so that it goes into the hands of legitimate businessmen.

On the other hand, on the other side of the border, we will continue to posture our forces to both detect, as best we can, to detect the infiltration of those caches of ammonium nitrate that come across. As we can, we will interdict them, and we have had some pretty big interdictions this year. But it is only a part of the flow that is coming across.

It has to be a joint effort. It has to be an effort with the U.S. and Afghanistan on one side of the border and the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan on the other side of the border. I believe at many different levels of the government, we have expressed our great desire that the Pakistanis sign up to this and stand up to the process of controlling and regulating ammonium nitrate and its flow and the hands into which it goes. If confirmed as the Commander of ISAF, I will continue to add emphasis to that.

Senator HAGAN. You said the Pakistanis are now putting forward their counter IED plans. Do you know what those are?

General ALLEN. We will get back to you on that.

[The information referred to follows:]

The improvised explosive device (IED) is as great a threat to Pakistan as it is to Afghanistan. According to Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, since January, there have been 684 IED events in Pakistan. Of those, 30 percent targeted Pakistan’s security forces, 10 percent targeted schools, 12 percent targeted civilians, and 16 percent targeted infrastructure.

On June 17, 2011, the Interior Division of the Government of Pakistan issued their National Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C–IED) Strategy through the General Civil Defense Directorate. This strategy focuses on national level stakeholders countering IED threats through effective interagency coordination. Some of their priorities and goals are as follows:

- Improve border control measures with special attention on smuggling of improvised explosive devices, accessories, ammonium nitrate, and other improvised explosive device precursors;
- Adopt legislation for Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Act;
- Create a National Counterterrorism Authority that provides specific requests for technical assistance from the National Counterterrorism Center;
- Implement an aggressive public improvised explosive device awareness campaign;
- Establish a C–IED cell within the office of the Director General, Civil Defense;
Engage international communities to help Pakistan build and develop their own C–IED capabilities by equipping the Armed Forces and police and providing focused training on the interdiction of improvised explosive device precursors; and

Establish a Level II National Improvised Explosive Device Exploitation Facility (NIEF), principally funded and supported by the United States, to attack the network by exploiting IED evidence primarily for prosecution purposes. The NIEF in Islamabad remains a long delayed aspiration.

Senator HAGAN. Also, do you have a timeframe at all on what the Pakistanis might be doing as far as controlling the businesses producing this?

General ALLEN. I do not.

Senator HAGAN. Okay. Thank you.

In your answers to the committee’s advance policy questions, Admiral McRaven, you mentioned the importance of the female cultural support teams to engage with elements of certain populations, presumably the women and children, which have previously been difficult to reach during counterinsurgency operations.

Can you describe the importance of these teams to counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, how they are being integrated into SOFs, and any changes to policy or law that you might suggest that would make these teams more effective?

Admiral M CRAVEN. Yes, ma’am. They have been wildly effective in terms of supporting our efforts in Afghanistan. Right now, when a special operations mission goes out, we normally take four females as part of the female engagement team with us. As you point out, their role in that particular mission is after we have secured an objective. I will speak first from the direct action side, and then I will talk a little bit about the special forces side, if you will.

But from the direct action side, after we have secured an objective, part of the role of our female engagement teams is to talk to the Afghan females on target, to make sure, one, that there is nobody else left inside the compound, that everybody is safe and secure, that we reassure the females and the children that they are going to be safe. Many times we will do tactical questioning of the females with a U.S. female soldier. Again, that has been wildly effective for us.

The special forces, the broader special forces teams that are part of developing the Afghan Local Police and the NATO forces that are supporting the provincial reconnaissance companies are also using some variation of the female engagement team to a great effect as well. They are essentially fully integrated, if you will, into the operational units.

They go through an extensive training period for the SOF female engagement teams back at Fort Bragg, under the auspices of the U.S. Army’s SOCOM. The Marine Corps SOF also has a female engagement team training program.

Once they have gone through their basic training program, they will come forward. There is some additional training that goes on forward with the unit that they are assigned to. Then, once they have achieved the standard we are looking for, then we will put them forward into the field.

Right now, all the policies and authorities are in place for us to do that. Again, it is probably several years late in coming. We probably would have been much better off had we developed these fe-
male engagement teams early on in the fight. But as we look at them now, they are a key component to our success in the special operations battlefield, if you will, in Afghanistan.

Senator HAGAN. Do you know how many of these female teams that you have?

Admiral McRAVEN. I know from a JSOC standpoint. I am not sure what the broader Army has. Right now, we have 12 teams, growing to 16.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Admiral McRAVEN. Yes, ma’am.

Senator HAGAN. My time is out.

General Thurman, I did want to just say you have done a great job as the commander of U.S. Army forces command in Fort Bragg. I welcome you, and I look forward to your confirmation.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan.

Senator BlUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to join in expressing my thanks and admiration for your great service to the country, the extraordinary sacrifice and service of the men and women who serve under you, and, of course, your families, and look forward to your confirmation and voting for it.

I want to pursue the line of questioning that Senator Hagan began. On the assumption that the Pakistanis are not cooperative, because they have not proven cooperative in the past, what additional measures can we take to destroy the sources of the calcium ammonium nitrate that has proved so absolutely and horrifically destructive to the men and women who serve our Armed Forces in Afghanistan?

General Allen, I would like, respectfully, to ask you to begin. Then, Admiral McRaven, if you could follow with perhaps some perspective on what can be done through special operations?

General Allen. Senator, that is an important question. The posturing of our intelligence-gathering apparatus, our capabilities, our ISR capabilities, the posturing, potentially, of our special operators on the western side of the border to detect the infiltration of these capabilities, to detect the infiltration of the ammonium nitrate, they come generally along relatively well-known routes of infiltration, to posture ourselves in a way where we can detect and interdict that material as much as we possibly can.

As I said with Senator Hagan, we have had some large interdictions this year. It is because there have been explicit plans, explicit efforts being put forward and being pursued to do just that. Should I be confirmed and become the Commander of ISAF, it is my intention to redouble that effort in every possible way we can to interdict and stop that flow as it gets to the border.

Senator BlUMENTHAL. Thank you.

Admiral McRaven?

Admiral McRaven. Sir, to continue on from General Allen’s discussion, from a special operations standpoint, we actually target the networks, vice the product itself.

Now, when we have the nexus of the product obviously in the network and the individuals in the network, then we get a two-fer. But for the most part, what we are trying to do is shut down the
leadership, both the senior leadership and the mid-level leadership and, to some degree, the foot soldiers that are moving this homemade explosives (HME) from areas like Chaman across the border and into southern Afghanistan.

What we found is where we have focused our effort against some of the HME networks, the Taliban networks down south, we have been very effective at disrupting the HME. The additional piece of this, and probably better to discuss in a more classified form, is there some technology out there that is allowing us to detect HME before the critical components are put together and turned into a homemade explosive.

I think we need to continue to pursue that technology because it has been reasonably effective early in the testing of it, to be able to determine where some of this HME is. Then we are subsequently going after those compounds where we see it.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I thank you both for those answers. I would like to pursue the offer to learn more about that technology in a different setting, if I may? General Allen, also from you, whatever additional information you or your staff can provide.

I am planning to be in Afghanistan and Pakistan toward the end of August on a trip that is designed specifically to focus on this issue, and I would like to be helpful and supportive through the committee and through the authorization appropriation process—I know the entire committee will share that view—in developing not only the technology, but whatever resources are necessary to pursue the calcium ammonium nitrate that is brought into Afghanistan.

I want to focus on the impacts of the explosive devices that are manufactured with those substances. Particularly, General Allen, I understand there are now 34 active telemedicine portals in operation in Afghanistan. That number will be expanded, I think, by an additional 42 planned focusing on the impacts of the IEDs and other explosive devices, particularly when it comes to traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress.

General ALLEN. That is correct.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I wonder if you could discuss not only the use of those resources but others to diagnose and treat the post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injuries (TBI) that, in many respects, are among the signature wounds of this war?

General ALLEN. Senator, that is a very important question from the standpoint of the health of the force in the long term. As we discussed yesterday, we have come a very long way with respect to our reaction to the effects of blast on our troops.

As I indicated, the nature of the immediate action that occurs in the aftermath of an attack has given us the ability to not just detect the results of the attack but to take those actions, those medical actions necessary in the immediate aftermath of the attack so that we can provide the opportunity for rest and medical care for those who have been caught in the blast effects.

That process has evolved dramatically, to the extent that today some 95 percent of those who are immediately diagnosed can be returned to their units. But there is some number, because of the immediacy of the care, that we are able to determine right away that
can go quickly to follow-on care. I think that process, as I said, has evolved pretty dramatically in recent time.

Of course, that follows on to the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that you have mentioned, Senator. What I would like to do is to give you a definitive lay-down both of how the detection for TBI is administered immediately on the spot and how it flows ultimately into the PTSD, so that you have one comprehensive answer.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.

My time has expired. I want to thank both of you for the very informative, candid, and forthright testimony that you have given today. It has been very helpful.

I would like to pursue the additional information that you both have mentioned. Thank you very much.

General ALLEN. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Let us try a 3-minute second round, see if we can all get 3 minutes of questions in.

Let me first ask you, General Allen, you were asked about the question of deadlines and as to whether you were aware of any deadlines that had been previously set that were supported by military commanders, I believe. In Iraq, back in November 2008, President Bush, as I remember, agreed to two deadlines for U.S. forces, one, a June 2009 deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities and, second, a December 31, 2011, deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Iraq. Is that accurate?

General ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, I will have to check those dates, but thank you for that elaboration.

Chairman LEVIN. But do you remember those two deadlines being set?

General ALLEN. I do remember them.

Chairman LEVIN. Did they have the support of the military at that time, do you remember?

General ALLEN. They did, actually. I remember the withdrawal from the cities that worked quite well, actually.

Chairman LEVIN. All right.

Second, relative to Korea, General Thurman, you indicated, I believe, that you would be willing to look into the plans that we have going on for a transformation underway in South Korea. There are three major initiatives going on involving our military, including a Yongsan Relocation Plan, a Land Partnership Plan, and a tour normalization plan. The costs of those, I believe, are something like $10 billion, significantly more than they were originally thought to be. That is just our share of the cost.

Can you, when you get there, take a look at the current plans to bring 8,000 more families to South Korea? There is a real question about the rationale. Why are we bringing more families to South Korea if it is a more dangerous place and continues to be a very dangerous place? There is also a very large question about the costs of that normalization, much greater than originally contemplated.

But would you take a look at the current plans and their rationale and their costs when you get there and get the full report to this committee? Because we have now basically put a hold on those plans until we can really make an assessment.
General Thurman. Mr. Chairman, yes, sir, I will. Based on our discussion yesterday, I fully expect to make that the number-one priority if I am confirmed, once I get on the ground over there.

[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. Chairman, I am fully aware of the concerns raised by you and other members of this committee regarding the Command’s tour normalization initiative as well as the efforts to consolidate forces onto two enduring hubs. My top priority remains the review of these programs in order to address the concerns that have been raised.

Chairman Levin. All right. Thank you.

Also, do you have any thoughts about the balance, the decision-making process as to, if there is another aggression, which I think is likely, from North Korea, what the proper response is to that aggression, as to what that decisionmaking process is, as to the adequacy of the response, but also as to the proportionality of the response? Is that a joint decision by us and South Korea?

General Thurman. Mr. Chairman, that is a very good question. First off, South Korea is a sovereign country, and I believe it is well within their rights to protect themselves if there is a provocation. Obviously, that has to be balanced.

I do know that General Sharp has been working very close with the ROK chairman of their joint forces on counter-provocation and looking at the responses in a joint fashion. But I do expect, if confirmed, I will look into that and make sure that we are doing the right things, because I think a provocation can occur any time.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Finally, Admiral, on the question of your detention of people, you made reference to a couple, I think, that are on a ship, something like that. Is there any legal prohibition against them being tried before an Article 3 court or before a military commission?

Admiral McRaven. Sir, again, it depends on the individual case, and I would be more than happy to discuss the cases that we have dealt with.

Chairman Levin. Well, no, not specific cases so much as is there any legal prohibition, assuming it is planned to having those people tried either before an Article 3 court, if they have committed a crime against the United States, or if they have committed a crime of war, by being tried by a U.S. military commission?

Admiral McRaven. Sir, not to my knowledge, there is no prohibition.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to follow up, General Allen, on the question of detention. If we were to, for example, capture someone like Ayman al-Zawahiri in Yemen, for example, outside of Afghanistan, could we detain him in Afghanistan at the detention facilities there?

General Allen. We would not recommend that.

Senator Ayotte. Why is that?

General Allen. Because Afghanistan is a sovereign country.

Senator Ayotte. So we are not going to use the detention facilities, for example, in Afghanistan to detain terrorists who are captured outside the territory of Afghanistan?

General Allen. It is not our intention.

Senator Ayotte. Following up, Admiral, with respect to detention, if we, for example, were to capture al-Zawahiri, and capture
him and not kill him but hold him for purposes of gathering intelligence and detaining him long term because we felt we needed to under the law of war, where would we hold him?

Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am. I think that is a policy question that I am really not in a position to answer. From a practical military standpoint, obviously, we can hold Zawahiri or Anwar al-Awlaki or anybody else in a number of places, from a practical standpoint.

It becomes a policy issue and a sovereignty issue for various countries. As General Allen said, we have looked a number of times at whether or not we would do that in Afghanistan, but owing to the nature of the sovereignty of Afghanistan and the concern about the potential backlash from the Afghan Government, we have recommended not to do that.

Senator Ayotte. Admiral, would it not be helpful, 10 years into the war on terror, to have a long-term detention and interrogation facility that would be secure for individuals where we need to gather further intelligence?

Admiral McRaven. Ma'am, I believe it would be very helpful.

Senator Ayotte. As far as you understand it, is Guantanamo Bay still off the table in terms of being used for that type of facility?

Admiral McRaven. As far as I understand it, it is. Yes, ma'am.

Senator Ayotte. Okay. Thank you very much.

I wanted to also ask, General Allen, as the Deputy Commander of CENTCOM, could you tell me if any ISR assets have been pulled from Iraq and Afghanistan or Yemen or the general CENTCOM area of operations in order to support operations in Libya?

General Allen. While I was still serving at CENTCOM, yes, there were.

Senator Ayotte. Could you describe generally what those assets were taken away and whether that has taken any capabilities away from us, ISR capabilities in Afghanistan?

General Allen. Not in Afghanistan, ma'am. I will get back to you on that question.

The information referred to follows:

There were no U.S. intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance assets taken from Afghanistan to support operations in Libya. One Predator unmanned aerial vehicle scheduled to flow to Afghanistan was redirected to support Libya operations. In addition, the United Kingdom remissioned an ASTOR reconnaissance aircraft (Ground Moving Target Indicator collection) from Afghanistan to support Libya operations. These adjustments were planned for and thus had no significant impact to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in Afghanistan.

Senator Ayotte. I would appreciate an answer on that. Thank you very much for that.

I do have an additional question for you, General Thurman, and I will submit that for the record.

I want to thank all three of you for your distinguished service and your willingness to continue to serve our country.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

Senator Graham.

Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral McRaven, if night raids were stopped, ordered to be stopped by the Afghan Government, how would that affect our ability to be successful?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think stopping night raids would certainly be detrimental to the special operations aspect of the fight in Afghanistan.

Just to give you some statistics, sir, over the course of the last 12 months, the task force that I commanded over there, we conducted approximately 2,000 operations. Of those 2,000 operations, somewhere in the neighborhood of 88 percent of them were, in fact, conducted at night. I think what is lost on a lot of folks is that approximately 84 to 86 percent of those missions, we never fired a shot.

Senator Graham. Admiral, I think it is fair to say that 78 percent of the people we are detaining come from those special operations missions.

Admiral McRaven. They do, sir.

Senator Graham. Now, General Allen, if the Afghan Government insisted that the 2,400 people we are detaining at Parwan Prison under the law of war be transferred to Afghan control by January 2012, would you have concerns about that decision?

General Allen. I would, sir.

Senator Graham. Would it affect our ability to be successful?

General Allen. I think it would.

Senator Graham. All right. Now let us talk about counterinsurgency. The option that the country has chosen through President Obama is to withdraw 10,000 this year, all surge forces gone by September.

Is it fair to say, General Allen, that was not one of the options presented to the President by General Petraeus?

General Allen. It is a more aggressive option than that which was presented.

Senator Graham. My question is, was that an option?

General Allen. It was not.

Senator Graham. I just want the country to understand that this is not the Petraeus strategy any longer. The Commander in Chief has the perfect right to do what he did. I just hope that it hasn’t undercut what I think could be a very successful outcome.

Now, perception is reality. Do you agree, General Allen, that when the President announced at West Point that we would be withdrawing in July 2011, that created a problem in Afghanistan because it was seen by some as that America is leaving?

General Allen. I believe there are those who could have——

Senator Graham. Were letters sent to people by the Taliban saying, “America is leaving in July, you better watch what you do,” something to that effect?

General Allen. The Taliban have, in fact, communicated——

Senator Graham. Would you agree that the Lisbon statement that we are going to transition in 2014 was very helpful?

General Allen. It was.

Senator Graham. Okay. My question is, now that we have changed the strategy and the withdrawal timeline, have we sent the signal yet again of uncertainty? Seems to be the Taliban commanders have renewed optimism, and it seems to be some of our allies are going to Iran and other places.
My question is, do you believe that this more aggressive withdrawal policy by the President has sent a signal of uncertainty, or do you know?

General ALLEN. I think it is too early to tell, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. Great answer. I know you are going to try your best. We are all pulling for you. Let us know what we can do to help you. God bless you all.

General ALLEN. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Your own position, though, you do support that decision of the President. Is that correct?

General ALLEN. I do, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. But you also felt it was a proper decision for the President to make?

General ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, we are in execution now.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Is it something you agree with?

General ALLEN. It is the prerogative of the President to take the recommendations of his commanders and to make the decision. He made that decision, and we are executing it.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Is it something you agree with?

General ALLEN. I agree.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

We want to thank all of you. I think we have probably run just exactly to noon, where we thought we would end.

Your families are sitting behind you, some of them shivering. They are not just figuratively behind you, but they are literally behind you. The air conditioning here is robust, just the way you and your men and women who serve with you act robustly.

Your challenges are tremendous. You are all up to them. With the support of your families, you will succeed in meeting those challenges. This committee is very grateful for the work that you do and the men and women with whom you serve. I can’t say that enough. I am sure it sounds to some people listening to our hearings it is a bit repetitious, but from our perspective, we cannot repeat it enough. We do that with a purpose, so that our troops understand exactly how much they mean to us and to the American people.

Thank you again, and we will stand adjourned. We will hope to get these confirmations done this week. That is also a challenging, aggressive schedule, but we are up to it, just the way you are up to it.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN James D. Thurman, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**DEFENSE REFORMS**

*Question.* The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readi-
ness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. No. If confirmed, I will continue to be alert to the need for any modifications.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. Not applicable.

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command (CFC)/U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and what is your understanding of how these different command responsibilities interrelate?

Answer. The Commander, United Nations Command (CDR UNC), serves as commander of an international command and is responsible for maintaining the Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula. The CDR UNC acts in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions and directives. The CDR UNC also acts in accordance with directives from the U.S. Government that are transmitted by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, keeping the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) informed. The CDR UNC is responsible for the strategic direction, guidance, operational control of forces, conduct of combat operations, and acceptance and integration of United Nations Command (UNC) member nations’ forces during contingencies. This includes enabling access to the seven UNC bases in Japan.

The Commander, CFC, as commander of a bi-national command, supports Armistice Agreement compliance, deters hostile acts of external aggression directed against the Republic of Korea, and, should deterrence fail, defeats an external armed attack. In this position, the Commander, CFC, is responsible for receiving strategic direction and missions from the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Military Committee, which acts as the strategic coordinating interface for ROK and U.S. national authorities. The missions and functions for the Commander, CFC, are prescribed in the Terms of Reference for the Military Committee and in the U.S.-ROK “Military Committee Strategic Directive Number 2.”

The Commander, USFK, as a subunified Commander of PACOM, is responsible for all duties and functions associated with title 10, U.S.C., the Unified Command Plan, and CJCSI 5130. This role provides the United States with the ability to provide forces to CDR UNC/CFC as required, and to support these forces with the required logistics, administration, and policy initiatives necessary to maintain readiness.

These three commands are, in a sense, mutually supporting of each other’s missions. The CFC and USFK can both provide support to the Armistice functions of the UNC. Similarly, both USFK and UNC can provide support to CFC for the latter’s deterrence and defense missions. International support to the CFC is coordinated through the UNC. The close consultative partnership with our ROK allies and the member nations of UNC ensure that these commands are leveraged in a complementary fashion in order to support the national interests of both nations.

Question. What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. If confirmed, my first priority as the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander must be to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined joint and combined commands that are prepared to fight and win. My extensive operational combat and joint duty experience positions me well to perform this key task. As a battalion executive officer during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Chief of Plans and Policy for Allied Forces Southern Europe in Kosovo (1999–2000), the Chief of Operations for Coalition Forces Land Component Command during the invasion of Iraq (2002–2003), and the Multi-National Division Commander responsible for all coalition operations in Baghdad, Iraq (2006), I have obtained the operational experience and skills that are needed by a UNC/CFC/USFK Commander who must lead forces that are ready to “fight tonight” on the Korean Peninsula. If confirmed, my operational experience in a combined/coalition environment would be of great benefit in a future role as the Commander of multinational UNC and the bi-national U.S.-ROK CFC. In the case of CFC, the ability to work effectively with a partner nation is particularly impor-
tant as significant change will occur under the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan. Experience gained from operating and leading in multiple combined/coalition environments prepares me well for applying the lessons learned toward further strengthening of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. Most recently, my assignment as the Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) has prepared me for leading large and complex organizations—FORSCOM is the Army’s largest organization—an experience that will serve me well when dealing with the complexities of UNC, CFC, and USFK. Additionally, by currently having the responsibility of overseeing, manning, training, and equipping 237,000 Active component soldiers, and training and readiness oversight of 560,000 soldiers in the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve, I am well positioned to apply this experience toward maintaining joint and combined commands on the Korean Peninsula that are prepared to fight and win.

**Question.** Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I plan on conducting in-depth discussions and exchange with personnel of the U.S. and ROK Governments, nongovernmental organizations, educational and research institutions, and civil society at large in order to enhance the expertise needed to command UNC, CFC, and USFK. I will continue this dialogue and exchange throughout my time in command so that my knowledge and understanding of affairs in the ROK continues to increase and mature.

**RELATIONSHIPS**

**Question.** Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK with the following officials:

- The Secretary of Defense.
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

**Answer.** The Department of Defense (DOD) is composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Inspector General of DOD, the combatant commands, the military departments, the defense agencies, DOD Field Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities, organizations, and commands established or designated by law, or by the President or by the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with sections 111, 113, and 192 of title 10, U.S.C. The functions of the heads of these offices are assigned by the Secretary of Defense in accordance with existing law. The CDR UNC reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and through the Secretary of Defense to the President, while at the same time keeping the Commander, PACOM, informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities. A validated binational U.S.-ROK document provides further guidance on CDR CFC’s unique relationship with the ROK National Command and Military Authorities and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

**Question.** The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

**Answer.** The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the authorities contained in title 10, U.S.C., and except as expressly prohibited by law or order of the President or Secretary of Defense, has full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense upon any and all matters concerning which the Secretary of Defense is authorized to act pursuant to law.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

**Answer.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy, and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

**Answer.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the Principal Staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters.

**Question.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Answer.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. CDR UNC communicates through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.

**Question.** The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of their respective Departments, including: recruiting; organizing; supplying; equipping to include research and development; training; servicing; mobilizing; demobilizing; administering to include the morale and welfare of personnel; maintaining; construction, outfitting, and repairs of military equipment; and the construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities as well as the acquisition, management, and disposal of real property and natural resources.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of the Services under title 10, U.S.C. Their support is critical to meet readiness needs. The Service Chiefs of Staff also provide military advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


Answer. The Commander, USFK, as commander of a subunified command of PACOM, reports directly to Commander, PACOM, on matters directly pertaining to USFK areas of responsibility. Commander, UNC and Commander, CFC, keep the Commander, PACOM, informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities.

Question. Other Combatant Commanders.

Answer. The commanders of the combatant commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the military missions assigned to them and shall exercise command authority over assigned forces as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions within the chain of command by transmitting to the commanders of the combatant commands the orders of the President or the Secretary of Defense.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK?

Answer. Based on my initial study of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and vital U.S. national interests in Northeast Asia, there are four major and enduring challenges that confront any UNC/CFC/USFK Commander.

First is the requirement to deter war, defend against provocation and attack, and maintain the Armistice. As shown by events in 2010, North Korea continues to commit provocations that have become increasingly escalatory and dangerous. A significant challenge is to understand the regime of Kim Jong-il and attempt to determine its intent. The Alliance must take the necessary actions to deter attack, break the cycle of North Korean provocation, and remain ready to defend if deterrence fails.

Second, the command must continue readiness preparations to fight and win a war with North Korea and at the same time prepare to deal with the complexity of a regime collapse and the attendant consequences.

Third, the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander must sustain the strategic U.S.-ROK Alliance and ensure that the military component of the Alliance continues to be strong as it has been historically and serves the interests of our two countries.

Finally, we must continue to transform the Alliance in the best way to achieve national security objectives on the Korean Peninsula. This should be done within the dynamic changes occurring in the region and the fiscal constraints imposed by the global economic situation.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

Answer. If confirmed, to address these enduring challenges I will focus on the readiness of U.S. and ROK forces to be able to “fight tonight.” This includes placing strong emphasis on joint and combined warfighting fundamentals, readiness and sustainment at best value, interoperability of forces, and counter-provocation. Planning and preparing for the complex challenges of war and collapse provides the foundation for deterrence, defense, and maintaining the armistice. If deterrence fails the Alliance will win the war; if regime collapse occurs we will deal with the myriad potential scenarios of regime collapse.

If confirmed, I will work to sustain and strengthen the Alliance, building on the great work both our militaries and our governments have done over the years and
focus on sustaining mutual trust and interoperability of forces through a robust joint and combined training program.

Finally, if confirmed, I will work toward transforming the military component of the Alliance in accordance with the interests of the United States and ROK and our fiscal constraints.

NORTH KOREA

Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near-term threats to regional security and stability. The seriousness of the threat is seen by North Korea’s continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and ballistic missile program, and particularly, over the past year, by North Korea’s unprovoked and deadly attacks against South Korea—specifically the attack on the ROK navy ship Cheonan in March 2010 and the artillery attack on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

Answer. I believe North Korea remains the primary threat to security in Northeast Asia. Over the past few years, the security situation on the peninsula has reached high levels of tension following the attack on the Cheonan and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. North Korea has hindered the progress of Six-Party denuclearization talks; adopted a policy of provocative actions in an attempt to secure concessions; continues its nuclear program, which includes pursuit of Highly Enriched Uranium; and continues to proliferate dangerous technologies. Although its conventional force threat continues to decline, it has compensated by investing in asymmetric capabilities, such as ballistic missiles and Special Operations Forces. However, Kim Jong-il carefully weighs the cost and benefit of military action and avoids actions that could escalate to war. Our primary concern is the potential for additional North Korean provocations, which is a tool of choice as part of its coercive diplomatic strategy designed to safeguard the regime, maintain internal control, and extort foreign aid.

North Korea is also in the process of a succession of power from Kim Jong-il to his son, Kim Jong-un, adding another dynamic to deterrence. Although little is known of Kim Jong-un, there is no evidence to suggest his decisionmaking calculus will differ significantly from his father’s or that his strategic priorities will change. However, Kim Jong-un’s youth and inexperience increase the likelihood of miscalculation, as does the imperative for him to establish credibility with the military hardliners he needs to support succession. These factors make him less predictable in the near-term.

I believe the U.S.-ROK Alliance is strong and ready to address these and other security challenges on the Korean Peninsula.

Question. What is your understanding of how the attacks on the Cheonan and on Yeonpyeong Island changed the ROK and U.S. security posture on the Peninsula?

Answer. In response to these two attacks by North Korea, the United States and ROK engaged in a series of combined military exercises designed to send Pyongyang the clear message that its irresponsible and belligerent behavior must stop and that both the United States and ROK remain committed to enhancing their combined defense capabilities. The first exercise held in this series was a combined maritime and air readiness event called Invincible Spirit. This exercise included extensive training in the areas of anti-submarine warfare, battle group air defense, surface warfare training, including live fire exercises, and a robust complement of aircraft that flew a variety of missions.

Invincible Spirit was followed by the Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise. This annual exercise, like all other training events conducted by the CFC, was designed to improve the U.S.-ROK Alliance’s ability to preserve the Armistice. The exercise was focused on ensuring readiness to prepare for, prevent, and prevail against a full range of provocations that could occur on the Korean peninsula now and in the future. Following Ulchi Freedom Guardian, the United States and ROK conducted a combined anti-submarine warfare exercise. Focused on anti-submarine warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures, the exercise was conducted in the waters west of the Korean Peninsula. This anti-submarine warfare exercise was followed by a U.S.-ROK naval and air training event that provided training in the areas of fleet protection, alerts/intercepts and defensive counter air/combat air patrols, air defense, surface warfare readiness, basic seamanship maneuvers, logistics sustainment, and communications.

When viewed in their totality, the set of combined exercises conducted since North Korea’s attacks in 2010 have enhanced U.S. and ROK combined defense capabilities and readiness, improved force interoperability, and demonstrated U.S. commitment to regional security.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to South Korea, Japan, and the United States by North Korea’s ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities?

Answer. North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear programs pose a direct threat to security in Northeast Asia. The Kim Regime continues to use these two programs to shape conditions to gain leverage during negotiations, to extract concessions, and ensure regime survival.

With an inventory of more than 800 ballistic missiles, North Korea continues to build short and medium range missiles of increasing range, lethality, and accuracy, while enhancing the survivability of its missile forces. With its continued research and development of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, and possible fielding of an intermediate range missile, North Korea grows closer to threatening the western United States and striking Okinawa, Guam, and Alaska. This missile development program presents a threat which cannot be ignored.

North Korea demonstrated the ability to produce a nuclear weapon with its second nuclear test on 9 October 2006 at Punggye. The intelligence community assesses that North Korea has enough material for at least six plutonium-based weapons. Additionally, there are indications that North Korea has pursued a highly enriched uranium program in the past, and it is likely the effort continues today. In November 2010 North Korea displayed a uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon to foreign visitors. The facility’s purpose, ostensibly, is to produce fuel for a light water reactor currently under construction at the facility. However, this capability could provide an alternative source of highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons.

Question. What is your assessment of North Korea's conventional capabilities and readiness?

Answer. Despite decades of decline in overall readiness and capabilities, North Korea retains the fourth largest armed force in the world with more than one million active duty and five million Reserve personnel. More than 70 percent of these forces are arrayed within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone and North Korea has garrisoned up to 250 long-range artillery systems in positions to strike the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area. Although an aging and technologically inferior force, North Korea fields over 1,700 aircraft, 800 naval vessels, and 13,000 artillery systems. The most modern North Korean tanks are no match for the U.S. M1A2 main battle tank or ROK K1 and K2 tanks. The North Korean Air Force has a very limited number of modern aircraft, and its pilots have a fraction of the flight hours of ROK and U.S. Air Force pilots. The North Korean Navy's surface fleet is likewise aging and suffering from maintenance problems. North Korea’s leadership likely understands its military is incapable of seizing the Korean Peninsula by force and that a conventional war would result in an end to the Kim Regime. However, the North will continue to use its military as a key component of a coercive strategy designed to gain concessions through intimidation and provocations.

Question. What, if anything, should be done to strengthen deterrence on the Korean Peninsula?

Answer. I believe the most important factor in maintaining deterrence on the Korean Peninsula is the maintenance of a strong U.S.-ROK Alliance. The Alliance is grounded in the Mutual Defense Treaty and we are now striving to develop and expand the Alliance based on the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement, Strategic Alliance 2015 plan, and the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation. These Alliance development measures are designed to build more adaptive and flexible force capabilities and promote closer policy and strategic coordination between the United States and ROK. Additionally, it is important to think of deterrence in a holistic manner, and to this end I will seek to ensure that we maximize the military elements of national power as a part of a synchronized whole-of-government approach. By maintaining a strong Alliance, the United States and ROK will maximize the deterrence effect of their combined capabilities.

**NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM**

**Question.** North Korea recently disclosed that it has a functioning uranium enrichment program. Whether this program is intended for nuclear power, as the North Korean government claims, or for nuclear weapons is unknown. Having achieved enrichment capability, however, North Korea could certainly use that capability to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons. North Korea has a history of proliferating missile and nuclear technology. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was established as a means to interdict suspect shipments, including shipments of nuclear or missile items to and from North Korea.
Would you recommend any improvements to the organization or capability of the PSI member nations to improve the ability to interdict prohibited shipments to and from North Korea?

Answer. The PSI is an interdiction program designed to impede or stop the transfer of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. It is an interdiction partnership among participating states where the development of operational concepts, organization of the program, and the sharing of information is done through meetings of its Operational Experts Group (OEG). Since endorsing the Statement of Interdiction Principles in May 2009, the ROK has increased its PSI participation. This increased participation is evidenced by its hosting of the Eastern Endeavor 10 maritime WMD interdiction drill off the port city of Busan and its joining of the OEG in November 2010. Although issues of organization and operational concepts of the PSI are an issue for the OEG, I do believe the initiative is an important component of the international community’s effort to stop the transfer of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to states and actors of concern. I support enhancement of the initiative.

Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology to Syria, Iran and others?

Answer. Effective counterproliferation requires an interagency and international cooperative effort with the intelligence effort the most critical. ROK and U.S. naval forces from the U.S. 7th Fleet participated in the October 2010 ROK led PSI exercise Eastern Endeavor 10. If confirmed, I will assess whether U.S. or Combined ROK/U.S. forces can more effectively contribute to the PSI. For the employment of other DOD forces and capabilities, I would defer to the Commander, PACOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense.

Question. In your view, how does the lack of progress in diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program inform or guide U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy in the region?

Answer. As I understand the situation, our diplomatic efforts have been extensive and we have made numerous attempts to reach an agreement leading to a verifiable disabling and dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs through the Six-Party Talks. However, responsibility for the lack of agreement rests with North Korea. The Kim regime continues to pursue its nuclear weapons and delivery systems programs and this indicates its potential intent to be able to employ or proliferate nuclear weapons. Therefore, the United States must maintain its nuclear deterrence capability and continue extended deterrence for the ROK until such time as North Korea verifiably dismantles its nuclear program.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PRIORITIES

Question. The proximity and size of North Korea’s missile inventory and the unpredictability of the North Korean regime place a premium on the missile defense capabilities in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula.

What is your assessment of the highest priority missile defense needs of USFK and CFC?

Answer. In 2008, the Secretary of Defense signed guidance directing the distribution of a set number of Patriot PAC–3 and GEM missiles for the Korean Peninsula. To date, the designated number of munitions set forth in that document has not been provided to the U.S. Patriot forces stationed in the ROK. The number of missiles designated for the ROK or, preferably, the Air Defense Artillery Brigade’s full unit basic load, is the highest priority concerning missile defense on the Korean Peninsula.

Question. What missile defense capabilities do you believe are needed in the near term to meet the operational needs of these commands, and what systems are available to provide such capabilities?

Answer. One of the basic tenants of air and missile defense is the employment principle of “layered defense.” Layered defense allows different missile defense systems to engage an inbound ballistic missile at different points in its trajectory. Although there is more than one missile defense system in the ROK, they are not mutually supporting nor do they provide layered defense. The U.S. and ROK militaries both have Patriot systems which conduct engagements in the terminal phase of a missiles flight (the current version of the ROK Patriot systems provide a very limited Theater Ballistic Missile [TBM] defense capability). The ROK Navy has acquired three Aegis-like missile defense cruisers (KDX IIIIs) but they currently do not have missiles to be used in theater missile defense (TMD) nor do they have the ability to engage TBMs over the Korean Peninsula. The system that would best support
the layered defense employment principle is a Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system which can engage inbound TBMs at either the terminal or mid-course phase of flight. A THAAD system could be used to provide layered defense and also improve early warning for the Korean Peninsula as well as enhance Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) early warning in the region.

Question. The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review established a policy of pursuing a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to regional missile defense, including in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. This approach is intended to provide timely and effective defense of existing and emerging missile threats with a flexible set of missile defense capabilities, tailored to each region.

Do you support the PAA to missile defense, and do you believe it is an appropriate approach to providing missile defense capabilities for the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula?

Answer. I do support the President’s guidance on PAA as detailed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review report. This approach is designed to enhance regional security and deterrence architectures in a way that is flexible and adaptive, and responsive to the threat. In coordination with Commander, PACOM, USFK has been working over the past decade to build a robust BMD force posture that contributes to deterrence and assures the ROK of our commitment to their security and to greater regional peace and stability. I will continue to work with my counterparts as plans for a regional PAA are further developed.

Question. Do you believe it would be in our security interests to seek a cooperative missile defense relationship with South Korea as a means of enhancing security on the Korean Peninsula and the region?

Answer. Yes. There are many benefits and synergies to be gained by cooperative missile defense with the ROK. The United States is working with the ROK to evaluate its missile defense requirements. Should the ROK decide to pursue additional BMD capabilities, experience with other allies has shown that we can each leverage our BMD capabilities through operational cooperation. We also believe that regional security can be enhanced through cooperative missile defense relationships.

NORTH KOREA-POW-MIA RECOVERY EFFORTS

Question. From 1996–2005, the United States worked with the North Korean military to recover and repatriate the remains of American servicemembers who perished on the Korean peninsula. However, in the spring of 2005, the United States unilaterally halted the program.

In your opinion, should the United States work with North Korea to repatriate the remains of American servicemembers found in North Korea? If so, when, or under what conditions, should the United States resume such cooperation?

Answer. It is a core value of the United States and our military to not leave a fallen comrade and I believe every attempt should be made to recover those missing as long as it does not conflict with critical security interests and appropriate conditions exist to execute recovery operations. This is an enduring commitment our Nation makes to its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.

The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) has responsibility for strategy and policy regarding the recovery of Korean War remains and provides DOD oversight on the entire personnel accounting process. The UNC assists DPMO and PACOM Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command in arranging operational and logistics support to remains recovery operations in North Korea. Also, the UNC conducts repatriation ceremonies after remains are transferred to UNC control at the Joint Security Area at the end of each operation.

Once national policymakers determine that conditions permit reengagement with North Korea, DPMO will lead the U.S. team for negotiating the resumption of repatriating Korean War remains. If U.S. and North Korean representatives can reach a mutually agreeable arrangement that provides the necessary process and procedures to conduct operations, it would seem possible to resume this humanitarian effort. The arrangement must address the safety and security of U.S. personnel executing remains recovery in North Korea. When U.S. commanders are satisfied that an acceptable level of risk to U.S. personnel exists, remains recovery operations can resume in North Korea.

Question. If confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to restart cooperation with North Korea on the POW–MIA remains recovery program?

Answer. National policymakers will decide when to restart remains recovery operations in North Korea. This is a bilateral U.S.–North Korea policy issue. However, when the decision is made, the UNC will continue to play a key role in supporting remains recovery operations in North Korea.
Question. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been a key pillar of security in the Asia-Pacific region. This relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.

What is your understanding of the current U.S. security relationship with the ROK?

Answer. It is my understanding the current U.S. security relationship with the ROK is very strong. It is based on mutual respect and trust and grounded in the Mutual Defense Treaty. In June 2009, the United States and ROK signed a Joint Vision statement that commits both nations to building an alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world at large. Objectives established in the Joint Vision statement are being supported by the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan that was agreed to by the United States and ROK in October 2010. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan will synchronize multiple U.S. and ROK military transformation efforts that are designed to build adaptive and flexible force capabilities to deter and defeat aggression and provocations against the ROK. The plan moves the United States and ROK toward building an Alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world, as called for in the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision statement.

The military component of Alliance development is led by the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation that were agreed to by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of Defense in October 2010. Established to direct the future course of the U.S.-ROK defense relationship, they are based on and serve to advance the June 2009 Joint Vision Statement and the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the guidelines, the U.S. upholds a firm commitment to ROK defense and both nations will implement a set of enabling measures needed for an effective combined defense posture. These enabling measures are: to enhance intelligence and information sharing; strengthen operational planning; further develop capabilities to address the ballistic missile threat from North Korea; institutionalize an extended deterrence policy committee; enhance interoperability; enhance the combined exercise program; and to collaborate on lessons learned. The defense guidelines also recognize the importance of close bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global peace and stability. In support of these stability objectives, the guidelines specify implementation of the following measures: strengthening capabilities to contribute to regional and global peace and stability; supporting the non-proliferation of WMD, related materials, technologies, and their means of delivery; enhancing bilateral, trilateral, and multinational defense relationships; strengthening cooperation for international security and peacekeeping efforts; and cooperating closely on other transnational and non-traditional security challenges. The defense guidelines recognize the importance of close policy and strategic consultation between the United States and ROK for the enhancement of common interests and further development of the Alliance.

Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?

Answer. Recognizing that a strong U.S.-ROK Alliance is one of the most important factors for maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region at large, I will, if confirmed, continue the work of my predecessors directed at sustaining strong ties with personnel of the ROK military, other members of the ROK Government, Korean civil society, and the South Korean people at large. I will encourage continued exchange and cooperation activity between Command personnel and the people of local Korean communities—activity that connects and binds Americans and Koreans together. I will also execute the Alliance building initiatives to promote the continuation of a strong U.S.-ROK security relationship.

Question. What is your assessment of ROK warfighting capability trends with regard to the modernization and capability improvements in ROK equipment and training?

Answer. It is my understanding that the ROK military is a highly professional and competent force with a modern, mobile network-centric warfare capability that fields an array of advanced weapon systems. These weapon systems include the K1 main battle tank, K9 self-propelled artillery, and the KDX–III guided missile destroyer. The ROK military is led by a professional officer corps that currently exercises daily command of its forces. It has sustained and supplemented operational experience through recent deployments to places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, Lebanon, as well as participating in a host of United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. Initiatives to further enhance force capabilities, modernize weapon systems, and improve organizational structures and force
management are being implemented as part of the ongoing “307” defense reform program.

ROK military modernization and capability improvements are supported through the maintenance of a robust Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Defense Armaments Cooperation Program with the U.S. These programs promote interoperability between U.S. and ROK forces and thus create a more capable combined force. During fiscal year 2010, the ROK was our 11th largest FMS buyer. FMS sales were augmented by a robust military training program, where the ROK sends students to the U.S. for training in a variety of military-related courses.

ROK force capability is also sustained and improved through the conduct of a tough and realistic exercise program. In addition to participating in the combined Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, and Foal Eagle exercises with the U.S., the ROK military also conducts annually the Taeguk, Hoguk, and Hwarang exercises. These exercises help derive requirements for joint force and unit structure development, improve interoperability between the military services, and practice inter-agency coordination. These factors in total lead me to believe that the ROK is a highly professional, competent, and modern military force.

Question. Until last year, the United States and ROK were planning the transfer to wartime operational control (OPCON) of ROK forces to the ROK in 2012. Then, in June 2010, the United States and ROK agreed to further delay the transfer of OPCON until December 2015. This delay was purportedly agreed to because of the evolving security situation on the Peninsula and in order to more closely synchronize the transfer with other transformation initiatives. What is your understanding of the ROK’s current and projected military capabilities and the ability of ROK forces to assume a greater role in the defense of their homeland including responsibility for command and control of the readiness, operations, and warfighting of their own forces in wartime (“OPCON Transfer”)?

Answer. It is my understanding that the South Korean military is a highly professional and competent force that will be capable of leading Alliance defense of the ROK in wartime. Numbering over 653,000 active duty personnel, it ranks as the world’s sixth largest military in terms of personnel and is a modern, mobile network-centric warfare capable force that fields an array of advanced weapon systems. The ROK military is led by a professional officer corps that currently exercises daily command of its forces. It has gained operational experience through recent deployments to places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, Lebanon, as well as participating in a host of United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations in East Timor and Morocco and other operations around the world. Initiatives to enhance force capabilities, modernize weapon systems, and improve organizational structures and force management are being implemented as part of the ongoing “307” defense reform program.

ROK military force capability is supplemented through the conduct of a tough and realistic exercise program. In addition to participating in the combined Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, and Foal Eagle exercises with the U.S., the ROK military also conducts annually the Taeguk, Hoguk, and Hwarang exercises. These exercises derive requirements for joint force and unit structure development, improve interoperability between the military services, and practice inter-agency coordination. Because of these factors, it is my understanding that the ROK will be ready and capable of leading Alliance defense of the ROK in wartime.

Question. Following the decision to delay OPCON transfer to 2015, the United States and ROK entered into an agreement referred to as Strategic Alliance 2015 which is described in the USFK October 2010 Strategic Digest as “an overarching and synchronized Alliance transformation roadmap, containing mutual Alliance end states and milestones, ensuring a smooth transition of the lead for the combined defense of the Republic of Korea.” What is your understanding of the purpose and scope of the Strategic Alliance 2015?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan synchronizes multiple U.S. and ROK transformation efforts that are designed to build adaptive and flexible capabilities to deter aggression against the ROK and to defeat aggression should it occur. The plan’s objective is to sustain and enhance the U.S.-ROK Alliance’s combined defense posture and capabilities and to support the Alliance’s future vision and bilateral defense priorities as stated in the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation. Execution of the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan ensures the effective synchronization of major elements of Alliance restructuring while maintaining a strong combined defense posture to deter or respond to the range of North Korean security challenges throughout the transition process. Key elements of the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan include: refining and improving combined defense plans; defining and developing the new organizational structures required for
ROK lead of the war effort; implementing more realistic exercises based on the North Korean threat of today and tomorrow; preparing for the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 2015; consolidating U.S. military forces in the ROK onto two enduring hubs under the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and Land Partnership Plan (LPP); and force management. The goal of all initiatives under the Strategic Alliance 2015 construct is to build adaptive force capabilities that deter and defeat future provocations against the ROK and fight and win on the Korean Peninsula should deterrence fail. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan as a whole synchronizes ongoing transformation efforts to ensure they are aligned and mutually supporting and better postures both nations to deter, counter, and defeat North Korean provocations and aggression.

**Question.** How will it help ensure that the OPCON transfer takes place no later than December 2015, as it is now scheduled?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that established within the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework is a governance structure that guides implementation of the plan to transition wartime operational control according to specified milestones. Implementation issues are identified and addressed through a bottom-up process, where U.S.-ROK governance bodies in order of rising decisionmaking authority include council of colonels, subcommittees headed by two-star level general officers, a steering committee, the joint committee, and the Strategic Alliance 2015 working group. These bodies continually work issues related to—among other elements of Strategic Alliance 2015—OPCON transition and ensure that established milestones are adhered to and difficulties addressed as they arise.

**Regional Posture**

**Question.** In your opinion, how should the United States employ its forces in ROK to provide for regional presence and engagement, and to best respond to regional threats, provide support for out-of-area contingencies, and maintain readiness?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that how U.S. forces stationed in the ROK are employed is currently in a state of evolution as the Command transforms its presence there. Our primary focus must remain the deterrence of aggression against the ROK—a key Alliance and security treaty partner—and to defeat aggression should it occur. However, the Command’s transformation initiatives as currently structured will create the opportunity for U.S. forces stationed in the ROK to become available for use in regional exercises, engagement, and global operations. We must maintain a U.S.-ROK Alliance military posture that allows for an immediate capability to deal with military threats and other contingencies on the Korean Peninsula while also seizing upon opportunities to address global challenges such as terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, piracy, peacekeeping, post-conflict stabilization, and regional engagement, as called for in the 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision for the Alliance. If confirmed, I will conduct a careful and thorough review of the opportunities for U.S. forces to be employed toward the support of regional engagement and out-of-area operations.

**Consolidation of U.S. Forces**

**Question.** The LPP is consolidating the combat brigade and supporting elements of the 2nd Infantry Division in and around Camp Humphreys, south of Seoul. New construction of facilities and infrastructure required to support the consolidation is being carried out using funds from both the Host Nation (South Korea) and U.S. military construction accounts. The YRP proposes to move most of the U.S. forces currently stationed at Yongsan compound in Seoul to Camp Humphrey as well. The YRP relocation is to be largely funded by the South Korean Government, but the United States will pay for the construction of the housing to support the relocation. What is your assessment of the current status of the two consolidation plans and the timeline for completion?

**Answer.** The YRP and the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) are being executed simultaneously and are scheduled for completion in 2016. The two plans are structured in such a way as to facilitate the orderly movement of servicemembers, civilian employees, and their families to the enduring hubs. The YRP and LPP plans are closely dependent on each other. Land development and infrastructure projects are under construction and must be completed before any unit moves can take place.

The LPP program is on schedule with the majority of projects under design and/or construction. The current plan is to complete construction of the LPP program in the first quarter of calendar year 2016 and complete all unit moves by the end of 2016. YRP negotiations still continue concerning requirements for the U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) Headquarters. Any delays in reaching agreement over this facility could push back completion of the YRP program. However, both the United
States and ROK expect these negotiations to be concluded shortly. The current plan is to complete YRP construction in early 2016 and complete all moves by the end of 2016 in accordance with the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan. For the relocation initiative as a whole, as I understand it, the planning and program phase is nearly complete and the design phase is well underway. Site development/construction has been ongoing since 2005 and vertical construction of YRP projects will begin within weeks. LPP program construction has been at a steady state since it began in 2004.

**Question.** What do you anticipate to be the total costs to be incurred by the U.S. Government to carry out the two consolidations?

**Answer.** According to the LPP signed by the United States and ROK in 2002, most of the facility costs associated with moving U.S. forces from locations north of Seoul to areas south are obtained from host nation burden sharing funds. It should be noted, however, that some of the LPP facility construction was paid for with U.S. Military Construction (MILCON) funds. Under the YRP, the majority of costs associated with the relocation will be covered by the ROK, to include the construction of facilities such as barracks, operational facilities, and support facilities. Housing owned by the United States at U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan—a facility that is returned to the ROK under YRP excluding a small parcel—will be replaced by the ROK at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys. Housing currently leased at U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan will be replaced by a privately financed housing project. For both YRP and LPP, additional land required to execute these two agreements was purchased and provided by the ROK. Over $2 billion worth of projects are in design and approximately $1.2 billion worth of construction are currently underway at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys. The United States agreed to provide the majority of required family housing and unaccompanied senior leader quarters for our force at a cost estimated at between $1–$2 billion. With respect to the relocation of 2nd Infantry Division under the LPP, the United States intends to fund the requirements using both appropriated funds and host nation provided burden sharing funds. The U.S. share of the total cost to carry out the two ROK-U.S. agreements will be approximately $2.4 billion.

**Question.** To what extent do you believe the United States should be responsible for the costs related to environmental clean-up at bases being vacated as a result of the LPP?

**Answer.** The return of U.S. installations in the ROK is governed by the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and its relevant agreements. The environmental clean-up of overseas facilities must be accomplished in accordance with existing DOD instructions. If confirmed, I will ensure that all provisions established in the SOFA and relevant DOD instructions are adhered to during the base return process and work with all parties concerned to practice good environmental stewardship at Command facilities.

**Question.** In your opinion, does the consolidation better support the warfighting mission? If so, how?

**Answer.** I have been briefed that the relocation initiative improves warfighting capabilities in several ways. First, the 2nd Infantry Division and future Korea Command will be collocated at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, improving coordination and planning between staffs of the two organizations. Similarly, relocating 2nd Infantry Division to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys consolidates the Division’s subordinate units at a single location, increasing direct face-to-face contact amongst unit personnel while reducing the physical span of control and infrastructure needed to support the Division. The unit is better postured to train and fight together. I understand that consolidation at two enduring hubs also enhances command and control and coordination. In addition to strengthening relationships between operational staffs of the 2nd Infantry Division and a future Korea Command, 2nd Infantry Division is better positioned to affect initial liaison and coordination during reception, staging, and onward movement of deploying maneuver and sustainment brigades. Early liaison and coordination sets the conditions to more reliable and effective command and control during execution of later phases/stages of conflict. Positioning of the 2nd Infantry Division at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys also improves tactical flexibility by posturing the division in a better tactical location for rapid commitment in support of either of the forward stationed ROK armies and corps. This position also shortens logistical lines during the initial phases of conflict that better postures the division for successful employment later.

I have been briefed that consolidation will also enhance the execution of non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). By reducing the dispersion of transportation assets, movement times are reduced. By separating U.S. forces from initial wartime threats such as North Korea’s long-range artillery and its ground forces threatening Seoul, the vulnerability of these forces is reduced and their survivability
enhanced. 2nd Infantry Division located at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys will be better able to integrate follow-on maneuver and sustainment brigades while not under the fire of North Korean long-range artillery. This factor supports the Division’s preparation for combat activities. Finally, I understand that force consolidation enhances warfighting capabilities by improving soldier quality of life, realization of stationing efficiencies, optimizes use of land in Korea, and enhances force protection and survivability.

HOST NATION BURDEN-SHARING PROGRAMS

Question. Two programs supported by the ROK, the Combined Defense Improvement Program and the Korea Host Nation Funded Construction Program, provide cash and in-kind projects to satisfy U.S. military facility and infrastructure requirements.

What is your assessment of the current level and quality of the burden-sharing arrangement?

Answer. I have been informed that since 1991, the ROK has made contributions toward the costs of stationing U.S. military forces on its territory. These contributions are known as cost sharing contributions, where cost sharing is defined as the cash and in-kind contributions allies make to help offset the costs of stationing U.S. forces on their territory. Over the years cost sharing arrangements between the ROK and U.S. have been established and specified in a series of special measures agreements that typically covered periods of time ranging from 1 to 3 years. On 15 January 2009, the ROK and U.S. signed a 5-year Special Measures Agreement (SMA) that specifies cost sharing arrangements during the 2009 through 2013 time period.

ROK SMA contributions are divided into three cost sharing categories: labor, logistics, and ROK Funded Construction (ROKFC). Labor contributions are used solely for the purpose of paying the salaries and benefits of USFK’s Korean national employees. Logistics support consists of in-kind support (logistics equipment, supplies, and services) to USFK from the ROK. Finally, ROKFC contributions support USFK’s military construction and military construction-like requirements. ROK cost sharing contributions help ensure that the Command maintains its fight tonight readiness and builds the infrastructure needed for a transformed U.S. military force presence in the ROK.

In addition to support provided through the SMA, the ROK makes other contributions toward the costs of stationing U.S. military forces on its territory that are outside the SMA framework. Support of this type includes items such as force protection outside USFK facilities, the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, improvements to infrastructure outside and around USFK facilities, use of ROK training areas, various fee exemptions, and other contributions. Unfortunately, the value of the non-SMA contributions is much more difficult to estimate, but in the past contributions of this type have been estimated to be valued in the range of hundreds of millions of dollars.

The current SMA expires at the end of 2013. Prior to 2013, the United States and ROK will engage in negotiations over a new SMA to specify cost sharing arrangements for the post-2013 time period. If confirmed, I will conduct an assessment on the level and adequacy of current cost sharing arrangements so that support can be given to U.S. goals and objectives during negotiations for a post-2013 SMA.

Question. What priorities would you establish, if confirmed, for U.S. forces in Korea to make the best use of these programs?

Answer. It is my understanding that USFK currently has a process in place to determine the appropriate distribution of ROK cost sharing contributions across the three cost sharing categories of labor, logistics, and ROK Funded Construction on an annual basis. If confirmed, I will review this process and make any needed changes to ensure that the contributions are being put to best use.

Question. The overwhelming majority of burden-sharing funds over the last 4 years has been used to carry out construction supporting the consolidation of forces at Camp Humphreys.

Do you believe this funding trend should be continued, or that funding should be spread to critical requirements at other U.S. bases in Korea?

Answer. ROK burden sharing (cost sharing) contributions are divided across three cost sharing categories: labor, logistics, and ROK Funded Construction (ROKFC). It is my understanding that USFK has a process in place to determine not only the appropriate distribution of cost sharing contribution across the three categories, but also the appropriate distribution within categories as well. Needs emanating from LPF requirements at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys are supported in the ROKFC account. During the 2009–2011 time period, the value of cost sharing contribution...
allocated to ROKFC averaged 40 percent of the total SMA contribution yearly. USFK conducts regular reviews of the ROKFC account to ensure that important and emergent military construction requirements are met. If confirmed, I will review the allocation of ROK cost sharing contribution across the ROKFC category to ensure that needs at Command facilities are being properly addressed.

TRAINING OF U.S. FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Question. In the past several years, as U.S. forces in Korea have drawn down and consolidated, home station training of both U.S. Army and Air Force units based on the Peninsula has emerged as a significant concern.

Do you believe there is sufficient availability and access to training ranges for large ground unit maneuver and fires, and for close air support missions and other Air Force operations?

Answer. As I understand it, the ground training requirements for U.S. forces in the ROK are currently being met. Expanded digital connectivity is being leveraged to combine live events in the field with virtual or simulation-driven events to maximize training opportunities at the tactical and operational levels. This might include linking events on and off the Korean Peninsula to both replicate the complexity of joint and combined warfare and to optimize use of available resources.

Access to air-to-ground training ranges in the ROK has increased in recent years due to refinements in range scheduling procedures. The command will need to continue unit deployments to other locations for the foreseeable future in order to maintain air crew qualifications with all types of ordnance and for electronic warfare. Additional arrangements must still be made with the ROK Government to further improve the level of range access.

Question. In your view, are the ranges in Korea adequate to meet the training requirements of U.S. forces?

Answer. I have been briefed that the current inventory for training ranges is sufficient to meet U.S. ground forces training requirements and maintain readiness. The United States is working closely with the ROK to improve the quality and availability of training ranges for our air component. Due to the ROK’s rapid economic growth, the relatively large scale of its military given the size of the country, environmental concerns, and competition between military and civic infrastructure, our Korean military partners work within the same limitations on range availability that U.S. forces face at home. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our ROK ally to modernize and fully utilize all available training facilities to ensure force readiness requirements are met.

TOUR NORMALIZATION IN SOUTH KOREA

Question. DOD is pursuing full tour normalization for U.S. military personnel assigned to the Korean Peninsula. Essentially, full tour normalization would lengthen service tours from predominantly 1 year, as is the case today, to 3 year tours for those accompanied by their families and 2 years for those who are unaccompanied. Completion of full tour normalization would result in about 12,000 U.S. military families in South Korea.

With the events of the past year on the Korean Peninsula and the likelihood that circumstances on the Peninsula will remain unpredictable for the foreseeable future, and considering that the costs of such a policy change have not yet been fully identified, do you believe that it is prudent to proceed with plans for full tour normalization and to significantly increase the number of U.S. families in South Korea? If so, why?

Answer. It is my understanding that one of the most important benefits of tour normalization is improved force readiness. Currently, about 85 percent of USFK servicemembers rotate each year, just as they have completed Korea specific training and the local exercise cycle. This limits the ability to achieve the same level of readiness enjoyed by American forces in the Continental United States, Europe, and other locations in the Pacific region. Conversely, as the proportion of trained military personnel in place with 3 year accompanied and 2 year unaccompanied tours increases, USFK will see benefits such as improved understanding of the region and operational environment, the strengthening of relations with our ROK ally, and enhanced ability to support the transition of Wartime Operational Control to the ROK. Simultaneously, USFK is in the process of relocating the majority of its forces in the ROK south of the capital city Seoul, thereby reducing the immediate threat to family members and simplifying the execution of noncombatant evacuation operations if such operations should ever become necessary. Non-combatant evacuation operation plans are exercised and practiced on a regular basis. Future hubs under the Command’s relocation initiative lie outside the effective range of North Korean
artillery. If confirmed, I will conduct a review of the tour normalization initiative, taking into account recent recommendations made by members of this committee.

Question. Since full tour normalization was not contemplated as part the either the LPP or YRP, what is your understanding of the total costs of full tour normalization and how do you believe it would be funded?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Secretary of Defense directed in September 2010 implementation of full tour normalization in Korea as affordable and according to no specific timeline. The Secretary further directed that a plan be provided to him on how to proceed with tour normalization no later than 31 March 2011. It is my further understanding that the Secretary of Defense is currently reviewing options to implement the tour normalization initiative and that his recommended course of action will be forwarded to the President as part of the fiscal year 2013 budget request.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. Through investment in quality of life amenities, to include housing, health care, and recreation, the Department has worked to achieve the goal of making South Korea an “assignment of choice” for U.S. Forces.

What do you consider to be the most essential quality of life programs for soldiers and their families stationed in Korea and, if confirmed, what would be your goals in this regard?

Answer. I believe the most essential quality of life programs for soldiers and their families serving in the ROK are access to quality living and working conditions and facilities, quality health care, and quality educational opportunities for dependents. If confirmed, I will advocate for and take actions to provide our soldiers and family members with the best possible living and working environment, health care services, and educational opportunities for dependent family members.

Question. What is your understanding of the capacity of DOD schools in South Korea to accommodate the increase in families/children associated with tour normalization?

Answer. My understanding is that USFK currently has 10 schools with the capacity of about 5,500 students. A number of these schools are scheduled to be replaced as part of the YRP, LPP, and the DOD Education Activity School Rebuilding Program. When these programs are completed, USFK will have the capacity to educate about 6,100 students. School capacity will need to increase to about 14,800 students in order to satisfy the projected demand required by full tour normalization.

MEDICAL CARE FOR U.S. FORCES IN KOREA

Question. One of the most important quality of life issues in Korea is ensuring access to high quality medical care for servicemembers of all military branches and their families. Separate medical chains of command responsible for providing health care, and the presence of non-command sponsored family members who need health services, among other factors, have presented challenges. One possible reform that has been proposed is to offer a TRICARE-like benefit to all family members and DOD employees, regardless of command sponsorship.

If confirmed, how would you assess the need for improvement in the management and delivery of health care services in South Korea?

Answer. Quality health care is essential for all servicemembers regardless of where they serve. However, this is even more important for our servicemembers stationed in the ROK, who are thousands of miles from home. I have been informed of the long history of excellent care provided by U.S. military treatment facilities in the ROK (Army and Air Force) as indicated by the most recent pinnacle surveys by the Joint Commission in 2010 that placed them among the top for patient care, patient safety, and overall performance for military installations. Furthermore, the advances in specialty care to include surgical care, imaging, and therapeutics of our host nation partners in the ROK is among the top in the world, with four of the institutions with whom USFK conducts business certifying in the Joint Commission International Surveys in the last 2 years. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor and assess the availability and quality of health care for our servicemembers, DOD civilian employees, and their families serving in the ROK.

Question. What is your view on whether or not the policy regarding medical support to noncommand sponsored family members should be reconsidered and revised by DOD?

Answer. It is my understanding that starting under previous USFK commanders and continuing through the present time, extraordinary strides have been made to ensure access and availability of the full range of services, entitlements, and privileges for noncommand sponsored family members and dependent family members
who reside with their military, DOD civilian, or invited contractor sponsor in the ROK. If confirmed, I will continue those efforts. I will also remain abreast of and weigh in on DOD policy adjustments that support adequate staffing and funding of U.S. military treatment facilities so that noncommand sponsored personnel can gain access at levels approaching that of command sponsored beneficiaries.

**SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE**

**Question.** DOD and the Military Services have developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However, numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in deployed areas as well as at home stations are still being reported. Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate treatment for the victim. They assert that commands fail to respond appropriately with basic medical services and with an adequate investigation of their charges, followed by a failure to hold assailants accountable.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

**Answer.** First and foremost, one sexual assault in our ranks is too many and significantly affects the morale and readiness of our units and personnel. We are working to eliminate these crimes from our formations. The current Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) policies and procedures are effective and will continue to improve as we transition to the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) program, especially for the confidential (restricted) cases. Over the next 27 months, the SHARP program is expected to be fully functional with trained, full time professionals to educate, respond, and assist in the reduction and elimination of this terrible crime.

**Question.** What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which confidential reporting procedures have been put into operation?

**Answer.** Confidential (restricted) reporting is critical to empowering victims of these traumatic crimes. It provides them with confidential reporters such as Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC), Victim Advocate, Chaplain, and/or Medical Provider to privately discuss the details and aid in their recovery. The challenge is when a non-confidential reporter such as a concerned roommate, friend, parent, Equal Opportunity Advisor, or bystander is informed of the incident and attempts to provide assistance and reports it, then the victim’s confidentiality is lost and the case automatically becomes an Unrestricted case. This is when the victims may consider themselves “revictimized” and forced to relive the assault. We must continue to encourage reporting, support victims of sexual assault, and ensure commanders can take appropriate actions as required to maintain good order and discipline.

**Question.** What is your view of the policies and procedures in place to prevent and respond to sexual assaults, including assaults against contractor personnel?

**Answer.** The Army has sound policies and procedures in place to prevent and respond to sexual assaults. Annually all soldiers are required to take Awareness and Prevention Training. Every sexual assault victim regardless of duty status is treated with dignity and respect, receives immediate medical care and victim advocate services. If the victim is a contractor then the case is transitioned to the contractor’s medical, victim advocate, and investigative staff unless the company does not possess these services then the Army provides the necessary care for the victim.

**Question.** What is your view of the adequate of the training and resources in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

**Answer.** Our Criminal Investigation Division (CID), special sexual assault investigators and prosecutors are well-trained and do an outstanding job investigating and responding to every allegation of sexual assault.

**Question.** What is your view of the willingness and ability of the commanders to hold assailants accountable for their acts?

**Answer.** Commanders understand their roles as commanders and judicial officials under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I am confident commanders exercise those authorities and responsibilities. Each case requires investigation, examination of the evidence, appropriate advice from experts, and decisions by the commander. I trust commanders to make their best judgment in each case, and am not aware of any reluctance to make the hard decisions when required.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults and to hold assailants accountable for their actions?
Answer. I am a strong supporter of the Army’s “I. A.M. Strong” campaign which directs all personnel to Intervene, Act, and Motivate each other to prevent sexual assaults. In addition, I will ensure the command has the required number of trained SARC/SHARP, Medical, CID, and Chaplain personnel to provide ample prevention training to units and responsive care to all victims. These actions support the CSA’s desire for a cultural change in our Army and lead the attack on sexual assaults in our Nation.

**HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY**

**Question.** The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010”, enacted on December 22, 2010, provides for the repeal of the current DOD policy concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces, to be effective 60 days after the Secretary of Defense has received the DOD’s comprehensive review on the implementation of such repeal, and the President, Secretary, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the congressional defense committees that they have considered the report and proposed plan of action, that DOD has prepared the necessary policies and regulations to exercise the discretion provided by such repeal, and that implementation of such policies and regulations is consistent with the standards of military readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion, and military recruiting and retention.

What is your view on repealing the current DOD policy?

Answer. This is a policy change that we can make successfully. I believe that the great soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines can and will accommodate such a significant change. The American people have spoken on this subject through their elected officials, and the result is the law that we currently have and the new policy we are deliberately preparing to implement. An important part of this process is to engage our men and women in uniform and their families. The Services’ chain-teaching programs facilitate thoughtful, constructive dialogue on the subject between leaders and servicemembers. Ultimately, I am confident we will continue to have an outstanding military ready and able to serve and meet the needs of the Nation.

**Question.** If confirmed, do you foresee any problems with implementing a repeal of the policy commonly referred to as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in the ROK and USFK, if the President, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs make the required certification to Congress?

Answer. If confirmed, I will implement repeal of the policy commonly referred to as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” as directed. I have completed the DOD policy repeal training.

**PREVENTION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING**

**Question.** Following media reports connecting prostitution and human trafficking in Korea to U.S. military forces, Commander, USFK, in 2004 instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding the illegal activities of prostitution and human trafficking. Under this policy, all USFK personnel, military and civilian, as well as contractors and their employees, are expected to comply with prohibitions, including observance of curfews and laws regarding off-limits areas and establishments, aimed at curtailing these practices.

What effects have changes in U.S. policy, as well as new criminal laws implemented by the ROK, had on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking in Korea?

Answer. It is my understanding that USFK has a zero tolerance policy regarding the illegal acts of prostitution and human trafficking. The command’s policy is built upon a four-prong strategy of awareness, identification, reduction, and enforcement. Awareness is established and increased through improved education such as mandatory prostitution and human trafficking training for all USFK personnel. Identification involves the recognition of indicators that an establishment may be participating in prostitution and human trafficking activities and the procedures to assist victims. Reduction occurs through constant Command presence and efforts to increase alternative activities available for servicemembers to participate in. Finally, the Command pursues aggressive enforcement on illegal establishments and offenders. Additionally, USFK regulation requires all incoming personnel to be briefed on the Command’s policy towards prostitution and human trafficking, establishments and areas that have been placed off-limits, and on individual conduct and values. As a result of this policy and related actions, there has been a steady decrease in the number of reports of prostitution and human trafficking and the awareness of Command personnel on this important issue has increased. I fully support the Command’s current policy of awareness, identification, reduction, and enforcement, and will continue—and improve upon if necessary—this approach if confirmed.
Question. What further changes, if any, to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and military regulations are needed in your judgment to ensure maximum effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?

Answer. I know of no changes needed to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and military regulations. If confirmed, I will continue to be alert of the need for any changes.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to further enhance the effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the Command’s existing policy of awareness, identification, reduction, and enforcement, and make efforts to sustain and build upon the success achieved to date.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

1. Senator LIEBERMAN. General Thurman, I note that in response to an advance policy question submitted to you by this committee, you stated that “the U.S. must maintain its nuclear deterrence capability and continue extended deterrence for the Republic of Korea (ROK) until such time as North Korea verifiably dismantles its nuclear program.” I would appreciate it if you would expand upon this response, as I am concerned it does not fully reflect U.S. policy on extended deterrence for the ROK. For example, in a joint communique by the U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting issued on October 8, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates “reaffirmed the continued U.S. commitment to provide and strengthen extended deterrence for the ROK, using the full range of military capabilities, to include the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities,” without linking that commitment to the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program. I thank you again for undertaking this important assignment, and look forward to your response to this question.

General THURMAN. I fully support current U.S. policy on extended deterrence for the ROK. Specifically, that the United States will use the full range of military capabilities to include the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities, without linking the duration of that commitment to dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. This policy has been established in several Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiques as well as in the June 2009 Joint Vision of the U.S. and ROK Alliance. My intention was not to limit U.S. extended deterrence policy for the ROK in my response to the advanced policy question.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

KOREAN REALIGNMENT

2. Senator McCain, General Thurman, do you agree with the conclusion of Senator Levin, Senator Webb, and myself that a period of review and reassessment is needed to determine whether the base realignment plan in Korea is still the right plan?

General Thurman. I am fully aware of your concerns regarding the Command’s base relocation plans. My top priority is to review the relocation program in order to address the concerns that have been raised.

3. Senator McCain. General Thurman, what is your understanding of the cost of this current plan?

General Thurman. It is my understanding that total costs for the Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land Partnership Plan will be about $12 billion.

4. Senator McCain. General Thurman, what do you consider to be the benefits of current planning for base realignment?

General Thurman. It is my understanding that the relocation plans were developed to address several problems associated with the existing basing arrangement. These problems included civilian encroachment, non-optimal base locations for the conduct of operations today, and declining servicemember quality of life due to aging and deteriorating facilities. I have been briefed that the relocation initiatives will improve warfighting capabilities by: colocating 2nd Infantry Division to and the U.S. Korea Command, enhancing coordination, planning, and command and control; reducing 2nd Infantry Division’s span of control and support infrastructure needs; improving tactical flexibility by better positioning 2nd Infantry Division for rapid support of either of the forward stationed ROK armies and corps; and shortening logistical lines during the initial phase of a conflict. In addition to improving these warfighting capabilities, the relocation initiatives will also enhance force protection and survivability by moving personnel and equipment outside tactical effective range of North Korean long-range artillery and improve the ability to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations. I have been told that once completed, relocation will create stationing efficiencies and optimize the Command’s use of land in the ROK. Servicemember quality of life will be improved through the construction of new and modern facilities.

DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY UNITS FROM KOREA

5. Senator McCain. General Thurman, in your answers to the committee’s advance policy questions, you stated that the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Command’s transformation initiatives as currently structured “will create the opportunity for U.S. forces stationed in the ROK to become available for use in regional exercises, engagement, and global operations.” GAO completed a report last month that questioned the cost effectiveness of the tour normalization plan and whether Army families would consider it an improvement in quality of life if soldiers assigned to South Korea would be required to deploy to other regions. Is the extended deployment of U.S. combat forces away from Korea consistent with the guidelines contained in the U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation agreement and the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan?

General Thurman. The deployment of U.S. forces off the Korean Peninsula appears to be consistent with mutually agreed upon documents between the United States and ROK. For example, the June 2009 Joint Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance states that the two countries are building a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope, adding that the ROK will take the lead role in combined defense of Korea supported by an enduring U.S. military force presence on the Korean Peninsula, in the region, and beyond. The Joint Vision further notes that the United States and ROK will work closely to address the global challenges of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and piracy, enhancing bilateral coordination on the conduct of peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilization operations.

It is my understanding that the deployment of U.S. forces off the Korean Peninsula is consistent with the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan. Similarly, the October 2010 Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation recognize the importance of close bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global peace and stability. With this recognition in mind, the guidelines list measures that will be taken to strengthen the Alliance’s role in enhancing regional and global security. These measures are: strengthening capabilities to contribute to regional and global peace and stability;
supporting the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related materials, technologies, and their means of delivery; enhancing bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral defense relationships; strengthening cooperation for international security and peacekeeping efforts; and cooperating closely on other transnational and non-traditional security challenges. The defense guidelines recognize the importance of close policy and strategic consultation between the United States and ROK for the enhancement of common interests and further development of the Alliance. It should be noted, however, that U.S. commitment to ROK security remains strong and the focus should always be placed on maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

6. Senator McCain. General Thurman, if confirmed, will you be comfortable with allowing a portion of the approximately 28,000 U.S. forces under your command to be deployed to other regions of the world for up to a year while leaving their families in Korea?

General Thurman. It is my understanding that USFK’s current transformation initiatives will create the opportunity for U.S. forces stationed in the ROK to become available for use in regional exercises, engagement, and global operations. Making these forces available for activities such as this appears to support objectives established in the June 2009 Joint Vision for the U.S. and ROK Alliance. It is my intention to conduct a careful and thorough review of the opportunities and timing for U.S. forces stationed in Korea to be employed toward the support of regional exercises, engagement, and global operations, as well as the effect such employment would have on security of the Korean Peninsula and military families.

7. Senator McCain. General Thurman, how is the participation of USFK forces in the Army’s force generation process consistent with the U.S. goal to deter or defeat aggression should it occur?

General Thurman. It is my intention to conduct a careful and thorough review of the effects deploying U.S. forces stationed in the ROK to regional exercises and global operations will have on deterring and defeating aggression directed at the ROK. Our primary focus must remain defense of the ROK.

8. Senator McCain. General Thurman, could a deployment of a sizeable number of U.S. forces away from Korea for a year act as a destabilizing event?

General Thurman. The primary focus of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK must be the deterrence of aggression against the ROK and, should deterrence fail, defeat of that aggression. My intention is to conduct a careful and thorough review of the prospect for employing military forces assigned to USFK toward the support of regional exercises and global operations and the effect such employment would have on security of the Korean Peninsula.

9. Senator McCain. General Thurman, how would such deployments be seen by our ROK allies?

General Thurman. Through documents such as the June 2009 Joint Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and October 2010 Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation, the ROK has committed itself to working with the United States to address the global challenges of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, and enhance bilateral coordination on the conduct of peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilization operations. The ROK has also committed itself to cooperate with the United States toward the promotion of regional and global peace and stability. Thus, there are bilateral agreements between the United States and ROK that suggests the latter’s openness to the deployment of USFK forces to operations off the Korean Peninsula. With that being said, my intention is to conduct a careful and thorough review of the prospect for employing USFK forces toward the support of regional exercises and global operations.

TOUR NORMALIZATION IN KOREA

10. Senator McCain. General Thurman, it has long been a goal of commanders of USFK to change from year-long, unaccompanied tours for most soldiers assigned to duty in South Korea to a normalized tour of 3 years, accompanied by dependents. However, the costs of carrying out this plan are very high. Building the required family housing, Department of Defense (DOD) schools, medical facilities, and so on represent an investment that the Army may not be able afford. What is your view of the feasibility of the current planning in this regard?
General Thurman. It is my understanding that the Secretary of Defense directed in September 2010 implementation of full tour normalization in Korea as affordable and according to no specific timeline. The Secretary further directed that a plan be provided on how to proceed with tour normalization no later than 31 March 2011. It is my further understanding that the Secretary of Defense is currently reviewing options to implement the tour normalization initiative. A top priority of mine now is to review the tour normalization initiative along with the appropriate stakeholders.

11. Senator McCain. General Thurman, do you support the proposal to increase the Overseas Housing Cost of Living Allowance to $5,000 a month, per soldier, to pay for family housing?

General Thurman. It is my understanding that the projected monthly Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA) under the Humphreys Housing Opportunity Program (HHOP) will be initially set at $4,200. The HHOP OHA will be a special rate for HHOP units only. I also understand that establishing the OHA rate requires joint approval by the Secretary of the Army and Chairman of the Per Diem and Entitlements Committee who works within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). The Secretary of the Army approved the rate establishment on 29 March 2011 and forwarded the request to the Chairman of the Per Diem Committee for action. It is my understanding that the request is still within the Office of Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). A top priority of mine in the near-term will be a review of the Command’s transformation program as a whole in order to address concerns that have been raised by Congress.

12. Senator McCain. General Thurman, what is your understanding of the current position of Army leadership on this issue?

General Thurman. It is my understanding that the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review stated that the Defense Department’s long-term goal is to phase out all unaccompanied tours in Korea. Later that year, in September 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed the implementation of full tour normalization in the ROK as affordable and according to no specific timeline. It is also my understanding that the Secretary of Defense is currently reviewing options to implement the tour normalization initiative. A top priority of mine is to review the tour normalization initiative with all key stakeholders, to include Department of Army leadership.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

NORTH KOREA

13. Senator Inhofe. General Thurman, how does the shifting of U.S. forces impact the United Nations’ readiness for deterring or repelling North Korean attacks?

General Thurman. I have been briefed that the Command is currently implementing a relocation program under the Land Partnership Plan and Yongsan Relocation Plan. These plans were developed to address several problems associated with the existing basing arrangement. These problems included civilian encroachment, non-optimal base locations for the conduct of operations today, and declining servicemember quality of life due to aging and deteriorating facilities. I have been further briefed that the relocation initiatives will improve warfighting capabilities by: co-locating 2nd Infantry Division and the future U.S. Korea Command, enhancing coordination, planning, and command and control; reducing 2nd Infantry Division’s span of control and support infrastructure needs; improving tactical flexibility by better positioning 2nd Infantry Division for rapid support of either of the forward stationed ROK armies and corps; and shortening logistical lines during the initial phase of a conflict. In addition to improving these warfighting capabilities, the relocation initiatives will also enhance force protection and survivability by moving personnel and equipment outside tactical effective range of North Korean long-range artillery and improve the ability to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations. A top priority of mine is to review the relocation program underway in the ROK to ensure that the Command maintains its “fight tonight” readiness.

14. Senator Inhofe. General Thurman, are U.S. forces in Korea receiving all the equipment they need to fight and win on the peninsula?

General Thurman. [Deleted.]

15. Senator Inhofe. General Thurman, how will the military construction that USFK is requesting contribute to that readiness?
General Thurman. I have been briefed that USFK has requested three military construction projects for fiscal year 2012. These three projects are: construction of a barracks complex at Camp Henry (Army); construction of a barracks complex at Camp Carroll (Army); and construction of a dormitory at Osan Air Base (Air Force). The two Army projects are needed so that unaccompanied soldiers can live in barracks that comply with new Army standards for security, space, and privacy. Current facilities are inadequate and adversely affect soldiers’ quality of life and morale. The Air Force dormitory will eliminate a deficiency in unaccompanied personnel housing and improve quality of life for enlisted personnel. Taken as a whole, it is my understanding that these three projects will improve soldier quality of life, morale, and thus, combat readiness.

16. Senator Inhofe. General Thurman, how does the normalization of tours from 1 year tours to 3 year tours affect our readiness?

General Thurman. I have been briefed that the tour normalization initiative will improve force readiness. Currently, about 85 percent of USFK servicemembers rotate each year, just as they have completed Korea specific training and the local exercise cycle. This limits the ability to achieve the same level of readiness enjoyed by American forces in the Continental United States, Europe, and other locations in the Pacific region. Conversely, as the proportion of trained military personnel increase with 3 year accompanied and 2 year unaccompanied tours increases, USFK will see benefits such as improved understanding of the region and operational environment, the strengthening of relations with our ROK ally, and enhanced ability to support the transition of Wartime Operational Control to the ROK. One of my top priorities upon arrival in the ROK is to conduct a review of the tour normalization initiative and how it will affect combat readiness.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS

17. Senator Inhofe. General Thurman, our military-to-military (1206), civilian-to-civilian (1207), small-scale special operations (1208), Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), and Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (CCIF) have been incredibly successful in aiding developing nations, fighting terrorism, and providing resources for emergency situations. My belief is that the key to these programs has been the combined efforts of DOD, DOS, the chiefs of mission, and combatant commanders working together to increase the capabilities of our partner nations to provide for their own security, increasing stability in their region and around the globe. What value do these funds provide in your prospective areas of responsibility?

General Thurman. In DOD, offices that play a role in management and execution of the programs identified in the question above are the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and combatant commands. As a subunified command, it is my understanding that the USFK Commander does not participate in the operation of these programs. Thus, I will have to defer to others on this question.

18. Senator Inhofe. General Thurman, do you have any concerns about being able to effectively execute these programs in your prospective areas of responsibility?

General Thurman. As a subunified command, it is my understanding that the USFK Commander does not participate in the operation of these programs. That being said, it should be noted that by working on a daily basis with Korean counterparts to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, USFK operates a robust engagement program with the ROK. This daily engagement is supplemented by USFK’s Good Neighbor program. Under this program, a host of activities are conducted that engage and connect the Command with the local Korean community. Good Neighbor events educate, inform, and familiarize Koreans with the mission and purpose of USFK. This direct engagement allows Americans and Koreans to develop mutual understanding of one another’s cultures, customs, and lifestyles, often leading to the formation of lifelong friendships between members of the two communities. Examples of events conducted by the Good Neighbor program include English-language camps, speaking engagements by U.S. military personnel, and tours of the Joint Security Area/Demilitarized Zone and USFK installations. The program promotes two-way exchange between USFK personnel and people of the ROK. The program helps foster exchange, understanding, and cooperation between members of USFK and the Korean communities that exist beside USFK facilities. All of these events strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance at both the professional and personal levels.
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

GLOBAL HAWK

19. Senator WICKER. General Thurman, by sharing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) responsibility with our coalition partners, I understand U.S. forces will realize a four-fold improvement in coverage over the Korean peninsula beyond Guam-based U.S. Air Force Global Hawk assets alone. I also understand USFK will have direct access to ISR data coming off a Korean Global Hawk, and U.S. and Korean intelligence analysts will continue to work side-by-side with Global Hawk data as they do today with U-2 data. Can you elaborate on the positive impact ROK acquisition of unmanned aircraft system platforms such as Global Hawk will have on American and ROK warfighters?

General THURMAN. ROK Global Hawk systems will dramatically increase our collection capacity. It means sustained collection for days and weeks at a time in crises or combat operations. Our goal is to distribute Global Hawk data creating new opportunities for existing exploiters and surge capacity in times of crises. Global Hawk in Korea provides the means to launch and recover U.S. platforms operating in the region. It provides greater capacity for Indications and Warning. Global Hawk can range the entire peninsula without risks to aircrews from air defense systems. In the hands of our allies, Global Hawk is a force multiplier on the peninsula and throughout the region.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

PATRIOT PAC–3 AND GUIDANCE ENHANCED MISSILES

20. Senator AYOTTE. General Thurman, in your responses to the advance policy questions, you state that the U.S. Patriot forces stationed in South Korea have not received the designated number of Patriot PAC–3 and Guidance Enhanced Missiles as per the Secretary of Defense’s 2008 guidance. Why hasn’t the designated number of munitions been provided yet to our troops in South Korea?

General THURMAN. [Deleted.]

21. Senator AYOTTE. General Thurman, has there been a subsequent policy decision to not provide these missiles to our forces in South Korea or is there a lack of capacity in the industrial base?

General THURMAN. No. However, the Joint Capabilities Mix II—and now III—studies show that there are not enough missile defense assets in the world to keep up with the growing threats. The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review acknowledges this fact and describes methods and suggestions to deal with this to include burden sharing with our allies and ensuring that the missile defense fight is a joint capabilities fight using assets and capabilities from all Services to negate and defeat the multiple and diverse tactical ballistic missile threats.

[NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
May 4, 2011.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General

GEN James D. Thurman, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of GEN James D. Thurman, USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA
Source of commissioned service: ROTC.

Educational degrees:
East Central University—BA—History
Webster University—MA—Management

Military schools attended:
Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
U.S. Army War College

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
<th>Promotions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Jun 75</td>
<td>2LT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jun 77</td>
<td>1LT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Nov 79</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan 86</td>
<td>LTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr 91</td>
<td>COL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sep 95</td>
<td>BG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan 00</td>
<td>MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan 03</td>
<td>LTG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jan 07</td>
<td>GEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Jun 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major duty assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 75 ....</td>
<td>Dec 75</td>
<td>Platoon Leader, A Company, 6th Battalion, 32d Armor, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 75 ....</td>
<td>Sep 77</td>
<td>Platoon Leader, Combat Support Company, later Executive Officer, C Company, 6th Battalion, 32d Armor, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 77 ....</td>
<td>Dec 77</td>
<td>Motor Officer, 6th Battalion, 32d Armor, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 78 ....</td>
<td>Jan 81</td>
<td>Student, Officer Rotary Wing Aviator Course, U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 81 ....</td>
<td>Sep 81</td>
<td>Assistant S-3 (Operations), 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 81 ....</td>
<td>May 82</td>
<td>Student, Armor Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army School, Fort Knox, KY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 82 ....</td>
<td>May 84</td>
<td>S-3 (Operations), Combat Aviation Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 84 ....</td>
<td>May 85</td>
<td>Commander, B Troop, 11th Combat Aviation Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 85 ....</td>
<td>Jun 86</td>
<td>Commander, 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 86 ....</td>
<td>Feb 87</td>
<td>S-3 (Operations), Apache Training Brigade, Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 87 ....</td>
<td>Jun 87</td>
<td>Student, AH-64 Aviator Qualification Course, U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 87 ....</td>
<td>Jun 88</td>
<td>S-3 (Operations), Apache Training Brigade, Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 88 ....</td>
<td>Dec 89</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 3d Squadron, 6th Cavalry Brigade, Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 89 ....</td>
<td>Jun 91</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 32d Armor, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX and Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 91 ....</td>
<td>Apr 92</td>
<td>Commander, 3d Battalion, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 92 ....</td>
<td>Dec 93</td>
<td>Commander, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 94 ....</td>
<td>Jun 95</td>
<td>Student, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 95 ....</td>
<td>Jun 97</td>
<td>Commander, 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 97 ....</td>
<td>Jan 99</td>
<td>Commander, Operations Group, U.S. Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 99 ....</td>
<td>Jun 00</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans and Policy Division, Allied Forces Southern Europe, Regional Command South, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 00 ....</td>
<td>Aug 02</td>
<td>Commanding General, National Training Center and Fort Irwin, Fort Irwin, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 02 ....</td>
<td>Sep 03</td>
<td>Director of Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army, and Chief, Operations, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 03 ....</td>
<td>May 04</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army with duty as Director, Army Aviation Task Force, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 04 ....</td>
<td>Dec 05</td>
<td>Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From</td>
<td>To</td>
<td>Assignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 05</td>
<td>Nov 06</td>
<td>Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)/Commanding General, Multi National Division-Baghdad, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 06</td>
<td>Jan 07</td>
<td>Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 07</td>
<td>Aug 07</td>
<td>Commanding General, V Corps, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 07</td>
<td>Apr 10</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army, Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 10</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of joint assignments:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 99–Jun 00</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of operations assignments:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec 89–Jun 91</td>
<td>Major/Lieutenant Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 02–Sep 03</td>
<td>Brigadier General/Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 05–Nov 06</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**U.S. decorations and badges:**

- Distinguished Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Meritorious Service Medal (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Commendation Medal
- Army Achievement Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Combat Action Badge
- Parachutist Badge
- Senior Army Aviator Badge
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
- Army Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN James D. Thurman, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   James D. Thurman.

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:
   May 4, 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   September 19, 1953: Gainesville, TX.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
   Married to Delia L. (Hilton) Thurman.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Jamie C. (Thurman) Brown, age 34.
   Carey L. (Thurman) Thomas, age 32.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Association of the U.S. Army.
    Army Aviation Association of America.
    American Legion.
    Military Officer Association of America.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    In 2005, I received the Robert M. Leich Award from the Army Association of America for outstanding service to Army Aviation.
12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
   Yes.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
   Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

JAMES D. THURMAN.

This 13th day of February, 2011.

[The nomination of GEN James D. Thurman, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 29, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2011.]

Questions and Responses

**Defense Reforms**

**Question.** The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and subsequent reforms related to Special Operations Forces (SOF) have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

**Answer.** Yes. Goldwater-Nichols did not meaningfully affect the Service manpower/personnel, acquisition, readiness reporting, training or other processes. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), in its daily interaction with all Services, must often address each issue in four different ways.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

**Answer.** SOCOM needs greater personnel management authority to shape mid- and senior-grade SOF operators to meet SOCOM defined requirements. Promotions, selection for command, selection for advanced educational opportunities, foreign language testing policy, and foreign language proficiency bonus payment policy all differ significantly by Service and are all primarily crafted to support Service needs.

**Question.** Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** From the perspective you have gained in your previous assignments, do you believe that the authority and responsibility of the combatant commanders, in general, and the Commander, SOCOM, in particular, are appropriate?

**Answer.** Yes, I believe the combatant commanders generally have appropriate authorities. As the Commander of SOCOM, I would seek to clarify the responsibilities
Geographic Combatant Commanders have for supporting their assigned Theater SOCOMs.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. By experience, training and education I have what is needed to lead this extraordinary force now and into the future. I have commanded at every level within the special operations community, including assignments as Commander Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and Deputy Commanding General for Operations at JSOC. My service in top leadership positions at both Service and joint headquarters has prepared me to operate at the senior levels of government, including as Director for Strategic Planning in the Office of Combating Terrorism on the National Security Council Staff. As Commander U.S. Special Operations Command-Europe, I gained valuable experience and built useful relationships with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and international special operations partners. I also established the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander of SOCOM to the following offices:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Secretary of Defense is the SOCOM Commander’s next superior command authority in the chain of command, as your introductory paragraph stated. If confirmed, I will look to the Secretary of Defense for operational authority to deploy and employ SOF as well as Department-level direction in the prioritization and accomplishment of the SOCOM mission. The SOCOM Commander owes the Secretary of Defense the commander’s best military advice on all aspects of recruiting, training, equipping, managing and employing SOF in support of his, and the President’s, national security objectives.

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The SOCOM Commander coordinates activities through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the senior military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is essential in communicating SOF capabilities and requirements to the President and Secretary of Defense. Coordination of SOCOM activities ensures that the Chairman remains fully informed in support of his responsibilities and for coordination of SOCOM staff and the Joint Staff efforts to meet Presidential and Secretary of Defense directed taskings.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).

Answer. The USD(P) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy. The USD(P) develops, coordinates and oversees the implementation of a wide variety of Department policy, including matters related to planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of special operations activities, including civil affairs and psychological operations, and of low-intensity conflict activities, including counter-terrorism, support to insurgency, and contingency operations. USD(P) also exercises authority, direction and control over the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC/IC)) who is responsible for overall supervision of special operations activities. If confirmed, I will work closely with USD(P) to ensure SOCOM activities are closely aligned with Department policies.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)).

Answer. The USD(I) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with USD(I), particularly to ensure the intelligence requirements of SOF in the field are met.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).

Answer. The USD(AT&L) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to the DOD Acquisition System, including procurement; research, development, test and evaluation; military construction; and
nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs. If confirmed, I will closely coordinate SOCOM acquisition activities with USD(AT&L) to ensure SOCOM procurement efforts are closely aligned with Department procurement processes and priorities.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC/IC)).

**Answer.** The ASD(SO/LIC/IC) is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on special operations matters. The principal duty of the ASD(SO/LIC/IC) is the overall supervision of special operations activities within the Department of Defense (DOD), including SOCOM. As I state in subsequent responses, the SOCOM Commander works closely with ASD(SO/LIC/IC) in the execution of his “Service-like” authorities under 10 U.S.C. section 167.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Assistant Secretary, and with U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Africa Command, to ensure the effective employment of SOF capability in support of national security objectives in the Europe, the Middle East and Africa. I am particularly interested in developing an enduring relationship with the newly established NATO SOF Headquarters, and look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary in developing policies in support of NATO SOF Headquarters.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Assistant Secretary, and with U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), to ensure the effective employment of SOF capability in support of national security objectives in the Asian and Pacific regions.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Assistant Secretary in developing SOCOM’s role in Homeland Defense, and in support of civil authorities, to determine the special operations support necessary to protect the United States and its citizens during domestic emergencies.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary in support of his efforts to develop policy on countering weapons of mass destruction and cyber security issues, two areas of abiding interest for SOF.

**Question.** The Service Secretaries.

**Answer.** The SOCOM Commander’s authority over the Service components, and those forces assigned to him, is clear in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but requires close coordination with the Service Secretaries to ensure that SOCOM does not intrude upon each Service Secretary’s legal responsibilities. Close coordination between the SOCOM Commander and each of the Service Secretaries is also essential to gaining and maintaining the Services’ support of SOF with support units from the general purpose forces and with service-common materiel.

**Question.** The Service Chiefs.

**Answer.** Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, the SOCOM Commander cannot ensure the preparedness of his assigned forces to execute his assigned missions. The Joint Chiefs are also a source of experience and judgment that every combatant commander may call upon. If confirmed, I will continue a full and frank dialog with the Service Chiefs.

**Question.** The other combatant commanders.

**Answer.** Successive SOCOM Commanders have fostered an atmosphere of teamwork and trust in their relationships with the combatant commanders. These relationships have only strengthened over the last 10 years, and certainly since SOCOM has been responsible for synchronizing counterterrorist operations after September 11. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the other Combatant Commanders to achieve our common objectives against transnational terrorist threats and violent extremist organizations.

**Question.** The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.

**Answer.** SOCOM is actively engaged in support of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and has been since it was established after September 11. SOCOM also relies upon NCTC estimates and reports in the refinement and synchronization of counterterrorist operations, and will continue to assist NCTC to achieve our common objectives against transnational terrorist threats and violent extremist organizations.

**Question.** The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

**Answer.** SOCOM and its subordinate elements are consumers of CIA products and analysis. If confirmed, I will ensure that SOCOM continues to develop interoperable
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander of SOCOM?

Answer. I believe Admiral Olson, in his 2011 Posture Statement, clearly laid out the major challenges that will confront the next Commander of SOCOM. These seven major challenges are discussed individually below (not necessarily in priority order) and I have laid out what I believe are each of their main drivers.

1. Carefully and deliberately meet the ever-increasing demand for SOF.

The SOF community has seen these challenges take shape over the last several years, and I see these same challenges continuing as SOF remain a first choice for many military operations.

First, we must carefully and deliberately meet the ever-increasing demand for SOF. Since September 11, SOF manpower has roughly doubled, the budget has roughly tripled, and the overseas deployments have quadrupled. Demand is outpacing supply, but we cannot grow more than 3–5 percent every year without compromising the quality of the force. Simply stated, more SOF cannot be created overnight. Our “new normal” is a persistently engaged, forward-based force to prevent and deter conflict and, when needed, act to disrupt and defeat threats. Long-term engagement is a hedge against crises that require major intervention and engagement positions us to better sense the environment and act decisively when necessary. The “new normal,” however, translates into increased demand for SOF. The pace of the last 10 years is indicative of what we expect for the next 10 years.

2. Improve and expand our tactical and operational level skills, equipment, and systems.

The strategic challenges facing our Nation are numerous and many may not be foreseen. Virtually all will continue to emanate from the incredibly dynamic and increasingly complex global environment. The next SOCOM Commander will be challenged to ensure our special operators are properly trained and equipped to fulfill the high degree of expectations the Nation places on our special operators. They must excel under the most demanding conditions while accomplishing some of the most difficult and sensitive tasks regardless of the environment or the difficulty.

Our special operators are supported by technology, mobility and communications systems that allow SOF to share information, rapidly move, tactically maneuver, and strategically influence the environment—whether via direct strike or indirect means. Our technology edge needs to be maintained to retain the capability to execute our missions.

3. Preserve our proposed budget levels and authorities.

Managing and preserving SOCOM’s Major Force Program-11 (MFP–11) funding within the current and future budget discussions is perhaps the major challenge facing the next SOCOM Commander. At the forefront of this challenge is acknowledging that many of the current expenditures are funded by Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. The Department has made a commitment to phase the OCO funding into SOCOM’s baseline requirement, but the command will continue to rely on OCO funding over the next few years as the phased transfer to the base budget occurs. The next SOCOM Commander must acknowledge our Nation’s current fiscal condition will focus attention on the Department thus creating the challenge to preserving the baseline for MFP–11. The current and future demand for SOF capabilities and foundational activities will exceed force deployment capacity. SOCOM infrastructure and readiness accounts have not kept pace with SOF growth or demand. Current operations will pressure future development and limit required modernization and recapitalization efforts. While the new baseline budget will be questioned, the new SOCOM commander will be challenged to deliver the required capabilities in a fiscally constrained environment knowing the budget without OCO transition does not fully resource the command.

Part of this major challenge includes monitoring and understanding the stress the Service budgets are facing and the impact it will have on their ability to meet established and future SOCOM requirements for forces, capabilities and platforms. Operationally important Service provided capabilities that enable SOF success in the field will be stressed and potentially unfunded. MFP–11 is used to address “SOF-peculiar” requirements; it cannot be used to deliver these basic building blocks or to generate new SOF capabilities to cover for fiscally limited service-provided capabilities.

4. Find better structures and processes to obtain Service-provided capabilities.
With SOF growth constrained to 3–5 percent annually, effectively meeting the growing demand for our force can only be met through the commitment of the Military Services to attach supporting and enabling forces at a commensurate rate. It is a “SOF Truth” that most SOF operations require non-SOF support. This is true for the acquisition process, personnel policies, and the preparation and execution of the full range of SOF operations.

5. Continue to improve our acquisition speed and agility.

“More” is not always the best answer and should not be the first answer. The speed and agility of SOCOM acquisition authority is achieved through Title 10 authority, its own budget line from Congress in the appropriation process, and being chartered to purchase non-mainstream military equipment, also known as special operations peculiar equipment procured using MPF–11. MPF–11 grants SOCOM the authority to purchase equipment, material, services, and supplies required for special operations mission support for which there is no conventional service requirement.

6. Better understand the people and conditions in the places we go, whether to assist or fight.

One of the Command’s top challenges is to better understand the people and conditions in the places we go, whether to assist or fight. Indeed, understanding the operational context of the environments in which we operate is a hallmark of SOF. Our complex, dynamic world presents ambiguous problems that challenge our Nation’s national security and interests, SOCOM’s strategic appreciation of these challenges stresses the importance of deeper knowledge of micro-regional geography, history, languages, religions, cultures and traditions, to enable SOF to conduct its activities with more predictable outcomes.

Developing this deep experience and high level of knowledge requires cultivating an agile intellectual posture within our force and maintaining persistent presence with partners and populations in diverse locations around the globe.

7. As our most solemn duty, look after the health and well-being of this magnificent force from whom we ask so much.

As the Commander, I would consider it my responsibility to ensure we are doing the most we can to support our teams and families in recognition of the vital role they play in our national security—there is no greater responsibility.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer.

1. Carefully and deliberately meet the ever-increasing demand for SOF.

I see the need to maintain the maximum growth rate of 3 to 5 percent per year. I also see the need to match this growth and the SOF demand with commensurate levels of Military Services’ provided capabilities that enable SOF to accomplish its mission. We were designed to rely on the Services to meet most of our combat support and combat service support requirements. I intend to continue SOCOM’s efforts with the Services to implement a way to align SOF demand with these Service-provided capabilities.

I will provide my best special operations military advice to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense on how to best use SOF to ensure we are optimizing our contribution to national security. Given the competing demands for SOF, we will need to be judicious and rigorous in our approach to support the Geographic Combatant Commanders and to do our part in support of national strategies and global campaign plans. Not all missions are appropriate for SOF, and we must guard against accepting missions at the expense of those operations requiring our unique skills and capabilities.

Lastly, if confirmed, I intend to continue the SOCOM initiatives to adapt how we train, deploy, and reset SOF for the “new normal.” The force is fraying, but we can stop the stress on the force by pursuing innovative ways that provide a predictable deployment pattern that accomplishes our missions while sustaining our force and protecting our people and families.

2. Improve and expand our tactical and operational level skills, equipment, and systems.

Success increasingly depends upon the larger combination of defense, diplomacy, and development activities. Long term success will depend more and more on SOF individuals that are selected and have expertise for the regions that they are going to habitually operate in. Our culture and language programs can be augmented to enhance our sub-regional and micro-regional knowledge, awareness and understanding. Efforts in training and personnel management can create better opportu-
nities for our personnel to build the productive and enduring relationships we desire.

In addition to a focus on the SOF operator, mobility enabling capabilities are a focal point in the existing SOCOM Strategic Plan; and technology areas seen as vital to intervention capability will also continue as focus areas for SOCOM research and development.

Finally, we must preserve our SOF buying power by critically assessing what we buy and prioritizing that which is most important while ensuring that the required service-provided capabilities are properly resourced.

3. Preserve our proposed budget levels and authorities.

First, I must ensure there is a clear understanding and support for the necessity of establishing and sustaining the new baseline budget through the transition of OCO funding into SOCOM’s baseline. OCO to baseline does not grow the force; it only preserves the command’s existing capabilities and current level of effort. The current and future demand for SOF capabilities makes this a top priority. Preserving MFP–11 budget levels is critical in ensuring SOF can meet the Nation’s requirements, which is the SOCOM Commander’s primary responsibility. MFP–11 provides for the advanced and unique training recently demonstrated in Pakistan. It enables the timely and flexible fielding of equipment, and the capability to rapidly and effectively project our force. A decrease in the Command’s budget level would severely impact my ability to meet the demand for SOF and significantly increase the risk to our Nation’s security. The importance of this issue is highlighted in the Command’s fiscal year 2012 budget submission where 34 percent of the total MFP–11 request is OCO funding. For some higher intensity SOF elements, the OCO percentage is greater than 75 percent. Without this transition, mission failure is a real possibility.

4. Find better structures and processes to obtain Service-provided capabilities.

For acquisition matters, regular Acquisition Summits with the Military Services create enhanced transparency and effectiveness in finding common solutions for Service-wide requirements, which in turn allows SOCOM to better invest in SOF peculiar modifications and special capabilities. For operational matters, a new SOF Force Generation process (SOFORGEN) will be fully synchronized with the Military Services, and fully operational by fiscal year 2013. SOFORGEN will identify Service-provided requirements in advance, allowing the development of habitual relationships for training and operations, thereby ensuring best possible support to the Geographic Combatant Commanders.

5. Continue to improve our acquisition speed and agility.

The speed and agility of SOCOM acquisition authority coupled with leveraging general purpose forces and service support mechanisms enables Special Operations to remain decisive on the battlefield. Working closely with the Services we have identified priorities to ensure there is no redundancy. We have taken the initiative to divest ourselves of equipment that is not core to the SOF mission. We have focused ourselves by disposing of obsolete, redundant or marginally beneficial capabilities. Leveraging acquisition ensures that special operations peculiar equipment necessary to confront the enemy is there when needed most and with the speed to ensure it meets the needs of the operator.

6. Better understand the people and conditions in the places we go, whether to assist or fight.

SOCOM will maintain and support a number of initiatives the Command has recently developed and implemented, which have shown promising potential and early progress toward meeting these challenges. For example, SOCOM will continue to review and coordinate changes to Service personnel policies to further incentivize language pay for key languages such as Pashto, Dari and Arabic, and increase the number of career SOF individuals in advanced language training. In order to gain the greater levels of nuanced understanding possessed by indigenous populations, SOCOM will continue to strongly support DOD’s Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) and the Army’s Intermediate and Advanced Language Programs (IALP) to recruit and access the requisite expertise provided by native speakers. Additionally, our attached female Cultural Support Teams (CSTs) allow us to reach key elements of the population in some environments which was not previously possible.

Furthermore, SOCOM will continue to expand our base of global expertise, pursue every opportunity to strengthen our overseas presence, and develop meaningful personal relationships with key foreign military leaders. To enhance current battlefield effectiveness, SOCOM will strive for repetitive deployments by individuals and small teams to the same locations. More broadly, SOCOM will participate in aca-
demic symposia and seminars, and place SOF members in key positions in U.S. Missions abroad, as well as foreign military units and headquarters. In addition, SOCOM will pursue career incentives that place value on regional and micro-regional expertise and determine a process that allows us to track and assign Foreign Area Officers with prior SOF experience back into SOF units.

7. As our most solemn duty, look after the health and well-being of this magnificent force from whom we ask so much.

SOF warriors face an increased operational tempo which will not abate even after eventual drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan due to the nature of “new normal” strategic environment that will require increasing SOF presence. To help SOF warriors and their families cope with the psychological hardships that accompany extended separation and the trauma that comes from violent armed conflict, and most critically to our wounded warriors, SOCOM has created the Care Coalition and is committed to the Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning (THOR3) Program. Both programs work with governmental and non-governmental organizations, to provide top-notch, personalized support and to physically and psychologically wounded SOF warriors and their families at multiple locations throughout CONUS. Through the Care Coalition and the Chaplaincy, SOCOM will continue to focus on improving the standard of living, happiness, and support of SOF warriors and their families.

Question. What are the most important lessons you have learned during your tenure in senior leadership positions in the special operations community?

Answer.

1. The SOF operator is the “platform” for special operations and we must always remain focused on this over what he carries with him to execute the mission. While material is important, the operator is the primary concern.

2. The world’s strategic environment has evolved toward one that is characterized more by Irregular Warfare activity rather than major nation state warfare. We must confront this “new normal” and posture our forces to be successful in it.

3. Partnerships are keys to success. The complex challenges of the world demand a more global approach to solving problems with those who share our interests. Part of the partnership building is within our own Interagency—building those relationships and trust that will build unity of effort in whole-of-government approaches to addressing problems.

4. Reputation is everything. We must work everyday to be the best that we can be, the most prepared, the best skilled operators in the world.

5. SOF continues to provide unique options for complex problems. The agility and diverse capabilities of our force, from long-term engagement to rapid lethal operations, make SOF a first choice for many military operations.

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Commander of SOCOM?

Answer. As the Commander of Joint SOCOM and a member of the SOCOM and SOF Board of Directors I helped to craft the Command’s current touchstone priorities of Mission, People, and Equipment. I believe these have served the Command well and will continue to do so in the future. Specifically, if confirmed, I will focus my efforts to enhance our efforts under each area using the following focus areas:

1. Mission
   - Deter, Disrupt, and Defeat Terrorist Threats
   - Plan and conduct special operations
   - Emphasize persistent, culturally-attuned engagement
   - Foster interagency cooperation

2. People
   - Develop and Support our People and Families
   - Focus on quality
   - Care for our people and families
   - Train and educate the joint warrior/diplomat

3. Equipment
   - Sustain and Modernize the force
   - Equip the operator
   - Upgrade SOF mobility
   - Obtain persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF SOCOM

Question. The 1986 Special Operations legislation assigned extraordinary authority to the Commander of SOCOM, to conduct some of the functions of both a military service and a unified combat command.

Which civilian officials in DOD exercise civilian oversight of the “Service-like” authorities of the Commander, SOCOM?

Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC/IC) is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on special operations matters. The principal duty of the ASD(SO/LIC/IC) is the overall supervision of special operations activities within DOD, including SOCOM.

SOCOM also coordinates with the USD(P), Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), USD(AT&L), and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) on matters within their jurisdiction which touch upon the SOCOM Commander’s “service-like” authorities under 10 U.S.C. section 167. The SOCOM Commander and his staff works closely with USD(P), USD(AT&L), and the Comptroller, and their staffs, to ensure SOCOM’s programs are aligned with DOD acquisitions policies and are appropriately funded.

Question. In your view, what organizational relationship should exist between the ASD (SO/LIC) and the Commander, SOCOM?

Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC/IC)’s role, as described above and in subsequent responses to your questions, describes the organizational relationship as it exists—and as it should continue to exist—between ASD(SO/LIC/IC) and the SOCOM Commander.

Question. What should be the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in preparation and review of Major Force Program 11 and the SOCOM’s Program Objective Memorandum?

Answer. ASD(SO/LIC/IC) is directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide overall supervision of the preparation and justification of SOF programs and budget; review and approve memoranda of agreement governing the SOCOM program, budget, and execution process; approve the SOCOM recommendations concerning which programs the SOCOM Commander will execute directly; review the SOCOM Program Objectives Memoranda (POM) and budget prior to submission to the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation and the DOD Comptroller, respectively; and present and defend the SOF program to Congress, with the advice and assistance of the SOCOM Commander. I believe these duties describe the appropriate role for ASD(SO/LIC/IC) in oversight and support of SOCOM.

Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the research and development and procurement functions of the SOCOM?

Answer. Working with the SOCOM Commander and the SOCOM Acquisition Executive, the ASD(SO/LIC/IC) advises and coordinates with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on acquisition priorities and requirements for special operations-peculiar material and equipment. I do not presently recommend any changes to ASD(SO/LIC/IC)’s role in research and development and procurement functions of SOCOM.

Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the operational planning of missions that involve SOF, whether the supported command is SOCOM, a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), or another department or agency of the U.S. Government?

Answer. Through his broad policy, coordination and oversight roles as the principle staff assistant and civilian advisor on special operations matters, the ASD(SO/LIC/IC) reviews the procedures and provides policy guidance to the SOCOM Commander on all aspects of special operations planning, including contingency planning when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. What is your understanding of the Department’s strategy for combating terrorism?

Answer. The current Unified Command Plan (UCP), 06 Apr 2011, designates the Commander, SOCOM, as responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations against terrorist networks, including the integration of DOD strategy, plans, and intelligence priorities for operations against terrorist networks designated by Secretary of Defense (Pg 24, Para 17). The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) assigns Commander, SOCOM, the responsibility to prepare the DOD (vice SOCOM) Global CT Campaign Plan, and to perform as the global synchronizer for planning (JSCP fiscal year 2008, Enclosure G, Appendix A, Para. 2).

Question. What are the roles and responsibilities of the Commander of SOCOM within the Department’s combating terrorism strategy and how would you fulfill such responsibilities if confirmed?
Answer. Practical implementation of global CT synchronization occurs throughout the development of the DOD Global CT Campaign Plan (CAMPLAN 7500) and its revisions, and in the parallel development of the GCCs' subordinate regional CT plans. Specifically, through the Joint Planning Working Groups, comprised and represented by all GCCs and FCCs, led by HQ SOCOM, regional objectives/intermediate military objectives, tailored 7500 Lines of Operation (LOO), and planning and assessment tasks, are agreed upon. Further, certain cross-area of responsibility (AOR) threat actor sets are assigned to specific GCCs for Supported or Supporting planning for Flexible Response Options. The regional (GCC) plans will have an in-progress review, either simultaneously or serially, at the Under Secretary level, allowing policy leader's visibility on GCC planning focus and priorities in each AOR.

Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and agencies?

Answer. Joint Staff J5 and USD(P) leadership is vital to advise planners of changes in Department priorities (e.g. resource availability, threat focus, interagency issues, IPR types and scheduling) when they occur. Further, as the ‘s Global CT plan, CONPLAN 7500’s alignment with the key national strategic documents should the Secretary of Defense be validated from the policy perspective. Finally, the indirect LOO concerning partner capacity building and eroding or discrediting of violent extremist narratives are areas where the Joint Staff and USD(P) can provide oversight and collaboration guidance for interagency review and validation events such as Promote Cooperation.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan? What are the weaknesses and shortcomings in the current effort to combat terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan?

Answer. General Petraeus’ population centric campaign strategy is yielding its intended results. Although hard won, we are witnessing a reversal in Taliban Momentum since 2005. Hundreds of Taliban are integrating, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) capacity is increasing, security force competencies are improving and the GIROA’s span of influence is beginning to impact a larger segment of the rural population. Security and governance are evolving across the country and as a result we are seeing an incremental shift in popular opinion toward the GIROA. As you can readily recognize, a myriad of political, operational and economic challenges remain, but we are employing the appropriate methodology and it is producing success.

Those weaknesses and shortcomings will arise not from the strategy or the efforts of our soldiers, marines, airmen, and civilians on the ground, but from diminished resourcing, lack of long-term commitment and any decrease in international assistance. These are the obstacles we must avoid to ensure success.

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of SOF in Afghanistan, and the proper relationship between direct action and counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations there?

Answer. Counterterrorism (CT) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) are inextricably linked in Afghanistan. There must be a balanced and measured approach to their application. CT efforts including direct action shape the environment and create conditions necessary for the causes of instability to be addressed, enabling governance capacity development. Afghan Security Force evolution and economic opportunity. However, CT efforts by themselves, offer no long-term chance at establishing stability and it is for this exact reason that SOF-led Village Stability Program is so important for future progress.

Question. General Petraeus and others have emphasized the importance of the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs to the strategy in Afghanistan. What has been the effect of these programs on rural Afghan populations and what has been the response from the Taliban?

Answer. VSO has focused on security, governance, and development simultaneously. It is a bottom-up approach linking governance to the village level. In the span of approximately 1 year, VSO has expanded GIROA influence in key rural areas from 1,000 Sq km to 23,500 Sq km today, roughly the size of the East Tennessee Valley or Lake Erie. Growth has been exponential since April 2010 and across Afghanistan we are witnessing increasing numbers of local communities requesting to participate in this GIROA program. Five sites have already transitioned to Afghan Government control, which is one measure of the GIROA’s evolving capacity. The ALP program, the armed neighborhood watch association with VSO establishment by President Karzi has grown into the thousands and the Afghan Ministry
of the Interior projects numbers nearing 10,000 by the summer of 2012. VSO has also enabled a massive expansion in small scale infrastructure development in these key rural areas. Approximately 2,000 development projects have demonstrated GIROA legitimacy in areas that have remained disenfranchised and ignored since 2001. These security and developmental successes combined with an aggressive GIROA governance mentoring effort are definitively changing popular attitude. It is empowering local communities, providing hope to historically disenfranchised segments of the population and as a result it is eroding support for the Taliban, denying them safe-haven and ultimately creating the conditions for long-term stability.

As a result, the Taliban have mounted an aggressive intimidation, assassination and disruption effort against GIROA officials and supportive populations. Despite these efforts however, we are witnessing ALP capturing insurgents, District Leaders requesting permissions to participate in VSO and ALP. In the south and west and north, this trend continues and increasing numbers of low-level and mid-level Taliban leaders are seeking reintegration.

**Question.** Do you believe the availability of U.S. Special Operations teams is a limiting factor in expanding these programs to a point where they can have a strategic impact in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Yes, the expansion of this effort depends largely now on the growth of SOF teams and enablers. Our combined teams are producing strategic changes presently and additional SOF force structure will demonstrably expand this effect across the country.

**Question.** How do indirect approaches like Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police Programs compliment direct action counterterrorism missions within the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Village Stability Operations are the foundation of General Petraeus' population centric campaign strategy in key rural areas across Afghanistan. Counterterrorism efforts compliment these rural efforts by shaping and managing the security environment where these indirect approaches are pursued. One is no less or more important than the other; they are separate and distinct efforts that must, and are working in tandem to achieve immediate and enduring stability.

**Question.** President Karzai has criticized "night raids" carried out by U.S. and coalition SOF in Afghanistan and alleged that they frequently result in civilian casualties.

**What steps have SOF taken to avoid civilian casualties and other collateral damage resulting from counterterrorism missions?**

**Answer.** This is a very sensitive issue for our SOF operating in Afghanistan. They have applied multiple approaches to minimize the potentialities for civilian casualties.

1. All of our forces receive formal instruction in theater tactical directives pertaining to civilian casualties (CIVCAS).
2. Every operation is conducted with our Afghan counterparts and they are always in the lead during entry of compounds and call-outs.
3. Escalation of force measures are strictly followed.
4. Full integration of Afghan Security Force leadership in the planning, execution, and post-operation phases has occurred to ensure full transparency and enable their leadership to balance risk, cultural considerations, and operational requirements.
5. Our Afghan partners, as well as our own commands strive to keep district and provincial political leadership appraised of all operations.
6. Employment of close air support and indirect forces is a more closely managed effort at every level of command today.

CIVCAS is the exception today, not a commonality in SOF operations. These multiple efforts have a combined effect of reducing opportunities for CIVCAS and mitigating it when in the off chance it does occur.

**PAKISTAN**

**Question.** The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has often been described as tumultuous and the effects on this relationship of the operation that killed Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011, remain to be seen. Concerns from senior Pakistani officials related to the presence of SOF in the country could negatively impact training and advising activities designed to counter al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Haqqani Network.

**What is your assessment of the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Pakistan?**

**Answer.** Our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan remains positive overall, particularly at the unit level. However, periodic events within the region,
oftentimes beyond the United States’ or DOD’s control, create temporary strains at the senior level. As with most military-to-military of this nature, relationships, personalities play a key role and must be maintained and nurtured over the long term. SOF has a long history of military-to-military relations with Pakistan. The creation and stand-up of the Office of Defense Representative—Pakistan (ODRP) and SOCOM Central (Forward)—Pakistan (SOC(FWD)-PAK) has enhanced and continues to foster our military-to-military relations with Pakistan. Since 2008, ODRP and SOC(FWD)-PAK have cultivated the military-to-military relationship on a daily basis with much success. Over the years, many enduring personal relationships have been established and benefit both Pakistan and the United States. I can only speak for U.S. SOF, but I expect it also holds true for ODRP that I expect these relationships and new ones to continue to grow and strengthen the relationship between Pakistan and the United States.

**Question.** In your assessment, how important is the U.S.-Pakistan military-to-military relationship to the success of our counterterrorism strategy?

**Answer.** Our national and military strategy is based on the direct and indirect approach. Our military-to-military relationships with Pakistan, along with other partner nations, are part of that indirect approach and are critical to the success of our counterterrorism strategy. The United States cannot win the war on terror alone. Wherever possible, we must garner support of partner nations so they can combat terrorism within their nations’ borders. The Pakistanis are a key partner in the war on terror. Our military-to-military relationship has assisted the Pakistanis with their successes in countering insurgent networks within their borders. Maintaining a strong military-to-military relationship is vital for Pakistan’s continued success. From training and equipping to infrastructure enhancements, all are key components in developing and fostering our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan. Maintaining a properly balanced U.S. military presence of SOF personnel and Office of Defense Representatives—Pakistan personnel enable us to cultivate and enhance our relationship.

**IRAQ**

**Question.** From your perspective as Commander, JSOC, what are the main “lessons learned” from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn?

**Answer.** Both operations have provided us with many lessons learned which we have incorporated into our current operations. Some of these lessons include: the need for a unified U.S. Government approach, active and integrated interagency coordination, the necessity for culturally attuned forces and the need to maximize combined operations. U.S. military and government efforts need to be synergized to provide a focused effort while reducing the likelihood of duplication and opposed efforts. Interagency integration is essential in our fight against violent extremism. Some of our greatest accomplishments would not have come to fruition without this coordinated effort. Our forces are now more culturally sensitive than ever before, greater language skills and incorporating female military personnel into our post operations activities have allowed our forces greater access and integration with the Iraqi and Afghan civilian populace. Lastly, we have maximized our combined operation efforts by working with and through the host nation forces. Every operation is coordinated with the Government of Iraq and Afghanistan and the Iraqi and Afghan Partnering Units. These combined operations are not only doing a tremendous job in accomplishing the mission but, also help enable and empower the Iraqi and Afghan SOF for future success.

**Question.** As conventional forces continue to draw down in Iraq, SOF remain heavily engaged with their Iraqi counterparts. However, SOF rely on their conventional counterparts for many support and enabling functions including airlift, medical evacuation, resupply, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. If confirmed, how would you ensure SOF are adequately supported in Iraq as the drawdown progresses?

**Answer.** As we reduce our presence in Iraq, it will be essential that we make sure that our SOF continues to receive support. SOF will continue to provide assistance and support to Iraq Special Forces until relieved. U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) is developing and refining their support plans as situations dictate. USF-I has instructed its forces to conduct detailed coordination and contingency plans to mitigate any degradation to SOF support. It will be crucial for SOF to maintain access to the key enablers you have already mentioned and more until the end of Operation New Dawn. SOCOM is postured to respond positively and provide SOF in support of CENTCOM missions. I will continue to ensure SOF operating in austere locations are provided the required support through detailed coordination and planning. Contingency plans to provide emergency assistance to U.S. SOF outside of the remain-
ing U.S. bases will require alternate means of support which will take time to co-
ordinate and execute.

YEMEN

*Question.* The U.S. Government has a robust security assistance program with
Yemen to help enable Yemeni security forces to deal with the threat posed by al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Much of the training and advising activities under
these assistance programs has been carried out by SOF.

In light of the political situation in Yemen, what is your assessment of the most
effective way the United States can advance its counterterrorism objectives there?

*Answer.* Yemen is unique in the Arab world, with socio-economic indicators simi-
lar to the poorest African nations, and governance limitations that invite easy com-
parisons with some of the world’s most vulnerable states. Current political turmoil
and an uncertain Yemen Government are enormous challenges that face the Repub-
lic of Yemen and by extension, the U.S. counterterrorism policy. No other nation en-
joy the level of influence with the Yemen Government than that of the U.S.
counterterrorism initiatives with the Yemen Government contribute directly to a
more stable security environment.

Fiscal year 2011 International Military Education and Training funds will con-
tinue to be used to train and educate Ministry of Defense personnel, thereby in-
creasing Yemen’s versatility and utility as a coalition member. These funds will con-
tinue to provide equipment and training essential for Yemeni Counterterrorism
Forces to combat terrorist groups, including al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). Increased funding levels for military assistance, particularly those that re-
late to training and equipping Yemeni counterterrorism forces will be essential for
the Yemeni Government to neutralize the threat from AQAP within their borders.
SOCOM and SOF will complement these activities with a carefully calibrated en-
gagement in tribal areas of the country where violent extremists enjoy safe haven.

Towards this end, we have established a close, working relationship with Yemen
Counterterrorism Forces.

TERRORISM THREATS IN AFRICA

*Question.* Over the course of the last few years, al Qaeda-inspired and affiliated
groups in Somalia and the Trans-Sahara have continued to gain strength, leading
many to express concern about their intent and ability to strike the interests of the
U.S. and partner nations.

What is your understanding of U.S. policy with regard to countering the threats
posed by these groups?

*Answer.* As with all our counterterrorist actions across the globe, we work in con-
cert with the Geographical Combatant Commands and SOF is integrated as just one
piece of the overall “Whole of Government” endeavor within U.S. Africa Command
(AFRCOM) has laid out a comprehensive approach to building security capacity
with partner nations across the continent. SOF will play a significant role in
AFRICOM’s four defense-oriented goals for their partner nations: having a capable
military force, having professional security institutions, having the capability to de-
feat transnational threats, and increase Partner Nation support to international
peacekeeping efforts. In assisting AFRICOM with these goals, basing, overflight and
arming rights are just a few of the challenges confronting us. We need streamlined
policy and procedures supporting rapid capacity building and information/intel-
ligence sharing, in order to facilitate new and nurture existing partner relation-
ships. We also understand this will all take place in a resource constrained environ-
ment. The difficult decisions facing Congress as you wrestle with the fiscal realities
facing this nation will most definitely have an impact on our counter terrorist activi-
ties in Africa and across the globe.

*Question.* Do you believe the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
assets and other resources allocated to countering terrorism threats in Africa are
adequate to understand and respond to the threats posed by these groups?

*Answer.* A significant portion of the U.S. counterterrorism effort is focused on the
CENTCOM AOR and they have received the lion’s share of ISR assets. ISR is a high
demand, yet finite resource, and in some areas, to include Africa, we have executed
an economy of effort in tackling terrorist groups. As our Nation’s activities in the
Pakistan/Afghanistan AOR change, additional ISR assets may be available to ad-
dress AFRICOM’s needs. DOD, with the outstanding support of Congress, continues
to build more capacity, spotlighting other significant limiting factors within Africa
such as communications, basing and overflight rights/agreements, information shar-
ing with partner nations, and highly diverse language requirements across the con-
tinent. Given the tenuous nature of African governments and the difficulties associ-
ated with adding basing/footprint on the continent, we specifically envision the need for substantial sea-based ISR to support Africa CT operations. We will be in lock-step with AFRICOM as they tackle each of these challenges. SOF will be an integral part of AFRICOM’s engagement program and will help lead their response to terrorist networks working on the continent.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

Question. General Fraser, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, recently testified that “The northern triangle of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras is the deadliest zone in the world outside of active war zones.” What is your assessment of the threat from transnational criminal organizations (TCO) operating in the Western Hemisphere?

Answer. TCOs are a threat to our national security. They enable insurgencies and terrorism, and undermine state security and stability. An obvious outcome can be seen in the violence in Mexico and Central America. They have evolved into regional threats as seen with Mexican cartel members operating as far south as Peru. These threats must be addressed through multi-national, multi-agency collaborative efforts.

Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, for SOF in countering these threats?

Answer. SOF should continue to support SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM’s requirements to build the capacity of selected partner nation forces through training under Counter-Narcoterrorism and Joint Combined Exchange Training authorities. Where appropriate, U.S. SOF should be applied to advise and assist partner nation forces in planning operations against TCOs.

Question. For more than a decade, Colombian security forces have worked in partnership with SOF to counter threats similar to those described by General Fraser. This partnership has helped to enable the Colombians to significantly degrade the terrorist organization known as the FARC.

What do you believe are the primary lessons learned from SOF training and advising activities in Colombia?

Answer. SOF is mostly effectively applied when we have persistent presence, we train the right unit at the right level, and we exercise the appropriate authorities through Regional command and control structures.

Question. Are there lessons learned that may apply to U.S. support to Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras in their efforts to counter the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations?

Answer. SOF has the capability to train partner nation (PN) forces in a myriad of specialties that are ideal in combating transnational criminal organizations. Many of the security cooperation strategies used successfully in Colombia should be applied in other Western Hemisphere countries.

PHILIPPINES

Question. What is your view of the effectiveness of the special operation forces assistance being provided to the Philippine military in its fight against terrorist groups?

Answer. Although the focus of the 10 year old mission in the Philippines tends to be on the actions of the military unit against the most prominent terrorist groups, I want to emphasize that this has truly been, and continues to be, a multifaceted approach. We have engaged with each branch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP) using every available authority to help build capacity, while at the same time working to improve the image and public trust of both the AFP and PNP. Individual examples of these efforts range from Title 22 funded (using Navy and Air Force SOF) training to improve AFP aviation Night Vision Goggles and maritime capabilities, to 1206 funded procurement of precision munitions, to DOD funded Military Information operations efforts and Civil Military Support Element funded Civil Affairs projects. Additionally, diplomatic efforts, congressional interest and senior military engagement have solidified the willingness of the Philippine Government to maintain the pressure on the key terrorist groups. As a direct result of these combined efforts, the capacity and legitimacy of the Philippine Security Forces has been greatly improved. An assessment of the Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF–P) mission is currently being conducted by Commander, PACOM.

Question. If confirmed, what measures or guidelines will you employ to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in combat in the Republic of the Philippines?
Answer. Ultimately, it is the Commander, PACOM, who assesses the situation and coordinates with the Ambassador on the execution of OEF–P to include the size of the U.S. Force and its employment. In addition to the restrictions dictated by the Philippine Constitution, the current Secretary of Defense and Commander, PACOM, orders are very specific and clear on how U.S. Forces may work by with and through the AFP. Obviously the right to self-defense would allow any U.S. military element to protect itself if unexpectedly attacked by the enemy. As a direct result of the current rules of engagement, there have been only three combat-related deaths; all due to IEDs.

PIRACY

Question. Despite a significant and concerted international effort, which includes various U.S. agencies and the U.S. military, piracy in the northwestern Indian Ocean and the approaches to vital sea lanes through the Gulf of Aden continues largely unabated. Similar threats exist in other key areas including the Straits of Malacca.

How do you assess the threat posed by piracy?

Answer. Piracy operations directly threaten U.S. personnel and interests in these regions. Kidnap for ransom by pirates has recently led to the death of U.S. civilians. Piracy’s biggest impact however, is economic. The seizing of cargo ships and ransom demands have harmful economic impacts to companies and countries. Anti-piracy efforts for ship protections and the deployment of military assets for prevention operations continue to require significant expenditures of funds and further strains limiting assets supporting these operations.

The second and third order effects of piracy may lead to future destabilization in the affected areas. The resultant vast sums of money in these impoverished areas lead to the establishment of safe heavens for pirates and their support groups. These funds also further subvert the efforts of African Union Mission in Somalia and the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia to stabilize Mogadishu against violent extremist organization (VEO) groups.

Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of SOF in counter piracy efforts?

Answer. NATO conglomerate, Navy capabilities, as well as Naval assets from coastal adjacent countries should lead the effort to deter/prevent piracy. This includes patrolling pirate populated waters and identifying, boarding and where appropriate, engaging with and confiscating suspect vessels and collecting data on suspect pirates.

Special operations involvement is currently limited in the counter piracy efforts. SOF support with unique capabilities when required. These capabilities involve maritime direct action, information operations and building partner capacity for maritime operations.

SOF provide unique capabilities for execution of specialized missions worldwide. These capabilities can be incorporated into counter-piracy operations but due to the high demand, low density nature of SOF, they should not be the lead. Conventional maritime forces have capabilities better designed to deal with the full range of counter-piracy operations on the water. U.S. SOF should only be employed in extreme scenarios where the situation exceeds ability of conventional forces to respond adequately.

Overall, with SOF current force structure and high demand worldwide for its capabilities, current U.S. policy does not warrant a high enough priority for the allocation of SOF assets against this mission since other forces have more relevant capabilities to deal with the full scope of counter-piracy operations.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR INDIRECT ACTIVITIES

Question. Some observers contend that the national intelligence agencies focus their assistance to the Defense Department in Afghanistan and Iraq on special operators engaged in direct action operations. As a consequence, it is alleged, general purpose forces and SOF engaged in indirect activities, including foreign internal defense and population protection, receive less intelligence support.

Do you believe this is true?

Answer. No.

Question. If so and if confirmed, how would you ensure SOF engaged in indirect activities receive adequate intelligence support?

Answer. CONPLAN 7500 makes clear the primacy of indirect activities in combating VEOs and the successful prosecution of that approach is predicated on the level of support given to those efforts, specifically intelligence support. SOCOM enables the indirect approach with an intelligence network focused on supporting Ir-
regular Warfare, specifically on the tenets: Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Civil-Military Operations (CMO).

At SOCOM intelligence support to IW is accomplished by the fusing of all source intelligence with cutting edge pattern analysis, imagery, and socio-cultural analysis (SCA) tools and analytic techniques. These efforts are coordinated by the SOCOM Joint Intelligence Center (JICSOC) and the Global Mission Support Center (GMSC), which provide network connectivity, 24/7 reachback support to deployed forces and Special Operations Task Forces, and coordination venues for ISR support.

Although the support to the indirect approach is directed by SOCOM, the requirements themselves are byproducts of the constant interaction between the supported Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) and SOCOM. This interaction ensures the coordination of SOCOM intelligence support with that of the regional Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC). At SOCOM we realize that the majority of the GCCs are combating terrorism and VEOs in non-kinetic operations so providing tailored intelligence support to those missions is vital to successfully supporting the national security strategy.

The Central Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Organization, and Defense Intelligence Agency have all adapted very well to these indirect approach intelligence requirements. To be sure, there are always capacity challenges as we continue to conduct military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and still meet other global challenges, but on balance I am very appreciative of the support provided by the national intelligence agencies.

**SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS**

**Question.** Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by SOF to combat terrorism.

What is your assessment of this authority?

**Answer.** Section 1208 authority remains a key tool for SOF to operate by, with, and through an array of willing partners in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and other locations. These foreign regular and irregular forces leverage their natural access to locations, populations and information that are denied to SOF, but critical to our success. Their work is challenging and often carries significant personal risk. The training, equipping, and operational support provided to these partners by our forces under 1208 authority are absolutely essential to overall mission accomplishment. We are appreciative of Congress’ continued support for this authority.

Recent Interaction with Congress: DASD–SOCOT (Garry Reid) accompanied by SOCOM reps provided a briefing on April 27 to House and Senate Armed Services Committee staffers that covered the fiscal year 2010 annual report. The briefing was well-received, with no significant issues. There was some additional discussion on expanding the authority to go beyond combating terrorism.

Future of the Authority: Rep Mac Thornberry (R–TX), Chairman of the Emerging Terrorism and Capabilities subcommittee of the HASC, has marked the House version of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 with an increase in 1208 authority from $45 million to $50 million, and directed DOD to provide a report/briefing on the future of the authority to address CT, UW, and IW requirements.

Expenditure trends (current authority is $45 million): (a) fiscal year 2010: $31 million spent of estimated $38 million requirement; and (b) fiscal year 2011 (to date): $9 million obligated of estimated $34 million.

**COUNTER-THREAT FINANCE**

**Question.** A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence Community have called for applying more resources to identify, monitor, and halt the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and the illegal narcotics trade. Comparable efforts have been undertaken by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization against the flow of money and components supporting the construction and employment of improvised explosive devices.

What is your assessment of the value of counter-threat finance (CTF) activities?

**Answer.** Finding, stopping, and via our law enforcement partners, freezing or seizing terrorist and narcoterrorist resources is immensely valuable in defeating current threat operations, disrupting future threat operations and ultimately in dismantling the enemy’s carefully crafted facilitation networks. Money is the oil that keeps these illicit networks in operation, whether moving guns, jihadists, drugs, or illegal mer-
chandise or persons. Sustained CTF activities are a critical part of any effective counterterrorism effort or campaign. CTF done well is preventive and thus highly cost effective.

Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of SOCOM in supporting CTF activities?

Answer. The enemy's sustainment networks are global in nature, and to defeat them, our approach must be global as well. We are not effective against these threats when we constrain ourselves in archaic thinking that limits our field of action, whether geographically, functionally, or otherwise. Hence, SOCOM was recently designated the DOD Lead for CTF and that role should be maintained, possibly even expanded, to ensure DOD can operate effectively alongside and in support of our interagency partners.

SOCOM ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

Question. SOCOM is unique within the DOD as the only unified command with acquisition authorities and funding. Further, the Commander of SOCOM is the only uniformed commander with a subordinate senior acquisition executive. If confirmed, how would you ensure SOCOM requirements are adequately vetted and balanced against available resources before moving forward with an acquisition program?

Answer. SOCOM has a robust requirements and programming process that is vetted through a Board of Directors consisting of leadership from each of the component commands. This disciplined process allows SOCOM to align available resources with requirements and to prioritize these requirements within our budget and future year programs.

Question. What role can SOCOM’s development and acquisition activities play in broader Service and DOD efforts?

Answer. SOCOM is a microcosm of the entire Defense Department, and our challenges are very similar to investment requirements among the Services. SOCOM also has mature processes to conduct rapid evaluations of technology, systems, and concepts of operations, the results of which benefit SOF and are transferrable to the rest of the Department. SOF Acquirers specialize in the integration of emerging off-the-shelf technologies. This integration allows SOCOM to take the best from each Service as well as industry and modify or customize the equipment to meet special operations needs and rapidly field it to the force. Our success can then be shared with the Services to improve their capabilities. Some of the SOF technologies that have made their way to the Services include the MH–47 Chinook helicopter common avionics architecture system (CAAS) cockpit, an extended service life wing for the C–130, the MK48 lightweight machine gun, software defined tactical radios, and an improved sniper sight.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that Special Operations capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall DOD research, development, and acquisition programs?

Answer. Although SOCOM generates and validates all SOF requirements, these requirements are provided to the Joint Staff for inclusion in the Joint Requirements Knowledge Management System. In addition, SOCOM has initiated acquisition summits with OSD, drawing together SOCOM, USD(AT&L), and the Service Acquisition Executives (SAE) where we discuss acquisition issues of common interest. For example, the SAEs agreed to synchronize technical and programmatic plans among all investment portfolios as well as explore initiatives to develop common architectures and standards across different future SOF and Service platforms. Additionally, USD(AT&L) agreed to develop a plan to address the standardization for certification and other Service test requirements between Services and SOCOM to gain efficiencies and promote common process reciprocity. Continuing that dialogue/exchange will remain one of my priorities.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure sufficient resources are dedicated to the development of special operations-unique platforms, when required?

Answer. Ensuring SOF not only has the resources to conduct today’s operations but preparing ourselves for the future environment is one of my top priorities. The Board of Directors process allows the Command to take a strategic view of future requirements and achieve a balance. Since September 11, the MFP–11 budget has kept pace with operations, and the investment funding has allowed SOCOM to support these increased demands and acquire equipment as required.

Question. If confirmed, what metrics will you use to determine the effectiveness of SOCOM technology development investments and whether SOCOM is investing sufficient resources in these efforts?
Answer. We have created a series of technology roadmaps that assist us in identifying promising solutions to our problems. These roadmaps are schedule oriented, containing both the technology development timelines and the formal acquisition program schedules. As such, they have quantifiable metrics (cost, schedule, performance, and technology readiness) embedded in them.

Question. SOCOM has undertaken a series of acquisition programs to fulfill its undersea mobility requirements. Both the Advanced Seal Delivery System and the Joint Multi-Mission Submersible programs were terminated and SOCOM recently initiated a new undersea mobility acquisition strategy. What lessons has SOCOM drawn from previous undersea mobility acquisition efforts and, if confirmed, how would you ensure they are incorporated into current undersea acquisition efforts?

Answer. From our previous efforts, SOCOM learned that satisfying a wide range of undersea requirements with a “one size fits all” solution was challenging. As a result, we are pursuing a series of dry combat submersibles along with modifications to the dry-deck shelters. This diversified approach will allow us to meet our operational requirements by deployment from either a surface ship or via a dry deck shelter on a submarine.

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that SOCOM has an acquisition workforce with the skills, qualifications, and experience needed to develop and manage its acquisition and research and development programs?

Answer. The SOCOM Acquisition Executive manages the SOF Acquisition workforce similar to the SAEs. SOF Acquirers are specialists in science and technology, acquisition, contracting, and logistics. They are operationally oriented, professionally trained and certified, and experts in the SOF-unique processes needed to meet the equipping needs of SOF. We are working with USD(AT&L) to expand our organic acquisition workforce, as well as create a unique identifier for SOF acquisition positions.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. Much attention has been focused on the transformation of our conventional Armed Forces to make them more capable of conducting counterinsurgency and combating terrorism missions. Do you believe our SOFs need to be transformed as well?

Answer. No, not in reference to the development of COIN or combating terrorism capabilities.

Question. If so, what is your vision for such a transformation, and how would the transformation of conventional forces complement a SOF transformation, and vice versa?

Answer. SOCOM and its components have featured counterinsurgency capabilities for many years. We have worked closely with the Services to prepare the total Joint Force, including conventional forces, to execute COIN and counterterrorism missions.

The partnership between conventional forces and SOF is as strong as it has ever been. The extensive combat employment of both forces in shared battle spaces has increased the need to closely coordinate our operations. This has resulted in a sharing of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) between SOF and conventional forces that has helped to increase conventional force capabilities to execute COIN and combating terrorism operations.

The transformation of SOP needs to build on the hard combat skills we have honed over the last 10 years by adding to our ability to understand the operational environment and better discern the likely effects of kinetic and non-kinetic actions we take in complex and increasingly urbanized environments. One of the ways we will help in this transformation is to increase our language and cultural capabilities of our forces. This includes recruiting of both females and U.S. born citizens who speak certain specific languages and are knowledgeable about the socio-cultural aspects of these regions.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Question. Some have argued that the Commander of SOCOM should have greater influence on special operations personnel management issues including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of SOF. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., to change the role of the SOCOM Commander from “monitoring” the readiness of special operations personnel to “coordinating” with the Services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect SOF.
What is your view of this proposal?

Answer. Ensuring we have the right people to perform SOF missions is paramount to our operational success. Service personnel policies significantly impact SOF retention—especially as they relate to compensation, development, and promotions. Changing Section 167 to reflect the word “coordinating” rather than “monitoring” will give SOCOM more influence than it currently possesses. The recently implemented DOD Instruction 5100.01 requires the Services to coordinate their personnel policies and plans with SOCOM. The “coordination” policy will provide SOCOM more visibility into personnel policy changes and initiatives. SOCOM is in the initial phases of working with the Services to put this policy into action. We’re optimistic that the inputs provided by SOCOM during the coordination process will provide the influence needed to develop and retain the most capable SOF personnel.

SIZE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have mandated significant growth in our SOF and enablers that directly support their operations. Do you believe that we should further increase the number of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?

Answer. The growth we received during the previous two QDRs has served us well. We are still realizing these increases, with more than 12,000 programmed personnel still to arrive in the next 4 years. The current commander has recommended that manpower growth not exceed 3 to 5 percent annually and I agree with Admiral Olson that growing too fast will dilute capability and outpace the support structure we have in place. A gradual increase in capacity ensures that second and third order affects can be accounted without sacrificing the quality of the SOF operator.

In your view, how can the size of SOF be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for special operators?

We are acutely aware of the risks of focusing on quantity rather than quality. In order to sustain our current growth rates at an acceptable level, we have stepped up our recruiting efforts and have enhanced our training pipelines to increase the throughput of our operators with no loss in quality.

READINESS AND OPERATIONAL TEMPO

Question. The current Commander of SOCOM has described a “fraying” of the SOF due to high operational tempo (OPTEMPO).

What is the current dwell time ratio for SOCOM personnel?

Answer. The calculation of dwell time varies depending on the context. Within the Global Force Management process, SOCOM is required to provide real time dwell calculations when responding to force requests. These responses are generated based on actual deployment data and current force structure. SOCOM has multiple unit types (e.g.: Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas, SEAL Platoons, aircraft platforms and crews, Marine Special Operations Teams, et cetera); too many to list in this response. However, overall, the deployment to dwell ratio for SOCOM capabilities ranges between 1:0.8 and 1:2. The most requested tactical level units lie at the lower end of this scale while the higher level headquarters at the upper end. With the exception of Special Forces ODAs, the current dwell of forces closely relates to that projected in the Operational Availability 2010 assessment. This assessment accounted for force structure growth not yet realized. However, force demand has continued to outpace some programmed growth. For example, between August 2009 and August 2010, SOCOM added 36 ODAs to the inventory while ODA requirements increased by 37.5 percent.

Question. In your view, how will shifting resources from Iraq to Afghanistan affect personnel tempo and dwell time ratios?

Answer. While some special operations resources will shift from Iraq to Afghanistan, it most likely will not be a one-for-one offset. Some SOF will shift to support other operations as well. The demand for SOF worldwide is at such a high level that OPTEMPO will still have to be very carefully managed.

Question. What can be done to increase dwell time for SOCOM personnel?

Answer. SOCOM will continue to support the requirements of Geographic Combatant Commanders at the highest level we can sustain without “breaking” the force. In most cases, SOF are doing what they expected and wanted, and they feel good about their impressive contributions. That said, we will set and enforce maximum deployment rates for each element of the force.

Much of the answer to the OPTEMPO challenge is in providing: (1) greater predictability, and (2) more opportunities to train closer to home when not deployed overseas.
Today, due to the significant demand for SOF, many units conduct a combat rotation then, during their dwell period, will deploy for a shorter duration in order to support foundational (Phase-0 type) operations before again deploying for a combat rotation.

Question. In your view, how has sustained high operational tempo impacted the readiness of special operations personnel?

Answer. High OPTEMPO has had a number of impacts on SOF readiness:

1. CENTCOM Focus: Over the years one of the major hallmarks of SOF personnel has been regional expertise and language proficiencies for the key nations and/or non-state groups of the region. Since September 11 the vast majority of SOF operations have taken place in CENTCOM AOR. As a result language proficiency and cultural awareness for other Geographic Combatant Commands has suffered.

2. The compressed time between deployments has had a major impact on the readiness of SOF forces. Opportunities to attend some schools and advanced training normally required for SOF personnel has been reduced or eliminated. Examples include reduced time for classroom language training/proficiency for all SOF; advanced Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape School; lack of fixed wing aircraft available for live ordnance drops needed to train Joint Tactical Air Controllers; lack of vertical lift capability to train SOF ground forces and aircrew proficiency; lack of fixed wing refueling aircraft for helicopter in-flight refueling and ships available to conduct deck landing qualifications. Insufficient availability of non-SOF ranges to support SOF training is a significant issue.

3. Equipment: The lack of CONUS equipment also impacts SOF personnel readiness. SOF aircraft are deployed at the maximum sustainable rate. The lack of CONUS-based rotary/tilt wing lift presents a serious readiness challenge for aircrew qualifications/proficiency and training for SOF ground forces. Many of these assets are either forward deployed or in depot level maintenance. These equipment issues, coupled with compressed inter-deployment timelines, have had a significant impact on overall SOF readiness.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to reduce the negative impacts associated with high operational tempo of special operations personnel?

Answer. First and foremost, we must instill the force sourcing discipline previously discussed to improve dwell time, reduce the high operational tempo, and therefore, reduce some of the negative impact resulting from the current operational tempo.

Additionally, SOCOM must coordinate with the combatant commands and Services to ensure that we have developed the best possible force sourcing recommendation for combatant command requirements. In some cases, Conventional Forces or a combination of Conventional and SOF may provide a better solution than a solely SOF.

A number of actions have already been taken to reduce some of these negative impacts on SOF. These include realigning Army Special Forces Groups to specific Geographic Combatant Commands in order for those personnel to regain cultural and language proficiencies; increasing language proficiency pays and training opportunities for all SOF personnel; contracting fixed wing aircraft as a short term “fix” for training Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTAC); and maximizing CONUS-based vertical lift assets for training SOF ground forces.

In the future it is imperative we continue our close relationships with the Services in order to gain or maintain current access to various ranges and to utilize more military fixed wing aircraft for JTAC training. Other initiatives should include continued development and utilization of simulators as a substitute for a portion of live ordnance training requirements; creation of a SOF special pay based on the current aviation flight pay model; and continue or enhance current retention incentives for SOF personnel.

Question. In your opinion, how has the high operational tempo affected the resiliency of SOCOM personnel, including rates of suicide, over the past several years?

Answer. Trend analysis shows that SOF personnel, compared to the conventional force and the population in general, are more resilient and capable of successfully handling the stress of high operational tempo. The SOF community has become extremely responsive to the creeping “fraying” of the force as operational tempo has increased over the past several years. Successful preventative programs include Command Leadership, an in-depth assessment and selection process, prevention, treatment, and education.

This responsiveness, based on proactive command leadership directives, significantly increased overall force resilience. These directives support the enhancement
and availability of psychological support throughout the SOF community. The success of this program is based on a number of basic concepts:

1. A SOF peculiar application of “Assessment and Selection” of potential candidates has been critical to this process. Command leadership, combined with the use of embedded psychologists, assess all personnel and closely monitors those individuals with potential or actual issues.

2. This process enhances the “Prevention” aspect of the directive through training, education, and monitoring.

3. The key to this program is “access to care” within the Military Health System (MHS) when required. This has decreased the negative stigma associated with seeking professional psychological help.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. How successful have the services been in recruiting and retaining the special operations personnel that are needed?

Answer. In today’s operating environment, the demand is much greater for SOF operators with varying languages, more cultural attunement, and regional expertise. Service recruitment efforts face many challenges as selection from the pool of eligible U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents are limited due to medical, educational, or conduct reasons. However, Service recruiting commands, in coordination with SOF component commands continue to be overall successful in recruiting SOF operators.

Continued support for programs like Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest, which has great potential to alleviate some critical strategic language and cultural gaps is needed. Looking forward, the Services’ recruitment must increase for those candidates who will bring ethnic, business, academic, technical and experimental diversity to SOF.

Question. What are the biggest challenges to retention you see in the SOC unconscious community?

Answer. The recent pressure on our force focus groups identified that one of the primary reasons personnel consider leaving the force is the lack of predictability for deployments to both named operations and to GCC theater security cooperation program missions—specifically, late shifts in deployment schedules and the insertion of new requirements.

Question. What steps need to be taken, in your view, to meet the recruiting and retention goals of each of the Services’ SOF?

Answer. The Services need increased flexibility to incentivize those qualified individuals who choose the path to become special operators. We need your help in supporting programs that are beneficial to SOF and in maintaining recruiting budgets for the Services.

Question. What monetary or non-monetary incentives do you believe would be most effective in this regard?

Answer. SOCOM currently has a set of retention incentives programs focused on maintaining our most senior and most experienced SOF personnel: Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB), Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP), Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) and Critical Skills Accession Bonus (CSAB). These programs have been effective in retaining their target demographic.

OSD directed a compensation study to verify the effectiveness of our current incentives programs. The OSD study is also looking at trends inside other demographics beyond our senior SOF personnel. This will give us the information we need to change or modify our existing programs. Trends are starting to show losses in our junior and mid-career SOF personnel. Adapting our retention incentives to counter losses within our junior ranks will ensure they stay SOF until they become our senior SOF personnel.

Prior to the initiation of the OSD study, SOCOM established a compensation working group composed of members of the SOCOM headquarters and the SOF Components. This working group was charged with gaining the approval of the Services to extend the current incentives and look at modifying our compensation plan based on being in a state of persistent engagement. The working group proposed a new compensation plan called SOF Career Pay or SCP (pronounced “skip”).

There are two primary intents incorporated into SCP: Predictability and Relative Parity. By institutionalizing the retention benefit, we eliminate the need for periodic revalidation and approval as with current incentive programs. However, periodic reevaluation of the program is integrated into the proposal. SCP will provide service-members with a predictable and dependable retention plan which incentivizes them throughout their entire SOF career. One of the thought processes behind SCP is to ensure newly trained and mid-career SOF personnel remain in military service to
become our experienced senior SOF personnel. Currently, our retention incentives’ package focuses solely on senior SOF personnel. The Services will reap the long-term benefit of the time and resources invested into our SOF personnel. The second primary intent of SCP is relative parity across the Services by granting similar compensation to those possessing similar skills, experience, and mission sets.

**DIVERSITY IN SOCOM**

*Question.* How do you define diversity in SOCOM?

*Answer.* SOCOM’s definition of diversity includes the traditional categories of minority representation and more. The ability to speak foreign languages, know the eccentricity of the region, blend into foreign environments, and understand the local cultures of our operating regions are invaluable skills which lends diversity to SOCOM. Diversity in application is our female Cultural Support Teams which allow us access to key populations in some environments which were not previously possible.

*Question.* Do you believe that achieving greater diversity in SOCOM is a priority?

*Answer.* Yes, diversity is an operational necessity for SOF. SOF engagement continues to grow into populations with varied societal values. SOF success is impacted by our ability to assess and adapt on multiple fronts. As such, SOF members must possess a broad range of skills and backgrounds.

*Question.* If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that continued progress toward diversity goals is achieved without violating reverse discrimination principles of law?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work with Senior DOD leadership and the Services to identify future operational requirements and support funding for them. The ability to recruit the right people, with the right skills, means establishing the right target goals.

**SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE**

*Question.* What is your assessment of current sexual assault prevention and response policies and procedures in SOCOM?

*Answer.* The Military Services have primary responsibility to ensure sexual assault response personnel (Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC), Victim Advocates, medical and mental health providers, and criminal investigation personnel) are well trained to support victims, investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault. If resources are not readily available where the alleged incident occurred, victims are transported to a facility where there is appropriate victim advocate support, medical and psychological care (regardless of service) and investigative/legal support.

The Joint Staff remains a key partner with the Services and OSD in the campaign against sexual assault. Additionally, the Joint Staff works closely with the combatant commands during the development of operational plans and personnel policy guidance to ensure the prevention and response to incidents of sexual assault is addressed.

Prevention of sexual assault is a leadership responsibility. Commanders at all levels must remain committed to eliminating sexual assault within our forces by sustaining robust prevention and response policies; by providing thorough and effective training to all assigned servicemembers, by identifying and eliminating barriers to reporting; and by ensuring care is available and accessible.

*Question.* Do you consider current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

*Answer.* Yes. For a multitude of reasons, sexual assault has historically been an under-reported crime. Restricted reporting has been effective. Although the use of restricted, or confidential, reporting doesn’t allow a commander to investigate alleged assaults, it does allow a sexual assault victim to confidentially receive medical treatment and counseling without triggering the official investigation process.

Unrestricted reporting supports a sexual assault victim who desires medical treatment and counseling—but also provides for official investigation of his or her allegations within existing administrative reporting channels (such as their chain of command, law enforcement or through the SARC).

As our military members’ confidence in the reporting and investigative policies and procedures improve, I believe and certainly hope that more victims will choose unrestricted reporting. This will ultimately increase offender accountability.

*Question.* What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources SOCOM has in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

*Answer.* The Services are responsible for training sexual assault response personnel to ensure they are well-trained to investigate and respond to allegations of
sexual assault. For example, in March of this year, the Army opened phase three of its Intervene Act Motivate (I.A.M.) Strong program. The four-phase program emphasizes that leaders must understand their responsibilities to ensure victims of sexual assault receive sensitive care and support and are not re-victimized as a result of reporting the incident. It also provides tangible guidelines to help Army leaders remain alert to, and respond proactively to, incidents of sexual assault. Improved training for investigators is also a priority and this includes investigative resources in deployed areas. As you may imagine, the combat environment and deployed operations are very dynamic and investigative resources are often strained by other mission requirements. Remoteness of locations, availability of transportation, or the level of ongoing operations may complicate access to resources. I believe the DOD training network in place now prepares investigators to handle sexual assault cases in a caring, responsive, and professional manner. Our ability to respond and support victims is critical.

WOMEN IN COMBAT

Question. The expanding role of women and the implementation of women-in-combat policies in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.

Answer. Prior to 1994, DOD Ground Combat Exclusion Policy prohibited assignment of female servicemembers to units expected to engage in direct ground combat. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 1994 repealed the U.S. Code that supported that policy (10 U.S.C. 6015), and required the armed services to issue policy/orders governing the same. The Secretary of Defense issued a “Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Policy” on 13 January 1994 that took effect on 1 October 1994. In part, that policy states:

a. Rule. Servicemembers are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground, as defined below.

b. Definition. Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel.”

Additionally, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 required DOD and the Services to review all laws, policies and regulations restricting service of female members of the Armed Forces. DOD is expected to provide its report to Congress by October 2011.

Question. What is the current SOCOM policy regarding the role of women in SOCOM operations?

Answer. SOCOM follows the DOD policy. Recently, SOCOM sought and was granted approval from USD(P) to attach females to select SOFs in order to perform activities that are inappropriate for males to accomplish, i.e. assisting in the searching of and engaging with women and children. This approval is in full compliance with established DOD policy.

Question. What is your view about changing the policy to allow female military personnel to be assigned to SOCOM units?

Answer. Many female military personnel are already assigned to SOF units in a variety of roles. In order to explore opportunities to expand the participation of females in operational activities, SOCOM fully supports the DOD’s efforts to review all laws, policies and regulations restricting service of female members of the Armed Forces as directed by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL AWARENESS CAPABILITIES

Question. Deployed special operations personnel are heavily concentrated in the CENTCOM theater of operations, including many who have been deployed outside of their regional area of expertise.

Are you concerned that the language and cultural skills among SOF are being degraded because of repeated deployments outside their regional area of expertise?

Answer. Rotational deployments of units not regionally aligned to the CENTCOM AOR have indeed taken a toll on the language, regional expertise, and culture capabilities of those units for their aligned regions. OPTEMPO limits our ability to retain and retrain for primary areas of responsibility while still preparing for the next CENTCOM deployment. This is being addressed to a degree by our force structure growth, however, that growth places increased stress on our training resources.

OPTEMPO continues to reduce our ability to send mid and senior grade operators to advanced regional education and professional development programs such as Foreign Professional Military Education (FPME) and the Regional Centers program. We
leverage these programs to improve specific regional acuity and cultural understanding.

Over the last year, we have improved as a command with getting operators to Regional Centers, however during the previous 2 years we pulled primarily from the senior grade SOCOM HQ Staff officers due to operational units executing rotational deployments. Therefore, the return on this investment was limited by our decreased ability to send mid-grade operators, with longevity in SOF, to build core capability and form regionally focused relationships.

**Question.** If so and if confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to ensure these unique skills are adequately maintained?

**Answer.** SOCOM set new, higher language capability requirements for its components in 2009. Since then, the SOF Service components significantly ramped up and improved training processes. The HQ, SOCOM also worked recruiting, language proficiency pay, and other policy issues to help facilitate higher capabilities within SOF organizations. Following through on these initiatives and ensuring the resources necessary for their continuation will remain priorities for the Command. The SOF Service components are actively engaged in implementing their programs and SOCOM will continue to engage the Department and Services to this end. Policy issues we continue to pursue include native/heritage recruiting, valuing language and regional capabilities in selections and promotions, language testing and incentives, maintaining DOD funded Defense Language Institute detachments at some of our components, adding SOF specific school billets and funding from the Services for foreign education, and encouraging the Services to award Intermediate Level Education and Senior Level Education equivalency for FPME programs.

**MARINE CORPS FORCES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

**Question.** Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC), is a subordinate component command to SOCOM established in 2005. What is your assessment of the progress made in standing up and growing MARSOC, and what do you consider to be the principal issues that you would have to address to improve its operations?

**Answer.** MARSOC was ordered established in November 2005 and actually activated on February 24, 2006. Since that time, MARSOC has made great strides developing and deploying relevant forces in support of SOCOM and the GCC’s. Support from both SOCOM and the Marine Corps have been good. Even though MARSOC represents only 5 percent on SOCOM’s total force, they have been aggressively employed as they continue their force build. In fact, MARSOC has conducted over 1000 active duty Marine billets, occupy state of the art training and living facilities currently under construction and continue receiving next generation SOF peculiar and Service common equipment. The Military Construction program produced significant mission support capability through delivery of facilities at Marine Corps Bases Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton, with plans to deliver additional facilities to accommodate capacity shortfalls. The interrelated relationship between the Marine Corps and SOCOM not only solidified the Marine Corps role as an equal partner in the SOF community, but also expanded the SOF capacity and capability that our Nation needs at this critical juncture in the war on terror. So, I would assess MARSOC’s progress over the past 5 years as tremendous.

As to the principle issue remaining, I believe that MARSOC’s greatest challenge is the management of its continued growth as it moves toward Full Mission Capability. We currently project that MARSOC will be fully manned with critical skills operators in fiscal year 2014. The 1,001 additional CS and CSS marines previously mentioned will be assigned to MARSOC from fiscal year 2013–2016. This uniformed growth, with an accompanying growth in civilian structure, will allow MARSOC to fully deploy and employ their robust capability of one Marine Special Operations Regiment (consisting of three battalions, each with four companies, with each company containing four teams), one Marine Special Operations Support Group (made...
up of all the Combat Support and Combat Service Support necessary to support MARSOC operations) and one Marine Special Operations School (conducting Assessment and Selection, the Individual Training Course, and follow-on Advanced Courses).

Question. What unique attributes, if any, does MARSOC contribute to the capabilities of SOF?

Answer. MARSOC brings several unique attributes to SOCOM:

1. First, they are marines, and they bring a marine perspective to all their efforts. This perspective, though not easy to quantify, is very valuable and the results speak for themselves. They certainly are very agile and can rapidly reorganize and adapt in order to address new or emerging requirements.

2. Second, MARSOC has been leading the effort to completely integrate Intelligence and Operations at the lowest possible level. To that end, they have task organized their 14-man Marine Special Operation Teams with additional Intel Marines and all the equipment necessary to collect and fuse locally collected intelligence. Their all source intel analysis allows the team to conduct organic, bottom-up targeting/engagement. The local battlespace dominance and distributed operations we see MARSOC conducting in Afghanistan today are proof of the value of this concept and the 1,001 marines being added to MARSOC’s structure include a large number of Intel Marines to further bolster this capability.

3. Third, MARSOC brings a unique Command and Control mindset and capability to SOCOM. As marines, coming from a Marine Air-Ground Task Force background, they are experienced and comfortable with ground elements, aviation elements and logistics elements combined within a single command and adept at tying all these efforts together into a cohesive effort. MARSOC has twice deployed Special Operations Task Force Headquarters to Afghanistan, provided Command, Control, Coordination and Support to Special Operation Forces spread of 100,000 square miles. At the lower levels, Marine Special Operations Companies routinely operate and direct the operations of SEALs, Special Forces and even foreign SOF elements in conjunction with their own inherent teams.

Question. Recently, the Marine Corps approved a primary military occupational specialty (MOS) for enlisted marines trained as special operators allowing these personnel to remain in MARSOC for their professional careers.

Do you believe officers should have a similar opportunity as enlisted marines to serve the duration of their military career in MARSOC rather than rotating through the command as they do currently?

Answer. Officers who attend the individual training course are assigned to MARSOC for a 4 year tour instead of the traditional 3 years. They also receive designation with an additional MOS (0370) to ensure their MARSOC service and training are highlighted in their record. With the 0370 designation, these officers can then be tracked and their records reviewed for the potential of follow on assignments back to MARSOC. However, the number of officers assigned to the operating forces at MARSOC is very small. My initial impression is that retaining certain officers within MARSOC for their entire career would impose some manpower management difficulties on the Service, but the topic is worthy of discussion between myself and the Commandant, particularly as we move closer toward the completion of MARSOC manning in fiscal year 2016.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

Question. In recent years, SOF have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to SOCOM’s Title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities SOFs are carrying out around the world.

What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by SOCOM, and why?

Answer. SOCOM and SOF senior leaders are in the process of reviewing the current list of SOF core activities, as listed in DOD Directive 5100.01, to ensure it captures the “new normal”. The outcome of this review could become the basis for a future update to the Directive and other key documents.

Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?

Answer. SOCOM and SOF senior leaders are in the process of reviewing the current list of SOF core activities, as listed in DOD Directive 5100.01, to ensure it cap-
tures the “new normal”. The outcome of this review could become the basis for a future update to the Directive and other key documents.

Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect SOF missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?

Answer. Indirect SOF missions are part of what the Department now calls foundational activities. The foundational activities which SOF perform have not necessarily lacked emphasis, but rather took a back seat during the last decade as SOF surged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, today we have plenty of resulting pent up demand. Moreover, we expect a future increase in the requirement for SOF to conduct foundational activities, as an evolved defense strategy premised on conflict prevention takes root. Accordingly, I do not see a lack of emphasis as being a future issue for SOF foundational activities. However, appropriate funding and authority are key. First, I believe Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton’s current proposal before Congress to create a Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) that would provide assistance for security forces, rule of law, and stabilization is indispensable to the future success of SOF foundational activities. (Both departments would contribute resources to the GSCF and have a say in its allocation, creating a real incentive for integrated planning and prioritization.) Accordingly, I recommend Congress pass it as proposed in the current legislative session. Second, we appreciate Congress’ ongoing support for section 1206, which we view as one of our most critical tools for building the capacity of partners to conduct counterterrorism operations and fight alongside us in stability operations. Third, increasing the resources at the Department of State for this work is essential. The Foreign Military Financing program provides a structure for long-term partner capacity development essential to future missions, but it is not sufficiently resourced to meet important needs.

MAY 1, 2011, OPERATION IN ABBOTTABAD

Question. The successful operation on May 1, 2011, which resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden, was a significant victory in the armed conflict against al Qaeda and affiliated organizations. What do you view as the most important factors that contributed to the success of this operation?

Answer. The operation was successful due to excellent interagency cooperation, operational security, and the tenacity and flexibility of the operators involved to adjust to any contingency that they encountered.

Question. What steps need to be taken, in your judgment, to ensure that the capabilities of SOF to undertake similar missions in the future are maintained and improved?

Answer. SOCOM must maintain the ability to rapidly take full advantage of cutting edge technology that will allow our SOF operators to gain the edge on an increasingly sophisticated adversary. But developing new technology from scratch is too time consuming and expensive so SOF must continue to be innovative in utilizing and modifying commercial off-the-shelf technology to support our missions. In addition, the key factor in any operation is the operator. Maintaining high standards, challenging training environments, and encouraging ingenuity develops unique and valuable operators. Finally, continuing to break down barriers between the various Agencies and Departments allows for increased cooperation and synchronization, allowing the U.S. Government to successfully accomplish the mission.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations personnel different from those carried out by others in the intelligence community?

Answer. SOF intelligence operations follow all existing policies and regulations guiding DOD and interagency activities. One key difference is the speed of special operations activities. SOF has refined the find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze (F3EA) intelligence cycle to support the cycle rate of SOF activities. The F3EA process is now being migrated to conventional forces. SOF have also placed a premium on sensitive site exploitation (SSE) and the collection and registration of biometrics data from the battlefield. SOCOM elements have developed a series of joint interagency task force nodes, both in deployed areas and in CONUS, that bring together expertise from all our interagency partners. Their specific expertise in SSE, combined with the methodology of the F3EA process, drives special operations on a much faster operational cycle than conventional operations. SOF maximizes interagency con-
tributions through reachback, deconfliction and coordination of activities between agencies, which allow our forces to get inside the enemy's decision cycle.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by SOF are coordinated adequately with other activities carried out by those in the Intelligence Community?

**Answer.** SOCOM will continue to follow all applicable intelligence community directives, report required sensitive activities to the USD(I), maintain the robust intelligence oversight processes in place involving our Inspector General, Staff Judge Advocate, and our Command Oversight Review Board. I will maintain and build upon the relationships developed over time with the numerous Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies represented in our Interagency Task Force in Tampa. Additionally, SOCOM will continue to employ and leverage our liaison officers, which we call Special Operations Support Team members, to coordinate with agencies in the National Capital Region. Interagency collaboration is a significant contributing factor in many of our biggest successes.

### SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL IN EMBASSIES

**Question.** SOCOM deploys personnel to work with country teams in a number of priority countries where the United States is not engaged in direct action operations, but rather trying to stop the spread of violent extremism. Their mission is to support the priorities of the Ambassador and the geographic combatant commander’s theater campaign plan against terrorist networks. At times, Ambassadors have complained that they have not been adequately informed of activities by SOF in their country.

**Answer.** SOCOM has two persistent, strategic avenues to engage with and inform the Embassy leadership of SOF capabilities and operations, the Ambassador Orientation Visit (AOV) Program and the Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO) Program.

The AOV provides future Ambassadors the opportunity to visit SOCOM headquarters, receive briefings on SOCOM unique capabilities and responsibilities, as well as regionally targeted introductions considerate of their newly assigned posts. During the program the ambassadors have a 1-hour one-on-one discussion period with their respective TSOC Commander and a 1-hour session with the SOCOM commander. To date SOCOM has hosted more than 75 ambassador designees. Feedback on the program has been positive and the future ambassadors have indicated that the experience is worthwhile and will help them in the future.

**Question.** Please describe the value of these special operations personnel to their respective Geographic Combatant Commands and the country teams they are supporting.

**Answer.** SOLOs are SOCOM sourced, SOF qualified officers, and placed under Chief of Mission authority as part of the Country Team, via the National Security Decision Directive–38. There are currently 8 serving SOLOs in various countries with 2 more going out summer 2011, for a total of 10 SOLOs working with the U.S. Embassy country teams. These countries were selected based on their proven or potential ability and desire to work SOCOM as partners across the spectrum of special operations missions and goals. The SOLOs serve as the SOCOM Commander’s representative to the country team and host nation SOFs. A prime objective of the SOLO program is improving coordination between the U.S. country team, the TSOC and the host nation. Although the program is still relatively new, all indications are positive. The countries that have SOLOs enjoy a more efficient, direct coordination, and information sharing on SOF specific issues.

### MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

**Question.** DOD recently announced that it was discontinuing use of the term “psychological operations (PSYOP)” in favor of the term “military information support operations (MISO).”

**Answer.** Yes. For some, the term PSYOP unfortunately conjures up images of propaganda, lies or deception—and these inaccurate perceptions limit the willingness to employ MISO personnel in some areas where they could be extremely effective.

To date, there is some evidence that the name change has allowed for some increases in acceptance, cooperation and coordination throughout the U.S. Government and our partner nations.
Question. What operational and doctrinal impacts do you believe such a change will have?

Answer. Replacing the term Psychological Operations with MISO throughout military doctrine, manuals, and other documents is one of semantics. There were no directed changes in doctrine or operational employment of the force.

Question. Do you believe the Armed Forces have sufficient personnel and other assets to conduct the range of military information support missions being asked of them?

Answer. MISO forces and assets, like the rest of the military, are stretched thin with the ongoing operational requirement to the deployed combat forces. This low density force is one of the most deployed in the military which demonstrates the need to increase forces and assets. Under Admiral Olson, SOCOM conducted several reviews to address these issues. One of the first responses to increasing the MISO capability is the reorganization of SOCOM MISO forces. This reorganization will reduce redundancy in commands and allow for the repurposing of numerous positions from staff to operational capability.

Question. Al Qaeda and affiliated violent extremist groups work hard to appeal to both local and foreign populations. The composition and size of these groups in comparison to the U.S. Government permits them to make policy decisions quickly. Do you believe DOD is organized to respond quickly and effectively to the messaging and influence efforts of al Qaeda and other affiliated terrorist groups?

Answer. DOD is well positioned and organized from the strategic level to the tactical to quickly respond to al Qaeda and its affiliates when a quick response is what is needed. But unlike kinetic warfare, effectiveness in the war of ideas does not necessarily lie in outpacing the tempo of our enemies. A steady drumbeat which clearly articulates U.S. policy over time, anchored in the bedrock truth, best serves our national interests. DOD takes its lead from the Commander in Chief and the Department of State, in re-enforcing the message from our Nation. In doing so, we are extremely effective in face-to-face engagements, through a broad array of engagements with our partner and host nations, and allies, on a daily basis. As a representative example, we reinforce our ability to engage with printed products, such as the Geographic Combatant Command’s Regional Magazines and the Geographic Combatant Command’s foreign engagement websites. These mediums allow us a broad range of options.

In addressing al Qaeda, we collectively identify and exploit their miscues and errors, and forcing them into a reactive role to gain the initiative. The DOD in that way, determines the appropriate level of response and quickly coordinates that response with other agencies, and the State Department. Our military commanders have a solid understanding of the impact messaging can have in the strategic environment and exercise authorities with coordinated guidance allowing them broad flexibility to respond in the most appropriate manner.

While shocking video and extremist propaganda constantly reminds us that al Qaeda and their affiliated terrorist groups exercise streamlined and individual messaging—with unencumbered release processes and no mandate for truth—it would appear to give them the ability to address emerging issues, as they see them, at a time and place of their choosing. But recent events suggest that the mainstream is rejecting their propaganda.

Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role for Military Information Support Teams (MIST) in these activities?

Answer. The MIST is the MISO equivalent to the Special Forces operational detachment. The element that executes MISO at the operational and tactical level—but should not be equated to tactical loudspeaker elements that operates in support of combat maneuver forces.

The MISTs develop messages to counter hostile information and propaganda, that are culturally relevant and acceptable to the host national population. Such messaging is closely coordinated with the embassy due to the Team’s relationship in support of the embassy staff. The MISTs also can maintain awareness of the information environment by identifying current trends in local and regional media reporting, identifying hostile messaging, and measuring local populace reaction.

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

Question. Civil affairs (CA) activities carried out by SOF in partnership with host nation personnel play an important role in developing infrastructure, supporting good governance and civil societies, and providing humanitarian assistance, including medical. But veterinary services to needy populations.

In your view, does SOCOM have sufficient personnel and resources to conduct the range of civil affairs missions required for today’s operations?
Civil Affairs activities are most effective when coordinated with other U.S. Government efforts, most notably those carried out by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs activities by special operations personnel are integrated into larger U.S. Government efforts?

**Answer.** MISOs can have an amplifying effect on Civil Affairs activities by actively promoting the efforts of the U.S. military and host nation and by communicating truthful messages to counter the spread of violent extremist ideology among vulnerable populations.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs and MISOs are adequately coordinated to achieve a maximum impact?

**Answer.** I'll start by saying this is a mutually supporting effort where, as you've stated, MISO can and does support, reinforce, and amplify CA efforts on the ground. On the other hand, CA can and does amplify MISO efforts to affect behavior through their on the ground activities. In a nutshell, it's about “words and deeds”—you can't have one without the other, and depending upon the situation one will support or be supported by the other.

Today, we affect this coordination and synchronization through our strategic plans and guidance, where both MISO and CA staff members participate with our strategic planners to ensure, depending upon the situation, activities of both are nested and mutually supporting. This is also true at the TSOCs and GCCs.

On the ground, this coordination and synchronization is achieved through the deployment and organization of cross-functional SOF teams that often include elements of MISO and CA who work together, plan together, and operate together, in coordination with the U.S. Embassy and Country team and JSOTF and/or TSOC commander's objectives.

While there's room for improvement, we believe we're on the right track. We continue to reinforce our efforts for CA and MISO to work more closely and better achieve our population-centric and indirect approach. Starting with a synchronized campaign in coordination with, and often in support of, our U.S. Government civilian interagency partners, CA and MISO have and will continue to improve operations to counter violent extremism as part of U.S. Government strategic objectives globally.

---

**TRAINING CAPABILITY**

**Question.** What capabilities do you consider most important for effective training of special operations personnel?

**Answer.** Professional military education remains an essential element to the development, sustainment, and advancement of SOF. Additionally, language skills and cultural knowledge continue to be key to establishing effective relations with the foreign forces, organizations, and individuals with which SOF will interact.

Maintaining core Special Operations skills are also critical. They provide the base for what makes SOF special.

**Question.** What improvements are necessary, in your view, to enhance training for special operations personnel?

**Answer.** SOF competition for Service installation’s Ground Tactical Ranges and Training Areas with the General Purpose Forces is one of our greatest challenges. Given SOF's OPTEMPO and unforeseen mission requirements SOF needs priority at Service installations over GPFs allowing immediate and unfettered access to ranges and training areas. In the current environment, training time is short and precious.

From a Presentation of Force Perspective, Pre-mission and Pre-deployment training with relevant Service-provided capabilities (e.g. mobility, fires, engineers, etc.) is also critical to ensure that joint SOF packages are effective and fully-enabled. The continued emphasis on language and cultural awareness training is important. SOF have seen remarkable improvements to three key areas since September 11—shooting, moving, and communicating. Now the command must concentrate on “understanding.”

**Question.** What are the most significant challenges in achieving effective training of special operations personnel?

**Answer.** SOCOM must move from a primarily threat-focused approach to a populace-centric approach. To achieve U.S. strategic objectives, the instruments of national power, including the military, and more specifically SOF, must posture for and then execute an approach based on populace-centric engagement. In this approach, the United States competes rivals in the open market of relevant populations as opposed to countering rivals in a more conventional manner based on threat-centric engagement. While emphasizing the need for the indirect approach,
we must not weaken our ability to execute direct action when necessary. To be successful, we must optimize our role with the defense-diplomacy-development construct and design our training programs to maximize our combat capability and make our staffs more effective.

Another challenge is ensuring there is enough time to train in the deployment cycle to maintain proficiency in our core SOF capabilities. Since most SOF missions require non-SOF support, time must be added to work closely with the Service Providers prior to deployment.

**Question.** What, if any, training benefits accrue to SOF from training foreign military personnel?

**Answer.** SOF providing training in regional synchronization, intelligence sharing, planning and coordination for counterterrorism related operations has provided huge benefits. SOF also participates in Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises throughout the world. These exchanges enhance SOF skills and fulfill training requirements. They also build person-to-person and unit-to-unit relationships.

The bottom line is we must continue to develop relationships with our foreign counterparts for persistent engagement, cultural awareness and to maintain SOF instructor and language skills.

**Question.** To what extent, in your view, is it appropriate for the United States to rely upon contractors for training foreign military personnel? What do you see as the primary risks and advantages in such contractor training?

**Answer.** Training of foreign forces, as a general rule, must be conducted as a part of the Department of State title 22 funded Security Assistance or Security Cooperation programs. SOF support to these programs usually does not include the use of contracted personnel. The use of contractors in many cases may make sense from a cost perspective, as well as relieving military assets from these tasks. The risk to SOF in using contracted personnel is the possible disclosure of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) which SOF has developed, and has resulted in our successes on the battlefield. SOF reviews contracts for training to foreign forces to ensure TTPs are protected from disclosure. The problem is trying to monitor contracted training that is being done by other countries for foreign forces. Frequently, former U.S. military personnel accept employment with foreign companies to conduct SOF training. It is very difficult to monitor the disclosure in this case.

Contractors are not a SOF substitute. They should only be used in a support role such as logistics and administration. The risk is they are not military and therefore cannot represent the U.S. Government. The advantages are they free up SOF from routine logistical and admin support functions and allow them to concentrate on operational mission accomplishments.

### Capabilities of Special Operations Forces and General Purpose Forces

**Question.** The 2010 QDR called for increased counter insurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces. What is your assessment of the QDR with regard to the mix of responsibilities assigned to general purpose and SOF, particularly with respect to security force assistance and building partner military capabilities?

**Answer.** SOF have routinely been the force of choice for Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities. However, SOF cannot indefinitely sustain current levels of overseas presence. The resulting pressure on the force and our families is too great and the pressure is creating a dramatic effect on our readiness. All capabilities, including SOF, require foundational activities to make them sustainable. Any comprehensive plan to develop a capability must address these activities base. The General Purpose Force (GPF) maintains the subject matter expertise to deliver most of these foundational activities. The GPF’s primary challenge is the lack of core competence in advising specific skills. The GPF’s challenge in the future will be to effectively institutionalize what they have learned, developing the right capabilities, and establishing effective and responsive policies, processes, and procedures to meet the national security goals with respect to building foundational activities necessary for conflict prevention. Once it is institutionalized across the Department, we feel the development of foundational activities can be accomplished through the appropriate employment of GPF, SOF or SOF/GPF mix.

GPF are best suited for delivering GPF capabilities to foreign military forces in environments where overt U.S. presence is acceptable to the host-country government and where large-scale U.S. presence is considered necessary and acceptable by the host-country government or in areas where a limited overt presence is acceptable to the host nation government. SOF is more appropriate for politically sensitive
environments where an overt U.S. presence is unacceptable to a host country government. These are not hard and fast rules but should serve as general guidelines for the Department.

**Question.** Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to become more like SOF in mission areas that are critical to countering violent extremists?

**Answer.** A key element to countering violent extremists is removing the factors that inspire hatred and discontent, both in their organizations and more importantly, among the populations they recruit. In order to do this effectively, any force, whether SOF or GPF, needs to have an understanding of the culture, and be able to build relationships with the population that promote mutual respect. A key element in the training of SOF personnel is the development of regional and cultural orientation, language capability, and an ability to interact effectively in other cultures. In Afghanistan for example, there are many GPF units currently conducting activities that are traditionally Special Operations and that are important for building Afghan capacity to counter VEOs and raising their standard of living to a point where most incentives to join VEOs no longer exist. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM–A/CSTC–A) has GPF conducting Foreign Internal Defense by training Afghan National Army and Police forces. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are conducting capacity building, medical, and engineering support missions that fall under the heading of Civil Affairs, as well as Information Operations to help the Afghan Government communicate more effectively with its own population. PRTs and other GPF units also conduct Humanitarian Assistance activities.

GPF needs to be more SOF like as it pertains to the Knowledge, Skills and Attributes (KSA) that make SOF effective, such as language, culture, regional expertise, cross-cultural ability, diplomacy, and adaptability. These KSAs will enable the GPF to effectively execute the missions and activities that support SOF, in coordination with SOF or independently to create an environment unfavorable to violent extremist organizations (i.e.: enhanced capabilities to conduct or support missions in foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, stability operations, security force assistance, unconventional warfare, and information operations as outlined in the 2010 QDR). I would also mention that the Services have made great strides in this direction in the last 2 or 3 years.

**Question.** Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for SOF only?

**Answer.** Missions involving the Title 10 SOF Core Activities of Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, and Unconventional Warfare are highly specialized and from a military standpoint SOF should have primacy due to the extensive specialized mental and physical training required and the high degree of risk that the personnel conducting these missions accept.

However, other agencies in the U.S. Government also specialize in some of these missions, particularly Counterterrorism and Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. SOF needs to partner closely with them in the conduct of these operations. Additionally, SOF is best suited for politically sensitive environments, where an overt U.S. presence is unacceptable to the host country government, and to denied environments.

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENABLING CAPABILITIES**

**Question.** The Commander of SOCOM has described the “non-availability” of force enablers as SOCOM’s “most vexing issue in the operational environment.” The 2010 QDR sought to balance previously mandated growth in SOF with additional enabling capabilities.

What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling capabilities facing SOF?

**Answer.** The greatest shortage is in those enabling capabilities not organic to SOCOM’s force structure.

SOCOM’s organic enabling capabilities are those that provide our forces the ability to self-sustain for short durations while maintaining the agility that allows us to deploy forces quickly in support of the combatant commanders. Support of SOF, by doctrine, and except under special circumstances, becomes the responsibility of each Service’s theater logistic command and control structure; Services and/or executive agents should be prepared to support special operations not later than 15 days after SOF are employed.

Shortages of enabling capabilities for SOF are often similar to the shortage of enablers that plague the rest of the deployed force. SOP struggle to obtain enough intelligence, EOD, ISR, communications personnel, medical, and security personnel support.
Question. Do you believe additional enabling capabilities, beyond those mandated by the QDR, are required to support SOF?

Answer. The QDR mandated an increase in the number of organic combat and combat service support assets available to both the Army and Navy special operations units. These capabilities include logisticians, communications assets, forensic analysts, information support specialists, and intelligence experts. We are slowly realizing this programmed growth, and it will make a difference in how our units are supported. The QDR only addresses growth within SOCOM. SOCOM will always rely on the Services for some level of support as addressed in the previous question. Our higher ‘tooth to tail’ ratio when compared to conventional forces will make us dependent on the services for most operations in excess of 15 days.

Question. Do you believe additional enabling capabilities should be grown within SOCOM or provided in support of SOF by the Services?

Answer. Both, but the preponderance of those support capabilities should remain in the conventional force and be provided to SOF through the habitual association of Service combat support and combat service support capabilities with the SOF units they primarily support.

Currently the responsibility of the conventional force to provide sustainment support to SOF is not clearly defined or specified. This limits SOF’s ability to sustain operations.

SOCOM is currently working with its components, the Services and the JS to develop the Special Operation Force Generation process to improve how it requests these critical capabilities. We will work to better define our requirements and make them farther in advance, to allow the Services to plan for the employment of habitually associated units in support of SOF. A reduction of our emergent requests and an increase in habitually associated Service provided capabilities will go a long way to resolve this problem.

Question. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a growing and especially concerning threat to our Nation. Select special operations units are assigned the task of interdicting and rendering-safe weapons of mass destruction should they ever fall into the wrong hands.

If confirmed, how would you ensure render-safe capabilities are adequately maintained by special operations units who may currently be heavily engaged in offensive kill/capture missions against high value targets in Afghanistan and elsewhere?

Answer. Currently, our capabilities are adequately maintained by special operations units. I will continue to use the current training and exercise programs in place. Special operations units participate in the Joint Operational Readiness and Training (JORTS) Cycle that incorporates world-wide deployments, individual training, collective training, and joint exercises (and evaluations) year round.

Question. Do you believe additional render-safe capabilities are needed within SOCOM?

Answer. Yes, but allow me to qualify that answer. As I stated before—our capabilities, training, and exercises are on track. We are abreast of the latest’s threats. However we cannot rest. We must stay in front of the evolving threat through our research and development (R&D) programs. I am grateful for what we have, but as with any program, we are limited by funding. Increased funding for our R&D programs could potentially enhance our current capabilities within SOCOM.

SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMAND

Question. Under certain circumstances and subject to direction by the President or Secretary of Defense, SOCOM may operate as a supported combatant command.

In your view, under what circumstances should SOCOM conduct operations as a supported combatant command?

In your view, what resource, organization, and force structure changes, if any, are required in order for SOCOM to more effectively conduct both supporting and supported combatant command responsibilities?

Answer. The plan of using SOCOM as a supported commander for CT ops was developed soon after September 11. Part of the reasoning was based on the assumption that SOCOM forces would most likely be prominent players in any terrorism-related incident, and also the fact that SOCOM is not limited to any specific area of ops. Additional rational was that the SOCOM Headquarters staff would be best suited to quickly plan any effort that spanned several AORs and/or involved precision timing based on a potential need for near-simultaneous execution against multiple targets. However, during the last 10 years, several real-world scenarios and numerous CT-focused global exercises have not supported the earlier belief that the
Commander, SOCOM, is the best choice for being the supported commander for CT-related ops. In every case, both real-world and exercise, the final decision was to designate the GCC as the supported commanders. Their staffs, each of which includes a TSOC of more than 100 personnel, proved they were able to competently coordinate cross-GCC efforts and there was no need for an added layer of command and control between them and the Secretary of Defense. Also, the Joint Staff has concluded they are capable of executing the planning for any CT-related mission and may only require some SOF augmentation rather than a SOCOM-led effort. I cannot think of any other situation where the Commander, SOCOM, would be the best choice for acting as the supported commander.

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Question. The collaboration between SOF, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?

Answer. We have learned a great deal over the last decade about the strength of collaboration. The organizational innovation of forming small task forces of subject matter experts from across the military, government, and partner nations allowed SOF in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere to synchronize efforts with an efficient agility. These task forces all follow three simple principles: the practice of flattened, agile communications, extensive senior leader involvement across the U.S. Government and allies, and the leveraging of information dominance provided by these subject matter experts and their systems. These principles are our most important lessons learned.

Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?

Answer. As we approach future phases of operations in New Dawn and OEF, these forward interagency task forces will likely relocate and refocus on other regions and priorities. We must preserve the ability for the greater interagency network to support these task forces by asking them to lean their best and brightest to the effort. We must remember that any complex task is best approached by flattening hierarchies. It gets everybody feeling like they’re in the inner circle, so that they develop a sense of ownership.

Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured in military doctrine and adopted as “best practices” for future contingency operations?

Answer. We’re on the right track with doctrinal publications such as Joint Pub 3–08, “Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.” Capturing the best practices of these horizontal interagency teams in future editions is critical.

TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Question. Section 1403 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

In your view, is the prohibition in the best interest of the United States? Why or why not?

Answer. Yes. It is essential that we follow both international and domestic laws regarding treatment of detainees. We do this not only to maintain international respect but also to set the example and to live our values. The way we behave shows how we view individual’s lives. It is who we are.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes, I fully support those standards.


Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes.
**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure that SOF comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

**Answer.** SOCOM ensures that these regulations are followed through unit and individual training, and incorporated into all operational plans, pursuant to law and DOD instructions. I would emphasize their importance, direct continued compliance, and hold those who fail to follow the standards accountable for their actions. Prompt investigation into allegations of abuse and swift action are keys to ensuring strict compliance.

**Question.** What steps, if any, would you take to ensure that those foreign forces trained by our SOF understand the necessity of complying with the Geneva Conventions when detaining and interrogating individuals?

**Answer.** When conducting the training, I would ensure that our SOF personnel continue to explain in clear terms why it is important to follow international laws, treaties, and conventions, and the consequences of failure to abide by them. Additionally, I will make sure that these training opportunities are not just to show them what we do and how we do it, but to also explain why it works. The best thing we can do is set the example and set down our expectations that they should emulate what we do not because we tell them to but because it is the right thing to do. Finally, we make it known that further military assistance and training is predicated on their adherence to the law of war and human rights laws, as required by the Leahy Amendment.

**CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT**

**Question.** In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander of SOCOM?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

**Answer.** Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN**

**SOLAR MICROGRIDS**

1. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral McRaven, for several years, elements of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have supported the development of solar power generators for Special Operations teams deployed in remote areas of Afghanistan, and for the use by the Afghan people through the Village Stability Operations program. The committee understands that two units have been built and forward-deployed for trial and evaluation. A third unit, reflecting input from the deployment of the first two, is now being tested at Aberdeen Proving Grounds before its scheduled deployment to Afghanistan.

   For our Special Operations Forces (SOF), these solar generators could dramatically reduce the consumption of diesel fuel and other consumables such as batteries. As we all know, getting supplies to forces in dangerous remote areas is hard and risky and reducing the number of convoys saves lives. What is your assessment of the utility and maturity of the solar microgrid system that SOCOM has developed?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM deployed the first two of three Mobile Smart Power Initiative Systems to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in late December 2010 as part of a pilot program to evaluate and assess the use of alternative power generation technologies at remote Forward Operating Base locations. The overall objective was to increase energy efficiency and reduce reliance on fossil fuels by our SOF elements deployed at remote Village Stability Platform locations. Operating costs, transport demands, resupply needs, and exposure to improvised explosive devices necessitate the need for alternative power capabilities at remote locations throughout Afghanistan. Thus far, the systems have demonstrated utility at both locations for the stated goals of fuel savings but equally important for village stability operations. At both locations we are supplying power to our SOFs but also to the Afghans village centers and medical clinics. System maturity will increase as we move forward applying lessons learned from the first two systems into a larger third system that will be deployed in August 2011. This third system will offer increased power generation capability and will undergo a similar limited user assessment. We believe solar power along with other fuel saving initiatives have a solid place on the battlefield.

2. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral McRaven, could fielding of solar microgrid systems for the Village Stability Operations program be accomplished using funding from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and/or Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund?

Admiral McRaven. The fielding of Solar Microgrid systems to provide electricity or power generation can be funded from the CERP or the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund.

3. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral McRaven, is SOCOM considering procurement of solar microgrid systems for the use of SOF?

Admiral McRaven. SOCOM investment will be limited to the three initial systems. We will provide our lessons learned to the Service that could best move this type of effort forward into a service common system.

4. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral McRaven, should SOCOM procure these systems or is the command looking to one of the Services to sponsor and fund this acquisition?

Admiral McRaven. SOCOM investment will be limited to the three initial systems. We will provide our lessons learned to the Service that could best move this type of effort forward into a service common system.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN

AL QAEDA

5. Senator Hagan. Vice Admiral McRaven, Secretary-designate Panetta has expressed concern about the shifting of al Qaeda to 'nodes' outside of Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan—most notably in Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa—and the need to keep up the pressure on these nodes. How would you characterize the relative threat these nodes pose to the United States and our allies?

Admiral McRaven. Al Qaeda (AQ), its associated movements (AQAM), and key affiliates (to include AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabaab, AQ in Iraq, and AQ in the Islamic Maghreb) remain the pre-eminent threat to the U.S. Homeland and interests abroad, to include our allies.

While AQ has been unable to perpetuate a “Spectacular” attack against the U.S. Homeland since September 11, the United Kingdom and Spain have suffered AQ-inspired attacks. The failed “Christmas Day Bomber” attempt to bring down an airliner over Detroit, MI, claimed by AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, is proof that AQ Senior Leader guidance to attack western interests and the U.S. Homeland is being adhered to by AQ affiliates around the globe. AQ utilizes modern communications, financial and logistic networks that transcend national borders and boundaries throughout the globe.

U.S. and partner nation Counterterrorism (CT) efforts, supported by SOCOM Forces and the U.S. Interagency (IA), have frustrated AQ’s operations in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility and across the globe; yet AQ’s motivation to attack the homeland is undiminished and their ability to reconstitute their capabilities is remarkable.

The shift of AQ operational nodes to Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa poses challenges for the U.S. in that the United States may have to conduct Security Co-
operation and Security Force Assistance activities to assist these country’s Armed Forces improve their military and security capacity and capability to meet the AQ threat within their borders.

6. Senator HAGAN. Vice Admiral McRaven, do you believe we are applying sufficient resources to address these threats?

Admiral MCRAVEN. We are applying significant resources toward neutralizing al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia, and East Africa. Our shortfalls continue to be manpower and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in support of kinetic operations in these areas. Unmanned ISR is a critical enabler for SOF in these direct action missions. Both the U.S. Central and Africa Commands have done an exceptional job in apportioning the available ISR but, we continue to experience shortages during these missions. Manpower is one of our greatest challenges we have and will continue to face in the future. The demand for SOF worldwide has quadrupled since September 11 and we do not expect this to decrease. SOF can not be massed produced. Our planned growth for manpower within SOCOM is 3–5 percent per year. It is essential that we ensure our forces have the resources that they need to survive and succeed in the complex, ambiguous and often violent environments in which we ask them to operate in.

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT MODIFICATIONS

7. Senator HAGAN. Vice Admiral McRaven, in response to the committee’s advance policy questions, you indicated that you believe modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act are required to provide SOCOM with “greater personnel management authority to shape mid- and senior-grade SOF operators to meet SOCOM’s defined requirements.” In what ways do the Goldwater-Nichols Act and current DOD policies provide insufficient authority to SOCOM to address these issues?

Admiral MCRAVEN. I believe the Goldwater-Nichols Act is one of the most significant pieces of legislation passed by Congress regarding DOD operations and organization. However, it has been 25 years since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols and with the passage of time and an ever changing landscape of threats, I believe it is prudent for DOD to continuously review and innovatively improve our personnel management practices. We must revisit how we manage our personnel in order to guarantee that our system produces the type of leaders needed to succeed in the future operational environment.

8. Senator HAGAN. Vice Admiral McRaven, what specific modifications would you recommend?

Admiral MCRAVEN. I am not prepared now to recommend any modifications, but look forward to reviewing this milestone legislation and assessing whether any modifications should be considered to address the challenges faced in today’s security environment.

TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

9. Senator HAGAN. Vice Admiral McRaven, earlier this year, the Commanders of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) described the debilitating impact of transnational criminal organizations in Central America and Mexico. Appropriately, both commanders indicated the lead U.S. Government agencies for supporting our foreign partners in their efforts to counter the influence of transnational criminal organizations should be U.S. law enforcement and DOS. However, they both indicated that DOD can play an important support and enabling role. Would you support SOCOM and SOF playing a more significant role in support of other U.S. Government departments and agencies in this region?

Admiral McRaven. Clearly the transnational criminal organizations are a threat to our national security that must be addressed through multi-national, multi-agency collaborative efforts. Per direction from the Secretary of Defense, SOCOM forces under the operational control of the NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM commanders currently execute counter-narcoterrorism training of selected partner nations’ security forces in support of those combatant commanders’ theater strategies. While SOF possess additional unique capabilities that could be leveraged against the problem, I would defer to the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to determine what, if any expanded role SOF would have within the context of the whole of U.S. Government and Department of Defense strategy. Should an expanded role be requested and approved, we would support to the extent possible.
10. Senator HAGAN. Vice Admiral McRaven, in your view, what—if any—support capabilities can SOCOM bring to this effort that the geographic combatant commands cannot?
Admiral MCRAVEN. We can bring to this effort the following: an in-depth understanding from a global perspective on Transnational Criminal Organizations networks based on our experience in counterterrorism; a well established relationship of working with law enforcement in forward deployed locations, in the National Capital Region, and through our Interagency Task Force in Tampa; and finally SOCOM can bring a well-honed process to identify lines of effort that should prove effective at disrupting Transnational Criminal Organizations networks.
In conducting our global mission of synchronizing DOD plans and planning for counterterrorism, we recognize the increasing threat posed by this crime-terror-insurgency nexus. SOCOM is uniquely positioned to contribute to the U.S. Government effort against Transnational Criminal Organizations through information sharing with those agencies possessing the authorities to take action. SOCOM has close working relationships with all of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and their subordinate TSOCs on countering these threats.

COUNTER-THREAT FINANCE

11. Senator HAGAN. Vice Admiral McRaven, in response to the committee’s advance policy questions, you indicate you are a strong advocate for counter-threat finance operations. You also indicated that you believe SOCOM might want to explore additional activities in this important area. Can you explain what sort of additional and expanded activities you have in mind?
Admiral MCRAVEN. We need to expand threat finance operations into the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) and develop our capabilities in the collection and processing of threat finance information. Processing means getting the information into the hands of our interagency partners or DOD elements that can operationalize that information. Since threat finance is still a relatively new and sometimes not well-understood addition to DOD operations, expanding threat finance operations/capabilities at the TSOCs may also include assigning experienced threat finance personnel from SOCOM to the combatant commands as needed or requested. Additionally, we need to expand our interaction with our interagency partners. This will enable a broader level of support to Law Enforcement, Treasury and other partners who assist in disrupting the global illicit financial networks. This cooperative work with law enforcement is a logical extension of the effort of SOCOM and the combatant commands. Interagency threat finance operations, supported by DOD worldwide, is a unique combination of authorities to mitigate, degrade and defeat the financial networks that support organizations threatening the United States.

12. Senator HAGAN. Vice Admiral McRaven, transnational criminal organizations in Central America and Mexico are having a debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people. Do you think expanded counter-threat finance activities in this region would be beneficial?
Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, provided they are led by our interagency partners, supported by DOD, and focused toward disrupting the illicit financial flows of the organizations versus High Value Individual (HVI) hunting. We need to emphasize disrupting the movement of illicit capital into, out of, and through such countries as Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Panama, Curacao, and Barbados. In addition, al Qaeda and its allies have expressed an interest in leveraging transnational criminal networks operating through Central America and Mexico into the United States. Disrupting these financial flows can help cripple the transnational criminal organizations, their associated drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), and the financial intermediaries who enable this activity. It can also reduce the possibility that terrorist groups can leverage transnational criminal organizations in Central America and Mexico to conduct attacks in the U.S. Homeland.

NATO SOF HEADQUARTERS

13. Senator HAGAN. Vice Admiral McRaven, during your time as the Commander of the Special Operations component of U.S. European Command, you oversaw the creation of what is now known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization SOF's Headquarters (NATO SOF HQ). In your response to the committee’s advance policy questions, you indicated you are “particularly interested in developing an enduring
relationship” with the NATO SOF HQ. What do you see as the value of the NATO SOF HQ to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan and to broader multilateral military engagements around the world?

Admiral McKRaven: I am indeed very familiar with the NSHQ as I was appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe as the first Director of the NSHQ’s predecessor organization, the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) in December 2006 while concurrently serving at the Commander of the Theater Special Operations Command.

The NSHQ value to the ISAF SOF effort has been nothing short of immense. I say that with first hand knowledge of its impact cognizant of where we started, but also from my more recent vantage point of an operational Commander in Afghanistan. In February 2007, just a few months after the establishment of the NSCC, we led the first NATO Senior SOF leader assessments to Afghanistan where we took many of the NATO SOF Commanders to Afghanistan to ascertain a first hand perspective. This event began a series of NSCC related activities in support of ISAF SOF, but most importantly served as a catalyst for invigorating NATO SOF force generation, which is the NATO process of gaining commitment of NATO SOF forces to the ISAF SOF team.

From 2007 to now, the NATO Allied and Partner SOF footprint in Afghanistan has grown 500 percent to some 2,100 personnel, primarily due to the NSCC/NSHQ support to the NATO Force Generation process managed by the Deputy SACEUR. Additionally, the NSCC/NSHQ has been an essential partner to the ISAF SOF Command over the last several years providing a degree of coherence to the effort that did not exist previously, in fact the current ISAF SOF Commander is the former NSHQ Deputy Commander. Other NSCC/NSHQ support to ISAF dating back to 2007 has included the development of a Strategic Concept for ISAF SOF Capabilities, a second ISAF SOF Assessment in December 2008 at the request of SACEUR, the drafting of a Strategic ISAF SOF Vision and supporting plan, an ISAF SOF Air Assessment, advice and assistance to the broader Afghanistan SOF command and control arrangements, and creation of ISAF SOF Medical information briefings and medical directives.

One of the most significant contributions was the creation of the SOF Fusion Cell, comprised of contributions from the ISAF SOF troop contributing nations and the NSHQ. It is focused on garnering information from in excess of forty different multinational sources and fusing that information to support ISAF SOF Special Operations Task Groups. This is really an unheralded success story that has been an unprecedented success for information sharing among Allied SOF that is difficult to appreciate. It has cut new ground for SOF collaboration that we aim to fully exploit for the future. As mentioned, today, more than 2,100 NATO Allied and Partner SOF are training and advising partnered elite Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) paramilitary units as part of a broader force multiplying/economy of force effort. As mentioned in my testimony, as forces draw down in Afghanistan, one can assume that NATO Allied and Partner SOF will figure prominently in continuing to facilitate the transition to Afghan lead.

In terms of broader global military engagement, the experience of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) is important to the U.S. and to SOCOM because we have seen U.S. leadership of this effort achieve a generational leap forward in NATO Allied and Partner SOF capabilities. We have been able to achieve this by leveraging the unique framework of the NATO Alliance as a vehicle to achieve greater effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence of special operations. Frankly, this is one of the unrecognized advantages or residual benefits of exploiting an Alliance framework. Beyond Afghanistan, the continued evolution of NATO Allied and Partner SOF into a more agile and dynamic force, and capitalization on best practices, will better enable these forces to augment and compliment U.S. national and theater level efforts against enduring challenges such as terrorism and proliferation of WMD.

The breadth of the NSHQ’s involvement beyond the 26 Allies that maintain SOF are also of interest to SOCOM. These evolutionary effects among NATO Allied and Partner SOF also resonate with and influence international SOF well beyond the NATO Alliance via other NATO cooperative mechanisms such as Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, the European Union and NATO collaboration with “contact countries” such as Australia, and New Zealand. The continued maturation and codification of the NSHQ’s Allied and Partner Collaborative Network will allow for comprehensive and sustained engagement among the NATO Allied and Partner SOF “human network,” which is in fact a de facto regional node of SOCOM’s broader Global SOF Network. This SOF human network takes a long view towards fostering deeper and more effective en-
during relationships among SOF, and for this reason, NSHQ is of great interest to SOCOM.

14. Senator HAGAN. Vice Admiral McRaven, if confirmed, how would you seek to build the relationship between SOCOM and the NATO SOF HQ?

Admiral McRAVEN. The Secretary of Defense’s (SECDEF) November 5, 2010, designation of SOCOM as the Lead Component Tasked with Executive Agent Responsibilities for the NSHQ established the framework for the relationship between SOCOM and the NSHQ in accordance with the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act. Specifically, SECDEF charged SOCOM with providing NSHQ with advocacy for resources, personnel, and funding within the Department; establishing the appropriate links with NSHQ to share best practices and lessons learned; creating mechanisms to provide NSHQ with the latest releasable U.S. policy, strategy, operations, tactics, and training for SOF; and serving as interlocutor for NSHQ to the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. So, the basis or foundation for the relationship already exists, and SOCOM has since established a NSHQ Working Group specifically oriented on the NSHQ.

Additionally, myself and ADM Olson both have been habitually engaged and involved in bi-annual NATO Allied and Partner SOF Commanders’ Conferences over the last several years. We have been active members of this growing NATO Allied and Partner Collaborative “human” Network alongside the other national SOF representatives. Indicative of this degree of involvement, in May of this year at the NATO Allied and Partner SOF Symposium in Krakow, Admiral Olson offered to host the next symposium in conjunction with SOCOM’s May 2012 International SOF Week in Tampa. As you can imagine, this is a superb opportunity to diversify our broader global SOF outreach efforts alongside the NSHQ’s annual event and anticipated strong NATO SOF participation.

From a SOCOM perspective, the NSHQ is viewed as a force multiplier, that leverages the unique venue of NATO to effectively and efficiently enhance the capability, capacity, and interoperability of U.S. and NATO Allied and Partner SOF from a centralized hub of influence within the Alliance. U.S. framework nation activities of the NSHQ support U.S. objectives through the construct of the Alliance to achieve commonality of doctrine, procedures, and equipment among NATO Allied and Partner SOF. This is an unprecedented opportunity for SOCOM to participate, lead, and influence where appropriate this aspect of commonality relative to SOF and multinational interoperability. This commonality creates an enduring framework for collective interoperability shaped and influenced by U.S. leadership of the NSHQ, rather than relying on short-term ad hoc solutions. So I think it is beneficial and in our interests to work closely with the NSHQ in these areas that are part of the mandate set forth by the Secretary of Defense. Ultimately, these efforts better posture NATO Allied and Partner SOF to provide world class complimentary capabilities alongside U.S. SOF or independently in support of U.S. objectives relative to contemporary and emerging challenges. Afghanistan is a prime example and the NATO Allied and Partner SOF contribution is not something we take lightly, it is a significant, sizable, and potent SOF element. So again, from a SOCOM perspective, access, influence, and participation in the NSHQ provide a very beneficial venue for a parallel and complimentary line of effort to other U.S. bilateral and multilateral means to build NATO Allied and Partner SOF capacity and capability. As a result, SOCOM will continue to look for opportunities to evolve further, what has been very successful collaboration thus far.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

15. Senator HAGAN. Vice Admiral McRaven, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called for increased counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the General Purpose Forces. These missions have traditionally been within the purview of SOFs. What actions, if any, do you believe need to be taken in order to allow SOFs and General Purpose Forces to successfully share these missions in the future?

Admiral McRAVEN. Doctrinally, all forces may have a role in these missions. Today, General Purpose Forces are participating in these mission sets globally, whether in the lead or in support of SOF. However, by approaching mission planning with a mid- to long-term view of the objectives and an holistic view of force capabilities, planners will increase both their force sourcing and force employment teaming options between General Purpose Forces and SOF for successful mission execution.
16. Senator HAGAN. Vice Admiral McRaven, are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for SOFs only?
Admiral McRAVEN. Counterterrorism and Unconventional Warfare missions should be reserved solely for SOF. In addition, the mission of Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, conducted in a hostile environment, should be reserved for SOF only. However, other SOF core activities, when conducted in politically sensitive areas, should be directed towards SOF as the primary force, supported by General Purpose Forces as required.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS

17. Senator INHOFE. Vice Admiral McRaven, our military-to-military (1206), civilian-to-civilian (1207), small-scale special operations (1208), CERP, and Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund have been incredibly successful in aiding developing nations, fighting terrorism, and providing resources for emergency situations. My belief is that the key to these programs has been the combined efforts of DOD, DOS, the chiefs of mission, and combatant commanders working together to increase the capabilities of our partner nations to provide for their own security, increasing stability in their region and around the globe. What value do these funds provide in your prospective areas of responsibility?
Admiral MCRAVEN. Section 1208 authority, which is specifically for SOF to enable foreign regular and irregular forces directly supporting our combating terrorism operations, has been tremendously useful in Iraq, Afghanistan and other key locations in our efforts to disrupt terrorist networks. The foreign elements that we leverage through section 1208 authority have been crucial in finding and fixing the enemy, resulting in more precise and timely targeting, reduced risk to our forces, and minimal civilian casualties. We have also worked to leverage 1206 authority in areas such as the Philippines to support their counterterrorist activities in Mindanao.

18. Senator INHOFE. Vice Admiral McRaven, do you have any concerns about being able to effectively execute these programs in your prospective areas of responsibility?
Admiral MCRAVEN. SOCOM has and maintains effective processes and procedures to execute these programs as currently established. Each of these programs, however, has specific purposes with limited annual funding that can cause the disaggregation of a holistic plan in order to meet the requirements and purpose of a specific program. 1206, for example, prohibits the training of non-Ministry of Defense forces with the exception of foreign maritime security forces. Many Partner Nations, however, maintain their CT forces outside of their Ministry of Defense. Additionally, there are border security and other paramilitary forces that conduct military tasks relevant to counterterrorism and counter insurgency that SOF or other DOD units would be best suited to train. In order to improve the combined efforts of the DOD, DOS, chiefs of mission and combatant commanders to aid developing countries to fight terrorism, insurgency and trans-criminal organizations; we should appropriately modify these programs that would allow DOD to train and equip all Partner Nation security forces that are conducting traditional U.S. military tasks, roles and missions. This would allow SOF and other DOD assets to improve its effective support to DOS and chiefs of mission initiatives to improve Partner Nations' capabilities to fight terrorism, insurgency and transcriminal organizations in a holistic, proactive manner. Additionally, DOD and the combatant commanders should develop resource informed, multi-year plans that are informed by DOS Mission Strategic Resource Plans that would link initiatives in these programs to more long-term Foreign Military Finance funded programs which would enable measurable phased-in approaches to aid developing countries efforts to fight terrorism, insurgency and transnational criminal organizations. Lastly, improvements to these programs, coupled with mutually supportive interagency plans will be extremely valuable in developing approaches to deal with the aftermath of the “Arab Spring” so that these nations do not fall into the influence of al Qaeda or other like minded extremist organizations.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

COUNTERTERRORISM RESOURCING/AUTHORITIES

19. Senator CHAMBLISS. Vice Admiral McRaven, although highly desired, perfection with respect to counterterrorism has yet to be obtained. While our capabilities have greatly improved since September 11, some security experts speculate that the military personnel charged with combating terrorism are still not properly trained, robustly staffed, or sufficiently resourced to effectively combat all the emerging threats to our national security. What, if any, resources or authorities do you feel the counterterrorism community lacks in order to adequately combat the host of emerging threats to our national security?

Admiral McRAVEN. The military component of the counterterrorist community, specifically the joint SOF for which HQ SOCOM has responsibility, will have adequate resources to execute currently approved plans and missions, if the current Program Objective Memorandum input and the related OCO-to-Base requests are accepted during the DOD budget approval process.

The plans in effect currently have adequate authorities, in law and policy, to pursue the nationally assigned strategic and operational counterterrorism (CT) objectives. We have several major CT plans in development, including the third revision of the DOD global CT campaign plan, and its SOF supporting plan, for which modified or additional authorities may become necessary. However, at the current stage of plan development, it is too early to speculate on specific authorities that may need to be modified or added. As these plans are presented to the Secretary of Defense for guidance during the coming year, any potential new requirements should become more readily apparent.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

20. Senator CHAMBLISS. Vice Admiral McRaven, section 167, title 10, U.S.C., defines 10 activities as “special operations” activities insofar as each relates to special operations. While there is a catchall proviso listed as well, [i.e. “such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense”], given the 2006 realignment of all Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations/Military Information Support Operations (MISO) forces from SOCOM, where they supported both the general purpose force and SOFs, to the U.S. Army Reserve Command, where they now primarily support the general purpose force, should civil affairs and psychological operations have remained on this list of special operations activities?

Admiral McRAVEN. Although frequently coordinated for mutual support and synergy of effect, Civil Affairs (CA) and (MISO previously called Psychological Operations (PsyOp)) are distinct activities and should not be regarded as synonymous. As such, the following responses address each activity separately:

The skill set associated with providing strategic influence capabilities, coupled with the intricacies of foreign audiences specifically in today’s asymmetric warfare, make military information support operations a natural fit with the irregular and unconventional nature of special operations activities. So, the simple answer to your question is “yes”, MISO is a special operations activity and should remain as such. This section does not restrict other DOD components from performing the activities. It is the mission profile and the supported unit that determine whether the particular mission is a conventional or special operation. However, in order for the MISO community to advise on the graduate-level cultural and social nuances required in the current and future operating environment, professional, multi-tiered training and up-to-date technological operating systems are a must. Unfortunately, similar to the dilemma faced by most of our Reserve component, time and other resource constraints force them to focus mainly on tactical missions. Several studies fundamental to this issue are in staffing throughout the Department of Defense. Recommendations from these comprehensive analyses are being validated through a joint and service requirements process, and will provide incremental solutions for this systemic challenge.

CA should be left as is in title 10, section 167 as a special operation activity. Leaving CA as a SOF activity, when conducted by SOF units, increases the scope of activities which SOCOM can pursue as it fulfills its strategic objectives. It allows SOF to expend MFP 11 (SOF) funds to prepare for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations; provides authority for SOF to engage in CA operations consisting of support to civil administration, nation assistance; and complements our direct action capability with more unique missions in the building partnership capacity line of operation designed to reinforce our friends and strengthen their ability to maintain security and stability within their borders.
I do believe, however, that amendments to the U.S. Code may be appropriate to better clarify the role of CA within the Department of Defense. Although it is a key SOF enabler, CA is not a unique SOF capability and is in fact required and used by non-special operations units. CA units are currently used to supplement Provincial Reconstruction teams in theater; historically have been used to provide military governance in an occupied territory with no host nation governance capability in place; and provide an interagency and nongovernmental organization (NGO) link during operations through the establishment of civil military operations centers.

21. Senator Chambliss. Vice Admiral McRaven, given this change of command and control, how do you reconcile the fact that Reserve component CA and Psychological Operations/MISO soldiers continue to perform what is technically defined as a special operations activity without commensurate authorities, training, equipping, or funding when they deploy in support of combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa?

Admiral McRaven. Although frequently coordinated for mutual support and synergy of effect, CA and MISO are distinct activities and should not be regarded as synonymous. As such, the following responses address each activity separately:

Other non-Special Operations DOD entities can, and do, perform section 167 functions. For example, humanitarian assistance is performed by many agencies. Reserve component MISO performs a Special Operations activity with a conventional mission profile, but it is still MISO. They have accomplished their mission with great competence, and have unmistakably contributed to the combat successes of their supported units operating under authorities derived from the supported Geographic Combatant Commander.

CA is not solely a SOF function. The wording of section 167 states that CA is a Special Operations Activity “insofar as it relates to special operations.” CA units are conducting Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) outside of SOF, and the need for them to do so in support of non-SOF units and operations is indisputable. I would note that the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy both operate a CA capability which is conventional, not SOF unique. The Marine Corps has operated their conventional Civil Affairs Groups (CAG) since 1985.

CA is inherently joint, interagency, and multinational in scope for planning and operations and is critical to both special and conventional operations and forces. CA is not just a capability required by SOF, it is a capability required by all. CA units conduct the same core missions whether assigned to a SOF or conventional unit; however, each employs this capability in different operating environments. SOF units work in austere, often sensitive areas which require special training and preparation while CA units in conventional forces support conventional warfare operations. For example, SOCOM operates a Civil Military Engagement program which uses SOF CA teams to compliment and enable select U.S. Embassy Mission Strategic plans in conjunction with U.S. Country Teams. These teams work in austere, politically sensitive, or strategically critical areas to further the goals outlined in the strategic plans.

There are two ways ahead for the CA capability. Clarification is needed in the law to define CA as not just a Special Operations Activity, but a core activity for non-SOF military forces as well. Second, the man, train, and equip mission for CA should not reside in a SOF organization. The Services should have this mission for their respective CA forces in their force structure. This will require them to provide guidance, combat development, and authorities needed for them to execute their conventional missions for their Service and the Joint Force as codified in current strategy and guidance documents. SOCOM will focus on those CA units assigned to us and ensure they receive additional SOF specific equipment, training, or guidance needed to support SOF.

22. Senator Chambliss. Vice Admiral McRaven, does this apparent statutory discrepancy need to be addressed or clarified?
Admiral McRaven. Although frequently coordinated for mutual support and synergy of effect, CA and MISO are distinct activities and should not be regarded as synonymous. As such, the following responses address each activity separately:

Activities listed in section 167 are each special operations activities insofar as they relate to special operations. Therefore, when conducted by SOF units they are special operations, when conducted by non-SOF units they are not. It simply provides authority for SOF to conduct missions like MISO and expend MPF–11 funds to do so. Amendments to the U.S.C. may be appropriate to better articulate the role and responsibilities when these activities are performed by non-SOF units.

I do not believe that section 167 should be amended to remove CA as a special operations activity. It should remain as it provides authority for SOF to conduct CA missions and spend MPF–11 funds on CA units assigned to SOF.

The current wording of section 167 clearly and unambiguously states that CA “insofar as it relates to special operations” is a Special Operations Activity. Therefore, all other CA activities conducted by non-SOF units are not in the SOF purview since they are conducting conventional operations outside the SOCOM operational chain. Likewise, if the 95th CA Brigade (A) units are performing CA operations and activities in support of a SOF mission, it is clearly a special operations activity since they reside in the operational SOCOM chain.

I do believe that amendments to the U.S.C. may be appropriate to better articulate the role and entities responsible for CA outside of SOCOM. CA is not a unique SOF capability, and is in fact required and used by non-special operations units. CA units are currently used to supplement Provincial Reconstruction Teams in theater; historically have been used to provide military governance in an occupied territory with no host nation governance capability in place; and provide an interagency link during operations through the establishment of civil military operations centers.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

FACIAL RECOGNITION SYSTEM

23. Senator Wicker. Vice Admiral McRaven, I understand there is a need for collecting and processing real-time intelligence in the field where the presence of bandwidth may be limited or non-existent. Do you believe there is a need for a lightweight, portable, real-time facial recognition system which can recognize and record enemy combatants in a matter of seconds, inconspicuously at a standoff distance without the use of bandwidth?

Admiral McRaven. Yes, this could be a useful capability, but it is not a top priority. Facial recognition is not on our top 10 list of Identity Management Technical Development Priorities. Special Operations Development and Acquisition Science and Technology Division tracks, researches and evaluates emerging technologies for SOF development. Facial recognition technologies are still considered an immature and inaccurate means of obtaining a positive identification. Operational deployment of unconstrained facial recognition technology will introduce significant deviations in subject control, impacting image quality and performance. Therefore, facial recognition at a distance is still considered a “soft biometric”, and will not be relied upon for positive identification in a tactical decision scenario. SOCOM anticipates this technology will be operationally viable within the next 5 to 7 years. Meanwhile, a stand-off capability could add value as a triage tool for identifying potential targets at long distances.

Current Facial Recognition Capability: SOCOM and other DOD organizations submit facial photos of persons of interest to the DOD Automated Biometrics Identification System (ABIS). ABIS includes a facial recognition capability that produces a list of potential matches when queried which then must be manually reviewed by a skilled examiner to determine a match/no match. Since January 29, 2009, SOCOM has received the following facial recognition matches:

- Face Only: 219
- Face, Finger, Iris: 4477
- Face and Iris: 115
- Face and Finger: 1996

There were 78,738 total biometric matches during this timeframe, so face was involved in ~9 percent of total matches.

The SOCOM Sensitive Site Exploitation Capabilities Development Document v.2, dated October 30, 2009, outlines the current requirements for a tactical facial recognition capability.
24. Senator WICKER. Vice Admiral McRaven, if it does not already, should an operational requirement for such a system exist?
Facial Recognition states: "Provide a ruggedized means to collect digital facial images at the minimum required resolution (currently five megapixels) and store images using the approved format (currently JPEG or JPEG 2000 format.) Objective capability would be a standoff facial recognition/geometry capability utilizing digital photographic capture technology of a person at 300 meters, and have it cross referenced with facial recognition software. It should interoperate with existing SOF software platforms."

[The nomination reference of VADM William H. McRaven, USN, follows:]

**Nomination Reference and Report**

*As in Executive Session,*

**Senate of the United States,**

April 6, 2011.

*Ordered,* That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Navy to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under Title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

*To be Admiral*

VADM William H. McRaven, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of VADM William H. McRaven, USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

**Biographical Sketch of VADM William Harry McRaven, USN**

06 Nov. 1955 ........ Born in Pinehurst, NC
08 June 1977 ........ Ensign
08 June 1979 ........ Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 July 1981 ......... Lieutenant
01 Jan. 1987 ......... Lieutenant Commander
01 Sep. 1991 ......... Commander
01 Apr. 1998 ........ Captain
01 Aug. 2004 ....... Rear Admiral (lower half)
23 July 2006 ......... Designated Rear Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade
01 June 2007 ......... Rear Admiral
13 June 2008 ....... Vice Admiral, Service continuous to date

*Major duty assignments:*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NROTC Unit, University of Texas (DUINS)</td>
<td>May 1977</td>
<td>July 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, San Diego, CA (DUINS)</td>
<td>July 1977</td>
<td>Jan. 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Special Warfare Unit One (Intelligence Officer)</td>
<td>Feb. 1980</td>
<td>Feb. 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAL Team Six (Team Leader)</td>
<td>Feb. 1982</td>
<td>Mar. 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS Speigel Grove (LSD 32) (Officer in Charge of Special Warfare Detachment for Units XXTV)</td>
<td>Apr. 1983</td>
<td>Oct. 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group One (Special Projects Officer)</td>
<td>Aug. 1988</td>
<td>Dec. 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XO, SEAL Team One</td>
<td>Dec. 1988</td>
<td>June 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (Assistant Current Operations)</td>
<td>June 1990</td>
<td>May 1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assignments From To

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (DUINS)</td>
<td>June 1991</td>
<td>June 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (Training and Readiness Officer)</td>
<td>June 1993</td>
<td>June 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, SEAL Team Three</td>
<td>June 1994</td>
<td>June 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group One (Chief of Staff)</td>
<td>June 1996</td>
<td>Oct. 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (Division Chief and SOCOM Strike Assessment Director)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group One</td>
<td>Oct. 1997</td>
<td>Sep. 1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Medals and awards:
- Defense Superior Service Medal with Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
- Legion of Merit with one Gold Star
- Bronze Star with one Gold Star
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Joint Service Commendation Medal
- Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal
- Combat Action Ribbon
- Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
- Navy “E” Ribbon
- National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
- Southwest Asia Service Medal with three Bronze Stars
- Afghanistan Campaign Medal
- Iraq Campaign Medal
- Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
- Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
- Sea Service Deployment Ribbon
- Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon
- Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
- Kuwait Liberation (Kuwait)
- Rifle Marksmanship Medal with Silver “E”
- Pistol Marksmanship Medal with Silver “E”

Special qualifications:
- BJ (Journalism) University of Texas, 1977
- MA (National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, 1993
- Designated Special Warfare Officer, 1978
- Designated Joint Specialty Officer, 2003
- Capstone, 2006–2
- Designated Level IV Joint Qualified Officer, 2009

Personal data:
- Wife: Georgianne Brady of Dallas, TX
- Children: William B. McRaven (Son); Born: 13 March 1979
- John E. McRaven (Son); Born: 13 January 1982
- Kelly M. McRaven (Daughter); Born: 3 February 1991

Summary of joint duty assignments:
The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. The form executed by VADM William H. McRaven, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
   William H. McRaven.

2. **Position to which nominated:**
   Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

3. **Date of nomination:**
   April 6, 2011.

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
   November 6, 1955; Pinehurst, NC.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Georgeann Brady McRaven (Maiden name: Brady).

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   William Brady McRaven, age 31.
   John Emory McRaven, age 28.
   Kelly Marie McRaven, age 19.

8. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Underwater Demolition Team/Seal Association.
11. **Honors and awards**: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

None beyond what’s listed in my Service record.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees**: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

13. **Personal views**: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN.

This 16th day of March, 2011.

[The nomination of VADM William H. McRaven, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 29, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2011.]

[Prepared questions submitted to LtGen John R. Allen, USMC, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow.]

**Questions and Responses**

**DUTIES**

**Question.** What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)?

**Answer.** The Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) is the senior NATO uniformed officer in Afghanistan. He is the in-theatre operational commander of all ISAF forces in Afghanistan and is tasked with: (a) employing assigned forces and conducting population-centric counterinsurgency operations; (b) enabling an expanded and effective ANSF capable of fighting their own counterinsurgency; (c) providing support to governance and development efforts to protect the Afghan people and to provide a secure environment for sustainability; and (d) evaluating ISAF security, governance, and development support activities.

ISAF is a NATO-directed operation conducted under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 (2001), which authorizes the establishment of ISAF to assist the Afghan Government in maintaining security in Kabul and surrounding areas and to take all necessary measures to fulfill this mandate.

Following a United Nations (U.N.) and NATO/North Atlantic Council agreement, NATO assumed strategic command of ISAF on 11 August 2003 under the authority of UNSCR 1386 and successor UNSCRs. Subsequently, UNSCR 1510 (2003) geographically expanded the ISAF mandate established in UNSCR 1386 to cover all of Afghanistan.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR–A) and how do those duties and functions relate to those of the Commander, NATO ISAF?
Answer. The Commander of USFOR–A is the senior U.S. officer in Afghanistan with duties distinct from his duties as Commander, ISAF. Commander, USFOR–A exercises National Command Element and National Support Element authorities and responsibilities ensuring that U.S. forces have the guidance, equipment, and funding they need to conduct their missions. He ensures unity of effort among all U.S. forces including those under the ISAF command and those forces not under ISAF command, such as those U.S. forces conducting U.S. detention operations and U.S. counterterrorism operations.

COMISAF employs the forces that troop-contributing nations provide to ISAF. The United States remains the largest troop-contributing nation to ISAF. The Commander, USFOR–A, directs and oversees the U.S. military contributions within ISAF. COMISAF ensures that the operations of all troop-contributing nations, including those of U.S. forces, are coordinated.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. Since the chain of command for the Afghanistan theater runs through Central Command (CENTCOM), as the Deputy Commander of CENTCOM from 2008–2011, I had the opportunity to work very closely on Afghanistan. During that time, I traveled to Afghanistan multiple times as well as other countries in the CENTCOM Area of Operations, including Pakistan. As a result, and if confirmed, I believe I understand Afghanistan and the region and also believe that my personal relationships with senior military and government leaders in the region will contribute to my ability to perform my duties at ISAF.

I also served as the deputy commanding general of the II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) when it deployed to Iraq’s Anbar Province from 2007–2008. That experience not only prepared me for battlefield command and the harsh reality of war, but it also taught me a tremendous amount about the nature of this kind of conflict and the complex challenges unique to counterinsurgencies. This was driven home in particular during the ‘Anbar Awakening,’ which occurred during my time in Iraq.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, NATO ISAF, and/or Commander, USFOR–A?

Answer. I believe that a professional military officer should never stop learning. I believe that my experiences have prepared me for this position, but, if confirmed, I will constantly educate myself about the strategic environment so that I can lead a force that is resilient and adaptive to the ever-changing battlefield—key requirements in this kind of conflict.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, NATO ISAF/Commander, USFOR–A, to the following:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Commander, USFOR–A reports to the Commander, CENTCOM who, in turn, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. This reporting relationship is prescribed in 10 U.S.C. Section 164(d)(1). COMISAF does not have a formal relationship with the Secretary of Defense because COMISAF reports to the NATO chain of command (Commander, Joint Forces Command-Brunssum), who reports to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The Commander, USFOR–A does not have a formal command relationship with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he coordinates with him through the Commander, CENTCOM, on a regular basis. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. Although he is the Nation’s senior military officer, the Chairman is not in the chain of command. The Commander, USFOR–A sends his advice and opinions on military operations to the Commander, CENTCOM who, in turn, presents them to the Chairman.

Question. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Answer. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, is the NATO strategic-level commander of all NATO forces, including those assigned to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. He provides Commander, Joint Forces Command Brunssum (JFC–B), with strategic guidance and direction. JFC–B is NATO’s operational level command that is responsible for the mission in Afghanistan. In turn, Commander, JFC–B, directs COMISAF with respect to SACEUR’s and JFC–B’s campaign objectives and COMISAF’s performance of key military and supporting tasks, as mandated by the North Atlantic Council.
Question. Commander, U.S. Central Command.
Answer. The Commander, USFOR–A works very closely with the Commander, CENTCOM on all aspects of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. By law, the Commander, USFOR–A reports directly to the Commander, CENTCOM. The Commander, CENTCOM exercises authoritative direction and control over all U.S. Forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, which includes all U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. The Commander, CENTCOM provides authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics. He has delegated National Command Element and National Support Element authority and responsibilities to the Commander, USFOR–A.

Question. Commander, NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan/Commander, Combined Transition Command Afghanistan.
Answer. Commander, NTM–A/CSTC–A reports to COMISAF/Commander, USFOR–A. NTMA/CSTC–A is a subordinate HQ to both HQ ISAF and HQ USFOR–A. The CSTC–A element retains its U.S.-only character primarily for funding and administrative authorities, and responds to the U.S. chain of command. The NAC established NTM–A in April 2009, and it was merged into CSTC–A in March 2010 under a dual-hatted commander.

Question. Commander, ISAF Joint Command.
Answer. Commander, ISAF Joint Command (IJC), reports to COMISAF. IJC is ISAF’s operational-level command and is subordinate to HQ ISAF. IJC was established in November 2009. The IJC Commander is also dual-hatted as the Deputy Commander, USFOR–A, and retains certain U.S. command authorities.

Question. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.
Answer. The Commander, USFOR–A provides operational assistance and advice, to include U.S. military views and recommendations, to the U.S. Ambassador. He maintains a close working relationship with the Ambassador to ensure that military and civilian efforts are synchronized and mutually supporting. This is particularly important in the Rule of Law arena where the Department of State has the lead for the U.S. Government. The Commander, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 (who reports directly to the Commander, USFOR–A), provides support to the Ambassador for Rule of Law and Law Enforcement, who reports directly to the U.S. Ambassador.

Question. The Secretary General of NATO.
Answer. The NATO Secretary General chairs the North Atlantic Council, the highest political authority in NATO, responsible for the overall decisions and direction of NATO policy and operations. The North Atlantic Council is comprised of ambassador-level representatives of all NATO members, including the United States. The Council is advised on military matters and the conduct of operations by the Military Committee, which is also composed of senior military representatives from each member state. The Council, under the Secretary General’s leadership, provides overall direction and guidance to the military chain of command. In practical terms, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) leads all NATO military operations and advises NATO’s Military Committee. Thus, in the case of the ISAF mission, the Secretary General, following consultations and decisions by the North Atlantic Council, provides guidance and direction to SACEUR through the Military Committee, and the SACEUR communicates those directives and guidance through NATO’s military chain of command. COMISAF and the Secretary General confer and consult regularly, including formal updates to the Secretary General and the North Atlantic Council on the progress of military operations in Afghanistan.

Question. NATO Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan.
Answer. The NATO Senior Civilian Representative-Afghanistan (SCR) is the civilian counterpart to COMISAF. As the NATO Secretary General’s direct representative in Afghanistan, the SCR is charged with carrying forward the political aspects of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan. Although there is no formal command relationship, the SCR and COMISAF work in close concert and with full transparency following the North Atlantic Council approved Terms of Reference for the SCR and SACEUR and Commander JFC–B’s guidance for COMISAF. In short, this cooperative relationship is critical to underwrite NATO’s operational military and political engagement in Afghanistan and can help to improve cooperation between ISAF and international civilian agencies in Afghanistan.

Question. United Nations Special Representative in Afghanistan.
Answer. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Afghanistan is an important leader in the international community’s efforts in Afghanistan. While no command relationship exists between COMISAF and the UN SRSG, the ISAF mission was authorized by U.N. Security Council Resolution to assist the Afghan Government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. Simi-
larly, the UN SRSG has a mandate to lead the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in supporting the Afghan Government in its efforts to improve critical areas, including security, governance, economic development, and regional cooperation, as well as to support the full implementation of mutual commitments made on these issues at the London Conference in January 2010 and the subsequent Kabul Conference in July 2010. The SACEUR Operational Plan states that COMISAF is expected to work in close coordination with both the NATO SCR and the U.N. SRSG. These partnerships support efforts to work with the Afghan Government to ensure progress towards the goal of a self-sufficient Afghanistan.

AFGHANISTAN–PAKISTAN STRATEGY AND MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In his speech at West Point in December 2009, the President formulated his strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Do you agree with that strategy?
Answer. Yes.

Question. What are the major challenges and problems you foresee, if confirmed as the next Commander, NATO ISAF/Commander, USFOR–A, in the implementation of that strategy?
Answer. Significant challenges will persist in Afghanistan. Among them, the Taliban will seek to recover lost ground, particularly in the south and southwest. Insurgent organizations such as the Haqqani network will continue to threaten our ability to secure some of the population in the east and will also seek to conduct high-profile attacks in the capital region. Transnational terrorist groups such as al Qaeda will seek to establish new bases and safe havens in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Corruption and other challenges to good governance will need to be addressed. Finally, although the mission is on track, there will be challenges as we build the Afghan National Security Forces to the point where they can assume full responsibility for Afghanistan’s security.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?
Answer. We must continue to focus on protecting the population, degrading the insurgency, and developing Afghan Security Forces that can assume more responsibility. Additionally, we have to continue—and, in some cases—expand our efforts on issues ranging from security to good governance and Rule of Law. For example, we have to continue building layered defenses to prevent insurgent infiltration from Pakistan and we also have to continue working with our Afghan partners to address corruption. If confirmed, I will work closely with international, Afghan, and Pakistani partners on all lines of effort of the campaign plan to maintain and accelerate the momentum that our campaign has generated.

Question. On June 22, 2011, the President announced his decision regarding the beginning of reductions of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and the size and pace of reductions through 2012. Do you agree with the President’s decision to begin reducing U.S. forces in July 2011? Why or why not?
Answer. Although I was not a participant in the discussions about the various options, I agree with the President’s decision to begin reducing forces. The troops that will be redeployed in July represent the fulfillment of the President’s commitment to both resource the strategy he enunciated at West Point but also to demonstrate to Afghan leadership the urgency of increased Afghan National Security Force strength and capability to assume its proper role in securing Afghanistan. In the context of our longer-term goal of transitioning security responsibility to Afghans by the end of 2014, this reduction reflects an inflection point alongside the commencement of transition, scheduled to begin next month.

Question. Do you agree with the President’s decision announced on June 22nd regarding the size and pace of reductions in U.S. forces? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the President’s decision. Of course, I will constantly monitor and assess the situation on the ground and, should I determine the situation has changed, I will so advise my chain of command through the proper channels.

It is also important to bear in mind that, even once the surge forces are removed, there will still be more than 68,000 U.S. troops and thousands of international forces in Afghanistan—not to mention the addition of some 70,000 Afghan forces, which will join the fight during the next 15 months. At the same time, the international community has demonstrated its intention to support Afghanistan until at least 2014, and the United States and NATO are both discussing some form of long-term partnership relationship with Afghanistan. I believe this reality sends an im-
important message of commitment to the Afghan people, as well as a sense of urgency that the Afghans must take on more responsibility for securing their own country.

SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan and the nature, size, and scope of the insurgency?

Answer. Based on my understanding of the situation on the ground, I believe that the momentum that the insurgency enjoyed for a number of years has been halted in most of the country and reversed in many key areas. For example, violence is 5 percent lower so far this year in comparison to last year, and it is down 40 percent in Regional Command Southwest. Obviously, we are facing a very resilient insurgency that has demonstrated continued lethal capacity as well as the ability to regenerate over time. That said, the ongoing maturation of Afghan National Security Forces, combined with the beginning of transition in July, should help to further pressure the enemy by degrading support networks and further reduce support for the enemy among the Afghan population. We and our Afghan partners still face numerous challenges, and there will be more tough fighting in the years ahead as we transition security to Afghan lead by the end of 2014.

Question. In your view, what is the impact of the death of Osama bin Laden on the security situation in Afghanistan?

Answer. We do not yet know what effect, if any, bin Laden’s death will have on enemy operations and morale among insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially at the operational and tactical level. The reality is that we still face very resilient enemies who will continue to try to establish safe havens from which they can expand their influence and from which they can target the governments, forces, and people of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the forces and diplomats of all of the Nations contributing to the mission.

TRANSITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

Question. In March, President Karzai announced the first tranche of provinces and municipal districts designated for the transition of lead responsibility for security to the Afghanistan security forces. The transition of security responsibility in these areas is to begin in July and be completed by the end of 2011.

Do you support the process established by NATO and the Government of Afghanistan for designating areas for transition of security lead to the Afghan Security Forces, including an initial round of transition to be completed by the end of 2011?

Answer. Yes, I believe that the comprehensive, collaborative process established to identify areas for transition is working as intended. If confirmed, I will look closely at our transition planning and implementation and make any changes I believe will increase the effectiveness of the process. The first tranche is on schedule to begin transition next month, and I support moving forward with the timelines that have been established. As the first tranche begins to transition, there will likely be lessons learned that can be incorporated into future transition planning and implementation.

Question. What is your assessment of the capacity of the Afghan Security Forces to assume the lead for security in the areas designated for this initial round of transition?

Answer. Based on my understanding of the current size and capability of Afghan Security Forces, I believe that Afghans are prepared to assume the lead for security in the areas designated in the first tranche. In some cases, such as Kabul and Parwan, Afghan Security Forces are already in the lead and have been for some time.

BUILDING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Question. There are approximately 100,000 more Afghan soldiers and police now than there were in November 2009. The strategy for training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) calls for growing the Afghan National Army (ANA) to a level of 171,000 and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to a level of 134,000 by October 2011. In addition, a new ANSF target end-strength has been set of 352,000 by 2012.

In your view, are the target end strength levels for the ANA and ANP sufficient to provide security and stability in Afghanistan?

Answer. If the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board approves the 352,000 ANSF target end-strength, then I believe the ANA and ANP should be capable of achieving the goal outlined at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit of Afghans in the lead for security by the end of 2014. However, as the NATO Secretary General has
stated, the training mission in Afghanistan will likely extend beyond our combat mission as part of an enduring partnership with Afghanistan.

Question. What in your view are the greatest challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF to assume responsibility for Afghanistan’s security?

Answer. Based on my understanding, there are five main challenges to building ANSF capacity.

Leadership: Leader development is one of our top priorities since good leadership provides the foundation upon which any organization develops and improves. Even though we have significantly expanded leadership training and development efforts, there are still shortfalls, especially since it takes substantially more time to train, educate, and develop leaders. With the growth of the force over the last year, the training mission has been able to focus more efforts on leader development as well as professionalization across the force.

Attrition: Attrition within the ANSF continues to be a challenge. Through ISAF’s partnership with the ANSF at the ministerial and unit levels, there has been some success at reducing attrition rates. If confirmed, I will ensure that ISAF continues to work with our Afghan partners to address this problem and to develop new initiatives to reduce ANSF attrition.

Insider Threat: To safeguard against infiltration and co-option by insurgents, the ANSF has developed a multi-layered defense, which starts with an eight-step vetting process for all new recruits joining the police and army. The addition of Afghan counter-intelligence personnel into the formations, as well as additional education and training on identifying threats, is intended to minimize this risk.

Logistics: Logistics and maintenance capabilities are required to ensure ANSF can sustain itself over the long-term, which is particularly important as Afghans assume more responsibility for security. We are working with the Afghan Government to field these enabling forces, but developing these specialized skills is complex and timeconsuming.

Literacy: Literacy is the essential enabling factor for professionalization of ANSF, although it is a challenge in a nation with a 15 percent literacy rate. Since November 2009, over 100,000 ANSF have completed some level of literacy training, and we have increased these efforts recently, with some 70,000 ANSF in literacy training on any given day. Training is focused on developing the basic ability to read and write so that ANSF can, for example, properly account for material, write reports, and read pay statements.

Question. There remains a shortfall in the number of training personnel required for the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM–A), in terms of both institutional trainers and embedded training teams, the so-called Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police OMLTs (POMLTs).

What is your understanding of the current shortfall in NTM–A institutional trainers and OMLTs and POMLTs?

Answer. There is currently a shortfall of 490 NTM–A institutional trainers, which is a significant improvement over the last few months. Despite additional pledges at the ISAF Force Generation Conference in May, we remain short of OMLTs and POMLTs, particularly in Regional Commands North, West, and Central. The partnering shortfall within the Afghan National Army remains at 10 units (Turkey has offered an additional OMLT for 2nd Brigade HQ, 111th Capital Division, which may alleviate some of these shortfalls). ISAF Joint Command is examining ways to potentially thin partnering relationships with more capable army units to mitigate these shortfalls. With the Afghan National Police, there is a shortfall of 88 units in Key Terrain Districts and Areas of Interest. There is an additional shortfall of 137 POMLTs in low priority locations, and we are looking at ways to reduce this shortfall using non-military assets.

Also of note, these shortfalls reflect 305,600 ANSF end strength; when the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board meets later this year, it is expected to endorse the growth of the force to 352,000 personnel, which may impact the nature, if not the number, of required OMLTs and POMLTs. Given the importance of the training mission to the overall campaign, filling all of these shortfalls is critical to the long-term success of our operations.

Question. Are there additional steps that you believe could or should be taken to get NATO and other coalition partners to provide more institutional trainers?

Answer. Training shortfalls are a longstanding issue best addressed by continued engagement with our partners by all elements of the U.S. Government—including Congress—as well as by NATO/SHAPE HQ, HQ ISAF, and representatives of the NATO training mission. Contributing nations who have operational commitments should be encouraged to reinvest any combat troop reductions with trainers, especially ones with specialized skills such as police, logisticians, medical and mainte-
nance specialists. Even as we solicit more trainers, we are also developing more Afghan trainers, which allows us to remission coalition trainers.

Question. Are there additional steps that you believe could or should be taken to encourage NATO and other coalition partners to meet the requirements for additional OMLTs and POMLTs?

Answer. As noted above, continuous engagement by all elements of the U.S. Government as well as NATO and other relevant organizations represents the best chance of generating more OMLT and POMLT pledges.

PARTNERING WITH AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES

Question. A key component of efforts to build the capacity of Afghan Security Forces is partnering ANSF units together with ISAF units in the field. A recent Department of Defense (DOD) report states that field reports suggest that a partnership ratio of greater than three ISAF personnel to one ANSF personnel “reduces the effectiveness of the ANSF’s participation” and that “ANSF are more motivated and, hence, more effective when the partnership ratio [between ISAF and ANSF personnel] is closer to even.”

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of partnering for building the capacity of the Afghan Army and Afghan police?

Answer. The process and practice of partnering is critical to building the capacity Afghan Security Forces so that Afghans can assume the lead for security across the country by the end of 2014. Over the past year and a half, we have made significant strides with our baseline training. At the same time, we have focused substantially on increasing our partnership efforts since this has proven to be the most effective way of increasing Afghan capability, confidence, and professionalism in the field. In fact, we have seen the most rapid improvements in our Afghan counterparts in places where we have higher partnering ratios and where our troops live and fight alongside their Afghan partners. It is also worth noting that partnering increased our own effectiveness since Afghan forces understand the human and cultural terrain in ways that we do not.

Question. Do you believe that the partnering of ISAF and ANSF forces can move to a partnership ratio below 1:1 (fewer than 1 ISAF soldier for every ANSF soldier) as the capability of Afghan Security Forces improves?

Answer. Yes, that is precisely what we intend to do as we transition security responsibility. Over time, we will move from partnered operations, to operations with Afghans in the lead with our forces in support, to operations where we are in a strategic over-watch position. For example, we would help offer advice on planning and enabling, but Afghans would carry out the operation by themselves. Eventually we plan to move to complete Afghan control. Many units are already below a 1:1 partner ratio, and there are increasingly more areas where Afghans are in the lead or operating independently. For example, Afghans have assumed more responsibility as our forces have thinned out in parts of the central Helmand river valley, and Afghan forces comprise the majority of forces around Kandahar City. In Kabul Province, Afghans lead almost all operations.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Afghanistan, and the proper relationship between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations there?

Answer. SOF in Afghanistan are a vital component of our overall counterinsurgency strategy, and play many critical roles in our overall campaign. Special operations strike forces, supported by intelligence and other enablers, are essential for attacking insurgent networks to capture or kill insurgent leaders. Special forces teams that are part of the Combined Forces Special Operations Command-Afghanistan are essential to the support of Village Stability Operations (VSO) and the mentoring of the Afghan Local Police (ALP), primarily in smaller villages and rural areas. The multinational special forces teams in the ISAF SOF provide essential training and partnering to Afghan specialized Provincial Response Companies to facilitate targeted missions against insurgent, drug trafficking, and other networks. Each of these elements also partners with, trains, and assists the Afghan units with which they are working—a critical component of increasing Afghan capabilities. All SOF coordinate closely with the conventional force battle space owner in the region in which they operate so that special operations missions complement conventional force operations to achieve the overall counterinsurgency effect. Counterterrorism operations are an important component of any comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency campaign.
Question. As U.S. forces are drawn down in Afghanistan, do you anticipate the requirement for SOF will be reduced, stay the same, or increase?

Answer. Although the exact future requirements for SOF are yet to be determined, they will clearly play a prominent role in the future.

AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE/VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

Question. General Petraeus and others have emphasized the importance of the VSOs and ALP programs to the strategy in Afghanistan. What has been the effect of these programs on rural Afghan populations and what has been the response from the Taliban?

Answer. The ALP program and VSO have had a measurable and positive effect on security in Afghanistan. Since the program’s inception in August 2010, ALP has grown to over 6,500 patrolmen operating at 41 validated sites. These units provide a measure of security where ISAF forces are scarce or non-existent, and build connections between the village, the province, and the central government. Additionally, the program appears to have jump-started local governance and also mobilized communities, a key condition for local populations to resist Taliban influence. Because this program has been so effective in denying terrain to the Taliban, the enemy has explicitly targeted it (although it appears that ALP members have fought off Taliban attacks in a number of recent incidents). Nonetheless, the ALP program and VSO continue to grow, and Afghans across the country are eager for the program to come to their area.

Question. Do you believe the availability of U.S. Special Operations teams is a limiting factor in expanding these programs to a point where they can have a strategic impact in Afghanistan?

Answer. The number of ALP and VSO sites that we can establish in Afghanistan is limited by the availability of Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams, but we have developed an innovative solution that allows us to continue to expand the programs without additional teams. We have begun integrating conventional forces with our special forces, which, after a period of specialized training, are able to thicken the ODAs and free up more special forces personnel for new ALP/VSO missions. We expect that this will allow us to continue to increase the ALP program, even as the number of ODAs in Afghanistan remains fairly constant.

Question. How do indirect approaches like VSO and ALP Programs complement direct action counterterrorism missions within the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?

Answer. The ALP and VSO programs are part of the comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency strategy and, as such, they complement other efforts—both kinetic and non-kinetic—to protect the population, to degrade the insurgency, and to build sustainable, effective governance in Afghanistan. By giving local villagers a stake in their own security, the ALP program builds cooperation and support for the district, provincial and central government, which, in turn, makes the environment inhospitable to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. The local security and improved governance that the ALP and VSO programs bring also increase local Afghans' confidence, which sets the conditions for development and grassroots community organizing, grievance resolution, and communal problem-solving. All of these activities complement the other elements of the comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, which includes direct-action counterterrorism missions.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENABLING CAPABILITIES

Question. The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command has described the “non-availability” of force enablers as the “most vexing issue in the operational environment” for SOF. In many instances, SOF rely on general purpose forces to provide the enabling capabilities they need to be successful in their missions, including rotary wing airlift, medical evacuation, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling capabilities facing our forces in Afghanistan?

Answer. Given the decentralized manner in which SOF are dispersed in austere, remote areas—especially those forces conducting VSO and training ALP—the greatest enabling shortage is air asset support, both rotary and fixed wing. Although substantial progress has been made with increasing the number of air assets in theater over the last 2 years, meeting the requirement for these assets will be critical as the number of VSO and ALP sites increase, since this will mean that more small units are fielded in rural areas. Related, these teams also have an increased requirement for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance platforms equipped with signals intelligence and full-motion video capabilities. The intelligence analysts, and associated systems, are also necessary to properly exploit the data col-
lected. Additionally, units in rural areas often need dedicated Route Clearance Packages to support ground movement, to conduct ground combat operations, and to maintain freedom of movement.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure the requirements for enabling capabilities of SOF in Afghanistan are met as general purpose forces are drawn down?

**Answer.** Based on lessons from the drawdown in Iraq, I expect requirements for special operations enablers to increase as the conventional force footprint is reduced in Afghanistan. Requirements will continue to evolve as we adapt to the new force posture, but my top priority will be to ensure full connectivity to our teams, especially when it comes to maintaining the “Golden Hour” for medical evacuation. Additionally, I will ensure that we have sufficient air assets, including Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and close-air support platforms as well as Route Clearance Packages.

### INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

**Question.** The collaboration between U.S. SOF, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.

**What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan?**

**Answer.** One of the most important lessons learned over the past few years is the necessity of a whole-of-government approach to be successful in campaigns such as that in Afghanistan. After all, the complexity of these missions requires experts from many fields and backgrounds to conduct an effective comprehensive civil-military campaign. Keeping all the actors on the same page, and communicating closely at all levels, has perhaps been a central factor in achieving a unified approach to our campaign plan. In particular, the close collaboration between the State and Defense Departments—from action officers to senior leaders—supports a unity of effort that has enabled progress in Afghanistan.

**Question.** How do you believe these efforts can be improved?

**Answer.** Although there has been substantial progress improving interagency and international coordination and collaboration, there is still room to improve in areas such as our collective understanding of roles and responsibilities and the manner in which they fit into the overall campaign plan. Essential to this is to maintain an open line of communication and frequent coordinated action between and among all the various actors—including the U.S. Embassy, NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative, the United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations—to increase efficiencies, reduce redundancies, eliminate waste, and seek areas where cooperation could lead to results greater than the sum of the whole.

### INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR INDIRECT ACTIVITIES

**Question.** Some observers contend that the national intelligence agencies focus their assistance to the Defense Department in Afghanistan on special operators engaged in direct action operations. As a consequence, it is alleged, general purpose forces and SOF engaged in indirect activities, including foreign internal defense and population protection, receive less intelligence support.

**Do you believe this is true?**

**Answer.** I believe this is a misperception since the national intelligence agencies are integrated into command processes throughout USFOR–A and ISAF. For example, Cryptologic Support Teams from the National Security Agency are spread across the theater down to the brigade level. Several hundred all-source analysts and specialty units from the Defense Intelligence Agency are located at every Regional Command (even the non-U.S. commands) and in conventional units executing VSO. There are also over 100 geospatial analysts and specialists from the National Geospatial Agency support units throughout Afghanistan. In every case, these professionals bring expertise and reach-back capabilities for all types of forces and have been an integral part of enabling the intelligence fusion that has contributed to our success.

With regard to the belief that some Special Operation Forces (SOF) are less supported than direct action SOF, this perception may arise from the operational reality of SOF elements that are supporting foreign internal defense, VSO, and the ALP. While most SOF forces engaged in direct action operate from fixed bases—with extensive communications, robust staff, and assigned national agency analysts—SOF elements engaged in indirect activities are normally deployed in small teams to remote locations. These teams do not have large staffs and the support they do
receive from headquarters elements is less direct, and, therefore, less obvious to many observers.

Question. If so, and if confirmed, how would you ensure SOF engaged in indirect activities receive adequate intelligence support?

Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to maintain the strong relationship between COMISAF and intelligence organizations’ leadership to ensure intelligence products are available to all of our forces and are concentrated to support the main effort. I will also continue to partner with National Intelligence Agencies to ensure our requirements are focused and clearly understood. Finally, I will continue requesting the Intelligence Community’s assistance in producing “tear-line” products to allow near-real-time and broad dissemination to all members and units of ISAF, as well as our Afghan partners.

CONTRACT OVERSIGHT AND PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

Question. The United States has implemented a number of efforts to reduce the risk that U.S. contracting practices will be subject to corruption, which helps fuel the insurgency and undermines the legitimacy of the Afghan Government. These efforts include the establishment of the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Shafafiyat (Transparency) to coordinate ISAF anti-corruption activities. What is your assessment of ISAF’s anti-corruption efforts and understanding of criminal patronage networks, and what additional steps, if any, do you believe should be taken to improve those efforts and to ensure adequate oversight of ISAF and U.S. contracts is in place?

Answer. ISAF and its partners in the Afghan Government and key embassies have together developed a common understanding of the problem of corruption and its effect on the ISAF mission and the viability of the Afghan state. The most dangerous forms of corruption involve criminal patronage networks, which divert development and security force assistance, subvert state institutions, obstruct justice, and engage in and protect illicit activities that strengthen the insurgency and undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of the government.

The establishment of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat (Transparency) has led to a better understanding of these problems as well as important initiatives to address them. As a result of Shafafiyat’s work, ISAF developed and implemented Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance, which has helped ISAF and the international community be better buyers, and buy from legitimate suppliers. As a result of improved vendor-vetting efforts and integration of procurement and contracting into intelligence and operations at all levels, 75 U.S., international, and Afghan individuals or companies have been debarred from receiving contracts, 24 individuals and companies have been suspended, and 27 debarment actions are pending. Additionally, ISAF has supported the training of specialized Afghan anti-corruption units to develop sustainable Afghan capacity to address corruption.

Given the complexity of this problem, more work can be done. In particular, based on what I know, there is still a need to develop comprehensive U.S. and coalition vendor-vetting and contract oversight procedures. ISAF is currently consolidating over two dozen databases; USFOR–A and the CENTCOM Contracting Command are coordinating to implement a new, more rigorous vendor-vetting process; and ISAF has submitted a proposal to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the establishment of the Acquisition Accountability Office-Afghanistan, which would provide oversight for all U.S. contracts in the country. If confirmed, I will examine these efforts to determine if they are on track and if anything else needs to be done.

Question. President Karzai has issued a decree calling for the disbandment of most private security contractors (PSCs). Following that decree, the international community negotiated a temporary arrangement to allow for the continued use of PSCs for 1 year while the capacity of a Ministry of Interior guard force, called the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), is developed. What is your assessment of the potential for the APPF to replace or supplement PSCs in providing security?

Answer. The APPF currently provides approximately 6,000 guards for various clients throughout Afghanistan, with plans to expand significantly to replace PSCs. I support the Afghan Government’s decision to eliminate PSCs and, if confirmed, intend to support the further development of the APPF. The most significant challenge is the short timeframe in which the APPF needs to increase in size and capability so that it can accomplish its mission. Efforts are underway to this end, including newly expanded APPF headquarters and the construction of a training center for guards. In short, the potential exists for the APPF to replace PSCs on time, although it will require significant work over the next year. Currently, joint ISAF-Af-
ghan assessments of the APPF—which is part of the bridging strategy—are scheduled for September 2011, December 2011, and March 2012.

**Question.** If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you recommend to improve the development and oversight of the APPF?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will look closely at APPF to determine what steps might be necessary to improve development and oversight. Based on what I know, I believe that we should focus on two parallel lines of effort. First, we should support the development of command, control, and management functions within the existing APPF, which is similar to developing any police or military headquarters to perform a specific security missions. Second, we should support the development of a state-owned enterprise, which will support the APPF as it strives to provide security services in a manner similar to those of commercial security companies.

### REINTEGRATION AND RECONCILIATION

**Question.** The Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Program (APRP) has been established to enable former insurgent fighters to renounce violence and reintegrate peacefully into their communities. As of mid-June more than 1,700 former fighters had enrolled in the APRP, and the Afghan Government reported that it was in negotiations with more than 40 additional groups representing up to 2,000 more fighters. The APRP has been criticized, however, as involving only a small fraction of the Taliban insurgents.

What is your assessment of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program and the program’s potential for reintegrating further numbers of low- to mid-level insurgent fighters?

**Answer.** The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is an essential component of our comprehensive, civil-military counterinsurgency campaign, one that convinces insurgents to join the peace process, accept the Afghan constitution, renounce violence, and rejoin Afghan society. It is a viable alternative to continued fighting or detention. Since the APRP began in August 2010, over 1,850 former insurgents have officially reintegrated—double the number from a few months ago—and at least another 2,000 are in some stage in the reintegration process. All 34 provinces now have Provincial Peace Committees, and a number of provinces have fully-functioning Provincial Reintegration Accounts, which give the Provincial Peace Committee resources to disburse in support of reintegration at the local level.

The greatest factor affecting reintegration, however, is not the number of functioning committees or the presence of reintegration accounts (though those are essential for the program’s successful operation). Rather, it is the insurgency’s declining resources, low morale, and poor leadership—all of which convince insurgents to abandon the fight and rejoin Afghan society. We are seeing some signs that these factors are encouraging informal reintegration (where insurgents do not enter the reintegration process, but simply return to their homes). As we continue to pressure insurgents on all fronts, we anticipate that we will see increased numbers of formal reintegrees as well. But where we can, we will encourage informal reintegrees to join the peace process by joining formal reintegration.

**Question.** It has been reported that coalition officials and Taliban representatives have engaged in preliminary talks on reconciliation.

Do you support the beginning of reconciliation talks with the Taliban at this time?

**Answer.** Historically, ending an insurgency requires some sort of political settlement. At the same time, I recognize that any solution to the fighting in Afghanistan must be led by the Afghan Government if it is to be effective and enduring. For that reason, I fully support Afghan-led reconciliation efforts and support the overall concept as it has been articulated by the Secretary of State.

### AMMONIUM NITRATE FOR IMPROVED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES FROM PAKISTAN

**Question.** Ammonium nitrate (AN), a prime component in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that have killed or wounded thousands of U.S., coalition, and Afghan troops and Afghan civilians, continues to flow into Afghanistan. The vast majority of this AN flows in from fertilizer factories in Pakistan. In 2010, in an effort to stem the flow of this material, the Afghan Government banned the use of AN as a fertilizer. Despite this effort and vigilance by Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), IED incidents and casualties have continued. The amounts of AN reportedly ferried into Afghanistan from Pakistan are staggering.

In light of your recent position at CENTCOM, what is your understanding of the situation regarding the flow of AN into Afghanistan?

**Answer.** We assess that a large amount of the AN used in IEDs in Afghanistan originates in Pakistan, where it is manufactured as a fertilizer called calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN). There are no regulatory controls to adequately control the
sale and distribution of CAN in Pakistan, which, combined with the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, allows insurgents to procure and move large amounts of CAN into Afghanistan. Although Afghan and ISAF forces have made considerable progress in interdicting shipments of CAN in Afghanistan and along the border since President Karzai banned it in early 2010, it will take a concerted, international effort with the Pakistani government and Pakistani industry in order to better regulate, track, and interdict CAN. The Pakistanis took a significant step forward recently with their release of national counter-IED strategy and the issue is being addressed with the Pakistani government on multiple levels within the U.S. Government.

Question. If confirmed as Commander, NATO ISAF/Commander, USFOR–A, what tools would you have at your disposal to address the flow of AN into Afghanistan and are there any additional tools that you would seek to have?

Answer. There are a variety of current tools at our disposal, and, if confirmed, I would closely examine what other resources, technologies, and initiatives could be brought to bear to reduce the flow of AN into Afghanistan. Currently, there are several border initiatives to address AN, and AN interdiction has increased significantly over the last year, aided by forces on the border and increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. However, due to the porous nature of the border, there also need to be efforts to address the flow of AN at its source: the factories in Pakistan that produce AN. This would require diplomatic resources— including continuing to work closely with the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad—to facilitate an agreement between the Governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and perhaps the United States to either transition to a fertilizer that cannot be used for IEDs or, possibly, to dye the AN to identify which factories are producing AN used in IEDs. If confirmed, I would engage senior Pakistani military officials on this issue and would also work closely with interagency and international partners to reduce the flow of AN and other IED components.

AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE

Question. According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 2010 Annual Report—released in June 2010, drugs from Afghanistan have an annual market value of $65 billion, cater to 15 million drug users, cause 100,000 deaths each year, are contributing to the spread of HIV at an unprecedented rate, and are a source of funds for criminal groups, insurgents and terrorists. Moreover, since 2006, much more opium has been produced in Afghanistan than is consumed worldwide, and the resulting stockpile is now large enough to meet 2 years' worth of world heroin demand.

As it relates to the drug trade in Afghanistan, what is your understanding of the role of the Commander of ISAF and Commander of USFOR–A respectively?

Answer. The Commander of ISAF operates under NATO mandate, which precludes forces under ISAF command from conducting operations specifically directed against narcotics organizations. However, NATO forces can conduct nexus operations, which are operations against narco-groups with direct linkages to the insurgency.

The Commander of USFOR–A operates under direction of U.S. policy. Selected U.S. units and organizations that are under the command of USFOR–A, such as Combined Joint Task Force-Nexus, can conduct operations that target the drug trade specifically.

Question. What is your understanding of the rules of engagement for U.S. forces as it relates to drug labs and the drug network respectively?

Answer. ISAF's mandate prevents the Alliance from participating in operations that are exclusively focused on counter-narcotics, although NATO forces can conduct nexus operations against narco-groups with direct linkages to the insurgency. U.S. forces under the ISAF command structure can participate in counternarcotics operations only when there is a connection between narcotics and the insurgency. Of course, it should also be noted that our forces always retain the right to defend themselves when they are facing an imminent threat.

Question. What is your understanding of the nexus—if any—between the drug trade and the various insurgent groups in Afghanistan?

Answer. The illegal narcotics industry is intrinsically linked to the insurgency, corrupt actors, and criminal patronage networks. There is no clear line separating any of these groups since their operations and support networks overlap and are intertwined at a fundamental level.

Question. How significant a source of funding is the drug trade for insurgent groups in Afghanistan?
Answer. While estimates vary, a significant percentage of the illegal drug trade funds the insurgency, and we assess that the illegal drug trade is the largest internal source of funding for the Afghan Taliban.

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Drug Enforcement Agency and comparable NATO law enforcement efforts in Afghanistan?

Answer. The Drug Enforcement Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Borders Patrol, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the U.S. Marshalls, the Serious Organized Crime Agency (UK), and other organizations all work closely with the Afghan Government and the international community to improve and reform the Afghan criminal justice system and to strengthen Afghan law-enforcement capacity. All of these groups bring unique skill sets required to address challenges posed by the drug trade and to help the Afghan Government develop long-term solutions.

Question. As Commander of ISAF and Commander of USFOR–A, respectively, what would be your relationship to these law enforcement activities?

Answer. To ensure unity of effort, ISAF/USFOR–A will continue to synchronize its efforts with civilian law enforcement partners in the areas of capacity-building, public awareness, disrupting illicit precursor chemicals, and combating nexus organizations. As with other efforts, the key to this is close communication and coordination so that we are all working toward the same goal and focused on our campaign plan.

COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE OF AFGHANISTAN

Question. In each of the past 3 fiscal years, DOD has expended approximately $450 million building the capacity of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA).

What is your current assessment of the CNPA?

Answer. The CNPA have dramatically improved over time. In Helmand Province, which accounts for approximately 40 percent of the world’s illicit opium production, the CNPA have provided expertise to help investigate narcotics trafficking in support of the Provincial Governor’s counternarcotics campaign (contributing to a 94 percent conviction rate in 2010). In May 2011 alone, the CNPA helped seize 12,000 kg of narcotics around the country.

Despite this progress, more work remains to be done. For example, the CNPA lacks sufficient manpower to effectively enforce counter-narcotics laws across the entire nation. It also needs to improve institutional capabilities such as strategic planning, budget formation, and logistics to reduce its reliance on other agencies, such as the Ministries of Interior and Defense.

Question. As the Commander, NATO ISAF/Commander, USFOR–A, what would be your relationship to the CNPA?

Answer. Currently, NTM–A/CSTC–A has a mentoring relationship with the CNPA to support its development. As Commander ISAF/USFOR–A, if confirmed, I would oversee this mentoring relationship.

Question. Are you satisfied with the arrangement?

Answer. Yes.

COUNTER-THREAT FINANCE ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. In 2008, the United States created the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) to disrupt the flow of funding from the Afghan opium trade and other illicit sources to the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other terrorist and insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The ATFC and related organizations have helped Afghan authorities investigate and prosecute individuals connected to the opium trade, identify outside sympathizers who have been supplying funding to those individuals, and police a variety of corrupt schemes that have filled the coffers of the Taliban-led insurgency and other illicit actors. The ATFC has also helped U.S. forces identify and target individuals associated with IED networks operating in Afghanistan.

What is your assessment of the operations of the ATFC?

Answer. The ATFC is a unique interagency, civilian-military organization that provides a variety of products, services, and support for military units and civilian agencies. These include target packages that support Joint Prioritization Effects List (JPEL) nominations for military commands; Drug Kingpin and Terrorist Designations; district-by-district assessments of insurgent finances used by military planners to identify targets; threat finance risk assessments for U.S. development projects and contracting; and training and mentoring of specialized Afghan investigative organizations. The ATFC provides support to a large number of United States agencies, coalition partners, and the Afghan Government. Given the imperative to staunch the illicit financial activities that fuel the insurgency, as well as the
criminal patronage networks that undermine the government, the work of the ATFC plays a vital role supporting many elements of our overall strategy.

*Question.* Some have argued that tracking and targeting the financial sources of insurgent networks is a waste of scarce intelligence resources. What is your view of counter-threat finance activities, particularly as it relates to Afghanistan?

*Answer.* Given the nexus of the insurgency, illegal narcotics networks, and criminal organizations, counter-threat finance activities are vital to our overall effort to degrade the insurgency while simultaneously supporting the development of an effective Afghan Government. As noted above, counter-threat finance activities involve more than just the tracking of financial sources, and, in fact, lead to intelligence and knowledge that is directly actionable. Additionally, these activities inform military planners as they are developing operational plans and allocating resources. Overall, counter-threat finance activities contribute significantly to multiple elements of the broader campaign.

**GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES USED FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE**

*Question.* Building the security forces of foreign nations has traditionally been a SOF mission. However, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, general purpose forces have been performing this mission for some time. What is your understanding and assessment of the preparation and performance of Army and Marine Corps general purpose forces operating in Afghanistan in a security force assistance role?

*Answer.* The Armed Forces of the United States have now been involved in counterinsurgency missions for nearly a decade, during which time they have had extensive experience with security force assistance. We have learned numerous lessons during this time, incorporated them into our training and education systems, and used past experience to prepare soldiers, marines, and others for the complex nature of these conflicts, to include security force assistance. Having seen our forces in action, my assessment is that they have performed very well in this role and have, in fact, surpassed all expectations.

*Question.* How do you envision the use of general purpose forces in the security force assistance role, if at all, as U.S. forces begin to drawdown between 2011 and 2014?

*Answer.* General purpose forces will continue to be used in a security force assistance role, helping to develop the ANSF as Afghans increasingly take the lead for security throughout Afghanistan.

**SUPPORT THE MISSION WITH OPERATIONAL ENERGY**

*Question.* On June 7, 2011, General Petraeus signed and issued a memorandum for U.S. Forces-Afghanistan providing command guidance on supporting the mission with operational energy. In the memorandum General Petraeus stated his expectation that commanders will take ownership of unit fuel demand and announced the standing up of an office to improve operational energy capabilities by changing how Coalition forces use energy. The memorandum also called on commanders to make energy-informed, risk-based decisions on aviation and vehicle operations, base camp design, power and water generation and distribution. General Petraeus also called for energy considerations to be included in requirements and oversight of contracts. Do you concur with General Petraeus’ command guidance and his efforts to date?

*Answer.* Yes, since our forces are more dependent on energy than ever before, this guidance recognizes the importance of managing that risk by reducing our energy consumption. Moreover, reducing our environmental footprint is also important in our efforts to be good, environmentally-conscious guests of the Afghan people.

*Question.* If confirmed, to what extent will you continue to support the mission of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan with operational energy or issue similar command guidance?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize this issue and will issue similar guidance.

**WOMEN IN COMBAT**

*Question.* What restrictions, if any, do you believe should be imposed with respect to the assignment of combat-related duties to women in uniform, or the assignment of women to combat units?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will adhere to the current policies in place regarding combat-related duties for women in uniform. That said, I understand that, at the direction of Congress, the Department is in the process of reviewing current policies. If they change, I will ensure that all forces under my command follow the new rules.
and guidelines and I will work with all the relevant parties to make sure potential
changes are instituted with as little disruption as possible. Obviously, women in
uniform make tremendous contributions every day on the battlefield, and, due to the
nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, many women have been engaged in combat
and have performed courageously. Some have been wounded, and indeed, some have
been killed. I honor their sacrifice.

HEALTH OF THE FORCE

Question. The committee is concerned about the stress on military personnel re-
sulting from lengthy and repeated deployments and their access to mental health
care in theater to deal with this increased stress. Increased suicide rates are clear
reminders that servicemembers, particularly those who have been deployed multiple
times, are under tremendous stress and need access to mental health care.

What is your assessment of the adequacy of health care and mental health capa-
bilities supporting servicemembers in Afghanistan?

Answer. With over 9,000 health-care personnel in Afghanistan, representing most
medical specialties, I believe that our forces have access to excellent health-care fa-
cilities and professionals. This is particularly true with our emergency health-care
capabilities. Rates of U.S. forces killed in action and those dying from wounds have
deprecated since 2009, despite an increase in number of personnel at risk. More troops
are surviving devastating wounds as a result of increased medical aviation plat-
forms, more field hospitals, and efforts like our “flying intensive care unit,” in which
wounded forces are transported to Landstuhl, Germany, often within hours of in-
jury.

Based on what I know, I likewise assess our mental-health capabilities as robust.
There has been a significant increase in the number of behavioral health-care per-
sonnel in theater in the last 2 years, as well as in the number of restoration and
reconditioning centers for those with behavioral and mental-health problems. A new
mental health telemedicine network has also been established, allowing direct com-
munications with mental health teams by troops based even in remote regions. Cur-
rently, there are 34 active telemedicine portals in operation, with an additional 42
planned. Also of note, the first theater-wide behavioral health and neurology care
conference took place this month, which allowed mental-health experts to discuss
best practices and lessons learned. Additionally, all efforts in theater have been bol-
stered by the Defense Department’s focus on this area, and significant improve-
ments in pre- and post-deployment assessments and support. If confirmed, I will
continue to ensure that our forces have access to the mental health care that they
need.

Question. What is your assessment of suicide prevention programs and resources
available to support these programs in Afghanistan?

Answer. Suicide is obviously a huge concern for all commanders, and the military
has made significant strides to address worrisome trends. In late 2009, The Suicide
Prevention Task Force reviewed more than 300 programs, culminating in a report
of best practices that have been incorporated throughout the force. In addition to
multiple direct care programs, the Army is managing 13 suicide prevention research
projects.

The military suicide prevention program currently spans the pre-deployment, de-
ployment, and post-deployment phases, with each Service having tailored programs
for their members. All members are exposed to specific prevention and resiliency
training, much of this through the Religious Support Teams in theater and through
programs such as “Ask, Care, Escort” and “Applied Suicide Intervention Skills
Training.” More than 32,000 additional servicemembers have received the suicide
awareness training so far this year, and over 900 have been trained to act as “gate-
keepers.”

Overall, I assess that we are actively addressing this problem with adequate re-
sources. If confirmed, I will continue to make this a priority within the command.

Question. What is your assessment of the implementation of DOD policy on man-
agement of mild traumatic brain injury throughout Afghanistan?

Answer. This is obviously another area of concern since these types of injuries
have been so prevalent in these conflicts. Under current guidance, medics and for-
ward physicians in theater use straightforward flow charts on laminated cards to
determine who needs to rest and who needs to be referred to higher levels of care.
This process appears to be working, with neurologists at the centers for higher lev-
els of care indicating that the patients they see have been appropriately dealt with
according to the clinical guidelines. As a result, these forward centers have achieved
a 95–99 percent return-to-duty rate without the need for advanced intervention. The
1–5 percent that do not recover using these guidelines are referred to the two major
concussion/traumatic brain injury specialty care centers, where specialists are able to diagnose and treat more advanced injuries. Overall, I assess that Defense Department policy is being followed in Afghanistan, with good effect.

**Question.** What is your assessment of medical evacuation capabilities in theater today?

**Answer.** I assess that medical evacuation capabilities in theater today are excellent, with the overall system performance continuing to improve. In 2009, the average time for urgent missions was 62 minutes; in 2010 it was 47 minutes; and, so far this year, it is 42 minutes. There are currently sufficient aircraft and crews in theater to continue to outperform the 60 minute “golden hour” standard through 2011.

**Question.** If confirmed, what standard would you establish for capability and availability of medical evacuation assets, including for forward operating units?

**Answer.** It is absolutely essential that we sustain the same high standard of medical evacuation performance and reliability to ensure that our forces have the support they need, especially in the critical summer fighting season. We have sufficient medical evacuation assets in theater to allow 24/7 coverage of the main battle space and the ability to forward position medical evacuation assets for deliberate operations outside the normal coverage rings. If confirmed, I will maintain these standards and continue to look for ways to improve this vital mission.

**Sexual Assault Prevention and Response**

**Question.** The Department has in recent years developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However, incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in Afghanistan are still being reported. Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate treatment for the victim. They assert that their command fails to respond appropriately with basic medical services and with an adequate investigation of their charges followed by a failure to hold assailants accountable.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be effective?

**Answer.** Yes, I believe that the current sexual assault policies and procedures are effective. DOD believes its first priority is for victims to be protected, treated with dignity and respect, and to receive the medical treatment, care, and counseling that they deserve.

A restricted reporting option is available for victims who wish to confidentially disclose incidents so that they can receive medical treatment and counseling without triggering the official investigative process. Servicemembers who are sexually assaulted and desire restricted reporting under this policy must report the assault to a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC), a Victim Advocate, a health-care provider, or a chaplain. Health-care providers will initiate the appropriate care and treatment, and report the sexual assault to the SARC in lieu of reporting the assault to law enforcement or the command. The goal of the restricted-reporting option is to encourage victims to come forward and receive help.

**Question.** What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which restricted reporting procedure has been put into operation?

**Answer.** Although I do not know the exact details, I understand that there was an issue when victims were flown via medical evacuation to other medical facilities where their identity and situation were unintentionally made known. This issue has been corrected, with the reason for a medical evacuation now listed as “internal wounds” versus “sexual assault trauma.” This change protects and ensures the sexual-assault case remains restrictive.

**Question.** What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in Afghanistan, including assaults against contractor personnel?

**Answer.** There are robust policies and procedures in place to prevent and to respond to sexual assaults. Our medical personnel, military police, and SARC support all personnel, including contractors.

**Question.** What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in place in Afghanistan to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

**Answer.** We currently have adequate training, resources, and investigators to respond to sexual assaults. One area of concern, however, is that some medical providers are not trained and/or certified before arriving in theater to conduct sexual-assault forensic examinations. This weakness was identified during a recent sexual assault assessment, and, as a result, medical providers will be required to receive adequate training and/or certification prior to deployment.
**Question.** What is your view of the willingness and ability of military leaders to hold assailants accountable for their acts?

**Answer.** I expect everyone under my command to hold assailants accountable, and, if confirmed, I will explicitly tell subordinates at all levels that sexual assault prevention is a command issue and I expect and require their personal commander’s attention.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Sexual assault prevention is a command issue, and if confirmed, I will tell my senior leaders that this is a priority for me and that I expect them to respond to incidents in a timely manner with appropriate medical services, to conduct thorough investigations, and to hold assailants accountable. My program managers will be tasked to provide the proper education and training on sexual assault prevention and reporting procedures to all personnel.

**STANDARDS FOR TREATMENT OF DETAINEES**

**Question.** Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures applicable to U.S. forces in Afghanistan fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** How would you ensure a climate that not only discourages the abuse of detainees, but that encourages the reporting of abuse?

**Answer.** Leadership starts at the top, and, if confirmed, I will personally ensure that the troops under my command understand my expectations and the clear standards under which we operate. I will provide clear guidance at every level of command, proper training, and ensure prompt and effective action is taken if there is a situation where we fail to meet our own high standards. Additionally, if confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to undertake thorough inspections of all detention facilities and related programs throughout Afghanistan and also that we continue to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross. Our country must always live our values, and nowhere is that more true than how we treat detainees.

**DETENTION OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN**

**Question.** In the past several years, significant changes have been made in the way detention operations have been conducted in a counterinsurgency environment. In Afghanistan, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 is responsible for overseeing detention operations, with the goal of responsibly transitioning detention operations to the Government of Afghanistan.

In your view, what are the main lessons learned over the last several years regarding the conduct of detention operations within a counterinsurgency environment?

**Answer.** Detention operations are an integral part of any counterinsurgency campaign, and our experiences over the past few years have taught us many valuable lessons. Perhaps chief among them is that detention operations have to be conducted in the most humane manner possible, since our treatment of detainees directly reflects our values as a nation and, as a result, can have strategic effects. We have also learned that we have to conduct counterinsurgency “inside the wire”, since detained individuals have the potential not only to be sources of intelligence, but also to be part of the solution if they can be effectively reintegrated into society. At the Detention Facility in Parwan, for example, we have initiated various programs to teach detainees job skills that range from agriculture to tailoring. Additionally, we have established a robust Detainee Review Board process and are conducting “release shuras” in which communities come together to support individuals we believe can safely be released. Another lesson learned in recent years is that all of our detention operations have to be conducted with the understanding that they
will eventually be transitioned to the host nation; capacity-building must always be a primary focus.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the progress of efforts to build the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to assume responsibility for detention operations?

**Answer.** The U.S. Detention Facility in Parwan—our flagship detention facility in Afghanistan—began transitioning detention operations in January with Afghans assuming responsibility at some of the Detention Housing Units. The Afghan Government clearly intends to assume more responsibility for detention operations over time, and we will continue to support efforts to build additional Afghan capacity to take on this mission. There are two areas in particular that still need additional work as the transition continues. First, we have to continue our efforts to support the Afghan Government as it establishes a more capable judicial system, which will require recruiting and training more judges and prosecutors, among other officials. (These efforts will be bolstered by the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission-Afghanistan, which was approved by the North Atlantic Council and endorsed by ISAF Defense Ministers this month; this organization will be established as a dual-hat command with the U.S. Rule of Law Field Force-Afghanistan.) Additionally, the Afghan Government needs to establish a legal framework for effectively dealing with insurgents. If confirmed, I will work closely with the interagency Rule of Law task force to closely examine our efforts to build the necessary Afghan capacity so that Afghans can assume more responsibility for detention operations.

**AFGHANISTAN-Pakistan Cooperation**

**Question.** What is your assessment of the current level of cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani forces in confronting the threat of militant extremists in the border region?

**Answer.** While the relationship between Afghan and Pakistani forces along the border has had its ups and downs, the level of cooperation in the border region has improved significantly over the last 2 years, especially at the operational level. For example, four Border Coordination Centers have been established; these centers are manned by Afghan, Pakistani, and ISAF liaisons and facilitate the timely exchange of information as well as operational coordination. Additionally, there have been several coordinated “hammer and anvil” operations along the border in Regional Command-East (RC(E)) between Afghanistan’s Kunar Province and Pakistan’s Mohmand Agency—in which forces on both sides of the border work together to ensure that insurgents do not use the border areas as an escape route.

Despite this operational progress, there is significant room for improvement. There are still periodic incidents of “friendly fire”, and insurgent cross-border movement has increased in recent months (due in part to the warmer weather). Despite these recent incidents—and increased tensions in the wake of the bin Laden raid—Afghan, Pakistani, and ISAF forces along the border have continued to use the Border Coordination Centers to exchange information.

**Question.** If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have for improving security cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would seek to increase opportunities for military-to-military and civilian-to-civilian dialogue on security matters. I believe this dialogue is critical so that we can best coordinate our activities with each other and pursue new initiatives. I would also build on the operational and tactical level on the collaboration in RC(E) by expanding existing Border Coordination Center cooperation and by looking to expand coordinated cross-border operations, including along the border in Regional Command-South.

**Congressional Oversight**

**Question.** In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ISAF Commander? Commander, USFOR-A?

**Answer.** Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE McCASKILL

CONTRACTING REFORM

1. Senator McCASKILL. Lieutenant General Allen, in 2010, General Petraeus issued a memorandum for commanders on counterinsurgency contracting guidance, in which he instructed commanders, among other things, to know where our money is going in contracting. General Petraeus said: “where our money goes is as important as the service provided or the product delivered.” Unfortunately, in the past few years, it has become painfully obvious that in many instances, we do not even know how much we are spending on contracting, which makes it very difficult to know where it is going.

I can pick up the phone and get 10 different statements from 10 different people about how much we are spending on contracting in Afghanistan. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) recently removed a report on Department of Defense (DOD) contract spending from its website, citing inaccuracies in one of the Central Contracting Command’s reporting. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) just notified Congress that it was not yet able to comply with its congressionally mandated review of the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) database, which is supposed to provide a single repository to track contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, because DOD, the Department of State (DOS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) did not provide the information on time. GAO also reported that the agencies had declined to agree with GAO’s prior recommendations to address problems with the accuracy of SPOT reporting.

Do you plan to make contracting oversight a priority under your command and, if so, how?
General Allen. I am committed to making contracting oversight a priority. We are working closely with Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to address contracting accountability and to institute a mechanism to better capture in-theater contracting information. This mechanism will enable us to have visibility of what we are spending and what we are about to spend; to ensure we are spending money with the right people and in the right areas to achieve the desired counterinsurgency results; and to ensure we serve as good stewards of the money the American people provide us. Additionally, in April 2011, CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command provided a contracting general officer to support our counterinsurgency contracting objectives and demonstrate our commitment to effective oversight as the Senior Contracting Official-Afghanistan. While his headquarters, staff, and 12 regional contracting centers only execute 20 percent of the spending in Afghanistan, they play a critical coordination role with all theater contracting agencies. Contracting oversight will be a priority during the period of my command.

2. Senator McCASKILL. Lieutenant General Allen, how will you work with the Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (under the CENTCOM Contracting Command) to manage contracting going on within your theater?
General Allen. We will work with the Senior Contracting Official-Afghanistan of the CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command to manage contracting within the theater through a three prong approach.

First, we will continue to participate in established venues for the coordination of logistics and contracting initiatives throughout Afghanistan including the Interagency Combined Joint Logistics Procurement Support Board, Counterinsurgency Contracting Executive Steering Committee, and Regional Commander's Interagency Counterinsurgency Management Boards.
Second, we will ensure the strategic and holistic development of requirements and allocation of resources.

Finally, we will remain engaged to improve our processes through regular feedback from Task Force 2010, Task Force Spotlight, commissions, audit agencies and inspectors general to include the Commission on Wartime Contracting, the U.S. Army Audit Agency, and the Special Inspectors General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

Towards these ends, the Senior Contracting Official-Afghanistan created Integration Cells within the U.S. Forces Afghanistan and Regional Commands to assist with contracting issues. The goals of the Integration Cells are to provide acquisition advice and education to the Commanders and staffs, to create cradle-to-grave requirements insight, to improve requirements definition, and speed procurement processes.

3. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Allen, how will you address the issue of contractors conducting oversight under your watch? I know there has been some improvement of late, but I remain concerned about that issue.

General Allen. While contractors can serve a valuable function as a force multiplier for Contracting Officers Representatives and Administrative Contracting Officers, contract oversight will continue to be addressed primarily through Contracting Officer Representatives. Commanders in the field have to continue to emphasize the criticality of Contracting Officer Representative duties to ensure we hold contractors accountable to their contracts. Those Contracting Officer Representatives are our eyes and ears on-site for every contract to provide feedback to Contracting Officers across the theater to ensure satisfactory performance of those efforts.

4. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Allen, how will the reduction in surge troops called for by the President affect the cadre of U.S. Government personnel (whether military or civilian) that we have worked hard to build up to conduct oversight? GAO still says there aren’t enough folks to do the job as it is.

General Allen. The reduction may certainly reduce the number of personnel available to provide contract oversight. However, on 21 March 2011 the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense issued a Class Deviation for the designation of Contracting Officer Representatives. This deviation clarifies that a Contracting Officer Representative must be an employee, military or civilian, of the U.S. Government, a foreign government, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/Coalition partners; this will increase the pool of available Contracting Officers Representatives, especially at remote sites without a significant U.S. military presence.

This limitation requires that those personnel available for contract oversight more efficiently and effectively achieve our contract administration requirements. To enable this, I will leverage contractors within the boundaries of what is appropriate and legal given their status. In this way they can serve as a force multiplier for Contracting Officers Representatives and Administrative Contracting Officers. In addition, we will continue to take advantage of the Defense Contract Management Agency and their disciplined and robust processes for contract administration to administer complex and sensitive contracts in Afghanistan.

COMMANDERS’ EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM

5. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Allen, concerning the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP), I have made clear in the past to General Petraeus I really appreciate the core, fundamental concept of providing small-scale humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects to help win the local people and to provide force protection. I think you should have that flexibility as commander. However, I have also been concerned that we give too much money to CERP (and to its affiliate funds such as the Afghan Infrastructure Fund) to be effective. I also have never been confident in the accounting mechanism for CERP, even though I realize some improvements have been made under General Petraeus’ watch. Can you tell me how you would, as commander, improve and maximize the way CERP is used?

General Allen. When I take command, I will certainly review our CERP, to include prior audits and assessments. Additionally, we will continue to ask for outside agency audits to review our compliance and to evaluate our progress. I will take action on those audits as appropriate and required.

6. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Allen, what changes, if any, do you think need to be made to the way CERP is handled and overseen?
General ALLEN. CERP has been a very successful tool for commanders on the ground. They depend heavily on this program to influence their battle space, support Afghan local populations, and most importantly work with local governments to improve capacity to deliver essential services and address urgent needs. These successes have improved the lives of Afghans and substantially contribute to the effectiveness of our counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. However, there is always room for improvement.

Proposed changes include a greater emphasis on small-scale projects (less than $500,000) and those that can be completed within 1 year of obligation. Additionally, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR–A) CERP guidance has been updated to require greater scrutiny of projects and additional steps to verify sustainability of projects. We are also going a step further and looking at our internal procedures. Finally, we are continuing to coordinate our efforts with development experts such as USAID and nongovernmental organizations working in the Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan.

These steps will provide increased oversight and significantly decrease the risk of project failures. We will remain vigilant in monitoring our ability to successfully execute CERP and continuously seek improvements to refine our procedures.

7. Senator MCCASKILL. Lieutenant General Allen, what do you have to say about the effectiveness of CERP and how do you plan to document it, and its effect on the COIN strategy, as commander?

General ALLEN. CERP has proven to be an effective tool that our commanders employ to execute our COIN strategy. It is used in conjunction with our COIN Contracting Guidance, which emphasizes hiring Afghans first, buying Afghan products, and building Afghan capacity. This is an integral part of our strategy to increase the Afghans’ trust in their government and deter insurgent influences, which often prey upon young men that need jobs to support their families. CERP is also part of the greater reconstruction effort. We synchronize local efforts with national programs implemented by DOS/USAID and the Afghanistan Government’s National Priorities Program.

Based on observations from our Special Operations Forces and Civil Affairs specialists and their interactions with the population, the execution of post-project atmospheres show that the completion of a project consistently has a positive effect on improving relationships and our ability to interact with and influence both the general population and key leaders within a community. In addition, projects are often designed to achieve other stabilizing effects like stimulating economic activity and supporting local government. Project effects are feeding into more comprehensive assessments such as the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC–A) Village Stability Methodology and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command (JIC) Provincial Stability Reports. These assessments address the three pillars of stability: development, security, and governance. These assessments and our experience collectively indicate that CERP has successfully supported stability operations and our overall COIN strategy.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK BEGICH

LITERACY IN AFGHANISTAN

8. Senator BEGICH. Lieutenant General Allen, in your answers to the advance policy questions from the committee you identified literacy as one of the greatest challenges to building the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to assume responsibility for security. I agree literacy is essential for a professional, capable and enduring security force. Literate Afghan people are also key to economic growth, proficient governance, and independence from corruption. What, if any, additional action do you believe the United States and coalition partners can take to increase literacy in Afghanistan, specifically within ANSF?

General ALLEN. The ANSF Literacy Program’s mission is to bring everyone in the ANSF to a third grade literacy level by the end of 2014. To date, over 94,247 have received literacy training and successfully tested at either the first, second, or third grade level.

To ensure long-term sustainability of the literacy program, there are three distinct opportunities for countries to contribute to literacy efforts in Afghanistan.

First, countries can donate funds to the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM–A) established “Addendum to the Trust Fund in Support of the Afghan National Army for the ANSF-Literacy and English Language Training, and Professional Military Education Programme.” This fund exists to institutionalize the long-
term commitment to literacy through the ANSFs. Donating to this fund will give the literacy program an opportunity to expand and provide literacy training to the ANSFs operational force beyond just the third grade level, and well beyond 2014. To date, the largest contributing nation to this fund has been the United Arab Emirates with a $10 million donation.

Second, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization has partnered with NTM–A and the Government of Japan to establish a comprehensive program that combines literacy with professional police education.

Third, using the United Nations’ highly regarded Education for All philosophy, countries can partner with the Afghan Ministry of Education to develop and certify a National Education Strategic Plan. Many features of this plan are already in place and literacy in schools is expected to increase steadily in the coming years.

**Question Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen**

**U.S.-Afghan Technology**

9. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Allen, as we draw down our forces in Afghanistan, the Afghan Government will need to be able provide for its own security on an ever-increasing basis. The Afghan Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Afghan Army believe technologies currently employed by the U.S. Marines Corps will help them provide security to their own forces and population. The Person-Born Improvised Explosive Device (PB–IED), or suicide bomber, is one of the more difficult threats to detect, but is particularly dangerous at checkpoints. The Afghan military leaders have thus requested NTM–A approval to receive the technology used by the marines to detect and thus counter PB–IED from a safe distance. Could you please provide me with an update on the status of the Afghan request, or plans to provide the counter-PB–IED technology (commercial name: CounterBomber) capability to the Afghan forces?

General Allen. In January 2011, NTM–A received a request from the Afghan Minister of Defense to review counter PB–IED technologies, followed by a March 2011 request of the Chief of the General Staff of the Afghan Army. NTM–A is working with the Afghan Ministry of Defense to evaluate counter Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device capabilities from the perspective of capability, cost, sustainability, feasibility, and the ability to integrate into a larger, more comprehensive Afghan counter-improvised explosive device (IED) strategy. They are also evaluating the financial capacity of the Afghanistan government to sustain this technology after the transition of Coalition support and assistance. A current estimate for the Counter Bomber technology is approximately $175 million, which provides for 200 systems with 3½ years of operations and support.

**Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain**

**Contracting in Central Command**

10. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Allen, various initiatives undertaken by CENTCOM commander last year, in particular, Task Force 2010 and Task Force Spotlight, have shed light on how some contractors (and subcontractors) to DOD have in some cases hired insurgents and other malign actors who were actively opposing U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Needless to say, if left unaddressed, this could significantly undermine the United States’ conduct of counterinsurgency operations in theater. Since those initiatives begun, in your view, how successfully, or unsuccessfully, have the CENTCOM commander and DOD been in discovering and discontinuing the inadvertent funding of such relationships with contract funds?

General Allen. I believe we are taking the appropriate steps to bring attention to the corruption problem and be good stewards on the management of contract funds; however, we still have much to do in this area.

Over this past year, in partnership with DOD and CENTCOM, we greatly increased our understanding of the corruption problem and how inadvertent funding affects our counterinsurgency efforts in theater. Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafadiyat (Dari word meaning “transparency”) has helped us map out the criminal patronage networks that exist in Afghanistan and to address corruption as a strategic problem. Task Force Spotlight has aided in tracking and enforcing our procedures regarding private security companies. Task Force 2010 has assisted us in helping us better understand with whom we are doing business, and provided commanders and contracting activities with the information needed for them to take action.
One of the principal tools available to us has been the infusion of intelligence into the assessment of potential vendors. Though not at the pace we desire, we are working closely with CENTCOM to expand the capability in Tampa to vet potential companies prior to doing business with them. To date, the ISAF Joint Command/CENTCOM Contracting Command vendor vetting cell has reviewed 483 companies and rejected 34 from contract award consideration. Task Force 2010, working with the Procurement Fraud Branch of the U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, follows up by referring those rejected companies for suspension and proposed debarment under the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Within the last year, we have seen an increase in the follow-on actions to debar companies and individuals who are deemed non-responsible and should not do business with the U.S. Government in Afghanistan. Our most recent results show 78 companies or individuals debarred; 67 companies or individuals suspended pending debarment; and 64 more companies or individuals submitted for consideration for suspension or debarment. In comparison with last year, we were tracking 23 companies or individuals debarred and 19 companies or individuals suspended pending debarment.

11. Senator McCaIN. Lieutenant General Allen, in the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2012, which this committee recently reported out, section 861 would enable contracting authorities at DOD to void a contract, or restrict the award of future contracts, to anyone who is determined by the CENTCOM commander to be actively opposing U.S. forces in Afghanistan. It also allows DOD to terminate—without liability to the taxpayer—any contract with anyone who fails to exercise due diligence to ensure that no contract funds are being used to actively oppose U.S. forces there. Another provision in the same bill, section 862, would authorize DOD to examine any records of a contractor (or subcontractor) in the CENTCOM theater to ensure that contract funds are not subject to corruption or extortion or not provided to anyone actively opposing U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The need for such authorities was originally requested by General Petraeus. In your view, would these authorities be sufficient to provide the Commander of ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan with the flexibility needed to ensure that the United States is not inadvertently contracting with the enemy in Afghanistan?

General ALLEN. I appreciate the support of this committee in providing us the tools needed to combat contract fraud and corruption. Though the provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 will not stop corrupt practices, it does address a critical gap within the Federal Acquisition Regulations. It provides us the authority to rescind or void a contract with someone identified as supporting or working for the enemy, and it provides us the transparency needed to look at all contracts in a contingency environment, especially regarding companies below the prime contractor level. Both of these authorities arm our leaders with the tools needed to gain visibility on the flow of contract funds, and if connections to the enemy are detected, the ability to take immediate steps to deny them further access to our money.

12. Senator McCaIN. Lieutenant General Allen, what additional authorities may be needed, if any?

General ALLEN. Currently no additional authorities are required. We recognize that Federal and DOD acquisition regulations, policies, and procedures do not adequately differentiate between peacetime and operational contracting practices. To address potential gaps and future authorities that may be needed to bridge the peacetime and the contingency environment, Task Force 2010 established a working group to review existing regulations, policies, and procedures with the goal to recommend areas where changes or select authorities can enhance our acquisition strategy and contract management in-theater. This forum includes all contracting and oversight agencies conducting business in Afghanistan.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

OVERALL STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

13. Senator InhOFe. Lieutenant General Allen, what level of risk are we accepting by following the President's withdrawal timeline?

General ALLEN. As commander, one of my very first duties would be to assess any necessary adjustments in concept and approach that may be required. In terms of risk, the surge recovery does not, in my opinion, render our objectives in Afghanistan unattainable. This is primarily because the surge, while still ongoing and important for continued momentum, has created success in several key parts of the
country. It has curtailed the momentum of the insurgency, and the ANSFs continue to grow and develop in their warfighting capacity. Even once the security surge forces have been removed, there will still be some 68,000 U.S. troops and thousands of international forces in Afghanistan, not to mention some 70,000 more Afghan forces that will join the fight in the next 15 months. At the same time, the U.S. and NATO are both discussing long-term strategic partnerships with Afghanistan. That said, I will continue to assess and evaluate the surge recovery and keep the chain of command informed.

14. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, in which areas are we accepting more risk?

General Allen. Any endeavor as complex as that which we are trying to achieve in Afghanistan requires balancing a variety of risks. As commander, it will be my job to assess the variety of challenges we face as we transition from ISAF lead to Afghan lead—not only in security, but in other areas as well.

I believe that the campaign has the development of the ANSFs, ultimately to be in the lead of security by 2014 with U.S. forces in a strategic overwatch, as an objective that is attainable. It is my opinion that the ANSFs, backed up by continued U.S. support and the provision of key enablers, will be up to the task. We will seek to constantly evaluate risk, and mitigate it whenever possible. The mission for all of us, including coalition partners is far from over, and success will increasingly depend on the degree to which Afghans can sustain this most important fight. If in my assessments and judgment risk becomes untenable I will so advise my chain of command.

15. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, which conditions have been met that justify the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan at this point?

General Allen. As General Petraeus has noted, Afghan and ISAF forces have halted the insurgency’s momentum in much of the country and have reversed it in key areas. Based on my work as the Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command, numerous visits to the theater over the past 3 years, and extensive discussions with senior military and civilian leaders, I share that assessment. Meanwhile, we are continuing to exert unprecedented pressure on the insurgency with a variety of efforts, including the Afghan Local Police initiative that is mobilizing communities to defend themselves, Afghan-led efforts to reintegrate former fighters, and a variety of governance and development initiatives focused on establishing the conditions necessary to achieve long-term security. Much of this progress has been enabled by and increasingly led by the ANSFs, which are conducting their own surge.

Even once the surge forces have been removed, there will still be some 68,000 U.S. troops and thousands of international forces in Afghanistan, not to mention some 70,000 additional Afghan forces that will join the fight in the next 15 months. At the same time, the U.S. and NATO are both discussing long-term strategic partnerships with Afghanistan. This reality sends an important message of commitment to the Afghan people, as well as a sense of urgency that Afghans must take more responsibility for their security.

16. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, what conditions would cause you to ask President Obama to delay the withdrawal of troops?

General Allen. As the commander in Afghanistan, one of my solemn duties would be to provide my best military advice to the President. I am going to monitor the operational environment and the conditions constantly, not just as they relate to the drawdown of the forces with respect to the surge, but throughout the entire period of time I command during this campaign. It is my responsibility to the chain of command and to our Commander in Chief to ensure that should I be concerned with the progress of the campaign, I would advise the chain of command with my forthright advice. If I feel that the drawdown of surge forces compromises our ability to achieve our national objectives in Afghanistan, I will not hesitate to recommend an adjustment to the current plan.

17. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, what role do you expect your military judgment to play in decisions about troop levels in Afghanistan?

General Allen. As commander in Afghanistan, one of my solemn duties would be to render my best military advice to the President of the United States, to include advice concerning the force levels necessary to accomplish my assigned mission. I expect that the President will be willing to receive that advice, to consider it, and to weigh it amongst the full range of issues and concerns presented to him. I am fully aware that the decisions the President makes must always be informed by a
wide range of considerations, of which the assessment from Afghanistan is one important component.

18. Senator INHOFE. Lieutenant General Allen, what conditions must be met in 2014 to transition to Afghan control?

General ALLEN. There are three aspects to the stages of transition, the first of which is security. To complete security transition to Afghan control, the ANSFs should be responsible for population security and law enforcement, be accountable, and serve the Afghan people. ISAF has a defined role to be postured to provide the strategic overwatch and the assistance needed to achieve sustainable security. Second, Afghan governance and development must be sufficiently inclusive, accountable, and acceptable to the Afghan people. Lastly, the population should have access to basic social services and adequate rule of law in order to establish the foundation for sustainable economic growth. ISAF will enable these second two goals by supporting U.S. efforts across the whole of government, as well as international efforts to assist the Afghan people.

19. Senator INHOFE. Lieutenant General Allen, do you believe this is a realistic date?

General ALLEN. I believe that the mission before us is hard, but doable. ISAF is going to take advantage of the opportunity between now and the end of the year to assess where we are with the progress of the campaign.

The primary governing factors that will determine successful completion by 2014 are ANSFs readiness, the Afghan Government’s legitimacy, the civil-military campaign progress, and the resulting decisions made by the enemy and other key regional players. The greatest influence ISAFs have over all these objectives is the ANSFs development, rate of fielding forces, and the quality of its emerging leadership from the ministry-level down to the noncommissioned officer. Quality ANSFs will promote the Afghan Government’s legitimacy, reinforce governance with improving law enforcement capacity, and have a positive effect on the campaign.

20. Senator INHOFE. Lieutenant General Allen, what impact would a failure in Afghanistan have on U.S. national security in the long term?

General ALLEN. The effects of a potential failure to achieve our core objective in Afghanistan, to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a sanctuary for al Qaeda, could be significant. Were al Qaeda able to re-establish sanctuaries because Afghan forces and governmental authorities proved incapable of securing and governing the country, there could be obvious negative implications for U.S. national security interests. Al Qaeda could operate once again from Afghan soil and there could very well be substantial civil strife in Afghanistan as well.

The coalition in Afghanistan consists of 49 Troop Contributing Nations, the largest coalition since WWII and operating under a United Nations Security Council Resolution with significant international legitimacy. Additionally, this is NATO’s first operation outside of Europe, and NATO performance in this area may well signal the future effectiveness and cohesion of the alliance in other out-of-area operations.

COUNTERINSURGENCY VS. COUNTERTERRORISM

21. Senator INHOFE. Lieutenant General Allen, one ongoing debate is how to deal with insurgencies. Some believe the best way to defeat an insurgency is to win over the population through COIN strategy. Others believe in a counterterrorism strategy that directly targets the insurgents and their networks. Some proponents of the withdrawal have said that we can accomplish our goals in Afghanistan with special operators alone. However, one of our lessons learned in Iraq is the importance of large amounts of conventional forces for counterinsurgency operations. You have worked closely with General Petraeus on his efforts in Iraq and are now discussing operations in Afghanistan. What is the best strategy to achieve our primary goal of preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base for terrorists and extremists to attack the United States and our allies?

General ALLEN. Insurgencies are exceptionally complex and each presents unique and differing challenges. The comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency strategy currently employed in Afghanistan includes operations across the spectrum of counterinsurgency, and includes targeted operations by counter-terrorism forces. Also important are clear, bold and build operations to protect the population, the development of the ANSFs to establish long-term security, and creation of local security forces to empower local authorities. It also provides support to various civil-
ian endeavors. The goal is a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, closely integrated across the whole of government and the international coalition, which is comprised of forces from ISAF troop contributing nations.

22. Senator INHOFE. Lieutenant General Allen, can counterterrorism alone achieve our primary goal in Afghanistan?

General ALLEN. No. On its own, counter-terrorist operations are insufficient to neutralize the insurgency. To be effective, they must be part of a strategy which includes the fielding and professionalization of ANSFs and the development of governance and socio-economic capacity to the degree that allows the Afghan Government to maintain pressure on insurgent forces and prevent the return of transnational terrorist organizations like al Qaeda. This is the approach we are taking today, and one we should continue to pursue.

REINTEGRATION OF THE TALIBAN

23. Senator INHOFE. Lieutenant General Allen, estimates of the strength of the various Taliban factions vary from 20,000 to 40,000. Almost 2,000 Taliban fighters have accepted the offer of reintegration from the Karzai Government. The reintegration program is aimed at the so-called “accidental guerrillas” for which fighting in the insurgency is just a job. What is the status of this program?

General ALLEN. Provincial Peace Councils have been established in 32 provinces, with one emerging in Kandahar and one previously established in Nangarhar under review. Twenty-three Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (technical and administrative support to Provincial Governors) have been formed. Currently 1,926 fighters have registered with the program, with others coming forward. Recently, 375 enrolled in one event in Badghis Province and will likely be added to the total once processed. However, progress is slower in the South and East where the infrastructure of the insurgency is most dense. The capacity to implement the program has been slow to develop. However, as structures develop, resources begin to flow, and confidence builds, we expect to see an increase in reintegration activity.

Reintegration is not easy or straightforward. Most fighters fight on the basis of local grievances, which mean they join this program on the basis of local grievance resolution and local military pressure. This also means that the program is continually dealing with small groups of fighters as opposed to larger networks or blocks. ISAF is working at accelerating reintegration by applying military pressure on the insurgents, supporting Afghan national and provincial leadership and organization, and developing Afghan ability to support local, community-based solutions.

24. Senator INHOFE. Lieutenant General Allen, what are your thoughts on the risks and payoffs of this program?

General ALLEN. Reintegration is a logical outcome in any counterinsurgency campaign. With the emergence of the Afghan mechanisms to support reintegration, we will seek every opportunity to permit insurgents to stop fighting and join the peace process. The payoffs of the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program are potentially significant, though it is currently making only incremental progress. The number of fighters who have officially enrolled is now almost 2,000 and growing steadily. In the past few weeks, the first demobilization event was held in Helmand province, and in the northwestern province of Badghis, 375 fighters registered at a single event.

We are realistic about potential scope of the program. One concern is that only the local ‘accidental guerillas’ will reintegrate—not the hardened, ideologically driven fighters. However, the reintegration of local fighters potentially undermines support for the hardliner and in time may cause the latter to reintegrate. A second risk is that reintegrated fighters will return to the fight. However, the evidence so far is that the reintegrates who go through the demobilization process are genuine. The key to this success is local reconciliation combined with provincial and national vetting. A third risk is that the Afghan national and provincial governments’ will lack the capacity to implement the program. ISAF is supporting the program by: assisting in the development of procedures; mentoring the selection and training of Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams; providing enabling funding through the DOD Afghan Reintegration Program; and, of course, by applying military pressure on the battlefield.
25. Senator INHOFE. Lieutenant General Allen, is it correct to say that the capability of ANSF is the decisive point of our Afghan strategy?

General ALLEN. The capability of the ANSF is one of the decisive points of the ISAF campaign. To that end, the coalition continues to emphasize ANSF growth and development. I should note recruiting continues to meet our desired goals, and the ANSF is increasingly capable and perceived positively. In addition, all Afghan National Army Branch schools are currently functioning and dedicated efforts to increase the professionalism of the ANSF are bearing fruit.

This is not to say that we are without challenges. As the campaign progresses, it is important to support our ANSF partners in the campaign. We will continue to partner and mentor the ANSF at the appropriate levels, in order for the ANSF to continue to take the lead in security operations.

26. Senator INHOFE. Lieutenant General Allen, will they be ready by the 2014 timeline that President Karzai has requested?

General ALLEN. Although 2014 is an aggressive timeline for the ANSF to take the security lead, it is achievable. The ANSF will begin assuming security lead this month in seven areas of Afghanistan. As the transition process moves forward and the ANSF take security lead, they will not be doing so alone. As each geographic area undergoes transition, the associated ANSF units will progress through a series of stages where they grow in capability as their partnered ISAF gradually step back. In fact, in certain areas of the country, coalition forces will continue to provide advising and enabling capabilities to the ANSF to ensure they remain capable, credible, and connected to the Afghan people and a deterrent to insurgent and transnational terrorist groups. This support will continue only until such time the ANSF can become completely self-sufficient.

27. Senator INHOFE. Lieutenant General Allen, as the ANSF end strength is increased, will there be sufficient U.S. forces available to partner with Afghan units?

General ALLEN. As the ANSFs increase in strength, they will also grow in capability. Partnership remains a critical part of our campaign plan and future professionalization of the force, which is invaluable to our efforts to conduct irreversible transition by the end of 2014. That said, as we conduct the surge recovery, we will continue to assess our partnership framework as well as future requirements for enablers, mentorship, and support. Progress to date allows us to adjust our partnership ratios as enabled by improving security conditions on the ground.

28. Senator INHOFE. Lieutenant General Allen, can the Afghan Government sustain/fund these robust security forces in the future?

General ALLEN. The Afghan economy is expected to be able to generate some of the income to partially support its security forces, but the Afghan Government will require supplemental funding from the United States and the international community to sustain them. The amount of outside funding will depend upon the level of the insurgency, and the estimated size of the ANSF required for the maintenance of security in Afghanistan beyond 2014.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS

29. Senator INHOFE. Lieutenant General Allen, our military-to-military (1206), civilian-to-civilian (1207), small-scale special operations (1208), CERP, and Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (CCIF) have been incredibly successful in aiding developing nations, fighting terrorism, and providing resources for emergency situations. My belief is that the key to these programs has been the combined efforts of DOD, DOS, the chiefs of mission, and combatant commanders working together to increase the capabilities of our partner nations to provide for their own security, increasing stability in their region and around the globe. What value do these funds provide in your prospective areas of responsibility?

General ALLEN. Our assessments have shown that the CERP has significantly supported our comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency strategy. Through investments into Afghan communities, the CERP empowers commanders to reinforce security gains with localized development and initiatives. The CERP is a powerful mechanism by which we have already convinced many Afghans in previously contested areas that the Afghan Government has greater capacity to offer peace, stability, and prosperity than insurgents.
CERP is a flexible tool that enables U.S. Commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their area of responsibility (AOR). In Afghanistan, CERP has been employed to great effect to repair battle damage, repair irrigation systems, build schools and medical clinics, provide urgently needed medical supplies, and supply many other urgent needs to local Afghans. We should continue to aggressively utilize CERP to achieve the desired end state in the Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan (CJOA–A).

To a significantly lesser extent, we have also made use of CCIF in the CJOA–A. CCIF is currently being used to support Rule of Law (ROL) enhancement with the construction of guard housing and other support facilities at the Saraposa Prison in Kandahar.

30. Senator INHOFE. Lieutenant General Allen, do you have any concerns about being able to effectively execute these programs in your prospective areas of responsibility?

General ALLEN. The CERP projects have improved the lives of millions of Afghans and substantially contribute to the effectiveness of our counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. In some areas, the operational environment has matured beyond the acute phases of stability operations to more advanced activities that support development and enabling governance. As a result, some aspects of CERP have evolved to include more complex, longer-term projects. I am concerned that commanders are incurring an increased risk of project failures as they attempt to address some of the more advanced needs within their battle space, but fortunately steps are already being taken to mitigate this concern.

Proposed changes include a greater emphasis on small-scale projects (less than $500,000) and those that can be completed within 1 year of obligation. Additionally, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR–A) CERP guidance has been updated to require greater scrutiny of projects and additional steps to verify sustainability of projects. We are also going a step further and looking at our internal procedures. Finally, we are continuing to coordinate our efforts with development experts such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in the CJOA–A.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

AFGHANISTAN—MITIGATION STRATEGIES

31. Senator CHAMBLISS. Lieutenant General Allen, while impressive gains in security have been made throughout Afghanistan since the surge was implemented, those gains have been repeatedly characterized as “fragile and reversible”. Afghanistan remains a dangerous place. Nonetheless, last week President Obama announced the beginning of the withdrawal of the surge forces ordering 10,000 troops to depart Afghanistan by the end of this year and the transfer of authority from ISAF to the Afghans to be completed by the end of 2014. As Tunisia, Egypt, and other nations in the Middle East have shown us so suddenly in these past weeks and months, and given the increasing level of instability throughout the Muslim world, is the drawdown of U.S. combat forces in Afghanistan the right thing to do at this time from an operational perspective?

General ALLEN. I support the President’s decision and believe that we can accomplish our objectives. This is primarily because the surge, while still ongoing and important for continued momentum, has created success in several key parts of the country. It has curtailed the momentum of the insurgency, and the ANSF continues to grow and develop in their warfighting capacity. Even once the surge forces have been removed; there will still be some 68,000 U.S. troops and thousands of international forces in Afghanistan, not to mention some 70,000 more Afghan forces, which will join the fight in the next 15 months. At the same time, the United States and NATO are both discussing long-term strategic partnerships with Afghanistan.

I will offer my candid assessment to the chain of command on the current state of the conflict, as well as provide options with respect to the President’s goals in accomplishing this strategy. As the commander in Afghanistan, it would be my responsibility to render my best military advice, and then to execute the President’s decisions as skillfully and diligently as possible.

32. Senator CHAMBLISS. Lieutenant General Allen, should things take a turn for the worse in Afghanistan, what mitigation strategies are you prepared to execute to manage risk to the mission and protect U.S. personnel remaining in Afghanistan as we remove forces from theater, and if needed, would you recommend ceasing the
withdrawal of U.S. forces and even increasing U.S. forces if that were the right operational move?

General ALLEN. The primary means to mitigate risk related to the United States surge drawdown is through the continued growth and development of the ANSF. Increases in the quantity of ANSF will likely outpace decreases in ISAFs. Of note, the Afghan Local Police are a particularly important element of risk mitigation, since they reside in local areas, often where U.S. and coalition forces do not already have a dense presence.

I will closely monitor the operational environment and make appropriate recommendations to mitigate risk and to adapt the force and our operational approach as necessary. It is imperative that we constantly review and assess our progress by challenging previous assumptions and then adapt our campaign and force to confront a changing environment. I will keep the chain of command informed of my assessments and any adjustments that may be required as the operational environment evolves.

AFGHANISTAN RECONCILIATION EFFORTS

33. Senator CHAMBLISS. Lieutenant General Allen, in your responses to advance policy questions you mention your service as the “deputy commanding general of the II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) when it deployed to Iraq’s Anbar Province from 2007–2008” as experience that “not only prepared [you] for battlefield command and the harsh reality of war but … also taught [you] a tremendous amount about the nature of this kind of conflict and the complex challenges unique to counterinsurgencies.” While you performed this duty during the Anbar Awakening in Iraq, Afghanistan is not Iraq. Afghans are accustomed to switching sides frequently, sometimes even during a battle. With that in mind, if confirmed as the next commander in Afghanistan, how do you propose furthering the political process of reconciliation to help ensure we are able to create and leave behind a secure Afghanistan and ensure the “fragile and reversible” gains we have made are permanent?

General ALLEN. Reconciliation is a political process among the Afghan people, and is supported by the DOS through the U.S. Embassy. ISAF has a key role in enabling this process, and is one which I will fully support. Reintegration is a complementary process, one where ISAF supports the Afghan-led Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program by assisting in the development of procedures, mentoring the selection and training of Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams, providing enabling funding through the DOD Afghan Reintegration Program, and by applying military pressure on the battlefield. These programs are an integral element of the counter insurgency (COIN) campaign, are fundamental to the strategic peace process, and are a key building block of the transition process. Progress in reconciliation processes is a function of building on security gains and governance improvements such that they tip the balance of confidence at all levels decisively in favor of the government. Building on current gains, a successful transition will provide the Afghans with the strength to make reconciliation and reintegration irreversible.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SCOTT P. BROWN

TRAINER-TO-TRAINEE RATIO

34. Senator BROWN. Lieutenant General Allen, the President’s withdrawal plan would leave about 68,000 U.S. troops on the ground in Afghanistan by the end of next summer, along with an expected ANSF end-strength totaling about 352,000 soldiers and police. From your perspective, what is the ideal trainer-to-trainee ratio you intend to meet by the end of this year?

General ALLEN. The current overall coalition trainer to ANSF trainee ratio is approximately 1:14, which is sufficient to produce the Army combat and police formations required for the Afghans to transition to the security lead. However, the critical shortage of 65 air coalition trainers hinders the development of the Afghan Air Force (Mi-17 and C–27 pilots). The Afghan logistics and medical systems are also short trainers; these have been identified and are scheduled to be “boots on the ground” by the end of the year. This number of trainers will allow NTM–A to reach the ANSF growth objective of 352,000 by October 2012 and should complete the training and fielding of the Afghan Army and Police by December 2013. Additionally, NTM–A is training and certifying Afghan trainers to be able to take the lead for basic training of Army and Police. The goal by the end of 2011 is to have 4,400 Afghan trainers assume the lead for training allowing coalition trainers to shift
focus to professionalize the force and develop systems that will endure past transition at the end of 2014.

35. Senator Brown. Lieutenant General Allen, with a current shortfall of 490 institutional trainers, how will the withdrawal of 10,000 troops by the end of this year affect your training mission?

General Allen. The withdrawal of 10,000 troops by the end of this year is not expected to impact the training mission. NTM–A trainers who are inbound from the United States and coalition countries between now and this fall will address all training shortfall except 65 air trainers (C–27 and Mi-17 pilots)-likely enabling us to reach the growth objective of 352,000 by October 2012 and complete the training and fielding of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police by the end of 2013. One key effort to meeting this goal will be appropriately balancing trainers and force structure requirements in the future.

36. Senator Brown. Lieutenant General Allen, what is the ideal trainer-to-trainee ratio you intend to meet by the end of next summer? Is that number an acceptable level of risk, in your opinion?

General Allen. The current overall coalition trainer to ANSF trainee ratio is approximately 1:14, which is sufficient to produce the Army combat and police formations required for the Afghans to transition to the security lead. However, the critical shortage of 65 air coalition trainers hinders the development of the Afghan Air Force (Mi-17 and C–27 pilots). The Afghan logistics and medical systems are also short trainers; these have been identified and are scheduled to be “boots on the ground” by the end of the year. This number of trainers will allow NTM–A to reach the ANSF growth objective of 352,000 by October 2012 and should complete the training and fielding of the Afghan Army and Police by December 2013. Additionally, NTM–A is training and certifying Afghan trainers to be able to take the lead for basic training of Army and Police. The goal by the end of 2011 is to have 4,400 Afghan trainers assume the lead for training allowing coalition trainers to shift focus to professionalize the force and develop systems that will endure past transition at the end of 2014.

__________________________

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE CONTRACTING

37. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Allen, both DOD and DOS have played a role in training the Afghanistan National Police. DOD has established the desired outcomes for this training, and, until this year, DOS handled the contracting. At the beginning of last year, the DOD and DOS Inspectors General reported that DOD failed to provide DOS with these requirements to include them in the contracts. Unfortunately, only 11 of the 64 police districts evaluated met the goal of being able to carry out law-enforcement actions unaided. We are told by the DOD Inspector General (IG) that the contract now resides with DOD. What metrics and performance requirements has DOD written into this training contract now that it has assumed responsibility for it?

General Allen. In April 2011, DOS transferred the Afghan National Police training mission to DOD. DOD and specifically NTM–A picked up this training mission and converted the training from contractor to coalition civilian and military personnel. The DOD IG conducted an audit of DOS to DOD transfer of mission and provided 10 findings in their draft report. NTM–A has addressed 9 of the 10 recommendations, with the remaining open recommendation being addressed between DOS and DOD leadership regarding funding reimbursement.

NTM–A has provided information to DOD IG as to how it has addressed or mitigated 9 of the recommendations, which will be identified in the final report from the DOD IG. Specific to the 64 police districts to meet the goal of being able to carry out law-enforcement actions unaided, ISAF Joint Command has written performance metrics to gauge the operational capability of the Afghan Police. The ISAF Joint Command Unit Assessment Tool serves as the basis for these metrics and performance requirements. Specific metrics and performance requirements, which are written in the Ministry of Interior Training and Support Statement of Work (dated 2 February 2011), include measuring the Afghan National Police’s ability to report the status of personnel, logistics, and operations and then take specific actions based on these reports in order to enable the long-term viability of the force.
[The nomination reference of LtGen John R. Allen, USMC, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
June 8, 2011.

The following named officer for appointment to the grade of general in the U.S. Marine Corps while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General

LtGen John R. Allen, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of LtGen John R. Allen, USMC, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LTGEN JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC

Position:
Deputy Commander, U. S. Central Command

Assigned:
17 Jun 08

Projected Rotation:
17 Jun 11

Date of Rank:
31 Oct 08

Date of Birth:
15 Dec 53

Date Commissioned:
2 Jun 76

MRD:
1 Jul 14

Education/Qualifications:
U.S. Naval Academy, BS, 1976
Georgetown University, MA, 1983
Defense Intelligence College, MS, 1984
The Basic School, 1977
Amphibious Warfare School Non-Resident, 1982
CMC Fellow—Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985
Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1993
National War College, 1998
CAPSTONE, 2006
CFACC, 2008
CLFLCC, 2008
Infantry Officer
Joint Qualified Officer

Commands:
Acting Commander, U.S. Central Command (LtGen: June 10–Aug. 10)
Commanding General, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MajGen: Aug. 06–June 08)
Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy (Col: Dec. 01–Sep 03)
Commanding Officer, The Basic School (Col: June 99–Apr. 01)
Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, 2d Marine Division (LtCol: July 94–Mar. 96)

Joint assignments:
Deputy Commander, U. S. Central Command (LtGen: July 08–June 10)
Principal Director (Asia & Pacific), Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Asia & Pacific) (BGen: Oct. 03–June 06)
Commanding Officer, Migrant Processing, Joint Task Force-160 (LtCol: May 94–July 94)
Service Staff Assignments:
Deputy Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy (Col: Apr. 01–Dec. 01)
Military Secretary to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Col: June 98–June 99)
Aide-de-Camp to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (LtCol: Mar. 96–July 97)
Assistant Operations Officer, G–3, 2d Marine Division (Maj/LtCol: June 93–Mar. 94)
Director, Infantry Officers' Course, The Basic School (Maj: June 90–Aug. 92)

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by LtGen John R. Allen, USMC, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   John R. Allen.

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:
   June 8, 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   15 December 1953, Fort Belvoir, VA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
   Married to Katherine Glickert Allen.
   Maiden name: Katherine Ann Glickert.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Betty Batchelder Allen; age 30.
   Barbara Elizabeth "Bobbie" Allen; age 26.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.
9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.

   None.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

   - Member, Council on Foreign Relations
   - Term Member, Council on Foreign Relations
   - Marine Corps Association
   - Naval Academy Alumni Association
   - Georgetown University Alumni Association
   - National War College Alumni Association
   - National Naval Officer Association

11. **Honors and awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, or any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

   - Honorary Life Member, Montford Point Marine Association
   - Pi Sigma Alpha, National Political Science Honor Society
   - Marine Corps Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies
   - Commandant of the Marine Corps Fellow

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

   Yes.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

   Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

---

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

   JOHN R. ALLEN.

This 23rd day of May, 2010.

[The nomination of LtGen John R. Allen, USMC, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 29, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2011.]
NOMINATIONS OF MADELYN R. CREEDON TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS AND ALAN F. ESTEVEZ TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS

TUESDAY, JULY 19, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in room SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Also present: Senators Lugar and Bingaman.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan, professional staff member; Ilona R. Cohen, counsel; Ozge Guzelsu, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff and Hannah I. Lloyd.

Committee members’ assistants present: Carolyn Chuahta, assistant to Senator Reed; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; and Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.

The committee meets today to consider the nominations of Madelyn Creedon to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs and Alan Estevez to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness.

We welcome our nominees and their families to today’s hearing. The long hours and the other sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make to serve our country are appreciated by us, and they could not happen without the support of their families. I hope the nominees will take an opportunity when we call on them for their opening statements to introduce any family members or friends who are here with them.

Both of our nominees have exceptional records of public service. Mr. Estevez has served with distinction in the Department of Defense (DOD) for 30 years, beginning with a series of positions in the Military Traffic Management Command in the 1980s and rising through the ranks over the course of five administrations to his current position as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness.

Ms. Creedon has served our country for the last 30 years in positions that included Assistant Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for Defense Programs, Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy for National Security Programs, General Counsel for the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, and a trial attorney in the Department of Energy.

Of course, Madelyn has served with distinction as counsel for this committee for 18 of those years, from 1990 to 1994, from 1997 to 2000, and from 2001 to the present. Over that time, we have all benefited from Madelyn’s energy, her intelligence, and her breadth of knowledge. We know firsthand of her extraordinary understanding of the nuclear, strategic, and space programs of DOD, programs that few know as well as she does.

Our committee has long benefited from her passionate commitment to the success of these programs, and to the national security of the United States. We will miss you, Madelyn, both personally and professionally.

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I congratulate Mr. Estevez and Ms. Creedon on their nominations.

Ms. Creedon, as you mentioned, has served with distinction for over 17 years on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Ms. Creedon, I guess you are free at last, as the sentiment goes.

I look forward to hearing, Ms. Creedon, your views regarding the future of nuclear reductions and how deterrence of attacks by our adversaries should most effectively be maintained, on the recapitalization of the nuclear weapons enterprise, and the future development and sustainment of missile defense.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) only entered into force in February. It will take 7 years to fully implement. The ad-
administration has signaled its intent to pursue further reductions to the size and scope of the nuclear stockpile.

During debate on the treaty in the Senate, the Senate made it clear that the recapitalization of our aging nuclear weapons infrastructure would be a prerequisite for pursuing further reductions, and the administration has proposed an adequate investment strategy. But to date, and with spending levels in flux across the board, it remains unclear if the strategy will be fulfilled.

Recent comments by the President's national security adviser have prompted new questions about the administration's intent, including the possibility of unilateral reductions and changes in targeting requirements and alert postures.

With respect to defense cyber strategy, Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Lynn, gave a speech last week at the National Defense University, which I thought was an important speech, but it also failed to answer some fundamental questions about how DOD will approach its responsibilities for defending national security aspects of cyberspace, including what constitutes a hostile act against our cyber capabilities and when the United States would respond, as necessary, with offensive cyber operations.

The comments of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cartwright, who questioned the predominantly defensive strategy portrayed by Secretary Lynn, highlight the need for the administration to clarify the authorities and policy that will apply to military operations in cyberspace.

Last month, Secretary Panetta said that, “The next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a cyber attack.” Yet, so far, U.S. strategy appears to have major shortcomings that could impair our ability to carry out military operations during a cyber attack.

Mr. Chairman, I would freely admit that Congress has not gotten its act together on this issue either.

General Cartwright stated his view, “There is no penalty for attacking the United States right now.” This statement, from one of our most senior military leaders, underlines the uncertainty that now exists.

I have often stated my view that Congress needs to act promptly to develop and pass comprehensive legislation to address cyber threats not only to defense networks and systems, but also to maintain the Nation’s critical infrastructure, encompassing the electric grid, air traffic control system, water supplies, financial networks, and much more from a cyber attack.

The Department's cyber strategy identified this area as one of its five pillars, but we have yet to answer the vast majority of key policy and legal questions that exist.

I still believe that the best course of action for the Senate to take is to establish a select committee on cybersecurity and electronic intelligence leak that would develop comprehensive cybersecurity legislation, building on much of the good work that has been done already, but considering new ideas and approaches as necessary.

With various agencies, Senate committees, and the White House moving forward with cybersecurity proposals, there is a need for clarity and unity of effort. A temporary select committee could provide much-needed order and urgency of purpose to the process.
Ms. Creedon, I look forward to hearing your assessment, as well as the role you foresee you will play in addressing and answering these questions on policy and legal authorities.

Mr. Estevez, the Department and combatant commands are now carrying out the tasks of removing, relocating, and transferring equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major challenges remain in establishing new supply lines if our ability to move equipment through Pakistan into Afghanistan is jeopardized.

Additionally, we will need your expertise and background as the Department is faced with operations and sustainment costs of the F–35 that may exceed $1 trillion over the life of the aircraft.

We will also need to ensure that the current tendency to slash future defense budgets will not detrimentally affect readiness, to include the capabilities of our forces, depots, and other industrial bases to the point which we may be faced with a hollow force reminiscent of the 1970s.

I look forward to your testimony on these issues, as well as the continued transformation of the Department’s joint logistics processes to better support the warfighter.

I thank both the nominees again for their willingness to serve in these positions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Now we are going to ask Senator Lugar to make an introduction of Ms. Creedon.

We welcome you. Senator Lugar, you are truly one of our experts on national security. You work with this committee on so many issues important to our national security throughout the years, nuclear proliferation just being one of those issues. We give you a very warm welcome to our committee this morning, and you can proceed with your introduction.

Senator Lugar.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your warm introduction—Ranking Member Senator McCain, Senator Nelson.

It is truly an honor once again to introduce Madelyn Creedon, nominated to serve as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs in the Pentagon.

Because of the testimony already of the distinguished chairman and ranking member, I know that she really needs no introduction, but I will proceed anyway because I am proud that the State of Indiana and the city of Indianapolis have produced an experienced and very capable threat reduction and deterrence expert, a long-time member of the staff of this committee.

I support her nomination, and I am proud to recommend Madelyn Creedon, this distinguished Hoosier, to the committee today.

This is not the first time I have had this privilege, providing support for Madelyn. If confirmed, it will not be Madelyn’s first time to serve in the executive branch in a Senate-confirmed position. In April 2000, I was pleased to express my support for her to this
committee as the President’s nominee to be the Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration for Defense Programs.

Before and after Madelyn’s work at the NNSA, she worked on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and her work on both the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of this committee are well known to all members. She has worked extensively on efforts to strengthen and improve threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union, including the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.

Indeed, I first encountered Madelyn when she was working for my colleague, Senator Sam Nunn, the former distinguished chairman of this committee.

If confirmed, she will play a vital role in the globalizing of the Nunn-Lugar program to new countries in her capacity as the Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs. If confirmed, I look forward to hearing from her on a regular basis on the progress of these new efforts.

Mr. Chairman, let me mention my interest in the growing importance of DOD programs over which she will preside and, thus, the growing importance of these positions. Over 2 years ago, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report urging DOD to enlarge the Nunn-Lugar CTR program beyond the states of the former Soviet Union to address newly emerging threats posed by materials and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The report identified the need for the CTR program to be made more flexible, more agile, more prepared to move more quickly if it were to be successful in its application outside the states of the former Soviet Union.

Yet, despite the Academy’s recommendation, despite the enactment of new legislation to provide the program with authorities to operate outside the former Soviet Union, and despite new presidential policy directives, including the global nuclear lockdown strategy and the release of PPD–2 on the threats posed by dangerous biological pathogens, the current pace of the work to meet these goals suggests that the President’s objectives are unlikely to be met. These are part of the challenges facing our nominee, should she be confirmed.

I appreciate the need to ensure that CTR forms of assistance are used appropriately to reduce WMD threats, that our partners can absorb and sustain the assistance, and that the actions of the U.S. Government are coordinated and effective. But I am concerned that in this round of administration, coordination, and planning meetings, certifications and determinations have resulted in paralysis, not progress, to the point where critical threat reduction and national security opportunities may be forfeited.

The path to globalizing the CTR program beyond the original states of the former Soviet Union is open. The program is well-positioned to enter a new phase of global security engagement. It has the authority and the direction. What has been missing is the political and bureaucratic will to move forward with implementation.

Indeed, I would suspect that one of the major challenges facing our nominee will be to work in close cooperation with the imple-
mentation of Nunn-Lugar Global Security Engagement to make each program as effective as possible.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, many committee members will recall the slogan associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion, namely, “out of area or out of business”. The same may be said with regard to the CTR program, as efforts are undertaken to expand the original program to meet the threats of WMD, no matter their type or origin or geographical location.

Two factors have led DOD to identify the importance of taking the CTR program to Africa, namely, the growing concern over bioterrorism and the natural prevalence of lethal pathogens in African nations.

Indeed, terrorist activities on the African continent are a growing concern. U.S. Africa Command, the U.S. military command responsible for engagement in Africa, described the threat in its 2010 posture statement this way, “In the last year, al Qaeda and terrorist groups in Africa appear to have strengthened their collaboration. Al Qaeda operatives are active in East Africa. The leaders of Somalia-based al Shabaab have publicly aligned themselves with al Qaeda. Al Shabaab continues to operate multiple terrorist training camps in Somalia with al Qaeda participation.”

The CTR Global Security Engagement Program in Africa that our nominee will inherit is designed to help secure vulnerable facilities, promote cooperative research and transparency in handling dangerous pathogens, and help build an early-warning system capable of quickly detecting, diagnosing, and reporting infections to help determine if they are natural or man-made and to stop their spread.

Last November, I invited several members of Madelyn’s staff-to-be in the Pentagon to join me on a visit to East Africa, particularly the states of Uganda and Kenya, to look into the interface between biosecurity and public health issues and the means by which the Nunn-Lugar Global Security Engagement program might help to contain this threat. With their proximity to the Middle East and large swaths of weakly governed lands, like Somalia, biological virus and bacteria research facilities could be attractive targets for terrorist groups or black market traders.

Moreover, public health boosts are important benefits to future security work of CTR Global. With the humanitarian interest in helping to prevent disease, such cooperative efforts to quickly detect, diagnose, and report dangerous infections are critical to stopping global pandemics.

Our nominee will be required to practice all of her diplomatic skills in mentoring these programs in Africa. The CTR program is building on relationships established by the Centers for Disease Control and the U.S. Army medical research units to work with these laboratories as additional security and shared scientific research are performed.

The intersection of public health issues with bioterrorism concerns will test the merits of the nominee. The selection of Madelyn to lead policy efforts in global strategic affairs is certainly a good one.

Despite the broad nature of the public areas she will oversee, including countering WMD, nuclear forces, missile defense,
cybersecurity, and space issues, she will be asked to ensure that the bedrocks of the CTR and Global Security Engagement components of our future counterproliferation efforts are not left to bureaucratic drudgery and interagency inertia. I know she understands that effective program execution relies on the collaboration of both the policy and implementation functions of DOD.

For all these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I strongly support her nomination. I am honored to be before the committee this morning.

[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, members of the Armed Services Committee, it is an honor for me to introduce Madelyn Creedon, nominee for the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs in the Pentagon. However, I know she really needs no introduction to members of this committee.

I am proud that the State of Indiana and the city of Indianapolis have produced an experienced and capable threat reduction and deterrence expert, and a longtime member of the staff of this committee, Madelyn Creedon. I support her nomination, and I am proud to recommend this distinguished Hoosier to the committee today.

This is not the first time I have had the privilege of providing my support for Madelyn, and if confirmed, it will not be Madelyn’s first time to serve in an executive branch in a Senate-confirmed position. In April 2000, I was pleased to express my support for her to this committee as the President’s nominee to be Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for Defense Programs.

Before and after Madelyn’s work at the NNSA, she has worked on the staff of the Armed Services Committee. Her work on both the Subcommittees on Strategic Forces and Emerging Threats of this committee is well known to all members. She has worked extensively on efforts to strengthen and improve threat reduction programs in the Former Soviet Union, including the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. Indeed, I first encountered Madelyn when she was working for my colleague Sam Nunn, the former distinguished chairman of this committee. If confirmed she will play a vital role in the globalizing of the Nunn-Lugar Program to new countries in her capacity as the Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs. If confirmed, I look forward to hearing from her on a regular basis on the progress of these new efforts.

Mr. Chairman, let me mention my interest in the growing importance of the Department of Defense (DOD) programs over which she will preside and thus the growing importance of this position.

Over 2 years ago, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report urging DOD to enlarge the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Program beyond the states of the former Soviet Union to address newly emerging threats posed by weapons and materials of mass destruction. The report identified the need for the CTR Program to be made more flexible, more agile, and prepared to move more quickly if it were to be successful in its application outside the states of the former Soviet Union.

Yet despite the Academy’s recommendations, despite the enactment of new legislation to provide the program with authorities to operate outside the former Soviet Union, and despite new Presidential policy directives including the Global Nuclear Lockdown strategy and the release of PPD–2 on the threats posed dangerous biological pathogens, the current pace of the work to meet these goals suggests that the President’s objectives are unlikely to be met. These are part of the challenges facing our nominee should she be confirmed.

I appreciate the need to ensure that CTR forms of assistance are used appropriately to reduce WMD threats, that our partners can absorb and sustain the assistance, and that the actions of the U.S. Government are coordinated and effective. But I am concerned that endless rounds of administration coordination and planning meetings, of certifications and determinations, have resulted in paralysis, not progress, to the point where critical threat reduction and national security opportunities may be forfeited.

The path to globalizing the CTR program beyond the original states of the former Soviet Union is open. The program is well positioned to enter a new phase of global security engagement; it has the authority and direction. What has been missing is the political and bureaucratic will to move forward with implementation. Indeed, I would suspect that one of the major challenges facing our nominee will be to work
in close cooperation with the implementers of Nunn-Lugar Global Security Engagement to make each program as effective as possible.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, many committee members will recall the slogan associated with NATO expansion: namely, out of area or out of business! The same may be said with regard to the CTR program, as efforts are undertaken to expand the original program to meet the threats of weapons of mass destruction no matter their type or origin or geographical location. Two factors have led DOD to identify the importance of taking the CTR program to Africa: namely, the growing concern over bioterrorism and the natural prevalence of lethal pathogens in African nations.

Indeed, terrorist activity on the African continent is a growing concern. Africa Command, the U.S. military command responsible for engagement in Africa, described the threat in its 2010 Posture Statement this way: “In the last year, al Qaeda and terrorist groups in Africa appear to have strengthened their collaboration. Al Qaeda operatives are active in East Africa. The leaders of Somalia-based al Shabaab have publicly aligned themselves with al Qaeda . . . al Shabaab continues to operate multiple terrorist training camps in Somalia with al Qaeda participation.”

The CTR Global Security Engagement program in Africa that our nominee will inherit is designed to help secure vulnerable facilities, promote cooperative research and transparency in handling dangerous pathogens, and help build an “early warning system” capable of quickly detecting, diagnosing, and reporting infections to help determine if they are natural or manmade and stop their spread.

Last November, I invited several members of Madelyn’s staff-to-be in the Pentagon to join me in a visit to East Africa, particularly the states of Uganda and Kenya, to look into the interface between biosecurity and public health issues and the means by which the Nunn-Lugar Global Security Engagement program might help to contain this threat.

With their proximity to the Middle East and large swaths of weakly governed lands like Somalia, biological virus and bacteria research facilities could be attractive targets for terrorist groups or black-market traders. Moreover, public health boosts are important benefits to future security work of CTR Global. Along with humanitarian interest in helping to prevent disease, such cooperative efforts to quickly detect, diagnose, and report dangerous infections are critical to stopping global pandemics.

Our nominee will be required to practice all of her diplomatic skills in mentoring these programs in Africa. The CTR program is building on relationships established by the Center for Disease Control and U.S. Army Medical Research Units to work with these laboratories as additional security and shared scientific research is performed. The intersection of public health issues with bioterrorism concerns will test the mettle of our nominee.

The selection of Madelyn to lead policy efforts in Global Strategic Affairs is a good one. Despite the broad nature of the policy areas she will oversee—including countering weapons of mass destruction, nuclear forces, missile defense, cybersecurity and space issues—she will be asked to ensure that the bedrocks of the CTR and Global Security Engagement components of our future counter-proliferation efforts are not left to bureaucratic drudgery and interagency inertia. I know she understands that effective program execution relies on the collaboration of both the policy and implementation functions of DOD.

For all of these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I strongly support her nomination. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much for that introduction. It is very important to us and very important to Madelyn Creedon as well.

We also know you have an important scheduling commitment to keep. You are free to leave, of course, as you wish.

Thank you so much, Senator Lugar.

We are delighted Senator Bingaman has joined us this morning. Formerly a member of this committee, he is the chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee.

We are counting on him to give us some more progress in the area of energy independence this year. But for this morning’s purpose, he really is well-acquainted with Madelyn Creedon. We would call upon you, Senator Bingaman.
Senator Bingaman. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me take just a couple of minutes to heartily endorse the nomination of Madelyn Creedon for this important position as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs.

I know this committee knows her work extremely well. She has been a stalwart of the professional staff on this committee, essentially during all the time that I served here and for many, many years.

Some of that work was interrupted when she was Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs at NNSA, when it was first formed. She was also Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy for National Security Programs and General Counsel to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

She has had broad experience in the executive branch as well as here in Congress, knows these issues extremely well, as all of us have come to realize.

Most of my interaction with Madelyn has been in connection with the nuclear deterrent issues that come into play at our two national laboratories in New Mexico, Los Alamos and Sandia. But I know she is extremely well-informed as to the importance of maintaining the nuclear deterrent, also extremely well-informed on the international situation.

I have had the good fortune to travel with her to Russia. I know she has traveled there and many other parts of the world extensively in the time she has worked here on the committee staff.

I heartily recommend her, and I think the President should be complimented for an excellent choice.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Bingaman, for your very important and useful introduction of Madelyn Creedon.

Now we will call upon our nominees for their opening statements. We will first call on Ms. Creedon.

Ms. Creedon. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, all the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, it is a pleasure to be here this morning.

I would also add that, as a long-time member of the committee staff, it is a little strange to sit on this side of the dais.

Thank you, Senator Lugar, Senator Bingaman, for your kind and supportive words. Senator Lugar’s leadership, along with that of former Senator Sam Nunn, at a time of great uncertainty, resulted in the establishment of the CTR program, which continues to be the keystone of the global proliferation prevention programs.

Senator Bingaman has been a leader in emphasizing the importance of research and development and has supported all things nuclear. It has been a particular honor for me to have been able to support their goals.

I am grateful for and humbled by President Obama’s decision to nominate me to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs. I would like to thank Secretary Gates, Secretary
Panetta, Deputy Secretary Lynn, Under Secretary Flournoy, and Deputy Under Secretary Jim Miller for their support.

If confirmed, I will be honored to serve as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs.

I would also like to thank my family for both supporting me and putting up with me over the last 30 years of my government service. I am proud to have with me this morning my husband and partner in all things, Jim Bracco, and our daughter and son-in-law, Meredith and Mike Walsh. Our son, John Bracco, lives in Atlanta and could not be here this morning.

I would also like to acknowledge my parents, Marilyn and Dick Creedon, who live in Indianapolis, and who were also not able to be here this morning. Their devotion to charitable and public service, including my father’s over 30 years as an Army Reserve officer, has always inspired me to do more.

The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs covers a range of complex and often controversial issues, including nuclear deterrence, missile defense, countering WMD, space, and cyberspace.

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the new policies and strategies that have been developed in these areas are implemented thoughtfully, expeditiously, and in a cost-effective manner. Most importantly, I would work to ensure that all the policies in these areas continue to support U.S. leadership and advantage.

One of the most difficult of the policy areas in which I will work, if confirmed, is the area of cyberspace. Cyberspace presents new and unique challenges, as cyber capabilities are an integral part of almost everything we do personally, professionally, and as a country.

Cyberspace provides both an advantage and a vulnerability. As the first man-made domain, it has no natural, geographic, or other boundaries, and few historic precedents. There are lots of questions, however, that, if confirmed, I would hope to begin to address.

In closing, I have to thank all of the members of this committee on both sides of the aisle. If confirmed, I will have to leave the staff of this committee. While I look forward to the new challenge, it will be very difficult to leave.

I hope that I will be able to continue to work with all the members and all of the great personal and committee staff in the same bipartisan way that this committee has always worked.

Finally, Senator Levin, your leadership, endless hard work, and dedication to the men and women in Military Service are unequalled. It has been a pleasure, an honor, a privilege, and great fun to work for you.

Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Well, thank you for that great introduction.

[Laughter.]

We will miss you for many, many reasons, as I said.

Mr. Estevez, you are next.
STATEMENT OF ALAN F. ESTEVEZ, NOMINATED TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATIERIEL READINESS

Mr. Estevez. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.

I am grateful for the confidence that President Obama has shown in me by nominating me to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness.

I also want to thank Secretary Gates, Secretary Panetta, and Under Secretary Carter for supporting my nomination.

I want to thank my family for their support, and I am happy to say that my wife, Susan Pearson, is here with me today. I want to thank her for her support, counsel, and understanding she has provided me over the last 8 years.

I would also like to note that my father, who was a career Army officer and subsequently a teacher, and my mother spent many years in civil service. While they are both now deceased, they instilled in me the values that have led me to this point in my career, and I know that they would be proud.

Having served for over 30 years in the government, the last several in the position of the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, and having made numerous trips to visit our men and women who are deployed in harm’s way, I know firsthand how important it is to provide critical logistics support to our forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I had the opportunity to visit our forces in Afghanistan last month and saw how our ability to deliver and sustain key items—ranging from mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicles to aerostats—have improved our force protection and our warfighting capabilities.

I appreciate that the President and Congress are working to ensure that the Department’s equipment is being properly sustained, maintained, and reset to overcome the wear and tear and damage that are a result of our ongoing combat operations. I am hopeful that my words here today will show my continued dedication toward implementing a comprehensive end-to-end logistics strategy that provides effective support to our warfighters and provides value to the American taxpayers who pay for that support.

In closing, I am deeply humbled and honored by this nomination. If confirmed, I will do my best to continue to provide quality support to the men and women of our Armed Forces while keeping a focus on affordability.

Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Estevez.

Let me now ask you both the standard questions that we ask of all of our nominees.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Ms. Creedon. I have.

Mr. Estevez. I have.

Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
Ms. CREEDON. No.
Mr. ESTEVEZ. No.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?
Ms. CREEDON. I will, yes.
Mr. ESTEVEZ. I will.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Ms. CREEDON. Yes.
Mr. ESTEVEZ. I will.

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Ms. CREEDON. Yes.
Mr. ESTEVEZ. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?
Ms. CREEDON. Yes.
Mr. ESTEVEZ. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Ms. CREEDON. Yes.
Mr. ESTEVEZ. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Why don't we try a 7-minute first round for questions, and if we need it, we will have, I am quite sure, an opportunity for a second round.

Let me start with you, Ms. Creedon, on the issue of proliferation of WMD. Do you see any opportunities for reducing the dangers of that proliferation?
Ms. CREEDON. I do, sir. There has been an awful lot of work done under the CTR programs, both at DOD and the Department of Energy, and a lot of progress has been made.

There has been a tremendous amount of progress in securing materials at their source. There has been a lot of progress made in what is referred to as the second line of defense, and that is developing mechanisms and capabilities to detect materials if they should be stolen or if they should be removed from where they are supposed to be and if they are trying to be transported across borders. There is a lot of work going on to enable other countries to facilitate and recognize when there are materials in transit.

There is a lot of work that has been done, but there is a lot of work that is left to be done. A good part of that is dealing with not only the rogue elements who want to steal either weapons or materials, but also the broader issue of proliferation by state actors.

There is a lot to be done. But I do think there is hope. I think the initiative to secure vulnerable, usable nuclear materials—materials that could be used in a nuclear weapon—in 4 years is a good goal. Whether we meet it or not really depends on the cooperation of the international community, but it is a good goal.

So I do think there is hope.
Chairman LEVIN. On the cyberspace issue, Senator McCain made strong reference to the need for progress in this area. You, in your opening comments, likewise made reference to it.

General Cartwright, in an interview last week, advocated a change in strategy from an emphasis on defense to an emphasis on offense, some form of retaliation to deter attacks. I am wondering whether you are in a position yet that you have an opinion on this issue as to whether we need to change the emphasis from defense to at least being able to threaten retaliation, to be in a position to retaliate in order to deter these growing number of attacks?

Ms. CREEDON. I have heard General Cartwright talk on this topic before, and I know that one of the issues is that right now our capabilities really are limited to defense. One of the areas where over time—and I don’t know how to define “over time,” but probably some years possibly—that we need to shift from a mostly defensive position.

General Cartwright has indicated that in his view it is about 90–10 right now, that we need to shift from a mostly defensive position to something where you also have at least 50–50 on the part of the U.S. Government and probably on the part of DOD something that looks like 90 percent offense and 10 percent defense.

But it is one of those longer-term goals, as we understand more about this problem and how to deal with more active defenses, how to deal with more offensive capabilities.

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Estevez, let me ask you a couple of questions about Afghanistan. What kind of additional steps can we take to reduce our logistical footprint, either through improvements in energy efficiency or the increased use of renewable sources of power such as solar and wind?

The dangers to our troops, the losses of lives which are involved in protecting these shipments of energy into Afghanistan, the huge cost of that energy in lives and in treasure, I think, require us to look for ways to reduce the logistical footprint for energy. Apparently, 80 percent of our ground convoys are dedicated to carrying just fuel and water. What would be your thoughts on that?

Mr. ESTEVEZ. There are a couple of things we can do, and we are teaming up with Sharon Burke, who is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs, on those things. When we look at things like our contract for sustainment of our bases, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, and what we need to do is require fuel-efficient generators, we need to ensure that we are putting up fuel-efficient housing, the containerized housing that we put up, that would reduce our energy footprint.

We are doing some tests on things like solar power out on the battlefield, which in certain areas of Afghanistan could work. Obviously, a number of gallons of our fuel go to our mobility assets. Those are longer-term issues to deal with. But in the near term, working on our base infrastructure, our deployed base infrastructure can reduce our energy consumption on the battlefield, reducing our convoys to sustain that.

Chairman LEVIN. It is an area that we need to pay much greater attention to. I know there has been attention paid to it, and it is not a new issue. But it is a huge issue.
We hope that when you are confirmed, that this will be one of the first items on your agenda to look at. There is potential for huge progress here, and the costs have been incredible.

Now, Mr. Estevez, if the Government of Iraq were to ask for the continued presence of U.S. forces beyond the end of this year, assuming they made that request and if we agreed to such an extension, either as requested or modified, what would be some of the more important logistical complications associated with interrupting our withdrawal and adjusting to some kind of a limited extension?

Mr. Estevez. U.S. forces in Iraq right now have multiple plans based on those scenarios. Obviously, as we close bases and we remove our presence in those bases, going back to those bases would be difficult. We do have certain tripwires on those, and we do have alternatives to those plans.

As we are moving equipment out, having to return that equipment back to Iraq would also be a logistics ripple. General Austin is holding forces back in Iraq right now. Again, it will be in the fall where those tripwires start to hit, which would increase our difficulty.

We also have contracts that are drawing down for sustainment of food and fuel, base support in Iraq. We can turn the volume on those contracts back up. They are drawing down now.

Most of those contracts will remain in place to sustain the Department of State presence in Iraq, as well as our foreign military sales and advisory presence. So it will be just extending those contracts and increasing the numbers that they support.

Chairman Levin. You say General Austin was holding back forces?

Mr. Estevez. Our drawdown plan starts in the fall, so late August, early fall. He has that ramp-down plan based on our current scenario.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, congratulations to the nominees.

Mr. Estevez, in your answer to the advance policy questions, you stated you have, “also worked extensively with the commercial sector to understand best logistic practices across a wide range of industrial and commercial activities.” What have you learned that DOD isn’t doing?

Mr. Estevez. When you look at some of the best commercial places—use a Wal-Mart—

Senator McCain. Best Buy, Home Depot, all of the major retailers.

Mr. Estevez. Yes. Right. Of course, they are in the retail business. So it is not exactly a match for us, but the way they—

Senator McCain. But it is a match from getting much-needed whatever it is from one place to another in the most efficient fashion.

Mr. Estevez. That’s correct, Senator.

Senator McCain. Go ahead, please.

Mr. Estevez. Seeing how they collaborate with their supply base to understand what the demand and the forecast would be, they do
that much better than we do. We are trying to copy their ways of
doing that.

They use third-party logistics more extensively than we do. They
select where and how to do that. We have also implemented some
of those practices.

Senator McCain. For example, what practices? It is my under-
standing that these major entities that we discuss, they somehow
are able to identify a need, and within a matter of hours, that partic-
ular need or requirement is fulfilled. The efficiencies is what
makes them far more cost-effective as compared with smaller com-
mercial enterprises is what I am trying to get at.

What do we do in the Defense Department to emulate that?

Mr. Estevez. They have the ability to shape demand that we
can’t. They have sales, and they can offer things. But we do
have——

Senator McCain. Maybe we need some sales. [Laughter.]

Mr. Estevez. But we do need a better predictive capability. We
need to work closer with our industrial base on them under-
standing what we are consuming so that they can provide that in
advance. We are doing some of that. We need to do better, Senator.

Senator McCain. I hope so. Because one of the recurrent, not
complaints, but voiced requirements, that I hear in places like
Kabul, Baghdad, Kandahar, and other places is that there is a sig-
nificant delay. If they have to consume a certain amount of what-
ever they have, whether it be ammunition or food or whatever, un-
foreseen consumption of what they have on hand, that there is still,
in their view, too long a delay.

I am sure they would like to have it instantaneously, but I think
that we might look again at what commercial enterprises do to
react as quickly as they do.

Ms. Creedon, as I mentioned earlier, General Cartwright said
that DOD is spending 90 percent of its time playing defense
against cyber attacks and 10 percent playing offense and that, in
his view, the Department should invert this ratio to demonstrate
there will be consequences to a cyber attack against the United
States.

To start with, do you agree with General Cartwright?

Ms. Creedon. I do, sir, and he said over time that is where the
Department has to be.

Senator McCain. Give me an example of what the consequences
would be, for example, of a cyber attack that shut down our de-
fense logistics system in some way.

Ms. Creedon. One of the things that he put in this context was
that the constant building higher defenses, it becomes more and
more expensive. The attacks are inexpensive, and the defenses are
more expensive.

So one of his constructs, and although he conceded that it was
in a very hypothetical construct, is that someday we have to figure
out that right now the attack just causes us to spend more money
on defenses. What he is trying to say is that at some point, we
have to make it clear that that attack, in fact, there is more to that
attacker to pay than there is to us to pay for the higher defense.

Senator McCain. I fully understand that. Now, what is the con-
sequence?
Ms. CREEDON. How to get there is hard. Part of this is, like any other thing, you have to look at, what is the attack? What was the result of the attack? Then——
Senator MCCAIN. Well, I just gave you an example. What would be the consequence?
Ms. CREEDON.—and act appropriately on something like that. So, it doesn't——
Senator MCCAIN. What would be an appropriate action?
Ms. CREEDON. It wouldn't necessarily have to be a cyber attack. You also have the problem of figuring out who did it.
Senator MCCAIN. Will you give me an answer as to what the consequences would be?
Ms. CREEDON. For instance, on something like that, if we knew who did it, it could be something that would deal with their ability to attack us further. So it could be a response in cyber. Maybe it is taking out some of their computer systems.
It depends on where they are. It depends on who is behind it. It could be a land-based attack. But again, it would have to be modulated based on the time, the duration, and the impact.
Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

Would you agree, now that you are free from your tenure here, that Congress, as much as we would like to hear from DOD and we like to hear proposals, as I just talked to you about, Congress really doesn't have its act together on this issue, for a variety of reasons, including the proliferation of committees of jurisdiction.

Would you agree with that assertion that we really haven't been able to address it effectively, not because of lack of dedication of members, but simply the way the Senate functions?
Ms. CREEDON. I don't think anybody is unique in this. It is very new. It is very difficult, and it is very uncertain. Over time, again, I think there is going to have to be a lot of rethinking on how everybody addresses these issues.
Far be it from me, after a lot of years up here, to try and either explain or understand or suggest how Congress should act, because in the end, it does always seem to get to the right conclusion.
Senator MCCAIN. It does?
Ms. CREEDON. I think, by and large, it does. But it is just sometimes really hard to get there.
Senator MCCAIN. But you would agree that because of cross-jurisdictional situation, that it makes it a little more difficult?
Ms. CREEDON. It does.
Senator MCCAIN. There is inherent sometimes competition between the committees for jurisdiction, which really should be resolved in one way or the other.
Ms. CREEDON. This is true.
Senator MCCAIN. I congratulate both of you on your nominations, and we look forward to confirming you as rapidly as possible.
Thank you. I thank the witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Nelson.
Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me add my congratulations to our two nominees as well, and a very special thank you to Ms. Creedon for her support for the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which I have been honored to chair.

The responsibilities that you have helped me with include nuclear and strategic forces, ballistic missile defense, intelligence programs, space programs, information warfare programs, and Department of Energy defense-related nuclear and environmental programs, as you have led professional staff on these issues. It really is no surprise that your immense experience, knowledge, and expertise in these areas have resulted in your nomination to this extremely important position.

If confirmed, you will be advising the Secretary of Defense on policy and strategy in these areas, and you have already mentioned cyberspace and countering WMD. It doesn’t seem like much of a stretch for me that you would go from the Senate to DOD to work on this.

From your work on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I have no doubt that, if confirmed, you will work to develop and grow the relationships and knowledge necessary to provide policy guidance on these multitude of issues. It is no exaggeration that, if confirmed, we are going to miss you as well on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee.

But I hope that, as I support your nomination, in spite of the fact of losing you in that position, we will be able to look forward to continuing our relationship once you take over these responsibilities.

Both Senator John McCain and Senator Carl Levin have mentioned cyber. Given the fact that we have learned about the cyber leak most recently, obviously it is one of the most important things, and it is in the forefront of our minds about how do we begin to deal with this.

It is perhaps a little bit unfair to ask you what your plans are to deal with this at this point in time, but if confirmed, do you have any initial thoughts about how we get to the bottom of what causes the leaks and what to do to prevent the leaks?

Whether it is offense or defense, the first thing that we need to focus on is how do we get control over our cyber opportunities so that they don’t become opportunities for our adversaries?

Ms. C REEDON. Thank you, Senator Nelson, and thank you for your kind words as well.

The issue of cyberspace is incredibly complicated, obviously. From where I sit right now, I really have been on the receiving end of various briefings on what exactly these instances lately have been. RSA, the little secure token company, that is one of the most recent ones.

But in looking at how to address these in the future, it is very clear that this is going to take lots of entities, including the private sector. The Defense Industrial Base Pilot is a good example of a good place to start, frankly, on how both government and industry have to work together to figure out how to both stop and counter these attacks.

DOD is heavily reliant on commercial systems for much of what they do. It is absolutely essential that not only government resources be brought to bear, but also the commercial things.
If I am confirmed, one of the things that I want to really dig down into and understand is what are the relationships that exist right now in the commercial sector? What are the commercial capabilities? What are the defensive capabilities that exist in the government? Where are the possibilities to bring these two things together?

So that you don’t have seams between the government approach and the industry approach, and really try to understand how this becomes an integrated function because, as we have discussed, this is not a geographically-constrained domain.

A lot of times you can’t even tell who the attacker is or where the attacker is coming from. Sometimes you can, and then it also is very hard to sort out even when it is state sponsored. Is it a terrorist? Is it a criminal? What is the motivation? What drove this?

It is a complicated subject. I look forward to getting into it.

Senator Nelson. It is very clear that our enthusiasm for cyber and for the benefits that we receive from being able to transmit information in the manner that we have been able to do it so effectively and efficiently has gotten us a little ahead of ourselves in terms of being able to protect that very important process at the same time as we have expanded it.

We didn’t build the firewalls that we would ordinarily build in the transfer and transmittal of information. Whether it is WikiLeaks or whatever it is, we have to tighten our capabilities of controlling the very vital information that we have, military and national security data, so that this sort of attack can’t occur. If we can firewall our information, then we are going to be less concerned about whether we take offensive means or otherwise because there won’t be any need if we can get ahead of our adversaries.

I hope that as you assume this position, if confirmed, that you will find ways to make certain that all the users are as enthusiastic about building the protection as they are about using the procedures that are there so easily available to pass information on from one group to another or to retain it for future use.

If we don’t do that, then I am in favor of going back to vaults and paper and the old way of doing things because that is one thing that you potentially, at least visually, can see you have some control over. The problem is we don’t have the visual control over cyber.

I wish you well in the new position. I hope that the Senate will act rather promptly to confirm both of you in your new positions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Ayotte.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to congratulate both of you on your nominations, and very much appreciate your service, both to this committee and also in DOD.

I want to ask Mr. Estevez about our Guard and Reserve because clearly in the conflicts that we have been engaged in, we have been using the Guard and Reserve as an operational force. Yet not all DOD systems and budget decisions have necessarily evolved to that place of where we are in terms of using the Guard and Reserve.
A recent National Guard and Reserve equipment report found major item shortages for the Guard and Reserve. Despite some very important investments in modernization and maintenance, some Guard units still don’t have sufficient equipment on hand to properly train or respond to domestic contingencies.

If you are confirmed, I wanted to get your thoughts on where we are with respect to equipment to train and maintain readiness for our Guard and Reserve and how you expect to work on those issues going forward, given what we have asked our Guard and Reserve units to do in the conflicts we have been involved in.

Mr. Estevez, the Guard and Reserve, as you noted, Senator, are part of our holistic force. They are part of the total force that we have out there.

We are working to ensure that they have the same equipment, at the same level of readiness, as the Active Force. Certainly, any force that is deploying has the equipment that they need to deploy with or they are falling in on equipment in Afghanistan or Iraq, depending on where they are going, just as the Active units do. They don’t bring their equipment anymore. They fall in on equipment.

We do have work, as we rotate equipment around in the rear base, in the training base, and at home station, to ensure that people have that, and they do get in that training. We do have equipment, of course, that is forward deployed that will eventually come back, and that will be distributed to make the force whole again at the return.

In the meantime, we are working hard to fill those gaps and ensure that we do have correct response capability for domestic incidents.

Senator Ayotte, thank you.

I wanted to follow up on an issue that I have been concerned about as a new member of this committee. I realize that your position is really dealing with logistics, materiel readiness, and that is what you will be focused on.

But as I have been on the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, one of the issues that I have seen time and time again is the issues we have had with procurement overall, particularly in weapon systems. We have spent $46 billion over the past decade developing weapon systems that ultimately were never fielded, due to cost overruns or technical challenges, we weren’t able to bring forward.

Given the difficulties we have right now in terms of the fiscal challenges that our country faces, I wanted to get your thoughts on how we could improve the procurement process. Because I have also been very troubled by some of the terms that we agree to in the contracts that we have been involved in that aren’t as beneficial as I think they should be to our interests.

Mr. Estevez, as you note, as the logistician of the Department, that is not my main focus. However, I do have the pleasure of working with Dr. Carter and Mr. Kendall, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and his Principal Deputy, who have a major focus on that.

Dr. Carter is leading a major effort inside the Department called Better Buying Power, which is full-focused on improving the way we buy. Part of that is looking at the requirements so that we go
into the process knowing that we can achieve the end result of getting the capability we are trying to buy.

As the logistician, I have a full seat at the table on that, and looking to ensure that what we buy is sustainable and affordable in that sustainment over the course of its life cycle. Frankly, 70 percent of the cost of an acquisition tends to be after the acquisition takes place in sustaining that piece of equipment over time.

Senator AYOTTE. In the maintenance costs?

Mr. ESTEVEZ. Yes, ma'am.

Senator AYOTTE. I would ask you, as you have that seat at the table, if there are issues that you see that you think we can help here to give you better tools so that we can improve that procurement process, would you let us know? I think that is very critical, given the fiscal challenges that we are facing. We can't continue to pour money into either weapons systems or other equipment that isn't going to serve its purpose.

Mr. ESTEVEZ. I agree, ma'am.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you.

Ms. Creedon, I wanted to ask you about a statement. I wanted to ask you about our nuclear force levels.

Tom Donilon announced on March 29 that the administration would be preparing for the next round of nuclear reductions. DOD will review the strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.

One of the issues that I wanted to ask you about is if we go below the New START force levels, that may require significant changes to the U.S. force structure, nuclear weapons, targeting guidance, and the nuclear doctrine. None of these changes, in my view, should be taken lightly.

I believe that we need to take serious caution before the administration makes a commitment to further reductions below New START force levels, especially since recently General Chilton, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, told the Senate during its consideration of the New START treaty that, “The arsenal we have is exactly what is needed to provide the deterrent.”

Ms. Creedon, can you assure this committee that in your capacity as Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs, that you would help ensure that DOD conducts its strategic assessment in a manner consistent with our interests, rather just in the pure pursuit of reductions for the sake of reductions? Because my concern is that it is very important that we maintain a proper deterrent.

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, Senator, I agree.

As the START treaty comes into effect, it is going to take about 7 years before all of the reductions, even under the START treaty, have been implemented. Yes, Senator, I will assure you that as, if I am confirmed and as I undertake this new responsibility, that I will make sure that as we review our deterrent, we will always make sure that the deterrent is safe, secure, reliable, and adequate to meet our national security requirements.

Senator AYOTTE. If we were to be in a position where we lower our nuclear force levels to a point where the assurances to our friends and our nuclear deterrence in terms of our enemies began to be called into question, what would be the impact, in your view, of that if we didn't take that seriously?
Ms. Creedon. I absolutely agree with you. We do need to take that very seriously. Frankly, from my perspective here, I don’t see that as part of any of the policy documents that have been outlined by the Department.

Certainly, in the Nuclear Posture Review, which is, at this point, the overarching policy document for the administration, that document is very clear that we will maintain the triad, that we will maintain the stockpile at the current levels set out in the START treaty. That above all, we will maintain a deterrent, and it will be safe, secure, and reliable.

It talked about the relationship with our regional allies and the importance of that extended deterrence and the importance of making sure that our allies are comfortable and that our deterrent is adequate to ensure that comfort level. Because if it is not, one of the concerns, obviously, that has long been out there and long been a worry is that if we are not adequately providing that regional comfort, that it could drive others to seek independent nuclear capabilities, which is clearly not where we want to head.

Senator Ayotte. I couldn’t agree more.

Thank you both. I appreciate your testimony, and I look forward to your confirmation.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

Senator Blumenthal? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me add my thanks for your service, both of your service in the past, and congratulations on your future. I join in hoping that your confirmations will be prompt.

I would like to ask Mr. Estevez a question about delivering power and fuel to our troops in the field. I know that you are aware, we all are, of the potential for fuel cell technology, which is a particularly important product in the State of Connecticut, to be used more frequently and in greater volume in the field. Is that correct?

Mr. Estevez. I am not an expert on fuel cell technology. But, yes, sir.

Senator Blumenthal. I would like your assurance that you will, in fact, focus on fuel cell technology and its potential uses in delivering energy sources to our troops in the field.

Mr. Estevez. To the point that Senator Levin made opening up, reducing our energy consumption on the battlefield is a force multiplier for us. It gives us more flexibility. We will certainly be looking at all capabilities to do that, including fuel cell technology, Senator.

Senator Blumenthal. I think there are also opportunities for improving the efficiency of the existing capability that we have. I know that as the drawdown occurs in Afghanistan, we are going to be bringing back to this country many of the micro-generators that rely now on diesel, and there is a proposal or a plan to refurbish them, make them more efficient, link them in micro-grids.

I am familiar with this plan because one of the potential companies that could be doing some of the work is located in Connecticut, DRS. The proposal, as I understand it, is to bring back those 12,000 generators, save 30 percent of their fuel, millions of dollars. The Army is finalizing those requirements. Are you familiar with that plan?
Mr. ESTEVEZ. I am not, but I could certainly look into that. The mix of generators that are out there on the battlefield are generators that we, the U.S. military, owns as part of unit equipment and generators that our commercial sustainers are helping us put on the battlefield to build capability. The mix will come back.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. If you could report back, if I could ask you, respectfully, to report back on how the Army will be finalizing those requirements, I would appreciate it.

Mr. ESTEVEZ. I will do so, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of Defense, and most notably the Army, has several initiatives aimed at improving the energy efficiency of its tactical power generation and distribution systems. For example, the Army has undertaken several efforts to design and evaluate micro-grids that save energy at fixed sites by better matching the production of power to required loads. The Army is also reviewing the specifications of its force provider systems—its deployable life support capabilities—in order to make them 30 percent more energy efficient than the current sets. The Army will accomplish this through enhanced power generation and distribution, improved shelters and appliances, systems that reduce water use, and the integration of renewable power sources. The Systems Integration Laboratory at Fort Devens, MA, is conducting side-by-side comparisons of existing equipment with new technologies, in a training environment with soldiers, in order to analyze and determine if the new technologies provide enhanced efficiencies and capabilities.

Other ongoing energy efficiency initiatives include the Army’s new generator program—the Advanced Medium-sized Mobile Power Sources (AMMPS)—which is presently going into production. The AMMPS generators consume 21 percent less fuel across the fleet than the Tactical Quiet Generators (TQG), and are between 100 to 500 percent (depending on size) more reliable than the TQGs. Because of these improvements, the Army is working to accelerate production and fielding of the new AMMPS to replace the TQGs currently used in Afghanistan.

The Department’s intent is to maximize the life of its equipment and provide economical upgrades that offer the best return on investment for taxpayers’ dollars, while providing energy savings across the battlefield.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Ms. Creedon, if I could ask you, one of the points that particularly interested me in the exchange involving Mr. Lynn and General Cartwright in their recent briefing, concerned the issue of when a cyber attack becomes an act of war and when a proportional and justified military response is appropriate. The theft or disruption of 24,000 files seems to me to be an act of war if it is done by a nation against DOD. Would you agree?

Ms. CREEDON. Sir, I think that is one of the areas where the policy is very uncertain. Frankly, I have not delved into this enough. Obviously, there are lots of other existing legal documents that define “act of war”. But that is certainly one of the things that I am going to have to look at very closely, if I am confirmed.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Cartwright, I think, himself said that an act of war, to some extent, is in the eye of the beholder. But at the same time, there are rules, standards, and guidelines. From a 30,000-foot level, if another nation goes into our DOD and takes 24,000 files or disrupts our defense capability in some way, I think the average American would say, “That is an act of war.” Would you agree?

Ms. CREEDON. Sir, again, I don’t have enough background right now from where I sit here on the committee to make that conclusion and to make that statement. But this has to be, I think, as
we look at all these things, put in the context of anything else and looking at an act of war.

Part of the difficulty in all this, too, is really understanding who that actor was. Was it a state actor? Was it somebody acting on behalf of the state? Is this criminally motivated? Is it terrorist motivated? It gets very complicated in sorting out the attribution as well.

Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied that we have the means and capability to determine who the perpetrator was in these instances?

Ms. Creedon. From what I have been briefed on at the staff level, I can only say that I think it is a very complicated and difficult question, and in not all instances do I think we fully understand that.

Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied that on our side there is a clear division of responsibility between DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice since, as you have mentioned and others have, there is a law enforcement element here as well?

Ms. Creedon. I think at a certain, 100,000-foot level, yes. The Department of Homeland Security has the dot-gov. DOD has the dot-mil. But to make it all work because even though, it is dot-mil, it also travels over commercial lines.

To make it all work, it has to be much more coordinated and unified, and industry has to play a very large part in this. I think there is a lot of work to be done.

Senator Blumenthal. Can you envision situations where a cyber attack on a utility or a bank or an Internet company could be interpreted as an act of war, if it is done by a nation to disrupt essential services or activities in this country?

Ms. Creedon. This is one of those things that is really hard to speculate on in the abstract. But in the same way that if it were a kinetic attack, what would be the result? What would be the analysis? What would be the reaction to a kinetic attack that had a similar, if you would, effect, and how would we respond to that?

I think at the moment we have to really look at these analogies and figure out, okay, just because it is cyber, is it different? If the bank were blown up, what is our reaction? If the bank is taken out by a cyber attack, what is our reaction?

I think you have to look at these in the context of the effect as well as how it happened before you can make these decisions.

Senator Blumenthal. My time is up. I know that I have nowhere near scratched the surface of these very complex and difficult issues. I do appreciate your very candid and forthright answers and your service, both of you.

Thank you for being here and being willing to serve in the future as well. Thank you.

Ms. Creedon. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Brown is next.

Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Also, Ms. Creedon, thank you. First of all, congratulations to both of you.
Just to follow up to Senator McCain’s questions on cybersecurity. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year, General Alexander stated that he would give the military a “C” on its ability to defend DOD networks.

Do you agree with his assessment? If so, what must be done in the near-term to improve the network defense?

Ms. CREEDON. Senator, I don’t have any basis right now to disagree with that. I would have to really struggle to see if that is the case, although he is, given his position, in a good position to know.

Senator BROWN. If you find that when you are there, what would you, in fact, try to do?

Ms. CREEDON. I would certainly hope it is no worse. This is obviously one of those situations where I think whatever the grade is, it can always be better.

As General Cartwright has said, or Deputy Secretary Lynn said, in the rollout of the new cyber strategy, we definitely need to get better. We, as a country, need to get better—not just DOD, but everybody needs to get better.

Senator BROWN. Section 934 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 required the Secretary of Defense to develop a cyber strategy and inform Congress on the policy for offensive and defensive operations by March 1, 2011. Unfortunately, the strategy released last week fails to do so.

If you are confirmed, do you intend to provide the requested answers to the comprehensive list of unanswered policy and legal questions regarding operating in cyberspace?

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, sir. I will certainly work on those, along with colleagues.

Senator BROWN. Finally, do you agree that irrespective of Russian objectives, the United States should remain committed to the continued development and deployment of the U.S. missile defense systems worldwide, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems?

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, sir. I believe that is included in the administration’s ballistic missile defense review and policy.

Thank you.

Senator BROWN. Thank you.

Mr. Estevez, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has published its analysis of the fiscal year 2012 defense budget. Are you familiar with that study, sir?

Mr. ESTEVEZ. I am not familiar with that one specifically, but I am familiar with a lot of assessments of the budget ongoing right now.

Senator BROWN. That being said, the study commented—just to let you know a little bit about what it said—about hollow growth that has resulted from a whole lot of defense spending over the past decade without actually gaining in readiness.

It concluded that it has happened for several reasons. Half of the spending over the past decade was unrelated to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Personnel costs have grown. Personnel costs have grown, while actual end strength has remained flat. Cost of peacetime operations has expanded, while the actual pace has gone down. Acquisition costs have ballooned, while the actual inventory has become smaller and older.
Do you agree that DOD is spending more, but not getting more?

Mr. Estevez. I did read an article this morning that pointed out that we spent $46 billion and did not achieve the acquisition side. Without having read that whole report, I can't make an assessment of that.

I do know that, and I responded to Senator McCain earlier, on the logistics side we do need to put a focus on driving down our costs and adapting best practices in order to sustain our warfighters.

Senator Brown. Because, with the significant DOD cuts over the next 12 years, it is obviously very important. What do you suggest the Department can implement in the areas of readiness and logistics policies to prevent these cuts from hurting our readiness and creating conditions of the so-called hollow force?

Mr. Estevez. As I cited to Senator McCain, we need to do better on managing our inventory and how we spend our inventory. We took $366 million out of the Program Objective Memorandum last year. I think that is a down payment. We can do better.

In order to do that, we need to understand our forecast. What is going to break on weapons systems? What do we need to buy? Focus our buy, and we need to do better in collaborating with our industrial base as we do that.

We can also look to best practices, like use of third-party logistics support. We are doing that in our transportation area now to lower our costs.

Senator Brown. Ms. Creedon, just to get back to Senator McCain's follow-up, he says, "Well, what would happen if"—remember that question? He said, "What would happen if that happened?" He said, "Yes, but what would happen?"

Let me tell you what I would like to happen if we find somebody who is actually perpetrating a crime on the United States. I would like them to be held accountable. I would like them to be shut down. I would like them to get the maximum amount of penalties that are afforded by our laws.

I think that is what he was looking for. Is that your position, if we find somebody, they should have the book thrown at them?

Ms. Creedon. From a criminal perspective, which is obviously not the Defense Department, that is obviously a Justice Department perspective, but, yes. As I understand this, it gets quite complicated because, very often, the actor is not necessarily within the United States.

Senator Brown. If there are problems, we need to know what they are. So if you identify what the complications are, we just can't continue to allow this to go willy-nilly.

Mr. Estevez, when you are dealing with what you are doing, I am not opposed to making judicious, thoughtful cuts. But in the middle of two and a half wars, I want to make sure that whatever we are doing is going to ensure that our men and women cannot only serve and do their jobs effectively and safely but, in fact, come home.

As a result of cuts that may affect that job performance and their safety, then I and others have a very real problem with that.

Thank you. I wish you both well.

Ms. Creedon. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Brown.

Senator Hagan.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to publicly acknowledge Ms. Madelyn Creedon and express my heartfelt endorsement for her nomination. I have been working closely with her, as with my duties in chairing the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

She is a true professional that I have worked so closely with. She is well-qualified to discuss the issues addressed in this hearing today. I offer her my sincerest congratulations on this nomination. I am proud that she stands to contribute to the immeasurable accomplishments of women serving in DOD.

My first question for you, Ms. Creedon, is this spring the President released a statement on the Nuclear Posture Review, and he publicly stated that the United States intends to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and focus on reducing the nuclear dangers for the 21st century.

We will, however, maintain our current stockpile, while making substantial investments to improve infrastructure, strengthen science and technology, and retain the human capital to sustain our stockpile. I am very concerned about the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics workforce in our country.

What are your thoughts, as far as DOD, what can DOD do to ensure that DOD continues to have access to future scientific and technical talents in our country?

Ms. CREEDON. Thank you, Senator.

This is a very large concern. I have looked at it over the years within the confines of the nuclear arena, to some extent in the confines of the space arena. It is a problem that extends not only in DOD, but also to the Department of Energy, which also has a very large role in making sure that our deterrent remains safe, secure, and reliable.

It is difficult to motivate students to stay with the science and technology career path and educational path. Motivating students early on is extraordinarily important. I am also aware that DOD has various programs to help these students, to provide scholarships for these students. The Department of Energy has some similar programs.

Part of the problem is also making sure that we have enough Ph.D. graduates, master’s degree candidates, bachelor’s degree candidates in our requisite science and technology disciplines that actually can come to work for DOD. In many instances, this requires clearances. It’s about making sure that they can get the clearances. Some of this then goes to their nationalities.

DOD is looking at this. There are some very early programs looking at how to accelerate the citizenship path. But this is a very serious problem we have to face going forward.

Senator HAGAN. It is a serious problem.

Mr. Estevez, thank you, too, for being here and your nomination. I look forward to both of your confirmations.

I have met with many soldiers who have been severely injured or wounded in Afghanistan. A large number of our wounded warriors are exposed, obviously, to improvised explosive devices (IED)
and to enemy attacks because of their involvement in moving supplies. It is of critical concern that our servicemembers have access to the necessary equipment, food, and resupplies, but I am concerned about supply movements, which are often the target of the enemy.

Afghanistan is landlocked, and the road networks are hard to navigate, and the country has few airports. What, if any, changes do you think can be made to meet the mission of the warfighters but minimize their exposure to enemy attacks in logistical supply movements?

Mr. ESTEVEZ. I share those concerns, Senator, again, having just come back from Afghanistan and looking at some of the things that we are doing to protect our soldiers on the battlefield.

First of all, our movement in providing things like MRAP vehicles, and their all-terrain variant, are incredible lifesaving devices out there that allow us a level of protection. There is nothing that is full protection, unfortunately.

Through our rapid acquisition initiatives that Dr. Carter is leading and that I am part of in sustaining that equipment, we are also providing things like mine rollers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, handheld devices that you can find IEDs on the road. We just need to do more of that.

For internal transportation in Afghanistan, we are doing more air drop to our remote outposts. That takes convoys off the road or combat logistics patrols, as we prefer to call them, because those guys are out there doing combat as well and performing their logistics duties. More vertical lift, helicopter lift, both commercial and our own, can also help in that regard.

Most of the movements in Afghanistan are actually commercial movements, using either Afghan national trucks or prime vendors who are contract. Now, those people also get wounded and killed out there. So taking them off the road is also beneficial. But commercial movements have better ability in some areas to get through than our own military convoys.

Put all those things together, and we have focus on doing exactly what we both share in trying to take our folks off the road and provide safer movements.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, because I have spent a lot of time with wounded warriors, and it is something that is of grave concern to me.

Ms. Creedon, due to the rising threat of cyber attacks, DOD established the U.S. Cyber Command. Currently, much of the attacks on DOD networks involve theft, which include stealing password and information from secure networks.

The cyber attacks on DOD are similar to the cyber attacks on large financial institutions and other major commercial industries that also face those attacks. How do you think DOD can work with the Department of Homeland Security and the private sector to protect critical national infrastructure, like the power-grid, the transportation system, and the financial sector?

Ms. CREEDON. It is important, obviously, that all of these sectors work together. DOD uses commercial communications capabilities. It relies on domestic power supplies in the United States. It relies
on commercial fiber lines. It is absolutely essential that these entities work together.

The difficulty, obviously, in getting three very disparate entities that are not often working together, that are not used to working together, working together is a difficult challenge. I know that this is a focus of the new cybersecurity strategy, the cybersecurity policy document that was just released.

It is also one of the big focuses of the Defense Industrial Base Pilot really trying to partner with industry, particularly industry that is working with DOD and that has sensitive DOD materials, trying to figure out both the advantages of the commercial approaches, the advantages of DOD approaches, and figure out what is really the best actor in these instances.

There are a lot of different ideas that I have heard. If confirmed, I look forward to really taking this on and trying to figure out how to improve our capabilities in this area.

Senator HAGAN. I will miss you on the committee, but I certainly do look forward to the confirmation of both of you.

Thank you very much for your testimony.

Ms. CREEDON. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.

Senator Begich.

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

To both of you, thank you very much for your willingness to serve. I agree, I hope the nominations go smooth, and you can be in your new roles.

First, Ms. Creedon, if I could ask you a couple questions. As you probably know, I am a big supporter of the Ground-Based Missile Defense (GMD) System, and I want to get your opinion of how you see the GMD that is currently assembled. Do you believe this is the only system at this point that is capable of defending the Nation against intercontinental ballistic missile attack?

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, sir, it is, and it needs to be maintained.

Senator BEGICH. Let me add to that. When you say “maintained”, can you elaborate a little bit on that? Where do you see the missile defense system for the United States in maintenance and/or expansion or other needs they may have?

Ms. CREEDON. My understanding that right now the Missile Defense Agency is focused on maintaining, updating, and upgrading the ground-based interceptors (GBI), so that they will eventually be in a common configuration, and to identify the root causes of the recent test failure and to make sure that once those are identified, that those fixes are incorporated across the land-based missile defense in Alaska.

Senator BEGICH. In your advance policy questions, and this may go to what you just said—you had made the comment that need for additional interceptors. Is that what you are referring to or just elaborate a little bit more maybe?

Ms. CREEDON. My understanding is that as part of the overall review of the GBIs, and as part of the review that is now ongoing as a result of the test failures, as well as the continuing overall review as to what the threat looks like over time, and also the need to have a certain number of tests and replacement assets, that the combination of all that, from what I understand, it is looking at if
there will probably be additional GBIs that will be needed over time. The amount, the timing of those, as I understand it, is still very much in the “to be determined” category.

Senator Begich. Thank you for your comment.

I want to let you know I agree with that. I have said that for the last 2½ years, that based on the schedule—actually, we had a hearing here maybe a year and a half ago with General O'Reilly, and we were talking about this. I made the comment that I think they are going to be short on how many they will need based on replacement.

It sounds like there is a full review, and like you said, they are not sure when and how, but it is clear that there is an additional need of interceptors. When and how they will be placed is still up in debate. Is that fair?

Ms. Creedon. That is my understanding at this point.

Senator Begich. Very good.

I don’t know how much you are familiar in Alaska with the Kodiak Launch Complex and how it has been used or not been used, depends on the agency.

Give me, if you could, some of your thoughts on how DOD will utilize their own systems, their own Federal facilities, as well as potentially facilities like this that are partially federally-funded, but State-operated. That is what this one is. It is not private, it is a quasi-government facility.

Can you give me some thoughts on that? I am being very specific here around Kodiak launch facility, but in the broader perspective of other facilities that might be out there.

Ms. Creedon. As you are well aware, we have been waiting for some time to get one of the TacSat satellites off. It looks like it is going to happen later this summer. That will be launched out of Kodiak.

Senator Begich. Out of Kodiak.

Ms. Creedon. That will be a good thing. We need that capability on orbit.

Looking farther, looking broader at where we go with the smaller satellites is an issue that, if confirmed, I would hope to really look at some more. This committee has been very active in sponsoring the Operationally Responsive Satellite office, making sure that there is focus and attention paid on small satellites.

Small satellites, I think, have an opportunity to play a very large role, both increasing our redundancy in space and also resiliency. It also has the added benefit of making more targets, if you will, which also has a deterrent effect on adversaries.

Looking at other possibilities about disaggregating large satellites into small satellite components, these are all things that I think we need to do. If all of that pans out, then there become opportunities for smaller launchers, for the smaller launch sites. There is a launch site in Virginia that has also been very active in these smaller satellite launches. I think it is all very much tied with where we actually decide to go in small satellite operations.

Senator Begich. The assumption is that you will be appointed and move forward in your new position, will you keep our office informed? Obviously, it is a great asset that the Federal Government
has invested in, and we sure don’t want to have it idle or not uti-

lize it, what you might think is a possibility.

But also, as you think of the long-term what your small satellite
deployment might be, if there are issues that they need to deal
with, please keep us informed and what we need to be doing there
to make sure it is an asset that the military can utilize or not uti-
lize, but at least be available to utilize.

Ms. CREEDON. I will, Senator.

Senator BEGICH. Very good.

Mr. Estevez, if I could ask you a couple questions. This one is
DOD on Defense Personal Property System (DPS), which is a new
system. It is Web-based. It helps manage personal property moves,
and so forth.

It has had some good changes, now you award these based on
satisfactory performance, not just low bid, which I am a big be-
liever in this, because sometimes the low bid is a garbage bid. Hav-
ing a quality bid is a better bid. I think that is a good move.

Here is the struggle. I know U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM) is working on this, and I just ask you to look into
this. Alaska is being treated a little differently in how the rate
structure is being designed, and it is actually a disadvantage be-
cause of how you can’t access 80 percent of the communities by
roads.

It is not like pulling up a moving van and hauling people out.
It is a little different. Because of that, we have asked them to reex-
amine the rate structure.

There is a group called Alaska Movers Association that has been
aggressive in trying to figure this out. They are fine with the new
Web base. They are all good with that. It is just the way they are
developing the model is based on a lower 48 model, actually is in-
consistent, to some extent, with the lower 48 model.

I don’t know how much you are familiar with this, but, if not,
would you be willing to work with our office and the Alaska Movers
Association and make sure we are on the right path here? We want
to make sure that individuals aren’t dipping in their own pocket,
military personnel, because of the formula.

We just had this problem with some housing issues, which is now
being corrected, because of the uniqueness of Alaska housing costs.

Mr. ESTEVEZ. Senator, I am very familiar with DPS. I am not fa-
miliar with the Alaska issue related to DPS. To your point, DPS
is actually showing some pretty good results. This year, because of
some bandwidth increases, it is actually working better than it did
last year in returning savings.

The transportation policy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary on the
Logistics and Materiel Readiness staff, on the staff which I will
lead, if confirmed, co-chairs an oversight board with TRANSCOM
that looks at how DPS is structured. I will absolutely work with
your staff to address disparities related to the Alaska Movers Asso-
ciation.

Senator BEGICH. Great. We are looking just for fairness, we are
not looking for anything special. It is just the uniqueness of the
transportation challenges are a little different than maybe Fort
McChord or any of that kind of activity.

Let me end there. My time is expired.
But one area I would like to touch on and you don't have to do it now, but maybe in the future, I would like to talk to you about rare earth materials. The comment I would make is with so much concentration in China, with, I think, 95, 96, 97 percent of our rare earth capacity, is to reexamine what we need to do. There are a lot of pieces of legislation floating now to try to figure out how do we deal with this from a defense perspective and a national security perspective.

At some point, maybe as we move on some legislation or have these discussions raised, Alaska has several of these potentials for rare earth development. I would be curious about how you will handle that and deal with that in the future.

But if you are confirmed, is this an area that will be of interest to you and willing to look at to make sure we are on the right path here?

Mr. ESTEVEZ. It is not my primary area. Brett Lambert, our Deputy Assistant Secretary for Manufacturing and Industrial Policy, leads that. However, I do oversee the stockpile that the Defense Logistics Agency manages. We share that concern. I would be happy to work with you, Senator.

Senator BEGICH. Great. I just want to make sure what stockpile you are looking at isn't empty, and so that is our goal.

Thank you very much. Congratulations to both of you. I know I am saying that without the vote being done yet. But I hope you are confirmed, and thank you for your service.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Begich.

On the missile defense system issue, first of all, Ms. Creedon, would you agree that operational missile defense systems should be operationally effective before they are deployed?

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. They should be cost effective?

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. As stated in the ballistic missile defense review.

Now, the United States and NATO are exploring options for cooperation with Russia on missile defense in order to enhance mutual security against common missile threats from Iran. Do you believe it is worth exploring those options?

Ms. CREEDON. I do, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Russia has expressed concerns that our missile defense systems may undermine its strategic deterrent. Will you use your best efforts to dissuade them from that perspective?

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. On the cyber issues, which have been raised by a number of us, I think we should appreciate the caution that you use in terms of your response to these questions as to when is a cyber attack an act of war. But I think we also need to do what you and others have suggested we do, which is to sort out the elements of that question because these are vitally critical issues to our security, to our own cybersecurity, to our country's security.

But when we are talking about acts of war, we are then talking about a necessity, if we can't deter, of responding to those acts. It seems to me that the question, if there is an intentional attack on our capability and our systems by another country and where that
intention is to disrupt our systems, that the issue of what is an appropriate response is an open issue. What is proportionate, for instance.

However, if you know who the actor is, and if it is another nation and if its purpose is not espionage—which we conduct as well, not just other nations that conduct acts of espionage. We conduct acts of espionage. We have spies out there, too.

If we decide that the motive is not espionage or spying on us, but that the motive is to disrupt our systems, then that it may be that the issue we haven’t sorted out is what is an appropriate response, but that the question of whether or not it is an act of war, it seems to me, is resolved by the way the question is framed.

If it is a purposeful, intentional effort on the part of another nation to disrupt some system of ours, putting aside the response and what is appropriate, that does constitute an aggressive act of war against us.

I know you are being cautious, and I admire that, and you should be. But I am trying to phrase a question in a way where it seems to me the issue becomes not how do you know. That is part of the question. It is the given. It is the assumption.

The question isn’t how do you respond? Set that aside. It is an important question, and proportionality is critically important. But I am trying to put everything into the question in a way that, yes, that sure sounds like an act of war to me, by the way. Would it not sound like an act of war to you, the way I phrased the question?

Ms. CREEDON. Sir, yes. I think part of this is understanding, and this is where I have trouble. I think this is where a lot of people have trouble, so you start with, okay, is it possible that a cyber act could be an act of war? I think that answer to that is absolutely yes. Just like any kinetic act could be an act of war.

The question then is, okay, let us assume that it was. It is a cyber attack, and we have determined that it is an act of war. That still gets you back to, well, what are we going to do about it?

Chairman LEVIN. No, but that is not the question.

Ms. CREEDON. But there is certainly a construct where an attack is an act of war. Whether it is a cyber attack or a kinetic attack, it can be determined an act of war.

Chairman LEVIN. I am trying to construct an example. That is what I am trying to do is construct an example so we have a feel as to where you are.

How would that not be? If the actor is known, it is a state actor. If the motive is known, its motive is to disrupt or destroy. Why would that not be an act of war?

Ms. CREEDON. It sure sounds like it is, but I don’t know for sure that it is.

Chairman LEVIN. Even with my givens and assumptions?

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, and I think some of this——

Chairman LEVIN. How could it not be?

Ms. CREEDON. I think part of it, we would have to go back and look at what is understood international law as to what is an act of war. It is certainly a hostile act. It is certainly a hostile intent. It is where does it become an act of war? That is where I think that there is some uncertainty.
Chairman Levin. The word “disrupt” doesn’t answer that question?

Ms. Creedon. I am not sure “disrupt” answers that. I am not sure “disrupt”——

Chairman Levin. If it is intentionally——

Ms. Creedon. Maybe it is the size of the disruption. Maybe there is a proportionality.

Chairman Levin. That is an issue of what the response is.

Ms. Creedon. There is an intent as well.

Chairman Levin. I have given the intent in my question. The intent is to disrupt.

Ms. Creedon. I think there is a point at which it probably could be. I think it probably could be. I think it is just really hard in the abstract to say, okay, that specific example is, in fact, an act of war because there is a danger, I think, also in laying out red lines.

If you say, “Okay, this is it. You cross this line. It is an act of war.” There is a danger there because it sets us up for some act that we might not necessarily be prepared to take.

Chairman Levin. I think we have to sort that out pretty quick because it sounds to me with all of the qualifications that I put in there, that there is an intent to disrupt. It is not a side effect. It is not an unintentional consequence of an act of espionage. It is an intent to disrupt.

That seems to me to go to the heart of the matter. But if it isn’t, we sure better find that out fast because we could give a false signal as well if we are ambiguous about considering that to be a hostile act or an act of war, and I think we better end that ambiguity fast.

The proportionality issue, that is always a problem. That is an issue after you have been attacked.

Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. But if you know what the intent is, once you know that intent is to disrupt or destroy, it seems to me then the issue becomes what is the appropriate reaction. But it is not a question of whether there should be a response at that point.

I think that your testimony indicates that there sure is a heck of a lot of work to do, and I think we better do some of the basic work quickly while we spend more time perhaps in trying to figure out how do we know and what do we do? Those are questions which may take a lot more time to figure out.

But the question of whether we respond to an intentional act to disrupt, seems to me, should not be difficult. It should not be difficult as to whether we respond.

We thank you both. We thank your families, those who are here and those who are not here. We look forward to a speedy confirmation.

The committee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Madelyn R. Creedon by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses

Defense Reforms

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. No. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation has been very successful in improving operational and warfighting effectiveness.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. I do not see the need to change this legislation.

Relationships

Question. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. At the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs (ASD/GSA) advises the Secretary of Defense on strategy and policy on issues relating to nuclear weapons, missile defense, countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the space and cyberspace domains.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The ASD/GSA provides support to the Deputy Secretary of Defense similar to the support provided to the Secretary of Defense.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Answer. The ASD/GSA provides support to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy similar to the support provided to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Answer. Under guidance of the USD(P), the ASD/GSA works with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) in pursuit of the Secretary's objectives and ensures that policy execution is well-informed and supported appropriately. The ASD/GSA also provides policy input regarding acquisition and programmatic activities that relate to nuclear weapons, missile defense, countering WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains.


Answer. The ASD/GSA works collaboratively and collegially with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to provide policy advice to the USD(P) and the Secretary on crosscutting global security strategy and policy issues, such as regional missile defense cooperation and NATO developments pertaining to GSA's functional expertise.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.

Answer. The ASD/GSA works with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs to provide policy advice to the USD(P) and the Secretary on crosscutting global security strategy and policy issues, such as containing North Korean proliferation of WMD.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

Answer. The ASD/GSA works with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs to provide policy advice to the USD(P) and the Secretary on crosscutting security strategy and policy issues, such as enhancing the survivability of critical cyberspace infrastructure.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities.

Answer. The ASD/GSA works with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict to provide policy advice to the USD(P) and the Secretary on crosscutting global security strategy and policy issues, such as countering the proliferation of WMD through improved synchronization of contingency plans.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.
Answer. The ASD/GSA works closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ASD/NCB) to provide policy advice to the USD(P) and the Secretary on cross-cutting global security strategy and policy issues. The ASD/NCB is responsible for implementing many of the activities for which the ASD/GSA develops policy guidance, such as chemical/biological defense, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, and oversight of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Therefore, the relationship between the two offices should be particularly close.

Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/GSA works with the Chairman (CJCS) and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide support on matters that affect strategy and policy for nuclear weapons, missile defense, countering WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains.

Question. The Service Secretaries.
Answer. At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/GSA works with the Military Department Secretaries on a broad range of policy issues.

Question. The Service Chiefs.
Answer. At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/GSA works with the Service Chiefs on a broad range of policy issues.

Question. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command.
Answer. At the direction of the USD(P) and in coordination with the CJCS, the ASD/GSA works with the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command on a broad range of issues that affect strategy and policy for nuclear weapons, missile defense, countering WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains.

Question. The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command.
Answer. At the direction of the USD(P) and in coordination with the CJCS, the ASD/GSA works with the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command on a broad range of issues that affect defense activities in cyberspace. As the OSD Principal Staff Assistant with responsibility for cyber policy, the relationship with U.S. Cyber Command should be very close to ensure appropriate coordination of this dynamic mission area.

Question. The regional combatant commanders.
Answer. In coordination with the CJCS, the ASD/GSA works closely with the geographic combatant commanders (GCC) to provide policy oversight of strategy, plans and operations relating to nuclear weapons, missile defense, countering WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains in support of the USD(P), the Secretary, and the President of the United States.

Question. The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Answer. The ASD/GSA works with the Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration to provide policy support to the USD(P) and the Secretary on strategy and policy issues, relating to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear material security, U.S. nuclear stockpile matters, and related issues.

DUTIES

Question. The position for which you have been nominated has been substantially restructured over the last few years.
What is your understanding of the duties that you will be assigned if you are confirmed?
Answer. My understanding is that ASD/GSA is primarily responsible for advising and supporting the USD(P) and the Secretary on policy and strategy in the areas of U.S. nuclear weapons and missile defense, countering WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have had over 30 years of experience in a variety of executive branch positions and as a member of the staff of the Senate Committee on Armed Services in the areas of responsibility assigned to the ASD/GSA.

Question. What additional actions do you believe you need to take, if any, to fulfill the responsibilities of this position?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on understanding the many specific responsibilities and interactions that are necessary to ensure that I can effectively carry out the duties of the office of ASD/GSA. Many of the overarching policy documents governing nuclear, space, and missile defense policies have been issued. I will develop
an understanding of the actions needed to implement these policies. The area of
cyber policy will need particular attention and, if confirmed, I will work to develop
and grow the relationships and knowledge necessary to provide policy guidance in
this challenging issue area.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the As-
sistant ASD/GSA?
Answer. Implementation of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Ballistic Missile
Defense Review (BMDR) and Space Posture Review (SPR), as well as the New Stra-
tegic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the National Space Security Strategy, the
DOD Cyber Strategy, and the President’s nuclear security agenda and biosecurity
strategy will all be significant challenges. Implementing these new policies and
strategies under a constrained budget will be even more challenging.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing
these challenges?
Answer. If I am confirmed as ASD/GSA, I will develop the close working relation-
ships with key partners in DOD, with other relevant executive branch partners, and
within Congress, to understand and address the various programs, issues, and con-
cerns necessary to implement the new policies and strategies.

Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the per-
formance of your responsibilities?
Answer. At present I am not sure what will be the most serious problems that
I would face if confirmed, but I am very concerned about ensuring that the new poli-
cies and strategies are implemented in a cost efficient manner.

Question. If confirmed, what management action and timelines would you estab-
lish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the ASD/GSA staff and the USD(P) to iden-
tify, understand, and prioritize any problems impeding performance of my respon-
sibilities, and to develop timelines to resolve these problems.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish for the office to
which you have been nominated?
Answer. I understand that Under Secretary Flournoy has emphasized the impor-
tance of her team’s support to the Secretary to improve interagency development of
long-term national security policy options. If confirmed, I will ensure that staff of
the ASD/GAS is equipped to support her and the Secretary in achieving these goals.

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in overseeing and implementing
the policies, strategies, and priorities established in the NPR?
Answer. If confirmed, I understand that I would help to develop and oversee imple-
mentation of the agenda set forth in the NPR. This would include helping to
frame key issues and decisions for the USD(P) and the Secretary in coordination
with my colleagues in USD(AT&L), the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and
STRATCOM, as well as the NNSA and the National Security Staff.

SPACE POSTURE REVIEW

Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in overseeing and implementing
the policies, strategies, and priorities established in the Space Posture Review?
Answer. If confirmed, I understand that I would support the USD(P) and the Sec-
retary to continue implementation of President’s 2010 National Space Policy and the
National Security Space Strategy, which included the Space Posture Review. In that
regard, if confirmed, I understand that I would help to develop and oversee imple-
mentation of DOD policies related to space. This would include overseeing imple-
mentation of strategy and plans related to space forces, systems, and activities in
close coordination with other DOD officials, as well as serving on the Defense Space
Council.

SPACE PROGRAMS

Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in establishing architectures for
various space systems, such as communications and Overhead Persistent Infrared
(OPIR)?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to participate actively in the Planning, Program-
ming, Budgeting and Execution system, as well as other DOD decisionmaking proc-
ess, to ensure space system architectures support our national security objectives effectively. I would expect that this would include support to effective, efficient, and well-coordinated communications, OPIR, and other essential national security space applications and programs.

Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in developing a space protection strategy and improving space situational awareness?

Answer. The United States is heavily reliant upon and gains unique benefits from its national security space capabilities. Continually improving space situational awareness underpins our ability to operate safely in the increasingly congested space environment and enables the protection of space assets. If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure appropriate and effective strategies are in place to increase our space situational awareness as well as to ensure that critical space capabilities are resilient and redundant to maintain the advantages provided by these capabilities.

SPACE RULES OF THE ROAD

Question. Over the course of the last several years there has been discussion about establishing international space rules of the road to deal with, mitigate, and reduce generation of space debris.

What are your views on establishing space rules of the road?

Answer. Establishing norms for the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space and preservation of the space environment are important issues for all space-faring nations. Rules of the road or other pragmatic guidelines for safe activity in space could help avoid collisions and other debris—producing events, reduce radio-frequency interference, and strengthen safety, stability, transparency, and security in the space domain.

INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION

Question. Do you support arms control limitations on space capabilities?

Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, which states that the United States will pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space, and will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies.

Question. Would you support the United States signing the so-called European Union Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities?

Answer. I understand that the Department is currently evaluating the European Union’s proposed international Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this evaluation.

Question. Given the concern about the increase in space debris, and the need to improve the ability to forecast and avoid potential conjunctions, in your view is there an opportunity to cooperate with Russia and other nations in the area of space debris analysis and warning?

Answer. The significant increase in space debris presents challenges to all space-faring nations. I believe that coordinated international efforts to develop and share information, particularly with respect to space debris, could help increase awareness and prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. I understand that the Department recently signed statements of principles on Space Situational Awareness sharing with Australia, Canada, and France. Additional such statements signed with other nations, and with commercial firms, would continue to enhance spaceflight safety for all parties.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MANAGEMENT

Question. Since the Air Force unknowingly flew nuclear weapons on a B–52 bomber from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana on August 30, 2007, the Air Force has taken a number of significant steps to increase its attention, discipline, and expertise on nuclear weapons management.

If confirmed, what role, if any, will you play in ensuring that nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and accounted for, and that the Military Services have established a high level of attention, discipline, and conduct of operations with respect to nuclear weapons?

Answer. Since the events of August 2007 the Air Force has made significant improvements in its management of the Air Force nuclear enterprise. If confirmed, I will work with the other stakeholders in OSD, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and combatant commands, as well as with NNSA, to ensure that the renewed senior-level focus and attention and new management approaches are sustained and institutionalized. It is vitally important that all aspects of our nuclear
force and the nuclear weapons enterprise are positioned to ensure their long-term safety, security, accounting, and reliability.

Question. The various reviews of the Air Force incident also exposed significant gaps in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) with respect to the attention and expertise to deal with nuclear weapons issues.

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that there is sufficient attention to management of nuclear weapon matters in the OSD?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(P), the ASD-NCB, the Military Departments and other key stakeholders to sustain senior-level attention on the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear deterrent.

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that there is sufficient technical expertise in OSD with respect to nuclear weapons?

Answer. I would note that with the reorganization in the policy office and the creation of the ASD/GSA, a strong focus on nuclear and other relevant expertise was reestablished. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate the expertise available to the ASD/GSA. Included in this evaluation will be the means to ensure that new technical and policy expertise relating to nuclear policy is "grown" in OSD since the aging nuclear workforce poses a challenge to our deterrent. If confirmed, I will continue OSD's traditional outreach to institutions such as the NNSA National Security Laboratories, in order to strengthen relationships and enlist on-site support through their experts detailed to OSD.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) is intended to be the joint DOD-Department of Energy (DOE) management organization for nuclear weapons matters.

If confirmed, what responsibilities and interaction do you expect to have relative to the NWC?

Answer. The NWC is a statutorily established entity with broad responsibility for nuclear weapons. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is a member of the NWC. If confirmed, I would expect to support the USD(P) in the work of the NWC.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

Question. The NPR established, among other things, nuclear force structure parameters prior to negotiation of the New START treaty. The administration has indicated that it is continuing to study future nuclear force levels, consistent with the NPR.

If confirmed, what roles and responsibilities do you expect to have relative to policy development concerning future nuclear force structure and planning?

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to help shape the development of policy for the nuclear force structure and the planning to implement the President’s vision of a recapitalized nuclear enterprise.

NEW START TREATY IMPLEMENTATION

Question. The New START treaty entered into force in February 2011, and establishes limits on the deployed and nondeployed strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States. The treaty allows the parties up to 7 years to comply with the numerical limits of the treaty.

If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in overseeing implementation of the New START treaty?

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work with the Air Force and the Navy, Strategic Command, the Joint Staff, the NNSA, and others to implement the New START treaty to meet the central limits of the New START treaty by 2018 while maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.

MODERNIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ENTERPRISE

Question. A principal issue in the debate of the New START treaty was ensuring that as we draw down the number of deployed nuclear warheads that we modernize our nuclear warhead production capability as well as their command and control systems and delivery platforms.

If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in modernizing these three areas?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the Department’s commitment to a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. This includes sustaining and maintaining the nuclear stockpile, and modernizing the nuclear infrastructure and delivery systems.
Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President’s plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort do you believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START treaty limits for either the deployed or nondeployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?
Answer. The most recent section 1251 report covers funding through 2021, the term of the New START treaty, but these substantial investments in nuclear infrastructure must continue well beyond this timeframe. As a result, any proposed future reductions in deployed strategic warheads covered by the treaty, or deployed non-strategic warheads and non-deployed warheads, not covered by the treaty, must all be considered in a number of contexts, including the rate and progress of the complex modernization, the success of the life extensions, and the sustainment and modernization of the delivery systems, as well as the geopolitical environment. I would note that the NPR states that any future nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, maintain strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and maintain the reliability and effectiveness of our security assurances to our allies and partners. Ensuring that we are well-hedged against geopolitical or technical surprise also remains a key priority. If confirmed, I will support the Department’s continuing assessment of the proper force size and the capabilities required for a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.

Question. Without the construction of the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility at Los Alamos and the Uranium Production Facility at Y–12 and the other elements associated with the robust plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, do you believe reductions to the strategic hedge would be prudent?
Answer. Ensuring that we are well-hedged against geopolitical or technical surprise remains a key priority of the NPR report with which I agree. Modernization of the nuclear complex, the success of the life extension programs, and the progress maintaining and modernizing nuclear delivery platforms, as well as the geopolitical environment, will all inform any future proposals to reduce the hedge. The NPR also stated that modernization of the nuclear weapons complex will eventually allow the United States to shift its “hedging strategy” away from retaining large numbers of non-deployed warheads to a smaller, more responsive manufacturing infrastructure. If confirmed, I will support the Department’s continuing assessment of the proper force size and the capabilities required for a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.

NUCLEAR POLICY

Question. Do you support the President’s vision for a world without nuclear weapons?
Answer. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, included as a goal the cessation of the nuclear arms race and set forth the commitment “to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.” The President’s ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide is consistent with the NPT. The President has also said, however, that while working toward that goal the United States will retain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent, as long as nuclear weapons exist. I support both of these goals.

Question. Do you believe this goal is a viable near- and/or long-term strategic strategy for the United States?
Answer. The conditions that would ultimately permit the United States and others to give up their nuclear weapons without risking greater international instability and insecurity do not exist today. As a result I think the goal is a long-term one.

Question. In a recent speech at the 2011 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Thomas Donilon, the President’s National Security Advisor, stated that the administration is currently “making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions” and that DOD will “review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.” He continued by stating that in meeting these objectives, the White House will direct DOD to consider “potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures.” Do you believe the United States should pursue further reductions? Please explain why or why not.
Answer. I would note that the NPR states that any future nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, maintain strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and maintain the reliability and effec-
tiveness of our security assurances to our allies and partners. Ensuring that we are well-hedged against geopolitical or technical surprise also remains a key priority. If confirmed, I will support the Department’s continuing assessment of the proper force size and capabilities required for a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.

Question. Do you believe it would be prudent for the United States to pursue unilateral nuclear reductions? Please explain why or why not.

Answer. On balance I do not believe the United States should make unilateral reductions in the strategic nuclear systems covered under the New START treaty, while the treaty is in force. Reductions in nuclear systems not covered by the new treaty should be addressed on a case-by-case basis and should reflect geopolitical situations as well as the technical requirements associated with maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.

Question. Do you believe changes to well-established nuclear targeting requirements could negatively impact our ability to: (1) assure our allies; (2) discourage other countries from seeking strategic equivalence with the United States in nuclear weapons; and (3) hedge against future threats and uncertainties?

Answer. While I understand that DOD continually assesses deterrence requirements, including potential changes in targeting requirements, I am not familiar with the specific targeting policy. If confirmed, I will continue to support a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear enterprise that maintains strategic deterrence and stability, strengthens regional deterrence, and assures our allies and partners.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW

Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans, programs, and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the Homeland against attack by a small number of long-range missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran.

Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to have in implementing these policies, strategies, and priorities?

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to provide oversight and guidance to implement the BMDR, and to participate in the development of related policies, as well as prioritization of resources.

PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles, starting this year and increasing in capability with each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability to defend against long-range missiles that could reach all of Europe or the United States, thus augmenting the existing Homeland missile defense capability.

Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe and, if confirmed, what role do you expect to have in implementing this approach?

Answer. Yes, I support the European PAA and, if confirmed, I will continue the substantial U.S. efforts already underway to deploy all four phases of the European PAA. I would expect that a significant part of my role would include working with our allies and partners to ensure pragmatic and cost-effective cooperation, and providing oversight and guidance to the development and deployment of U.S. missile defense capabilities.

“FLY BEFORE YOU BUY” APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. The two most recent flight tests of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has formed a Failure Review Board to determine the root cause of the most recent failure, and will devise a corrective plan that includes two flight tests to confirm the correction. Until the second flight test confirms the correction, the Director of MDA has suspended production of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicles
(EKV) of the type that failed last year’s flight tests, in order to ensure that those EKV’s are not deployed with a flaw that would need to be corrected later.

Do you agree that it is essential to verify that the GMD flight test failure problem has been corrected before continuing production of the EKV’s, and before delivering more Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI’s) or deciding how many additional GBIs may be needed in the future?

Answer. Yes. I understand that although the exact number of additional GBIs will not be decided until the test failure problems are identified and resolved, it does appear that additional GBIs will be required.

Question. Do you agree with the Defense Department’s “fly before you buy” policy for missile defense that “before new capabilities are deployed they must undergo testing that enables an assessment under realistic operational conditions against threat-representative targets” to demonstrate that they will be effective and reliable?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you support the continued modernization and sustainment of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System?

Answer. Yes.

HOMELAND MISSILE DEFENSE HEDGING STRATEGY

Question. One of the elements of the BMDR is the policy of hedging our Homeland missile defense options in case the threat of future long-range ballistic missiles from countries like North Korea and Iran develops more rapidly or more robustly than expected, or if we encounter technical problems or delays in developing the Standard Missile-3 Block IIB interceptor. DOD has already decided to pursue a number of hedging options, and is considering others.

Do you support the policy that the United States should maintain a hedging strategy for Homeland missile defense?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in overseeing our missile defense hedging strategy?

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to monitor the ballistic missile threat and to be responsible for ensuring that we have the policies and strategies in place to address changes in the threat or unexpected delays in development of new technical capabilities.

MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

Question. The United States and NATO are exploring options to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.

Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from nations such as Iran?

Answer. I think that cooperation with Russia could strengthen the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses, as well as those of the Russian Federation against Iran.

Question. Do you believe that U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation could send an important signal to Iran that the United States and Russia are unified in their determination to reduce the risks of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs?

Answer. Yes, missile defense cooperation with Russia could send an important signal to Iran that Russia and the United States are working together to counter the acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles. This in turn could further strengthen the international commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Question. Do you agree that irrespective of Russian objections, the United States is committed to the continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defense capabilities, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such capabilities?

Answer. My understanding is that the United States is committed to this goal and to developing and deploying improved missile defenses against states such as Iran and North Korea.

Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in efforts to pursue missile defense cooperation with Russia?

Answer. The administration is pursuing a broad agenda with Russia focused on shared early warning of missile launches, technical cooperation, and even operational cooperation. Cooperation with Russia could offer some important tangible benefits for the United States, our NATO allies, and Russia. If confirmed, I will sup-
port the efforts of the Defense Relations Working Group, established by Defense Secretary Gates and Defense Minister Serduykov, to further practical cooperation in a number of areas, including missile defense.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Question. One of the areas under the ASD/GSA is the Chemical and Biological Defense Program of the Defense Department.

What do you believe are the principal challenges in chemical and biological defense, and what would be your priorities for the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program?

Answer. As part of the Department’s overall effort to counter WMD, the Office of the ASD/NCB manages the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. If confirmed, I would be responsible for development of policies to guide the program. I am informed that current priority issues include developing defenses against non-traditional chemical agents, and accelerating the ability to detect and attribute any chemical, nuclear, or biological materials used to attack or threaten the United States. These appear to be appropriate priorities. I would note that DOD, through the CTR and other programs, is developing a comprehensive toolkit of biological defense options for the Secretary that includes biosurveillance, vaccines, and other medical countermeasures to protect our forces against multiple threats.

Question. Do you believe the Chemical and Biological Defense Program should be closely coordinated with related efforts of the Defense Department’s CTR program focused on reducing biological threats?

Answer. Yes. The Chemical and Biological Defense program and the CTR program are well-established components of the U.S. efforts to counter WMD. The two programs have related but distinct goals, but they should be closely coordinated for the best effect. If confirmed, I will ensure that these and other DOD biological defense policies are coordinated appropriately both within the DOD and with other relevant U.S. and international agencies.

CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION

Question. DOD Directive 5160.05E states the DOD policy that “DOD shall be in full compliance” with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Warfare Convention (BWC). In 2006, the Department announced that the United States would not meet even the extended deadline of April 2012 for destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile, as required under the CWC.

Do you agree that DOD and the U.S. Government should be in full compliance with the terms and obligations of the CWC and the BWC, including the deadline for destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile under the CWC?

Answer. I understand that in 2006, the United States informed the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that it did not expect to meet the 2012 deadline. Since then the United States has continued to follow a policy of transparency about the U.S. chemical weapons destruction program and stressed U.S. efforts to find ways to accelerate it. I understand that the Department is on track to destroy 90 percent of the U.S. stockpile by the CWC deadline, and that the Army and the office of the USD(AT&L) are focusing significant senior leadership attention on this issue.

Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that the Department takes steps needed to minimize the time to complete destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, without sacrificing safety or security, and that the Department requests the resources necessary to complete destruction as close to April 2012 as practicable?

Answer. Yes.

COUNTER-WMD EFFORTS

Question. One of the issue areas under the ASD/GSA is the DOD effort to counter WMD, meaning nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

What do you believe are the principal challenges in countering WMD, and what are your priorities for Defense Department efforts to counter WMD?

Answer. President Obama made clear in his April 2009 speech in Prague that overcoming the twin dangers of WMD proliferation and WMD terrorism are the greatest threats facing our country and will require a comprehensive approach to reduce and counter these threats. Countering these threats takes commitment not only by the United States but also by the international community. One of the significant challenges is developing a sustained commitment among international partners to both recognize the threat and to take the actions necessary to reduce the dangers.
Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in the creation of policy for, and oversight of, Defense Department programs to counter WMD?

Answer. If confirmed, I will pursue policies to reduce and eliminate WMD dangers at their source and in transit, while enhancing our ability to detect and respond to emerging threats. Another key priority is to continue refining policy guidance that ensures our forces and coalition partners can fight and win, in an environment contaminated by chemical, biological, and other hazards. I would support the USD(P) in developing these policies and coordinate the efforts within DOD with the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and DOE, and other entities that will be essential to execute this function successfully.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

Question. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an international effort to identify and interdict WMD and related materials. If confirmed, would you recommend that the PSI program continue, and if so, do you believe that it should be modified in any way?

Answer. I agree with the 2010 National Security Strategy and the NPR Report, which state that the PSI should become a “durable international effort.” If confirmed, I will support the Department’s continued lead role in organizing U.S. support for PSI Operational Experts Group activities, including interdiction exercises.

Question. The absence of funding specifically identified for the PSI program has made it difficult for the Department and Congress to provide appropriate oversight. If confirmed, would you seek to establish a separate budget account for PSI? If not, why not?

Answer. I understand that congressional oversight of the PSI program has been difficult and that the PSI activities have not always been clear or well-understood by Congress. If confirmed, I would seek to improve understanding of the PSI and to ensure that Congress has whatever information it needs to conduct appropriate oversight of PSI activities.

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

Question. If confirmed, what will your role be in implementing and overseeing the CTR program?

Answer. If confirmed, I will provide departmental policy guidance for activities of the CTR program. My understanding is that the ASD/GSA works closely with the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the ASD/NCB to ensure that the execution of the CTR program activities is consistent with policy guidance.

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the CTR program, including changes in legislative authorities, programs, or funding?

Answer. Congress has taken steps to streamline CTR’s authorities over the past several years, and I believe this process should continue. Congress has authorized the CTR programs to expand its activities beyond the traditional geographic focus on the states of the former Soviet Union. In carrying out this expanded authority, the DOD CTR program has expanded its biological defense work to address those challenges around the world. If confirmed, I will work with CTR’s many stakeholders in the administration and in Congress to ensure that this expansion is conducted in coordination with other relevant entities and that it is carried out in a cost effective manner.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in any efforts to obtain Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?

Answer. If the Senate takes up the CTBT for consideration, and if I am confirmed, I would expect to play a significant role in presenting the views of the DOD to the Senate.

Question. Would you support and/or advocate for the administration to pursue the ratification of the CTBT?

Answer. The President set forth his agenda for nuclear security during his April 2009 address in Prague, Czech Republic. Nonproliferation was a central goal of this agenda, and U.S. ratification of CTBT would play an important part in that agenda. The NPR reflected the Department’s commitment to the goal of ratifying the CTBT. I support the CTBT. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting an effort to ratify the CTBT when the Senate decides to take up the CTBT.
RUSSIA

**Question.** What areas of opportunity and cooperation do you believe the United States could take to improve overall U.S.-Russian relationships?

**Answer.** ASD/International Security Affairs (ISA) leads OSD’s involvement in defense relations with Russia. If confirmed, I will work with ASD/ISA in support of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in those areas that fall under the ASD/GSA including nonproliferation, nuclear security, and missile defense. I believe that the historic cooperation with Russia under the CTR program could help guide such future cooperation.

**Question.** Would you support an expansion of the U.S. and Russian military-to-military relationship?

**Answer.** While I do support such cooperation, my understanding is that the office of the ASD/GSA has minimal involvement in military-to-military relations with Russia, and if confirmed, I would look to the ASD/ISA to guide such contacts and to support that office as needed.

**Question.** What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, on these issues?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I expect to work with the ASD/ISA, U.S. European Command, and the Joint Staff as appropriate, on any issue relating to nuclear policy and arms control, missile defense cooperation, combating WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains.

**CYBERSECURITY**

**Question.** What are the main policy challenges facing DOD in the area of cybersecurity, both within the Department and with respect to the Federal Government as a whole?

**Answer.** My understanding is that the Department’s primary policy challenge is to determine how U.S. Government departments and agencies can best collaborate to provide for the cybersecurity of Federal Government systems and U.S. critical information infrastructure. The President’s International Strategy for Cyberspace calls for a whole-of-government approach to cybersecurity while ensuring the continued promotion of an open, interoperable, secure and reliable information and communications infrastructure. I am told that the Department is a full partner in these efforts, which include a commitment to protect the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. citizens.

**Question.** What should the Defense Department’s role be in defending the Nation against cyber threats? Should the Department play the lead role in stopping attacks from abroad through cyberspace, just as the Department defends the Nation from attack by missiles, aircraft, or ships?

**Answer.** DOD has cyberdefense capabilities that make it an invaluable player in defending the Nation against cyber threats, but it should not be the lead in non-DOD cybersecurity. My understanding is that DHS is the lead for U.S. Federal Government and critical information infrastructure security, a designation with which I agree. The challenge for DOD is to leverage its cybersecurity capabilities to ensure that other agencies, under DHS leadership, are synchronized appropriately for the best defense of U.S. Government networks and critical infrastructure.

**Question.** What should be the role of law enforcement and DHS in directing operations to defend the Nation in cyberspace?

**Answer.** I understand that the DHS is the lead for the cybersecurity of non-DOD U.S. Federal systems, and critical infrastructure, a designation with which I agree. Law enforcement can play a key role in U.S. cyber defense by assisting in development of complete forensic information regarding a cyber-intrusion and should maintain its criminal investigative responsibilities. This is an essential step in formulating a U.S. policy and operational response. I am told that DOD organizations such as the Defense Cyber Crime Center have been working to improve collaboration with various law enforcement agencies within DHS and the Department of Justice to ensure enhanced cybersecurity of federal and critical information infrastructure systems.

**Question.** What organizational and operational construct would allow multiple departments and agencies to mount an effective, unified defense of the Nation’s cyber networks and resources?

**Answer.** My understanding is that the administration’s current organizational construct allows multiple departments and agencies to develop, implement, and maintain an effective, unified defense of our federal and critical information infrastructure networks and the resources that reside or pass through those networks. DOD leads this effort, developing plans to secure Federal Government (.gov) systems. My understanding is that DOD is responsible for the security of its networks, some classified government networks, and is currently engaged with the defense in-
dustrial base, through a pilot program, to look at the appropriate role for DOD to protect defense industrial base information systems. I would note that the legislation recently submitted by the President would, if enacted, address many of these issues, including the ability to share information.

Question. In your view, is there a need for a strategy and doctrine for deterring foreign adversaries from engaging in attacks on the United States through cyberspace, just as there is a nuclear deterrence strategy and doctrine based on the threat of retaliation?

Answer. Yes. I believe there is a need to develop a deterrence strategy in cyberspace. The President’s International Strategy for Cyberspace states, “The United States will ensure that all risks associated with attacking or exploiting our networks vastly outweigh the potential benefits” and reserves the right to defend vital national assets as necessary and appropriate. If confirmed, I would devote considerable attention to developing appropriate policies and guidance to ensure that all DOD components are coordinated closely in this rapidly evolving aspect of our national security posture.

Question. Should the United States have the ability, and announce the intention, to undertake offensive operations in cyberspace, through DOD, in retaliation against, or to defeat, foreign aggression in cyberspace? Does such doctrine exist today, in your view?

Answer. The President’s recently announced International Strategy for Cyberspace states that the United States will maintain the full spectrum of options for cyber deterrence, and that the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. The strategy highlights that nations’ inherent right of self-defense applies to cyberspace. If confirmed, I would devote considerable attention to developing appropriate policies and guidance to ensure that all DOD components are coordinated closely in this rapidly evolving aspect of our national security posture.

Question. When do you expect the Department to have a policy and rules of engagement for offensive operations in cyberspace?

Answer. My understanding is that DOD and the executive branch have existing policies and rules of engagement for cyberspace, but that further development and clarification may be useful. The Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace provides guidance on DOD’s role in cyberspace. If confirmed, I will work with senior leaders in OSD, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and the Joint Staff to ensure that rules of engagement are consistent with applicable international laws, and drafted to allow us to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests.

Question. Defending cyberspace implies the need for conducting surveillance in cyberspace to achieve the ability to warn of threats and to characterize them. Can surveillance in cyberspace be conducted effectively without impinging on the privacy interests of the American people?

Answer. While this is a challenge, the privacy of U.S. persons should be protected. Balancing requirements for surveillance in cyberspace against privacy interests of the American people is a critical element of any policy or strategy for government operations in cyberspace. The balance between national security and privacy is one we have confronted many times before in other security domains. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department’s senior leadership is fully invested in decisionmaking on this essential civil liberties challenge.

Question. In your view, will it be necessary to publicly disclose more information about the government’s plans and methods for conducting surveillance in cyberspace in order to explain how civil liberties and privacy will be protected?

Answer. While the public’s understanding of the threat is growing, it is not clear to me at this time whether there is a good understanding of the actions that are taken or could be taken by the U.S. Government. If confirmed, I will devote all necessary attention to ensure that policies and procedures are appropriate to support public confidence in DOD’s cyberspace activities.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate
550

and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD/GSA?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

PREVENTING ANOTHER WIKILEAKS

1. Senator McCain. Ms. Creedon, a cyber defense, or shield, should defend against insider threats, such as the downloading of classified documents in Wikileaks. Setting Department of Defense (DOD) computers to prevent unauthorized downloading or transmission of data would seem to be a necessary systemic precaution. What role would you expect to play as the Assistant Secretary in countering these kinds of insider threats?

Ms. CREEDON. No matter how strong we make our external defenses, we will constantly face an insider threat. DOD's recently released Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace outlines top-level requirements to mitigate that threat. The strategy states that in order to deter and mitigate insider threats, DOD will strengthen its workforce communications, workforce accountability, internal monitoring, and information management capabilities.

As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, I will work closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the DOD Chief Information Officer, as well as our military departments, defense agencies, and combatant command partners, as we implement our Defense Strategy for Cyberspace Operations and defend against insider threats.

NUCLEAR DECLARATORY POLICY

2. Senator McCain. Ms. Creedon, the longstanding nuclear declaratory policy of calculated ambiguity has been embraced by past administrations on a bipartisan basis and was strongly endorsed by the Perry-Schlesinger Commission in their 2009 report. Unfortunately, this administration, in my opinion, recklessly abandoned this longstanding policy in its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) which asserted that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a shift in policy which some argue will lead our enemies to rapidly develop chemical and biological weapons. Do you support this significant change in our declaratory policy?

Ms. CREEDON. I support the change in declaratory policy that sends a strong message to Iran and any other future states parties that fail to comply with the NPT.

Under the previous U.S. “negative security assurance,” the United States indicated it would “not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the [NPT].” The previous policy statement implied that the United States would not consider as an option the use of nuclear weapons against Iran, a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, “except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its Armed Forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.”

The revised negative security assurance in the 2010 NPR addresses this issue by committing that the United States “will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations,” thus leaving the door open to using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states parties to the NPT, like Iran, that are in violation of the NPT.

U.S. declaratory policy, as stated in the 2010 NPR, has a number of distinct audiences, including both potential adversaries we wish to deter, and allies and partners
we wish to reassure. With respect to potential adversaries, the NPR affirmed that “any state eligible for the assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons (CBW) against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response.” In addition, the NPR states that the United States reserves the right to make any adjustments to this assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat, and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.

In the case of states that possess nuclear weapons and states that fail to comply with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, the NPR makes clear that there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons still play a role in deterring conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners. This statement makes clear what the risks and consequences may be for those states considering the use of CBW against the United States, or its allies and partners. As such, the 2010 NPR is less a significant departure from previous declaratory policy than a refinement that takes into account present day challenges and future risks, while preserving U.S. flexibility. This is an evolution that I support.

3. Senator M.C. McCain. Ms. Creedon, how does the new policy make us safer and deter the growing nuclear ambitions of rogue nations like North Korea and Iran?

Ms. Creedon. The revised declaratory policy proclaims that states that do not comply with the NPT are not covered by the U.S. “negative security assurance”. This change in policy makes clear that, in addition to sanctions, pursuing nuclear proliferation carries the additional risk that the United States may consider the use of nuclear in response to nuclear or non-nuclear attack.

The 2010 NPR states that “the United States . . . would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” The NPR emphasizes that in cases where a country possesses nuclear weapons, but fails to comply with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations, there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring conventional, chemical, or biological weapon attacks against the United States, or its allies and partners. Together, these statements make clear what the risks and consequences may be for states considering the use or threatening the use of nuclear weapons or CBW against the United States or its allies and partners.

DEFENSE SPACE

4. Senator M.C. McCain. Ms. Creedon, in your advance policy questions you were asked if you support arms control limitations on space capabilities. In your response, you stated that you support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy which clearly states that the administration will “consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies.” Do you agree that space capabilities—including the ground and space segments and supporting links—are vital to our national interests?

Ms. Creedon. Yes. I agree with the President’s 2010 National Space Policy statement that the sustainability, stability, free access to, and use of space are vital to U.S. national interests. Thus, any arms control measures should be evaluated in terms of our national interests to determine whether they would enhance our national security. If the terms of any such agreement would not enhance our national security objectives, I would not support the agreement.

5. Senator M.C. McCain. Ms. Creedon, do you agree that freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power?

Ms. Creedon. A key objective of the 2011 National Security Space Strategy, as I understand it, is to maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by space in an environment that is increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. Space capabilities provide the United States and our allies unprecedented strategic advantages in national decisionmaking, military operations, and Homeland security. Similar to our air and naval systems, space systems provide national security decisionmakers with unfettered global access, and create an advantage by enabling a rapid and tailored response to global challenges. As the President’s National Security Strategy makes clear, the sea, air, and space domains must be protected from those who would deny us access or use them for hostile purposes.
6. Senator McCain. Ms. Creedon, are you committed to informing Congress prior to signing any multilateral commitments on space activities?

Ms. Creedon. I am committed to keeping Congress fully informed in a timely fashion on efforts in this area.

——

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

FLY-BEFORE-YOU-BUY

7. Senator Chambliss. Ms. Creedon, in your responses to the advance policy questions you commented on the Fly-Before-You-Buy approach to missile defense and, specifically, said that you agree that “before new capabilities are deployed they must undergo testing that enables an assessment under realistic operational conditions against threat-representative targets to demonstrate that they will be effective and reliable.”

While I don’t necessarily disagree with the Fly-Before-You-Buy approach, I do believe that missile defenses are fundamentally different than other DOD systems and that therefore our criteria for testing and fielding them should also be different.

For example, if 95 percent of the time a fighter plane took off it was able to land successfully, but 5 percent of the time it crashed, that would be unacceptable and we would never tolerate it. However, if 95 percent of the time we launched a ballistic missile interceptor it hit its target, but 5 percent of the time it missed, in my view that is a good track record and infinitely better than having no missile defense system at all, particularly given the exceptional complexity of hitting a missile with another missile in outer space.

What are your thoughts on this and do you believe that, when it comes to protecting our country from a possible nuclear attack, and given the choice between fielding a system which although not perfect is very effective—or instead—fielding no system at all, that it may be acceptable to have different standards for what represents operationally effective and reliable with respect to ballistic missile defense than we have for some other DOD programs?

Ms. Creedon. I agree that we should take a common-sense approach to standards for assessing what constitutes an operationally effective and reliable system. Operationally realistic testing presents a picture of the operational capabilities of the system. When a system is deployed, the warfighter needs to know its capabilities. Operationally realistic testing would also inform any future modifications needed to improve the performance of the system, either before or after deployment. It is my understanding that DOD is pursuing a balanced approach that seeks to conduct operationally realistic missile defense testing to ensure such systems are reliable, effective, and responsive to warfighter requirements. This approach recognizes that even less than perfect defenses can strengthen both deterrence and the protection of deployed forces, the U.S. Homeland, and allies. Moreover, given the grave consequences of a ballistic missile attack with WMD, DOD is executing a rigorous test program that will continue to improve our missile defense systems to make them as reliable and effective as possible.

——

[The nomination reference of Madelyn R. Creedon follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
March 14, 2011.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Madelyn R. Creedon of Indiana, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Michael Nacht.

——

[The biographical sketch of Madelyn R. Creedon, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MADELYN R. CREEDON

Education:
- University of Evansville
  - September 1969–June 1973
  - BA awarded June 1973
- Tulane University School of Law
  - September 1973–June 1974
- St. Louis University School of Law
  - September 1974–June 1976
  - JD awarded June 1976

Employment Record:
- Senate Committee on Armed Services, Counsel, January 2001–present
- Senate Committee on Armed Services, Counsel, March 1997–July 2000
- Base Realignment and Closure Commission, General Counsel, November 1994–November 1995
- Senate Committee on Armed Services, Counsel, February 1990–November 1994
- Private practice of law, September 1977–July 1980
- Alexandria City Attorney’s Office, Law Clerk, March 1977–September 1977

Honors and awards:
- Department of Energy, Secretary’s Achievement Award, 2001
- Department of Energy, Distinguished Service Award, 1990

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Madelyn R. Creedon in connection with her nomination follows:]
1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
   Madelyn Raub Creedon.

2. **Position to which nominated:**
   Assistant Secretary of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Department of Defense, Policy.

3. **Date of nomination:**
   March 14, 2011.

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
   November 1, 1951; Indianapolis, IN.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
   Married to James J. Bracco.

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   Meredith Bracco Walsh, age 29.
   John Edward Bracco, age 26.

8. **Education:** List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
   University of Evansville, 1969–1973, BA
   Tulane University School of Law, 1973–1974
   St. Louis University School of Law, 1974–1976, JD

9. **Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   Counsel, Senate Committee on Armed Services, January 2001–present

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
    Counsel, Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 1990–November 1994
    General Counsel, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, November 1994–October 1995
    Counsel, Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 1997–July 2000

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Daughters of the American Revolution
    Women in Aerospace

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
    (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
    None.
    (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
    None.
    (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
    None.

14. **Honors and awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
    DOE Secretary’s Achievement Award, 2001
    DOE Distinguished Service Award, 1990
15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

None.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

None.

17. **Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:**

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Yes.

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

No.

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

Yes.

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Yes.

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Yes.

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

Yes.

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

MADELYN R. CREEDON.

This 13th day of April, 2011.

[The nomination of Madelyn R. Creedon was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Alan F. Estevez by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**DEFENSE REFORMS**

**Question.** The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?
Answer. Currently I see no specific changes in the act that I would recommend.

**Question.** If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?
Answer. Currently I see no specific changes in the act that I would recommend.

**DUTIES**

**Question.** Section 138a of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness is to serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on logistics and materiel readiness in the Department of Defense (DOD).

If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Defense, what would you view as your principal responsibilities to the Secretary and the Under Secretary?
Answer. If confirmed, I would fulfill the statutory responsibilities of being the principal advisor on logistics and materiel readiness issues to the Secretary and the USD(AT&L), and serving as the principal logistics official for DOD. In this capacity, my responsibilities would include providing oversight and developing policy for all logistics, maintenance, materiel readiness, strategic mobility, and sustainment support programs.

**Question.** If confirmed, what other duties do you expect that the Secretary and the Under Secretary would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I would remain responsive to changes of mission and leadership direction. I would work to provide superior logistics support to the warfighter and find new ways to provide the goods and services we offer in a more efficient and cost effective manner. I strongly believe that logistics has been and will always be a key enabler to the warfighter.

**Question.** What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I believe my extensive experience in a variety of positions as a DOD logistician qualifies me to perform the duties of this position. I am currently serving as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness). In this capacity, I am responsible for guiding the transformation of DOD logistics processes to ensure cost-effective joint logistics support to support the warfighter.

Furthermore, I have served in every leadership position within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness during my tenure in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). I understand fully the linkages between different logistics capabilities, as well as the relationship between the Department, the Services, our interagency partners, and Congress. My experience provides me with a grounded perspective and insight into DOD operations, allows me to quickly assess a diverse range of issues, and make the rapid but informed decisions needed to support our national interests. I have also worked extensively with the commercial sector to understand best logistics practices across a wide range of industrial and commercial activities.

**Question.** Do you believe that there are any additional steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform these duties?
Answer. I believe I am prepared to commence these duties, if confirmed. I would embrace this position with enthusiasm and energy.

**RELATIONSHIPS**

**Question.** If confirmed, what would your relationship be with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on logistics and materiel readiness issues within the DOD.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the principal advisor to the USD(AT&L) on all logistics and materiel readiness issues in DOD. I would also monitor, review, and provide oversight of all logistics, maintenance, materiel readiness, and sustainment support programs within DOD, in accordance with applicable DOD policies. In addition, I would assist the USD(AT&L) in the performance of his duties relating to acquisition and technology (logistics and materiel readiness) in any other capacity that he might direct.

**Question.** The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Principal Deputy USD(AT&L) would be the same as that described above in relation to the USD(AT&L).

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness so that we can both carry out our statutory obligations relating to readiness.

Question. The Director for Logistics (J4), the Joint Staff.

Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Director for Logistics (J4), the Joint Staff, would be based on my role as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(AT&L) on logistics and materiel readiness in DOD, and as the principal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on logistics and materiel readiness.

Question. The Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J7), the Joint Staff.

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, the Joint Staff, to ensure that DOD logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with operational planning and joint force development requirements.

Question. The Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J8), the Joint Staff.

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J8), to ensure DOD logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with force structure and resource requirements.

Question. Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to continue to work closely with the Commander, TRANSCOM, to ensure seamless support to meet warfighter requirements.

Question. The Defense Logistics Agency.

Answer. If confirmed, I would exercise authority, direction, and control over the Defense Logistics Agency through its Director.

Question. The Army Materiel Command.

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Commanding General, Army Materiel Command, to ensure DOD logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with Army materiel requirements.

Question. The Naval Sea Systems Command.

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, to ensure DOD logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with Navy materiel requirements.

Question. The Naval Air Systems Command.

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, to ensure DOD logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with Navy materiel requirements.


Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command, to ensure DOD logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with Marine materiel requirements.


Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information with the Commander, Air Force Materiel Command, to ensure DOD logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with Air Force materiel requirements.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness?

Answer. If confirmed, I would anticipate the major challenges to be:

1. Ensuring our warfighters engaged in contingency operations are provided with the best possible logistics support in an era of limited resources. While my key focus in this area would be on our drawdown of forces and transition to the Department of State in Iraq, and continued sustainment of our operations in Afghanistan, I would ensure that we have logistics capability to support any contingency or humanitarian operation.

2. Integrating lifecycle management and long-term logistics planning into the acquisition process.

3. Optimizing the DOD supply chain so that it is globally responsive to the demands of our warfighters.
While focused on these priorities, I would work to ensure that support was seamless, cost-effective, and timely. I would strive to lower costs and continuously evaluate ways to improve support.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I would:

1. Continue to optimize all elements of the DOD’s logistics community to include commercial partners and build on measures that would effectively support our warfighters at the best value to the American taxpayers.
2. Continue to partner with our Services, the OSD agencies, program offices, and industry partners to integrate long-term lifecycle management considerations early on and throughout the acquisition process.
3. Continue to manage supply chain policy and refine our logistics processes to ensure that the DOD operates at its optimum capacity while providing seamless support to the warfighter.

I would continue to streamline operations and enhance capabilities, where appropriate. We continue to work to find more joint solutions from procurement to day-to-day logistics support. This is a natural progression from the way we fight as a joint force to the way we must jointly provision in the future.

DEGRADATION OF EQUIPMENT READINESS DUE TO OPERATIONS TEMPO

Question. The committee has received testimony from senior DOD officials and the Military Services citing the effects of operations tempo on the materiel readiness of equipment deployed in support of contingency operations.

What is your understanding of the extent to which current operations are impacting the service life of major equipment items?

Answer. The engagement of all Services during nearly 10 years of combat since September 11 does have lifespan implications. High usage of equipment based on an aggressive operational tempo, coupled with the harsh environments in which these systems operate, create logistical challenges that the Department must deal with on a continuing basis in order to ensure readiness of critical systems. This is especially true of ground combat equipment and helicopters, but also applies to key Air Force and Navy platforms.

Question. If confirmed, what would your approach be to regenerating materiel readiness that has been degraded by operations tempo?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that we reset our systems to a level where we can adequately support the Nation’s objectives. After 10 years of conflict we must realize that many of our systems have been degraded and are in need of extensive maintenance in order to bring them back to an acceptable level of operational readiness. DOD will need to make sure that dollars are spent wisely to gain the highest degree of readiness possible.

DRAWDOWN, RESET, AND RECONSTITUTION

Question. The military departments face a major challenge in resetting and reconstituting their equipment as they draw down their forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army and the Marine Corps anticipate that this effort will continue for several years beyond the end of military operations.

Do you believe that the Army and the Marine Corps have set aside adequate levels of funding in their budgets for fiscal year 2012 and future years to meet anticipated reset and reconstitution requirements?

Answer. Reset and reconstitution of both Army and Marine Corps equipment is dependent upon Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) or supplemental funding, as baseline budgets are insufficient to cover these costs. We must expect to fund reset for 2 to 3 years beyond the end of major contingency operations.

Question. If not, what steps do you believe the Department should take to ensure that this effort is successfully completed in a timely manner?

Answer. Currently, the depots and reset facilities are workloaded to satisfy the Services’ readiness requirements within available funding allocations. To ensure work is accomplished in a timely manner, we must continuously improve our processes while ensuring that adequate funding (from both base and OCO accounts) is available. If confirmed, I would ensure we request the appropriate resources, reduce logistics operating costs, reduce total maintenance and supply-chain cycle-times, and increase the effectiveness of all of our programs.
AIR FORCE AND NAVY MAINTENANCE FUNDING

Question. In recent years, the Navy and Air Force appear to have significantly underfunded readiness accounts for maintenance and repair of ships and aircraft and relied upon Congress to provide additional funding in response to unfunded requirements lists. As the country faces an increasingly difficult budget situation, it is likely to become increasingly difficult for Congress to address these unfunded requirements.

Do you believe that maintenance and repair of ships and aircraft has received an appropriate level of priority in the budget processes of the Navy and the Air Force?

Answer. The Navy and the Air Force continue to plan for and request sufficient funding to manage the maintenance and repair of ships and aircraft. However, reset and reconstitution of both Navy and Air Force equipment is dependent upon OCO or supplemental funding, as baseline budgets are insufficient to cover these costs.

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to address this issue?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure we request adequate resources to allow us to maximize readiness. I would make certain that we strive to reduce logistics operating costs, reduce total maintenance and supply-chain cycle-times, and increase the effectiveness of all of our programs.

DEPOT MAINTENANCE STRATEGIC PLANS

Question. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that the Military Services lack clear and comprehensive depot maintenance strategic plans addressing capital investment in facilities and equipment, implementation of a methodology to revitalize and resource organic depot facilities, public-private partnerships, workforce planning and development, and the integration of logistics enterprise planning systems.

What is your understanding of the extent to which the Military Services have updated or revised their depot maintenance strategic plans to address current and future reset requirements, the type and mix of equipment expected to return for reset, equipping priorities, required reset funds for operations and maintenance, and the impact of contractor support work to reset equipment?

Answer. The Military Services regularly update their depot maintenance strategic plans. I believe they are generally prepared to adjust to new equipping priorities and have been successfully performing reset and other maintenance functions for the past 8 years. The appropriate mix of organic and contractor support is also conforming to the 50/50 statute as well.

Question. Do you believe that the steps taken by the Military Services are adequate, or are additional measures needed?

Answer. Yes, I do believe that the steps the Services are currently taking are appropriate given the warfighting requirements and available resources. If confirmed, I would look for additional opportunities to seek efficiencies and increase effectiveness across the logistics enterprise.

Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the Military Services have assessed the effects of reset on the baseline budgets, competing demands to reset equipment to meet unit readiness goals, the preservation of core capabilities, and the risk level that organic depot maintenance facilities may be able to accommodate in order to complete reset workload requirements?

Answer. Reset for all Services is reliant on OCO funding as well as on baseline budgets. Currently, the depots and reset facilities are workloaded to satisfy the Services' readiness requirements within available funding allocations. To ensure work is accomplished in a timely manner we must continuously improve our processes while ensuring that adequate funding (from both base and OCO accounts) is available. We must expect to fund reset for 2 to 3 years beyond the end of major OCOs.

Question. Do you believe that the steps taken by the Military Services are adequate or are additional measures needed?

Answer. I believe that the Services are taking appropriate steps and performing the correct activities to ensure long-term sustainment of equipment. If confirmed, I would ensure we request the appropriate resources, reduce logistics operating costs, reduce total maintenance and supply chain cycle times, and increase the effectiveness of all of our programs.

Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the depots' plans address the need to manage workload as current operations draw down and decreases in maintenance requirements when these operations end?

Answer. As a Department, we are preparing to draw down prudently to ensure the warfighter is supported and equipped properly. Air Force and Navy require-
ments will change very little due to the nature of commitments placed on them in Operation New Dawn (OND)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). However, the Army and Marine Corps requirements will decrease in direct proportion to the drawdown of deployed forces. There will be a 2- to 3-year enduring requirement during the post-drawdown phase to ensure that all reset and other maintenance work is completed and forces are readied for future requirements. If confirmed, I would look for additional opportunities to seek efficiencies and increase effectiveness across the logistics enterprise.

**Question.** Do you believe that the steps taken by the Military Services are adequate or are additional measures needed?

**Answer.** Yes, I do believe that the steps the Services are currently taking are appropriate given the warfighting requirements and available resources. If confirmed, I would continue to examine this issue closely to identify whether additional measures are needed.

**ARMY UNIT EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS**

**Question.** As the pace of overseas operations declines, the Army is resetting equipment and rebuilding the readiness of its forces. Two documents—Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), and Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)—provide the basic personnel and equipment requirements against which on-hand personnel and equipment are measured in determining unit readiness. During our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Central Command repeatedly requested force capabilities that did not align well with Army MTOEs. What is your understanding of the action the Army is taking to review and update unit requirements so that they better reflect the needs of the combatant commands?

**Answer.** All Services, including the Army, continually adjust to meet the changing requirements of the mission. Multiple DOD/Service Centers ensure that the lessons learned are incorporated into Service/DOD doctrine, as appropriate. These efforts shape the current and future training of our men and women in uniform, as well as the equipment that they use. For example, when improvised explosive devices (IED) became the prevalent threat to the health and safety of our troops engaged in OND/OEF, service-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) changed to meet that threat and the acquisition and logistics arms of the DOD partnered to produce multiple variants of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles. The Army has ongoing work to ensure its ability to sustain items acquired to meet urgent operational needs. The Department continues to work to train and equip units for emerging and nontraditional missions as outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review.

**Question.** Do you believe that this action is adequate or are additional measures needed?

**Answer.** Yes, this action is appropriate.

**Question.** If confirmed, how will you approach the task of ensuring that unit equipment requirement documents (MTOE and TDA) are updated in sufficient time to be considered in the development of future budget requests?

**Answer.** This issue is largely a Service responsibility and they must determine what equipment they need to support the operational mission. However, I recognize that rapidly developing threats require the rapid fielding of systems to meet them. We are doing this now by integrating with organizations like the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), and with our Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, where we address these types of issues early on to improve systems and support the warfighter. If confirmed, I would plan to continue this work.

**AIRCRAFT CONDITION-BASED MAINTENANCE**

**Question.** DOD helicopters are under high demand and flying well beyond their anticipated flying hours, and the Army is currently engaged in an effort to install digital source collectors (DSC) on its manned aircraft (AH–64 A, AH64 D, CH–47 D, CH–47 F, MH–47 G, UH–60 A, UH–60 L, UH–60 M, MH–60 L, MH–6, and OH–58 D) in order to conduct Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM). The DSC are being installed on all new production utilizing procurement appropriations. However, the funding of the transmission, storage, and analysis of the data is minimally funded and heavily leveraged with OCO funding at this point. An Army Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology report released this month stated, “there is clear evidence that CBM+ technologies and procedures have avoided at least three catastrophic Class A accidents that would have resulted in the total loss of the aircraft.” Do you believe the Army should extend the Product Improvement Pilot Program beyond fiscal year 2013? If so, why?
Answer. The Army has taken advantage of the current authority and is in the process of completing an assessment of the Aviation Pilot Program. As requested by current legislation, the Army will provide a report and recommendation to Congress in fiscal year 2012. I believe the Army’s current direction is prudent and will allow both the Department and Congress ample opportunities to take action and make corrections as necessary in the future.

Question. What is your understanding of the Army’s plans to fund the transmission, storage, and analysis of the data that are important to improving maintenance efforts, decreasing maintenance and spare part costs, and increasing readiness?

Answer. The Army funds Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) functions, such as CBM data storage, analysis, and transmission, within the budget cycle. The long-term strategy for CBM data transmission, storage, and analysis includes the integration of actionable logistics data in a future increment of the Global Combat Service Support-Army (GCSS–A). The engineering unique CBM data transmission and storage requirements to enable weapon system performance analyses are separately funded from the GCSS–A.

Question. Do you believe that the planned level of funding is adequate for this purpose?

Answer. The fiscal year 2012 President’s budget request is sufficient to meet our Condition-Based Maintenance data storage, analysis, and transmission critical requirements. If confirmed, I would work with the Army to adequately fund Condition-Based Maintenance Programs.

Question. What is your understanding of the results of the condition-based maintenance effort thus far in terms of readiness and cost-savings?

Answer. The beneficial outcomes of the Army’s Aviation Condition-Based Maintenance program include a 3 to 12 percent reduction in Non-Mission Capable Maintenance rate, a 5 to 8 percent increase in fleet readiness, and a 1 to 4 percent reduction in Maintenance Test Flight Hours. These results have increased the Army’s combat power, reduced maintenance costs, and have provided critical information that avoided catastrophic failures during flight.

Question. What do you believe should be the overall goal of the Condition-Based Maintenance effort in the Army?

Answer. I believe the overall goal of Condition-Based Maintenance-Plus (CBM+) should be to increase combat power by performing maintenance and supply functions based upon evidence of need. The Army has set forth four CBM program objectives to meet this goal:

1. Decrease the maintenance burden
2. Increase platform availability and readiness
3. Enhance safety
4. Reduce operations and support costs

ARMY PREPOSITIONED STOCK

Question. As contingency operations in Iraq wind down, the Military Services have begun reconstituting their prepositioned equipment. At the same time, the Military Services have begun to review future requirements for their prepositioned stocks. We also understand that DOD also intends to include prepositioned stock in some of its department-wide strategy planning, and has a number of initiatives underway to improve the mobility system, responsiveness to forces, and effectiveness of prepositioned capabilities.

What is your understanding of the extent to which the Department is working with the Military Services to develop an integrated requirement for prepositioned stocks that is based on a Department-wide strategy?

Answer. The Department is currently conducting a prepositioning study that has a high probability of reshaping the future landscape of prepositioning programs. This initiative, The Comprehensive Materiel Response Plan (CMRP), is a VCJCS-directed and TRANSCOM/SLA-led study aimed at developing a comprehensive plan for DOD materiel positioning and distribution.

Question. Do you believe that the Army has adequately assessed which of the many pieces of nonstandard equipment that were purchased to meet urgent warfighter needs should be added to the prepositioned stock sets?

Answer. The assessment of which equipment goes into prepositioned stocks is generally driven by operational vice logistics considerations. All non-standard equipment the Army has procured is being systematically reviewed as part of the Army’s Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) process. One of the possible outcomes for materiel going through CDRT is to be selected for stockage in Army Prepositioned Stock (APS). Probably the best example of nonstandard equipment
being selected for APS is the MRAP—in fact, the majority of the total MRAP vehicle population will be positioned into global APS sets.

**Question.** What additional reset and sustainment resources will be needed to add to these stocks?

**Answer.** In order for the Army to complete its APS Strategy 2015, sets used in support of current operations will require the continuation of OCO funding to ensure the reset of equipment for future use.

**Question.** Do you believe that these new requirements are appropriately accounted for in the APS Strategy 2015?

**Answer.** I believe the Army is incorporating new requirement in APS 2015. Currently, new requirements in the Army’s APS sets include MRAP vehicles, Long Term Armor Strategy (LTAS) Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, and Counter Measure Electronic Warfare equipment. The Army continues to modernize its APS in accordance with warfighting strategy and priorities.

**Question.** In your view, has the Army identified adequate funding to meet its plan of reconstituting its prepositioned stocks around the world by 2015?

**Answer.** The Army is counting on the reset of theater retrograded equipment from OND and OEF in order to fill its Army Prepositioned Stock strategic requirements. In order for the Army to complete its APS Strategy 2015, sets used in support of current operations will require the continuation of OCO funding to ensure the reset of equipment for future use. Most of the equipment will come to the Army's Army prepositioned stock inventory from depot stocks or equipment already purchased.

**Question.** What steps, if any, would you take if confirmed to address this issue?

**Answer.** Prepositioning decisions are based on warfighting strategy and requirements that are informed by logistics capabilities. If confirmed, I would shape the future of prepositioning strategy by leveraging efforts such as the Comprehensive Material Readiness Plan to ensure our policies on prepositioned equipment provide the Services with the overarching guidance they need to make informed programming decisions. L&MR is currently incorporating improvements, including new reporting procedures that will provide Congress with greater insight into the Services prepositioning program.

**DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY FULFILLMENT OF SPARE PARTS ORDERS**

**Question.** Air Force Logistics Centers (ALC) have expressed frustration over DLA’s inability to deliver some parts on time to the ALCs. DLA achieves a 94 percent fill rate for spare parts, however, the remaining 6 percent can occasionally ground an aircraft. Some parts can take well over a year to arrive at the ALCs and it appears that DLA will not order parts until the aircraft reaches an ALC. As a result, the Air Force is sometimes forced to cannibalize a part off of one aircraft to repair another.

What is your view of DLA’s track record on delivering parts to the Air Force’s ALCs?

**Answer.** DLA has acknowledged that there is room for continued improvement in delivering parts to the Air Force ALCs. It is working closely with the Air Force to improve performance and is sharply focused on the supply chain management planning activity. To accomplish this, DLA conducts senior leadership engagements to review issues of major importance to the Air Force. These engagements have improved demand forecasting and helped to standardize critical planning processes.

The Air Force and DLA must continue to partner with one another to improve demand and supply chain processes. While we still have a way to go to improve our collaborative demand planning processes, the focus is there and we are seeing benefits.

**Question.** What changes, if any, do you think are needed to improve DLA’s performance in this regard?

**Answer.** DLA is continuously working with the Air Force to improve performance. The efforts to standardize critical planning processes have improved demand forecasting. The Air Force and DLA will continue to partner to improve the supply chain process through synchronizing workflows between the Air Force industrial customers and DLA’s distribution points. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that DLA remains responsive to the Air Force’s needs.

**Question.** What is your view of the High Velocity Maintenance (HVM) program and the role that it can play in expediting needed parts for aircraft maintenance?

**Answer.** I fully support the HVM program and believe it is extremely beneficial to both the Air Force and DLA. It will provide predictability for the respective System Program Office’s plan to induct weapon systems (down to the specific tail number) for repair which will improve demand planning accuracy. Improved demand
planning accuracy will allow DLA to optimize its supply chain response to future customer requirements.

BALANCED SCORECARD AND LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

**Question.** DOD’s logistics leadership has adopted the Balanced Scorecard concept as one of the important components of logistics performance management. The process of adapting and implementing the Balanced Scorecard in DOD is almost 2 years old.

In your view, what are the benefits of the Balanced Scorecard for logistics performance management?

**Answer.** While the Department does not currently use a formalized Balanced Scorecard, we do apply a performance framework to logistics which has many of the same attributes and objectives of the Balanced Scorecard. Performance is monitored quarterly against defined goals and targets for response time to customer (warfighter) requests. These include the total time for a customer to receive an ordered item (Customer Wait Time) and the percentage of orders filled to customer specification (Perfect Order Fulfillment). This framework is implemented as part of the Department’s Strategic Management Plan and Performance Budget, and the performance measurements are reviewed by senior logisticians in the Services and DLA, by logistics leadership in OSD, and by the Deputy Chief Management Officer, as part of the process of monitoring Department-wide performance goals.

**Question.** Do you believe that implementation of the Balanced Scorecard in DOD can be accelerated?

**Answer.** We do not intend to accelerate implementation of a formalized Balanced Scorecard. However, as described above, we apply a performance framework for logistics which has many of the same attributes and objectives of the Balanced Scorecard. Performance is monitored quarterly against defined goals and targets. To meet these goals and targets, we are implementing key initiatives such as the Comprehensive Inventory Management Improvement Plan, automated identification technology, and improved Operational Contract Support (OCS), and we continue to seek ways to accelerate the time to implement fully these key initiatives.

CORROSION PREVENTION AND CONTROL

**Question.** Congress and DOD have significantly increased their emphasis on the prevention and management of corrosion in equipment and materiel of the Services. Actions to address corrosion challenges include establishment of a central corrosion program management office and the institutionalization of corrosion prevention and mitigation as a key component of the Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process.

What is your understanding of the challenge to the readiness of the Military Services as a result of corrosion in equipment and materiel and the extent to which the Services are coordinating their efforts?

**Answer.** Corrosion has a negative impact on readiness, cost, and safety. The Department has completed analyses over the last 5 years which provide the Services with detailed data on the cost of corrosion for weapon systems. Clearly, corrosion is a growing challenge that every weapon system in the DOD faces and, as such, the Department is aggressively working to share knowledge between the Services and commercial entities all aimed at finding the best solutions at the least cost to the Department.

**Question.** If confirmed, what would be your relationship with the Director of Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would collaborate with the Director of Corrosion Policy and Oversight in several activities. Since corrosion is closely linked to sustainment, I would continue to foster this partnership.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you assess the implementation and effectiveness of corrosion prevention and control efforts in programs under your purview and, working with other responsible officials, address identified areas of concern?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would aggressively attack this growing logistics issue by collaborating with the Director of Corrosion Policy and Oversight and through corrosion prevention control forums.

RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION

**Question.** Congress has supported DOD’s Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) program in order to improve the visibility and identification of, and access to, equipment and supplies.

What experience and familiarity do you have with RFID technologies and their implementation?
Answer. I have been a leader in DOD’s efforts to implement RFID technologies since the early mid-1990s, implementing the world’s largest active RFID network to provide in-transit visibility to combatant commanders and implementing satellite tracking and intrusion detection devices to reduce pilferage in hostile regions of the world. Under my leadership, we have leveraged commercial global RFID standards to align public and private sector standards, implemented passive RFID at strategic distribution depots, and continued to focus on the use of RFID to add enterprise business value.

**Question.** In order for RFID technology to be effective, it must be used consistently throughout DOD and the Military Services. One of the problems highlighted in ongoing contingency operations is a lack of understanding of RFID technology and how to use the devices, particularly in field operations. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that standardized training on the use of RFID and other tracking technologies is being provided to all necessary military and civilian logistics personnel?

Answer. I continue to lead efforts to improve the tracking of key assets through the use of RFID across the spectrum of DOD operations, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. I lead a senior-level summit with the Joint Staff J–4 to continue to improve in-transit visibility.

Currently, our forces train on the use of RFID technologies. We apply active RFID tags to our sustainment shipments bound for overseas destinations even during peacetime, and use them at major training centers as a means to ensure soldiers are trained before they are deployed. If confirmed, I would continue to focus on ensuring our forces are properly trained on the use of our tracking capabilities.

**DOD INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES**

**Question.** Each of the Military Departments has its own maintenance depots, shipyards, and air logistics centers to help maintain its equipment. The Military Departments also contract with the private sector for maintenance support. LMI recently completed a congressionally-directed review of depot maintenance issues and recommended significant changes.

What are your views of the LMI study?

Answer. The study made specific recommendations to DOD that it felt would improve the depot maintenance processes. Overall, the study provided DOD with a review of the organic depot maintenance environment and raised broad issues that we now must more fully assess in the context of the Department’s related and ongoing logistics support improvements and efficiency initiatives. We are assessing their recommended follow-on policy and legislative implementation activities for feasibility.

**Question.** What changes, if any, do you plan to institute, if confirmed, in response to the recommendations of the LMI study?

Answer. Given the far-ranging and long-term implications of any changes, the Department is working through a very deliberate process to determine the most appropriate way forward. If confirmed, I would continue to shape this process.

**DATA VALIDATION FOR DEPOT MAINTENANCE PUBLIC-PRIVATE WORKLOAD DISTRIBUTION REPORT**

**Question.** Section 2466 of title 10, U.S.C., directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress by April 1 of each year outlining the percent distribution of depot-level maintenance and repair workload between the public and private sectors for the preceding fiscal year and the projected distribution for the current and ensuing physical years. One of the continuing problems noted in the preparation of this report is the validity and accuracy of data submitted by the Services. As a result, the actual percentage of work completed at public depots is less than what is reported by the department in some cases.

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure the accuracy of DOD public-private workload distribution reporting?

Answer. The Department has taken steps to improve the accuracy of these reports. These steps include:

- Improved guidance and instructions. Detailed instructions now accompany our annual data call that supports this reporting;
- Third-party review by Military Service audit agencies is required;
- Emphasis on prompt and proper training for those responsible for developing the report; and
- The use of a 2 percent “trigger” for increased oversight—a Military Service must submit a plan to OSD identifying actions taken to ensure compliance if they are within 2 percent of the limitation.
In their last audit in November 2006, the GAO found only one error in our reporting that amounted to approximately ½ of 1 percent of the private sector share of the Army's workload.

If confirmed, I would plan to send Congress the most accurate data available on depot maintenance and public-private workload distribution.

DEFENSE PERSONAL PROPERTY SYSTEM

**Question.** After many years of costly development, DOD in 2009 implemented the Defense Personal Property System (DPS) which is a web-based system for managing personal property moves for all DOD personnel. The DPS incorporates numerous improvements including contractual awards to movers based on satisfactory performance, not lowest bid; full replacement value as the standard for lost, stolen, or severely damaged personal property; on-demand web-based move counseling; and many other features. An important means of evaluating who the best and worst moving contractors are in DPS is satisfaction surveys that should be submitted by DOD personnel who have completed permanent change-of-station moves.

What is your understanding of the cost-efficiency of the DPS and whether its reliance on web-based systems has produced any savings for the Services?

**Answer.** DPS was intended as a quality-of-life initiative. However, DPS drives a more competitive rate environment and the Department has realized a savings of $300 million since implementation in April 2009, and continues to realize savings of more than $20 million per month.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the current return rate of satisfaction surveys by DPS customers?

**Answer.** The overall customer satisfaction survey return rate for the last 12 months has been gradually improving, and is now at 25 percent.

**Question.** If the rate is below 50 percent, to what do you attribute the inability to achieve a higher rate of return and do you believe that the current rate of return jeopardizes the ability to distinguish good and bad movers?

**Answer.** Although the current 25 percent survey return rate is statistically valid and provides the Department with the ability to distinguish between good and bad movers, a higher return rate would optimize the carrier selection process by awarding more business to higher performing movers. The Department, in collaboration with industry, has set a new survey return goal of 35 percent, which we believe is achievable.

**Question.** What methods do you think could properly be used to improve the survey return rate?

**Answer.** In addition to setting a customer survey return rate goal of 35 percent, the Department is communicating the importance of completing the customer satisfaction survey via entitlement counseling, on-site inspections, 24/7 call centers, automatic email alerts, brochures, and overseas commercials on the Armed Forces Network. The Department is using every possible opportunity to remind customers about the importance of completing the customer satisfaction survey.

**Question.** What is your understanding of actions being taken by TRANSCOM and the Services to improve the performance and utility of DPS?

**Answer.** The Department is constantly looking for ways to improve DPS for all DOD and industry users. We established a General Office Steering Committee that meets regularly to prioritize work and to steer the program. An example of a recent improvement that TRANSCOM and the Military Services have made is increasing the bandwidth to allow more users on the system, which results in improved DPS response times. Another improvement is that the Department is leveraging DPS to transition household goods storage invoicing and payments from a manual to electronic process.

LOGISTICS SUPPLY ROUTES FOR OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

**Question.** Logistics supply for ongoing operations in Afghanistan present a number of difficult issues, including the difficulty of transporting cargo through neighboring countries, security issues on Afghan roads, unreliable transportation and security contractors, limited airfield infrastructure within Afghanistan, synchronizing arrival of units with equipment, and competing logistics priorities in a coalition environment.

What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in addressing these logistics challenges?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would continue to focus on operations in support of Afghanistan.

While understanding that Afghanistan is a challenging logistical environment, we must continue to identify ways to improve our support to the warfighter. Working
with our government and industry partners, I will work to ensure that strategic and in-theater logistics operations are synchronized. We will also focus on improving the visibility of assets and movements in order to better synchronize the arrival of units with equipment and supplies.

**Question.** What steps, if any, do you plan to take, if confirmed, to address logistics supply challenges for ongoing operations in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would continue to monitor the delivery to and sustainment of materiel in Afghanistan. My goal would be to continuously improve our logistical support to the warfighter.

L&MR has integrated logistics experts into the requirements process to ensure that sustainment considerations and solutions are incorporated into rapidly fielded programs. Additionally, we have focused on programs such as the MRAP vehicle. We conduct MRAP Deep Dives quarterly in order to focus on the readiness of this key warfighting capability and ensure that all logistical requirements are addressed.

**Question.** What additional steps, if any, do you believe we can and should be taking to address the possibility that the southern supply route may become less available or more challenging in light of recent events in Pakistan?

**Answer.** The Department continues to plan for contingencies that threaten any of our routes into and out of Afghanistan. We continue to look at ways to mitigate dependencies on any one country’s logistics support by expanding existing capabilities and developing new logistics routes. DOD has already increased the amount of cargo moving via the Northern Distribution Network and we continue to work to minimize the impact of any one route failure. We have also established viable multi-modal and airlift only alternatives to ground movement that can work in both directions.

**PLANNING FOR CONTRACTOR SUPPORT IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS**

**Question.** GAO recently reviewed DOD’s OPLANs and found that only four such plans include an approved Annex W addressing contract support requirements, contractor management plans, contract oversight processes, and manpower requirements to execute contractor oversight. Moreover, GAO found that the few annexes that do exist merely “restate broad language from existing OCS guidance” and fail to identify military capability shortfalls that will require contract solutions or ensure that combatant commanders are aware of even the general scope and scale of contract support that will be needed for an operation.

Do you believe that the current level of military planning for contractor support in military operations is adequate and appropriate?

**Answer.** This is a complex issue and may be different for every mission. We have learned a lot and continue to improve and evolve our strategy regarding the use and management of contractors. In terms of forecasting and planning for contracted support, the Department is integrating contractor support estimates into existing adaptive planning systems. If confirmed, I would work through the Defense Logistics Agency to resource joint OCS planners for each of the combatant commanders. These planners have the background experience and expertise to address the shortfalls noted by the GAO study. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued guidance to include contractor deployment planning into Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and to ensure visibility of appropriate development of relevant Annex Ws. Additionally, the Department is ensuring that OCS requirements are considered in force planning scenario development and joint force assessments. To enhance these efforts, I would ensure that we continue to develop the automated tools to support Operational Contractor Support in adaptive planning under JOPES. We need the same level of fidelity in planning for OCS as we have for organic military forces.

**Question.** What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to improve military planning for contractor support in military operations?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would continue to work with and support the Chairman in the development of automated tools to plan for contractors during military operations. The Chairman is currently working on the development of a tool that estimates contractor requirements at the operational level. We are simultaneously developing a complementary type of tool that will allow DOD leaders to have insight into global and strategic requirements that include that availability, readiness, and capabilities of contractors. Both of these automation tools will allow senior decision-makers to quickly and accurately assess the impacts, risks, and mitigating strategies for proposed changes to forces, capabilities, assignments, apportionments, and allocations/options. I would also continue to adequately resource joint OCS planners currently supporting each of the combatant commands. In addition, DOD expects to provide over 50 planners to support the Military Services and Defense Agencies, resourced through the Defense Acquisition Workforce Initiative as provided by the
fiscal years 2012 to 2016 Resource Management Directive 700A2. In coordination with the Chairman and Military Services, if confirmed, I would maintain visibility and oversight of these planners to ensure that they continue to be relevant for contingency contractor planning.

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

Question. Federal agencies, including DOD, have spent more than $5 billion for private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade. Over this period, there have been numerous reports of abuses by private security contractors, including allegations of contractors shooting recklessly at civilians as they have driven down the streets of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. In September 2007, employees of Blackwater allegedly opened fire on Iraqis at Nisour Square in downtown Baghdad, killing more than a dozen Iraqis and wounding many more. More recently, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported on questionable activities by private security contractors in Afghanistan.

What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in addressing issues relating to the use of private security contractors in OCOs?

Answer. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics, Materiel, and Readiness oversees the Operational Contractor Support capability along with the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy. This is accomplished through the development of joint policies on requirements definitions, contingency program management, and contingency contracting and includes contracted security functions. If confirmed, I would expect that my role would be to ensure that my policy reflects the statutory requirements enacted by law and the values of DOD—consistent with other national and international laws and the enduring values of our Nation.

Question. Do you believe DOD and other Federal agencies should rely upon contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations?

Answer. Without a substantial increase in the force structure committed to contingency operations, the use of contractors for some security functions in contingencies is a necessity. However, these security contractors must be properly regulated and supervised and their roles must be carefully limited and defined. Contractors cannot engage in combat operations. Their use of force is limited to self defense and the defense of others against criminal violence and the protection of critical property. Under these circumstances, I believe that the limited use of security contractors in contingency operations is acceptable. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on their use by other departments and agencies. If confirmed, I would ensure that proper limitations on private security contractors are reflected in DOD instructions, regulations, and the processes that implement those instructions.

Question. In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. The use of force by contractors or military personnel can, if misapplied, undermine our policy objectives. Private security providers are a necessity in Iraq and Afghanistan and will likely continue to be so in future contingency operations. DOD has established policies and procedures to manage contractors effectively to prevent unnecessary violence that would be detrimental to our policy objectives. This is an area that requires constant attention and in which continued supervision and policy refinement are required.

Question. What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that two actions are taken. First, policy for the management and oversight of private security contractors involved in military operations would be fully coordinated and understood across the Department and in the field. To this end I would work to ensure that DOD instructions remain current, clear, and aligned with combatant commander guidance and orders, and consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives.

Second, there must be unified and consistent procedures for all private security contractors (PSC) that define the proper roles, limitations, and basic operating practices for all U.S. Government agencies, coalition partners, and private sector customers of PSCs operating in contingency areas. If confirmed, I would continue to collaborate with the State Department and other governmental agencies to
ensure consistent policy is developed and to promote a common international understanding of responsible use and oversight of private security services.

**Question.** Do you support the extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of all Federal agencies?

**Answer.** I support steps to ensure that there is legal accountability for the actions of all contractors supporting the U.S. Government in contingency operations. DOD has consistently supported unambiguous application of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to all DOD contractors and all U.S. Government private security contractors who are supporting the DOD mission in a contingency area. If confirmed, I would consult with DOD’s interagency partners concerning appropriate mechanisms to ensure such accountability.

**Question.** What is your view of the appropriate application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to employees of private security contractors operating in an area of combat operations?

**Answer.** I support the use of appropriate civilian and military legal processes to enforce accountability for the actions of all contractors deployed to an area of combat operations. I believe that in the absence of an effective civil legal system, the application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is one tool that can be employed effectively to hold contractors accountable for their actions if it is authorized.

**Question.** OMB Circular A–76 defines “inherently governmental functions” to include “discretionary functions” that could “significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons.” In your view, is the performance of security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations an inherently governmental function?

**Answer.** There are certain situations where this may be the case, or be so close to inherently governmental as to blur the distinction. For this reason, current defense instructions require combatant commanders to carefully assess the likelihood of an activity becoming involved in combat before authorizing the use of private security contractors. This is particularly true for tasks involving access control to military installations and protecting military supplies.

Whether military or civilian contractors, it is critical that we ensure that all security elements are properly trained to a common standard, regardless of who they work for. Further, it is essential that these contractors are effectively supervised, under the control of competent authority, and accountable for their actions. To this end, DOD is facilitating the development of the business and operational standards for private security companies described in section 835 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011. DOD is also working with the State Department to develop international norms for private security provider conduct and oversight. If confirmed, I would ensure that as these efforts mature, and they are incorporated into DOD policy and contracting procedures.

**Question.** Do you see a need for a comprehensive reevaluation of these issues now?

**Answer.** The use, oversight, and management of private security contractors must be continually reviewed. The changing situation on the ground demands that we look to see if our policy remains relevant. International efforts, such as the Montreux Document, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, and the current effort to write business and operational standards for private security service, also require us to regularly review our policies. The implementation of these policies must be reviewed as well. If confirmed, I would continue to review these issues to determine whether there is a need to reevaluate these policies.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

**Question.** In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness?

**Answer.** Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.

Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

USE OF CONTRACTORS AT DEPLOYED LOCATIONS

1. Senator M. McCain. Mr. Estevez, I note in your advance policy answers regarding the use of contractors in support of overseas contingency operations that this is a complex issue and may be different for every mission. In your opinion, can the combatant commanders feasibly plan and carry out operations without the use of contractors?

Mr. Estevez. The Department of Defense (DOD) has, and continues to utilize contractors for operational support during contingency operations. While the extent of our use of contractors depends in part on the size, scope, and complexity of the mission, DOD expects that future operations will require the integration of substantial contractor support. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledged that contractors are part of the Total Force. The Department has issued strategic planning guidance that significantly increases the requirement to include contracted support during the operational planning process. As part of operational planning, combatant commanders must factor in contractor support as a component of the Total Force. Planning for contracted support is essential and is now the norm where it was not in previous operations.

2. Senator M. McCain. Mr. Estevez, what impact does the reliance on military contractors have on the idea of combat force multiplication on the battlefield?

Mr. Estevez. As a result of the report produced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Task Force on Contractor Dependency (April 2010), the Department is focused on operational contractor support and continues to assess implications with respect to force mix, contract support integration, planning, and resourcing. Contractors serve as force multipliers, performing non-inherently governmental functions while allowing military forces to focus on the operational mission.

3. Senator M. McCain. Mr. Estevez, if confirmed, what would you do to reform contracting and oversight processes to ensure contingency contractors perform their tasks efficiently without waste of taxpayers’ funds?

Mr. Estevez. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) exercises management and oversight of contingency contracting through the Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Material Readiness) (ASD(L&M)). Additionally, DOD has a functioning governance body which synchronizes the efforts of the Joint Staff, the Services, and other departmental staff agencies—the Operational Contract Support Functional Capabilities Integration Board which is chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support, a key leader on the ASD(L&M) staff, and includes the Service Operational Contract Support Program Managers, the Joint Staff, OSD offices, and defense agencies. This entity ensures that processes and policy are in place to effectively oversee contracted support during contingency operations and is the primary body that addresses findings and recommendations from other organizations such as the Commission on Wartime Contracting and the Defense Science Board. Furthermore, the ASD(L&M), in conjunction with the Joint Staff, the Services, and DOD staff agencies, continues to update policies and procedures to incorporate lessons learned along with emerging legislative requirements, while assessing planning capability requirements, and updating business systems, in order to improve processes related to contingency contracting and contractor oversight.
4. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Estevez, the well-known 50/50 statute is codified in title 10, U.S.C. 2466, and states that “Not more than 50 percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year to a military department or a defense agency for depot-level maintenance and repair workload may be used to contract for the performance by non-Federal Government personnel of such workload for the military department or the defense agency. Any such funds that are not used for such a contract shall be used for the performance of depot-level maintenance and repair workload by employees of DOD.”

The rationale for this statute as well as the companion core statute codified in title 10, U.S.C. 2464, is that the United States needs to ensure we have the organic capability and capacity to carry out critical depot maintenance activity, that the government’s skills and capabilities in this area do not atrophy, and that we are always able to respond effectively and timely to a mobilization, national defense contingency, or other emergency requirement.

What are your views of the core and 50/50 provisions and, if confirmed, will you be committed to retaining a robust organic capability and capacity for depot maintenance within DOD and the Military Services?

Mr. Estevez. I believe robust, organic capabilities, shaped by core depot maintenance requirements, are essential in order to maintain the readiness of our force. The legislative framework provided by core and 50/50 has served us well in the past and supports considerations we must address to ensure the continuation of appropriate organic depot maintenance capabilities and capacity. It is critical that we guarantee that a robust capability is available in the national industrial base, and as part of that, key capabilities must reside in the organic depots. Additionally, we must ensure that our commercial industrial base stays vital, and along with our organic base, is capable of surging to support our national security requirements. I am committed to the efficient utilization of both of these enablers and, indeed, to all aspects of logistical support throughout the industrial base.

5. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Estevez, every area of the DOD budget is under scrutiny for savings and readiness, and logistics are no exception. What are your thoughts regarding how DOD and the Services might attain efficiencies and savings, specifically in the area of logistics, while still complying with the core and 50/50 provisions?

Mr. Estevez. The tenets of core and 50/50 will serve as boundary conditions as we pursue efficiencies throughout the entire industrial base—both in the organic and commercial sectors. While doing so, we will actively monitor and assess the impacts of our initiatives on compliance with the provisions—and all initiatives will include, as a basic tenet, consideration of the health of both sectors. Our objective is to strengthen the depot maintenance industrial base by improving the efficiency of its operations, not to weaken it. This is true whether we are implementing initiatives that affect the organic sector, commercial sector, or both.

6. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Estevez, is interservicing of workload a possible means of achieving savings and, if so, what are your views on interservicing of workload?

Mr. Estevez. I believe that interservicing of workloads is one of many effective tools that may be used to achieve increased efficiency at DOD depots and DOD conducts substantive interservicing maintenance operations today. We need to give careful consideration to interservicing options during the “source of repair decision-making process.” Most notably, we must examine those decisions associated with new systems, where the establishment of a duplicate capability may be avoided, and where the Department can maximize on the use of existing capabilities. As DOD explores options related to interservicing of depot maintenance, we must fully consider responsiveness to our warfighters and maintain adequate robustness within our industrial base.

[The nomination reference of Alan F. Estevez follows:]

570

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

50/50 STATUTE
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
Alan F. Estevez, of the District of Columbia, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness. (New Position)

[Bio Sketch of Alan F. Estevez]

Education:
- Rutgers University
  - September 1975–May 1979
  - Bachelor of Arts degree awarded May 1979
- Industrial College of the Armed Forces
  - August 1994–June 1995

Employment Record:
- Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness), Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC, Nov. 2006–Present
  - Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness), April 2009–Present

Honors and awards:
- Presidential Rank Distinguished Executive Award (2011)
- Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Award (2006)
- Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service (two awards—2005, 2009)
- Service to America Medal, National Security category (2005)
- Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service, 2001
- Office of the Secretary of Defense Award for Excellence, 1997
- Defense Logistics Agency Superior Civilian Service Award, 1997

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee.]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Alan Fredric Estevez.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness).

3. Date of nomination:
   April 6, 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   September 20, 1957; Kearny, NJ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
   Married to Susan Hideko Pearson (Ludrick).

7. Names and ages of children:
   N/A.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
   Rutgers University, BA in Political Science, 1975–1979

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   Principal Deputy assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness), Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC, Nov. 2006–Present
   • Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness), April 2009–Present

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
   DOD Liaison to Board of Governors, Electronic Product Code Global (EPCGlobal), Global Standard 1 (GS1) (standard setting group), 2004–Present.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
   Member, National Defense Industrial Association
   Member, Museum of Modern Art, NY
   Member, Defenders of Wildlife
   Member, Friends of the National Zoo
   Member, Corcoran Gallery
   Member, WETA
   Member, The Potomac Conservancy
   Member, Habitat For Humanity
   Member, National Parks Conservation Association
   Member, The Nature Conservancy
   Member, Rails to Trails
   Member, Chesapeake Bay Foundation
   Member, WAMU885
   Member, Philips Collection
   Member, Potomac Appalachian Trail Club
   Member, C&O Canal Trust

13. Political affiliations and activities:
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
   None.
   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
   None.
   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
   None.

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
   Presidential Rank Distinguished Executive Award, 2011
   Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Award, 2006
   Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service (two Awards—2005, 2009)
   Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service, 2001
   Office of the Secretary of Defense Award for Excellence, 1997
   Defense Logistics Agency Superior Civilian Service Award, 1997

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

I speak in my official capacity at conferences and luncheons about once a month on topics ranging from Radio Frequency Identification technology implementation to general Department of Defense logistics programs. However, these are not formal speeches.

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee's executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

ALAN F. ESTEVEZ.

This 13th day of April, 2011.

[The nomination of Alan F. Estevez was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]
NOMINATIONS OF ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY; AND GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

THURSDAY, JULY 21, 2011

U.S. Senate,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:41 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Brian F. Sebold and Breon N. Wells.

Committee members’ assistants present: Margaret Goodlander and Christopher Griffin, assistants to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta and Elyse Wasch, assistants to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda,
Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee meets this morning to consider the nominations of three outstanding military officers for positions of leadership and command, among the most important in the Department of Defense (DOD).

Our witnesses today are Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, U.S. Navy, to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); General Raymond Odierno, to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army; and General William Fraser III, USAF, to be Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).

We thank each of you for many decades of dedicated service to our Nation and your willingness to continue that service in these positions of great responsibility and challenge.

Let me also extend on behalf of the committee our thanks to your families, whose support has been so important to the success that you have enjoyed, and whose support for you makes a difference for the Nation as well. As is a tradition that we particularly enjoy, we would invite each of you to introduce any family members or friends who may be here with you during your opening remarks.

One of the first actions that all three of our nominees will carry out, if confirmed, will be immediately implementing the reduction of U.S. forces in Afghanistan by 10,000 by the end of this year, and removing the rest of 33,000 U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan by the end of the summer in 2012.

These reductions are part of an ongoing process of transitioning, increasing responsibility for Afghanistan's security to the Afghan security forces, which by 2014 would have leader responsibility for security throughout the country.

The course which the President's decision sets provides a strategy for success in Afghanistan. The Afghan security forces have increased by almost 100,000 since the President announced the surge in December 2009, and that Afghan army will expand by another 70,000 security forces by the time all of the U.S. surge forces are brought home by September 2012.

The growing capabilities of the Afghan security forces provide the Afghan people, but one Afghanistan elder in southern Afghanistan told me what they want the most, which is the ability to secure their own country themselves. Having Afghan forces in the lead puts to the lie to the Taliban's propaganda that international forces are there to occupy Afghanistan. The Afghans taking over their own security is the key to the strategy for success in Afghanistan.
Admiral Sandy Winnefeld currently serves as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and is Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) with Canada. In this capacity, he has been responsible for defense of the Homeland, military support through civil authorities for domestic emergencies, as well as aerospace warning and control for North America.

In his current capacity, he is the combatant commander responsible for the operation of the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the JCS, he would have a number of key roles and responsibilities related to missile defense.

We would be interested in Admiral Winnefeld’s views on whether he believes we should demonstrate correction of the two recent GMD flight test failures before resuming production or delivery of the kill vehicles for the GMD interceptors.

The Vice Chairman of the JCS has a wide range of responsibilities, including playing a major role as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in defining and improving requirements for future acquisition programs, and monitoring the progress of ongoing programs.

As we all know, most of the major acquisition programs at DOD are over budget and behind schedule. The F–35 Joint Strike Fighter is one dramatic example. As the Defense budget is reduced, the inability of the Department to acquire, and its contractors to provide, needed systems on time and on budget becomes an even more significant problem than it is already.

A significant challenge related to the Vice Chairman’s acquisition responsibility is in the area of cyber security. All of the systems, equipment, support, intelligence, and almost everything else that DOD does relies on networks. Making sure that the networks can support the operations reliably will be a large part of Admiral Winnefeld’s responsibilities.

There also are issues, such as when does a cyber attack on United States’ activities or entities require or justify a U.S. offensive reaction, cyber or other. The Vice Chairman will surely be involved in addressing that issue as well.

If confirmed, Admiral Winnefeld would also serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council. Producing and maintaining nuclear weapons is expensive and technically challenging. Today the Nuclear Weapons Council is participating in the design of the nuclear deterrent for the next generation. If confirmed, one of the challenges would be to keep both the costs and the scope of maintenance and modernization within reason.

Of course, a central part of the Vice Chairman’s role will be to act as chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the chairman’s absence. General Odierno is well known to this committee. He has been before us several times as a commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, and more recently when nominated for his current position as Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command.

General Odierno will assume leadership of an Army that is battle tested and proven, but stretched by 10 years of war. The Army has met every challenge with the courage, dedication, and professionalism for which all of us are profoundly grateful.
Over the next 4 years, under General Odierno’s leadership, the Army will deal with many enduring and new challenges. First and foremost, the Army must continue to meet the demand for trained and ready forces in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a commander with recent operational experience, we will be interested to hear General Odierno’s views on the continuing demands for Army units in support of operations, their preparation, readiness, and performance, and how he would ensure that we continue to meet this challenge.

The future beyond operations in Afghanistan and Iraq holds real questions about what we will need the Army to do, how it will be structured and equipped, and how we manage to keep a force that is as good and ready as it is today, modernizes to stay relevant for tomorrow, and that is at the same time affordable. We will be interested to hear General Odierno’s views on how he will deal with the budget pressures that are already being felt throughout the Defense Department and that no doubt will result in funding challenges over the next several years.

Perhaps the greatest leadership challenge that General Odierno will face is the 49,000 soldier end strength reduction planned for completion by 2017. The Army has reduced its size many times in its history, most recently at the end of the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm. The Army must plan and be able to manage its troop reductions and accompanying force structure changes to avoid hollowing out units and to remain as capable as it is today. We are interested to hear General Odierno’s thoughts on end strength reduction, force structure changes, and how best to manage this change without losing the Army’s hard won fighting edge.

Finally, the Army must continue to work as hard as possible to deal with the human costs to soldiers and their families from the pressures and consequences of an army in continuous combat for 10 years. The Army has instituted significant programs to improve deployment predictability and reduce the stress of multiple rotations on soldiers and their families, improve care for our wounded soldiers and their families, and strive to deal with the heart-breaking incidence of suicides that continue in the Active-Duty Force, and have been increasing in our National Guard and Reserves. The committee will be interested to hear General Odierno’s assessment and plans for the Army’s efforts in those areas.

General Fraser will also face critical challenges in his new position. The strategic mobility of our Armed Forces enables us to project power anywhere around the world. TRANSCOM, which encompasses the Air Force’s Mobility Command, the Navy’s Military Sealift Command, and the Army’s Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, is the linchpin of that strategic mobility.

General Fraser will also be dealing with the disparate components of the private transportation sector, including railroad, commercial air carriers, who participate in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, and commercial ship operators.

One area where General Fraser will be immediately deluged is the growing challenge of logistical support for the Afghanistan theater of operations, concerns about over reliance on sometimes tenuous surface lines of communication through Pakistan, for logistic support into Afghanistan had led to over the past couple of years
to the establishment of the Northern Distribution Network through Central Asia. However, these northern routes may need to be expanded to allow increased movement, both into and increasingly out of, Afghanistan if we are to maintain the quality and the timeliness of that support to our forces.

We will be interested in General Fraser’s views on that challenge.

Again, gentlemen, our deepest thanks to you and to your families for all that you have done and will do for the Nation in the days ahead.

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome General Odierno, Admiral Winnefeld, General Fraser, and their families. A special thanks to their families, and I congratulate them on their nominations.

I particularly want to recognize Mr. Tony Odierno, a distinguished wounded warrior and former soldier who is here today supporting his father.

General Odierno, I strongly support your nomination to be the next Chief of Staff of the Army. Your critical role in Iraq, and I note that you are one of the very few officers to have commanded at the division, corps, and Army level during a single conflict, gives you a unique perspective on the capabilities of U.S. forces as you executed maneuver and counterinsurgency operations.

Your service as Commander of the 4th Infantry Division, as Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, and U.S. Forces-Iraq, was instrumental in implementing the surge strategy and turning the tide of battle in Iraq.

Your career of Army service and your various joint assignments, currently as Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, have provided you with an essential understanding of counterinsurgency operations, joint operations, and, most importantly, of soldiers and their families.

We know that soldiers, Active Duty, reservists, and national guardsmen and their families have served gallantly and with a single-minded focus on victory under the most stressful conditions. As the Army has transformed itself into an expeditionary force while meeting the demands of two wars, we are enormously grateful for their service and sacrifices. The human costs of combat have been great.

The comprehensive study completed last year under the Army Vice Chief’s direction underline the effects of continuous combat rotations and the work that has to be done. But I applaud the efforts of senior military leaders in the Army and in DOD to understand these problems, provide the best medical care possible in responding to the needs of wounded soldiers, and to assist the families of all soldiers. If you are confirmed, there will be no higher priority than continuing this work.

Winning the current fight in Afghanistan and preserving the hard-won gains in Iraq must continue to be the Army’s top priority. In his few short months on the job, General Dempsey identified resolving the future mix of personnel and equipment as the Army’s
top priority. In this regard, you will be required to deliver honest assessments and make hard choices.

As the Army decides upon the optimal number and type of vehicles and equipment and invests in recapitalization and modernization, I urge you to look carefully at recent history. Over the last decade, the Army embarked on a number of developmental procurement and modernization programs that were subsequently de-scoped, re-baselined, or cancelled outright. I am very interested in the specific steps you intend to take to improve the Army’s procurement track record.

The committee will be interested to know your views on the continued drawdown of our forces in Iraq, and under what conditions you would advise an enduring troop presence. I have expressed my concerns about the size and pace of the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan. I also want to hear your views about reducing Army manpower by 22,000 soldiers over the next 3 years, and another 27,000 in future years, while absorbing a growing population of nondeployable soldiers.

As you take the reins of Chief of Staff, we need to know how much risk the Army, and individual units and soldiers, are being required to absorb in this challenging environment.

Admiral Winnefeld, congratulations on your nomination to be the next Vice Chief. I think you set a very high standard as Commander, NORTHCOM, improving our homeland defense capabilities and enhancing security in our southwestern border.

There are still many challenges in this regard, and I hope that as Vice Chairman of the JCS, you will continue to participate in this important work.

You are stepping into big shoes following General Cartwright. I thank him for his great service, and I hope he will continue to contribute his expertise to national security debates in the future.

I urge you to focus immediately, upon confirmation, on improving the acquisition process. The Department and its industry partners have stumbled again and again in producing weapons systems at an affordable cost that, without question, the Services desperately need.

Your involvement is also needed in furthering cyber defense strategy and nuclear strategy, in ensuring we achieve success in the Middle East and Libya, and in ensuring that the demand for budgetary reductions does not result in loss of capabilities and a military diminished and unable to respond in defense of our vital national interests.

General Fraser, you are following in the steps of two outstanding leaders at TRANSCOM, General McNabb and General Schwartz. I am sure you will receive excellent mentoring and advice from them. Last year, DOD released the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS–16), that found the Department’s planned mobility capabilities are sufficient to support the most demanding projected requirements. Specifically, the study found that large cargo aircraft airlift capacity exceeds the peak demand in all the peacetime and wartime scenarios considered, which covered a broad spectrum of military operations.

The study concluded that the military needs only 264 to 300 large cargo aircraft. Eliminating the 316 large cargo aircraft for re-
striction would allow the Air Force to retire an additional 15 C–5A aircraft, and provide substantial savings by freeing up billions in taxpayers’ dollars over the next few years. Given the current climate of fiscal austerity, which requires we look to all corners of the defense enterprise to determine how DOD can conduct itself more efficiently, this is a move in the right direction.

I thank our witnesses again for their service and their willingness to serve in these key positions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Let me now call first on Admiral Winnefeld.

STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral WINNEFELD. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am very honored to appear before you today as the President’s nominee to become the Vice Chairman of the JCS.

This nomination is especially humbling to me when I consider the eight exceptional officers who have previously held this position. I am very energized by the opportunity to continue serving alongside America’s young men and women in uniform.

It is also an honor to appear alongside two very special colleagues in Ray Odierno and General Will Fraser, with whom I have been so privileged to serve in the past, and whom I hold in such high regard. If we are confirmed, I look forward very much to the opportunity to continue working closely with them in the future.

It goes without saying that we as a Nation face many serious near-term and long-term challenges, and that many of them fall inside the military’s lane. If confirmed, I will do my part, do my best to ensure that our many ongoing operations around the world are concluded successfully, to assist the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman in crafting a way ahead for the Department to include operating in a challenging budget environment, the continued improvements in the requirements and acquisitions process that Senator McCain referred, and also to maintain the best possible stewardship of the young men and women that have been entrusted to our care.

As such, I look forward to working with not only the senior leadership in DOD in Washington, but also with our combatant commanders and our friends and allies around the world, and also key members of the executive branch and Congress to include the members of this committee to do our best to make sure that we’re defending the American people.

If I am confirmed, I will be joined in Washington by my family, who unfortunately could not be here today. But I want to mention my incredible wife, Mary, who is so supportive of military families, and my two sons, L.J. and Jonathan, who I love dearly and I am very proud of.

My parents were also unable to be here today, but I will forever be indebted to them for their love and support, and also for their service together with a 30-year Navy career.
Thank you again very much for the opportunity to appear before you. Thank you for the ongoing support that you on this committee and your hardworking staff continue to provide to our men and women serving in uniform.

I look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral.

General Odierno.

STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR RE-APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General Odierno. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, other distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for allowing me to have the opportunity to appear before you today.

Before I get started, I would like to introduce my family. I would first like to start out with my wife, Linda, who has been by my side for my entire 35-year career. She has dedicated herself to soldiers and family, leading family readiness groups at company, battalion, brigade, division, and corps levels, volunteering and leading to ensure our soldiers and their families are taken care of. But most importantly, I believe she served as a role model for all the young spouses throughout the military.

Over the last 3 years, she has dedicated herself to championing and providing pet therapy to our wounded soldiers and taking this on as a great opportunity to help to continue to move forward with their lives. She has done all this while being the mother of three children and three grandchildren. I could not do it without her. She has been by my side the whole time, and she is, frankly, my personal hero and my partner.

I am also blessed to have three wonderful children who are all here today. First, my youngest son, Michael, who is a senior at Texas Tech University, and who has probably had to live with more deployments than any other child in recent years, and has done so well in helping my wife as they have worked through these together.

My daughter, Katie, and her wonderful husband, Nick, who are here today, they are from Baltimore. Katie is a mother and also works in interior architecture. They live in Baltimore, and they are so supportive of me.

Finally, my oldest son, Tony, who many of you know, West Point graduate, served in Iraq, was injured in 2004. He has set such an excellent example for all of us through his perseverance and dedication. Today, Tony is married to Danielle. Unfortunately, she could not be here today. She is watching their twin boys and could not make it out today. He works for the Yankees, but he continues to——

Senator Lieberman. You were doing so well until then. [Laughter.]

General Odierno. But he continues to dedicate himself to wounded warriors as he is on the board of directors of the Wounded Warrior Project. It is an honor for me to have them here as they continue to serve me and our country.
Mr. Chairman, if I could go on, over the last 10 years, our Army has proven itself in arguably the most difficult environment this Nation has ever faced. Our leaders at every level have displayed unparalleled ingenuity, flexibility, and adaptability. Our soldiers have displayed mental and physical toughness and courage under fire. They have transformed the Army into the most versatile, agile, rapidly deployable, and sustainable strategic land force in the world today.

I am proud to be part of this Army with the opportunity to serve with these great men and women. I am humbled and honored that I have been nominated to be the 38th Chief of Staff for the Army.

But today is like no other in our history. It is a time of uncertainty and historic change. We face a multitude of security challenges, such as transnational and regional terrorism in places like Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. We have uncertainty surrounding the Arab spring, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We face the challenges of rising powers. But most importantly, all of this is underpinned by our own fiscal crisis.

I know that if confirmed, we will face some very difficult resource decisions within DOD. As we determine those essential characteristics and capabilities which we will need on our Joint Force to meet our future security challenges, I pledge that I will work with everyone to make sure we come up with the right answer and mitigate the risks associated with such.

But I do have a word of caution. We must avoid our historical pattern of drawing down too fast and getting too small, especially since our record of predicting the future has not been very good. As you make difficult resource decisions, you must be thoughtful in understanding the risks we incur to our Nation's future security.

Today, the Army must continue to provide trained and ready forces to ensure we prevail in our current missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the future, we must ensure that our Army remains our national force of decisive action, a highly relevant and effective force across the spectrum of conflict.

In order to do this, we must sustain our own volunteer Army today and in the future, providing depth and versatility to the Joint Force, an army that is more efficient in its deployment, provides greater flexibility for national security decisionmakers, and defense of our interests at home and abroad.

Finally, and most importantly, if confirmed, it is my moral responsibility as Chief of Staff of the Army to be the number one advocate for our soldiers and their families. It is their dedication and sacrifice that has earned the respect and confidence of the American people as they continue to put their lives in harm’s way for our Nation’s security.

I want to close by stating my appreciation to the committee, its unwavering support of our soldiers and their families throughout the last several years. We could not do it without that great cooperation.

I promise you that if confirmed, I will dedicate myself to carrying out my duties to the best of my ability and continue to work openly with Congress to support our warfighters.
I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much.

General Fraser.

STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

General Fraser. Senator Levin, Ranking Member McCain, distinguished members of this committee, I am indeed honored to appear before you today as the President’s nominee to be the Commander of TRANSCOM.

It is also a privilege to join two fine officers on this panel, Admiral Sandy Winnefeld and General Ray Odierno, with whom I have worked closely not only in my current command, but in previous assignments. It is an honor and a privilege to join them today.

This morning I am joined, as I have been throughout my 37-year military career, by my wife, Bev, with whom I have been blessed to share this extraordinary experience of serving in the Armed Forces of this great Nation. Bev and I are indeed humbled to serve with the terrific men and women who have volunteered to serve our Nation, and we are grateful for this opportunity to continue serving, if confirmed, in this new capacity.

As you all well know, the military is truly a family, and Bev and I are extremely proud that our family has been a part of it. Our son, Mack, served in the U.S. Marine Corps. Our daughter, Ashley, is a military spouse of an Air Force officer. They have blessed us with six grandchildren.

Throughout my career, I have become increasingly appreciative of the team effort required of all military families. All families of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and Coast Guards members, they help us perform our mission on a day-to-day basis and make many sacrifices.

The families of our servicemembers that make these tremendous sacrifices are doing it for their husbands, their wives, their fathers, their mothers, their sons, and their daughters to answer our Nation’s call. I thank them for their priceless contribution to our freedom.

If confirmed, I look forward to joining the TRANSCOM family, the more than 145,000 men and women who are dedicated to delivering, sustaining, and then returning our forces.

In my current role as Commander, Air Combat Command, I know the critical importance of rapid, efficient, and timely global logistics. I also understand at the heart of that capability is the innovation and creativity of thousands of men and women who really make it happen.

If confirmed, I pledge to enable our total force—soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardmen, and civilian team members—to build on the superior legacy of my friend and colleague, General Duncan McNabb. He has chartered a vision based on making our forces more effective and more efficient through rapid and responsive global logistical solutions and interagency, non-governmental, commercial, and international partnerships. We will always deliver.
Finally, if confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and all Members of Congress to ensure that TRANSCOM can continue to provide world class support through all of our incredible men and women.

Once again, I am humbled to have been nominated by the President for this position. I appreciate the trust and confidence of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in considering me for this command. I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.

Let me ask you the standard questions. You can all answer together.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interests?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree when asked to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

[All three witnesses answered in the negative.]

Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree if confirmed to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Thank you all.

Let us have an 8-minute first round of questions today.

On June 22, President Obama announced his decision that the United States would draw down its forces in Afghanistan by 10,000 by the end of this year, and the remaining 23,000 U.S. surge forces by the end of the summer 2012, for a total of 33,000.

Let me ask each of you, and start with you, Admiral. Are you comfortable with the President's decision relative to those reductions?

Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir, I am.

Chairman Levin. General Odierno?

General Odierno. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. General Fraser?
General Fraser. Yes, sir, I am.

Chairman Levin. General Odierno, the now former Secretary of Defense, Secretary Gates, made a speech at West Point last February saying that the Army is going to be increasingly challenged to justify the number, size, and cost of its heavy formations. The Army’s first major challenge will be how to structure itself, how to train-and-equip for the extraordinarily diverse range of missions that it’s going to face in the future.

Now, there were a number of other assertions by Secretary Gates, and I think you are familiar with them. But basically, how would you react to his statement that the Army is going to have difficulty justifying size, structure, and cost to the leadership of Congress and to the country?

General Odierno. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have actually had several conversations with Secretary Gates about this. What I believe he was doing was challenging all of us as leaders to make sure that we are looking ahead, that we understand the future of conflict by being informed by the past, and the lessons we have learned in conflict. Because of that, we must make sure we shape our Army for the future to meet what we believe will be our future requirements. It is about identifying the right capabilities and characteristics that we need.

I think what we have to do is become agile. We have to become more adaptable. We have to be able to respond to a wide variety of potential capabilities that national command authority will need the Army to do. He is challenging us to make sure we do that as we conduct our assessments. I am confident that the Army, as we are looking both at today and into the future, are conducting detailed assessments to decide what we should look like as we move forward. I will report this out as we review and make progress in this effort.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Let me ask you, Admiral, a couple of questions about Afghanistan and Pakistan as you undertake these major responsibilities. How important is it, in your judgment, to the success of our counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan that we maintain the process of transitioning more and more responsibility to the Afghan security forces for their country’s security?

Admiral Winnefeld. I think it is fundamental to the entire campaign that we transition responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces. The ultimate goal in Afghanistan is establishing adequate stability so that al Qaeda and other extremist groups cannot return there and have a position from which to attack this country. Ultimately, the Afghans are going to have to step up and take that kind of responsibility for themselves. I think it is fundamental to the campaign.

Chairman Levin. One of the challenges to that campaign is the Pakistanis’ remaining reluctance to take on the Haqqani network. Do you have an assessment as to why they are refusing to take them on?

Admiral Winnefeld. Of course, Pakistan is a very difficult partner, and we all know that. We do not always share the same world view or the same opinions or the same national interests. I believe it is very unfortunate that Pakistan years ago made a decision to
go down a very risky road of using proxy groups to carry out some of its desires to protect what it views as its own national interests. Among those groups has been the Haqqani network.

I think we need to keep continued pressure on Pakistan using all elements of pressure that we are able to apply to what really should be a friend, to get them to realize that the Haqqani network poses a threat to their own country, and to take the steps that we have asked to take and that they need to take in order to eliminate that as a threat, not only inside Pakistan, but equally importantly for us in Afghanistan.

Chairman LEVIN. Relative to Pakistan, we have a real problem of resupplying our forces in Afghanistan, particularly as the Pakistan lines of communication are degraded or threatened or interrupted.

When we met earlier, General Fraser, you indicated that we might have to rely more heavily on sealift with intra-theater airlift as the last leg of support for Afghanistan operations. Can you tell us about that, and what would be the problems associated with relying more heavily on that combination of sealift and intra-theater airlift if we have to resort to that?

General F RASER. One of the things that in preparation for this hearing I have taken a hard look at is the expansion that we have had through the Northern Distribution Network. We have made progress there. If confirmed, I will continue to work that very aggressively to expand the opportunities there as an alternative mode for getting goods into the theater.

We understand the challenges that may be presented with Pakistan if it was to shut down, and, therefore, that is why we are working hard to expand the network through the use of inter-theater lift, but once getting the supplies through the ports. Working with the countries in the Persian Gulf to have access to ports will allow us in to bring goods into the ports and then move them on from there with intra-theater lift.

If it shuts down, I am confident that we will be able to satisfy the requirements in the theater.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General Odierno, what is the operational urgency to field a new ground combat vehicle (GCV) in 7 years? How do you propose to manage the program risk which is associated with that kind of a fairly aggressive schedule through technology development or otherwise?

General ODIERNO. Thank you very much.

The Army for almost 10 years now has been on a path of a developing capability for light forces, medium force with the Stryker, and sustain our heavy forces with the Abrams battle tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle. There was a plan at one time for us in the future—2020, 2025—to convert all that to the Future Combat System (FCS).

We all know that the FCS program specifically was not successful. So, we have to constantly look at what is going to be the vehicle that the Army uses as we bring our force together for the future?

One of the potential vehicles is the GCV. What we have to do is continue to assess, look at the requirements that we have estab-
lished for the GCV to see if it will meet the future requirements that we see for our Army in the future.

We are constantly assessing and working that, and we will continue to work with the committee on that.

Chairman Levin. Okay. Thank you all.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Fraser, to follow up on Chairman Levin’s question about what would happen if Pakistan cut off its supply routes, what percent of our logistics now goes through Pakistan?

General Fraser. Sir, it is my understanding that approximately 35 percent moves through the ground, and the other is moving through the Northern Distribution Network, coupled with the lift as we bring in supplies by air.

Senator McCain. How long would it take you to make up for that 35 percent? Suppose tomorrow Pakistan shut off those supply routes. How long would it take you to adjust to keep the same level of logistics into Afghanistan?

General Fraser. If confirmed, I will certainly delve deeply into that.

Senator McCain. You do not know.

General Fraser. I have not gotten the details of that.

Senator McCain. It cannot be right away, you know that much about it.

General Fraser. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. So, there would be a period of time where we would not have the normal logistic supply.

General Fraser. Sir, in my visits to the theater, I see the——

Senator McCain. Is that true or false?

General Fraser. I'm sorry, sir?

Senator McCain. True or false. It would be a period where we would not be able to maintain the same level of supply.

General Fraser. That is true, sir.

Senator McCain. If we have to use airlift, airlift is approximately four or five times as expensive as the present mode of ground transportation, right?

General Fraser. Sir, we are doing everything we can to reduce the costs through the multi——

Senator McCain. Is it true that it is three or four or five times more expensive to use air to carry these logistics than the present mode of overland?

General Fraser. Sir, I will delve deeply into those cost figures. I do not have them off of the top of my head. It is more expensive to go by air.

Senator McCain. Thank you.

Admiral Winnefeld, how big of a threat do the drug cartels in Mexico pose to the very government and country of Mexico?

Admiral Winnefeld. I do not think they pose an existential threat to the central Government of Mexico, but it is very clear that in particular regions of Mexico, that they have coopted elements of the government, and that the Mexican Government is facing a very serious challenge in those areas. But in terms of the viability of the democracy of the central Government of Mexico, I am not overly concerned about that.
Senator McCain. Do you believe that there’s any law enforce-
ment institution in Mexico that is untainted by corruption?

Admiral Winnefeld. I think that the higher you go in the Mexi-
can law enforcement realm, the less tainted they are. I have more
confidence certainly in the Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP),
which is the federal police. They have made tremendous strides.
They are working very hard. As you get down closer to the munic-
ipal level, there is a great deal of corruption, yes, sir.

Senator McCain. Do you agree with the Government Account-
ability Office assessment that our border is about 44 percent “oper-
ationally secure”?

Admiral Winnefeld. I do not have any facts that would dispute
that conclusion.

Senator McCain. Is it your view that there are some parts of our
border that are still not operationally secure?

Admiral Winnefeld. In terms of operationally secure, meaning
being able to completely shut off the flow of illegal immigration, I
would agree with you.

Senator McCain. Maybe not completely, but operational control,
I think you and I both share the same definition.

Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. There are parts of our border that you agree
are not operationally secure?

Admiral Winnefeld. I would say that there are definitely parts
that are very challenged in terms of their operational security. But
I would hasten to add that there has been a lot of progress made
over the last few years. I would defer to the Secretary of the De-
partment of Homeland Security to give you the real details on that.

Senator McCain. General Odierno, today there is a report that
a senior broad-base analyst says that al Qaeda is expanding in
Yemen and Somalia, posing a new threat to U.S. military planning.
The tactic could be part of the outfit’s strategy of energizing its
franchise with an objective of widening the areas of conflict, and
hitting at its enemy, the United States, in places where such at-
tacks are the least expected. Do you agree with that assessment,
particularly in regards to Yemen and Somalia?

General Odierno. I think for years we have been tracking the
fact that al Qaeda has been trying to establish significant capa-
bility in Yemen. They are, I believe, starting to join other terrorist
elements within Somalia, building a relationship with them in
order for them to expand their organization as we continue to chal-
lenge them in other places.

Senator McCain. In your view and most experts say that it is a
growing threat, both Somalia and Yemen, particularly given the
unrest in both those countries.

General Odierno. It is a very big concern, Senator.

Senator McCain. Should we not take that into consideration as
we talk about massive cuts in defense?

General Odierno. As I said in my opening statement, Senator,
I believe the transnational and regional terrorist threat is a huge
issue for us as we look forward. We have to consider that as we
move forward with any reductions and what our policies and strat-
egies are to go after these threats.
Senator McCain. Let me ask you about a continuing presence in Iraq. You obviously have been disturbed by hearing about the published reports of increased weapons from Iran coming into Iraq, and Afghanistan as well, increased Iranian influence in southern Iraq. How important do you think it would be for us to maintain, with the agreement of the Iraqi Government, a troop presence, say, of about 10,000 people in Iraq, air defense, the Tikrit, the areas under dispute on the Kurdish border, and also for air defenses?

General Odierno. I think that if the Government of Iraq were to request, as you said, I think it is important that we provide them with the support they think is necessary. It is clear that Iran is attempting to influence this decision with the actions they have taken, specifically over the last several months, in continuing to support, fund, train, and equip surrogates in southern Iraq and central Iraq, specifically going after the remnants of our U.S. presence inside of Iraq.

It is important that we continue to support Iraq for their external security, both for air sovereignty, and also to help them in some of their security challenges, to include potentially some of the Kurdish areas. Those will be decisions that will be made by General Austin, the Ambassador, and General Mattis as they move forward.

Senator McCain. You do agree that there is clear evidence of increased Iranian activity in Iraq in a broad variety of areas, including the supply of weapons?

General Odierno. Absolutely, Senator.

Senator McCain. Which makes one wonder if the Iranians believe that we are totally evacuating the area.

Let me just mention again, you and I have talked about it a lot, but there are those of us who are deeply concerned about continued cuts in defense. I would like to have your views of the effects of significant cuts in defense, particularly in personnel areas.

Again, a group chartered by the Secretary of the Army to look into how the Army procures major weapons systems found that every year since 1996, the Army has spent more than $1 billion annually on programs that were ultimately cancelled. Since 2004, $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion per year of Army developmental testing and evaluation funding has been lost due to cancelled programs, including the now cancelled FCS program. It goes on and on. You are very aware of it.

Does that not have to be one of your highest priorities of trying to get this procurement situation under control? Would it not be helpful if we gave legislative authority to the Service Chiefs to be more involved in the whole acquisition process?

General Odierno. First off, I will work very closely with the Secretary of the Army on these issues. We have identified several issues. First, it takes us too long to develop programs, and as the length of time increases, we change the requirements, so it becomes more expensive. We have not been good at predicting the technologies that are available. We have to work at all this so we are not wasting money, and we are putting money in places that will be essential to us in meeting the future.
I will have to think about the legislation about giving the Chiefs more authority, and I will certainly get back to you, Senator, on that.

[The information referred to follows:]

I believe the authorities vested in the position of the Chief of Staff under title 10 sufficiently establish roles and responsibilities within the acquisition process. I pledge to work diligently with the Secretary of the Army and the Army leadership, along with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress, to ensure a unified effort centered on effectiveness and efficiency that meets the capability needs of our force.

Senator McCain. On the whole issue of defense cuts and its effect on personnel, I would like your comments.

General Odierno. First off, in the Army, the Army is about soldiers. When we talk about defense cuts, you are talking about structure. You are talking about end strength of the Army, 42 percent of the budget is personnel costs in the Army budget. As we look at reductions, it will be about structure and personnel.

It is important for us that we understand that as we go forward we are in a supply and demand business. It will depend on what the demand is for the use of our soldiers so we can continue to sustain our All-Volunteer Force, and we are able to continue to meet the commitments around the world. That must all be considered as we look at the characteristics and capabilities you want the future force to look at it, because the Army will pay a force structure because that is what we are, and that is what we provide to the joint force.

Senator McCain. All right, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all the witnesses for their service. I would just like to add, again, I have had the honor of watching General Odierno lead the brave men and women under his command in Iraq, and there is no one that I think is a finer leader that I have encountered in the team of Odierno, Petraeus, and Crocker, as instrumental in our success in implementing the surge in Iraq.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, gentlemen, thank you for your service to the country, and to the families that have supported you, thank you very much.

Admiral Winnefeld, one of your principal responsibilities will be in the requirements process, and ultimately that transitions into procurement. The former Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England, who I greatly admire and has great insights, suggested a procurement holiday, if you will, as we face a great deal of uncertainty in terms of what systems are going forward and how much money you will have.

In the context of that proposal, how do you propose to get your hands around the reset that is necessary, the new innovative technologies that have to be incorporated, and a budget that is going to be extremely challenging, more so I think than I believe today.

Admiral Winnefeld. Sir, I do not have the details of the proposal that you referred to regarding a procurement holiday. I think that would probably be unwise. We have future challenges in the world we need to continue to address and prepare ourselves for as
a military, even as we resolve the conflicts that we have going on today.

I think this is a big ship in terms of the acquisition programs and the processes and the embedded requirements process, that we need to turn into a much more favorable direction for the taxpayers. I will be the first one to agree with that.

I think that we have a confluence of tools that are going to work for us. I think beginning with the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act, which I think is good legislation, but it is going to take time for that to have its effect. I believe that Under Secretary Carter has a very good approach in better buying power that he is imposing on the Department to get more cost efficiencies, to provide incentives for industry, to provide more for competition and the like. Then I think that General Cartwright, if I am confirmed, has set me up for success to further improve the requirements process.

I think those three things working together are going to get this ship turned in the right direction. We are going to be doing that, as you point out, sir, inside a very challenging budget environment.

Senator Reed. Again, I do not want to presume to argue Secretary England’s case, but what it suggested to me is at least the possibility of stepping back, and instead of continuing to procure what is in the pipeline of looking out strategically to what we might really want 10 years from now or 15 years from now.

Again, we have had the discussion with all three gentlemen privately that in times like this, we would like to think strategy drives the budget, the decisions, but most times it is the budget that drives things. Given this tight budget, this notion of looking ahead and maybe not simply doing what we’re doing today, but a little less and a little less and a little less might be the appropriate approach. I do not know if you would consider that.

Admiral Winnefeld. I think that the old adage, if you keep on doing the same thing you have been doing that is the definition of insanity, right? I think that we are going to have to take a very close look, especially in a very difficult budget environment. There are probably some of these programs, depending on the pressures, depending on the decisions that are made by the senior leadership of the Department based on ongoing comprehensive review, that may end up falling by the wayside.

But I hope that those decisions can be made with a strategy in mind. That strategy, of course, lives in an environment with a changing world, with threats that are out in the world, but also budget realities that we have to live with. We have to get the balance just right.

Senator Reed. Let me switch to General Odierno. First, again, I join my colleagues in commending all of you, but I have had the privilege to work with General Odierno for many years now. I personally commend him for his incredible service to the Nation, to the Army, and, most importantly, the troops he leads. Thank you, sir.

One of the challenges you had, you talked about end strength. You talked about budgets. But one of the challenges you have is, how do you continue to maintain, develop, the talent, the enthusiasm, the energy of the superb officers and noncommissioned offi-
cers (NCO) that are the heart and soul of what you do, not the equipment, not the force structure, at a time they have been in combat, many of them, their entire careers, which no generation of American soldiers has ever experienced.

That creates psychological pressures. It creates family pressures. It creates real, profound questioning within the profession. I think the profession is where these questions have to be addressed initially before they come to us about what do we do? What changes do we make?

I know you have thought about this, but your comments today would be appreciated.

General Odierno. Thank you, Senator Reed. I think one of my number one priorities is to first view leader development and how we are going to do leader development.

One of the things we have learned over the last 10 years is the requirement that we have on our leaders has changed significantly and grown frankly—what we expect them to be able to do, how we expect them to adapt, how we expect them to be agile. We now have to infuse in our leader development program, how do we develop this from the time they start at Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) or West Point to their time as they develop as young officers to senior officers, and as well as NCOs.

We have to dedicate ourselves to look at new ways, broaden their horizons so they are able to better react and better be prepared for the world situations that they will be placed.

Second, we have to understand that we have a force that is very different now. We have majors and captains today that all they have experienced is war. We have to help and understand and make sure they understand the profession of arms and reinvigorate our thoughts on the profession of arms, and reinvigorate how we are going to continue to move forward with trust within our system to understand how we operate as professionals. We are going to reinvigorate this as we move forward, and I think these are important.

We also have to understand we have to challenge them. This is about challenging these leaders who have had so many challenges and been so successful, that we have to be able to continue to challenge them because we are going to need them as we move forward in the future. If confirmed, I will dedicate myself and the Army leadership to putting programs in place that allow us to do this.

Senator Reed. Let me ask a question for both you and Admiral Winnefeld. One would love to be able to conduct a full spectrum, panoply of training, operations, and anticipation. But in thinking back 40 years now, when I entered the Army in 1967, it was all about counter-guerilla training, et cetera. When I left it in 1979, it was all about the major land air attack battle in Europe.

It raises the question of, not only in terms of reaction to what we have been through, but in terms of resources, are you both going to emphasize full spectrum capabilities, or are you going to drive to shift one way or the other, presumably away from some of the recent activities and more to other activities?

Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I would say it is a very good question that speaks to reset for what? That is going to depend on the strategic environment. I think as we look out ahead of us in that
environment, we are going to have to be ready for a very broad spectrum of potential conflicts.

If you look at what a conflict might be like in a place like Korea as opposed to other places, we are going to need to be prepared for that full spectrum of operations. That is going to be a big challenge, not only resetting the equipment for that, but also resetting our people for that, and making sure that we don’t myopically focus on one type of conflict over another, but that we are prepared as well as we can be for whatever comes across the plate, but as General Odierno pointed out earlier, we do not have a very good track record of predicting what comes next.

Senator REED. General Odierno?

General ODIERNO. Senator, as we look to the future, we are determining what we are now calling hybrid threat. I think this is the basis on how we move forward. Hybrid threat consists of irregular/regular terrorists and criminality. We have to understand that that is going to be more and more part of what we face no matter where we go.

What we have to do is then develop the programs and the capabilities that allow our formations to adapt depending on where they will have to operate.

I think that is what we have to focus on. I think there are some basic fundamentals that we must always train on. They must always be able to understand their weapons systems and be able to execute with their weapons systems with lethality any time. But they also must understand that the environment that they are going to operate in is going to be very different, and they have to be able to adapt and adjust. That is why we talk about leader development as well as part of this.

Senator REED. General Fraser, we had a chance to talk in the office, and you have, I think, a central role because without TRANSCOM, these folks do not have soldiers, sailors, marines, and ammo to do the job. I appreciate what you are doing.

The challenges ahead, I think, are similar, which is in a tight budget to manage your resources very well. I think you are inheriting from General McNabb a quite effective organization, and I know you are going to carry on in that tradition. Let me just commend you for your service.

Just to simply ask, because we have had a discussion about strategy, budgets, et cetera, any comments you might have on this issue as it affects TRANSCOM.

General FRASER. Sir, if confirmed for the position, I will certainly work as hard as I can to continue to ensure that we not only effectively support the warfighter in the field, but do it in the most efficient manner. That is going to be partnering with our commercial partners, international partners, and working through other agencies. I look forward to that opportunity, should I be confirmed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Fraser, I agree with Senator McCain’s concerns about the logistic network through Pakistan. Do we have other options that you are aware of that we can rely on?

General Fraser. Sir, I have not delved deeply into the plan. I know ongoing planning is happening. I know there would be a disruption. But if confirmed, I would delve deeply into that plan to ensure that any disruption that we have is minimal, to ensure that we continue to provide that effective, yet efficient, support for the warfighter.

We would also have the ability to tap into strategic airlift from the United States, too. It is not just intra-theater, but is also inter-theater. Intra-theater, it is also using ships. It would be a holistic look that we would have to address, sir, and I will delve deeply into that.

Senator Brown. Based on Senator McCain’s initial foray, I would suggest that you do that probably sooner rather than later. I know you are at a disadvantage, so I am sure you are going to assess what the risks of those other logistical avenues will be. I look forward to maybe offline touching base when you get settled. I think it is an important issue.

General Odierno, I met with you yesterday, and you failed to include your Yankees connection as you were looking at my Red Sox memorabilia in the room. [Laughter.]

But it is okay. It is okay.

Chairman Levin. You are speaking for yourself when you say it is okay, by the way. [Laughter.]

Senator Brown. I am speaking for two people actually, sir.

Sir, obviously I asked a lot of questions yesterday and was obviously satisfied with those answers. I was just wanting to take a further question.

The Army recently requested to reprogram procurement dollars away from the modular handgun system into the lightweight .50 caliber machine gun. It was based upon a decision to delay the procurement of the Army pistol to the fiscal year 2014, as well as changes to the requirement documents. Do you have any comments on that at all?

General Odierno. I do not know the specifics of the reprogramming, but what I would say is that I think we are fairly happy with the handgun, and we think that we can continue to work and satisfy our needs through 2014. I think that we feel it is more of a need for the light machine gun, and that is why that was done.

Senator Brown. Okay. Admiral, if I could shift over to you, one of the challenges facing the National Guard in its Homeland mission while at the same time it continues its obligations as an operational reserve that will continue to experience the stresses and strains resulting from today’s global threat. If you could comment on that.

Admiral Winnefeld. Thank you, Senator. First of all, I think it goes without saying that the National Guard has been absolutely fantastic over the last decade in stepping up to support operations overseas in places like Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time they continue to maintain their homeland security disaster relief-type responsibilities. They have just done a magnificent job.
The process over the last year, I have grown very close to the Guard. I think I understand them better than I ever did as naval officer certainly, and they do face challenges.

We are doing a much better job of equipping them, I think, that former Secretary Gates quoted going from 40 to 70-something percent. I think we need to continue that progress to equip the Guard.

I think that we need to make sure that we account for the same challenges that a guardsman has when he or she deploys regarding being a wounded warrior, regarding their families, and making sure that we support those people who tend to be dispersed around the country. We cannot lose sight of their family needs as we try to do the best we can to take care of the Active Forces’ need, which tends to be, as hard as it is, a little bit easier.

I think those are our challenges, and I think we just need to make sure that we continue to strike the right balance between the Homeland mission and maintaining the Guard as an Operational Reserve.

Senator Brown, General Odierno, I was going to submit that question for the record. I apologize for asking that first question. But I did have a question, one that I forgot to ask yesterday. I understand that the Humvee will serve as the majority of the Army's and Marine Corps' light tactical vehicle fleet for the next 20 or 30 years with nearly 100,000 vehicles slated for recapitalization and modernization.

However, it fails to include scalable solutions and provide lightweight and affordable protection capabilities. Nonetheless, these scalable solutions seem to be a key design feature for both the GCV and the joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV).

Do you think the Humvee recapitalization program should also incorporate scalable protection solutions and rocket propelled grenade protection similar to the GCV and the JLTV programs?

General Odierno. I think we constantly have to conduct these assessments. Obviously the protection of our troops and how we use these vehicles is important. We always try to include the most protection that we can, either in the original design or some sort of armor that can be attached later on to protect them.

Now, I will get back with you, Senator, on this to give you a more specific answer than that.

[The information referred to follows:]

Yes, but given the light weight of a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), the scalable solution may not be as robust as that on a Ground Combat Vehicle or Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. Scalable protection is a very important tenet of our Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy. We have seen how rapidly technology and the threat can change, so we have adapted a strategy to acquire vehicles with an inherent protection level we refer to as an A-kit, to optimize protection with other essential capabilities such as mobility, transportability, and payload. Supplemental protection in the form of a B-kit may be added as required. We remain conscious of cost and only plan to buy a fraction of the total requirement to meet our essential Army Force Generation need, while reserving the opportunity to insert future improvements in protection. The Army, with congressional approval, has initiated the Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle (MECV)/HMMWV Competitive RECAP Program that will incorporate scalable protection and plan for additional protection against rocket propelled grenades. The final MECV design will depend largely on solutions proposed by industry to meet our requirements within the cost constraints established as affordable.
Senator BROWN. Thank you. Admiral Winnefeld, sir, initially there was a conversation where Secretary Gates ordered us to find $100 billion, and then several months ago the President advocated a plan to cut $400 billion. Then there is a potential plan to cut $800 billion, and there is another senator who said, let us do a trillion.

Sir, at what point do these cuts affect our operational readiness and then prohibit our men and women from not only getting the equipment, tools, and resources they need to do their job, but in fact do it safely and come home. Is there a number that you have a feeling is a good number? I just wanted to explore that a little bit.

Admiral WINNEFELD. From my current vantage point as the Commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD, I do not have a specific number in mind.

Senator BROWN. How would those cuts affect you and your present command position?

Admiral WINNEFELD. It depends on how they were applied. I think that your question is a very good one, and it highlights the importance of doing this in a strategy-based manner rather than just driving into individual programs and cutting out the ones that people like or do not like.

As we get to a higher and higher number, we are going to find that the strategies that we currently have are going to reach inflection points where we are just going to have to stop doing some of the things that we are currently able to do, because what we cannot afford is to have any kind of a cut result in a hollow force. We cannot afford to have a cut result in irreversible damage to our industrial base. We have to make sure that the All-Volunteer Force remains viable and we take care of these young men and women.

I think we are going to find strategic inflection points. I do not have an exact number for you, Senator.

Senator BROWN. Of course not.

Admiral WINNEFELD. But we are going to have to explore that very carefully and articulate it very carefully as these decisions come forward.

Senator BROWN. No, and I would ask that you do articulate it to the chairman and us so we can advocate and/or criticize, depending on what it is, and then help in that effort. We would be happy to do what we can certainly to provide that safety and security for our troops.

[The information referred to follows:]

To my knowledge, the Department has not evaluated what an $800 billion or greater budget reduction would entail. In my judgment, cuts of this magnitude to defense spending would likely require us to reexamine our national security and military strategies. Based on that examination, we would need to look both across and within the many roles our military plays in protecting our Nation’s vital and important interests based these adjustments to strategy. Such an examination is likely an iterative process, and would have to consider both capability and capacity within each role, and then determine how the role itself might change or how we might accept risk therein. We would need to ensure any force structure and modernization cuts do not come at the expense of readiness in order to avoid migrating into a hollow force. We also need to take care to protect our industrial base in a way that can adjust to potential future needs. As Vice Chairman, I will work to ensure any cuts to the defense budget are made in a way that sustains a responsive and versatile Joint Force.
Senator Brown. Just one final question, General Fraser, the Guard and Reserve airlift and transport capabilities, how does that figure into your overall strategy?

General Fraser. Sir, the total force is a key and integral part of our accomplishment of this mission, not only as they look forward towards TRANSCOM, but also in my current position as Air Combat Commander. It takes a total force to get the job done. There are men and women who are on a day-to-day basis making tremendous contributions. I am very appreciative of that, and I thank them for their service.

Senator Brown. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.

Senator Akaka.

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to add my welcome to our witnesses this morning and want to wish them well, and especially their families as well, because we know their families really make a difference in helping our witnesses in their work and also our country.

Admiral Winnefeld, the Air Force and Navy predict that significant savings can be achieved by leveraging research efforts in the Globalhawk and Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) program. There are other examples of the Services working jointly to take advantage of efficiencies. You have been working on that as well.

Admiral, do you see additional opportunities for efficiencies and eliminating duplication?

Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, thank you. I believe this speaks to what former Secretary Gates spoke to as the different bins where we approach the problem of decreasing potentially our budget. One of those is reducing redundancies and programs that just aren’t working for us. The example you point to of the Globalhawk and the BAMS is a very good one.

I do not have any specific instances in mind, but if confirmed, I can promise you that I will be doing my part to look for those because there may be some fertile ground there for us find greater efficiencies. Absolutely.

Senator Akaka. Thank you. I am glad you are looking forward to that.

General Odierno, as the Department continues to look for efficiencies and savings, I want to ensure that our troops have the necessary equipment and training to accomplish their missions.

General, while I think the Active Duty will continue to fare well, I have some concern about resources for the Guard and Reserves. What will you do to ensure that they receive the training and equipment needed so that they can be ready whenever they are called upon?

General Odierno. Thank you very much, Senator. As you are well aware, over the last 10 years, the National Guard and Reserve component have played such an integral role in all of our war efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, other places around the world. They are a part of what we do. As we get into budget decisions, they will become more of a part of what we have to do.

The operationalization of the National Guard and Reserve component in my mind has had a significant impact on our capability...
and the depth that we need to execute operations. Based on this, it is important that we keep them equipped.

Part of the things we have to look is in the future as we come out of Iraq and Afghanistan, we believe we still need to have an operational capability within the National Guard and the Reserve component. We have to identify what that will look like. We have to ensure we have access to the National Guard and Reserve component.

All of this will enable us then to ensure that they get the training and equipment necessary to meet the requirements that we will place on them as we move forward. This is critical to us in our success.

I promise you that, if confirmed, we will constantly assess, study, work very closely with the National Guard Bureau, with the Reserve component leaders in order to deal with these issues.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, General.

General Fraser, in April, General McNabb testified that the CRAF is a critical component to rapidly deployed forces and equipment with response times between 24 and 48 hours after the mission is assigned.

What are your thoughts on the future of this partnership with the civilian sector?

General F RASER. Thank you, Senator. I agree with General McNabb that the CRAF, as it is called, is a significant part of what we have in our capabilities that are available to us. If confirmed, I will work my hardest to make sure that it stays viable, and that means reaching out and working with our commercial partners, and doing everything I can in working with this committee and Congress along those lines to keep it viable.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.

General ODIERNO. Senator, first off, I will tell you that I believe this is the strength of our Services, and I will speak to the Army specifically, is its diversity. That is what gives us the strength. It gives us people from all backgrounds, all capabilities that enables us to be very successful.

In my mind, we become stronger the more diverse that we become. It is important that we have programs in place, both in our recruiting, in our ROTC programs, in our military academies, that then gets carried on as we continue to develop our leaders through our training programs.

Now, we have to monitor this. We have to make sure that everyone is being fairly treated. But most important, we have to make sure everybody is given the opportunities to do the jobs that are career enhancing. We have to track this regularly to ensure that happens.

I will be dedicated to that, if confirmed, to ensure that we understand the importance of diversity, include that in all of our develop-
mental programs both for our leaders and all the soldiers within the Army.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte is next.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for your outstanding service to our country. The three of you are incredible leaders, and we are so fortunate to have you, and particularly want to thank all of the soldiers and sailors, our service men and women who serve underneath you for what they do for our country to keep us safe.

Admiral Winnefeld, if confirmed to be the Vice Chairman of the JCS, you will have a very important role in advising the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and the President regarding a variety of DOD policies.

In your written testimony, you discussed al Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula, as well as al Shabbab, and you called al Qaeda a growing threat to our Homeland, and noted that al Shabbab is planning to conduct attacks against United States' interests in East Africa.

During the hearing on June 28, I had the opportunity to ask Vice Admiral McCraven if it would be helpful 10 years into the war on terror to have a designated long-term detention and interrogation facility for terrorists from groups like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al Shabbab. He said that he thought it would be very helpful. What is your opinion about that?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would share, I think, both Secretary Panetta's and Bill's opinion on that, that it would be helpful to have a long-term detention facility. For now, we are making due, as Bill pointed out. We recently apprehended somebody, got pretty good interrogation of that person, and I think we got the information we needed. But it would be much better for us to have a longer-term solution.

Senator AYOTTE. I believe, Admiral, you were referring to Orsami, who was held on a ship for nearly 2 months and was interrogated on the ship, and then has been brought for trial within the United States.

I remain concerned about the fact that we could have put an individual like that in Guantanamo versus having to rely on keeping individuals on ships because if we get to a situation where we need longer than a couple of months to interrogate someone, a ship does not become a viable option. Would you agree with me?

Admiral WINNEFELD. It is a lot less convenient to put them on a ship. It is a burden on the ship. But we did just fine with Orsami, and we may have to do that from time to time in the future. I do agree that would be a good idea to have a longer-term solution if we can find one. If I am confirmed, I will drill into that more obviously and work with the committee as required to see what the options are.

Senator AYOTTE. Can I ask you a question? There was an Associated Press report about a man named Ali Musa Daqduq, who is a senior Hezbollah operative, who has been held by the United States in Baghdad as a top threat to American troops. He has been ac-
cused of working with Iranian agents, basically with their Shi’ite militias, to fight Americans.

The article noted that this dangerous Hezbollah terrorist could be turned over to the Iraqi authorities within days, and within the article, if it is purported to be true, U.S. security officials are worrying that he could escape or even be freed from the Iraqis.

Admiral, are you familiar with this situation?

Admiral WINNEFELD. No, ma’am, I am not familiar with that specific situation.

Senator AYOTTE. I would ask you to follow up either here or in a classified setting an answer to what is the situation with this individual. It brings to mind to me, again, the concern with the lack of a long-term detention facility for individuals that remain dangerous to us.

I firmly believe that Guantanamo is a top rate facility having visited it and should be that facility. We end up making decisions, like turning over people to other countries that are not prepared to assure their security, and then they end up in the battle against us again. It is one of the reasons I would like a follow-up on this particular individual. But, again, why I think it is so important that we establish this. I think we have a facility. It works well.

I hope as you go forward in this role that you will be focused on this as you advise the President.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Senator, I will provide an answer for the record on that.

[The information referred to follows:]

Currently, we examine all options for persons captured outside of Afghanistan and Iraq on a case-by-case basis to determine an appropriate disposition. As part of that analysis, we consider long-term detention as one of the possible disposition options. If a decision is made to detain a future capture in long-term detention, we would necessarily address an appropriate detention location. In reference to your specific question about Ali Musa Daqduq, he currently remains in U.S. forces’ custody in Iraq, and we are looking at all options for his ultimate disposition.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much.

I also wanted to ask both General Odierno and you, Admiral, as well about the President’s recommendations in terms of withdrawal from Afghanistan, and his plan that he has brought forth.

I know a number of us have shared concerns. I am deeply concerned about one particular aspect of it, and that is the plan to fully remove the surge troops during September 2012 as opposed to at end of the fighting season. The fighting season, as I am sure both of you know, is generally from April through October. We are going to be withdrawing troops during July and August as we are in the middle of the fighting season. As far as I can see, there does not appear to be a strategic or operational reason to do it at that particular time.

As we go forward towards 2012, Admiral, if it becomes apparent to you that based on the recommendations of General Allen and General Mattis that it is necessary to change that recommendation, or to stop the Afghanistan troop withdrawal in terms of the timing given that we are going to be in the middle of the fighting season, would you be willing to recommend to the President and the chain of command a change in that deadline based on conditions on the ground?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, throughout the nomination process, it has been made very clear to me from the senior leadership of the Department and the Nation that they expect candor from me, and I intend to provide that candor. I do, in consultation certainly with the theater commander and with the combatant commander, if it becomes apparent that conditions on the ground warrant some sort of a shift, I would not hesitate to make a different recommendation.

Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, I appreciate your leadership in Iraq, and obviously the key leadership that you provided working with General Petraeus and a successful surge in Iraq.

I first wanted to get your view. Do you have an opinion whether there was any strategic, operational, or tactical advantages to the September withdrawal versus at the end of the fighting season?

General Odierno. I am not privy to conversations that went on and what General Petraeus' recommendations, General Mattis', and now General Allen's recommendation had been. I am not privy to that.

What I would say, though, is that this does remind me a bit of where we were in Iraq in 2008. Although Iraq and Afghanistan are different, the situations are somewhat the same.

In 2008, we still had some violence. Although the surge had started to bring violence, we still had violence in Iraq. But we did have to begin to withdraw the surge forces for no other reason that we could no longer continue to supply the surge force because we did not have the capability to back fill surge forces.

But what this does, I believe the most important thing in this plan is it provides flexibility now to General Allen to decide how he withdraws those forces, when he withdraws them. I think that is what is most important because that enables us to buy down risk. This is about risk. It is about how some people are concerned that we are assuming high risk at the end of the fighting season, August/September/October potentially as we withdraw. But at least the President and the Secretary of Defense and General Mattis have given him the flexibility of when he will bring these troops out.

I would just say a year is a long time, so I think we have to wait. I think we have to see how he is able to execute this. I think it is doable, but he will be the one who has to determine the risk and then provide us input as it moves forward.

Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, just a follow-up. Given your experience in Iraq, would you agree with me that General Allen's recommendations about the conditions on the ground are really what should determine the timing there?

General Odierno. I think, again, yes. I think how he withdraws with what he has been given, I think, will be based on conditions. If he believes at some time the conditions do not warrant it, it is incumbent on him to bring that forward through General Mattis.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I appreciate it.

My time is up, but if I could ask just one quick question, Mr. Chairman? Thank you.

General Fraser, I just wanted to follow up. Ranking Member McCain asked you about the strategic airlift capacity level. We just recently had a hearing before the Subcommittee on Seapower with
General McNabb. Do you fully agree with his recommendations that we can meet our capacity at approximately 300?

General Fraser. Thank you, Senator. I have taken a look at the MCRS–16, and discussed with General McNabb and others, and I do support it.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

Senator Udall.

Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your service and willingness to take on even additional responsibility.

If I might indulge in a bit of personal commentary, Admiral Winnefeld, it has been terrific to have you in Colorado heading NORTHCOM. You are going to be missed, but you are going to add an enormously capable voice, presence to the Joint Chiefs, and you will always have a home in Colorado. I hope you know that.

General Odierno, we have phenomenal presence with the Army at Fort Carson. We are really proud of our soldiers. We are looking forward to the arrival of the combat aviation brigade. I also wanted to point out that General Dave Perkins, who is deployed right now, and along with General Doherty, who has taken his place, and Colonel McLaughlin. The Army has been very well represented.

You and I talked about the Pinon Canyon situation, and I know that we are committed to working with you and the ranching community to see if we can put that issue to rest.

General Odierno, I do not know you as well, but I am reminded of an adage I have heard, at least quietly shared among the ranks of military leaders, and that is as follows: “Tactics are for amateurs. Strategy is rank amateurs. But logistics is for the true professional.” We are excited to have you on the verge of taking the helm of this important command.

General Odierno, if I could turn to the dwell time question. I understand in the current Army force generation cycle, we are just not going to be able to provide that optimal ratio of 2 years at home for every year deployed. My question is, we know that the quantity of time at home station will be limited. What steps might you be able to take as chief to improve the quality of that time at home?

General Odierno. Thank you, Senator.

First off, we are moving closer and closer to that goal. We are not there yet as you stated. As we stay engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, we will work towards trying to achieve that goal because we know that is one of the key factors of ensuring that we sustain our soldiers and their families as we continue to ask them to sacrifice.

There are other things that we can do. What we have to do first is we have to be more predictable to them while they are home, predictable where they will be stationed, predictable on what kind of training cycle they are in as they are preparing to redeploy in 2 years, so they can have more predictability with their families.

That is an area we have to focus. It is about having resiliency centers that allow them to go and discuss issues and their families to discuss issues as they work with the reintegration and the stresses of repeated deployments. It is things like this that we have
to continue to do that helps us to improve the quality of life of our soldiers and families, as well as continue to work towards increasing our dwell time home. Those are things we have to continue to focus on as we move forward, sir.

Senator Udall. I look forward to working with you in that area, and I know how important it is, and I know you know that.

Admiral Winnefeld, in your capacity as the NORTHCOM Commander, you have a unique understanding of the capabilities and the contributions of the Military's Reserve components. We all know since September 11, the Guard and the Reserve have played a vital role here at home and overseas.

As we begin to transition out of Iraq and Afghanistan, do you anticipate there will be a need to adjust Reserve component force structure or the missions they currently perform?

Admiral Winnefeld. I have not had a chance to really participate in the comprehensive review, Senator, that is going on right now that will consider that very question. I wouldn’t want to get out in front of that or pre-judge it. We are going to have to take a closer look at it, but I really do believe that we need to strike the right balance between maintaining the Guard as an Operational Reserve, as well as maintaining their capability to conduct the day-in and day-out work that they do so well inside the States.

There is an overlap there in terms of equipment and training, but there also is uniqueness there. We are going to need to strike the right balance as they come home.

Senator Udall. If I could, let me add a question for the record as you undertake that survey. The question is as follows, if the current budget constraints and the reduced number of deployed troops would cause DOD to either cut into the Reserve or additional missions in order to maintain Active-Duty Force structure and capabilities, how would you end up answering that question? I'll ask for the record.

Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir, I will take that for the record.

Senator Udall. That would be terrific.

[The information referred to follows:]

Force structure is not necessarily best viewed as a stark Active component versus Reserve component trade-off. To cut into the Reserve simply to maintain Active-Duty Force structure and capabilities would not serve our national security interests well.

Over the last 10 years, we have seen a tremendous interdependency develop between Active and Reserve Forces. The success of this transformation is not only a result of the tremendous investment made in training, equipping and deploying Reserve Forces, but also our strategic policy commitment to employ an Operational Reserve. Moving forward, it is crucial to capitalize on these investments and the “value proposition” presented by an operationally capable Reserve component.

As we face a resource-constrained fiscal environment, the Department must take a comprehensive approach that will likely involve a rebalancing of the Total Force. There are many capabilities residing in the Reserve component that can be provided in a more cost effective manner than in the Active component. Conversely, there are capabilities that require very short timelines, or have such a significant demand signal and require such a high degree of training and currency, that they are best suited to reside in the Active component. We will need to strike a balance that best addresses the strategic environment we will likely face, while minimizing cost.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently conducting a Front End Assessment to provide a comprehensive analysis of our Total Force mix as we complete our draw downs in Iraq and Afghanistan. I look forward to working with the committee and Congress to implement their recommendations.
Senator Udall. Let me turn to cyber. You and I talked about this the other day, and, again, your responsibilities at NORTHCOM have linked you to that very important and new concern we all have.

The Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative that the President initiated has identified cyber as one of the most serious economic and national security challenges that we face.

I know there is a limit to what we can discuss here, but can you discuss what you believe DOD's role should be in defending the United States and our vital assets against cyber attack? Then would you talk, if you think you can, about where a kinetic military response might be justified?

Admiral Winnefeld. Clearly, DOD has a role in cyber defense of the country. The first and easiest thing to talk about is defense of our own networks within the dot.mil domain.

We also have a role, I believe, in supporting the Department of Homeland Security in their role of helping defend the rest of government and the rest of the country. That is a complex relationship. I believe that former Secretary Gates and Secretary Napolitano struck a very good, solid agreement. General Alexander, my counterpart over at U.S. Cyber Command, is doing a very good job, I believe, of working with the Department of Homeland Security to construct how that support would work to include making sure that we have respect for civil liberties as we do that.

That is a growth industry, to be sure, that we need to pay very close attention to.

Regarding your question on offensive capability, it is very clear that an element of deterrence, one of the several elements of deterrence, is the ability to respond to an attack, and to make that attack so costly for an attacker that they are unwilling to conduct it. I believe that we have to consider the full range of potential responses to an attack, not only, by the way, military responses, but also the full range of diplomatic and using force as a last resort, as it were. But I would never want to rule anything out in responding to a serious cyber attack on this country offensively. It could be a cyber response or it could be a kinetic response, depending on the nature of the attack and the circumstances that surround it.

Senator Udall. I would like to acknowledge the tremendous work that General Cartwright has done in this area. I know you will build on what he has learned and what he has proposed. This committee had an opportunity to sit in secured settings and learn more and more about the threats and also the responses that we have available to us.

Before my time runs out, I want to turn to energy. I visited with all three of you about the opportunities and also the challenges we have in the energy space. Admiral Mullen, I think, put it quite well recently when he said, energy needs to be the first thing we think about before we deploy another soldier and before we build another ship or plane. He also said saving energy saves lives. I know you all three know that acutely.

General Fraser, would you care to comment on any thoughts you have in regards to how we can do a better job and enhance our national security, and perhaps also develop some technologies that will have great application in the civilian sector.
General Fraser. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it.

The Air Force is doing a lot in the area to certify our aviation assets to run on alternative fuels. We continue to move forward in a number of different platforms. In fact, just this year, at the Andrews air show, the F–16s that flew as a part of the Thunderbirds, we had an aircraft that was on alternative fuel. I think that we need to continue to move forward in that area.

Right now, we also need to see about making it more economical. It is very costly, and so I think as more get in line and we find out that there are opportunities there, there is a competition for it that will drive costs down, and it may be an opportunity to look forward into the future to using these blends and these mixes or biofuels.

I also feel that there are some technologies that we need to continue to explore with respect to our engines. Alternative engines, as we look to the future, are the things from the engineering and design perspective that we can get more efficient use out of our engines in the future? That ought to be something that is taken into consideration as we move forward to the future in everything that we do.

Energy is an integral part of our analysis, and I look forward as I move into this position, if confirmed, to continue to move forward, ensure that we are doing things in a most efficient and effective manner.

A couple of things that I have already been made aware of that we are doing is utilizing tools to maximize the assets that we have. There is a route planning tool that is used that has actually increased the efficiency along routes by upwards of 15 percent. There is an air optimization tool that has also been used to increase our ability by up to about 10 percent.

It is these types of things I look forward to delving into even greater if confirmed and moving into my next position. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator Udall. Thank you for that update. Again, I look forward to working with all of you on this important opportunity when it comes to saving energy and developing new energy technologies.

Thanks again for your service.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.

Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for your service. I am sure you will be confirmed, and congratulations on being nominated by the President to very important jobs at a critical time.

Admiral Winnefeld, whatever number of transport aircraft we have available as a Nation, do you agree with me that over the last decade we have been flying the wings off these things?

Admiral Winnefeld. Sir, did you mean that for General Fraser?

Senator Graham. Yes, General Fraser, I am sorry. I apologize.

General Fraser. Sir, we are indeed flying at a higher rate with respect to a large number of our platforms, whether it is tactical air or strategic air. Our assets have been deeply engaged in today's fight.

Senator Graham. As a matter of fact, the operational tempo is probably unheard of maybe since World War II. Is that correct?
General Fraser. Sir, it is a high ops tempo across all of our platforms.

Senator Graham. When we look at numbers, we all need to understand from the committee’s point of view, I believe, that we are really aging these airplanes pretty quickly because of the demands.

Admiral, as Vice Chairman, do you believe that the term “war on terror” is a correct term for the threats we are facing?

Admiral Winnefeld. That is a very good question. I think that term has passed out of vogue with a number of people, but I think we are still so much in a fight with al Qaeda and their related extremist groups that it sure feels like a war, yes, sir.

Senator Graham. That is a good response, I think. What do you tell the public? Is it close to being over? Is it just beginning? Are we in the middle? Or we don’t know?

Admiral Winnefeld. I think I would echo Secretary Panetta when he was asked a question about this, and he said we are close to being able to strategically defeat al Qaeda. To me, that means their message being bankrupt, a lack of financial support that enables them to conduct operations and the like, that ultimately causes them to unravel from their internal contradictions, much the same way the Soviet Union did.

But that said, al Qaeda is morphing. It is less of a centrally-controlled organization. There are more home grown terrorists out there that are ascribing to the ideology in some cases.

This is not yet over. It is not even close. We still have a fight on our hands in places like Yemen and Somalia, and even ensuring, with the cooperation of our law enforcement partners, that of course we manage this at home.

It is going to be a long struggle.

Senator Graham. What would you call the potential threat we face from a nuclear armed Iran? Is that part of the war on terror, or is that a different threat altogether?

Admiral Winnefeld. Unless Iran were to hand a nuclear weapon over to an extremist, then I would consider it a completely different animal.

Senator Graham. What do you think the odds are that if the Iranians developed a nuclear capability they would indeed hand it to an extremist group?

Admiral Winnefeld. I think the Iranians understand that if they handed it to an extremist group, it probably would not be very difficult for us attribute any use of that weapon to Iran. I think they know that they would suffer grave consequences if that occurred.

Senator Graham. Do you think they believe they would suffer grave consequences if they developed one at all?

Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that they are going to understand that they are going to feel the effects of all elements of national and international power applied to them as required if and when they continue this development.

Senator Graham. Do you believe that all the efforts of international power being applied is deterring the Iranians from obtaining a nuclear weapon?

Admiral Winnefeld. It remains to be seen, Senator. It is a very good question. It certainly, I believe, slowed them down, but there
is more pressure, I think, that could be and probably should be ap-
plied eventually.

Senator GRAHAM. In terms of the threats we face in the future, if
Iran acquired a nuclear capability, what kind of threat and what
would be the likely consequences of that event to our national secu-

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think it would be grave if they acquired
a nuclear weapon and the ability to deliver it.

Senator GRAHAM. Right.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Of course, we need to watch that very care-
fully and pace that so that we can——

Senator GRAHAM. That takes us to missile defense and to sup-
press the Iranian nuclear threat could require some pretty sophisti-
cated military capability. Do you agree with that?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. That the idea of attacking Iran with a single
strike and neutering their nuclear capability if the President chose
to do that is probably not going to happen. It would be a more sus-
tained effort if we went down that road?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would not want to rule anything out, Sen-
ator, at this point.

Senator GRAHAM. That is why F–35s and F–22s have become im-
portant, is that correct?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The F–35 and the F–22 certainly represent
a very important capability.

Senator GRAHAM. That is why air refueling capability becomes
important. That is why bases in the region become important.

The reason I ask these questions is to get to what kind of threats
the Nation faces. I would argue that the fight against al Qaeda has
been successful, but not nearly over. It is morphing, that the Paki-
stani border is more unstable than it has been in the past. That
when you look at the amount of money which we spend to defend
the Nation, you have to look at the threats. We have not even got-
ten to North Korea yet.

My question for all of you, is it fair to use gross domestic product
(GDP) spending on defense as a guide to what is sufficient? Is that
a good measuring device?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Senator, I think it is an indicator, a com-
parative indicator. But it is also very often comparing apples to or-
anges. If you look at what we spend as a percentage of GDP in
World War II, it does not even compare to what we are spending
now.

Senator GRAHAM. Right. Secretary Gates identified GDP as a
benchmark for defense spending. I associate myself with that.
When you look at World War II spending, you are right. We went
up to 42 percent at the height of the war of GDP. Korea was 8.23
to 13 percent; Vietnam was 7.65 to 10.8 percent. In 2010, we are
spending 5.78 percent of our GDP on defense.

If you believe it is a benchmark, would you agree that it is on
the low end of conflicts in recent memory?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would say factually it is on the low end
GDP-wise, yes, sir.
Senator GRAHAM. General, can the Army withstand 49,000 troop reductions and deal with some of the threats we have just talked about?

General ODIERNO. The 49,000 troop reduction depends on our commitments, and I think the assumption in that reduction is our commitments to Afghanistan will go away. Our commitments in Iraq will go away and there will be no new more commitments generated.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think it is logical for this country to assume in the future that we are not going to have to use the Army in some kind of role in the future operations in the war on terror?

General ODIERNO. As I said earlier, we have never been good at predicting the future. We must have an Army that is capable of responding to worldwide issues.

Senator GRAHAM. When we respond, we want to respond with overwhelming force. We are not looking for a fair fight here, right?

General ODIERNO. We are not looking for a fair fight, no, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. Now, you mentioned to Senator Ayotte’s questions that you believe that General Allen had flexibility in terms of withdrawal. Are you suggesting to the committee the President’s dictate that we will remove all surge forces out of Afghanistan by September 2012 is conditions based?

General ODIERNO. What I was suggesting is that he has flexibility within the timeline that was set for him by the President.

Senator GRAHAM. But my question is, it is not condition-based. As I understand the policy, all troops will be removed by the end of September.

General ODIERNO. What I was discussing was the flexibility he has within those dates of removing troops.

Senator GRAHAM. I guess he could bring 30,000 out on September 15 but that would be pretty hard to do.

General ODIERNO. He could.

Senator GRAHAM. I just want to thank you all. As the committee inquires into what is enough to defend America, we are going to need your counsel and advice. There is a budget problem we are all facing. Defense spending has to be on the table. But I do not want to America to lose sight, Mr. Chairman, of the threats we are facing.

This is not a time to seek a peace dividend because we are nowhere near peace. The way to avoid war is to be able to deter it. When you go into it, end it quickly, and we need capability as far as the eye can see.

Thank you all and God bless.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator Begich.

Senator BEGICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for your service and your willingness to serve. Thank all of you for most recently and some over the last few months having conversations about what is important to Alaska.

Let me, if I can, to Admiral Winnefeld. Again, thank you for moving to this level. As Senator Udall said, we will miss you in regards to your role in NORTHCOM. I know I owed you a call back from your call to me, but thank you for figuring out who is in
charge in the Arctic. We appreciate that more than you can imagine, per our conversation that we had.

On that issue, if I can walk through a concern, and we have talked about this before. In dealing with the Arctic, which is now becoming more and more apparent to almost all aspects, it does not matter if it is military, industry, environmentalists, you name it, the Arctic is becoming a pretty important piece of the puzzle for our country. Of course, for Alaska, it is a critical piece.

One of the pieces of this puzzle is the Law of the Sea that has been delayed or we are one of the few countries that have not signed on. One, I would be interested in your thoughts on that. Two, the concerns that we hear from people, and a very small amount of people, as we have talked about before, is it that somehow we will lose our sovereignty by signing on to the Law of the Sea.

First, can you respond to the importance of the Law of the Sea from your perspective? Then this whole issue of sovereignty and that we would be giving up our role? Admiral?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, I think the Law of the Sea Treaty is important to us, both from a strategic perspective, and also inside the military perspective. From the strategic perspective, specifically to the Arctic, it gives you a seat at the table when other nations are starting to step forward and assert their claims in the Arctic. We want to be there as part of the international community to participate in that process to make sure that that is adjudicated properly.

Senator BEGICH. Can I hold you there for a second? Could I just read to you, and it might have been over the last month that Russia is moving aggressively with military operations potentially in the Arctic. Did I read that correctly?

Admiral WINNEFELD. They have made a number of statements, for example, putting a couple of brigades up in the Arctic. It remains to be seen where they go, what they do, and how they are configured. I am withholding judgment on that a little bit. But it is a significant statement on their part.

Regarding the military piece of the Law of the Sea, there is nothing in the Law of the Sea that prevents us from exercising any of the standard operations that we need to be able to do—straights passages, freedom of navigation, and that sort of thing. If anything, it more formally codifies it and gives us a seat at the table as they might be modified in the future.

I fully support accession to the Law of the Sea Treaty.

Senator BEGICH. It does not, again, to the main question, limit or reduce our rights and sovereignty in the areas that we control?

Admiral WINNEFELD. As far as I can tell, and reading the treaty and consulting with our people, it does not. There are mechanisms that we have in place where if that were attempted, we would be able to avoid any kind of a limitation on our freedoms or sovereignty.

Senator BEGICH. The military supports the effort to get the Law of the Sea Treaty resolved.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I do not know of anybody in the Defense Department, including the Navy, that is not in favor of acceding to it.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much. I just wanted to make sure that is, again, on the record. I know we talked about it several months ago, and I just wanted to make sure.

The second is, if I can shift here to, I sit also on the Veterans’ Affairs Committee, and one of the big issues is transition from DOD, military operations, individuals, and then going into veterans’ programs, and that transition. I can only speak for the last 2 1/2, 3 years that I have been here, but I know there was concerns in the past that transition was not as smooth as it could have been. Can you give me some general comments of what you think, and how that is improving? The reason I ask, I come to the Armed Services Committee here, talk to the Active Duty members and hear pieces. Then I go to the Veterans’ Affairs Committee and hear pieces. Not all the time do they meet. But I am seeing some progress, at least in my 3 years here. But maybe you could respond to that and tell me what you think, and is there some areas of room for improvement in that arena?

Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, it is a very good question. It is something that I would need to dive into deeply, if confirmed.

I do know that there have been, as you point out correctly, problems in the past where we have not stitched together those two systems as we well we probably should have. I also know cursorily that the Department is determined to work with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to stitch that together the way it should be. I can assure you that if I am confirmed, I will look into that.

Senator Begich. I appreciate that. I know as we talked about what the future is in end strength, there will be less in the Active end and more in the veteran end. We want to make sure that transition works very smoothly.

Very parochial, but yet a more broad sweep, and that is how the Defense Department will work with nonprofit organizations, organizations that are important to family support. What I mean by that is I know in Alaska we have a program, Alaska Assistance Dogs, that are important for many of our veterans and wounded warriors. It is basically run by a nonprofit organization. I know sometimes the Defense Department is very rigid in their access or allowability of access from nonprofits.

One, do you see these organizations as important for the long term, especially with our wounded warriors? Two, can you make a commitment here that you will aggressively look at how we ensure these non-profit organizations really do integrate their services or provide these services that the military just cannot?

Admiral Winnefeld. Sir, I think that Chairman Mullen has done an exceptional job of outreach into the country through his conversations with the country and a number of other initiatives that he has had in place to reach out and leverage every capability that the Nation can muster to try to help our families and our wounded warriors.

I would be committed to continuing that. I think it involves a number of different bins, if you will, of awareness within the population and certainly businesses and schools in the country of what military families’ needs are. It includes employment. It includes education. It includes wellness. It includes what I believe are qual-
ity of services that we provide to our military individuals. I think that non-profits can have a key role to play in that.

I do not know the exact details, whether there are any particular limitations on non-profits being able to participate in that. But if confirmed, I will make it a matter of priority to continue to support Chairman Mullen's program in that regard.

Senator Begich. If you see areas that, just because of regulatory or old systems that we put in place through legislation, that limits their ability, even though it sounds like a good idea to include them, please let me know or let others know, because I think we want to engage the community because I think the community is very interested and want to help as much as possible.

Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I relish cutting through red tape like that. As long as I can do it legally and ethically, I will be all over it.

Senator Begich. On the legal end, if you see laws that need to be changed, that is our job, so please feel free to tell us. It may take longer than we want, but let us see what we can do.

Thank you very much. To General Odierno, let me ask you a couple of questions.

I know we had a great conversation regarding family support and the need to ensure—and there is no question in my mind after our conversation, your strong interest to have a strong Army, you need to have a strong family component to it.

One area we talked about a little bit was education and how and what we need to do. Can you give me your thoughts—and I know I talked to you about ensure that our DOD facilities are properly maintained, but I thought it was very interesting your conversation about the community part of it and how you can kind of see this balance. Could you respond a little bit?

General Odierno. As I have my three children here who all grew up in DOD schools as well as community schools, I think the important part about this is there are places where there is no other choice, but you have to have DOD schools. I think in those places, it is important that we support the infrastructure in order so our children can continue to be educated.

But there are many programs around in many places, and I will use Killeen, TX, as an example, out of Fort Hood where there is a partnership where the Killeen school district is taking over the infrastructure on post in order to have our kids get a good education. I think these partnerships are important.

My personal opinion is inside the United States, we should really continue to build these partnerships, and that should be the way ahead for our education. I think it brings more resources. It brings more capability to our children.

If you could just indulge me, if I could just comment on the question you just asked. It is absolutely critical that we have the opportunity for non-profit organizations to supplement our support to our soldiers and families, wounded warriors. There are so many of them out there who do so many great things for our soldiers. It is important. We have to have that, and it is so important. Sometimes it is difficult for us to reach out them, and I think we have to look at ways at how we can do this legally and ethically in such a way where they can provide more support to our soldiers, sailors, air-
men, marines, and their families in order to provide them what they need as we go through this time of war. I think that is a very important effort, and I would like to work with you and the committee on that, if confirmed.

Senator Begich. Thank you very much. Thanks for those comments. I will just throw an idea, and then my time is up here, and that is, it just dawned on me as you were talking. I wonder if the military when the school board associations meet on an annual basis, they meet, I think, a couple of times a year, all the school boards from across the country. If the military actually participates in those meetings.

General Odierno. I would tell you in a couple of ways. First, in the community I was involved with, there are four or five communities. Frankly, I met once a month with all the superintendents.

Senator Begich. Excellent.

General Odierno. They would come in together, and we had a program where I met personally with them. Those are the kind of relationships I think we have to have. But I think in many places that is in fact the case, but we have to continue at things like that.

Senator Begich. Thank you very much. General Fraser, we had a great conversation. I have run out of time. But from our conversation, I have faith that you are not going to leave the troops hanging out there without the right logistic support they will need to do their job. I just want to put that on the record.

I know we talked about a little bit about a plan B. As you get confirmed, you will be engaging in that in an aggressive level. I want to at least reassure people who might be watching us that there may be slight gaps, but it is not about a total gap. The goal is to have a full plan to make sure all logistics are dealt with wherever our troops are. Afghanistan being one of the places obviously now. You do not have to respond. I just want to put that out there.

Thank you very much to all three of you, and to the families that are behind you, thank you very much.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich. Senator, if you will look into the issue that you raised about the National Association of School Boards and whether or not there is a connection at those national meetings, I would be happy to join with you. Perhaps the committee could even, if it is not already the case, suggest to them that it be the case.

Senator Begich. I think that is a great idea, Mr. Chairman. Why it dawned on me when I was with U.S. Conference of Mayors, they never had one, and we created one because it was critical that mayors have that connection, so it just dawned on me. I will do that.

Chairman Levin. It was a good idea.

Senator Begich. We will do it.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Sessions.

Senator Sessions. Thank you. Thank all of you, and congratulations on your appointments and nominations. I expect to support you and continue to support you after confirmation, which I am certain will happen.
I truly believe we have the greatest military the world has ever known. It is large. It is mobile. It is courageous. It is well led by the finest operations corps we have ever had, and I believe the finest NCO corps. It is just a remarkable thing.

As the ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee, things are going to be tighter in the years to come. I would just say that we have to tighten our belts, but do it in a way that does not damage this fabulous morale and spirit and capability that the military has accomplished. I just would say that in opening comments.

General Odierno, Senator Ayotte, a former prosecutor like I have been, asked you about prisoners, prosecutions, and jails. Those are fundamental things. I truly think we are going to have to examine how we are detaining dangerous individuals.

I am aware that there are problems in Afghanistan now with some very dangerous individuals being arrested and being detained and then being released rather rapidly. Are you aware of that? Is it a concern? If you need assistance in bringing that to the right level, let us know.

General ODIERNO. I am not aware of any of the specifics in Afghanistan, specific cases, but I would make a general comment on this.

What we have learned over the last 5 to 6 years specifically is that the ability to detain those dangerous individuals for long-term detention is critical to us in getting the information we need to prosecute our campaigns. It was the case in Iraq. It was the case in Afghanistan, and we found that to be important.

I think it is important that we take a look at this. I clearly agree with Admiral McCraven's assessment of this, that it is important that we take a hard look at this because it does have a significant impact in us getting the information necessary to continue to prosecute our operations around the world against terrorism.

Senator SESSIONS. I just agree. I think policies in Iraq changed. I think we did a better job of identifying using normal police techniques, fingerprints, biometrics, and bomb characteristics to identify people. They have to be detained. It is very demoralizing and dangerous to release someone who is going to go back to the war and kill people. We would not do that in the United States.

My observation is that undeveloped nations are consistently deficient in being able to detain people in prison for long periods of time. I suppose that is one reason they had a death penalty so much. They did not have the ability. My observation is that people tend to get out. They either pretend to talk. They either bribe their way out. They either escape, or they are released because there is not room for them.

I do think that you should give attention to that, and if we need more resources, I hope you would call on us.

With regard to our forces in Europe, the original plan was to bring back two Army brigades, General Odierno, from Europe. I understand those plans are now on hold. According to Stars and Stripes, in April, the Army will return only 1 brigade, and that only represents 5,000 soldiers out of 80,000 U.S. troops in Europe.

I think it is time for us to have a serious heart-to-heart with the Europeans on their defense expenditures. In Germany, I understand they are about 1.2 percent of GDP. Other countries are at
that level in Europe. Very few are meeting their goal of 2 percent of GDP on defense as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization obligation, while we are at about 4 to 5 percent of GDP on defense.

Are you aware of this discussion? Maybe Admiral Winnefeld would be, and I just have to say it means a lot economically to Germany or other places where we have people spending money in their economy. It means a lot to our Nation when our people are at home spending money in our economy, number one. Number two, if they do not need to be there for serious strategic reasons, I think we should look to bring more home and reduce our presence.

General ODIERNO. Senator, my understanding of that decision is similar to yours, the most recent decision.

I would just say as we go through these budget reductions potentially, we have to review all of this again. In my opinion, it will have to be reassessed. Where this will all be part of where we put Army force structure, where we most need it depending on what is left based on the budget realities that we are facing over the next 10 years. That will have to be part of the discussion.

I am assuming we will have to continue to look at this, continue to look at strategically what is best in order for us to execute our policies. We certainly will continuously review this as we move forward over the next several years.

Senator SESSIONS. I was in a security conference some months ago, and the British told us they were reducing their defense spending 8 percent. Frankly, they are not spending enough now. I responded, I guess you feel okay because the United States will be there to take care of you. But we need to have this kind of conversation with our allies. They have to participate more.

I see Senator Lieberman relooking at the budget numbers. A lot of people have complained that our deficit is a result of our military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking at the numbers, that is not really so. We have spent a tremendous amount of money on those two efforts, about $1.5 trillion, maybe a little less. The deficit has increased about $15 trillion during this time.

At this point, we are projected, this year we are spending about $150 billion on the military effort, $158 maybe, this fiscal year, going to $118 next fiscal year. But our deficit this year is $1,500 billion. Those numbers would come down to $118 billion and continue to drop under the plan that we have seen and I am hopeful that we can adhere to.

But I just want to say that while every dollar has to be managed carefully, the reason we have a severe financial crisis in America is not because of our military effort. It may be a part of it, but it is about 10 percent. We will have to look at it.

You do represent about half of the non-defense discretionary spending. In the last 2 years, non-defense discretionary spending has increased 24 percent. Military spending is about 2 or so percent, maybe 3. It is projected to stay at 2 or 2½ percent the next decade, and I do not think it will. I do not think we can have that big an increase, frankly. But we have had much, much larger surges in non-defense spending than defense spending, and certainly in recent years.
How we work our way through that, I do not know, but I call on all of you to realize that we are at a level of spending, borrowing 40 cents of every dollar we spend, that cannot be sustained. You represent about half of the discretionary spending budget of the United States, separate from Social Security and Medicare. You will have to be part of the belt tightening, there is just no doubt about it.

General Odierno, you have had such tremendous on-the-ground experience in Iraq and in that area. I know you are fully aware of the requirement to give your honest and best judgment to Congress when you are called upon to do so. You have to respect the Commander in Chief and the civilian defense officials. But you have led those men and women in combat. Many of them have lost limbs. Many of them have lost their lives. I am sure you feel an obligation to speak for them to avoid unwise decisions that could inadvertently give away the things they fought and too many of them have died for.

Will you share with us that first and foremost that you will give us your best military advice regardless of the consequences, that you will just give us your best leadership, because I think uniquely as the chief of staff have the kind of experience that could help us make the difficult decisions that we will be facing.

General ODIERNO. Senator, I absolutely always give my honest and frank opinion, especially when it comes to taking care of our soldiers and their families, but on all issues when asked. I will continue to do that.

Many of the issues that we deal with are not black and white; they are very gray, as you are well aware. There are many second, third order effects that impact decisions as well as opinions on issues. It is my job, I believe, from a military perspective to always identify the issues, identify what the risks are, and give my opinion how to mitigate those risks and be successful in accomplishing our missions. I will always do that when I am in front of the committee or any other forum that I participate in within the government.

Senator SESSIONS. I know our soldiers and their families and Americans are happy that we can draw down our force presence as rapidly as possible. But what impact would it have, in your opinion, if we drew down too fast and ended up undermining the success that we have gained, and maybe suffering a strategic loss that was not necessary as a result? What impact would that have on our morale of our men and women, as well as strategically?

General ODIERNO. Senator, my assessment is, it obviously would have a huge impact. But I would just say I do not think there is anybody who believes that is the case.

Senator SESSIONS. I understand. My question to you is, but if we did so, if events occurred unlike something you expect this moment, and we unwisely did not handle the situation based on a goal just to reduce troop levels regardless, it would have an adverse impact on the men and women who put their lives at risk for us, would it not?

General ODIERNO. I would just say obviously that for many who have participated in the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places around the world, obviously they believe in what they are
doing. That’s why they continue to reenlist. That is why they continue to go back on multiple, multiple deployments.

It is our duty as leaders to ensure that we do everything we can to ensure their success and safety. We will never stop from doing that. If that becomes the case, it would obviously have an impact on morale as we move forward.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to begin by thanking each of you for your extraordinary service to our Nation, and thank your families as well as others have done who share in the sacrifice that you have made. I know some of them are here today, and I would just like to assure them that we share in the gratitude of the country for their as well as your service.

General Odierno, you have talked very eloquently and powerfully about your caring and attention to all of our warriors, our wounded warriors and those who are serving now in theater. Most especially to the need for better care when it comes to traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress. I understand from your testimony and our conversations that you will continue to seek to upgrade and improve the kind of care that the military provides to those warriors. Am I correct with that assumption?

General Odierno. Absolutely, Senator.

Senator Blumenthal. So far as particularly the problem of suicide, which you again have spoken to very eloquently and powerfully in your written testimony, and I was very impressed by it. Would you have plans to try to upgrade the kind of preventive care that is provided to our warriors?

General Odierno. The work that General Pete Chiarelli has done, the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, has been tremendous, but it is not done yet. There is much more that we have to do. We have identified factors, but now we have to figure out how we mitigate those factors that we believe are responsible for suicides and all the components of the Army and the Armed Forces themselves. We still have a lot of work to do, and we are dedicated to doing all we can to reduce this terrible risk that we have today.

Senator Blumenthal. Do you have any thoughts that you could share with us about potentially the causes of those increased rates of suicide, the stress factors and so forth?

General Odierno. Senator, it is a combination of things. It has to do with dwell time and the number of deployments. It has to do with family stress. It has to do with uncertainty. It has to do with many other issues that we deal with. It has to do with physical injuries that affect individuals mentally. It has to do with sometimes the home environment that they are involved with. It is all of these things.

The main thing is we have to understand what those risk factors are, how many are applying, and when does it become critical. It is about us training our young leaders to understand the signs, to understand the factors. The Army specifically, I will talk to, has done a lot of work in helping our leaders to understand these issues.

But then it is about the individuals themselves feel comfortable in identifying that they do have their own issues, and they do come
forward, and they do ask for assistance and help. That is so important in this part of this process is that they feel comfortable doing that. We have to create an environment that allows them to do this, and that is the key that we want to continue to move forward in and accomplish, sir.

Senator Blumenthal. I do not mean to put you on the spot here, but part of the popular view of making a frank and candid self-reporting of problems more effective and more frequent, and making it more acceptable many people have debated might involve the condolence letters that are sent by the President. I wonder if you could share with the committee your view as to whether those letters should be provided more broadly, more frequently, to the families of individuals who might be affected?

General Odierno. I will not comment specifically on the President, but I will comment that as a commander in Iraq at the division, corps, and theater level, I sent letters to all to include those who committed suicide because they were such an integral part of our force. They are a part of our family, our Army family, and they are our comrades. Although they might have struggled with the situation they were in, we still owe them the utmost respect and honor for their service.

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. You also have commented in your written testimony, and again, in other forums about the need for better transition for our wounded warriors to the VA. Maybe you could expand on that point.

General Odierno. First off, the Army has done some good work, and they have 70 teams out around the country, specifically located with VA centers. They are helping us to do a better transition as they transition out of the Army into the Veterans Affairs.

From anecdotal discussions that I have actually had recently with several wounded warriors who are getting ready to transition, one of the things we have to continue to work is the discussion between treatment of a military doctor to a Veterans Affairs doctor, because one of the things that bothers them and sometimes becomes traumatic is that they use different treatment regimens, and it makes them feel uncomfortable. We have to work this piece.

I think we have the administration piece taken care of. We now have to look at the medical transition itself as they transition from military medical care to Veterans Affairs medical care.

Senator Blumenthal. I thank you and commend you and welcome your attention to this problem. I know it comes from a genuine caring, and I think that is extraordinarily impressive. Any way that I can be helpful or I am sure members of the committee, we will be there.

General Fraser, I wanted to follow up, if I could, on a couple of the questions that Senator Udall mentioned, and some of the comments in your testimony about cyber security, and your comment in your testimony that you move lots of information. I think the American public does not appreciate how much information is part of what you transport, so to speak.

I wonder if you could share with the committee your view as to whether more does need to be done of an offensive or deterrent nature to make invasions or intrusions more costly, as Admiral
Winnefeld commented, for any enemy that has an intention to do so.

General Fraser. Thank you, Senator. The cyber domain and protection of our data is a high focus area, certainly of mine in my current position, but as I look forward and moving possibly, if confirmed, into TRANSCOM’s realm in which they deal not only in the .mil, but also the .com domain. The reason I mention that is because there is a seam there, and there has to be a partnership to ensure that the right data is getting to the right place with the information at the right time. Protection of that data is something that I will certainly be focused on, if confirmed, and move to TRANSCOM.

I think behind the defense and the .mil domain and the active defense that we have, that we are doing a lot. What I would be doing is then going out and engaging our commercial partners to ensure that they are protecting their data as much as possible. That is going to have to be a collaborative effort that we will have to work together to ensure that we are able still to accomplish the mission. Cyber will be very high, if I move into this position, to ensure the protection of that data.

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. My time has expired, but I would just like to suggest in closing that at some point these attacks obviously have to be viewed as an act of war on this country, whether it is on .mil or .com, if the attacks on the .com area so impact our infrastructure, our utilities, our banking system that they in effect constitute an act of hostility toward this country. I welcome your thinking about that topic, as you have indicated you are doing, and look forward to working with you.

I am sure you will be confirmed. You certainly have earned it, and the country deserves and will need your service. I want to thank you in advance. Thank you very much.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I am really sorry I could not get here earlier this morning, but I am glad I could get here while we are still in session to welcome the three nominees, to thank you for your extraordinary service to our country, and to say that I think President Obama could not have made better selections.

I have known the three of you in your previous positions, particularly in the case of General Odierno and Iraq, and Admiral Winnefeld at NORTHCOM. I know you have done really, not just good work, but great work, really transformational work, and I appreciate it. We are lucky to have you in our service.

In the case of General Odierno, getting here while you are in still in session gives me the opportunity to welcome his family, at least one of whom had the wisdom to marry a woman from Connecticut and to become my constituent. He also is living out my childhood fantasy of working for the greatest sports franchise in the history of American sports, that is the New York Yankees. [Laughter.]

With Senator Blumenthal and me here, I think we have a majority on the committee to support that conclusion. [Laughter.]

Senator Blumenthal. I would second that observation. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. The quality of our dismay outweighs the quantity of your support. [Laughter.]

Senator Lieberman. Okay, enough of that.

I know that many of my colleagues earlier have talked about the impact of budget cuts on the military. This is a real serious challenge.

We are the Armed Services Committee, so I suppose we understandably feel a special protectiveness of the military budget, but we should. To me, it is, after all is said and done, the first responsibility of our National Government, which is to protect our security. If we do not have security, the American people do not have anything else that matters. We do not have our freedom, and nor do we have the economic opportunity that has been part of what it has meant to be an American.

Everybody has to give in this crisis. As Admiral Mullen said a while ago, our national debt has become a national security problem, and, therefore, we have to work together to cut it down. But we have to be really careful about the impact of these cuts on our military.

We all have to understand that the classic members’ district advocacy has to be tempered by the national interests of getting our government back into fiscal balance. But beyond that, I think, and this is what I want to focus on in my questions, how we treat the military personnel, the men and women in uniform, and the numbers we have, are critically important, and are beyond parochial district level or State level concerns. These are what I want to focus on.

A lot of us on this committee, including myself, spent a fair amount of time in recent years trying to make sure that the two Services that have been most stressed, under most demand in Iraq and Afghanistan, namely the Army and the Marine Corps, had end strength increase in recent years, and fortunately that happened.

Now, the Army has been directed to carry out a reduction from the 570,000 essentially that we reached in Active Army numbers down to 520,000 or 521,000 over the next 5 years. I know the Army, General Odierno, has said they will do that. I think we have to be really careful about going beyond that.

But you said something, sir, in your answers to the questions that the committee asked, written answers, that when I read, I was so glad to see you say it, and I agree 100 percent. Here is the quote: “End strength reductions should not be automatic. They are conditions based and will require periodic assessment.” We are not operating in a static universe. Things are changing all the time with regard to our national security.

I wanted to ask you, General, if you would discuss what are some of the conditions that as Chief of Staff of the Army you will ask be weighed before these end strength reductions are carried out?

General Odierno. Thank you, Senator.

As I look at this, I believe that the reduction down to 520,000 has been based on the temporary end strength increase of 22,000, which was put into place to account for frankly many of the wounded warriors and other non-availables that we have had that has taken away from meeting our requirements, of filling our units.
The other 27,000 is based on the fact that the assumption that we will continue to come out of Afghanistan on time by 2014. Because of that, we will be able to maintain a dwell time deployment ratio that is something that we can sustain over a long period of time.

If those conditions change, if we decide to stay in Afghanistan longer or if another contingency comes up that requires deployment of Army units, then that would be something that could impact that force reduction, because what it could then do is significantly again increase and go after the dwell time, and put even more pressure on the Army itself.

Those are the kind of things that we have to understand, and those are the kind of things that we have to constantly reassess based on reality and what is going on around the world.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. I appreciate that answer. Just one follow-up on it.

Am I right that the 22,000 number of non-deployables, including wounded warriors, has not gone down?

General ODIerno. In fact, it continues to go up.

Senator LIEBERMAN. It goes up. That also puts stress on you as you try to go down.

General ODIerno. It does.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. I think we have to follow that carefully, and I hope there may be a way, and I will work with the chairman on this, to see if in the defense authorization bill when it comes to the floor, we can state some of these conditions, because just as we say, our drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan have been conditions based. It seems to me it is fair to say that the drawdown of our end strength, how many people we have in uniform, ought to be conditions based as well.

I wanted to ask about Iran. I do not believe this has been asked before. General Odierno, because we have talked about this when you were in Iraq, Army personnel and others in Iraq at different times over the last years have come out and specifically said, publicly, I am not revealing anything classified, we know that Iran has been training and equipping Shia extremists who have then gone back into Iraq and are responsible really for the murders, for the killing of hundreds of American soldiers.

I guess people could argue about whether it is hundreds. I believe it is, but it is certainly some, and the wounding of a lot of others, and the killing of thousands of other Iraqi soldiers and civilians.

I was really encouraged by that. I know a lot was going on. In a sense, you would say that if a far nation is training people to come in and kill our soldiers, classically it is a causus belli. It is cause for war. But I understand there was a lot going on.

I was very encouraged about a week ago, both Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen made statements. Admiral Mullen said, “Iran is very directly supporting extremist Shia groups which are killing our troops.” Secretary Panetta said, “We are very concerned about Iran and the weapons they are providing to extremist in Iraq.”

We cannot simply stand back and allow this to continue to happen. This is not something we are going to walk away from. It is something we are going to take on head-on.
Admiral Winnefeld, as you begin a new chapter in your career as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I wanted to ask you to comment on, do you agree with Secretary Panetta and Admiral Mullen about this behavior by Iran?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, I absolutely agree with it. I would not want to take away any options or anything like that, but I would say that they are testing our patience to be sure. We always would use force as a last resort. There are plenty of instruments of national power that can be applied. But it is a very serious problem, and I fully support what Secretary Panetta and Chairman Mullen said about it.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I thank you for your statement. I do not have to say to any of you because you have been on the battlefield, and you know how important it is. But we have now escalated our identification of what the Iranians are doing. I think if they do not stop, our credibility with them and a lot of others in the region, if not the world, is going to go down if we do not do something about it. I appreciate your statement, and I am encouraged by the others. None of us want to have more conflict, but we are not asking for it by our behavior. In this case, they clearly are.

Anyway, I thank the three of you. I look forward to working with you. I would say that, if I may paraphrase an old political slogan. The great thing to say is that not only are the three of you extraordinary, but you are as extraordinary as the people you are leading. In other words, this is a bottom up, top rate, high quality military we have. To me, it is the one institution in our country that I always say look at it when people tell me that America's best days are behind us. I wish I could say that as you look at the U.S. Congress. I cannot quite say that at this moment, but they can look at the military. I thank you for that.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman. I share your thoughts and comments very deeply.

Just a couple of quick questions. One, General Odierno, about Iraq. You have indicated you would support retaining some U.S. forces in Iraq beyond the December 31 deadline if there is a request. How much longer does Iraq have to make a request for us to consider?

General ODIERNO. Every day it makes it more difficult because it is not only us. I know General Austin has built a lot of flexibility in his plan for the final withdraw of our troops, but he has to do some planning.

But, more importantly, there has to be some work done on some sort of a status of forces agreement between our two countries. It has to be done soon because it could take a little bit of time to get that. I cannot give you a specific date, Mr. Chairman, but I would say it has to be the sooner for us in order to make this appropriate transition.

Chairman LEVIN. You said something before, which I think you did not exactly mean, but let me probe you on it. You said it is important we provide Iraq with the support they think is necessary. I assume it would be a joint decision, not only they think is necessary, but that we are willing to provide.
General ODIERNO. Yes. I think we have done a joint assessment where we identified gaps in their capabilities, and that has been done jointly and driven by us.

Chairman LEVIN. So, it is not only what they think.

General ODIERNO. It is not just what they think. It is a joint assessment.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, General, relative to the importance of keeping the Guard equipped, you indicated very strong feelings about the importance of doing that because there are requirements we place on them, in your words, among other things.

We have in the Army, the main battle tank, the M1–Abrams, a tank which is going to remain in the inventory. As it currently stands, it is going to end production of upgraded M–1A2 version vehicles in 2013. The Active Army now has the M–1A2 version of the tank, and most of the Guard has the M–1A1 version. Stopping that production will mean stopping of the equipping of the Guard with the M–1A2.

Here is the issue. The Army is going to begin the next Abrams upgrade modernization effort in 2016, and they are going to end the production of the upgraded M–1A2 in 2013 as it now stands. There is going to be a 3-year gap there between production of the upgraded M–1A2 in the next upgrade program. But we know there is going to be an upgrade program. That is a given as I understand it.

The Army has initiated a comprehensive cost benefit and risk analysis of the impact of that gap in production on our armored vehicle production facility, which is in Ohio, and the supporting industrial base. The final results of the analysis are expected at the end of the year. We are not going to have the results of the analysis until the end of the year.

In considering the costs of closing and restarting the production line, which we know is going to be restarted, should we not consider the increased capability in the National Guard tank units which would result from continuing this production during this gap?

General ODIERNO. Certainly, Senator, we will take a look at it.

The problem we have is we will have several other factors maybe that could impact on this. It has to do with budget reductions and force structure reductions and the mix that we decide we need in the force. It could be that we decide that potentially the number of heavy units reduce, and we are able to push more M–2A2s to the Guard out of the Active component. That could be one solution. Part of this problem is waiting to see what we are going to have to do with our force mix and force structure as we think about this problem.

But I understand the issue, Senator. We will look at it very carefully, and we will work with you on this issue.

Chairman LEVIN. All right, because there is a question as to whether or not it pays us to terminate the cost to restart and whether those costs are not better.

General ODIERNO. I am not completely familiar with all the details of that, but I will certainly get back to you, Senator.

[The information referred to follows:]
The M1A1 SA remains one of the best tanks in the world, providing overmatch against known threats and digital command interoperability within the Heavy Brigade Combat Team formation. The Army does not plan to immediately replace this very capable and relatively young portion of the Abrams fleet. The Army National Guard began receiving the M1A1 SA tank in August 2008 and will complete fielding in June 2014.

The Army has a young Abrams fleet. By 2013, when the Army fully meets the Abrams tank requirement for the Heavy Brigade Combat Team, the average Abrams fleet age will only be 2- to 3-years-old. Because of this, the Army will not need to begin modernizing through recapitalization of the Abrams tank fleet until approximately 2016. Our analysis indicates that total costs would not exceed $822 million for a 3- to 4-year shutdown and restart of Abrams tank production. These costs include the impact on the supplier base; government-furnished materiel; storage, preservation, manpower and equipment; re-qualifying vendors; a Production Verification Test and the impact to Anniston Army Depot. In comparison, maintaining a production rate of 70 tanks per year during fiscal years 2012-2016 will cost approximately $2.67 billion.

Analysis of the most cost-effective approaches to sustain the required combat vehicle industrial base capabilities during the upcoming production gaps is ongoing. This analysis is expected to be complete by December 2011, and the results will help shape and begin to right-size the industrial base in an effort to maximize more cost-efficient capabilities within the industrial base.

Given that the Army can save approximately $1.85 billion by shutting down and restarting production, the Army must stop Abrams tank production with the last M1A2 System Enhancement Program v2 tank delivery in June 2013.

I would be happy to have my staff provide an update to your office once this analysis is complete in order to provide you with the Army’s plan for the Abrams tank and the industrial base.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

This is for Admiral Winnefeld. Do you agree that missile defense systems should be operationally effective and cost effective and should be tested in an operationally realistic manner before deployment?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir, I do. We are also in a simultaneous training test and development phase.

Chairman LEVIN. Finally for the admiral, you have experienced as the combatant commander responsible for the GMD system that currently provides protection of the Homeland against the threat of a limited missile attack from nations like North Korea and Iran. You also have experience working in a cooperative manner with Russian military officials.

If we could work out something in a cooperative manner with Russia on missile defense, that would enhance our security against common missile threats from Iran. Would you agree?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir, absolutely.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Lieberman?

Senator LIEBERMAN. Nothing more for me, thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Gentleman, we are all in your debt, and the Nation is in your debt. We are in debt to your families. We thank you and them profusely. We will do this confirmation just as speedily as we can, given the U.S. Senate. You never know for sure, but I think all of us are pretty darn confident that it will happen very quickly.

Thank you. We will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]
QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. Previously you have answered the committee's policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in connection with your nomination to be Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM).

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the committee at your most recent confirmation hearing?

Answer. No. I have served in various joint capacities throughout my naval career and witnessed first-hand the tremendous advancements this landmark legislation has created, not only among our Nation's military and civilian leadership, but as a whole within the joint services and interagency environment. As such, I do not see a need to change the provisions of this legislation.

Question. In your previous response to a question concerning whether you saw a need for modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment, you indicated that you would "take a hard look at ways NORTHCOM does business to determine if changes in the legislation are warranted."

In light of your experience as Commander of NORTHCOM do you see any need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. I do not believe changes to Goldwater-Nichols are necessary at this time. However, if confirmed, I will remain alert to opportunities or shortcomings that might indicate that changes to the legislation are warranted.

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in section 154 of title 10, U.S.C., and in regulations of the Department of Defense (DOD) pertaining to functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. None at this time.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform the duties of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. It has been my honor to serve for 33 years in a diverse set of positions that I believe have prepared me to serve as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have experience on the Joint Staff and Navy staff; served as a joint, combined, and combatant commander; and have worked closely with Congress on a variety of issues. My technical background should be useful in my role, if confirmed, as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). As the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, I gained insight into the conduct of joint, combined, and international operations. In my current position as Commander of NORTHCOM and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), I command forces in the execution of Homeland defense and civil support operations. In this position, I have seen first-hand the importance of the Total Force in defending our Nation's interests at home and abroad.

Question. Is there anything that you need to do to better prepare yourself to perform the duties of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. Although there are always opportunities for additional learning in advance of assuming a new position, I feel well-prepared to serve as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him and other such duties as may be assigned by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as the Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or until the absence or disability ceases. These duties would include providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense. The Vice Chairman may also provide the Secretary of Defense advice upon the Secretary's request in his capacity as a military adviser.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary
is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary.

_Question._ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

_Ans._ The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as assigned by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of the Chairman, or during the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I look forward to a close working relationship with the Chairman.

_Question._ The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).

_Ans._ Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. With particular regard to the USD(AT&L), the Vice Chairman serves on many deliberative panels focused on resource decisions, including the Deputies Advisory Working Group as its Vice Chair and as Chairman of the JROC. If confirmed, I look forward to working very closely with the USD(AT&L) on continuing improvements to the requirements process and providing senior-level focus on key acquisition programs.

_Question._ The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).

_Ans._ With regard to the duties of the Vice Chairman as they relate to the USD(P), the Vice Chairman co-chairs the Policy and Strategy Committee, serves as a member of the Counter-proliferation Council, represents military interest in Interagency Affairs, and provides oversight and direction on behalf of the Chairman in areas such as use allocation and use of military forces. The Vice Chairman and USD(P) serve together on the Deputies Committee. If confirmed, I plan to have frequent interaction with the USD(P).

_Question._ The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)).

_Ans._ I recognize the importance of the Vice Chairman working closely with the USD(C) in appropriately managing and providing oversight of the budgetary and fiscal processes of the Joint Staff required to achieve the budgetary goals prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

_Question._ The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).

_Ans._ Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation as a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and other senior officials of the DOD on cost assessment and program evaluation. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Under Secretary under the auspices of the Director's resourcing and requirements functions, as well as benefiting from the extensive and independent analysis provided by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office towards making informed resourcing decisions.

_Question._ The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

_Ans._ With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks and Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense under the auspices of the Vice Chairman's resourcing and requirements functions, as well as benefiting from the extensive and independent analysis provided by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office towards making informed resourcing decisions.

_Question._ The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

_Ans._ Title 10, U.S.C., section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces assigned to unified and specified commands.

The Chairman, or Vice Chairman when directed or when acting as the Chairman, advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations
and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the requirements of the combatant commanders. The Vice Chairman has numerous interactions with the Service Secretaries in the various management forums within the Department. Finally, in his role as the Chairman of the JROC, the Vice Chairman has considerable interaction with the Service Secretaries’ acquisition staffs. If confirmed, I look forward to a close and productive working relationship with the Service Secretaries and their staffs.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

Answer. The Service Chiefs serve two significant roles. First, they are responsible for the organization, manning, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no combatant commander can be ensured of the readiness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the President and Secretary of Defense. Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they are advisors to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. The Service vice chiefs play a key role on the JROC, chaired by the Vice Chairman. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service chiefs and their vice chiefs to fulfill the combatant commanders’ warfighting and operational requirements and on other relevant policy matters.

Question. The Combatant Commanders.

Answer. The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. The Chairman provides a vital link between the combatant commanders and other elements of DOD and, as directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman when interacting with the combatant commanders. Having served as a combatant commander, I have clear insight into the capabilities and limitations of combatant command (COCOM) staffs. If confirmed, I will work closely with the combatant commanders to enable their warfighting capabilities and provide other support as required.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. What are the major challenges that you see facing the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. The principal challenge I will face, if confirmed, will be in assisting the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in formulating their recommendations to the President regarding balancing the national security imperative of regaining our fiscal solvency against the national defense imperatives of winning our current fights and maintaining our ability to deter or defeat a broad spectrum of potential threats to our Nation’s vital and important interests.

Our most important near term task is to ensure our service men and women deployed and in combat overseas—and their families and those who return wounded, ill, or injured—are supported to the best of our ability as a nation. The spectrum of potential threats against which we must defend within an increasingly constrained budget environment includes:

- Violent extremism, which is the only threat that currently possesses both the capability and active intent to harm the United States and our allies and friends;
- Regional instability, including the uncertainty caused by recent turmoil in the Arab world, that could threaten the United States’ or allies’ vital or important interests or that poses a grave threat of human disaster;
- Self-alienated nations whose leaders view acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as an insurance policy for preserving their status and increasing their regional influence;
- Powerful states, to include those with strategic offensive capability, that could threaten the survival or vital interests of the United States or our allies;
- The growing threat of cyber attack against defense or civilian infrastructure posed by individuals and nations;
- Transnational criminal organizations (TCO) that produce serious corrosive effects within the United States and among our friends and allies; and
- The constant threat of natural and manmade disasters.

We must also work to ensure the American people maintain their connection to and support for our Armed Forces.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary, the Chairman, the other Joint Chiefs, the combatant commanders, and other key national security officials to ensure our national defense remains strong by:

- Ensuring our service men and women in combat are fully and properly supported;
- Making appropriate recommendations when the use of U.S. military force is being contemplated;
- Contributing to policy discussions regarding the trajectories of threat capabilities and capabilities, their implications for U.S. vital and important interests, and the relative priority, cost, posture, and temporal aspects of ensuring U.S. capabilities and capacities are able to defeat them;
- Continuing ongoing efforts to improve the requirements system—ensuring the combatant commanders are properly represented therein, among other imperatives—as well as ensuring the system is well-synchronized with budgeting and acquisition processes;
- Continuing the search for greater efficiency and effectiveness in the way we do business within the Department;
- Working collegially within the U.S. interagency to synchronize our efforts to advance the security interests of our Nation;
- Strengthening our relationships with our allies and friends; and
- Ensuring our families and wounded warriors are properly cared for.

As always, the national security leadership will need to make difficult choices. Thus, I intend to contribute to the collaborative and collegial approach that will be required—among what I view to be an exceptional group of Joint Chiefs, combatant commanders, and other stakeholders in the executive branch and Congress—to accomplish these difficult tasks in an increasingly constrained budget environment.

JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

Question. As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if confirmed, you would be the Chairman of the JROC. The JROC has the responsibility to review and validate Service requirements.

Are there any recommendations that you would make to modify the JROC or its authority or the requirements process?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue on the current trend in line with recent changes to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011 of empowering the combatant commanders in providing the warfighter a clear voice in the requirements process. Additionally, I would continue to streamline the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to provide more informed decisionmaking of the JROC. Currently there are two requirements processes: Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) and JCIDS. The JUONs process provides the warfighter in combat a quick way to procure a system that prevents loss of life and critical mission failure due to direct enemy action. JCIDS is utilized for all other Joint acquisition systems—both long-term large and near-term small programs use the same requirements process. I believe we need to develop a system that better addresses the continuum of requirements and acquisition programs. It is my understanding that such a system is currently being designed, and if confirmed, I will continue that effort.

Question. During the confirmation of General Cartwright for the position of Vice Chairman, the committee asked him a variety of questions about problems, challenges, and recommendations for improvements in the requirements process and the workings of the JROC. General Cartwright emphasized his view of the importance of enhancing the role of the combatant commanders in the JROC beyond what was mandated in the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009. Specifically, he recommended that the combatant commanders become members of the JROC, along with representatives from the offices of USD(P), USD(AT&L), and USD(C). He also suggested that the Vice Chairman be authorized to delegate authority to functional combatant commanders to approve certain specific types of requirements. Section 841 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 makes changes to the JROC authorizing statute, based on General Cartwright’s recommendations.

What are your views on General Cartwright’s specific recommendations?

Answer. I fully support General Cartwright’s specific recommendations that have been written into section 841 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011.

Question. What are your views on the changes made by section 841?

Answer. As a currently-serving combatant commander, I am pleased with General Cartwright’s recommendations that were written into section 841 to empower the combatant commanders in the requirements process. If confirmed, I will investigate...
whether there is even more we can do in this regard, subject to the capacity and expertise of the combatant commander staffs to participate.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the status of proposed guidance to implement the changes made by section 841?

**Answer.** My understanding is that these changes have been fully implemented. On 26 April 2011, I sat on the JROC as a voting member specifically for an Initial Capability Document briefing in which my COCOM had specific interest.

**Question.** What are your views on the proposed guidance?

**Answer.** The combatant commander now has a clear voice in the requirements process with his vote on the JROC, though I acknowledge that it is not always easy for combatant commanders to participate. Also, adding the additional advisors to the JROC provides a wide breadth of expertise and experience. However, I believe we must continue to pursue ways to further include combatant commanders in the requirements process.

**Question.** General Cartwright was also asked about the role of the requirements process in the acquisition process after requirements have been initially approved and a program begins engineering and manufacturing development. General Cartwright noted that in 2007, the JROC established what he called a “trip-wire” process to “bring troubled programs back to the JROC for a review and to consider performance trade-offs to mitigate further cost growth and/or schedule delays before the program faced a Nunn-McCurdy review.”

To your knowledge, has this review mechanism been regularly employed on large programs that have experienced significant cost growth and schedule delays?

**Answer.** Yes, the first “trip-wire” review was conducted in 2007 and this mechanism has been used regularly for several defense programs. I personally observed, while attending a JROC meeting as the NORTHCOM Commander, this process in action in scrutinizing a troubled program. If confirmed, I will continue this practice.

**Question.** Has the JROC altered requirements, either for performance or procurement quantities, as a result of such reviews?

**Answer.** My understanding is that the “trip-wire” review forces an assessment of the relationship between requirements and program cost drivers, allowing the JROC to weigh the cost benefit of reducing a requirement to control cost growth. It is a maturing process as cited in a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report. My understanding is that a recent example where the JROC altered requirements is the Joint Tactical Radio System.

**Question.** WSARA required the Secretary of Defense to ensure that trade-off analyses are conducted on cost, schedule, and performance as part of the requirements development and approval process. Such analyses enhance the Department’s understanding of what performance factors are the critical ones driving costs and schedules.

In your view does the Joint Staff have the operations research expertise to determine where the cost “knees in the curve” lie for weapons systems performance?

**Answer.** Currently the Joint Staff relies on CAPE as an advisor to the JROC for their operations research expertise to determine where the cost “knees in the curve” lie for weapons systems performance. The Joint Staff then utilizes that data to determine proper tradeoffs regarding Key Performance Parameters (KPP). The ongoing review of JCIDS is addressing this and will provide recommendations on increased Joint Staff analytical expertise on cost, schedule, and performance considerations.

**Question.** In your view has the Department effectively integrated the operations research and cost estimating resources across the Joint Staff, the Office of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OSD(AT&L)) to conduct these trade-off analyses?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that synergistic staffing between the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) CAPE, and OSD(AT&L) has been effective.

**Question.** What is your view of the modifications to the JROC process made by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009?

**Answer.** Implementation of a “trip-wire” process helps inform the JROC of critical cost growth of Major Defense Acquisition Programs. This enables the JROC to properly inform the Secretary of Defense of potential Critical Breaches. When there is a breach, these programs must report to the JROC for validation and to review program cost, schedule, and performance. I fully support these modifications, which have been codified into the JROC process.

**Question.** What additional steps do you believe that Congress or the Department should take to ensure that trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance objectives for major weapon systems are made at an appropriately early point in the acquisition process?
Answer. It is my observation that the Department is already moving to make assessments of cost, performance, and technical readiness of weapon systems earlier in the acquisition process. I believe that the JROC should work to synchronize its decision points to better inform the acquisition milestone decisions. One course being considered is for the JROC to review Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) from major defense acquisition programs and provide advice to the milestone decision authority in support of milestone A. This also addresses a key recommendation made in a recent GAO report.

Question. Are there any other recommendations that you would make to modify the JROC or its authority or the requirements process?

Answer. I believe the changes in the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 captured several positive changes to the JROC and should be allowed to mature for a period of time to assess the implementation of those changes. If confirmed, I will remain alert to opportunities to improve this process.

Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the DOD acquisition process?

Answer. I believe the JROC is an effective partner with OSD in the acquisition process. Through participation in many common forums, such as the Defense Acquisition Board and the Deputies Advisory Working Group, JROC members are able to identify disconnects early and make the necessary course corrections.

Question. What is your vision for the role and priorities of the JROC in the future?

Answer. First and foremost, if confirmed, I will continue to ensure the warfighter’s voice is heard and supported in the requirements process. Additionally, as we move into a period where it appears there will be great downward pressure on the defense budget, I believe the JROC and joint requirements process will need to play a key role in prioritizing what capabilities are most important to the Department. This will enable the JROC to make informed decisions to ensure the Department’s most important warfighting capabilities remain intact. I also believe we must do a better job of controlling requirements creep within programs, and that tight synchronization between requirements, budgeting, and acquisition will become even more important in the coming years.

Question. Do you believe the JROC process is sufficient to understand and identify where there are opportunities for multi-Service collaboration or where programs could or should be modified to take advantage of related acquisition programs?

Answer. Recent implementations of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 have provided a broader look into current programs and future collaboration, not only among Services but between COCOMs. There is always room for improvement, but generally I believe the JROC is effective in ensuring collaboration among the major stakeholders.

Question. What principles guide your approach to inviting, and helping ensure the sufficient participation of other stakeholders in the JROC?

Answer. I believe transparency and honesty are crucial to the effective determination of joint requirements in order to meet warfighter needs. If confirmed, I will fully support the recommendations made by General Cartwright, to include advice from any organization with a stake in the requirements being validated.

JOINT CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS

Question. There have been longstanding concerns about the lack of flexibility and responsiveness within DOD’s complex process of addressing the needs of the warfighters. Recently, GAO reported that the JCIDS has evolved to provide many opportunities for combatant commanders to express their capability gaps, but that combatant commanders are frustrated with the lengthy, staff intensive advisory process that results in investments driven by Service priorities.

As a combatant commander, what is your perspective on the responsiveness of the JCIDS process in addressing joint capabilities needs?

Answer. JCIDS is a deliberate requirements process, designed to be analytical to ensure Service proposals are aligned with Joint Concepts of Operations and strategic guidance. It is also designed to ensure the Department complies with applicable laws by fully supporting acquisition and budgetary processes.

As concept of operations and missions have rapidly evolved to support the current security environment, and as acquisition and budget processes were adjusted to be more responsive to urgent warfighter needs, a parallel requirements process (supporting acquisition of JUONs) was created to ensure joint needs were met in the short term (preventing loss of life or mission failure).

I have experienced frustration as a combatant commander in being caught between these two processes. However, the Joint Staff in this case proved to be very
responsive in accelerating the JCIDS process to meet my needs, though final resolution of my requirement is pending. As stated above, the Joint Staff, with inputs from all COCOMs and Services, continues to make adjustments to both processes based on inputs from users, lessons learned, and changes in law, to ensure responsiveness to critical joint capabilities needs. I believe the ongoing JCIDS review will provide solid recommendations to improve the responsiveness and decision support to the JROC, COCOMs, Services, and Defense Agencies.

Question. What level of involvement in the joint requirements process and the JROC do you believe is appropriate for the COCOMs?

Answer. COCOMs continue to play an important role in the requirements process. They have always been able to act as a sponsor, identifying capability gaps for consideration by the JROC for validation. COCOMs have always had an open invitation to attend and participate in any JROC meeting, to ensure their equity was considered on any subject.

Since the changes mandated by the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act, and the changes in the structure of the JROC mandated by the 2011 NDAA, the COCOMs' role on the JROC is now equivalent to that of a Service. Because of this, the COCOM voice is able to be heard at all levels of the joint requirements process. The expansion of the COCOM role, and the active participation of COCOM commanders in the JROC, is completely appropriate, and I applaud the work General Cartwright has done to bring this to fruition.

However, I believe the COCOMs still have work to do to grow into this role, as their limited capacity and expertise, as well as limited senior officer bandwidth, makes it challenging to fully participate in this process. If confirmed, I will search for ways to not only provide the rule set that permits COCOM participation, but to provide the means for them to do it. I believe this is the next step in improving this process.

Question. Section 862 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 directs the GAO to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of designating a COCOM to provide a Joint Evaluation Task Force to participate in the development of a material solution for a new requirements document.

Do you think that such a Joint Evaluation Task Force would improve the dialogue between COCOMs and the Services' acquisition communities? Why or why not?

Answer. I believe that the current requirements process already provides a mechanism for joint dialogue between COCOMs and acquisition communities. The challenge is not in establishing a process, it is in enabling COCOMs to participate in it. My concern is that establishment of a Joint Evaluation Task Force may result in an additional layer of coordination and staffing between the existing requirements and acquisition processes, further delaying the identification of capability gaps and the subsequent fielding of systems addressing those gaps.

Question. What additional steps do you think need to be taken to improve coordination and better integrate the warfighters into a requirements development process that is controlled by the Services?

The process known as the Senior Warfighter Forum (SWarF), led by the COCOM Vice Commanders, provides a consolidated COCOM voice in prioritizing the attributes of identified mission areas. An additional step that is being recommended as part of the ongoing JCIDS review is to formalize the SWarF process to better inform JROC decisionmaking to further integrate and coordinate requirements efforts of services and COCOMs.

Question. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cartwright directed the Joint Staff to begin an effort to overhaul the JCIDS process to make it more responsive to warfighter needs, have a stronger voice, and to develop a methodology for setting investment priorities across the Department.

Do you think that JCIDS needs to be changed? If so, what are your views on the how it could be improved to make the process more responsive to users' needs while efficiently investing resources in a fiscally constrained budget environment?

Answer. Yes, JCIDS continues to change as the agencies that support it (Services, COCOMs, Joint Staff), and that it supports (acquisition and budgeting) continue to evolve. The work that has been going on since last summer has produced several significant recommendations to revise the joint requirements process. These recommendations take into account recent efficiencies gained by the disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff J–6, and the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network Integration and Information (ASD/NII), as well as the changes ongoing in the acquisition community with the revision of the DOD Directive 5000.02.

The fundamental idea behind JCIDS—that is, to assist the JROC in identifying and assessing joint military capability needs—will not change. The process used by the Joint Staff, and the content of the submissions, will move away from a docu-
ment-centric toward a data-centric model, with more time spent on analysis of the risks associated with cost, schedule, and performance considerations to meet the urgency of the requirement. Staffing time and redundancy will be significantly reduced. It will also enable the JROC to make a better informed decision on the validation and prioritization of joint military requirements.

**Question.** How do you envision your role, if confirmed, as the Chairman of the JROC?

**Answer.** The Vice Chairman, as JROC Chairman, co-chairman of the Deputies Advisory Working Group, and a member of the Defense Acquisition Board, is the only person who sits at the intersection of both requirements and acquisition processes at the executive level. The JROC controls the requirements process through exercise of their validation authority. The JROC Chairman, therefore, must ensure the needs of the warfighter are met within the fiscal constraints placed on the Department.

**Question.** What are your thoughts on the need for a joint force model to guide the development of requirements by each of the Services and the fielding of capabilities?

**Answer.** Our move from threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning has enabled a joint assessment of capabilities that are interoperable and supportable across the joint force. Requirements are based on strategic guidance, which is constantly being revised to meet the current and anticipated threat. Services, as the principal sponsors of requirement submissions, identify capability gaps that are aligned with strategic guidance. The current capabilities-based planning model is sound, yet it is prudent that we continue to review the model to ensure our highest priority joint military requirements are being fielded to meet the needs of our joint force.

**Question.** The requirements development process is not a stand-alone process, but instead is required to work collaboratively with the acquisition and budgeting processes. What steps are needed to better align the requirements development process with the acquisition and budgeting processes to make for a more efficient and effective process for delivering capabilities?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the ongoing JCIDS review evaluated several areas for improvement, and the Joint Staff has been working together with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OSD/AT&L) to implement these improvements. The implementation of expanded requirements manager certification training, through courses designed and conducted by the Defense Acquisition University, ensures responsible managers from both the requirements and acquisition communities have a common understanding of the needs of both processes, an awareness of the touch points between the two communities, and can work together effectively.

The move to a data-centric requirements generation model, partly facilitated by the creation of Capability Development Tracking and Management software, was mandated on 30 June of this year. This has the potential to provide acquisition communities greater visibility of requirements earlier in the process.

Another recommendation from the JCIDS review is for Joint Staff requirements experts to advise the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD/CAPE) and the OSD/AT&L by conducting a Joint Staff review of the results of the AOAAs to better inform the Milestone ‘A’ acquisition decision. This will facilitate a better competitive prototyping strategy and allow a joint assessment of AOA results prior to the establishment of KPP.

**Question.** How soon do you anticipate that reforms to the JCIDS could be implemented?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that some improvements to JCIDS have already been implemented and final recommendations will be approved in the coming months. We anticipate implementation of major reforms by the end of this year.

**Question.** Do you anticipate that the drawdown of U.S. combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan will affect efforts to overhaul the system, and if so, how?

**Answer.** I do not anticipate that changes in existing force deployment levels will significantly affect the reforms to the joint military requirements process.

**ACQUISITION REFORM AND ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT**

**Question.** What is your view of the changes made by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009?

**Answer.** I fully support the changes made in the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, and if confirmed, will work to implement any necessary changes in the requirements process.

**Question.** What role have you played, and do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the implementation of that Act?
Answer. I have played no direct role in the act’s implementation in the billets I have held since its passage. However, I have read the act and fully support it—if confirmed, I will work within the authority vested in the Chairman of the JROC to implement any changes to the requirements process necessary to support implementation of the act.

Question. What role, if any, do you believe the JROC should play in the oversight and management of acquisition programs after requirements have been established?

Answer. I believe the JROC should continue to monitor acquisition program execution to identify areas where requirements may drive cost growth and schedule delays. The JROC should play a key role in determining the appropriate balance between the performance of weapons systems and the resources needed to develop and procure them.

Question. What role, if any, do you believe the JROC should play in reviewing the progress of major defense acquisition programs or other acquisition programs?

Answer. I believe the JROC should continue to review the progress of major defense acquisition programs and other programs of joint interest to fulfill its role in achieving appropriate balance between capability, schedule, and cost.

Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition management processes?

Answer. Not at this time.

Question. What is your view of the role played by Configuration Steering Boards in preventing cost growth due to requirements creep?

Answer. I believe the Configuration Steering Boards are still maturing, but are increasingly providing a forum that promotes control of requirements and cost growth.

Question. What do you see as the proper relationship between Configuration Steering Boards and the JROC in managing requirements for acquisition programs?

Answer. In my view, when the Configuration Steering Board recommends adjusting requirements in order to mitigate cost or schedule growth, the requirements community should consider the impact of the adjustment and provide guidance in support of the recommendations that balances the priority of the requirement with the program cost and schedule.

Question. What is your view of the role played by Configuration Steering Boards in managing requirements for acquisition programs that fail to meet cost, schedule, and performance objectives?

Answer. I support the Nunn-McCurdy requirements. I believe they force the Department to take a critical look at poor performing programs and reassess the path to achieving valid warfighter needs.

Question. What do you see as the proper relationship between the JROC and those DOD officials charged with implementing the Nunn-McCurdy requirements?

Answer. I believe the role of the JROC as military advisor to the Milestone Decision Authority is appropriate when assessing Nunn-McCurdy breaches.

URGENT NEEDS PROCESSES

Question. Section 804 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD to develop a comprehensive approach for managing all of its various urgent needs processes that would, among other things, define roles, responsibilities, and authorities, and designate a senior-level focal point for urgent needs.

Do you agree that DOD should develop DOD-wide guidance that better defines roles, responsibilities, and authorities and designates a senior-level focal point for urgent needs?

Answer. Yes, and I am aware that efforts are underway to address those concerns.

The Department has recently made positive steps in addressing JUONs with the establishment of the warfighter Senior Integration Group (SIG) co-chaired by the USD(AT&L) and the Joint Staff J3. This group is providing a streamlined and tightly integrated approach to expedite the resolution of issues associated with rapid fielding to include requirements, funding, acquisition, sustainment, and performance. The JUONs process has been very successful in recent years in providing much needed capability to our warfighters, and the process is continuously being improved.

Question. In your view, what specific steps should the Department take to better manage the joint urgent needs process?

Answer. I believe the Department should continue to streamline the urgent needs process to quickly respond to urgent needs. Establishment of the SIG is a positive step and Joint Staff refinements to the validation process will continue to enhance the Department’s support to the warfighter.
I also believe we should continue to build a process that bridges the gap between urgent needs and the formal JCIDS process. Many requirements are not urgent enough to require the full court press of a JUONs process, but should be subject to the same process that establishes requirements for and procures a large weapons system.

Question. What is your sense of where the DOD might consolidate urgent needs entities and/or processes and how cost savings could be achieved through such consolidation?

Answer. I believe that the warfighter SIG has the potential to become DOD’s permanent oversight body of Urgent Operational Needs (UON). This has potential for significant cost savings since the SIG can monitor the Services and various agencies to minimize the duplication of effort on urgent needs.

Question. Do you believe that the Joint Staff should take steps to integrate the Joint Urgent Needs process with the individual Services’ processes? If so, please explain?

Answer. I believe it is important that the distinction between Service UONs and JUONs remain in place so that the combatant commander has an effective channel to ensure joint warfighter needs are promptly addressed. Execution of Service UONs and JUONs are already largely an integrated process as, both requirements generally flow to directorates with the requisite expertise to resolve all urgent needs.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you would serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). What would your priorities be for the NWC?

Answer. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal is a key priority in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), central to the responsibilities of the NWC. If confirmed, I will work with the members to review the NWC work plan and execute it in accordance with the President’s guidance in the NPR.

I will also work with the members of the NWC to pursue sound Stockpile Management for extending the life of U.S. nuclear weapons, ensuring a safe, secure, and effective deterrent.

Additionally, I will work with NWC members to ensure the modernization of our aging nuclear facilities and investment in human capital, to enable a substantial reduction to the number of nuclear weapons that need to be retained as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, to accelerate dismantlement of retired warheads, and to improve our understanding of foreign nuclear weapons activities.

Question. What changes if any would you recommend to the organization, structure, or function of the NWC?

Answer. U.S.C., title 10, section 179, sets forth the organization, structure and function of the NWC. I have no recommendations at this time. However, if confirmed, I will work with the NWC chairman and members to assess the organization, structure and function of the NWC, and where warranted, provide recommendations for change to increase effectiveness and value in support of the nuclear mission for national security.

LEGISLATIVE GAPS IN DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Question. The Department continues to lack statutory authority to order Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Reserve personnel to Active Duty in order to provide support in response to a natural disaster. Despite determined efforts by you, as Commander, NORTHCOM, and the Council of Governors to address concerns of State Governors about operational control of Federal forces during naturally causes emergencies, no resolution that would facilitate a legislative change has been achieved.

From a contingency planning perspective, how necessary, in your view, is modification of title 10, U.S.C., to allow reservists involuntarily to be called to Active Duty to respond to natural disasters?

Answer. I believe it is important for DOD to be able to plan for and access title 10 Federal Reserve capabilities to ensure adequate speed, capability, and capacity in responding to natural disasters in support of the American people. Title 10 Federal Reserve Forces possess significant capabilities to mitigate the effects of major disasters or emergencies, whether natural or manmade. Federal Reserve Forces are geographically dispersed throughout the Nation and are often located closer to the incident site than Active-Duty Forces. A high percentage of skill sets and capabilities needed during response to natural disaster is contained in the Federal Reserves.
Question. What is the current status of negotiations with State Governors, and what unresolved issues remain that stand in the way of an agreement?

Answer. In the 2009 NDAA, Congress recommended that DOD "engage with the community of governors to work out an understanding of unity of effort during domestic terrorist events and public emergencies." The President established a Council of Governors in 2010 to address this and other issues. The Council has already made important progress in approving a concept that provides dual chains of command to ensure unity of effort in response to disasters.

Proposed legislation to address access to the Federal Reserve Forces has been a priority topic of discussion in the Council over the past year. The members of the Council have worked hard to ensure we get the language right.

Based upon the 17 July 2011 Council of Governors meeting that I attended in Salt Lake City, I believe there are no more unresolved issues. My understanding is that there is now full concurrence among the Council, the Department of Homeland Security, and the DOD for the National Governors Association regarding language to recommend to Congress for inclusion in NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012.

Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you play in ensuring the Department addresses what is clearly a significant vulnerability?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to continue to support the Council of Governors and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs as they finalize work on a legislative proposal to gain access to Federal Reserve Forces for domestic incidents that can increase the speed of response and deliver necessary capabilities to our citizens in need. I believe we are close to positive resolution of this matter.

HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY

Question. The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010," enacted on December 22, 2010, provides for the repeal of the current DOD policy concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces, to be effective 60 days after the Secretary of Defense has received the DOD's comprehensive review on the implementation of such repeal, and the President, Secretary, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the congressional defense committees that they have considered the report and proposed plan of action, that DOD has prepared the necessary policies and regulations to exercise the discretion provided by such repeal, and that implementation of such policies and regulations is consistent with the standards of military readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion, and military recruiting and retention.

What is your view on repealing the current DOD policy?

Answer. I support repeal of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy in the manner that the repeal has been crafted. I believe the Armed Forces are prepared to implement the repeal of 10 U.S.C. 654, consistent with the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–321). I have expressed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in writing that NORTHCOM is prepared for implementation.

Question. What effect do you anticipate the repeal will have on readiness and discipline in the Armed Forces?

Answer. We have the policy and regulations needed for implementation, consistent with standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and military recruiting and retention. I am confident that we are ready now to affect repeal while sustaining military effectiveness, even in our current conflicts.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Department has in recent years developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However, numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in combat areas of operation and at home stations are still being reported. Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate treatment for the victim. Despite the leaders' commitment to "zero tolerance," the view is held by some that the Department has not done enough to provide the resources and policies needed to prevent sexual assaults.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

Answer. I believe current policies and programs designed to address sexual assault to both care for victims and hold offenders accountable. That said, I believe that, until no sexual assaults occur within our forces, we should continue to look for ways to improve the system.
Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which confidential reporting procedure has been put into operation?

Answer. I am not personally aware of any problems in the implementation of the restricted reporting option. Confidential reporting allows victims who wish to remain anonymous to obtain the support they need following an assault. I will remain alert and receptive to reported flaws in the program and support taking prompt action to improve the system.

Question. What is your view of the steps the Services (including the Reserve components) have taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including assaults against contractor personnel and assaults by foreign nationals?

Answer. No sexual assault is acceptable anywhere in our Armed Forces, whether deployed or not. I believe the Services have procedures in place to address the challenges of preventing and responding to sexual assaults in an operational environment to include working with host governments and our international partners. Every effort is made to take care of all victims and hold offenders accountable. However, as I stated above, until no sexual assaults occur within our Armed Forces, we should continue to look for ways to improve prevention and response.

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Answer. Our investigators and first responders are well trained. All Services recently enhanced their resources for investigating and prosecuting sexual assault cases.

Question. What do you see as the most difficult problems commanders must contend with holding assailants accountable for their acts?

Answer. I believe building and maintaining victim confidence to assist in the investigation can often be difficult for commanders trying to take appropriate command action against assailants. Commanders are also frequently confronted with the challenge that alleged sexual assaults are also often accompanied by other lesser misconduct on the part of both the victim and the alleged assailant that is easier to prove than sexual assault.

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults?

Answer. Senior leadership focus on this important topic is critical. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chiefs to monitor progress in eradicating sexual assault in the military.

ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH

Question. Former Secretary of Defense Gates announced this year that the Army would reduce its end strength by 22,000 through fiscal year 2013, including 7,400 in fiscal year 2012. This end strength was part of the temporary increase authorized in 2009 and was intended to more fully fill out the existing force structure. Beginning in fiscal year 2015, depending on conditions on the ground, the Army and Marine Corps plan to reduce their permanent end strength and force structure by 27,000 soldiers and at least 15,000 marines, respectively. Does the foregoing statement accurately reflect current planning?

Answer. The statement appears to be consistent with remarks made by Secretary Gates. It is also my understanding that the Army and the Marine Corps need a bit more time to confirm these projected personnel numbers and the timeframe for their implementation, particularly for the out-years.

Question. How would you describe the risk in adhering to these reductions?

Answer. Given current trends in Iraq and Afghanistan, including reduced demand for ground forces in Iraq, the risk is manageable, but dynamic. This process will require careful monitoring and potential management flexibility during the drawdown.

Question. Can the Army accelerate to 2012 more of its planned reduction in its temporary overstrength?

Answer. Though I currently do not have the information I need in order to reach a firm conclusion, I believe it would be difficult to accelerate a reduction in ground forces prior to concluding the Afghan campaign. Accelerated reductions would likely increase the stress on the force and could introduce unacceptable risk to other COCOMs that have ground force requirements. If confirmed, I will pay close attention to the pace at which force structure changes are planned for our ground forces.

Question. What are the assumptions regarding “conditions on the ground” that will allow for the planned reductions beginning in 2015 to occur on time?

Answer. In general, I would expect such a decision to depend on our assessment of progress against security objectives in specific theaters and the elements of key strategic decisions regarding potential future contingencies as 2015 approaches. I would solicit the advice of our combatant commanders and
DOD's senior military and civilian leaders to inform my recommendations on such decisions.

*Question.* The Navy and Air Force, while not currently facing the same level of planned reductions in their Active Duty end strengths in the coming years, are concerned about exceeding their end strength authorizations due to higher than expected retention. Consequently, both Services are seeking force management tools that require congressional authorization and relying on involuntary separations to reduce their forces.

What tools do the Department and the Services need to get down to authorized strengths by the end of this fiscal year, and which of these require congressional authorization?

*Answer.* I understand that some of the authorities used during previous force reductions have expired or are expiring soon. DOD is seeking to renew these authorities and is requesting new legislation to size and shape the force. My view is that DOD should make maximum use of voluntary authorities; however, great care should be taken to ensure those who leave are not going to be needed in the near term. If confirmed, I will study this issue closely and rely on the advice of both civilian and military professionals within DOD.

**RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE**

*Question.* What is your understanding and assessment of the Reserve components as an Operational Reserve, as opposed to its longstanding traditional role as a Strategic Reserve?

*Answer.* Sustained engagement in combat operations has transformed the Reserve components of our Armed Forces from a purely strategic force to one that also provides operational, full-spectrum capabilities to the Nation. Repeated combat deployments, as well as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and Homeland defense missions, have produced a force more operationally capable and experienced than any time in our Nation’s history. Given sufficient predictability of the “next” deployment, the vast majority of Reserve component forces and capabilities can be accessed systematically long into the future. National Guard and Reserve members expect to deploy periodically to meet the Nation’s security needs, and all have volunteered to remain a part of the force with this “new normal.” This operational force is a direct result of the substantial investment in resourcing commitments and the personal sacrifice of members, their families, and their civilian employers. I expect that as budget pressures tighten, the Reserve component role will evolve along with that of the Active component in a strategy-driven process, which could alter the current shape of the Reserve component in ways not yet clearly understood.

*Question.* In your view, what are the major challenges to maintaining and enhancing the National Guard and Reserves as a relevant and capable Operational Reserve?

*Answer.* Two key challenges that come to mind are access to the Reserve components and sustained funding for their operation. Since September 11, the Department has relied on the provisions of the Presidential Declaration of National Emergency to gain involuntary access to the Reserve components. This declaration must be extended annually for the provisions to remain in effect. The Reserve component is no longer considered a solely strategic capability to call upon in a national emergency. Therefore, to ensure continued access, I understand that DOD is working with the Armed Services Committees within the 2012 NDAA to enable and facilitate periodic and recurring use by granting the Secretaries limited mobilization authority for up to 365 days for non-named contingency operations. This would better satisfy Joint Force Commanders’ requirements.

In addition to access, and depending on available resources, the Department will need to program sufficient resources to use the Reserve component on a predictable and periodic basis to meet requirements, preserve readiness gains, avoid snapping back to a purely Strategic Reserve, and capitalize on cost efficiencies inherent in Reserve component employment. As an operationally experienced and capable force, requiring only a small portion of defense funds, the Reserve components can provide solid solutions to the significant fiscal challenges our military and our Nation face.

*Question.* What are your views about the optimal employment in generating forces for combat missions of the National Guard and Reserve?

*Answer.* We’ve seen a significant change in Reserve component use over the past 20 years and have developed a Total Force—Active, National Guard, and Reserve— to meet sustained combatant commander requirements around the globe. This evolution, combined with the current era of conflict and the broad range of security challenges on the horizon requires us to make smart decisions about Total Force capabilities and capacities to make sure we have the forces needed to defend and ad-
vance our national interests. To that end, the Secretary of Defense directed a Re-
serve component front end assessment that will inform the 2013 Program Budget
Review and should be completed in September. I would want to read that assess-
ment, but without making any firm commitments. I believe those findings, combined with
recommendations articulated in the Department’s Comprehensive Review of the Fu-
ture Role of the Reserve component, will present and shape optimum mix and em-
ployment models for our Total Force.

**Question.** In your view, should Homeland defense or other global or domestic civil
support missions be assigned exclusively to the National Guard?

**Answer.** No, I believe each component of the Total Force—Active, Guard, or Re-
sure—has an important, layered, and interdependent role in the successful execu-
tion of Homeland defense and civil support missions.

**NATIONAL GUARD**

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of changes in the global
and domestic roles and mission of the Army National Guard, the Air National
Guard, and the National Guard Bureau?

**Answer.** The roles of the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and the Na-
tional Guard Bureau in domestic missions have not changed over the last few years.
The National Guard continues to be the first military response to a community-
based event. Meanwhile, the National Guard has performed exceptionally well in
our conflicts overseas during the past 10 years, and is a combat-seasoned force.

If confirmed, I look forward to participating in the discussion of how the National
Guard will evolve its dual role of supporting domestic missions while remaining a
relevant contributor to global missions in support of an evolving national military
strategy.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of increasing the grade
of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to General (O–10)?

**Answer.** From my experience as Commander, NORTHCOM, I believe elevating
the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to the rank of General
has proven to be the right decision. In my current capacity, I have benefitted from
being able to interact with a four-star officer leading the NGB, and we have formed
a solid partnership. The National Guard is an indispensable component of the oper-
atinal military and the Chief serves as a bridge for the States to the Federal Gov-
ernment and the Active components of the military.

**Question.** In your view, should there be a requirement that the position of Com-
mander, NORTHCOM or Commander, U.S. Army North, the Army component com-
mander, be filled only by a National Guard officer? Please explain.

**Answer.** While I absolutely welcome the possibility that a National Guard officer
could be assigned to either position, I do not believe there should be a mandated
requirement for either position to be filled by a National Guard officer. I believe the
best-qualified officer, regardless of status as Active, Guard or Reserve, should be se-
lected as Commander, NORTHCOM and Commander, U.S. Army North.

**Question.** In your opinion, should the Chief of the National Guard Bureau be a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

**Answer.** I have developed a strong relationship with—and am a big believer in—
America’s National Guard and I would, if confirmed, give such a change the serious
consideration it deserves. Although, like the Commandant of the Coast Guard, the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau already attends most meetings of the JCS, I
do see potential advantages to this initiative, to include bringing his unique insights
more formally into this forum. However, before making such a recommendation, I
would want to gain a better understanding of its implications, to include: what it
means for the rest of the Reserve component and whether they would feel
disempowered, how it would affect the existing balance on the Joint Chiefs or would
be redundant, whether other organizations with a title 10 role would subsequently
require full membership, the potential implication that the National Guard would
evolve into separate Services, and other implications of which I may not yet be
aware.

**Question.** What steps need to be taken, in your view, to ensure that a “deep
bench” of National Guard general officers is continually being developed?

**Answer.** I believe there should be more joint education and training opportunities
for National Guard general officers. Additionally, I am encouraged by the Air Force’s
recent elevation of the 1st Air Force/Air Forces Northern Commander position to
three stars and filling it with an Air Guard officer. I support reestablishing the
three-star position of Vice Chief of the National Guard in order to develop National
Guard lieutenant generals for promotion. As Commander of NORTHCOM and
NORAD, I have benefitted by having National Guard officers assigned to my head-
quarters, which has surely contributed to their development, and I would encourage expansion of this program. The program under which we temporarily bring National Guard general officers into NORAD and NORTHCOM headquarters to fill in for Active Duty officers attending the CAPSTONE senior officer course has been a major success. If confirmed, I will continue to seek opportunities to grow and develop our bench of National Guard officers.

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. In the past year, the Navy has opened on submarines to women, the Marine Corps has expanded opportunities for women in intelligence specialties, and the Army is reviewing its assignment policy for female soldiers. The issue of the appropriate role of women in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.

Do you believe additional warfare specialties currently closed to women members should be opened for by women?

Answer. I have always believed in opening the door to additional roles for women in the Services. Current policies provide DOD sufficient flexibility under current law to make changes to assignment policy for women. I believe the Services should continue to assess their combat needs in order to make those determinations and notify Congress accordingly as required by statute (10 U.S.C., § 652 and/or § 6035).

Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy regarding women in combat are needed or warranted?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department’s policies and practices that restrict assigning female members are being reviewed at this time as mandated by section 535 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011. I would want to have access to the facts from that review before making a recommendation.

RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that “medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.” In April 2009, then Secretary of Defense Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force Base that “health care is eating the Department alive.” What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs on future DOD plans?

Answer. The continuing cost growth trend will pose a greater problem for the Department the longer it remains unresolved. Rising costs of medical care will require the Department to balance the costs of the health care system against risks in warfighting capability. This may either require increased strategic and military risk or the acceptance of changes in the system of health care.

If confirmed, I will help to ensure the health care system is flexible, efficient, and cost-effective to meet the requirements of the Military Departments, Services, and combatant commanders to achieve our military objectives. I will also consider the critical importance of the medical system for our people—military members, retirees, and their families.

If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our efforts with Congress and DOD to find effective ways to improve the cost-effectiveness of the Military Health System.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?

Answer. The rising cost of health care is clearly an issue we need to work and will require the close support of Congress. Based on my current position, I do not have any specific initiatives in mind at this time. However, if confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Defense as he works with both the health care leadership of the Department, the health care industry, and veterans groups to examine new ways to ensure military beneficiaries are provided the highest quality care possible while managing cost growth. Although this may require some adjustments to the program, I will keep in mind the critical importance of the medical system for our people—military members, retirees, and their families. It is especially important that we provide the most advanced system of care possible in our combat theaters and provide for our forces who are returning with both “seen” and “unseen” combat injuries.

Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of military health care?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary of Defense, as he leads the Department’s ongoing effort to explore all possibilities to control the costs of military health care. This may include an analysis of benefit payment structures, organiza-
tions, systems, and policies for the military health system. I would also support a strong push for the potential long-term gains available through the promotion of healthy lifestyles and prevention among our beneficiaries to help reduce the demand for health services.

PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget. Secretary Panetta, in his confirmation process, advocated for a comprehensive review of military compensation, saying "everything must be on the table," including military retirement.

Do you believe the time is right to begin discussing reform of military compensation and retirement benefits?

Answer. I agree with Secretary Panetta about the need to conduct a comprehensive review of military pay and benefits. I believe that it is possible to restructure our military pay and benefits in a way that continues to attract, support, and retain our men and women in uniform and their families while containing cost.

Question. Other than reducing Active Duty and Reserve end strength, what actions do you believe can be taken to control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?

Answer. I understand that personnel-related costs represent a growing percentage of the DOD’s limited resources. I’m also concerned about the fact that our current military compensation system is deep-seated in structures established decades ago. To control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending, I believe it is appropriate to conduct a comprehensive review of the military pay and benefits structure to determine where costs can be contained. However, while I support a review of military pay and benefits, we must do so in a manner that supports and sustains the all volunteer force.

MILITARY RETIREMENT

Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more resembles the benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement System than the current military retirement benefit. Many other studies have questioned the affordability, feasibility, and fairness of the current “cliff vesting” system.

While it is often said that the military retirement benefit encourages retention after the 10-year point, do you believe it provides any significant boost to recruitment? Do 17–18 year olds, in your experience, care about retirement benefits when deciding to enlist?

Answer. My understanding is that recruit surveys show retirement benefits are often not a driving factor to enlist for those who are 17–18 years old, but I believe it may be appropriate to review the military retirement system for needed changes and efficiencies that encourage retention and boost recruitment. I understand that the Defense Business Board is reviewing military retirement and I look forward to reviewing their proposed alternatives to the current military retirement system in order to make an informed recommendation, if confirmed.

Question. How might the military retirement system be modernized to reflect the needs of a new generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost to the government?

Answer. There are many proposed alternatives to the current military retirement system. As General Cartwright has stated, changes these benefits tend to only impact on the Department’s budget requirements in the long term. Any changes should be carefully considered, as they will have far-reaching and long-lasting effects on our force. I have no specific suggestions to offer at this time, but if confirmed, will closely review, along with the rest of the Joint Chiefs, those proposals and their impact in order to make an informed recommendation.

SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

Question. Members who are or have been wounded and injured performing duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from their for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from Active Duty when appropriate, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and continuing emphasis, many challenges remain in both the Active and Reserve components in responding to the needs of wounded, ill, and injured members under current law and regulations.
What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured members and their families?

Answer. Since the institution of the Wounded, Ill, and Injured, Senior Oversight Council in 2007, DOD and VA have been working on multiple ways to improve the care, management, and transition of our wounded warriors and their families. DOD has established Wounded Warrior Units and Program oversight offices through which individual and family medical, mental, and social-economical needs are addressed. I understand DOD and VA have established several Centers of Excellence for development of diagnostic tools, treatment modalities, education, and training for care providers, wounded warriors, and family members to provide treatment for the multiple facets of injuries or illness our seriously wounded warriors face.

Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based?

Answer. I have been advised that we should continue to expand upon the research and treatment baselines established both within the private medical research and health care sector (e.g. Johns-Hopkins University on Traumatic Brain Injury, Mayo Clinic on Biomechanics, University of Utah and University of Massachusetts on Limb Regeneration) and the Centers of Excellence which fall under the Defense Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury. These groups are making daily strides in providing the best level and quality of care to our wounded warriors and their families. If confirmed, I will continue to support their efforts and work to ensure that they receive the support (both financial and manpower) required for them to continue their important work.

Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?

Answer. One weakness is clinical case management through the period when members transition from the Active Force to DOD retiree or eligible veteran status. For example, a single electronic health record is needed, and is in development but is still not deployed. Additionally, the improvement of the transition process and tracking for wounded warriors with unseen psychological wounds is an area of special concern. We must strive for continued process improvement for our wounded warriors—if confirmed, I will work to coordinate with all stakeholders to develop systems and processes to close these gaps.

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded members and their families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

Answer. I would continue to capitalize on the many non-profit programs and organizations that fall within “the Sea of Goodwill”. There are hundreds of these organizations and programs that have come to the aide of the wounded warriors and their families to provide for everything from assistive devices (e.g. wheel chairs, house ramps), to conducting research on medical treatments, to providing direct economic aid. The Chairman’s Office of Warrior and Family Support has been at the forefront on coordinating with a number of these organizations, cataloging those which provide the best quality and quantity of assistance to our wounded warriors and their families. I will also encourage continued work between the Federal and State governments on this important topic via the Council of Governors and other potential forums.

Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program, have been established to improve processing of members.

What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the Integrated DES?

Answer. I agree with the need to streamline the current Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES). It is my understanding that earlier this year, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Veteran’s Administration established an IDES Tiger Team. Since May, the Tiger Team initiated a reform program and has set in motion a campaign plan to reduce the IDES total process time. The goal is to eventually reduce the IDES total process time to 90 days or less. This will require close coordination with Congress for legislative change. This will reduce the total number of warriors in the evaluation process, thus reducing the overall cost to the system and the burden on our wounded warriors.

Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support current IDES reform initiatives as set forth by the secretaries and, if necessary, make recommendations to ensure the appropriate levels of disability rating and compensation are provided our Wounded Warriors.
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services has increased in recent years. The Army released a report entitled “Army Health Promotion Risk Reduction Suicide Prevention” in June 2010 that analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In addition, mental health surveys conducted by the Army of soldiers and marines in theater document declines in individual morale and increases in mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced multiple deployments.

In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all members and their families?

Answer. The rising suicide rate amongst Active Duty personnel is deeply concerning. In response to the 2010 DOD Task Force Report on Prevention of Suicide, the DOD is developing an action plan to address the 13 foundational and 76 targeted recommendations in the report. Expedient implementation and resourcing of the particular recommendations the services have identified as high priority would benefit DOD commitment to reducing suicides. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Congress, our military leaders, Veterans Affairs, and other Federal and civilian organizations to see that our members’ and families’ psychological health and mental health issues are addressed.

Question. What is your understanding of the action taken in response to the June 2010 Army report, and the data in Chapter 3 (“The Lost Art of Leadership in Garrison”) in particular?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Army continues to evaluate and modify programs and services that are related to health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention. Early identification of “high risk” behavior, such as substance abuse and behavior problems, should allow leaders to intervene early. I understand that the Army has engaged leaders at all levels to improve education and awareness of behavioral health issues and high-risk behaviors. The Army has increased behavioral health providers at the brigade level in Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve units; required increased behavioral health screening before and after deployments; improved training for chaplains and suicide prevention coordinators; and improved training for primary care medical providers to identify and respond to behavioral health issues.

Question. What actions, if any, should the Joint Chiefs of Staff take with respect to Army policies regarding detection of and response to illegal drug abuse?

Answer. On 1 November 2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined several initiatives to improve the detection and response to illegal drug abuse. The DOD Biological Testing Advisory Board, which has Army representation, has been working to jointly address the recommendations identified and to discuss additional actions that would be beneficial. However, I understand that funding remains a constraint to immediate implementation of identified improvements.

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to members in theater, and to the members and their families upon return to home station?

Answer. Personal mental health issues cannot be ignored and, as an institution, DOD must continue to directly address this issue. My understanding is that there are three areas that must be addressed to ensure sufficient resources are available to members and their families.

First, we must ensure that members are comfortable seeking treatment and using the resources that are available. A DOD Instruction will be issued soon to address this directly. This new instruction will positively affect command notification reducing the stigma associated with receiving mental health treatment. Second, we must continue working to develop additional and more effective mental health therapies. Third, we must ensure that we have the necessary resources available, including trained mental health professionals. We must continue to coordinate closely with our VA and civilian counterparts to ensure consistent staffing of mental health professionals across the continuum of care.

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. In January 2009, the Department published its second Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of key quality of life factors for military families, such as family support, child care, education, health care, and morale, welfare, and recreation services. How do you perceive the relationship between military and family readiness and quality of life improvements and your own top priorities for the Armed Forces?
Answer. I expressed in a previous question that I will work closely with the Secretary and his staff, the Chairman, the other Joint Chiefs, and the combatant commanders to ensure our national defense remains strong by, among other things, ensuring our families and wounded warriors are cared for properly. We cannot protect this country unless we have healthy, personally-secure fighting men and women who are willing to put their lives on the line. A key component of this is ensuring we do everything possible and appropriate to meet their personal needs.

Question. What further enhancements, if any, to improve quality of life would you consider a priority in an era of intense downward pressure on budgets, and how do you envision working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and Congress to achieve them?

Answer. I understand the importance of quality of life programs on the wellness of the total force. If confirmed, I will encourage proactive management of the key areas such as access to counseling, fitness opportunities, child care support and spouse employment opportunities. Though basic quality of items such as satisfaction with PCS moves are largely issues, I have a keen interest in ensuring they are looked after properly. I look forward to working with advocacy groups and Congress to efficiently close gaps and reduce overlaps in programs and to communicate effectively with families to ensure that they know how to access available support when they need it.

FAMILY SUPPORT

Question. Military members and their families in both the Active and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations that go with them.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for members and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

Answer. I believe family readiness is tethered to family resilience. It is DOD’s responsibility to ensure families are well-prepared to meet the challenges that come with deployment and service. Through focusing on the psychological, social, financial, and educational well-being of military families, DOD can continue to build family resilience. I understand that strides have been made in improving access to resources for families through such programs as Military OneSource, and the Yellow Ribbon Program, but there is always room for improvement.

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and growth in end strength?

Answer. It is DOD’s responsibility to ensure that all available resources, including those in healthcare, education, and employment, are available to families at the required level and location. In order to accurately address the needs of these families in a changing environment, it is also critical to DOD’s success to build community partnerships between all Federal agencies and with local governments, businesses, and nonprofit organizations that are stakeholders in addressing the stressful aspects of military life. I also believe we need to encourage continued progress among individual states’ legislative initiatives to ease recognition of professional accreditation of family members and support for various school programs transferring children. If confirmed, I will monitor the changing needs of our military families closely.

Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to enhance family support?

Answer. I understand there are many excellent State programs that support members and their families. If confirmed, I would like to explore these further and see if they can be expanded across all States. If confirmed, I would encourage the implementation of flexible family support programs that meet the needs of our
members and their families, whether they live on military installations, near military installations, or far from military installations.

**DEFENSE READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM**

**Question.** In June 2002, the Department issued a directive to replace the current readiness reporting system, yet that replacement is yet to be fully operational. What challenges still remain in the transition from the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) to the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) and what is the plan to fully implement DRRS?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the transition from the GSORTS to the DRRS faces challenges associated with management, acquisition practices, definition of requirements, and testing. The transition is scheduled to be complete the end of fiscal year 2012. I also understand that as part of the DRRS governance structure, the Joint Staff is working with the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Personnel and Readiness to develop an executable implementation plan, including milestones, performance goals and quantifiable, measurable validated requirements. On 6 June 2011, the DRRS was placed under Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, and USD Acquisition Test and Logistics Developmental Test and Evaluation oversight.

**Question.** Have any delays or obstacles been attributed to technological maturity or changing requirements?

**Answer.** I understand the Joint Staff was informed by the DRRS Implementation Office (DIO) during normal governance processes of some technological challenges. These included challenges associated with the ability of the DRRS to connect to strategic command and control systems and connections within the DRRS enterprise. I also understand that changing requirements have also contributed to delays in the development of a long-term DRRS program, and the transition from GSORTS. Additionally, since the originally planned Full Operational Capability (FOC) date of 2007, challenges remain with clearly defining measurable requirements. When combined with growing lists of requirements that still require prioritization or validation, efforts to develop executable plans have been delayed. Work continues to define FOC criteria, finalize dates for transition, and complete the accompanying implementation plan.

**Question.** GAO has reported that significant shortfalls remain in the implementation of DRRS, stability of requirements, adequacy of testing, and overall management and oversight of the program. What is your view on their findings?

**Answer.** I concur with the specified findings of the 2009 GAO report. I support the DRRS oversight related findings in GAO–11–256, “Military Readiness: Army and Marine Corps Reporting Provides Additional Data, but Actions Needed to Improve Consistency” report. Specifically, I believe steps are needed to achieve interoperability, oversight, and execution. Additionally, I concur with the GAO assessment that an independent program risk assessment is needed to improve program organization.

**Question.** With respect to DRRS development and implementation, to what extent, if any, has the USD for Personnel and Readiness, worked or coordinated with the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Chief Information Officer of DOD?

**Answer.** I am aware of a report and corresponding memorandum produced for the Defense Committee as directed by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010. I understand the USD for Personnel and Readiness and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering produced the report. I do not believe the September 2010 report, “Preliminary Technology Readiness Assessment Report on the DRRS,” and accompanying memorandum to the committee, “DRRS—Response to the Request Made on Page 111 of Senate Report 111–35” was coordinated with or endorsed by the Joint Staff. I am aware the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration/DOD Chief Information Officer coordinates with the USD for Personnel and Readiness through participation in the DRRS governance process.

**AIR FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION**

**Question.** As the head of the JROC, you would be responsible for overseeing the development and validation of requirements for major weapons systems. Some have raised concerns that many of the problems within the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program derive from growth in requirements. Do you agree that this is a problem with the JSF program?

**Answer.** I understand that issues with the JSF program have been addressed through a deliberate requirements and acquisition review process, and that requirements growth has been an issue. A high level replan was approved in January 2011,
and the program expects to deliver a fully-compliant weapon system. I am taking steps to gain in-depth familiarity with the JSF program, intend to give the program my close personal attention, and fully support continuing JROC reviews of the program.

**Question.** What actions would you propose to take to prevent requirements growth on major weapons systems?

**Answer.** Requirements growth requires continued vigilance, which will be especially important in an increasingly constrained budget environment. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize current checks and balances that are in place to include the “trip-wire” process and Configuration Steering Boards. Additionally, I understand that one of the core elements of the ongoing JCIDS review is to strengthen requirements synchronization with the acquisition process, which will serve to improve control of requirements growth.

**Question.** If the JROC cannot control requirements growth on the largest acquisition program in the DOD portfolio, what prospect is there that the JROC could control requirements growth on any other major acquisition programs?

**Answer.** I have confidence that the JROC maintains adequate authorities and processes to manage requirements growth, and if confirmed, I will continue General Cartwright’s emphasis on imposing discipline on such growth.

**Question.** At a hearing earlier this year, the committee received testimony from senior DOD officials that there really is no alternative to continuing the JSF program.

What actions would you propose to take to prevent DOD from finding that future major acquisition programs that run into cost schedule or performance problems leaves us with no alternative to continuing the troubled programs?

**Answer.** I do not believe any program is too big to fail or should be fenced. That said, we need to work hard to ensure programs, including the JSF, are successfully executed. Process improvements resulting from the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act and JCIDS review should reduce the risk of similar circumstances in the future. If confirmed, I will work closely with my and OSD(AT&L) counterparts to properly manage current and future program development to balance cost, schedule, and performance in the best interest of the taxpayer.

**IRAQ LESSONS LEARNED**

**Question.** What do you believe are the major lessons learned from the Iraq invasion and the ongoing effort to stabilize the country?

**Answer.** While there are other lessons to be sure, perhaps the most important lesson is that in executing a major contingency, we must remain prepared for the difficult work that occurs in the wake of major combat. This will manifest itself in two ways. First, in framing future strategic and force sizing constructs, we must account for the fact that conflicts are never as compact as predicted, and that the notion of rapidly swinging forces from one conflict to another must be viewed with healthy skepticism. Second, we must plan and train with our civilian counterparts and be prepared to operate effectively in all phases of conflict. That said, the military should also be prepared to undertake critical non-military tasks when civilian agencies cannot operate effectively, either due to the security environment or due to lack of capacity. Indeed, the need for greater capabilities and capacity in civilian agencies has been a recurring lesson for the entire U.S. Government. Finally, we need to obtain better situational awareness of the underlying political, cultural, and economic drivers within a host nation to ensure our actions meet our objectives and not trigger unintended consequences.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the Department’s adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force structure, or operational concepts based upon the lessons learned?

**Answer.** The Iraq war has led to deep and far-reaching changes in all of the areas listed above. For example, counterinsurgency doctrine has been completely revised, culminating in the publication of Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3–24. Force structure changes include the development of the Advise and Assist Brigade. Additionally, the Department better understands that in Irregular Warfare, the strategic center of gravity is a population, and not necessarily a nation-state. The Department has demonstrated the ability to learn and adapt across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy.

**Question.** If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you propose making to policy, programs, force structure, or operating concepts based on the lessons of combat and stability operations in Iraq?
Answer. I understand that most of the lessons from Iraq are in the process of being integrated into DOD policy and doctrine. However, I do believe we need to be cautious in not over-correcting into a force that is exclusively prepared for an Iraq-type of conflict.

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Joint Staff in supporting and resourcing efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere to foster commitment to the “Rule of Law” as part of stability operations and doctrine?

Answer. The principle of respect for the rule of law is thoroughly embedded in our military forces and is reinforced throughout joint doctrine with regard to stability operations. Stability operations are a core military mission and our support to other U.S. Government agencies is a significant force multiplier. Indeed we recognize that it is often the establishment of the rule of law, and a security sector that can enforce it, that will permit the redeployment of the joint force when supporting a stabilization effort in a failed or failing state. Even in a non-combat theater, at NORTHCOM we maintain an extensive relationship with the Mexican military on human rights and the rule of law that, with the support of Congress, is fully supported by counternarcotics funding.

I understand that a portion of the OSD’s Operations and Maintenance budget has been designated to support continued strategic planning, programming, and inter-agency training for rule of law operations and that the Joint Staff recently assisted the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in gathering information to draft a rule of law report that soon will be delivered to Congress.

**DRAWDOWN IN IRAQ**

Question. Do you support the plan for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq consistent with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement?

**Answer.** I support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq in accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. It is important that we fulfill our obligations under this bilateral agreement and we are on track to complete the drawdown by December 31, 2011.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the Department’s planning for the withdrawal of troops and equipment out of Iraq consistent with the December 2011 deadline of the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement?

**Answer.** The drawdown of troops and equipment in Iraq is on track due to solid planning and the discipline, training, and dedication of our deployed forces. My understanding is that the Joint Staff closely tracks the progress of the drawdown on a daily basis. Since this process began in 2010 with the force reduction from 159,000 to 50,000 troops, we have closed hundreds of bases and outposts and turned them over to our Iraqi partners in better condition than we inherited them. Our logisticians have moved mountains of equipment. The plan is on time and on schedule for a complete withdrawal by the December 2011 deadline of the Security Agreement.

**Question.** It’s been reported that the administration is considering options for a U.S. force to remain in Iraq beyond December 2011 should the Iraqi Government request the continuing presence of U.S. forces.

**Answer.** If the GOI requests the presence of U.S. forces beyond 2011, I will consider the missions the GOI is asking our forces to perform, the risks our forces will face, the willingness of the GOI to take action against militias and other extremist groups that could target U.S. forces, the benefit it might bring to Iraq and the U.S.-Iraq relationship, and the cost of the mission. If confirmed, and if these factors support retention of U.S. forces, I would make such a recommendation.

**LEAD AGENCY TRANSITION IN IRAQ**

Question. Responsibility for lead U.S. agency in Iraq is scheduled to transition from DOD to the Department of State (DOS) by October 2011. However, a May 2011 State Department Inspector General report found that progress in effectively transitioning to a civilian-led presence in Iraq is slipping in a number of key areas, including the establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq to manage the defense relationship between the U.S. Government and the GOI.

What is your assessment, if any, of the planning and progress in executing the transition from DOD to DOS? In your view, what are the sources of greatest risk to the current plan and the successful implementation of the transition?

**Answer.** My understanding is that the transition from DOD and DOS is on track. DOD, DOS, and other agencies and offices have undertaken unprecedented levels
of coordination and planning for the transition in Iraq. We have an excellent working relationship with our State Department colleagues and are working together at all levels to achieve a successful transition. As one would expect with a transition of this scope and complexity, challenges exist, but it is my understanding that we are working together to overcome them and remain on schedule. Fully funding the State mission to its completion is vital to this effort.

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the current plan or the implementation of transition?

Answer. The transition plan is solid, and my understanding is that we are on track to fully implement it. Normal operational challenges remain as we close bases and move personnel and equipment, but we anticipate no issues meeting the deadline in accordance with the transition plan. However, should the Iraqis request a continued U.S. presence beyond 2011, I would want to be closely involved in subsequent planning efforts.

U.S.-IRAQ STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

Question. In your view, what will be the nature of our strategic relationship with Iraq after December 31, 2011?

Answer. Our stated goal has always been to establish a long-term strategic partnership with Iraq. We support an Iraq that is sovereign and self-reliant; that has a just, representative, and accountable government; that denies support and safe haven to terrorists; that is integrated into the global economy; and that contributes to regional peace and security. All these elements of our desired strategic relationship with Iraq were codified in the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement established between Iraq and the United States. If confirmed, it is my intention to closely monitor the status and progress of our relationship.

AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY

Question. Do you agree with President Obama’s strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan announced at West Point in December 2009?

Answer. Yes.

Question. On June 22, 2011 President Obama announced his decision to draw down 10,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of this year and to withdraw the remaining 23,000 “surge” force by September 2012, for a total announced drawdown of 33,000.

Do you support the President’s decision to begin reducing U.S. forces in July 2011? Why or why not?

Answer. While I have not been focused on the mission in Afghanistan while executing my duties at NORAD and NORTHCOM, it is my understanding that we have made significant gains as a result of deploying the surge force. This force increase has allowed us to arrest Taliban momentum, establish security in previously-held Taliban areas such as Central Helmand and Kandahar (areas of historic importance to the insurgency), and expand Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capacity and capability. It is my understanding that the theater and combatant commander have expressed that we can drawdown and continue to manage the risk, as long as we retain flexibility if circumstances on the ground change. Commencing the drawdown in July 2011 has the benefit of sending an important signal to the Afghan Government that international support is not open-ended.

Question. Do you support the President’s decision regarding the size and pace of reductions in U.S. forces? Why or why not?

Answer. Yes. It is my understanding that this decision does not represent a change in our strategy—the ends, ways, means, and boundary conditions outlined for the mission in Afghanistan remain the same. It appears to me that we have reached a point in the campaign where a responsible drawdown in U.S. forces is possible. Once surge forces are removed, there will still be more than 68,000 U.S. troops and thousands of international forces in Afghanistan—not to mention the addition of some 70,000 Afghan forces that will join the fight during the next 15 months. At the same time, the international community has demonstrated its intention to support Afghanistan until at least 2014, and the U.S. and NATO are both discussing some form of long-term partnership relationship with Afghanistan.

Thus, I agree with the President’s decision. If confirmed, I will remain abreast of conditions on the ground in Afghanistan and, should I determine the situation has changed, I will provide such advice to the Chairman and the Secretary.

SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation in Afghanistan?
Answer. It is my understanding that the security situation in Afghanistan continues to improve though, as General Petraeus has said, it is fragile and reversible. Insurgent momentum has been halted in most of the country and reversed in many key areas like Helmand and Kandahar. For example, May and June mark the first time since 2006 that insurgent attacks have decreased when compared to the same months the year prior. The enemy is resilient and retains lethal capacity as well as the ability to regenerate over time. However, even in the wake of recent attacks, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the ANSF have also proven their resilience and it appears that they will continue to push forward for a secure and stable Afghanistan. Our forces, partnering with the ANSF, should help to further pressure the enemy by degrading support networks and further reduce support for the enemy among the Afghan population. Nonetheless, numerous security challenges remain, and there will be tough fighting in the years ahead as we transition security to Afghan lead by the end of 2014.

BEGINNING OF TRANSITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

**Question.** The transition of lead security responsibility to Afghan security forces is set to begin in mid-July, with the initial phase to be completed by the end of this year. In March President Karzai announced the first tranche of provinces and municipal districts designated for the transition of security responsibility to an Afghan lead. President Karzai has called for the transition of security responsibility throughout Afghanistan to be completed by 2014, and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) members endorsed this goal at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010.

**Question.** Do you support the decision to transition the lead security responsibility to the Afghan security forces in the areas announced by President Karzai beginning this month?

**Answer.** Yes, based on support from our commander on the ground.

**Question.** In your view, how important is it to the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan that the transition of security responsibility begin in July 2011?

**Answer.** Transitioning to Afghan-led security responsibility is the next step in our comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) effort in Afghanistan. It will not be easy, and there will likely be setbacks as well as progress. However, as we seek to eliminate safe havens from which al Qaeda or its affiliates can launch attacks against our homeland or our allies, the Afghan Government must step up its ability to protect its people and move forward with actions to build a more stable, economically viable country in the future. We should remain committed to working with the Afghan Government and our coalition partners in executing the transition phase of the NATO/ISAF comprehensive COIN strategy in order to transfer lead security responsibility to the Afghan Government by the end of 2014.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the capacity of the Afghan security forces to assume the lead for security in the areas designated for this initial round of transition?

**Answer.** I believe that the Afghans are prepared to assume the lead for security in the areas designated in the first tranche based on my understanding of the current size and capability of Afghan security forces. Afghan security forces are already in the lead in some places, such as Kabul and Panjshir. It goes without saying that our support will be critical, especially in the early days of the transition, but the Afghan National Security Forces must step up, and these areas are a good place to start.

BUILDING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

**Question.** There are approximately 100,000 more Afghan soldiers and police now than there were in November 2009 and by September 2012 another 70,000 personnel will be added to the ANSF. A new ANSF target end strength of 352,000 by 2012 is awaiting final approval by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board.

In your view, is the target end strength level for the ANSF sufficient to provide security and stability in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** I believe the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police should be capable of achieving the lead for security by the end of 2014 if the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board approves the 352,000 ANSF target end strength and if that end-strength is achieved.

**Question.** What in your view are the greatest challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF to assume responsibility for Afghanistan’s security?

**Answer.** I believe the primary challenges to ANSF capacity building are: building literacy, reducing attrition, developing leaders, eliminating insider threats, and provision of key enablers such as logistics, maintenance, and intelligence capability.
There remains a shortfall in the number of training personnel required for the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM–A) and in the number of embedded training teams, the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) embedding with Afghan Army units and the Police OMLTs (POMLTs) embedding with Afghan Police units.

In your view, to what extent should U.S. forces be used to source the shortfall in NTM–A trainers?

Answer. Fielding professional and capable ANSF is critical to our long-term success in Afghanistan. This is a priority for ISAF and NTM–A. U.S. personnel are currently filling numerous training and partnership requirements throughout Afghanistan. Our forces will continue to support the ANSF as required in order to achieve our mission objectives. This may require shifting U.S. forces into positions to cover trainer shortfalls if required by the commanders in the field.

Question. What more should be done to get NATO members and other coalition partners to meet the ISAF requirements for additional NTM–A trainers and OMLTs and POMLTs?

Answer. Training shortfalls are a longstanding issue best addressed by continued engagement with our partners by all elements of the U.S. Government—including Congress—as well as by NATO/SHAPE HQ, HQ ISAF, and representatives of the NATO training mission. Our allies and contributing nations with operational commitments are being encouraged to reinvest any combat troop reductions with trainers, as has recently occurred with our Canadian partners. Personnel with specialized skills such as police, logisticians, medical, and maintenance specialists are essential. We continue to work on filling all training requirements, while also developing more Afghan trainers, in order to realign coalition trainers.

Question. A key component of efforts to build the capacity of Afghan security forces is partnering ANSF units together with ISAF units in the field.

In your view, how effective has partnering been in building the capacity of the Afghan Army and Afghan police?

Answer. Partnering is an essential component of building Afghan security force capacity in order to allow Afghans to assume the lead for security across the country by the end of 2014. It is my understanding that we have made significant strides with our baseline training while, at the same time, focusing on our partnership efforts. This has proven to be the most effective way of increasing Afghan capability, confidence, and professionalism in the field. Afghan units that are partnered with ISAF elements continue to develop more rapidly. Partnered units are more effective in the field, have a better understanding on how to sustain their forces and have fewer incidents of corruption.

Question. Would you support moving to a partnership ratio of ISAF and ANSF forces below 1:1 (less than one ISAF soldier for every ANSF soldier) as the capability of Afghan security forces improves?

Answer. My understanding is that we intend to do this as we transition security responsibility. This is part of the process of building ANSF capacity and then putting them in the lead. Developing units will require greater partner support, while effective units will have less partner support. Balancing partner efforts increases their capacity. Partner ratios will change dramatically as we move to complete Afghan control. My understanding is that there are several units now below a 1:1 partner ratio, and there are increasingly more areas where Afghans are in the lead or operating independently.

Relationship between Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency

Question. In your view, what is the proper relationship between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan?

Answer. The mission in Afghanistan is to degrade, disrupt, and destroy al Qaeda and to provide sufficient stability so that Afghanistan can never again become a safe haven for terrorists. As such, counterterrorism directly targets al Qaeda networks themselves, including leadership, thereby addressing the first imperative. It also supports the counterinsurgency campaign, which in turn intends to eliminate the conditions in which al Qaeda can exist. Special operations forces are vital in both roles.

Afghan Local Police/Village Stability Operations

Question. Secretary Panetta and others have emphasized the importance of the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police programs to the strategy in Afghanistan.

What has been the effect of these programs on rural Afghan populations and what has been the response from the Taliban?
Answer. My understanding is that the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program and Village Stability Operations (VSO) have had a measurable and positive effect on security in Afghanistan. Since the program's inception by Afghan presidential decree in August 2010, ALP has grown to over 6,700 patrolmen operating at 44 validated sites. ALP is a means of extending legitimate security where ISAF forces are scarce or non-existent. VSO, of which ALP is a component, builds the connection between the village, the province, and the central government. The program is intended to jump-start local governance and also mobilize communities, a key condition for local populations to resist Taliban predation. The enemy has explicitly targeted VSO because they fear its effectiveness and ALP members have successfully fought off Taliban attacks in a number of recent incidents. The ALP program and VSO continue to grow, and Afghans across the country are eager for the program to come to their area.

Question. Do you believe the availability of U.S. special operations teams is a limiting factor in expanding these programs to a point where they can have a strategic impact in Afghanistan?

Answer. My understanding is that the number of ALP and VSO sites we can establish in Afghanistan is limited by the availability of Special Operations teams. This is because Special Operations teams embed and live where VSO/ALP has been established. In order to expand the VSO/ALP program, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC–A) has operational control of two U.S. Army Infantry battalions. The deployment of these two battalions under CFSOCC–A control has allowed us to thicken the Special Operations forces and free up more special forces personnel for new ALP/VSO missions. We expect that this will allow us to continue to increase the ALP program, even as the number of Special Operations in Afghanistan remains fairly constant.

Question. How do indirect approaches like Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police Programs compliment direct action counterterrorism missions within the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?

Answer. I understand that the VSO/ALP program methodology includes full-time embedded partnership between Special Operations Forces and local villagers. Local villagers have among the best insight into insurgent actors, intentions, and their support structures. Special Operations forces conducting VSO/ALP and those conducting precision strike operations habitually cooperate and share information. The combination of these two efforts has had significant synergistic effects for the overall campaign and have made key areas of Afghanistan inhospitable to the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

Pakistan

Question. The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has often been described as tumultuous. Recent reports indicate Pakistan has expelled approximately 90 out of 135 special operations personnel who were deployed there to train the Frontier Corps and other Pakistani security forces to fight al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other associated groups. Also the United States has announced that some aid to Pakistan’s military will be suspended.

What is your assessment of the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Pakistan?

Answer. Militaries in general tend to respect the common ethos associated with serving their nations’ interests through the profession of arms. This general appreciation applies to how we regard Pakistan’s military; since 2001, they have incurred roughly 12,000 casualties (3,000 KIA, 9,000 WIA) fighting violent extremists. We respect their courage and commitment to the defense of their nation. Relationships ebb and flow based on a combination of national interests, communications, and events. It is no surprise that our relationship is undergoing a turbulent period at present. The Pakistan military leadership has concluded that, for a variety of reasons, we should reduce our footprint inside their country, and we will of course abide by their decision, which will result in withholding some related aid. But we take our Pakistani counterparts at their word that this footprint reduction is temporary in nature.

Even though this is a difficult partnership, it is an important one. We cannot afford to return to the days when there was no partnership at all and a generation of Pakistani officers grew up with no contact with the United States. This professional relationship will continue to evolve at the most senior levels in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, and along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border at the tactical and operational levels.
their invasion of Afghanistan, and thus the military bears a certain loyalty to them. For this tendency. Moreover, these groups fought hard against the Soviets during the Cold War, and some of them still retain a strong anti-Soviet sentiment. They believe that by presenting India as a threat, Pakistan can gain support from the United States and other Western countries. The Pakistan military benefits from this perception because it remains committed to the idea of a regional balance of power, and it sees the United States as an important ally. However, some of the Pakistan military leaders also believe that India is an existential threat to Pakistan's security and that it is necessary to counter this threat. They have taken steps to improve the security and safety of their nuclear weapons, and to do so they have invested in the development of strategic weapons systems. Should Pakistan desire, it believes it has the capability to counter the United States and our allies. Nonetheless, the Pakistan military continues to have productive engagements in other venues, including coordination between units on both sides of the border.

**Question.** In your assessment, how important is the U.S.-Pakistan military-to-military relationship to the success of our counterterrorism strategy?

**Answer.** U.S. strategic interests in Pakistan encompass both our relationship with Pakistan itself and Pakistan's role in the campaign against al Qaeda and its affiliates. Because our efforts in Afghanistan have eliminated al Qaeda as a safe haven, al Qaeda and other extremists use Pakistan as a base for the movement's overall ideology and to plot and prepare attacks against the United States and our allies and partners. These safe havens also pose a major challenge to our campaign in Afghanistan. Pakistan's efforts in eliminating these safe havens are dependent in some measure on U.S. support, which implies the need for a strong military-to-military relationship. Their full commitment to this effort would mark a new era of deeper partnership in which we share the mission of defeating terrorists and extremists.

**Question.** What is your assessment of U.S. programs to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and the Frontier Corps to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, including train and equip programs under the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund?

**Answer.** Enabling the Pakistani Army and the Frontier Corps to eliminate extremist safe havens is the premise of our outreach through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, intended to add additional capability to Pakistani courage and competence that already exists. Pakistan's senior military and civil leaders must in turn demonstrate the willingness to aggressively take on this mission. I understand that PCF-funded training, equipment, and infrastructure have produced some important initial results for the Frontier Scouts, Special Services Group, and other organizations involved. The quality of Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps units' tactical maneuver, communications, marksmanship, and intelligence have demonstrably improved for participating small units. These programs have only begun to fully operate, and they remain vulnerable to disruptions of funding or access.

**Question.** In your view, to what extent does the Pakistan military recognize that militant extremist groups pose a threat to Pakistan's own national security interests, including such groups as the Haqqani network, the Afghan Taliban operating in and around Quetta, and Lashkar-e-Taiba?

**Answer.** The Pakistani nation will always act in its own interests, which are often different from our own. Pakistan has viewed India itself and Indian (or any other nation's) domination of Afghanistan as an existential threat, and has taken steps it believes are necessary to counter this threat, including developing nuclear weapons and nurturing extremist groups to fight proxy irregular warfare. That the Pakistani military benefits from presenting India as a threat, and that there are many in the military who sympathize with the extremist views of these groups, only reinforces this tendency. Moreover, these groups fought hard against the Soviets during their invasion of Afghanistan, and thus the military bears a certain loyalty to them.
However, in both supporting and tolerating these groups, the Pakistani military has grabbed the tail of a tiger that they may or may not be able to control. Military and civilian leadership seem to have gained in recent years a greater appreciation for the costs and dangers of such tolerance. For that reason, Pakistan has increasingly proven ready to act against extremist groups that target their own government. We are working, with limited success, to convince our Pakistani partners that they must take externally-focused terror groups just as seriously as domestic terror groups, that in fact all such groups form a linked syndicate of sorts.

**CYBERSECURITY**

*Question.* In a recent interview with Defense News, Admiral Mullen stated that “The single biggest existential threat that’s out there, I think, is cyber.”

Do you agree with Admiral Mullen and, if you do, do you believe this threat is receiving the focus and resources within DOD?

*Answer.* I agree on both counts. Both state and non-state actors have or are developing the capability to severely impact both our national infrastructure and our ability to execute command and control and other military functions that have become dependent on cyber capability. It is a serious threat. Last year the Secretary of Defense created a new, sub-unified command, U.S. Cyber Command, to address this issue and help preserve the Nation’s freedom of action in cyberspace. The launch of the DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace on 14 July 2011 is also a clear indicator that the Department is focused on the cyber threat. With the implementation of the strategy’s five strategic initiatives, the Department is focusing its resources both internally and externally to organize, train, and equip our forces to take full advantage of cyberspace’s potential; employ new defense operating concepts to protect DOD networks and systems; partner with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy; build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen collective cybersecurity; and leverage the Nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation.

*Question.* What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the development of DOD’s cybersecurity policy, strategy, and planning?

*Answer.* Our reliance on cyber capabilities, the many and varied threats, and the rapid rate of technological change all demand we shine a spotlight on defense of our information networks. If confirmed, I will advocate within the Department, and with Federal agencies and Members of Congress, for appropriate policies and resources regarding cyberspace. Although the Department just released the DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, there is still a great deal of work to do, including placing greater focus on interagency relationships, authorities, and building flexible and responsive capabilities. We also need to protect our warfighting mission, strengthen and expand partnerships in the domain, build capability to conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations, and develop processes to integrate cyberspace capabilities into COCOM operations and plans.

*Question.* What do you believe is the appropriate role for NORTHCOM in providing support to civil authorities in the cyber domain in relation to U.S. Cyber Command?

*Answer.* The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead Federal agency for national cyber security policy and programs. As such, the DHS will manage and lead a fully-coordinated response to a significant cyber incident to minimize impact, restore operations, and reduce the risk of future occurrence of the event or events. DOD organizations may be asked to support the federal cyber response, if military resources are needed to address the specific situation. NORTHCOM’s position is that U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and its subordinate sub-unified COCOM, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), should be in the lead for DOD support to civil authorities for the technical aspects of recovery from a cyber attack. CYBERCOM and DHS have established a strong relationship for exactly this purpose. NORTHCOM’s role would be in assisting the DHS in mitigating the physical effects of such an event. For example, if a cyber attack disables our Nation’s electrical grid for an extended period of time, the effects could be devastating. In such a situation, NORTHCOM could provide transportation and other logistical support using military capabilities. STRATCOM, NORTHCOM, and CYBERCOM would coordinate closely throughout such an event.

**COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

*Question.* After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress established the Department of Homeland Security, and DOD established the NORTHCOM and
an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs.

What is your assessment of the current level of cooperation and coordination between DOD and DHS on homeland security matters, and what will be your goals in this regard if you are confirmed?

Answer. Cooperation and coordination between the DOD and the DHS is very strong and constantly improving. DOD staffs are tightly connected with the DHS and its component agencies through continued exchange of department representatives, to include DOD COCOMs and DHS headquarters and subordinate agencies. As the Commander of NORTHCOM, I have directly observed and benefitted from such cooperation, notably including close partnerships with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Coast Guard. There continues to be a significant increase in the overall collaboration in deliberate and crisis action planning, policy decisions, and applicable directives impacting homeland security matters. The many correlations in our mission sets demand this collaboration. If confirmed, I will help the DOD continue to mature and strengthen our relationship with the DHS through information sharing, exercises, operations, and planning.

Question. What do you believe is the appropriate mechanism for DOD to respond to the needs of domestic agencies for DOD support—whether through new or modified programs within DOD or otherwise?

Answer. I believe the current Request For Assistance (RFA) mechanism for Federal agencies to obtain assistance from the DOD, through the exchange of Executive Secretary memoranda, is appropriate. The DOD has unique capabilities that have supported domestic agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Interior for the Deep Water Horizon oil spill, Federal Emergency Management Agency for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, and the National Interagency Fire Center for wildland forest fires. In domestic natural disasters, DOD is always in support of a Primary Agency. If confirmed, I will continue to seek ways to respond more quickly and effectively to requests from our Federal partners, to include expanded use of pre-scripted mission assignments.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. The administration recently released its National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked threats "that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia."

How do you view the Department's role under the new National Strategy for Counterterrorism?

Answer. DOD plays a significant role within the government-wide global fight against al Qaeda (AQ) and its adherents primarily through partner nation capacity-building and enabling efforts, targeted counterterrorism (CT) operations, and countering violent extremist messaging. Building competent, professional and responsive CT forces that protect populations and strengthen the rule of law reinforces the legitimacy of partner governments, creates sustainable security, and reduces AQ's ability to establish safe havens. Targeted CT operations are focused on eliminating near-term threats, creating space and time to develop partner nation capacity, and supporting the development of sustainable host nation government institutions.

Question. Do you believe the National Strategy for Counterterrorism modifies the Department’s role in combating the threat posed by al Qaeda and affiliated groups?

Answer. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism further codifies DOD’s priorities and roles as part of the whole of government global CT approach. The new strategy is closely aligned with our existing priorities and does not significantly modify our ongoing efforts.

Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role for the Department in countering threats from al Qaeda and affiliated groups outside of South Asia?

Answer. Building partner nation capacity and enabling partner forces is the primary role for DOD in countering threats from al Qaeda (AQ) and affiliated groups. DOD also conducts limited targeted CT operations as directed in order to eliminate imminent threats to the United States and U.S. interests and to create space and time for the very challenging development of enduring host nation solutions to CT problems. Building strong and enduring partnerships based upon shared understanding of the threat and common objectives is essential for success. DOD also supports other efforts led by interagency partners, which focus on the development of
better governance and supplying basic needs, thereby reducing the underlying causes that enable AQ to recruit from vulnerable populations.

Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and agencies?

Answer. The level of interagency coordination that occurs in the global CT fight is greater than it has ever been, but must be continually emphasized and prioritized. To succeed at both the tactical and strategic levels, we must foster a rapid, coordinated, and effective CT effort that reflects the full capabilities and resources of our whole government. I will continually emphasize the need for transparency and interagency communication and prioritize the existing NSS-led CT planning and decisionmaking venues.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Question. Vice Admiral McRaven, USN, Commander of Joint Special Operations Command, has argued that the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) should have greater influence on special operations personnel management issues including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of Special Operations Forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., to change the role of the SOCOM Commander from “monitoring” the readiness of special operations personnel to “coordinating” with the Services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect Special Operations Forces. What is your view about the authority of Commander, SOCOM in this regard?

Answer. I support the coordination between SOCOM and the Services related to personnel issues. To improve this coordination, DOD Directive (DODD) 5100.01, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,” was published in December 2010. Currently, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, Commander SOCOM, is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, in addition to those specified, all affairs of command relating to special operations activities, including: coordinate on Military Department and Military personnel management policy and plans as they relate to accessions, assignments, compensation, promotions, professional development, readiness, retention, sustainment, and training of all Special Operations Forces personnel. This coordination shall not interfere with the title 10 authorities of the Military Departments or Military Services.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENABLING CAPABILITIES

Question. The Commander, SOCOM, has described the “non-availability” of enabling capabilities as SOCOM’s “most vexing issue in the operational environment.” The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) sought to balance previously mandated growth in Special Operations Forces with additional enabling capabilities. What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling capabilities facing Special Operations Forces?

Answer. In the recent past, rotary wing lift has been one of the special operations community’s biggest shortfalls. The Department is mitigating these shortages by growing SOF forces through fiscal year 2015 by several thousand personnel and adding additional rotary wing units to SOF.

Question. Do you believe additional enabling capabilities, beyond those mandated by the QDR, are required to support Special Operations Forces?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Services and SOCOM are increasing enabling capabilities as mandated by the QDR. The Force Sufficiency Assessment should inform our senior leaders in deciding whether more enabling capabilities are needed.

Question. Do you believe the process for Special Operations Forces to request enabling capabilities from the Services, when required, should be formalized? If so, how?

Answer. This process is formalized in the Global Force Management Board (GFMB) Force Allocation process. COCOMs submit their SOF and enabling capability rotational requirements annually through the GFMB. The COCOMs also submit their emergent SOF and enabling capability requirements as a request for forces through the force allocation process. Additionally, it is my understanding that SOCOM is incorporating SOF-enabler requirements in the Strategic Analysis products, which support senior-leader force development decisionmaking, and the Services are integrating SOF-enabler support into their Force Generation Models.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to SOCOM’s title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.

Do you believe any modifications to SOCOM’s title 10 missions are appropriate? If so, what modifications would you suggest?

Answer. I believe SOCOM’s title 10 authorities are structured properly and that no modifications are required at this time.

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from interagency collaboration on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?

Answer. Information sharing, leveraging the strengths of interagency partners, and collaboration during the planning and execution of operations has led to increasingly successful results. Organizationally, the innovation of forming purpose-built task forces that draw upon expertise from among the interagency community has provided a high level of agility and efficiency in the conduct of civil-military operations. The practice of flattened, agile communications, extensive senior leader involvement across the U.S. Government and allies, and leveraging information dominance provided by these subject matter experts and their systems are among our key lessons learned.

Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?

Answer. Preserving the lessons learned of the interagency task force in doctrinal publications, properly resourcing future task forces, continuing our efforts to raise the state of the art of intelligence and operations fusion, and applying the lessons learned in future challenges will be among the ways we continue to improve upon the many hard fought insights made during the last decade. Our ability to address future complex challenges through the application of faster, flatter interagency organizations will be key.

Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured in military doctrine and adopted as “best practices” for future contingency operations?

Answer. Codifying our work is key. I believe it is critical that doctrinal publications such as Joint Pub 3–08, “Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations” capture the best practices of these horizontal interagency teams.

Our centers of and joint excellence are charged with making changes institutional across the military, and they will do this by integrating doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel, and facilities across all levels of command, from Joint Force Commanders to component commands to the unit level.

CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called for increased counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces. These missions have traditionally been within the purview of Special Operations Forces.

What actions, if any, do you believe need to be taken in order to allow special operations and general purpose forces to successfully share these missions in the future?

Answer. I believe the 2010 QDR’s strategic shift toward expanding general purpose forces’ capabilities and capacity for these contingencies makes sense. The overall flexibility of our Armed Forces can be greatly improved by investing in key enablers within our conventional force, such as strengthening and expanding capabilities for security force assistance; increasing the availability of rotary-wing assets; expanding manned and unmanned aircraft systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; improving counter-improvised explosive device capabilities; and enhancing linguistic, cultural, counterinsurgency, and stability operations competency and capacity.
Question. Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for Special Operations Forces only?
Answer. Special Operations Forces are a unique component of our U.S. Armed Forces that are trained to conduct operations in areas under enemy control or in politically-sensitive environments, including counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In such environments, Special Operations Forces provide a unique and essential capability.

LIBYA

Question. Do you support the limited U.S. military mission in Libya?
Answer. Yes. We are operating in Libya as a part of an international coalition enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973. Our role is to support and assist our partners in preventing the mass killing of innocent civilians in Libya. The U.S. military provides unique capabilities to this effort such as electronic warfare; aerial refueling, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support, and unmanned strike drones. In my view, we should maintain pressure until the goals agreed by NATO allies and partners are met.

Question. Do you support broadening the military mission to include regime change?
Answer. The goal of our military effort, and the mandate of the UN resolution, is very clear: we are protecting the Libyan people. I believe the regime’s attacks on its own people will continue unless Colonel Qadhafi relinquishes power, and that such attacks will dramatically increase if pressure is removed. To this end, while to my knowledge forced regime change is not specified in the military mission, this mission complements other instruments of power and will add significant pressure on Colonel Qadhafi over time to step down.

Question. Do you believe the United States should provide arms and training to the Libyan rebels?
Answer. Since the purpose of our military action is grounded in UNSCR 1973, which specifies protection for the Libyan people in population centers like Benghazi from a massacre at the hands of Colonel Qadhafi’s forces, any such assistance should be for that purpose. Because this is not a unique U.S. capability, and we are heavily engaged in other locations, I believe other countries should be the first to provide such assistance.

ARAB SPRING

Question. The Arab Spring has changed—and will likely continue to change—the political and military dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa for many years to come. These changes may require the United States to adjust our military-to-military and defense civilian relations engagements in this region.
In your personal view, what adjustments—if any—should be made to U.S. military-to-military and defense civilian relations in the region?
Answer. It is clear this is a moment of profound transformation and change in the Middle East and North Africa. People in this region seek greater individual rights, political reform, and economic opportunities. These calls for reform are gaining momentum across the region and are likely irreversible. Although we can expect instability as this region transforms, we have a unique opportunity to support these reform movements through our military relationships.

Military-to-military relationships offer important policy influence opportunities with our partners. We have very strong relationships with our military partners in the region, which has helped us keep pace with the transitions and to be in position to offer advice and assistance. A good example of this is our relationship with the Egyptian Military and their Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Throughout the political transition in Egypt, we have kept in close contact with Field Marshall Tantawi (Minister of Defense), Lieutenant General Enan (Chief of Defense Forces) and other members of the SCAF. These personal relationships have allowed us to engage on behalf of the U.S. Government and keep track of the events in Egypt.

Although our military relationships throughout the region are strong, these reform movements give us an opportunity to review our security cooperation and assistance policies to ensure they support and complement these democratic transitions. We are working closely with OSD and our COCOMs to review our programs and policies and ensure they help our partners continue to develop military forces that respect the rule of law and human rights.
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Question. Over the past decade, DOD has funded an increasing number of military information support operations and influence programs. While the Department does not have any separate budget documentation outlining its strategic communication activities, GAO reports that DOD "spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year" to support its information operations outreach activities. Many of these programs are in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) from SOCOM are also deploying to U.S. embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Further, the geographic COCOMs—at the theater and regional level—are moving into this operational space.

What are your views on DOD's military information support operations and influence programs?

Answer. DOD communication strategy and the unique capabilities of Military Information Support Operations play an important role in DOD communications efforts. I view Military Information Support Operations as traditional military activities that a global combatant commander uses to support Theater Security Cooperation and underpin the essential shaping operations required to support achievement of Theater Campaign Plan objectives, and (if needed) contingency operations in an area of hostilities. Influence programs and activities are one method by which DOD can support U.S. foreign policy objectives. In a world dominated by information purveyors and consumers, information-related capabilities have grown significantly in importance. Through Military Information Support Operations, we have a tremendous opportunity to shape the environment in support of a broad range of activities to include security cooperation and deterrence efforts. At the same time, it is critical that such activities be conducted in a synchronized manner with other U.S. Government departments.

Question. What was your experience with these types of operations in your capacity as the Commander of NORTHCOM?

Answer. NORTHCOM uses multiple communication methods to reach audiences outside the borders of the United States that are within our area of responsibility. We have used web sites, magazines, personal engagements, and blogs as tools, and have worked hard to improve internal DOD (and to some extent, external) understanding of the best ways, including the most appropriate messages, to communicate publicly about our partnership with Mexico, in particular. These operations are vital tools for enhancing military-to-military relationships and achieving our Theater Campaign Plan goals. Of course, these have to be well-integrated with other U.S. agencies, the Country Teams, and neighboring global COCOMs to ensure a whole-of-government effort.

Question. In your view, are DOD's programs adequately integrated into overall U.S. foreign policy activities?

Answer. Every effort is made to integrate DOD programs into U.S. foreign policy activities. A "whole-of-government" approach is critical in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. DOD's information and influence activities support DOD policy guidance and military objectives established by a theater's combatant commander. Activities conducted outside areas of hostility are often led by and always coordinated with our interagency partners. Activities conducted inside areas of hostility are similarly coordinated when they touch other activities of the U.S. Government or other activities of partner nations.

Question. In 2005, al Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that "We are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking place in the battlefield of the media." Last year, a non-partisan study highlighted the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment violence.

In your view, what are the appropriate roles of DOD, the Intelligence Community (IC), and the State Department in information operations to counter violent extremist ideology?

Answer. Ultimately, it is our collective actions that send the strongest messages to populations across the globe regarding radical ideologies and extremist groups. However, DOD also works closely with the CIA, the Department of State (principally its Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications), and the National Counterterrorism Center, in an interagency effort to coordinate programs and deconflict activities aimed at delegitimizing radical extremist ideology and its messages. The respective roles of all government departments and agencies involved in this campaign are defined by their legal authorities, institutional functions, and operational capabilities. DOD's global presence and outreach opportunities enable it to engage with local populations and develop relationships with credible interlocu-
tors to counter the messaging and discredit the appeal of violent extremist movements.

**Question.** In your view, what is the most effective means to counter radical ideologies that foment violence?

**Answer.** I believe that the most effective means to counter radical extremist rhetoric is through delegitimizing the leaders and ideology behind it to the point that these movements collapse under the weight of their own contradictory messages and actions. This is a war of ideas and ideals, and optimally moderating ideas are communicated by local voices. Our activity in this area must be persistent and long-term, focused foremost on clearly communicating our strategic narrative—our national interests, values, and policies—through both words and actions. An essential component of this effort is an adaptive communication framework that enables leaders at all levels to send coherent messages through credible messengers to key audiences using mediums that resonate at the right time. Our overarching objective is to truthfully and consistently demonstrate the efficacy of our policies and values, influencing our intended audiences to challenge and ultimately reject the sociopathic inducement to terrorism and violence that radical Islamist ideologies propagate.

**Question.** Defense Secretary Gates launched the Minerva Program in 2009 to develop deeper social, cultural, and behavioral expertise for policy and strategy purposes in the Middle East and the Far East. What do you believe this program contributes to broader DOD and U.S. Government efforts to counter violent extremist groups and their ideologies?

**Answer.** Although I've not had an opportunity to be closely associated with the Minerva program, I fully endorse the imperative of understanding the perceptions, attitudes, ethnic identities, religious beliefs, and predispositions of the audiences we seek to reach. Indeed, in my role as the NORTHCOM Commander, I have found that our efforts with Mexico have benefited in proportion to the degree to which we understand Mexican outlooks and sensitivities. The same applies in other parts of the world. Commanders and leaders at all levels need to appreciate not only how radical Islamist ideology and its messages resonate with its intended audiences, but how their own words and actions are processed through foreign cultural receptors. Our ability to effectively challenge the legitimacy of violent extremist groups depends on our appeal to the core interests and values of our target audiences, and that requires an in-depth understanding of their perspectives.

**EAST AFIRCA—AL QAEDA AND AL SHABAAB**

**Question.** Somalia is a failed state with a weak government unable to project either power or stability or to provide basic services to its people. Somalia is also a training and operations hub for al Shabaab and other violent extremists; pirates operating in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Peninsula; illicit traffickers of weapons, humans, and drugs; and remnants of the al Qaeda East Africa cell that was responsible for the destruction of our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August 1998. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and al Shabaab to the U.S. and Western interests in East Africa and to the U.S. Homeland?

**Answer.** I anticipate al Shabaab is planning to conduct attacks against U.S. interests in East Africa. I also expect the May death of al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden increased al Shabaab's planning against U.S. targets in East Africa, despite its primary focus on internal Somali issues, which include repelling a regionally-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) offensive. I further expect al Qaeda associated al Shabaab foreign-fighters will continue planning attacks against U.S. and Western targets. I remain concerned that individuals who successfully travel to Somalia and receive training from al Shabaab could become further radicalized and return to the United States to conduct operations without al Shabaab's guidance.

**Question.** What is your understanding of DOD's role in countering the threat posed by al Qaeda in East Africa and al Shabaab?

**Answer.** Al Qaeda has clearly set their sights on this region as potential safe haven from which to plan and to train for future attacks both within and outside the region. I am increasingly concerned about as well as about al Qaeda's growing influence on and near the Arabian peninsula, including al Shabaab's growing ties to al Qaeda and its transregional ambitions.

As we do elsewhere, we have provided—and congressional support will continue to provide—assistance to regional partner nation forces to counter threats from violent extremists in East Africa. DOD assists these efforts in concert with our international partners, by focusing our approach on populations, security capacity, and basic human needs. Some of that support is also aimed directly at improving counter-ter-
rorism capabilities. I cannot get into the specifics about operations we are supporting, but the work remains critical to our goal of disrupting and dismantling al Qaeda and their affiliates, and is having a significant impact on the terror network’s leadership, planning and resourcing efforts.

Question. What is your understanding of DOD’s supporting role to other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government in this region?

Answer. DOD supports other U.S. department and agency efforts in the region, such as the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development through the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) in Djibouti. The CJTF–HOA’s mission in the East Africa region is to build partner nation capacity in order to promote regional stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. and coalition interests. These activities directly support each country team’s objective of good partner nation governance by focusing on improving its security institutions’ professionalism and commitment to human security. As part of the overall “3–Ds” whole-of-government approach—Diplomacy, Development, and Defense—the CJTF–HOA’s role is a long-term commitment to regional stability through population-centric activities that strengthen both internal and international counter-violent extremist organization relationships.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD’s current role in East Africa?

Answer. I believe we must view Somalia from a regional East Africa perspective, not least because most of the U.S. Government’s traditional security cooperation tools are restricted from being used in Somalia. I understand that DOD is reviewing the status of Joint Task Forces to determine if any should transition to more permanent Joint Interagency Task Forces. In addition, U.S. Africa Command is looking at how best to direct our military efforts in the region to work in concert with our interagency partners. The ultimate goal is a strategy under which security assistance, capacity building, cooperation with regional partners, and counterterrorism actions are fully integrated to provide security and stability in East Africa.

YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Question. A number of senior U.S. officials have indicated the most significant threat to the U.S. Homeland currently emanates from Yemen. What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen and what is your understanding of the role of DOD within that strategy?

Answer. The current strategy in Yemen, as outlined in the State Department’s fiscal year 2011 Mission Strategic Plan, remains our best option for achieving a stable Yemen, one in which violent extremists cannot operate. The near-term goal of containing and degrading al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), while pursuing long-term initiatives to create a stable Yemen that can provide internal security, remain valid.

DOD’s role within this strategy is two-fold. First and foremost, U.S. Central Command works with interagency partners to build Yemen’s counterterrorism (CT) capacity and enhance CT partnerships. Separately, select elements work with the Yemeni Government to disrupt near-term threats to the U.S. Homeland. This effort is intended to provide time and space for the Yemeni security forces to increase their effectiveness and eventually eliminate Yemen as an al Qaeda safe haven.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD’s current role in Yemen?

Answer. My understanding is that, given the growing AQAP presence in Yemen, its threat to the Homeland, the ongoing unrest that has already weakened the Yemeni Government and the economy and allowed AQAP to expand its influence, we continue to closely evaluate our security assistance programs in Yemen—particularly those provided under section 1206. The Republic of Yemen Government currently remains a critical partner in the war against al Qaeda, and we remain particularly alert to the continued and growing threat to the Homeland from AQAP. I understand that we believe the likelihood of continued counterterrorism cooperation with the Yemeni Government will remain high during and after any future political transitions, but are prepared to reevaluate our partnership as necessary to address the changing military situation.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

Question. On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department’s CN operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyzing intelligence
on CN-related matters. In a recent GAO report, GAO found that DOD “does not have an effective performance measurement system to track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.” This is the second such finding relating by GAO to DOD CN in the last decade.

What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?

Answer. Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are a multi-dimensional threat to the United States. In addition to the impact on our Nation’s public health and economy, drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime provide a funding source for terrorists and insurgents, undermine legitimate government institutions, and contribute to international instability.

As the Commander of NORTHCOM, I have had the opportunity to work with the DOD’s interagency and foreign partners to ensure that our counternarcotics programs achieved positive results that were aligned with the goals of the National Security Strategy and the National Drug Control Strategy. If confirmed, I look forward to applying my experience in North America to the global DOD counternarcotics program.

Question. In your personal view, should DOD continue to play a role in stemming the flow of illegal narcotics?

Answer. Based on my experience, confronting this issue requires that all agencies work closely together to confront the flow of illicit narcotics. This whole-of-government approach has been critically important to the progress we have made since the 1980s and should continue. While the effort should largely be led by law enforcement, DOD has unique capabilities to bring to bear to this important effort. Moreover, DOD’s existing partnerships with countries throughout the world can help support U.S. Government efforts to confront this problem.

Question. In your position as the Commander of NORTHCOM, what was your assessment of the DOD CN program as it related to Mexico and the Caribbean?

Answer. The DOD CN program is critical to the success of NORTHCOM efforts in both Mexico and the Caribbean. Resourcing has improved over the last year, which has considerably improved our ability to assist our Mexican partners in their struggle against TCOs. Mexican security organizations are gradually transforming from a force principally focused on natural disasters into one able to integrate intelligence and operations in support of law enforcement operations that fully respect human rights and the rule of law. Counternarcotics funding is a key enabling factor of that effort. Recognizing that the threat posed by TCOs extends well beyond drugs, and that there are complex challenges associated with defeating them, future increased collaboration with mission partners and adequate resourcing are essential.

Question. In your position as the Commander of NORTHCOM, were there any activities that you had hoped to be able to conduct using DOD CN funding, but were not able to do and that you, if confirmed, would recommend DOD seek the authority to conduct?

Answer. Current authorities are appropriate and sufficient for successful execution of the NORTHCOM counternarcotics mission and the support we provide to our mission partners. Should I be confirmed, and should my view change based on the evolution of our relationship with regional partners or the perspectives I gain as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will work with the Committee to suggest potential improvements.

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS

Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 29, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the United States “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations.”

What is your view on whether the United States should contribute more military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

Answer. In my previous duty as director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, I had the privilege of concurrently serving as senior member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Military Staff Committee. In that role, I gained a first-hand appreciation of the valuable contributions our members make in support of U.N. peacekeeping missions. Keeping in mind our continuing troop commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe the United States can and should consider assigning a modest number of additional personnel to peacekeeping missions. Even in small numbers, U.S. members make a special contribution to these activities by virtue of their experience, training, and special skills.
Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations?

Answer. Some of the compelling benefits of providing U.S. personnel to these missions include:

- Delivering combat-tested expertise in logistics, intelligence, planning, and other key military functions where they are most needed;
- Providing our members with valuable experience in working shoulder to shoulder with international troops—a critical skill at the heart of our operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere; and
- Sending an unmistakable signal that the United States values U.N. peacekeeping operations—and because they are far more cost-effective than unilateral American interventions.

Among potential disadvantages, I would cite our significant troop commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan, which take priority and continue to subject our force to stress. I would also point out that, in some cases, U.S. personnel on the ground are not what a U.N. mission most needs. Local sensitivities will sometimes lead us to contribute to peacekeeping in other, less visible ways.

Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the United Nations?

Answer. The personnel management systems of our armed services do not perfectly align with the needs of multinational organizations like the United Nations. If confirmed, I would explore alternate mechanisms to respond to the requests of these institutions within the demands of our ongoing operations elsewhere in the world. In particular, we should examine how our Reserve components, whose personnel have recently delivered specialized, hard-to-find skills to Iraq and Afghanistan with such distinction, can make a greater contribution in this area.

GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE

Question. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) was established after the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit to address growing gaps in international peace operations. In most cases, DOD plays a supporting role in the implementation of this train and equip program.

What is your understanding and assessment of this program?

Answer. GPOI is an important part of our government’s strategy to build the capabilities of U.S. partners in peacekeeping operations. Through comparatively small investments in training and equipment, we can help those countries that want to contribute to peacekeeping operations. Over 80,000 military personnel have been trained under GPOI since 2005—a significant achievement. I also consider GPOI to be a strong example of the results we obtain when the Departments of State and Defense collaborate to promote our Nation’s security.

Question. Would you support additional DOD contributions—in the form of U.S. military trainers—to support this program?

Answer. From my perspective, GPOI has been successful in building partnership capacity because of its flexibility. The program has given our combatant commanders the freedom to tailor assistance to the specific needs of individual partners. If confirmed, I would consider recommending provision of additional military trainers under the GPOI program subject to the demands of our other operations overseas.

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

Question. A number of officials in DOD and the IC have called for investing significantly more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking.

What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance activities?

Answer. Terrorists, drug and weapons traffickers, and other adversaries rely heavily on legal and illegal funding sources to support their activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests. It is critical to engage all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the flow of money associated with these organizations. It is my understanding that DOD has capability to identify and disrupt our adversaries’ finances while working with our interagency counterparts both in countering terrorism and illicit trafficking. Counter Threat Finance is a cost-effective measure because both licit and illicit finances are often exposed through Western banking and customs processes and are subsequently vulnerable to interdiction, sanctions, and other law enforcement action. DOD is not the U.S. Government lead agency in counter threat finance but, it plays a supportive role by working with other depart-
ments and agencies—and with partner nations—to counter our adversaries’ ability to use global financial networks.

Question. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?

Answer. Recent DOD efficiencies decisions directed the creation of a Joint Threat Finance Intelligence Office to consolidate the counter threat finance intelligence functions resident in the Department, and this new office is expected to be operational by the end of FY2012 under the direction of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Although this effort does not seek to expand DOD’s role in CTF, it is my opinion that it streamlines the DOD’s efforts with the intent of improving support to other U.S. departments and agencies.

Question. TCOs in Central America and Mexico are having a debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people. Do you think expanded Counter Threat Finance activities in this region would be beneficial? If so, what role—if any—should DOD play in those activities?

Answer. Expanding the scope and scale of counter threat finance activities in the Central and North American regions would be beneficial, and DOD has a strong supporting role in those activities. NORTHCOM and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) are helping to shape and leverage unique capabilities in support of our foreign and domestic mission partners. Rather than attempting to conduct this mission in isolation, the correct approach is to understand the unique intelligence analysis capability that DOD can bring to this effort and then leverage it in support of other lead agencies, such as the Treasury Department. This will enable all stakeholders to achieve unity of effort in gaining leverage against potentially significant TCO vulnerability.

CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO

Question. During a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, the Commander of SOUTHCOM and you—in your capacity as the Commander of NORTHCOM—discussed the increasingly dangerous region along the northern and southern borders of Mexico and the devastating impact TCOs are having on the people and security of southern Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador. The United States has increased its assistance in this region, but—to date—DOD has had only a small role.

What are your views on the threats posed by TCOs in this region?

Answer. The corrosive effects of TCO-fostered drug abuse are taking an increasingly severe toll on our economy and our human capital. The presence of TCO distribution networks in many of our cities increases the scale and complexity of gang activity in our urban areas. The pervasive activity and influence of TCOs among our friends and neighbors in North and Central America are directly and negatively impacting their prosperity and security—to include increased violence, decreased real economic activity, and increased drug abuse—which carries its own indirect impact on the United States. The TCOs are vicious in the extreme, better-armed than many police forces, very well-financed, diversified, and increasingly adaptable and sophisticated in their methods. Their criminality extends far beyond drugs to extortion, robbery, kidnapping, trafficking in firearms and persons, and many other illegal activities. Currently, TCOs are using military grade equipment and tactics, including sophisticated assault weapons, sniper rifles, grenades, aircraft, improvised armored vehicles, and even submarines to move illegal drugs.

Question. What is your assessment of DOD’s current activities in Mexico and Central America?

Answer. I believe that DOD’s current activities in Mexico and Central America are having a positive impact. The scope and depth of our military-to-military relationships with most regional nations, including Mexico, have reached unprecedented levels. While continuing to emphasize the importance of the sovereignty of regional nations, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM have dramatically increased senior level interactions, subject matter expert exchanges, human rights training, mobile training teams, intelligence support, and exercises. Within the NORTHCOM area of responsibility, while Mexico deserves great credit for its own work, we are beginning to see the positive effects of our support, to include more Mexican emphasis on intelligence-operations fusion, greater tactical proficiency, jointness, and willingness to work with interagency partners. These nations’ security forces are often out-gunned by the TCOs, but they are making progress on all fronts in their ability to confront the serious threat of TCOs.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD’s current activities in this region?
Answer. I believe we need to further tighten the already-close cooperation among U.S. Government agencies, to include a willingness to expose regional militaries—beginning with Mexico—to more of the lessons learned and capabilities we have used overseas in the past decade. In so doing, we need to continually reinforce the need to fully respect the sovereignty of our partner nations. We should also support in any way we can the parallel activities that fall under other departments’ missions, such as strengthening justice institutions and building strong and resilient communities. Counter threat finance is an area we could better exploit to disrupt the funding streams fueling the TCOs. Finally, I have always believed we are better able to support observance of human rights by building close partnerships with our partners’ forces. Our activities in supporting human rights training have been highly successful and I would support more engagements of this type as requested by partner nations, and more freedom to interact with nations that have troubled histories in human rights.

Question. If DOD expands its activities in Mexico and Central America, where—in your view—can U.S. assistance have the greatest impact?

Answer. The greatest DOD impact will be felt in increasing regional militaries’ ability to conduct effective intelligence-driven operations—that are fully meshed with law enforcement and that respect human rights and democratic ideals—against the TCOs. This will involve assisting them in improving their ability to integrate intelligence and operations at the highest levels of proficiency while fully respecting their sovereignty in the process.

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation along the border of the United States and Mexico?

Answer. I believe we have made significant progress in securing our southwest border over the past couple years. As a nation, we have joined forces with our Mexican partners in dedicating increased manpower, technology, and infrastructure to counter the corrosive effects of TCOs, and we are seeing positive results. Seizures of contraband (illicit drugs, weapons, and bulk cash) have risen, illegal immigration attempts have decreased, and crime rates in southwest border communities have remained steady or dropped in recent years. In spite of this progress, I remain concerned about TCO-related violence in Mexico and the potential for spillover violence in the United States. If confirmed, my intent is to continue DOD’s strong support of our law enforcement partners to enhance their efforts to make the southwest border even more secure.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the Department’s support to civilian agencies operating along the southern border?

Answer. DOD support to civilian agencies operating along the U.S. southern border has a long history of collaboration and is on the rise as NORTHCOM and our Federal partners seek additional opportunities to partner. Through Joint Task Force North, NORTHCOM provides a wide array of training, assistance, and resources to support our partner agencies’ efforts. NORTHCOM has made progress over the past year through closer collaboration at senior leadership levels (to include our first-ever staff talks with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) senior leadership), increased agency presence (including CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration and others) in NORTHCOM headquarters, increased agency participation in planning, exposure to CBP of tactics and techniques the DOD has accumulated overseas, and direct provision of support. If confirmed, I will emphasize the need to understand partner agency plans, priorities, and concerns to aid the DOD in identifying areas where we can provide additional support to these agencies within DOD’s authorities and capabilities.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA

Question. Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided more than $7 billion to support Colombia’s efforts to counter the threat of narcotics and various insurgent groups.

In light of budget conditions, do you believe more significant reductions in U.S. security assistance to Colombia are advisable?

Answer. A significant reduction in U.S. assistance to Colombia would be ill-advised at this critical juncture of Colombia’s fight against TCOs and insurgent groups. Unquestionably, Colombia has made great strides, enabled by U.S. assistance, in its effort against TCOs and the illicit drug trades that feeds them. However, the Colombians have not defeated this threat. Any precipitous drop beyond the United States and Colombia coordinated and synchronized glide path reductions in our assistance is likely to inhibit achievement of a final negotiated settlement.
Question. What options do you believe are available to the United States to counter Iran's growing influence in the Middle East region?

Answer. Nearly every source of instability or other challenge in the Middle East—including support for terrorism, threats to the internal stability of regional nations, weapons proliferation, mischief in Iraq and Afghanistan, and overt and covert threats to Israel—may be traced in some manner back to Iran. We should encourage Iran to take its rightful place in the international community as a force for peace, stability, and prosperity in the Middle East. Until that occurs, however, every element of national and international power should be brought to bear to pressure Iran to change its behavior. Among other possible actions, these elements include:

- Diplomacy to maintain international resolve and overcome objections from both major states and non-aligned nations to taking firmer action, as well as continued attempts to engage Iran in responsible dialogue;
- Economic sanctions to place greater pressure on all sectors of Iran's government;
- Financial sanctions on individuals within Iran who support activity such as weapons proliferation, terrorist activity, and support for groups that target U.S. forces;
- Intelligence sharing to bring Iran's activities into sharper focus;
- Coherent information strategies to expose Iran's destabilizing behavior to the world at large;
- Law enforcement to curtail criminal activity on the part of Iranian surrogates and proxies;
- Close cooperation with regional militaries to ensure Iran is aware that aggression will be met by a capable and coherent response; and
- Continued presence of U.S. forces in the region to bolster our partners and deter Iran from taking irresponsible action.

Question. Do you believe that a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, beyond 2014, would increase, decrease or have no effect on Iran's influence in the region?

Answer. I do not believe a protracted U.S. deployment in Afghanistan after 2014 would measurably change Iran's influence in the region. Because such a deployment would serve as an irritant to Iran, that nation would support any group in Afghanistan that resists U.S. presence, but this influence would not likely extend far beyond Afghanistan. Should Afghanistan achieve greater stability, it is possible that Iran's influence could slightly decrease. On the other hand, Iran could claim some sympathy within the region under the banner of U.S. occupation.

Question. In your view, does Iran pose a near-term military threat to the United States by way of either its missile program or its nuclear program?

Answer. Iran openly states its intent to use its missile program as a deterrent against the United States as well as Israel and other regional nations. Iranian research, development, and testing continues for short and medium-range missiles, along with its pursuit of an anti-ship ballistic missile capability. These systems pose a near-term threat to U.S. forces in the Middle East, including in the Arabian Gulf region, as well as a threat to our vital interests in the region.

In the near- to mid-term, Iranian space program advancements include dual-use technologies that can be applied to development of long-range ballistic missiles that could carry a nuclear warhead. Iran also continues to pursue activities to improve its ability acquire nuclear weapons. Iran continues to enrich uranium at the Natanz facility in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, and has announced its intent to build additional enrichment facilities. In June, Iran announced it would triple its production of 20 percent uranium enrichment at the previously covert Qom enrichment facility by the end of this summer. Additionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency continues to assert that Iran has not provided sufficient answers to the possible military dimensions of their nuclear program.

Question. If you believe either of these programs pose a near-term threat, what in your view are the best ways to address such a threat?

Answer. For the near term, we should deter Iran by continuing robust regional security cooperation efforts in the Middle East region, to include assistance and cooperation efforts with the Gulf States, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other allies and partners. This would include continuing our commitment to air and ballistic missile defenses, shared early warning systems, counterterrorism, and counter-piracy programs, as well as programs to build partner capacity and protect critical infrastructure. Iran should have no doubt that we are committed to regional stability—we should thus maintain presence in the region to reassure our partners and persuade Iran that aggressive actions will come with a high cost.
An Iran with a nuclear weapon is extremely destabilizing and could precipitate a nuclear arms race in the region. I support the current U.S. position—that we cannot accept Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon. We should maintain a robust international consensus using all elements of power, including robust sanctions and targeting the finances of those involved in Iran’s nuclear program, to place pressure on Iran to reject its nuclear program and its other destabilizing activities.

Question. Other than nuclear or missile programs what are your concerns, if any, about Iran?

Answer. Malicious Iranian activities throughout the region include the use of proxies to extend Iranian influence into sovereign nations by providing increasingly sophisticated weapons, training, and finance. We are concerned Iran’s activities will negatively impact stability and erode the regional economy. It is important to maintain and strengthen our relationships with our regional partners and allies by continuing to build their security capacity.

Additionally, Iran supports Shia militant groups whose attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq are increasing in frequency, scope, and lethality. Asaib Ahl al-haq’s recent attack (15 June 2011) is an example of increased lethality based on Iranian technological partnerships.

Meanwhile, Iranian mischief elsewhere in the region continues. They have supported the Taliban with weapons shipments to enable Talibin attacks against U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Iranian support to Lebanese Hizballah and Syria directly counters U.S. interests regionally and threatens Israel. Finally, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy has the ability to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. In Iran’s recent Noble Prophet 6 exercises, Iran publicly stated that their intent was to demonstrate the ability to attack U.S. naval forces with anti-ship missiles.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Question. U.S. relations with Russia, although previously strained over a variety of issues, have recently improved in some areas. If confirmed, do you believe that there are any opportunities to improve relations through military-to-military programs, or other actions that you would recommend be taken?

Answer. We have already taken many positive steps to improve military-to-military relations between the United States and the Russian Federation, and we will continue to pursue improved relations in the future. Following the creation of the Military Cooperation Working Group in January 2010, we held several joint exercises and exchanges, and working group meetings to improve cooperation and transparency between our two countries. To illustrate, during 2010, NORTHCOM and NORAD held a joint field training exercise that demonstrated the ability of our forces to work together against airborne terrorist activities (Vigilant Eagle 2010). In my view, we have more work to do in order to make these types of exchanges more a matter of routine and less transactional. However, I look forward to continued exchanges and dialogue between the United States and Russia, which will help formulate and reinforce the trust and respect necessary to promote continued cooperation and increased transparency between our two nations.

Question. In January of this year you indicated that you would like to open a dialogue with Russian military officials and that you would welcome the opportunity to host a Russian counterpart. If confirmed, would you still welcome dialogue with your Russian counterpart?

Answer. Yes. As the NORTHCOM Commander, I have hosted several Russian delegations, and I strongly believe such exchanges can improve our communications and understanding and enhance our mutual security. Although there is no direct counterpart to the Vice Chairman’s position on the Russian General Staff, I welcome engagement on behalf of the Chairman with the Chief of the General Staff and with other members of the General Staff.

Question. What issues do you consider to be most important to address?

Answer. We have made great strides over the last year on improving the formal lines of communication between the U.S. and Russian militaries. Our communications must remain candid and constructive to ensure continued cooperation in areas such as the Northern Distribution Network in support of the Afghanistan effort and to close gaps in mutual understanding in areas such as missile defense. We should continue to cooperate on combating terrorism and piracy, and there is room for discussions regarding cyber security. Perhaps most importantly, we should make greater strides in establishing routine contact between many different levels of our military forces, as such contacts build trust and confidence and grow future leaders who will be on a familiar basis with their partners. However, this will require greater
willingness on the part of the Russian Federation Armed Forces to allow such communication.

INTEGRATION OF SPACE PROGRAMS

Question. What is your view on the need to institute a more integrated approach to both the military and intelligence sides of the space community?

Answer. I agree with the need to better integrate military and intelligence space capabilities. Members of both communities participate in a number of joint forums and I believe that progress is being made. We are jointly developing programs, and at senior levels have very integral relationships. However, when the needs of either side diverge to the extent that solutions impose impractical cost on the government, consideration should be given to potential independent, but complimentary solutions.

SPACE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Question. In many instances the military and intelligence space programs have experienced technical, budget, and schedule difficulties. In some instances these difficulties can be traced to problems with establishing realistic, clear, requirements and then maintaining control over the integrity of the requirements once established. If confirmed as chairman of the JROC you will be involved in determining these requirements.

How in your view can or should the space systems requirements process be improved?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that space system requirements process improvements are considered within the context of the Joint Capability Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS) process review in collaboration with the Director of National Intelligence.

Question. In general, space programs take many years to move from conception to launch. The result is that the technology in the satellites is significantly outdated by the time the satellites are launched and operational, which in turn, can lead to a decision to terminate a program early, and look to a newer technology. This vicious cycle results in significantly increased costs for space systems as sunk costs are never fully amortized.

How in your view can this cycle be addressed?

Answer. I believe shorter cycle times from concept to launch that are based on less complex system requirements can provide more frequent opportunities to infuse technology as it is determined to be mature enough for operational use.

SPACE COOPERATION

Question. Do you support arms control limitations on space capabilities?

Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, which states that the United States will pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space. We should only consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies.

Question. Would you support the United States signing the so-called European Union Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities?

Answer. I understand that the Department is currently evaluating the European Union’s proposed international Code of Conduct for Outer Space as a pragmatic first set of guidelines for safe activities in space. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this evaluation and considering appropriate steps to establish rules of the road for space operations.

OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

Question. Do you support the concept of operationally responsive small satellites and what do you see as the most promising opportunities for small satellites?

Answer. The concept of providing operationally responsive space capabilities to address emergent warfighter needs when existing capabilities cannot is sound. I understand that the recent launch of the first Operationally Responsive Space satellite is a good first step along the road to low cost, responsive space capabilities.

Question. Do you believe that smaller less complicated less expensive satellites can play a role in providing resiliency or redundancy for space systems?

Answer. I believe smaller, simpler, lower cost satellites can certainly play a role in providing resiliency for space systems. The specific role will depend on the priority of the mission, the state of technology, and the cost. The potential benefits in-
clude better availability of capability for the warfighter, and a more stable industrial base.

**PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE**

**Question.** DOD is currently working on technologies that if successful could lead to the decision to develop and deploy conventional, non-nuclear, prompt global strike capability. Do you believe that a prompt global strike capability should be developed and deployed?

**Answer.** I believe DOD should continue to study and test technologies relevant to Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capabilities, with an eye towards future acquisition. Affordable CPGS weapons would provide the Nation with a unique capability to strike time-sensitive targets without using nuclear weapons, so that distant, heretofore inaccessible locations will no longer provide sanctuary to adversaries.

**Question.** If your answer to the previous question is yes, what is your vision of the capability that should be developed for prompt global strike and the types of targets that would underpin the need to develop the capability?

**Answer.** CPGS systems could be useful in scenarios involving regional adversaries considering an imminent attack using weapons of mass destruction or against high-priority non-state adversaries. More broadly, CPGS may be the only system available in situations where a fleeting, serious threat was located in a region not readily accessible by other means. Fielding this capability strengthens deterrence by providing a credible means of responding to potential threats without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.

**NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

**Question.** If confirmed, you would become a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, and work closely with the National Nuclear Security Administration and its Stockpile Stewardship Program. What, in your view, are the longer-term Stockpile Stewardship Program goals and what are the key elements that should be addressed from a DOD perspective?

**Answer.** Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

It is my understanding that stockpile stewardship is effective; today’s stockpile has been certified and does not require further nuclear testing. But the stockpile is aging. I understand that there are challenges in identifying andremedying the effects of aging on the stockpile. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Department of Energy to maintain the critical skills, capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile, within a constrained budget environment.

**Question.** In your view is the Stockpile Stewardship Program providing the tools to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing and if not what tools are needed?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would continue to study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally-mandated Stockpile Management Program. It is important that the full range of life extension programs be considered to include: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.

**Question.** Do you believe the administration’s 1251 report sets forth an appropriate road map for the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and the strategic delivery systems?

**Answer.** I do believe the administration’s 1251 report details the right roadmap for ensuring the future safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile and associated delivery platforms as well as for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex. The 1251 report details a strong commitment to the nuclear mission and is an important element of assurance that the U.S. deterrent remains strong.

**Question.** Do you agree that the full funding of the President’s plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?

**Answer.** I agree that the full funding of the 1251 report is a critical national security priority. As stated by Secretary Gates and Secretary Chu in their joint 1251
transmittal letter to Chairman Levin, “... an increase of $4.1 billion in the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) budget highlights the administration’s strong commitment to the long-term effort to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent and the NNSA infrastructure that supports it. We look forward to continuing the modernization and sustainment of our nuclear weapons delivery systems, stockpile, and infrastructure.”

**Question.** Prior to completing this modernization effort do you believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START Treaty limits for either the deployed or nondeployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the 2010 NPR Report stated that we would pursue additional reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons with Russia, and a key aspect of implementing the 2010 NPR, as with previous such reviews, is conducting follow-on analysis. In determining U.S. objectives in future negotiations with Russia, our subsequent analysis will consider multiple factors in the effort to secure an outcome that best advances U.S. objectives for reductions in the numbers of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, both strategic and non-strategic, in a manner that supports the President’s commitment to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability with Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners. I believe that the status of the modernization effort will play a role in these deliberations.

Finally, the Senate noted in its resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty, and certified by the administration, that we must seek to initiate negotiations with Russia on a new arms control agreement by February 2012.

If confirmed, as we complete follow-on analysis required by the NPR, I will support the Department’s continuing assessment of the proper force size and capabilities required for an effective nuclear deterrent.

**Question.** Without the construction of the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Facility at Los Alamos and the Uranium Production Facility (UPF) at Y–12 and the other elements associated with the robust plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, do you believe reductions to the strategic hedge would be prudent?

**Answer.** Without CMRR, UPF, and other elements to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, the United States will not have sufficient infrastructure or capability to sustain the nuclear stockpile, nor will it have the capability to address a critical failure in a weapon type. Without the ability to correct deficiencies and failures, no matter how remote, careful analysis and the potential acceptance of risk would be required to enable or accept reductions in the strategic hedge.

Without construction of CMRR, the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise will not have essential tools to manufacture or assess the special nuclear materials required to produce or rebuild pits and other components. Aging facilities, long past their useful life and already partially condemned, cannot be sustained to meet ongoing requirements for the U.S. nuclear stockpile. CMRR is an important key to sustaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile and enabling reductions to the strategic hedge.

UPF at Y–12 is also key to the ability of NNSA and the National Security Laboratories to sustain the existing U.S. nuclear stockpile and provide capability to rebuild secondaries as long as a nuclear stockpile is required. As at Los Alamos, aging facilities, long past their useful life and already partially condemned, cannot be sustained to meet ongoing requirements for the U.S. nuclear stockpile. UPF is essential to sustaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile and enabling reductions to the strategic hedge.

**NEW START TREATY AND FUTURE REDUCTIONS**

**Question.** Earlier this year the New START treaty entered into force. Under the terms of the treaty both sides have 7 years to come into compliance with the treaty. Do you believe that there is any opportunity to come into compliance in less than 7 years and what would be the conditions under which such compliance could be achieved?

**Answer.** The treaty requires both parties to ensure their strategic offensive forces are at levels within the treaty’s three central limits 7 years after entry into force, which will occur on February 5, 2018. DOD is undertaking efforts to ensure we will comply with our treaty obligations. For instance, to date, all B–1B bombers have been converted to conventional use and all Minuteman II Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launchers have been eliminated or converted into Minuteman III ICBM launchers, thereby removing these formerly accountable items from being counted under the treaty’s central limits.
Question. Do you believe that reductions in the total number of warheads, both Reserve and operationally deployed, is feasible prior to the expiration of the New START treaty and, if so, under what conditions?

Answer. The Article II central limit of 1,550 warheads applies only to warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers. Seven years after entry into force (February 5, 2018), the New START treaty requires both State Parties to ensure total numbers of deployed strategic warheads are within this central limit. The DOD is undertaking efforts to ensure the United States will comply with our treaty obligations.

The New START treaty does not address non-deployed strategic nuclear warheads, e.g., nuclear warheads in the U.S. stockpile. Thus, any reductions in these weapons would be subject to a different analytical process that would consider stockpile reliability, modernization of our nuclear infrastructure, and other factors.

NUCLEAR TRIAD MODERNIZATION

Question. Under the NPR, the administration has committed to begin modernization of each leg of the nuclear triad including development of new nuclear cruise missiles and extending the life of nuclear weapons. This process will continue over the next 30 years and longer, and will be very expensive.

If confirmed, would you agree to review the requirements and cost of these initiatives, identify any opportunities for cost savings, and report back to the committee on a periodic basis if you identify such opportunities?

Answer. Yes, this will fall under my responsibilities, if confirmed, as Vice Chairman, and I would be pleased to report any opportunities for cost savings to the committee.

NUCLEAR POLICY

Question. Do you support President Obama’s vision for a world without nuclear weapons?

Answer. I share the President’s vision to “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” I also share the President’s commitment to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent capability as long as nuclear weapons exist.

Question. Do you believe this goal is a viable near- and/or long-term strategic strategy for the United States?

Answer. The President recognized, and I agree, that such an ambitious goal could not be reached quickly and perhaps, as he said, not in his lifetime. He also pledged that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.

A commitment to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent means sustaining our nuclear deterrent through life extension programs for warheads and modernization of delivery systems. I believe that providing necessary resources for nuclear modernization should be a national strategic priority.

When considered in total, I believe this is a viable long-term strategy.

Question. In a recent speech at the Carnegie Endowment the President’s National Security Advisor stated that the administration is currently “making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions” and that DOD will “review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.” He continued by stating that in meeting these objectives, the White House will direct DOD to consider “potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures.”

Do you believe the United States should pursue further reductions? Please explain why or why not.

Answer. I believe the United States should carefully consider future reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons—deployed and nondeployed, strategic and non-strategic. Ideally, U.S. reductions would be associated with reductions in Russian nuclear forces, and they should continue to support U.S. commitments to stability, deterrence, and assurance. Any reductions in these weapons should consider non-Russian threats, stockpile reliability and other factors in addition to the status of any planned or ongoing negotiations with Russia.

Question. Do you believe it would be prudent for the United States to pursue unilateral nuclear reductions? Please explain why or why not.

Answer. I believe the size and composition of Russia’s nuclear forces will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how fast the United States is prepared to reduce its forces; therefore, we should place importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels.
Any future reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners.

Question. Do you believe changes to well-established nuclear targeting requirements could negatively impact our ability to assure our allies, to discourage other countries from seeking strategic equivalence with the United States in nuclear weapons, and hedge against future threats and uncertainties?

Answer. I believe the United States is committed to maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures and that we will continue to reassure our allies and partners worldwide of our security commitments to them. I have observed that no significant changes to such DOD policies occur without thorough analysis and review. National Security Advisor Donilon has stated the next round of nuclear reductions will be accompanied by such a review to include targeting policy. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in this review.

FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES

Question. During the Cold War, DOD pursued three key technologies to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces: precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and satellite-based navigation. These three technologies have given U.S. forces unparalleled superiority until now. Our technology edge, however, in these areas is beginning to erode. What do you think are key technologies that DOD should be pursuing in order to maintain a technological edge?

Answer. The Department recently published seven strategic science and technology priorities. I believe focusing efforts in these areas are key to maintaining a technological edge. These priorities include:

• Data to Decisions to reduce cycle time and manpower needs;
• Engineering Resilient Systems for agile manufacturing of trusted and assured systems;
• Cyber Science and technology for effective cyber capabilities;
• Electronic Warfare and Protection to protect across the electro-magnetic spectrum;
• Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction;
• Autonomy for reliable and safe autonomous systems; and
• Human Systems to enhance human machine interfaces.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA


Answer. Yes, I strongly support U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as the best possible means for maximizing the rights of our Armed Forces to move freely through and over the world’s oceans. I believe that joining the Convention will strengthen our military’s ability to conduct operations.

Question. How would you answer the critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?

Answer. Accession to the Convention would more permanently secure the global mobility rights that are of vital importance to ongoing and future national security operations and humanitarian assistance missions. From the right of unimpeded transit passage through straits used for international navigation, to reaffirming the sovereign immunity of our warships, to providing a framework for countering excessive claims of other states, to preserving the right to conduct military activities in exclusive economic zones, the Convention provides the stable and predictable legal regime we need to conduct our operations today and in the future. The Convention codifies fundamental benefits important to our operating forces as they train and fight, supports the operational maneuver space for combat and other operations of our warships and aircraft, and enhances our own maritime interests in our territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. Further, amendments made to the Convention in the 1990s satisfied many of the concerns that opponents have expressed.

Among the vital rights provided by the Convention that accession would place on a more secure footing are:

• Innocent Passage through territorial seas;
• Archipelagic sea lanes passage through island nations;
• Transit passage through, under and over international straits;
• Warship right of approach and visit; and
• Laying and maintaining of submarine cables.
For example, in the ongoing tensions over rights in the South China Sea, the United States is in a weaker position in both bilateral and multilateral discussion by not having ratified the treaty. As another example, absent joining the Convention, we will lose the opportunity to influence key international decisions that will be made in the coming years regarding Arctic resource claims. Accession would eliminate the need for the United States to assert that vital portions of the Convention addressing traditional uses of the oceans are reflective of customary international law. As the Law of the Sea continues to be developed, there is a need to lock in the Convention’s provisions as a matter of treaty law while we still can as a bulwark against customary law drifting in a negative direction. Accession would give the United States a seat at the table as the world’s nations deliberate the future direction of the Law of the Sea.

The Convention provides the only internationally-accepted process for nations to establish legal title to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from their coasts. Only by submitting its claim of an extended continental shelf to the Commission set up under the Convention can the U.S. guarantee international acceptance of its claim to an extended continental shelf off its coasts, including sovereign rights to potentially vast energy resources in the Arctic.

Finally, joining the Convention will enable us to shape the future evolution of the Law of the Sea Treaty by placing U.S. nominees in key positions within important bodies, including those currently interpreting the Convention.

TREATMENT OF DETAINEE

**Question.** The Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.

**Answer.** Yes.


**Answer.** Yes.

**BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

**Question.** In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles, starting this year and increasing in capability with each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability to defend against long-range missiles that could reach the United States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense capability.

Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe?

**Answer.** I support the President’s policy on European Phased Adaptive Approach and, if confirmed, I will ensure DOD supports the program’s full implementation.

**Question.** In February 2010, DOD issued its report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans, programs, and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the Homeland against attack by a small number of long-range missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging against future uncertainties.

Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the BMDR?

**Answer.** I support the policies, strategies, and priorities as set forth in the BMDR. If confirmed, I will implement the policy priorities of the BMDR, including sustaining and enhancing defense of the Homeland, while increasing our capability against growing regional threats.

**Question.** As the Commander of NORTHCOM, you are the combatant commander responsible for the operation of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the homeland against potential limited missile attacks from nations like North Korea and Iran. The most recent GMD flight test, in December 2010, failed,
and the Missile Defense Agency is working to fully understand and correct the problem that caused that flight test failure.

Do you agree that it is essential to correct the problem that caused the December 2010 flight test failure, and to verify the success of that correction through extensive testing, including flight testing, before continuing production and delivery of additional Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKV) for the GMD system?

Answer. Verifying and correcting the problems with the EKVs prior to continuing production is prudent and supports the administration’s policy to “fly before you buy” in order to improve reliability, confidence, and cost control of U.S. missile defense systems.

Question. Do you support the continued modernization and sustainment of the GMD system?

Answer. Yes. The United States is currently protected against the threat of limited ICBM attack from states like North Korea and Iran. It is important that we maintain this advantage by continuing to improve the GMD system and ensuring we have adequate capacity to counter limited threats as they evolve.

Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.

Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from nations such as Iran?

Answer. Yes, cooperation with Russia would strengthen the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses, as well as those of the Russian Federation. In this particular case, effective ballistic missile defenses devalue Iran's ballistic missile arsenal by reducing its confidence that an attack would be successful.

Question. What do you believe would be the security benefits of such missile defense cooperation, and what types of cooperation do you believe would be beneficial?

Answer. Cooperation could offer tangible benefits to the United States, Europe, and Russia in the form of stronger protection against missile threats and a greater insight into our respective missile defense plans, which could strengthen strategic stability. As President Obama stated, this cooperation can happen “even as we have made clear that the system we intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint system, and it will not in any way limit United States’ or NATO’s missile defense capabilities.” Pursuing a broad agenda with Russia focused on shared early warning of missile launches, technical cooperation, operational cooperation and planning, and joint exercise would be beneficial cooperative efforts.

Question. The Vice Chairman of the JCS is a member of the Missile Defense Executive Board, and the Chairman of the JROC. This gives the Vice Chairman a unique perspective on the oversight and management of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), including its requirements component.

Are there additional steps that you believe would make the BMDS more responsive to the operational needs of the combatant commanders, and are there additional steps that you believe would improve the requirements process for missile defense?

Answer. I believe that we must continue to involve the combatant commanders in the acquisition process to ensure that their operational needs are considered as we develop and field systems to support the joint warfighter. To that end, we continually review these processes to ensure that we are doing the best job that we can to support the warfighter. While recognizing that BMD systems developed by the Missile Defense Agency are not subject to the JROC, the unique position of the Vice Chairman as a member of both the Missile Defense Executive Board and JROC provides the oversight to ensure that we are integrating all of the development and requirements of missile defense.

FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Question. In your view, what existing or new missions should be the focus of NATO’s strategic efforts over the next 5 years?

Answer. The focus of NATO’s strategic efforts should be to collectively secure our Nations through collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. NATO must complete its current missions in Afghanistan, Libya, the Mediterranean, off the Horn of Africa, and in the Balkans. We must also maintain the flexibility to respond to emergent threats such as ballistic missiles, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and cyber attacks.

Question. In your view, how should NATO proceed on the issue of further enlargement of the alliance over the next 5 years?
Answer. This is clearly a decision reserved for NATO Heads of State and Government. However, in accordance with Article 10 of the NATO treaty, I believe that any Transatlantic State that is in a position to further the principles of the NATO treaty and that is willing and able to contribute to the security of the NATO Atlantic area commensurate with its capacity should be favorably considered for NATO membership.

Question. At a NATO Defense Ministers meeting in June, then-Secretary of Defense Gates warned that NATO was at risk of losing U.S. financial support for an alliance “on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.” He criticized the “significant shortcomings in NATO—in military capabilities, and in political will.” He worried that NATO would turn into a “two-tiered alliance” consisting of “those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership.”

Do you share Secretary Gates’ concerns regarding NATO capabilities? Why or why not?

Answer. Yes, I do share former Secretary Gate’s concerns. Most allies (due to limited resources made available to defense ministries) have been forced to make critical choices between spending money on transforming their militaries or on contributing to alliance operations.

Many allies have been able to strike a delicate balance between these two competing demands. However, it has resulted in an overall loss of effectiveness, which initially was minor but has now been compounded by time.

The current economic climate has added to this as all allies envisage budget reductions. This lack of resources is the biggest threat to the alliance’s ability to accomplish its core missions.

Question. What steps, if any, could or should NATO take, in your view, to reduce tensions with Russia?

Answer. I believe that NATO should continue to engage actively and positively with Russia on issues of mutual interest through the NATO Russia Council. This Council serves as a valuable forum not only to discuss issues on which we agree, but also to discuss issues on which we disagree. This engagement has facilitated NATO-Russia cooperation in numerous areas such as counter-piracy, combating-terrorism, non-proliferation, search and rescue at sea, and disaster response. The continuation of this type of cooperation is important not only from a military perspective, but it remains an essential means by which to enhance transparency and therefore avoid or reduce tensions.

Question. What is your view of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)? If confirmed, would you advocate ratification of the treaty?

Answer. The CTBT is an important tool that will help counter nuclear proliferation. An in-force CTBT would limit the development of more advanced and destructive nuclear weapons and inhibit the ability of non-nuclear weapons states from developing their own programs. I understand that it has been assessed that CTBT would have no impact on U.S. military confidence in its nuclear stockpile. If confirmed, I would support ratification of the CTBT with adequate safeguards regarding stockpile stewardship and verification.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress be able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

BORDER SECURITY

1. Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Winnefeld, Joint Task Force (JTF)-North is the sole Department of Defense (DOD) organization tasked to support the Nation’s Federal law enforcement agencies in the identification and interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and along the approaches to the Continental United States (CONUS). While the potential threats vary, they can include narco-trafficking, smuggling, weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to our security. The Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for Force Protection and Intelligence Analysis program was created in order to research, exploit, analyze, and disseminate unclassified information on cartels and transnational criminal organizations along the U.S./Mexico border. What is your assessment of the OSINT program administered by JTF-North and whether it provides value to our interagency border security and counter-narcotics efforts?

Admiral WINNEFELD. As the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Commander, I have seen the important mission contributions that OSINT provides, including those to NORTHCOM’s JTF-North component. I understand that funding for the continuation of the OSINT for Force Protection and Analysis program is currently under review, but assure you that the critical merits of this program will be reviewed before a final decision is made. I would defer to Department of Homeland Security for an assessment of the value of OSINT to its border security mission and to the Drug Enforcement Administration for the impact of OSINT on counter-narcotics trafficking.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

HEALTH CARE COSTS

2. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Winnefeld, in a modest attempt to control DOD’s health care costs, former Secretary Gates sought to apply a medical inflation factor to TRICARE Prime enrollment fees for working-age retirees beginning in fiscal year 2013. Unfortunately, our committee balked at that idea, and reported a bill that would permanently tie DOD’s hands to annual increases to the annual increase in retired pay, which has been minimal. TRICARE fees haven’t changed since they were established in 1995. At that time, according to DOD, working age retirees paid about 27 percent of their total costs when using civilian care. Today, out of pocket expenses for working age retirees represent less than 9 percent of the total cost of the family’s health care costs. Some argue that health care benefits to retirees have been eroded over time. Do you agree?

Admiral WINNEFELD. DOD provides generous health benefits to retirees while maintaining TRICARE enrollment fees that are still well below the inflation-adjusted out-of-pocket costs set in 1995. However, rising medical costs add pressure to the Department’s budget, which make modest attempts to control DOD’s health care costs applied fairly to veterans necessary. The health benefits we provide to retirees are a significant part of the military quality of life. This commitment to caring for our men and women in uniform also provides the opportunity to recruit and retain the highest caliber personnel the Nation has to offer. I intend to continue our efforts to identify effective ways to improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of the Military Health System.

3. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Winnefeld, do you support the administration’s modest goal of linking future increases in fees for working age retirees to a factor that relates to rising national medical costs?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I believe that the proposed health care efficiencies, including modest increases in beneficiaries’ cost shares, are sensible efforts to control DOD’s health care costs while maintaining the same level of care.
If confirmed, I will continue to identify cost-effective improvements to the Military Health System. Such an examination would include consideration of future changes in fees related to national medical costs.

4. Senator McC.AIN. Admiral Winnefeld, do you see the rise in health care costs as a threat to readiness and if so, what would you do or recommend, if confirmed, to address this very serious issue for DOD?
Admiral WINNEFELD. I believe that the rise in health care costs is a threat to readiness, as projected rising costs of medical care could demand an increasing share of a decreasing top line for DOD.
Our uniformed servicemembers make great sacrifices for the Nation and deserve a quality of health care that is both commensurate with their quality of service and ensures they are ready for whatever we ask of them. Additionally, the generous health benefits we provide to their families and retirees are a significant contribution to our ability to recruit, and even more significantly, retain the best our Nation has to offer which directly correlates to our future readiness.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

5. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Winnefeld, DOD’s recently released its report “Strategy for Operating in Cyber-Space” which portrays a bleak outlook for our Nation’s national security and highlights the need for increased defensive operations. However, the strategy sidesteps the question of retaliation measures the United States can take against attackers, as well as how to locate the culprits in order to punish them. General Cartwright stated that this strategy is “too predictable” and expressed dismay that it outlined a defensive plan without mentioning an offense. In unveiling the strategy, Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn disclosed that, in March, DOD discovered that a foreign intelligence service stole 24,000 computer files related to a weapons system under development. While the President has said large-scale attacks such as knocking out a power grid would be subject to full-scale retaliation by the U.S. military, smaller attacks such as data theft and security breaches are far more rampant and serious today and apparently have no defined consequences. What are your thoughts on this issue?
Admiral WINNEFELD. We must ensure our adversaries understand the consequences of a cyber-attack against the United States. As with more traditional domains, we must make a determination of when espionage crosses the line into hostile intent or a hostile act. While it can be more challenging to make this determination in cyberspace, as stated in the President’s International Strategy for Cyber-space, when warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. DOD is prepared to defend U.S. national security interests through all available means, if so directed. At the same time, we are addressing our vulnerabilities in cyberspace and the efforts of state and non-state actors to gain unauthorized access to our networks and systems.

6. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Winnefeld, do you agree that DOD needs an offensive as well as a defensive strategy for cyberspace?
Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes. DOD requires a strategy for cyberspace operations that includes both offensive and defensive components. To this end, the Department must strike a balance between offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. This balance includes continuing with our cyberspace deterrent strategy; collaborating with the interagency community and international partners to increase our cyber security posture; continuing the ongoing executive level interagency review of the current offensive policy; and supporting efforts with the Department of Homeland Security, which protects U.S. networks, to develop the procedures to identify and mitigate threats.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

7. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Winnefeld, the statutory functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relate primarily to planning, providing advice, and policy formulation, particularly related to the strategic direction of the Armed Forces and strategic plans. In this capacity, not later than January 1st of each odd-numbered year, the Chairman is required to submit to the Secretary of Defense his assessment of the nature and magnitude of the strategic and military risks associated with executing the missions called for under the National Military Strategy (NMS). Not later than
February 15 of each even-numbered year, the Chairman is required to submit to the Senate and House Defense Committees a comprehensive examination of the NMS. While I realize you have been nominated for Vice Chairman, not Chairman, nevertheless you will be involved in these discussions and your views will carry great weight.

With that in mind, I would appreciate your views on our current NMS, whether you believe the Armed Forces are adequately postured and, if not, what changes we need to make to improve our posture with respect to our global responsibilities and global threats.

Admiral WINNEFELD. At this time, I believe the current NMS meets our requirements and is appropriately nested with the National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review. The Joint Force remains fully engaged executing that strategy. That includes major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, conducting strategic and conventional deterrence, defending the Homeland, countering terrorism and piracy, and operating with our key allies and partners. As U.S. Northern Command Commander, I participated in the development of Admiral Mullen’s 2011 Chairman’s Risk Assessment, and fully support his conclusion that we face a number of challenges in holding down strategic and military risk in this uncertain security and funding environment. However, based on the growing national security imperative of deficit reduction and how this may impact resources available to DOD, we may need to reexamine our strategy. As Vice Chairman, I will, along with the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commanders continue to work with the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategic approach that best mitigates these risks including how we posture our forces.

8. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Winnefeld, in light of pending reductions in all aspects of Federal spending including defense, do you have any thoughts on what commitments, responsibilities, and tasks you believe the U.S. military should consider stop doing?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The Department is continuing its Comprehensive Defense Review to ensure our spending decisions are strategy-based, risk-informed, and defend and advance our national interests given the range of threats we face in the current and projected security environment. We are taking a close look at those essential missions we must undertake today and in the future to meet our national security needs. We are also reviewing the capabilities, force structure, posture, and resources required for those missions, considering throughout the process what we should stop doing, or do less of, to not sacrifice the readiness and training of our forces.

In the current environment, I believe we can achieve our financial imperative through a combination of efficiencies and, essentially, “doing less of the same.” It goes without saying that the latter will involve increased risk. Should additional funding reductions be mandated, we will likely be forced into a strategic inflection point that would cause us to migrate towards less balance among the “prevent,” “prevail,” and “prepare” imperatives of the Quadrennial Defense Review, while maintaining our commitment to the “preserve” imperative. The Chairman and I, in close consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, are closely examining every issue as part of this review, and will provide our military advice on where we think we can assume additional strategic and military risk resulting from reductions in the defense budget.

——

Question Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Recapitalization Program

9. Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Winnefeld, regarding the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Recapitalization Program, the currently submitted P-forms show volumes between 1,300 and 2,900 vehicles expected to go through the program annually with a budget allocation of approximately $161 million per year. With a target price for HMMWV recapitalization between $160,000 and $180,000 each, this would only equate to about 1,000 vehicles recapitalized annually. Can you explain this potential discrepancy? Based on this, what is the expected timeline to complete all 60,000 HMMWVs slated for recapitalization?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The discrepancy in question arises from different cost assessments for each variant of the HMMWV. Specifically, we intend to procure 1,362 Up-Armored HMMWVs (UAHs) in fiscal year 2012 at the unit cost of $101,000 as shown on the P-form. The vehicle quantity of 2,963 per year depicted for fiscal year
2013–2016 was based purely on non-armored HMMWVs at approximately half the cost of the UAHs per unit.

As indicated on the P-form, the Army was initiating plans for UAH RECAP Modernization effort beginning in fiscal year 2013 to add improved performance and protection to the UAHs which aligns with the $160,000–$180,000 referenced in the question. Upon successful completion of the integration and testing of these efforts, the recapitalization of UAHs will migrate to the UAH RECAP Modernization Program. With better knowledge of the scope of this effort, the BES–13 submission will reflect a mix of UAH RECAP Modernization and non-armored HMMWVs.

An ongoing assessment of the state of the HMMWV fleet and available funding will inform the overall vehicle quantity and mix, as well as the final timeline to completion.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS

10. Senator Collins. Admiral Winnefeld, the U.S. Navy currently has the fewest number of ships since before World War I. In fact, the Navy has established a requirement for fiscal year 2024 of having a force of 94 multi-mission large surface combatants, but the Navy’s fiscal year 2012 30-year shipbuilding plan projects the Navy will only achieve the 94-ship goal for BMD-capable ships in 2020 and 2012, with force levels declining thereafter. Furthermore, a February 2011 Navy report on Surface Ship Readiness found that 60 percent of the fleet is underway at any given time and 43 percent forward deployed, both of which represent historically high percentages, and negatively impacts material readiness and service life capacity. As national security requirements demand more from our ships, it is increasingly unlikely our surface combatants with programmed 35-year service lives will reach that goal.

Do you support the Navy’s plan to eliminate the gap between the 285-ship Navy we have today and the 313-ship Navy that has been described by the current Chief of Naval Operations as the minimum number of ships needed to meet the national security requirements?

Admiral Winnefeld. I support the Navy’s current plan to eliminate the gap between the 285-ship Navy we have today and the 313-ship Navy needed to meet the national security requirements of our current strategy. However, I also acknowledge that it may be necessary to adjust our strategy to match the national security imperative of deficit reduction with our investments in national defense. Thus it may be difficult to achieve the 313-ship goal. In any case, I will work to ensure that the Navy’s shipbuilding plan continues to provide a battle force capable of meeting our national security requirements and that is properly balanced against risk and cost.

COMBATANT COMMAND MISSILE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS

11. Senator Collins. Admiral Winnefeld, as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will chair the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) which is responsible for ensuring our warfighters have the capabilities they need to achieve the National Security Strategy. Many of us are concerned about the number of missiles and ships required to deploy an adequate ballistic missile defense (BMD) for our Nation and our allies. In March 2011, General Mattis testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he does not expect his requirements in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) for these assets will be fully satisfied now or in the future. He said, “There simply are not enough assets to deal with the global threat.” I would anticipate the other combatant commanders in Europe and in the Pacific would say something similar. How will you ensure the combatant commanders’ BMD requirements are met through the JROC process?

Admiral Winnefeld. As a sitting combatant commander, I am intimately aware of both the importance of understanding combatant command equities in the JROC process and ensuring we deliver necessary capabilities to our warfighters. From that experience, I believe involving the commanders in the acquisition process ensures their operational needs are considered as we develop and deploy future systems.

If confirmed, I will have a role in the resourcing of our BMD capability as a member of the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB), but specific requirements for BMD fall outside of the JROC and are instead managed by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). I also recognize that the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is uniquely suited to ensure combatant command BMD requirements are met as a member of both the MDEB and JROC and through his general involvement in the budget proc-
ess. I look forward, if confirmed, to ensuring we deliver for the warfighter in this valuable mission set.

SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE

12. Senator COLLINS. Admiral Winnefeld, in their fiscal year 2012 budget testimony, former Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen identified shipbuilding as one of the two components of the defense industrial base that worried them, in particular. Secretary Gates stated, "A number of the Navy ships that were built during the Reagan years will basically reach the end of their planned life in the 2020s, and where the money comes from to replace those ships is going to be a challenge ... there are some tough choices in terms of big capabilities that are coming down the road." Do you agree with that assessment and the importance of sustaining the shipbuilding industrial base?

Admiral WINNEFELD. A healthy industrial base is critical in all areas of defense acquisition to ensure delivery of the industrial capacity and quality necessary to meet our national security requirements. I agree that a number of ships will reach their planned life in the 2020s. The Navy's long-term shipbuilding plan includes retirement of 105 ships from 2020 to 2029. During the same period, the Navy plans to take delivery of 94 ships. Based on the Comprehensive Review and expected defense spending reductions, I will work to ensure that the Navy's shipbuilding plan continues to provide a force capable of meeting our national strategic objectives. As we work through the difficult decisions we will face due to ongoing deficit reduction efforts, maintaining an adequate industrial base must, in my view, remain a priority.

SAFE HAVENS

13. Senator COLLINS. Admiral Winnefeld, on July 17, 2011, Maine lost another one of its proud soldiers, Private First Class Tyler Springmann, to an improvised explosive device that exploded in Afghanistan. Given the tremendous sacrifice that our service men and women are making, I want to be sure that the strategy currently being pursued can work. The President has stated the core goal of the U.S. strategy in Central Asia is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. Earlier this year, Admiral Mullen testified that one of the necessary conditions to achieve that goal was to neutralize insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan, but that insurgent groups currently operate unhindered in those sanctuaries. Yet, General Mattis recently testified that he does not expect Pakistan will reverse its current approach and eliminate the safe havens that exist there. He said that "satisfactory end-states are attainable in Afghanistan, even if the sanctuaries persist." Even if there is a satisfactory end-state in Afghanistan, how can we achieve the President's goal of preventing the return of al Qaeda fighters to Afghanistan and Pakistan so long as they can take advantage of the safe havens enjoyed by the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network just across the border in Pakistan?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The loss of Private First Class Tyler Springmann and others like him exemplifies the challenges our forces currently face; a challenge exacerbated by sanctuaries in Pakistan and by Pakistan's apparent unwillingness to fully engage these extremist networks.

A satisfactory end state in Afghanistan should make it more difficult for extremists finding safe haven in Pakistan to operate in Afghanistan. We have found that areas in Afghanistan in which security and economic progress are achieved tend to reject the presence of these extremists. Moreover, we intend to continue our efforts to persuade Pakistani leaders that extremist groups operating in Pakistan, including some that exist as proxies of the Pakistani government, pose a threat to regional stability and to Pakistan itself, and should be disrupted and dismantled.

SUCCESS METRICS

14. Senator COLLINS. Admiral Winnefeld, the fiscal year 2012 budget request documents state the top strategic goal for DOD is to prevail in today's wars. I am surprised that the budget documents include only six metrics to measure whether DOD is prevailing in today's war in Afghanistan. Two of the metrics look at the number of trained Afghan security forces. Another metric evaluates whether CENTCOM has the resources to conduct military operations. The last three of the six DOD metrics are tied to contracting actions in theater. I am concerned that most of these metrics fail to address the major challenges in Afghanistan: eliminating the Pakistan safe
havens, reducing corruption, building a robust agriculture economy, and improving
governance. The metrics do not even include how many al Qaeda members are
present in either country. Given that prevailing in today’s wars is the most impor-
tant goal of DOD, do you believe the current metrics allow you and the rest of the
Services to adequately measure success in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Admiral WINNEFELD. As part of a budget document, the fiscal year 2011 and fiscal
year 2012 DOD-wide priority performance goals in the fiscal year 2012 Defense
budget are specifically related to business operations and logistics support to over-
seas contingency operations. The specific metrics for evaluating progress and meas-
uring success in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including the two DOD-assigned objec-
tives, are spelled out in Annex B of the NSC’s 2009 strategic implementation plan
for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Examples, among many others, include the extent of militant-controlled areas in
Pakistan, the effectiveness of Pakistani border security efforts, measures of popu-
lation security at all levels including the number of districts or extent of area under
insurgent control, the size and capability of the Afghan National Army and Afghan
National Police, and effectiveness of Afghan National Security Forces-International
Security Assistance Force partnered counterinsurgency operations.
While I believe these metrics, indicators, and submetrics are sufficient, we con-
tinue to work with the interagency to refine our criteria as the environment
changes.

[The nomination reference of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, follows:]  

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
June 6, 2011.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed
Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a position
of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 154:

To be Admiral
ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., 0000.

[The biographical sketch of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]  

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF VADM JAMES ALEXANDER WINNEFELD, JR., USN

24 Apr. 1956 Born in Coronado, CA
07 June 1978 Ensign
07 June 1980 Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 July 1982 Lieutenant
01 Sep. 1988 Lieutenant Commander
01 Sep. 1992 Commander
01 Sep. 1997 Captain
01 Oct. 2003 Rear Admiral (lower half)
06 May 2006 Designated Rear Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade
01 Aug. 2006 Rear Admiral
14 Sep. 2007 Vice Admiral
19 May 2010 Admiral, Service continuous to date

Major duty assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignments and dates</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Station, Annapolis, MD (Division Officer)</td>
<td>June 1978</td>
<td>Nov. 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL (DUINS)</td>
<td>Nov. 1978</td>
<td>Apr. 1979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Summary of joint duty assignments:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff (Action Officer, EUCOM/CENTCOM Branch, J3)</td>
<td>Feb. 1990</td>
<td>July 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff (Senior Aide-De-Camp to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td>July 1991</td>
<td>Aug. 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Group, United Nations Military Staff Committee</td>
<td>Aug. 2008</td>
<td>May 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Medals and awards:**

- Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal
- Legion of Merit with two Gold Stars
- Bronze Star Medal
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal
- Air Medal with First Strike/Flight Award
- Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one Gold Star
- Joint Service Achievement Medal
- Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal
- Joint Meritorious Unit Award
- Navy Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star
- Navy “E” Ribbon with “E” Device
- National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
- Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two Bronze Stars
- Southwest Asia Service Medal with one Bronze Star
- Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
- Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
- Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star and one Bronze Star
- Expert Pistol Shot Medal

**Special qualifications:**

- BS (Aerospace Engineering) Georgia Institute of Technology, 1978
- Designated Naval Aviator, 1980
- Capstone, 2004–3
- Designated Level IV Joint Qualified Officer, 2009

**Personal data:**

- Wife: Mary Alice Werner of Menomonie, WI
- Children: James A. Winnefeld II (Son), Born: 29 November 1995
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff (Senior Aide-De-Camp to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td>July 91–Aug. 92</td>
<td>CDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (Director of Joint Innovation and Experimentation, J9)</td>
<td>June 06–Aug. 07</td>
<td>RADM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Commander, Sixth Fleet/Commander, Striking and Support Forces NATO/Deputy Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Commander, Joint Headquarters Lisbon, Joint Staff (Director, Strategic Plans and Policy) J5/Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee.  
Commander, Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command | Sep. 07–Aug. 08   | VADM   |
|                                                                           | Aug. 08–May 10    | VADM   |
|                                                                           | May 10–to date    | ADM    |

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM James A. Winnefield, Jr., USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
Room SR–228  
Washington, DC 20510–6050  
(202) 224–3871  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM  
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES  
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)  
James A. Winnefield, Jr. (Nickname: Sandy).

2. Position to which nominated:  
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Date of nomination:  
June 6, 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)  
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:  
24 April 1956, Coronado, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)  
Married to Mary Alice Winnefeld, Maiden name: Werner.

7. Names and ages of children:  
James A. Winnefeld II; age 15.  

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.

9. **Business relationships**: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.

My wife and I participate in two limited liability corporations (LLC) with her sister, Dr. Sarah Werner of Denver, CO, in ownership of two real estate properties in Breckenridge, CO. One LLC is for a vacation residence that is offered for rent when not being used by the owners and for which my wife and I earned moderate income ($1,006) in calendar year 2010. The other LLC is for an unimproved lot that we intend to build a vacation residence on. These LLCs are closely-held family entities, and I do not serve on a compensated basis in the management of them. There are no conflicts of interest associated with these arrangements.

10. **Memberships**: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

Member (otherwise referred to as a Trustee) of the U.S. Naval Academy Foundation: Athletic and Scholarships Program (a nonprofit organization).

11. **Honors and awards**: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

None.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees**: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

13. **Personal views**: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR.

This 6th day of June, 2011.

[The nomination of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**Questions and Responses**

**Defense reforms**

*Question.* The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to re-
cruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? Answer. No. 

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications? Answer. None. In my view, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been very effective in making the armed services an integrated joint force.

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. Section 3033 of title 10, U.S.C., establishes the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Army. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army? Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army is the senior military advisor to the Secretary of the Army. In addition to his role as an advisor, the Chief of Staff is responsible for the effective and efficient functioning of Army organizations and commands in executing their statutory missions. The Chief of Staff shall also perform the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under section 151 of title 10.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that the Secretary of the Army would prescribe for you? Answer. If confirmed, I would expect Secretary McHugh to assign me the following duties:

(a) Serve as the senior military leader of the Army and all its components;
(b) Assist the Secretary with his external affairs functions, including presenting and justifying Army policies, plans, programs, and budgets to the Secretary of Defense, executive branch, and Congress;
(c) Assist the Secretary with his compliance functions, to include directing The Inspector General to perform inspections and investigations as required;
(d) Preside over the Army Staff and ensure the effective and efficient functioning of the headquarters, to include integrating Reserve Component matters into all aspects of Army business;
(e) Serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provide independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and the President. To the extent such action does not impair my independence in my performance as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would keep the Secretary of the Army informed of military advice that the Joint Chiefs of Staff render on matters affecting the Army. I would inform the Secretary of the Army of significant military operations affecting his duties and responsibilities, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense;
(f) Represent Army capabilities, programs, policy, and requirements in Joint Forces;
(g) Supervise the execution of Army policies, plans, programs, and activities and assess the performance of Army commands in the execution of their assigned statutory missions and functions; and
(h) Task and supervise the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, the Army Staff and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Army, elements of the Army Secretariat to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position? Answer. I have over 35 years of experience in the Army with joint and combined operations. I have commanded at every level from platoon to theater level. I had the distinct privilege to command at the division, corps, and theater level in the Iraq combat theater. I have participated in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, supported the operations in Bosnia as the V Corps Chief of Staff, and deployed to Albania in support of the war in Kosovo. In Iraq, I've had the opportunity to apply the full range of Army, joint, and combined force capabilities against a broad range of complex environments as well as to establish strong civil military relationships to achieve unity of effort. My considerable service in joint as well as Army positions has given me a unique perspective of the Army, its processes and capabilities. The combination of all these things as well as my experience in working with the great young soldiers that we have in the Army today will enable me to lead the Army to meet our current and future missions and requirements.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, my tenure as Chief of Staff will be marked by continuous self-assessment of my ability to perform my duties. As I believe necessary, I will enact measures which will improve my ability to lead the Army. It is essential in this complex environment that we continue to learn and adapt to ensure that our skills remain current so we remain viable to meet our future challenges.

**Question.** What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?

Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff of the Army, I would ensure the Vice Chief of Staff is responsible for providing me advice and assistance in the execution of my duties, specifically with regard to manpower and personnel; logistics; operations and plans; requirements and programs; intelligence; command, control, and communications; and readiness.

**RELATIONSHIPS**

**Question.** If confirmed, what would be your working relationship with:

- The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as the head of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the principal assistant to the President in all Department of Defense matters, provides guidance and direction to the military departments. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with the Secretary of Defense's guidance and direction. If confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will serve as a military adviser to the Secretary of Defense as appropriate. I will cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Army properly implements the policies established by his office. In coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Secretary of Defense in articulating the views of the Army.

**Question.** The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and exercises such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The Secretary of Defense also delegates to the Deputy Secretary of Defense full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and exercise the powers of the Secretary on any and all matters whenever the Secretary is authorized to act pursuant to law. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense, and to his deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with the Secretary's guidance and direction. Also, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Deputy Secretary in articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with them to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance and direction issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

**Question.** The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries perform responsibilities that require them, from time to time, to issue guidance—and in the case of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direction—to the military departments. If confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Under Secretaries in articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with the Under Secretaries to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the Office of the Secretary of Defense's guidance and direction.

**Question.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman plans the strategic direction and contingency operations of the Armed Forces; advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets that the combatant command commanders identify; develops doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; reports on assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces; provides for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations; and performs such other duties as the law or the President or Secretary of Defense may prescribe.

In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the Chief of Staff of the Army assists the Chairman in providing military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chairman to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the policies established by his office. In coordination with the Chairman, I will provide individual military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, it would be my duty as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide frank and timely advice and opinions to the Chairman to assist him in his performance of these responsibilities. If confirmed, and as appropriate, I will also provide advice in...
addition to or in disagreement with that of the Chairman. I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the Chairman, and I will communicate directly and openly with him on any policy matters impacting the Army and the Armed Forces as a whole.

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the Chairman in providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. If confirmed, it would be my duty as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that the Vice Chairman receives my frank views and opinions to assist him in performing his responsibilities.

Question. The chiefs of the other Services.

Answer. If confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be my duty to engage in frank and timely exchanges of advice and opinions with my fellow Service Chiefs. I look forward to developing strong working relationships with these colleagues, if I am confirmed.

Question. The combatant commanders.

Answer. Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and are directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for their commands' preparedness to execute missions assigned to them. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries assign all forces under their jurisdiction to the unified and specified combatant commands or to the U.S. element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, to perform missions assigned to those commands. In addition, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and the authority of combatant commanders under title 10, U.S.C., section 164(c), the Service Secretaries are responsible for administering and supporting the forces that they assign to a combatant command. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the combatant commanders in performing these administrative and support responsibilities. I will establish close, professional relationships with the combatant commanders and I will communicate directly and openly with them on matters involving the Department of the Army and Army forces and personnel assigned to or supporting the combatant commands.

Question. The Army component commanders of the combatant commands.

Answer. The Army component commanders of the combatant commands exercise command and control under the authority and direction of the combatant commanders to whom they are assigned and in accordance with the policies and procedures established by the Secretary of Defense. The combatant commanders normally delegate operational control of Army forces to the Army component commander. The Secretary of the Army generally delegates administrative control of Army forces assigned to the combatant commander to the Army component commander of that combatant command. The Army component commander is responsible for recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within the combatant command. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the combatant commanders and Army component commanders in performing these responsibilities.

Question. The Secretary of the Army.

Answer. If confirmed, I will establish a close, direct, and supportive relationship with the Secretary of the Army. Within the Army, one of my primary responsibilities as Chief of Staff would be to serve as the Secretary's principal military adviser. My responsibilities would also involve communicating the Army Staff's plans to the Secretary and supervising the implementation of the Secretary's decisions through the Army Staff, commands, and agencies. My actions would be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary. In my capacity as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would also be responsible for appropriately informing the Secretary about conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and about significant military operations, to the extent this would not impair my independence in performing my duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely and in concert with the Secretary of the Army to establish the best policies for the Army, taking into account national interests.

Question. The Under Secretary of the Army.

Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's principal civilian assistant. The Under Secretary of the Army performs such duties and exercises such powers as prescribed by the Secretary of the Army. The Under Secretary's responsibilities require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary and to the Under Secretary for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary to ensure that the policies that the Office of the Secretary of the Army establishes are implemented properly. I will communicate openly
and directly with the Under Secretary in articulating the views of the Army Staff, commands, and agencies.

Question. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army serves as the principal advisor and assistant to the Chief of Staff. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with Vice Chief of Staff, Army.

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional responsibilities that, from time to time, require them to issue guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with the Assistant Secretaries in order to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we address the Army’s day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements.

Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army. The duties of the General Counsel include coordinating legal and policy advice to all members of the Department regarding matters of interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the Army on any legal question or procedure, other than military justice matters, which are assigned to The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the General Counsel to assist in the performance of these important duties.

Question. The Inspector General of the Army.
Answer. The Inspector General is responsible for inspections and certain investigations within the Department of the Army, such as inquiring into and reporting to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff regarding discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army with continuing assessment of command, operational, logistical, and administrative effectiveness; and serving as the focal point for the Department of the Army regarding DOD Inspector General inspections and non-criminal investigations, as well as the DOD inspection policy. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Inspector General of the Army to ensure effective accomplishment of these important duties.

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General is the military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and all officers and agencies of the Department of the Army. The Judge Advocate General provides legal advice directly to the Chief of Staff and to the Army Staff in matters concerning military justice; environmental law; labor and civilian personnel law; contract, fiscal, and tax law; international law; and the worldwide operational deployment of Army forces. The Chief of Staff does not appoint The Judge Advocate General, and does not have the personal authority to remove him. This enables The Judge Advocate General to provide independent legal advice. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the The Judge Advocate General as my legal advisor and I will assist him in the performance of his important duties as the legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army.

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The National Guard Bureau is a joint activity of DOD. The Chief National Guard Bureau is appointed by the President, he serves as a principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters concerning non-Federalized National Guard forces. He is also the principal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on matters relating to the National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, National Guard Bureau to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau, as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army.

Question. The Director of the Army National Guard.
Answer. The Director, Army National Guard is responsible for assisting the Chief, National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the National Guard Bureau, as they relate to the Army National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Director, Army National Guard to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau. This will be essential as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army to sustain and improve the Army National Guard’s operational capabilities.

Question. The Chief of the Army Reserve.
Answer. The Chief, Army Reserve is responsible for justifying and executing the Army Reserve’s personnel, operation and maintenance, and construction budgets. As such, the Chief, Army Reserve is the director and functional manager of appropria-
tions made for the Army Reserve in those areas. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, Army Reserve as we deal together with the Army’s day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements in order to sustain and improve the Army Reserve’s operational capabilities.

VISION FOR THE FUTURE

Question. What is your vision for the Army of today and the future?
Answer. My vision is of an All-Volunteer Army today and in the future that provides depth and versatility to the Joint Force, is efficient in its employment and provides flexibility for national security decisionmakers in defense of the Nation’s interests at home and abroad.

Question. What roles do you believe the Army should play in contingency, humanitarian, and stability operations?
Answer. I believe our Army must maintain the right capabilities and amount of capability to provide our national leaders with trained and ready forces that can perform missions across the spectrum of conflict. We are capable of executing contingency, humanitarian or stability operations as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense under the control of the appropriate combatant commander.

We are also capable of assisting our international partners in building their own operational capacity. Through theater engagement and Security Force Assistance, we have the capability to increase the capacity of partner nations to uphold the rule of law, protect its citizens during natural disasters, and avoid conflicts, which would otherwise require U.S. military support.

Question. Do you see any unnecessary redundancy between Army and Marine Corps ground combat forces, particularly between Army combat battalions, regiments/brigades, and divisions and the equivalent Marine Corps formations?
Answer. No, we each have unique but complementary capabilities that provide the National Command Authority flexibility. We have proven over the last 10 years, specifically, the flexibility and the adaptability of the Army and the Marine Corps to complement each other in a variety of operations and environments.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. In a potentially resource constrained environment, we must:
1. Continue to provide trained and ready forces to meet current wartime requirements and other worldwide contingencies;
2. Continue to reset the Army to meet future challenges;
3. Continue to adapt and develop a more effective and efficient force to meet our Nation’s future challenges; and
4. Right-size the Army and sustain the All-Volunteer Army by ensuring programs are in place to care for and develop our soldiers and their families.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Congress to address these challenges. We will continue to refine and update our training programs to ensure all our soldiers are fully prepared to deploy to combat. We will continue to review our reset, force modernization and acquisition programs in order to more efficiently meet the needs and requirements of today and the future. I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and combatant commanders to identify the capabilities needed to provide depth and versatility to the Joint Force in order to provide more effective and flexible forces for employment. I will continue to adjust our leader development programs in order to develop thinking, adaptable decisionmakers necessary to operate in an increasingly complex and unpredictable environment. I will review our soldier and family programs to ensure we are meeting their needs.

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. At this point, I am not aware of any problems that would impede the performance of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. I will ensure that management systems are in place. I will continue to monitor and to assess those processes, and I will specifically reinforce and review our management processes to ensure stewardship of the precious resources we are given to accomplish our mission.
I am committed to the wise stewardship of our limited and valuable resources. Having just completed the disestablishment of Joint Forces Command, I understand the tough choices that must be made to operate within fiscal constraints, while minimizing risk to operational capability. If confirmed, I will carry this experience and ethos into this position.

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?
Answer. I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army to lay out the priorities of the Army. Within the framework of the Secretary of the Army’s vision, here are my priorities:

- Develop and articulate a vision of the Army that addresses the needs of the Nation;
- Keep faith with our All-Volunteer Force;
- Focus on leader development to ensure our future leaders remain resilient;
- Explore, outline, and implement tangible methods to become more efficient and effective; and
- Reinvigorate the Profession of Arms.

U.S. FORCES IN IRAQ.

Question. If the Government of Iraq were to ask for the continued presence in Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the end of 2011, would you recommend to the President the deployment or retention of additional troops in Iraq beyond the current deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?
Answer. Based on the information I have available to me now, my personal opinion is that I would recommend that the United States continue to support the Government of Iraq as it assumes responsibility for security. Our assessments indicate that Iraq is well on its way to being capable of providing for its own security, but they must have the opportunity to ensure their systems are fully capable of meeting their needs. If asked by the Government of Iraq, I would recommend a continued presence focused on training and filling any gaps in external security as required, combined with a variety of continued engagements, exercises, and other mutual security arrangements. Our commitment to Iraq is a signal of our commitment to the region, which is closely linked to our national interests.

Question. The Army has recently announced the extension in Iraq of elements of the 25th Infantry Division beyond the normal 12-month deployed limit. What is your understanding and assessment of this extension and its potential impact on Army, unit, and family morale, well-being, and future rotation cycles?
Answer. As we withdraw from Iraq, there remain some critical requirements and issues that necessitate continuity and experience. I understand that this 30-day extension of the of 25th ID Headquarters specifically, was fully reviewed by U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the former Secretary of Defense and steps were taken to minimize any negative impacts on the soldiers and the families.

Although extensions are always difficult, I expect that this extension may have only a minimal effect due to its relatively short duration and the nature of redeployment. To mitigate the impact when approving the extension, the Secretary of Defense also directed that the maximum number of soldiers, with consideration of special family issues, redeploy prior to the holiday period.

Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor the redeployment of these troops to ensure that the requirements of the U.S.-Iraq security agreement are met and that delay of their return home is avoided?
Answer. This extension was approved by the Secretary of Defense at the request of USF-I and CENTCOM. The Army continually monitors the deployment and redeployment of soldiers rotating or taking leave. If confirmed, we will do everything we can to facilitate the redeployment and ensure that we maintain accountability of all soldiers to ensure their safety and well being while accomplishing the mission. We will monitor the redeployment of these soldiers as we do all others and provide whatever support is needed to U.S. Pacific Command as they redeploy to Hawaii.

Question. Is it your understanding that those soldiers who are extended will be compensated for their additional deployed time in the same manner as those who have been extended in the past?
Answer. Yes, the Army will provide compensation for those soldiers whose deployments are extended in a similar manner to those who have been extended in the past.

Question. What is your understanding of how the Army will address the needs of those families who have incurred nonrefundable expenses based upon original redeployment plans?
Answer. If mission conditions dictate extending soldiers beyond scheduled redeployment dates and families have incurred nonrefundable expenses, the Army has a claims process they can use to address the situation. Additionally, the Army does provide monthly compensation for soldiers who are involuntarily extended.

To mitigate the impact, when approving the extension, the Secretary of Defense also directed that the maximum number of soldiers, with consideration of special family issues, redeploy prior to the holiday period.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EFFICIENCY INITIATIVES AND BUDGET TOP LINE REDUCTIONS

Question. The Army’s share of the DOD efficiency initiatives in the near-term is about $29.5 billion that the Army will keep for reinvestment in its own programs. The Army’s plan to achieve these savings is based on reorganizations and consolidations of management activities, deferral of military construction costs, and cancellation of some major weapons programs. DOD has also reduced its planned top-line by $78.0 billion over fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2016 and will achieve this goal, in part, with end strength reductions in the Army.

What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD efficiency initiatives and the additional $78.0 billion cut to the top line?

Answer. The Army must do its part in our national effort to reduce the Federal budget deficit and improve our economic posture. The Army exceeded Secretary Gates’ efficiencies guidance target of $28.3 billion by achieving over $29.5 billion in efficiencies and applied these savings to enhance capabilities and improve quality of life for our soldiers and families.

Question. In your view, what are the major risks for the Army associated with these reductions and, if confirmed, how would you propose to manage those risks?

Answer. The projected reductions in the Army’s permanent Active-Duty end strength that are part of the DOD’s $78 billion top-line decrease are based on an assumption that America’s ground combat commitment in Afghanistan would be reduced by the end of 2014, in accordance with the President’s strategy. As we reduce end strength, we must continue to assess the impacts to our current and future requirements. This also applies to our civilian workforce. If I am confirmed, I will continue to review the status of efficiencies with particular focus on areas we assess as medium to high risk of implementing. The Army reviews status of efficiencies with particular focus on areas we assess as low to high risk of implementing. Reviews are conducted monthly to ensure that we are able to evaluate plan development, milestone achievement, and resource execution.

Question. Harvesting savings through process improvements and efficiencies has a mixed record of success in DOD. In your view, how likely is it that the planned savings will be achieved?

Answer. I do know that the Army is working to ensure successful implementation or continuation of all efficiencies and related initiatives. As I understand it, comprehensive Capability Portfolio Reviews and the Task Forces commissioned by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on such key topics as the Generating Force, utilization of the Reserve components, and improved installation management are aggressively pursuing these efficiencies. If confirmed, I will be in a better position to determine if the Army’s objective will be achieved. I feel strongly, however, that we have to make sure that we achieve real savings through realistic and obtainable methods and goals.

MODULARITY

Question. Modularity refers to the Army’s fundamental reconfiguration of the force from a division-based to a brigade-based structure. Although somewhat smaller in size, modular combat brigades are supposed to be just as, or more capable than the divisional brigades they replace because they will have a more capable mix of equipment—such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment. To date, the Army has established over 90 percent of its planned modular units, however, estimates on how long it will take to fully equip this force as required by its design have slipped to 2019.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s modularity transformation strategy?

Answer. I know the Army is almost complete with transformation and is currently assessing the effort. I personally believe that modular transformation has increased the Army’s ability to meet combatant commander requirements and national security strategy objectives by providing tailored formations and leaders who are accustomed to building teams based on changing requirements. It has enabled us to sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But after almost 6 years since the begin-
ning of the modularity transition, we must incorporate and capitalize on lessons learned.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions or changes, if any, would you propose relative to the Army’s modular transformation strategy?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will continue to review Army plans and strategies, including the modular transformation strategy, force structure, and modernization to ensure the Army continues to provide the joint force with the best mix of capabilities to prevail in today’s wars, and engage to build partner capacity, support civil authorities, and deter and defeat potential adversaries.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of the employment and performance of modular combat brigades and supporting units in Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom?

**Answer.** As the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq, and U.S. Forces-Iraq commander, I was extremely pleased with the employment and performance of the modular brigades. Soldiers from across the combat, combat support, and combat service support formations were able to adapt, change, and react to the ever-changing operational environment. We also learned some key lessons that must be reviewed. If confirmed, we will review and incorporate these lessons into the modular force.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of the need to add a third maneuver battalion to the modular heavy and infantry combat brigades?

**Answer.** The Army is currently conducting analysis on this potential organizational change through a deliberate and holistic process. I am personally in favor of a third maneuver battalion based on my experience in combat, stability, and humanitarian missions, but I will wait to see the results of the ongoing analysis in order to make a more informed decision.

**Question.** With respect to the Army’s modular combat brigade force structure design, General Dempsey’s June 2011 pamphlet titled: “CSA’s Thoughts on the Army’s Future,” directs the Army to assess the feasibility of adding a third maneuver battalion to each heavy and infantry brigade where there are only two maneuver battalions now.

**Question.** What changes, if any, would you propose to the modular design, the mix of combat and supporting brigades, or modular unit employment to improve performance or reduce risk?

**Answer.** We are currently working with current and former commanders to examine organizational options to see if they are the best we can provide. We are continuously looking at alternate force designs and force mixes to see how we can improve, in both effectiveness and efficiency, our force structure. If confirmed, I will ensure that we look at span of control and training and readiness oversight paradigms in order to provide the most effective and efficient force to the combatant commanders.

**Question.** With respect to the Army’s modular combat brigade force structure design, General Dempsey’s June 2011 pamphlet titled: “CSA’s Thoughts on the Army’s Future,” directs the Army to assess the feasibility of adding a third maneuver battalion to each heavy and infantry brigade where there are only two maneuver battalions now.

What is your understanding and assessment of the need to add a third maneuver battalion to the modular heavy and infantry brigades?

**Answer.** I know the Army is continuously assessing the factors that affect end strength including assigned missions, operational demands, unit readiness, soldier and family well-being, Reserve component capability and capacity, and fiscal constraints in order to determine required Active-Duty end strength. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army to determine the appropriate Army Active-Duty end strength based on our National Military Strategy and contributions to the Joint Force.

**ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH**

**Question.** The Army has increased its Active-Duty end strength over the last several years to meet current, and what was believed to be future, demands of operational requirements. Authorized Active-Duty Army end strength is now 569,400. The Secretary of Defense has announced Army Active-Duty end strength reductions beginning this year through 2014 of 22,000 soldiers followed by another 27,000 beginning in 2015. The fiscal year 2012 budget starts this reduction by requesting 7,400 fewer soldiers.

**In your view, what is the appropriate Army Active-Duty end strength needed to meet today’s demand for deployed forces, increase non-deployed readiness, build strategic depth, and relieve stress on soldiers and their families?**

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will review the analysis of the modular brigade designs and the associated force mix, including the number and type of brigades. I will discuss this with commanders in order to make an informed decision on the future force structure and design of our combat brigades.
In your view, what is the appropriate Army Active-Duty end strength needed to meet the likely future demand for deployed forces, maintain non-deployed readiness, ensure ground force strategic depth, and avoid increasing stress on soldiers and their families?

Answer. I am not yet prepared to provide you with an answer on future Army end strength. If confirmed, this will be a priority focus of mine.

Plans for the reduction of Army end strength assumes that the cuts will be made gradually over several years.

What, in your view, are the critical requirements for the management of this end strength reduction to ensure that should strategic circumstances change the cuts can be stopped and, if necessary, reversed?

Answer. End strength reductions should not be automatic. They are conditions based and will require periodic assessment. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh and the Army leadership to develop a plan that will allow us to accomplish current and projected missions, balance the well-being of soldiers and families, and keep us prepared to meet unforeseen operational demands by retaining the best leaders and sustaining the optimal force structure.

The gradual reduction of end strength may provide a hedge against an unforeseen contingency requiring sufficient and available Army forces, however, savings from the reduction of forces could be realized sooner and with greater long-term advantages with faster implementation.

What, in your view, are the most important advantages and disadvantages of faster end strength reductions?

Answer. I believe the Army’s deliberate and responsible draw-down plans should proceed at a pace necessary to ensure mission success, the well-being of soldiers and families, compliance with directed resource constraints and flexibility for unforeseen demands.

The advantage of drawing down faster would be the flexibility to invest in other required areas. The disadvantages lie in the reduced flexibility for meeting unforeseen demands and the ability to maintain the skills and quality of the remaining force.

We want to be able to make sure that we have the force necessary to meet the needs of the National Command Authority.

End strength reductions totaling 49,000 soldiers are likely to require force structure reductions.

If confirmed, how would you propose to reduce Army force structure, if at all, to avoid the problems associated with a force that is over-structured and under-manned?

Answer. I would continue to implement the Total Army Analysis process to ensure Army force structure contains required capability and capacity to meet current and future operational requirements. I am dedicated to ensuring that we have a quality force that is trained and equipped to meet the needs of our future security challenges.

How will these planned end strength reductions impact the Army’s plans for overseas basing of its units?

Answer. In my present position, I have not had a chance to examine the potential impact of end strength reductions on overseas basing. If confirmed, I will address this as part of the Army’s continuing force structure assessment.

The Army has had two other major post-conflict end strength reductions in the last 40 years: after Vietnam and after Operation Desert Storm.

What, in your view, are the critical elements of the planning and management of a major force reduction to ensure that the Army as a whole is not crippled, impacting ongoing operations or general readiness?

Answer. Today’s environment is very different than the one following Operation Desert Storm. There are significant uncertainties in many regions. We are facing a significantly greater number of regional and transnational threats and hot spots that could pose a concern for our national security; a sharp and distinct contrast to the early 1990s. Therefore, end strength reductions must be conditions based, well thought out and executed deliberately and responsibly. The Army’s plan should ensure accomplishment of its assigned missions, operational readiness for future demands, and resource constraints while ensuring the sustainment of the All-Volunteer Force.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the planning and management of an end strength reduction minimizes the negative impact on the readiness of the Army and soldier families?

Answer. Whatever decisions are made, we must ensure that we have a decisive, quality Army that is trained, ready, and optimally equipped while sustaining a
healthy environment for our soldiers and families which allows them to thrive and grow.

*Question.* Does the Army have the legislative authority it needs to properly shape the force as part of the personnel drawdown?

*Answer.* I am not aware of any specific issues, but if confirmed, I will assess this area to ensure the Army has the appropriate authorities necessary. Should I determine the need for changes, I will work with Secretary McHugh and Congress to identify any needed authorities.

**STRATEGIC RISK**

*Question.* Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create increased levels of strategic risk for the United States based on the lack of available trained and ready forces for other contingencies?

*Answer.* It is well known that the extended pace and scope of combat and other contingency operations over the last 10 years have created a demand on our forces that exceeded the previously programmed available mission forces. As the Army looks to drawdown in both theaters and adjust the boots-on-the-ground to dwell ratios, units will have more time to reset, train, and prepare for full spectrum operations. This in turn will allow for greater flexibility to meet our national security challenges.

*Question.* If so, how would you characterize the increase in strategic risk in terms of the Army’s ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of risk acceptable?

*Answer.* The Army would be challenged to generate responsive combat power for an additional unforeseen contingency. A concerted effort to reduce risk created by unsustainably high deploy-to-dwell ratios is required to ensure we maintain a high state of readiness and restore strategic depth in our force given these demands. The Army’s plan to reduce this risk to the force is contingent upon achieving sustainable deploy-to-dwell ratios over the long-term, maintaining assured access to the Reserve component, adequately providing for soldiers, civilians, and families, and receiving reliable, timely, and consistent funding to reset depleted equipment sets.

*Question.* What is the impact of the decision to decrease Army forces committed to Afghanistan on our ability to meet our security obligations in other parts of the world?

*Answer.* As we continue to reduce our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, it allows us the ability to reset and train forces to make them available to meet other world-wide contingencies and thereby reduce the risk. But this will take some time.

*Question.* How and over what periods of time, if at all, will reductions to Army end strength increase or aggravate this risk?

*Answer.* Any potential reductions beyond the 27,000 will be thoroughly assessed through our Total Army Analysis modeling efforts to understand the risks involved given anticipated mission requirements. We must be prudent in our approach to budget cuts and ensure we adequately man, train, and equip without hollowing out the force. With tightening budgetary constraints, our intent is to arrive at the right mix of capabilities to meet current demands as well as future challenges and ensure we continue to provide national leaders options in a crisis. We will achieve this by ensuring our forces have the greatest possible versatility while maintaining core capabilities. Any of these reductions must be tied to consideration of the actual drawdown of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

*Question.* If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?

*Answer.* As we look to the future, it is my view that we have to develop an Army that provides depth and versatility to the Joint Force, is more efficient in its employment, and provides greater flexibility for our national security decisionmakers. Our efforts must be tied to the National Military Strategy and our anticipated strategic and operational environment.

**INSTITUTIONALIZING SUPPORT FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE**

*Question.* A major objective of the Department over recent years has been increasing emphasis on lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability-type operations. All of which are areas that place a high premium and demands on Army capabilities. In order to ensure that a rebalance achieves this objective, and perhaps more importantly is then sustainable, Secretary Gates has stressed the need for the Department to “institutionalize and finance” the support necessary for the irregular warfare capabilities that have been developed over the last few years and will be needed in the future.
What, in your view, does it mean to institutionalize capabilities and support for irregular warfare capabilities in the Army?

Answer. Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare means developing the appropriate doctrine, organizations, materiel solutions, leader developments, personnel assignments and facilities (DOTMLPF) into the Army. Thus far, we have institutionalized Irregular Warfare into the Army through our Leader Development, Individual, and Collective Training and Doctrine Development.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of Army efforts to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?

Answer. The Army is in the process of creating specified proponents responsible for the institutional management for key tasks associated with Irregular Warfare:

1. The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at Carlisle Barracks charged with maintaining our doctrine on stability operations and coordinating with other government agencies to facilitate interagency cooperation required to ensure a whole-of-government approach to the conduct of stability operations.
2. The Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell at Fort Leavenworth charged with coordinating all IW activities within TRADOC, but in particular with maintaining and training doctrine on counterinsurgency.
3. The U.S. Army Information Operations Proponent at Fort Leavenworth charged with maintaining doctrine on Inform and Influence Activities and conducting a course to train officers specifically on information operations.
4. We are creating a proponent for Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities at Fort Leavenworth to write doctrine for Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities and manage the entire DOTMLPF process for Cyber/EM.
5. The Security Force Assistance Proponent provides input on working by, with and through host nation security forces to increase our partners’ capability and capacity. This proponent is located at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

From a doctrine standpoint we have made significant strides in creating a mindset that treats all of the above mentioned activities as central to how the Army conducts operations. Specifically, within doctrine we have done the following:

1. The Army’s senior operations manual, FM 3–0, has elevated stability tasks to be equal in rank with combat tasks, in line with DODD 3000.05. FM 3–0 also designates inform and influence activities and cyber/electromagnetic activities as key tasks within the mission command warfighting function.
2. We published a separate FM on Stability Operations that goes into great detail on the tasks of stability operations and how they fit within a broader construct of the whole-of-government approach. Further we are in the process of writing an additional manual on stability tasks that goes into more detail on the specifics at the tactical level of tasks directly related to stability operations.
3. We published FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, that laid out a new and innovative approach to the conduct of counterinsurgency campaigns.
4. We published an FM on Information Operations tactics, techniques, and procedures, that is currently being updated to account for lessons learned in our current conflicts.
5. We published an FM on Security Force Assistance that lays out guidelines and specific tasks for conducting security force assistance operations to build partnership capacity. This manual too is being updated based on the latest lessons learned from active operations.
6. We are writing doctrine on the conduct of Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned has collected, collated, and distributed numerous Handbooks and Newsletters on Irregular Warfare related topics, to include:

1. The Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines handbook sharing best practices and lessons learned from Special Operations Forces that are assisting Philippine Military and Police forces conducting Counterinsurgency.

The information collected by the Center for Army Lessons Learned helps to inform what should be incorporated into new Doctrine and Tactics manuals.

From an organizational standpoint we have also made significant changes in our organizational structure to account for all of the general tasks mentioned above:

1. All of our division, corps, and theater Army headquarters have been given additional staff structure specifically to address, inform, and influence activities, increased civil affairs capability, increased engineer staff to support infrastructure development, and restoration of essential services.
2. We have created the 1st Information Operations Brigade to assist units in the
count of inform and influence activities, the Army Asymmetric Warfare
Group to support rapid adaptation to the activities of hybrid threats, and U.S.
Army Cyber Command to execute cyber/electromagnetic activities for the
Army.
3. We created a specialized training brigade to prepare individuals and units to
conduct security force assistance missions.
4. We are active participants in the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Or-
ganization.

Training the Army starts with the time that soldiers enter the Army, all the way
through their Professional Military Education (PME). We've incorporated Irregular
Warfare into basic training scenarios for use during initial military training by both
soldiers and officers, and have counterinsurgency training and education for stu-
dents attending the War College. Irregular Warfare is part of our preparation for
units deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq:
1. Scenarios at our collective training centers include Stability Operations, Secu-
rity Force Assistance, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism.
2. All Brigade Combat Teams attend a 5-day Counterinsurgency seminar at Fort
Leavenworth taught by the Army's Counterinsurgency Center.

Question. In your view, what are the obstacles, if any, to institutionalizing this
kind of support, and what will be necessary to overcome them?

Answer. The biggest obstacles will be downsizing the right formations for our mis-
sion and requirements. As pressures for cuts in defense spending and force struc-
tures increase, we will have to assess which of these capabilities we retain and at
what level. Finding the right mix will be a challenge. We can maintain our doctrine
and lessons learned databases fairly easily, but retaining all of the necessary force
structure will be more challenging.

Question. While force structure and program changes may be necessary, they are
unlikely to prove sufficient to achieve full institutionalization. The greater challenge
may be found in changing Army culture, attitudes, management, and career path
requirements and choices, for example, through adjustments to organization, train-
ing, doctrine, and personnel policies.

In your view, what are the most important changes, if any, that might be nec-
essary to complement programmatic changes in support of the further institutional-
ization of capabilities for irregular warfare in the Army?

Answer. The most important thing we need to do is to ensure that we educate
our leadership through professional military education about the conduct of irreg-
ular warfare, including COIN, stability operations, inform and influence activities,
cyber/EM activities, and security force assistance. We must also maintain our doc-
trine and lessons learned that we've gained from almost a decade of active oper-
ations. We need to keep this knowledge-base updated, based on our own oper-
ations, but also those of our coalition partners. Through education and maintaining
a sound knowledge base, we'll be able to respond effectively to a wide range of tasks
in the future. Much as the Army did between the two world wars, we must have a
highly professional education system that educates future leaders on the hard-
earned lessons of this past decade so we don't repeat the mistakes of post-Vietnam
of thinking these kinds of operations are behind us.

We have to retain the flexibility, adaptability, and agility to operate both in mis-
sions requiring maneuver over-extended distances and in missions requiring the es-
tablishment of security over wide areas regardless of what kind of threats populate
the battlefield.

Question. Institutionalizing support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability
capabilities in the force does not mean ignoring the requirement for the Army to
be trained, equipped, and ready for major combat while at the same time it increases and institutionalizes support for irregular, counter-
insurgency, and stability operations?

Answer. The future battlefield will be populated with hybrid threats—combina-
tions of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups. We must train and edu-
cate our leaders and units to understand and prevail against hybrid threats. We are
training and educating our soldiers to understand that they must be capable of both
combined arms maneuver and wide area security in this hybrid threat environment.
In training, we must replicate the threats and conditions they are likely to face in
their next mission. For 10 years, that has meant irregular threats and conditions
common in the wide area security role that supports counterinsurgency operations.
Question. Do you anticipate that the Army will continue to train and equip general purpose force brigades for the “advise and assist brigade (AAB)” mission after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to an end?

Answer. I was involved in developing the initial requirements for the advise and assist brigades when I was the Multi-National Force-Iraq commander. The flexibility of the modular brigades allowed us to organize, train, and equip for Security Force Assistance activities. I anticipate that there will be an ongoing requirement for Security Force Assistance activities of the type carried out by these brigades into the future. If confirmed, I will continue to assess requirements and work with Congress to ensure we have the resources and flexibility required to accomplish these missions.

Question. If so, what mission essential task list or other training guidance changes do you plan to institutionalize this mission set in training for the general purpose force brigades?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with our joint partners to identify the mission essential tasks for Security Force Assistance and incorporate them into the Unified Joint Task List and Army Unified Task List.

Question. Do you foresee that general purpose force brigades or other formations will be regionally aligned to carry out an AAB-type mission? If so, what changes to unit training and equipping based on the requirements of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model will be necessary to support regional alignment?

Answer. As we look to the future, I believe some brigades may be regionally aligned. This will depend on combatant command requirements. The number and type of brigades will depend upon what we have available after meeting the operational requirements in the CENTCOM AOR. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to determine the best allocation to support operational requirements. The ARFORGEN model and our modular design are well-suited to the kind of adaptations that will be required to meet Security Force Assistance requirements in the future.

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What do you believe are the major lessons that the Army has and should have learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation New Dawn (OND) regarding its title 10, U.S.C., responsibilities for manning, training, and equipping the force?

Answer. 1. We must ensure that our future leaders understand their environment. A combination of socio-economic, political, cultural, and military factors will affect operations at all levels. We must develop leaders who are adaptable and flexible in solving complex problems. 2. We have learned that soldiers require more than a year to fully recover from extended deployments and to prepare for another deployment. We must do better at identifying and incorporating lessons learned at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. We have learned that the ability to adapt rapidly is the key to success in current and future operational environments. 3. We must have a fully integrated Reserve component to meet our operational needs. 4. ARFORGEN works, but must constantly be reviewed and adjusted to the operational environment.

Question. If confirmed, which of these lessons, if any, would you address as a matter of urgent priority?

Answer. They are equally important and all must be addressed in order to ensure our Army remains as effective and efficient in the future.

EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

Question. Both deploying and non-deploying Active and Reserve component Army units are training without all their required equipment. Deploying units do not receive some of their equipment until late in their pre-deployment training cycle or as they arrive in theater. In your view, has deployment of additional brigades to Afghanistan increased the strain on maintenance systems and further reduced equipment availability for training?

Answer. With our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have a significant requirement and responsibility to ensure the most modern and capable equipment is available to our forces in combat. This has at times limited equipment availability for training. ARFORGEN has helped us to manage the movement of equipment for
training. It is our responsibility to ensure units are properly trained upon deployment. As force generation requirements reduce, this will mitigate some of the risk.

*Question.* What do you expect will be the impact, if any, of our drawdown from Iraq and Afghanistan in this regard?

*Answer.* The drawdown from Iraq has already improved availability of equipment for units to conduct predeployment training. The future drawdown in Afghanistan will also help if we sustain the resources to do reset.

*Question.* What is your understanding and assessment of the availability of modern equipment to fully support the predeployment training and operations of deploying units?

*Answer.* With our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have a significant requirement and responsibility to ensure the most modern and capable equipment is available to our forces in combat. This has at times limited equipment availability for training. ARFORGEN has helped us to manage the movement of equipment for training. It is our responsibility to ensure units are properly trained upon deployment. As force generation requirements reduce this will mitigate some of the risk.

*Question.* What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls, if any, for training and operations?

*Answer.* I understand that the Army is short Unmanned Aerial Systems and some non-Line of Sight communications equipment. I am told that light infantry equipment shortfalls in Afghanistan are being addressed through existing processes. As we continue to reset equipment returning from Iraq we will see a steady improvement in on-hand equipment for units training for and deploying in support of operational missions.

*Question.* What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and operate?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will continue to support the ARFORGEN Model of phased equipping through which the Army intensively manages our equipment on-hand to ensure next deploying units, from all components, have sufficient equipment for training and deployment. If confirmed, I will continue our capability portfolio reviews to evaluate our priorities against mission requirements and adjust our resource allocations to ensure the Army continues to strike the critical balance between having enough modern equipment to fully support pre-deployment training and operations in theater.

**EQUIPMENT REPAIR/RESET**

*Question.* Congress provided the Army with approximately $15 to $17 billion annually to help with the reset of nondeployed forces and accelerate the repair and replacement of equipment. However, the amount of reset funding requested for DOD in fiscal year 2012 decreased to $11.9 billion from the fiscal year 2011 request of $21.4 billion.

In your view, is this level of funding sufficient to not only prepare Army forces for operations in Afghanistan but to also improve the readiness of non-deployed forces for other potential contingencies?

*Answer.* The level of funding appears sufficient. In my experience, Congress has been very supportive of the Army’s reset requests, providing the Army with what we require to reset our redeploying forces. It is true that in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011, the Army was appropriated approximately $10 billion for reset, and in fiscal year 2012, the request is less than half that. However, with the drawdown in one theater and more efficient management of materiel moving in and out of Afghanistan, our annual reset requirements have decreased. The Army will continue requiring reset funding 2 to 3 years beyond end of operation in both theaters to move all materiel through repair programs.

*Question.* Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for reset?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that our repair depots are currently fully engaged and have the ability to meet a surge in our repair requirements as necessary.

*Question.* What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be taken to increase the Army’s capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and training?

*Answer.* The Army has the needed capacity through certain measures, such as adding additional shifts, contract augmentation or rebalancing workload that could be used to increase production at our facilities. This will, of course, also increase cost. At this time, I do not know if such measures are necessary. If confirmed, I will look into this matter further.
Question. What impact is this level of funding likely to have, if any, on the ability of Army National Guard units to respond to Homeland defense and support to civil authorities’ missions?

Answer. I am told that the decrease in the Army’s reset funding requirements for fiscal year 2012 should have no impact on the Army National Guard’s ability to respond to Homeland defense missions and provide support to civil authorities. I also understand that Reserve component reset requirements are fully funded.

DEPLOYMENT AND ROTATION CYCLES

Question. Over the last year, the Active Army’s ratio of time spent deployed to time at home station has improved from 1:1 to 1:1.6—that is for each year deployed a soldier spends about 1½ years at home station. The previously stated Active Army objective was 1:2 whereby soldiers could expect to be home for 2 years for each year deployed. The Reserve component objective is 1:5 where soldiers can expect to be home for 5 years for each year deployed. In General Dempsey’s June 2011 pamphlet titled “CSA’s Thoughts on the Army’s Future,” he sets a new dwell time goal of 27 months at home for every 9 months deployed as soon as possible.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s near- and intermediate-term plans for deployment length (or boots-on-the-ground (BOG)) and dwell time?

Answer. The Army utilizes a rotational ARFORGEN readiness model that effectively and efficiently generates trained and ready forces for combatant commanders at sustainable levels. ARFORGEN also provides ready forces for unforeseen contingencies. Starting in fiscal year 2012, the Army’s intermediate goal for BOG is 1 year deployed to 2 years dwell at home station for the Active component and 1 year deployed to 4 years dwell at home station for Reserve component soldiers. The Army’s long-term goals are 1 year deployed with 3 years at home station for the Active component and 1 year deployed with 5 years at home station for Reserve component soldiers. The Army is moving to a 9-month BOG, which I support. It should begin to reduce some of the strain on our soldiers and families. If confirmed, we will constantly monitor the implementation of the 9-month BOG and its impact on dwell.

Question. What impact do you expect the proposed troop reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan to have on the dwell time of Army soldiers? Is it possible that the reduction of demand for Army forces in Iraq alone will allow the Army to achieve the 1:2 dwell time goal by the end 2011, or the 1:3 dwell time goal (whether in terms of months or years) by 2014?

Answer. Utilizing Operation New Dawn (Iraq) drawdown planning assumptions, projections show corps, divisions, and Brigade Combat Teams will continue to improve BOG/dwell and move closer to achieving our goals.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the potential impact of the decision to decrease Army end strength on the rotation schedule and meeting the near-term dwell goal of 1:2 for Active-Duty Forces?

Answer. The Army will plan to reduce its end-strength and restructure its force mix consistent with reductions in overseas contingency operations commitments and in conjunction with the needs of the Department and the combatant commanders. Our intent is to arrive at the right mix of capabilities to meet current demands as well as future challenges, within budgetary constraints. Based on the current strategic guidance and projected future requirements, the Army should be able to maintain its progress to reach its Boots on Ground to dwell ratio goal and have sufficient troops to respond to unforeseen events. But if our overseas contingency operations commitments differ from those planned, it will impact BOG/dwell and availability of forces.

Question. How, in your view, will the proposed reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan impact the demand on Army Reserve and National Guard troops? In your view, how might a reduction in demand, if any, for Army Reserve and Guard troops impact their availability to respond to contingencies for Homeland defense and support to civil authorities?

Answer. The return of these Army National Guard forces to State control should provide the Governors and Adjutants General with increased forces to conduct Homeland defense, disaster response, and defense support of civil authorities. These forces will be better trained and more experienced due to their Iraq and Afghanistan combat deployments. Although the National Guard has been able to meet all disaster relief requirements, the return of forces will allow more flexibility to accomplish local missions.
CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for increased counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces (GPF).

What is your assessment of the QDR with regard to the mix of responsibilities assigned to GPF and SOF, particularly with respect to security force assistance and building partner military capabilities?

Answer. The report of the 2010 QDR struck an appropriate balance between the capabilities and capacity of our special operations and multipurpose forces. Today's demand for security force assistance and building partner military capabilities exceeds the capacity of our Special Operations Forces requiring the integration of our multi-purpose forces with our Special Operations Forces to accomplish the mission. Additionally, some of the security force assistance missions, such as those related to building national institutions like military academies and logistics systems, are typically more appropriate for our multipurpose forces and our generating force institutions.

Question. Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to become more like SOF in mission areas that are critical to countering violent extremists?

Answer. Over the last 10 years our multipurpose ground forces have developed many of the capabilities once only inherent in our Special Operations Forces. Just as our multipurpose forces have improved their capabilities, so too have our Special Operations Forces. Both forces are national capabilities that must be sustained and continuously enhanced. They increase our flexibility and agility. The needs of our combatant commanders will continue to inform the degree of overlap or specialization required between our special operations and multipurpose forces.

Question. What actions, if any, do you believe need to be taken in order to allow SOF and GPF to successfully share these missions in the future?

Answer. In all of the geographic commands, close collaboration and planning between SOF and GPF will ensure optimum use of all available forces. Additionally, we have a process within DOD whereby combatant commanders identify their future needs and request the allocation of forces to accomplish specific tasks. Through this process—the Global Force Management Process—we integrate the demands and allocation of special operations and multipurpose forces to fill combatant commander needs. We should integrate combatant commander needs for both special operations and multipurpose forces, including their supporting forces, into this common process.

Question. Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for SOF only?

Answer. Generally speaking, mission areas that require minimal footprint or recognized presence, operations independent of larger ground forces in the immediate area, or operations that place a premium on regional cultural awareness and negotiation skills appear best suited for our Special Operations Forces. While our special operations and multipurpose forces share much of the same skills, equipment, and tactics, our Special Operations Forces are generally more mature, at a higher skill level in these common skills, and also equipped and trained in unique capabilities. Where that difference is needed for mission success, that is where we should employ our Special Operations Forces.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENABLING CAPABILITIES

Question. The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has described the “non-availability” of force enablers as the “most vexing issue in the operational environment” for SOF. A recent report required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84) indicated that adequately enabling SOF in the future will require improvements to “the process by which SOF gains access to enabler support, and by synchronizing efforts with the Services.” The report also stated that “Currently, SOF units divert scarce organic resources to satisfy enabler requirements and accomplish the assigned mission. In future operating environments, the effects of enabler shortfalls will be further exacerbated unless SOCOM and the Services can better forecast the need for support, codify support through formal agreements, and eventually get SOF units and their GPF counterparts training together throughout the deployment cycle.”

If confirmed, how would you work with the Commander of SOCOM to address the enabling requirements of Army SOF throughout the deployment cycle?

Answer. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and general purpose forces have made great strides in providing integrated sourcing solutions to increase the overall combat effectiveness of the force. It is the early identification of the right mix of forces that will allow units to properly integrate. It is my understanding that U.S. Army Special Operations Command (ASOC) is refining its force generation methodology
to build appropriate enabling support into existing ASOC formations and integrating requirements into the ARFORGEN process. Through this effort, SOF and critical enabling support will be better integrated on a more sustained and predictable basis. If I am confirmed, I will work with SOCOM and ASOC to ensure the effective and efficient accomplishment of our enabling requirements.

Question. Vice Admiral William McRaven, Commander of Joint Special Operations Command, has stated that SOCOM needs greater personnel management authority to shape mid- and senior-grade SOF operators to meet SOCOM-defined requirements. In his view, promotions, selection for command, selection for advanced educational opportunities, foreign language testing policy, and foreign language proficiency bonus payment policy all differ significantly by Military Services and are all primarily crafted to support Services' needs.

Do you agree that Army special operations personnel should be managed by SOCOM? Please explain.

Answer. No. The Army must consider both operational needs and career management in order to ensure the best possible force for the future and not limit flexibility in managing its force. Throughout its operations, Special Operations Forces (SOF) have demonstrated a unique ability to operate in a joint and multinational environment. There are also Service-specific career milestones and development opportunities that vary based upon the individual soldier. Given these unique needs, the Army should retain management of all members of its force. However, we must work closely with SOCOM to identify those skills and opportunities needed so we can incorporate appropriate leader development programs to meet their needs.

ARMY READINESS

Question. How would you characterize Army readiness in its deployed and non-deployed units?

Answer. Simply stated, I believe that Army readiness is out of balance between deployed and non-deployed units. Deployed and deploying Army units are given every priority for manning, equipping, and training in order to achieve the combatant commander’s mission requirements. Due to excessive demand, non-deployed Army units are used to provide the additive resources to ensure that deployed and deploying Army units can meet mission requirements. Routinely, non-deployed commanders are providing personnel and equipment to support deployed and deploying units. The effect of these actions on the force and on specific operational plans, in specific terms, is amply covered in the Chairman's Comprehensive Joint Assessment.

Question. Do you believe the current state of Army readiness is acceptable?

Answer. No. However, the Army and DOD senior leadership recognize that the Army operates in a fiscally constrained environment. The readiness of Army units, while of utmost concern to the Senior Leadership, must be balanced with other national security and domestic priorities. In light of those competing priorities, the Army has developed a force generation model that synchronizes available soldiers and resources with units during periods of predictable availability.

Question. How do you see operations in Iraq and Afghanistan impacting the readiness of Army forces that may be called upon to respond to an attack or another contingency?

Answer. Clearly, the current demand for Army forces coupled with the cumulative effect of nearly 10 years of conflict impacts the Army’s ability and reduces our flexibility to provide forces to respond to an attack or other incident or disaster inside the United States. The Army has “surged” to meet additional contingencies in the past and will do so again in the future—but those “surge” operations impact the readiness of Army units for months and even years after completion. I concur with the specific and well-documented effects and examples covered in the Chairman’s Comprehensive Joint Assessment.

DEPLOYMENTS AND STRESS ON THE ARMY

Question. Many soldiers are on their fourth and some their fifth major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Beginning in August 2008 DOD policy has been to limit deployments for Active component soldiers and mobilization of Reserve component soldiers to not longer than 12 months.

What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial Active Duty obligated service has been completed?

Answer. The Army monitors retention very closely, as I do as a commander given the high operational demand and multiple deployments that soldiers are experi-
encing. Statistics reveal that multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq are not adversely impacting retention.

Since fiscal year 2005, retention rates of initial term and mid-career enlisted soldiers in deploying units has remained above Army goals while retention rates among officers continue to exceed historic rates and outpace the preceding decade. Continuous improvements to Army benefits, such as world class health care advances for wounded soldiers, enhancements in family support programs, and additional monetary bonuses have encouraged large numbers of our soldiers to continue their commitments beyond their obligated service periods. The Army is focused now on retaining the highest quality soldiers and officers as we move forward into a period of tightly constrained resources decreased operational demands, and reductions in authorized end strength.

Question. What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and rates of indiscipline.

Answer. The indicators of stress on the force that the Army tracks continuously include: reenlistments, chapter separations, divorce, domestic violence, sexual assault, enlisted desertion, AWOL offenses, drug and alcohol enrollments, drug use, courts-martial, and suicides.

I understand that Army discipline and misconduct rates, including desertion, absence without leave and courts-martial, have remained steady or declined in the past year while other indicators of stress on the force, such as substance abuse and domestic violence have increased. However, the significant increase in the number of soldier suicides is of the greatest concern. Soldiers and their families continue to make significant personal sacrifices in support of our Nation. If confirmed, I am committed to providing soldiers and families with a quality of life commensurate with their service and to continuing Army efforts to develop multi-disciplinary solutions directed at mitigating risk behaviors and enhancing soldier and family fitness and resilience.

Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army?

Answer. I am very concerned about the long-term health of the force if we are unable to achieve the appropriate deployment to dwell ratio for our soldiers. Adequate dwell time should help the visible and invisible wounds of this protracted conflict. If confirmed, I will closely monitor indicators of stress on the force and work to ensure that the Army has plans and programs to confront these issues appropriately.

FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, GENERAL CASEY, STATED THAT THE ARMY WAS “OUT OF BALANCE.”

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the concept and efforts to achieve “balance” for the Army?

Answer. I understand balance to be the Army’s ability to sustain the Army’s soldiers, families, and civilians, prepare forces for success in the current conflict, reset returning units to rebuild the readiness consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments and contingencies, and transform to meet future demands. With the help of Congress we have made progress over the past 3 years to restore balance. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress on this issue.

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to achieve and sustain Army “balance”?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh and Army leadership to adopt measures and strategies to achieve and sustain balance. Building and maintaining resilience among our forces will be one of my highest priorities.

“TOXIC” LEADERSHIP IN THE ARMY (G1, ASA M&RA)

Question. A recent press report outlined the results of an Army survey of leadership and morale that found 80 percent of Army officers and noncommissioned officers had observed and 20 percent had worked for a “toxic” leader in the last year. According to the press report, the survey, conducted by the Center for Army Leadership at Fort Leavenworth, KS, concluded that toxic leadership “may create a self-perpetuating cycle with harmful and long-lasting effects on morale, productivity, and retention of quality personnel.” They also note that, “there is no indication that the toxic leadership issue will correct itself.”

What is your understanding and assessment of “toxic” leadership in the Army and its impact or potential impact, if any, on morale, productivity, and retention of quality personnel?
Answer. Throughout my career my top priority has been to create an environment where individual soldiers and leaders feel empowered and a central part of the organization to which they are assigned. Leadership built on trust, values and standards is essential to our success. Our Army leaders must be disciplined, positive, tolerant, supremely competent, and exemplars of our system of values. Anything less negatively impacts morale, unit effectiveness, and individual soldiers' willingness to continue service.

If confirmed, we will review and assess how we continue to prepare our leaders for command and will develop practices that will allow us to identify “toxic” leader environments and take action to correct.

*Question.* If confirmed, what actions would you propose to take, if any, to deal with the risk to the Army posed by “toxic” leadership?

Answer. Leadership education is a critical component in ensuring a positive command climate. The Army’s professional military education curricula and pre-command specific training address this important aspect of leadership. If confirmed, I will work with my staff to ensure that the Army continues looking at itself to determine if it is placing appropriate emphasis at all levels of military education on the interpersonal dynamics of positive command climate.

*Question.* What are your views on the benefits and risks of incorporating input from both subordinates and peers, also known as “360-degree” evaluations, into the officer and non-commissioned officer evaluation and promotion selection systems?

Answer. Constructive criticism from peers and subordinates can be an invaluable tool to help leaders see themselves from different perspectives. It is my understanding that the Army is currently evaluating options for revision of its Performance Evaluation System and that a tool utilizing the Army’s Multi-source assessment and feedback/360 degree will be incorporated beginning on 1 October of this year. There will also be a requirement to discuss the 360 degree assessment feedback as part of periodic performance counseling. The Army is also considering inclusion of a 360 degree assessment into the Brigade Command Selection process. I look favorably upon changes to our performance evaluation system that enhance the development of leaders without risking fair and equitable treatment of all our soldiers.

**RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE**

*Question.* What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s Reserve components as an Operational Reserve, as opposed to its longstanding traditional role as a Strategic Reserve?

Answer. The demand for U.S. ground forces over this past decade has required continuous use of Active component and Reserve component forces in order to meet the Army’s operational requirements. The Reserve component is no longer solely a Strategic Reserve. Current and projected demand for Army forces will require continued access to the Reserve component. Mobilization and operational use of the Reserve component will continue for the foreseeable future.

*Question.* In your view, what are the major challenges to maintaining and enhancing the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as a relevant and capable Operational Reserve?

Answer. In my opinion, the Army must ensure continued access to the Reserves as an essential part of the Total Force. If confirmed, I will work to ensure they have the necessary training and equipment to accomplish all missions. Maintaining an appropriate level of resourcing for the Operational Reserve and mobilizing these forces on a predictable and recurring basis will be important to our success.

*Question.* What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve component forces in meeting combat missions?

Answer. Reserve component forces play a critical role in enabling the Joint Force Commanders to meet assigned missions. Today’s force is structured to balance maneuver capability in the Active component with a majority of the enablers in the Reserve component. This balance should provide capabilities to meet operational requirements in sustained operations.

In addition, the Reserve components are well-suited for those operational missions that are recurring and predictable, such as enduring overseas contingency operations, support of treaty obligations, Homeland defense and theater security cooperation requirements.

*Question.* In your view, should DOD assign Homeland defense or any other global or domestic civil support missions exclusively to the Reserve?

Answer. Reserve component forces are uniquely positioned to be the first responders to these missions; however, the Army’s Total Force must be able to execute Homeland defense or other global/domestic support missions.
Through experience we've found that the Army works best as a Total Force, sharing requirements and responsibilities across the formation and between components. Although Reserve component forces are uniquely positioned to be the first military responder to these missions, the Army's Total Force must be able to execute Homeland defense as well as other global and domestic support missions.

**Question.** In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1-year mobilized to 5 years at home affect the viability and sustainability of the All-Volunteer Reserve Force?

**Answer.** Once the Army can restore its balance and stress on the force has been significantly reduced, a predictable cycle that ensures full recovery and training will support the viability and sustainability of the All-Volunteer Reserve Force. The Army's long-term goal of 1-year deployed to 5 years at home station for Reserve component units is optimal in supporting both the unit's ability to effectively generate readiness, and to ensure soldier and family well-being and employability.

**Question.** Advocates for the National Guard and Reserve assert that funding levels do not meet the requirements of the Reserve components for operational missions. Do you agree that the Army's Reserve components are inadequately resourced, particularly in view of the commitment to maintaining an Operational Reserve?

**Answer.** Nine years of mobilization and employment for current contingencies has produced the most experienced, ready Reserve component forces in history and yielded unprecedented readiness levels. The Army must continue to adequately resource the Reserve command for training and operational requirements. Failure to resource an Operational Reserve may result in unit and enabler shortfalls to the total Army.

**NATIONAL GUARD ISSUES**

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of changes in the global and domestic roles and missions of the Army National Guard and the National Guard Bureau in the last decade?

**Answer.** The Army National Guard is and will remain a critical component of the Army. It provides depth to the Army and links us to the local U.S. population. During the last 10 years, the Army National Guard has transformed from a Strategic Reserve to an operational force, a trend which should continue with predictable operational use of the Reserve components. The Army National Guard, with direction and oversight provided by the National Guard Bureau, has proven to be integral to the Army's Total Force.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's commitment to fully fund Defense Department requirements for Army National Guard equipment?

**Answer.** The Army is committed to fully equipping the Army National Guard to DOD requirements, and I understand significant progress in achieving both modernization and interoperability has been made as the Army National Guard has transformed to an operational force. If confirmed, I will maintain emphasis on the importance of the Army National Guard and its readiness as a part of the Army Total Force.

**Question.** In your view, do Army processes for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution sufficiently address these requirements for National Guard equipment?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will examine the funding of the Army National Guard to ensure it receives the appropriate level of resources as a part of the Army's Total Force.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure that these equipment needs of the Army National Guard are fully considered and resourced through the Army budget process? In your view, what is the appropriate role for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief, National Guard Bureau to ensure that Army National Guard requirements and needs are considered, and appropriately synchronized with Army priorities and resourcing strategy.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of the effect, if any, of increasing the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to General (O-10)?

**Answer.** The increase in grade reflects the importance of the National Guard to our Total Force and the significant responsibilities of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. I have had the opportunity to work closely with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on several issues as Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq and U.S. Joint Forces Command.

**Question.** In your opinion, should the Chief of the National Guard Bureau be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. I am aware of this topic, but have not had any discussions regarding the chief of the National Guard Bureau becoming a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will consider this important question further before forming my opinion.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of the role and authority of the Director of the Army National Guard, and, in your view, does this compare with the role and authority of the chief of the Army Reserve?

**Answer.** The Director of the Army National Guard leads the Army National Guard Directorate of the National Guard Bureau, and assists the chief of the National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the National Guard Bureau as they relate to the Army. The Director, Army National Guard serves as a member of the Army Staff and as a Reserve component chief in similar fashion to the chief, Army Reserve.

**Question.** In your view, should the Director of the Army National Guard be “dual hatted” as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army?

**Answer.** I have not had the opportunity to fully consider this issue before, but if confirmed, will be better able to understand the duties and responsibilities of Director, Army National Guard as they relate to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff.

Given my understanding of the National Guard Bureau, however, the chief, National Guard Bureau is the principal advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army on National Guard matters, while the Director, Army National Guard assists the chief of National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the Bureau as they relate to the Army.

If confirmed, I will continue to study the duties and responsibilities of Director, Army National Guard as they relate to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff and make recommendations as appropriate.

**Question.** In your view, should there be a requirement that the position of Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) or Commander, U.S. Army North, the Army component commander, be filled only by a National Guard officer? Please explain.

**Answer.** No. We want to sustain flexibility to ensure we have the most experienced and capable leaders. In my opinion, we should not be restricted to Reserve component or Active Duty component when selecting a commander to fill either of these positions. Recognizing the roles of NORTHCOM and Army North, however, it is logical to conclude that Army National Guard leaders should be considered for senior command and staff positions.

**GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM RECEIVERS AND EQUIPMENT**

**Question.** As a major user of global positioning system (GPS) receivers, what is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s participation, if any, in testing GPS receivers and equipment that use GPS signals with respect to potential interference or disruptions associated with commercial broadband services?

**Answer.** The Army is a major acquirer of GPS systems both stand alone or embedded in other weapon systems that require position location information. I understand that the Army has tested these systems to verify their requirements, including their GPS functionality. The Army has been a partner with the Air Force, developers of the GPS constellation, since the inception of the program, and has participated extensively in development and operational testing throughout the life of the program.

**Question.** Has all Army equipment utilizing GPS signals been tested?

**Answer.** The Army has tested all GPS equipment it provides to the field either through independent development tests, operational tests, in partnership with other services and in participation in the prime contractor test efforts. The Army will continue to conduct testing in this manner to address continuing equipment developments, the introduction of new GPS features, and evolutionary changes to the GPS system.

**Question.** Is there specific equipment, if any, that has not been tested for which interference or disruption is not known?

**Answer.** I am not aware of any. The GPS program continues to evolve, as it must, to address changes in technology and to address any disruptions or attempts by adversaries to deny us the use of GPS. The Army will participate in the testing of new GPS equipment and waveform (signaling) changes to verify systems performance. New GPS security, space segment, and waveform changes meant to improve GPS performance will be tested as those program enhancements mature and proceed through their development cycles.

**Question.** In your view, has the time allotted for testing been adequate?
Answer. Yes, based on my current understanding, the time allotted to testing has been adequate.

Question. What are the preliminary results, if any, from testing?
Answer. All equipment testing is meant to verify performance of the systems against the requirements levied upon them prior to providing them to the field. Testing has been successful and any issues resulting from tests are addressed and any fixes are verified and incorporated via software or hardware changes as necessary.

WOMEN IN COMBAT

Question. What is your view of the appropriate combat role for female soldiers on the modern battlefield?
Answer. Because of the distributive nature of the battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan, women’s exposure to combat conditions has changed significantly. We must conduct constant reviews and assess how women can continue to improve our capabilities and flexibility and maximize their contributions to the Army.

Female soldiers have been and continue to be an integral part of our Army team, contributing to its success and overall readiness, as they perform exceptionally well in specialties and positions open to them and remain critical to the success of ongoing missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Question. In your view, should the current Army policy prohibiting the assignment of women to ground combat units be revised or clarified in any way to reflect changing roles for female soldiers and the changing nature of warfare?
Answer. I believe we must constantly assess the role of women, especially considering the changing nature of war and our experiences over the last 10 years. A review of current policies and regulations is ongoing in concert with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), as directed in the Women in the Service Restriction (WISR) under section 535, National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011. If any changes are determined to be appropriate, required notice would be provided to Congress prior to implementing any changes to current policy.

Question. Do you believe that it is appropriate for female soldiers to serve in positions in which they may be exposed to combat?
Answer. Women in the Army continue to make tremendous contributions as well as demonstrate their selfless-service and sacrifices in roles and responsibilities critical to the safety and security of our Nation and to the readiness of the Army. The contemporary operating environment finds our female soldiers serving in positions that have exposed them to combat and they have proven that they are up to any task, regardless of their occupational specialty, when freedom is threatened and when their country calls.

SUICIDES

Question. The committee continues to be concerned about the continuing increase in soldier suicides, especially the increase in Reserve component suicides. In June 2010, the Army released a report on Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention that analyzed the causes of suicides in the Army and in Chapter III ("The Lost Art of Leadership in Garrison") reported disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, high risk behaviors, and inadequate responses by Army leaders.

In your view, what is the cause of this apparent increase in the number of suicides of Reserve component members?
Answer. I am concerned about suicide as an issue for the Total Army, including both the Active component and the Reserve component. The Army is focusing attention on the differences between our Active component and Reserve component suicides because there may be unique variables at play for Reserve component soldiers not serving on Active Duty, including: economic and civilian job-related stress; military service factors; and access to medical and behavioral health care. The economic recession has added additional stress to those Reserve component soldiers who find it increasingly difficult to find or sustain employment whether as a result of a military deployment or merely the prospect of one. Within their military units, Reserve component soldiers are often only involved with their chain of command during battle assemblies and have fewer opportunities to form "buddy teams" of peers. In terms of access to medical and behavioral health care, Reserve component soldiers generally do not have the same access to base and family support services, such as Army Substance Abuse Program, Family Life Chaplains, and other Services that Active Duty soldiers utilize.
Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s response to the continuing increase in suicide rates?

Answer. Leaders across the Army have taken aggressive steps to improve the health of the force, decrease high risk behavior, and stem the increasing rate of suicides in our formations. This is a very complex issue and it is going to take fully engaged leadership to modify programs and policies, fully understand the causes for this increase, identify the indicators, and implement appropriate intervention measures. After nearly a decade of war, we are working to keep pace with the expanding needs of our strained Army, and continuously identify and address the gaps that exist in our policies, programs, and services. The Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention Report 2010, along with the DOD Task Force on the Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces and other strategic reports, serve as the foundation for our systemic effort to improve.

Question. What is the Army doing to address the disciplinary and other issues raised in the report on Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention?

Answer. The Army’s Resiliency Program, Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, initiated in 2008, has been fully deployed beginning in fiscal year 2009. This is a long-term strategy that better prepares the Army community—including all soldiers, family members, and Department of the Army civilian workforce—to not only survive, but also thrive at a cognitive and behavioral level in the face of protracted warfare and the everyday challenges of Army life that are common in the 21st century. It has made developing psychological strength as much a part of Army culture as becoming physically fit and technically proficient.

The program, based on 30-plus years of scientific study and results, uses individual assessments, virtual training, classroom training, and embedded resilience experts to provide the critical skills our soldiers, family members, and Army civilians need. There is now solid scientific evidence that a well-implemented resilience program increases good coping, adaptability, and decrease catastrophic thinking among soldiers, especially young soldiers. A robust program evaluation is continuing to ensure we continue to provide the best education and training for our force.

Question. The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is currently performing a 5-year, $50 million study on suicides in the Army (referred to as the Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers) (STARRS). According to NIMH, preliminary data reveal several potential predictors for suicide as well as a three-fold increase in suicide rates among women who have deployed.

In light of this information, and based on your own experience as commander, what actions will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the Army’s suicide prevention program?

Answer. It is important to recognize that the problem of the increasing suicide rate is complex. The findings from Army STARRS are being used to inform the Force, raise awareness, and promote help-seeking behavior. The Army STARRS team will continue to work with Army leadership to analyze and integrate context
into the research that is being conducted. This is an enduring problem that requires enduring solutions. If confirmed, I will sustain the extensive leader focus on this issue and its challenges.

SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

Question. Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from the Army for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from Active Duty, if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Fort Stewart in 2003 and Walter Reed in 2007 revealed, the Army was not prepared to meet the needs of returning wounded soldiers.

In your view, what were the most critical shortcomings in warrior care since 2001?

Answer. The quality of military medical care has and continues to be superb. I have seen first-hand how innovations such as the combat application tourniquet and combat gauze have saved hundreds of lives on the battlefield, allowing severely wounded soldiers to avoid bleeding to death before additional medical care is able to get to them. At the outset of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Army’s infrastructure in garrison was lacking in the area of housing and managing outpatient care for returning wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. Additionally, we identified shortcomings in traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress, behavioral health, and pain management. Since 2001, we have invested significant research and resources to learn how to better care for these injuries and as a result have developed formal programs to improve warrior care. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to ensure we continue to assess and enable procedures, processes, and care for our soldiers.

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s response?

Answer. With the support of Congress, the Army has improved in the housing of wounded and injured soldiers, developed well-resourced Wounded Warrior Transition Units (WTU) and more effectively centralized our Army programs under the Warrior Transition Command. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to assess and monitor procedures, processes, and care of our soldiers.

Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from Active Service?

Answer. In 2004, the Army created the Wounded Warrior program to provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who separated from service. Under the program, the Army maintains contact with soldiers to provide a continuum of care and support.

Question. How effective, in your view, are those programs?

Answer. With more than 190 advocates stationed around the country in Department of Veteran Affairs medical facilities, at WTUs, and everywhere severely injured Army veterans reside, the Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) Program has continued to progress in support of our wounded warriors. These advocates enhance the Veteran Affairs Federal Recovery Care Coordinators to ensure seamless support for our most seriously wounded. As part of the Warrior Transition Command, AW2 is now positioned to ease the transition from soldier to veteran as part of a continuum of care and support that stretches from the battlefield to where they reside today. We still have some work to ensure seamless medical care as we transition our wounded warriors to the VA. We will continue to assess and make adjustments.

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Army’s support for wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continuously assess the efficiency and appropriateness of the Army’s support for wounded personnel. I would implement strategies and seek resources as needed to ensure that the Army meets the needs of wounded soldiers.

Question. Studies following the revelations at Walter Reed point to the need to reform the Army’s disability evaluation system.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s disability evaluation system?

Answer. The Disability Evaluation System (DES) is better than it was 4 years ago; legislative changes and the new Integrated Disability Evaluation System has made the system less adversarial; provided greater consistency between military and VA ratings; reduced the time it takes to start receiving VA benefits after separation. However, the DES remains complex, disjointed, and hard to understand. We must do better to achieve a sustainable system that is understood and better serves
our wounded warriors. I also believe the rehabilitation and disability evaluation systems deserve a broader national and interagency discussion which focuses on the holistic care of our wounded warriors as they transition from the Army to the VA.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you direct to address needed changes in this system, including the Army’s growing population of non-deployable injured, ill, or wounded soldiers?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work with the other Services, DOD, the Department of Veterans Affairs to bring real reform to the process and get the Services out of the disability evaluation business.

**ARMY WARRIOR CARE AND TRANSITION PROGRAM (OTSG, G1)**

**Question.** In February, the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review published a series of articles that alleged that the Army’s 38 WTUs had become “a dumping ground for criminals, malingerers, and dope addicts” creating an imbalance of soldiers who need complex medical case management and soldiers that commanders do not want to take on combat deployment.

Does the Army have adequate guidelines to ensure that only those soldiers with qualifying medical needs are assigned to WTUs?

**Answer.** I am concerned that WTUs maintain the focus on complex medical care management and support those soldiers with a genuine need. If confirmed, I will continuously assess guidelines to ensure that only soldiers with qualifying needs are assigned to the WTUs.

**Question.** In your view, are the WTUs serving the purpose for which they were created?

**Answer.** Over the past 4 years, the Warrior Care and Transition Program has significantly improved the quality of care and support soldiers and families have received.

**Question.** If confirmed, do you plan to make any changes to the criteria for assignment to a WTU?

**Answer.** While I do not have plans to change the criteria for assignment to WTUs at this time, this is an issue I will thoroughly assess, if confirmed. Also, I will continuously assess the effectiveness of the Warrior Care and Transition Program to ensure it provides the level of care and support our wounded warriors deserve.

**Question.** Staffing of WTUs has been a major issue, especially at installations experiencing surges of redeploying troops.

In your view, are the WTUs staffed with sufficient numbers of qualified personnel?

**Answer.** While not fully informed concerning existing staffing levels in WTUs. I know that the Army Staff led by the Director of Force Management, in coordination with key leaders from the U.S. Army Medical Command and the Warrior Transition Command, reviews the structure and staffing of the WTUs on a quarterly basis. I will, if confirmed, learn more about this area and ensure that the WTUs are appropriately resourced to support the soldiers under their care.

**IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK DON’T TELL” POLICY**

**Question.** What is your assessment of the Army’s readiness and capability to implement the repeal of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy?

**Answer.** Per the Chief of Staff, Army memorandum for Director, Joint Staff, subject: Assessment of Preparedness for Implementation of the Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, dated July 6, 2011: Based on both objective and subjective criteria, it is the CSA’s judgment that the Army is prepared for implementation of the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell consistent with the standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and the recruiting and retention of the Armed Forces. I concur in this assessment. Policies have been reviewed and training conducted to prepare for repeal within 60 days after certification.

**Question.** What in your view are the major challenges, if any, that could confront the Army in implementing the repeal of DADT? If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose taking to deal with these challenges?

**Answer.** The most important challenge has been educating our soldiers who are in combat situations with a minimum of disruption and risk and we have already successfully trained over 92 percent of the soldiers currently in theater with expected completion by mid-August. Although we have done some training with currently deployed units, we have made it our priority to train units prior to deploying and upon redeployment, and have allowed deployed units the maximum time to complete training. We will follow up with deployed units to ensure that all soldiers receive the required training upon their return from deployment.
Question. What measures has the Army taken to focus training on combat units and other deployed units and ensure that repeal of the current policy does not adversely affect combat operations?

Answer. The Army is using a chain teach methodology, where each commander is responsible for educating his/her subordinates and they in turn train their soldiers. Commanders and leaders are carefully managing deployed units' training to minimize impact on the mission. The Army continues to make every effort to train units prior to deployment.

Question. If confirmed, what conditions or circumstances would you expect to be achieved, if any, before recommending that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs certify that DADT can be repealed without adversely affecting the Army?

Answer. If confirmed, I would base my recommendation on the input I receive from commanders and leaders, various assessments on chain teaching and propensity to serve consistent with the requirements established by Congress and the DOD leadership. The Army is completing training according to Army guidance.

**Army Role in the Joint Force**

Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the role of the Army as a part of the joint force.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I generally concur with General Dempsey that the Army best contributes to improved joint military capabilities while preserving its service unique capabilities and culture by providing forces for prompt and sustained combat operations on land and making permanent the advantages gained by the joint forces.

I would add, however, that I will continue to look closely at what capabilities the Joint Force and Nation require of its Army. We have learned to fight well as a Joint Force over the past decade and to leverage our sister service strengths and unique capabilities. If confirmed, one of my charters will be to ensure the Army continues to look outwardly at its role as a member of the Joint Force.

**Acquisition Issues**

Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the poor performance and challenges of major defense acquisition programs and the Army's efforts with its capability portfolio review process.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I generally concur with General Dempsey's answers to the acquisition issues raised in the advance policy questions. The Army must have carefully refined contract requirements, a sound program strategy, and stable funding to be successful in fielding major weapons systems and any other large acquisition programs. We also need to take a hard look at our acquisition process overall in an effort to shorten the delivery time, reduce costs, and improve our record of delivering the capability we require. Building a degree of flexibility to react to emerging requirements during production may be one area to consider but I would need to study this issue further before I make any specific recommendations for change.

I believe the Army is a learning organization and it continues to look for ways to improve itself in the acquisition arena, through both internally directed reviews like the Decker-Wagner study commissioned by the Secretary of the Army and external reviews like the Comptroller General’s assessment referenced in the acquisition questions. As General Dempsey pointed out, we are already making progress with future programs and I am confident in our ability to continue to improve in our future acquisitions.

If I am confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the results of these assessments and I pledge to work diligently with the Secretary of the Army and the Army leadership, along with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress, to ensure a unified effort toward acquisition effectiveness and efficiency that meets the capability needs of our force.

Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the Army should take to address these problems?

Answer. The Department of the Army has already begun taking steps to address these concerns. There is a renewed emphasis on collaboration between the requirements and acquisition communities in the development of new programs. Last year,
Secretary McHugh commissioned a thorough review of the Army’s acquisition process led by Hon. Gil Decker and Gen (Ret.) Lou Wagner that provides a blueprint for improvements to the acquisition process. I understand the Army is now studying these recommendations and developing a plan to implement those that help our process. As a whole, the Department must continue to build on these efforts to avoid unnecessary cost and delay in our programs.

ARMY MODERNIZATION

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army modernization efforts over the last decade and the findings of a recent modernization study done for the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the Army Gilbert Decker and retired Army General Louis Wagner.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I concur with General Dempsey’s assessments of the Army’s modernization efforts over the last decade. We have had success when it comes to equipping our soldiers, but we have also learned some valuable lessons including the importance of carefully and rigorously reviewing programs before we initiate them. If I am confirmed, I pledge that I will study the Army’s acquisition process, and the results of the recent reviews of the process, and work closely with Secretary McHugh to identify areas where we can improve our modernization efforts and the acquisition process. I will definitely look hard at our capability as an Army to meet all potential threats and to operate in the variety of environments we are sure to find ourselves.

I recognize that all of my decisions and recommendations with respect to vision, structure, force mix, and modernization will be made against a backdrop fiscal constraint. However, I also agree with General Dempsey in that every decision and recommendation for trade-offs must be made only after considering and consciously acknowledging an acceptable level of risk.

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program for the Army?

Answer. I recognize that a stable modernization strategy and program is an important component to both a balanced Army and to exercise good stewardship of resources entrusted to the Services. If confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary McHugh on how to achieve this.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s current modernization investment strategy?

Answer. While it is true that several of our major modernization efforts over the past decade have been unsuccessful, I would submit that the American soldier today is the best equipped and enabled soldier this country has ever fielded. Successes such as the Stryker vehicle, world class body armor, soldier night vision equipment, soldier weapons, Precision fire systems such as Excalibur and HIMARS, and vehicles such as the Family of Medium Trucks all suggest to me that the Army has had some tremendous success in modernization.

I believe the Army has learned and continues to learn some important and valuable lessons in its processes and mindset to more carefully and rigorously review programs both before we initiate them and while they are in progress. We will have to do better as we move forward. This will be an area I will assess more deeply if I am confirmed as Chief of Staff and will periodically give this committee my frank assessments.

Question. Do you believe that this strategy is affordable and sustainable?

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to closely examine this strategy to ensure it is affordable and sustainable.

ARMY WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAMS

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on several specific major Army research, development, and acquisition programs.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure to monitor the progress and validity of each of these programs with respect to our current and future capability requirements.
1. **Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).** In the development of the Ground Combat vehicle—the replacement for the Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle—the Army is fully committed to the “Big Four” imperatives: Soldier protection; soldier capacity (squad plus crew); the capability to operate across the Full Spectrum of operations; and Timing (7 years to the first production vehicle from contract award). The Ground Combat Vehicle will be the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to operate in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) environment. Modular armor will allow commanders the option to add or remove armor based on the current threat environment. The Ground Combat Vehicle will be designed with the capacity for Space, Weight, and Power growth to incorporate future technologies as they mature. The Army is using an incremental strategy for the Ground Combat Vehicle with the initial increment being an Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Army is currently reviewing proposals from vendors for Technology Development contracts.

2. **Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN–T).** I believe that the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical is one of the Army’s most important programs. It provides the broadband backbone communications for the tactical Army. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 1 (formerly Joint Network Node) began fielding in 2004 to provide a satellite based Internet Protocol network down to battalion level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2 begins fielding in fiscal year 2012 to provide an initial On The Move capability, extending down to company level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 3 will provide improved capabilities, including higher throughput, three to four times more bandwidth efficiency, and an aerial transmission layer, to all 126 brigades/division headquarters with an on-the-move requirement.

3. **E–IBCT Network Integration Kit (NIK).** The E–IBCT investment provides the infrastructure that will allow the Army to grow the tactical network capability, and an opportunity for both large and small companies to support the Army’s tactical network strategy. The NIK is a necessary bridge solution that allows the Army to continue evaluation and development of incorporated network technologies.

4. **Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) including the Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) radios.** Joint Tactical Radio System is the Services’ future deployable, mobile communications family of radios. They provide Army forces dynamic, scalable, on-the-move network architecture, connecting the soldier to the network. Fiscal year 2012 procurement funding supports fielding of Joint Tactical Radio System capability to 8 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to meet fiscal years 2013/2014 network requirements. The Ground Mobile Radio is the primary vehicular radio capability using the Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveforms to meet tactical networking requirements. The Man Pack and Rifleman Radio are the primary Joint Tactical Radio System capability for battalion and below tactical operations. The man pack supports the Soldier Radio Waveform and interoperates with legacy waveforms (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications). Rifleman Radio primarily serves the dismounted formation and utilizes the Soldier Radio Waveform to provide voice and individual location information from the dismounted soldier to the leader. The combination of the three radios helps the Army to push the network to the individual soldier.

5. **Stryker combat vehicle, including the Double-V Hull initiative, procurement of more flat-bottom vehicles, and the Stryker mobile gun variant.** The current Stryker vehicle has exceeded its Space, Weight and Power and Cooling (SWaP–C) limits due to add-on applique (armor and devices) required for ongoing combat operations. In the near term, it is imperative to increase crew protection with the Double-V Hull (DVH) Stryker. In the mid-term, Stryker modernization will improve protection and mobility by recouping SWaP–C, enabling future growth and allowing integration of the emerging network for all Stryker variants. Fleet-wide modernization for all variants upgrades protection, counter-IED, drive train, suspension, electrical power generation and management, and digital communications and network integration. Double-V Hull: Stryker Double-V Hull (DVH) is on track for June 2011 fielding. The initial DVH test results are positive, indicating the vehicle will be ready for fielding as scheduled. Non-DVH: The Army will procure 168 Stryker NBCRVs in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 for a total quantity of 284 (an ARFORGEN rotation quantity). These vehicles are in normal Hull configuration. The Stryker NBCRV provides a unique capability to the Joint Force including a critical mission of Homeland defense, for which DVH protec-
6. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The JLTV is a joint program with the USMC, Navy and the Army; the Australian Army is also currently a partner in the Technology Development phase. I believe that the JLTV is a vital program to fill the force protection and payload gaps not currently satisfied by HMMWV. It will also fill the mobility, transportability, and communication architecture gaps not satisfied by the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles being used in Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) roles. The Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy plans for the JLTV to replace about two-thirds of the LTV fleet, which is roughly 46,000 vehicles. The Army is currently examining the attributes of the JLTV program to ensure it meets our needs for the future Army light tactical fleet, especially in terms of protection.

7. Armored Aerial Scout (AAS). I agree the Army has an enduring requirement for an armed aerial scout as was reaffirmed after the termination of the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program. This requirement will be validated by the ongoing AAS Analysis of Alternatives whose findings are scheduled for release in the third quarter of fiscal year 2011.

8. M1 Abrams tank modernization. In my view, the Abrams modernization is necessary and will initially enable integration of the emerging network and provide ability to fire the next generation of 120mm ammunition. Future modernization will provide capability improvements in lethality, protection, mission command, mobility, and reliability intended to maintain the fleet’s combat overmatch and restore space, weight, and power margins to keep the tank relevant through 2050. The Abrams modernization program is funded in the fiscal year 2012 budget request. If confirmed, I will be able to offer an assessment as the program matures.

9. M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization. The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) will be replaced by the Ground Combat Vehicle beginning in 2018. Bradley Non-Infantry Fighting Vehicle (Cavalry, Engineer and Fire Support variants) modernization will address recoupment of space, weight, and power to provide platform growth and enable improvements in protection, mobility, and ability to integrate the emerging network.

10. Logistics Modernization Program (LMP). Logistics Modernization Program (LMP). I understand that LMP is the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system used by the Army Materiel Command for national-level (wholesale) logistics, including the operation of our depots and arsenals. LMP has 25,000 users and completed its final deployment in October 2010, making it the first fully-deployed Army ERP. Based on commercial off-the-shelf SAP software technology, LMP provides the Army with an integrated end-to-end supply chain solution at the national level that improves overall synchronization of information. I concur with the Army’s vision to achieve a seamless, end-to-end modernized business enterprise and to develop and implement an enterprise logistics architecture. To support that vision, LMP integrates with other Army ERPs, including the General Funds Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), and Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS–Army), to provide a seamless enterprise-wide logistics environment spanning the factory to the foxhole in accordance with the Army’s overall ERP Strategy.

11. Paladin Integrated Management Vehicle program. I understand that the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program is an effort to address an existing capability gap in the self-propelled artillery portfolio brought about by an aging fleet and the termination of prior howitzer modernization efforts (Crusader and Non-Line of Sight-Cannon (NLOS–C)). The PIM program provides upgrades that allow the Army to meet existing and future needs, and leverages the commonality with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle chassis and automotive components. PIM should provide growth potential in space, weight, and power and capacity for network expansion to accommodate future howitzer related needs, to include the addition of such force protection packages as add-on armor.

12. M4 Carbine Upgrades/Individual Carbine Competition. The Army continues to make improvements and upgrades based on operational lessons learned through the M4 Product Improvement Program. The Army’s effort is designed to integrate full automatic firing, an ambidextrous selector switch and a more durable “heavy” barrel. Simultaneously, the Army has initiated a full and open competition to confirm the best possible Individual Carbine solution. Results of the competition are expected in fiscal year 2013.
Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the future of the Army’s large MRAP and MRAP–All Terrain Vehicle fleets. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I generally concur with General Dempsey that the Army should try to provide MRAP levels of protection to deploying forces worldwide commensurate with the mission assigned.

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the 2010 report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), its guidance with regard to the sizing of military forces for the future, and the military departments’ orientation on six key mission areas.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I agree with General Dempsey’s assessment that the Army’s size and structure have proven adequate to meet the demands of our defense strategy, although the toll on our soldiers and families has been high. When trying to predict future size or structure changes, we need to maintain some flexibility. It is difficult to predict what our future commitments will be and we need to account for our wounded warriors and nondeployables which will continue to increase over the next several years as we continue to engage in Afghanistan. Like General Dempsey, if I am confirmed, I pledge to work closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and our combatant commanders to match end strength, structure, and tempo in our ARFORGEN rotational model to meet demands as they change.

Question. If confirmed, what size or structure changes would you pursue, if any, to improve or enhance the Army’s capability to meet these requirements?

Answer. The nature of the strategic environment requires the Army to continuously assess its capabilities and force requirements. It’s taken 10 years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can reasonably describe as balanced. We are accustomed to change, and we will undoubtedly need to continue to change. As we do we must seek to maintain a balance of capabilities that are available to meet the Nation’s needs at a sustainable tempo.

I concur with each of General Dempsey’s assessments of the improved capabilities required in the six key mission areas discussed in the attached reference. I also agree with his assessment that the Army is currently capable of supporting these mission requirements, but there are areas where we need to restore our proficiency and improve our training. If confirmed, I will study the QDR further and better evaluate areas where additional emphasis may be needed.

Question. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement for improved capabilities in the following six key mission areas. For each, what is your assessment of the Army’s current ability to provide capabilities to support these mission requirements?

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue to improve the Army’s capabilities to support:

Defense of the United States.

Answer. The Army is fully capable of fulfilling its responsibility to defend the Homeland through detection, deterrence, prevention, and if necessary, the defeat of external threats or aggression from both state and non-state actors. A specific program recently undertaken to enhance this ability include the fielding of the enhanced Stryker Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle. This provides us with a much improved technical assessment and decontamination capability.

Question. Support of civil authorities at home.

Answer. The Army is well-postured to provide support to civil authorities. We are organized and trained to provide responsive and flexible support to mitigate domestic disasters, CBRNE consequence management, support to civilian law enforcement agencies, counter WMD operations, and to counter narcotics trafficking activities. We continue to address the challenges associated with this mission set including
unity of command, integration with civilian authorities, and the integration of title 10 and title 32 forces.

**Question.** Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations.

**Answer.** We are highly proficient in counterinsurgency, stability and counterterrorism operations. This has been the focus for the Army for much of the last 10 years and we have institutionalized lessons learned across the operating and generating force.

**Question.** Build the security capacity of partner states (including your views, if any, on the use of general purpose forces in the security force assistance role).

**Answer.** General Purpose Forces have a clear role in building sustainable capability and capacity of partner nation security forces and their supporting institutions. Peace time engagement is our best opportunity to shape the future operating environment. General Purpose Forces are well-suited to support these activities through Security Force Assistance.

**Question.** Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments.

**Answer.** The Army’s ability to deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments as part of the joint force is adequate to meet the demands of the current security environment. That said, there are some tasks and skills to which we have not trained due to the demands of our ongoing conflicts. We must restore our proficiency in those tasks. We work with our sister Services to assess our capabilities to conduct entry operations as part of the joint force and watch closely the improved anti-access/area denial capabilities being developed by potential adversaries.

**Question.** Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

**Answer.** The Army provides highly trained and ready forces with capabilities to support combatant commander requirements to counter the proliferation of WMD. Current capabilities include operating effectively within a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment, specialized teams to locate and neutralize WMD, and an operational headquarters with expertise in eliminating WMD.

**Question.** Operate effectively in cyberspace.

**Answer.** We are on the right glide path to support U.S. Cyber Command and our geographic combatant commanders to operate effectively in cyberspace. On 1 October 2010, the Army stood up a new three-star command (U.S. Army Cyber Command/2nd Army), to direct the operations and defense of all Army networks, and when directed, provide full-spectrum cyberspace operations. The Army is bringing the forces of network operations, defense, exploitation, and attack under one operational level command to integrate and synchronize global operations for the first time.

**MISSILE DEFENSE**

**Question.** The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on air defense missile programs and a recent proposal to transfer a number of Army air and missile development programs to the Missile Defense Agency.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

**Answer.** I agree with General Dempsey’s responses involving the Army’s missile defense program and his understanding of the Army’s relationship with the Missile Defense Agency. In addition to protection of our deployed forces, I would add defense of our Nation’s national security interests as one of the priorities of this program.

**Yes.** The Army has confirmed on many occasions that Air and Missile Defense is a core competency. Defense of our Nation’s national security interest and protection of our deployed forces is the priority. The Army provides this protection in coordination with our sister Services and coalition partners.

**I concur with General Dempsey in that the Army needs to continue to monitor the threat and prioritize required future capabilities to ensure we provide effective affordable solutions in a timely manner to our forces.**

**SPACE**

**Question.** The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army support to Strategic Command in getting space based communications to the warfighter and the apparent lag in the acquisition of ground and other terminals to work with new satellite systems.
We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. Similar to General Dempsey, I am not currently in a position to provide an informed assessment of what needs the Army could address from space or what my vision for future Army space forces would be. I certainly appreciate, however, the importance of the Army’s role in space and of ensuring that the Army does not fall behind or fail to be a complimentary contributor to the Joint Force in this domain. The Army depends on capabilities from space-based systems such as global positioning satellites, communication satellites, weather satellites, and intelligence collection platforms for the effective execution of full spectrum operations. I experienced some of the challenges the Army has with respect to the lag in acquiring required space technology in theater, but I would need to examine this issue more closely, if I am confirmed, before I can determine the real cause of any lag or recommend future action.

LOW-DENSITY/HIGH-DEMAND FORCES

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on low-density/high-demand forces. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that the Army needs to use the Total Army Analysis (TAA) to identify the capabilities necessary, within resource constraints, to achieve the full spectrum of missions expected of the Army. This process allows us to identify requirements while still managing acceptable risk for all forces, in both Active and Reserve components. I am not aware of any necessary functional changes that should be made between the components at this time, but if I am confirmed, I will continue to evaluate this matter. I also intend to continue to reinforce the great interaction seen between the Active and Reserve components of the Army that we have seen in the past 10 years.

MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the challenges associated with the mobilization of Army National Guard and Reserve Forces. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I have seen firsthand throughout my career how critical our Reserve component soldiers are to the Total Force. With increased deployments in the last decade, the Army has learned a lot about mobilizing and demobilizing these forces, and it will continue to learn from our experiences and to improve our processes. I understand the Army is currently reviewing all of its mobilization policies to ensure that the systems in place are effective and responsive to meet the Army’s needs and the needs of our Reserve component soldiers and their families. If confirmed, I will continue to support these efforts.

I share General Dempsey’s understandings and assessments of Reserve Force management policies and changes to how the Army uses the ARFORGEN model to build unit readiness for mobilization requirements. If I am confirmed, I will continue to assess the validity and effectiveness of this model over time and to work with Secretary McHugh to identify areas where changes may be needed. At present though, I am not aware of any required changes.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on accessing the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that the IRR has proven to be an invaluable asset to all Army components in support of contingency operations around the world and it is a critical source of highly-skilled soldiers. I continue to be amazed
at the incredible talent resident across our Total Force. I am not aware of any
changes that need to be made to the mobilization or recall policies of our IRR. If
I am confirmed, I will learn more about these policies before making any final as-
essment.

In response to the recent studies showing higher rates of suicide among the IRR,
I concur with General Dempsey’s response and acknowledge the gravity of this par-
ticular issue. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Army’s effort to pursue all
avenues available to assure the well being of our Total Force.

PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised
a series of issues on the challenges of personnel and entitlement cost growth.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate
General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of
an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you
would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I agree with General Dempsey that in order to take control of the Army’s
personnel costs and entitlement spending, we need to strike a balance between pre-
serving the All-Volunteer Force, accomplishing operational missions, and retraining
an Army that is affordable to the Nation. I am not familiar with a requirement to
reprogram money to cover current personnel costs.

I also understand that the Military Personnel Army (MPA) appropriation was
passed by Congress in April 2011; and both the MPA OCO and Active component
base force requirements are adequate to meet current personnel costs.

MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE
PERSONNEL

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised
a series of issues on medical and dental readiness of Reserve component personnel.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate
General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of
an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you
would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I concur with General Dempsey and believe the Army should develop and
resource mechanisms to routinely identify, screen, and assess Reserve component
medical readiness. I also believe that the health and fitness of the Reserve compo-
nent is a very important issue. In addition to the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness
Program already discussed by General Dempsey, the Army is also moving forward
with a Soldier Medical Readiness Campaign Plan that seeks to improve health and
fitness, increase soldier resilience, and reduce injury rates. If confirmed, I would
work with the Army’s Active and Reserve component leadership to continue these
important initiatives and to develop policies for more effectively identifying ready
and medically non-ready soldiers across the force.

ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised
a series of issues on Army the value and management science and technology pro-
grams.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate
General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of
an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you
would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. As General Dempsey stated, the Army’s science and technology invest-
ment strategy is shaped to foster invention, innovation, and demonstration of tech-
nologies for the current and future warfighter. I believe that a strong Army science
and technology program has already provided many advanced capabilities dem-
onstrated in the past 10 years of war.

Technological innovations have resulted in the rapid development and deployment
of lightweight and adaptable armor solutions, jammers, unmanned air vehicles, un-
manned ground vehicles, surveillance systems, communications devices, and day/night
vision systems. All of these technology enabled capabilities have significantly
improved our warfighters’ capabilities in recent operations. If I am confirmed, then
like General Dempsey, I would use metrics that demonstrate improved warfighters’
capabilities; improve acquisition programs; and align technology development to
warfighters’ requirements, to judge the value and investment level in Army science
and technology programs. I do not currently envision any specific new science and
technology areas for the Army to pursue, but I would welcome the opportunity to study this matter further.

**ARMY LABORATORIES AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING CENTERS**

**Question.** The committee's advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army's commitment to and investment in its laboratories and research, development, and engineering centers.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

**Answer.** As General Dempsey stated, Army laboratories are science and technology performing organizations that play a major role in supporting current operations with best capabilities available and providing critical new capabilities for soldiers particularly in key strategic science and technology areas.

I concur with General Dempsey that the Army laboratories and research and development centers need to maintain the resources required to continue initiatives and advancements that support the warfighters. If confirmed, I will learn more about their operations and support efforts to improve best practices and workforce quality necessary for mission accomplishments.

**ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION EFFORTS**

**Question.** The committee's advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army's failure to meet test and evaluation range investment certification requirements from the DOD Test Resource Management Center.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

**Answer.** I have reviewed General Dempsey's answer and concur with his response, that testing is a crucial capability for maintaining the Army's combat edge and modernizing the force. I fully recognize the value of testing to ensure new technologies and equipment address the capabilities our warfighters need. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Army test and evaluation community and the Office of the Secretary of Defense test and evaluation leadership to ensure the Army's test and evaluation infrastructure is adequately resourced to address testing requirements and maintain robust test capabilities.

**ARMY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS**

**Question.** The committee's advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army information technology management, consolidation, and efficiencies initiatives.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

**Answer.** I concur with General Dempsey's response and believe the Army needs to implement and enforce technical standards, make acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or near-COTS technology easier, and field new technology to operational forces more quickly. This is in line with the congressional mandate you gave us in section 804 of the 2010 NDAA.

The center for network integration at Fort Bliss, TX—the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) will serve as the Network's primary test unit with a two-fold intent, to remove the integration burden from the operational units and to provide an operational venue to evaluate new technologies and network capabilities prior to fielding to operational units. The new capabilities they develop should ultimately provide the impetus for future acquisition and equipping decisions.

**HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEMS**

**Question.** The committee's advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army's plans to institutionalize its Human Terrain System program.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.
Answer. I concur with General Dempsey and I understand the Army has institutionalized the Human Terrain System as an enduring capability assigned to Training and Doctrine Command and funded capability starting in the fiscal year 2011. I also believe there is merit to developing a joint capability. In September 2010, General Dempsey directed a Training and Doctrine Command capability-based assessment of all socio-cultural capabilities throughout the combatant commands and Services. The intent is to identify other ongoing socio-cultural initiatives, to determine potential synergies and best practices in order to develop and evolve an enduring joint capability. The results of this assessment have been compiled, and if confirmed, I will make this part of my review.

OPERATIONAL ENERGY

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army’s operational energy program and its lack of quantitative metrics against which to measure progress.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I concur with General Dempsey’s response that the most important issue with operational energy is the amount of fuel used to meet our operational needs. Most of our fuel is used in generation of electricity. The Army has implemented, and accelerated deployment, of generators that use less fuel as well as microgrid systems that tie generators together to operate more efficiently. We are developing more efficient motors for helicopters and vehicles to reduce our operational energy footprint and, ultimately, wars are won or lost by dismounted soldiers, so the Army is addressing excessive soldier loads, driven in large part by energy and power constraints.

If confirmed, I will continue efforts currently underway to increase our energy efficient capabilities in theater and emphasize energy awareness through the military chain of command, and across the Army, to foster a more energy-aware culture.

Question. What is your understanding of the Army’s progress with respect to testing and deploying operational energy technologies?

Answer. As General Dempsey stated, the Army is taking advantage of every avenue, to include industry, to help us develop technologies that can reduce our operational energy footprint. Renewable energy systems and insulated tentage are some of the systems being piloted and tested. We are also evaluating technologies that will help lighten soldier loads and reduce the amount of batteries and fuel we must procure and deliver to theater. We will continue to pursue more efficient devices, emphasize energy conservation, and employ energy management capabilities that are essential to retain energy as an operational advantage.

Question. What is your understanding of how the Army is taking advantage of its labs and research, engineering, and development centers to further its operational energy and security goals?

Answer. I concur with General Dempsey’s response that the Army has integrated the national laboratories with Department of Energy and Army laboratories to develop solutions to a range of operational energy, power, and security needs. Some of the initiatives include research to reduce the size and weight of components, broadening alternative energy sources, leveraging various emergent energy efficient technologies. These new technologies will increase energy efficiency and improve power supplies for contingency bases, forward operating bases and equipment carried by individual soldiers. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the research conducted at Army facilities continues to focus on meeting the operational energy needs of the current and future Army and to support DOD’s high priority program to increase energy efficiencies.

INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on decades of under-investment in installation infrastructure that have led to increasing maintenance backlogs and substandard living and working conditions.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I concur with General Dempsey’s statement that since fiscal year 2007, with Base Realignment and Closure, Transformation, and Grow the Army initia-
tives, the Army has made significant military construction investments in its infrastructure. Additionally, a variety of public-private partnership initiatives have complemented direct Army investments. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation, Energy and Environment, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, and the Commanding General at Installation Management Command to assess our infrastructure investments.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities?

**Answer.** The proper stewardship of our facilities portfolio requires the Army to fully sustain current facilities, dispose of our excess facilities, improve the quality of our worst facilities, and build-out our largest and most critical shortages, all at a level adequate to support the mission. The Army is utilizing programs in which it leverages private financing to upgrade infrastructure and ensure more sustainable, efficient, and reliable mission support. If confirmed, I will evaluate the proper balance of funding, to include evaluating privatization opportunities and whether the Army should increase operation and maintenance funding for restoration and modernization and proper stewardship of our facilities portfolio requires the Army to fully sustain the current facilities, dispose of our excess facilities, improve the quality of our worst facilities, and build-out our largest and most critical shortages, all at a level adequate to support the mission.

**ARMY POLICIES REGARDING DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE**

**Question.** The committee's advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army drug and alcohol abuse policies and programs. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

**Answer.** I concur with General Dempsey that Army policy directs commanders to initiate administrative separation for all soldiers involved in trafficking, distribution, possession, use, or sale of illegal drugs. While the policy requires initiation of separation, commanders have the authority to retain or separate a soldier. I concur with this policy as it has proven effective in allowing commanders necessary discretion in treating each soldier and incident on its merits while balancing the needs of the Army.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the Army’s policy with respect to rehabilitation and retention on Active Duty of soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?

**Answer.** I agree with General Dempsey. Army policy requires the separation authority consider a soldier drug offender's potential for rehabilitation and further military service allowing effective management of the Army's personnel and discipline needs. To effectively enforce this policy, soldiers who commit drug and alcohol offenses are required to be evaluated by a certified substance abuse counselor through the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP). The ASAP counselor's recommendation is considered by the commander when determining a soldier's potential for rehabilitation and retention. I concur with this policy.

**Question.** Do you believe that the Army has devoted sufficient resources to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways?

**Answer.** I have served at numerous command levels since 2001. In my experience, sufficient resources are devoted to the Army's rehabilitation policies and objectives. If confirmed, I will assess and closely monitor the level of resourcing for this important area.

**Question.** What measures are being taken to improve the Army's performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?

**Answer.** The Army is very adept at analyzing itself to determine a better way ahead. The Army's policy is a comprehensive approach bringing together the skills and experience of commanders, law enforcement, and the medical community for drug and alcohol abuse incidents. The Army continues working on improving systems for detecting drug and alcohol abuse as well as on improving intervention systems so that we can help our soldiers who selflessly sacrifice for our Nation. One method through which the Army builds resiliency in the force is through the continually expanding Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. By encouraging a more resilient force and through awareness of available confidential programs, the Army's goal is to promote help seeking behavior by soldiers.
MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both the Army’s Active and Reserve components.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

The Army continues to face significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve components.

What is your understanding of the most significant personnel challenges in recruiting and retaining health professionals in the Army?

Answer. I concur with General Dempsey, there continues to be a national shortage of medical professionals that challenges the Army’s efforts to recruit and retain health care professionals. We are concerned that escalating need in the civilian sector will impact the demand for these critically short professionals. To take care of our soldiers, the Army must continue evaluating initiatives and programs to attract and retain the most skilled and talented health care providers.

Question. If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new requirements for 2011 and beyond?

Answer. Like General Dempsey stated, I also believe it is important to review medical support requirements on a regular, recurring basis. If confirmed, this review will allow me to assess whether the Army is meeting its medical support requirements and, if not, determine where improvements can be implemented to better serve our soldiers.

Question. If confirmed, what policies or legislative initiatives, if any, are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill ongoing medical support requirements?

Answer. I do not believe additional legislative authorities are needed to ensure the Army fulfills medical support requirements. Like General Dempsey, the policy initiatives currently underway and the changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 at this time, allow the Army to serve the needs of its soldiers. If confirmed, this will be an area I closely monitor. If any additional authorities are identified as necessary to maintain this goal, I will work closely with the administration and Congress to address the needs.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on foreign language policy, doctrine, and building capabilities for both military and civilian personnel.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by DOD in March 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at transforming the Department’s foreign language capabilities to include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for both military and civilian personnel.

What is your assessment of the progress the Army has made in increasing its foreign language capabilities in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that the Army has increased in foreign language capabilities in support of OIF/OEF. The Army revolutionized its recruiting processes to enlist native and heritage speakers into vital interpreter/translator positions. Overall, these initiatives have provided enhanced capabilities for counterinsurgency operations and building partner capacity overseas.

Like General Dempsey, I also believe a high priority for DOD should be the continued support of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, which provides Culturally Based Language Training to all Services and DOD components.

PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on a DOD review of the attack at Fort Hood concluding that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization of military personnel.
Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that the lessons learned are invaluable to the Army as we strive to improve the Army Protection Program for individuals and units against emerging threats. If confirmed, and as General Dempsey also stated, I will ensure that we continue to integrate and synchronize the many Army Protection Programs that protect our soldiers, family members, and Department of the Army civilians by ensuring that commanders and leaders have the information and tools needed to address the ever changing threat environment.

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on a DOD review of the attack at Fort Hood observation that “DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization” and recommended that the policy be updated.

Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that there are established policies for religious accommodation in wear and appearance of Army uniforms and insignia and because the Army is a diverse, professional force, committed to treating all soldiers with dignity and respect, that our policies must be clear and provide appropriate guidance for both soldiers and commanders. Like General Dempsey, I also believe that current Army policies provide commanders with adequate flexibility to balance accommodation for religious beliefs and maintain good order and discipline. To this end, if confirmed, I will assess the current policy and determine if further changes are necessary.

FAMILY SUPPORT


We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I concur with General Dempsey’s statement that the most pressing family readiness issues include sustaining the Army Family Covenant and improving communication and awareness of the extensive range of available support programs and services the Army has to improve soldier and family quality of life. The Army Family Action Plan, Survey of Army families, and other studies revealed that soldiers and families may not be aware of the myriad of available support services.

To address this concern, the Army is transforming Army Community Service (ACS) to help connect soldiers and families to the right service at the right time. The Army has begun piloting ACS transformation and anticipates completion by October 2011. I also will endeavor to ensure that Army family programs reach out to all soldiers and their families, regardless of component, geographic location or deployment status. I will work to ensure that family program platforms and delivery systems keep pace with a mobile Army and utilize technological advances and social networking so services are available to the soldiers and families who need them.

I am highly interested in the results of the ACS pilot and if confirmed, I will continue to strengthen our support services and ensure our programs efficiently meet the needs of the soldiers and families who use them.

MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAMS

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army’s Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) studies in Iraq and Afghanistan and their value in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in combat theaters.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that the MHAT studies have played a key role in proactively identifying how changes in the operational environment impact the ability to provide behavioral health care. Both MHAT VI OEF and VII OEF recommended several critical measure that we have put into effect, namely the number of behavioral health personnel in theater to number of soldiers. One of the most valuable findings from the MHATs has been to document that soldiers suffering multiple deployments and/or short dwell times report higher mental health
problems. Overall, the willingness to take a systematic look at the behavioral health care system and the behavioral health status of soldiers through programs such as the MHATs has ensured that the Army is being responsive to the needs of deployed soldiers. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to develop and synchronize the expeditionary components of health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention programs and services.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on policies and procedures to improve the prevention of, and response to, incidents of sexual assault, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault and addressing the challenges that remain.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. Like General Dempsey, I am very concerned about reports of sexual assault in our Army, whether deployed or otherwise. We cannot tolerate this behavior wherever it occurs. The Army is committed to providing victims in all units with appropriate medical care, resources, and support while ensuring that our prevention and response programs are fully available and prepared. The Army’s SHARP program is a formidable effort at dealing with this issue. There is no doubt that this is a challenging problem that will require leadership and constant vigilance at all levels, and if confirmed, I will continue to look closely at the Army’s sexual assault program, to ensure there is trust and faith in the Army’s programs and system, and that there is continuous oversight and leadership involvement.

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. The committee’s advance policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs critical to the enhancement of military life for members and their families.

We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey’s responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that the Army has taken steps to ensure we care for and retain families through a broad range of meaningful initiatives, to include many family and MWR programs and services. The criticality of these programs is immeasurable and I feel we cannot afford to lose such a key enabler of our Force.

The challenge will be in our resource-constrained environment to sustain a consistent level of funding for these programs. If confirmed, I will consult with commanders, soldiers, and families to ensure that these programs are adequate and meet their needs.

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes. The U.S. military will continue to follow the principles of humane treatment outlined in Common Article 3. These basic rules of the law of armed conflict will continue to guide our conduct toward detainees, no matter how they were captured or how the conflict is characterized.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes. Both of these documents provide effective, practical guidance, and direction to the field on critically important issues relative to detainee treatment, detainee operations training, and the interrogation of detainees.

Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective military operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes. Common Article 3 has long provided the minimum standards of conduct for the U.S. military. Our forces have adhered to the humane treatment protec-
tions outlined in this article and they have been a part of U.S. policy on the law of war for many years.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

Answer. First, the Army is committed to adherence to the law of war and the humane treatment of detainees. The value of adherence to the rule of law in our operations cannot be underestimated—it ensures the trust and respect of the American people, enhances our international credibility, and establishes our professional credentials. Our professional and ethical conduct on the battlefield also earns the respect of the civilian populace we are sworn to protect on this asymmetric battlefield.

I intend to emphasize the importance of conducting disciplined military operations, characterized by adhering to the laws of war, treating detainees humanely, and showing compassion and restraint on the modern battlefield.

I would also seek to sustain and improve our existing systems for helping our soldiers to understand and adhere to the proper standards for detainee treatment, detention operations, and interrogations.

Finally, when allegations of wrongdoing by soldiers surface, the Army will continue to fully investigate and hold soldiers accountable, as appropriate and consistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice, if misconduct is substantiated.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Chief of Staff of the Army?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Note: General Martin E. Dempsey’s responses to his Advance Policy Questions from his nomination hearing dated March 3, 2011, to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, appear at the end of this transcript, located at Annex A.]

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
General Odierno. We structure the Army—Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve—as a Total Force, responding together to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders. An important distinction between Strategic Reserves and Operational Reserves is readiness and length of time and resources required to deploy a unit to a theater of operation. Continuous investment in a Strategic Reserve is considerably less than that of an Operational Reserve because the Strategic Reserve has no immediate or short-term expectation of deployment; however, any rapid need for this force requires unprogrammed resources. The Operational Reserve has an assigned mission and must be at a higher state of readiness, similar to an Active Duty unit.

The demand for U.S. ground forces over this past decade has highlighted the need for the Army to maintain an Operational Reserve to meet both current and future operational requirements. Reducing our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan will not alleviate the responsibility of the Army to be prepared to rapidly participate in the full spectrum of contingency operations across the globe. Maintaining an appropriate level of resourcing for the Operational Reserve coupled with Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) will allow the mobilization of these forces on a predictable and recurring basis. It will be the enabling edge that ensures our success in a complex security environment. The operating force consists of the units (both Active and Reserve) whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof.

2. Senator Levin. General Odierno, how would you treat each with respect to resource requirements and allocation if they are distinguished by different standards of readiness in manning, equipping, and training?

General Odierno. We do not distinguish components by different standards of readiness. We structure the Army—Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve—as a Total Force, responding together to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders. To meet joint force requirements for rotational and contingency operations in the new security environment, the Army moved to the sustainable ARFORGEN system. Under ARFORGEN, standards of readiness in manning, equipping, and training of units are synchronized to meet their respective operational deployment mission and training/readiness timeline. We ensure that any unit, regardless of component, is resourced to accomplish its assigned mission. To enable us to keep all units ready we need continued assured access to the Reserves, and the resources to sustain readiness.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

ARMY MAJOR WEAPONS PROCUREMENT PROCESS

3. Senator McCain. General Odierno, as you likely know, a group chartered by the Secretary of the Army to look into how the Army procures major weapons systems found that, every year since 1996, the Army has spent more than $1 billion annually on programs that were ultimately cancelled. Since 2004, including the now-cancelled Future Combat System program, $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion (or 35 percent to 42 percent) per year of Army developmental testing and evaluation funding has been lost to cancelled programs. The Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessments just recently came out with a similarly harsh assessment of how poorly major Army weapons programs have performed as promised. Do you agree that the Army cannot afford to continue losing funds in this manner? If so, how would you address it, if confirmed as the Army Chief of Staff?

General Odierno. I agree that the Army must exercise very careful stewardship of the taxpayers' dollars, particularly in this time of budgetary constraints. Although the Army has clearly faced challenges with the development of major weapons systems, Secretary McHugh has undertaken an unprecedented review of the Army acquisition process. The Decker-Wagner panel examined weapons system procurements from “cradle-to-grave” with a key focus on properly defining requirements. I understand that many of the Army's development and procurement problems stemmed from pursuing requirements that ultimately did not match the needs of the soldier, were cost prohibitive or were technologically infeasible. The Army has been working to implement many of the recommendations of the Decker-Wagner panel and many of these recommendations are already reflected in the acquisition strategy for the new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army to ensure a unified effort to improve the effectiveness of the process to meet the capability needs of our force.
4. Senator McCain. General Odierno, in your view, what are the lessons learned from the Army's experience with these failed major Army weapons programs?

General Odierno. In my view, the most important lesson learned from past experience is that materiel solutions require diligent and complementary efforts throughout the acquisition lifecycle among the requirements, acquisition, and resourcing communities in pursuit of affordable and achievable solutions. Affordability and risk must be addressed from the earliest stages of requirements development throughout the execution of acquisition programs with an emphasis on what we can realistically afford and develop. The lessons learned from recent conflicts and prior acquisition efforts will help the Army invest limited fiscal resources in a responsible manner.

5. Senator McCain. General Odierno, if confirmed, how would you help to ensure that the enormously expensive lessons learned from these failed major Army programs are brought to bear on the GCV program?

General Odierno. I understand the Army acquisition community has already applied some of these lessons learned on the GCV program. Under the leadership of the Army Acquisition Executive, the Army assembled a team of senior subject matter experts as they refined the 900-plus GCV requirements and revised the original Request for Proposals. The Army team, which included members of the requirements, resourcing, contracting, and program management communities, developed a set of tiered requirements that distinguish critical must-have capabilities and provide industry with the necessary flexibility to develop vehicle designs that meet the Army's strict cost and schedule constraints. In addition, the GCV acquisition strategy implements innovative measures designed to keep the program on schedule and on budget, to include fixed price incentive fee contracts in the 2-year technology development phase, an increased emphasis on mature technologies and reliance on competition throughout the program as an incentive. In short, GCV is an example of the Army's implementation of acquisition reform.

ARMY MEADS PROGRAM

6. Senator McCain. General Odierno, as you probably know, this committee declined to authorize the President's request for $407 million to continue U.S. participation in the Army's troubled Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program. During the previous administration, the United States partnered with Italy and Germany to develop this aspect of the missile defense program in Europe. But, since then, this development effort dramatically overran in cost and has failed to perform as promised. Considerably frustrated with the program's failure and how the program addressed "termination liability" as to the United States, this committee zeroed out the administration's funding request for the program for fiscal year 2012. However, a few days ago, a top German defense official reportedly had strong words for the United States and the likelihood that it would unilaterally withdraw from the program. This official indicated that such a withdrawal was "not an option" and called on the Department of Defense (DOD) to uphold U.S. "contributions commitments—even beyond the development phase". What is your reaction to the German officials' comments and how this committee addressed the administration's funding request for the program?

General Odierno. The President's fiscal year 2012 budget request funds MEADS development in fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 in accordance with the international agreement with Italy and Germany. The funding will complete a Proof of Concept effort to mature advanced air and missile defense technologies under the MEADS MOU and will culminate with two intercept flight tests in fiscal year 2013 using the PAC–3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missile. The Proof of Concept is intended to place the program on sound footing should Germany and Italy wish to continue to production. Per recent correspondence to Dr. Carter from both German and Italian government officials, both partners have agreed that refocusing the remaining MEADS development as a Proof of Concept, as reflected in the President's budget, is the proper course of action and that is the course that we strongly recommend pursuing.

7. Senator McCain. General Odierno, as far as you know, DOD's current plan is only to participate in the program inasmuch as it is restructured as a Proof of Concept program, as opposed to a larger development effort. But, the German official is clearly calling for the United States to modify its plan. Are you aware of any current interest whatsoever among leadership at the Army, or the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), to change its approach as the German official suggested?
General Odierno. No, the Army continues to support OSD's decision that DOD will participate only through the completion of the Proof of Concept approach.

PERSONNEL COSTS

8. Senator McCain. General Odierno, what percentage of the U.S. Army is non-deployable due to medical conditions, being on a temporary retired status, or awaiting disability determinations prior to separation from military service?

General Odierno. About 10 percent of soldiers currently serving in the Active Army are non-deployable due to medical conditions; this includes soldiers awaiting disability determinations and soldiers with temporary conditions. Soldiers on the Temporary Disability Retired List (TDRL) are retired and considered veterans, so they do not count against end strength.

9. Senator McCain. General Odierno, do you know if that number has increased or decreased in recent years?

General Odierno. Since January 2008, the number of soldiers in the Army's Disability Evaluation System (DES) has increased 169 percent (6,948 to 18,671). In the last year, we have seen a 50 percent increase in this population (12,419 to 18,671) and currently we have over 18,000 soldiers in the DES. We currently have over 11,000 soldiers on the TDRL. Soldiers on the TDRL are retired and considered veterans, so they do not count against end strength, but we do use limited medical resources conducting their disability reevaluation. Since January 2008, the number of soldiers on the TDRL has increased 127 percent (4,959 to 11,049), and in the last year we've seen an increase of 15 percent (9,586 to 11,049). Normally, soldiers on the TDRL receive a medical reevaluation at least once every 18 months, and at any given time we have a third undergoing a medical reexamination.

10. Senator McCain. General Odierno, do these prolonged processes represent costs that could be avoided in the personnel arena, and applied to other readiness requirements?

General Odierno. The Army has 18,671 soldiers in the DES. Apart from the impact these nondeployable soldiers have on our ability to man contingency forces at 90 percent, the DES process diverts limited medical resources. Medical requirements for DES population increasingly compete for care with deploying SM, family members, and those recovering from wounds and injuries; the DES pulls limited medical resources away from treatment and rehabilitation.

Additionally, there has been a significant increase in the number of administrative staff required to prepare for and manage the board process and to provide direct support to the soldiers going through the disability evaluation process.

11. Senator McCain. General Odierno, as Chief of Staff of the Army, what actions do you think are necessary to address this issue?

General Odierno. The DES is better than it was 4 years ago. Legislative changes have improved the consistency between Military and VA ratings, and the new joint DOD/VA DES has reduced the time it takes for soldiers separated for a disability to start receiving the VA benefits. However, the process remains complex, adversarial, not fully integrated, and takes far too long to complete.

While the two departments have merged their separate disability systems, each still must follow the laws and policies specific to their own department. This dichotomy produces differing results. The military compensates only for conditions related to being unfit to serve while the VA compensates for all Service-connected conditions. Military conditions related to unfitness are a subset of all Service-connected conditions; so the military's combined rating is usually going to be less than VA's combined rating. This creates confusion, and causes soldiers to believe the Army does not recognize their complete medical condition in a deliberate effort to minimize disability compensation and limit access to other valuable benefits.

As long as this system of dual adjudication exists, we are not going to have an integrated process. In a fully integrated process, the Military Services would determine fitness.

HEALTH CARE COSTS

12. Senator McCain. General Odierno, in a modest attempt to control DOD's health care costs, former Secretary Gates sought to apply a medical inflation factor to TRICARE Prime enrollment fees for working-age retirees beginning in fiscal year 2013. Unfortunately, our committee balked at that idea, and reported a bill that
would permanently tie DOD’s hands to annual increases to the annual increase in retired pay, which has been minimal.

TRICARE fees haven’t changed since they were established in 1995. At that time, according to DOD, working age retirees paid about 27 percent of their total costs when using civilian care. Today, out of pocket expenses for working age retirees represent less than 9 percent of the total cost of the family’s health care costs. Some argue that health care benefits to retirees have been eroded over time. Do you agree?

General Odierno. Health care costs are increasingly becoming a larger part of everyone’s budget including DOD’s annual budget. Military health care costs have increased due to an expansion of benefits rather than an erosion, increased use of TRICARE, and no change to TRICARE premiums since the program began in 1995. Because of DOD’s low enrollment costs compared with private health insurance, there has been a steady increase in retirees enrolling in TRICARE. The Army believes these proposals to raise the TRICARE enrollment fees for working age retirees and adjust future increases to be modest, gradual, and responsible. Even with this proposed fee change, TRICARE would remain one of the Nation’s very best health benefits and beneficiaries would continue to have less out-of-pocket costs in comparison to Federal, State, and private health plans.

13. Senator McCain. General Odierno, do you support the administration’s modest goal of linking future increases in fees for working age retirees to a factor that relates to rising national medical costs?

General Odierno. The Army, in partnership with DOD, is committed to preserving this health care benefit while recognizing that continued increases in costs are not sustainable. I support DOD efforts to work with Congress to find ways to help control escalating health care costs including fee increases for working age retirees that can be adjusted in some way to reflect rising national medical costs.

14. Senator McCain. General Odierno, do you see the rise in health care costs as a threat to readiness, and if so, what would you do or recommend, if confirmed, to address this very serious issue for DOD?

General Odierno. I share former Secretary of Defense Gates’ concerns about the rise of DOD’s health care expenditures and its impact on the overall DOD budget including readiness. I support DOD efforts to work with Congress to find ways to help control escalating health care costs. The Army, in partnership with DOD, is committed to preserving this health care benefit while recognizing that continued increases in costs are not sustainable. Even with the proposed fee changes DOD recommended for fiscal year 2012, TRICARE would remain one of the Nation’s very best health benefits and beneficiaries would continue to have less out-of-pocket costs in comparison to Federal, State, and private health plans. I believe this proposal balances our commitment to preserve readiness while slowing future growth in health care costs.

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE

15. Senator McCain. General Odierno, please describe the operational urgency driving a GCV by 2017.

General Odierno. Lessons from the last 10 years of sustained combat operations indicate that the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) is no longer capable of fully meeting the necessary levels of protection, fire power, and mobility requirements that our infantrymen will need as they face both current and future hybrid and conventional threats. We will counter that threat by building a GCV IFV that has the mobility to keep up with, communicate with, and survive alongside the improved Abrams Main Battle Tank. We believe the Bradley IFV will have reached its capacity to improve in these areas upon completion of its next modernization efforts. The GCV’s research, development, test, and evaluation and production timeline (7 years from technology development contract award) should provide vehicles that have the increased protection, mobility, and network capability to maneuver and fight alongside the Abrams, meet our near-term threats, and have the capacity to grow in the future.

16. Senator McCain. General Odierno, would GCVs be employed within Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as part of GCV/Bradley mixed fleet?

General Odierno. Yes. The GCV will replace the Bradley IFV in the Heavy BCTs as unit sets.
MRAP VEHICLES

17. Senator MCCAIN. General Odierno, what is the Army’s plan to recapitalize and incorporate thousands of mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles into the wheeled vehicle fleet?

General ODIERNO. In accordance with the Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy and the Army Campaign Plan, the Army plans to incorporate most of the MRAP Family of Vehicles (FOV) into enduring force structure, while divesting a small number of low-density and under-utilized variants such as the RG33L, MAXXPro XL, and Caiman CAT II XM1220. The Army will work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the MRAP Joint Program Office to reset/recapitalize the MRAP variants selected for retention. The reset/recapitalization will incorporate upgrades to standardize variants to a common baseline as vehicles are retrograded from theater. The upgrades will infuse commonality, increase survivability, mobility, and sustainability to meet emerging hybrid threats. Today the MRAP FOV is comprised of 25 variants delivered by 6 different manufacturers. With the required resources, these upgrades will reduce the MRAP FOV to nine variants produced by four manufacturers and provide soldiers with the greatest capability available. The Army plans a balanced distribution of MRAP vehicles with 37 percent going into units, training bases, 57 percent into Army Prepositioned Stocks, and 4 percent going into Army War Reserve and Contingency Retention Stocks.

18. Senator MCCAIN. General Odierno, where do these vehicles fit into the force structure?

General ODIERNO. The Army plans a balanced distribution of MRAP vehicles into units, training bases, Army Prepositioned Stock, Army War Reserve, and Contingency Retention Stocks. This distribution of MRAPs maximizes their capabilities (primarily protection) based on operational needs by making MRAPs available to deployed formations in sets configured to their needs. They will also fill specific mission roles in Army units where there are gaps.

NONDEPLOYABLE SOLDIERS

19. Senator MCCAIN. General Odierno, what is the total number of nondeployable soldiers currently serving?

General ODIERNO. There are about 92,000 soldiers currently serving in the Active Army that are nondeployable for one or more reasons; the majority of these are temporary conditions.

20. Senator MCCAIN. General Odierno, of this total, how many have a permanent profile which would prevent them from ever deploying?

General ODIERNO. There are about 15,000 soldiers currently serving in the Active Army who have a permanent (P3 or P4) profile. More than 90 percent of these soldiers will be separated from service upon completion of their Medical Evaluation Board (MEB)/Physical Evaluation Board (PEB).

21. Senator MCCAIN. General Odierno, what is your intent with regard to permanently non-deployable soldiers?

General ODIERNO. Ninety-nine percent of soldiers identified as permanently nondeployable for other than medical reasons are in the process of separating from the Army. Of the soldiers with permanent (P3 or P4) profiles who are referred to the MEB/PEB process, more than 90 percent will ultimately be separated from service. For those who are retained, the Army is currently exploring options to more heavily weight deployability as a criterion for retainability.

22. Senator MCCAIN. General Odierno, how would you characterize the efficiency of the Army’s medical review board process?

General ODIERNO. The Army’s medical review board process is very complex, lengthy, and confusing. The transformation from legacy disability processing to the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) has been a gradual process in the Army since November 2007. The DES is better than it was 4 years ago. Although legislative changes and the new IDES have made the system less adversarial, it has not made the process more efficient.

IDES facilitates soldiers/veterans receiving VA disability ratings in concurrence with the Service’s disability process. IDES has provided greater consistency between Military and VA ratings, reduced the time it takes for a soldier to start receiving VA benefits after separation, and increased soldiers’ satisfaction. But the amount
of time to process veterans under IDES has actually increased due to the many additional VA exams that were not required under the previous process.

END STRENGTH

23. Senator McCain. General Odierno, former Secretary of Defense Gates previously announced that Army end strength will be reduced by some 49,000 troops over the next 5 to 10 years, beginning with 7,400 fewer troops in 2012. Do these reductions introduce risk to continued operations in Afghanistan?

General Odierno. No, the initial end strength reductions in 2012 are a portion of the planned decrease of the temporary end strength increase approved in 2009. For the remaining end strength reductions, the Army will use a deliberate process and take into consideration operational demands, unit readiness, and those actions necessary to sustain and care for the All-Volunteer Force. Our plan will proceed at a pace necessary to ensure mission success and retain flexibility to respond to unforeseen demand.

24. Senator McCain. General Odierno, what is the personnel reduction threshold for force structure change?

General Odierno. Army force structure is dependent on the Army end strength limit. Any reduction in Army end strength drives reductions to force structure. The Army is coordinating end strength reductions with its deliberate Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to ensure Army force structure contains the required capability and capacity to meet current and future operational requirements within its authorized end strength.

25. Senator McCain. General Odierno, in your view, what is the optimal end strength number to meet worldwide commitments?

General Odierno. The Army continuously analyzes current and projected factors such as assigned missions, operational demands, unit readiness, soldier and family well-being, Reserve component capability and capacity, and fiscal constraints in order to achieve the required Active-Duty end strength. The highly analytical process to determine force structure is called the TAA. The focus of our TAA process is to answer this very question while considering the uncertainty of future operational requirements. The answer to your question is dependent on what America is asking its Army to do; it is entirely driven by demand. For today, the Active Army end strength is 569,400; end strength in the future could be higher or lower depending on missions assigned. As worldwide commitments change, our optimal end strength number will change as well.


General Odierno. Individual dwell time varies greatly among grades and specialties and is largely a function of demand. As the demand for our forces decreases, we expect most soldiers will continue to experience dwell periods of longer duration.

GUARD/RESERVE

27. Senator McCain. General Odierno, what practical changes will be implemented to transition the Army National Guard and Army Reserve into operational forces?

General Odierno. This year, DOD requested a change in title 10, U.S.C., section 12304, that would allow the Reserve components to be involuntarily activated with prior coordination at the service chief level, and provide the necessary budgetary authority to support the deployment. This will allow for the continued critical contributions of the Reserve component. This proposal would ensure that DOD is able to utilize the National Guards’ unique capability throughout the world and codify the requirement for the National Guard as an operational force.

In addition, by continuing the use of the ARFORGEN cycle, the Army can maintain an Operational Reserve that is more integrated into the day-to-day military operations, and participates at a higher level of operational missions. The Army, in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, has also developed a training strategy for units to participate in collective training, including additional inactive duty training, annual training, and Active Duty days. This strategy achieves company level proficiency for all units as they move into the available force pool.

Estimates for the cost of the Reserve’s operational role vary. Overseas contingency operation accounts currently fund much of the Reserve component deployments,
training, and family support. To ensure continued funding to support the Reserve component as an operational force, the Army has included the National Guard’s operational role in its future budget planning.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

ARMY MODULAR TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY

28. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Odierno, in one of the advance policy questions regarding what actions or changes, if any, would you propose relative to the Army’s modular transformation strategy, you replied that “if confirmed, [you] will continue to review Army plans and strategies, including the modular transformation strategy, force structure, and modernization to ensure the Army continues to provide the joint force with the best mix of capabilities to prevail in today’s wars, and engage to build partner capacity, support civil authorities, and deter and defeat potential adversaries.” In your opinion, are we lacking any capabilities within the joint force to prevail in today’s wars? If so, what are they?

General ODIERNO. The Army, as part of the joint force, has sufficient capability to prevail in today’s wars. Building partner capacity, stability operations, and counter insurgency operations have been primary missions of the Army for the past 10 years and we have incorporated lessons learned across the entire force. We are exceedingly proficient in these operational missions with the current force in support of today’s wars. There are concerns regarding the downsizing of Army force structure associated with our ability to meet the continued demand, and our ability to be proactive in order to prevent and prevail in future conflicts. We have to ensure that the drawdown of our force structure is coordinated with the reduction in forces committed to ongoing operations. Additionally, we have to ensure that the drawdown will not adversely affect the ability of the Army to train for full spectrum operations to provide strategic flexibility for the Nation.

29. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Odierno, is the Army’s current mix of capabilities properly apportioned to accomplish the tasks we must do now, such as building partner capacity, supporting civil authorities, and deterring and defeating potential adversaries?

General ODIERNO. The Army’s sustainable capacity for steady-state combatant command requirements is known as the Mission Force, currently comprised of one corps headquarters, five division headquarters, 20 brigade combat teams, and approximately 90,000 troops worth of enabling capabilities. A Mission Force of this size satisfies steady-state combatant command demands, meets the national military strategy objectives, and facilitates the Army’s dwell-time goals to allow time for reset, training, and troop recovery.

The Mission Force is currently operating at a greater velocity than designed because higher than expected demand by combatant commanders. These satisfied demands include the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, global posture requirements in Korea, the Army contribution to the Global Response Force and DOD Homeland defense requirements, and other missions such as Multi-National Force and Observers force in the Sinai. As the Army completes its Iraq force draw down and begins its Afghanistan force draw down, the Mission Force will begin to build toward its dwell goals and be better postured to satisfy combatant command demands related to building partnership capacity and other security cooperation activities outside the Central Command area of responsibility.

While the Army will be able to meet all combatant commander requirements, it will take a few challenging years to fully reset equipment, replenish prepositioned stocks, reintegrate Army families, and train forces for full spectrum operations. At that point the Nation will have true strategic flexibility and will have reduced both strategic and military risk in the mid- to long-term.

30. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Odierno, in a resource-constrained environment, could embedding critical, indirect enablers responsible for building partner capacity and providing support to civil authorities, such as civil affairs personnel, within BCTs help the Army accomplish these critical tasks and save precious Army resources?

General ODIERNO. Enabling capabilities such as medical, legal, and civil affairs are vital augmentation to the BCT’s capabilities. Augmenting the BCTs with modular, cohesive unit enabling capabilities ensures that the right augmentation is fully capable to support the commander, can be tailored to the specific mission, and allows rapid increase or decrease depending on the environment. Some indirect
enablers such as medical and legal personnel have a role in building partner capacity and providing support to civil authorities but also serve a day-to-day function within the BCTs. Other enablers such as civil affairs and foreign area officers don’t have a day-to-day function inside the BCT but have a role in building partner capacity and providing support to civil authorities. Therefore, the Army is effectively and efficiently served by civil affairs forces that can support multiple BCTs, as needed. We are working on attaining the correct balance of enablers between the Active component and Reserve component.

31. Senator Chambliss. General Odierno, if the Army continues to build a second Civil Affairs Brigade to support the General Purpose Forces, what then do we do with the preponderance of the Nation’s tactical Civil Affairs force structure located in the Army Reserve?

General Odierno. The ability of the Army to provide sufficient Civil Affairs tactical capability to the General Purpose Force for two or more simultaneous conflicts has been significantly enhanced by the inclusion of the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade to the nine Reserve Civil Affairs Brigades. Over the past 10 years, the Army Reserve had to make up for a shortage of Active component Civil Affairs by deploying Reserve units more often than any other type of Reserve unit. While a second Active component brigade will provide Civil Affairs capability on a more rapidly available and rotational basis, the Army Reserve Civil Affairs will continue to provide support for the long-term with planned, predictable missions of Building Partner Capacity throughout the world. In addition, the Army Reserve will continue to provide the capacity to surge as missions require.

The new Active Duty Civil Affairs Brigade will enable the Army to concentrate the Reserve component Civil Affairs Units on their functional skills and redevelop the capability to conduct Transitional Military Authority (Military Government) while providing the capacity to support maneuver brigades and geographical combatant commanders in phase zero operations.

32. Senator Chambliss. General Odierno, how do we further integrate Army Reserve Civil Affairs forces and their vitally important civilian skills and expertise into the future Army?

General Odierno. Army Reserve Civil Affairs forces bring unique skill sets and experience to augment the capabilities of the Army. These skills and experience enable the United States to fulfill its obligations under the Geneva Conventions to provide for the care and governance of the areas we occupy pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority. Army Reserve Civil Affairs forces should be the vanguard of our Nation’s capability to provide for the care and governance of ungoverned populations and to provide training to our partner nations to do the same. The specific functional skills such as agriculture, education, and economics will be valuable to the combatant commands in operations supporting building partner capacity.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS BOWE BERGDahl

33. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, Private First Class (PFC) Bowe Bergdahl, U.S. Army, was captured by the Taliban over 2 years ago, on June 30, 2009, in Paktika province in eastern Afghanistan. As the only known U.S. soldier held captive in Afghanistan by enemy belligerents, I want to ensure that we are doing everything we can to obtain his release. What is PFC Bergdahl’s status, and what is DOD doing to obtain his release?

General Odierno. Sergeant (then-PFC) Bowe R. Bergdahl, of Hailey, Idaho, was declared Missing-Captured on July 3, 2009, after he was discovered missing from his combat outpost in Afghanistan on June 30, 2009. At the time of his capture, SGT Bergdahl was assigned to 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th BCT, 25th Infantry Division.

Sergeant Bergdahl is one of two U.S. military members, both U.S. Army soldiers, currently listed by DOD as having the duty status “Missing-Captured,” the other soldier being SSG Ahmed Altaie. U.S. Central Command is responsible for the ongoing efforts in theater to recover both soldiers. For the safety and security of the soldiers and units involved, the details of these efforts remain classified.

Sergeant Bergdahl’s parents continue to receive regular updates from DOD regarding significant developments in the efforts to recover their son.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

FORT HOOD ATTACK

34. Senator COLLINS. General Odierno, as ranking member of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, I worked with Senator Lieberman to investigate the U.S. Government’s failure to prevent the Fort Hood attack. One of the most distressing aspects of this report was that it found the Army and the Federal Bureau of Investigation “collectively had sufficient information necessary to have detected Major Hasan’s radicalization to violent Islamist extremism but failed both to understand and to act on it.” In light of the Fort Hood attack and the findings in this report, what steps has the Army taken to improve personnel oversight such that warning signs of individual problems are identified and acted on as early as possible?

General ODIERNO. The Army has implemented over 20 of the recommendations proposed by the DOD’s Independent Review Panel and the Army’s Internal Review Team and continues to improve its ability to identify and quickly respond to potential insider threats to the force. In January 2011, the Army established the Army Protection Program (APP) to better manage risks relative to the safety and security of our soldiers, families, civilians, infrastructure, and information. The program provides a strategic management framework to synchronize, prioritize, and coordinate Army protection policies, resources, and activities.

As part of the APP, the Army is developing a Security Resiliency Program to strengthen security policies, processes, and systems, and provide the Army with an up-front approach to addressing the “insider threat”. One of the key components of the strategy is to focus on deterring and preventing insider threats through improved personnel security and suitability screenings, counterintelligence and security awareness training, improved information sharing, and an Automated Continuous Evaluation System to proactively alert and flag issues of concern for cleared personnel.

The Army also established a Counterintelligence/Security Fusion Cell to review and flag security background investigations to identify threat, security, and other high-risk behavioral concerns. Additionally, the Army expanded the Threat Awareness and Reporting Program and the Security Education Training and Awareness Program. These programs increase awareness of potential adverse behaviors and provide a systematic approach to threat reporting and educating all commanders and leaders on their roles and responsibilities for reporting adverse information.

The Army revised its policy regarding command-directed mental health evaluations. Behavioral health providers are now required to report to the soldier’s chain of command within 24 hours, those individuals who may present a risk to the protection of classified information, and commanders must notify the Army Central Clearance Facility when concerns are noted.

The Army has reinforced, through Army-wide messages, commander and soldier roles and responsibilities to report threat-related incidents and behaviors deemed detrimental to good order and discipline (including violent behavior and prohibited activities). The goal is to improve knowledge of which behaviors to report, who to report them to, and the importance of Army leaders taking appropriate action when behavior or activity is reported. The result will be a better awareness of potential insider threats, early intervention, and a safer environment for our Army community, installations, and activities.

The Army has improved its behavior health screenings for new Army applicants by requiring medical personnel to conduct face-to-face screenings at all 65 Military Entrance Processing Centers utilizing five questions that better assess the potential behavioral health issues. The Army is consulting with national experts (e.g., Columbia University, Harvard University, National Institute of Mental Health, et cetera) to develop, test, evaluate, and deliver improved behavior health screening tools.

35. Senator COLLINS. General Odierno, the Army plans to reduce its end strength by 22,000 soldiers in 2013 and 27,000 soldiers in 2015 and beyond as we draw down forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Army officials and mental health experts have repeatedly said that a dwell time of 2 years at home for every 1 year deployed is the minimum time necessary to preserve the long-term mental and physical well-being necessary to sustain our soldiers and our Army over the long-term. Can you assure me that the Army’s manpower reductions will not be made until the Army has reached its target dwell time of 2 years at home for every 1 year deployed for sol-
diers, and specifically for those soldiers who are in the combat arms, who have served on the frontlines for the last 10 years of war?

General ODIERNO. Boots-on-the-ground (BOG) time to dwell time ratios are largely based on demand; given the current strategic guidance and the associated projected future requirements, the Army can achieve and sustain 1:2 BOG to dwell ratio for high demand and low density units. The Army expects to improve on this ratio and have sufficient troops to respond to unforeseen events. With current and projected force demand consistent with current strategic guidance, and with some exceptions, the Army will adopt shorter deployment periods (9 months) for division-level-and-below units in 2012.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

DOD BUDGET CUTS

36. Senator CORNYN. General Odierno, in the President’s April speech on debt reduction, he targeted security spending for $400 billion in cuts over the next 12 years, the preponderance of which is expected to come from the DOD budget. However, news reports are now indicating that DOD is bracing for much deeper cuts, potentially reaching $800 billion or more over the next decade. In your opinion, what impact would deeper cuts have on our ability to adequately meet our national security requirements, maintain our Nation’s historic military superiority, and provide the requisite resources and support for our soldiers?

General ODIERNO. Deeper cuts would impact the level of risk, both to soldiers and to mission accomplishment. Based on the challenges we faced in finding efficiencies to make $400 billion in cuts, I believe that $800 billion in cuts would be extremely high risk. The Army is committed globally, and we must be able to accomplish the unforeseen when called to do so. We will reduce the size of our Army by ensuring we remain in balance with synchronized adjustments of manpower, modernization, training, maintenance, and infrastructure. We are also determined to honor our commitments to the force by fully resourcing the most important family programs, transitioning to a 9-month BOG commitment and holding, as a minimum, a 1:2 BOG-dwell ratio. Our end state is to provide a force capable of meeting the current National Military Strategy with enough flexibility to provide the National Command Authority the greatest possible number of options for an uncertain future.

ARMY ACQUISITION REFORM

37. Senator CORNYN. General Odierno, according to the final report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, between 1990 and 2010, the Army terminated 22 major acquisition programs before completion, totaling at least $32 billion—which represents almost one-third of the Army’s budget for creating new weapons. The report notes that, “Every year since 1996, the Army has spent more than $1 billion annually on programs that were ultimately cancelled.” Since 2004, $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion per year (35 percent to 45 percent) of the Army’s Developmental, Test, and Evaluation funding has been lost to cancelled programs. In my view, this represents extremely poor stewardship of taxpayers’ dollars. In your opinion, what are the primary problems in the Army’s acquisition process that have caused these program cancellations, and what can be done to end this decade-long trend of sinking billions of dollars into trying to develop weapons systems that will never be fielded?

General ODIERNO. I understand the Army acquisition community has already applied some of these lessons learned on the GCV program. Under the leadership of the Army Acquisition Executive, the Army assembled a team of senior subject-matter experts as they refined the 900-plus GCV requirements and revised the original Requests for Proposals. The Army team, which included members of the requirements, resourcing, contracting, and program management communities, developed a set of tiered requirements that distinguish critical must-have capabilities and provide industry with the necessary flexibility to develop vehicle designs that meet the Army’s strict cost and schedule constraints. In addition, the GCV is the first major program to implement innovative measures designed to keep the program on schedule and on budget, to include fixed price incentive fee contracts in the 2-year technology development phase, an increased emphasis on mature technologies as well as reliance on competition throughout the program as an incentive. We will continue to monitor the GCV and assess these acquisition reform initiatives. I am committed to continue acquisition reform to assure effectiveness in attaining our future capability requirements.
38. Senator CORNYN. General Odierno, earlier this year, the Army announced its decision to reduce the number of Army BCTs it has in Europe from four to three after 2015. This development is a change from the 2004 plan, which called for withdrawing two of the BCTs and leaving two in Europe. Reports have indicated the original plan was suspended due to concerns that it would hamper the U.S. military's ability to respond to trouble in Africa and the Middle East, leave it unable to fulfill its commitments to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or leave it unable to engage effectively with European allies. Maintaining large units like BCTs overseas is very expensive, especially when substantial new military construction funding is involved, as with the Army plan for maintaining BCTs in Europe. With the Army budget under increasing pressure, keeping so many BCTs in Europe will involve trade-offs elsewhere in the Army budget. Would it not be more cost-effective to bring additional BCTs home to posts in CONUS, especially when the Army has posts in CONUS that already have the infrastructure and facilities in place to support another BCT and provide training opportunities far superior to those reasonably available in Europe?

General ODIERNO. The Army is considering the disposition of BCTs in Europe as part of TAA 14–18 and Program Objective Memorandum (POM) deliberations. No decisions have been made. The cost-effectiveness of BCT stationing decisions will be considered as part of this process.

39. Senator CORNYN. General Odierno, do our European allies not have their own capable militaries to provide for their national defense?

General ODIERNO. Our European allies have modern militaries, but with limited capabilities because they are not designed to provide stand-alone, 360-degree national defense. Their militaries, through the NATO Defense Planning Process, are designed to provide their nation’s contribution to the collective defense of all 28 members of the NATO alliance, as stipulated by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

AFGHANISTAN DRAWDOWN

40. Senator CORNYN. General Odierno, on June 22, 2011, President Obama announced he would withdraw 10,000 troops from Afghanistan by the end of this year and another 23,000 by next summer, resulting in a complete drawdown of the 33,000 troop surge by September 2012. Following the President’s announcement, Admiral Mullen testified to the House Armed Services Committee that: “the President’s decisions are more aggressive and incur more risk than I was originally prepared to accept.” Do you agree with Admiral Mullen’s statement? If so, what pace of drawdown do you believe will incur an acceptable level of risk?

General ODIERNO. The National Command Authority has directed the surge recovery of troop strength in Afghanistan. The Army is postured to support the drawdown. The drawdown in Afghanistan will enable the Army to better posture itself for potential contingency operations and future operations as determined by the National Command Authority.

As the Army completes its responsible drawdown from Iraq and begins its Afghan-istan force recovery, it will achieve the higher dwell time goals it has sought and be better-postured to satisfy combatant command demands related to building partnership capacity and other security cooperation activities.

While the Army will continue to be able to meet all combatant commander requirements, it will take a few challenging years to fully reset equipment, replenish prepositioned stocks, reintegrate Army families, and train forces for Full Spectrum Operations. At that point the Nation will have true strategic flexibility and will have reduced both strategic and military risk in the mid-to-long term.

LIBYA

41. Senator CORNYN. General Odierno, in the early 1990s, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, laid out his policies for conducting military operations, which have since come to be known as the Powell Doctrine. General Powell stated that: “We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the surgery is over and the desired result is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation . . . history has not been kind to this approach to warmaking.” Regarding the air war over Libya, do you believe that a vital U.S. national security interest was or is threatened there?
General ODIerno. The stability of the region, especially following the transformational effects of the Arab Spring, is a national security interest for the United States.

42. Senator CORNYN. General Odierno, does the United States have a clear, attainable objective in Libya? If so, what is that objective?

General ODIerno. Yes, the goal of the NATO-led military effort and the mandate of the U.N. resolution is very clear: to protect the Libyan people. While forced regime change is not specified in the military mission, this mission complements other instruments of power and will add significant pressure on Colonel Qadhafi over time to step down.

ARMY SURFACE FLEET

43. Senator CORNYN. General Odierno, the Army currently operates a fleet of over 100 ships, used mostly for logistics purposes. The vessels range from large landing ships to medium-sized and smaller utility landing craft, to a force of tugboats and barges. Those vessels are operated by over 2,000 soldiers and another 200 civilians in support roles. A 2010 report by Defense News stated that the Army was in discussions with the Navy over the potential transfer of the Army’s watercraft mission and its vessels. In today’s Joint Service, does it make sense for the Army to continue operating a fleet of over 100 ships?

General ODIerno. While it is true that the Army was in discussions with the Navy over potential transfer of the Army’s watercraft mission and its vessels over the past year, we have mutually concluded that it makes sense for the Army to continue operating a fleet of over 100 watercraft.

Army watercraft are a critical maneuver element that enable Army logistics operations and bridge the sea-land gap. We envision expanded roles and missions for Army watercraft in the 21st century, and we can gain better efficiencies in partnering our capabilities with the Navy versus combining them.

However, the Army and Navy did agree to transfer the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) program, in which the Army was to receive five JHSVs starting in 2012, to the Navy. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to that effect has been signed by the Secretaries of both Services, and appropriate budget transfers have been made.

Joint doctrine directs the Army to prepare for land combat and provide watercraft support in a theater of operations. In sourcing watercraft support for land combat ashore, the Army will be called upon to perform the post-assault resupply mission for joint and combined operations that may also include coastal and inland waterway transportation. Army watercraft also supports Joint Logistics-Over-The-Shore operations, requiring Army watercraft to be capable of performing a wide range of ship-to-shore cargo transfer and harbor utility functions in support of full fixed ports, partial fixed ports, or bare beach operations.

The mission of Army watercraft is different from the mission of Navy watercraft. Army watercraft executes a tactical port mission, conducting distribution and operational maneuverability within a theater in support of combatant commanders. The Army is also responsible for operating common user ports, and the watercraft are critical to performing that function. These are not carriers, destroyers, or the submarines that immediately come to mind when one envisions the Navy. The Navy watercraft that are similar to Army vessels assist in the establishment of beachheads for the U.S. Marine Corps. In today’s joint environment, these capabilities complement one another rather than create redundancies. The Army watercraft support all Services based on combatant commanders' theater support requirements.

Over the past few years, the Army has conducted three separate capabilities-based assessments associated with watercraft requirements in the joint environment. The results from all three of those assessments repeated the same message: the need exists for the Army to continue to operate a small amount of watercraft to support Army and joint operations.

44. Senator CORNYN. General Odierno, please comment on the proposed transfer of this mission and assets from the Army to the Navy, and provide a status update.

General ODIerno. While it is true that the Army was in discussions with the Navy over potential transfer of the Army’s watercraft mission and its vessels over the past year, we have mutually concluded that it makes sense for the Army to continue operating a fleet of over 100 watercraft.

Army watercraft are a critical maneuver element that enable Army logistics operations and bridge the sea-land gap. We envision expanded roles and missions for
Army watercraft in the 21st Century, and we can gain better efficiencies in partnering our capabilities with the Navy versus combining them.

However, the Army and Navy did agree to transfer the JHSV program, in which the Army was to receive five JHSVs starting in 2012, to the Navy. An MOA to that effect has been signed by the Secretaries of both Services, and appropriate budget transfers have been made.

Joint doctrine directs the Army to prepare for land combat and provide watercraft support in a theater of operations. In sourcing watercraft support for land combat ashore, the Army will be called upon to perform the post-assault resupply mission for joint and combined operations that may also include coastal and inland waterway transportation. Army watercraft also supports Joint Logistics-Over-The-Shore operations, requiring Army watercraft to be capable of performing a wide range of ship-to-shore cargo transfer and harbor utility functions in support of full fixed ports, partial fixed ports, or bare beach operations.

The mission of Army watercraft is different from the mission of Navy watercraft. Army watercraft executes a tactical port mission, conducting distribution and operational maneuverability within a theater in support of combatant commanders. The Army is also responsible for operating common user ports, and the watercraft are critical to performing that function. These are not carriers, destroyers, or the submarines that immediately come to mind when one envisions the Navy. The Navy watercraft that are similar to Army vessels assist in the establishment of beachheads for the U.S. Marine Corps. In today’s joint environment, these capabilities complement one another rather than create redundancies. The Army watercraft support all Services based on combatant commanders’ theater support requirements.

Over the past few years, the Army has conducted three separate capabilities-based assessments associated with watercraft requirements in the joint environment. The results from all three of those assessments repeated the same message: the need exists for the Army to continue to operate a small amount of watercraft to support Army and joint operations.

[The nomination reference of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 6, 2011.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 3033:

To be General

GEN Raymond T. Odierno, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA

Source of commissioned service: USMA
Educational degrees:
U.S. Military Academy, BS, No Major
North Carolina State University, MS, Engineering, Nuclear Effects
U.S. Naval War College, MA, National Security and Strategy
Military schools attended:
Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
U.S. Naval Command and Staff College
U.S. Army War College
Foreign languages: None recorded.
Promotions:
Dates of appointment

2LT ............................................................................................................... 2 June 76
1LT ............................................................................................................... 2 June 78
CPT ............................................................................................................... 1 Aug. 80
MAJ ............................................................................................................... 1 Dec. 86
LTC ............................................................................................................... 1 Feb. 92
COL .............................................................................................................. 1 Sep. 95
BG ................................................................................................................ 1 July 99
MG ................................................................................................................ 1 Nov. 02
LTG ............................................................................................................... 1 Jan. 05
GEN .............................................................................................................. 16 Sep. 08

Major duty assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 76 ..</td>
<td>Jan. 78 ..</td>
<td>Support Platoon Leader, later Firing Platoon Leader, C Battery, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 78 ..</td>
<td>Aug. 78 ..</td>
<td>Survey Officer, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 78 ..</td>
<td>Oct. 79 ..</td>
<td>Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 79 ..</td>
<td>July 80 ..</td>
<td>Student, Field Artillery Advanced Course, Fort Sill, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 80 ..</td>
<td>Dec. 80 ..</td>
<td>Liaison Officer, 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 80 ..</td>
<td>Dec. 82 ..</td>
<td>Commander, Service Battery, later A Battery, 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 82 ..</td>
<td>May 83 ..</td>
<td>Assistant S–3 (Operations), 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 83 ..</td>
<td>May 84 ..</td>
<td>S–3 (Operations), 3d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 84 ..</td>
<td>Aug. 85 ..</td>
<td>Student, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 85 ..</td>
<td>June 89 ..</td>
<td>Nuclear Research Officer, later Chief, Acquisition Support Division, Defense Nuclear Agency, Alexandria, VA, later detailed as Military Advisor for Arms Control, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 89 ..</td>
<td>June 90 ..</td>
<td>Student, U.S. Naval Command and Staff Course, Newport, RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 90 ..</td>
<td>Dec. 90 ..</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 90 ..</td>
<td>June 91 ..</td>
<td>Executive Officer, Division Artillery, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 91 ..</td>
<td>May 92 ..</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 42d Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 92 ..</td>
<td>June 94 ..</td>
<td>Commander, 2d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, CA (relocated to Fort Lewis, WA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 94 ..</td>
<td>June 95 ..</td>
<td>Student, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 95 ..</td>
<td>June 97 ..</td>
<td>Commander, Division Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 97 ..</td>
<td>Aug. 98 ..</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, V Corps, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 98 ..</td>
<td>July 99 ..</td>
<td>Assistant Division Commander (Support), 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany to include duty as Deputy Commanding General for Ground Operations, Task Force Hawk, Operation Allied Force, Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 99 ..</td>
<td>July 01 ..</td>
<td>Director, Force Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army, Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 01 ..</td>
<td>Aug. 04 ..</td>
<td>Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, TX and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 04 ..</td>
<td>Oct. 04 ..</td>
<td>Special Assistant to Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 04 ..</td>
<td>May 06 ..</td>
<td>Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 06 ..</td>
<td>Dec. 06 ..</td>
<td>Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq/Commanding General, III Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 06 ..</td>
<td>Feb. 08 ..</td>
<td>Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 08 ..</td>
<td>Sep. 08 ..</td>
<td>Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 08 ..</td>
<td>Dec. 09 ..</td>
<td>Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 10 ..</td>
<td>Sep. 10 ..</td>
<td>Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 10 ..</td>
<td>Present ..</td>
<td>Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of joint assignments:

VerDate Aug 31 2005 09:33 Jun 14, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00744 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\74537.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Research Officer, later Chief, Acquisition Support Division, Defense Nuclear Agency, Alexandria, VA, later detailed as Military Advisor for Arms Control, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC</td>
<td>Sep. 86–June 89</td>
<td>Captain/Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC</td>
<td>Oct. 04–May 06</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq/Commanding General, III Corps</td>
<td>Dec. 06–Feb. 08</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
<td>Sep. 08–Dec. 09</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA</td>
<td>Oct. 10–Present</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of operations assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Officer, Division Artillery, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Dec. 90–May 91</td>
<td>Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
<td>Apr. 03–Mar. 04</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq/Commanding General, III Corps</td>
<td>Dec. 06–Feb. 08</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
<td>Sep. 08–Dec. 09</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. decorations and badges:
- Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Defense Superior Service Medal
- Legion of Merit (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Bronze Star Medal
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Commendation Medal
- Army Achievement Medal
- Combat Action Badge
- Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
- Army Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Raymond T. Odierno.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, DC.

3. Date of nomination:
   6 June 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   8 September 1954; Rockaway, NJ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Linda Marie Odierno. (Maiden Name: Bukarth).

7. Names and ages of children:
   Tony Odierno, age 32.
   Kathrine Funk, age 30.
   Mike Odierno, age 24.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Association of the U.S. Army
    Field Artillery Association
    VII Corps Association
    9th Regiment Association
    4th Infantry Division Association
    1st Cavalry Division Association
    American Legion
    Veterans of Foreign Wars
    The Lotos Club (Honorary for 2011–2012)
    Union League Club of New York City (Honorary)
    Union League Club of Chicago (Honorary)
    Union League Club of Philadelphia (Honorary)
11. **Honors and awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

- Ryan C. Crocker Award
- Abraham Lincoln Award
- USO’s Distinguished Service Award
- Romanian National Order For Merit in Rank of Grand Officer, For War
- Naval War College Distinguished Graduate Leadership Award
- Union League Club of NYC Leadership Award
- Morris Hills Regional District Hall of Fame
- National Italian American Foundation (NIAF) Special Achievement Award
- Secretary of State Distinguished Service Medal
- No Greater Sacrifice Freedom Award

When responding to questionnaires in support of previous nominations, I was advised that I needed to list only those awards, honors, et cetera, that were totally outside of my military service, of which I have none (i.e., all of the above awards were given in recognition of my service as a senior U.S. military officer). However, while preparing this nomination package, I was advised differently that this question was meant to include all outside awards and honors, regardless of the capacity in which they were presented to me. Based on that, all outside awards and honors I have received are now listed above.

Of note, I received the Ryan C. Crocker Award, the Abraham Lincoln Award, and the Union League Club of NYC during my current tour of duty as Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.

Additionally, in June 2009, while serving as Commander, Multi-National Forces Iraq, I received the Romanian National Order For Merit in Rank of Grand Officer, For War. This foreign decoration has been approved by the U.S. Army Human Resources Command as required by Army Regulation 600–8–22.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

---

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

---

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.  

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO.

This 1st day of June, 2011.

[The nomination of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. William M. Fraser III, USAF, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]
DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. No. Goldwater-Nichols has transformed the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military for the better. I have completed six joint assignments and can personally say that now as Commander of Air Combat Command (ACC), I have seen first-hand how we continue to institutionalize “jointness” within our Armed Forces. The reforms of Goldwater-Nichols remain an essential part of the DOD fabric and the efficient and effective way we employ forces.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. I have no suggested changes to Goldwater-Nichols; however, if confirmed, I will work closely with Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and other senior leaders of our military to continually review Goldwater-Nichols and then implement any changes that are needed.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)?

Answer. The mission of the Commander, TRANSCOM, is to provide air, land, and sea transportation for DOD, in peace, crisis, and war. The Commander relies on his component commands—Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC)—to accomplish this mission. The Commander also has the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) mission to improve the worldwide DOD distribution system. As DPO, the Commander works closely with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Services to identify inefficiencies, develop solutions, and implement improvements throughout the end-to-end distribution system. The TRANSCOM team blends Active and Reserve Forces, civilian employees, and commercial industry partners to provide the mobility forces and assets necessary to respond to the full range of military operations.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. My entire Air Force career has been filled with a variety of opportunities and experiences that prepared me for this job. This includes operational tours commanding strategic bomber units which deployed, employed, and returned home. But also tours as the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, Commander, ACC, and six joint assignments to include time as Assistant to the Chairman, JCS.

As the Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, I traveled the globe with the Secretary of State working to build partnerships with foreign governments and international and non-governmental organizations. I also participated in numerous interagency deputies meetings at the National Security Council.

As the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, I interacted frequently with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the JCS, combatant commanders, and Service Chiefs on major issues facing our military.

Finally, in my current capacity as Commander, ACC, I organize, train, equip, and maintain combat-ready air forces of more than 1,000 aircraft and 79,000 Active-Duty and civilian personnel in the Air Force’s largest command. When mobilized, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve contribute more than 700 aircraft and 49,000 people to ACC. This includes the logistics of preparing airmen to deploy around the globe, a complex task I have led for various organizations at virtually all Air Force levels. In doing so, I’ve worked with some of the military’s finest logisticians and they have taught me well.

If confirmed, it will be my distinct honor to lead the men and women of TRANSCOM in their world-wide mission.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, TRANSCOM?
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, TRANSCOM, to the following offices:

The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense when serving as his designated representative in the Secretary’s absence. As such, the Commander, TRANSCOM, will report to and through the Deputy Secretary when serving in that capacity.

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with DOD components, including combatant commands, which have collateral or related functions. In practice, this coordination and exchange is normally routed through the Chairman of the JCS. If confirmed as a combatant commander, I will act accordingly.

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The Chairman is established by title 10 as the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman serves as an advisor, and is not, according to the law, in the chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary to each combatant commander. The President normally directs communications between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. This keeps the Chairman fully involved and allows the Chairman to execute his other legal responsibilities. A key responsibility of the Chairman is to speak for the combatant commanders, especially on operational requirements. If confirmed as a Commander, I will keep the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters for which I would be personally accountable.

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. Although the Vice Chairman does not fall within the combatant command chain of command, he is delegated full power and authority to act for the Chairman in the Chairman’s absence. If confirmed as a combatant commander, I will keep the Chairman informed, but if the Vice Chairman is representing the Chairman I will keep him informed as I would the Chairman.

Question. The Director of the Joint Staff.

Answer. The Director of the Joint Staff assists the Chairman in managing the Joint Staff. The Director of the Joint Staff does not fall within the combatant commander’s chain of command. However, he enables important decisions to be made as the combatant commander’s staff interacts with the Joint Staff. The Director is also a key interface with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) principles and interagency leadership, and can assist combatant commanders working issues below the Chairman’s level.

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

Answer. Close coordination with each Service Secretary is required to ensure that there is no infringement upon the lawful responsibilities held by a Service Secretary.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and equip their respective forces. No combatant commander can ensure preparedness of his assigned forces without the full cooperation and support of the Service Chiefs and their respective Reserve components. As members of the JCS, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. The experience and judgment the Service Chiefs provide is an invaluable resource for every combatant commander. If confirmed, as Commander, TRANSCOM, I will pursue an open dialogue with the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.

Question. The other combatant commanders.

Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain open dialogue with the other combatant commanders to foster trust and build mutual support. Today’s security environment requires us to work together to execute U.S. national security policy.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander, TRANSCOM?

Answer. The next commander’s near-term challenge will be maintaining today’s warfighter support, including redeployment of forces, while building and sustaining alternative strategic lines of communication in case we lose any of our current primary routes. Long-term challenges include preparing for a future with a wide range of adversaries in an ever-changing, more complex and distributed battlespace. Even as the Department prepares for a broad range of military crises, we know we will face disaster-related humanitarian crises like those that have occurred here at home, as well as in Haiti, Japan, and elsewhere. We will need to do this in a more expeditionary, yet fiscally constrained environment than ever before.

The real strength of TRANSCOM—as with any military organization—is evident in the unique talents and skills of its people. There is no more important challenge to a commander than proper stewardship of this resource. TRANSCOM’s components rely heavily on Reserve elements. TRANSCOM includes multi-Service Active Military and large amounts of Reserve personnel, government civilians, and contractors. If confirmed, I would take an active role in preserving and enhancing the quality and expertise of TRANSCOM’s personnel resources.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will address these challenges by improving our global end-to-end ability to deliver to the point of need in the most cost-effective way possible—projecting power where our national interests dictate. To do this, I will work with our commercial partners and the interagency to expand capacity and continue TRANSCOM efforts around the world to secure diplomatic and physical accesses to ground and airspace infrastructure for logistics. I will also leverage ongoing multimodal efforts to optimize our operations to support the warfighter while improving the performance and efficiency of deployment and distribution enterprise. Working closely with CYBERCOM, I will ensure our networks remain secure as TRANSCOM’s Agile Transportation for the 21st century (AT 21) program is brought to operational status. This will provide decisionmakers with automated tools to improve the end-to-end movement and distribution of forces and sustainment.

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish?

Answer. If confirmed, TRANSCOM’s number one priority will remain to support the warfighter with whatever is needed to meet national objectives; including deployment, sustainment, rapid maneuver, aeromedical evacuation, redeployment, and humanitarian crisis response. Always mindful of our resources, I will continue process improvements and enterprise synchronization efforts through relationships within the Department, around the U.S. Government, and with commercial and international partners.

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Commander, TRANSCOM?

Answer. TRANSCOM has done a world-class job supporting the Nation and our military forces over the years. Its stock with the warfighter has never been higher, earned through deployments, sustainment, redeployments, surges, drawdowns, and humanitarian crises like the recent calamity in Japan or the earthquake in Haiti. TRANSCOM’s human enterprise is large, diverse, and global, and there will always be things we wish we can do better. The most significant area I would focus on would be improving the coordination and synchronization of the entire Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). The JDDE is a vast network of organizations both in and out of DOD that relies heavily on commercial partnerships with industry. General McNabb has made great strides toward this end, and if confirmed, I will continue this work by aligning JDDE authorities and resources commensurate with responsibilities, improving our ability to rapidly build strategic lines of communication, and institutionalizing best practices learned during the last decade.

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. If confirmed, I will reach outside of the command early to deepen strategic relationships with my fellow combatant commanders, TRANSCOM’s components, commercial and international partners, leaders within the interagency, and with Members of Congress. As we move forward, we will balance our desire for perfection with the art of what is possible across a highly diverse enterprise, proceeding smartly after considering the options and balancing their costs and benefits.
EXPERIENCE IN MANAGING LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

Question. Unlike the current Commander of TRANSCOM, you have not had extensive experience in managing transportation forces. Much of your operational experience has been in bomber units.

What steps do you believe you need to take to achieve a more complete understanding of the logistics operations that TRANSCOM and the component commands within command manage for DOD?

Answer. I will work diligently to increase my knowledge of DOD and national transportation issues, including the challenges facing the commercial transportation industry and other national partners. If confirmed, this will include ensuring the TRANSCOM staff works to enhance my understanding of logistics operations and the mission of the command. I will also personally engage our interagency, non-governmental, commercial, and multi-national partners to learn and discuss improvements to our shared logistics priorities.

DISTRIBUTION PROCESS OWNER

Question. In September 2003, following a review of logistics operations, the Secretary of Defense designated the Commander, TRANSCOM, the Distribution Process Owner (DPO). As the DPO, TRANSCOM was tasked to improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities—deployment, sustainment, and redeployment support during peace and war.

What is your understanding of TRANSCOM’s responsibilities as the DPO?

Answer. The mission of TRANSCOM as the DPO is twofold: first, to coordinate and oversee the DOD distribution system to provide interoperability, synchronization and alignment of DOD-wide, end-to-end distribution; and, second, to develop and implement distribution process improvements that enhance the Defense Logistics and Global Supply Chain Management System.

Question. What is your assessment of the progress TRANSCOM has made in improving the distribution process?

Answer. The Command has made significant progress in transforming DOD distribution. In collaboration with the COCOMs, Services, DLA, and GSA, TRANSCOM has matured the DPO governance structure to use a robust performance measurement framework, with common metrics and negotiated Time Definite Delivery (TDD) standards which establish expectations, identify where the system needs improvement, and prioritize resources to making improvements.

TRANSCOM has made improvements through the DPO Strategic Opportunities (DSO) initiatives, which is a collaborative effort between TRANSCOM, DLA, GSA, the Services, and COCOMs to move sustainment through the distribution network faster and cheaper. For fiscal year 2011, these combined initiatives have delivered approximately $280 million in savings through July.

For example, the Strategic Surface Route Plan maximized 40 foot container utilization and improved velocity on key routes by 15 percent. Strategic Air Optimization has improved aircraft cargo utilization by ~10 percent by employing the full array of airlift services, improving Aerial Port pallet build processes and better matching airlift capacity with demand. Lastly, by applying lean principles to air and surface cargo distribution processes, TRANSCOM improved velocity by up to 40 percent across multiple COCOM distribution lanes.

Looking forward, there are always ways to institutionalize process improvements and efficiencies through business process reengineering. One example is the AT 21 program, which uses industry best-practices and government and commercial off-the-shelf optimization and scheduling tools to deliver best value, end-to-end distribution and deployment solutions. Business process reengineering improves transportation planning, forecast accuracy, and on-time delivery of forces and sustainment to combatant commanders at a lower cost to the Services.

Question. Do you believe that the current system needs any changes to enhance the ability of TRANSCOM to execute the responsibilities of the DPO?

Answer. No. I believe the Commander of TRANSCOM has the necessary authorities to execute his responsibility as the DPO. If confirmed, I will continue to build on the hard work and successes achieved to date. I will emphasize reducing costs by exploring new areas in the DOD supply chain that emphasize a total cost management view, balancing efficiency with effectiveness to achieve best value and visibility for the warfighters and the taxpayers. I will enhance unity of effort by promoting the Joint Deployment Distribution Enterprise and pursuing opportunities to remove barriers to reinvesting enterprise cost savings.
STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

Question. The requirement for organic strategic airlift needed to support wartime requirements has been set at a level of 32.7 million ton-miles per day. This requirement is somewhat smaller than the capability of 222 C–17s and 111 C–5s which could carry roughly 35 million ton-miles per day. With that situation in mind, the Air Force intends to retire some portion of the C–5A fleet of aircraft. Do you agree with the DOD proposal to eliminate the strategic airlift force structure floor of 316 aircraft?

Answer. Yes. Our national defense strategy requires a viable fleet of about 300 organic strategic airlift aircraft, which would provide the 32.7 million ton-miles per day peak wartime requirement as established in the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS–16). The C–17 will continue to be our premier airlifter, and our modernized C–5s are achieving their expected levels of mission readiness. However, in order to achieve the correct mix of C–17 and C–5 aircraft, and take full advantage of our aircrews, maintainers, and aerial porters, the Air Force should be given the authority to retire the oldest, least capable C–5As. This action would improve aircraft availability by removing aircraft with the lowest mission capable rates from the fleet and will allow the Air Force to focus their critical personnel and resources on the right-sized fleet.

Question. What is your view of the requirements in peacetime for such organic airlift aircraft?

Answer. The MCRS–16 established the organic strategic airlift requirement at 32.7 million ton-miles per day. This requirement includes steady-state (peacetime) requirements as well as wartime requirements. Proactive management of the Guard and Reserve participation and commercial augmentation allows TRANSCOM to respond rapidly to sudden changes in the peacetime requirements. If confirmed, I will work to ensure our partnership with the Guard, Reserve, and CRAF carriers remain strong for our national security.

Question. Do you believe that the Air Force could, at reasonable costs and within reasonable timeframes, reactivate some portion of the 32 C–5 aircraft that will have been retired under the Air Force’s current plans, if later we find out that 301 strategic airlift aircraft is not sufficient to meet our peacetime and wartime needs?

Answer. Based on the MCRS–16, the Air Force does not anticipate the requirement for strategic airlift to exceed 32.7 million ton-miles per day, which equates to about 300 aircraft. If, at some point in the future, we determine that the requirement is greater than anticipated, TRANSCOM will support the Air Force to find the best solution, which might include reactivation of aircraft.

Question. Does possible closure of Pakistan lines of communication supporting Afghanistan operations change your assessment of airlift requirements, and if so, how?

Answer. No. The possible closure of Pakistan lines of communication would not change the requirement of about 300 organic strategic airlift aircraft. Improving throughput at existing airports and expanding capacity in our surface networks which supply Afghanistan has again been a centerpiece of our efforts in 2010. The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) remains a priority for TRANSCOM. In 2010, two additional routes were added through the Baltics and Central Asia and continue to improve the processes, facilitating a faster, less costly cargo flow. In addition to the NDN improvements, capacity was added at intermodal Persian Gulf locations. Realizing that more capacity was needed to support the surge of forces into Afghanistan and the movement of thousands of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles, TRANSCOM worked closely with CENTCOM and the Department of State to secure access to additional airfields and seaports in the Persian Gulf. Using a concept called multi-modal operations, large volumes of cargo and thousands of vehicles were moved by sea to locations in closer proximity to the CENTCOM area of operations, by truck from the seaports to the nearby airfields and then by air to Afghanistan.

NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK

Question. The Defense Department has plans to expand its use of air and ground supply routes along the NDN to deliver equipment and supplies to Afghanistan, in part to reduce the U.S. reliance on supply routes through Pakistan. Yet significant portions of the NDN go through certain countries, particularly in Central Asia, that have extremely poor track records on human rights and corruption. What do you see as the major challenges to expanding the use of the NDN to deliver supplies to Afghanistan?

Answer. The primary challenges we face with expanding the NDN are access and types of cargo allowed to transit. Receiving necessary and timely transit permissions from partner nations, particularly those in Central Asia, has been a challenge. Addi-
tionally, the current transit agreements only allow non-lethal cargo to transit the NDN. This limiting factor leads to heavier reliance on the Pakistan ground lines of communication for some military equipment and airlift for delivery of lethal and critical or sensitive cargo.

Question. To what extent, if any, should concerns about the human rights and corruption records of authoritarian regimes, particularly in Central Asia, be taken into account in negotiating expanded access to supply routes along the NDN?

Answer. It is in the national interests of the United States to advance and protect fundamental human rights, and to promote democratic institutions that are responsive and accountable to its citizens. These strategic priorities should be taken into account and balanced against other strategic priorities in our dealings with foreign governments. We need to work with the whole-of-government to take a holistic approach to our bilateral relationships, and it is in this context that negotiations to expand needed NDN supply routes should be considered.

STRATEGIC SEALIFT

Question. Strategic sealift has always played a significant role in providing support to our forces overseas. Typically, we have seen strategic sealift delivering 95 percent of the equipment transported to overseas contingencies.

Are there any initiatives that you believe are necessary, if confirmed, in the area of strategic sealift?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Navy and our commercial sealift partners to develop initiatives such as Joint Seabasing and Joint High Speed Vessels, which may play a role in enhancing strategic sealift. Strategic sealift continues to play a vital role in the transportation of equipment and supplies for DOD. The MSC, the SDDC, and U.S. Maritime Administration, working in partnership with the U.S. maritime industry, have done a superb job at meeting the performance requirements of strategic sealift as we execute Operations Enduring Freedom and New Dawn and support other military missions around the globe.

MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAM

Question. Through programs like the Maritime Security Program (MSP), the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), and the Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA) administered by the Maritime Administration, DOD has maintained access to U.S. commercial capabilities and transportation networks while ensuring the continued viability of both the U.S.-flag fleet and the pool of citizen mariners who man those vessels.

What is your view of the importance of these Maritime Administration programs?

Answer. The MSP, VISA, and VTA are all vital components of the overall strategic sealift capability required to meet the Nation’s strategic sealift requirements. The MSP maintains a modern U.S. flag fleet providing military access to vessels and vessel capacity, as well as a total global, intermodal transportation network. This network includes not only vessels, but logistics management services, infrastructure, terminals facilities and, perhaps most importantly, U.S. citizen merchant mariners to crew the government owned/controlled and commercial fleets.

Question. What changes in these programs, if any, do you believe are appropriate and would make them more effective or more efficient in supporting DOD transportation requirements?

Answer. TRANSCOM is coordinating with the Maritime Administration on proposed enhancements to the MSP that would allow an opportunity for cost efficient recapitalization of our organic surge sealift fleet. As force drawdowns continue in Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom, so will the deployment and sustainment cargoes which have become such a valuable piece of our commercial partners’ business plans. If confirmed, I will work to mold these programs to respond to the ever changing global strategic and economic environment maintaining our U.S. flag fleet, our precious pool of U.S. citizen merchant mariners, and the industrial base which supports them.

CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET

Question. With the expansion of military operations since September 11, 2001, the Air Force’s mobility requirements have increased. The Air Force has in the past, and may very well in the future, rely heavily on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to supplement its organic airlift.

Do the changes in the commercial airline industry, characterized by bankruptcies and a move toward smaller and shorter-range aircraft, bring into question the future viability of the CRAF system?
Answer. Several recent studies indicate that the airline industry will continue to provide sufficient numbers of large, long-range aircraft to meet our defense needs. In this past year, through discussions with our commercial industry partners, TRANSCOM has made the most sweeping changes to the CRAF program in 15 years. These changes will result in a stronger, more viable program and address congressional mandates to improve predictability of DOD commercial requirements and incentivize carriers to use modern aircraft.

To ensure the CRAF partnership remains strong, TRANSCOM created the Executive Working Group (EWG), modeled after a similar venue with our sealift partners. The CRAF EWG brings together TRANSCOM and AMC leaders with Chief Executive Officers, Presidents, and other representatives of the commercial airline industry to discuss issues with the CRAF program. The CRAF EWG will continue to meet on a regular basis to discuss additional changes to this vital program. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our CRAF partners to ensure the business relationships are solid and the contracts support DOD requirements.

Question: How much should we be relying on CRAF aircraft to meet our peace-time and wartime airlift requirements?

Answer. The CRAF is a critical component in our ability to rapidly deploy forces and equipment. We must balance and integrate all the tools of American power, to include our industrial capacity and partners, to succeed in ensuring our national security.

The CRAF is intended to augment wartime capability to carry passengers and bulk air cargo, which it is very efficient in doing, allowing the organic fleet to focus on missions for which they are better suited. It is a win-win for our Nation.

JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL

Question. Initial reporting from recent military operations indicate joint command and control capabilities have greatly improved in recent years. What is your assessment of the performance of TRANSCOM’s global and theater command and control (C2) systems?

Answer. TRANSCOM’s global C2 systems work well, as evidenced by their timely support of warfighter requirements. If confirmed, I will work to improve TRANSCOM’s C2 systems to focus on enhancing situational awareness, rapid decisionmaking, and end-to-end distribution optimization.

Question. What interoperability challenges remain between Service-to-Service and Service-to-joint C2 systems?

Answer. There is a need to improve information exchanges across the various classification boundaries and between Services and combatant commanders, while simultaneously improving information sharing with our commercial and coalition partners. Information sharing is crucial to successful and safe mission accomplishment, but there are security risks that require constant attention.

To enhance Service-to-joint C2 systems, TRANSCOM is working to identify key processes and information technology solutions that best integrate Service unique or stand-alone applications to enhance the delivery of timely, accurate, and complete data. TRANSCOM is teaming with commercial partners and individual Services to ensure these interoperability risks are addressed. If confirmed, I will continue to improve TRANSCOM’s superior service to their customers, and most importantly, our warfighters.

Question. What role should the TRANSCOM Commander play in ensuring the development of reliable, interoperable, and agile C2 systems?

Answer. As DPO, the TRANSCOM Commander plays a preeminent role in the integration of C2 systems across boundaries and domains from one end of the distribution chain to the other. Commercial partners, DLA, Joint Staff, combatant commanders, Services, and coalition partners all have unique logistics systems that serve their mission.

If confirmed, I will work with distribution partners and customers to make C2 improvements which will allow protected and unconstrained sharing of information across these domains. This is a clear challenge, but necessary, if we are to maximize the combat multiplying effects of logistics for the warfighters.

CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS AND SECURITY

Question. TRANSCOM must communicate over the unclassified Internet with many private-sector entities that are central to DOD’s force generation and deployment operations—in the transportation and shipping industries in particular. Much of the rest of the critical communications and operations of DOD can be conducted over the classified DOD internet service, which is not connected to the public Internet and is therefore much more protected against eavesdropping and disruption by
computer network attacks. General McNabb has been quoted as stating that TRANSCOM is the most attacked command in the Department.

What do you believe are the critical needs of TRANSCOM for cyber security?

Answer. TRANSCOM not only moves cargo and passengers, but vast amounts of information between our military and commercial partners. Command and control systems must get the right information to the right people at the right time, while protecting it from exploitation and attack. If confirmed, I will work to protect the command's information from new technologies that exploit and attack, reduce costs by eliminating duplication of data, systems, or processes, and set data standards across the enterprise to build trust, security, and efficiency.

Question. What do you believe are the critical needs of TRANSCOM for cyber security?

Answer. TRANSCOM will need to continue addressing these issues on multiple fronts. Keeping command and control systems secure and protecting them from attack is a huge challenge. TRANSCOM has been partnering with CYBERCOM, industry, and academia to introduce innovative technologies and methodologies to protect essential systems and information. To reduce costs and boost security, the command is implementing architectures to leverage new technologies, eliminate duplication of data, and better protect its command and control systems. To improve the accuracy and trust of our information, TRANSCOM is partnering with military and commercial partners to define standards for the processing and handling of data. Implementation of these standards streamlines information flow, provides better transparency to authorized users, and leverages new technologies. The results are trusted and timely information supporting a more responsive transportation enterprise. If confirmed, I will focus on cyber security by working with our components, the Department, and industry experts to develop innovative solutions that maintain our freedom of operations through data security.

Question. Is DOD taking adequate steps to address your special needs?

Answer. Yes. TRANSCOM is engaged with the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DOD Chief Information Officer, U.S. Cyber Command, the Cyberspace Integration Group, and COCOM Senior Warfighter Forums in a concerted effort to enhance cyberspace operations security posture and countering cyber threats to our enterprise networks and information.

AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION

Question. Following the cancellation of the C–9A aircraft for medical evacuation in 2003, the AMC adopted a new operational approach to its worldwide mission of aeromedical evacuation. The concept employs other airlift, such as cargo and aerial refueling aircraft, for the air evacuation of wounded and ill patients. Based on lessons learned in OIF, OEF, and Operation New Dawn, are you satisfied that the current model ensures the highest quality of aeromedical evacuation support for our severely injured or ill personnel?

Answer. I am extremely satisfied with the high quality of aeromedical evacuation support TRANSCOM provides for our severely injured or ill personnel. The current approach using designated versus dedicated aircraft has transformed our global patient movement capability. The transition from the C–9A to cargo and aerial refueling aircraft provided access to a greater variety of airframes globally while offsetting the cost of maintaining a dedicated air fleet solely for aeromedical evacuation. This also provides greater flexibility to respond to urgent and priority patient needs with In-system Select missions that can land at airfields not accessible by a C–9A. Ten years of experience and lessons learned has led to significant advancements in mission operations, technology, and medical capability. Patient support pallets and specially trained critical care teams are just two examples of enhancements that made cargo and aerial refueling aircraft suitable for aeromedical evacuation. This has allowed safe movement of severely injured and ill patients more effectively through the enroute care system. In addition, the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is able to provide additional aeromedical evacuation capability if patient movement requirements exceed current system capacity. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure the highest quality of aeromedical evacuation support for our severely injured or ill personnel. I believe this is a critical pillar to conduct combat operations and to sustaining an exceptional All-Volunteer Force.

Question. If confirmed, how would you continuously evaluate the quality standards of aeromedical evacuation?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support an integrated approach to evaluate the quality standards of aeromedical evacuation. This includes expanding the use of aeromedical evacuation data from the Patient Movement Quality Reporting System and the TRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System to pinpoint opportunities to optimize patient care. Integrating other existing patient
safety databases used by the Services, COCOMs, USTC/AMC aeromedical evacuation patient safety monitors, the Critical Care Air Transport Performance Improvement Team, and the Joint Theatre Trauma System would further enhance patient safety and quality standards. In addition, I would support development and deployment of a user-friendly electronic medical record that captures patient information and care data all the way from point of injury, through care in the air, to the medical treatment facility or rehabilitation facility.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

*Question.* TRANSCOM’s budget includes funding for a research and development (R&D) activity designed to allow for examination and improvement of the entire supply chain as part of TRANSCOM’s role as DPO. What are the major capability gaps related to TRANSCOM’s mission that need to be addressed through R&D efforts?

*Answer.* Increased demands on TRANSCOM’s global mission and the ability to execute those responsibilities in an ever-increasing contested cyberspace environment represent challenges that require innovative solutions to maintain critical communication with the distribution community including our commercial partners. Additionally, new technologies may increase the efficiency and effectiveness of our distribution options. If confirmed, TRANSCOM’s R&D investment focus will explore technologies that improve efficiencies and lower the operating cost of our Nation’s joint logistics enterprise. Some examples include:

- **Point of Need Delivery**—improve delivery speed, volume, and accuracy of airdropped cargo, as well as leverage unmanned and hybrid airlift capabilities in operationally relevant conditions and synchronize strategic and theater delivery capabilities to meet increasingly dynamic customer needs;
- **Joint Sea Basing**—capability to safely and efficiently move vehicles, containers, and cargo in a sea base environment;
- **Command and Control (C2)/Decision Support Tools**—improve visibility, decisionmaking, and collaboration within DOD’s logistics chain;
- **Ability to Operate in All Environments**—improve expeditionary operations for environments that feature anti-access, austere conditions, adverse weather, and contested cyberspace; and
- **Fossil Fuel Dependency Reduction**—explore energy alternatives to enhance our ability to employ our Nation’s airlift and aerial refueling capacity and reduce cost relative to warfighter requirements.

*Question.* What unique processes and technologies do you feel TRANSCOM needs to develop through its own program and investments?

*Answer.* TRANSCOM is investing in process reengineering as part of the AT 21 program to institutionalize improvement opportunities that are repeatable and reliable. Examples include the Strategic Surface Route Plan, and Strategic Air Optimization, which use demand, capacity, and other factors to maximize utilization of containers and pallets while maintaining desired service levels. In addition, TRANSCOM continues to enhance warfighter support with technologies ranging from precision airdrop to exploring the potential of hybrid airships. If confirmed, I will examine the entire R&D portfolio to find innovative solutions to enhance enterprise support to the warfighter.

*Question.* How will you work with other R&D organizations to ensure that TRANSCOM’s current and future capability gaps are addressed?

*Answer.* Nearly 75 percent of TRANSCOM’s RDT&E projects are collaboratively funded efforts that place proven capabilities in the hands of the warfighter within 2 to 3 years. If confirmed, I will work, in partnership with the Services, DLA, the combatant commands, OSD, and the Joint Staff, to identify, validate, and recommend RDT&E projects to explore emerging technologies that close validated capability gaps.

TECHNOLOGY PRIORITIES

*Question.* Serving the needs of the combatant commanders both in the near-term and in the future is one of the key goals of the Department’s science and technology executives, who list outreach to commanders as an activity of continued focus. What do you see as the most challenging technological needs or capability gaps facing TRANSCOM in its mission to provide air, land, and sea transportation to DOD?

*Answer.* Of utmost concern is the need to improve the Department’s ability to provide timely and precise delivery of sustainment to our warfighters as well as humanitarian aid and relief anywhere and anytime and to do so in a fiscally responsible manner. Additionally, we need to explore information security and assurance
as well as new cyber technologies to ensure greater efficiency and mission accomplishment. Mitigating fossil fuel dependency also remains a major focus area.

**Question.** What would you do, if confirmed, to make your technology requirements known to the department’s science and technology community to ensure the availability of needed equipment and capabilities in the long-term?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will focus on enhancing Department/industry partnerships to rapidly develop and field proven technologies. Within DOD and the interagency, I will work through the established processes to ensure our support to the warfighter continues.

**TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION**

**Question.** TRANSCOM has been active in the Joint Concept Technology Development (JCTD) process. What are your views on the JCTD process as a means to spiral emerging technologies into use to confront changing threats and to meet warfighter needs?

**Answer.** The Department’s JCTD program is an extremely effective tool that COCOMs can use to insert emerging technologies into the warfight. It provides the joint community an agile means to deliver mature technology addressing warfighter gaps. Building on TRANSCOM’s past record of success, if confirmed, I will strongly advocate for technologies that rapidly enhance warfighter support and success.

**Question.** What steps will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts within your command and in cooperation with other Services and defense agencies?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will continue to apply the Command’s RDT&E investments, in partnership with other COCOMs, Services, defense agencies, academia, and industry to advance our Nation’s warfighting capabilities. I will leverage the Department’s many programs (JCTD, Coalition Warfare Program, Joint Test & Evaluation, Small Business Innovative Research, et cetera) to develop and field, in collaboration with our government, coalition, industry, and academic partners, the rapid development and transition of proven technologies. Specifically, I will include the Services, COCOMs, JDDE partners, OSD, and the Joint Staff in the JCTD and RDT&E project selection process to ensure buy-in and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Finally, I will ensure that all projects have a program of record identified for transition and emphasize rapid fielding from day one.

**DEPLOYMENT CHALLENGES**

**Question.** Multiple studies by TRANSCOM and the Army, and direct experience in Afghanistan and elsewhere, demonstrate that the airlift strategy and airlift platforms developed for the Cold War confrontation in Central Europe are not ideal to support operations in third-world regions. Unlike Europe, most of the world has few airfields with long runways, and there are fewer still that have parking space for more than a couple of cargo aircraft to unload at one time. This “Maximum-on-Ground” or MOG metric is the critical measure of throughput capacity at airfields. The few airfields with MOG greater than 2 are scarce and are located within major urban areas, usually far from where ground forces would be employed. Traditional fixed-wing airlifters—even flexible ones like the C–17—cannot be effectively employed in large numbers to deploy and support ground forces in these regions because of these infrastructure limitations.

TRANSCOM is now completing a Future Deployment and Distribution Assessment that documents this capability gap and evaluates alternatives to traditional fixed-wing transports. The alternatives that scored very high are heavy-lift airships and heavy vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) rotorcraft. These alternatives would deploy more forces faster, save lots of fuel, and increase sustainment. Because they deliver troops and supplies directly to the point of need, they reduce the number of trucks on the road that are vulnerable to IEDs, as well as the length of supply lines. In other words, they would also reduce the vulnerability of our supply lines and save lives.

The Air Force and the Army are conducting an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) for a replacement of the C–130. We understand that the Army favors a heavy lift second generation tilt-rotor that would provide VTOL capabilities. The intent of the JFTL TS is not to replace the C–130 but to supplement the C–17, C–130, and C–27 capabilities to deliver medium weight combat vehicles into very austere environments. The JFTL TS is assessing the overall value and cost
of a cadre of fixed wing aircraft, hybrid airships, and tilt-rotor platforms as to how they might perform in emerging, future intra-theater airlift missions. Upon completion of the AOA, OSD in concert with the Air Force and the joint partners will develop conclusions and recommendations.

**Question.** TRANSCOM has apparently assessed the airships in this review to be much more mature technology. This assessment also agrees with other independent assessments.

**Do you think that DOD should develop and produce such platforms, or do you think the government could buy or lease them from the private sector to acquire a capability sooner?**

**Answer.** At this time, a hybrid airship configured for heavy cargo, equivalent to legacy lift platforms, does not exist. Industry has developed an ISR hybrid airship, which may serve as the basis for further expansion as a cargo carrying platform. Initial flight testing of this platform is scheduled to begin in early 2012. I believe the DOD should partner with industry as we go forward advancing this transportation modal option.

**Question.** In natural disasters such as the Haiti earthquake or Hurricane Katrina, the airfields, roads, and bridges that are required to fly in and distribute relief forces and supplies were destroyed by the disaster. Fixed-wing transports that need functioning airfields are not much use, but vertical lift aircraft or airships have the potential for continuing effective operations.

**Do you believe that the TRANSCOM analyses have adequately factored disaster relief into their assessments?**

**Answer.** TRANSCOM is conducting studies and analyses to ensure we can respond across the full range of military activities. They are working with industry partners through the use of Cooperative Research and Development Agreements with specific focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and contingency sustainment (Afghanistan) operations. These look to determine the feasibility of using hybrid airships as a modal option for the transportation distribution system. In order to continue or increase TRANSCOM’s capability to support the warfighter and nations in need with effective and efficient distribution, this team is engaged to ensure situations such as Haiti’s earthquake and other natural disasters are analyzed for the use of the hybrid airship.

**DEFENSE PERSONAL PROPERTY SYSTEM**

**Question.** For over 10 years, TRANSCOM and its subordinate command, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, have been working to improve the process of moving servicemembers’ household goods and gaining the support of the transportation provider industry for needed changes. Implementation of the new system—Defense Personal Property System (DPS)—uses a “best value” approach to contracting with movers that focuses on quality of performance, web-based scheduling and tracking of shipments, servicemember involvement throughout the moving process, and a claims system that provides full replacement value for damaged household goods. Successful implementation of this system depends on replacement of the legacy Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS) with the web-based DPS.

**What do you view as the most significant challenges that remain in continuing to implement DPS?**

**Answer.** The DPS is now booking over 90 percent of all household goods shipments, with Active Duty, Reserve, and civilian members taking advantage of on-line self-counseling. Awards to move their personal property are made on a best-value basis to transportation service providers (TSPs). Based on the 17 Mar 11 DPS Cost Savings Analysis, DPS has saved approximately $153 million in fiscal year 2011 personal property movement costs through the use of more competitive rates and best-value scoring. Although the program has come a long way, some final implementation steps remain. TRANSCOM is currently incorporating the last remaining functionality, such as Domestic Small Shipments, Intra-Country Moves, and Non-Temporary Storage, into the DPS software while continuing to enhance the overall system performance and the user experience.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the success of DPS in achieving the requirement for full replacement value for damaged or missing household goods claims?

**Answer.** Full replacement value (FRV) is implemented across the Services, and is now in place for all modes of shipments in support of the Defense Personal Property Program (DP3). If confirmed, I will ensure process improvements are in place so claims submission procedures become more straightforward for the DPS Claims module user.
Question. What is your understanding under DPS of the percentage of valid personal claims for damage or loss of household goods that is currently paid for by DOD and the percentage that is paid for by the movers who caused the damage?

Answer. Based on metrics provided by the Military Claims Offices (MCOs), the percentage of claims paid by the DOD is approximately 52 percent. However, when a MCO pays a claim to a servicemember, the next step in the MCO process is to initiate collection of those funds from the mover who caused the damage.

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the response rate on customer satisfaction surveys as a method for identifying best and worst performers?

Answer. Customer satisfaction survey response rates have risen to 27 percent. It is clear the survey response rates are key to ensuring only quality service providers participate in the program. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service Headquarters to increase the response rate.

Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring that DPS is fully funded and implemented and will you make every effort to ensure this program is successful in meeting its goals?

Answer. If confirmed, I will leverage DPS to continue to improve our business processes for household goods and services. I will work to ensure the DPS program successfully meets its goals and full funding is obtained. OSD and the Services have committed to fully fund the DPS program. In May of this year, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Capability Assessment and Program Evaluation office validated the fiscal years 2012 to 2017 funding required for DPS development and sustainment. In addition, OSD, Joint Staff, and the Services have indicated their support to fund DPS.

AIR FORCE ABILITY TO RESPOND TO WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES

Question. What impact, if any, do you see on the Air Force’s ability to respond to worldwide contingencies as a consequence of the demands of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. The Air Force has the right people, skills, and equipment to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as a full partner. The continued operations tempo does however take its toll. Continued deployments place stress upon our people and their families. Our equipment is also being stressed and aged at an accelerated rate. Despite this, the Air Force is proud to be serving alongside our sister Services in protecting the future of this great country.

Question. How much additional risk has the United States assumed in this regard?

Answer. Our forces engaged in combat today are ready to perform their missions, but many Air Force capabilities require modernization to help us shape and respond to a very challenging future. We must retain an enduring technological edge that flows from our unmatched ability to research, develop, operate, and sustain the world’s premier Air Force. We must retain an enduring technological edge that flows from our unmatched ability to research, develop, operate, and sustain the world’s premier Air Force. The Air Force remains committed to recruiting and retaining the highest caliber airmen and sustaining the quality of service for them and their families, and we must continue to ensure we are able to set the conditions for America’s success against emerging threats in an uncertain future.

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

Question. Subsequent to the Air Force assuming full responsibility for the direct support airlift mission capability for the Army, the Air Force decided that a total program of 38 C–27Js would be sufficient to meet their responsibility for providing that capability. The Air Force based this conclusion on: (1) an analysis of the Army’s demand for the direct support mission; (2) a Mobility Capability Requirements Study conclusion that the programmed Air Force fleet of 401 C–130 aircraft exceeded maximum demand for intra-theater airlift in any wartime scenario by 66 C–130 aircraft; and (3) an analysis that showed that a supply of 38 C–27J aircraft, along with 20 C–130 aircraft diverted from an intra-theater airlift mission to the Army direct support mission, would meet the Army’s needs.

Should the Air Force consider buying more C–27Js specifically for meeting the Army direct support mission requirements, rather than recapitalizing C–130 inventory that may be excess to intra-theater airlift requirements, since the cost per flying hour for a C–27J should be much less expensive than that for a C–130J aircraft?

Answer. No. The Air Force Intra-Theater Airlift Force Mix Analysis accomplished by RAND in 2008 demonstrated the C–130J as being consistently most cost-effective in accomplishing the spectrum of theater lift missions. C–130s and C–27Js have comparable short-field access and soft-field performance. The C–27J has a niche for small loads (3 pallets or fewer) and is well-suited to perform that role with the cur-
rent plan to acquire 38 aircraft. The continued recapitalization of the C–130 fleet offers the warfighter greater and more cost-effective capability and flexibility.

Question. The Defense Department also has requirements for supporting domestic missions, such as those from the Department of Homeland Security. Absent other information, it would appear to the committee that the Department merely assumes that it can muster the appropriate support for domestic missions from within those forces that are derived from warfighting requirements. Just as it has turned out that the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were not exactly the “lesser included contingencies” that previous defense planning had assumed, it is altogether possible that the same would be true for meeting whatever domestic demands may be placed on the Department.

How would you propose to ensure that TRANSCOM forces are able to meet domestic mission requirements?

Answer. MCRS–16 concluded intra-theater airlift was adequate in supporting each of the three cases studied. Each case contained not only a major contingency campaign but also included worldwide commitments, training, and Homeland defense scenarios.

SPACE AVAILABLE TRAVEL POLICIES

Question. DOD, in consultation with TRANSCOM, submitted a report to Congress on Space Available Travel for Certain Disabled Veterans and Gray-Area Retirees in December 2007. The report concluded that increases in space available eligibility would significantly impact DOD’s ability to accomplish effectively the airlift mission and negatively affect support to Active Duty military space-available travelers. Additionally, the report concluded that adding to the eligibility pool would increase support costs and displace the current policy that mandates that space-A travel not incur additional costs to DOD.

Do you consider the conclusions and recommendations of the December 2007 report to still be valid?

Answer. I believe the conclusions and recommendations remain valid. The potential for expanding the eligibility pool cited in the report by nearly 2 million individuals (a 27 percent increase) cannot be accommodated without having a detrimental impact to our Active Duty members. The space-A travel system’s primary objective is to enhance the morale and welfare of our Active-Duty Force.

Question. What are the constraints in today’s operational environment of expanding the categories of individuals eligible for space available travel?

Answer. Given current operational requirements, I do not believe DOD has the global ability to support this expansion. The expansion would increase support costs for security identification, administration, processing, baggage handling, safety equipment, training, personnel, and facilities, and would undermine the current policy that execution of the space-A travel is at no cost to DOD. An expansion places additional stress on heavily tasked DOD aircrews and support personnel because of wartime commitments.

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have regarding changes to the existing policies controlling space available travel eligibility?

Answer. Due to the current operational requirements, I do not see space-A expansion as advisable.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, TRANSCOM?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK

1. Senator Levin. General Fraser, a major concern has been our significant reliance on supply routes through Pakistan which have been subject to attack by militant extremists. Currently, nearly 40 percent of surface cargo to Afghanistan arrives from the north, and military planners reportedly intend to expand to 75 percent the share of surface cargo coming into Afghanistan along the northern network. While the growth of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) has reduced concerns about vulnerable supply lines through Pakistan, it has also raised concerns about U.S. dependence on authoritarian regimes in Central Asia with high levels of corruption. Given the levels of corruption in a number of Central Asian countries, what steps has U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) taken to ensure that its contractors and their subcontractors operate in a manner that safeguards against corrupt practices that result in U.S. tax dollars being siphoned off?

General Fraser. There is a continual dialogue between TRANSCOM and our commercial carriers who transport cargo into Afghanistan as part of the Universal Services Contract (USC). By using our commercial carriers, who have established commercial networks and subcontracts throughout the NDN, the rates for TRANSCOM transportation are competitive and considered reasonable in comparison to commercial tariffs in those countries. With our rates being comparable to both commercial and NATO cargo rates, we believe the opportunity for funds being siphoned off through corruption is minimal. The USC's contain a clause requiring contractors to have a business code of ethics and conduct, along with all the required U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Contracting Command clauses. Additionally, the prime contractors have a vested interest in ensuring all business conducted in these countries is above board and free of any corruption. They have international brands with untarnished reputations—reputations they want to maintain. We work closely with our prime contractor and by maintaining continuous communications, we remain alert to any potential corruption. In addition, our embassies have provided guidance to local carriers regarding the legitimacy of transit fees charged by Central Asian governments to ensure all charges are valid.

2. Senator Levin. General Fraser, in Kyrgyzstan, questions have arisen regarding payments under a contract to provide fuel to the Manas Transit Center that may have been diverted to relatives of two presidents. What is the status of any Department of Defense (DOD) investigations into allegations of possible corruption in connection with fuel contracts relating to the Manas Transit Center?

General Fraser. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Policy) and Defense Logistics Agency-Energy are currently engaged with the Government of Kyrgyzstan concerning the fuel contract to support Manas Transit Center, and the contractual process continues to move gradually forward.

Regarding allegations of possible corruption, the December 2010 congressional report "Mystery at Manas" was critical of Departments of State and Defense oversight of fuel contracts in Central Asia due to the high risk of corruption in the region and concern that negative public perception may be detrimental to U.S. efforts. However, the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs uncovered no credible evidence that Mina Corporation and Red Star Enterprises were linked to corrupt activities and we are not aware of any further DOD investigations at this time.

Manas Transit Center continues to be a critical hub for strategic airflow as TRANSCOM provides continuous support to CENTCOM operations in Afghanistan.
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

STEWART AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE

3. Senator GILLIBRAND. General Fraser, as I’m sure you are aware, Stewart Air National Guard Base (ANGB), NY, is the proud home of the 105th Airlift Wing. Rich in history and tradition, Stewart ANGB employs more than 660 full-time and part-time military members and some 1,700 traditional guardsmen.

Earlier this year I was pleased with the decision by the Air Force to replace the 12 retiring C–5A Galaxy aircraft with the C–17. However, I was surprised to learn only eight C–17 are going to be based at Stewart ANGB. I’ve asked the Air Force for an explanation and received a response indicating they were currently researching the issue and promised me a more detailed answer upon completion of their review.

I understand the 8 C–17s destined for Stewart ANGB are coming from Charleston Air Force Base (AFB), SC, and McChord AFB, WA, both of which already have in excess of 50 aircraft. With another 13 C–17s still to be delivered to the Air Force, I believe basing an additional 8 C–17s (for a total of 16) with the 105th Airlift Wing will not only maximize the capability of Stewart ANGB and its highly trained and dedicated personnel, it will increase the geographic distribution of this important national asset, and increase available ramp space at Charleston and McChord AFBs, relieving any potential overcrowding. With the retirement of the C–5As, Stewart ANGB has the infrastructure, personnel, and community desire to accommodate more than eight C–17s.

While I was unable to attend your confirmation hearing due to a conflict in my schedule, I have reviewed your testimony and appreciated your comments on the importance of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. As the President’s nominee to command TRANSCOM, I would appreciate your thoughts on maximizing the capabilities of Stewart ANGB by increasing the number of C–17s based there.

General F RASER. TRANSCOM recognizes the importance of the Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) to the strategic airlift mission. The continued contributions of the Stewart ANGB airmen are invaluable to the Air Force, as they complete the transition from C–5As to C–17s. The Air Force is responsible for the basing of strategic airlift assets which is accomplished through the Secretary of the Air Force’s Strategic Basing Process. The process is deliberate, repeatable, and transparent, with defined roles and responsibilities designed to find the appropriate location for aircraft and personnel basing.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN

4. Senator M CCAIN. General Fraser, our relations with Pakistan have hit new lows since the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in early May. Pakistan has insisted that some of our training and assistance forces be withdrawn, and has continued to create delays and uncertainty in authorizing visas for a wide variety of Americans to enter Pakistan. How concerned are you about our logistics routes that support our troops in Afghanistan that run through Pakistan?

General Fraser. All of our lines of communication are vital and we must continue with our best diplomatic efforts to maintain them and keep them open. It is mutually beneficial for the United States and Pakistan to promote a stable Afghanistan. Pakistan remains an important ally in that effort. Our logistical networks within Pakistan are just a portion of a vast network of supply lines serving Afghanistan.

5. Senator M CCAIN. General Fraser, what alternatives could we use, if needed? General Fraser. TRANSCOM, in coordination with U.S. European Command and CENTCOM, has built a network of routes to support operations in Afghanistan.

Surface cargo supporting Afghanistan travels via the Pakistan road network or the NDN road and railway routes. TRANSCOM is working with our commercial and international partners to further expand NDN capability by seeking approval to transport wheel armored vehicles and their spare parts.

Cargo requiring airlift travels via Pakistan or the northern air corridors transiting Central Asia. TRANSCOM is continually developing and maturing multi-modal locations throughout the Middle East and in Europe to include the recent addition of a 100 percent commercial multi-modal hub in Dubai and the recently completed 172nd Brigade Combat Team deployment via commercial assets through Romania. TRANSCOM continues to seek multi-modal opportunities to reduce airlift costs while improving overall asset utilization and velocity.
These routes are designed to overlap and maintain the ability to surge if one node is restricted due to unforeseen events while keeping the warfighter supported within Afghanistan.

6. Senator McCain. General Fraser, how confident are you that TRANSCOM will be able to fully support the movement of troops and equipment that will be needed to implement our strategy in Afghanistan?

General Fraser. As a land-locked country with remarkable topography, logistical support into and out of Afghanistan is extremely challenging. Over the last 10 years we have learned many lessons and have worked to build as many land, air, and sea routes to support the warfighter in Afghanistan as possible. TRANSCOM and CENTCOM both assess that we will continue to be able to sustain the current force level within Afghanistan. Together, we have worked hard to create a robust and efficient logistical network with multiple overlapping routes that fosters competition in the commercial industry to help keep costs in check while providing sufficient logistical capacity.

7. Senator McCain. General Fraser, under the President’s Afghanistan withdrawal strategy, do the caps or limits on the numbers of troops authorized in Afghanistan provide a challenge for TRANSCOM forces as they move equipment in, out, and around Afghanistan and continue to support our remaining combat forces there?

General Fraser. TRANSCOM has sufficient military and commercial logistical personnel on the ground to successfully sustain current operations within Afghanistan.

U.S. FUNDS TO THE TALIBAN

8. Senator McCain. General Fraser, reportedly, a year-long military-led investigation recently concluded that U.S. taxpayers’ money has been indirectly funneled to the Taliban under a $2.2 billion ground transportation contract. Yet U.S. and Afghan efforts to address the problem have been slow and ineffective, and all eight of the trucking firms involved in the work apparently remain on the U.S. payroll. According to reports, DOD found that four of the eight transportation contracts in Afghanistan are funding the insurgents there and that six of the eight companies were associated with “fraudulent paperwork and behavior.” Despite these findings by the Government Accountability Office and DOD, in March, the Pentagon extended the contract for another 6 months. In your view, how much of a problem is our unwittingly contracting with the enemy in Afghanistan—particularly with regard to transportation contracts?

General Fraser. Any funds being siphoned off to the enemy is a problem. The Host Nation Trucking contracts referred to in these reports fall under the responsibility of CENTCOM and do not correlate to the inter-modal transportation contracts managed by TRANSCOM. TRANSCOM assessed potential risk upon receipt of the Warlord Inc. report and found minimal risk to our contracts. We have provided this report to Universal Services Contract carriers for their reference when subcontracting transportation services in Afghanistan. We also forwarded a 25 July 2011 Washington Post article, titled: “U.S. Cash Said to be Reaching Taliban”, to our commercial partners and the carriers confirmed they are not doing business with the companies cited in the article. As the TRANSCOM commander, I will ensure we work hard to assist CENTCOM in their efforts to address this issue.

9. Senator McCain. General Fraser, how do you intend to address this issue?

General Fraser. TRANSCOM will continue to work with contractors to mitigate risk concerning this issue, when acquiring transportation services into Afghanistan. We shared the Warlord Inc. report with our contractors providing transportation services in Afghanistan, asking them to compare their operations to those of the Host Nation Trucking contract carriers and assess the risk. Based on the Warlord Inc. report and our carriers’ feedback, it appears most of the risk of money going to the Taliban was associated with subcontracted security for convoys. Our carriers are using Afghanistan Ministry of the Interior vetted companies for their convoy security. Additionally, we will continue to work with CENTCOM and the various task forces established to identify and eliminate this type of corruption.

10. Senator McCain. General Fraser, at General Petraeus’ request, this committee adopted legislation in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 that would give military commanders additional powers to inves-
tigate and cancel contracts in which insurgent ties have been found. It also imposes an affirmative obligation on contractors doing business with CENTCOM to conduct the due diligence necessary to determine if malign actors are benefitting from these contracts. Are you aware of these possible authorities?

General FRASER. Yes, I understand the new legislation adopted by the Senate Armed Services Committee for inclusion in the proposed NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012. As Commander, I will work to help ensure the TRANSCOM commercial partners are aware of these authorities and my acquisition staff will execute them appropriately.

11. Senator MCCAIN. General Fraser, do you think they may be helpful with respect to contracting for transportation in Afghanistan? Please explain your answer fully.

General FRASER. Yes. Further, the Commander, International Security Assistance Force published the Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance in September 2010 which emphasized contracting within a contingency environment is a commander’s business and leaders must be aware of contracting activities that are occurring within their areas of responsibility. If not properly monitored, contract and donor funds could be diverted from their intended purpose and fuel corruption, finance insurgent organizations, or strengthen criminal networks. Being able to terminate a contract when this occurs will stop the flow of funds immediately, and facilitate the ability to look into records of contractors and subcontractors at any tier. This will assist Task Force 2010 which was established to ensure the money spent by the coalition is delivering the intended purpose and that contract efforts are linked to implementing the counterinsurgency strategy effectively.

Airlift Capability

12. Senator MCCAIN. General Fraser, a major reason why the Air Force has excess large cargo aircraft is because the Senate and House Appropriations Committees in recent years have earmarked 44 additional C–17’s for the Boeing Company that were not requested by DOD nor authorized by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. Does the programmed fleet of 300 large cargo aircraft provide enough capacity to meet wartime and peacetime requirements?

General FRASER. Yes. The most demanding scenario in the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS–16) generates a strategic airlift fleet requirement of 32.7 million ton miles per day (MTM/D). A fleet of 222 C–17s, 52 C–5Ms, and 27 C–5As meets the 32.7 MTM/D requirements.

13. Senator MCCAIN. General Fraser, in your view, what is the budgetary impact to the Air Force if restricted from executing programmed C–5A retirements?

General FRASER. The fiscal year 2012 President’s budget recommends retiring 10 C–5As. Without relief from the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010’s 316 airlift floor restriction, these 10 C–5As, as well as the remaining 5 from the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget (15 C–5As in total) would be restricted from retirement. To continue to operate and maintain these aircraft drives a $1.23 billion Future Years Defense Program bill. Of this $1.23 billion, $844 million is operations and maintenance funding for flying hours and depot level maintenance. This funding is not included in the fiscal year 2012 President’s budget and would have to be sourced from other Air Force programs.

14. Senator MCCAIN. General Fraser, in your view, where will the funding come from to pay for maintaining and flying the extra aircraft if the Air Force is not allowed to retire them?

General FRASER. Assuming a fixed or declining defense budget for the foreseeable future, funding to pay for maintaining and flying the extra C–5A aircraft would have to be sourced from other Air Force programs.

15. Senator MCCAIN. General Fraser, the President has announced we will begin to withdraw from Afghanistan. Is there adequate airlift to support this endeavor and the continued withdrawal from Iraq?

General FRASER. Yes. There is adequate airlift capacity to support the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The MCRS–16 determined the strategic airlift requirement to be 32.7 MTM/D. That determination is based upon a requirement to support two overlapping large-scale land campaigns occurring in different theaters, and still handle the steady-state requirements of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. As an illustration, while supporting both the troop withdrawal from Iraq and the surge
into Afghanistan, TRANSCOM's busiest day in Air Mobility Command was March 23, where they performed 16.6 MTM/D of lift. The difficulty in planning the withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq is determining the rate of withdrawal, which will be directed by our national leadership.

16. Senator McCain. General Fraser, what limitations are there and how do you intend to overcome them, if confirmed?  
General Fraser. First and foremost, TRANSCOM will always deliver, and we have the capability to do that today. We must continue to support the warfighter in all locations and climates, without fail. While doing so, we must remain good stewards of the taxpayers' money, and continue our efforts to locate faster, less-expensive ways to deliver the forces and support, and bring our troops home. I intend to overcome any limitations by relying upon the hard work and innovation of the men and women of TRANSCOM, our component commands and commercial partners, and by encouraging efforts to find new and efficient ways of doing business. This will also require support from Congress to complete the right-sizing of the airlift fleet to facilitate efficiencies. As Commander, I look forward to working with Congress on this issue.

HEALTH CARE COSTS

17. Senator McCain. General Fraser, in a modest attempt to control DOD's health care costs, former Secretary Gates sought to apply a medical inflation factor to TRICARE Prime enrollment fees for working-age retirees beginning in fiscal year 2013. Unfortunately, our committee balked at that idea, and reported a bill that would permanently tie DOD's hands to annual increases to the annual increase in retired pay, which has been minimal. TRICARE fees haven't changed since they were established in 1995. At that time, according to DOD, working age retirees paid about 27 percent of their total costs when using civilian care. Today, out-of-pocket expenses for working age retirees represent less than 9 percent of the total cost of the family's health care costs. Some argue that health care benefits to retirees have been eroded over time. Do you agree?  
General Fraser. I believe military retiree health benefits are well deserved and are important to all retirees. The Assistant Secretary of Defense Health Affairs and TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) should address any possible erosion of DOD health care benefit.

18. Senator McCain. General Fraser, do you support the administration's modest goal of linking future increases in fees for working age retirees to a factor that relates to rising national medical costs?  
General Fraser. This question relates to DOD Health Care Benefits and belongs in the purview of Assistant Secretary of Defense Health Affairs and/or TMA.

19. Senator McCain. General Fraser, do you see the rise in health care costs as a threat to readiness and if so, what would you do or recommend, if confirmed, to address this very serious issue for DOD?  
General Fraser. This question relates to DOD Health Care Benefits and belongs in the purview of Assistant Secretary of Defense Health Affairs and/or TMA.

DEFENSE PERSONAL PROPERTY SYSTEM

20. Senator McCain. General Fraser, in your advance policy question regarding Defense Personal Property System (DPS), you indicated that DOD currently is paying approximately 52 percent of all claims from servicemembers for lost or damaged household goods in connection with permanent change of station (PCS) moves. This is a surprisingly high number given the assurances from Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) and TRANSCOM when the DPS was proposed and justified to Congress that the movers and shippers, who cause the damage, would be required by the terms of their contracts to reimburse the servicemember directly at full replacement value. Please explain why DOD is currently paying such a high percentage of household goods claims for lost or damaged property.  
General Fraser. Although 52 percent of claims are paid through the Military Claims Office (MCO), this figure is a fraction of all DOD shipments in fiscal year 2010, whether moved in the DPS or the legacy system, the Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS). During fiscal year 2010, ap-
approximately 55 percent of shipments were transferred through TOPS, which partially accounts for the high percentage of shipments settled by the DOD.

21. Senator McCain. General Fraser, what is the dollar figure of the amount, per year, that DOD is paying out in claims in connection with PCS moves, and what percentage of that amount is DOD actually collecting after-the-fact from movers?

General Fraser. The DOD amount paid and recovery amounts are not a one-on-one, per claim, correlation. DOD could pay an amount on a claim during 1 fiscal year, and the recovery could very well be in the next fiscal year. Due to reasons such as, but not limited to, appeal processes (negotiating, rebutting, going back and forth with the Transportation Service Provider (TSP)), previous lack of offset capability, and MCO consolidations, providing a consolidated monetary comparison which ties a fiscal year payout to the same fiscal year for recovery is not a possible task.

The claims payments and recoveries vary slightly between Services, but the individual approach(s) are approximately 95 to 97 percent. As of 31July11, DOD MCOs collectively paid out approximately $3.9 million and collected approximately $3.3 million. However, it must be reiterated that the collections reflected above do not correlate to the claims paid during this fiscal year for the reasons previously stated.

22. Senator McCain. General Fraser, are meritorious claims being paid by DOD to servicemembers being paid at depreciated value or full replacement value of the items lost or damaged?

General Fraser. A meritorious claim is one that meets all the statutory and regulatory criteria for payment and they are the only kind the Services pay. Initial payment to the servicemember is depreciated value; however, when the MCO is successful at recouping from the TSP full replacement value and additional monies are recovered, those additional monies are provided back to the customer.

23. Senator McCain. General Fraser, PCS moves involving international travel present unique challenges because of the numbers of movers and shippers involved and the time and distance involved in the shipments. Last year, DOD requested and received statutory authority for DOD to pay full replacement value claims of this kind. What is your assessment of DOD and SDDC’s practical and legal ability to require reimbursement of claims at full replacement value from movers and shippers for international moves?

General Fraser. The SDDC’s assessment is that claims are being processed and settled internationally at the full replacement value as detailed in the policy guidance.

24. Senator McCain. General Fraser, is there a solution for this aspect of the DPS claims system, or is this a cost DOD and the Services must plan on absorbing?

General Fraser. There is no additional cost to DOD for claims associated with DPS.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

CONTRACTING AIRLIFT FROM RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

25. Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, the Air Force is proposing to retire additional C–5As for a total of 32 aircraft because they believe these aircraft are excess to the Air Force’s needs. It has been estimated that between 2005 and 2009, DOD spent $1.7 billion contracting airlift from the Russians and Ukrainians. This is a good deal more than the amount of resources the Air Force hopes to save by retiring additional C–5s. Do you think it makes sense and is a good expenditure of U.S. taxpayers’ resources to retire U.S. aircraft when we are already relying on foreign airlift to meet our needs and are spending billions of dollars contracting with the Russians and Ukrainians for these aircraft?

General Fraser. Contracting for oversize/outsize commercial airlift using our Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) carriers and their commercial partners is a prudent use of taxpayers’ dollars. When not operating at full war-time capability and utilization rates, as in current operations today, it is 25 percent less costly to move Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles by AN–124s than by C–5s. Furthermore, by contracting for foreign strategic airlift today, we extend the useful life of our strategic airlift fleet into the future, increasing our system capacity, operational flexibility, and strengthening relationships with our commercial partners.
26. Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, are Russian and Ukrainian aircraft available worldwide or just in limited locations?

General Fraser. Foreign airlift is available worldwide to support TRANSCOM requirements when U.S. flag capabilities are not suitable due to cargo constraints or destination restrictions.

27. Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, how, or does, the United States account for the fact that, based on the specific requirement the Russians and Ukrainians are asked to support, they might decline to do so, similar to how some countries where we have troops or assets stationed have denied over-flight rights or denied those troops or assets being used for certain purposes?

General Fraser. There is a distinction between resources we use for our planned war-time capability and those we use in current operations. Our planned war-time capability does not rely upon any foreign source of airlift. By contracting for foreign strategic airlift today, we extend the useful life of our organic inventory into the future. Additionally, TRANSCOM use of foreign airlift via subcontracts with our CRAF partners increases system capacity and flexibility, is a prudent use of taxpayers' dollars as these capabilities are often less costly to utilize than organic assets, and serves to strengthen our important relationship with our commercial partners.

28. Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, in 2008, DOD conducted a Strategic Airlift Review and concluded that the then current program of record was the most cost effective and there was no need for additional C-17s. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council also established a requirement for 33.95 million-ton-miles (MTM) organic capability and stated that any reduction in strategic airlift capability would increase risk to unacceptable levels and jeopardize DOD's ability to adequately support the combatant commands.

In 2008, OSD also certified the need for 316 strategic airlifters. In 2009, a congressionally-directed airlift review conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses concluded that the current program of record (316 aircraft) met all requirements and that retiring C-5As to buy/operate additional C-17s was not cost effective. Air Force leadership also testified to Congress that 316 strategic airlift aircraft was “the sweet spot”.

In 2009, the MCRS established a new 32.7 MTM worst-case requirement which was lower than previous studies in recent years. The Air Force's desire to retire 30+ C-5As which could drive the strategic airlift fleet below 300 aircraft is based on this most recent study.

Over the last 3 to 4 years, DOD and the Air Force have changed their position several times on what the strategic airlift requirement is. How do you compare the results of these studies and which study is most correct?

General Fraser. All previous DOD-level studies you reference were correct. History has shown a need to update such studies every quadrennial review cycle and we respond to those validated and reviewed changes each time we submit a new Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The MCRS–16 is the most current and now serves as the foundation for a requirements demand signal extending to fiscal year 2016.

Based on MCRS–16, we know that the peak demand signal for 32.7 MTM/D of strategic organic airlift capacity can be met with approximately 300 aircraft. Our program of record for 222 C–17s, 52 RERPed C–5Ms, and 27 C–5As assures we can address the most demanding validated needs of the Nation with this force structure.

29. Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, how do we know that you have it right this time and that we are not incurring unacceptable or unnecessary risk?

General Fraser. The MCRS–16 is the most current assessment of the need for mobility assets based on 2 years of studying three demanding cases involving the integration of scenarios to simultaneously protect the Homeland, posture our Nation to respond to events around the globe, and be prepared to address significant overlapping combatant campaigns in response to threats to our national interests. These DOD validated scenario sets are continuously being reviewed and updated to assure we can respond to world events and address conflicts with acceptable levels of risk. Each year we submit our programming actions based upon the most current family of scenario sets and demands approved by the Department.
[The nomination reference of Gen. William M. Fraser III, USAF, follows:]  

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT  
AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
June 16, 2011.  

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:  
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Air Force to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:  

To be General  
Gen. William M. Fraser III, 0000.  

[The biographical sketch of Gen. William M. Fraser III, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]  

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF  
Gen. William M. Fraser III is Commander, Air Combat Command, with headquarters at Langley Air Force Base, VA, and Air Component Commander (ACC) for U.S. Joint Forces Command. As the commander, he is responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and maintaining combat-ready forces for rapid deployment and employment while ensuring strategic air defense forces are ready to meet the challenges of peacetime air sovereignty and wartime defense. ACC operates more than 1,000 aircraft, 22 wings, 13 bases, and more than 300 operating locations worldwide with 79,000 Active-Duty and civilian personnel. When mobilized, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve contribute more than 700 aircraft and 49,000 people to ACC. As the Combat Air Forces lead agent, ACC develops strategy, doctrine, concepts, tactics, and procedures for air and space power employment. The command provides conventional and information warfare forces to all unified commands to ensure air, space, and information superiority for warfighters and national decision-makers. ACC can also be called upon to assist national agencies with intelligence, surveillance, and crisis response capabilities.  

General Fraser entered the Air Force in 1974 as a distinguished graduate of the Texas A&M University Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program. His operational assignments include duty as a T–37, B–52, B–1, and B–2 instructor pilot and evaluator. General Fraser has commanded an operations group and two bomb wings. His staff duties include tours on the Air Staff, Joint Staff, and Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Offutt Air Force Base, NE. He has also served as Chief of the Nuclear Requirements Cell at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Chief of Staff for U.S. Strategic Command, and as the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  

General Fraser has extensive war time, contingency, and humanitarian relief operational experience. During Operation Enduring Freedom he led an intelligence fusion organization that provided direct support to the warfighter. Prior to assuming his current position, General Fraser served as the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff.  

Education:  
1974 Bachelor of Science degree in engineering technology, Texas A&M University  
1977 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, AL  
1980 Master of Science degree in management information systems, University of Northern Colorado, Greeley  
1983 Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA  
1985 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA  
1987 National Security Management Course, Syracuse University, NY  
1991 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL  
1995 Executive Development Program, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY  
1999 Combined Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, AL
1999  Senior Information Warfare Applications Course, Maxwell AFB, AL
2000  National Security Leadership Course, National Security Studies, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, NY
2002  Executive Program for Russian and U.S. General Officers, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
2002  Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, Maxwell AFB, AL
2002  Senior Intelligence Fellows Program, Wye River, MD
2005  Leadership at the Peak, Center for Creative Leadership, Colorado Springs, CO

**Major duty assignments:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1974</td>
<td>October 1975</td>
<td>Student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, AZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1975</td>
<td>March 1976</td>
<td>Student, instructor pilot training, Randolph AFB, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1978</td>
<td>March 1980</td>
<td>T-37 instructor pilot and flight examiner, 82nd Flying Training Wing, Williams AFB, AZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1981</td>
<td>March 1983</td>
<td>B-52H aircraft commander, later B-52G aircraft commander and instructor pilot, 46th Bomb Squadron, Grand Forks AFB, ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1983</td>
<td>December 1984</td>
<td>Chief, B-52G Standardization and Evaluation Branch, 319th Bomb Wing, Grand Forks AFB, ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1985</td>
<td>June 1985</td>
<td>Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1985</td>
<td>March 1986</td>
<td>Chief, European Single Integrated Operational Plan Tactics, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, Offutt AFB, NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1986</td>
<td>October 1987</td>
<td>Executive officer to the Strategic Air Command Chief of Staff, Headquarters SAC, Offutt AFB, NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1987</td>
<td>July 1990</td>
<td>Chief, Nuclear Requirements Cell, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1990</td>
<td>July 1991</td>
<td>Student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1991</td>
<td>July 1993</td>
<td>Deputy Commander, 344th Operations Group, McConnell AFB, KS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1993</td>
<td>January 1995</td>
<td>Commander, 509th Operations Group, Whiteman AFB, MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1995</td>
<td>August 1995</td>
<td>Vice Commander, 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman AFB, MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1995</td>
<td>January 1997</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1997</td>
<td>May 1998</td>
<td>Commander, 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth AFB, SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1998</td>
<td>May 1999</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1999</td>
<td>December 2000</td>
<td>Commander, 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale AFB, LA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2000</td>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>Deputy Director for National Systems Operations, the Joint Staff, Director, Defense Space Reconnaissance Program, and Deputy Director for Military Support, National Reconnaissance Office, Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>October 2004</td>
<td>Director of Operations, Headquarters AECC, Randolph AFB, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2004</td>
<td>February 2005</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the Commander, Air Force Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center, Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration, Langley AFB, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2005</td>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Vice Commander, Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>October 2008</td>
<td>Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2008</td>
<td>September 2009</td>
<td>Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2009</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Commander, Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, VA, and Air Component Commander for U.S. Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of joint assignments:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1985</td>
<td>March 1986</td>
<td>Chief, European Single Integrated Operational Plan Tactics, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, Offutt AFB, NE, as a major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1987</td>
<td>July 1990</td>
<td>Chief, Nuclear Requirements Cell, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, as a lieutenant colon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1995</td>
<td>January 1997</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, as a colon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1998</td>
<td>May 1999</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, NE, as a colon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From</td>
<td>To</td>
<td>Assignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2000</td>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>Deputy Director for National Systems Operations, the Joint Staff; Director, Defense Space Reconnaissance Program; and Deputy Director for Military Support, National Reconnaissance Office, Washington, DC, as a brigadier general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>October 2008</td>
<td>Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, as a lieutenant general</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Flight information:**
- Rating: Command pilot
- Flight hours: More than 4,200
- Aircraft flown: T–37, T–38, T–1, KC–135R, B–1B, B–2, B–52G/H, and C–21

**Major awards and decorations:**
- Defense Distinguished Service Medal
- Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
- Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
- Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
- Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
- Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
- Air Force Achievement Medal
- Secretary’s Distinguished Service Award, Department of State
- National Intelligence Medal of Achievement
- Combat Readiness Medal
- National Defense Service Medal with bronze star
- Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
- Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
- Armed Forces Service Medal
- Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal

**Other achievements:**
- Officer training award, undergraduate pilot training
- Top graduate, T–37 pilot instructor training
- T–37 Instructor Pilot of the Year
- Distinguished graduate, B–52 G/H combat crew training
- Air Force Public Affairs Directors Special Achievement Award for commander support
- Joseph A. Moller Award, Outstanding Wing Commander, ACC
- Gold Medal, National Reconnaissance Office

**Effective dates of promotion:**
- Second Lieutenant .............................. November 8, 1974
- First Lieutenant ................................. November 8, 1976
- Captain ................................. November 8, 1978
- Major .............................. October 1, 1983
- Lieutenant Colonel .............................. June 1, 1988
- Colonel ........................................ January 1, 1992
- Brigadier General .............................. January 1, 2000
- Major General .......................... October 1, 2003
- Lieutenant General .......................... February 3, 2005
- General ............................. October 8, 2008

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. William M. Fraser III, USAF, in connection with his nomination follows:]
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   William M. Fraser III.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Commander, U.S. Transportation Command.

3. Date of nomination:
   June 16, 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   17 August 1952; Lakeland, FL.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Beverly Anne Fraser (Maiden Name: Copeland).

7. Names and ages of children:
   William M. Fraser IV; age 34.
   Ashlee Fraser Cain (Maiden name: Ashlee Jeanette Fraser); age 32.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Air Force Association (member)
    Order of Daedalians (member)
    Texas A&M University Association of Former Students (member)
    15th Air Force Association (member)
    Army and Air Force Mutual Aid Association (member)
    Military Officers Association of America (member)
    American Association of Retired Persons (member)

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.
12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees**: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. **Personal views**: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

**WILLIAM M. FRASER III.**
This 15th day of February 2011.

[The nomination of Gen. William M. Fraser III, USAF, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]

**ANNEX A**

[General Martin E. Dempsey’s responses to his advance policy questions from his nomination hearing dated March 3, 2011, to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**ARMY ROLE IN THE JOINT FORCE**

*Question.* The U.S. military fights as a joint force and strives to achieve realistic training in preparation for military operations. The Army provides trained and equipped forces for joint military operations.

*How do you believe the Army can best contribute to improved joint military capabilities while preserving its service unique capabilities and culture?*

*Answer.* The Army works our relationships with Sister Services diligently while maintaining our unique values, culture, and traditions. The Army provides forces for prompt and sustained combat operations on land as a component of the Joint Force. Through sustained operations on land and among populations, we make permanent the advantages gained by joint forces.

**ACQUISITION ISSUES**

*Question.* Major defense acquisition programs in the Department of the Army and the other military departments continue to be subject to funding and requirements instability.

*Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems?*

*Answer.* A variety of factors contribute to increased risks of cost increase and delay, depending on the program, the technologies involved, and the acquisition strategy employed. However, I agree that the foundation for any successful large acquisition program rests on carefully refined requirements, a sound program strategy, and funding stability.

*Question.* What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to address funding and requirements instability?

*Answer.* Requirements must be carefully refined to meet realistic and affordable objectives, and they must account for the rate of technological and scientific change in meeting needed capabilities.
Question. What is your view of the Configuration Steering Boards required by statute and regulation to control requirements growth?

Answer. I support efforts by Congress to control costs, refine requirements, and reduce program risk in our major acquisition programs. The Configuration Steering Boards play a significant role in oversight of acquisition programs and compliment Army efforts to validate requirements and eliminate redundancies through Capability Portfolio Reviews. In tandem, these oversight processes help the Army avoid cost increases and delays in our programs.

Question. What role would you expect to play in these issues, if confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?

Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will work diligently with the Secretary of the Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology to ensure that all oversight mechanisms for acquisition programs are used effectively to reduce cost and schedule risk. In the area of requirements, I will work with TRADOC to refine requirements to meet affordable and achievable acquisition strategies.

Question. The Comptroller General has found that DOD programs often move forward with unrealistic program cost and schedule estimates, lack clearly defined and stable requirements, include immature technologies that unnecessarily raise program costs and delay development and production, and fail to solidify design and manufacturing processes at appropriate junctures in the development process. Do you agree with the Comptroller General's assessment?

Answer. I agree that this assessment is valid with respect to some of the Army's past programs. However, the Army has already adopted different approaches in the development of more recent programs. I understand that prior to the release of the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Request for Proposals (RFP) in November 2010, the program's requirements were carefully reviewed, prioritized and weighted in the RFP to avoid reliance on immature technologies, mitigate cost and schedule risk, and provide an achievable and affordable framework for a new vehicle. The GCV program involved close coordination between acquisition, requirements and resourcing experts to provide a solid program foundation. The Army is vigorously working to avoid the characterizations in the Comptroller General's assessment in future programs.

Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the Army should take to address these problems?

Answer. The Department of the Army has already begun taking significant steps to address these concerns. There is a renewed emphasis on collaboration between the requirements and acquisition communities in the development of new programs. Last year, Secretary McHugh commissioned a thorough review of the Army's acquisition process led by The Hon. Gil Decker and Gen (Ret.) Lou Wagner that provides a blueprint for improvements to the acquisition process. I understand the Army is now studying these recommendations and developing a plan to implement those that help our process. As a whole, the Department must continue to build on these efforts to avoid unnecessary cost and delay in our programs.

Question. What role would you expect to play in these issues, if confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?

Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will continue to work with Department of the Army leadership to implement any necessary changes to ensure that the Army’s acquisition programs succeed in providing needed capabilities to our soldiers.

Question. Beginning in 2010, the Army began a series of capabilities portfolio reviews that have contributed to the rationalization of the Army’s modernization plans and resulted in significant programmatic decisions, including the termination of major weapons programs. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s capabilities portfolio reviews and process?

Answer. The capabilities portfolio reviews have been successful in identifying redundancy and finding efficiencies across system portfolios. The Army is now studying how to best institutionalize the capabilities portfolio reviews process to identify additional efficiencies, and then work to achieve them.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take, if any, to institutionalize the portfolio review process within the Army?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the studies to institutionalize portfolio review process to identify and achieve further Army efficiencies.

ARMY MODERNIZATION

Question. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not been successful over the past decade. Since the mid-1990s, Army modernization strategies, plans,
and investment priorities have evolved under a variety of names from Digitization, to Force XXI, to Army After Next, to Interim Force, to Objective Force, to Future Combat System and Modularity. According to press reports, a recent modernization study done for the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the Army Gilbert Decker and retired Army General Louis Wagner found that the Army has spent $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion annually since 2004 on weapons programs that have been cancelled.

What is your assessment, if any, of the Army’s modernization record?

Answer. Over the last 10 years, our Army has achieved a remarkable degree of modernization in areas such as improving soldier protection, increasing battlefield intelligence, and bringing the network to individual soldiers. At the same time, we have nearly completed the modular conversion of over 300 brigade level organizations and to complete the conversion of our division and higher level headquarters to enable mission command in the operational environments we anticipate in the first half of the 21st century. If confirmed, I look forward to studying the Decker-Wagner recommendations to identify areas where we can improve.

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program for the Army?

Answer. I recognize that a stable modernization strategy and program is an important component to both a balanced Army and to exercise good stewardship of resources entrusted to the Services. If confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary McHugh on how to achieve this.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s current modernization investment strategy?

Answer. While it is true that several of our major modernization efforts over the past decade have been unsuccessful, I would submit that the American soldier today is the best equipped and enabled soldier this country has ever fielded. Successes such as the Stryker vehicle, world class body armor, soldier night vision equipment, soldier weapons, precision fire systems such as Excalibur and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and vehicles such as the family of medium trucks all suggest to me that the Army has had some tremendous success in modernization.

I believe the Army has learned some valuable lessons and now has both the processes and the mindset to more carefully and rigorously review programs both before we initiate them and while they are in progress. This will be an area I will assess more deeply if I am confirmed as Chief of Staff and will periodically give this committee my frank assessments.

Question. Do you believe that this strategy is affordable and sustainable?

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to closely examine this strategy to ensure it is affordable and sustainable.

Question. In your view does the Army’s current modernization investment strategy appropriately or adequately address current and future capabilities that meet requirements for unconventional or irregular conflict?

Answer. From my current position, I believe the current modernization investment strategy strikes an appropriate balance between current and future capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward to studying this further with the Army staff.

Question. Does the investment strategy appropriately or adequately address requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with the peer or near-peer enemy we can reasonably foresee in the fiscal year 2012–2016 FYDP time horizon.

Answer. From my current position, I believe the current modernization investment strategy appropriately and adequately addresses requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with a peer or near-peer enemy.

Question. If confirmed, what other investment initiatives, if any, would you pursue with respect to unconventional or conventional capabilities?

Answer. I have not yet formulated investment initiatives particular to either conventional or unconventional capabilities that are different from those the Army is currently pursuing, but I look forward to doing so, if confirmed.

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to ensure that all these initiatives are affordable within the current and projected Army budgets?

Answer. To be good stewards of the resources provided, the Army must continue to internalize a “cost culture” that considers “affordability” as an essential element of all (not just modernization) initiatives. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Secretary to ensure future initiatives are affordable within current and projected budgets.

Question. In your view, what trade-offs, if any, would most likely have to be taken should budgets fall below or costs grow above what is planned to fund the Army’s modernization efforts?
Answer. While I do not have that information at this time, I believe trade-offs must occur after all areas of risk are carefully considered and coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and Congress.

ARMY WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAMS

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the following research, development, and acquisition programs?

Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).

Answer. In the development of the Ground Combat vehicle—the replacement for the Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle—the Army is fully committed to the “Big Four” imperatives: soldier protection; soldier capacity (squad plus crew); the capability to operate across the Full Spectrum of operations; and Timing (7 years to the first production vehicle from contract award). The Ground Combat Vehicle will be the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to operate in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) environment. Modular armor will allow commanders the option to add or remove armor based on the current threat environment. The Ground Combat Vehicle will be designed with the capacity for Space, Weight, and Power growth to incorporate future technologies as they mature. The Army is using an incremental strategy for the Ground Combat Vehicle with the first increment being an Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Army is currently reviewing proposals from vendors for Technology Development contracts.

Question. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T).

Answer. I believe that the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical is one of the Army's most important programs. It provides the broadband backbone communications for the tactical Army. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 1 (formerly Joint Network Node) began fielding in 2004 to provide a satellite based Internet Protocol network down to battalion level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2 begins fielding in fiscal year 2012 to provide an initial On the Move capability, extending down to company level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 3 will provide improved capabilities, including higher throughput, three to four times more bandwidth efficiency, and an aerial transmission layer, to all 126 brigades/division headquarters with an on-the-move requirement.

Question. Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E–IBCT) Network Integration Kit (NIK).

Answer. The E–IBCT investment provides the infrastructure that will allow the Army to grow the tactical network capability, and an opportunity for both large and small companies to support the Army's tactical network strategy.

The NIK is a necessary bridge solution that allows the Army to continue evaluation and development of incorporated network technologies.

Question. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) including the Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) radios.

Answer. Joint Tactical Radio System is the Services’ future deployable, mobile communications family of radios. They provide Army forces dynamic, scalable, on-the-move network architecture, connecting the soldier to the network. Fiscal year 2012 procurement funding supports fielding of Joint Tactical Radio System capability to eight Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to meet fiscal years 2013/2014 network requirements.

The Ground Mobile Radio is the primary vehicular radio capability using the Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform to meet tactical networking requirements.

The Man Pack and Rifleman Radio are the primary Joint Tactical Radio System capability for battalion and below tactical operations. The Man Pack supports the Soldier Radio Waveform and interoperates with legacy waveforms (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications). Rifleman Radio primarily serves the dismounted formation and utilizes the Soldier Radio Waveform to provide voice and individual location information from the dismounted soldier to the leader. The combination of the three radios helps the Army to push the network to the individual soldier.

Question. Stryker combat vehicle, including the Double-V Hull initiative, procurement of more flat-bottom vehicles, and the Stryker mobile gun variant.

Answer. The current Stryker vehicle has exceeded its Space, Weight and Power and Cooling (SWaP-C) limits due to add-on applique (armor and devices) required for ongoing combat operations. In the near term, it is imperative to increase crew protection with the Double-V-Hull (DVH) Stryker. In the mid-term, Stryker modernization will improve protection and mobility by recouping SWaP-C, enabling future growth and allowing integration of the emerging network for all Stryker
variants. Fleet-wide modernization for all variants upgrades protection, counter-
IED, drive train, suspension, electrical power generation and management, and digital communications and network integration.

Double-V Hull: Stryker Double-V Hull (DVH) is on track for June 2011 fielding. The initial DVH test results are positive, indicating the vehicle will be ready for fielding as scheduled.

Non-Double V Hull and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV): The Army will procure 168 Stryker NBCRVs in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 for a total quantity of 284 (an Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model rotation quantity). These vehicles are in normal Hull configuration. The Stryker NBCRV provides a unique capability to the Joint Force including a critical mission of Homeland Defense, for which DVH protection is a lesser consideration.

Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS): The Army has procured and fielded 142 of 335 MGS. In August 2009, the Army decided to not pursue additional MGS procurement at this time with forthcoming fleet-wide modernization.

Question. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). Answer. The JLTV is a joint program with the U.S. Marine Corps, Navy, and the Army; the Australian Army is also currently a partner in the Technology Development phase. I believe that the JLTV is a vital program to fill the force protection and payload gaps not currently satisfied by the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. It will also fill the mobility, transportability and communication architecture gaps not satisfied by the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles being used in Light Tactical Vehicle (LT) roles. The Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy plans for the JLTV to replace about a third of the LT fleet, which is roughly 46,000 vehicles. The Army is currently examining the attributes of the JLTV program to ensure it meets our needs for the future Army light tactical fleet, especially in terms of protection.

Question. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS). Answer. I agree the Army has an enduring requirement for an armed aerial scout as was reaffirmed after the termination of the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program. This requirement will be validated by the ongoing Armed Aerial Scout Analysis of Alternatives whose findings are scheduled for release in third quarter fiscal year 2011.

Question. M1 Abrams tank modernization. Answer. In my view, the Abrams modernization is necessary and will initially enable integration of the emerging network and provide ability to fire the next generation of 120mm ammunition. Future modernization will provide capability improvements in lethality, protection, mission command, mobility, and reliability intended to maintain the Fleet’s combat overmatch and restore space, weight, and power margins to keep the Tank relevant through 2050. The Abrams modernization program is funded in the fiscal year 2012 budget request. If confirmed, I will be able to offer an assessment as the program matures.

Question. M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization. Answer. The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) will be replaced by the Ground Combat Vehicle beginning in 2018. Bradley Non-Infantry Fighting Vehicle (Cavalry, Engineer and Fire Support variants) modernization will address recoupment of Space, Weight and Power to provide platform growth and enable improvements in protection, mobility and ability to integrate the emerging network.

Question. Logistics Modernization Program (LMP). Answer. I understand the LMP is an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system in the Operation and Support phase of its life-cycle.

Based on commercial off-the-shelf SAP Corporation software technology, LMP provides the Army with an integrated end-to-end supply chain solution at the national level that improves overall synchronization of information.

I concur with the Army’s vision to achieve a seamless, end-to-end modernized logistics enterprise and to develop and implement logistics enterprise architecture with joint interoperability. To support that vision, the LMP will integrate with other Army ERPs, including General Funds Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), and Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS–A), to provide a seamless enterprise-wide logistics environment spanning the factory to the foxhole in accordance with the approved Army ERP Strategy.

Question. Paladin Integrated Management Vehicle program. Answer. I understand that the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program is an effort to address an existing capability gap in the self-propelled artillery portfolio brought about by an aging fleet and the termination of prior howitzer modernization efforts (Crusader and Non-Line-of-Sight-Cannon (NLOS–C)). The PIM program provides upgrades that allow the Army to meet existing and future needs, and
leverages the commonality with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle chassis and automotive components. PIM should provide growth potential in Space, Weight and Power and capacity for network expansion to accommodate future howitzer related needs, to include the addition of such Force Protection packages as add-on armor.

Question. M4 Carbine Upgrades/Individual Carbine Competition.
Answer. The Army continues to make improvements and upgrades based on operational lessons learned through the M4 Product Improvement Program. The Army’s effort is designed to integrate full automatic firing, an ambidextrous selector switch and a more durable “heavy” barrel. Simultaneously, the Army has initiated a full and open competition to confirm the best possible Individual Carbine solution. Results of the competition are expected in fiscal year 2013.

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

Question. If confirmed, what would you propose should be the Army’s long term strategy for the utilization and sustainment of its large MRAP and MRAP–All Terrain Vehicle fleets?
Answer. The Army needs to continue to provide the best level of protection for our deploying soldiers. Given what we have learned during the last 10 years, I believe we should attempt to provide MRAP levels of protection to deploying forces worldwide commensurate with the mission assigned. The Army will integrate MRAPs into the force.

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

Question. The 2010 report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provides guidance that military forces shall be sized to prevail in ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war against al Qaeda as well as for conducting foundational activities that prevent and deter attacks or the emergence of other threats.
What is your assessment of the Army’s current size and structure to meet the QDR report’s guidance?
Answer. The Army’s size and structure have proven adequate to meet the demands of our defense strategy as we know them today, although a very heavy demand has been placed upon soldiers and their families for nearly 10 years. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and our combatant commanders to match end strength, structure, and tempo in our ARFORGEN rotational model to meet demands as they change.

Question. If confirmed, what size or structure changes would you pursue, if any, to improve or enhance the Army’s capability to meet these requirements?
Answer. The nature of the strategic environment requires the Army to continuously assess its capabilities and force requirements. It’s taken 10 years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can reasonably describe as balanced. We are accustomed to change, and we will undoubtedly need to continue to change. As we do we must seek to maintain a balance of capabilities that are available to meet the Nation’s needs at a sustainable tempo.

Question. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement for improved capabilities in the following six key mission areas.
For each, what is your assessment of the Army’s current ability to provide capabilities to support these mission requirements?
If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue to improve the Army’s capabilities to support:
Defense of the United States.
Answer. The Army is fully capable of fulfilling its responsibility to defend the homeland through detection, deterrence, prevention, and if necessary, the defeat of external threats or aggression from both state and non-state actors. A specific program recently undertaken to enhance this ability include the fielding of the enhanced Stryker Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle. This provides us with a much improved technical assessment and decontamination capability.

Question. Support of civil authorities at home.
Answer. The Army is well postured to provide support to civilian authorities. We are organized and trained to provide responsive and flexible support to mitigate domestic disasters, CBRNE consequence management, support to civilian law enforcement agencies, counter WMD operations and to counter narcotics trafficking activities. We continue to address the challenges associated with this mission set including unity of command, integration with civilian authorities, and the integration of Title 10 and Title 32 forces.
**Question.** Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations.

**Answer.** We are highly proficient in counter insurgency, stability and counter-terrorism operations. This has been the focus for the Army for much of the last 10 years and we have institutionalized lessons learned across the operating and generating force.

**Question.** Build the security capacity of partner states (including your views, if any, on the use of general purpose forces in the security force assistance role).

**Answer.** General Purpose Forces have a clear role in building sustainable capability and capacity of partner nation security forces and their supporting institutions. Peace time engagement is our best opportunity to shape the future operating environment. General Purpose Forces are well-suited to support these activities through Security Force Assistance.

**Question.** Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments.

**Answer.** The Army's ability to deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments as part of the joint force is adequate to meet the demands of the current security environment. That said, there are some tasks and skills to which we have not trained due to the demands of our ongoing conflicts. We must restore our proficiency in those tasks. We work with our sister Services to assess our capabilities to conduct entry operations as part of the joint force and watch closely the improved anti-access/area denial capabilities being developed by potential adversaries.

**Question.** Operate effectively in cyberspace.

**Answer.** We are on the right glide path to support U.S. Cyber Command and our geographic combatant commanders to operate effectively in cyberspace. On 1 October 2010, the Army stood up a new three star command (U.S. Army Cyber Command/2nd Army), to direct the operations and defense of all Army networks, and when directed, provide full-spectrum cyberspace operations. The Army is bringing the forces of network operations, defense, exploitation, and attack under one operational level command to integrate and synchronize global operations for the first time.

**MISSILE DEFENSE**

**Question.** The Department of Defense recently decided to terminate the Army's Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, and not to proceed with procurement and fielding of the tri-national Medium Extended Air Defense System, two Army air and missile defense systems.

Do you consider missile defense to be one of the Army's core missions?

**Answer.** Yes. The Army has confirmed on many occasions that Air and Missile Defense is a core competency. Protection of our deployed forces is the priority. The Army provides this protection in coordination with our sister Services and coalition partners.

**Question.** How do you believe the Army should manage the risks that result from these decisions?

**Answer.** I believe the Army needs to continue to monitor the threat and prioritize required future capabilities to ensure we provide effective affordable solutions in a timely manner to our forces.

**Question.** The Army has recently proposed transferring a number of its air and missile development programs to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

In your view, what is of the proper relationship between the Army and the Missile Defense Agency?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the Army relies on the MDA to develop and produce the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The Army works with MDA to provide those BMDS capabilities to the combatant commanders. The Army maintains a relationship with MDA through the Army/MDA Board of Directors and its four standing committees.

**Question.** The Army has recently completed a review of its air and missile defense portfolio.

In your view, what are or should be the Army's responsibilities, if any, with respect to development, procurement, and operation of missile defense systems?
Answer. The Army's responsibilities depend on the type of missile defense system being developed and guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

Question. One year ago, 13 people were slain and scores wounded during a shooting rampage allegedly carried out by a U.S. Army Medical Corps officer. A Department of Defense review of the attack concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization of military personnel.

What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at Fort Hood?

Answer. The lessons learned are invaluable to the Army as we strive to improve the Army Protection Program for individuals and units against emerging threats. Through a holistic Protection approach, the Army is aggressively fielding material and nonmaterial solutions to address internal and external threats.

Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to integrate and synchronize the many Army Protection Programs that protect our soldiers, family members, and Department of the Army civilians by ensuring that commanders and leaders have the information and tools needed to address the ever changing threat environment.

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. The DOD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed that “DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization” and recommended that the policy be updated.

What is your view of the need to clarify the policy regarding religious accommodation in the Army?

Answer. The policies for religious accommodation in the Army are published in AR 600–20, Army Command Policy. The policy must be clear and provide appropriate guidance to both soldiers and commanders regarding how the Army accommodates for religious beliefs and practices. To this end, if confirmed, I will assess the current policy and determine if further changes are necessary.

Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the Army?

Answer. Your question raises a valid concern. However, the Army is a diverse force. As soldiers in the profession of arms, we understand the key role that good order, discipline, morale, and safety have in ensuring units are at all times ready to defend this nation. The Army has long been a place where people from all walks of life can serve proudly and where the many become one—a U.S. Army soldier.

Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the Army?

Answer. The Army has a longstanding commitment to treat all soldiers with dignity and respect. Treating soldiers with dignity and respect requires continuous leader emphasis and vigilance.

Question. Do Army policies regarding religious practices in the military accommodate, where appropriate, religious practices that require adherents to wear particular forms of dress or other articles with religious significance?

Answer. Regulations regarding wear of religious clothing or items are found in two regulations (AR 600–20, Army Command Policy and AR 670–1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia). The policy provides the authority to wear religious jewelry, apparel or articles if they are neat, conservative, and discreet and compliant with these regulations.

Question. In your view, do these policies accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

Answer. In my opinion, current Army policies provide commanders with adequate flexibility to balance accommodation for religious beliefs and maintain good order and discipline.

Question. In your opinion, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?
Answer. The Army does not have a policy regarding public prayer by military chaplains. As a matter of practice, however, chaplains are encouraged to be considerate of the audience.

FAMILY SUPPORT

Question. The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families. What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

Answer. In my view the most pressing family readiness issues include sustaining the Army Family Covenant and improving communication and awareness of the extensive range of available support programs and services the Army has to improve soldier and family quality of life.

In 2007, the Army Family Covenant was unveiled to improve quality of life by providing programs and services that enhance soldier and family strength, readiness, and resilience. Since then, the Army has made great progress and continues to fulfill its commitment to provide soldiers and families a quality of life commensurate with the quality of their service.

The Army Family Action Plan, Survey of Army Families, and other studies revealed that soldiers and families may not be aware of the myriad of available support services. To address this concern, the Army is transforming Army Community Service (ACS) to help connect soldiers and families to the right service at the right time. This transformation will create a more streamlined and modular support structure that better supports our modular Army at every installation. The Army has begun piloting ACS transformation and anticipates completion by October 2011.

The Army has made great progress in building a wide range of support capabilities over the last few years, but the strain on the force continues. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen our support services and ensure our programs efficiently meet the needs of the soldiers and families who use them.

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, and lengthy deployments?

Answer. If confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure that Army Family programs reach out to all soldiers and their families, regardless of geographic location or deployment status. I will also work to ensure that family program platforms and delivery systems keep pace with a mobile Army and utilize technological advances and social networking so services are available to the soldiers and families who need them.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as active duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

Answer. I am committed to ensuring soldiers and families remain connected to Army Family services and programs, whether by internet, telephone, or in person regardless of geographic location or Component. Army OneSource (www.MyArmyOneSource.com) is the website of choice for information on Army Family programs and services. Army OneSource highlights Active and Reserve Component Family Programs, is publicly accessible, and thus available to all components and immediate and extended family members.

The State Joint Force Headquarters is the platform for support of geographically dispersed servicemembers and families. This platform projects the Joint Family Support Assistance Program resources, ARNG Family Assistance Centers (FACs), ARNG Family Readiness Support Assistants, and the ARNG Child and Youth program in support of Reserve component families and Active component families that do not reside near the installation. Additionally, Army sponsored programs including Operation Military Kids and Community Based Child Care and Respite Care programs build community capacity for the geographically dispersed Army population. These programs offer similar services and assistance to geo-dispersed Reserve component families as would be available on installations and are connected to local resources that soldiers and families are eligible to use.

SPACE

Question. The Army Space support to Strategic Command works closely with Air Force Space Command in getting space based communications to the warfighter. Recently the Army has begun to look at the possibility of expanding the scope of data that could be provided to the last tactical mile from space.

In your view, what are the needs that the Army could address from space, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that this is coordinated with OSD?
Answer. While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment, I understand that the importance of space programs continues to increase across DOD, and the Army needs to keep pace to fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space systems are appropriately prioritized within both DOD and the Department of the Army.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your vision for the Army space forces in the future?

Answer. While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment, one of my priorities, if I am confirmed, is to position the Army to keep pace to fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space systems are appropriately prioritized and resourced.

Question. The Army, as do all the Services, tends to lag behind in the acquisition of ground and other terminals to work with new satellite systems. Acquisition of GPS M-code capable equipment is just one example of where there is needed capability on orbit but terminals will not be available in a timely fashion to utilize the capability.

What is your view on this lag and, if confirmed, what actions would you propose taking to resolve the lag?

Answer. If confirmed, I would need to examine this issue more closely. While I understand that all of the Services have specific requirements to meet specific needs for their forces and that the Army depends heavily on these systems, I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment.

LOW DENSITY/HIGH DEMAND FORCES

Question. If confirmed, how would you address the Army’s management of low density units such as Special Operations Forces, military police, civil affairs, and others which are in extremely high demand in this new strategic environment?

Answer. If confirmed, I would use the Total Army Analysis (TAA) to identify the capabilities necessary, within resource constraints, to achieve the full spectrum of missions expected of the Army. When requirements for additional low density/high demand capabilities are identified through this process, they are resourced within acceptable risk. This process will help determine where these capabilities should reside: the Active component, the Reserve component, or a mix of both. The Army balances the inventory of these low density units to ensure availability of an affordable mix of flexible forces capable of accomplishing the missions required within the most likely security environment.

Question. Are there functional changes among the Active and Reserve components that you believe should be made?

Answer. I am not yet aware at this time of any changes that may be necessary.

MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems arose in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening and medical readiness monitoring, errors caused by antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and lack of access to members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Reserve Force management policies and systems have been characterized in the past as "inefficient and rigid" and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.

What is your assessment of advances made in improving Army Reserve component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems still exist?

Answer. I understand the Army is currently reviewing all of its mobilization policies to ensure that the systems in place are effective and responsive for Reserve component soldiers. I believe Reserve components are a critical part of the Total Force, and if confirmed, I will continue the effort to ensure that Reserve component soldiers are mobilized and demobilized in the most effective and efficient way possible and that their needs and the needs of their families and employers are met.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the sufficiency of current Reserve Force management policies?

Answer. As I understand current Reserve Force management policies, the goal is to manage the force to produce a supply of units to the combatant commanders with a short-term goal of 1 year of mobilization every 5 years with a long-term goal of 1 year of mobilization every 6 years. The challenge the Army has faced has been that demand has been greater than the supply and has caused the need for more
frequent mobilizations. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan start to draw-down, the Army should be better able to attain the mobilization to dwell goals.

**Question.** What do you consider to be the most significant enduring changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?

**Answer.** The Army Force Generation Model fundamentally changes the way the Army builds unit readiness for mobilization requirements. The ARFORGEN model presents a structured progression of readiness through a multi-year long cycle.

**Question.** Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?

**Answer.** At present, I am not aware of a need to modify current statutory authorities to facilitate mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to review the statutory authorities to determine if they are sufficient.

**INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE**

**Question.** The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has found that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war was problematic, and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning is a failed concept. What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All-Volunteer Force?

**Answer.** I believe the IRR has proven an invaluable asset to all Army components to support contingency operations around the world.

**Question.** What are your views on the proper role of the IRR in Army force management planning?

**Answer.** The IRR can serve as a source of experienced and highly-skilled soldiers to help the Army meet critical skill and grade requirements.

**Question.** If confirmed, what changes, if any, do you foresee making to the Army’s IRR recall policy?

**Answer.** At this time, I do not have sufficient information to recommend changes to this policy. If confirmed, I will consider input from all components to determine the best IRR recall policy.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the adequacy of the system in place for members in the IRR receiving orders to active duty to request a delay or exemption for that activation, including the procedures in place for appealing the Army’s decision on that request?

**Answer.** While this is an important part of the IRR mobilization, I do not have sufficient familiarity with this policy to recommend changes.

**Question.** Recent studies of Army suicides show higher rates among the IRR. What should the Army and DOD do to address this concern?

**Answer.** Suicides in the IRR are often more difficult to address because those soldiers are not affiliated with a unit. If confirmed, I will consider all methods to integrate IRR soldiers into the Army’s Health Promotion/Risk Reduction efforts.

**PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS**

**Question.** In addition to health care costs, personnel and related entitlement spending continues its steep upward growth and is becoming an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget. If confirmed, what actions would you take to control the rise in the Army’s personnel costs and entitlement spending?

**Answer.** We need to strike a balance between preserving the All-Volunteer Force, accomplishing operational missions and retraining an Army that is affordable to the Nation. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense on how best to achieve it.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions would you take to avoid a requirement for massive end-of-year reprogramming to cover personnel costs?

**Answer.** My understanding is the President’s budget is adequate to meet current personnel costs.

**Question.** What would be the impact of a year-long continuing resolution on Army personnel funding?

**Answer.** If the Army is given the flexibility to manage total resources (both Base and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds) to pay its force, then fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution will have minimal impact on military pay and allowances.
Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee, and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for improved policy oversight and accountability. If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?

Answer. I believe the Army should develop and resource mechanisms to routinely identify, screen, and assess Reserve component medical readiness. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Army Reserves, the Director of the Army National Guard, and the Surgeon General to develop policies for more effectively identifying personnel that are nondeployable for medical reasons.

Question. How would you improve upon the Army's ability to produce a healthy and fit Reserve component?

Answer. This is a very important issue, and I will work with the Army's Active and Reserve component leadership to assess whether there are challenges in this area. The Army is moving forward with a Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. If confirmed, I would determine how this program applies to Reserve component and National Guard soldiers.

ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. What do you see as the role that Army science and technology programs will play in continuing to develop capabilities for current and future Army systems?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Army's science and technology investment strategy is shaped to foster invention, innovation, and demonstration of technologies for the current and future warfighter. The science and technology program should retain the flexibility to be responsive to unforeseen needs identified through current operations.

Question. What in your view have been the greatest contributions, if any, of Army science and technology programs to current operations?

Answer. I believe the most significant contribution the Army science and technology community has offered to current operations is the ability to use technology to significantly improve warfighter capabilities. Technological innovations have resulted in the rapid development and deployment of lightweight and adaptable armor solutions that have been critical to addressing emerging threats, enhancing intelligence capabilities, and better protecting our deployed forces.

Question. What metrics would you use, if confirmed, to judge the value and the investment level in Army science and technology programs?

Answer. To judge the value and investment level in Army science and technology programs, I would use metrics that demonstrate improved warfighter capabilities; improve acquisition programs; and align technology development to warfighter requirements.

Question. What new science and technology areas do you envision the Army pursuing, for instance to lighten soldier load, and to improve the survivability and combat effectiveness of dismounted soldiers and ground vehicles?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage the Army's science and technology program and its stakeholders, including the acquisition community, Training and Doctrine Command and the combatant commanders to discuss the needs of the warfighter and the “art of the possible” for future technology-enabled capabilities to ensure the Army remains the best equipped force in the world.

ARMY LABORATORIES AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ENGINEERING CENTERS

Question. How will you balance the role of Army laboratories between long-term fundamental research, support to current operations and the development of new capabilities to support current and future Army missions?

Answer. The Army laboratories are science and technology performing organizations and as such have and will continue to play a major role in supporting current operations with best capabilities available. Through their broad range of investments in key strategic science and technology areas, they also provide critical new capabilities for soldiers.

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army laboratories and R&D centers have the highest quality workforce, laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so that they can continue to support deployed warfighters and develop next generation capabilities?

Answer. Army laboratories and Research and Development Centers need to maintain the resources required to continue initiatives and advancements that support
the warfighter. If confirmed, I will learn more about their operations and support efforts to improve best practices and workforce quality necessary for mission accomplishments.

ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION EFFORTS

**Question.** In the past, the DOD Test Resource Management Center did not certify the Army’s test and evaluation (T&E) budget due to identified shortfalls in T&E range sustainment, operations, and modernization. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army’s T&E infrastructure is robust enough to test new systems and technologies and reliably verify their combat effectiveness and suitability?

**Answer.** Testing is a crucial capability for maintaining the Army's combat edge and modernizing the force. I fully recognize the value of testing to ensure new technologies and equipment address the capabilities our warfighters need. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Army T&E community and the Office of the Secretary of Defense T&E leadership to ensure the Army’s T&E infrastructure is adequately resourced to address testing requirements and maintain robust test capabilities.

ARMY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) PROGRAMS

**Question.** What major improvements, if any, would you like to see made in the Army's development and deployment of major information technology systems?

**Answer.** I believe the Army needs to implement and enforce technical standards, make acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or near-COTS technology easier, and field new technology to operational forces more quickly. This is in line with the congressional mandate you gave us in section 804 of the 2010 NDAA.

As Commanding General for Training and Doctrine Command, I helped establish a center for network integration at Fort Bliss, TX—the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF). It will serve as the Network's primary test unit with a two-fold intent, to remove the integration burden from the operational units and to provide an operational venue to evaluate new technologies and network capabilities prior to fielding to operational units. The new capabilities they develop should ultimately provide the impetus for future acquisition and equipping decisions.

**Question.** How will the consolidation of IT systems announced under Secretary Gates efficiency initiative reduce the IT support cost per user to the Army?

**Answer.** I understand the two primary Army initiatives that fulfill Secretary Gates' mandate are Enterprise Email and consolidation of Army data centers. Implementation of these initiatives should help reduce the cost of information technology support to the Army.

HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEMS

**Question.** What is your understanding of the Army’s plans to institutionalize the Human Terrain System (HTS) program? Given the proliferation of such capabilities across the Services, what are your views, if any, on developing a joint HTS capability?

**Answer.** The Army has institutionalized the Human Terrain System as an enduring capability assigned to Training and Doctrine Command and funded capability starting in the fiscal year 2011. I believe there is merit to developing a joint capability. In September 2010, I directed a Training and Doctrine Command capability based assessment of all Socio-cultural capabilities throughout the combatant commands and Services. The intent is to identify other ongoing socio-cultural initiatives, to determine potential synergies and best practices in order to develop and evolve an enduring joint capability. The results of this assessment are due in the spring of 2011.

OPERATIONAL ENERGY

**Question.** Prior to and since the creation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Program, a number of the Services have made progress addressing concerns associated with operational energy. The Army has announced its operational energy aspirations for the future but, unlike the other Services, the Army’s five strategic energy security goals appear vague and lack quantitative metrics against which to measure progress.

If confirmed, how would you propose that the Army address its operational energy challenges, requirements, and opportunities in the immediate short-term?

**Answer.** The most important issue with operational energy is the amount of fuel used to meet our operational needs. Most of our fuel is used in generation of electricity. The Army has implemented, and accelerated deployment, of generators that
use less fuel as well as microgrid systems that tie generators together to operate more efficiently. We are developing more efficient motors for helicopters and vehicles to reduce our operational energy footprint and, ultimately, wars are won or lost by dismounted soldiers, so the Army is addressing excessive soldier loads, driven in large part by energy and power constraints. As the Commanding General of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, I'm a charter member of the Army's Senior Energy and Sustainability Council, which is responsible for addressing energy challenges across the Army. If confirmed I will continue efforts currently underway to increase our energy efficient capabilities in theater and emphasize energy awareness through the military chain of command, and across the Army, to foster a more energy-aware culture.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the Army's progress with respect to testing and deploying operational energy technologies?

**Answer.** The Army is taking advantage of every avenue, to include industry, to help us develop technologies that can reduce our operational energy footprint. Renewable energy systems and insulated tentage are some of the systems being piloted and tested. We are also evaluating technologies that will help lighten soldier loads and reduce the amount of batteries and fuel we must procure and deliver to theater. We will continue to pursue more efficient devices and employ energy management capabilities that are essential to retain energy as an operational advantage.

**Question.** What is your understanding of how the Army is taking advantage of its labs and research, engineering and development centers to further its operational energy and security goals?

**Answer.** The Army has integrated the national laboratories with Department of Energy and Army laboratories to develop solutions to a range of operational energy, power and security needs. Some of the initiatives include research to reduce the size and weight of components, broadening alternative energy sources, leveraging various emergent energy efficient technologies. These new technologies will increase energy efficiency and improve power supplies for contingency bases, forward operating bases and equipment carried by individual soldiers. If confirmed I will work to ensure that the research conducted at Army facilities continues to focus on meeting the operational energy needs of the current and future Army.

### INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE

**Question.** Witnesses appearing before the committee in recent years have testified that the military Services under-invest in their facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-investment in our installations have led to increasing backlogs of facility maintenance needs, created substandard living and working conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies that could increase productivity.

What is your assessment of Army infrastructure investment?

**Answer.** Since fiscal year 2007, with BRAC, Transformation, and Grow the Army initiatives, the Army has made significant MILCON investments in its infrastructure. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation, Energy and Environment, and the Commanding General at Installation Management Command to assess our infrastructure investments.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities?

**Answer.** Proper stewardship of our facilities portfolio requires the Army to fully sustain the current facilities, dispose of our excess facilities, improve the quality of our worst facilities and build-out our largest and most critical shortages, all at a level adequate to support the mission.

If confirmed, I will evaluate the proper balance of funding, to include evaluating whether the Army should increase operation and maintenance funding for restoration and modernization and Demolition.

### ARMY POLICIES REGARDING DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

**Question.** What is your understanding of the Army’s policy with respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you agree with this policy?

**Answer.** Army policy directs commanders to initiate administrative separation for all soldiers involved in trafficking, distribution, possession, use, or sale of illegal drugs. While the policy requires initiation of separation, commanders have the authority to retain or separate a soldier.

I concur with this policy.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the Army’s policy with respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of soldiers who have been determined to have
used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?

Answer. Army policy requires that the separation authority consider a soldier drug offender’s potential for rehabilitation and further military service. For this reason, soldiers who commit drug and alcohol offenses are required to be evaluated by a certified substance abuse counselor through the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP). Commanders consider the recommendation of ASAP counselors when determining a soldier’s potential for rehabilitation and retention.

I concur with this policy.

Question. Do you believe that the Army has devoted sufficient resources to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways?

Answer. My personal experience at various command levels since 2001 has been that the Army devotes sufficient resources to implement these objectives. If confirmed, I will assess and closely monitor the level of resourcing for this important area.

Question. What measures are being taken to improve the Army’s performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?

Answer. Army policy requires a comprehensive approach by commanders, law enforcement and the medical community for drug and alcohol abuse. The Army is working diligently to improve its surveillance, detection, and intervention systems for drug and alcohol abuse.

The Army investigates all reported drug and alcohol incidents to assist commanders in properly adjudicating the offense. The Army is also enhancing detection capabilities through the Drug Suppression Teams.

The Army is also working to improve intervention systems. In addition to increasing the number of ASAP counselors to accommodate the increasing demand, the Army continues to expand the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program to build resiliency in the force. The Army is also conducting the Confidential Alcohol Treatment and Education Pilot program at six installations to promote help-seeking behavior by allowing soldiers to confidentially seek help for alcohol problems.

MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The Army continues to face significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve components.

What is your understanding of the most significant personnel challenges in recruiting and retaining health professionals in the Army?

Answer. There continues to be a national shortage of medical professionals that challenges the Army’s efforts to recruit and retain health care professionals. The Army competes with governmental and non-governmental agencies, as well as private health care organizations to attract and retain the most skilled and talented health care providers, in a uniformed or civilian capacity. The Army continues to evaluate initiatives to provide more flexibility to allow the Army to adequately compete in these areas.

Question. If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new requirements for 2011 and beyond?

Answer. I believe it is important to review medical support requirements on a regular, recurring basis. With that in mind, if confirmed I will assess whether the Army should undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army.

Question. If confirmed, what policies or legislative initiatives, if any, are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill ongoing medical support requirements?

Answer. Given the policy initiatives currently underway and the changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 at this time, I do not believe additional legislative authorities are needed to ensure that the Army fulfills medical support requirements. If confirmed, I will closely monitor this area and will work closely with the administration and Congress to seek any additional authorities identified as necessary to maintain this goal.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by the Department of Defense in March 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at transforming the Department’s foreign language capabilities to include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for both military and civilian personnel.
What is your assessment of the progress the Army has made in increasing its foreign language capabilities in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. As Commanding General for the Training and Doctrine Command, I witnessed a tremendous increase in foreign language capabilities in support of OIF/OEF. The Army revolutionized its recruiting processes to enlist native and heritage speakers into vital interpreter/translator positions. Pre-deployment training for the General Purpose Force Soldiers and Civilians has transformed to include Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands Program, Language Enabled Soldiers Program, Language Enabled Advocacy Program, and other Soldiers and Civilians with Culturally Based Language Training. The Reserve Officer Training Corps has introduced a very successful Culture and Language Program, which provides incentives and immersion opportunities for cadets who take foreign language and related cultural studies. Overall, these initiatives have provided enhanced capabilities for counterinsurgency operations and building partner capacity overseas.

Question. In your view, what should be the priorities of the Department of Defense, and the Army in particular, in responding to the need for improved foreign language proficiency and improving coordination of foreign language programs and activities among Federal agencies?

Answer. In my opinion, one of the highest priorities for the Department of Defense should be the continued support of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, which provides Culturally Based Language Training to all Services and Department of Defense Components. With the increasing demand for Pashto and Dari instructors, and foreign language professionals in general, the Department of Defense must coordinate with Federal agencies to ensure best practices are shared to recruit and retain personnel with these critical skills.

MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAMS

Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) studies in Iraq and Afghanistan have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in combat theaters. The most recent report, MHAT VI, stated that multiple deployments were related to higher rates of acute stress and psychological problems, that servicemembers on their third and fourth deployment "reported using medications for psychological or combat stress problems at a significantly higher rate," and that "soldiers with short dwell-time report high mental health problems, high intent to leave the military and low morale."

Based on the findings of MHAT VI that soldiers experience increased stress due to multiple deployments and short dwell time, what actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate mental health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return?

Answer. The MHAT studies play a key role in proactively identifying how changes in the operational environment impact the ability to provide behavioral health care. Since OEF MHAT VI, the number of behavioral health personnel in theater was significantly increased to improve the ratio of behavioral health specialists to soldiers. Specifically, the MHAT team recommended one behavioral health personnel should be deployed for every 700 soldiers, and this ratio was met. Second, the MHAT team recommended a redistribution of behavioral health personnel to ensure that each BCT had one additional dedicated provider to augment their organic provider. This "dual provider" model was designed to ensure that a provider would be available to travel to remote outposts to see soldiers who had limited access to the larger Forward Operating Bases. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to develop and synchronize the expeditionary components of health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention programs and services.

Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of the Army's Mental Health Advisory Teams, and what are the lessons which can be applied to future deployments?

Answer. One of the most valuable findings from the MHATs has been to document that soldiers on multiple deployments report higher mental health problems. This finding was first observed in 2005 (MHAT III), and has been replicated in every subsequent MHAT. Another valuable finding noted in the question was the observation that mental health problems are related to dwell-times. Specifically, short dwell-times are associated with a heightened increase in reports of mental health problems. Other key findings include the observation that deployment length is strongly associated with reports of mental health problems and deployments have put a strain on marital relationships. Overall, the willingness to take a systematic look at the behavioral health care system and the behavioral health status of soldiers through programs such as the MHATs has ensured that the Army is being respon-
sive to the needs of deployed soldiers to include refining behavioral health care delivery models.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving soldiers in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan have been reported over the last several years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They asserted that the Army failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services, including medical attention and criminal investigation of their charges and, ultimately, appropriate disciplinary action.

What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Army has in place in deployed locations to offer victims of sexual assaults the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?

Answer. I am very concerned about reports of sexual assault anywhere in our Army but especially in deployed locations. We cannot tolerate this behavior wherever it occurs. While the deployed theatres pose special challenges, the Army is committed to providing victims in deployed units with appropriate medical care, resources and support. The Army has taken a number of significant steps to improve the assistance to victims of sexual assault, including enhanced recognition of the special circumstances posed by deployed soldiers. The Army's Sexual Harassment Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program includes medical, advocacy, chaplain, investigative and legal services. This program requires every brigade sized unit to appoint and train a deployable sexual assault response coordinator and every battalion to appoint and train unit victim advocates.

Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to prevent additional sexual assaults at deployed locations as well as home stations?

Answer. In 2008, the Army implemented its I. A. M. (Intervene, Act, Motivate) Strong Sexual Assault Prevention Campaign. The campaign includes strategic, operational and tactical level execution of the I. A. M. Strong Campaign, with heavy emphasis on soldiers' commitment to intervene and protect their fellow soldiers from the risk of sexual assault and from the risk of sexual harassment. The campaign places additional emphasis on establishing a command climate that deters sexual harassment and assault.

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Army has in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Answer. While increasing emphasis to prevent sexual assaults before they occur, the Army continues to emphasize victim services and response capabilities, to include enhancements to investigation and prosecution resources.

The SHARP Program is a great start to managing strategies, policies and resources necessary to adequately prevent and respond to incidents of sexual assault. This is a challenging problem that will require leadership and constant vigilance at all levels.

Question. Do you consider the Army's current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

Answer. Prior to implementation of the I. A. M. Strong Prevention Campaign, the focus of the Army program was primarily on victim response. Part of that response focus was the implementation of confidential reporting, or restricted reporting, which is an effective way to allow a victim to come forward and have their personal needs met without fear that may be associated with a criminal investigation. If confirmed, I will continue to look closely at the Army's sexual assault program.

Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?

Answer. Getting victims to trust the system and come forward can be challenging; however, I am not aware of any specific problems with the current reporting procedure. Confidential reporting, or restricted reporting, allows a victim to come forward and have their personal needs met without fear that may be associated with a criminal investigation.

Question. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Army staff in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?

Answer. Perhaps the most important role of any Senior Army Leader is to ensure there is an adequate assessment of an organizational climate, where such behavior is not tolerated and where victims feel free to report incidents without fear of reprisal.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure senior management level direction and oversight of Departmental efforts on sexual assault prevention and response?

Answer. If confirmed, I will have an active role in the oversight and implementation of the Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program. I will work with the Secretary and the Army leadership to ensure the Army's SHARP program continues to receive the appropriate level of supervision, guidance, and support needed to drastically reduce incidents of this unacceptable crime.

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including Active Duty and Reserve personnel, and their eligible family members.

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Army MWR programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?

Answer. The Army has taken steps to ensure we care for and retain Families through a broad range of meaningful initiatives, to include many family and MWR programs and services. In October 2007, the Army leadership unveiled the Army Family Covenant, which institutionalized the Army's promise to provide soldiers and their families with a quality of life that is commensurate with their service to the Nation. The Soldier Family Action Plan provided the original roadmap to implement the Army Family Covenant, and includes such important programs as Soldier Family Assistance Centers, Survivor Outreach Services, improved services to the geographically dispersed, Exceptional Family Member respite care, Army OneSource, Child, Youth and School Services, Child Development Center and Youth Center construction, and more.

A challenge will be to sustain a consistent level of funding for these programs. If confirmed, I will consult with commanders, soldiers and families to ensure that these programs are adequate and meet their needs.
NOMINATION OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman), presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian Niemeyer, professional staff member; Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Christine G. Lang.

Committee members’ assistants present: Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhuta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Elena Broitman, assistant to Senator Gillibrand; and Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony J. Lazarcki, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brent Bombach, assistant to
Senator Portman; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; and Sergio Sarkany, assistant to Senator Graham.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee meets this morning to consider the nomination of General Martin Dempsey to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was not long ago that General Dempsey came before us for his nomination hearing to become Chief of Staff of the Army. We welcome him back, with thanks again for his 36 years of dedicated service to our Nation and his willingness to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As we know from those decades of service, General Dempsey is an exceptionally well qualified American soldier and leader. As we were reminded at his last hearing, he is also a proud husband, father, and grandfather. General Dempsey, we remain grateful for the sacrifices that you and your family have made over the years, for the devotion of your beloved wife Deanie, and the military service of your daughters and your son. As is our tradition, at the beginning of your testimony we would welcome your introducing to us any family members and friends who may be with you this morning.

General Dempsey will replace Admiral Mike Mullen as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the most senior military adviser in the Department of Defense (DOD). Admiral Mullen’s service over the last 4 years during the daunting challenges of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been truly remarkable and the Nation owes him our deepest gratitude.

It is appropriate at today’s hearing also to note the passing last week of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff retired Army General John Shalikashvili. General Shalikashvili’s personal story is well known, rising from post-World War II immigrant youth to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. His example of patriotism, leadership, and selfless service to the Nation and our Armed Forces inspired the generation that leads our military today. For those of us who knew him, we treasured his professionalism, his candor, and his deep love for America and our men and women in uniform.

General Dempsey’s confirmation will help complete the transition to President Obama’s new national security team, which has seen significant changes in the last few months. The next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will face complex and demanding challenges as operations in Afghanistan and Iraq continue at the same time the fiscal realities that confront the Nation will put tremendous pressures on the Defense Department’s budget.

Those fiscal realities require us, when considering defense planning and programs, to take into consideration historic budgetary constraints. Admiral Mullen has said that: “Our national debt is our biggest national security problem.” Most everyone agrees that the Defense Department cannot be immune from efforts to bring our fiscal house in order.

We have been told that the Department is conducting a comprehensive program review and that the details are not yet known, but it is likely that this review will include significant additional
suggested reductions in the 2012 budget request, cuts that are even more than the $6 billion reduction to the Department’s request that this committee recently reported in our fiscal year 2012 authorization bill.

The Department will have to make tough funding choices and we will need our military’s best advice on how to reduce spending that realistically manages risk in ways that adequately addresses our top national security challenges. We will be interested in hearing General Dempsey’s thoughts on defense spending and in particular whatever he can tell us about the comprehensive national security review that I referred to.

The next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will also have to manage the transition of security responsibility and the drawdown of U.S. forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, the coming months will be crucial, leading up to the December 2011 deadline for the withdrawal of our remaining 49,000 U.S. troops. Even though there are still concerns in Iraq over their security forces’ capacity to assume full responsibility for Iraq’s security, Iraq’s political leaders have yet to request that the United States consider retaining a U.S. troop presence there beyond the end of the year deadline set by President Bush for complete military withdrawal. We will be interested to hear what General Dempsey’s recommendations would be if the Government of Iraq makes a timely request for a continuing U.S. troop presence beyond 2011.

In Afghanistan, the President has set a course for transitioning increased security responsibility to the Afghans and drawing down U.S. forces, beginning with the withdrawal of 10,000 U.S. troops by the end of this year and bringing the balance of 33,000 U.S. surge forces home by next summer. I applaud the President for sticking to the July 2011 date that he set in his West Point speech 1½ years ago for the beginning of the drawdown. Doing so offers the best chance of success for the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. That is, getting Afghan security forces in the position to take principal charge of that nation’s security.

The sense of urgency that this timetable created at the highest levels of the Afghan Government contributed to a surge of some 100,000 additional Afghan security forces in just the last year and a half. Over the next 15 months, the Afghan security forces will be increasingly in the lead in operations, while another 70,000 Afghan soldiers and police will be added to their ranks.

At the same time, General John Allen, the commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan, stated that the campaign plan calls for more and more Afghan security forces to be partnered in operations with fewer coalition forces. The growth in the capabilities of the Afghan security forces, both in quantity and professionalism, has already made possible the first phase of transition to an Afghan lead for security in a number of provinces and areas around Afghanistan.

A significant challenge to achieving our goals in Afghanistan remains Pakistan’s failure to act against militant extremists like the Haqqani network in North Waziristan, the Afghan Taliban around Quetta, and other militant extremists. We will be interested in hearing General Dempsey’s thoughts on how to get the Pakistan
military to go after terrorist groups finding sanctuary in Pakistan's Tribal Regions.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and al Qaeda elements of al Shabab in Somalia continue to take advantage of failing and failed states to train their operatives and to plan attacks against the United States and our interests. It is critical that we continue to apply significant pressure to these terrorist organizations and to work with governments and international organizations in the region to address the long-term problems.

Iran remains probably the greatest risk to world peace and to regional stability. We share the concerns of many nations about Iran’s continued support of terrorist activities beyond its borders, development of its missile programs, and refusal to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Commission with respect to its nuclear program. While we have seen evidence that the international sanctions have put stress on Iran, more remains to be done to pressure Iran to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions.

In Libya, our Armed Forces continue to provide unique enabling capabilities to our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and regional partners as they carry out the United Nations mandate to protect Libyan civilians from a dictator bent on killing his own people and destroying a country simply to preserve his grip on power.

In the dynamic Asia Pacific region, we are committed to working with our many allies and partners to maintain peace and stability and to align our forces in a way that is both strategically sound and fiscally responsible. This is not only true in Northeast Asia, where the United States is realigning its forces in Korea and Japan, but it is also true in South and Southeast Asia.

General Dempsey’s leadership will be critical in determining how the Defense Department and indeed the Nation addresses the many and growing threats to our cyber security. All of our military communications, weapons systems, support, intelligence, and virtually everything else that DOD does relies on cyber networks. Making sure that we have the policies, practices, and technologies to reliably support military operations is a matter of increasing urgency. A recent critical Government Accountability Office (GAO) report emphasized the urgency of having a clear and coordinated cyber policy put in place.

General Dempsey no doubt will also be called upon to help develop national cyber security policies, such as when does a cyber attack on activities or entities in the United States require or justify a U.S. offensive response, cyber or otherwise. We’ll be interested in hearing General Dempsey’s views on that.

Repeated deployments of our military over the last decade has resulted in many of our service men and women being away from their families and homes for many tours, stressing our servicemembers and their families. Reducing the demand for deployed forces is essential to increasing time at home station, increasing unit readiness, and reducing our strategic risk in the event of an unforeseen contingency. We look forward to hearing General Dempsey’s views on how best to manage both the demand for rotational forces and how we meet that demand while restoring our strategic depth, that is the readiness of our non-deployed forces.
The Nation could not be more proud of their families. We are grateful for General Dempsey’s leadership and his willingness to assume greater responsibility for the readiness, employment, and care of all of our forces and the families that support them.

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN M. MCCAIN

Senator M. CCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I add my welcome to General Dempsey and his family, his wife, and congratulate him on this nomination.

I first want to express my condolences to the family of General John Shalikashvili, who passed away last Saturday. General Shali was born in Poland of Georgian parents in 1936, fled from the advancing Soviets near the end of World War II, came to the United States as a teenager, and rose in the ranks to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to 1997. He was a great American patriot and Army leader.

General Dempsey, just 3 months ago on April 11, you became the Chief of Staff of the Army. You’re now poised to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Your impressive history of assignments I believe has prepared you well to become the principal military adviser to the President and the leader of the Joint Chiefs. Without question, your combat experience and career military leadership, your service as Acting Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and your thorough understanding of our transforming force stressed by a decade of combat will serve you well as strategic decisions regarding Iraq and Afghanistan must be made and we face hard calls about our priorities in the future.

We’re conducting this hearing at a time when Americans are deeply frustrated over the enormous debt we’ve accumulated and the effects of runaway entitlement spending on our economy and on our future. In this very difficult fiscal environment, there’s no doubt that the defense budget will be constrained in the years ahead as we seek to solve our debt crisis.

Clearly, DOD cannot afford to waste taxpayers’ resources on Pentagon programs that are over cost, behind schedule, or fail to provide an increase in warfighting capability to our troops. However, I hope the President and the Secretary of Defense, with your assistance, advice, and counsel, will realize that defense expenditures following the attacks of September 11, which were preceded by nearly a decade of drastic reductions in military personnel, equipment, and readiness, are not the cause of the economic dilemma we find ourselves in today.

Congress and the President must address the issue of unsustainable deficit spending and unprecedented debt in non-defense spending and entitlements which will impact the future of our military during your term. Since this year began, the President has already asked the Defense Department to cut more than $178 billion by finding efficiencies and taking top-line reductions in proposed defense spending over the next 5 years. But, even the current direction by the President to cut an additional $400 billion in defense spending by 2023 has been eclipsed by some debt reduction proposals that include $800 billion to a trillion dollars in cuts in defense spending over the next 10 years.
I'd be the first to suggest that the Defense Department budget could be responsibly reduced and reasonable people can disagree over how deep those cuts should be. But what concerns me most about our current debate is that the defense cuts being discussed have little to no strategic or military rationale to support them. They are simply numbers on a page. Our national defense planning and spending must be driven by considered strategy, not arbitrary arithmetic.

The defense cuts currently proposed reflect minimal, if any, understanding of how they will be applied or what impacts they will have on our defense capabilities or our national security. While Secretary Panetta has made it clear that a comprehensive review will precede any decision of further defense cuts, Congress currently has no specific indication of how the current proposals would impact the size of our military forces, what changes they would require to our compensation system, what equipment and weapons would have to be cancelled as a result, or what additional risks to the readiness and modernization of our forces and their equipment we would have to accept.

If Congress is to make informed decisions about our national defense spending, we need information like this. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can begin holding hearings on this important subject.

I also hope that you will carefully monitor Department contracting and expenditures. Your frankness and candor on how money is spent by the Department will be much needed by Congress as we assess how to direct Pentagon spending.

General Dempsey, obviously I'm confident you will be confirmed. I hope you and Secretary Panetta will avoid misguided and excessive reductions in defense spending that cut into the muscle of our military capabilities. Defense spending is not what is sinking this country into fiscal crisis, and if Congress and the President act on that flawed assumption they will create a situation that is truly unaffordable—the hollowing out of U.S. military power and the loss of faith of our military members and their families.

I trust that you will have the ability and confidence to advise the President and Congress on your views regarding the health of our military and the ability of our forces to meet our cooperative security commitments with our allies around the world. We will need an honest and forthright military assessment of the impacts of funding decisions.

I look forward to your opinions today and on these matters and your vision of the way forward. Again, my congratulations.

Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

General Dempsey.

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR RE-APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General DEMPSEY. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I'm honored by the opportunity to appear before you today in support of my nomination as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I want to thank the President and both Secretaries, Gates and Panetta,
for their confidence in me. I also want to compliment Admiral Mike Mullen for his remarkable service over more than 4 decades as he nears the end of a distinguished career. I would as well like to add my condolences to the family of General John Shalikashvili. He was truly an accomplished soldier and a great American.

As always when something important is happening in my life, I am joined this morning by my wife Deanie. I met Deanie 41 years ago and she’s been my wife for just over 35 of those years. I have asked a lot of her and she’s always given more than I’ve asked. We have three wonderful children, three near-perfect grandchildren, and three more on the way.

We’re also blessed to have several brigades’ worth of young men and women in uniform and their families with whom we’ve served and who we consider our extended family and it’s on their shoulders that I have been lifted up today to be considered for this position.

But it won’t surprise you to know that the glue that holds all of that together is Deanie, and I can’t thank her enough for her love and support and for her dedication to our military, its families, and our Nation.

I appeared before this committee just a few short months ago and as far as I can tell my tenure as 37th Chief of Staff of the Army hasn’t changed me very much. However, now that I’m nominated as Chairman, the images that drive me are beginning to change. I’ll share just one of those images.

In 2008, as the Acting Commander of CENTCOM, I visited the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in the Indian Ocean and observed flight operations there that were being conducted in support of ground operations in Afghanistan. As I watched these brave young men and women departing on their missions, I saw looming in the background on the superstructure of the aircraft carrier the imposing profile of Abraham Lincoln, and inscribed above that image were the words “Shall Not Perish,” taken, of course, from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. It occurred to me then, as it reminds me now, that those who volunteer to serve our country in uniform understand what’s at stake when we send them into harm’s way.

I relate this story simply to assure you that I know what this nomination means and I will do my best to live up to the responsibility. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Chiefs to ensure that this Nation has the military it needs.

It’s clear we have work to finish in the current conflicts and it should be just as clear that we have work to do in preparing for an uncertain future. Our work must result in a joint force that is responsive, decisive, versatile, interdependent, and affordable. We must keep faith with service men and women, their families, and our veterans.

We’re all very proud of the military forces of the United States and this committee has been instrumental in making it the finest force ever assembled anywhere at any time. We are also aware that a new fiscal reality confronts us.

In 1973, as Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton Abrams led us out of the Vietnam conflict and he said that it was the enduring role of the Army to ensure that America remains immune from coercion. That benchmark remains as true today as it
was 38 years ago, and it applies, of course, not only to our Army, but to all our Services.

I look forward to working with the Joint Chiefs, with our civilian leaders, and with the members of this committee to adapt the U.S. military to a new fiscal reality while ensuring, as my primary responsibility, that America remains immune from coercion. Should you confirm me as Chairman, you have my solemn commitment to those tasks.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Dempsey. Again, thanks to Deanie.

General, the committee has a series of standard questions that we ask all of our nominees and I’ll ask them of you. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

General Dempsey. I do, sir.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

General Dempsey. I will.

Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

General Dempsey. I have not.

Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

General Dempsey. I will.

Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

General Dempsey. I will.

Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

General Dempsey. They will, sir.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

General Dempsey. I do.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

General Dempsey. I do.

Chairman Levin. Let us have a 7-minute first round of questions. I understand there’s a vote at around 12:15.

General, first relative to Afghanistan. On June 22, President Obama announced his decision that the United States would draw down its forces in Afghanistan by 10,000 by the end of this year and the remaining 23,000 U.S. surge forces by the end of the summer in 2012, for a total drawdown of 33,000. Do you agree with the President’s decision on these reductions?

General Dempsey. I do, Senator. I’ve been in contact with both General Petraeus and now General Allen and, based on their mili-
tary judgments and the options they’ve presented, I do agree with the decision taken.

Chairman Levin. How important is it to the success of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan that we maintain the momentum for transitioning more and more responsibility to the Afghan security forces for their country’s security?

General Dempsey. As it was in Iraq and is now in Afghanistan, it is the transition at the end of the day that will determine our successful outcome. Of course, it does take a great deal of thought, a great deal of deliberation and collaboration, to understand the capabilities as they are accrued by security forces of those nations where we task ourselves to build those security forces.

Chairman Levin. A recent Defense Department report called the extremist Haqqani network “the most significant threat in eastern Afghanistan”. Yet, the Haqqanis continue to find safe haven across the border in Pakistan and the Pakistan army has so far refused to conduct major operations to eliminate the Haqqani sanctuary in the tribal area of North Waziristan.

Will you press the Government of Pakistan to take the fight to the Haqqani network in North Waziristan?

General Dempsey. I will, Senator. As the Acting Commander of CENTCOM, in those days we talked about four particular networks that existed along the Afghan-Pakistan border, and we encouraged our Pakistani counterparts to press them. They have pressed some of those groups, but not all. It’s not always been clear to us exactly why they press some, but not all. But I will continue to work with Pakistan to reduce the safe haven on the Pak border.

Chairman Levin. In answers to your advance policy questions, you state that in working with Pakistan on security cooperation we should not push programs the Pakistanis do not want, because doing so dilutes the value of U.S. cooperation, and you call for a frank and respectful dialogue in order for our security cooperation to be successful.

Can you give us your assessment on the DOD programs of assistance to Pakistan, in particular the coalition support funds and the Pakistan counterinsurgency fund, and to tell us whether or not those are programs that the Pakistanis want or whether or not we’ve been pushing them on Pakistan, which has reduced Pakistan’s buy-in to those assistance programs?

General Dempsey. I’d reflect back on my tour as the Acting Commander of CENTCOM in answering this question. I’m not current on the state of the coalition support funds and the programs you described as they’ve evolved. But I will tell you it’s always been a matter of discussion between us and our Pakistan counterparts about what threats are most serious to them and to us. They persist in the idea that India poses an existential threat to their existence, while the terrorists that operate with some impunity in the Northwest Frontier Province and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are less threat to them, and therefore they allocate their resources accordingly and they embrace different engagement activities with us differently.

We have been, over the course of time, working to convince them that the terrorist threat, the extremist threat, to their west is as great a threat and probably a greater threat to them than any
threat that India might pose. But it's on that basis, it's on that intellectual disagreement about what is most threatening to them, that these programs are viewed. We would tend to view programs to improve counterinsurgency capability in their general purpose forces, policing and security role for their Frontier Corps, we would tend to view those as more important than the higher end processes and programs. It's just one of those things we have to continue to work through.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

There's been a great deal of discussion about standards of interrogation and detainee treatment, and some of the language in our authorization bill relates to that subject. First, do you support the standards for interrogation and detainee treatment which are specified in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?

General Dempsey. I do, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Would you tell us why?

General Dempsey. I had a hand in preparing them and so I have a certain sense of ownership for them. But I do think that they articulate the nexus of the importance of gaining intelligence with the importance of preserving our values as a Nation and as an Army.

Chairman Levin. Would you agree that the standards for detainee treatment should be based on the principle of reciprocity, in other words that the manner in which we treat detainees that are under our control may have a direct impact on how U.S. troops are treated should they be captured in future conflicts?

General Dempsey. I do believe that reciprocity should absolutely be one of the principles on which our approach to detainee operations should be based.

Chairman Levin. A number of us—many, probably all of us on this committee—are increasingly concerned about cyber attacks. It's a subject of, obviously, great and increasing concern for our country. One of the questions is whether or not when we are a victim of cyber attack, as to how we should respond. Of course, I guess the real question is whether or not we can identify the attacker as being a state actor and whether or not an attack is intentional or not. It could be an act of espionage which we engage in ourselves. We engage in espionage and other countries engage in espionage, and those acts apparently are not considered to be acts of war.

On the other hand, if something intentionally damages, destroys, a facility or an entity in another country that it would seem to me at least to be an act of war or an aggressive act which requires a response.

Can you give us your thinking about the whole growing emerging issue of cyber attacks and how should the Defense Department participate in determining what the response is to those attacks?

General Dempsey. I can, Senator, but I'll confess at the start that my thinking on this is nascent at best. It has been suggested to me that, if confirmed, the issue of cyber and cyber warfare, the cyber domain, will probably be one of a handful of issues that define my tenure as Chairman. I'm taking a greater interest in it. But I have some thoughts on it right now as well.
The decision about whether something is an act of war or whether we would respond to it is, of course, a political decision, and it's the role of the Department and, if confirmed, with my advice as Chairman, on how to respond to it. At this point my greater interest is in determining what capabilities we must provide the Nation to be prepared to respond should we be attacked and should the determination be made that it was a hostile act or an act of war.

You've described the challenge very articulately. It's very hard to trace fingerprints and threads back through the cyber domain because of the ability to use servers at remote locations. It's a place, it's a domain, where anonymity is more an issue than it might be in the domains of space, air, land, or sea.

That said, we have done a lot of work. You know that the President published a policy in May 2011. That was followed up just a week ago, actually, by a DOD declaration by Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn, and at this point I'm in the process of studying that. I have a series of meetings scheduled, if confirmed, between the time I'm confirmed and when I take the job, with those who are delivering that capability today to better understand it.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, congratulations, General. Just to follow up on what Chairman Levin said, you want to assess the capabilities, but you have to develop a strategy and a policy before. That comes before the capabilities, in all due respect.

Look, this is a serious issue. Congress has not done its job, but certainly DOD has not done its job, and to just say we're going to assess our capabilities—we have to develop a strategy. This is a serious, serious issue that hardly when we pick up the newspaper every week or so that somebody hasn't been hacked into, not always military, but industrial, which obviously are key to our Nation's economic and military success.

I suggest you start working on a policy, and I also suggest we here in Congress start working on legislation which would implement that policy.

I hate to keep going back to this issue of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Now, the President announced the drawdown, and you said you supported it. Was it recommended by any military leader, the President's schedule for the drawdown?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, my understanding is that General Petraeus proposed three options. I haven't talked to him about how he felt about those options, but no military man would propose an option he considered to be infeasible. The President chose one of those three options. So I can only say——

Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus did not give him this option of the accelerated withdrawal so that they didn't have two fighting seasons, General. I'm sure you know that.

General DEMPSEY. No, I do not know that, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. You do not know that?

General DEMPSEY. I do not.

Senator MCCAIN. General, I'll send you the testimony of General Petraeus before this committee, and I'm disappointed that you didn't know that, because it was not recommended by any military
leader, nor would it be. In fact, General Petraeus and others have testified that it increased the risk. Do you share that view?

General DEMPSEY. I think it did increase the risk, yes.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. An unnecessary risk in my view.

I want to talk about budget cuts. You just left as Chief of Staff of the Army and I understand the President has called for $800 billion in budget cuts; is that correct?

General DEMPSEY. The current number we’re targeting is $400 billion, Senator, over 12 years.

Senator MCCAIN. Have you developed any plans as to how to implement that?

General DEMPSEY. We are working on that even as we speak. We have a task from the Department to look at what the impact of that budget cut would be.

Senator MCCAIN. When could we expect to have that assessment, since the appropriations process moves on here?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, back to your point about strategy, we have a task to try to keep strategy running parallel with resource decisions, and the comprehensive strategy that the chairman mentioned is due for completion some time in late September, early October.

Senator MCCAIN. So we have announced cuts without the commensurate strategy to go along with it? Not comforting.

General DEMPSEY. Senator, what I would describe is we’ve announced a target and we’re trying to determine what the impact would be to meet that target, and we are looking at that.

Senator MCCAIN. In most cases that I’ve seen, the strategy has been developed and then the budget for it is arrived at, not the other way around.

General DEMPSEY. Sir, I can speak as the Chief of Staff of the Army. Because the cuts are articulated over 10 or 12 years, it’ll affect four program operating memorandums. Decisions taken in 2013–2017 would not be binding on the following three targets, but would certainly affect that program operating memorandum.

Senator MCCAIN. But we are talking about $80 billion developed for next year; is that correct?

General DEMPSEY. Potentially, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Potentially?

General DEMPSEY. Again, sir—

Senator MCCAIN. Isn’t that what the President has called for?

General DEMPSEY. He has, sir; but we have not provided the analysis back to the Secretary of Defense on what the impact would be as yet.

Senator MCCAIN. Which brings me again full circle. We have announced cuts without a commensurate assessment of the impact of those cuts. In your view, what would an $800 billion to $1 trillion cut in defense spending over the next 10 years do to our readiness, General?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, I haven’t been asked to look at that number, but we have looked and we are looking at $400 billion. I would react in this way. Based on the difficulty of achieving the $400 billion cut, I believe $800 billion would be extraordinarily difficult and very high risk.
Senator McCain. I forgot to mention at the beginning of our conversation an article yesterday: “U.S. drawdown, internal crises, fuel fears for Afghanistan. The start of the U.S. troop drawdown, overlapping security, political, and economic crises are fueling fears that Afghanistan could sink into wholesale turmoil and even civil war as the U.S.-led international combat mission winds up at the end of 2014.”

Are you concerned about that?

General Dempsey. Yes, sir, I am.

Senator McCain. On the supply routes for Afghanistan, our relations with Pakistan have hit in the view of most observers an all-time low. Have you assessed and looked at, in your previous role, the impact on our ability to supply the forces in Afghanistan if the Pakistanis cut off those supply routes across Pakistan?

General Dempsey. Yes, Senator, we have.

Senator McCain. What’s been your conclusion?

General Dempsey. The conclusion is that we would have to rely more on what we describe as the Northern Supply Route, which does exist, and that it would be more expensive.

Suppose tomorrow Pakistan cut it off, what would be the period of time between then and when you would be able to maintain the same level of supply through the northern routes or air resupply?

General Dempsey. It would be a classified issue of how many days of supply we maintain inside the country. But beyond that, we believe that if that Southern Supply Route were cut off that we could react.

Senator McCain. You could react. There would be a delay?

General Dempsey. Yes, sir, but in a way that would not jeopardize the mission.

Senator McCain. Would not jeopardize the mission.

A group chartered by the Secretary of the Army to look into how the Army procures major weapons systems found that every year since 1996 the Army has spent more than $1 billion annually on programs that were ultimately cancelled. Since 2004, $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion per year of Army developmental testing and evaluation funding has been lost to cancelled programs, including the now-cancelled Future Combat System program.

As we know, the cost of the F-35 has lurched completely out of control. The few short months after the awarding of the contract to Boeing for the new tanker, it is now another additional billion dollars in cost, and the list goes on and on. What’s the level of your concern and what do you think we ought to be doing about it?

General Dempsey. Senator, as we discussed when I was here a few months ago, it would be impossible to sit here and justify the current process, given that it has not delivered the capabilities we’ve required within the resources available to do so. I think that we’re in a point where we absolutely have to seek acquisition reform. I know that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition is seeking that. I know we were helped by the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act. You know that the Department, based on that, is seeking the Better Buying Power Initiative. We’re working toward it.
Right now there's probably a reason to consider a different role for the Service Chiefs in acquisition. Right now it's kind of bifurcated. Service Chiefs do requirements, acquisition does material solution. That hasn't worked and I think it has to be revisited.

I completely agree with your assessment of our current state. Nevertheless, we need capabilities. It will be my role, if confirmed, to argue for that fifth generation fighter, but a fifth generation fighter that the Nation can afford. Therefore, the way to that is through acquisition reform.

Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Dempsey, for your service to the Army and to the Nation. I have every confidence you're going to be a superb Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I'm going to recognize Deanie and your family. I think I properly pointed out to the chairman that, although you were high school sweethearts, you married after West Point. I just want to make sure of that because it's problematic otherwise.

I also want to salute Admiral Mullen for his extraordinary service and join my colleagues in recognizing the extraordinary service of General John Shalikashvili. General Shalikashvili proudly said he was a citizen of only one country, the United States of America, despite where he was born and where he traveled. He was the consummate citizen soldier, and to his family my deepest sympathies.

The issue that is before us, and it's been alluded to and talked about in your previous hearing for Chief of Staff of the Army, is the budget. With the sake of risking oversimplification, there's at least three major categories that you have to deal with: force structure, including pay and allowances, in this context the Reserve Forces and the retired forces and the National Guard, but particularly retirees; equipment, procurement, how much it costs, what do you need, can you suspend acquisitions; and finally, the issue of operations and training, where we're going to go in an operational sense and how are we going to train.

With that as a very broad context, can you comment upon the approach you're going to take with respect to these issues and the budget you face?

General Dempsey. Yes, Senator. I think the important point to make in the question of how to absorb reductions or debt total obligating authority is really to reinforce that it must touch each of the things you mentioned. We will not be able to change the size and the capability of the force—and I'll speak for the Army because I'm immersed in it now—unless we do so by touching each of those areas you talked about.

For example, if we try to artificially preserve manpower we will suffer the consequences in modernization and in operations, maintenance, and training. Conversely, if we go after just manpower, it won't make any sense to have the kind of resources in operations, maintenance, and training.

This really requires us to maintain balance as we make any changes that become necessary by virtue of budget support. I'll also
say that includes pay, compensation, retirement, and health care, because it's important that we place everything on the table, assess the impact, and then request the time to do it in a deliberate fashion, so that we can maintain balance at whatever level we end up at.

Senator Reed. When you address the issue of pay and allowances, retirement compensation, health care, there are two factors. One is the relationship between funding those programs and funding troops in the field, equipment in the field, etcetera. Do you propose to make that very explicit, particularly to the retirement community, that with the top line there's no longer the possibility of simply adding more money, that there has to be tradeoffs between operations, training, troops in the field, their safety, and some of the benefits that have accrued to retirees?

General Dempsey. I think what I would say—yes. If I could, I'll just elaborate for a moment.

Senator Reed. Yes, sir.

General Dempsey. I think it's very important that we maintain an open dialogue with all parts of this total force, Active, Guard, Reserve, families, retirees, to help them understand the challenge. The challenge is simply this, and again I'm speaking just for the Army. Right now our manpower costs consume approximately 42 percent of our budget. Left unabated, that is to say left unaddressed, that will rise to approximately 47 or 48 percent by 2017. That is not sustainable.

The question then comes back, what should we do about it and how can we do so in a way that maintains the trust we've established with our force over time. I'll say one other thing. What makes this budget discussion different—I'm a student of history, and I've studied the post-Vietnam period, I've studied the post-Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield period. What makes this period different is we're doing all this while we're still actively engaged in conflict and we have young men and women in harm's way. That adds a degree of complexity and a degree of uncertainty that I think we can't discount.

Senator Reed. A final point with respect to this whole issue of how do you rebalance the personnel costs, etcetera. I presume your view would be to lead from the top, that senior officers and senior personnel would be the first ones to stand up and say: If it's going to have to happen, it'll happen with us. Is that fair?

General Dempsey. Did you have to ask me that question in front of my wife, Senator? [Laughter.]

But the short answer is: Absolutely. I think it's leading from the top individually, but I also think it's leading from the top at examining our structure, which tends to be rather top-heavy and in fact historically, again if you look through conflicts, headquarters grow in ways that have to be reconsidered and reformed after conflict.

Senator Reed. Let me slightly change the subject, but I think it relates to what we've been saying, that we are on our way out of Afghanistan, as we are in Iraq. Going forward, you have to be prepared to successfully hand over significant activities to the Department of State, to the U.S. Agency for International Development, et cetera. Your success in transition is a function of the resources
they must receive. My perception being here is that when the defense budget is reduced, the State Department budget is decimated.

Do you, one, have those concerns; and two, consciously, if we are going to maintain a credible security force beyond 1 or 2 years, we’re going to have to internationally provide resources to Afghan national forces. Is that going to be one of your priorities? My only historic hook here is that Najibullah, the last Soviet-era leader, survived 2-plus years after the Soviets withdrew, but when the resources—and not just for the military, but for everything—dried up, his days were literally numbered.

General Dempsey. Yes, sir. We certainly don’t want to be guilty of reprising the epilogue of Charlie Wilson’s War. I take your point completely. My job will be, given the strategic objectives in Afghanistan, to determine how best to meet them. If and when U.S. force structure reduces, what is it that compensates for that. Is it other agencies of government?

The measure of national power is the aggregate of economic strength, diplomatic strength, and military strength. All three of those have to participate in these outcomes and all three of these have to be considered as we look at these reductions to make sure we stay in balance in that way as well.

Senator Reed. Thank you for your service and thank you for your family’s service. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.

Senator Sessions.

Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Dempsey, for your leadership and your commitment, your willingness to serve in harm’s way. I notice just looking at your bio—I looked at it because I remember seeing you in Iraq and coming back and you were still there. I notice you were there the first tour 16 months, came home to Germany and were deployed there for 10 months, and back for 21 months. That’s the kind of deployment that a number of our military people have made serving their country in dangerous areas of the globe. I just want to personally thank you for your commitment, and I think it reflects the kind of commitment many other enlisted people, many other of our leaders in the military, have exhibited.

Mrs. Dempsey, it’s good to see you, and thank you for being a good partner in those difficult years.

I just want to follow up on Senator McCain’s comments about the budget. We’ve had a lot of people believe that the deficit is caused by the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. It certainly was not inexpensive. It’s been an expensive process. Last year was one of our highest years, $158 billion committed to that effort. But our deficit—I say “last year”: the year we’re in, we’re projected to spend $158 billion. It looks like our deficit this year will be $1,500 billion. A little more than 10 percent only, if you eliminated the war, of our deficit would be eliminated. Over the period of time, that percentage has been fairly accurate about the cost of the war.

I also am a bit troubled that some of the projections for our spending go from, next year we’re projected to drop from $158 to $118 billion for the overseas contingency operations (OCO). Is that your understanding?

General Dempsey. It is, Senator.
Senator Sessions. I think is it the next year, 2013, that it’s projected to go to just $50 billion?

General Dempsey. I have seen that number, but I’m more confident in the $118 billion than I am in the follow-on years.

Senator Sessions. It would be a dramatic drop to $50 billion that quickly. I don’t think that is likely to be achieved and I’m concerned about it. The President’s budget projects $50 billion for the rest of the decade there for spending. I don’t know if that’s accurate or not.

I would say that we can’t let numbers like that drive the agenda. The agenda has to be if we can draw down our forces, good, let’s do it in a strategic, smart way that does not put our soldiers or the goals they’ve put their lives at risk for in jeopardy just to meet that kind of goal. I hope and expect that you would advise us if you think that number is not acceptable. Would you?

General Dempsey. I wonder, Senator, if I could—I mentioned earlier that I’m not a man of numbers necessarily or charts and wiring diagrams, but rather images. Could I ask my staff to pass out an image to you by way of answering your question, if I could?

[The information referred to follows:]

General Dempsey. While the staff is handing this image out, one of the things we’ve said consistently, my predecessor and his predecessor as Chief of Staff of the Army, is that when this conflict ends, however we define “ends”, it’ll take 2 years for us to reset the force because of the stress and strain on equipment and people. It’ll take us 2 years to reset, and that reset should be in my judgment funded by OCO and therefore it will be my responsibility, on behalf of all the Services, to define what will it take to reset the force once we have the opportunity to do so.
If I could just ask you to glance at the picture. I’ve done a lot of thinking about what is it that will get us through, has gotten us through this last 10 years, because frankly if someone had suggested to me 10 years ago that we would be able to fight a war for 10 years with an All-Volunteer Force, I honestly would have been skeptical about it. We have gotten through that, and not only have gotten through it, but we’ve actually flourished. The force is extraordinarily healthy.

Whatever we do, it’s important to remember we’re doing it from a foundation of great strength. It is truly the finest military force we’ve ever had, all components.

The reason I like that picture—my sergeant major, by the way, doesn’t like it because the soldier’s not wearing his eye protection and he has his sleeves rolled up. But I asked him to get beyond that for a moment, because that picture speaks to me, that image speaks to me, on the issue of trust.

It’s trust because, as you see, there’s a soldier protecting that soldier’s flank. He’s wearing a wedding band, so it reminds us that they’re married and they trust that we’ll take care of their families both now and into the future.

Here’s the point. He’s on the radio and he’s calling for something, and we don’t know what it is. It could be a medevac, it could be close air support, it could be artillery. It’s likely to be another Service that delivers it. But here’s the profound point not to forget: What makes us unique is that noncommissioned officer (NCO) believes he’s going to get what he asks for. We are the only army on the face of the Earth that believes that when you ask for something because you need it to prevail in the environment we place you, you’re actually going to get it.

As we do whatever we have to do with this force based on the resources, the one thing we cannot lose is that relationship of trust that exists, that what that soldier, airman, sailor, marine, or coast guardsman needs to do the things we ask him to do, they have to have it. That’s what carries us through.

In answer to your question about budget numbers, I don’t know. But what I do know is that I will not allow that relationship of trust to be violated.

Senator Sessions. Thank you. I think this is a very critical point, that we have the finest military the world’s ever assembled. They are courageous. They put their lives on the line. They’ve lost their lives in significant numbers and been injured significantly. But they do have to be confident the people of this country are behind them, and sometimes that means money, dollars, that get them the things that they need. I appreciate your comments on that.

General Dempsey, on a specific matter, I notice in your answers to the advance policy questions you note that you supported the decision to retain three brigade combat teams in Europe and this is the answer—I’m sure staff helped you put it together, since I notice you have a master’s in English at Duke, typical of our high quality and highly educated officer corps. But it says: “...to meet a wide array of engagement, building partner capacity, and interoperability objectives while being prepared to support a full range of military operations needed for plausible European and global contingencies.”
I’m not sure what that means, but I don’t think we need three brigades to do it there. The plan was to bring it to two. I understand we’re talking about a new hospital for Lanstuhl, which if, we pray, we’re successful in drawing down, maybe that can be scaled down. But that’s the kind of things I think we need to ask about when our allies are spending about 1.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, 1.3, only a few of our NATO allies are meeting the goal or coming close to the goal of 2 percent, while we’re over 4 percent of GDP on defense. I think we have to ask ourselves, can we continue to maintain that kind of forward deployment of brigades when we were supposed to be reducing to two?

My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

I know you’ve given that answer that you support the three, but I’d like you to say that you will at least reconsider that in the months to come.

General DEMPSEY. First of all, Senator, I apologize for the run-on sentence. That one got past me, apparently.

But I will say I am an advocate of forward presence—I want to be clear about that—for all the things it does for us, not just for our allies. Second, I am a strong advocate of maintaining a strong relationship with our current allies, because they’ve been tried and true. I know that we sometimes look at, compare an individual NATO country to us, but the reality is that in the aggregate they commit about $300 billion a year to defense in the aggregate, and they are serving very bravely and courageously with us in Afghanistan. Notably, I was at a ceremony at the French embassy last night where the French presented five of their equivalent of Silver Stars to our soldiers who had served alongside of them in Kapisa Province, and the French were very proud to note that they have a French battalion under our command without caveat in Afghanistan.

I think we should not, in the midst of our current budget challenges, undervalue our relationships overseas. Now, that said, the comment about whether it’s two or three brigades in Europe was made when we were shooting for $178 billion in reductions, not $400 billion. I would restate my earlier message in discussion with Senator Reed: Everything is back on the table.

Senator SESSIONS. I would agree. Secretary Gates noted that our allies, with exasperation—he’s urged them to do better and share better, and been disappointed that they have not.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I apologize for having had to step out for a few minutes, and I missed your exchange with Senator Reed and the beginning of your exchange with Senator Sessions. I hope these questions aren’t redundant to those.

First of all, we are going to be entering into a period of reformulation of our national strategy and our posture around the world in many cases with the wind-downs in Iraq and eventually in Afghanistan. I’ve not seen anything on your views with respect to sea power as an instrument of national strategy, not simply in terms of supporting ongoing ground operations, which was one of your
comments earlier about visiting the USS Lincoln, but actually in its historical role as a direct instrument of deterrence on a larger scale.

General Dempsey. Sir, both because of my time in the joint world and now as a member of the Joint Chiefs, I am enormously proud of our Navy and cognizant of and respectful of its role. I think that one of the questions we have to ask ourselves in this strategic review is where are the new power centers across the globe? The Navy has a traditional role in protecting the global commons with respect to, obviously, the maritime domain, as the Air Force does in the aviation domain.

I would say that my views on sea power are about the same as they are on land power, and that is that we should never get to the point where we have to choose between a particular domain and another. We should be increasingly interdependent.

I am concerned, by the way, about the Navy shipbuilding program and the fact that we’re sitting at 280 ships with a suppressed demand for 313, and some of the acquisition problems we’ve had are making it more difficult to get there.

I'm a big fan of the Navy, with one important exception, and that is on that Saturday in November when we play the Army-Navy football game.

Senator Webb. Having gone from the Naval Academy into the Marine Corps, I don’t watch that game very often. [Laughter.] But it does seem to me that we are at the end of another inevitable historical cycle here, when we have these extended ground combat deployments that expand the size of the Active Duty Army and of the Marine Corps, at the expense very often of what I would call national strategic assets, like our operational Navy.

I think I'm hearing from you the same thing I heard from Secretary Panetta, that the 313-ship goal for the Navy is a reasonable goal. Would that be correct?

General Dempsey. My engagements with Gary Roughead over the past 3 months suggest to me that it is. But again, I think we had a conversation a bit earlier about how do we keep strategy apace with resource decisions. That comprehensive strategy review that we’re doing should, it seems to me, either reinforce that or cause us to think differently about it.

One of the things I think will happen is, to the question of whether we can absorb $400 billion, I don’t know the answer to that as I sit here today. I don’t know for the Army and I certainly don’t know for the joint force. But as we look at it, we will reach a point where we have to make a determination, can we execute the strategy we have today, which is what the 313-ship shipbuilding program is built to? Can we continue to execute that strategy or do we have to change our strategy? That’s the kind of questions and the answers to those questions that we owe you as a member of this committee.

Senator Webb. I would hope that part of the reexamination of the strategy is a realization that the model that we put in place in Afghanistan is not going to be the model of the future. It’s enormously costly, in more ways than show up in the direct DOD budget.
One of the concerns that I’ve had since I’ve been here in the Senate is with what I can only call a deterioration of the management aspects in the Pentagon. I hope you will really take a look at that, items such as data collection that’s necessary to have debates on different issues. I could give you a whole string, as someone who worked over there as a manpower person and was used to some fast turnarounds when data was requested, where this wasn’t. It took us a year to get attrition data from the Services that were necessary to analyze what percentage of the military actually left the military on or before the end of their first enlistment, which was vitally important in the way that I was trying to advance the GI Bill as a readjustment benefit, which it had been traditionally.

I just held a hearing as chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee and part of it was asking for courtmartial and discharge data, and the Army was not able to tell me with a week’s notice how many honorable, general, and other than honorable discharges it had issued over the past year. The other data kind of fluctuated day to day.

This is the kind of stuff that when I was a committee counsel up here a few years ago you could literally get in 24 hours. I hope you will get on top of it. I think it’s a management issue. I don’t think people are so busy that they can’t keep that kind of data, and certainly the size of the military and the retention rate—the size of the military is lower. The retention rates are higher. It shouldn’t be difficult data to keep.

One of the pieces of data that jumped out at me goes to the number of general/flag officers Service by Service. I used this as a starting point when we were looking at an issue of whether the Air Force should be able to keep seven—I believe it’s seven—six flag officers as Judge Advocates General (JAGs). I’ll give these numbers really quickly. The Army has 569,400 people on Active Duty as of this week, the Navy 328,000, the Marine Corps 202,000, the Air Force 332,000. Do you find it curious that the Air Force has more four-star generals than any of the other Services?

General DEMPSEY. I’m not sure how to answer that question, Senator.

Senator WEBB. Let me give you a couple more data points.

General DEMPSEY. It does surprise me. I’ve never looked.

Senator WEBB. The Air Force has 332,000. This isn’t a knock on the Air Force. I see your assistant is getting a little nervous over there. But it’s a question of how you properly manage the force.

The Air Force has more brigadier generals than any of the other Services, by far. They have the same number of three-stars. They have almost the same number of two-stars as the Army and more than the Navy and the Marine Corps combined. As I said, this is not a hit on the Air Force. It’s just a question of how do you come up with this?

General DEMPSEY. Your point’s a good one, Senator. By the way, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Gates, did take a look at general officer strength and required each Service—I think our number for the Army was we had to eliminate nine general officer billets. That’s not the last state of that.

Not by way of justifying it, I’ll tell you how some of this has grown up. You’ve talked about Iraq and Afghanistan—when we
build up new headquarters, they tend to be magnets for flag officers to run particular capabilities and functions within those headquarters.

But if you're suggesting we should see ourselves and determine if we have our ratios right, I take the point.

Senator Webb. I absolutely think you should, because the other piece of it is when force structure is reduced it's very hard to give up flag commands or flag billets. I would really hope you take a look at it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Webb.

Senator Wicker.

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much.

I appreciate your service, General Dempsey, and look forward to working with you.

One of Secretary Gates' final actions as Secretary before his retirement was a very important speech before NATO about NATO's future back in June. I want to point out some of the most important facts that he mentioned and ask you to respond to that, if you will. For one thing, he worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance, where some members are willing to do the soft tasks and others the hard combat missions.

He also said there is a very real possibility of collective military irrelevance and in light of this member nations must examine new approaches to boosting combat capabilities. He went on to point out that now, 2 decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States' share of NATO defense spending has now risen to more than 75 percent.

Then he concluded with this very key point, and I will quote him directly: "Indeed, if current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted or reversed, future U.S. political leaders, those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me, may not consider the return on America's investment in NATO worth the cost."

Now, it's often valuable for someone to be able to speak very frankly toward the end of a career, and I think Secretary Gates did just that. You're about to embark on a new aspect of your career, in which perhaps you have to be a little more diplomatic and more careful. But I would appreciate your responding to the points that Secretary Gates made.

I wonder if you have any new ideas about reversing this continued trend and if you have any suggestions to this committee or this Congress as to what we might do to reverse this trend?

General DEMPSEY. I'll take your caution about trying to figure out whether I'm at the beginning of the next 4 years or the end of my career.

Senator WICKER. I'm assuming you're about to embark on a very important part of your career.

General DEMPSEY. What you can count on, Senator, is that I'll answer and let the chips fall where they fall in that regard.

I think that we have some competing narratives that we should acknowledge. On the one hand, we have a narrative that says we have to, based on the reality of a new fiscal environment, we have
to do less and therefore rely on allies to do more. That is one narrative and we have to acknowledge it.

Then we have the other narrative that you just described, which is they're not doing enough to sustain what they're doing now. The question is, as we go forward in determining whatever adaptations we make to our strategies, we have to do it in a way that doesn't paper over potential problems.

One of the problems we could paper over is what can our allies provide. Now, in terms of new ideas, we've talked about ourselves as a joint force of being interdependent for years. How do we rely on each other and eliminate redundancies? This budget reality is going to cause us to look at that again, and I think it should cause us to look again at that issue vis-a-vis our allies. It may be that we would enter into a discourse with our allies about capabilities that they provide that we may not provide, and in so doing we actually may have to become dependent on them for that.

Now, I'm not advocating that. I am not even advancing it yet. But it may be that if there's a new idea out there in a new fiscal environment, it may be something to do with establishing an interdependent relationship with close allies. Is there risk there? Absolutely. Is there potential opportunity there? I think so. But in answer to your question, I think that's where we find ourselves today.

Senator WICKER. Let's take that down, then, to the specific instance of Libya and the frustration that many of us felt in coming to a consensus over there. Do we risk our adversaries or our competitors finding ways to place the interests of NATO member countries against each other in arriving at consensus, and what observations would you draw from your general statement down to the specific situation that we're in right now with Libya?

General DEMPSEY. I think you've touched on it, Senator. As a consensus organization, it is far more difficult to find end states that are acceptable and achievable to all members. That's the nature of an organization of that size that's built on consensus.

On the other hand, when you can achieve consensus with an organization like NATO, it's pretty powerful and pretty compelling and pretty persuasive. I think as we go forward, as I mentioned, we have to be clear-eyed about not making assumptions that could from their very inception be proven inaccurate. I think it's going to require a different kind of transparency.

Senator WICKER. I wish you very much success in that regard, and I hope if you have further suggestions for this Congress you will work with us on that, because I share Secretary Gates' concern and I don't know when the tipping point might be. But we do have budget concerns in this country and we're bumping up against them within a week. For the United States to expend 75 percent of the combat funds seems to me a situation that has to change.

Let me ask you a very specific question about the culture that Services nurture among our young officers and NCOs with regard to foreign language study and programs that enhance global awareness. Do you have any ideas about how we might do a better job of incentivizing activities across the Services? My son happens to be a second lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force with a Mandarin language proficiency. Do you think we're using the universities and the great resources of our country enough, or is there a different
way that we can be achieving a larger cultural awareness and language proficiency across the Services?

General DEMPSEY. I absolutely do, Senator. I think to the extent we can develop our young leaders to have the kind of global awareness, even if it is manifested in particular regional expertise, whether it's Asia or wherever, I think we will do two things: One, we will make ourselves far better prepared for an uncertain future. We found ourselves short in cultural awareness and language capability in Iraq and Afghanistan for a very long time. I think that as we now have the time to commit to the kind of things you're talking about, we should. That is absolutely, I would describe it as one of the adaptations we need to make to our leader development programs.

The other thing we'll do in so doing is we'll keep these kids interested. They want to know what it is we need them to do, and it's not just about turning wrenches or providing lethal effects. They want to know that they are developing, that they are growing, and that development and growth is valued inside the Service.

The last point I'll make is I think we're going to be able to do exactly what you say. The reason we haven't in the last 10 years is we've been meeting ourselves coming and going. We've been extraordinarily busy and so we haven't taken the time necessary, in particular in expertise outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Second, our promotion boards, for example, in wartime always tend to value most the current fight. I can only speak for the Army, but if you look at our promotion boards they have tended to reward time in the saddle in Iraq and Afghanistan disproportionate to potentially what we need for the deeper future. My commitment to you is that, if confirmed, I will be not only the Chairman, but I will believe myself to be the steward of our profession, that is the profession of arms, for all Services and look dutifully and carefully at how we're developing our leaders for the future.

Senator WICKER. Thank you, sir. Tell us what you need and we'll try to provide it for you.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.

Senator Udall.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, General. Good morning, Deanie. It's been a treat to get to know the two of you in this process and discover your connections to Colorado and your love of our wonderful State, the Centennial State, and I look very much forward to working with you when you're confirmed.

If I might, let me pick up on Senator Wicker's line of questioning and discussion, General. I had a chance to ride in yesterday from the airport with former Senator Hart, who's well known for his strategic thinking along with a lot of other retired Senators in both parties, and of course retired military officers.

What have you learned about the last 10 years? What do you think are the most important lessons that stare us in the face and some that aren't so obvious, because it is easy to fight the last war, and yet the world is undergoing enormous change from the Middle East to the events we see in China, and on and on.
If you'd share for a couple minutes your thoughts on some of the lessons.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Senator. Again, these are very personal lessons, not to be interpreted as criticism of predecessors or anything else, because, by the way, in some cases I was the one who fumbled a ball here or there. I think that one of the lessons of the last 10 years of war ought to be that we can't look at issues through a soda straw, in isolation. They don't exist that way.

Looking back on it, at least my own personal view about Iraq in 2003 was that Iraq had a particular problem and it was a regime that was destabilizing the region and that we should take action. It was my recommendation that we should take action to change the dynamic inside of Iraq and that the region itself would become more stable. I'm not sure it turned out that way. Probably it is, but it didn't happen exactly as we intended it, and that's because I don't think we understood—let me put it differently.

I didn't understand the dynamic inside that country, particularly with regard to the various sects of Islam that fundamentally on occasion compete with each other for dominance in Islam, so the Shia sect of Islam, the Sunni sect of Islam. When we took the lid off of that, I think we learned some things and I'm not sure we could have learned them any other way. I don't know. I've reflected about that a lot.

But I learned that issues don't exist in isolation. They're always complex. I've been scarred by rereading a quote from Einstein, who said: "If you have an hour to save the world, spend 55 minutes of it understanding the problem and 5 minutes of it trying to solve it." I think sometimes, in particular as a military culture, we don't have that ratio right. We tend to spend 55 minutes trying to solve the problem and 5 minutes understanding it. That's one of the big lessons for me in developing leaders for the future, not only in the Army, but, if confirmed, in the joint force.

Another one is the degree to which military operations in particular, but probably all of them, have been decentralized. You'll hear it called various things: decentralized, distributed operations, empowering the edge. Whatever we call it, we have pushed enormous capability, responsibility, and authority to the edge, to captains and sergeants of all the Services. Yet our leader development paradigms really haven't changed very much. They are beginning to change.

But I think that second lesson, on the enormous responsibility that we put on our subordinates' shoulders, has to be followed with a change in the way we prepare them to accept that responsibility. I think those would be the two big lessons for me.

Senator UDALL. Thank you for sharing those, and I look forward to hearing more of your insights. You're right, we ask particularly personnel on the front lines now to be educators, be diplomats, be aware of civil affairs, cultural, and historical trends, and on and on and on. Every single soldier, marine, airman, and sailor presents the face of America. I look forward to working with you on what I see as an opportunity.

Let me turn to a related distributed concept, which is in energy. It's a real interest of mine. I think increasingly the committee is spending more time looking at how we use energy more effectively.
We know that saving energy saves lives, as Admiral Mullen has put it so well. We know that a good quarter of our casualties have been tied to fuel convoys and other kinds of convoys.

How do we help you develop a strategy where we have more fight with less fuel? Please share your thoughts on energy with the committee.

General DEMPSEY. First of all, I agree with you, Senator. Again, I'm at a bit of a disadvantage in this regard, speaking just about the Army now, but that's what I've been working. We have some energy goals that both DOD have established, but that we've established for ourselves as well. In the two broad areas of institutional energy—that's how we manage our posts, camps, and stations—we have six, maybe more, prototype installations that we want to achieve a net-zero energy status. One of them happens to be in your State. We're moving along to try to see how we can improve our standing vis-a-vis institutional energy.

The other one is operational energy. That's really the one you're speaking to most clearly with how do we keep soldiers off the road in supply convoys because we've become more energy efficient. Every one of our recent acquisitions and certainly every one going forward for vehicles or other equipment that have an energy demand are always done with a key systems attribute, is the term, related to energy. The Ground Combat Vehicle has an energy target for its design.

But that's sort of the upper end of it. The lower end of it is batteries. I'll give you one vignette that might fascinate you. In pushing responsibility to the edge, we've pushed all kinds of emitters—I'll just call them "emitters", but it could be a Blue Force Tracker, it could be a data collector, it could be a full-streaming video, it could be a set of optics, a night vision device, whatever it is. But they all have a power demand.

In so doing, we see the benefit to the soldier and it makes him more capable, but we often don't see what it does in the aggregate to their ability to carry the batteries. An infantry platoon today for a 72-hour mission has to carry 400 pounds of batteries. Now, what they do, of course, is they don't carry them. You can follow them in some cases like breadcrumbs through the Hindu Kush.

We have to get better at that and figure out what is the energy requirement, how do you deliver it at a lighter load, in a more efficient manner, so that the soldier both becomes more capable and we don't overburden him. I can just assure you we are actively pursuing this, and I think it has implications across the joint force as well.

Senator UDALL. I agree. When we find some of these breakthrough applications for batteries, there will also be utility in the civilian sector as well. I forecast that the military will lead us more broadly to more energy self-reliance.

I'll end on this note. My time's expired. I think you're well aware of the couple of Marine Corps ex-forward operating bases that are now being utilized, and in the end they're actually creating an environment that is much more than experimental. Those environments, I'm learning, are more secure. They have a smaller footprint noise-wise, light-wise, energy-wise, and therefore the mission is more easily performed.
I look forward to working with you on this. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.

Senator Brown.

Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sir, we've already met and discussed a lot in private. I have just a few follow-up questions. Senator Ayotte and I actually plan to have a bill and are deeply concerned about the evidence that taxpayer money that was intended to be used for a transportation contract has in fact ended up in the hands of the Taliban, and we want it to stop. Not only are we trying to fund our own needs; I guess we're funding the Taliban's needs, too.

I was wondering if you could comment on that and what your thoughts are about lowering the risk involved with our reliance on contractor support and the money trail that goes along with it.

General Dempsey. Yes, thanks, Senator. I saw the same report in the media. I haven't yet had time to get the GAO report and understand the details. But I'll tell you, I share that concern completely. In fact, in Iraq when serving as the Commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, now called NATO Training Mission Iraq, and having approximately $5 billion a year to build the Iraqi Security Forces, it was among my gravest concerns.

I had a concern about building them. I had a concern about enabling them and integrating them with our forces. But there wasn't a day that I didn't worry about where the money was going, because it's a very opaque culture in which we deal in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Now, what we've done. We've increased the number of contractors enormously. We've formed Contracting Command. Again, I'm speaking for the Army, but I know the other Services are doing this as well. In our captains' career courses, they're taught contract oversight.

I probably should have mentioned, in response to the former question, what are one of the big lessons of the last 10 years of war? One of the big lessons of the last 10 years of war is that when we apply these kind of resources we have to have the right kind of contract oversight.

I hope what I find in the GAO report is that it's a lagging indicator, in other words that it might be a couple of years ago, before we took the measures I just mentioned. But I don't know. I share your concern about it.

Senator Brown. Thank you, sir.

Also, I want to just touch upon and follow up with Senator McCain and others: $100 billion was the initial, now it's $400 billion, $800 billion; I'm hearing $1 trillion. As someone who's still serving, I see in the Guard and Reserves a certain amount of things we could probably do better and more efficiently. But I'm deeply concerned that hasty, across-the-board cuts will dramatically affect the safety and security of the men and women serving.

I would echo Senator McCain's general premise, in that whatever you're planning on doing or whatever recommendations you're considering making, I know we're trying to reach a number, but when it comes to the safety and security of our men and women I don't
think I can put a number on that. I think we need to, if we're going
to commit to these wars and we're going to commit our men and
women to do it, we have to give them the assets to do just that.

Not really a question, but my hope is if you're running into road-
blocks or you need to adjust and adapt, then please come back to
the committee so we can work with you in trying to do it differently
and shift maybe the burden to other areas of the government be-
fore we start jeopardizing the safety and security of our men and
women.

That being said, I am in the Guard and I do know that the
Guard and Reserves perform a function at a fraction of the cost of
the money used for the Active Army and all other Services. We're
somewhat leveraging the skills and experience of our citizen-sol-
diers and airmen. What's your plan? Is there a plan, in order to
save money, to potentially shift and expand Guard and Reserve op-
portunities, or is that in the bailiwick or what?

General Dempsey. Senator, we are closer to our Reserve compo-
nent—that's both the National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve.
I'm speaking for the Army, but I'm sure that General Schwartz
would echo this. We're closer to the Guard and Reserve than we've
ever been. The question now becomes, as the demand goes down
and as potential resource constraints collapse around us, how do
we maintain that relationship, how do we articulate what capabili-
ties have to be available in the Active component, which capabili-
ties have to be available in the Guard and Reserve?

One of the things I mentioned in the response to the advance pol-
icy questions, was I think there is an opportunity here to recon-
sider and adapt our relationship with the Guard and Reserve, so
that as we become smaller, which seems to me to be inevitable at
any one of the numbers you mentioned. It's not just taking the ex-
isting structures and the existing relationships and shrinking
them, but rather adapting them to actually give the Nation options,
because that's ultimately our responsibility, is to provide options
for the Nation in meeting its security needs.

My commitment to you is that the issue of the future relation-
ship of Active, Guard, and Reserve will be at the forefront of any
decisions we make in responding to these budget issues.

Senator Brown. I would also ask, if the goalposts used to meas-
ure our national objectives in Afghanistan change, which they ap-
parently are, and if you need a new set of requirements based on
those changes before the end of the summer, I'm hopeful you'll let
us know, so we can help in that regard, as Senator Wicker pointed
out, too. Let us know what the needs are.

Finally, I have noticed, being on the Veterans Affairs Committee
as well, that many of the soldiers that are coming home—and the
unemployment rate amongst military folks, Guard and Reserve in
particular, is dramatically higher. Even though many of them have
higher technical expertise, leadership skills, and military experi-
ence, they feel they're ultimately disqualified for lack of civilian
equivalent certificates.

I hear it over and over again. I'm wondering if there's a system
or if there's something that you will be able to do that will help
members translate their military-specific skills and vocational ex-
perience and expertise to the civilian sector? Nothing for today, but
just something to think about, if there’s a way we can have some-
one reach out and work that through, because when you look, the
State of Israel does it. Employers actually seek out those folks be-
cause they have a higher work ethic, many times they’re more ex-
perienced. Yet here, especially because of the fear of redeployment,
there’s an artificial wall, I feel, sometimes. Just a thought, and I
wish you well, General.

Thank you.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Senator. One of your colleagues is
helping us with some legislation that might help with that, in re-
gard of transition for veterans. Some of the reason that we’re hav-
ing this problem is that we haven’t paid as much attention as we
need to our Army again, career and alumni program.

Senator BROWN. You can talk about the Army all you want.

[Laughter.]

General DEMPSEY. But anyway, we’re alert to the challenge,
working both internal to the Army as well as with this committee
to try to determine how we can do a better job.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, sir. Good luck.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Brown.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks, General Dempsey. Just having the opportunity to sit
here and listen to you, you’ve been really impressive today. We’re
lucky to have you in the service of our country. I think you are a
student of history. You know the details of reality that the military
faces, and when you don’t you’re honest enough to say you don’t.
I’m very grateful that the President has nominated you and I’ll be
proud to vote to confirm you, I suppose unless you say something
from here to the end of the hearing that I think is over the edge.
But I doubt that.

This is a very moving picture and you used it to tell a powerful
story of trust, the trust of his family back home, trust of the others
in his unit, and the trust that he has when he calls somebody is
going to be there.

I was thinking, as I lead into the first topic I wanted to talk
about, there’s another element and it wouldn’t be called trust, it’s
the certainty, a different kind of certainty, which is the certainty
that those who wish us ill, our enemies, have that if they cross
lines that we will respond, that they won’t get away with it. That’s
not trust, but it’s a certainty that we’re credible.

In that regard, I was really struck by your response to one of the
advance policy questions submitted by the committee, in which you
spoke about the threat posed to the United States by Iran, and you
said, “With its nuclear activities and its surrogate activities in
southern Iraq, there is a high potential that Iran will make a seri-
ous miscalculation of U.S. resolve.”

I totally agree with you and I do think in the case of southern
Iraq, where the Iranians have been training and equipping Shia ex-
tremists, who then go back and have been responsible for the
deaths of a lot of Americans, that they have been making a mis-
calculation. In some sense it’s been based, unfortunately, on the
fact that they haven’t paid a meaningful price up until now for
doing the things that they’ve done that have been so harmful to so many Americans in uniform.

I wanted to say, one, I appreciated the statement. Two, I wanted to ask you to elaborate on what you meant when you said that there was a high potential that Iran will make a serious miscalculation of U.S. resolve.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Senator. Again, I’ve been out of Iraq for about 4 years now. But that doesn’t mean I’ve lost touch with it or the leaders with whom I have remained engaged. It’s their observation, in some cases supported by intelligence, but it’s their observation that Iran’s activities in southern Iraq are intended to produce some kind of Beirut-like moment and in so doing to send a message that they have expelled us from Iraq.

What I wanted to make clear in my response, and as well today, is that, while we have soldiers in southern Iraq—and, my view is that when you put the U.S. military, whatever Service you place, but you place them someplace, it is the clearest signal of national resolve we have.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General DEMPSEY. As long as we have those soldiers there, we’re going to do whatever we have to do to protect them, and I want to make sure that’s clear to everyone.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate it. I agree with you. It follows on some pretty strong statements made in the last couple of weeks by Admiral Mullen and Secretary Panetta about the risk that Iran is taking by supporting the Shias who are going back into southern Iraq and killing our people. Obviously, it’s important once the people at the top of our military, like the three of you, say that, that Iran takes it seriously or suffers consequences.

I thank you for that, and I know you’re a serious man and I know your word is credible. I hope the Iranians understand that.

I wanted to spend just a few minutes on the budget questions. I thought you said something, if I heard it right earlier, that was really interesting and important for all of us to think about. Obviously, we’re facing a big budget crunch and everybody is being asked to contribute to helping the country get back into balance. As far as the military is concerned, this is not like the period at the end of the Cold War, because we are actually still involved in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, where we’re drawing down our troops. But the larger war with the Islamist extremists who attacked us on September 11 goes on on many different fronts in the world.

I wanted to make sure that I caught you right, that’s what you were intending to say, that this is a tough time to cut the military budget drastically because we are at war.

General DEMPSEY. That is my professional judgment, Senator. If I could reflect my own anxieties with you; can I share my anxieties with you for just a moment?

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, just lay down on the couch. [Laughter.]

General DEMPSEY. This is a three-legged stool. On the one hand, it is the responsibility of the military to provide the Nation options, and that means we have to have capabilities of a certain size, of a certain quality, and in a certain quantity because of the rota-
tional requirement to sustain our effort. That’s one leg of the stool, if you’ll permit me.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General DEMPSEY. The other leg of the stool, though, is we demonstrate that we are sensitive to the challenges of the broader Nation. We’re all citizens as well as soldiers.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General DEMPSEY. If we don’t show that we recognize that the Nation has a significant economic problem and then do our part, whatever that part may be, to help solve it, we will be seen as simply putting up barriers and defending ourselves against what Eisenhower famously called the military-industrial complex. That’s the second leg of the stool.

The third leg of the stool is we have an All-Volunteer Force with whom we must keep faith. It is that element of trust that I described earlier that will keep that All-Volunteer Force in the fight, inspired, in the service of their country over time.

As we go forward, kind of the way I will assess how much of a budget reduction we can absorb will be on the basis of that: How much capability does it provide? Are we contributing something, so that we remain connected to America? Can we preserve the All-Volunteer Force? On that basis, I think we’ll be able to make a pretty clear determination.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. That’s a very balanced answer and I think you have your anxieties well in control and I would certify to your mental health.

Thanks very much, General. Good luck.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Ayotte.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I very much want to thank you, General Dempsey and Deanie, for your service, and appreciate your coming before the committee today.

I wanted to echo on the question that Senator Brown had asked you about the Guard and Reserve and the role of the Guard and Reserve. I notice from your written comments you acknowledge what I think we all have seen has been the case, that really we haven’t used the Reserve as a Strategic Reserve in these conflicts; we used them as an operational force.

There was a need to do it, but there’s also been some need to cost-effectively use the Guard. As we go forward in this difficult fiscal climate, how do you anticipate preserving that readiness that we have as a result of having the Guard and Reserve acting as an operational force, and how do you anticipate working with the Guard and Reserve to seek their feedback as you make some of these difficult choices going forward?

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Senator.

We are working very closely with the Guard and Reserve. If there’s something we’re withholding from them, it’s not apparent to me, because I’ve said that it’s back to this relationship of trust. It also exists in our Army. It has to exist, and the other Services as well with their Reserve components.

I would like to just elaborate a bit on what you said about the cost-effectiveness, because there is a certain cost-effectiveness to
the Guard and Reserve, but truthfully that’s not why we have them. We’ve had them for centuries, but after Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams made the conscious decision that we would never allow ourselves to go to war again without the Reserves. He did that because he recognized that as we transitioned to an All-Volunteer Force the Guard and Reserve are an extraordinarily important part of our ability to stay connected with America.

As we sit here today, the choice before us is not will we have the participation of the Guard and Reserve. The reality is, Senator, we cannot go anywhere, cannot, without the Guard and Reserve. We’ve built our structures that way. Two-thirds of our combat power is in the Active component, a third in the Guard. But two-thirds of our sustainment capability is in the Guard and Reserve and only a third of it in the Active component.

We built our Army consciously that way so that we would never again go to war without America. As we go forward with these budget issues, it’s not about are we going to make a stark decision to favor one component over the other. We have to find a way to balance them.

Senator Ayotte. That would include, obviously, readiness across the Active Duty as well as the Guard and Reserve, as the holistic view of our readiness in the future.

General Dempsey. Yes, Senator. Again, to be completely transparent here, we have built some expectations on the back of OCO, for example, on the level of readiness we can have in all components. We’ve never had, really never had an army any component, Active included, that was 100 percent ready to go all the time. That was also true in the Guard and Reserve.

But with OCO now, we’ve been able to raise the level of equipping, training, and every aspect for all components. All of that will be affected to some degree as we lose the ability to apply OCO to our Army. But it’ll be applied fairly, equally, and with a specific outcome in mind, I promise you that.

Senator Ayotte. I thank you and appreciate your comments about how important the Guard and Reserve is to our readiness and to our country and our national security.

I also wanted to ask you, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one of the roles, very important role that you have, of course, is advising the Secretary of Defense and the President on a variety of Defense Department issues and policies. An issue that I’ve been very concerned about is our detention policy, our interrogation policy.

During a June 28 hearing I asked Admiral McRaven if it would be helpful, 10 years into the war on terror, to have a designated long-term detention and interrogation facility for terrorists, for groups like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al Shabab. I wanted to ask you if you agree whether it would be helpful to have a designated long-term detention and interrogation facility, because it seems to me that we’ve had to make some ad hoc decisions and that puts our military leaders in a difficult position.

General Dempsey. It could be, Senator. I’m not being elusive. I’m reflecting my own, where I am in my understanding of the issues. I say it could be because I think where these individuals are placed and whether what we have in our detention of them rises to the
level of evidence vice simply intelligence, because there's a huge difference, if you want to talk about the rule of law, on what's based on intelligence and what's based on evidence. I think we have to understand how agile we need to be and whether our current policies and locations allow us to do it.

The other issue that plays as well is recidivism. That is to say, when we have these individuals in custody, return them to their nations, do they just simply return back to the fight?

This is another one of those issues where I, because I haven't been involved with it, I haven't studied it to the extent I need to to engage you as articulately as I should, but I will.

Senator AYOTTE. I appreciate it. I just want to highlight I think a couple of examples—the case of Warsame, who is a member of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al Shabab, who was kept on a ship for 2 months for interrogation and then brought to the United States. I think we basically, as Admiral Winnefeld said, for now we're making do, and I don't think that making do is good enough, particularly since we're not going to be able to keep every single individual on a ship. That is a short-term type of fix.

I would hope that you would look at this as a very important security issue. As you mentioned, the recidivism rate, 25 percent of those that have been released from Guantanamo have gotten back in the fight against us.

In that vein, I wanted to ask you—my time is almost up, but about a particular case, to ask you to look into. That is Ali Dakduk, who is someone that myself and 18 other Senators, many of whom serve on this committee, he is an individual that was being held in Iraq and is also accused of collaborating with Iranian agents and Shiite militias to kill American troops. We received a report that he was going to be released back to the Iraqis. People are very concerned. The 19 Senators that signed that letter, we're concerned that releasing him back to the Iraqis is like releasing him back into the theater.

This is again another case I would ask you to look carefully at, because it is one that demonstrates again why we need a detention facility that ensures the security of these individuals so that they don't just go back to other countries that will just release them and then we'll be fighting them again.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Senator.
Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, General.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General and Deanie, very much for your kind hospitality. We appreciated it very much the other day, stopping by unannounced, and you're very kind.

Sir, with that, I would concur with Senator Lieberman that you're a sound person and I think things will be very well. I'd like to ask a few questions.

One is following up on Senator Ayotte. She asked about the Guard. I know there's been discussions and concerns about would the Guard ever have a post on the Joint Chiefs of Staff or be of equal footing on that. I know you've been a little bit receptive in
thinking about that, and I didn't know what you thought impediments might prevent that from happening or if there's a possibility.

General Dempsey. I would describe my current position as being open-minded, Senator, but concerned. I'll express concern on two fronts. One is, of course, I just finished, rather inelegantly perhaps, describing how close we are, speaking again for the Army, but the need for the Guard. I just don't know what that would do to the relationship if we had now two four-stars overseeing the same force, because we aspire to be one force.

The other one is more pragmatic, and that is what gives me my authority as the chief, is the budget. If it weren't for the budget, no one would even pay attention to me. But they pay attention to me because I have to deliver something for the Nation using the resources I'm given. I'm held accountable for delivering it.

I don't know what that would mean to a potential National Guard role. All the Service Chiefs, by the way, are in that same situation. They derive their authority both from the title, but also from the fact that they manage their Service's budget. If we have a National Guard four-star on the Joint Chiefs, he's not accountable because he doesn't have anything with which to deliver capability, and so I'd have to understand how that would be sorted out.

Senator Manchin. The other is concerning financial responsibility, but also the situation that we have, and I think that Senator Brown touched on, the $10 million a day that was reported leaving Kabul in suitcases and never got to where it was needed—which is about $3.6 billion a year, and not able to have a handle on that.

I think you've seen or you've been hearing about our debt discussions that we've had. Both Democrats and Republicans have anticipated a trillion dollars or more in savings if it's not spent on the war, another $400 billion in savings on interest that you would be spending on the trillion. That doesn't make a lot of sense to me because we were never anticipated to be there that long. Someone anticipated that we were going to spend that much and now they're taking it as a savings.

Can you give me your thoughts on that? Does it make sense to you at all that we would be saving something we shouldn't have been spending and now they're all counting it and booking it?

General Dempsey. Senator, if you would allow me, I would take personal pleasure in telling you I'm not an economist nor a lawyer, and so I can't go anywhere near that question. But I will say that we have done a great deal of work to try to figure out how to get on top of this issue of spending in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I'd be happy at some point to come and chat with you about that.

Senator Manchin. Do you have an idea basically of how you can secure the corruption that's going on? As we know, Afghanistan—and I think you know my personal feeling is that we should get out as quickly as we possibly can. It's not going to get any better, and they'll steal as much as they can get their hands on, and they've proven it every chance they've had. But how we can stop this blatant type of thievery?

General Dempsey. Yes, sir. We do have some programs. I sent probably our best brigadier general over about a year ago, Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, to stand up an anti-corruption task force and campaign. It's made some progress. In fact, I ought to
have him come back and chat with you about what he’s accomplished.

I wouldn’t suggest that anyone would ever drive corruption in that part of the world to zero, but we can certainly get a lot closer to zero.

Senator MANCHIN. You and I both talked about contracting, the amount of contracting that goes on in the Defense Department, and the cost of contracting and a lot of fraud, abuse, and waste there. I think you’ve shown a desire where you want to look into that in a much more critical way.

I would say also on the flight services, I know that we’re contracting all of our flight services out to take our goods into that area. With that, with NATO also, has there been any types of decisions or discussions on how we could best curtail that or use our own equipment, or are we just too strapped for that?

General DEMPSEY. I don’t know the specifics, sir. I would simply say that I think we have to keep a contracting option open because we would very quickly and very clearly overwhelm our ability to transport the things we need, ground or air, with our own organic resources. I think the issue is really not walking away from contractor support. I think it’s getting it under control.

Senator MANCHIN. Finally, I would ask a question—and I truly believe that—on the draft, what your opinions may be or if you have a position, but just your thoughts on the draft. Of course, those of us sitting on this side, living through Vietnam, the draft pretty much brought that skirmish to an end. I would assume that if we had the draft today we would be taking a much more critical look at what we’re doing over there than we are as we proceed on now. So your thoughts on the draft?

General DEMPSEY. Sir, this comes up from time to time throughout my career. That would very clearly be a political decision, to go back to a system of universal suffrage. What I would offer you at this point in a discussion would be that I think the Nation is better served by an All-Volunteer Force, and I could elaborate on why I believe that. But I think we are better served by an All-Volunteer Force and would seek to find ways to preserve it in an era of fiscal constraint, rather than move at this point to a draft.

Senator MANCHIN. My reasoning for that question was because of all the deployments that the people, families, are basically going through. It’s a tremendous hardship, I know, to them and their families, especially in the Guard back home and to our small States that have a great dependency on the Guard. But with that happening and the pressure that’s put upon them and now with three wars going on, there comes a time when we spread ourselves so thin that the draft is the only option that I think that we would have if that’s the policy we continue down, unless we intervene and stop these senseless wars.

General DEMPSEY. Without commenting on the wars, because sometimes I think, Senator, wars choose you, you don’t choose them. That’s just a professional judgment. But I think that as we look at the lessons of the last 10 years of war, I think we’ll find that the All-Volunteer Force actually performed better and more resiliently than I think its crafters thought it would back in the early 1970s.
But I think we need other options for the Nation when we enter into conflict that can escalate and that can take longer than we thought.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, sir.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Begich.
Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much.

General, thank you for your willingness to continue your service at this level, and I look forward to approving you and again looking forward to your service. I first want to say thank you.

I'm actually going to do one quick thing on Afghanistan to follow up on Senator Manchin. Tell me, from your perspective in regards to the security forces that we and our allies are working to train and ensure that they have their own security force. The question I always have—I know they are growing them, but what is their retention rate of those folks that, once trained by us and doing the service for security at different levels, what's the retention rate that they're able to maintain? At the same time, are they increasing their literacy rate? Because I know we were very successful in Iraq because the literacy rate was also very high. Here it's very low. Can you comment on both those elements, retention and their literacy rate?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I can, sir. Retention has shifted over time, for two reasons. One is in the early days we were paying them at a rate that I think was probably too low to keep them. That was changed about 2 years ago.

The other factor is seasonal. We have to remember that these young men in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, but absolutely in Afghanistan, they're agrarian and so when the planting and harvesting seasons come and go, the attrition rates wax and wane accordingly.

Now, that said, General Caldwell, who is currently in charge of our NATO Training Mission-Iraq, monitors the attrition issue constantly. We also think the literacy issue is related to attrition.

Senator BEGICH. Absolutely.

General DEMPSEY. I don't have the number committed to memory, Senator, but it's more than 10,000 and growing, the number of soldiers we've risen or helped achieve an eighth grade, as I recall it, level of literacy.

These issues are all related, but your concerns about attrition are shared by us, as well as the concern for how we develop leaders, because you can develop a basic rifleman; it's a little more challenging to develop the leaders to lead them.

Senator BEGICH. Can you share—you don't have to do it right now, obviously, but if you could get to my office—maybe what you see those trend lines look like over the last several years and where we're going in literacy attainment within our security force that Afghanistan has, as well as the retention rate?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir.

Senator BEGICH. Will you do that?

General DEMPSEY. Yes. The last time I touched on it the trend line on attrition was trending positive, which means we were gaining control of it. The trend line on literacy training was also
trending positive, but that is an enormous slope to climb, for all the reasons you suggested. But both trends are positive.

Senator Begich. Good. If you could share that with us that would be great.

[The information referred to follows:]

Attrition:

Attrition is an ongoing issue within the ANSF. ANA attrition rates from June 2010 to June 2011 averaged 2.5 percent or 3,817 personnel per month. ANA recruiting rates averaged 4.2 percent or 6,241 personnel per month. Attrition will not prevent the ANA from achieving their projected manning fiscal year 2011 goal of 171,600 personnel. This graph displays ANA strength, manning goals, recruiting and attrition from June 2010 to June 2011.

ANP attrition rates from June 2010 to June 2011 averaged 1.4 percent or 1,682 personnel per month. ANP recruiting rates averaged 2.8 percent or 3,248 personnel per month. Attrition will not prevent the ANP from achieving their projected manning fiscal year 2011 goal of 134,000 personnel. This graph displays ANA strength, manning goals, recruiting and attrition from June 2010 to June 2011.
Literacy:

Illiteracy is one of our greatest challenges in developing the ANSF. NTM–A is building a National Army and National Police force out of a population that has a 28 percent literacy rate.

Approximately 86 percent of all new recruits coming into the ANSF are illiterate.

In order to address this issue, NTM–A has established literacy programs throughout the ANSF. The literacy program began in October 2009. At the time there were approximately 13,941 ANSF (7,596 ANA and 6,345 ANP) literate at a 1st grade level. On 28 July 11, the 100,000th ANSF student graduated from 1st grade level literacy training. These students completed training and passed a certification exam. The ANA increased the number of personnel with 1st grade literacy by 634 percent since October 2009. The ANP increased the number of personnel with 1st grade literacy by 934 percent since October 2009.

New recruits going through their initial training receive literacy training. Soldiers attending NCO and Officer training receive additional literacy training. There are training programs in place at ANSF forward operating bases throughout Afghanistan.

Senator BEGICH. You just made me think of something additionally. Because I know the military does this. They always have a contingency plan about everything, plan A, B, C, all the way to Z. I'm assuming somewhere, and maybe it's not within DOD, but maybe it's a combo between DOD, State, and others: Assume the scenario we're out of Afghanistan; there is a financial cost that we're going to be committed to at some point, for all the reasons. Their economy can't sustain the security forces that we're training for and everyone else is training for. They don't have the money.

Is there somewhere within DOD, State Department, or a combo, or one of the other agencies, that has looked at a scenario X that, out of Afghanistan, here is the U.S. commitment financially?

General DEMPSEY. Yes, and I would add NATO.
Senator Begich. NATO.

General Dempsey. Because it's very clear that as we reach 2014 that, as you suggested, there will be a lingering economic challenge for Afghanistan and we will have to assist. I say "we" again meaning not just the United States.

Senator Begich. The combination.

General Dempsey. Right.

Senator Begich. But we'll have a commitment.

General Dempsey. I believe we will, yes, sir.

Senator Begich. Do you know, is that something that's available at this point to review and what those costs might be? Is that something that you could get back to me, at least, with and determine where I need to direct that question?

General Dempsey. Let me contact, if I could, Senator, the CENTCOM commander, who would essentially, as the combatant commander for that region, oversee that effort, and I'll see if I can put him in touch with you or if he can communicate with you through me.

Senator Begich. That would be great. Thank you very much.

Let me walk through a couple other quick ones. Obviously, in Alaska we care greatly about missile defense system, and I know the military has done some additional work and they're continuing to make some additional plans of finishing up some of the fields there and also some additional interceptors.

Can you give me your opinion of the missile defense system that's currently in Alaska, but also let me add another caveat to this. As we know, the system there deals with North Korea, the Pacific Rim, so forth, but also has reach to the east coast, but very last minute, last second kind of Iran issue.

It's a two-part question: One, your thoughts on ground-based midcourse defense for Alaska; but also, is there a need for a complementary system on the east coast to then finish the efforts of not only North Korea, but more robust in dealing with Iran? If you could answer those two pieces of the question?

General Dempsey. Yes, sir. The current strategy calls for replicating what you would describe as an air defense capability on the West Coast, but replicating that in Europe because of the flight plan of any missile that might be launched from Iran. There's also some, I'll describe them as very early, nascent discussions with Russia about sharing early warning and things that could be very positive.

I think this work is ongoing and important, and I'll give it my full interest.

Senator Begich. The system we have up in Alaska is important. You see where I'm going here.

General Dempsey. I do, sir, and it is.

Senator Begich. Very good.

Let me move to another issue, the Law of the Sea Treaty. Some members that were here last week up for nomination for different positions within DOD, I was asking them the same question. We're one of the few countries that haven't signed onto this treaty. We're hanging out with Syria, Iran, and Libya. Those are the people that we're in company with who haven't signed also, which is not the company I care to keep and I'm sure you don't care to keep either.
Can you tell me just your thoughts on the Law of the Sea Treaty from a military perspective? The complaint people have is that this gives up our sovereignty if we sign this treaty. I disagree with that. I think this helps our sovereignty, strengthens our sovereignty. Can you give me your thoughts on that?

General Dempsey. I support the other leaders who have testified and attested to the fact that I think it will improve our standing and our security if we enter into the Law of the Sea Convention.

Senator Begich. Thank you very much.

My time is up. I have one question which I'll submit for the record. It's in this very tight budgetary time, where I sit on the Budget Committee—the military budget is a big challenge. We've dealt with some cuts that have to be dealt with. But how we balance that between personnel and assuring that we have a robust volunteer system and ensure that pay and benefits and retirements are there, at the same time how do we balance against some of the infrastructure. I have a more detailed question. I'll submit it to the record, but that's the gist of it, how you will manage that to make sure we have the fighting men and women that we need, but at the same time deal with some severe budget constraints. I'll just submit that for the record, if that's okay.

General Dempsey. Okay, Senator. Thanks.

Senator Begich. Thank you very much. Good luck.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.

Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congratulations on your nomination. I know you will do a good job and your family's proud. This is a special time in your life.

Iraq. There are increasing reports coming from Iraq that Iran is introducing weapons into Iraq, into Shia militia hands, explosively formed penetrators and more lethal rockets. Is that generally true?

General Dempsey. I've heard both General Austin and others state that they have intelligence that suggests that is true, yes, Senator.

Senator Graham. The argument is that they're trying to claim they drove us out of Iraq, the Iranians. Do you generally agree with that assessment?

General Dempsey. I obviously can't speak for their motivations, but I will say that my contact with my colleagues in Iraq—and I'm talking about my Iraqi colleagues—many of them believe that's the case.

Senator Graham. What is your message to Iran, General Dempsey?

General Dempsey. It would be a gross miscalculation to believe that we will simply allow that to occur without taking serious consideration or reacting to it.

Senator Graham. I think that is a very sound position. I doubt if the Iranians are watching, but they need to be listening, because I think it would be a gross miscalculation on the Iranian part to believe that you can be involved in killing Americans and nothing comes your way.

Iraq. If the Iraqi Government requested additional troops to remain in 2012 in Iraq, do you think it would be wise for us to agree to that request?
General DEMPSEY. I do, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. I think there's plans in the works to try to come up with a formulation somewhere around 10,000; is that correct?

General DEMPSEY. I don't know the number, Senator, but it would be a number where we could provide the capability that they would request, that we would be able to protect ourselves, and it would have to meet both of our Nations' mutual interest.

Senator GRAHAM. Right. One, they'd have to ask and we'd have to agree. But one of the concerns is the forces that we have along the Kurdish-Arab fault lines have paid dividends. There has been no real fighting, but there have been some skirmishes. I guess one of the things you would want to look at in terms of future troop presence is to have sort of a referee along those lines; is that correct?

General DEMPSEY. I have heard discussion of that as one of the capabilities we might be able to provide for them if asked.

Senator GRAHAM. Now let's move to Afghanistan. There's a lot of talk about 2014. My view is that the drawdown of all surge forces by September 2012 has reignited the debate in Afghanistan and the region, is America leaving, and the enemy is seizing upon that drawdown schedule. But one thing that we could do in my view to reset that debate is to enter into a relationship with the Afghans, if they request it, post-2014.

Several months ago I asked Secretary Gates about his view as to whether or not he believes it would be wise to have an enduring military, economic, and political relationship with the Afghans if they requested such a relationship past 2014. What he said regarding the security agreement, he said: "A security agreement with Afghanistan that provided for a continuing relationship and some kind of joint facilities and so on for training, for counterterrorism, and so on beyond 2014 I think would be very much in our interest. I think it would serve as a barrier to Iranian influence coming from the west. I think it would serve as a barrier to reconstitution of the Taliban and others coming from the border areas of Pakistan. So I think it would be a stabilizing effect, not just in Afghanistan, but in the region."

Do you agree with that?

General DEMPSEY. I do, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. As I understand, there are some ongoing negotiations between the Afghans and our government to have a stabilizing, enduring joint relationship on the military side past 2014; is that correct?

General DEMPSEY. I've read that in the open press, Senator. I have not been brought into that dialogue, but I've read the same reports.

Senator GRAHAM. But as the senior military adviser to the President, if you get this job you would recommend that we go down that road to send the right signal to the Afghans and to the region; is that correct?

General DEMPSEY. I would, Senator. That's without putting any assumptions about how long or how big, but I think that simply the thought that we would have an enduring relationship could send the right signal.
Senator GRAHAM. Let’s look at this photo again, this photo of this NCO basically calling for assistance. It’s called “Trust” and I think it’s a great photo.

One of the things that I worry about is that allies of the United States, partners of the United States, need to trust us. Do you agree with that?

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely.

Senator GRAHAM. A lot of people in Afghanistan and Iraq have taken on radical Islamic extremists and they’ve paid a heavy price; is that true?

General DEMPSEY. They have, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. The Afghan and Iraqi people have paid a very heavy price fighting for their freedom. What I’m trying to impress upon people back home, I’m going to at noon get asked about, why would you invest money in a schoolhouse in Afghanistan when we need improvements in our schools in South Carolina? How would you answer that question?

General DEMPSEY. I’d probably say that it’s important to remember that we went to Afghanistan for our national interest, not theirs, and there is a residual requirement for that for how long as we deem our ability to do so. But this isn’t about doing things just for them. It’s in some way about doing things for us.

Senator GRAHAM. One way to defeat radical Islam is to provide an education to young women and young men to give them the tools to fight back and chart a new course for Afghanistan; do you agree with that?

General DEMPSEY. I do, sir, within means and capabilities.

Senator GRAHAM. Within means and capability. A schoolhouse may do more good for the long-term security of the United States than maybe a brigade in Afghanistan?

General DEMPSEY. It could very well be, when we reach the point of stability.

Senator GRAHAM. Now, killing bin Laden was a seminal moment in the war on terror. I want to congratulate the President and our Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency and all those who stayed on the case. But I have a theory that killing terrorists only takes you so far when it comes to security. The ultimate security is partnerships; partnerships with people in the region who, if they had the capability to marry up with their will, they would fight back against these radical elements.

I know it’s more labor-intensive. I know it costs more money and in many ways it’s deadlier. But I believe the payoff is greater.

What is your view of our Nation’s security being enhanced by having countries like Iraq and Afghanistan becoming stable, representative in nature, and generally aligned with us in rejecting radical Islam? Would that be a transformational event in the war on terror more than killing bin Laden?

General DEMPSEY. I think it would have benefits beyond just the war on terrorism. I’m an advocate of building global relationships both to promote our values, to have partners who can help us when we encounter an uncertain future. I just think that we are better and we’re a better army when we are out and about and interacting with our peers.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, first congratulations. I thank you for your many years of service and what was apparently one of the briefest tenures as the Army Chief of Staff in history, I think.

Let me ask you a series of questions. The President’s budget proposes that we move to a smaller Army and Marine Corps. In response to the advance policy questions, you indicated agreement with the reductions in end strength that are included in the President’s long-range budget. My concern is that we have heard repeatedly from military officials and mental health experts that a dwell time of 2 years at home for every 1 year deployed is the minimum time necessary to preserve the long-term mental and physical health of our forces.

Certainly the Army and the Marine Corps have borne the brunt of the two wars in which we are now engaged. We’re not counting Libya as well. What will be the impact in your view of reducing the end strength on our ability to meet those dwell time goals?

General DEMPSEY. Senator, my responsibility as the Service Chief, with my fellow Service Chiefs and the current Chairman, is to take the budget targets we’ve been given and to determine how we provide capabilities, how much force structure that involves, how much modernization, how much training, maintenance, and readiness—this is your point—at a rate which we can sustain the All-Volunteer Force.

For the Army, it is in fact 1 year deployed to 2 year home boots-on-the-ground (BOG)-dwell ratio. As we do this, some of it is art and some of it’s science. The science of it is to take that BOG-dwell ratio, apply the force you can afford, and see if you can sustain it. We’re running those models and that analysis right now.

Senator COLLINS. I hope that you will keep a very close watch on this. I think it’s absolutely critical. I understand that we’re drawing down our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, but I’m very concerned about the strain and pressure of repeated deployments. This strikes me as the wrong time to be reducing the size of our force, and so I think we need to watch that very carefully.

Let me turn to an issue that Senator Webb raised with you, and that is sea power. The fact is that our Navy currently has the fewest numbers of ships since before World War I. Now, our ships are clearly more capable than they used to be, but, as an admiral once told me, quantity has a quality of its own, and you do need to have a sufficient number of ships.

I’m concerned by what we see in China, with an enormous build-up by the Chinese of their fleet. I’m concerned by a February 2011 report by the Navy on surface ship readiness that found that 60 percent of the fleet is underway at any given time and 43 percent is forward deployed. Those figures represent historic high percentages.

Our national security demands are growing. The ships are now going to be playing a very important role in ballistic missile defense. The fact is that we have a gap between the 285-ship Navy that we currently have and the 313-ship Navy that the Chief of Naval Operations has described repeatedly as the floor, as the absolute minimum.
So first question: Do you support the Navy’s goal of increasing the number of ships that we have to 313?

General DEMPSEY. Against the current strategy, Senator, I do. I would only caveat it by saying that as we do this analysis of resources we may have to actually change our strategy. We may reach a point where we say as Joint Chiefs we cannot achieve the strategy, here’s the recommendations we make on changing our strategy, whether it’s forward presence, whether it’s allocating resources or not, to building partner capacity.

In other words, your point hits exactly at the challenge I face, we face, which is we have a strategy and we have the means to execute it today. The means will change. We’ll make some adaptations on how we do things. But at some point we may reach a point where we have to recommend to the President that we have to adapt or revise our strategy. We’re not there.

In answer to your question, right now I absolutely do agree with the Navy’s shipbuilding program. I’m aware how it supports their air-sea battle concept. I’m aware what it does for us with anti-access, denial activities. It’s the right strategy with the right resources for today, and if the strategy changes then I’ll change my opinion about it.

Senator COLLINS. My concern is that the budget is at risk of dragging the strategy, rather than the other way around. The way we should be doing this is determining our military requirements and have that dictate our resources, not the other way around.

There certainly are savings to be achieved. I’m going to submit a couple of questions for the record on overseas bases, military construction overseas, on some procurements that our Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee has looked at, that has to do with the enterprise resource programs, which are now sole source contracts and have enormous cost overruns.

But let me use my remaining seconds to bring up a report that Senator Lieberman and I produced through our Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee. It was on whether or not the Fort Hood shootings could have been prevented. I want to make sure to bring that report to your attention because, while we found that there was very poor communication between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Army, we also found that the Army had sufficient evidence on its own of Major Hasan’s increasing radicalization.

We found that there was a flawed personnel evaluation process that was very troubling, because not only was his radicalization evident, but the fact is he wasn’t a good doctor. Yet many times he received outstanding ratings. One of his supervisors actually told the people at Fort Hood: You’re getting our worst. Yet that physician had an outstanding rating.

I would ask you to take a look at the rating process throughout DOD. I think that’s absolutely critical.

General DEMPSEY. We actually are in the process of taking those lessons learned and adapting policies. But I will continue the work. You have my commitment for that.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
Senator Hagan.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Dempsey, I just want to welcome you and I am looking forward to your confirmation. To Mrs. Dempsey, it's always a pleasure seeing you and I know this is definitely a team effort. Thank you for all your past service and sacrifice.

Recently I joined several of my colleagues in sending a letter to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Gates, regarding findings of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission. This commission, established by Congress, issued a decision paper earlier this year. This is about women in combat. It stated that tactical and operational occupations and command assignments are important factors that increase opportunities for promotion to higher officer ranks, but women and minorities are underrepresented in tactical and operational career fields and in candidate pools for command assignments; and the most important barrier keeping women from serving in tactical and operational career fields is the DOD and Service policies that prohibit women from serving in occupations involving direct offensive ground combat.

The commission recommended DOD and the Services conduct a phased elimination of combat exclusion policies for women. My question, General Dempsey, is what do you think are the opportunities and risks for eliminating combat exclusion policies for women?

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Senator. There is a DOD task force in fact looking at what have we learned over 10 years about the nature of the current conflicts. Of course, I don't have to explain this to you. You have visited. But the nature of current conflict is there's no front line and back line. Some of the rules we have in place on collocation, for example, are simply outdated and need to be revised. We're prepared to do that as an Army.

Now again, the DOD task force is looking both at collocation issues, but also at the issue of changing access to particular military occupational specialties. That work should take place here in the fall. I fully support it. I think we will learn that there are additional opportunities to be made available, and my commitment to you is to keep that on my agenda.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. I think from a fairness standpoint, from the promotion, it certainly has to be on a level playing field, so that we can have very talented people in the upper levels.

I also wanted to ask on the role of Pakistan. Pakistan is a key regional actor in Central Asia, although right now our relationship with Pakistan is complicated. Pakistan is obviously an important player in terms of regional stability in Central Asia.

Can you describe how the Pressler Amendment has affected our relationship with Pakistan and how do you feel the United States needs to interact currently with Pakistan and in the future? How do you feel we should use the aid as a weapon of influence, based on the current relationship that we have now with Pakistan?

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Senator. I think Pakistan is an enormously important country in the CENTCOM area of operations. In fact, when I was the Acting CENTCOM Commander I considered it to be among probably the top one or two countries to be addressed.
We’ve had, as you described it yourself, a very complex relationship with them. But I think it’s one we need to stick with. To your point about the Pressler Amendment, that was a period in our history where we made a determination that we had such stark differences with Pakistan, notably on the issue of nuclearization, that we would cut off not only all aid, but all contact. As a result, we have now a generation among the Pakistan military, we have a generation of officers—generally they are field-grade majors and lieutenant colonels—who not only know nothing about us, but actually are somewhat antagonistic toward us because they’ve had no contact with us, and they simply remember a period of time when they were prohibited from having contact.

I think that’s a mistake. The point would be as we go forward to Pakistan, I think we should continue to find areas of common interest. There are plenty of those. I think we ought to acknowledge where we have differences and there ought to be consequences for greater or lesser cooperation. But I think we have to stick with the relationship.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

I also wanted to ask a question about the military assistance for education. I know that GAO released a report back in March that focused on the military transition assistance program. My understanding is that oversight of the education programs receiving tuition assistance funds is really lacking and that the for-profit schools in particular have used in some cases, not all, improper tactics to enroll troops.

I’m also told that just this week the Pentagon has imposed some new rules for online-only schools, in which our military are using the tuition assistance dollars. This is a direct result from the findings of the GAO report. I think that’s positive. But I also feel strongly that these rules need to go further.

Shouldn’t these rules—and we’re talking about online—also apply to brick and mortar institutions, so that all of the for-profit institutions are held to the same standards, whether they’re online or not? Additionally, with all of the fraud and abuse that we’ve seen, do you believe these rules should apply to all DOD and Veterans Affairs (VA) benefits and not just the tuition assistance programs?

General DEMPSEY. It’s an interesting point you raise. We are focused at this time on online education, but it certainly seems logical that we would be focused on making sure that these soldiers get best value for the money, whether they’re in a brick and mortar schoolhouse or online.

But this next generation is more likely to seek education opportunities online, so that’s probably why we have chosen to start the process there. But I would support the idea that we should take a look at both.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.

Senator Portman.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, congratulations on your nomination, it’s well deserved. I believe I am the one person standing between you and a very
well-deserved break, so I will try to be succinct. I'm delighted you're willing to step forward, and you've had a very distinguished career and I look forward to working with you.

Let me ask you a few questions, if I could, on the fiscal side, because we find ourselves in, unfortunately, very difficult economic and fiscal times. The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, has talked about this. In January he said: “The Pentagon’s budget has basically doubled over the last decade and my own experience here is that in doubling we’ve lost our ability to prioritize, we’ve lost our ability to make hard decisions, to do tough analysis, to make trades.”

He also issued this very famous quote that maybe has been brought up earlier today, which is: “The single biggest threat to our national security is our debt.”

Let me ask you a couple just quick comments, if you could, on that. One, do you agree with him on his famous quote about the debt being our biggest national security threat? Second, do you agree with him that we’ve lost our ability to prioritize, make hard decisions, and do tough analysis?

General DEMPSEY. On the first, Senator, which is the idea that our economic condition is the greatest threat to national security, I don’t agree exactly with that. I’m very——

Senator PORTMAN. Fiscal, he said, not economic.

General DEMPSEY. Sorry?

Senator PORTMAN. Fiscal, so the debt.

General DEMPSEY. The way I would prefer to describe it is the issue is national power. From what do we derive our national power? We derive our national power, our influence across the globe, our access to resources, global commons, that is all derived from the combination of three things. You can’t pick or choose. You have to have strength in the military arm, the diplomatic arm, and the economic arm.

So to the extent that he says our economic arm is weakened, therefore we are less capable across the globe, I buy that entirely. But I don’t want to find myself in a position of voting that one or the other of those is more important than the other.

On the issue, to the second part, about whether the Pentagon has lost the ability to prioritize, yes. I think I would probably say that you develop cultures over time. When times are flush with resources, the culture becomes that you just aren’t forced to make those kind of decisions. Then when the cycle returns and resources are more constrained, it requires a change in culture. So yes, I agree with that.

Senator PORTMAN. Let me dig a little deeper on that in terms of one issue, which is the acquisition side of your future role and your current role as a Service Chief. I just left the Contracting Oversight Subcommittee, where I’m the ranking member on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, where we were talking about the tough fiscal conditions we face and how we need to have Government do more with less.

In my time here on this committee, looking at various programs and witnessing some of the challenges we have in fielding capabilities for the Services in a timely way, it seems to me there are a few common themes. Surely there’s a lot we can do in the acquisi-
tion process. The chairman and others have been involved with that over the years.

But I hear just as often blame attributed to the way the Department develops requirements. I'm involved again on this contracting issue on a broader scale and looking at the Joint Strike Fighter, for instance, where now we're looking at projected cost overrun of $150 billion roughly—incredible.

You and Admiral Winnefeld, who was up here last week, are going to be in the middle of all this. It seems to me attempts to look at the data and analysis and get away from some of the litany of documents and lockstep wickets is a good thing. I get the feeling a lot of this stuff early on in the programs is time-consuming. It's a lot of paperwork. It's a need to meet the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System review requirements. The intent is certainly the right one. We need to figure out what we need before we develop it.

But something's not working here, and I just wonder if you could talk a little about this. Do you think the efforts being made to alter some of these processes are significant enough, and what would you do to ensure that real change occurs?

General DEMPSEY. I completely agree that the status quo is unacceptable and that the system itself does require reform. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Ash Carter is working diligently, based on some of the guidance we've received from the Congress of the United States.

I think there are some answers actually. I think the Service Chiefs need to have a greater role throughout the process. Right now we tend to have a role in requirements determination, but then the process is handed over to find a material solution. I think we have to partner more closely throughout the process, from start to finish, with industry.

I think we need to take a shorter time horizon on acquisitions. The way requirements creep is when we have decade-long programs, which allow the aperture to remain open and for guys like me to keep stuffing things through. I think the answer is greater collaboration between requirements determination, material solution, greater collaboration with industry earlier, and shorter time horizons, as a start, but there's probably other opportunities as well.

Senator PORTMAN. I think we're going to be forced to make some of those tough decisions, as you said, to prioritize.

By the way, you said Ash Carter, in reaction to guidance from Congress, is looking at some of these issues. I can't help myself, Mr. Chairman, say that some of the guidance I think it's fair to say from Congress on the second engine on the Joint Strike Fighter is not being adhered to, and that is what we want competition.

General DEMPSEY. I had more in mind the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act.

Senator PORTMAN. I know, yes. I just think we have to go to competition wherever possible, get the costs down, and be sure that it's open and fair.

Financial management. I want to get your thoughts on this. We recently had a debate on this on the floor because the Senate chose not to have so many positions be confirmed through the normal ad-
vise and consent process, which is a good thing. We're streamlining it. I offered an amendment, supported by many on this committee, saying there are some folks in the Federal Government who ought to continue to go through a process because we want to give them the stature that comes with that and empower them, and that included the financial management officials at the Department, including the Comptroller and each Service branch's financial management officer.

We were successful in getting that done. The reason we did it, again, was to be sure that those folks are listened to by others who are confirmed, and those who are in the civilian leadership at the Pentagon are usually the people we talk to about this issue. But I would tell you today that I think the auditing function, being sure that you have financial officers in every Service who are getting the attention from the leadership, is extremely important and I would hope that the uniformed leadership would continue to play a role, in fact, I would say even a more active role. I think some view those back office functions as not important to our fighting forces. I would say, particularly in these times, it's incredibly important. The Marine Corps recently showed this, I think. By focusing more on financial management, they claimed a three dollar rate of return for every dollar spent on financial management, for instance.

As one member, I will tell you I would hope that you personally will get engaged in this issue. With the increasing pressure on the Pentagon's budget, we ought to be sure that every dollar is spent as intended and that we're freeing up funds for critical needs by focusing on financial management.

Can you give me your quick thoughts on that as a Service Chief now and how you intend to approach this as Chairman?

General DEMPSEY. As a Service Chief, I absolutely concur that we tend to look at—we describe them as Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP), where the money is placed inside of our budget, and we tend to look at the top 10 percent of our MDAPs because that's where the big dollars are. Actually, it's 17 percent of the MDAPs have about 50 percent of the financial management challenges. But that's where we tend to focus our sight because it's the big dollars.

But there's another 50 percent out there in the smaller MDAPs, that total $3, $4, $5 million, and I think we're in one of those environments where we have to be paying attention to all of it.

Then the other aspect of it is audit ability. We're on path to become auditable by 2017, and I'm committed to that.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, General. I appreciate it and again appreciate your willingness to step forward.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Portman.

I would recommend to you, relative to the issue of contracting in Afghanistan, a report which was a major report of this committee in October 2010, entitled “Inquiry Into the Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan.” It was a long investigation, a detailed investigation, a very disturbing investigation, about the shortfalls of our private security contractors and the regulations and the policies needed to govern their operations.
The article that we saw in the paper the other day about some of the funds ending up in the hands of our enemy was based on that investigation, made reference, as a matter of fact, to the investigation.

But in terms of trying to put an end to some of the waste and worse that was going on and is going on relative to contractors in Afghanistan, I would recommend that very detailed report that we all worked so hard on.

I was intrigued by your comment about how much personal pleasure you take from not being a lawyer, but I will not pursue that, being a lawyer, since I'm interested in your rapid confirmation.

Unless there are any additional questions from Senator Portman, we will, with thanks to you and your bride, stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**DEFENSE REFORMS**

*Question.* You previously have answered the committee’s policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in connection with your nomination to be the Chief of Staff, Army.

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed from the perspective of your nomination to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) or since you testified before the committee at your most recent confirmation hearing for the Chief of Staff, Army?

*Answer.* Generally, no. Goldwater-Nichols made us the joint force we are today. However, if confirmed, I would examine the lessons of the past 10 years of war to determine if there are opportunities to make us an even more effective force.

**DUTIES**

*Question.* Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the CJCS is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the CJCS?

*Answer.* The CJCS performs duties as prescribed in law and as assigned by the Secretary of Defense. These duties include being the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman also heads and regularly convenes the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and regularly consults with combatant commanders. Where the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff differs, the Chairman conveys dissenting opinions in rendering his advice.

*Question.* Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that Secretary Panetta would prescribe for you?

*Answer.* I anticipate the Secretary will assign duties consistent with the law and designed to support the requirements of the Secretary and the President.

*Question.* If confirmed, what changes to section 151, if any, would you recommend?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I do not anticipate recommending any changes to the law. I will, however, be attuned to issues and opportunities that might suggest consideration of potential changes to the law in the future.

*Question.* Sections 152 through 155 of title 10, U.S.C., relate to the duties, organization, and functions of the Chairman and Vice CJCS, and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff.

If confirmed, what changes to sections 152 through 155, if any, would you recommend?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I do not anticipate recommending any changes to the law. I will, however, be attuned to potential issues and opportunities for improvement that might suggest consideration for eventual changes in the law.
Question. What duties, responsibilities, and priorities would you plan to assign to the Vice CJCS?
Answer. The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as assigned by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. I have not yet determined any additional duty assignments beyond those prescribed in law. If confirmed, I intend to discuss potential duties with the Vice Chairman as part of our close working relationship.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the most critical functions and performance of the Joint Staff? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to enhance the performance of the Joint Staff?
Answer. The Joint Staff is independently organized and operated to support the Chairman and Vice CJCS in discharging their duties as assigned by law. Among these duties, serving as the principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense and President of the United States is paramount. This requires close collaboration and coordination with the staffs of the Secretary of Defense, Service Chiefs, and combatant commanders as well as other interagency offices and foreign military staffs. One ongoing change to the Joint Staff is the integration of certain functions and responsibilities that currently reside in Joint Forces Command. In addition to managing this transition, I will be alert to other opportunities to improve Joint Staff performance.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I’ve been the beneficiary of assignments both with the Joint Force and within the Institutional Army that provide an important perspective on national security issues. Specifically, I’ve served as General Hugh Shelton’s special assistant when he was the CJCS, as a Division Commander in combat, in a security assistance/building partner capacity role in both Saudi Arabia and Iraq, as Deputy and then Acting Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), as Commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and as Chief of Staff of the Army.

Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the CJCS?
Answer. Yes. It seems clear we are entering a future environment that is more complex, less predictable, and faster paced. It is also clear we are entering a new fiscal environment. To be effective in that environment, I will need to establish strong relationships with the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, the President, and Congress. I will also have to ensure that as a military we learn faster and adapt more quickly than our potential adversaries. Finally, if confirmed, I will be the senior military officer in the Nation. With that comes responsibility as the steward of our profession. Therefore, I will take personal interest in the development of our force as professionals in the service of our Nation.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Chairman and other officials. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the CJCS to the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The CJCS must have a close working relationship with the Secretary of Defense. Under title 10, the Chairman is assigned several duties that guide the relationship to include serving as the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman also performs other duties assigned by the Secretary of Defense.

Question. The National Security Advisor.
Answer. The National Security Advisor is a special assistant and direct advisor to the President. As the role of the Chairman is to serve as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and Secretary of Defense, if confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the National Security Advisor to ensure our efforts are synchronized across the interagency and for the purpose of implementing presidential decisions.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary.

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current Department of Defense (DOD) directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the CJCS.

Question. The General Counsel of DOD.

Answer. Under title 10, U.S.C., section 140, the DOD General Counsel serves as the chief legal officer of DOD. In general, the DOD General Counsel is responsible for overseeing legal services, establishing policy, and overseeing the DOD Standards of Conduct Program, establishing policy and positions on specific legal issues and advising on significant international law issues raised in major military operations, the DOD Law of War Program, and legality of weapons reviews. The DOD General Counsel works closely with the Office of Legal Counsel to the CJCS, and communications with the combatant commanders by the DOD General Counsel are normally transmitted through the CJCS.

Question. The DOD Inspector General.

Answer. The DOD Inspector General performs the duties, has the responsibilities, and exercises the powers specified in the Inspector General Act of 1978. If confirmed, I will cooperate with and provide support to the DOD Inspector General as required.

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The Vice CJCS performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. The Chairman advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments conform to priorities in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the combatant commands.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

Answer. Because of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. However, this does not diminish their importance with respect to title 10 responsibilities. Among other things, they serve two significant roles. First, they are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no combatant commander can assure the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President. Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs are advisers to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. In this function, they play a critically important role in shaping military advice and transforming our joint capabilities. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Service Chiefs to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements.

Question. The combatant commanders.

Answer. The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. By law, and to the extent directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman for the combatant commanders and is charged with overseeing their activities. He provides a vital link between the combatant commanders and other elements of DOD, and as directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with the combatant commanders to enable their warfighting capability and to provide support.

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

Answer. The Chief of the National Guard heads a joint activity of DOD and is the senior unified National Guard officer responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, programs, and plans affecting more than half a million Army and Air National Guard personnel. Appointed by the President, he serves as
principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS on National Guard matters. He is also the principal adviser to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard issues. As National Guard Bureau Chief, he serves as the Department’s official channel of communication with the Governors and Adjutants General. If confirmed, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau will continue to have full access to the upper echelons of the Joint Staff and me.

Question. The Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Answer. There is no command relationship between the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the U.S. military. However, because of the critical importance of coordinating State Department and DOD activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan to advance U.S. policy objectives in the region, if confirmed, I will work closely with him to ensure our efforts are synchronized.

Answer. Although the CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, he is not in the chain of command of the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR–A). The Commander, USFOR–A reports to the Commander, CENTCOM, who, in turn, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. This reporting relationship is prescribed in title 10 U.S.C. section 164(d)(1). The Commander, USFOR–A does not have a formal command relationship with the CJCS, but he coordinates with him through the Commander, CENTCOM on a regular basis. The Commander, USFOR–A sends his advice and opinions on military operations to the Commander, CENTCOM, who, in turn, presents them to the Chairman.

Question. The Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq.
Answer. Although the CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, he is not in the chain of command of the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF–I). The Commander, USF–I reports to the Commander, CENTCOM, who, in turn, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. This reporting relationship is prescribed in title 10 U.S.C. section 164(d)(1). The Commander, USF–I does not have a formal command relationship with the CJCS, but he coordinates with him through the Commander, CENTCOM on a regular basis. The Commander, USF–I sends his advice and opinions on military operations to the Commander, CENTCOM, who, in turn, presents them to the Chairman.

Major Challenges and Priorities

Question. What is your vision for the Armed Forces of today and the future?
Answer. We have the finest military in the world today, and we must maintain it as the finest military in the future. We must provide the Nation with the military it needs, and that means we must provide our leaders with options. The force must be responsive, decisive, versatile, interdependent, and affordable. We are likely to be somewhat smaller, but in doing so we must remain capable of providing what the Nation needs. Delivering a force such as I’ve described will require us to reform many of our current processes including but not limited to the acquisition and procurement processes as well as our training and leader development strategies. It will likely be necessary to establish a different relationship among the Active and Reserve components of our Armed Forces, and it is likely that we will have to establish a different relationship among our closest allies and partners.

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next CJCS?
Answer. The next Chairman must achieve the Nation’s objectives in the current conflicts, shape the international security environment, prepare the force for an uncertain future, respond to a changing fiscal reality, and do all of that while preserving the All-Volunteer Force.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?
Answer. Addressing these challenges starts with a clear-eyed look at the mid-future and the determination of what the Nation needs in its military. Stated another way, we must decide what military capabilities we need in 2020 and determine how we will deliver them.

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?
Answer. We have to provide whatever it takes to achieve our national objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have to maintain pressure on those state and non-state actors who threaten us. We have to stay connected to the American people, and we have to keep faith with
soldiers, families, and veterans. As I said earlier, the Joint Force for 2020 must be responsive, decisive, versatile, interdependent, and affordable.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct communications to combatant commanders be transmitted through the CJCS and may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function.

Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and effective chain of command?

Answer. The current chain of command provides a clear and effective means for employing our Nation’s military. The combatant commanders, under the orders of the Secretary of Defense, fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman provides a vital link between the President, the Secretary of Defense, the combatant commander, and the Service Chiefs. If confirmed, I may inform decisions and transmit directions, but there will be no question that the combatant commanders receive their orders from the Secretary of Defense.

Question. The recent successful mission against Osama bin Laden was executed using military forces of DOD, under the control of the Central Intelligence Agency, and predicated under the authorities in title 10, U.S.C.

Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority outside the chain of command established under title 10, U.S.C.?

Answer. I believe the chain of command established by title 10 is the appropriate mechanism for the command and control of military operations. Without commenting on the bin Laden operation in particular, it is my understanding that in general there are circumstances in which military capabilities should be made available temporarily to support an activity of a non-DOD U.S. Government department or agency. In these instances, it is appropriate for the head of such department or agency to direct the operations of the element providing that military support. The President remains at the top of the chain of command and at all times has overall command and responsibility for the operation. The military units supporting such an operation are still governed by the laws of armed conflict and, as an administrative matter, the military personnel remain accountable to the military chain of command, including for matters of discipline under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Question. In your view, what are the advantages, disadvantages, and risks, if any, in utilizing U.S. military personnel for missions under the authorities contained in title 50, U.S.C.?

Answer. Non-DOD Federal departments and agencies may, in carrying out their duties, occasionally require support that resides in the U.S. Armed Forces and does not exist in the department or agency conducting the operation. It sometimes is therefore preferable to make an appropriate military capability temporarily available to support the operations of other departments and agencies. The advantage of this authority is that it allows for specialization and division of labor across departments and agencies and can prevent the development of under-utilized, military-like capabilities in other agencies. A potential disadvantage or risk is of sharing capabilities is that the department or agency receiving the support may not be sufficiently organized, trained, or equipped to most effectively direct the employment of the military capability. In all cases, however, we work to minimize any disadvantages and risk.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the authorities and agreements which are in place to allow U.S. military personnel to carry out missions under the authorities contained in title 50, U.S.C.? Do you believe any modifications to these authorities are necessary?

Answer. As noted above, consistent with title 50 of the U.S.C., the President may authorize departments, agencies, or entities of the U.S. Government to participate in or support intelligence activities. As stated above, military personnel in support of any such activities remain subject to the laws of armed conflict and the Uniform Code of Military Justice while operating under the direction of the head of a non-DOD Federal department or agency. I believe that existing authorities are sufficient to facilitate DOD’s providing appropriate support under title 50 while ensuring necessary oversight.
Question. Please explain your views on the preferred chain of command structure for counter terrorism operations conducted outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Answer. I believe the chain of command established under title 10 is appropriate for command of U.S. military operations regardless of the location. The determination of whether chain of command structure for a specific counterterrorism operation is appropriate will depend on the nature of the contemplated operation and the circumstances specific to the time and place of that operation.

ADVICE OF THE SERVICE CHIEFS AND THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS

Question. Section 163 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the CJCS serves as the spokesman for the combatant commanders, especially on the operational requirements of their commands. Section 151 of title 10 provides for the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit their advice or opinion, in disagreement with or in addition to the advice or opinion of the Chairman, and requires the Chairman to provide that advice at the same time that he presents his own advice to the President, National Security Council, or Secretary of Defense.

What changes to section 151 or 163, if any, do you think may be necessary to ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs and of the combatant commanders are presented and considered?

Answer. I believe the legislation is well-crafted and is sufficient to ensure that differing viewpoints are offered to our national leadership, while preserving the Chairman’s role as the principal military advisor. It has been my experience that this relationship works well, and I see no need to change the law. If confirmed, I will maintain the very effective and collaborative environment that currently exists.

Question. Do you believe the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Please explain your position.

Answer. While I am open-minded to the possibility, I have significant concerns about this proposal. The Services have never been closer to their Reserve components, and separating them by title risks creating unnecessary friction in the ranks. Furthermore, the authority of the Service Chiefs is built on the foundation of their budget responsibility. Stated another way, they are accountable for the military advice they provide by virtue of their control of their Service budgets. The Chief of National Guard, if appointed as a member of the JCS, will have authority without accountability. This would concern me.

SECURITY STRATEGIES AND GUIDANCE

Question. In your view, is the Nation’s defense strategy appropriate for the threats we face today and could face in the coming decades?

Answer. I believe the strategy is appropriate for the threats we face today, although I am alert to concerns that it might be under-resourced over the mid- to long-term. It is my understanding that the ongoing comprehensive review is being careful to ensure it is strategy-based and risk-informed. If confirmed, I will ensure that we clearly identify the specific risks commensurate with revised resource levels.

Question. What changes, if any, should be considered?

Answer. In my judgment, a good strategy is dynamic and adaptive to changes in the strategic environment the threat, and the needs of our Nation. I believe the existing strategy addresses known threats while posturing for less well-defined or understood threats and contingencies that might arise.

Question. In your view, is our broad defense strategy and current establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the military departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. forces properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet security challenges the Nation faces today and into the next decade?

Answer. Overall, I would say yes, but I would also be careful about the word “optimal”, because it implies some static ideal. I would say that as our strategy evolves, so too must our organizations, approaches, and forces. I think we do that well. We continually examine whether our forces are appropriate to the missions at hand. A recent example is the stand up of U.S. Cyber Command in response to challenges in cyberspace.

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the structure, roles, and missions of the defense establishment?

Answer. The Defense Department conducts continuous security analysis that results in the periodic publication of strategic evaluations and plans intended to guide all elements of the defense establishment in its strategic and operational planning, programming and budgeting, and for the development and employment of military forces. These evaluations and plans include the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the National Military Strategy, the Unified Command Plan, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Quadrennial Roles and
Missions Review, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and the Global Defense Posture Review. If confirmed, I will examine our current status and provide my best military judgment on what needs to be adapted. Title 10 requires the Secretary to conduct a Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review and submit it to Congress prior to the budget submission in 2013. One of my statutory responsibilities will be to provide an assessment of roles, missions, and functions to inform that review. I would do so in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs and Combatant Commanders.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the most current versions of these strategic evaluation, guidance, and report documents?

**Answer.** My assessment is that these documents derive from a common understanding of a complex strategic environment, and that their strategy objectives and tasks are integrated, consistent, and appropriate to advancing U.S. national security. The simultaneity of the multiple reviews enhanced the ability for these reviews to complement each other. For example, the QDR was informed by early NPR findings.

**Question.** What, in your view, is or should be the relationship, if any, of each document to the Department's annual and long range budget request and plans?

**Answer.** Budget plans and requests must be informed by national strategies as strategies must be resource informed. The security strategies and guidance inform the Program, Planning, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) process and allow the Department to align resources with the execution of strategy, guidance, and policies. The PPBE process allows us to revisit decisions that need review due to changing world situations, and it enables the Department to adjust resources as needed.

**Question.** If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the strategic analysis and approval processes or to the reports and guidance contained in each?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I do not anticipate recommending any immediate changes, but I retain the right to change my mind. The Department conducts rigorous strategic analysis, which informs strategic discussions and provides options. The approval processes ensures that multiple perspectives are captured prior to final direction being provided.

**STRATEGIC RISK**

**Question.** Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create increased levels of strategic risk for the United States based on the lack of available trained and ready forces for other contingencies?

**Answer.** No. Our service men and women have gained enormous combat experience in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. I think our military and civilian leaders have managed the risks associated with our extended campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan well. That said, there are skills that have atrophied, and we must address them as time to train permits.

**Question.** If so, how would you characterize the increase in strategic risk in terms of the military's ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of risk acceptable?

**Answer.** I believe the Services have done a tremendous job maintaining the readiness of our military to respond to contingencies—evidenced, in part, by our rapid ability to plan and execute military operations in Libya, respond to the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and maintain a credible deterrence against potential aggressors across the globe. The temporary increases in end strength authorized by Congress played an important role in this, and recently, the drawdown in Iraq has made more forces available. I believe any risk we have assumed to be acceptable, because while training in some areas has suffered, our forces are actually the most experienced they have ever been. The focus now needs to be on resetting and reconstituting degrades capabilities.

**Question.** What is the impact of the decision to decrease U.S. forces committed to Afghanistan on our ability to meet our security obligations in other parts of the world?

**Answer.** We are meeting our current global security obligations. Given the size of the drawdown scheduled for this year and next year, there will be little initial impact on our ability to meet these obligations. As we reset and reconstitute our military, we will be better able to meet any additional and emergent security obligations.

**Question.** How and over what periods of time, if at all, will reductions to Army and Marine Corps end strength increase or aggravate this risk?

**Answer.** An unpredictable and/or hasty timeline to reduce ground forces would damage both the institution and increase military and strategic risks to the Nation.
The current planned reductions and timelines, coupled with efficiency efforts are executable with what I consider acceptable risk.

Question. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?

Answer. If confirmed, I will address risks by advising on the employment of the Joint Force to maximum effect, working closely with allies and partners, and integrating coordinating to integrate military actions with other elements of national power. Furthermore, I would use my first annual risk assessment to clearly identify the risks that require mitigation.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. Military “transformation” has been a broad objective of the Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War.

What is your understanding and assessment of the progress made by the Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, toward transforming the Armed Forces?

Answer. Transformation can have many different meanings, but in general it implies fundamental organizational change. Such change has certainly occurred over the last decade even as we have preserved our core values and retained the trust of the American people. The Joint Force is more battle-tested and integrated across Services and components than at any time in our history. It has changed its structure, doctrine, education, exercises, training, material, leader focus, and posture to account for changing threats in diverse theaters. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we continue to change in a way that strengthens joint warfighting capabilities over time.

Question. If confirmed, what goals, if any, would you establish regarding military transformation in the future?

Answer. As we adjust our posture and missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, I would like to see a balanced force that is capable across the full spectrum of missions vice optimized for any particular mission set. If confirmed, I would also work to further advance affordable and versatile joint capabilities.

Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a larger role in transformation? If so, in what ways?

Answer. The areas of concept development and experimentation, strategy development, requirements development, and the doctrine development processes. The assumption of many Joint Forces Command responsibilities will ensure that Joint Staff plays an even larger role in the future.

ECONOMIC SECURITY

Question. Current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Michael Mullen, asserted in January that the Pentagon’s “budget has basically doubled in the last decade. My own experience here is in that doubling, we’ve lost our ability to prioritize, to make hard decisions, to do tough analysis, to make trades.” Most recently on July 10th, Admiral Mullen stated that “the single-biggest threat to our national security is our debt”.

Do you agree with Admiral Mullen’s assessments regarding the relationship between U.S. security and debt?

Answer. I wouldn’t describe our economic condition as the single biggest threat to national security. There are a lot of clear and present threats to our security in the current operational environment. That said, there is unquestionably a relationship between U.S. security and the debt. However, national security didn’t cause the debt crisis nor will it solve it. I agree that the national debt is a grave concern. Our national power is the aggregate of our diplomatic, military, and economic influence. We have to address our economic stature, but that doesn’t mean we can neglect the other instruments of national power.

Question. If so, in your view, how does this relationship impact the Defense Department and, if confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to ensure that in building a military capable of meeting our strategic objectives, the defense budget does not at the same time undermine our national security?

Answer. DOD is currently conducting a comprehensive review directed by the President to determine the strategic implications of a $400 billion reduction in spending. If confirmed, I will focus on delivering the military force the Nation needs while endeavoring to be a good steward of our national resources.

Question. Do you agree with Admiral Mullen that the Defense Department has lost the ability to prioritize and make the tradeoffs that come with tough decisions?

Answer. Over the last decade in an era of relatively unconstrained resources, DOD has not had to make difficult decisions about budgetary tradeoffs. While we
may have lost some of the “muscle memory” for such decision-making, I am confident we can adapt to a changing security and fiscal environment. If confirmed, I will build on current efforts to strengthen the analytical processes needed for making hard choices. More importantly, I will reinforce a culture of cost discipline that will ensure we remain good stewards of our national resources.

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to regain the Department’s ability to objectively analyze its requirements, prioritize to meet national security needs, and make the tough choices in allocating resources to meet those needs?

Answer. The next Chairman—whoever he or she is—will clearly have to balance ends, ways, and means more proactively than his immediate predecessors to deliver a military that will meet the needs of the Nation. This is not about changing process; it’s about managing change.

NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET REDUCTIONS

Question. The President has called for $400 billion in reductions to security spending over a 10-year period starting in 2013, and has asked the Secretary of Defense to lead a review to provide recommendations on where to make those cuts. What is your understanding of the current status of that review?

Answer. The review is ongoing. I participate in the review now as a Service Chief, and if confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to continue to collaborate with the Secretary of Defense, Service Chiefs, and combatant commanders to achieve a more affordable Joint Force.

Question. What is your view as to how such cuts should be distributed among the various components of security spending?

Answer. While some distribution of cuts among various components of security spending is both inevitable and appropriate, we should avoid simply making formulaic, across-the-board cuts. Reductions in one area have implications in others. Therefore, we must carefully calibrate cuts to ensure the result is a strengthened Joint Force. The precise distribution of cuts across components of security spending is still being determined, but I understand it to be a fundamental consideration for the ongoing review.

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in guiding the review and in determining what cuts, if any, should be made to the defense budget?

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to play a prominent role in this review, and I will work closely with both the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide my best judgments on how what cuts should be made.

Question. Do you believe that a national security spending reduction of this magnitude can be accomplished without significant adverse impact on our national security?

Answer. The review is ongoing, and it will help inform the risks associated with prospective cuts to our defense budget. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure an affordable Joint Force that meets our national security needs.

Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the objectives of: making needed investments in the future force, addressing pressing requirements for completing the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, meeting ongoing operational commitments across the globe, resetting of the force, and achieving the level of savings proposed by the President?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to prioritize funding to support our troops fighting in our conflicts abroad while helping to assure we are conducting operations in fiscally responsible manner. Given that the review is ongoing, I do not want to prejudge how to prioritize among the other categories listed; however, it is my judgment that we can achieve the level of proposed savings in a way that strengthens the Joint Force over time.

USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Question. The question as to whether and when U.S. forces should participate in the use of force is one of the most important and difficult decisions that the national command authorities have to make. Prior Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have proposed criteria to guide decision-making for such situations.

What factors would you consider in making recommendations to the President on the use of force?

Answer. If confirmed, in making recommendations to the President on the use of force, I would consider the threat to our national interests, the role of non-military means to achieve our objectives, the ability of military means to contribute to our
political objectives, and the likely outcome from the use of military force. If it is determined that the use of military force is appropriate, I would propose its use in a precise and principled manner. I would pursue the cooperation and assistance of our allies and partners and adhere to international standards and treaty agreements while still reserving the right to act alone if necessary.

**Question.** What circumstances should pertain for you to recommend that the President employ preemptive force?

**Answer.** If adversaries challenge our vital interests with the threat of force, and both deterrence and diplomacy fail, the United States must be prepared to consider preemptive force. If confirmed, some of the key factors I would consider in recommending the employment of preemptive force include the vital national interests at stake, the degree to which other options have been exhausted, the probability of an attack by our adversary, the potential results of the enemy attack, and the consequences of our preemptive action.

**Question.** What degree of certainty do you believe is necessary before the United States would use preemptive force?

**Answer.** While I believe the degree of certainty necessary before the United States should employ preemptive force should be high, it is not reasonable to articulate a pre-existing standard. Rather, it should take into account the imminence and severity of the threat and the likely outcomes of the use of preemptive force.

**Dwell Time**

**Question.** While dwell time is improving as our forces draw down in Iraq, many active duty military members are still not experiencing the dwell-time goal of 2 years at home for every year deployed.

In your view, under what conditions and when will dwell-time objectives be met for the Active and Reserve components?

**Answer.** All Services are making progress toward achieving objective dwell rates based on guidance issued in the Global Employment of Forces document. While the Army is now averaging about a 1:1 dwell time, we expect to reach 1:2 by the end of this year. I understand the other Services are at about 1:2 already and that dwell times will continue to improve for both the Active and Reserve components through fiscal years 2012–2014. Our goal remains to optimize the quality of life for every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine while still meeting mission requirements. If confirmed, I will closely monitor this important issue.

**Active Duty End Strength**

**Question.** Under current planning, the Army will reduce its end strength by 22,000 through fiscal year 2013, including 7,400 in fiscal year 2012. This end strength was part of the temporary increase authorized in 2009 and was intended to enable the Army to cease relying on the so-called “stop-loss” authority and to make up for a growing population of nondeployable soldiers. Beginning in fiscal year 2015, depending on conditions on the ground, the Army and Marine Corps plan to reduce their permanent end strength and force structure by 27,000 soldiers and at least 15,000 marines, respectively.

Do you agree with this Active Duty end strength reduction plan?

**Answer.** Yes. End strength reductions are conditions based and require periodic reevaluation. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary Panetta and support the Army leadership’s plan to accomplish current and projected missions, balance the well-being of soldiers and families, and keep the Army prepared to meet unforeseen operational demands.

**Question.** What is your view of how these planned end-strength reductions will affect dwell-time ratios?

**Answer.** The planned end strength reductions are intended to take advantage of reduced demand to support ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is my understanding that if the draw-downs continue as planned, the end strength reductions should allow our forces to achieve and sustain acceptable dwell ratios.

**Question.** What effect would inability to meet dwell-time objectives have on your decision to implement the planned end strength reductions?

**Answer.** Should an unforeseen event change our assumptions about end strength assumptions, I would review all options and provide my best military advice in adapting existing plans.

**Question.** In your view, can the Army accelerate to 2012 more of its planned reduction in its temporary over-strength without an adverse impact on national security?

**Answer.** Army force structure is directly linked to the pace of ongoing operations. We will manage end strength reductions to ensure that we do not incur excessive
risk. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Army and the Marine Corps to determine our appropriate end strength and the associated timing.

**Question.** What would be the effect on dwell time of accelerating the Army’s force reduction plan?

**Answer.** Currently, our plans for end strength reductions are well integrated with our dwell-time projections. Any changes to current timelines for end strength reductions would need to be assessed against our current and projected operational requirements and our dwell-time goals.

**Question.** What are the assumptions regarding “conditions on the ground” that will allow for the planned reductions beginning in 2015 to occur on time?

**Answer.** We’re tracking the: (1) transition of tasks to our Afghan counterparts in the security forces and various government institutions; and (2) the responsible drawdown of our surge forces within the parameters set by the President. The planned reductions in end strength are based on achieving these drawdown objectives in Afghanistan. As 2014 approaches, we will have to assess our enduring strategic interests in the region to determine the appropriate size and nature of force presence in Afghanistan after 2014.

**Question.** The Navy and Air Force appear to be on pace to exceed authorized strengths for fiscal year 2011, and to address this overstrength, the Department has requested congressional authorization of force management tools to avoid exceeding end strength limits and save money.

**In your view, what tools do the Department and Services need to get down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these require congressional authorization?**

**Answer.** I am not yet familiar with the full extent to which the authorities used during previous force reductions have expired or will soon expire. If confirmed, I will work closely with the senior military and civilian leadership of the Department to identify any additional tools and associated legislation that may be needed to help us meet our authorized end strengths.

### Institutionalization of Counterinsurgency Capabilities

**Question.** The 2010 report of the QDR provided that military forces shall be sized to prevail in ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war against al Qaeda as well as for conducting foundational activities that prevent and deter attacks or the emergence of other threats. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement for improved capabilities in key mission areas such as counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations, as well as building the security capacity of partner states.

**What is your understanding and assessment of the current ability of each Service to provide capabilities to support these mission requirements and, if confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue to improve these capabilities?**

**Answer.** My belief is that we have adapted extraordinarily well. Over the past decade, our forces have made tremendous advances in developing their counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism capabilities. Leaders have put a tremendous amount of effort into actually learning and applying the lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just as I did during my tenure with Training and Doctrine Command, it is my understanding that all the Services are continuously incorporating those lessons into doctrine and training regimes. In turn, these lessons are being adapted by our forces in combat, as I witnessed on more than one occasion in Iraq. If confirmed, I will continue to support those recurring and continuous improvement efforts that bring the right mix of capabilities and force structure to address future requirements. I will also continue to assess and balance risk across the spectrum of operations.

**Question.** A major objective of the Department over recent years, as well as guidance in the QDR report, has been toward increasing emphasis on and institutionalization of lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability type operations.

**What is your understanding and assessment of the Department’s efforts to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?**

**Answer.** During over 10 years of continuous operations in these areas, DOD has made remarkable progress toward developing and institutionalizing joint capabilities for irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. We have further supported these capabilities by adopting lessons learned and resetting and maintaining the equipment that facilitates those operations. The United States will continue to face challenges from non-state adversaries and regions threatened by terrorist or insurgent violence. If confirmed, I will closely examine our efforts to develop the right capabilities at the right price effectively counter these threats.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to redistribute the Department’s efforts and resources, if at all, to ensure that the force is prepared for force-on-force combat at the same time it increases and institutionalizes capabilities and support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability operations?

Answer. The 2010 QDR recognized the need to balance future military capabilities to meet a broad range of threats across a wide spectrum of adversary capabilities and operating environments. In a period of potentially significant budget constraints, it will be imperative to appropriately balance risk across the spectrum of potential operations. If confirmed, I will support existing and ongoing efforts and processes to assess the impact of these constraints and ensure our forces retain the appropriate size and mix of capabilities. I am committed to preserving the appropriate mix of hard-won, joint capabilities and experiences for our decade-plus of war.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM

Question. Two years ago, Congress enacted, without a dissenting vote in either House, the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA). WSARA is designed to ensure that new defense acquisition programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the acquisition process.

What are your views regarding WSARA and the need for improvements in the Defense acquisition process?

Answer. I welcome WSARA. WSARA mandated much needed reforms to the defense acquisition process. I support its requirements for DOD to examine cost, schedule and performance trade-offs to reduce cost-growth. I am also aware that DOD has pursued significant additional improvements to the acquisition process to include examining the requirements process. If confirmed, I will not only work to implement the changes required by law, but I will continue to pursue improvements to defense acquisitions processes.

Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of the acquisition process—requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?

Answer. The 2009 Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act was an important step forward in improving defense acquisition. It is my understanding, that DOD has made significant progress toward implementing its requirements and achieving our shared interest in deriving better value for every dollar spent. I fully support the DOD “Better Buying Power” initiative to coordinate the requirements, acquisition, and budget processes in a way that mandates affordable requirements to ensure programs start from a solid foundation. If confirmed, I would work to enhance the quality of interaction among these processes and promote greater participation by the warfighter throughout the acquisition lifecycle.

Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?

Answer. While I am not yet familiar with the entirety of the defense budget, my sense is that the current investment budget for major systems is not affordable in this fiscal and operational environment. Certain progress was made on this front under the leadership of Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen leading to a leaner major weapons system portfolio. But, we are not finished pursuing cost control and affordability. Given historic cost growth and current budget pressures, we must closely manage existing programs, and start new programs smartly, so that cost growth does not make them unaffordable. If confirmed, I will continue to examine the investment budget closely for opportunities to achieve greater cost savings and improve overall weapon systems affordability.

Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?

Answer. If confirmed, I will address weapons system cost growth in several mutually supportive ways. I will directly leverage the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) “trip-wire” process to monitor for cost growth and schedule delays in Major Defense Acquisition Programs. This process also helps ensure I am prepared to properly advise the Secretary of Defense with regard to the Nunn-McCurdy certification process and participate in the still maturing Configuration Steering Boards. Additionally, balancing system performance and cost will continue to be a central goal of the ongoing Joint Capabilities Integration and Development process review. Program and portfolio affordability will be important factors in performance trade-off decisions.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that requirements are realistic, and prioritized?

Answer. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 implemented requirements process changes that I would allow to mature if confirmed.
For example, the addition of combatant commanders as voting members of the JROC is proving its value to ensure that Service and Joint priorities are properly aligned. A further improvement is the requirement that JROC validations specify cost, schedule, performance, and quantity to ensure we get the capabilities we need in a responsive and reasonable timeframe. As the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS) review goes forward, I anticipate several reform recommendations that will improve our ability to establish increasingly realistic and properly prioritized requirements.

CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have relied on contractor support to a greater degree than previous U.S. military operations. According to widely published reports, the number of U.S. contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan has often exceeded the number of U.S. military deployed in those countries. Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on contractor support for military operations?

Answer. While I am not yet in a position to render a judgment about whether we have become too dependent on contractors, my instincts suggest that this is the case. Recently as a result of a study by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum to DOD directing a wide range of changes to improve operational contracting support along with guidance for the assessment of high-risk contracted capabilities. If confirmed, I will review this study and the military departments’ assessments.

Question. What risks do you see in the Department’s reliance on such contractor support? What steps do you believe the Department should take to mitigate such risk?

Answer. The most significant risk is in contract oversight. DOD’s recent experience supporting contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that poor contract management can increase the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. Additionally, interaction of contractors with local communities, along with their potential use of force, has a direct impact on the operational mission. Therefore, it is imperative for DOD to properly plan for, use, and manage contractors in the operational environment. As with any situation, understanding the current problems and their risks are the first step in mitigation. It is my judgment that the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense have set the department on the right path and if confirmed, I look forward to reviewing ongoing assessments and continuing efforts to improve the use and oversight of contractors.

Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?

Answer. I’m not sure. I recognize that initially DOD was not properly organized and staffed to effectively manage contractors in the ongoing contingency operations, but corrective actions have been implemented over the last several years. Operational contracting support efforts will enhance our ability to modify the way we source and oversee contracting. If confirmed, I will review ongoing efforts to ensure that DOD institutionalizes its contingency contracting capabilities and that the lessons learned from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan are applied to future operations.

Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?

Answer. DOD has made significant progress in institutionalizing effective management of contractors during contingency operations through several ongoing efforts. DOD’s management of contractors on the battlefield has evolved from a more reactionary approach toward pro-active theater-wide management. As an example, DOD stood up Task Force 2010 and Task Force Spotlight to improve contractor management and oversight in Afghanistan. Furthermore, we are using the task force efforts to shape how the department will continue the institutionalization of contractor management in future operations. If confirmed, I will review these efforts and ensure they are adequate and effective, and I will continue to champion effective management processes.

Question. Do you believe DOD and other Federal agencies should rely upon contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations?

Answer. Based on current force structure and the level of operations tempo, the use of contractors for some security functions is necessary. We can mitigate the risk that this accrues if we properly plan for contractor use and have a clear designation.
of their mission and assigned tasks. Furthermore, we must ensure they have the necessary skills and training to perform these tasks. Finally, we must have the proper oversight in place. Contractor use of force should remain limited to self-defense and the defense of others against criminal violence and the protection of critical property. With proper planning, contractor capability, and government oversight, I think that the limited use of security contractors by DOD in contingency operations is acceptable. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on their use by other departments. If confirmed, I will ensure that proper limitations on DOD private security contractors are in place and enforced.

Question. In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. No. The use of contractors to perform security functions remains a viable DOD option and has been necessary in Iraq and Afghanistan. As with all security forces, the inappropriate use of force remains the greatest risk to our policy objectives. Contracted private security, used correctly with proper management and oversight, preserves DOD’s ability to achieve defense and foreign policy objectives. If confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to continue to examine and improve DOD’s procedures to manage and provide oversight of these contractors.

Question. What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to further institutionalize two primary initiatives already underway. First, the use of private security contractors in any area of combat operations must be fully planned, coordinated, and synchronized with the Joint Force Commander of the designated area of responsibility. Furthermore, commanders on the ground must have the authority and flexibility to restrict security contractors as the operations dictate. Second, we must continue to hold private security contractors accountable and work with our host nation partners to ensure rigorous licensing procedures and enforcement of their laws.

Question. Do you support the extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of all Federal agencies?

Answer. Individuals who provide support to U.S. agencies in our vital missions overseas should not be allowed to operate with legal protection. They should be held accountable for any criminal activity. This is especially true as we work to support the Rule of Law in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. If confirmed, I would support further study in order to investigate the most effective legal method to ensure private security contractor accountability.

Question. What is your view of the appropriate application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to employees of private security contractors operating in an area of combat operations?

Answer. Individuals who provide support to the U.S. military operations as private security contractors should not be allowed to operate with impunity. They should be held accountable for any criminal activity. This is especially true as we work to support the Rule of Law in Iraq and Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will remain open to all recommendations for ensuring accountability of private contractors.

FUTURE ARMY

Question. In a speech at West Point last February, former Secretary Gates argued that it is unlikely that the Nation will commit large land forces to future conflicts, and that the Army must “confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military [will be] primarily naval and air engagements.” The Army’s first major challenge, he stated, is “how will it structure itself—how will it train and equip—for the extraordinarily diverse range of missions it will face in the future?” Former Chief of Staff of the Army, General George Casey Jr., said he expected that over the next 10 years we will still have 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers deployed in combat. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Michael Mullen said that for planning purposes the Department assumes 6 to 10 combat brigades will likely be deployed.

Do you agree that high-end military operations will primarily be naval and air engagements such that the Army will have difficulty justifying the size, structure, and cost of its heavy formations?

Answer. I believe that the strength of our military is in the synergy and interdependence of the joint force. My experience of 37 years suggests that single-component solutions to security challenges is at best risky and at worst foolhardy.
Question. In your view, what are the most important considerations or criteria for aligning the Army’s size, structure, and cost with strategy and resources?

Answer. Our Nation needs a versatile Army that can conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. We need an Army that can win conventional fights, remains adept at conducting counterinsurgency and stability operations, and that can work shoulder to shoulder with the ground forces of our partner states to impart the necessary skills that can help them bring security and stability to their own countries and regions. I understand that some tradeoffs across the force may be required to meet cost-savings goal. If confirmed, I will work closely with military and civilian leaders to balance these risks and help develop a versatile Army for a versatile Joint Force.

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to properly align the Army’s size and structure with the requirements of security strategies and the likely availability of resources?

Answer. Our Army, like our other Services, must provide options to the national command authority. It must be responsive, decisive, versatile, interdependent, and affordable. In sizing it, we must address three fundamental questions: what do you want it to do, how often, and for how long. This requires a comprehensive analysis of the security environment and a detailed assessment of the relationship of the Active, Guard, and Reserve components.

TACTICAL FIGHTER PROGRAMS

Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will face over the next several years is the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program to modernize our tactical aviation forces with fifth generation tactical aircraft equipped with stealth technology.

Based on current and projected threats, what are your views on the requirements for and timing of these programs?

Answer. The Department has the necessary fighter aircraft capacity in the near-term to support our Nation’s security needs. Based on the current and projected threats, I am convinced that we must transition to a fifth generation tactical aviation capability across the U.S. Military Services.

Question. What is your assessment of whether the restructuring of the JSF program that we have seen over the past 2 years will be sufficient to avoid having to make major adjustments in either cost or schedule in the future?

Answer. It is my understanding that the issues with the JSF program have been addressed through a deliberate requirements and acquisition review process. A high level plan was approved in January 2011, and the program expects to deliver a fully compliant weapon system. If confirmed, I will closely monitor the progress of the program to ensure affordability.

INFORMATION ASSURANCE

Question. Protection of military networks, information, and communications is critical to DOD operations.

What is your understanding and assessment of the cyber security posture of the Department’s critical information systems?

Answer. The DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (DSOC) lays out a roadmap for DOD to effectively conduct the defense of critical information systems and strengthen overall cyber security. The Department is working aggressively with national agencies to assess current and future threats while ensuring the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of critical information systems.

Question. What Department-wide policies, guidance, or changes in legislation do you believe are necessary to address information and cyber security challenges for current and future systems?

Answer. DOD recently released the first DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace which addresses information and cyber security challenges along with the ways and means for employing defense capabilities to meet these challenges. Furthermore, I understand that DOD supports the administration’s recommendations for cyber legislation recently provided to Congress. If confirmed, I will work with the administration to provide recommendations to Congress on any additional legislation that may be required to address information and cyber security challenges.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. In September 2008, President Obama announced that he had accepted the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and emerging
threats from Iranian missiles, starting this year and increasing in capability with each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability to defend against future long-range missiles from Iran, including those that could reach the United States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense capability.

Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe?
Answer. I support the President’s policy on European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).

Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans, programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the homeland against a small number of long-range missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging against future uncertainties.

Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you implement them?
Answer. I support the administration’s policies, strategies, and priorities in concert with this review. If confirmed, I will implement the policies set forth including those that sustain and enhance our Nation’s defense while increasing our capability against the growing regional threats.

Question. The two most recent flight tests of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has formed a Failure Review Board to determine the root cause of the most recent failure and will devise a plan to correct it, including two flight tests to confirm the correction. Until the second flight test confirms the correction, the Director of MDA has suspended production of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKVs) of the type that failed last year’s flight tests, in order to ensure that those EKVs do not contain a flaw that would need to be corrected later.

Do you agree that it is essential to correct the problem that caused the December 2010 flight test failure, and to verify the success of that correction through extensive testing, including flight testing, before continuing production and delivery of additional EKVs for the GMD system?
Answer. I agree that it is essential to have confidence and reliability in the EKVs prior to continuing production in order to control costs and ensure the United States has an effective missile defense system.

Question. Do you support the continued modernization and sustainment of the GMD system?
Answer. Yes. The GMD system currently protects the United States from the threat of a limited ICBM attack. It is important to maintain this advantage by continuing to improve the GMD system.

Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.

Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from nations such as Iran?
Answer. Yes. Russia’s cooperation could improve the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses as well as those of the Russian Federation. An effective multi-partner ballistic missile defense system has the potential to deter aggression and strengthen regional security.

Question. What do you believe would be the security benefits, if any, of such missile defense cooperation, and what types of cooperation do you believe would be beneficial?
Answer. Cooperation could result in tangible benefits to the United States, Europe, and Russia in the form of a more robust common defense against missile threats, which could strengthen strategic stability and transparency. U.S. cooperation with Russia along the lines of shared early warning of missile launches, technical exchanges, operational cooperation and planning, and joint exercises would be mutually beneficial.

Question. Do you agree that irrespective of Russian objections, the United States is committed to the continued development and deployment of United States missile defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems?
Answer. Yes, the United States is committed to continued development, improvement, and deployment of U.S. missile defense systems in order to enhance our de-
fense capabilities. Cooperation with Russia on missile defense has the potential to enhance U.S. and NATO security.

SPACE

Question. China’s test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a turning point for the United States in its policies and procedure to ensure access to space. As a nation heavily dependent on space assets for both military and economic advantage, protection of space assets became a national priority.

Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of space assets should be a national security priority?

Answer. Yes. Space situational awareness underpins our ability to operate safely in an increasingly congested space environment. It is vital that the United States protect national space assets to maintain the benefits and advantages dependent on our access to space.

Question. In your view should China’s continued development of space systems inform U.S. space policy and programs?

Answer. Yes. The United States should ensure its space policy and programs address China’s continued development of space systems as well as systems of other space-faring nations. Our National Security Space Strategy acknowledges space is vital to U.S. national security and our ability to understand emerging threats, project power globally, conduct operations, support diplomatic efforts, and enable the global economy. We are and should seek opportunities to co-operate in space and lead in the formation of rules and behaviors for benefit of all nations. I support development of U.S. space capabilities which preserve the use of space for the United States and our allies, while promoting the principles of the 2010 National Space Policy.

Question. If confirmed would you propose any changes to National Security space policy and programs?

Answer. I am not in a position to recommend any proposed changes at this time. If confirmed, I would continue implementation of the President’s 2010 National Space Policy and the supporting National Security Space Strategy.

The Federal Communications Commission is currently considering licensing a telecommunications provider who plans on using a signal that has the potential to interfere with GPS signals and GPS receivers.

Question. If confirmed, would you look into this matter to understand the impact of the proposal to national security GPS signals receivers and commercial receivers used by the national security community?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Joint Staff is currently reviewing this issue, and if confirmed, I will ensure continued emphasis. We are committed to working within DOD and with various government agencies and the FCC to ensure that GPS remains a secure and reliable national asset.

Question. What is your view on weapons in space and the merits of establishing an international agreement establishing rules of the road for space operations?

Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, which states that the United States will pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space. I understand the Department is currently evaluating the European Union’s proposed international Code of Conduct for Outer Space as a pragmatic first set of guidelines for safe activities in space. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this evaluation for space operations.

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

Question. Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next 15 plus years, DOD will also have to sustain the current strategic nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking.

Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to afford the costs of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the rest of the DOD commitments?

Answer. I share the President’s and the Secretary’s commitment to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Sustainment of our nuclear deterrent requires modernization of delivery systems and life extension programs (LEP) for warheads. Successfully accomplishing this will require balancing our current commitments with our national interests and strategic priorities.

Question. If confirmed will you review the modernization and replacement programs to ensure that they are cost effective?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support our commitment to sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that supports stra-
tegic stability in an efficient and cost effective manner while strengthening regional
deterrence and reassuring allies and partners.

READINESS FUNDING

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the methods currently
used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of military equipment?

Answer. Each of the Military Services uses costing models to estimate funding for
maintenance of equipment at various levels of readiness, including support of over-
seas contingency operations. Their estimates are based on readiness metrics such
as system miles, steaming hours, or flying hours. It is also my understanding that
the Joint Staff evaluates readiness across the Joint Force.

Question. Do you believe that we need an increased investment to reduce the
backlog in equipment maintenance and improve readiness?

Answer. My primary concern is with reset funding for equipment readiness that
currently comes out of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. If con-
formed, I will examine this issue further. At this juncture, however, it is my under-
standing that we will need OCO funding 2 years after the end of the conflict in
order to ensure all equipment is reset. Without OCO funding, there will be signifi-
cant pressure on the base budget maintenance accounts to cover those costs, which
could impact long-term readiness.

OPERATIONAL ENERGY BUDGETING

Question. The committee recently received the fiscal year 2012 budget certification
report from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and
Programs. The certification report highlighted several failures by the Services to
fund significant energy efficiency and renewable energy programs, such as: smart
and green energy (SAGE), tactical fuel managers defense (TFMD), near-term and
mid-term modifications to legacy systems to increase efficiency and reduce oper-
ational energy demand, and tent foaming efforts at forward operating bases.

Do you believe the Department should increase funding for operational energy re-
quirements, renewable energy opportunities, and energy efficiency demands?

Answer. My understanding is that DOD certified the 2012 budget submission as
adequate to implement operational energy strategic goals. As identified by DOD's
Operational Energy Strategy, many operational energy improvements do not nec-
essarily require increased funding and could ultimately save DOD money. If con-
formed, I plan to closely monitor the implementation of the Operational Energy
Strategy. Overall, I think DOD needs to improve the incorporation of energy consid-
erations into our strategic planning and force development processes. In doing so,
the Department will inherently make investments in energy efficiency, alternative
energy, and reliability to increase operational effectiveness.

IRAQ

Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from the Iraq inva-
sion and the ongoing effort to stabilize the country?

Answer. Perhaps the most important lesson is that our country must remain pre-
pared for the difficult work that occurs in the wake of major combat. Future stra-
tegic and force sizing constructs must account for all phases of conflict. We must
plan and train with our civilian counterparts and be prepared to operate effectively
both at peace and during post combat. Furthermore, our political objectives are best
achieved when all the instruments of national power are coordinated toward a com-
mon purpose. Finally, I am reminded of the importance of working with allies and
partners, none more important than the host nation populace, in order to attain our
objectives.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the Department’s
adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force structure, or operational concepts
based upon these lessons learned?

Answer. The Iraq War has led to deep and wide-ranging changes in all of the
areas listed above. For example, the Department better understands and is better
at Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations. Our shared goal across the Depart-
ment is to learn and apply these important lessons and experiences to strengthen
the Joint Force. The military has demonstrated the ability to learn and adapt across
many areas, and if confirmed, I will continue to integrate that valuable knowledge
into future doctrine, training, and readiness.

Question. If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you propose mak-
ing to policy, programs, force structure, or operating concepts based on the lessons
of combat and stability operations in Iraq?
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation in Iraq?

Answer. The overall security situation is relatively stable. I am concerned about increased violence in southern Iraq, about the inability of the Iraqi Government to appoint security ministers, and about the enduring potential for Arab-Kurd violence in Kirkuk and Mosul.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda in Iraq?

Answer. Al Qaeda in Iraq still poses a significant threat within Iraq. Al Qaeda in Iraq continues to pursue an attack strategy focused on Iraqi government officials and security forces personnel, Shia civilians, and Sunnis who oppose the terrorist group’s agenda. However, the ISF demonstrates improving counter-terrorism capability and the capacity for maintaining internal security despite occasional high-profile attacks.

Question. What are the main challenges to stability and security in Iraq over the coming months?

Answer. In the coming months, the main threats to Iraqi stability and security are attacks by Sadrist and Iran-sponsored forces against departing U.S. forces and the unresolved status of territories claimed by the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Question. Do you support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq consistent with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement of 2008 signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki?

Answer. I support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq in accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. It is important that we fulfill our obligations under this bilateral agreement, and we are on track to complete the drawdown by December 31, 2011.

Question. Responsibility and authority for lead U.S. agency in Iraq is scheduled this year to transition from DOD to Department of State (DOS). By October 2011, the Department of State is supposed to achieve an initial operating capability as lead agency and achieve full operating capability by December.

What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the planning and progress on executing this transition from DOD to DOS? In your view, what are the sources of greatest risk, if any, to the current plan and successful implementation of this transition?

Answer. My understanding is that the transition from the DOD and DOS is on schedule. The DOD, DOS, and other agencies have undertaken unprecedented levels of coordination and planning for the transition in Iraq. As one would expect with a transition of this scope and complexity, challenges exist, but it is my understanding that we are collaborating well to overcome them in order to meet our objectives. Of concern, failure to support fiscal year 2012 State Department budget requirements for Iraq increases the risk for a successful transition of responsibilities.

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the current plan or actions for implementation of the transition?

Answer. I wouldn’t anticipate any changes at present but will remain vigilant.

Question. In your view, what will be the nature of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship after December 31, 2011?

Answer. In my judgment, a long-term strategic partnership with Iraq is in our national interest. As stated by the President, we support an Iraq that is sovereign and self-reliant; that has a just, representative and accountable government; that denies support and safe haven to terrorists; that is integrated into the global economy; and that contributes to regional peace and security. All these elements of our desired strategic relationship with Iraq were codified in the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement. If confirmed, it is my intention to closely monitor the status and help to advance our relationship.

Question. If the Government of Iraq were to ask for the continued presence in Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the end of 2011, would you support the deployment or retention of additional troops in Iraq beyond the current deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?

Answer. I am not in a position to recommend such a proposal at this time. If confirmed, I would provide my best military advice to the Secretary of Defense and President after considering all relevant factors.

Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for that relationship over the coming years?

Answer. The greatest challenges will be maintaining U.S. engagement and support for Iraq during a time of change. Recent turmoil in the broader Middle East highlights the importance of active U.S. engagement and maintaining strategic partnerships with regional partners based on mutual interests and mutual respect. We
must maintain focus on Iraq in order to advance broader U.S. objectives of peace and security in the region.

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Question. The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of stability and support operations in post-conflict situations.

In your view, what are the appropriate roles and responsibilities of DOD and other departments and agencies of the Federal Government in the planning and conduct of stability operations?

Answer. In my judgment, stability operations are a core U.S. military mission which we should be prepared to conduct with a proficiency equivalent to combat operations. Stability operations cut across all phases of conflict. The military often operates in a supporting role to other Federal Government agencies. However, when directed, we have taken a lead role in stability operations activities to establish civil security and control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance. In these cases, our objective is to transition the lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, the host nation or international organizations as the situation dictates. As seen in recent operations, experts from the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Justice Department, and other agencies are needed to build host nation capacity to improve economic development, establish effective governance, and institute the “rule of law” which are essential for stability.

Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government needs to establish new procedures to manage stability operations? If so, why?

Answer. We should certainly capture the lessons of 10 years of conflict. DOD policy regarding stability operations adequately clarifies roles and responsibilities. We now treat stability operations as a core U.S. military mission and are prepared to conduct those operations on par with major combat operations in support of other U.S. Government departments and agencies. If confirmed, I will continue to assess our ability to conduct stability operations, and I will remain open to ideas and issues that might suggest needed change.

Question. In Afghanistan, the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 works in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan, the U.S. interagency, and international partners to conduct detention and corrections operations and promote the rule of law and judicial sector reform.

What role do you believe DOD should play in providing training and advocacy for “rule of law” development in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. With respect to Iraq and Afghanistan, the “rule of law” is essential for the creation of stable and enduring democratic governments that can prevent the return of terrorists. I strongly support the State Department’s lead in building rule of law capacity in both of these countries. DOD has the capability and capacity to provide “rule of law” related training in a supporting role for civilian and military leaders.

AFGHANISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

Question. Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?

Answer. Yes. Over the past 18 months we have made significant gains in halting Taliban momentum and reversing it in many places. The surge has allowed us to establish security in previously held Taliban areas such as Central Helmand and Kandahar, areas of historic importance to the insurgency, and to expand Afghan National Security Force capacity and capability. As we drawdown our surge force in Afghanistan and partner with Afghan forces, this will serve to expand the Afghan National Security Forces’ responsibilities and their control of Afghanistan.

Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? For example, would you support an increase in counterterrorism action in Afghanistan?

Answer. In my judgment, the current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is on track. Counterterrorism forces support the ISAF campaign plan and are certain to remain an integral part of this effort. If confirmed, and if conditions on the ground warrant a reevaluation of an aspect of the current strategy, I would unhesitatingly provide my recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and President.

Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?

Answer. We have made important gains over the past 18 months, and we have reached a point in the campaign where a responsible drawdown in U.S. surge forces
is possible. An increasing number of Afghan forces will join the fight in protecting
Afghanistan over the next 15 months, and the international community has dem-
onstrated its intention to support Afghanistan until at least 2014.

Question. In your view, how significant an impact does the death of Osama bin
Laden have on the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?
Answer. The death of Osama bin Laden is important as it demonstrated our abil-
ity to deny safe haven to al Qaeda (AQ) members and our commitment to disrupt,
dismantle and defeat AQ. While it is too early to fully understand the long term
impact of his death, I believe, the mutual relationship between AQ and the Taliban
has been dealt a severe blow and that we have an opportunity to prevent Afghani-
stan from once again becoming a safe haven and staging area for AQ.

TRANSITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND U.S. TROOP
REDUCTIONS

Question. On June 22, President Obama announced his decision to draw down
10,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of this year and to withdraw the
remaining 23,000 “surge” force by September 2012, for a total drawdown of 33,000.
Do you support the President’s decision to begin reducing U.S. forces in July
2011? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the President’s decision. If confirmed, I will constantly
monitor and assess the situation in consultation with the theater commanders and
should it be determined that the situation has changed, I will advise Secretary of
Defense and President.

Question. Do you support the President’s decision regarding the size and pace of
reductions in U.S. forces? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes. I support the President’s announced drawdown goals for a condition-
based withdrawal of surge forces. As these surge forces are withdrawn, the ANSF
will continue to grow in capacity and capability while assuming more responsibility.
This component of the strategy is designed to safeguard the significant gains made
possible by the surge. I believe the strategy is working at this time. If confirmed,
and if conditions on the ground warranted a reevaluation of both the pace and scope
of the draw down, I would unhesitatingly provide my recommendations.

Question. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon last November, the participants in the
International Security Assistance Force endorsed President Karzai’s goal of the Af-
ghanistan National Security Forces having the primary responsibility for providing
security throughout Afghanistan by 2014. In March of this year, President Karzai
announced the first tranche of provinces and municipal districts designated for the
transition of security responsibility to an Afghan lead.
Do you support the goal of transitioning responsibility for security throughout Af-
ghanistan to the Afghan security forces by 2014?
Answer. Yes. There is still a significant amount of work to be done but, I believe,
the transition of security can be accomplished to meet this objective.

Question. Do you support the decision to begin this month the transition of lead
security responsibility to the Afghan security forces in the areas announced by
President Karzai, with that initial transition of security lead to be completed by the
end of the year?
Answer. Yes. The first round of transition includes areas such as Lash Kar Gah
in Helmand Province, an area where we significantly invested the surge force and
has since seen a remarkable change in the security environment. ANSF is providing
the bulk of security responsibility in Lash Kar Gah today. This is also true in places
such as Kabul, Bamiyan, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, which are also part of the first
tranche of the transition process. I would highlight that transition is conditional on
the following: transitioned areas have sustainable ANSF who are responsible for
population security and accountable to and serve the people; that ISAF is postured
to provide over watch; that provincial governance is inclusive, accountable and ac-
ceptable to the Afghan people; and that the population has access to basic social
services and adequate rule of law.

Question. In your view, how important is it to the counterinsurgency effort in Af-
ghanistan that the transition of primary responsibility to the Afghan security forces
for providing security throughout Afghanistan be completed by 2014?
Answer. I think that momentum in Afghanistan has broadly shifted. The ANSF
are on track to begin the transition process by assuming lead security responsibil-
ities in several areas of the country. In my judgment, the transition of security will
also aid in the legitimization of the Afghan government, removing some of the impe-
tus behind insurgents who claim to only seek the departure of foreigners.
**AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES**

*Question.* In your view, how important is it to the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan that the initial round of transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan security forces begins in July and be completed by the end of the year?

*Answer.* Transitioning to Afghan lead for security responsibility in the Tranche 1 areas is a critical part of our comprehensive civil-military campaign in Afghanistan. As we seek to eliminate safe havens from which al Qaeda (AQ) or its affiliates can launch attacks against our homeland or our allies, the Afghan Government must step up its ability to protect its people and move forward with actions to build a more stable, economically viable country. If confirmed, I will remain committed to supporting transfer of lead security responsibility to the Afghan Government by the end of 2014.

*Question.* Approximately 100,000 more personnel have been added to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) since November 2009 and by September 2012 another 70,000 Afghan Army and police personnel will be added. The NATO training mission is ahead of schedule for meeting its target end strength of 305,000 ANSF by October of this year. A new ANSF target end strength of 352,000 by 2012 is awaiting final approval by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional and effective ANSF?

*Answer.* The ANSF continues to improve and is developing into a more professional and capable force with each passing day. In May 2011, the Afghan National Army (ANA) completed the fielding of all of their required infantry kandaks—the ANA equivalent of a U.S. battalion. With the fielding of the last infantry kandak, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM–A) shifted its focus from force generation to force professionalization. The additional support from NTM–A will enable the ANSF to assume security lead of Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

*Question.* If approved, will an ANSF end strength of 352,000 be sufficient in your view for the ANSF to assume lead responsibility for security in Afghanistan?

*Answer.* Based on the current security environment, I believe so. Once all of the 352,000 personnel are fielded, the ANSF should be capable of assuming lead responsibility by the end of 2014. If confirmed, however, I will closely monitor progress to assess whether the ANSF and Afghan Government are taking ownership of their responsibilities.

*Question.* What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges?

*Answer.* The three primary challenges for the ANSF are literacy, the lack of enablers, and force attrition. We are assisting the ANSF by providing literacy training, support for the development of branch schools, and helping with leader development programs. If confirmed, I will explore all options to increase ANSF capacity by working closely with Afghan, U.S. military and civilian leaders and our international partners.

*Question.* There remains a shortfall in the number of training personnel required for the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM–A) and in the number of embedded training teams, the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) embedding with Afghan Army units and the Police OMLTs (POMLTs) embedding with Afghan Police units. This shortfall may become more acute if the new end strength target of 352,000 for the ANSF by 2012 is approved.

What more should be done to get NATO members and other coalition partners to meet the ISAF requirements for additional NTM–A trainers and OMLTs and POMLTs?

*Answer.* Our NATO allies and other coalition partners have demonstrated a strong commitment to the mission in Afghanistan over the years. As we move forward, we must continue to engage our partners on the importance and need for NATO/SHAPE HQ, HQ ISAF, and representatives of the NATO training mission. They share our view that a strong and capable ANSF is the key to achieve our objectives. Personnel with specialized skills such as police, logisticians, medical personnel, and maintenance specialists are essential. We must also engage coalition members to get their assistance in filling requirements for troops to partner with the ANSF.

*Question.* If the 352,000 ANSF end strength target is approved, what challenges would this present in generating the necessary training personnel to build these Afghan security forces?

*Answer.* There are obvious challenges associated with training a larger force. Although there is work being done to fill all vacant trainer requirements, a shortfall
of trainers remains. While this shortage may delay the development of ANSF, it is my understanding that NTM–A is exploring all options to compensate for the shortfall.

**Question.** If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have for meeting these challenges?

**Answer.** The ANSF have made significant gains in creating Afghan trainers. The ANA and ANP are participating in Teach the Instructor (T2I) programs in order to build their own internal training capacity. The ANP have trained 474 instructors and are on track to have 900 instructors trained by December 2011. Between the U.S., Coalition, and Afghan trainers, my understanding is that we will have sufficient capacity to meet most training requirements.

**Question.** A key component of efforts to build the capacity of Afghan security forces is partnering ANSF units together with ISAF units in the field. An April DOD report states that field reports suggest that a partnership ratio of greater than 3 ISAF personnel to one ANSF personnel “reduces the effectiveness of the ANSF’s participation” and that “ANSF are more motivated and, hence, more effective when the partnership ratio [between ISAF and ANSF personnel] is closer to even.”

In your view, how effective has partnering been in building the capacity of the Afghan Army and Afghan police?

**Answer.** We are committed to partnering. Partnering builds the capacity of Afghan security forces in terms of capability, confidence, and professionalism in the field. The last 18 months have seen significant strides in our baseline training, but our partnership efforts have proven to be the most effective training mechanism. The benefits of partnering work both ways. Our Afghan counterparts have made the most rapid improvements where we have higher partnering ratios and where our troops live and fight alongside their Afghan partners. In addition, our effectiveness increases since Afghan forces understand the human and cultural terrain in ways that we do not.

**Question.** Would you anticipate ISAF–ANSF partnering moving to a partnership ratio below 1:1 (fewer than 1 ISAF soldier for every ANSF soldier) as the capability of Afghan security forces improves?

**Answer.** Yes. Over time, we will move from partnered operations, to providing support with Afghans in the lead, and finally to coalition forces in strategic overwatch. There are units already below a 1:1 partner ratio, and there are increasingly more areas where Afghans are in the lead or operating independently. For example, in Kabul Province, Afghans lead almost all operations.

**RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION**

**Question.** Under what conditions, if any, should reconciliation talks with the Taliban leadership be pursued?

**Answer.** Ending the insurgency in Afghanistan will require some sort of political settlement between the Afghan Government and the Taliban. This settlement must be brokered among the Afghans themselves. To this end, I support an Afghan-led reconciliation effort consistent with U.S. policy for reconciliation as laid out by the Secretary of State. In particular, those who are willing to renounce violence, cut ties with al Qaeda, and respect the Afghan Constitution—to include the rights of women and ethnic minorities—should be welcomed as part of this process.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of the current program for reintegrating insurgent fighters willing to lay down their arms? What additional steps, if any, should be taken to improve the reintegration program?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is an essential component of our comprehensive civil-military campaign. The goal of this Afghan program is to convince insurgents to join the peace process, accept the Afghan constitution, renounce violence, and rejoin Afghan society. Regarding additional steps to improve the program, it’s important to note that this program is still relatively new in many provinces. One challenge among many is the capacity to channel funds from the Afghan national level down to the provincial level. Funding at the local level enables many of the reintegration opportunities as they emerge. If confirmed, I will more closely assess the status of this program.

**U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN**

**Question.** What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to Pakistan?

**Answer.** Our strategic interests and national security goals remain to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its militant allies, and eliminate their capacity to threaten the United States and its allies in the future. Tactically, Pakistan secures our southern lines of communication into Afghanistan. We also have an interest in
stable Pakistan and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. U.S.
strategic interests in Pakistan encompass both our relationship with Pakistan itself
and Pakistan’s role in the campaign against violent extremists. Our partnership
with Pakistan in the context of the greater South Asia region holds great potential
for security, economic advancement, and stability.

Question. What in your view are the key lessons from the operation to kill Osama
bin Laden for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship?
Answer. Our relationship must be pragmatic. Pakistan supports us in several key
areas. We should leverage those areas and “meter” our support for them against
their support of us. That said, I strongly believe we must maintain a relationship
with Pakistan.

Question. How significant do you believe military-to-military relations have been
for the development of a strategic relationship between the United States and Paki-
stan?
Answer. Our senior military engagements, and especially our security assistance
and cooperation programs, have been essential to laying the foundations for effective
military cooperation between our two countries. But these are only foundations. A
true strategic relationship is only possible when our countries come to appreciate
more closely the compatibility of our vital interests in the region. This can only
come through a whole-of-government approach that strengthens civilian institutions,
promotes the rule of law, and supports economic development.

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. rela-
tions with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-military relations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would sustain the general approach to security coopera-
tion endorsed by the Secretary of Defense and President. From my perspective, the
guiding tenet of security cooperation is to assist in areas the host nation considers
important, but that also respects the shared interests of the host nation and the
United States. We should not push programs the Pakistanis do not want because
doing so dilutes the value of U.S. cooperation. Nor should we feel compelled to pro-
vide equipment or training just because we are asked. A frank and respectful dia-
logue is intrinsic to successful security cooperation.

Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant military assist-
ance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing and training and equipment
through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund to build the capacity of the Pakistan
Army and Frontier Scouts to conduct counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the
United States has provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs as-
associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border and other support provided in connection with Operation Enduring
Freedom.
How effective, in your view, has this assistance been in improving Pakistan’s ef-
forts and commitment to counter terrorists in Pakistan?
Answer. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) has produced some impor-
tant initial results for Pakistan’s Frontier Scouts, the Special Services Group, and
other organizations. The quality of tactical maneuver, communications, marksmen-
ship, and intelligence fusion have improved survivability and performance in combat
against extremist groups which threaten Pakistan and the U.S. efforts in Afghan-
istan. U.S. programs offer the potential of exceptional value for both our countries,
but cannot succeed without the buy-in and invitation of Pakistan’s sovereign leader-
ship and continued support of the U.S. Congress.

IRAN

Question. Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and has failed to provide
full and open access to all aspects of its current and historic nuclear program to the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
What more do you believe the United States and the international community
should be doing, if anything, to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons pro-
gram?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the policy objectives for Iran established by
the President. It is my understanding that we continue to apply pressure on Iran
to make it clear that Iran’s failure to meet its international obligations will make
it less secure and prosperous. Concurrently, we should continue to encourage Iran
to become a responsible member of the international community.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the military threat
posed by Iran from its nuclear program and its ballistic missile program?
Answer. Iran is a destabilizing influence in the region. It is my understanding
that the Government of Iran continues to enrich uranium, pursue nuclear capabili-
ties, enhance its ballistic missile program, and has failed to provide full and open
access to all aspects of its current and historic nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy Agency. With its nuclear activities and its surrogate activities in southern Iraq, there is a high potential that Iran will make a serious miscalculation of U.S. resolve.

Question. In your view, have the various sanctions that have been imposed by the international community reduced the military abilities of Iran?

Answer. International sanctions have hindered Iran’s weapons procurement efforts and driven up the costs associated with obtaining necessary components for its military. Sanctions also appear to have slowed Iran’s progress on its nuclear program. It has also become increasingly difficult for Iran to import needed materials or skills for its military programs.

OSAMA BIN LADEN AND AL QAEDA

Question. In your view, will the death of Osama bin Laden have a significant impact on the conflict against al Qaeda and if so, how?

Answer. The death of Osama bin Laden is a significant milestone in our campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda. The successful operation does not mean we can rest, but rather we have a window of opportunity to make new gains toward the strategic defeat of al Qaeda. It is too early to assess the long term impact of his death, but it clearly conveys our persistence, determination, and capability to achieve our goals.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda affiliates to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?

Answer. The killing of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden may increase the threat from al Qaeda’s regional nodes to the U.S. Homeland and U.S. interests overseas. Each of the regional nodes—al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda in Iraq, Somalia-based al Shabaab, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—eulogized Bin Laden and vowed attacks against the United States in retaliation. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has demonstrated its intent and capability to carry out an attack targeting the U.S. Homeland, as evidenced by the group’s 25 December 2009 attempted bombing of a U.S. airliner on approach to Detroit. Each of the other three nodes remain largely focused on attacks within their respective regions, though each is likely capable of supporting operatives engaged in transnational attack planning against U.S. or western interests in Europe and possibly the United States.

ARAB SPRING

Question. The Arab Spring has changed—and will likely continue to change—the political dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa for many years to come. These changes will require the United States to adjust our military-to-military and defense civilian relations in this region. Some observers argue that the United States should reduce significantly our military-to-military contact in countries as a result of the ongoing changes and others advocate more robust and stepped-up contact with our partners in this region.

In your view, what should be the posture of the U.S. Government on military-to-military and defense civilian relations in the region?

Answer. In my judgment, we have a unique opportunity to support some of the Arab Spring reform movements through our military relationships. It is my understanding that the Department and our combatant commands are reviewing our policies and posture in the region to enhance our ability to promote responsible change. If confirmed, I will work to ensure our programs and policies further our national interests while strengthening our relations in the region.

LIBYA

Question. Do you support the limited U.S. military mission in Libya?

Answer. Yes. We are operating in Libya as part of an international coalition enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973. Our role is to support and assist our partners in protecting innocent civilians in Libya. The U.S. military provides unique capabilities to this effort such as electronic warfare, aerial refueling, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and unmanned aerial systems.

Question. Do you support broadening the military mission to include regime change?

Answer. The purpose of our military mission, consistent with the U.N. Security Resolution 1973, is to protect innocent civilians. As directed by the President, we are using all non-military instruments of power to apply further pressure on the Qadhafi regime to end the conflict. If confirmed, I would consider a wide array of fac-
tors before providing my advice on whether the military mission should be changed for any reason.

**Question.** Should the United States provide arms and training to the Libyan rebels?

**Answer.** It is my understanding the administration has chosen not to provide arms or training to the rebels at this time. The purpose of our military action is grounded in UNSCR 1973, to protect the Libyan people in population centers like Benghazi from a massacre at the hands of Qadhafi’s forces. If confirmed, I would assess the full range of implications for providing arms and training before making any recommendation.

**EAST AFRICA—AL QAEDA AND AL SHABAAB**

**Question.** What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and al Shabaab to the U.S. and Western interests in East Africa and to the U.S. Homeland?

**Answer.** The al Shabaab threat to U.S. and western interests in East Africa is significant. While al Shabaab remains focused on resisting the current Transitional Federal Government and African Union Mission in Somalia, the group has the capability to plan attacks against U.S. and western interests in East Africa. The April 2009 attacks in Kampala proved their capability to stage simultaneous suicide attacks, and senior al Qaeda in East Africa operative Harun Fazul had evidence of advanced plans to attack European allies with him at the time of his death. Finally, al Shabaab’s effort to recruit U.S. persons increases the threat to the U.S. Homeland.

**Question.** What is your understanding of DOD’s role in countering the threat posed by al Qaeda in East Africa and al Shabaab? What is your understanding of DOD’s supporting role to other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government in this region?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that DOD in concert with interagency partners has provided security assistance to regional partner nations to counter threats from violent extremists. Some of that support is also aimed directly at improving counterterrorism capabilities. I cannot provide detail about the operations we are supporting, but I can say the work remains critical to our goal of strategically defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates.

**Question.** What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD’s current role in East Africa?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I do not anticipate making any immediate changes to DOD’s role in East Africa. It is my understanding that U.S. Africa Command is looking at how best to direct our military efforts in the region to work in concert with our interagency partners. In my judgment, our goal is a strategy through which security assistance, capacity building, cooperation with regional partners, and counterterrorism actions are fully integrated to provide security and stability in East Africa.

**YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA**

**Question.** What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen and what is your understanding of the role of DOD within that strategy?

**Answer.** The current strategy in Yemen remains our best option. The near term goal of containing and degrading al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) while pursuing long term initiatives to create a stable Yemen that can provide internal security remain valid even amidst domestic turmoil. A stable, unified, and economically viable Yemen, free of violent extremist, remains in our best interest. My understanding of DOD’s role is that CENTCOM works with interagency partners to build Yemen’s counterterrorism capacity and enhance our partnerships. Separately, select elements within DOD work with the Yemeni Government to disrupt near-term threats to the U.S. Homeland. This effort is intended to provide time and space for the Yemeni security forces to increase their effectiveness and eventually eliminate Yemen as an al Qaeda safe haven.

**Question.** Given the ongoing political upheaval and splintering of the military in Yemen, what are your views on the United States continuing to provide security assistance—most significantly DOD section 1206 funding—to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?

**Answer.** The ongoing unrest has already weakened the Yemeni Government and economy and has allowed al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to expand its influence. We will continue to closely evaluate our security assistance programs in Yemen, particularly those provided under section 1206. It is my understanding that we expect to continue counterterrorism cooperation with the Yemeni Government during and after any future political transitions, but that we are prepared to re-
evaluate our partnership as necessary to address the changing military situation. If confirmed, I will be attentive to the potential need to reconsider our approach.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Question. In a speech to allies in Brussels in June, then-Secretary of Defense Gates delivered a blunt warning about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) becoming “a two-tiered alliance”. Secretary Gates described a division between “members who specialize in ‘soft’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the ‘hard’ combat missions,” and between “those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership . . . but don’t want to share the risks and the costs.” He added, “This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today, and it is unacceptable.”

In your view, how important is the NATO alliance to U.S. national security interests?

Answer. The NATO Alliance is vital to the United States. It is a collective defense alliance and forum for security dialogue that has maintained the trans-Atlantic link and kept Europe peaceful for the past 60 years. NATO remains equally important today providing the foundation for European and supporting global security. NATO is the critical enabler for coalition operations in Afghanistan, and it is leading operations in Libya.

Question. Do you agree with former Secretary Gates that NATO is today a two-tiered alliance?

Answer. I have not been in a position to evaluate it in that way. What I do know is that some allies have made the political decision to limit the resources dedicated to defense. This has forced critical choices between spending money on transforming their militaries and contributing to alliance operations. It has also resulted in an overall loss of effectiveness, which, while initially minor, has compounded over time. Some allies remain capable partners, while others’ past decisions now limit their ability to contribute to collective security.

Question. Given the significant budgetary constraints facing many NATO allies, what in your view needs to be done to enhance the capabilities of the NATO alliance to undertake combat operations?

Answer. Several NATO allies are planning further cuts to defense investment in order to sustain their operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere while coping with financial constraints. To enhance capabilities, Allies must prioritize, seek efficiencies and cost savings, and invest those savings into maintaining credible military power. Additionally, those countries that can afford to should expand their investment in defense. Investments should be coordinated among Allies, and we all must be mindful of threats and risks to collective security.

Question. What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next 5 years?

Answer. NATO’s New Strategic Concept is an important step in ensuring that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring the common security of its members as well as guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution. Over the next 5 years, the top NATO challenges include: achieving durable progress on a successful transition in Afghanistan; implementing missile defense in Europe; and stemming the deterioration in European military capability. However, this is also an opportunity for allies to develop innovative multi-national solutions to deliver capabilities in a more cost-effective manner such as the C–17 Strategic Airlift Consortium.

Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?

Answer. NATO’s New Strategic Concept states NATO’s commitment to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. However, it also made clear that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. NATO has initiated a review of its overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the alliance. NATO’s new Strategic Concept reflects allies’ commitment to a nuclear alliance and to nuclear burden sharing as fundamental to deterrence and assurance in Europe.

U.S. FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE

Question. In April it was announced that following an extensive review of its force posture in Europe, the Department will revise its plans to withdraw two of four brigade combat teams (BCTs) from Europe, and instead retain three BCTs in Europe. The drawdown of one BCT from Europe will not be implemented until 2015, when a reduced demand on U.S. ground forces is projected.
Do you support the decision to reduce the U.S. force posture in Europe by one BCT?

Answer. I support the decision to retain three BCTs in Europe. It strikes the best balance between responding to a more constrained fiscal environment and the need to maintain a flexible and easily deployable ground force to meet Article 5 and other NATO commitments. This size force will also allow the United States to engage effectively with allies and partners and to satisfy other security objectives.

Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in Europe and would retaining three BCTs in Europe beyond 2015 serve those security priorities? Why or why not?

Answer. U.S. security priorities in Europe are focused on meeting our Article 5 NATO security commitments, building partnership capacity, and engaging with allies and partners. Additionally, the U.S. and NATO allies are preparing to meet a broad range of 21st century threats, including new challenges such as missile defense, cyber security, countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and terrorism at home and abroad. In my judgment, retaining three distinct types of BCTs in Europe (Heavy, Stryker, and Airborne) enables U.S. European Command to meet a wide array of engagement, building partner capacity, and interoperability objectives while being prepared to support a full range of military operations needed for plausible European and global contingencies.

Question. The Defense Department’s 2010 report of the QDR states that the United States needs to “sustain and strengthen our Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region,” and that, to accomplish this, DOD “will augment and adapt our forward presence” in the Asia-Pacific region.

Do you agree that the United States needs to augment and adapt our presence in the Asia-Pacific region?

Answer. Yes. The Nation’s strategic priorities and interests will increasingly emanate from the Asia-Pacific region. The rise of new powers with their growing share of global wealth, the expanding influence of non-state actors, and the potential spread of WMD will create a security environment that poses profound challenges to international security. The U.S. military should maintain an enduring military presence in the Asia-Pacific region that provides tangible reassurance that we are committed to Asia’s security and the prosperity essential to the region’s success.

Question. If so, what specific capabilities or enhancements are needed in your view?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review our military’s force posture in Asia and make appropriate recommendations on any enhancements. In general, U.S. presence must remain capable of reassuring our allies and partners in the region while positioning us to deter against—and if necessary, defeat—the full range of potential threats. Our actions in the Asia-Pacific region should encourage greater regional security cooperation by strengthening and expanding our bilateral and multilateral relationships so that we preserve stability in Northeast Asia while investing new attention and resources in Southeast and South Asia.

Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the Asia-Pacific region?

Answer. Our alliances in Asia have provided the bedrock for security and economic prosperity in the region. We must continue to deepen these alliances while evolving them to face current and emerging threats. Our security priorities in this region should promote regional peace and stability while combating such threats as terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, piracy, and cyber security threats. Additionally, we must work to maintain free and open access to the maritime, air, and space domains.

North Korea

Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

Answer. North Korea remains the primary threat to security in Northeast Asia. The security situation on the peninsula has reached high levels of tension over the past year with the attack on the Cheonan and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. North Korea continues to improve its asymmetric capabilities including WMD, ballistic missiles, Special Operations Forces, and cyber capabilities. Absent evidence of fundamental change, North Korea will remain a serious security threat in the region and a significant concern for the United States and the international community.
Question. In your opinion, what should be the U.S. role in the South Korean response to any future North Korean attacks or provocations?
Answer. The U.S. role as part of a combined force with the Republic of Korea (ROK) is to deter North Korean aggression and if deterrence fails, fight and win. This mission is accomplished through the employment of agile and well-trained forces within the ROK–U.S. Alliance.

Question. In your view does the lack of progress in diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program inform or guide U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy in the region?
Answer. In my judgment, the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy has helped prevent the resumption of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula for more than half a century. Successful deterrence creates the space within which diplomacy can operate. The success of diplomatic efforts, however, will ultimately hinge on the willingness of North Korea to comply with the agreements it makes.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of those capabilities?
Answer. North Korea's missile and WMD programs are increasingly a direct threat to the United States. These programs already pose a serious and real threat to U.S. regional allies and partners. The United States must continue to monitor North Korea's capabilities and related proliferation, while collaborating with our partners and allies, to ensure contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.

Question. In your view are there additional steps that DOD could take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology to Syria, Iran and others?
Answer. Proliferation of missile and weapon technology by North Korea is a regional and global threat. In my judgment, there may be additional steps that can be taken consistent with the President's policy. If confirmed, I will work to ensure continued coordination and cooperation between DOD, other U.S. agencies, and our international partners to strengthen international consensus against proliferation, invest in capacity building programs with partner nations, and find ways to increase WMD-related information sharing with international partners.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Question. What is your understanding of the current U.S. security relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK)?
Answer. The ROK–U.S. alliance is one of the most successful alliances in the world and serves the interests of both of our Nations. The United States is committed to the security of the peninsula and ensuring the alliance remains a comprehensive, strategic partnership with bilateral, regional, and global scope. The alliance's resolve has never been stronger, and we should continue to advance the alliance in terms of both capability and commitment.

Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to maintain close contact with my South Korean counterpart to promote the continuation of a strong U.S.-ROK security relationship. DOD and the ROK should continue to work closely to realign U.S. forces on the Peninsula and prepare for the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK by December 2015. U.S. forces should continue the plan to reposition south of Seoul, making the U.S. presence less intrusive to the Korean People and improving force readiness and quality of life.

Question. What is your view regarding the timing of turning over wartime operational command to the ROK?
Answer. The South Korean military is a highly capable and professional force and is increasing its ability to lead the defense of its country. I appreciate that the United States and the ROK have a shared understanding on a comprehensive way forward for the transfer of wartime operational control by December 2015. If confirmed, I will continue to work with my ROK counterpart to advance this process.

Question. Do you believe that current planning regarding tour normalization in the ROK should be reconsidered in view of the high cost of the plan and the risks associated with significantly higher numbers of dependents on the Korean peninsula?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate the associated costs and benefits of implementation and make recommendations based upon proposed force posture and best way forward. I understand the goal of tour normalization is to enhance the quality of life for our forward-stationed forces and their families. A stable family
improves operational readiness. DOD's long-term goal remains full tour normaliza-
tion with the timeline to be determined based upon affordability.

CHINA

Question. From your perspective, what effect is China's expanding economy and
growing military having on the region at-large and how is that growth influencing
the U.S. security posture in Asia and the Pacific?

Answer. In my judgment, we should welcome a strong, prosperous, and successful
China that plays a responsible role in world affairs. China's economic growth has
been a key factor for the Asia-Pacific regions' economic growth and development. Its
economic growth has also allowed China to embark upon a comprehensive trans-
formation of its military forces. However, a lack of transparency into the pace and
scale of China's military modernization raises concerns within the region. If con-
firmed, I will continue to monitor China's military development and engage China
to promote stability.

Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's military modernization
program?

Answer. If confirmed, my new responsibilities will allow me to more closely exam-
ine this issue. From my current perspective, China appears to be building the capa-
bility to fight and win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery,
with a near-term focus on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan.
This appears to include an emphasis on anti-access and area denial capabilities.
China is also increasing attention and resources to conducting operations
beyond Taiwan and China's immediate periphery as evidenced by public revelations
about their aircraft carrier program. China is modernizing its nuclear forces and
strengthening its nuclear deterrence capability, while enhancing its strategic strike
capabilities, such as space and counter-space operations and computer network op-
erations. Additional military missions include humanitarian assistance, non-combat
evacuation operations, and counter-piracy support.

Question. How do you believe the United States should respond to China's mili-
tary modernization program?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to use our interactions with China's mili-
tary to encourage a constructive role in addressing common security challenges.
Force posture, presence, capability developments, and actions that strengthen our
alliances and partnerships will demonstrate our ability and commitment to main-
tain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.

Question. Do you support the sale of F–16 C/D aircraft to Taiwan?

Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to study in detail Taiwan's defense
needs; however, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, we have a responsi-
bility to make available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Our China policy has been
consistent for the past eight U.S. administrations, and supports the Three Joint
U.S.-PRC Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act.

Question. In the past 6 months, the United States and China have had a series
of high level military-to-military engagements beginning with Secretary Gates' visit
to China in January which was followed by Chinese General Chen Bingde's visit to
the United States in May. Most recently, Admiral Mullen traveled to China to meet
with General Chen and to visit Chinese military sites. Nonetheless, the U.S.-China
military-to-military dialogue has been strained over the past several years and ef-
forts to establish and maintain mutually beneficial military relations has been ham-
pered by China's propensity for postponing or canceling military engagements in an
apparent effort to influence U.S. actions.

What is your general experience with U.S.-China military-to-military relations?

Answer. My experience so far has been fairly limited during my short tenure as
Chief of Staff of the Army. My interactions with my PLA counterpart and other sen-
ior leaders have focused on the positive aspects of a military-to-military relationship
to increase cooperation between our Nations.

Question. What is your view of the relative importance of sustained military-to-
military relations with China?

Answer. I firmly believe that healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-
military relations between the United States and China are very important.

Question. Do you believe we should make any changes in the quality or quantity
of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

Answer. I understand General Chen's recent visit to the United States and Admi-
ral Mullen's trip to China to signify progress in the relationship. If confirmed, I will
certainly strive to further improve the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship,
both in terms of quantity of exchanges and, more importantly, the quality of the events.

Question. What is your understanding of U.S. military operations in the proximity of the South China Sea and do you think the United States should make any changes in those operations?

Answer. The U.S. military is committed to maintaining peace and stability, freedom of navigation, open access, and respect for law in international waters, including the South China Sea.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

Question. On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department’s CN operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that DOD “does not have an effective performance measurement system to track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.” This is the second such finding by GAO related to DOD CN in the last decade.

What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?

Answer. Drug trafficking and transnational organized crime continues to be a complex threat to the United States and its interests abroad. I have not had an opportunity to assess the DOD’s counternarcotics program fully. If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring the DOD’s program supports our Nation’s interests and our foreign partners, aligns with the National Drug Control Strategy, and strives to achieve measurable results.

Question. In your personal view, should DOD continue to play a role in attempting to stem the flow of illegal narcotics?

Answer. Based on my experience, confronting this issue requires a whole-of-government approach to confront the flow of illicit narcotics, associated transnational organized criminal activity, and potential terrorist connections. Interagency collaboration has been critically important to the progress made since the 1980s and should continue. Additionally, DOD’s existing partnerships with countries throughout the world contribute considerably to U.S. Government efforts to confront this global problem.

COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS

Question. Since January 2009, the U.S. Navy has been patrolling the waters of the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia as part of the international coalition engaged in counter-piracy operations. While there have been some high profile interceptions and arrests, data suggests that the number of pirate attacks has not been diminished in any meaningful way. To the contrary, piracy in that region remains a significant problem.

What is your assessment of the counter-piracy mission to date?

Answer. The presence of the coalition navies continues to deter and prevent individual pirate attacks, reducing the success rates of pirate attacks by 15 percent in the Horn of Africa region.

Question. What changes, if any, do you believe are necessary in terms of the level of effort by the U.S. and coalition countries and also in terms of strategy and tactics?

Answer. It is my understanding that current DOD and coalition tactics and procedures are proving effective, especially when executed in conjunction with commercial vessels adhering to industry Best Management Practices. Due to the size of the affected region, additional naval vessels would not necessarily provide significant increase in return on the investment. However, using other instruments of government power, such as disrupting pirates’ financial networks or increasing the judicial capacity and capability throughout East Africa, would likely have a greater return on U.S. Government investment.

Question. Do you think DOD should continue the counter-piracy mission, as it has been conducted over the past few years, and, if so, how long do you think the Navy can continue the mission without experiencing any adverse effect on other missions?

Answer. Yes. As articulated in the President’s Maritime Security Policy and the NSS Counter Piracy Action Plan, the United States has a unique leadership role in protecting high seas freedom and global sea lines of communication, noting that piracy threatens U.S. security and economic interests and contributes to regional instability. of pirated vessels.
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS

Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the United States “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations.”

What is your view on whether the United States should contribute more military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

Answer. Our troop commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan remain substantial and take first priority in my judgment. As these commitments change, however, I believe that we should consider opportunities for U.S. personnel to contribute to U.N. peacekeeping missions. Experience shows that even a small number of trained and experienced American servicemembers can have a significant, positive effect on U.N. operations.

Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations?

Answer. I regard U.N. peacekeeping operations as a cost-effective alternative to unilateral U.S. military action. These missions save civilian lives, promote stability, and support American interests around the world. U.S. servicemembers can have a very positive impact on U.N. operations, especially in areas where our troops can deliver hard-to-find expertise, like logistics and intelligence. If confirmed, I would carefully weigh the advantages of additional participation in U.N. peacekeeping against potential costs including an increase in the operational tempo of our force. I would also acknowledge the reality that in some cases, U.S. boots on the ground may not be supportive of the mission’s desired end state. In these cases, we may be able to achieve our objectives in other ways.

Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the United Nations?

Answer. I’m not aware that we have been unresponsive. If confirmed, I will seek to learn more about this issue.

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC) have called for investing significantly more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking.

What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance activities?

Answer. To defeat a network it must be attacked in each of its components including leadership, operations, supply, and financing. DOD has an important role in counter threat finance activities. Terrorist activities and illicit networks that traffic narcotics, WMD, or improvised explosive devices can and will leverage funding to further resource and expand their operations. DOD policy is to effectively deny, disrupt, degrade, and defeat our adversaries’ ability to attain and utilize financial resources. To penetrate the financial networks of our adversaries, we must leverage the full capabilities of our Nation while simultaneously attaining vital assistance from our allies. If confirmed, I will further this effort by working with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, as well as with our partner nations, in order to effectively counter threat finance activities.

Question. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?

Answer. In my judgment, DOD should continue to work with and support other U.S. Government departments and agencies to conduct counter threat finance activities. If confirmed, I do not anticipate an immediate need to expand the support that DOD is providing, but we certainly must ensure that we are fully engaged in the interagency process to counter threat finance activities.

Question. Transnational criminal organizations in Central America and Mexico are having a debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people.

Do you think expanded Counter Threat Finance activities in this region would be beneficial? If so, what role—if any—should DOD play in those activities?

Answer. NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM are helping to shape and leverage unique capabilities in support of our foreign and domestic mission partners. If confirmed, I will examine this issue carefully.
CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO

Question. During a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, the Commanders of U.S. Northern Command and Southern Command discussed the increasingly dangerous region along the northern and southern borders of Mexico and the devastating impact transnational criminal organizations are having on the people and security of southern Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador. The United States has increased its assistance in this region, but—to date—DOD has had only a small role.

What are your views on the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations in this region?

Answer. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) operating throughout Mexico and Central America are better-armed than many police forces and demonstrate increasing adaptability and sophistication in their methods. Their criminality extends far beyond drugs to extortion, robbery, kidnapping, trafficking in firearms and persons, and many other illegal activities. All of these activities, coupled with the fear, corruption and violence they engender, are having a considerably negative impact on the prosperity and security of our partners in the region.

Question. What is your assessment of DOD's current activities in Mexico and Central America?

Answer. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) have been assisting our regional partners through increased senior level interactions, subject matter expert exchanges, human rights training, mobile training teams, intelligence support, and exercises. Our overall military-to-military relations with Mexico have expanded considerably as have our relationships with Central American nations.

Question. What changes, if any, would you propose to the DOD's current activities in this region?

Answer. If confirmed, I would closely examine all aspects of our activities in the region.

ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA DENIAL

Question. Over the past few years, much has been made of the emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the U.S. military's freedom of movement and action in certain regions.

Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities are a concern and, if so, what should the U.S. military be doing now and in the next few years to ensure continued access to all strategically important areas?

Answer. The proliferation of anti-access and area denial capabilities are of growing concern to the U.S., threatening assured access and our freedom of maneuver on land, sea, air, and space. They also potentially inhibit global commerce by controlling passage through regional chokepoints. If confirmed, I will focus on developing joint capabilities to counter these threats while working with our allies and partners to deter those who would attempt to deny access to the global commons.

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Question. What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?

Answer. Among other lessons, it seems clear to me that we have learned that countering insurgent and terrorist threats demands the integration of all instruments of national power toward a common purpose.

Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?

Answer. If confirmed, I will pursue opportunities for early and regular interagency engagement to foster enduring partnerships and to develop the planning, training, and education necessary for complex operations. We should seek new opportunities to collaborate and identify common mission tasks and related core training objectives. We should seek opportunities to leverage DOD joint training venues and resources to build capacities that improve our ability to work together.

Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured in military doctrine and adopted as “best practices” for future counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations?

Answer. As part of the recurring revision of joint doctrine, there is a direct link to joint lessons learned and best practices. If confirmed, I will continue to invest in the ability of our joint force to learn and adapt.

to submit a report on the organizational structures of the headquarters of the geographic combatant commands (GCCs). DOD's report, dated June 2011, highlights the role of "interagency" (i.e., non-DOD, non-intelligence community) representatives at each of the GCCs. Stronger and more effective interagency integration was a central theme in the establishment of U.S. Africa Command and has apparently also informed re-organizations at U.S. Southern Command and other GCCs. Yet a number of observers have suggested that there is still room for improvement in both the nature and extent of interagency integration at the regional level.

In your view, what is the importance, if any, of interagency integration to the ability of DOD's GCCs to execute their missions?

Answer. Interagency integration is critical to the ability of the COCOMs to execute their missions. It enables the U.S. Government to build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared national and international goals.

Question. If confirmed, how would you envision the appropriate roles of "interagency" representatives at GCCs?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Executive Branch’s Interagency Process of national security policy development and implementation integrates all aspects of U.S. national security in a whole-of-government approach to advance our national security interests. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate the roles of interagency representatives at the COCOMs in a similar fashion.

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Question. The U.S. Government has recognized the “responsibility to protect” (R2P)—that is, the responsibility of the international community to use appropriate means to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, by encouraging states to protect their own populations, by helping states build the capacity to do so, and by acting directly should national authorities fail to provide such protection. In its 2010 QDR, DOD names "preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities" as one of a long list of potential contingencies that DOD might be called on to address. DOD has begun to explore some of the implications of R2P, by considering “mass atrocity prevention and response operations”.

In your view, how high a priority should the "responsibility to protect" be for the U.S. Government as a whole?

Answer. Maintaining the will and the ability of the United States to prevent human suffering is not only a moral imperative but also an important means to promote our values and increase our influence around the globe. This doesn’t seem to me to be an issue of prioritization. A well trained and well led Joint Force can accomplish this mission if called upon to do so.

Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, if any, in fulfilling the responsibility to protect?

Answer. Given our global reach and organizational capabilities, DOD can play a role in responding to humanitarian disasters including mass atrocities. DOD has played an effective role in support of the efforts of the State Department, USAID, and other agencies to prevent mass atrocities from occurring.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The previous two QDRs have mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and enablers that directly support their operations. Do you believe that we should further increase the number of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?

Answer. The current growth of 3 to 5 percent in special operations personnel is appropriate. If confirmed, I will examine if additional growth of Special Forces is needed.

Question. In your view, how can the DOD increase the size of Special Operations Forces while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting, selection, and training standards for special operators?

Answer. Although SOF has nearly doubled since September 11, recruitment, assessment, selection, and training standards have not been altered or lowered.

Question. Do you believe any modifications to U.S. Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) title 10, U.S.C., missions are appropriate? If so, what modifications would you suggest?

Answer. In my judgment, no modifications are required at this time. If confirmed, I remain open to issues and ideas that might suggest modifications should be considered.
Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?

Answer. The Commander, SOCOM, continues to emphasize the importance of the indirect SOF mission profiles and insures that SOF trains to these mission profiles. It is my understanding that we have grown our SOF Civil Affairs and Military Information Support forces to insure we have extra capacity to conduct indirect operations. If confirmed, I will work with our SOF commanders to ensure that an appropriate balance is maintained.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The previous two QDRs have mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and enablers that directly support their operations.

Answer. The Commander of SOCOM has described the “non-availability” of enabling capabilities as SOCOM’s “most vexing issue in the operational environment”. The 2010 QDR sought to balance previously mandated growth in Special Operations Forces with additional enabling capabilities.

Question. What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling capabilities facing Special Operations Forces?

Answer. Rotary wing aircraft is the single most significant shortage, and we are taking steps to address it. If confirmed, I will work with our SOF commanders to identify and resolve other critical shortfalls.

Question. Do you believe additional enabling capabilities, beyond those mandated by the QDR, are required to support Special Operations Forces?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Services and SOCOM are increasing enabling capabilities as mandated by the QDR. The Force Sufficiency Assessment should inform our senior leaders in deciding whether more enabling capabilities are needed.

Question. Do you believe the process for Special Operations Forces to request enabling capabilities from the Services, when required, should be formalized? If so, how?

Answer. This process is formalized in the Global Force Management Board Force Allocation process. The SOCOM Commander and I are in discussion about adapting the process for the Army based on the lessons of the past 10 years. If confirmed, I will closely monitor these processes to ensure SOF requirements for critical enabling capabilities are being addressed.

Question. Some have argued that the Commander of SOCOM should have greater influence on special operations personnel management issues including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of Special Operations Forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., to change the role of the SOCOM Commander from “monitoring” the readiness of special operations personnel to “coordinating” with the Services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect Special Operations Forces.

What is your view of this proposal?

Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine this proposal; however, it is my judgment that the law does not need to change at this time. The recently implemented DOD Instruction 5100.01 requires the Services to coordinate their personnel policies and plans with SOCOM. The “coordination” policy will provide SOCOM more visibility into personnel policy changes and initiatives.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. The administration recently released its National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda’s core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked threats “that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia”.

How do you view the Department’s role under the new National Strategy for Counterterrorism?

Answer. Elements: antiterrorism, or defensive measures; counterterrorism, or offensive actions; and consequence management, or measures to recover from terrorist attacks. Each of these components of combating terrorism has its own policies and strategies, developed in close coordination with interagency partners. DOD plays a significant role within the government-wide global fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates primarily through partner nation capacity-building and enabling efforts, targeted counterterrorism operations, and countering violent extremist messaging.
Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role for the Department in countering threats from al Qaeda and affiliated groups outside of South Asia?

Answer. In my judgment, DOD’s primary role is to pursue the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates as part of a whole-of-government counterterrorism approach. We accomplish this through security force assistance, building strong and enduring partnerships, and when directed, conducting targeted counterterrorism operations in order to eliminate imminent threats to the United States and U.S. interests. We also support other efforts led by interagency partners who focus on the development of better governance and supplying basic needs thereby reducing the underlying causes that enable AQ to recruit from vulnerable populations.

Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and agencies?

Answer. It’s my personal experience that the level of interagency coordination that occurs in the global counterterrorism (CT) fight is greater than it has ever been. But that does not mean we can rest in continually improving our coordinated efforts to bring the full weight of our national power to bear in the defense of our interests. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we collectively put forth the most effective approach to combat terrorism.

Question. What do you view as the role of the Department in countering al Qaeda and affiliated groups in cyberspace?

Answer. The Department acts in support of the Nation’s strategic objective to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates. In cyberspace, this includes directing DOD information networks operations, planning against designated cyberspace threats, and executing cyberspace operations as directed. DOD also employs cyber defense measures to prevent intrusions and defeat adversary (including AQ) activities on DOD networks and systems.

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

What is your assessment of this authority?

Answer. Combatant commanders have repeatedly confirmed section 1208 as a key tool in this ongoing fight. The ability for Special Operations Forces to leverage willing partners who possess access to areas, people, and information that are denied to our forces is critical to tactical and strategic success. We have been able to respond quickly to global challenges due to this authority while maintaining the appropriate civilian oversight, including Secretary of Defense approval and congressional notification. The Department is appreciative of Congress’s continued support for this authority and if confirmed, I will continue to keep you informed through our annual report and briefings.

CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Question. The 2010 QDR called for increased counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces.

What is your understanding and assessment of the QDR’s guidance with regard to the mix of responsibilities assigned to general purpose and Special Operations Forces, particularly with respect to security force assistance and building partner military capabilities?

Answer. The 2010 QDR emphasized expanding general purpose forces’ capabilities and capacity for these missions. Our general purpose forces have always performed some security force assistance and built partner capacity; however, this strategy increases that emphasis and expands the range of missions. This approach is also consistent with the 2010 QDR emphasis on allies and partners.

Question. Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to become more like Special Operations Forces in mission areas that are critical to countering violent extremists?

Answer. Our conventional forces should continue to become more versatile, adopting some special capabilities, particularly in areas such as cultural awareness, linguistic capabilities, information operations, and in the ability to operate in a decentralized, widely dispersed environment. Doing so will improve general purpose force capabilities across mission areas including counterinsurgency and stability operations.

Question. In your view, what mission areas, if any, should be reserved for Special Operations Forces only?
Answer. In my judgment, Special Operations Forces provide unique abilities and are an essential component of our U.S. Armed Forces. In a very unpredictable security environment, they must remain versatile as well. Unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counter-proliferation of WMD are some of the unique mission areas in which they excel and provide an essential capability.

DOD’S COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

Question. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which is focused historically on accounting for, securing, or eliminating Cold War era WMD and materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, has started to expand its focus to other countries. With this expansion the CTR program is widening its focus to biological weapons and capabilities including biological surveillance and early warning; and encouraging development of capabilities to reduce proliferation threats.

Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts, e.g., DOD, the Department of Energy, and the State Department?

Answer. My understanding is that effective interagency coordination has been a defining characteristic of the CTR program since its inception, which has directly contributed to the program’s success. We should continue to evaluate the program’s objectives in alignment with our national security interests. If confirmed, I will evaluate whether interagency coordination can be improved.

Question. If confirmed, would you make any changes in the current programs or goals of the CTR program?

Answer. The CTR program has contributed significantly to reducing residual Cold War stockpiles of WMD and associated materials within the states of the former Soviet Union. However, such threats continue to exist, both within the Eurasia region and throughout the world. I support the continued expansion of this program to other regions of the world in order to build global partnerships. Where governments are unable to mitigate this threat on their own, we should consider working with them to secure all WMD and related materials.

PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

Question. The 2010 QDR concluded that the United States will continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has been no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the effort is early in the technology and testing phase.

In your view, what is the role for a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national security in the near future?

Answer. There has been no decision to field a CPGS capability; however, the concept can merit in a variety of scenarios. If confirmed, I will closely examine CPGS in order to provide recommendations on its future development.

Question. What approach to implementation of this capability would you expect to pursue if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support continued research, development, test, and evaluation of critical technologies. I will also assess the formal establishment of follow-on Service acquisition programs and a concurrent effort to improve the Nation’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities necessary to support a future CPGS capability.

Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike capability?

Answer. As with other weapons systems, effective employment of CPGS weapons depends on the collection, analysis, and dissemination of timely and accurate intelligence information. Currently, DOD is conducting assessments of the adequacy of present and future ISR to support strikes using a CPGS weapon system. If confirmed, I will use these assessments to inform the performance requirements for CPGS, just as assessed CPGS performance will shape future ISR requirements.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim of developing computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest challenges, if any, with respect to assuring the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile?
Answer. To sustain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile today, we must prudently manage our nuclear stockpile and related LEPs, while cultivating the nuclear infrastructure, expert workforce, and leadership required to sustain it in the future. If confirmed, I will consider the full range of LEP approaches to include refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.

*Question.* If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing? What considerations would guide your recommendation in this regard?

Answer. Our current stockpile stewardship is assessed as effective. Today's stockpile has been certified and does not require further nuclear testing. However, the stockpile is aging. I understand that there are challenges in identifying and remediating the effects of aging on the stockpile. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Department of Energy to maintain the critical skills, capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile within a constrained budget environment.

*Question.* Do you agree that the full funding of the President's plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?

Answer. Yes. The administration's 1251 report details the roadmap for ensuring the future safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile and associated delivery platforms as well as for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex. It demonstrates a strong commitment to the nuclear mission and is an important signal that the U.S. deterrent remains strong.

*Question.* Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START treaty limits in the deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?

Answer. The 2010 NPR Report stated that the United States would pursue additional reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons with Russia, and a key aspect of implementing the 2010 NPR is conducting follow-on analysis. The Senate also noted in its resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the New START treaty that we must seek to initiate negotiations with Russia on a new arms control agreement by February 2012. The analysis of further reductions would inform my judgment, if confirmed, on whether it is prudent to reduce nuclear weapons below New START treaty limits.

*Question.* If confirmed, would you recommend any changes to the non-deployed hedge stockpile of nuclear weapons?

Answer. As detailed in the administration's section 1251 report, the National Nuclear Security Administration is pursuing a multi-year program to build critical plutonium and uranium facilities that will give the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise the ability to correct identified stockpile deficiencies. Without these infrastructure improvements and the ability to correct stockpile deficiencies and failures, careful analysis would be required to enable or accept reductions in the strategic hedge. If confirmed, I would assess this analysis before recommending any changes to the non-deployed hedge stockpile.

**LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION**

*Question.* The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is pending consideration in the U.S. Senate. What is your view on whether or not the United States should join the Law of the Sea convention?

Answer. I support the United States becoming party to the Law of the Sea Convention. This Convention provides U.S. Armed Forces the best possible means to maximize its rights to move freely on, through, and over the world's oceans. I also think that joining the Convention will allow the United States to strengthen our military's ability to conduct operations.

*Question.* How would being a party to the Law of the Sea convention help or hinder the United States' security posture?

Answer. In my judgment, accession to the Convention would more permanently secure our Nation's global mobility rights, which are critical to America's ongoing and future national security operations and humanitarian assistance missions.

**MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES**

*Question.* In support of the current ongoing conflicts, the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since World
War II. Numerous problems have arisen over time in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening and medical response to service-connected injuries or illnesses, antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and inefficient policies regarding members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve Force management policies and systems have been characterized in the past as "inefficient and rigid" and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment shortages, cross-leveling, and reset policies.

What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems still exist?

Answer. At this point, I can speak only for the Army Reserve component, but we have made significant progress in this area and eliminated or improved many "inefficient and rigid" procedures. In doing so, we have been able to better sustain the vital employment of the National Guard and Reserves. Some of the direct results of these improvements are: increased deployment predictability, earlier mobilization notifications, stabilized dwell times, and reintegration and transition services throughout the deployment cycle. Deliberate investments and policy commitments to this Operational Reserve have resulted in the best trained, best equipped, and best led Reserve component in our history. There remains room for improvement, such as achieving a single, standardized pay system and providing first-rate medical care before and after deployment. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on the shared goal of providing our Total Force the most capable and best cared for military force in the world.

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring changes to the enabling of an operational Reserve aimed at ensuring Reserve component readiness for future mobilization requirements?

Answer. The future fiscal environment will present significant challenges as we seek to program sufficient resources to preserve the readiness gains of the Reserve component while continuing to use them on a predictable and periodic basis to satisfy our national security requirements. Meeting this challenge will require the commitment of both the Department and Congress.

Question. Do you believe the Reserve components should be Operational or Strategic Reserves?

Answer. The reality is that the Reserve components of our Armed Forces have transformed from an exclusively Strategic Reserve to one that also provides operational, full-spectrum capabilities to the Nation. Repeated combat deployments, as well as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and Homeland defense missions, have produced a Reserve component far more operationally capable and experienced than at any time in our Nation's history. Returning to a strictly Strategic Reserve role for the Reserve component would not be in the Nation's best interest.

Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves to further enhance their ability to perform various national security missions?

Answer. Over the past 10 years, the Department has primarily relied on the provisions of the Presidential Declaration of National Emergency to gain involuntary access to the Reserve components. If confirmed, I think it would be prudent to explore more effective and potentially more decentralized authorities to involuntarily access and mobilize Reserve and National Guard Forces. To that end, I understand DOD is working with the Armed Service Committees to include new mobilization authorities in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. These authorities would allow Service Secretaries limited mobilization authority, of up to 365 days, for non-named contingencies. Such a change would allow us to better support the requirements of the Joint Force Commanders. Additionally, the recent agreement between DOD and the Governors, which will allow Reserve and National Guard Forces to respond to a domestic emergency or disaster when requested by a Governor, is a positive step forward.

MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF THE RESERVES

Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee, and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for improved policy oversight and accountability.

If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?

Answer. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component personnel remains an issue of significant concern. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Reserve Health Readiness Program (RHRP), which provides Periodic Health Assessment (PHA), Post-Deployment Health Reassessment, and other Individual Medical Readi-
ness services—both medical and dental—to all Reserve component forces. In addition to these programs, command emphasis on meeting standards and the integration of RHRP data with our existing readiness systems will improve both reporting accuracy and overall readiness. If confirmed, I will work to improve Reserve readiness across the Department.

**Question.** How would you improve upon the Department’s ability to maintain a healthy and fit Reserve component?

**Answer.** Improving the Department’s ability to maintain a healthy and fit Reserve component requires senior leadership involvement and individual accountability. Strong command emphasis must be in place to produce necessary improvements. If confirmed, I will work with the Defense Safety Oversight Council and the Medical and Personnel Executive Steering Committee to advance health and safety promotion and injury/illness prevention.

### RECRUITING STANDARDS

**Question.** Recruiting highly qualified individuals for military service during wartime in a cost-constrained environment presents unique challenges. The Army has been criticized in past years for relaxing enlistment standards in tough recruiting environments with respect to factors such as age, intelligence, weight and physical fitness standards, citizenship status, tattoos, and past criminal misconduct. On the other hand, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G–1, testified earlier this year that less than 25 percent of all 17–24 year olds are eligible to enlist, primarily due to physical and educational requirements.

**What is your assessment of the adequacy of current standards regarding qualifications for enlistment in the Armed Forces?**

**Answer.** From my perspective as CSA, the current enlistment qualification standards are well-defined and have stood the test of time. They are driven by the need to provide the Services with men and women who are prepared to adapt to the rigors of military life and meet performance requirements. To that end, the Services carefully screen applicants who come from all walks of life. The traditional high school diploma remains the best single predictor of attrition. That said, some standards may change over time. As an example, I personally believe that the enlistment process should include an open-source social media screening and have asked the Department of the Army to consider whether we have the necessary authorities and whether it is feasible to do so.

**Question.** In your view, is there any way to increase the pool of eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality?

**Answer.** Again, speaking from the Army perspective, we are not currently challenged by recruiting and retention. There is an adequate pool of eligible enlistees. However, we are alert to challenges other than quality such as ensuring a reasonable geographic diversity of recruits so that we remain reflective of American society. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to continually find new ways to improve recruitment.

**Question.** Are there any enlistment requirements or standards that are overly restrictive or which do not directly correlate to successful military service?

**Answer.** My current assessment is that our military enlistment standards are not overly restrictive. The Services employ fitness, adaptability, and aptitude standards which correlate to the physical, disciplined, regulated lifestyle and cognitive demands needed to succeed in the Armed Forces. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate this issue closely.

**Question.** Current recruiting policies define three tiers of high school diploma credentials, aimed at minimizing attrition during the initial enlistment term. At the height of OIF, the Army was particularly forward-leaning in advocating for more GED holders and non-traditional high school graduates to meet recruiting goals. Pending legislative proposals would treat all graduates of State-recognized programs equally for recruiting eligibility.

**Do you believe the current “tier” system for evaluating potential enlistees has outlived its usefulness in today’s All-Volunteer Force?**

**Answer.** The Services track the attrition rates of military recruits by a variety of credential types. Traditional high school diploma graduates have lower rates of attrition than any other type of credential holder. I am aware of the proposals that would classify graduates of online public schools as “Tier I” candidates for military enrollment, and if confirmed, I will give it careful consideration.

**Question.** What do you consider to be the most important indicators of future successful Active Duty military service in a new recruit?

**Answer.** The fitness, adaptability, and aptitude standards which the Services employ have historically correlated to the physical, disciplined, regulated lifestyle and
cognitive demands needed to succeed in the Armed Forces. Young men and women who are motivated to serve their country and desire to excel will have that opportunity through military service.

HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY

**Question.** The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010”, enacted on December 22, 2010, provides for the repeal of the current DOD policy concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces, to be effective 60 days after the Secretary of Defense has received DOD’s comprehensive review on the implementation of such repeal, and the President, Secretary, and CJCS certify to the congressional defense committees that they have considered the report and proposed plan of action, that DOD has prepared the necessary policies and regulations to exercise the discretion provided by such repeal, and that implementation of such policies and regulations is consistent with the standards of military readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion, and military recruiting and retention.

What effect do you anticipate the repeal will have on readiness and discipline in the Armed Forces?

**Answer.** We have the policies and regulations needed for implementation, and they are consistent with standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention. I have considered both objective and subjective measures, and it is my judgment that with our training and preparation nearly complete, we are now ready to affect repeal while sustaining military effectiveness.

PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

**Question.** On November 5, 2009, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 people and wounding or injuring 43 others. A DOD review of the attack released in January 2010 concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization among military personnel.

What, in your view, are the lessons learned from the tragedy at Fort Hood?

**Answer.** Fort Hood revealed areas that require corrective action. Specific lessons include: (1) identifying and monitoring potential threats through gathering, analyzing, and acting on information and intelligence; (2) providing time-critical information to the right people through the sharing and merging of key indicators; and (3) planning for and responding to incidents through immediate emergency response as well as the long-term care for victims of attacks and their families.

**Question.** If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?

**Answer.** As a result of the tragedy at Fort Hood, the Department will strengthen its policies, programs, and procedures to mitigate internal threats, ensure force protection, enable emergency response, and provide care for victims and families. If confirmed, I will work to: (1) address workplace violence; (2) ensure commander and supervisor access to appropriate information in personnel records; (3) improve information sharing with partner agencies and among installations; (4) expand installations’ emergency response capabilities; (5) integrate force protection policy, and clarifying force protection roles and responsibilities; and (6) ensure that we provide top quality health care to both our servicemembers and our healthcare providers.

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

**Question.** The Independent Review Related to the Tragedy at Fort Hood observed that “DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization.” Recommendation 2.7 of the Final Recommendations urged the Department to update policy to clarify guidelines for religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the Department to task the Defense Science Board to “undertake a multi-disciplinary study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and self-radicalization . . . ”

What is your view of these recommendations?

**Answer.** I understand the Independent Review Related to the Tragedy at Fort Hood issued recommendations based on their findings, and that the Fort Hood Follow-on Review prepared an implementation plan in response to these. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor implementation and track the progress being made to protect our servicemembers from harm while ensuring DOD policies, programs, and procedures appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of current policies and programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the military?
Answer. The right of servicemembers to observe their respective religious faiths has always been highly valued by all of the Services. It is my current judgment that our policies and programs reflect this value and provide commanders with adequate flexibility to balance accommodation for religious beliefs and maintain good order and discipline. If confirmed, I will remain open to issues and ideas that might suggest any change in policy or programs.

Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

Answer. Yes, I believe our policies appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion.

Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?

Answer. Yes, I think existing policies and practices strike the proper balance. I admire our military chaplains for their work ministering amidst the pluralistic environment of the military. Even as chaplains express their faith, they and their commanders also are asked to be as inclusive as possible when ministering to an interfaith group. Our chaplains can voluntarily participate, or not participate, in settings which conflict with their faith traditions while remaining mindful of the requirement for inclusiveness. If confirmed, I will remain open to issues and ideas that might suggest improvement to policy and practices.

Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that a scientific fact-based approach to understanding radicalization will drive the Department’s relevant policies on this topic?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that our force is protected by a reliance on scientific, fact-based approach to countering radicalization. I understand Defense Science Board has been commissioned by DOD and that there are plans to commission two additional clinical studies focused on identifying any potential indicators of violent behavior in military personnel. I believe the results of these studies can help inform future policies and programs on radicalization.

Question. Current policy in the Department gives discretion to military leaders to decide whether requests to waive uniform and appearance standards should be granted based on religious beliefs. The Department has submitted a legislative proposal that would clearly exempt the armed services from the requirements of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).

What is your view of the manner in which DOD policies accommodate religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith?

Answer. I understand the important and delicate balance that we must strike between accommodating religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith and maintaining the military's uniform grooming and appearance standards. My understanding is that wearing particular articles of faith are permissible so long as the articles are neat and conservative, do not negatively impact the readiness, and good order or discipline of the unit and the mission is not jeopardized. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring an appropriate balance between maintaining the military's uniform grooming and appearance standards and accommodating particular articles of faith.

Question. Do you believe that the Armed Forces need to be exempted from the strictures of RFRA? If so, why?

Answer. Yes. It is my understanding that the RFRA has the effect of ensuring that a "rational basis" standard in the specific area of military grooming and appearance is applied by the courts instead of by the Armed Forces. The DOD legislative proposal will restore a more appropriate balance between maintaining the military's uniform grooming and appearance standards and approving requested religious accommodations.

Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?

Answer. First and foremost, the events related to the attack at Fort Hood are a tragedy for all involved. While it is possible that such a tragic act could spur harassment and violence as a means of retaliation, I have confidence in the professionalism of our men and women in the Armed Forces. Furthermore, our military
leaders and supervisors at all levels take precautions to prevent such occurrences while maintaining good order and discipline.

**Question.** If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the U.S. military?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would focus on sustaining the professionalism of our All-Volunteer Force. I would also advocate open communications, decisive action on the part of military leaders and supervisors, and command emphasis on our standards for maintaining good order and discipline. It’s worth noting that the vast majority of our force has lived and worked among Muslims for the past 10 years and is very culturally aware.

### SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

**Question.** The Department has in recent years developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assault, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However, numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in combat areas of operation and at home stations are still being reported. Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate treatment for the victim. They assert that their command fails to respond appropriately with basic medical services and with an adequate investigation of their allegations followed by a failure to hold assailants accountable.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential or restricted reporting, to be effective?

**Answer.** I do, but am also acutely aware that we must continue to do more. Current policies and programs designed to address sexual assault have allowed the Department to both care for victims and hold offenders accountable. However, until we have zero sexual assaults within our forces, we should continue to look for ways to improve the system. If confirmed, I will continue to engage and emphasize the importance of addressing sexual assault, of caring for victims, and of holding offenders accountable.

**Question.** What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the restricted reporting procedure has been implemented?

**Answer.** Getting victims to trust the system and come forward can be challenging. Confidential reporting, or restricted reporting, allows a victim to come forward and have their personal needs met without fear that may be associated with a criminal investigation. I will remain alert and receptive to any reported flaws in the program and take prompt action to improve the system.

**Question.** What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including assaults by or against contractor personnel?

**Answer.** I am very concerned about reports of sexual assault against anyone in any location. We will not tolerate this behavior. The Services have procedures in place to address the challenges of preventing and responding to sexual assaults in an operational environment to include working with host governments and our international partners. The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program requires larger units, such as brigades, to appoint and train a deployable sexual assault response coordinator and every battalion or squadron to appoint and train unit victim advocates. Until no sexual assaults occur within our Armed Forces, we will continue to look for ways to improve prevention and response.

**Question.** What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

**Answer.** DOD is committed to addressing sexual assault in a comprehensive, integrated and uniform manner. All the Services have been directed to establish guidelines for a 24-hour, 7 day a week sexual assault response capability for all locations, including deployed areas. Our investigators and first responders are well trained. All services recently enhanced their resources for investigating and prosecuting sexual assault cases.

**Question.** What is your view of the willingness and ability of the Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?

**Answer.** The Services have the willingness and ability to hold assailants accountable. Moreover, senior leaders are very aware of the importance of establishing a positive organizational climate. Sexual assault is personally destructive for the victim while also undermining organizational climate, unit discipline and morale. When sexual assaults do occur, leaders must ensure victims feel free to report incidents without fear of reprisal, while appropriately applying available resources to investigate and punish assailants.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults?

Answer. DOD has a zero tolerance policy for sexual assault, and we have assigned a General/Flag Officer with operational experience to provide direct oversight of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program office. If confirmed, I will constantly evaluate policies to ensure the safety, dignity, and well being of all members of the Armed Forces.

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. In recent years, the Navy has opened service on submarines to women, the Marine Corps has expanded service opportunities for women in intelligence specialties, and the Army is currently reviewing its assignment policy for female soldiers. The issue of the appropriate role of women in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public. Do you believe additional specialties should be eligible for service by women?

Answer. DOD is currently conducting a comprehensive review of the role of women in combat. We are participating in this review, and if confirmed, I will continue to monitor combat needs as Services recommend expanding combat roles for women and notify Congress accordingly as required by statute (10 U.S.C., § 652 and/or § 6035). Any decision regarding opening additional specialties for service by women will be based on our obligation to maintain a high state of mission readiness of our All-Volunteer Force.

Question. Do you believe any changes are needed or warranted in the current assignment policies regarding women?

Answer. I support the DOD review and welcome the opportunity to determine what we've learned in 10 years of combat.

RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February, 2009, the Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that “medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.” In April, 2009, then Secretary of Defense Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force Base that “health care is eating the Department alive”. The administration has proposed health care efficiencies to save nearly $8.0 billion through 2016.

Do you agree with the proposed health care efficiencies?

Answer. As they have been described to me, I believe that the proposed health care efficiencies are sensible efforts to control DOD’s health care costs while maintaining the same level of care. I also believe the modest increases in beneficiaries' cost shares are reasonable and still compare favorably to private sector healthcare plans.

Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of military health care?

Answer. Before reforms can be initiated, detailed analysis must be done. This must include a look at benefit payment structures, organizational structure, systems, and policies for the military health system. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary of Defense, as he leads the Department’s ongoing effort to explore all possibilities to control the costs of military health care. I am also an advocate for the potential long-term gains available through the promotion of healthy lifestyle and prevention among our beneficiaries to help reduce the demand for health services.

Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs on future DOD plans?

Answer. The medical cost growth trend will continue to add pressure to the Department’s budget the longer it remains unresolved. Our uniformed servicemembers make great sacrifices for their Nation and the quality of their health care is a critical component to having a fit and ready force to accomplish the National Security Strategy. Additionally, the generous health benefits we provide to their families and retirees are a significant part of the quality of life which allows the military to recruit and retain the highest caliber personnel the Nation has to offer. If confirmed, I will continue our efforts with Congress and DOD to find effective ways to improve the cost-effectiveness of the Military Health System.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?

Answer. I'm not in a position to make specific recommendations at this time. If confirmed, I will work closely with health care leadership in DOD to continue the
administration's efforts to examine every opportunity to ensure military beneficiaries are provided the highest quality care possible while managing cost growth.

PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel, and related entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget.

What actions do you believe can and should be taken, if any, to control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?

Answer. The cost related to personnel and entitlements is an increasing portion of DOD's available resources. Our current military compensation system is rooted in structures established a generation ago. In order to control the rise in costs related to personnel and entitlements, it is appropriate to conduct a comprehensive review of the military pay and benefits structure to determine where costs can be contained. If confirmed, I would coordinate with the Secretary of Defense on any review in a manner that supports and sustains the All-Volunteer Force.

Question. In your view, can the Department and the Services efficiently manage the use of bonuses and special pays to place high quality recruits in the right jobs without paying more than the Department needs to pay, or can afford to pay, for other elements of the force?

Answer. In my judgment, recruiting and retention bonuses are cost-effective tools to achieve DOD's personnel strength and experience objectives, but we must continually monitor these tools to ensure they are being used efficiently as well as effectively. It has been my experience that the Services adjust enlisted bonus levels to ensure we get the right numbers of personnel in the corresponding specialties. If confirmed, I would be open to a review of the utilization and efficacy of bonuses as part of any comprehensive review of the military pay and benefits structure.

MILITARY RETIREMENT

Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more resembles the benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement System than the current military retirement benefit; increasing TRICARE fees for retirees; and the adoption of dependent care and flexible spending accounts for servicemembers. Secretary Panetta has called for a comprehensive review of the military retirement benefit.

While it is often said that the military retirement benefit helps retention after the 10-year point, do you believe it provides any significant boost to recruitment? Do 17–18 year olds care when deciding to enlist?

Answer. Surveys show that retirement benefits are often not a driving factor to enlist 17–18 year old men and women. I agree with Secretary Panetta that it is time to review the military retirement system for needed changes and efficiencies that will still encourage retention and recruitment.

Question. How might it be modernized to reflect the needs of a new generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost to the Government?

Answer. There are many proposed alternatives to the current military retirement system. I am unable to make recommendations at this time, but if confirmed, I will closely study proposals and their impact as part of a comprehensive review process.

SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured performing duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from Active Duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007 illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of significant numbers of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain, including a growing population of servicemembers awaiting disability evaluation.

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured servicemembers and their families?

Answer. The Wounded, Ill, and Injured, Senior Oversight Council DOD formed in 2007 has provided the necessary consistent focus on these issues, and has made excellent progress. DOD, in collaboration with the Services and the Department of Veterans Affairs, has been working on multiple ways to improve the care, management, and transition of our wounded warriors and their families. The Services'
Wounded Warrior Units and Program oversight offices have made dramatic improvements through which individual and family medical, mental, and social-economic needs are addressed.

**Question.** What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would continue to build upon the successes of the Services’ Wounded Warrior Units. By continuing to appropriately resource and staff these organizations with high quality personnel we can further improve the transition processes and overall well being of our wounded warriors. Additionally, we should continue to expand upon the research and treatment by continued collaboration between the private medical research and healthcare sector and the Centers of Excellence which fall under the DCoE (Defense Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury). These groups are making daily strides in providing the best level and quality of care to our wounded warriors and their families, and if confirmed, I will continue to place the highest priority on these efforts.

**Question.** What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?

**Answer.** The Services’ have taken great strides to improve care to our wounded servicemembers. However, continuous improvement is needed. One area to further improve is individual case management when a servicemember transitions from the Active Force to DOD retiree or eligible veteran status. The key components of this process are the implementation of a single electronic health record, which follows the servicemember through transition and a single tracking tool for case management. If confirmed, I will work to improve collaboration with our Department of Veterans Affairs partners to expedite fielding of this system. The transition process and tracking for wounded warriors with unseen psychological wounds is an area which requires continued development as well.

**Question.** If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

**Answer.** Yes. For example, if confirmed, I would continue to take advantage of generous support the Department has received from the many non-profit programs and private organizations who have reached out to support our returning veterans. There are hundreds of these organizations and programs that have come to the aide of wounded warriors and their families to provide for everything from assistive devices (wheel chairs, house ramps, etcetera), to conducting research on medical treatments, to providing direct economic aid. I would also continue the Joint Staff’s role in providing the Department with evaluation and analysis across the Services in order to share best-practices and lessons learned.

**Question.** If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

**Answer.** Yes. For example, if confirmed, I would continue to take advantage of generous support the Department has received from the many non-profit programs and private organizations who have reached out to support our returning veterans. There are hundreds of these organizations and programs that have come to the aide of wounded warriors and their families to provide for everything from assistive devices (wheel chairs, house ramps, etcetera), to conducting research on medical treatments, to providing direct economic aid. I would also continue the Joint Staff’s role in providing the Department with evaluation and analysis across the Services in order to share best-practices and lessons learned.

**Question.** Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program, has been established to improve processing of servicemembers.

**What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the integrated DES?**

**Answer.** It is my belief that the current Integrated Disability Evaluation System has made significant progress but needs further reform. If confirmed, I would facilitate the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Veterans Administration’s collaboration via the IDES Tiger Team. In order for IDES to reach its full potential, DOD may need to closely coordinate with Congress for legislative change. Ultimately, this will reduce the total number of warriors in the evaluation process, thus reducing the overall cost to the system and the burden on our wounded warriors.

**Question.** If confirmed, how will you address any need for change, particularly the Army’s growing population of servicemembers awaiting disability evaluation?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will support current IDES reform initiatives and, if necessary, assist the Secretary of Defense with recommendations to Congress on legislative adjustments to the disability rating and compensation system. Additionally, I would continue support for the Services Wounded Warrior units, where significant improvements are being made to the quality of care for our wounded warriors.

**suicide prevention and mental health resources**

**Question.** The numbers of suicides in each of the Services has increased in recent years. The Army released a report entitled “Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, Suicide Prevention” in July 2010 that analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In addition, studies conducted by the Army of soldiers and marines in theater are showing declines in individual morale and increases in mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced multiple deployments.
In your view, what should DOD do to shape policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members of the Reserve components?

Answer. I am very concerned about the suicide rate. Suicide is a problem that cuts across the Army family, affecting our servicemembers, our Veterans, and their families. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Congress, our military leaders, Veterans Affairs, and Federal and civilian organizations to see that our members' and families' psychological health is addressed. DOD has developed an action plan to address the 13 foundational and 76 targeted recommendations outlined in the 2010 DOD Task Force Report on Prevention of Suicide. Resourcing and implementing recommendations set forth by the Services will improve resilience in the force in hopes of ultimately lowering suicide rates.

Question. What is your understanding of the action that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army are taking in response to the July 2010 Army report, and the data in Chapter 3 in particular?

Answer. Early identification of "high risk" behavior and issues such as marital problems, substance abuse, and behavior difficulties are at the forefront of the Services' proactive interventions. This has allowed leaders to intervene on the leading edge. We are seeing increased unit resilience in soldiers and marines, and though it is still a factor the stigma regarding mental health care is dissipating. The Army and the Marine Corps continue to evaluate and modify services related to health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention including increased behavioral health providers at the brigade level in Active and Reserve units, allowing engaged leaders to improve education and awareness of behavioral health issues. In addition, the Army has required increased behavioral health screening before and after deployments; improved training for chaplains and suicide prevention coordinators; and for primary care medical providers to identify and respond to behavioral health issues.

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to home station?

Answer. As an institution, DOD must continue to directly address mental health issues because they directly affect the wellness of our force. There are three key areas that must be addressed to ensure sufficient resources are available to members and their families. First, we must continue to reduce stigma and ensure that members are comfortable seeking treatment and using the resources that are available. Second, we must continue to develop effective mental health therapies that are relevant and appropriate for the experiences of our forces and their families. Third, the necessary resources must be available to include trained mental health professionals.

FAMILY SUPPORT

Question. Military members and their families in both the active and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations that go with them. What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for servicemembers and their families?

Answer. I share the common judgment that family resilience is tied to family readiness. We must ensure military families are well prepared to meet the chal-
lenges that come with deployment and service. Through focusing on the psychological, social, financial, and educational well-being of military families, we can continue to build family resilience. Great strides have been made in improving access to resources for families through such programs as Strong Bonds, MilitaryOne Source and the Yellow Ribbon Program. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on these and other initiatives to promote family readiness.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Services, the Department, and other agencies on improving resources for benchmark Service programs as well as access to other programs such as MilitaryOne Source and the Yellow Ribbon Program. I believe it is DOD’s responsibility to ensure that appropriate resources, including those in health care, education, and employment, are available to families at the level they need wherever they may be located.

**Question.** How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, base realignment and closure, deployments, and future reductions in end strength?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will monitor the changing needs of our military families closely to ensure that all available resources are available to families at the required level and location. In order to accurately address the needs of these families in a changing environment, it is critical that we build community partnerships between all Federal agencies and with local governments, businesses, and non-profit organizations that are stakeholders in addressing the stressful aspects of military life. I also believe we need to encourage continued progress among individual states’ legislative initiatives to ease recognition of professional accreditation of family members and support for various school programs transferring children.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

**Answer.** We have a duty to ensure every family has access to quality resources, regardless of component or location. These resources should provide information, access, referrals, and outreach to all military members and their families. This needs to be underwritten by a coordinated, community-based network of care encompassing DOD, VA, State, local, non-profit and private providers. It is my understanding that DOD’s Yellow Ribbon Program has been successful in addressing these needs. If confirmed, I will assess this program and others to ensure it is properly focused and funded to address the issues faced by Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve members and their families.

**Question.** If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to enhance family support?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would encourage the implementation of flexible family support programs that meet the needs of our members and their families whether they live on, near, or far from military installations. I understand there are many excellent State programs that support members and their families. If confirmed, I would like to explore these further and see if they can be expanded across all States.

**Question.** If confirmed, in your view, are the recent increases in military family support (which have risen to $8.3 billion in the fiscal year 2012 President’s budget) sustainable in future years?

**Answer.** We will have to review family programs with respect to efficiencies just as every other program in DOD will be reviewed against the overall needs of the Department. In so doing, the focus should be on the efficiency and quality of Family Support programs along with the leveraging of community-level organizations and citizens who desire to help their military-connected neighbors. DOD efficiencies, along with community partnerships and cooperation, are key to meeting the long-term needs of our military families in a fiscally constrained environment.

### DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

**Question.** Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

**Answer.** Yes. If confirmed, I would continue to support the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s 7 July 2006 memorandum which states that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

**Question.** Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006,
and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would continue to support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations and DOD Directive 2310.01E.

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure all DOD policies and plans related to intelligence interrogations, detainee briefings, and tactical questioning comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations.

Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Answer. Yes. I share the view that the way in which we treat detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. forces are treated should they be captured in future conflicts.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as CJCS?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ARMED FORCES

1. Senator Levin. General Dempsey, in response to an advance policy question about your vision for the Armed Forces of today and the future, you responded, in part, that “It will be necessary to establish a different relationship among the Active and Reserve components of our Armed Forces, and it is likely that we will have to establish a different relationship among our closest allies and partners.” Can you elaborate on what you meant in terms of what might be different in the relationship among the Active and Reserve components of our Armed Forces and among our closest allies and partners?

General Dempsey. In my judgment, it is reasonable to expect the relationship among the Active and Reserve components of our Armed Forces as well as among our closest allies and partners to evolve. Fiscal constraints, for example, will challenge our ability to program and budget sufficient resources to preserve the readiness investments made to the Reserve components. Constrained resources will also drive us to look at new approaches for how we maintain forward presence and build partnerships. As Chairman, I will work with the Secretary of Defense and Joint
Chiefs of Staff to sustain a versatile and affordable Joint Force that preserves the strong relationship between our Active and Reserve components and with our allies and partners.

**NOMINEES WITH JOINT EXPERIENCE**

2. Senator Levin. General Dempsey, recently, the committee became aware in the case of nominees for Service chief and combatant command that there was a need for secretarial waivers for promotion to flag rank and for presidential waivers for such assignments because of a lack of joint experience. Are you committed to ensuring that nominees for these positions of importance and responsibility have the requisite joint qualifications?

General Dempsey. I am wholly committed to a Joint Force led joint qualified leaders. Overall, our senior flag officers have substantial joint experience. Eligibility to pin on the rank of brigadier general or rear admiral is contingent on being a Joint Qualified Officer. It is my understanding that waivers are increasingly less frequent as our military continues to progress under Goldwater-Nichols.

---

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK BEGICH**

**MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM**

3. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, Secretary Panetta has called for a review of the military retirement system. Senior military leadership has vocalized support for a review of the military retirement system since personnel costs are a significant portion of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) budget. DOD is going to have to work with constrained resources, however, we have the greatest military in the world because of the people who serve in it and they should be compensated their service—especially if they serve long-term. While studies may show retirement benefits are not a driving factor for young recruits, they certainly become a driving factor with age. Any proposals to Congress to modify the current retirement system must still provide appropriate compensation and recognition for long-term service, especially to retain the best and the brightest. Even the current discussions regarding military retirement are causing alarm among the force and may impact retention. In the midst of three ongoing operations overseas, is now the right time to evaluate and possibly modify the military retirement system?

General Dempsey. I share in your conclusion about your military being the finest in the world. Sustaining our force at this level requires, in part, an assessment of how best to structure compensation and benefits to include retirement. In the era of fiscal constraints, we should review the military retirement system for efficiencies and effectiveness. However, any proposal should address the potential effect on recruitment, retention, and sustainment of the All-Volunteer Force.

4. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, if confirmed, how do you propose to ensure discussions regarding modifications to the retirement system and any proposed modifications do not result in significant recruiting and retention issues or impact the ability to retain the best and the brightest among our servicemembers?

General Dempsey. Our force management and compensation policies and programs are being assessed as part of the comprehensive review. The current statutory and policy framework has served us well during recent conflicts. However, fiscal constraints require us to examine options for a more affordable compensation structure that will not compromise the readiness of the All-Volunteer Force. As Chairman, I will ensure that all options under consideration include an assessment of the likely impact on recruiting and retention. Most importantly, I am committed to ensuring any potential changes do not break faith with our servicemembers, veterans, and their families.

5. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, as the discussion continues, how will you and other senior leaders communicate with the force about pay, benefits, and retirement?

General Dempsey. As Chairman, I will communicate directly with the Joint Force. I will encourage all our senior military leaders to conduct regular outreach through a variety of mediums to include media engagements, townhalls, journal articles, and social media. Our goal will be to share information openly and widely. I expect that the Service Chiefs will play an especially vital role.
6. Senator M CCAIN. General Dempsey, the impact of the ongoing financial crisis over deficit spending and the Nation's enormous debt unquestionably will have an impact on defense budgets and how we respond to the many national security threats we face. I agree with Secretary Panetta who recently said that DOD would “continue to be accountable to the American people for what we spend, where we spend it, and what the results are.” Do you view the $14 trillion deficit and projections for significant increases in this amount in the future as a national security threat?

General DEMPSEY. There is a relationship between our national security and our economic prosperity. Our national power is the aggregate of our diplomatic, military, and economic influence. In this respect, the national debt is a serious concern.

7. Senator M CCAIN. General Dempsey, what's the remedy for Admiral Mullen's belief that DOD has “lost the ability to prioritize, to make hard decisions, to do tough analysis, to make trades”?

General DEMPSEY. In my judgement, our acquisition system needs significant improvement. In particular, I will look closely for ways to improve accountability. This likely means a more prominent role for Service Chiefs early in the process. Another option under consideration is making assessments of cost, performance, and technical readiness of weapon systems even earlier in the acquisition process. As Chairman, I will ensure that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council synchronizes its decision points to better inform these earlier acquisition decisions. Through an improved Joint Capabilities Integration Development System, we will also work to ensure more focus on affordability through the analysis of risk versus cost, schedule, performance, and the urgency of the requirement.

8. Senator M CCAIN. General Dempsey, discussions on defense spending cuts as part of negotiations on raising the debt ceiling have, according to media reports, ranged from the $400 billion over 12 years that President Obama had already announced, to as much as $800 billion over 10 years, and in some cases $1 trillion over 10 years. None of these numbers assigned to defense cuts has been accompanied by any sort of strategic analysis. In other words, no one seems to be asking: “What do we need to spend for what we want our military to do?”

In your opinion, what would a cut of $80 billion to $100 billion a year over 10 years mean in terms of impact on DOD? What sort of things would we have to be willing to cut? What sort of missions would we have to consider giving up or cutting back?

General DEMPSEY. I would echo the Secretary of Defense who stated that “cuts that deep would damage our national defense”. Most likely, such reductions would require changing our national security strategies, and would probably result in a different force than we have today. The force would likely be smaller and less able to address multiple, simultaneous contingencies.

9. Senator M CCAIN. General Dempsey, what are your top priorities for programs or missions you would protect?

General DEMPSEY. As Chairman, my top priority is to protect the homeland and the American people. As mentioned in my hearing testimony, I will work to keep America immune from coercion. To this end, I am committed to developing a decisive, responsive, interdependent, versatile and affordable Joint Force that can deliver options for the Nation. As we make the force affordable, I am focused on keeping faith with our servicemembers, veterans, and their families.

10. Senator M CCAIN. General Dempsey, where do you think DOD can achieve the most savings?

General DEMPSEY. The Department is placing renewed emphasis on creating a cost culture in both our military and civilian leadership. We are expecting significant savings from efficiencies announced and enacted last year. However, efficiencies are unlikely to be sufficient to achieve directed spending reductions. We are currently working through a comprehensive review to identify where additional savings can be achieved. Recommendations will be first provided to the President and eventually submitted through the budget request.
11. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, how would you convince Congress that personnel and health care costs are going to have to be part of any major reduction in defense spending? General Dempsey. Our health care and personnel costs have increased substantially over the past several decades. We have to invest in manpower, training, equipment, and infrastructure. We know what percentage of our total obligating authority we can invest into each account and remain in balance. It is on this basis that we will communicate with Congress.

12. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, some plans currently under discussion claim to achieve a $1 trillion reduction in defense spending simply by reducing the baseline the Congressional Budget Office has been using for the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from an assumed level of about $150 to 160 billion per year for an indefinite period into the future. In your opinion, is DOD already planning for the spending on Iraq and Afghanistan to come down significantly in the future? General Dempsey. The President’s recent announcement of troop drawdown in Afghanistan will change the Department’s fiscal year 2012 budget requirements for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), but the exact change will depend on the commanders’ determination of the pace of the drawdown and/or adjustment of the forces mix. The Department is in the process of reformulating its Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) requirements for OEF for fiscal year 2012, and developing its OCO funding requirements for fiscal year 2013. Given that the forces in both OEF and Operation New Dawn (OND) are being reduced over time, a reduction in the OCO request logically follows. However, the costs for resetting the force that will extend beyond the drawdown dates.

13. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, how much do you think we will need to spend in Iraq and Afghanistan to sustain our operations there after 2012? In other words, what is a reasonable level of spending for Iraq and Afghanistan to assume for the near-term future? General Dempsey. Spending levels will depend on the results of several pending decisions. Discussions over the structure of our future security relationship with Iraq are ongoing. For Afghanistan, planning is underway to determine the pace of withdrawing the first 33,000 troops. The schedule for reducing remaining forces has not yet been determined. The OCO budget is a bottom-up budget preparation each year that is configured to support the military strategy. We will continue to work to achieve a reasonable estimate of spending.

TROUBLED DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

14. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, 2 weeks ago Congress was informed that the Government share of the cost overruns on the first 3 lots of 28 aircraft for the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was a whopping $771 million. The next week, we learned that the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, will face a bill for $283 million for their share of these cost overruns. Adding everyone’s share together, including the additional expenses associated with “concurrency”—which means costs associated with trying to develop the aircraft and build production jets simultaneously—raises the total cost of these first 28 jets by just over $1 billion to a new estimate now of about $8.1 billion. That’s a 15 percent cost increase for the first three lots of production aircraft. In April, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) projected as of last June that the total cost of development and procurement for the F–35 program would be about $833 billion. DOD’s latest estimate of the sustainment cost for the F–35 over its projected life span is an unaffordable $1 trillion. In my view, even without 15 percent cost overruns, these costs are unsustainable in this fiscal environment. How can these costs be reduced? General Dempsey. My understanding is that the Department’s plan to reduce production costs includes continued use of fixed price contracts and applying aggressive “Should Cost” analysis in our negotiations. This will limit the Department’s liability for future cost growth, incentivize the contractor to control costs, and enable low rate initial production negotiations to result in the lowest price achievable. The approach to drive down operations and sustainment (O&S) costs focuses on reducing costs associated with Depot Level Repairables and implementation of cost reduction initiatives being developed in the Affordability Management Plan (AMP).

15. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, does DOD have a “Plan B” if the costs of the F–35 cannot be significantly reduced?
General Dempsey. The Department's focus for the F–35 is cost reduction and fielding an affordable 5th generation aircraft. Even as we do so, we will continue to assess ways to meet warfighter needs and our security objectives within the realities of today's fiscal environment.

16. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what would you do as Chairman to ensure that a program as expensive as the F–35 does not siphon away resources from other defense priorities?

General Dempsey. I am committed to ensuring a balanced approach to defense priorities with regard to current operations and future capability requirements. As part of the ongoing comprehensive review, and institutionally through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and other processes, I will work to ensure that we balance and align our resources to the highest defense priorities.

17. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, we also recently learned from various media reports that the Air Force and Boeing are now expecting that the first four development aircraft for the replacement aerial refueling tanker, the KC–46A, are estimated to cost between $1 billion to $1.3 billion more than the contract's target cost. I'm particularly concerned that the taxpayers' share of that first $1 billion over target cost is 60 percent, or $600 million. Can you explain how it is that we contract for something using what is supposed to be a fixed price type contract, but before the metal is bent on the first aircraft the taxpayers are told they will face a bill for $600 million over the target cost?

General Dempsey. My understanding is that the KC–46A tanker is a Fixed Price Incentive Firm contract with a ceiling price of $4.9 billion. The intent is to get the best value for the taxpayer. Boeing acknowledges that its current cost estimate is $5.2 billion, $300 million more than the contract ceiling price. Boeing absorbs this cost under the contract.

18. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, when you tell the American people and Congress that the target cost for a program is a certain amount, what does that mean?

General Dempsey. Generally, the target price is included in contracts as an element of the incentive structure. As the contractor reduces cost from the ceiling price to the target price, the contractor's profit increases with the government getting a share of the cost savings.

19. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, according to media reports citing Boeing and DOD sources, the current estimated cost of this first development contract is $4.9 billion to $5.2 billion. The target cost of the contract was $3.9 billion. When the contract was announced, the official DOD press release, dated February 24, 2011, described the contract value as being “more than $3.5 billion”. Can you explain why a contract value that was announced as $3.5 billion has now swelled to as much as $5.2 billion in 5 months?

General Dempsey. It is my understanding that the contract includes both a ceiling price and a target price. The ceiling price of $4.9 billion represents the maximum government liability for the development of the KC–46A. Any additional costs associated with developing the KC–46A will be borne by Boeing. The announced value reflected a best case should Boeing maximize incentives contained in the contract.

20. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, if confirmed, what will you do as Chairman to ensure that Congress and the American people are not asked to pay huge cost overruns on defense programs that are simply not affordable?

General Dempsey. When I assume the office of Chairman, I will work with other Department officials to improve affordability early in the development of new joint capabilities. I will be attentive to requirements overreach or pursuit of insufficiently mature technologies without compromising innovation. Overruns will also be addressed with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council's trip-wire process. Through this process and others, we will continue to examine performance trades to mitigate cost growth and schedules delays, advise the Nunn-McCurdy certification process, and participate in Configuration Steering Boards and the Defense Acquisition Board.

AFGHANISTAN

21. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, Admiral Mullen viewed the President's timetable to take the surge forces out of Afghanistan as more aggressive and incur-
ring more risk than he was originally prepared to accept. What will be the impact of this troop withdrawal on our ability to keep the Taliban on its heels and protect the population?

General DEMPSEY. As we recover the surge force, we will continue to maintain the pressure on the Taliban while simultaneously protecting the population. The surge force allowed us to reverse Taliban momentum, and to that end we have been largely successful, particularly in key districts that were once Taliban safe havens. Concurrent to these operations, we have steadily built Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capacity and capability to the point where we are now confident that they are increasingly able to take the lead in security in many areas.

22. Senator M CCAIN. General Dempsey, what are the goals in the year ahead to continue to reduce the influence and resiliency of the Taliban?

General DEMPSEY. Our comprehensive civil-military strategy in Afghanistan will sustain pressure on the Taliban while expanding security for the populace. We will do this through coalition military operations and increasingly through partnered and independent operations by ANSF. Concurrently, we will help grow the Afghan capacity for governance and security as we transition full security responsibility by the end of 2014.

23. Senator M CCAIN. General Dempsey, are you aware of any military leader who recommended the withdrawal strategy the President adopted?

General DEMPSEY. When the President announced the troop surge in December 2009, he also stated that these additional forces would begin to come home within 18 months. Those 18 months have elapsed and, true to his word, the President has made the decision to begin withdrawal of our surge forces beginning in July 2011 to be completed by summer of 2012. It is my understanding that the withdrawal strategy announced by the President was “within the range of options” that military leaders presented. After the recovery of the surge force, there will be 68,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

IRAQ

24. Senator M CCAIN. General Dempsey, what do you consider to be the “point of no return” for the Maliki Government to request the continued presence of U.S. troops to assist in their efforts to defeat al Qaeda and provide a national defense?

General DEMPSEY. On 2 August 2011, Prime Minister Maliki received approval from the Iraqi Council of Representatives to begin negotiations with the United States for a continued U.S. presence after 2011. This important step by the Government of Iraq signifies their desire to maintain an enduring strategic relationship with us. As we continue to draw down our forces, the ability to support an Iraqi request for a continued U.S. presence becomes increasingly problematic, especially after 30 September 2011.

HOLLOW FORCE

25. Senator M CCAIN. General Dempsey, how would you define a hollow force?

General DEMPSEY. While there is no consensus definition, the hollow force construct is useful for thinking about what we must avoid as we shape the future Joint Force. Generally, something hollow appears to have characteristics or capabilities that, in fact, it lacks. Essentially, a hollow force disproportionately retains force and organizational structure at the expense of proper training and fully functional equipment. This creates the illusion of readiness for the full range of military operations.

26. Senator M CCAIN. General Dempsey, if confirmed, what data or signs would you look for to determine if we are trending towards a hollow force?

General DEMPSEY. Given the broad meaning often ascribed to what constitutes a “hollow force”, we should focus on general trends across multiple indicators. This will best enable us to assess our ability to meet the military objectives outlined in national security strategies. Examples of relevant indicators include dwell time, unit readiness, and recruitment and retention rates. I will also be focused on the overall health of the force to include trends in personal and family data like divorce rates and suicide.
27. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, in your opinion, do the Military Services have adequate benchmarks or other measuring criteria to determine how levels of funding affect overall readiness?

General Dempsey. It is my understanding that each of the Military Services use costing models to estimate funding for required levels of readiness, including support of OCOs. Their estimates are based on adequate readiness metrics such as system miles, steaming hours, or flying hours. The Services then report readiness through the Defense Readiness Reporting System. The Joint Staff then evaluates readiness across the Joint Force through the Chairman’s Readiness System.

28. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, if confirmed, do you have confidence you will be able to tell the Secretary of Defense or the President that defense cuts above a certain level raise the risk of a hollow force?

General Dempsey. I am confident that I will be able to define both strategic and institutional risk.

YEMEN

29. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, is al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in a stronger position to plan and launch an attack against the United States or our allies given the sustained political and security unrest in Yemen?

General Dempsey. It seems clear that AQAP is attempting to exploit the political unrest in Yemen to strengthen its position. It is also clear that AQAP retains aspirations to plan and launch a transnational attack against us or our allies.

SOMALIA

30. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), has stated that al Qaeda and its affiliates in East Africa—to include al Shabaab—have experienced a “dramatic increase” in their influence in the region. In response to advance policy questions posed by the committee, you stated that al Shabaab has the capability to plan attacks against the United States and Western interests and that the group’s efforts to recruit U.S. persons increases the threat to the U.S. Homeland. Do you agree with General Ham’s assessment?

General Dempsey. I do. Al Shabaab has increased its influence in East Africa by merging with like-minded Islamic groups and establishing Islamic administrations in southern districts of Somalia. Despite their recently reported withdrawal from Mogadishu, I do not consider the threat they pose has diminished.

31. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what is your understanding of the extent of al Shabaab’s efforts to recruit U.S. and Western citizens for terrorist activity?

General Dempsey. To my understanding, it is likely that over 40 Americans have traveled to Somalia to join al Shabaab. A majority of these U.S. persons are ethnic Somalis who have joined al Shabaab for nationalistic reasons. Additionally, al Shabaab supporters in the United States have been known to conduct recruiting and fundraising activities within their communities.

32. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what is the role of DOD in combating these recruitment efforts?

General Dempsey. It is my understanding that DOD supports efforts to identify, disrupt, and disable extremist networks that drive al Shabaab’s recruiting. We support all interagency actions against extremist networks by applying unique military capabilities consistent with our legal authorities. We should take all legal means possible to disrupt the recruitment of extremists into the al Shabaab network.

33. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, to what extent does al Shabaab coordinate with al Qaeda?

General Dempsey. Al-Shabaab first publicly aligned itself with al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan in 2008. In 2010, al Shabaab declared its loyalty to al Qaeda with the release of a video called “At Your Service, O Usama.” More recently, al Shabaab pledged to follow the new al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri following bin Laden’s death. There is also reason to conclude that al Shabaab has established a foreign fighter training program in Somalia, and portrayed itself as playing a role in the international jihad.
34. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what is your assessment of the security situation in Mexico?

General Dempsey. I am concerned about violence in Mexico and how it affects our security. Violent Transnational Criminal Organizations threaten innocent civilians, the Government of Mexico, and the United States. The Mexican security forces face a well-armed and financed adversary with regional, if not global reach. The people and Government of Mexico, including their security forces, are to be admired for their resilience and determination in confronting this threat. Our increasingly strong partnership with Mexico is one way we are sharing in the responsibility to address this dynamic security challenge.

35. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, in what ways can DOD expand its support to President Calderon and his government to combat the cartels and other transnational criminal organizations operating in Mexico and throughout the region?

General Dempsey. The scope and depth of our military-to-military relationship with Mexico has grown as part of the overall U.S. Government approach for assisting the Government of Mexico against these criminal organizations. As we further strengthen our relationship with Mexico, we will continue to respect their sovereignty and provide the assistance we can in response to their requests. Among other initiatives, we should continue with subject matter expert exchanges, exercises, and the sharing of information and lessons learned. The sharing of information and intelligence, where appropriate, is particularly valuable as a way to enable operations against these threats to our mutual security.

NUCLEAR TRIAD

36. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, earlier this month, General Cartwright suggested that DOD must re-examine the future role of each leg of the nuclear triad—bomber aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and submarine-launched missiles—so that desired capabilities and quantities are maintained, rather than determined by budget-cutting drills. General Cartwright told reporters that “nothing is off the table” as DOD looks to cut at least $400 billion from the budget through fiscal year 2023. Do you agree with General Cartwright’s statement?

General Dempsey. As we shape the future Joint Force, our assessment should include consideration of what is required for an effective, reliable nuclear deterrent. It is my understanding that includes examining how the nuclear triad might be adapted to the security environment and our national security strategy. As Chairman, I will remain committed to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear force at levels that maintain strategic deterrence and stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, strengthens regional deterrence, and reassures U.S. allies and partners.

37. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, the administration has identified over $120 billion over the next 10 years for the sustainment and modernization of the triad. Much of that funding is dedicated to the development and procurement of our next-generation ballistic missile submarine and bombers. One of the biggest unanswered questions is the future of the ICBM force, which will need to be replaced by 2030. Do you believe it is essential to sustain the nuclear triad and commit the resources to fulfill the recapitalization of each leg? If not, do you believe it is in our strategic interest to forgo one or more legs of the triad?

General Dempsey. I believe we must sustain and modernize a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that is also affordable. I also believe we must do this in a manner that maintains strategic deterrence and stability, strengthens regional deterrence, and reassures our allies and partners. To this end, I am supportive of the conclusions of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, which stated that the U.S. nuclear Triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will be maintained under the New Start treaty. When Chairman, the Joint Staff will continue to assess what is required for an effective nuclear deterrent as part of a future Joint Force.

CYBER SECURITY

38. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, after the release of the DOD cyber strategy last week, General Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that DOD is spending 90 percent of its time playing defense against cyber-
attacks and 10 percent playing offense and that DOD should invert this defense-offense ratio to assert that there will be consequences to a cyber-attack against the United States. Do you agree with General Cartwright’s statements?

General DEMPSEY. Consistent with my support of the Department’s Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, I agree that we need to ensure our adversaries understand there are consequences to a cyber-attack against the United States. To this end, the Department must strike a balance between offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. We should do this while continuing our deterrent posture and collaborating with our interagency and international partners to enhance our cyber security posture. We should continue to examine offensive capabilities and the policies required to enable their appropriate use.

39. Senator MCCAiN. General Dempsey, what do you view as the appropriate direction DOD should be headed with respect to cyber strategy?

General DEMPSEY. The recently released DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace provides the foundation for our cyber strategy. I endorse its overall objectives and strategic initiatives. Moreover, it clearly prioritizes reducing our own vulnerabilities as essential to execute this new strategy.

40. Senator MCCAiN. General Dempsey, do you view this as a matter of urgency?

General DEMPSEY. Yes. As the recently released DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace articulates, the Department and the Nation have vulnerabilities in cyberspace. The continuing growth of networked systems, devices, and platforms means that cyberspace is an integral part of an increasing number of capabilities upon which DOD relies to complete its missions. We must leverage the opportunities cyberspace presents to advance our capabilities and national security objectives.

FURTHER NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

41. Senator MCCAiN. General Dempsey, recent statements by the President’s National Security Advisor have prompted new questions regarding the administration’s intent to pursue additional reductions. In his speech before the Carnegie Endowment, National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon stated that the administration is currently “making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions” and that DOD will be directed to “review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.” Donilon continued by stating that in meeting these objectives, the White House will direct DOD to consider “potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures.”

The New START Treaty entered into force only 5 months ago. Do you believe it is prudent for the United States to pursue further reductions? If so, why?

General DEMPSEY. Yes. As the recently released DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace articulates, the Department and the Nation have vulnerabilities in cyberspace. The continuing growth of networked systems, devices, and platforms means that cyberspace is an integral part of an increasing number of capabilities upon which DOD relies to complete its missions. We must leverage the opportunities cyberspace presents to advance our capabilities and national security objectives.

42. Senator MCCAiN. General Dempsey, what conditions in your opinion must exist for the additional near-term reductions; do you believe it would require a fundamental shift in the geopolitical environment?

General DEMPSEY. Any future reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, enhance strategic stability as it relates to Russia and China, and assure our allies and partners. In my judgment, the size and composition of Russia’s nuclear forces will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how fast we are prepared to reduce our nuclear forces. As we engage Russia and China in strategic dialogue, we will continue to assess the proper force size and capabilities required for an effective nuclear deterrent. Any potential reductions should consider the full range of potential threats and continue to support U.S. commitments to stability, deterrence, and assurance.

43. Senator MCCAiN. General Dempsey, focusing on the reckless ambitions of North Korea and Iran and the fact that every current nuclear weapons state is currently modernizing its nuclear arsenals, do you agree that any reductions to the size and scope of the stockpile should be multilateral and involve not only other nuclear powers but also in serious consultation with our key non-nuclear allies dependent on U.S. nuclear forces?

General DEMPSEY. We will continue, and expand as appropriate, consultations with nuclear and non-nuclear allies and partners to address how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
44. Senator McCAIN. General Dempsey, during our committee’s hearings on the New START treaty, General Chilton, the former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified that the force level under the New START Treaty (1,550 warheads on 700 deployed delivery vehicles) was “exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent.” We received extensive briefings from General Chilton and other senior DOD officials during consideration of the treaty last year. Do you agree with General Chilton’s assessment? If so, do you believe that the global threat environment has changed in any way since General Chilton made these comments to merit a near-term reduction in the size or scope of our nuclear deterrent?

General DEMPSEY. The U.S. nuclear strategy and force structure continually evolves with the global strategic environment. Going forward, and as part of the Nuclear Posture Review Report follow-on analysis, we will continue to evaluate changes to the environment that might impact on our force structure. We are committed to sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent in an efficient and cost effective manner.

45. Senator McCAIN. General Dempsey, in the current fiscal environment, some in Congress have suggested that funding for research and development (R&D) within the Services and for defense-wide agencies should be dramatically reduced to find savings. Do you agree that R&D funding should be cut? If so, please explain. If not, please explain why you disagree and outline what you see as a path forward for R&D funding, particularly with regard to the fiscal situation.

General DEMPSEY. A balanced approach is needed that considers today’s operational commitments and tomorrow’s anticipated threats within fiscal constraints. We should be cautious about cuts from any account, including R&D. The ongoing comprehensive review will develop guidelines and recommendations on our path forward for R&D funding.

46. Senator McCAIN. General Dempsey, if you had to make cuts to R&D lines, what would you consider a responsible budget reduction?

General DEMPSEY. My expectation is that the Department’s ongoing comprehensive review will provide guidelines and recommendations on responsible budget reductions given today’s fiscal realities.

47. Senator McCAIN. General Dempsey, what criteria would you use to determine what R&D programs should be cut?

General DEMPSEY. The Department’s ongoing comprehensive review will provide guidelines and recommendations on responsible budget reductions. This review will take into account our need to protect our core national security interests and provide a set of defense programs that will meet the threats present today and anticipated tomorrow. Within this review, heavy scrutiny will be applied to those programs that are not meeting cost, schedule, and requirements goals.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

BOYCOTTS OF CERTAIN U.S. DEFENSE CONTRACTORS

48. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, in recent years, global activists, foreign business enterprises, and certain governments have demonstrated an increased willingness to advance de facto foreign boycotts on contractors and subcontractors of DOD that provide certain products to DOD. If successful, such actions would not only harm the U.S. defense industrial base, but also impede the military strategy and tactics of our Armed Forces and allies in regions where our forces are deployed or our interests are at stake.

Such endeavors include a recent effort to classify the Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) as a prohibited weapon under the terms of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), and ongoing attempts today to pressure investors and suppliers to terminate their relationships with U.S. manufacturers that provide key SFW components to DOD. Meanwhile, similar but less reliable weapons possessed by other governments are permitted for use under the CCM.

The motivations and efforts of those now seeking to enforce the CCM—which was forged outside recognized international bodies—contrast sharply with ongoing efforts by our Government and others to address the true humanitarian impact of cluster munitions while recognizing the SFW’s enduring and critical importance to
our military strategy on the Korean Peninsula, Persian Gulf, and other sensitive re-

gions.

I understand that in the coming weeks U.S. diplomats will have an important op-
portunity to advance a responsible course of action with regard to cluster munitions

during preparations for a review of the United Nations (UN) Convention on Prohibi-

tions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Given the

potential negative impact of the CCM on the SFW, its role in our military strategy,

the defense industrial base, and foreign military sales to allies in key regions, what

actions will you take to support and reinforce U.S. diplomatic efforts to achieve tan-
gible progress on an alternative agreement under the auspices of the CCW?

General DEMPSEY. We are not a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

(CCM or Oslo Treaty); however, we are participating in ongoing negotiations to de-

velop a comprehensive and binding Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

(CCW). We intend for this protocol to align with DOD policy on the use, transfer,

stockpile, and destruction of cluster munitions. The CCW protocol under negotiation

addresses the legitimate military need to maintain stocks of cluster munitions for

national security and defense purposes while reducing the risk of unintended harm

to civilians. When Chairman, I will ensure that the Joint Staff fully supports the

DOD policy and negotiations to conclude a CCW protocol.

GLOBAL SECURITY CONTINGENCY FUND

49. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, our military-to-military (1206), civilian-to-
civilian (1207), small-scale Special Forces (1208), Commander’s Emergency Re-

sponse Program (CERP), and Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (CCIF) have been

incredibly successful in aiding developing nations, fighting terrorism, and providing

resources for emergency situations. Now the Global Security Contingency Fund,

which would be authorized under this committee’s version of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, would supply the Department of State

(DOS) with authority to use a $300 million fund drawn from authorities like section

1206 to bolster the security of our allies. My belief is that the key to these programs

has been the combined efforts of both DOD and DOS . . . Chiefs of Mission and com-

batant commanders working together to increase the capabilities of our partner na-

tions to provide for their own security, increasing stability in their region and

around the globe. What value do these funds provide our warfighters?

General DEMPSEY. The programs you mention are highly valuable to our ability

to respond to emergent challenges and opportunities. The provision of timely assist-

ance can help promote stability, combat terrorism, enable partners, and respond to

urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements. Capable partner na-

tions reduce the need for U.S. forces while enhancing security. To this end, the

Global Security Contingency Fund makes DOD and DOS collaboration the norm in

order to ensure our security assistance programs are as effective as possible. Fund-

ing is required from both DOD and DOS, and expenditure of funds requires con-

sultation and concurrence from both departments.

50. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what is the future of the partnership be-

tween DOD and DOS when it comes to foreign security assistance?

General DEMPSEY. DOD’s relationship with DOS is certain to remain strong on

multiple fronts to include our collaboration on security assistance. The proposed

Global Security Contingency Fund is just one example of how we can increase co-

operation in the delivery of security sector assistance. As Chairman, I will continue

to seek ways to strengthen our partnership with DOS and others to ensure a whole-

of-government approach.

TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

51. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, traumatic brain injury (TBI) continues to

be one of the most prevalent wounds from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The

ability to diagnose and treat TBI continues to be problematic despite the priority

Congress and the Army have given to this wound. I remain concerned that we are

not adequately screening our soldiers prior to deployment and when they return.

Once diagnosed with TBI, we need to be able to treat our wounded warrior and en-

sure that treatment is continued as long as needed, to include transition to Depart-

ment of Veterans Affairs (VA) care. Various alternative treatments for TBI may

have promise and are used in the private sector but few of these treatments have

been approved for use by Army soldiers. In a report by National Public Radio (NPR),

General Chiarelli expressed frustration about the pace of the vetting of these treat-
ments. Are you satisfied with the pace with respect to identify TBI and treatment to include alternative treatments?

General Dempsey. I share General Chiarelli’s sense of urgency to find effective solutions to these problems. I am committed to ensuring early detection of concussion and finding state of the science treatments for wounded warriors with TBI. To my knowledge, we are fast tracking any available treatment strategies that have proven to be safe and effective to our military members. There is considerable work occurring in the civilian academic, industry and VA medical research communities. We are working very closely with our civilian counterparts to vet the outcomes of these studies, and when the clinical results become available, quickly transition treatment protocols to our wounded military.

52. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what frictions are delaying the vetting of alternative treatments?

General Dempsey. I am committed to fielding alternative treatments to our wounded as quickly as possible. In doing so, we have a responsibility to make sure that any treatment alternatives have been tested and found to be safe and effective. Good research to determine the clinical effectiveness of any treatment is both time and resource intensive. There are also clinical issues which cloud the blanket adoption of civilian research findings. For example, post-traumatic stress and chronic pain are not seen with such frequency in the civilian sector. However, we are engaged with our civilian counterparts in an effort to appropriately adopt alternative treatment strategies for the care of our wounded warriors.

53. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what can we do to speed up the process of the vetting better ways of diagnosing and treating TBI?

General Dempsey. We have made tremendous progress, but we must continuously seek ways to improve the process. For example, it is my understanding that we are undertaking a comprehensive review of over 400 studies on TBI. In-process-reviews are conducted on each of the topics, which allow a deep dive analysis of specific treatment strategies. This year, for example, we have reviewed new studies on neuroimaging, non-invasive diagnostics in mild TBI, blast brain research, and biomarker findings. This review process allows us to quickly assess what strategies work and just as important, what strategies do not work.

54. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what types of equipment solutions are being developed, procured, and fielded to help prevent, measure, and identify TBI?

General Dempsey. We have developed a program to evaluate and field devices and equipment that can aid in the prevention, identification, and assessment of TBI. Among many others are a portable electroencephalogram (EEG) for battlefield use and an eye tracking device to assess attention/concentration deficits. In addition, we are working with the materiel community to improve helmet design to help mitigate blast effects and prevent head injuries. As Chairman, I will support efforts to aggressively identify, evaluate, and disseminate best practices, equipment, and programs for our wounded warriors with TBI.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

55. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, it worries me that a series of upgrades to extend the service life of the legacy Kiowa Warrior helicopter appear to be conveniently organized into individual programs that will escape the rigor and oversight required under ACAT-1D programs. Can you assure me that, if confirmed, you will exercise your responsibilities as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to personally look into this issue and make sure the Army is on a path that will get the best value from our investment?

General Dempsey. As Chairman, you can be assured that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council will ensure the appropriate cost and capability trades are being made to deliver the best value to the Department.

56. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, I am aware that the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) for this program is complete, yet we have not been briefed on the results. Would you please provide me with the results of the AOA and what the acquisition plan is for replacing the legacy scout fleet with a modern capability?

General Dempsey. Although the Analysis of Alternatives for the Armed Aerial Scout is complete, the final report is still in development. To date, the analytical
results were briefed to the Joint Senior Advisory Group and to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. The Army is currently assessing the path forward for the Armed Aerial Scout given the new fiscal environment. As Chairman, I look forward to working with this committee to ensure we are developing an affordable future Joint Force.

ALTERNATIVE ARMED SCOUT

57. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, will you assure me that the Alternative Armed Scout program will include competition as a fundamental element of the procurement strategy?

General Dempsey. Should the Army decide to pursue a new solution to fulfill the requirements of the Armed Aerial Scout, I will advocate for a competitive process consistent with current acquisition policies to derive the best value for the U.S. taxpayer.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE AND CULTURE TRAINING

58. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, I am a strong proponent of foreign language and cultural training at the military academies and for Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) cadets and midshipmen. To date these efforts have been limited to a few institutions, for example, the University of Mississippi. To what extent do you believe that education and training in foreign languages and cultures are important in preparing the next generations of military officers, and how would you use the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to further this agenda?

General Dempsey. Our future officers will operate in a global environment where national security interests are inextricably linked to the greater international community. Knowledge of foreign languages and culture is essential to building partnerships and multilateral operations. As Chairman, I will work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and through our joint officer development programs to optimize foreign language and cultural training and education. I will also support DOD efforts authorized under Section 529 of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act to establish Language Training Centers at accredited universities to accelerate the development of expertise in critical and strategic languages.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SCOTT P. BROWN

2013 FIGHTING SEASON

59. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, in light of the debate regarding the significance of a missed fighting season in the summer of 2013 due to the President’s proposal to withdraw 33,000 troops by the end of next August, does a summer 2013 fighting season matter?

General Dempsey. The 2013 summer season does matter. Our ability to maintain pressure on the Taliban will be sustained as the surge force is withdrawn. Even as we reduce forces, the ANSF are gaining in capacity and capability. In addition, Afghan special forces and their coalition partnered forces will continue to degrade Taliban mid- and senior leadership by capturing or killing them wherever they operate in Afghanistan.

AFGHAN CONTRACT FRAUD

60. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, according to yesterday’s Washington Post, a year-long investigation conducted by the U.S. military uncovered definitive evidence that taxpayers’ money intended to fund a $2.16 billion transportation contract in Afghanistan ended up in the hands of the Taliban through fraud, kickbacks, and money laundering. Another report released last week by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction found that U.S. agencies still have limited visibility over the circulation of these funds, leaving them vulnerable to fraud, waste, or diversion to insurgents. Can you comment on this and tell me how we can lower the risk involved with our reliance on contractor support?

General Dempsey. Contractors provide critical logistical and services support to operations in Afghanistan. The use of local national contractors is integral to our civil-military campaign. Despite the capabilities enabled by contractors, corruption remains a challenge. In light of several investigative reports, DOD and U.S. Central Command established several task forces to address contracting accountability and
institute mechanisms to enhance performance monitoring. Additionally, our management of contractors on the battlefield evolved from an initial approach toward pro-active theater-wide management. Together, these broad initiatives and many others are improving the way we use contractor support. But clearly more needs to be done.

EMPLOYMENT OF VETERANS

61. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, last June, 13.3 percent of veterans were unemployed—4 percent higher than the national average, which means approximately 260,000 people in real numbers are out of work. You noted that one area where we can improve is individual case management when a servicemember transitions from the Active Force to veteran status. Can you comment on the ways in which DOD and the VA are collaborating to improve the transition of wounded warriors and their families into the VA system, particularly when it comes to employment?

General Dempsey. To strengthen and improve transition of service men to civilian life, DOD is working with the Veterans Administration (VA) and the Department of Labor (DOL) to re-engineer, redesign, and transform the current program in a way that will better meet the needs of servicemembers and their families. The enhanced Transition Assistance Program (TAP) is a collaborative effort where each agency will improve its component of TAP through a number of initiatives to include leveraging technology and improving curriculum, staffing, and training. We are also developing ways to make information accessible 24/7. DOD is also collaborating with the VA, DOL, and the Office of Personnel Management on an Education and Employment Initiative (E2I) to address employment concerns. The goal of the E2I pilot is to engage servicemembers early in their recovery to identify skills they have, the skills they need, and the employment opportunities to which those skills can be matched.

62. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, I continue to hear from veterans who—despite their technical expertise, leadership skills, and military experience—feel as though they are ultimately disqualified for civilian positions due to a lack of civilian equivalent certifications. I hear it over and over again. They’re told while on Active Duty that their veteran status and military experience will put them ahead of their civilian peers when they transition out of the military simply because they’ve proven themselves as reliable leaders. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Is DOD working on a system to help servicemembers translate their military-specific skills and vocational expertise to the civilian sector?

General Dempsey. I am absolutely convinced that our servicemembers possess valuable skills that should translate well to the civilian sector. To my knowledge, there are many initiatives underway. For example, servicemembers can go to Career One Stop to find information on exploring careers, salary and benefits, education and training, resume and interviews, and licensure and certification (http://www.careeronestop.org). The Workforce Credentials Information Center provides a wealth of licensure and certification information. The member can also access the Occupational Information Network called O*NET (www.onlinenonetcenter.org). O*NET helps the servicemember to crosswalk his or her Military Occupational Code and the civilian equivalency of that code, linking the member to the Standard Occupational Classifications in the civilian workforce. These tools will help, but they are just part of what must be a more comprehensive solution. As Chairman, I will continue to collaborate with our partners in the DOL to address this critical issue.

SUICIDES

63. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, in 2010 alone, there were 468 suicides throughout the military. It’s estimated that between 2005 and 2009, one servicemember committed suicide every 36 hours. More men and women committed suicide in 2010 than died in combat. Do you agree that the military is facing a suicide epidemic, and what are we doing about it?

General Dempsey. I remain deeply concerned about the suicide rate among servicemembers. As Chairman, I will support the action plan resulting from the 2010 DOD Task Force Report on Prevention of Suicide. The plan will address the 13 foundational and 76 targeted recommendations in the report. It is my understanding that DOD intends to update Congress once the plan is implemented this fall. In my judgment, expedient implementation and resourcing of these rec-
ommendations will go a long way to ensuring that our servicemembers’ and families’ psychological health and mental health issues are addressed.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

DEPLOYMENT CYCLE SUPPORT PROGRAM

64. Senator Ayotte. General Dempsey, the New Hampshire National Guard has developed the Deployment Cycle Support Program (DCSP) to help prepare and support servicemembers and their families during the full cycle of mobilization, deployment, and reintegration. It is a cost-effective public-private partnership between the New Hampshire National Guard, New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Easter Seals, and civilian and veteran service organizations. The DCSP combines public funding and private resources to establish an integrated, sustainable, and fiscally-responsible service delivery framework that delivers measured results. The National Guard has found that military members involved in DCSP are eight times more likely to be treated for previously untreated mental health issues, four times more likely to stay married, four times more likely to stay in the military, and five times less likely to be homeless. The program also provides licensed support to all servicemembers and their families considered at risk for suicide.

Once you are confirmed, do you commit to work with me and Congress to support and learn from best practices for this important program in order to ensure all servicemembers and their families—especially those in the Reserve component who are often far from bases and established support networks—have access to the quality, full-cycle support they deserve and that our Nation’s military readiness demands?

General Dempsey. One of my highest priorities is the care of our servicemembers and their families. We need to confront these challenges through innovative government and private sector partnerships like the Deployment Cycle Support Program. Such initiatives will become more valuable in a fiscally constrained environment. They clearly enable us to attend to the unique challenges faced by our community-based and geographically-dispersed Reserve components. I am committed to working closely with Congress, our Service Chiefs, Federal partners like the Department of Veterans Affairs, and State, local, and private organizations to leverage best practices like the ones you highlight.

MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

65. Senator Ayotte. General Dempsey, I am concerned about the DOD problems in recent years in the area of procurement. One of the more recent failures is that of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). After the investment of $1.5 billion of taxpayer money, DOD concluded earlier this year that the program remains a high risk for both cost and schedule. Despite these cost and schedule failures, DOD decided to not terminate the program because the Memorandum of Understanding on which the program is based commits the United States to continued funding up to an agreed cost even if the United States withdraws from the program. As a result, DOD has requested $804 million over fiscal years 2012 to 2013 for the continued development of a system it has no intention of fielding due to technical challenges, cost overruns, and schedule delays. What is your assessment of the MEADS?

General Dempsey. It is my understanding that the Department’s options are constrained by a 2004 MEADS agreement with our German and Italian partners. Funding MEADS up to the existing ceiling established in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) enables all partners to harvest technology and proven concepts from investments thus far. This would also place the development on sufficiently stable footing to support Germany and Italy in continued MEADS development and production after the MoU funding is expended. It would also provide the same options to us should our air defense plans change.

66. Senator Ayotte. General Dempsey, do you believe it makes sense to spend $804 million over the next 2 fiscal years on a program we are not going to field?

General Dempsey. In light of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with our German and Italian partners, and based on extensive analysis and deliberations, our best option is to complete the lower cost restructured Proof of Concept effort. This will enable the Department and our MEADS partners to harvest technology from our work to date. Additionally, it places the program on stable footing to support Germany and Italy in their plans to continue MEADS while honoring the MoU.
It would provide options to the United States should our air defense plans change. The Department is committed to maximizing the return on remaining funds and prior investments.

67. Senator Ayotte. General Dempsey, do you believe we should push our allies to work with us to limit our financial obligation and terminate this program multilaterally?

General Dempsey. The Department’s senior leadership has explored mutual termination with Italy and Germany, and our partners have clearly stated they have no interest in pursuing this course of action. The German National Armaments Director continues to express German support for the program and has recently restated their plans to field MEADS after a successful Proof of Concept effort. Our Italian partners have also confirmed their continued commitment. Faced with these facts, a multilateral withdrawal is not an option, and the United States would be forced to execute a unilateral withdrawal from the program. A unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the program would entail significant termination costs for the United States.

68. Senator Ayotte. General Dempsey, how can we work together to avoid procurement failures like this in the future?

General Dempsey. As Chairman, I look forward to working with Congress and this committee to mitigate program risk and maximize program success rates. Development and procurement of new weapons systems must be carefully assessed to ensure funds are spent wisely. For my part, I will ensure that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council sustains a robust requirements validation process and closely monitors cost growth through the trip-wire process. Participation in Configuration Steering Boards will further shape affordable solutions for the Joint Force.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS

FORT HOOD ATTACK

69. Senator Collins. General Dempsey, as ranking member of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, I worked with Senator Lieberman to investigate the U.S. Government’s failure to prevent the Fort Hood attack. One of the most troubling findings was that it found the Army and Federal Bureau of Investigation “collectively had sufficient information necessary to have detected Major Hasan’s radicalization to violent Islamist extremism but failed both to understand and to act on it.” In light of the Fort Hood attack and the findings in this report, what steps has the Army taken to improve personnel oversight such that warning signs of individual problems are identified and acted on as early as possible?

General Dempsey. The Army has implemented over 20 of the recommendations proposed by the DOD’s Independent Review Panel and the Army’s Internal Review Team. Among many initiatives, the Army recently established the Army Protection Program to better manage risks relative to the safety and security of our soldiers, families, civilians, infrastructure and information. The Army has also revised its policy regarding command-directed mental health evaluations. Behavior health screenings for new Army applicants is also required using face-to-face physician screenings at all 65 Military Entrance Processing Centers. Underpinning all of this is leadership accountability.

SAFE HAVENS

70. Senator Collins. General Dempsey, on July 17, 2011, Maine lost another one of its proud soldiers, Private First Class Tyler Springmann, to an improvised explosive device (IED) that exploded in Afghanistan. Given the tremendous sacrifice that our servicemen and women are making, I want to be sure that the strategy currently being pursued can work. The President has stated the core goal of the U.S. strategy in Central Asia is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. Earlier this year, Admiral Mullen testified that one of the necessary conditions to achieve that goal was to neutralize insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan, but that insurgent groups currently operate unhindered in those sanctuaries. Yet, General Mattis recently testified that he does not expect Pakistan will reverse its current approach and eliminate the safe havens that exist there. He said that “satisfactory end-states are attainable in Afghanistan, even if the sanctuaries persist.” Even if
there is a satisfactory end-state in Afghanistan, how can we achieve the President’s goal of preventing the return of al Qaeda fighters to Afghanistan and Pakistan so long as they can take advantage of the safe havens enjoyed by the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network just across the border in Pakistan?

General DEMPSEY. The loss of Private First Class Tyler Springmann and other servicemembers is a tragic example of the challenges our forces face. This challenge is exacerbated by sanctuaries in Pakistan that Islamabad has not always been willing or able to engage to our satisfaction. That said, military actions are being taken on both sides of the border to minimize this threat and reduce the effect of sanctuary in Pakistan. For their part, Pakistan’s military has and continues to conduct disruptive counterinsurgency operations against mutual threats throughout the border region. Diplomatically, the U.S. Senior Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan has made control and elimination of IED precursor materials emanating from Pakistan a priority in all discussion with Pakistani officials. We have also sought to make it clear that Pakistan is itself threatened when violent non-state actors are selectively permitted the free space to engage in hostile actions. We are also helping to build Afghan security forces that can contest the presence of hostile groups even if some safe havens persist.

ENTERPRISE RESOURCE PROGRAMS

Senator COLLINS. General Dempsey, DOD’s Enterprise Resource Programs (ERP) have been the subject of significant negative GAO reports. DOD has spent billions on nine ERP information technology systems that are intended to be part of DOD’s solution to its fiscal problems and achieve audit readiness by 2017. However, according to GAO reports, six of the nine ERPs have experienced schedule delays ranging from 2 to 12 years and five have incurred cost increases ranging from $530 million to $2.4 billion. DOD is currently funding non-competitive ERP contract-writing system pilots. I have become increasingly concerned with the way DOD has managed these programs. If confirmed, what will you do to address the ERP cost overruns, schedule slips, and a lack of competition as additional capabilities and functionalities are added to existing ERPs?

General DEMPSEY. When Chairman, I will leverage multiple processes and forums to address these shortfalls. For example, I will rely on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the trip-wire process to monitor for cost growth and schedule delays in Major Defense Acquisition Programs. Additionally, balancing system performance and cost will continue to be a central goal of the ongoing Joint Capabilities Integration and Development process review. Program and portfolio affordability will be important factors in performance trade-off decisions.

SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE

Senator COLLINS. General Dempsey, in their fiscal year 2012 budget testimony, former Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen identified shipbuilding as one of the two components of the defense industrial base that worried them, in particular. Secretary Gates stated, “A number of the Navy ships that were built during the Reagan years will basically reach the end of their planned life in the 2020s, and where the money comes from to replace those ships is going to be a challenge … there are some tough choices in terms of big capabilities that are coming down the road.” Do you agree with that assessment and the importance of sustaining the shipbuilding industrial base?

General DEMPSEY. The Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan includes retirement of 105 ships from 2020 to 2029. During the same period, the Navy plans to take delivery of 94 ships. Based on the comprehensive strategy review and expected defense spending reductions, I will ensure that the Navy’s shipbuilding plan continues to provide a force capable of meeting our national strategic objectives. Moreover, sustainment of the shipbuilding industrial base is carefully considered with each Navy acquisition decision. A healthy industrial base is critical in all areas of defense acquisition to ensure appropriate capacity and quality is available to meet our national security requirements. A robust industrial base should also enable competition in order to drive down cost and enhance affordability. For its part, the industrial base must be innovative and efficient if it is going to remain relevant to our national security needs.
OVERSEAS BASING

73. Senator Collins. General Dempsey, shortly after the issuance of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Under Secretary for Policy, Michele Flournoy, indicated a comprehensive review of roles and missions as it relates to the U.S. military’s global presence would be forthcoming in 2012. This review is potentially critical to our understanding of funding overseas basing and force structure. Recent polls indicate the vast majority of American citizens support the closure of U.S. military bases overseas where there is no strong foreign policy objectives involved, to save the cost for maintaining these troops, and to protect investment and sustainment accounts for ships, aircraft, and other equipment. Given our increasing ability to project power from further distances, can you comment on whether or not you believe all of the overseas military bases are still necessary?

General Dempsey. We continually assess our overseas posture to determine the optimal mix of forward stationed and deployed forces needed to meet current threats, deter conflict, and assure allies. In a fiscally constrained environment, we must carefully calibrate our forward presence and overseas activities. I will ensure the issue is prominent in our comprehensive strategic review.

PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

74. Senator Collins. General Dempsey, under the phased adaptive approach (PAA) to missile defense, we plan to protect our forward-based troops, as well as our allies, in addition to protecting the U.S. Homeland. According to current plans, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries will commit $200 million Euros to establish the European PAA. The United States contributes about 40 percent to NATO activities. This $200 million Euro commitment is much lower than the commitment from the Japanese, who have invested $1 billion in the R&D for ballistic missile defense (BMD) in the Pacific. Our European allies, to my knowledge, have made no similar degree of financial commitment, even as BMD is a shared NATO goal. Do you think our European partners should be contributing more to this significant mission?

General Dempsey. Our European partners make significant contributions to the NATO integrated air and missile defense mission. They do so by acting as host nations, providing national air and missile defense sensor and interceptor assets, and funding the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme. This program will provide the command and control structure for the NATO capability to accept control of U.S. missile defense assets. The U.S. European Phased Adaptive Approach is our contribution to the NATO integrated air and missile defense mission. As the threat and our own capabilities evolve, we should continue to assess the need for additional resource investments by all parties.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

TAIWAN

75. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, according to DOD’s 2010 report, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC), “China’s military build-up opposite the island (Taiwan) continued unabated. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing the capability to deter Taiwan independence or influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms, while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or deny any possible U.S. support for the island in case of conflict.” Under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the United States is statutorily obligated to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services “as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” What is your assessment of our recent record of fulfilling our obligations under the TRA?

General Dempsey. It is my understanding that we have fulfilled our recent obligations in a way that is consistent with the legislation and that enhances Taiwan’s self-defense capability without upsetting the cross-Strait balance. Of note, Taiwan’s annual defense spending is approximately one-tenth of the Chinese defense budget. Since Taiwan cannot match China’s arms procurement, we continue to encourage Taiwan to develop joint capabilities, streamline more effective and less costly defense programs, and seek low-cost innovative and asymmetric solutions that complement traditional military capabilities.
76. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, according to DOD’s 2010 report, the PRC has a total of approximately 2,300 operational combat aircraft, including 330 fighters and 160 bombers, stationed within range of Taiwan. An unclassified January 2010 Defense Intelligence Agency report on Taiwan’s air force concluded that, although Taiwan has an inventory of almost 400 combat aircraft, “far fewer of these are operationally capable.” In your opinion, does Taiwan need more modern replacement fighters to maintain a credible air force?

General Dempsey. It is my understanding that upgrades to Taiwan’s F–16 A/B airframes will provide a stop-gap measure for the Taiwan air force to continue performing its basic defense functions. However, Taiwan will likely need to recapitalize its air force since its F–5s, Indigenous Defense Fighters, and Mirage airframes reach end-of-service life toward the end of this decade. Even then, Taiwan will still face a numeric disadvantage to China’s air force, but the modernization of current airframes will allow Taiwan to maintain its current air defense capability.

77. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, does this deterioration of Taiwan’s air force indicate that the United States has failed to uphold our obligations under the TRA?

General Dempsey. The TRA calls for the United States to make available to Taiwan defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Multiple factors affect the cross-Strait balance beyond the specific state of Taiwan’s air force. That said, it is my understanding that the modernization of current airframes will allow Taiwan to maintain its current air defense capability. We continue to encourage Taiwan to develop joint capabilities, pursue more effective and less costly defense programs, and seek lower-cost innovative solutions to complement traditional military capabilities. Among these initiatives are efforts to improve the Taiwan air force’s survivability, assist with the professionalization of Taiwan air force’s enlisted ranks, and improve the Taiwan air force’s current aircraft defensive capabilities.

78. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, how does Taiwan’s airbase survivability compare to other air forces in the region?

General Dempsey. Given the nature of the missile threat posed against Taiwan, the survivability and operational capability of airbases on Taiwan are at significant risk. Taiwan is undertaking measures, many classified, to enhance the survivability of its airbases and the ability to continue operating its aircraft in case of conflict.

79. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, since 2006, the Taiwanese Government has made clear its desire to purchase new F–16 C/Ds from the United States to augment its aging air force and regain dominance, or at least restore balance, in the airspace over the Taiwan Strait. In your opinion, would these additional F–16s bolster Taiwan’s ability to conduct maritime interdiction in a blockade scenario?

General Dempsey. Taiwan’s ability to conduct maritime interdiction in a blockade scenario is affected by several factors to include, but certainly not limited to the quality and quantity of its air force. More important than the number of any particular airframe, is the ability of the airframe, its pilot, and those in support to execute their mission. In this respect, modernizing Taiwan’s air force and air defense systems may be just as valuable for a range of scenarios Taiwan could face.

80. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, if the administration denies Taiwan’s pending request, and it becomes impossible for Taiwan to purchase these new F–16s, what would be the impact on Taiwan’s ability to defend its own skies?

General Dempsey. It is my understanding that Taiwan’s older airframes (F–5, Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Fighters, and Mirage 2000) reach end-of-service life by the end of this decade. Without modernization, or possibly replacement aircraft, Taiwan will face the challenge of performing basic peacetime defense functions with a less capable air force. As Chairman, I will work to ensure that we recommend options for the best way forward on Taiwan defense capabilities and requirements.

81. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, what would be the impact on U.S. interests in the region?

General Dempsey. The United States remains committed to engagement in Asia that promotes stability and access to the global commons. The sale of appropriate defense capabilities to Taiwan is required by law and can contribute to peace and stability across the Strait and in the region. Failure to honor our commitments may cause regional partners to lose confidence in the United States as a reliable security partner.
82. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, a National Ground Intelligence Center report that was recently declassified provides concerning details regarding China’s development of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons for use against U.S. aircraft carriers, as well as Taiwan’s electronic infrastructure, in the event of any potential conflict over Taiwan. In your opinion, what effect would such an attack have on U.S. aircraft carrier operations?

General DEMPSEY. The U.S. military, including the U.S. Navy, has prepared to withstand the effects of EMP weapons since the Cold War. U.S. aircraft carriers and carrier strike groups train to operate in nuclear and EMP attack scenarios. We will continue to monitor the development of Chinese military capabilities, particularly as they relate to anti-access/area denial capabilities and strategies.

83. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, does the United States currently have adequate measures in place to defend against such an attack?

General DEMPSEY. The U.S. military continually conducts extensive analysis, evaluation, and testing of military systems and equipment to ensure they are resistant to the effects of EMP weapons. Critical pieces of equipment are also retrofitted to be made more EMP resistant before they are fielded. After an EMP attack, critical infrastructure and communications would continue to operate, and our forces will still have adequate operational capability.

84. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, according to DOD’s 2010 report on China’s military power, “U.S.-China military-to-military relations improved in 2009, based on the commitment of President Obama and President Hu to deepen and improve ties, and to take concrete steps to advance sustained and reliable military-to-military relations.” Given that the Chinese readily terminated this contact over political issues, as we saw in January 2010 following the Obama administration’s announcement of its intent to sell defensive arms and equipment to Taiwan, what is your assessment of the overall value China places on this type of engagement?

General DEMPSEY. The leaders of both countries have all committed to improving our military-to-military relationship. Though our relationship has only recently been renewed, the PLA has stated its desire for improved defense relations as well as made steps to follow up. For example, we have agreed to advance planning on various initiatives to include first ever cooperative exchanges in counter-piracy this year and exercises in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief next year. We have exercised our defense telephone link several times this year and have agreed to more routinely use the system.

85. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, how is China benefitting from the military-to-military relations, and what does the United States gain?

General DEMPSEY. Greater military cooperation between the United States and China benefits both countries. We jointly face a complex international security environment and our two militaries operate more frequently in close proximity. Our exchanges increase opportunities for positive cooperation, lower the risk of miscalculation, and more effectively communicate our resolve to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. These exchanges provide China opportunities to understand the U.S. military’s role in contributing to global and regional security, while providing the U.S. military opportunities to impress upon China the importance of international law and common safety practices in military operations. Our military-to-military contacts and exchanges are based on the principles of transparency, balance, and reciprocity.

DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS

86. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, in his April speech on debt reduction, the President targeted security spending for $400 billion in cuts over the next 12 years, the preponderance of which seems likely to come from the DOD budget. However, news reports are now indicating that DOD is bracing for much deeper cuts, potentially reaching $800 billion or more over the next decade. During your confirmation hearing, in response to Senator McCain’s question regarding defense cuts in the range of $800 billion to $1 trillion, you responded that “based on the difficulty of achieving the $400 billion cut, I believe $800 billion would be extraordinarily difficult and very high risk.” Please elaborate on why cuts of this magnitude ($800 billion or greater) would be very high risk.

General DEMPSEY. We have not evaluated what an $800 billion or greater reduction would entail. In my judgment, cuts of this magnitude to defense spending
would likely require us to review and possibly adjust our national security and military strategies. It is reasonable to expect our capacity to shrink, which would affect our ability to meet global security commitments and potentially increase strategic risk. I am also concerned that deeper cuts directed in a compressed timeline could create a hollow force, lacking the training, readiness, equipment, and modernization it needs to accomplish all its objectives. This said, as Chairman, I will work to ensure any defense cuts are made in a way that sustains a responsive and versatile Joint Force.

87. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, in your opinion, what impact would cuts deeper than $400 billion have on our ability to adequately meet our national security requirements, maintain our Nation's historic military superiority, and provide the requisite resources and support for our soldiers?

General DEMPSEY. In my judgment, cuts beyond $400 billion would likely require us to review and possibly adjust our national security and military strategies. It is reasonable to expect our capacity (size which equates to frequency) to shrink, which would affect our ability to meet global security commitments and potentially increase strategic risk. As Chairman, I will work to ensure any defense cuts are made in a way that sustains a responsive and versatile Joint Force without rival. I will also remain committed to sustain a strong All-Volunteer Force that keeps faith with our servicemembers, veterans, and their families.

88. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, will it be possible for our military to maintain its current capabilities while absorbing $800 billion or more in cuts?

General DEMPSEY. We have not yet evaluated the implications of an $800 billion cut. It seems reasonable, however, to expect that cuts of this magnitude would not enable us to maintain our current military capabilities. It would likely require us to reconsider on national security and military strategies. As Chairman, I will remain committed to ensuring that any size cuts result in a strong Joint Force that continues to protect the Homeland and American people.

89. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, in your estimation, how much damage would defense spending cuts of that magnitude do to our national interests around the world?

General DEMPSEY. While we have not studied cuts of that magnitude, deeper cuts would impact the way we protect and promote our national interests around the world. As Chairman, I will work to ensure that any cuts do not imperil the ability of the Joint Force to protect the homeland and secure our national interests.

ACQUISITION REFORM

90. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, according the final report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, between 1990 and 2010, the Army terminated 22 major acquisition programs before completion, totaling at least $32 billion—which represents almost one-third of the Army’s budget for creating new weapons. The report notes that, “Every year since 1996, the Army has spent more than $1 billion annually on programs that were ultimately cancelled.” Since 2004, $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion per year (35 percent to 45 percent) of the Army’s Developmental Test and Evaluation funding has been lost to cancelled programs. In my view, this represents extremely poor stewardship of taxpayers’ dollars. Unfortunately, this poor stewardship is not limited to the Army, and there are clear examples of it across DOD. In your opinion, what are the primary problems in the DOD acquisition process that have caused these program cancellations, and what can be done to end this decade-long trend of sinking billions of dollars into trying to develop weapon systems that will never be fielded?

General DEMPSEY. I share your concerns about cost overruns and cancelled programs. I am also aware that program cancellations can stem from many causes to include changing national security priorities, overreaching requirements, immature technology, and insufficient attention to overall affordability at program inception. Congress has taken important steps in the 2009 Acquisition Reform Act and the Department has adopted a better buying program initiative to address these issues. As Chairman, I will support DOD efforts to improve Defense Acquisition processes within my authorities in order to develop the most capable and affordable Joint Force possible.
AIR-SEA BATTLE CONCEPT

91. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, the Air-Sea Battle concept has been described by some as a new way for the Navy and Air Force to work together to fight future wars against major powers. In today’s budget environment, such coordination between our Military Services is more important than ever. As I understand it, the Air-Sea Battle concept is aimed at maintaining U.S. dominance of the air and sea domains and to overpower any nation-state that might try to defeat our military forces through the use of advanced missiles, stealth aircraft, and/or a blue-water naval fleet of its own. Please describe the importance of the Air-Sea Battle concept in our future operations.

General DEMPSEY. The proliferation of anti-access and area denial strategies and capabilities by potential adversaries threatens our assured access to the global commons. It is a challenge of growing concern. Defeating these strategies and capabilities will require the Joint Force to better integrate core military competencies across all domains. Developing joint interdependencies, capabilities, concepts, and strategies—such as Air-Sea Battle—is an important initiative within the context of this overall effort.

92. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, what are the implications for the Air-Sea Battle concept if draconian budget cuts force the Air Force to abandon or curtail the new long-range strike aircraft or the Navy to cut its number of aircraft carrier battle groups?

General DEMPSEY. We are currently studying the impact of a wide range of potential budget cuts on the Joint Force’s ability to protect U.S. interests around the globe. Any cuts that negatively affect our ability to project U.S. military power, protect our access to the global commons, and maintain freedom of maneuver, particularly at sea or in the air, must be carefully considered with respect to the strategic and military risks involved.

AFGHANISTAN DRAWDOWN

93. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, on June 22, 2011, President Obama announced he would withdraw 10,000 troops from Afghanistan by the end of this year and another 23,000 by next summer, resulting in a complete drawdown of the 33,000 troop surge by September 2012. Following the President’s announcement, Admiral Mullen testified to the House Armed Services Committee that: “the President’s decisions are more aggressive and incur more risk than I was originally prepared to accept.” What pace of withdrawal do you believe would incur an acceptable level of risk?

General DEMPSEY. In my judgment, the projected pace of the surge recovery is within acceptable risk. The recovery of the surge will be complete by summer of 2012. At that point, there will be about 68,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. There will be greater than 70,000 additional ANSFs fielded. If conditions on the ground change this judgment, I will advise the Secretary of Defense and President.

LIBYA

94. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, in the early 1990s, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, laid out some basic guidelines for conducting effective military operations, which have since come to be known as the Powell Doctrine. General Powell stated that: “We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the ‘surgery’ is over and the desired result is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation … History has not been kind to this approach to war-making.” Regarding the air war over Libya, do you believe that a vital, U.S. national security interest was or is threatened there?

General DEMPSEY. The stability of the region and the range of potential outcomes of the Arab Spring are clearly in our national security interest. As President Obama has stated with regard to Libya, “Our safety is not directly threatened, but our interests and values are.” In this respect, it is consistent with our national interest to protect Libyan civilians in accordance with the President’s policy and United Nations Security Council resolutions.

95. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, does the United States have a clear, attainable objective in Libya? If so, what is that objective?
General DEMPSEY. The goal of the NATO-led military effort, and the mandate of the U.N. resolution, is clear. The United States is supporting NATO in protecting the Libyan people. Forced regime change is not the purpose of the military mission; however, military operations do complement other instruments of power that are being used to pressure for the eventual departure of Qadhafi.

96. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, how does the Powell Doctrine apply or not apply with regard to the Libya campaign?

General DEMPSEY. The Powell Doctrine is certainly an appropriate source of counsel for any potential use of force. When writing about the use of force in Foreign Affairs (1992), it is my understanding that General Powell did not intend for a rigid application of his words. He did, however, argue that military force “should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the goodwill outweighs the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue.” In my judgment, this is just one example of how the Powell Doctrine might be applicable to the NATO-led effort in Libya.

97. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, the Army currently operates a fleet of over 100 ships, used mostly for logistics purposes. The vessels range from large landing ships to medium-sized and smaller utility landing craft, to a force of tugboats and barges. Those vessels are operated by over 2,000 soldiers and another 200 civilians in support roles. A 2010 report by Defense News stated that the Army was in discussions with the Navy over the potential transfer of the Army’s watercraft mission and its vessels. In today’s Joint Service, does it make sense for the Army to continue operating a fleet of over 100 ships?

General DEMPSEY. As Chairman, I will work to develop and align joint capabilities in a way that leads toward a more interdependent, affordable, responsive, and versatile Joint Force. The Army-Navy Warfighter Talks, conducted in December 2010 to address the issue you raise, worked toward a similar goal. As a result of these talks, the Services agreed to transfer the Army’s share of the Joint High Speed Vessel program to the Navy. The objective is to optimally align Service core competencies for strategic movement and reduce Total Ownership Costs. The transfer of management oversight to the Navy does not change the joint character of the mission set, and the Navy-operated vessels will support Army missions as directed by the combatant commanders. It was also decided to undertake a thorough examination of the potential transfer of the remaining Army watercraft missions to the Navy in light of changing requirements and fiscal constraints.

98. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, please share your view on the desirability of the proposed transfer of this mission and assets from the Army to the Navy, and provide a status update.

General DEMPSEY. The Army and Navy leadership have assessed the potential to gain efficiency in this area while minimizing risk. They have determined that it may be feasible to consolidate watercraft roles and missions in response to changes in future global military posture. However, further analysis will be required to fully assess any long-term efficiencies or costs, and identify capability gaps or overlaps that could result. This is not unlike other areas where we are seeking to gain efficiency, but doing so in a deliberate manner that does not compromise national security.

99. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, the F–35 JSF will replace the aging tactical jet fleets of A–10s, F–16s, F–18s, and AV–8s. In prepared remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Under Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated that “its [F–35s] importance to our national security is immense. The F–35 will form the backbone of U.S. air combat superiority for generations to come.” In the past, some major acquisition programs (such as the B–2 and F–22) have experienced large cost increases and other problems so significant that DOD has had to greatly reduce the number of aircraft ultimately procured. Can you comment on the importance of JSF to our national defense?

General DEMPSEY. The F–35 is indeed foundational to our national security. This 5th generation aircraft will preserve our decisive advantage over potential adversaries for a generation. I also recognize that controlling cost is central to our ability
to procure the appropriate quantity of F–35s. As Chairman, I will work to ensure
an affordable F–35 program that meets our national security requirements.

100. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, what steps will you take to ensure the
JSF does not meet the same fate as the B–2 and F–22?

General DEMPSEY. As Chairman, I will work directly with the Office of Secretary
of Defense (OSD), the Services, and Congress to deliver the most affordable JSF pos-
sible. The Vice Chairman and I will rely on improved joint requirements and acqui-
sition processes to regularly review the JSF program in conjunction with OSD. We
will aggressively assess capability and cost trades, closely monitor cost growth
through the trip-wire process, and participate in Departmental Boards.

SIZE OF GENERAL/FLAG OFFICER CORPS

101. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, during your confirmation hearing, Sen-
ator Webb made the following statement regarding the number of general officers
in the Air Force: “The Air Force has more brigadier generals than any of the other
Services, by far. They have the same number of three stars. They have almost the
same number of two stars as the Army and more than the Navy and the Marine
Corps combined.” According to a May report by the Air Force Times, in the last 7
years alone, the Air Force cut nearly 43,000 airmen but added 44 generals. The effi-
ciencies initiative led by former Secretary Gates touted that it would cut 102 gen-
eral/flag officer billets. However, roughly 40 percent of that cut comes as a result
of reducing the forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In your opinion, where can DOD find
further efficiencies within its general/flag officer ranks?

General DEMPSEY. As mentioned, many of the efficiencies have come from the
elimination of joint positions associated with the transition of our operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. These cuts impact the Services by reducing the available number
of joint general/flag officer positions. In turn, this reduces the number of such offi-
cers each Service is authorized to maintain. There are also Service-specific cuts that
go beyond these joint cuts that are being considered and implemented. On assuming
the office of Chairman, I will continue to examine the issue and seek opportunities
for additional reductions.

102. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, in light of anticipated cuts to the DOD
budget, should the Services look at reducing their numbers of general/flag officers
before reducing overall force structure?

General DEMPSEY. As you may be aware, we have already initiated the reduction
of 130 general/flag officer positions across DOD. The size and composition of the
general/flag officer ranks should continue to face scrutiny as we shape the overall
force structure.

103. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, how else can we prioritize tooth over tail
when it comes to force structure?

General DEMPSEY. In my current role as Chief of Staff of the Army, we are exam-
ing the echelons of command as well as the size of higher headquarters. I will say
that “staff power” and “intellectual bandwidth” are as important as combat power
and lethal effects. As Chairman, I will seek the right balance.

MILITARY BANDS

104. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, the fiscal year 2012 DOD budget request
included $320 million for military bands, which many think are of questionable
value in bolstering national security. Given the current budgetary crisis and im-
pending cuts to the defense budget, what is your assessment of the importance of
military bands?

General DEMPSEY. I am a strong advocate of our military bands. My own 1st Ar-
mored Division Band was among my greatest heroes for their service in Iraq in
2003–2004. Our U.S. military bands have had a long and distinguished place in our
Nation’s history. Through ceremonies, national tours, public concerts, and record-
ings, our military bands continue to inspire patriotism, elevate esprit de corps, and
support recruiting efforts. These bands have also made a significant contribution to
preserving our Nation’s musical heritage and projecting a positive image of the U.S.
military at home and overseas. I am sensitive to our current budget constraints and
think we can take a balanced approach that protects our national security priorities
while recognizing the important contributions military bands continue to make to
our Nation.
105. Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, what plans do you have to recommend cuts and efficiencies in this area, to ensure that our Military Services prioritize tooth over tail?

General DEMPSEY. At this time, I am not aware of specific recommended cuts to military bands. However, the ongoing comprehensive review is looking at the entire defense structure. As Chairman, I will remain committed to ensuring we have a strong Joint Force capable of meeting our national security objectives.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

LAW OF THE SEA

106. Senator VITTER. General Dempsey, it’s my understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy have long supported U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The primary claim is that U.S. membership would guarantee or otherwise secure the navigational rights and freedoms set forth in the convention. However, it is my understanding that the Navy has maintained its global presence despite the fact that the United States has remained outside of UNCLOS. Could you provide me with an example of a situation or operation where the Navy was unable to successfully complete a mission due to the fact that the United States is not a party to UNCLOS?

General DEMPSEY. The decision not to accede to the UNCLOS has not prevented the U.S. Navy from successfully completing any missions. Since 1983, the U.S. Navy has conducted operations consistent with UNCLOS provisions on navigational freedoms, in accordance with then President Reagan’s Oceans Policy. Those provisions are vital to our Armed Force’s global mobility and must not be allowed to erode. An accession to UNCLOS provides the United States a stronger leadership voice to guide and influence future law of the sea developments instead of relying on UNCLOS provisions only as a matter of customary international law. Becoming a party to UNCLOS closes a seam with our partners and allies.

107. Senator VITTER. General Dempsey, has access to a key international strait—such as Hormuz, Malacca, Bab el-Mandeb, or Gibraltar—ever been denied to the Navy due to the fact that the United States is not a party to UNCLOS?

General DEMPSEY. The decision of the United States not to accede to UNCLOS has not denied our Navy access to any key international straits to date. For this, we rely on the regime of transit passage, a key provision of UNCLOS. An accession to UNCLOS would enable the United States to guide and influence future law of the sea developments and protects its key provisions, like the regime of transit passage. We must ensure these provisions are not eroded in order to preserve our robust navigational freedoms and provide our Armed Forces abroad the highest degree of global mobility.

[The nomination reference of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, follows:]

Nomination Reference and Report

As in Executive Session, Senate of the United States, June 6, 2011.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 152 and 601:

To be General.

GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA

Source of commissioned service: USMA

Educational degrees:
- U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
- Duke University - MA - English
- U.S. Army Command and General Staff College - MMAS - Military Arts and Sciences
- National Defense University - MS - National Security and Strategic Studies

Military schools attended:
- Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
- U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
- National War College

Foreign language(s): French

Promotions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promotions</th>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>5 Jun 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>5 Jun 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>8 Aug 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAI</td>
<td>1 Sep 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>1 Apr 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>1 Sep 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>1 Aug 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>1 Sep 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>8 Sep 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>8 Dec 08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major duty assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 75 ...</td>
<td>May 76</td>
<td>Platoon Leader, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 76 ...</td>
<td>Sep 77</td>
<td>Support Platoon Leader, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 77 ...</td>
<td>Jun 78</td>
<td>S–1 (Personnel), 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 78 ...</td>
<td>Jan 79</td>
<td>Student, Armor Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 79 ...</td>
<td>Jan 80</td>
<td>Motor Officer, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 80 ...</td>
<td>Oct 80</td>
<td>Commander, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 80 ...</td>
<td>Jun 81</td>
<td>S–3 (Operations), 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 81 ...</td>
<td>Jul 82</td>
<td>Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 82 ...</td>
<td>May 84</td>
<td>Student, Duke University, Durham, NC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 84 ...</td>
<td>Jul 87</td>
<td>Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of English, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 87 ...</td>
<td>Jun 88</td>
<td>Student, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 88 ...</td>
<td>Sep 89</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 89 ...</td>
<td>May 91</td>
<td>S–3 (Operations), later Executive Officer, 3d Brigade, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 91 ...</td>
<td>Jun 93</td>
<td>Commander, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 93 ...</td>
<td>Jun 95</td>
<td>Chief, Armor Branch, Combat Arms Division, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, VA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 95 ...</td>
<td>Jun 96</td>
<td>Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 96 ...</td>
<td>Jul 98</td>
<td>Commander, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, CO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 98 ...</td>
<td>Oct 99</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Europe and Africa, J–5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 99 ...</td>
<td>Aug 01</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 01 ...</td>
<td>Jun 03</td>
<td>Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program, Saudi Arabia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 03 ...</td>
<td>Oct 04</td>
<td>Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 04 ...</td>
<td>Jul 05</td>
<td>Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 05 ...</td>
<td>May 07</td>
<td>Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO Training Mission-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From To Assignment
Aug 07 ... Mar 08 Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL.
Mar 08 ... Oct 08 Acting Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL.
Dec 08 ... Mar 11 Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA.
Apr 11 ... Present Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, DC.

Summary of joint assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignments</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC</td>
<td>Oct 99–Aug 01</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO Training Mission-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
<td>Aug 05–May 07</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL</td>
<td>Aug 07–Mar 08</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL</td>
<td>Mar 08–Oct 08</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Officer, 3d Brigade, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Jan 91–Feb 91</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
<td>Jun 03–Oct 04</td>
<td>Brigadier General/Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO Training Mission-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq</td>
<td>Aug 05–May 07</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL</td>
<td>Aug 07–Mar 08</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL</td>
<td>Mar 08–Oct 08</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal with “V” Device
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Combat Action Badge
Parachutist Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Martin E. Dempsey.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.

3. Date of nomination:
   6 June 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   14 March 1952; Jersey City, NJ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Diane Sullivan Dempsey.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Christopher, 32.
   Megan, 31.
   Caitlin, 28.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Member, Veterans of Foreign Wars.
    Member, Association of the U.S. Army.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
    I, Martin E. Dempsey agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.
13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

I, Martin E. Dempsey, agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give my personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power.

[The nominee responded to Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.  

MARTIN E. DEMPSEY.

This 6th day of June, 2011.

[The nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]
NOMINATIONS OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; AND LTG CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA, TO BE GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

THURSDAY, JULY 28, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; and Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant.
Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Kathleen A. Kullenkampff, Brian F. Sebold, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members’ assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brent Bombach, assistant to Senator Portman; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; and Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. Today the committee meets to consider the nominations of two distinguished senior military officers: Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, the nominee to be Chief of Naval Operations (CNO); and Lieutenant General Charles Jacoby, Jr., U.S. Army, the nominee for Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

The long hours and the hard work that are put in by our senior military officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) require commitment and sacrifice not only from our nominees, but also from their families. We greatly appreciate the willingness of our nominees to carry out their new responsibilities and we also appreciate the support that they have from their families. Without that support, these nominees could not possibly do what they've been asked to do throughout their careers and what they're going to be asked to do when they are confirmed. Our nominees should feel free to introduce their family members when they make their opening remarks this morning.

The nominees have impressive qualifications and suitability for their positions. Admiral Greenert has served as Vice CNO, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet, and Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

General Jacoby has served as the Commanding General of the Multinational Corps in Iraq, the Commanding General of ICOR, and the Commanding General of U.S. Army-Alaska. He has also served as the Commander of U.S. Southern Command’s Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras, which provided counterdrug support, and he led relief operations for Hurricane Mitch, missions that are directly relevant to NORTHCOM’s missions.

I would also note that he is a native of Michigan, he holds a master’s degree in history from the University of Michigan, so from my perspective that seals the deal. The fact that Admiral Greenert’s wife hails from Michigan should not hurt his chances, either.

If confirmed, each of our nominees will be responsible for helping DOD face critical challenges. The ongoing use and possible future use of our military forces overseas, as well as the defense of our Homeland, make it critically important that we choose military leaders for DOD who can provide a vision for dealing with a number of critical issues that confront DOD.

These challenges include balancing force structure and modernization needs against the costs of supporting ongoing operations, and to do so in an increasingly constrained fiscal environment.

Those fiscal constraints are likely to get tighter as we deal with whatever agreement comes from the ongoing debt ceiling-deficit reduction discussions. The President announced a reduction in security funding of some $400 billion over the next 12 years. The actual reduction could be significantly greater, and if that happens this is going to amplify the challenges that you will face.

Admiral Greenert would be the 30th CNO. He will face the difficult tasks of recruiting and retaining a quality force and maintaining current readiness to conduct the ongoing war on terrorism, while at the same time transforming the Navy’s force structure to
deal with the threats of the future in the face of difficult cost and scheduling problems with the Navy’s major acquisition programs. Many of the ongoing challenges facing the Navy center on acquisition programs. As CNO, Admiral Greenert would be leading the Navy in defining requirements for the acquisition community to fill. There are some programs that have been proceeding reasonably well, such as ramping up the two attack submarines per year.

But too many acquisition programs are mired down in problems which, unless resolved, will make it difficult, if not impossible, to reach our goal for the size of the fleet.

NORTHCOM is responsible for the defense of the Homeland and for providing defense support to civil authorities in response to domestic natural or manmade disasters. Its area of responsibility includes all of North America, including Mexico. General Jacoby would be dual-hatted as the Commander of NORAD, our binational command with Canada, which has the mission to provide aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America.

When confirmed, General Jacoby would face a number of significant challenges. These challenges include working with the Mexican military to help them defeat the transnational criminal organizations that are causing high levels of violence in Mexico, which pose a threat within Mexico and to the security of our southern border.

As part of the mission of providing defense support to civil authorities, NORTHCOM must work closely and cooperatively with other Federal agencies and with all the States on plans and coordination for emergency response to domestic disasters, including potential incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

General Jacoby will need to work with the State Governors and National Guard Forces to improve the capabilities of State and Federal military forces to work together to support the Governors’ needs for disaster assistance.

NORTHCOM is also the combatant command responsible for the operation of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, whose mission is to help defend the Homeland against the threat of a limited ballistic missile attack from nations such as North Korea and Iran. The GMD system has had two consecutive flight test failures, most recently last December. We look forward to hearing General Jacoby’s views on what we need to do to make the system work reliably and effectively, including adequate testing.

We all look forward to hearing your testimony this morning on these and other issues and the kinds of issues that you are going to be facing in your new assignments.

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome Admiral Greenert and General Jacoby and their families and I congratulate them on their nominations. Admiral Greenert, in a nomination hearing on Tuesday for General Martin Dempsey, nominated to be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we discussed the likelihood of deep cuts in future defense
budgets and the uncertainty about how these cuts will affect defense personnel, equipment, readiness, and capabilities.

General Dempsey expressed his appreciation for the role of sea power in our national defense strategy and the Navy's enduring role in protecting our economic and national security interests in vast and vital areas, such as the Asia Pacific. Indeed, with the increasing importance of this geopolitical and maritime space, the roles and responsibilities of the Navy are becoming even more critical.

General Dempsey also acknowledged, however, that if adequate funding is not provided by Congress, DOD strategy will have to change to reflect the resources that are made available. Clearly, each of the Services stands to be affected by the budget decisions made in the days ahead. But in my judgment, the Navy, with its capital-intensive shipbuilding and aircraft procurement and maintenance accounts, could be the Service that would be most adversely affected.

This puts huge additional pressure on the Navy to design and produce on time and on budget, reliable, battle-ready ships, submarines, and aircraft, a task in which I'm sad to say the Navy's recent track record has been less than admirable. If the Navy's performance in the design and procurement of its weapons systems doesn't improve, I'm worried that the Service could lose the commitment and support of American taxpayers and Congress, which would be a long-term disaster for the Navy and our Nation.

While I'm confident you will be confirmed, Admiral, you will have many difficult challenges ahead. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) heads the list. I continue to think the Navy misjudged in going forward with a dual-source block buy strategy for the LCS and that the true life cycle costs of buying and sustaining both LCS variants will be considerably more than what the Navy has estimated.

In recent days we have learned that one of the newly commissioned LCS ships has experienced unacceptable cracking of its steel hull, while the other variant suffers from aggressive galvanic corrosion that will require repair and backfitting to ensure the safety and durability of its aluminum hull. I'm sure you share my frustration that following an $8 billion taxpayer investment in the LCS program, the Navy continues to lack a single ship that is operationally effective or reliable.

Similarly with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, we're all too familiar with its continued cost overruns and schedule slips. After nearly 10 years in development and a $56 billion investment to date, the program has produced a handful of test and operational aircraft. We've recently learned that the government's share of the most recent cost overruns for the first 28 production aircraft stands at three-quarters of a billion dollars, in addition to a requirement for an additional 33 months and $7.4 billion as a result of recent program restructuring decisions.

The overall estimated cost of the program, $383 billion, and an estimated sustainment cost of $1 trillion, make it the most expensive acquisition program in history. I remain deeply concerned about the affordability of this program and I don't think the taxpayers and Congress will have a lot more tolerance for additional cost increases and schedule slips.
The same is true with the LPD–17 San Antonio-class of amphibious ships. Plainly, the Navy faces many difficult challenges. But if we can be confident in one thing without a doubt, it is the performance and commitment of our sailors and that of their families over the last 10 years of constant conflict. They give us reason to redouble our efforts to solve these problems and they make us proud every day, and they deserve better. So do the taxpayers.

General Jacoby, I congratulate you on your nomination. I’m interested in what your priorities will be if confirmed to ensure NORTHCOM is able to accomplish its missions and navigate an increasingly complex security environment.

The current situation in Mexico should be of concern to all of us, and I’m interested in your assessment of what steps need to be taken to strengthen the partnership between our two nations to combat the increasingly capable and ruthless transnational criminal organizations. President Calderon continues to act with great courage in this fight and he has achieved significant successes with the capture or killing of several powerful cartel kingpins. However, the situation remains dire. More than 35,000 Mexicans have lost their lives in drug-related violence since 2006, and this violence continues to rage in many areas in Mexico, threatening the safety and security of Mexican and American citizens alike.

Finally, I’m interested in your views on an increasingly grave threat to both American military and economic security, the growing proliferation of attacks in cyberspace. There isn’t a week that goes by without media reports of major intrusion or compromise of cyber networks in the United States, both military and commercial.

We need to focus our attention and act with a real sense of urgency. I think we are long overdue in developing an understanding of how to respond to cyber attacks and when to shift from defense to offense. I’ve been and remain greatly concerned about the lack of a clear strategy that establishes coordinated, unambiguous command and control relationships that have real capability to effectively respond to cyber attacks within DOD.

In short, I don’t think we have answered a host of fundamental questions involving cyberspace, despite recent efforts. I look forward to hearing the role you believe NORTHCOM should play in protecting the Homeland against our cyber threats and what must urgently be done to ensure the roles and responsibilities for protecting the United States are clearly defined and established both within DOD and across the interagency framework.

Thank you both for your willingness to serve in these important leadership positions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Let me now ask you to give us your opening statements, if you would. Let me first call on Admiral Greenert.

STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, NOMINATED FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral Greenert. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good morning. Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee: it is indeed an honor, a great honor, to appear before you
as the nominee to be our Navy's CNO. I am thankful for the confidence placed in me by President Obama and Secretaries Panetta and Mabus and Admiral Roughead.

But I'm most grateful for those people behind me who for years have given me great support, understanding, and inspiration, especially my wife Darlene, who is with us today, as you've acknowledged earlier, Mr. Chairman. We've been married for 30 great years. Darlene has been steadfast and, for heaven's sakes, she's been patient. She's a caring Navy spouse and the greatest mother three children could ever have.

Joining us also today is my daughter, Sarah, who's really the apple of my eye, and my son, Bryan. He's obviously the lieutenant behind us. He's just completed a 4-year tour as a Navy surface warfare officer, serving on two destroyers in Japan. Regrettably, Mr. Chairman, our oldest son, Jonathan, could not be here. He too serves our Navy, as a Navy Criminal Investigative Service special agent, and he's currently underway in the Western Pacific on the aircraft carrier George Washington as their special agent.

More than anything, I am grateful for the opportunity to continue serving as a sailor in the U.S. Navy. To me there is nothing more meaningful and honorable than to wear the cloth of our Nation and serve alongside today's magnificent Navy men and women. They are committed, they are tough, adaptive, and innovative, and therefore they deserve wisdom, clear direction, and understanding from their leadership.

The sailors we send into harm's way today could not do what they do without the support they receive from their families at home. As the Vice Chief, I have been honored to meet many thousands of Navy family members in an effort to understand how our institution can serve them better. I am grateful for their dedication, their resiliency, and their selflessness.

Today, 50 percent of our ships are underway and 43 percent are deployed. We have over 12,000 sailors on the ground in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and about 10,000 sailors on individual augmentee assignments. Mr. Chairman, these numbers were almost identical to the numbers that Admiral Roughead reported to you almost 4 years ago. Your Navy remains ready. It is agile and it's global, and it has been relentlessly busy. Operating tempo has been high. Our missions have evolved, and changes are occurring in our world, particularly the Middle East, at a pace we couldn't previously imagine.

In spite of all that has taken place around us, one key element endures and I believe will endure; we must assure the security and freedom of the seas in all the domains, so that the economies of the world can flourish. To do this, I believe our Navy must be forward in order to influence events, assist our allies and partners, and provide our Nation an offshore option.

If confirmed, my priorities will be to remain ready to meet the current challenges today; build a relevant and capable future force; continue to take care of our sailors, our civilians, and their families, and institute a manning strategy that recruits and nurtures a motivated, relevant, and diverse future force.

Meeting these challenges in today's budgeting environment will not be easy. Going forward, we must be clear-eyed in commu-
nicating what we will and what we won’t be able to provide the Nation in the future.

I recognize there will be rough seas ahead, but with the help of the Navy and DOD leadership and the support of this committee, I am confident we will succeed.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed as the next CNO, I will give you and the magnificent sailors in our Navy my best efforts. You rightfully expect it, they absolutely deserve it. I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Admiral.

General Jacoby.

STATEMENT OF LTG CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA, NOMINATED TO BE GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

General JACOBY. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee: it is a great honor and distinct privilege to appear before you today. I'm honored and humbled that President Obama has nominated me to be Commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD. I thank all of you for this opportunity.

Thank you, sir, for your kind words about our families. Today I'm joined by my wonderful wife, Grace, my faithful partner of almost 22 years, who was raised in an Army family and originally hails from Puerto Rico. As a retired U.S. Army officer, Grace knows and understands the sacrifices of our servicemembers and their families, and has worked tirelessly on their behalf. She has also raised three great young men. I know she'll be prepared to give me a comprehensive after-action review at the completion of this hearing. Thank you, sweetheart. [Laughter.]

Chairman LEVIN. One of the benefits of marriage. [Laughter.]

General JACOBY. Yes, sir. [Laughter.]

I'm very proud of my three sons. Mike, a middle schooler, and Vic, a high schooler, are both at camps today; and our eldest, CJ, is a third-year West Point cadet, currently completing his summer duties. I'm blessed with a terrific Army family. I thank the committee for inviting them here today.

Mr. Chairman, over the past year, Admiral Sandy Winnefeld has led the NORTHCOM and NORAD team with distinction. His leadership, vision, and drive will leave a legacy of continuous improvement which, if confirmed, I hope to build upon.

Before fielding your questions, I'd like to emphasize just two points. First, as a leader who has devoted much of his service life to combatting threats outside of the United States, I can think of no greater responsibility now than leading our military in defense of the Homeland, while providing support to our citizens at the Federal, State, and local levels in times of their greatest needs. I view the NORTHCOM and NORAD mission simply as a sacred trust.

Second, in my current role as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, I observed no other command and certainly no other combatant command in which cooperation with and support for partners is more important than with NORTHCOM and NORAD. If confirmed, I will reinforce the critical importance
of a close partnership and teamwork with, first and foremost, the National Guard, the Reserve, other combatant commanders and Service Chiefs, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and all other interagency, State, local, and nongovernmental partners, as well as our close friends and neighbors, Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas.

I look forward to working with the members of this committee and your superb staffs. Your countless visits to support our troops in theater, many of which I personally benefited from in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with your steadfast commitment to providing for their requirements and your unprecedented support for our families, are greatly appreciated.

I look forward to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General.

First, some standard questions that we ask of all of our nominees. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Admiral GREENERT. I will.

General JACOBY. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views even though those views differ from the administration in power?

Admiral GREENERT. I do.

General JACOBY. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions that appear to assume to outcome of the confirmation process?

Admiral GREENERT. No, sir.

General JACOBY. No, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record, in hearings?

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir.

General JACOBY. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

General JACOBY. Yes, sir.

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

General JACOBY. Yes, sir.

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir.

General JACOBY. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

General JACOBY. Yes, sir.

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.
We'll have a 7-minute round for our first round. Admiral, let me start with you. You appeared at a House Armed Services Committee hearing earlier this week, I believe, to discuss total force readiness and much of the discussion, understandably, centered around potential budget reductions. I believe that, in an exchange with Mr. Forbes, you pointed out that combatant commander requirements already exceed the Navy's ability to meet those requirements.

Can you outline for us what are the greatest risks to the Navy if there are large budget reductions forthcoming?

Admiral GREENERT. Mr. Chairman, right now the fleet is stressed. We are operating at a tremendous operating tempo and we are seeing some indicators of decreasing readiness. So I think we're operating at a pretty high rate today and we are at a limit.

If given a large budget reduction that we had to take, when I look at the global force management in the future that we might have to meet, I can't reconcile that without some change to that global force management plan. Our options are limited. We can't hollow the force, so the future force has to be ready. As I said before, we have to keep the faith and trust our sailors. We can't go to our personnel. Our Navy hasn't changed much since 2008 in our Manning level and our Manning plan.

If we reduce force structure, that would exacerbate the problem we already have. If we reduce modernization, that is going to the shipbuilding and aircraft accounts, I'm concerned about the industrial base.

So we have a conundrum here and I believe that this needs to be a strategic approach to such a large reduction.

Chairman LEVIN. Cost increases in our shipbuilding have meant that we're spending more and not making much progress in building the size of the fleet. The next major shipbuilding program over which the Navy has an opportunity to control requirements to keep the ship affordable is the Ohio-class replacement, the SSBN–X.

Admiral, are you supportive of the design decisions that the Navy has made on the SSBN–X program to constrain costs?

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. The committee's been concerned, very concerned, with the cost growth in the F–35 JSF program. At a hearing earlier this year, several members asked: What are the alternatives to the F–35 program if it is just unaffordable, we just run into new trouble, and we just don't see it working out the way we planned and the way it needs to work out?

Some of the witnesses said we just have no alternative, which of course troubles many of us. Admiral, what are the options for modernizing tactical aviation facing the Navy and the Marine Corps?

Admiral GREENERT. Mr. Chairman, the F–35 provides us a fifth generation strike fighter, which is really a measure of its stealth, its capability. The F/A–18 Hornet, our primary strike fighter right now, is a fourth generation fighter. We have no alternative in the Navy and Marine Corps with regard to an aircraft that will bring that capability.

If for some reason we were unable to bring the F–35 in, we would have to look at the capabilities, the weapons that we could
produce and design for the Hornet, a more standoff weapon, so that we could get a better output from that.

Chairman Levin. Admiral, in your written response to the advance policy questions you talked about the U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. Can you tell us whether or not you believe it’s important to our national security to join this treaty?

Admiral Greenert. Mr. Chairman, I believe it is important to the national security. The legal certainty and the public order that it would bring, our ability to have a dialogue in an international forum for issues such as freedom of navigation, excessive exclusive economic zone claims, and also our continental shelf issues, such as in the Arctic, I think would be enhanced greatly by our accession to the Law of the Sea.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

General, the last two flights, as I mentioned, of the GMD system failed and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is working to understand and fix the problem, including plans to conduct two flight tests to verify any fix. Until that happens, MDA has suspended production of the interceptor-kill vehicles. Do you support the need to take the time necessary to fully understand and to fix the problem, to conduct all necessary testing to confirm the fix and to demonstrate that the system works?

General Jacoby. Senator, yes, I do.

Chairman Levin. General, last year NORAD conducted the first annual exercise with Russia, called Vigilant Eagle, in which both countries practiced passing control for monitoring and escorting a simulated hijacked aircraft into each other’s air space. Can you tell us whether that exercise was a success and whether you believe that these kind of cooperative exercises enhance U.S. security, and if so, how?

General Jacoby. Senator, I believe Vigilant Eagle was a success. It is an annual exercise. It is a practical exercise. As we saw in this last run-through with the Russian Federation, there really was benefit in that transparency that took place in the handoff of a hijacked aircraft, that really builds trust and confidence in a relationship and contributes to U.S. national security interests.

So with the Russian Federation, of course, we work with our eyes wide open. But there are areas of cooperation that are mutually beneficial and I think Vigilant Eagle is a perfect example of how we can both gain in the security realm by cooperating together.

Chairman Levin. Would that possible cooperation also be or might be helpful in the area of missile defense with Russia in terms of enhancing our security, particularly against Iranian missile threats?

General Jacoby. Senator, I know there are important discussions going on right now in seeking ways to cooperate with the Russian Federation on missile defense. I know Ambassador Rogozin just recently visited NORTHCOM--NORAD command centers. I know that we’ve been in extensive dialogue with them.

So again, finding places and venues and capabilities where we can cooperate with the Russian Federation can contribute not just to both nations’ mutual security needs, but regional security needs as well.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, both.
Senator McCain.

Senator Mccain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses again.

Admiral, I don’t know if you had a chance to see the Wall Street Journal this morning and other periodicals. The headline is “China Says Carrier Won’t Alter Naval Strategy.” The first paragraph says: “China’s defense ministry said its first aircraft carrier would be used for research experiments and training and would not affect its defensive naval strategy, in an apparent attempt to ease regional concerns that the vessel could be used to enforce territorial claims.”

I have never viewed an aircraft carrier as a method to employ a defensive strategy. I don’t believe that’s what carriers are intended to. I’m curious of your impression. We’ve known that this aircraft carrier was in the phase of being refurbished for a long period of time. What’s your view of the impact of this very significant move on the part of the Chinese?

Admiral Greenert. Senator, I believe it’s clearly a prototype for what they ultimately want to have, which is a better aircraft carrier, indigenously built and tailored to their needs.

Senator Mccain. What do you think of the overall meaning of it?

Admiral Greenert. By virtue of being an aircraft carrier, it’s typically offensive. It’s made to project power.

Senator Mccain. What is your view of the significance as far as what you think the Chinese thinking is?

Admiral Greenert. The Chinese say they built it for defensive measures. There’s some question as to what their intent is. It’s hard to gauge their intent. They could use it for defensive reasons, but as we just stated, this is a power projection.

Senator Mccain. When you look at their statements about the South China Sea, about economic zones that are theirs, the near conflicts they’ve had with their neighbors, their assertion about the oil resources out in the South China Sea, and their new research ship that just reached new depths that exceeded that of the United States, doesn’t all this put together a picture for you?

Admiral Greenert. It puts together a picture of a navy that is interested in expanding its operations to blue water.

Senator Mccain. Thereby extending its influence.

Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir.

Senator Mccain. Thank you.

In a House hearing yesterday, in response to a question about the possibility of drastic defense budget cuts ranging from $400 billion to $1 trillion over the next 10 years, you said: “Without a comprehensive strategy review, a fundamental look at what we are asking our forces to do, without a change in activity, we won’t be able to meet the global force management plan today.”

As Vice Chief, are you taking part in DOD’s comprehensive strategic review?

Admiral Greenert. We are not in the major deliberations of that. We are providing some data, but we have been told we would be part of any final decision process in this comprehensive review.

Senator Mccain. How would you view a $400 billion, $600 billion, $800 billion, or $1 trillion cut in defense over the next 10
years? Do you have an assessment of what the impact that would be on our most capital-intensive Service?

Admiral GREENERT. Given that size of budget reduction and assuming it was apportioned to the Navy in accordance with our current ratio, we cannot go hollow, Senator, so we have to sustain our current force. Our personnel levels are not an area we can go to make further reductions. We’ve done about the best we can with efficiencies. There’s some more overhead.

My concern is the cuts at that level, we’d have to go into force structure and modernization, and my concern is about the industrial base and our shipbuilding plan.

Senator MCCAIN. You are already concerned about the downward trend in ship maintenance funding and commensurate rise in ship inspection failures; is that true?

Admiral GREENERT. I am, yes.

Senator MCCAIN. It’s already a serious problem.

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir. We are making some progress, but it remains a concern.

Senator MCCAIN. I won’t go into my rant about the F–35 or the LCS. I will spare you that. But I am deadly serious about the fact that the costs of both of these programs are simply unsustainable. I’m not the only one that holds that view. So I strongly recommend that you give both the LCS and the JSF your serious attention as you assume your new serious responsibilities.

General, give us an assessment of the situation in Mexico vis-à-vis the drug cartels. Is the situation improving, is it deteriorating, is it the same? Is it an area of concern for ranging from American tourists to the threats of increased violence along our border?

General JACOBY. Senator, Mexico and the United States have tremendous shared mutual interests, security interests as well as other interests, along our border, but specifically with regards to countering the transnational criminal threats that are shared by both countries. We both share responsibilities to counter those threats.

Senator MCCAIN. I’m curious about your view of the seriousness of those threats and whether we are making progress or if it’s basically stagnant or if it’s a standoff between the cartels and the Mexican Government. I’d like to have your assessment of that.

General JACOBY. Yes, Senator. It’s my understanding that progress is being made on both sides of the border. I know the Mexican Government and security forces have made courageous political, moral, and physical commitments to countering the transnational criminal organizations. I know that we have made progress. I know there is much more work to do.

I think recently the President has released an executive order declaring a national emergency regarding the threat of transnational criminal organizations, highlighting them as an unusual and extraordinary threat to the U.S. foreign policy, our economy, and our security. I think that that accurately describes the seriousness of the threat.

Senator MCCAIN. The Government Accountability Office has recently stated that the border is approximately 44 percent under operational control. Would you agree with that assessment?
General JACOBY. Senator, DHS is responsible for those assessments. I don’t know of any counter to that report in terms of percentages under control or not under control. I know that it is a long border. I’m sure there is much work to be done along the border and at different places.

So if confirmed, it would be a priority for me to work closely with DHS to understand and to see how NORTHCOM could support DHS and other agencies in gaining effective control of the border.

Senator MCCAIN. I can tell you one thing and that is the use of Predator aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), has been extremely effective and helpful. I think you would agree.

General JACOBY. Yes, Senator, I’d agree. We have found UAVs to be a multiplier across the board in all DOD endeavors and certainly can assist in law enforcement operations as well.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for the service of your families. The chairman indicated he had a threshold level, which is some connection to Michigan. I too have a threshold level and you’ve both passed it. Admiral Greenert commanded a submarine and General Jacoby commanded the First Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. So I’ll ask a few questions, but I think you’ve already done fine.

Admiral, both the chairman and Senator McCain have brought up the issue of the maintenance issues that are confronting the Fleet. Some reports suggest that some destroyers, for example, will not reach their 30-year expected life or be able to be extended to a 40-year life. With these budget pressures, one of your most obvious responses is to keep the ships at sea. So can you comment generally in terms of will that be a first response? Will that require additional money for maintenance? Are you making any progress there? Because, as much as we all like to see additional platforms, you very well might have to curtail that, which obviously implies keeping the ships at sea longer.

Admiral GREENERT. Senator, the foundation of reaching our 30-year shipbuilding plan and our inventory is to make sure that the ships that we have reach their expected service life. To do that you have to do the right maintenance at the right time. That was something we didn’t have right until recently. We were in our surface ship maintenance, we would fully fund a year’s worth of maintenance and still not get the right things done in drydocking or otherwise.

We’ve made some good progress and the key now is we have to schedule it, allow them the time to do the maintenance, so that we can ensure ourselves that the ships make their full life.

Senator REED. Is part of this recent response turning more responsibility over to the Navy and to the crews, rather than contractors? Is that part of it, too?

Admiral GREENERT. Senator, that’s part of it, because first of all, it’s good for the crew. It’s good for a crew to understand their ship, to understand how to operate it, and do that maintenance. That’s
what the commanding officers of the ship have said: We need more time to do that maintenance and get to know the equipment, and when you operate it right it’ll last.

Senator Reed. Admiral, the chairman also mentioned the Ohio-class program, which is in the stages of design finalization requirements. One of the issues that I’ve addressed with Admiral Roughead is given the pressures on the shipbuilding budget, that this, as well designed and as efficient as you can build it, is going to be an expensive proposition.

There’s been ongoing discussions, because of its strategic role, of having some costs shared by DOD, not exclusively the Navy. Are those discussions still underway?

Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, they are. If confirmed, I intend to try to continue those discussions. In the 2020s we will have a phenomenon, an unfortunate one, where many of the ships built in the 1980s will now come due for retirement. That’s right when the Ohio replacement comes in. So we’ll work very hard to make sure we got the requirements right. We’ll work very hard with the acquisition community to drive that cost down.

But we may, even so, need some assistance in the shipbuilding budget if we’re going to meet our goals.

Senator Reed. The British Government has still fully committed to buying the Ohio-class ship, which should help, perhaps not decisively, but should help in terms of the cost allocation; is that correct?

Admiral Greenert. Yes, Senator. They are all in on the missile compartment agreement that we had.

Senator Reed. Thank you.

General Jacoby, and I’ll ask the Admiral also to comment, one of the most interesting developments in your theater of operations is the fact that the Navy predicts by 2020 that the Arctic Ocean will be navigable for commercial traffic at least 1 month a year and perhaps longer, which opens up a whole new space that you and the Navy have to operate in.

Can you comment upon your views as to what we should be doing now and what we can anticipate?

General Jacoby. Yes, Senator. In the most recent unified command plan, 2011, NORTHCOM received the responsibility for Arctic Ocean areas. It’s shared with U.S. European Command (EUCOM) as EUCOM picks up country responsibilities on the other side. But NORTHCOM is the advocate for the requirements and for the capabilities that will be needed as the Arctic becomes increasingly open.

The Secretary has directed that NORTHCOM ensure the peaceful and responsible opening of the Arctic, with a special emphasis on future transit lanes and potential choke points. I think there is also quite a bit of emphasis that this should be an international effort and that our efforts in the Arctic should strengthen international agreements and a sense of the peaceful opening of the Arctic.

So if confirmed as the NORTHCOM commander, it will again be about building relationships and ensuring that, eyes wide open, we do the right things in the Arctic as it opens up over time.
Senator Reed. Admiral, 20 years ago, I don’t think the CNO was thinking, how do I support a unified commander with ships in the Arctic Ocean for the transit of commercial vessels. So any thoughts?

Admiral Greenert. Yes, Senator. I believe we need to think about the Arctic as we think about other attributes when we bring in new programs. It’s going to be a fact of life that we may have to operate up there. I’m taken back to when we first started operating in the Persian Gulf. That was a unique experience. We didn’t plan this into our equipment, so we had air conditioning issues and other issues with dust, et cetera.

There are unique challenges in the Arctic and I think it needs to become an attribute when we consider requirements. We also need to consider it in our concept of operations (CONOPS) when we talk about what a ship needs to be able to do. Chem-bio and those kind of things; cold weather is another thing and it needs to be built into the CONOPS.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir.

General Jacoby, you have significant responsibilities with respect to National Guard and Reserve. There is an ongoing and very healthy debate about whether these units’ primary responsibility should be for DOD missions or for homeland security missions, given the fact that they are State militias as well as federalized forces that deploy constantly on the orders of the President of the United States.

Can you give us an idea of where you are in terms of that debate?

General Jacoby. Yes, Senator. I think the verdict is in. They’re important for both. They’re integral to both. As the Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq and deputy in Afghanistan, we could not have accomplished our mission without the effective, properly trained, equipped, and manned Reserve component forces, primarily National Guard, that we fought side-by-side with over the last 10 years.

So as we look at the challenges in the future and balancing our requirements against resources, the National Guard and the Reserves become even more important in our calculus.

Just as well in the Homeland, Senator. They’re absolutely essential. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and just good common sense have driven us to look to the Guard for more of a role in things like chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management. I think that is the proper place for that to grow, and of course as the NORTHCOM Commander, if confirmed, one of the things that I’ll advocate strongly for are the resources that the Guard and Reserve need to accomplish those missions, and I look forward to that opportunity.

Senator Reed. Thank you both, gentlemen, for your service.

Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.

Senator Collins.

Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I enjoyed having the opportunity to participate with you last week as we honored the outstanding servicemembers. Although you are not from the State of Maine, and don’t have the ties
that you do to the home States of other members, I'm confident that, based on our discussion, that you fully understand the critical role that the great State of Maine plays for our Navy, with Bath Iron Works and also the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and a Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training facility as well. I look forward to having you come to Maine to see all of those firsthand.

I want to follow up on the questions that the chairman and the ranking member asked you about shipbuilding and your testimony earlier this week. You testified that the Navy would need approximately 400 ships to meet all of the combatant commanders' demands, a number which is 115 ships more than are in our Fleet today. So that is of great concern to me.

Could you be more specific on what are the unmet requirements of the combatant commanders as they relate to Navy ships?

Admiral GREENERT. Senator, in my statement I was referring to an unconstrained combatant commander input, which is what we get in DOD as part of the process. For those that aren't validated, if you will, by the Joint Staff and make the global force management plan, they tend to be theater security cooperation activity in theaters outside of U.S. Pacific Command and CENTCOM. Those tend to be our centers of operations for the global force management plan.

These are important operations. They help preclude conflict. They help build partnership capacity. But, regrettably, in our force structure limitations we can't meet some of those.

Senator COLLINS. Among those is there a significant gap, for example, in ballistic missile defense (BMD), anti-piracy efforts? Are those some of the unmet needs of the combatant commanders?

Admiral GREENERT. BMD is a limit, Senator, but it is really based on the amount of force structure, writ large, we have. It isn't as if we have a destroyer that would be available for BMD and we don't provide. We provide the combatant commanders all those that are capable today.

Counter-piracy, we do as much as we can in counter-piracy operations, particularly in the CENTCOM and the U.S. African Command areas of responsibility.

Senator COLLINS. General, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, on which I am the ranking member and former chairman, did an in-depth investigation into the failed response to Hurricane Katrina. One of our astonishing findings was that NORTHCOM had so little situational awareness about what was going on in Louisiana and Mississippi.

I know that there has been considerable progress made since that time. Military support to civil authorities during a major disaster relief is absolutely critical to effective response and recovery, as I'm sure you're aware. What are your goals for strengthening the cooperation between NORTHCOM and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the State National Guard units, and the State emergency managers? Specifically, will you continue the program to train dual-status commanders?

General JACOBY. Senator, I think you've nailed it right on the head in terms of situational awareness. That's been my personal experience in large-scale disasters. It's really a challenge to know
exactly what's happening to you and to gain that. I think under Admiral Winnefeld's leadership it's my understanding that great strides have been made in improving its ability to see and understand what the requirements are, and more importantly, to anticipate those requirements. That's another part of the question you asked. I think it's about building strong, cooperative partnerships and effective relationships prior to an incident, so you're not exchanging business cards after the hurricane strikes; you're doing it beforehand.

That comes down to trust and confidence, and trust and confidence have been built by Admiral Winnefeld in a way that I think is unprecedented. Reflecting that is the initiative by the Council of Governors on dual-status commanders. I think it's a tremendous and overdue initiative. It's something that's been tried and worked before in special, national special security events, and I think that it will serve us well in times of disasters in the future. If confirmed, I will continue to put energy and power behind the back wheels of that program as best I can, supporting State and local authorities.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I look forward to working with you to advance that goal.

Admiral, I want to talk further with you about shipbuilding. Admiral Roughead said many times that he considered 313 ships to be the absolute minimum that is really needed for the Fleet. There are other studies, such as the QDR and the independent, bipartisan Perry-Hadley panel, that suggest that the number really should be in the neighborhood of 346 ships.

What is your judgment on the minimum number of ships that, unconstrained by budget, we should have in our Fleet?

Admiral GREENERT. Senator, I believe that the 313-ship floor remains the right number to deliver the capability needed to meet the challenges in the 2020 timeframe.

Senator COLLINS. Finally, and my time has expired, one way that we can reduce the cost per ship is to increase the rate of procurement. We've seen that in the past with the DDG–51 program. In fact, at one point when DDG–51 contracts were being awarded, at a rate of three per year, it saved nearly $800 million.

Do you have any thoughts on whether we would be able to increase the procurement rate and thus lower the cost per ship?

Admiral GREENERT. Senator, at every opportunity we will pursue multi-year procurement of a DDG–51. As you said, it's an efficient way. You get economic order quantity. It's good for the builder, it's good for the Navy. As we balance resources across the shipbuilding portfolio and all accounts, we'll be looking for that opportunity.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.

Senator Udall.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for being here.

Admiral, I look forward to working with you. Colorado is land-locked, but there are certainly important developments in the world that will be under your purview. I note that a book titled "Monsoon," which I think you've probably seen—and General Jacoby talked about this the other day—presents a fascinating
way, an insightful way, of looking at the Indian Ocean and that part of the world, in which we’re very involved. I look forward to carrying on those conversations with you. Thanks for your willingness to serve.

If I might, I’d like to turn to General Jacoby and talk about NORTHCOM. We have been well-served by your predecessors, General. We had a chance to talk about their accomplishments and successes the other day. Thank you for taking the time to come by and see me.

Would you just touch on your top priorities and concerns as you begin to take a look at the command you’re going to assume here in the near future?

General JACOBY. Senator, as I look across the portfolio of the NORTHCOM Commander, it really consists of three groupings: defense support for civil authorities in case of natural and manmade disasters; defense of the Homeland; and security cooperation with our neighbors. In all of those mission areas, complex relationships are the key to effectiveness, particularly in support to civil authorities and defense of the Homeland.

There are many stakeholders in the comprehensive defense of the Homeland and support to civil authorities. So without delving immediately into a set of things to do, it’s my understanding and as I’ve watched Admiral Winnefeld command so effectively, it’s really building trust and confidence in those relationships, building effective partnerships, ahead of the problem, that will allow NORTHCOM to play its critical supporting role in most of those activities.

Of course, the defense of the Homeland is the responsibility of the NORTHCOM Commander. But so much of the rest of the mission set falls into that and supports that mission that really, I think, getting down to business means rolling up your sleeves and paying attention to the critical partners that are required to really effectively support and defend our people and its interests.

Senator UDALL. Let me build on those comments, as well as those of Senator Collins. You talk about creating those relationships beforehand. We talked about the dual-status command opportunity and Senator Collins just brought it up as well. I just want to underline my support for working with the Guard, particularly those Guard leaders, the State adjutants general (TAG), who know their home States, who know those relationships in the civil and the military world.

I just really encourage you to move in every way possible to firm that up and take advantage of those relationships. I know that’s your intention, but I want to work with you and really make that happen.

General JACOBY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator UDALL. If I could, let me turn to cyber. Would you share your thoughts on where we are, and talk a bit about the discussion we’re having about kinetic and nonkinetic responses; how do you determine which is most appropriate? I’d appreciate it.

General JACOBY. Senator, like members of this committee and senior leaders across the military, we are recognizing the cyber domain as being critical to our national security. Within the realm of DOD, we rely heavily on the cyber domain for something as signifi-
cant and fundamental as command and control, but also for all the supporting infrastructure that makes DOD run and supportive of our national security interests.

So it is an absolute requirement that we become effective in that domain and that we have the right strategies, the right policies, and the right authorities to conduct the full range of activities required in the cyber domain for now and in the future.

For NORTHCOM specifically, the NORTHCOM responsibilities lie primarily in the physical domain. The technical side is really a comprehensive issue that involves the lead with DHS, but a very close partnership with the U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Strategic Command. NORTHCOM's role will be to not only protect critical physical infrastructure outside DOD, if requested by local and State authorities, but also DOD facilities as well.

Then in the event of an incident that would certainly have some kind of physical consequences, NORTHCOM would then go into its mode as a supporting element of providing DOD resources in support of civil authorities that are dealing with the consequences of such an incident. I think that all of us can imagine pretty significant consequences as a result of a deliberate cyber attack.

Senator UDALL. I think we have more work to do on the civilian side with the vulnerabilities, but also strengths. Again, I look forward to working with you in that regard.

Admiral, I want to turn to China. I'm sure you're familiar with the piece that Admiral Mullen penned recently. I thought he had some interesting insights into how we interact with China. I'm somebody who thinks we ought to communicate, collaborate, and compete with China. We ought to be careful, though, about getting ourselves into conflicts with China that involve the use of force.

Would you share any of your thoughts on that relationship? Then in particular, a piece of good news is what we're doing in the Gulf of Aden. Sino-American efforts there to counter piracy I think maybe present a model that we might move forward.

Admiral GREENERT. Senator, I think Admiral Mullen had it pretty much exactly right. We need to continue the dialogue. It's a long, grinding affair, but in my experience in the Pacific, especially at Seventh Fleet, I found that we can make some headway. We can't be naive.

What I found was, especially in special mission ships operating in and around China, an understanding of a proportional response. I think we have an opportunity with the desire of both nations for a peaceful resolution of the Korean Peninsula. I think we should leverage that. You've already mentioned the piracy. So there's a few areas that I think we can leverage and continue on. But we can't be naive. We have to be clear and deliberate.

Senator UDALL. Well put.

Thanks again for your service. I look forward, particularly, General, to having you out in Colorado with your great wife. So looking forward to it. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall.

Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, what's the current strike fighter shortfall?
Admiral GREENERT. The predicted current strike fighter shortfall for the Navy will be 65.

Senator BROWN. Is it your opinion that the Navy needs 28 Super Hornets in fiscal year 2012 to alleviate that shortfall?

Admiral GREENERT. With the 28 Hornets in 2011, that would be the shortfall, Senator.

Senator BROWN. So the cost of a Super Hornet is about $54 million and, just to kind of pick up a little bit on what Senator McCain didn’t want to talk about, the JSF right now is about $132.8 million. Do you think that the Super Hornet and getting those would be the plan B, the safe hedge against further slips in growth costs of the F–35 JSF for your purposes?

Admiral GREENERT. Senator, that would get us a temporary measure for the strike fighter shortfall. But I go back to the requirement for fifth generation. Eventually we need to move ahead in capability to the fifth generation, that stealth, that ability to deliver the range and the weapon capacity.

Senator BROWN. First of all, congratulations to both of you for, obviously, having this opportunity, and I look forward to voting, as well as probably everybody up here, for your confirmation.

General, what sort of relationship will you have with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) in terms of coordination between NORTHCOM and NGB? Are there any improvements that you think we can make?

General JACOBY. Senator, if confirmed, it will be a top priority to develop a relationship, an effective and a strong trusting relationship with NGB. I’ve watched General McKinley with great respect over the last year. He provides invaluable assistance and advice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the NORTHCOM Commander. I’ve watched the current NORTHCOM Commander, Admiral Winnefeld, forge those bonds, develop those relationships that allowed them to make these bold initiatives like the dual-status command opportunity.

So if confirmed, I’ll commit to you that I will continue to develop those relationships and have that strong, trusting working partnership that’s required for support to the States and the civil authorities and for the defense of the Homeland.

Senator BROWN. In your view, how and when will dual-status commanders be utilized?

General JACOBY. Senator, in the past we’ve proven the concept. Dual-status commanders have worked effectively in support of national special security events. So this leap forward is saying, why do we need 6 months to put in place a dual-status commander? Why can’t we do that in advance?

So the training program, the designation in advance of dual-status commanders, and the marrying up of dual-status commanders with a deputy from the other authority, I think those are tremendous initiatives that need to carry forward, and I think that can be used across a broad spectrum of support to civil authorities in response to incidents around the country. It makes a lot of sense. It’s about unity of effort.

Senator BROWN. When you’re dealing with the Mexican-U.S. border, and the use of guardsmen, some of the concerns are the fact that they don’t have the ability to actually defend themselves, like
we would in a war situation. I would argue that what's happening down there is pretty darn close to being a war, a war on drugs, and a form of terror.

What's your position as to giving them the authority to protect themselves when it comes to life and death?

General Jacoby. Senator, I'm not familiar with the exact rules of engagement or the arrangements that have been made for the guardsmen that are serving in a terrific manner along our southwest border. I know that the States have requested that and have implemented that program, and the Guard's mobilized very effectively to support it.

I also know that DHS is training agents to eventually replace those guardsmen. I would say that, as just a matter of professional opinion, any time we put a soldier, sailor, or marine in harm's way, we need to make arrangements for their personal security.

Senator Brown. Thank you, sir.

Admiral, just getting back to you, you said you predict that there's a 68-strike fighter shortfall. Why is that a prediction?

Admiral Greenert. It's when we take into account the number of hours on an airframe that we have today, hours flying by tail number, and look at operations and extrapolate it out.

Senator Brown. The usual that we've talked about.

Admiral Greenert. It's the throughput, yes, sir.

Senator Brown. One final question. The Navy's business case analysis of its dual LCS award strategy indicated that it can demonstrate overall cost savings of around $1 billion. Is that still accurate?

Admiral Greenert. Senator, I would like to take a look at those numbers and get back to you on the precise number.

[The information referred to follows:]

Yes, the cost savings generated by the Littoral Combat Ship award of the dual block buy included savings of approximately $1 billion (Then Year) which is directly attributable to the dual award versus the original down select strategy. This number is still an accurate representation of the savings. This strategy is assessed to achieve overall procurement savings of $2.9 billion when compared to the Department's fiscal year 2011 President's budget Future Years Defense Program through fiscal year 2016 for 20 Littoral Combat Ships.


Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.

Senator Sessions.

Senator Sessions. Thank you.

Congratulations to both of you. We appreciate your service and value that tremendously. We have a magnificent military and as we go through the financial challenges that we all face we want to be sure that we keep the most magnificent military in the world, and I trust that you will help us achieve that, and also cost savings wherever they can be achieved.

General Jacoby, as NORTHCOM Commander, you will be the person to pull the trigger if we were to have an incoming missile attack. You have the GMD system and other systems that are on the drawing boards. I am a strong believer that the GMD system we have presently will work to protect the country. I do believe that we need to enhance its kill vehicle to be more sophisticated, and that's being worked on, although we did have a defect in that
My first question to you is: Will you tell us and commit to us that you will master that program and will keep us advised on any shortfalls or problems that occur and will work to ensure that we properly spend the money to deploy the system that we've invested substantially in over several decades?

General Jacoby. Senator, yes, I will.

Senator Sessions. Will you give us your best military judgment when asked about that?

General Jacoby. Senator, if confirmed as the commander responsible and accountable, I will.

Senator Sessions. You've had some experience with the National Guard and you told me yesterday your respect for that institution. Would you share with us your understanding of the partnership between Active Duty and the Guard and how that can benefit the Nation?

General Jacoby. Yes, Senator, I will. It's been my privilege to serve side-by-side with guardsmen from my days as a second lieutenant out in the woods at Fort A.P. Hill, VA, on annual training, right up until last year in command of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, where tens of thousands of guardsmen served side-by-side with Active Forces in the accomplishment of a single mission.

It's also been my privilege to serve with guardsmen around the world in support of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, particularly in Central America and South America. So I have an abiding respect and admiration for the Guard. They bring special talents to every endeavor and they make special and unique sacrifices, as do their families, when we call upon them, both in their home States and abroad, to serve the Nation.

So I believe that this is all about working together. I think it's about taking advantage of unique skills and opportunities. I believe it's about responding locally first and then piling on as required. So there is a very special supporting role that NORTHCOM can provide State Governors and TAGs, and I think that in order to be the most effective in doing that you have to have that relationship with the Guard.

I think exercising, training, and fighting together, those are the keys to building those relationships and bonds that you can't break.

Senator Sessions. I agree. I know you'll be working with the 167th Theater Support Command out of Alabama, and I know they look forward to that, and I hope and believe you'll have a positive relationship.

Admiral Greenert, we're at 285 ships in the Navy today. The requirement is for 313. The CNO previously called that a floor for the Navy. We'll have to work hard to get there. I believe that is a reasonable amount for the Navy and hope that we can be able to support you maintaining that.

I know you were asked earlier about the LCS. They're just beginning to be produced and the plan calls for 55 of those to be a part of that Fleet. I understand the personnel required to man the ship is only about 40. How do you see that in terms of being able to help us achieve the Fleet size we need with a cost improvement as compared to conventional ships that we now have in service?
Admiral GREENERT. Senator, I had the pleasure of spending an overnight on the Freedom and I went from stem to stern on the Independence, and I am very impressed with the potential that those ships will bring. They have speed, volume, agility, and the ability to adapt. They are coveted by Special Forces. The Marine Corps wants to get involved as we are putting together packages.

So with the mission modules, with anti-submarine warfare, with mine warfare, and surface warfare mission modules, the LCS will be a key and essential part of our future fleet. We just have to bring them in on time, budget, and schedule.

Senator SESSIONS. Compared to the other ships that would be most comparable to it, they would be a lot more expensive and require a lot more personnel to operate, do they not?

Admiral GREENERT. That would be correct, yes, sir. The closest thing that I know of to the LCS is the National Security Cutter. It has a different mission, but nonetheless costs a little bit more, the cutter, and its crew is larger than the LCS.

Senator SESSIONS. The DDG–1000 or –51s, some of their missions could be reduced, and they're substantially more expensive and have much larger crews; is that not correct?

Admiral GREENERT. That's correct.

Senator SESSIONS. I think this is a smart Navy move. I remember when Admiral Clarke proposed it, and it came up when I was chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee. I thought it was a good step in the right direction. I will acknowledge that some of those ships now will be built in Alabama, so I'm watching it closely. But I do believe it was a good idea then as a cost-cutting, flexible, more mobile Navy capability with much varied capabilities.

With regard to the corrosion matter that I think Senator McCain asked you about, I've looked into that. I don't know if you've had a chance to. I've talked to DOD people. It does appear that they checked them from stem to stern for corrosion and other problems. They found a bit of corrosion.

For any ship that's in the oceans, corrosion is always a problem, is it not? Do you believe that when launching a ship, you wouldn't be surprised to see some corrosion problem appear; is that correct?

Admiral GREENERT. It has happened in the past. It is not a new problem, corrosion. As you said, with the turbulence of the water, any metal in seawater, you have that threat of corrosion.

Senator SESSIONS. We've looked and talked with DOD officials and, while it may be this ship that's in the water may cost $1, $2, $3 million to fix that problem, once it's been identified there are techniques that can be employed for the new ships ongoing that would avoid that problem at a much, much more modest cost; is that correct?

Admiral GREENERT. That's correct, Senator.

Senator SESSIONS. I just feel that you have a good ship there. I appreciate Senator McCain because he's going to be on top of it, and we should be on all our procurements. Your feet will be held to the fire. The contractors and the Navy will be held to the fire. But I don't think that this is a huge problem. It does not jeopardize the program financially or technologically, and I do believe that the LCS will be cheaper to operate and be a step forward for the Navy.
as we strive to create the 300-plus-ship Navy that we'd like to have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.

Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General and Admiral, for your extraordinary, very distinguished service to our country, and thank you for your willingness to serve in the future. I apologize that I missed some of your testimony because of my appearing at other committee hearings. But I think I was here for probably some of the most important part, where you thanked your families, and I want to join in thanking them and recognizing their service to our country as well.

In that spirit, Admiral, let me ask you my first question, which really centers on family support. I noted in your testimony your very important reference to the need for "adequate oversight and sufficient funding" for these programs. You say that you "remain open to initiatives designed to further evolve existing programs and look for innovative ways to help our sailors and families become more resilient and ready to meet the enduring demand for Navy forces."

In that spirit, I would like to suggest perhaps to both of you that there really is a need for more family support, particularly in the employment area, where spouses are concerned, and where professional credentialing requirements are imposed that may limit employment for members of families at those bases where they move frequently, as you know much, much better than I, and career options are frequently blocked for frequently relocating military spouses.

I'm sure you're familiar with this problem and I don't need to belabor it for you. But to the extent that we can help on this committee with that issue, certainly I would like to do so. One means of doing so might be to have an individual at bases responsible for those credentialing or professional licensing issues.

But beyond that, perhaps, Admiral, you could speak to the issue of how family support more specifically can be provided to our Navy and perhaps the Navy as a model for the other Services.

Admiral Greenert. Senator, I appreciate your offer of support. We have a Department-wide, joint effort in credentialing of spouse skills. We have, I believe, eight States where we have gone straight to the governments and the Governor in the case of the chairman, to form a coalition who will agree to accept the credentialing of our military spouses.

We're working very vigorously on this and will be very vigilant. It's a joint effort and we're really mimicking the Army method and model to do that.

I believe that family programs are the foundation for the support of the family, and without a strong family the sailor can't do what he or she needs to do. I'm committed, if I am confirmed, to ensure those programs are properly programmed and budgeted and that they execute properly and we share best practices.

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.

General, if you could address that same question I'd appreciate it.
General Jacoby. Senator, I really thank you and the committee for taking this on. We are really finding that we’ve been testing the All-Volunteer Services here over the last 10 years, and we’re discovering their strengths and we’re discovering things that we can continuously do better.

One of the things that we’ve discovered is how critical families are. When we ask soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and our civilians to deploy over and over and over again in support of our national security interests, we’re also asking their families to make tough commitments.

I’m especially grateful for your consideration of the challenges that come from moving, and particularly true for the young families that are moving and young spouses that are seeking employment, and oftentimes that employment is central to running the household. So those initiatives are very, very important. I applaud the efforts and I thank all that are moving those family programs into the base, and I can tell you as a recipient and as a commander across my experience here during the last 10 years of conflict we have gotten better and better with the help of Congress.

Senator Blumenthal. Another area where I found your written testimony very compelling was on the issue of better treatment for our wounded warriors, particularly those suffering from the less visible wounds of war, traumatic brain injury (TBI), and post-traumatic stress. If you could expound perhaps on some of the specifics, where I know that both the Navy and the Army are seeking to address those issues, which are not new to this conflict, but perhaps newly discovered in their importance and their priority.

Admiral Greenert. Senator, I think we’ve made some strides. We need to continue to pursue the ability of our medical people to detect the potential for TBI in the field. If somebody gets bonked or has what might be perceived as a concussion, to be able to detect that and to document it and get that person off line and recognize it.

Following up at the completion of a tour of duty, to be sure there are people who may suffer from post-traumatic stress, that we do the proper post-deployment health assessment; and particularly for our reservists, that those that feel different, they may have an issue, that we keep them on active duty, take care of them, do psychological outreach. I think that’s a program that has done us well.

Post-deployment returning warrior weekends, people get together, talk about how they feel, what’s going on, they get great referrals there.

Lastly, for the Navy we have what we call Navy Safe Harbor. When an individual is wounded, ill, or injured, combat or otherwise, they enter the Navy Safe Harbor. They’re a member of Navy Safe Harbor until they choose to leave, go back to full duty, and voluntarily leave Safe Harbor, or they transition to a new lifestyle out of military service and their disability evaluation system is complete.

Senator Blumenthal. My time has unfortunately expired and I may be one of the last of your questioners today. But again, I want to thank you for your service. I want to particularly support your observation, Admiral, in your written testimony, that “An attack
submarine force level below 48 will increase the risk of gaps in our coverage for indications and warnings of potential hostile actions, delay or reduce the arrival of submarines critical to the war fight, and potentially allow an adversary to create and maintain a safe haven.”

I think that is a very powerful and eloquent statement in support of the kind of submarine force that we need. Again, I offer my strong support.

So thank you for being here and thank you for your service, and I look forward to working with you. I have no doubt that you’ll both be confirmed.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal. I just have a few questions for the second round and then if any other Senator wants to add to that they should come by.

General, I’ve asked the Admiral about the question of whether the United States should join the Law of the Sea Convention. NORTHCOM is going to have new responsibilities for the Arctic. Can you tell us what your views are about whether the United States should join the Law of the Sea Convention?

General JACOBY. Senator, I believe we should.

Chairman LEVIN. Can you tell us why?

General JACOBY. Senator, I think that when we look at the global commons in all of its domains, particularly at sea, it’s important that the commons are disciplined, that there are international standards, and that those standards are agreed to across the international community. It’s hard to sit at the table with any moral authority or standing when you’re not a member of that treaty.

It’s my understanding as well that we had significant input in the design of it, and so I think our friends, allies, neighbors, and the rest of the community that travels the global commons would benefit from our ability to influence outcomes by being a member.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

You’ve been asked, General, about the cyber security issues and the growing threats of cyber attacks and the growing number of cyber attacks. You indicated in your prehearing questions that DHS is the lead Federal agency for the cyber security of the Nation and that NORTHCOM would operate in support of DHS. Can you expand just a bit on that? What is the relationship, if any, between the NORTHCOM mission to protect critical infrastructure and its cyber security mitigation role?

General JACOBY. Senator, NORTHCOM would play a supporting role in mitigating consequences of a cyber attack. To that end, close coordination with DHS is a requirement.

Where we have critical infrastructure associated with cyber elements on DOD property, then NORTHCOM would play a critical lead role in defending that or protecting that, with the Services, in protecting that infrastructure. Then, upon request, if there are Federal properties that require additional assistance in their protection, NORTHCOM would play a supporting role.

But across a wide variety of potential impacts on our critical infrastructure, NORTHCOM could be called on to provide support to civil authorities in mitigating the results of a cyber attack. I think when you pull the thread on what could happen if there was a sig-
significant cyber attack on our electrical grid or other types of infrastructure that has not just maybe local, but regional implications, then you can see where a response of some significance might be required.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

We want to thank you both again and your families for your service. We're going to hope to get these nominations and other pending nominations acted on by the committee yet this week. That's our goal, and then to get you and the others confirmed next week, if not late this week. That's our hope and, even though there are some wild things going on in Congress these days, these nominations I think will not only be confirmed, but will, when people do realize the importance of these nominations and coming together on a bipartisan basis in support of our military efforts and our military families and people who wear our uniforms, these nominations are going to have a settling effort on the environment here in Congress.

So that's our goal, and I will close with that optimistic note, and again with thanks to both of you.

[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. Goldwater-Nichols has served us well, but in the past 20 years the security environment has changed significantly and a review is worthy of consideration.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy if I see need for specific improvement.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 5033 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the composition and functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), including the authority of the CNO, as a member of the JCS, to submit advice and opinions to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. Other sections of law and traditional practice, also establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the CNO to the following offices:

Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense (DOD). As a Service Chief and member of the JCS, the CNO is a military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, particularly regarding matters of naval warfare, policy, and strategy.

Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on occasion, serves as acting Secretary in the absence of the Secretary. During these periods, the CNO's relationship with the Deputy Secretary will essentially be the same as with the Secretary. The Dep-
uty Secretary is also responsible for the day-to-day operation of DOD. If confirmed, I will endeavor to interact regularly with him and provide him with my best possible professional military advice and the same level of support as I would the Secretary.

**Question.** The Under Secretaries of Defense.

**Answer.** Under current DOD Directives, Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with DOD components, to include the Services, in the functional areas under their cognizance. If confirmed, I will respond and reciprocate. If confirmed, I will use this exchange of information as I communicate with the CJCS and provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense.

**Question.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Answer.** The CNO is a member of the JCS and, as such, works with and through the Chairman in the execution of duties. Along with the other Service Chiefs, I will be a member of the JCS tasked with the responsibility for actively reviewing and evaluating military matters and offering professional military advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.

**Question.** The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Answer.** When functioning as the acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman’s relationship with combatant commanders is that of the Chairman. Also, the Vice Chairman has the same rights and obligations as other members of the JCS. If confirmed, I would exchange views with the Vice Chairman on any defense matter considered by the JCS. The Vice Chairman also heads or has a key role on many boards that affect readiness and programs and, therefore, the preparedness of naval forces. If confirmed, I will establish a close relationship with the Vice Chairman on these critical issues.

**Question.** The Secretary of the Navy.

**Answer.** The CNO is responsible, under the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), for providing properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support combatant commanders in the accomplishment of their missions. In addition, the CNO assists the SECNAV in the development of plans and recommendations for the operation of the Department of the Navy. The Navy enjoys a productive, collaborative environment within the Department, and if confirmed, I will work closely with the SECNAV.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of the Navy.

**Answer.** The Under Secretary of the Navy is the principal assistant to the SECNAV and is first in line of succession. The Under Secretary performs such duties, and exercise such powers, as the Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I look forward to establishing a close relationship with the Under Secretary and to working with him to achieve the Secretary’s goals.

**Question.** The General Counsel of the Navy.

**Answer.** The General Counsel of the Navy serves as legal advisor to the Department of the Navy and performs such functions as the SECNAV shall direct and as necessary to provide for the proper application of the law and effective delivery of legal services within the Department. If confirmed, I will work closely with the General Counsel to achieve the Secretary’s goals.

**Question.** The Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

**Answer.** Under 10 U.S.C. § 5148(d), the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy performs duties relating to any and all Department of Navy legal matters assigned to him by SECNAV. The JAG provides and supervises the provision of all legal advice and related services throughout the Department of the Navy, except for the advice and services provided by the General Counsel. It is important that the CNO receive independent legal advice from his senior uniformed judge advocates. If confirmed, I will work closely with the JAG and seek the JAG’s legal advice.

**Question.** The Commandant of the Marine Corps.

**Answer.** A unique historical and operational relationship exists between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Many of our capabilities, programs, and personnel issues are inextricably linked. Our forces deploy together, and both must be ready on arrival. If confirmed as CNO, my relationship with the Commandant of the Marine Corps must be exceptionally close and I will be committed to making every facet of the Navy-Marine Corps team stronger.

**Question.** The Chief of the Navy Reserve.

**Answer.** Under 10 U.S.C. § 5143, the Chief of the Navy Reserve serves on the staff of the CNO and is the principal adviser on Navy Reserve matters to the CNO and
is the commander of the Navy Reserve Force. The Chief of the Navy Reserve has an essential role in advising CNO of Navy Reserve capabilities alignment to Navy’s Total Force mission and operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Chief of the Navy Reserve to continue and enhance the vast progress and Total Force synergies we have achieved.

**Question.** The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force.

**Answer.** Our Armed Forces must work together to recognize each other’s strengths and to complement each other’s capabilities. We must achieve and maintain synergy in warfare, training, and procurement to ensure each Service contributes optimally to joint and combined operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with my counterparts to enhance joint interoperability and other aspects of the joint relationship in order to improve the warfighting capabilities of the United States.

**Question.** The combatant commanders.

**Answer.** The CNO’s responsibility as a Service Chief is to provide properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to the combatant commanders to accomplish their military missions. If confirmed, I will work to foster close working relationships with the unified and specified combatant commanders.

**MAJOR CHALLENGES**

**Question.** In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next CNO?

**Answer.** The major focus of the next CNO must be to maintain current readiness and provide ready, capable forces; to define and deliver a relevant naval force for the future; and to ensure we continue to attract a motivated, high-quality and diverse force of sailors and civilians. The CNO’s enduring leadership covenant is to take care of those who serve today, including our wounded, ill and injured, and their families. The overarching challenge remains balancing priorities in a fiscally-constrained environment.

**Question.** If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will remain committed to warfighting readiness to ensure we remain agile, capable, and ready forward. I will continue to employ our Fleet Response Plan while seeking to re-establish a sustainable level of operations consistent with our force structure. We must adapt our deployment models to ensure the viability of both current and future readiness, which involves reaching the expected service lives of our ships and aircraft at reasonable cost.

In light of budget realities, our acquisition programs will face increasing pressure; therefore, it is more important than ever to meticulously review requirements throughout the acquisition process. We will stay in lockstep with the acquisition community and joint partners and be willing to change, adapt, and rescope to meet evolving threats. I intend to partner with the Commandant of the Marine Corps in establishing the finest naval force attainable within fiscal limits; a Naval Force ready to respond today to today’s crises—anytime, anywhere. I also plan to remain open, transparent and collaborative with our fellow Services and OSD in efforts to seek cost savings while ensuring our Navy remains strong, effective and relevant.

Internal to Navy, we will continue ongoing efforts to eliminate redundant processes, overhead, and costly infrastructures, as well as identify and adopt business best practices as standards for all.

I intend to be unwavering in our obligation to take care of sailors and their families through sustained program oversight and support. They are the Navy’s foundation. Attracting and retaining a diverse, high-quality Total Force will require innovative ways to communicate with the youth of our Nation. Once aboard, we will provide opportunities for individuals to rise as far as their talents and ambitions allow.

**MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS**

**Question.** What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the execution of the functions of the CNO?

**Answer.** The Nation cannot have a strong defense without a strong economy; therefore I view the deficit crisis and corresponding deep cuts in defense as one of the most significant challenges to the entire national security community. Fiscal realities aside, every CNO faces the following challenges executing his duties: (1) properly balancing current resources allocated to sustain, train, and equip the Navy; (2) obtaining the necessary resources to build and man the future Navy; and (3) ensuring continuity among requirements, resourcing, and acquisition in the existing planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process. The Navy’s larger imperatives are to remain whole (avoid decisions that create hollow capabilities) and maintain an international forward presence that offers our national leadership options to protect U.S. global interests.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with my Navy senior leadership team, my fellow Service Chiefs, the CJCS, the SECNAV, and through him, the Secretary of Defense and Congress to develop balanced, fiscally-responsible approaches to addressing and solving these problems.

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. Section 5033 of title 10, U.S.C., describes the duties of CNO and requires that the person nominated to fill the job have had significant experience in joint duty assignments, including at least one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a flag officer.

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I believe the breadth and depth of my experience as a naval officer and joint warfighter qualifies me for this position. I had the privilege of five commands, including assignments as Commander U.S. SEVENTHFLT, where I served as a Joint Task Force Commander, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, and Coalition Force Maritime Component Commander for two major Pacific war plans. As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, I was responsible for the Navy’s Global Force Management and support to three combatant commanders. In my current position as Vice Chief of Naval Operations, one of my core responsibilities is to serve as Navy’s representative for joint capabilities development. My five tours on the Navy headquarters staff and financial management specialization have provided me deep insight on integration of warfighting capabilities and resources; business operations; planning, programming, budgeting and execution; and cost reduction efforts in a fiscally constrained environment.

Question. Do you meet the joint requirements for the position or did you require a waiver?
Answer. Yes, I required a waiver. Per 10 U.S.C. section 5033(a)(3), the President may waive the joint requirements. My nomination is based in part on my joint duty assignment as a flag officer while serving as the U.S. Pacific Command Representative, Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau. The Secretary of Defense requested this waiver based on the recommendation of the SECNAV and the advice of the CJCS.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. Officials of DOD, including previous Chiefs of Naval Operations, have advocated for accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
Do you support United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?
Answer. Yes. The United States is the world’s foremost maritime power and our security interests are intrinsically global in nature. Our Navy is deployed throughout the world. We have more to gain from legal certainty and public order in the world’s oceans than any other nation. Joining the Convention will reinforce our Cooperative Strategy for 21st Seapower and the Naval Operations Concept 2010 to confront maritime security challenges.

Question. How would you respond to critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?
Answer. I believe that accession to the Law of the Sea Convention is in our national security interests. The basic tenets of the Convention are clear and beneficial to the Navy. From the right of unimpeded transit passage through straits used for international navigation and reaffirming the sovereign immunity of our warships, to providing a framework for countering excessive claims of other states and preserving the right to conduct military activities in exclusive economic zones, the Convention provides the stable, predictable, and recognized legal regime we need to conduct our operations today and in the future.

U.S. military forces must be able to operate freely on, over, and above the world’s oceans. That freedom is critical to our national security interests, the military in general, and the Navy in particular. The Law of the Sea Convention codifies fundamental benefits important to our operating forces as they train, transit, and fight. Amendments made to the Convention in the 1990s satisfied many of the concerns that opponents have expressed. Also, joining the Convention will not subject the U.S. Navy to the jurisdiction of international courts, nor will it adversely affect the President’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) or United States intelligence activities.
The Convention is the bedrock legal instrument underpinning public order for the world’s oceans. By joining the Convention, we can best assert our leadership in oceans law and policy, and in conjunction with our Freedom of Navigation program, we can best protect the navigational rights and freedoms that are of such critical importance to our Nation’s security and economic prosperity.

Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime disputes such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?

Answer. The United States is the only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and the only Arctic nation not a party to the Law of the Sea Convention. U.S. economic interests in the Arctic are significant, including natural resources, shipping and trade. The United States has an extended continental shelf (ECS) that is likely to be more than 1 million square kilometers—an area nearly half that of the Louisiana Purchase, with energy and mineral resources that have been estimated to value up to $1T and include mineral deposits and petroleum resources (oil, gas, gas hydrates).

In the ongoing tensions over rights in the South China Sea, the United States will be in a stronger position of influence by joining the Convention that provides the legal regime for the oceans. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) membership will put the full weight of U.S. political leadership behind the legal maritime framework it upholds. Application of the legal standards and framework as codified by UNCLOS is central to resolution of existing maritime disputes. Our friends and allies need our political leadership within UNCLOS to influence resolution of South China Sea disputes in accordance with the legal standards and customary maritime law as defined by UNCLOS.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. If confirmed, you would play an important role in the process of transforming the Navy to meet new and emerging threats. What are your goals regarding Navy transformation?

Answer. The Navy is on a good course and speed regarding transformation initiatives and we have a good navigation plan for the future. If confirmed, my goals will remain largely consistent with our current efforts. For example, Navy has taken the lead within DOD in reshaping itself to meet current and future cyber threats and opportunities, but we have more work to do to capitalize on our progress to date and realize the full potential of our growing cyber force. We must continue to mature Navy’s recently-formed Information Dominance Corps, which will help develop integrated solutions in unmanned ISR systems, Electronic Warfare, and C5I. We must continue to retain our advantage in the undersea domain in order to achieve joint assured access wherever it is needed. We will also focus on supporting the development of emerging technologies we think hold the greatest promise for future naval and joint warfighting (such as the railgun, Free Energy Laser, and Directed Energy).

Underpinning all these goals is a need to transform our demographics within the Navy to ensure our personnel reflect the society we defend. I intend to pursue diversity goals within established policy guidelines, so that we can recruit, retain, and promote the best talent the Nation has to offer, regardless of color, creed, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender.

FLEET READINESS

Question. Recently, there have been a number of ships that have failed inspections by the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV), including Aegis cruisers and destroyers due to poor material condition. Some have suggested that these INSURV failures result from increased deployment demands supporting current operations. Others have suggested they are caused by deficiencies in the maintenance efforts or deficiencies of leadership in maintaining these ships.

What do you believe has caused these increases in INSURV inspection failures, and what would you propose to do about it?

Answer. The Navy has been aggressively tackling causal factors related to increases in INSURV inspections that have resulted in “degraded” or “unsatisfactory” findings. A major contributor to these problems has been our high operational tempo to support ongoing conflicts over the last decade. Frequent deployments, compounded by a decreasing fleet size, have constrained our ability to adhere to pre-planned maintenance schedules. Other causal factors include past decisions regarding “optimum manning” (excessive reductions in ship manning), technical training for sailors, material assessment training for senior officers, shifts in staffing of in-
termediate maintenance activities, and planning and execution of surface ship maintenance.

We have initiated a number of activities to improve overall readiness of our surface ships over the long term. The Naval Sea Systems Command has established SEA–21, a directorate dedicated to managing the complete lifecycle support, maintenance and modernization for all non-nuclear surface ships operating in the Fleet. Another critical step forward is the improved research, planning, and execution of surface ship maintenance built upon the proven processes we use in the carrier and submarine communities. We are increasing the crew size of select ship classes, focusing on critical technical ratings, creating waterfront material assistance teams, and increasing the staffing of Regional Maintenance Centers. Technical training has been updated to increase hands-on experience and improve the balance between computer-based and instructor-led classes. We have partnered with the American Bureau of Shipping to improve our assessment of ship material condition and actions required to achieve the expected service life of each hull. These initiatives are resulting in tangible improvement in surface ship readiness, and improvement in functional areas in recent INSURV inspections, as attested to by recent Fleet reports. If confirmed, I intend to continue to promote and support these actions, which are expected to continue to have a positive impact on material readiness of our surface ships over the next several years.

ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Office of the CNO in the requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition management processes of the Department of the Navy?

Answer. From my perspective, the role of the CNO in the requirements determination and resource allocation process is clear and appropriate. While the current cooperation among the CNO and acquisition officials is good, it should not be personality dependent. Service Chiefs should have a more formal role in acquisition management to ensure continuity among the requirements, resourcing and acquisition processes.

Question. Do you see a need for any change in the structure or functions of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) or the role played by the CNO and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations in the JROC?

Answer. I do not. I will continue to support the important work of the JROC. If confirmed, and after I have participated in the process, I will recommend changes as appropriate.

ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL

Question. Over the past few years, much has been made of the emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the U.S. Navy’s freedom of movement and action in certain regions.

Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities are a concern and, if so, what do you believe the Navy needs to be doing now and in the next few years to ensure continued access to all strategically important segments of the maritime domain?

Answer. There are an increasing number of foreign capabilities that have the potential to slow or prevent the deployment of friendly forces into the theater, cause our forces to operate from distances further from a crisis than desired, or to disrupt friendly operations in theater by targeting our enabling capabilities. The Navy has and will continue to develop programs that provide capabilities and capacity to address emerging anti-access threats. Accordingly, we are strengthening our partnerships, modernizing our forces, fielding new capabilities and technologies, and developing new operational concepts. One specific initiative that will help preserve access and freedom of action in denied areas is implementation of the Air-Sea Battle Concept. This effort leverages advantages a particular service has in one domain in order to enable or enhance effects in another domain through integrated operations of networked naval and air forces. Air-Sea Battle implementation will ensure continued U.S. advantage against emerging anti-access threats.

RECAPITALIZING THE FLEET

Question. Despite the fact that Navy leadership has determined that it needs to have a 313-ship fleet to meet the maritime requirements of the National Military Strategy, it is currently operating with 284 battle force ships. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has concluded that the Navy has underestimated the costs for building the 313-ship fleet by approximately 16 percent.
Do you agree with the CBO’s assessment that there is significant cost risk associated with the Navy’s shipbuilding plan?

Answer. The Navy and CBO are in relatively close agreement in our cost estimates for the first 10 years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan because we have a good understanding of the ships requirements and costs. In the second 10 years, our cost estimates begin to diverge because we lose some of the cost fidelity, and inflation factors come into play. There is a difference between the way the Navy cost estimators account for inflation versus the way CBO accounts for inflation, which impacts the gap between CBO’s estimates and the Navy’s estimates. In the last 10 years of the 30-year plan, the gap increases are driven by this difference in inflation estimates, and by the assumptions made for the capabilities and costs of new ships. As the near term is most relevant from an execution perspective, the relatively small differences pose limited risk to the shipbuilding plan.

Question. What actions do you believe are necessary to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plan within the Navy’s budget estimates?

Answer. In the near term, I anticipate the acquisition community will continue its efforts to promote efficiency and competition in the industrial base to gain best value for the Navy and the taxpayer. For the longer term, we will work to control changes in requirements and ensure requirements for new classes of ships are limited to essential or mandated capabilities.

Question. How would you characterize the risks to mission performance posed by the current shortfall in battle force ships and the growing shortfall in tactical aircraft?

Answer. The Navy is meeting critical Combatant Command (COCOM) demand for battle force ships and associated tactical aircraft. While not able to meet the cumulative annual global COCOM requirements, Navy is meeting all adjudicated demands through the Joint Global Force Management process, based on prioritized requirements defined by the OSD’s Guidance for the Employment of the Force.

Question. What adjustments to the respective programs are necessary and appropriate to reduce that operational risk?

Answer. Based on our current strategy, I believe the President’s budget reflects the best balance of resources across the totality of our requirements.

Question. What further adjustments would you consider if the Navy's program comes under further pressure due to cost growth?

Answer. Pending the outcome of the current strategic review, it is premature to identify where it might be most appropriate to adjust requirements.

ALTERNATIVE FINANCING METHODS FOR SHIPBUILDING

Question. Navy leaders have testified that alternative financing methods must be found for shipbuilding.

What are your views and recommendations on the benefits and feasibility of alternative financing methods, such as incremental funding and advance appropriations?

Answer. The Navy currently has incremental funding authority for our most expensive ship class, nuclear carriers, and Congress has granted 2-year funding authority for some large amphibious ships. This authority has been helpful in mitigating the impact of the high levels of funding required by these ships on other ships which need to be procured to achieve required force levels and to more efficiently load the shipbuilding industrial base.

Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of such alternative financing methods on the availability of funds for shipbuilding?

Answer. Alternative financing methods allow the Navy to maintain the shipbuilding industrial base through more efficient management of SCN total obligational authority. Different financing periodicities provide greater flexibility in executing scarce resources and help avoid individual-year funding spikes. Whenever possible, the Navy remains committed to following a full-funding policy, where the entire obligation is provided upon contract award.

ATTACK SUBMARINE FORCE LEVELS

Question. The Navy’s most recent statement of requirements for attack submarine force levels was 48 attack submarines. However, the Navy projects that the number of attack submarines will fall as low as 39 boats and remain below the 48-boat requirement for almost two decades. The Navy is now claiming that it will be able to mitigate this shortage using three techniques: (1) building the new Virginia-class submarines faster by reducing the time between the start of construction to delivery from the current level of 86 months for the last boat to deliver to a level of 66 months; (2) extending the life of some boats currently in the fleet from 3 to 24 months; and (3) increasing the length of deployments
What is your assessment of whether the three techniques listed above will yield a number of deployed attack submarines sufficient to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs?

Answer. The Navy has already made progress in shortening the time to build the Virginia-class SSN to 66 months for the most recent delivery, USS Missouri (SSN–780). The program is on schedule to meet its ultimate goal of a 60-month construction span. This has the effect of adding one submarine to the force, thereby delaying the onset of the SSN force structure trough which will begin in 2024. Projected life extensions of a limited number of SSNs is possible, but will relieve less than 20 percent of the force structure trough and its duration. Increasing the length of deployments can improve forward deployed presence for short-term periods but does not address the impending force structure trough. Taken together, although helpful, these three techniques will not be sufficient to meet the shortfall relative to combatant commander’s requirements under current planning guidance.

Question. What risks are being incurred by allowing the attack submarine force levels to remain below 48 for so long?

Answer. Under current planning guidance, an attack submarine force level below 48 will increase the risk of gaps in our coverage for indications and warning of potential hostile action, delay or reduce the arrival of submarines critical to the war fight, and potentially allow an adversary to create and maintain a safe haven.

OHIO-CLASS REPLACEMENT

Question. A major cost risk facing the Navy at the end of this decade is the cost of replacing the Ohio-class strategic missile submarines. The acquisition process has already resulted in the Navy acquisition system making a number of cost vs. capability decisions to try to reduce those costs risks to the shipbuilding budget.

Do you agree with the decisions that have been made about the capability of the Ohio-class replacement submarines?

Answer. The Ohio Replacement Program Milestone “A” decision reflects cost versus capability trades that were jointly agreed on by the requirements and acquisition stakeholders in the Navy and DOD. I support these decisions.

Question. How confident are you that the program will be able to produce an Ohio-class replacement vessel that meets current cost objectives?

Answer. The Ohio Replacement Program has been thoroughly reviewed. All aspects of the program (warfighting requirements, program execution, design and construction efforts) were aggressively challenged to drive down non-recurring engineering and construction costs. The Navy estimates that the average Ohio Replacement cost for hulls 2–12 will be $5.6 billion with a goal of reducing this to $4.9 billion.

I believe these estimates are achievable in the context of the current shipbuilding plan due to the scrutiny on requirements and costs leading up to the Milestone “A” decision.

SEA-BASED ISR

Question. There is a documented Joint Urgent Operational Need for sea-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to support missions by special operations forces in areas where land-based ISR is unavailable. The committee understands the Navy recently completed a proof of concept which demonstrated the value of such a capability to current combat operations, but does not intend to field a program-of-record solution until 2019.

What is your understanding of the requirement for sea-based ISR capabilities to support special operations forces?

Answer. Navy is planning and developing capabilities that will help satisfy legitimate ISR demands of Special Operations Forces. The intent is to procure ISR systems with multi-intelligence sensor modules, on station endurance and integrated weapons to support a broad range of missions from the sea.

Question. Do you believe the responsibility for fielding sea-based ISR capabilities to support Special Operations Forces falls on the Navy or U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)?

Answer. Fielding sea-based ISR capabilities is a shared responsibility that begins with coordination over requirements and development of systems that can execute many types of ISR missions for operational commanders. Demands for service-specific ISR already in the field is managed through the Joint Staff Global Force Management Allocation Plan and Request for Forces. The Navy is investing in sea-based ISR support to SOF with programs of record such as the Small Tactical Unmanned Air System (IOC 2013) and the Medium Range Maritime Unmanned Air System
While program development continues, the Navy is committed to supporting SOF from the sea with other capabilities to include Fire Scout, land-based Scan Eagle support, manned ISR aircraft and deployed combatants. The Navy is pursuing options to accelerate the fielding of an upgraded Fire Scout that will provide enhanced endurance and payload.

Question. Do you believe the Navy’s current timeline for fielding a program-of-record capability for sea-based ISR is appropriate?

Answer. The Navy has embarked upon a transition to a future ISR “Family of Systems.” The Family of Systems will allow the Navy to transition from a limited number of multi-intelligence manned platforms to a greater number of systems that are tailorable and scalable to meet Navy, Coalition and joint warfighter requirements. We are making significant investments of over $8 billion across fiscal year 2012–fiscal year 2016 to address the Navy’s future requirements, including funding for the following Unmanned Airborne Systems: Fire Scout ($1.1 billion, IOC 2012), Broad Area Maritime Surveillance ($3.9 billion, IOC 2015), Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike ($2.5 billion, IOC 2018), and Medium Range Maritime Unmanned Aerial System ($1.1 billion, IOC 2019). These platforms with appropriate sensors and processing will recapitalize the capabilities currently provided by EP-3 and Special Projects Aircraft and are programmed for delivery to the fleet prior to EP-3/SPA end of service life in the 2019–2020 timeframe.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Question. Some have argued that the Commander of SOCOM should have greater influence on special operations personnel management issues including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of Special Operations Forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., to change the role of the SOCOM Commander from “monitoring” the readiness of special operations personnel to “coordinating” with the services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect special operations forces.

What is your view of this proposal?

Answer. I do not believe the proposal is necessary. Navy already coordinates with SOCOM—typically through the component SOF commander to SOCOM—on a wide variety of personnel policy/actions such as individual selection, assignments, promotion precepts, and command selection. It is vital that a Service is vested with final decision authority when it comes to personnel and manpower management policies.

CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called for increased counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces. These missions have traditionally been within the purview of Special Operations Forces.

What actions, if any, do you believe need to be taken in order to allow special operations and general purpose forces to successfully share these missions in the future?

Answer. The Navy continues to emphasize coordination and integration, where appropriate, of Navy’s General Purpose Forces (GPF) and Special Operation Forces (SOF) for Counterterrorism (CT), Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions. These missions are shared in many parts of the world, whether using naval platforms for Afloat Forward Staging Bases in remote littoral areas, integrating sea-based ISR and fires support to augment SOF “find, fix, finish” operations, or using Naval Expeditionary Combat Command units to support SFA activities. We will continue to encourage increased coordination between GPF and SOF units in pre-deployment phases. Navy’s inherent multi-mission focus continues to give operational commanders options to mix and match capabilities to best meet their mission needs in forward areas.

Question. Are there certain mission areas that should be Reserved for special operations forces only?

Answer. Unconventional Warfare and Direct Action missions in Counterterrorism should stay predominantly within the purview of SOF.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM

Question. The budget request for defense Science and Technology (S&T) still falls short of the Defense Science Board’s recommended goal of dedicating 3 percent of the total defense budget to S&T. In particular, the Navy S&T program, especially the investment in long-term, innovative work which has been so successful in con-
fronting emerging threats, has declined significantly since the fiscal year 2006 request.

If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess whether the Navy is investing adequately in S&T programs?

Answer. Three key components exist to an effective S&T program: (1) a strong and focused investment in basic and early applied research to build the scientific foundation for future technologies, (2) an emphasis on key “game changing” initiatives that can provide disruptive technologies to the Navy and Marine Corps warfighter, and (3) an ability to transition S&T programs to the acquisition community and the Fleet. One way we assess the adequacy of our investments is to assess the balance of effort and output in each of these areas. A second metric is our success rate in transitioning viable and affordable S&T initiatives into the acquisition programs that make it to the Fleet.

Question. How would you assess the value and appropriate investment level for basic research programs?

Answer. Discovery and Invention (D&I) includes basic research (6.1) and early applied research (6.2) in areas with unique requirements essential to the naval mission and in areas that are undefined but hold promise for future application. D&I develops fundamental knowledge, provides the basis for future Navy/Marine Corps systems, sustains our scientist and engineer workforce, and contributes to long term DoN strategic goals. D&I constitutes the largest portion, approximately 40 percent, of the Navy’s $2 billion S&T investment. We believe this investment is appropriate for our needs.

TECHNICAL WORKFORCE

Question. A significant challenge facing the Navy today is an impending shortage of high quality scientific and engineering talent to work at Navy laboratories and technical centers.

In your view, what are the pros and cons of having active-duty Navy personnel trained and working as scientists and engineers within the Navy research and acquisition system?

Answer. The Department of the Navy’s technical workforce has been the reason for the Navy’s long-term technical success in developing and fielding advanced maritime systems. The current level of U.S. Navy talent is high—producing the world’s top-ranked government patent portfolio, according to the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Navy estimates that close to 50 percent of our S&T professionals will be retirement eligible by 2020. Attracting, recruiting, and retaining qualified scientific and engineering talent is critical to the Navy and the Nation’s future.

The use of uniformed military officers to fill potential shortfalls in our scientific community helps infuse an understanding of fleet operations and requirements, and strengthens the military-civilian partnership in our acquisition system; however, laboratories and technical centers are best served by a strong, stable cadre of civilian specialists who provide long-term, dedicated support in their highly specialized fields of study.

TEST AND EVALUATION ISSUES

Question. What do you see as the role of the developmental and operational test and evaluation communities with respect to rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other evolutionary acquisition processes?

Answer. The developmental and operational test community role in rapid acquisition is the same as that of traditional acquisition. Adequate testing is critical to assess performance of systems in operationally realistic environments. Testing informs decision makers of the capabilities and limitations of systems and how they perform relative to the acquisition program requirements or the operational need. The goal is to do this as early as possible and before systems are fielded. The only significant difference between “normal” acquisition processes and rapid acquisition or urgent needs is the flexibility and timeline for testing requirements and the oversight provided. In general, the test community has flexible policies which can be customized. A good example of this is the Quick Reaction Assessment on the Littoral Combat Ship, which allowed it to deploy earlier in support of Fleet needs.

Question. Are you satisfied with the Navy’s test and evaluation capabilities?

Answer. Yes. Current T&E capabilities are adequately funded to meet acquisition program requirements and Navy Ranges and Labs are considered key to assessing system performance. The Navy has a robust process to evaluate current and future T&E capability needs. Through the Tri-Service T&E Reliance process, we work with the other Services and the OSD Test Resource Management Center to review exist-
Question. In which areas, if any, do you feel the Navy should be developing new test and evaluation capabilities?
Answer. We continue to look at emerging technologies and the T&E capability needed to test them. New focus areas may require future capability investments as systems are developed and their T&E needs and challenges are defined. Requirements for new technologies and programs of record will be used to determine shortfalls and build investment plans for Navy T&E Improvement and Modernization funding. We also work with OSD and the other Services to develop Joint T&E capabilities, where appropriate.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. The Navy will play an important role in defending the Nation against the threat of long range ballistic missile attack and in defending allies, friends, and deployed forces against theater ballistic missile threats.

The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383) required the SECNAV to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the requirements for major combatant surface vessels with respect to ballistic missile defense (BMD). The Navy report stated that the Navy has established a requirement for fiscal year 2024 of having a force of 94 multi-mission large surface combatants (including BMD capability).

The Navy also delivered a copy of its 30-year shipbuilding plan to the committee. The Navy projects that they will achieve the 94-ship goal for BMD-capable ships in 2020 and 2021, although force levels will decline thereafter. Specifically, the Navy projects that they will have, at most, 92 BMD-capable ships in 2024 before declining to 65 ships in 2034.

Do you view BMD as a core Navy mission?
Answer. Navy BMD is fully consistent with our Maritime Strategy, enhancing deterrence, supporting sea control and the conditions for power projection, all of which is achieved through forward presence. The Geographic Combatant Commanders recognize the value of this capability and have created a high demand for these assets, as demonstrated through the validation of an increase in the large surface combatant requirement from 88 to 94 in the current planning environment.

Question. What options should the Navy be exploring to reduce the shortfall in meeting the stated requirement of having 94 BMD capable ships?
Answer. The Navy has already embarked on an effort to increase the production of BMD capable large surface combatants through the restart of the DDG–51 production line, promoting competition in DDG production to improve cost, setting the conditions for a future DDG multi-year program, and adding an additional DDG in fiscal year 2014. The Navy has also embarked on a focused effort to control costs in the Ohio Strategic Ballistic Submarine replacement program to minimize impacts on other elements of the shipbuilding plan.

ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH

Question. According to the latest data provided to the committee, the Navy remains on pace to exceed its 2011 authorized end strength and the problem is likely to continue into 2012, given the state of the economy and the fact that the Navy plans to reduce its active-duty end strength by 3,000 sailors in 2012. The other Services are facing similar problems as the Air Force is also overstrength and the Army and Marine Corps are planning significant force reductions. To address these issues, DOD is seeking force management tools that require congressional authorization.

What force management tools does the Navy need to address these issues, and which of these require congressional authorization?
Answer. Our strength projections show we will finish the fiscal year under our congressionally-authorized end strength. We have taken action to shape the force, such as reducing accessions, conducting a selective early retirement board and holding an enlisted retention board. High retention and low attrition continue to challenge our ability to keep a balanced force in terms of seniority, skill, and experience.

I support the administration’s fiscal year 2012 Defense Authorization Request that seeks approval for the following Force Management Authorities:

- Reinstatement of Enhanced Selective Early Retirement authority would expand the retirement eligible pool of officers to target to shape the force.
- Extension of Voluntary Separation Pay, to provide Secretaries of the military departments with temporary authority to continue using voluntary separation pay.
• Reinstatement of Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) to target officers with between 15 and 20 years of service for early retirement.
• Voluntary Retirement Incentive (VRI) to provide a voluntary retirement incentive to servicemembers with 20 and 29 years of active service, who would retire prior to their planned retirement dates without the need to force their retirement through involuntary means.
• Authority to Reduce Years of Service for Mandatory Retirement for certain Officers in the Grade of O–5 from 28 years to 25 years.
• Authority to Reduce Years of Service for Mandatory Retirement for certain Officers in the Grade of O–6 from 30 years to 27 years.

Question. In addition to Enlisted Retention Boards, what methods does the Navy plan to use to reduce active-duty end strength from 2012 through 2014?
Answer. The objective of our force management policies is to preserve a balanced force based on seniority, skill sets, reward our best performers, and position the force to meet future manpower requirements for our projected force structure. We assess our end strength requirements each year as part of the budget submission process. For fiscal year 2012, Perform to Serve, our centralized reenlistment process, will be augmented by a Selective Early Retirement Board and an Enlisted Retention Board to meet our projected end strength. As we have yet to determine our end strength levels for fiscal year 2013 and beyond, it is too early to determine our required end strength target or assess methods we might use should a reduction be necessary. I anticipate we will make those decisions coincident to our fiscal year 2013 budget request.

NAVY RESERVE

Question. What is your vision for the roles and missions of the Navy Reserve, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you seek to achieve with respect to the Navy Reserve's organization, end strength, and force structure?
Answer. The mission of the Navy Reserve is to provide strategic depth and deliver operational capabilities to our Navy and Marine Corps team and joint forces, from peace to war. Our vision for the Navy Reserve is to be a provider of choice for essential naval warfighting capabilities and expertise, strategically aligned with mission requirements and valued for its readiness, innovation, and agility to respond to any situation. Our Navy is carrying out this mission and working toward that vision.

In the decade since the September 11, 2001, attacks on our Nation, our Navy Reserve has answered the call. Going forward, we face a changing global security and economic environment, and we will ensure our Navy Reserve remains aligned with mission requirements. Because our Navy Reserve is ready, innovative, and agile, we can assign capabilities and missions to our Reserve component with confidence. Even as we reduce our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, I see a continued need and desire to keep our Navy Reserve engaged as a full partner in Navy’s Total Force. We will work together to ensure Navy’s Total Force, Active and Reserve, delivers the right capabilities to the Nation at the best value to the taxpayer.

Question. How do you anticipate the Navy will use new legislative authorities, if enacted, that would permit involuntary call-up of reservists for pre-planned, operational missions?
Answer. As we move forward into a post-Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) environment, the Navy Reserve should be a regular part of our worldwide deployment cycle, as well as performing the Navy’s predictable, part-time missions, where appropriate. The new authority would provide the ability to freely use the Reserve components as a rotational, operational force to augment the Active component forces in the execution of planned missions in support of the President’s national security strategy, as well as for operational missions. For instance, our Navy Reserve Seabees are currently part of the Navy’s Total Force mobilized deployment cycle. They mobilize in a one in five cycle, which allows the active duty Seabees to maintain a 1-in-3 cycle. This provides a cost-effective model for both components while maintaining sufficient strategic depth in this capability. Post-OCO, without this legislation, our ability to continue to use some of the Reserve component as an operational force, as we currently are and described above, would be severely inhibited.

JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nichols-required Joint Qualification System (JQS)?
Answer. When the JQS was implemented on 1 October 2007, it recognized the skills that support U.S. military response to national security threats, interagency coordination, combat operations, and humanitarian crises. It also accounts for the
intensity, environment, and duration or frequency of a joint experience. The JQS provides the opportunity to create and sustain the largest possible pool of fully-qualified and inherently joint leaders suitable for joint command and staff responsibilities in both the Active and Reserve components.

Question. Do you think additional changes in law or regulation are needed to respond to the unique career-progression needs of Navy officers?

Answer. The JQS effectively addresses the need of the military services to provide qualified Active and Reserve component personnel in support of joint missions. We will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of the JQS and will consider changes in law or regulations as required or needed. No changes are proposed at this time.

Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with becoming a Joint Qualified Officer, including links to promotion to general and flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and professional demands of Navy line officers?

Answer. We have made solid progress in policy initiatives linking career progression and joint management policies within Navy line officer career paths. While it is challenging to meet these joint requirements, especially for nuclear-trained aviators commanding our aircraft carriers, we continue to assign high-quality line officers to joint billets. Our goal is to sustain a cadre of officers who are fully qualified and inherently joint leaders, suitable for joint command and staff responsibilities. We are meeting our joint promotion objectives and filling our joint assignments and JPME seats with high-caliber officers.

Question. Do you think that career judge advocates in the Navy should be required to complete joint professional military requirements in connection with operational law requirements?

Answer. I believe there is value for judge advocates to obtain Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). I understand that the JAG Corps intends to formalize JPME guidance that would strongly encourage judge advocates to complete JPME Phase I as part of JAG Corps training requirements. The feedback the Judge Advocate General will receive from this initiative will inform any decision that will be made regarding the desire to formalize judge advocate participation in the joint officer management program and joint qualification system.

SELECTIVE EARLY RETIREMENT AUTHORITY

Question. The Navy has requested that Congress reinstate enhanced authority for selective early retirement.

What changes in existing law, if any, regarding selective early retirement, are needed in your view?

Answer. Although Navy prefers to utilize voluntary force shaping methods before resorting to use of involuntary Selective Early Retirement (SER), we have determined that its employment will be necessary in fiscal year 2012 and beyond as Navy transforms to meet future warfighting requirements. Accordingly, Navy believes that Selective Early Retirement authority should be extended until December 2018 and that enhanced authority should:

• permit consideration of members for early retirement more than once in any 5-year period;
• permit consideration for officers in the grade of O–5 who have failed to select for promotion one time (rather than two or more times); and
• permit selective early retirement of officers in the grade of O–6 with greater than 2 years time in grade.

INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES

Question. The Navy continues to support non-traditional requirements through the use of Individual augmentees (IAs). Admiral Roughead, in his written testimony for the Navy Posture Hearing earlier this year, stated that there were, at that time, more than 14,000 sailors deployed in the CENTCOM Area of Operations on the ground, with some significant portion of these sailors serving as IAs.

Will the Navy continue to be able to support these non-traditional assignments as it draws down its end strength?

Answer. Properly manning our ships, squadrons and submarines while simultaneously supporting Overseas Combat Operations (OCO) and meeting end strength limits is increasingly challenging. Previous manpower programming provided additional end strength authorizations to support the OCO IA demand. In anticipation of the drawdown of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy has phased out Non-Core and Adaptive Core billets from the baseline budget request, and is no longer authorized OCO-related supplemental end strength. In order to properly man our units, this will require the Navy to limit the number of sailors and officers it sends on OCO IA assignments in coming years.
**Question.** What are the criteria being applied to determine which Active and Reserve officers and enlisted personnel are assigned duty as IAs?

**Answer.** The Navy provides over half of its IA support in core skill areas, such as cargo handling, airlift support, and SeaBees. Navy also provides sailors for provincial reconstruction, detainee operations, civil affairs, customs inspection, and a variety of other “non-core” missions. The joint sourcing process to meet both “core” and “non-core” requirements is deliberate and is currently focused on reducing IA requirements without unduly increasing the risk to mission success.

**Question.** How do these assignments impact Navy readiness?

**Answer.** Every sailor on an OCO IA assignment is a sailor away from his or her primary duty station. This has a direct impact on the manning of our operational units and ultimately could degrade readiness. Sailors on Non-Core OCO IA assignments are not maintaining their primary, or core Navy skill sets, potentially degrading operational and material readiness. This requires a balance when considering IA assignments for our sailors so that we do not disadvantage them.

**Question.** What benefit, if any, inures to the Navy as a result of these assignments?

**Answer.** Sailors and officers who serve on OCO IA assignments gain valuable leadership skills and experience in joint, interagency, and nontraditional Navy skills. Many OCO IA assignments also provide coalition experience that further enhance professional skills and adaptability.

**RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE**

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of the Navy Reserve as an Operational Reserve, as opposed to its longstanding traditional role as a Strategic Reserve?

**Answer.** The Navy Reserve is doing a magnificent job in both their operational and strategic roles. These missions are not mutually exclusive. The Navy Reserve can operate anywhere along the spectrum from strategic to operational, and as long as commanders have assured access to their Reserve component sailors, we can confidently assign missions to the Navy Reserve where it makes operational and fiscal sense.

**Question.** In your view, what are the major challenges to maintaining and enhancing the Navy Reserve as a relevant and capable Operational Reserve?

**Answer.** Our Navy Reserve is relevant and capable today because we have invested in our people and our equipment, we have assigned them real and meaningful work, and we have honored the support of our families and our employers. In the future, we need to ensure our sailors continue to have the training and equipment they need to maintain their readiness. Much of the Reserve’s valuable training and operational support is funded with Active Duty for Training (ADT) dollars. We must maintain an appropriate level of ADT funding to ensure our sailors are a relevant and capable force. Obtaining congressional legislation allowing assured access of the Navy Reserve for routine deployments would further enhance the Reserve as a relevant and capable operational force.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the optimal role for the Reserve component forces in meeting combat missions?

**Answer.** The optimal role for the Reserve component is as a partner in the Navy Total Force, where we view missions in terms of capabilities first, and then decide where the capability should reside. For some capabilities, the Navy Reserve mirrors the Active component, in some cases the Navy Reserve complements the Active component, and in others, the Active component and the Reserve component augment each other.

**Question.** In your view, should DOD assign Homeland defense or any other global or domestic civil support missions exclusively to the Reserves?

**Answer.** We look at each mission from a Total Force perspective and decide what capabilities are needed, how often we need them, and what component is best suited to carry them out. As DOD assigns Navy to Homeland defense or domestic civil support missions, Navy will evaluate which component can best deliver those capabilities.

**Question.** In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1 year mobilized to 5 years at home affect the viability and sustainability of the All-Volunteer Reserve Force?

**Answer.** We view predictability as a key element of a viable and sustainable All-Volunteer Reserve Force. With predictability and a 1-in-5 dwell ratio, we can maintain the support of the three elements that make our Navy Reserve strong: sailors, families, and employers.
Question. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since World War II. Across all of the Services, numerous problems arose in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening and medical readiness monitoring, errors caused by antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and lack of access to members of the Individual Ready Reserve. In the Reserve components, force management policies and systems have been characterized in the past as “inefficient and rigid” and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.

What is your assessment of advances made in improving Navy Reserve mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems still exist?

Answer. The Reserve Force has seen improvements in the planning and notification of sailors selected to mobilize. Internally, the Reserves have leveraged technology for process improvements via the Ready Mob Pool, Volunteer Portal, IA Portal and a Single Source Deployability metric.

Sailor notification of impending mobilization has greatly improved from an average of 60 days in 2009 to 140 days (orders in hand) as of July 2011. The longer notification time directly translates into needed time for Navy families to plan for impending mobilizations and for our sailors to individually prepare themselves medically, physically, and administratively. This improvement is seen in the significant lowering of the administrative mobilization processing fall-out rate from 40 percent to 15 percent of cancellations. It also allows employers more time to prepare for mobilized employees and eases tension in the workplace.

The Navy Reserve has made a concerted effort to strengthen all phases of the deployment cycle to take the best possible care of sailors and their families. Predeployment Family Readiness Conferences, Command Individual Augmentee Coordinators (a Total Force program), Returning Warrior Workshops, the Psychological Health Outreach Program, and the Navy’s Family Readiness programs minimize risk to Navy missions supported by Navy Reserve sailors. These programs enable servicemembers to focus on the mission by preparing them before, during, and after deployment, and reassuring them that their families are being cared for while they are away.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the sufficiency of current Reserve Force management policies?

Answer. Management policies as they relate to mobilization are sufficient. Colocation of Reserve Forces Command with Fleet Forces in Norfolk, VA, following the 2005 BRAC has improved integration and facilitated constant and consistent communications. The joint working space of the Individual Augmentee Portal allows for greater notification of requirements. Coupled with the increased volunteer rate, these have improved the ability to provide the Reserve sailor increased notification of impending mobilization to allow for improved preparation from individual readiness to family preparedness.

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?

Answer. Improvements in overall Reserve Force notification time has allowed Reserve sailors to seek additional resources earlier, which has improved the readiness of the Reserve Force.

Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities for the mobilization of members of the Reserve component?

Answer. Yes. The Reserve component has been used as a rotational, operational force during the past 10 years. DOD expects that there will be a continuing military requirement to augment the Active component to meet the force requirements of the combatant commanders as we execute the President’s national security strategy. Since September 11, 2001, access to the Reserve component has been assured via Presidential action that initially invoked, and has annually extended, a declaration of national emergency that enables the use of the partial mobilization authority detailed in 10 U.S.C. 12302.

DOD has proposed an amendment to section 12304 of title 10, U.S.C., which would enable the President to access the Reserve component for all missions to support his national security strategy, not just operational missions, weapons of mass destruction scenarios, and terrorist threats or attacks.

Question. Is the Navy Reserve currently meeting the dwell-time ration goal of 5 years at home for every year deployed?
Answer. Yes. The Navy Reserve has no communities that are required to involuntarily mobilize any Reserve sailors inside a 1-to-5 dwell ratio. Between new accessions, volunteers and Navy Reserve sailors completing their dwell period, the Navy Reserve has had the necessary inventory to meet all missions assigned without violating the 1-to-5 dwell period.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

Question. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has found that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war was problematic, and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning is not feasible. What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the Navy?

Answer. The Navy has developed and implemented new objectives for its IRR, as well as changed the face of the current IRR population to provide improved training, manning, accountability and valuable support to gaining commands worldwide. During the past couple of years, we have strived to streamline the IRR by discharging sailors not able to mobilize and improving access to those members who remain qualified for mobilization and show a continued interest to serve.

Question. What are your views on the proper role of the IRR in Navy force management planning?

Answer. The role of the IRR is and should be a Strategic Reserve of members who are a valuable resource pool of trained veterans that can be mobilized individually or with an augmented Selected Reserve unit with minimal preparation.

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, do you foresee making to the Navy’s IRR recall policy?

Answer. The Navy has been working for the past 2 years to sustain a ready pool of medically, physically, and training-ready IRR sailors in high demand, low supply skill sets. This right-sizing effort has paid tremendous dividends with the increased demand for IRR support staff at multiple gaining commands worldwide with noticeable results. Also, Navy has recently switched from physical musters of the IRR to completely virtual musters. We have found that the benefits of a physical muster were marginal when compared with the cost and manpower required to administer them.

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the system in place for members in the IRR receiving orders to active duty to request a delay or exemption for that activation, including the procedures in place for appealing a denial of that request?

Answer. Navy has not involuntarily mobilized members from the IRR and currently has no plans to do so. Should we change course with regard to this policy, we have the tools in place to fairly and efficiently recall our IRR sailors. The current delay or exemption process utilized for Selected Reserve sailors could be expanded to include IRR members.

MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF NAVY RESERVE PERSONNEL

Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee, and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for improved policy oversight and accountability. If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Navy Reserve?

Answer. In the past 2 fiscal years, Navy has exceeded DOD readiness standards for fully and partially ready Reserve component workforce. We attribute our improved readiness status to process improvements in policy implementation and legislative changes. Examples including: (1) improved access to Navy Military Treatment Facilities, satellite clinics, Navy Operational Support Centers and Community healthcare via Reserve Health Readiness Program (RHRP) Point of Service to complete individual medical/dental screening requirements; (2) access to TRICARE Standard 6 months pre- and post-deployment has also contributed to a continuum of available clinical services for our RC sailors identified for mobilization; and (3) implementation of TRICARE Reserve Select, an affordable health plan option available to our selected reservists, enabling them to obtain required medical and dental services that have contributed to our high level of overall medical and dental readiness.

If confirmed, ensuring timely and accurate medical and dental readiness of our Reserve component will remain a priority for me and Navy leadership. Moving forward, we will continue to focus on improvements in readiness reporting including use of Medical Reserve Readiness System (MRRS) as a single source capturing Medical/Dental Readiness indicators. We will also be assessing opportunities in developing interoperability capabilities that will standardize internal readiness processes.
Question. How would you improve upon the Navy's ability to produce a healthy and fit Navy Reserve?
Answer. Our sailors must be healthy, fit and mission capable. A healthy and fit Navy Reserve Force is not negotiable. We will continuously improve our screening process and work to ensure compliance with current individual medical readiness policies (including obtaining required periodic health assessments). Our focus will continue to be one of health promotion and disease prevention.

NAVY POLICIES REGARDING DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

Question. What is your understanding of the Navy's policy with respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of sailors who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you agree with this policy?
Answer. Navy's policy on drug abuse is "zero tolerance." Navy members determined to be using, possessing, promoting, manufacturing, or distributing drugs and/or drug abuse paraphernalia shall be disciplined as appropriate and processed for Administrative Separation. Members diagnosed as drug dependent shall be offered treatment prior to separation. I support this policy to preserve troop strength and mission readiness.

Question. What is your understanding of the Navy's policy with respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of sailors who have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?
Answer. Our policies are sufficiently permissive to allow commanders the opportunity to assist servicemembers with treatment and recovery for both illegal drug use and alcohol abuse. Members diagnosed as drug dependent shall be offered treatment prior to separation. Commanding officers have the discretion to retain members determined to have abused alcohol. The separation authority may, under unusual circumstances, forward cases of illegal drug use or abuse of prescription drugs to Commander, Navy Personnel Command for retention. I agree that Navy policies ensure that the deterrence benefit of disciplinary action is balanced with—but not sacrificed to—the need to appropriately provide treatment and support.

Question. What measures are being taken to improve the Navy's performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?
Answer. Navy has taken an integrated approach across all of our sailor programs to emphasize positive lifestyle choices including physical and mental fitness, nutrition, healthy personal relationships, and alcohol free entertainment opportunities. Navy also emphasizes the significant negative outcomes associated with drug and alcohol abuse such as suicide, domestic abuse, sexual assault and other damaging personal and professional events.

RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. The DOD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed that "DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization" and recommended that the policy be updated.
Has the Navy revised its policy regarding religious accommodation since the issuance of this report?
Answer. No. We have coordinated with DOD and other Services on a policy that will apply uniformly across all the Services. Once we receive an updated DOD policy, we will work with the SECNAV to update our standing policy.

Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the Navy?
Answer. No. I expect that all Navy personnel—both uniformed and civilian—will act professionally and treat their shipmates with dignity and respect. The Navy has a zero tolerance policy for harassment. All commanders and commanding officers routinely reiterate this policy to their personnel and closely monitor their commands for potential issues such as these.

Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the Navy?

Answer. I do not believe new strategies are required beyond reinforcement of existing policies, guidelines, and standards that emphasize dignity and respect for all.

Question. Do Navy policies regarding religious practices in the military accommodate, where appropriate, religious practices that require adherents to wear particular forms of dress or other articles with religious significance?

Answer. Current Department of the Navy policy is to accommodate the doctrinal or traditional observances of the religious faith practiced by individual members when these doctrines or observances will not have an adverse impact on military readiness, individual or unit readiness, unit cohesion, health, safety, discipline or mission accomplishment. Accommodation of a servicemember's religious practices cannot be guaranteed at all times and is subject to military necessity. Determination of necessity rests entirely with the commanding officer.

When approved by competent military authority, religious apparel not visible or otherwise apparent may be worn with the uniform, provided it does not interfere with the performance of the member's military duties or interfere with the proper wearing of any authorized article of the uniform. Visible items of religious apparel will be authorized for wear with the uniform, except when the item is not neat and conservative (i.e. discrete, tidy and not dissonant or showy in style, size, design, brightness or color), its wearing will interfere with the performance of the member's military duties, or is specifically prohibited if the item impairs the safe and effective operation of weapons, military equipment or machinery; poses a health or safety hazard to the wearer or others; interfere with the wearing or proper functioning of special or protective clothing or equipment (e.g. helmets, flak jackets, flight suits, camouflage uniforms, gas masks, wet suits, and crash and rescue equipment). Furthermore, visible items of religious apparel shall not be worn while wearing historical or ceremonial uniforms; participating in review formations, parades, honor or color guards and similar ceremonial details and functions.

Question. In your opinion, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?

Answer. Yes. Title 10 § 6031 says, “An officer in the Chaplain Corps may conduct public worship according to the manner and forms of the church of which he is a member.” Navy policy on public worship as set forth in SECNAVINST 1730.7D supports this Title 10 guarantee, i.e. “a chaplain may conduct divine services ‘according to the manner and forms’ of his or her Religious Organization.” When inviting a chaplain to deliver religious elements such as prayer at a command function outside of public worship, a commander shall not compel the chaplain to pray in a way that is inconsistent with the tenets of his or her faith and the chaplain may choose not to participate without suffering adverse consequence.

When religious elements are incorporated in command functions outside of public worship, such as changes of command, where all members of the command are required to be present, chaplains are instructed to be sensitive to the needs of the total audience.

Question. Current policy in DOD gives discretion to military leaders to decide whether requests to waive uniform and appearance standards should be granted based on religious beliefs. The DOD has submitted a legislative proposal that would clearly exempt the armed services from the requirements of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).

Do you believe that the Navy needs to be exempted from the strictures of RFRA? If so, why?
Answer. Our current policy provides our commanders adequate ability to provide religious accommodation and is supported. I am aware of this legislative proposal, but have not had the opportunity to assess the need for a change to our current policy.

SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED, INJURED, AND ILL SAILORS

Question. Wounded servicemembers from Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from the Navy for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007 illustrated, all of the Services were not adequately prepared to meet the needs of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain.

In your view, what were the most critical shortcomings in warrior care since 2001 in the Navy?

Answer. We have no higher priority than caring for Wounded, Ill and Injured shipmates. I believe we have made significant improvements in the care for our Wounded Warriors and their families; yet all of us remain concerned about the cumulative effects of stress, worry and anxiety due to a decade-long conflict on our sailors and their families. I also understand that preserving the psychological health of personnel is one of the greatest challenges we face today. We are learning more about injuries such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury and ensuring our sailors have access to the best treatment available to support their recovery. Fortunately, we are seeing historically unprecedented survival rates and dramatic innovations in the combat casualty care on the battlefield. However, we, like the other Services, also are seeing more complex battle injuries as our personnel return to heal. We must continue to develop our systems of support and recovery for our sailors and families.

Question. What is your assessment of the Navy’s response?

Answer. The Navy has made significant progress in developing programs that support the treatment, recovery and reintegration of our wounded sailors and their families. Our medical facilities are providing world-class care—and I am reminded of this each time I visit our wounded personnel. Our programs of support are in place and maturing as we adapt to the needs of our patients. Throughout the Fleet, we have developed an integrated health promotion and prevention program, Operational Stress Control, to help build resiliency at all levels. We have implemented targeted programs such as Families OverComing Under Stress (FOCUS), Returning Warrior Workshops and Psychological Health Outreach Program to ensure both our Active and Reserve component personnel and their families have access to support programs.

Question. How does the Navy provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service and transition assistance to help sailors who are disabled find rewarding employment prior to separation?

Answer. We recognize how important it is for our injured sailors to heal in body, mind and spirit and we honor our commitment to provide the support and resources to aid in their recovery and transition. We have significantly increased our medical case management resources at our treatment facilities to help our wounded, ill and injured personnel not only recover but also assist in the coordination of their care. These efforts extend to helping our sailors transition their medical care to the Veterans Administration or TRICARE networks/civilian clinician to provide better care and seamless service and support. Our Navy Safe Harbor program has responsibility for coordinating the non-medical care of wounded, ill, and injured sailors and their families. This program provides exceptional, individually-tailored assistance to our wounded, ill, and injured for the duration of their lives. We have increased our support for community reintegration through the Anchor Program, which pairs members with volunteer Reserve component sailors in their communities, and initiated the Adaptive Athletics Program, designed to support long-term recovery and rehabilitation through whole-body training and education. Additionally, we signed Memoranda of Agreement with the Departments of Labor and Veterans Administration to ensure greater access to employment services and support programs.

Question. How effective, in your view, are those programs?

Answer. I am pleased with the progress and effectiveness of all these programs. Assessing their efficacy, adapting to the needs of our personnel and their families and implementing best practices will remain priorities as we move forward. We are engaged and committed to ensuring resources will be in place to meet our commitments to sailors and their families.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Navy’s support for wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

Answer. We are grateful to the support that Congress has provided in this important area. I remain confident we have good programs in place that will continue to mature and improve. If confirmed, I will continue to build on the progress we have made within the Navy and our collaborative engagements with the VA and other Federal and private sector partners.

Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program have been established to improve processing of servicemembers.

What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the Integrated DES (IDES)?

Answer. The IDES provides the process and administrative framework necessary to fulfill the requirements of Title 10 U.S.C., Chapter 61. Designed to function within existing laws, IDES leverages military core competencies to determine servicemember fitness for continued service via the Medical Evaluation Board and Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) processes. Under IDES protocols, the Veterans Administration leverages their core competencies to render the disability rating percentages needed to establish both title 10 and title 38 disability compensation. IDES brings these core competencies together to minimize duplicative burdens on the member and the departments while maximizing support through the seamless availability of post-service benefits for our wounded, ill, or injured (WII).

While the IDES process delivers many significant improvements over the Legacy DES, it does not provide the desired end-state for disability processing because it takes too long to process servicemembers (avg 400 days). Navy supports ongoing OSD and VA efforts to compress the processing down to a more efficient and acceptable duration that limits undesirable personnel and operational impacts.

Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?

Answer. A principle focus for change must be on reducing the amount of time consumed by the IDES process without affecting the quality of support to our WII servicemembers. We continue to support WII servicemembers and our mission needs by supporting process design changes in IDES that are under consideration, adequately resourcing capabilities such as PEB liaison officers at medical treatment facilities, and better leveraging capabilities that exist within Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA).

NON-WORLDWIDE DEPLOYABLE SAILORS AND DISABILITY EVALUATION

Question. The Navy has used involuntary administrative separation for unsuitability as a means to remove from Active Duty sailors with medical conditions who were found fit for duty by physical evaluation boards. Previous Navy policies authorized denial of re-enlistment of sailors considered to be non-worldwide deployable, even if they had been found fit for duty, or had not been evaluated in the disability evaluation system.

What is current Navy policy regarding the retention of sailors who are non-worldwide deployable due to physical or medical conditions?

Answer. Section 534 of NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 restricts the involuntary administrative separation of personnel found fit by a Physical Evaluation Board if later found unsuitable due to the inability to deploy for the same medical condition. We are complying with the new law. SECNAV policy is that those retained on active duty after a finding of “fit” should not be denied reenlistment or other career progression simply because of the finding. These individuals shall receive the same opportunity to compete with other sailors for reenlistment and promotion.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK DON’T TELL” POLICY.

Question. The President, Secretary of Defense, and the CJCS have certified to Congress that repeal of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell homosexual conduct policy will not harm military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, or recruiting and retention. The statute underlying the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy will be repealed on September 20, 2011, 60 days from the date of this certification.

Do you support the repeal of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Policy?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, do you foresee any problems with implementing a repeal of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy in the Navy?

Answer. No.
Question. What effect, if any, do you anticipate the repeal will have on readiness and discipline in the Navy?

Answer. I have every confidence that the men and women of the U.S. Navy, with their character, discipline, and decency, will successfully implement this change in the law and continue to fulfill the U.S. Navy’s mission with the utmost professionalism. As always, strong leadership remains essential to a successful transition. Navy leaders will continue to set a positive tone, create an inclusive and respectful work environment, and enforce our high standards of conduct as we serve the Nation.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Navy has in place on ships, overseas, and in CONUS locations to offer victims of sexual assaults the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?

Answer. Sexual assault is a criminal act that has far-reaching consequences for all involved. It violates the Navy ethos, corrodes morale, undermines trust, and will not be tolerated. A DOD Safe Help line number is available to all and widely posted in command spaces and websites to ensure immediate “hotline” support. Our resources and programs are distributed so that all deployable Navy units have Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Victim Advocates (VAs) and SAPR Command Points of Contact (POCs) assigned. This ensures continuity of victim support regardless of whether the unit is shore based or at sea. Deployed units have ready access to medical, investigative and legal support, and the unit VAs have reachback to a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC).

To ensure resource and program availability in a joint environment, joint protocols have been developed and joint SARCs meet regularly to outline, understand and mitigate differences in SAPR program requirements. The key is to ensure standardized coordination of SAPR responses across all Services.

Individual Augmentees (IAs) receive pre-deployment briefings from IA Support/Deployment Specialists at the Fleet and Family Support Centers (FFSC) that include specific contacts for both sexual assault reporting options.

Question. What is your view of the steps the Navy has taken to prevent sexual assaults?

Answer. While significant progress has been made to date, we are continuing to implement further enhancements to contribute to ongoing efforts to eliminate sexual assault from the Navy:

• We are implementing Bystander Intervention training to teach sailors how to safely and effectively intervene to prevent sexual assault and other negative behaviors.
• Sexual Assault Response Coordinators have been provided 2 full days of training to better equip them in the collection of data and standardized training for prevention.
• Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy have implemented specialized training to more effectively investigate and prosecute sexual assault cases.
• We are conducting a pilot prevention program, developed in collaboration with national experts, which uses multiple prevention modalities based on local demographics and circumstances. Rigorous pre- and post-pilot survey data will show the efficacy of these modalities and determine applicability to other locations.

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Navy has in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Answer. Navy provides robust training for investigators and prosecutors of sexual assaults. All NCIS agents are trained to be “first responders” to sexual assaults and other criminal activity, and attend courses that combine prosecutors and investigators in a shared environment that enhances cross discipline understanding. NCIS agents have recently attended the U.S. Army’s advanced course on sexual assault investigative techniques and several other seminars and courses taught by nationally recognized experts.

Members of Navy’s Judge Advocate General Corps attend a course on litigating sexual assault at Naval Justice School. JAGs also attend a course on prosecuting alcohol facilitated sexual assaults, prosecuting complex cases (which includes a section on Victim Witness Assistance Program). Navy has hired two nationally recognized experts on adult and child sexual assault and child physical abuse litigation to provide field-level legal training and case consultation, and provide policy support for the Navy SAPR program.
Question. Do you consider the Navy’s sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

Answer. Navy’s policies and execution of confidential reporting (Restricted Reports) are effective. We continue to emphasize to sailors, SAPR stakeholders and leadership, the policy and importance of a restricted reporting option. A 2010 SAPR Quick Poll indicated that nearly 92 percent of respondents are aware victims can report sexual assault without command notification (Restricted Reporting).

Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?

Answer. Close-quarters environments such as controlled basic training educational environments and briggs for “incarcerated” sailors provide a challenge with regards to confidential reporting. Solutions to address these situations are being investigated. California state law has also caused confusion due to state-mandated reporting for all medical personnel. Our California-based SARCs continue to educate leaders and responders to ensure compliance with policy and victim privacy when considering the “restricted” reporting option.

Question. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders in the Navy in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?

Answer. Preventing sexual assaults is the job of all Navy leadership. It mandates a synergistic approach by military and civilian leaders. The Department of the Navy established a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office and Director in 2009 to serve as the principal point of accountability for all sexual assault matters, program support, and oversight. From the SECNAV on down, we are committed to eliminating sexual assault from our ranks. A key to success is the understanding and engagement by unit level leaders.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure senior management level direction and oversight of Navy efforts on sexual assault prevention and response?

Answer. At a minimum, I intend to maintain strong and viable Family support programs by ensuring adequate oversight and sufficient funding. I will remain open to initiatives designed to further evolve existing programs and look for innovative ways to help our sailors and families become more resilient and ready to meet the enduring demand for Navy forces.

FAMILY SUPPORT

Question. Sailors and their families in both the Active and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations that go with them.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for sailors and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

Answer. Family Readiness is critical to Fleet readiness and sailor retention. If confirmed, I intend to continue supporting Navy families with a variety of institutionalized programs and resources to meet their needs. Our existing programs cover everything from Exceptional Family Members and Respite care to deployment preparedness, ensuring our sailors and their families are cared for while deployed.

Navy will continue to pursue opportunities to optimize services, including counseling, family and youth development programs, and deployment readiness to ensure our sailors continue to have access to the necessary resources that enable readiness while minimizing stress and impact to their loved ones at home.

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and declining O&M budgets?

Answer. Navy will preserve the current Family Readiness budget plan and has realigned funding from supplemental requests and overseas contingency funds to our baseline budget requests. We have consolidated oversight to ensure all Family Readiness programs are adequately sustained and fully resourced as required.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Navy Reserve families related to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

Answer. Navy supports geographically isolated servicemembers and their families through the nearest DOD facility whether a Navy Operational Support Center or other sister service installation. If a support site is not conveniently located nearby, then Navy provides remote support through our network of FFSCs and Military OneSource.
In support of Individual Augmentee (IA) spouses and family members, FFSCs have developed programs tailored to their specific needs, such as IA Family Handbook, Deployment Readiness Briefs, IA Family Discussion, Family Connection Newsletter and Families of Warriors in Transition Homecoming Program, and Active and Reserve Command IA Coordinators (CIAC), whose primary responsibility is to serve as the Navy liaison to IA sailors and families.

**Question.** If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to enhance family support?

**Answer.** At a minimum, I intend to maintain strong and viable family support programs by ensuring adequate oversight and sufficient funding. I will remain open to initiatives designed to further evolve existing programs and look for innovative ways to help our sailors and families become more resilient and ready to meet the enduring demand for Navy forces.

**SUICIDE PREVENTION AND MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES**

**Question.** The numbers of suicides in each of the Services has increased in recent years. In addition, mental health surveys conducted in theater are showing declines in individual morale and increases in mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced multiple deployments.

In your view, are Navy suicide prevention and resiliency programs adequate to help prevent suicides both in homeports and on deployment, and to increase the resiliency of sailors and their families?

**Answer.** Yes. I am committed to doing everything possible to prevent the tragedy of suicide and provide our sailors, families, and leaders with the tools, training, and environment to allow them to successfully navigate the stress of Navy life and thrive personally and professionally. Within the past 6 months, Navy has significantly increased staffing and resources devoted to supporting Navy suicide prevention program and institutionalizing resilience building both ashore and within the Fleet. Resilience cannot be built in a day. It will require time to fully take root and grow. As our efforts continue to mature, ongoing assessment will guide further improvement.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to Navy personnel on deployment, and to their families upon return to home station?

**Answer.** Navy is committed to fostering a culture that promotes resilience and wellness and empowers our leaders to ensure the health and readiness of our sailors and families. Our Psychological Health program supports the prevention, diagnosis, mitigation, treatment, and rehabilitation of post-traumatic stress disorder, and other mental health conditions, including planning for the seamless transition of such members throughout the recovery and reintegration process.

Through active leadership, we are also working to reduce the stigma associated with seeking help. We have increased the size of our mental health workforce and continue to focus on recruiting and retention of our mental health providers. Our priority is ensuring we have the service and support capabilities for prevention and early intervention available where and when it is needed, including in operational environments. Embedded mental health providers provide coordinated, comprehensive primary and secondary prevention efforts throughout the deployment cycle, focusing on resilience training and stress reduction. In order to understand the behavioral health needs of our sailors serving in theatre, we deployed a Mobile Care Team to administer the Behavioral Health Needs Assessment Survey which allows real-time surveillance and intervention as needed.

If confirmed, I will continue to ensure we have the proper number of mental health providers in place to address the medical, physical, psychological, and family readiness needs of our sailors and their families.

**MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION**

**Question.** Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including Active Duty and Reserve personnel, and their eligible family members.

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Navy MWR programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?

**Answer.** The major challenges facing MWR are maintaining adequate funding, repairing or replacing aging infrastructure, and dealing with increases in certain core services, particularly in the area of child and youth programs. We have and will continue to take aggressive actions to address these challenges. In the area
958

of child and youth programs, for example, Navy has funded dozens of new Child Development Centers that, by the end of fiscal year 2012, will increase capacity by over 7,000 spaces. When these centers are completed, we will have almost entirely eliminated unmet demand for child care spaces.

I believe we should continue to expand our stable of partners in the private and public sector off base as we build on our past track record of success in ensuring Navy MWR programs measure up to the needs of our sailors and their families.

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. In the past year, the Navy has opened service on submarines to women, and the issue of the appropriate role of women in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.

What is the status on the implementation of the decision to allow service by women on submarines?

Answer. In 2010, 18 female officers began their submarine officer pipeline training, which consists of nuclear power school, prototype training and the submarine officer basic course. Two officers deferred their training to complete follow-on graduate studies. The first 16 officers will complete training and report to their submarines between November 2011 and February 2012. Eight female warfare-qualified supply officers have been selected to serve as department heads to provide senior female mentoring. We have applied lessons learned from integration of women in surface combatants and aviation squadrons in the mid-1990s and have incorporated those into our comprehensive women in submarines integration plan.

What challenges still exist and what proactive measures are submarine force leaders taking to enhance the success of female officers assigned to submarine duty?

Answer. Submarine crews that are slated to be integrated will receive appropriate training on fraternization, berthing/privacy requirements, Navy’s Equal Opportunity policy, prevention of sexual harassment, and sexual assault and rape prevention. Executive level training will ensure that commanding officers, executive officers and chiefs of the boat are prepared to lead an integrated crew. Independent Duty Corpsman assigned to each submarine to be integrated will receive refresher training on medical situations unique to women. A Command Climate Survey will be conducted on each crew prior to certification and again about 6 months after integration to evaluate and address any unanticipated concerns and challenges that may arise.

Do you believe additional specialties should be eligible for service by female sailors?

Answer. Navy continues to examine opportunities for additional specialties for female sailors. Navy modified its policy in 2007 to allow the temporary assignment of women to units normally closed if the unit is not expected to conduct a combat mission during the period of temporary duty. Since that time the Navy Special Warfare (NSW) Command has deployed 10 to 15 females to the CENTCOM region with each NSW Squadron for support operations (intelligence, administrative, legal, information technology, and construction ratings). From 2008 through the present, certain NSW operational successes have been directly related to the rapport Navy females have been able to develop with both indigenous women and men. Leveraging unique cultural skills of women, NSW has been able to gain access, develop key relationships, calm tense situations, and locate individuals of interest.

Do you believe any changes are needed or warranted in current assignment policies regarding women?

Answer. At present, the Navy’s assignment policies for women are in the best interest of the naval service, accomplished per current Secretary of Defense guidelines, and are consistent with the principles of fairness and equal opportunity. However, we continue to evaluate opening other opportunities as appropriate. As part of our current review of restrictions on women in the Navy, we have identified a number of medical and chaplain support billets assigned to Marine Corps units that could potentially be opened to women.

PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel, and related entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget. Secretary Panetta has supported a comprehensive review of military compensation, saying “everything must be on the table,” including military retirement.

What percentage of the annual Navy budget from 2011 to 2015 is devoted to personnel costs?

Answer. The percentage of the annual Navy budget, from 2011 to 2015, devoted to Active and Reserve military personnel costs is approximately 23 percent. This is
comprised of the Military Personnel, Navy (MPN); and Reserve Personnel, Navy (RPN) payments to the Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund (MERHCF).

**Question.** Do you believe the time is right to begin discussing reform of military compensation and retirement benefits?

**Answer.** I support Secretary Panetta’s call for a comprehensive review of military compensation, including the retirement benefit. If confirmed, I will support the Navy’s continued participation in ongoing efforts to assess the cost, value and effectiveness of all parts of the military compensation system.

**Question.** Other than reducing Navy end strength, what actions do you believe can be taken by DOD and Navy leaders to control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?

**Answer.** Reviews of military compensation are currently ongoing. I will use the results of these reviews to inform my judgments.

**MILITARY RETIREMENT**

**Question.** The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more resembles the benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement System than the current military retirement benefit; increasing TRICARE fees for retirees; and the adoption of dependent care and flexible spending accounts for servicemembers. Both Secretary Gates and Secretary Panetta have called for a comprehensive review of the military retirement benefit.

While it is often said that the military retirement benefit encourages retention after the 10-year point, do you believe it provides any significant boost to recruitment? Do 17 and 18 year olds care about the military retirement benefit when deciding to enlist?

**Answer.** The current retirement benefit is better suited to enhance retention than to serve as an enlistment tool. While a generous retirement benefit relative to the private sector is a good recruiting point, the retirement benefit is not at the top of the list of things that attract new recruits to the Navy. During a recent poll of new recruits, military retirement ranked seventh among reasons for joining.

**Question.** How might the retirement benefit be modernized to reflect the needs of a new generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost of the government?

**Answer.** The overwhelming majority of those who enter military service never qualify for the 20 year military retirement, therefore, many servicemembers would benefit from some form of a defined contribution plan that offered vesting short of a full military career. Navy has not yet studied this option well enough to define how certain contribution plans might impact recruitment and retention.

**JUDGE ADVOCATE ISSUES**

**Question.** In December 2010, the DOD Inspector General completed an evaluation of post-trial reviews of courts-martial within the Department of the Navy—triggered in part by the egregious case of United States v. Foster—documenting the persistence of serious post-trial processing problems within the Navy and Marine Corps for at least two decades.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to address the post-trial processing issues identified by the DOD Inspector General?

**Answer.** I am confident that given the improvements in structure, operating procedures, case tracking and oversight that have been undertaken to date, we have a military justice system that works as intended. I will continue to support all efforts to address the issue of post-trial processing.

**Question.** The Inspector General concluded that current Navy and Marine Corps case-tracking systems do not provide the visibility needed to monitor case progress and timeliness throughout the post-trial process and recommended the development of a single Navy and Marine Corps military justice case processing and tracking system.

What is the current plan for the development of a single Navy and Marine Corps military justice case processing and tracking system?

**Answer.** Efforts are ongoing within the Department to develop a unified case-tracking system for the Navy and Marine Corps and a joint effort is currently in progress to formally establish a new acquisition program for the Naval Justice Information System (NJIS). In the interim, the Judge Advocate General’s Corps has continued to use the Navy Case Management Tracking Information System (CMTIS) to track every case while the new systems are being developed.

**Question.** Will this case tracking system be funded by the Navy?

**Answer.** Yes, Navy will fund the system.
Question. At the direction of Congress, the Secretary of Defense appointed an independent panel to review the judge advocate requirements of the Department of the Navy. This Panel issued a report in February, 2011, that concluded that “there is a requirement in the U.S. Navy for approximately 950 active-duty judge advocates. The Panel noted that the Navy had 811 judge advocates on active duty at the end of fiscal year 2010, but had programmed further reductions in judge advocate manning over the next 5 years. The Panel expressed “strong concern over the current and future manning levels for judge advocates in the Navy, believing those manning levels create an unacceptable legal risk to the Department of the Navy.” Testimony at a recent hearing indicated that Navy leadership has now indicated an intent to fund 852 positions over the FYDP.

What is your evaluation of the recommendations of the Independent Panel regarding the role and resources available to the Navy JAG Corps?

Answer. I concur that we need to have adequate judge advocate manning to meet operational law and other requirements, including a first-rate military justice system. In the Navy, this issue is currently undergoing the required budget review process for implementation across the FYDP.

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that the Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps is adequately manned to address the increasing complexity and intensity of the legal and policy environment in which commanders are required to operate?

Answer. This issue is currently undergoing the required budget review process for implementation across the FYDP.

DEFENSE INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM (DIBRS)

Question. DIBRS is an information technology system funded and managed by the Defense Manpower Data Center and required under DOD Directive 7730.47. It is intended to provide more comprehensive data on the incidence and types of crimes committed within the Armed Forces. The Department of the Navy is developing a Department of the Navy Criminal Justice Information System (DONCJIS) to satisfy DIBRS reporting requirements but has been unable to predict when the system will be fully operational.

What is the status of the Navy’s implementation of DIBRS and DONCJIS?

Answer. The DONCJIS was initiated but did not meet program requirements. The Department cancelled it in September 2010. Efforts are ongoing within the Department to develop a unified case-tracking system for the Navy and Marine Corps and a joint effort is currently in progress to formally establish a new acquisition program for the Naval Justice Information System (NJIS). As currently envisioned, this system will incorporate not only the Defense Incident-Based Reporting System (DIBRS) required data, but expand to include criminal justice case tracking and management.

Question. What utility do you see for Navy’s senior leaders in having the information available through DIBRS?

Answer. The lack of such a functional database inhibits electronic interface and data sharing among all stakeholders of a criminal case and inhibits accurate data collection. We will continue to use the Navy Case Management Tracking Information System (CMTIS) to track every case while the new systems are being developed.

U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY OVERSIGHT

Question. In November 2009, the Naval Inspector General submitted a report harshly critical of the financial management practices at the U.S. Naval Academy, which reflected a lack of oversight and supervision over the Academy’s internal controls, regulatory compliance, and expenditure of appropriated and non-appropriated funds.

What measures have been put in place to ensure that the financial management at the Naval Academy complies with the legal and regulatory requirements that apply to other comparable commands?

Answer. The Naval Academy has worked closely with Navy leadership, including the Navy General Counsel and Office of the Judge Advocate General to improve meaningful oversight, improve guidance and foster continual self assessment of the Academy’s financial management practices. After a series of reviews and audits, including the 2009 Navy Inspector General report, 59 corrective actions were identified. To date, 49 of the 59 have been completed, including a comprehensive fiscal oversight review of Naval Academy Nonappropriated Fund activities by Commander, Navy Installations Command this month (July 2011). In all, these efforts have resulted in improved and revised financial procedures, directives and instruc-
tions, including gift acceptance and expenditure guidance, ensuring the Academy is in compliance with relevant Navy and DOD instructions and policies.

Question. What is your assessment of the changes that have been made to the Honor System at the Naval Academy following the review conducted last year by the Chief of Navy Reserve and what do you consider to be the most important reforms put into place?

Answer. The changes to the Naval Academy Honor Concept have been very positive for the Brigade of Midshipmen and the Naval Academy as a whole. While several important reforms were adopted, improved educational understanding, process efficiency, consistent accountability and Brigade empowerment have been most notable. Specifically, the focus on refining the adjudication process has driven average adjudication time down to approximately 17 days, providing more immediate feedback to the Midshipmen on honor cases. Coupled with consistent application of the Honor Concept and increased ownership of the Honor Concept by the Brigade of Midshipmen, the Naval Academy has seen a significant drop in repeat honor offenses and honor offenses by upper classmen.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend in the organization or functioning of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors?

Answer. I wouldn’t recommend changes in the organization or functioning of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors. Since the findings of the Navy IG, the Board of Visitors has taken an active and positive role in assisting the Naval Academy and providing oversight.

Question. Following congressional direction, the DOD in August 2007, established a policy regarding modification of the active-service obligation for service academy and ROTC scholarship graduates who are offered professional sports contracts. This policy is currently not being applied uniformly by the Departments of the Air Force, Navy, and Army. What is your personal view of the appropriate applicability of this DOD policy in the Navy?

Answer. My view is that Navy personnel are first and foremost here to faithfully serve their country and fulfill their military commitment by completing their Active Duty Service Obligations (ADSO). I do believe however, in rare and exceptional cases, a Servicemember can use their exceptional talents in a mutually beneficial way to the Service and the member, after completing a shortened ADSO and then continue to actively engage in the military by participating in the Selected Reserves.

The SECNAV recently updated the early release policy for the Navy and Marine Corps, removing a moratorium imposed in 2007 on applications for early release to participate in professional sports. This change in policy will again allow Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps and U.S. Naval Academy graduates to apply for early release from active duty after 2 years of service providing the requestor has relevant and proven special or unique talents that would aid in recruiting. This policy change aligns the Department of the Navy’s application of the DOD policy with the Departments of the Air Force and Army. While the number of those allowed for an early release is expected to be small, I believe that those rare individuals with extraordinary abilities should be allowed to showcase their talents on a national stage when in the best interests of the Service.

INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE

Question. In your past assignments, you have had the opportunity to observe the working relationship between the Navy General Counsel, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and judge advocates advising commanders in the field. What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocate General to provide independent legal advice to the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps?

Answer. The ability to provide independent legal advice is vital to the Navy. The law appropriately prohibits any officer or employee of DOD from interfering with the Judge Advocate General’s independent legal advice to the SECNAV, CNO, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Question. What is your view of the responsibility of judge advocates within the services and joint commands to provide independent legal advice to military commanders?

Answer. Commanders and commanding officers are obligated to discuss legal issues with their staff judge advocates. To provide legal solutions that address the legal challenges faced by our military commanders requires independence.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

Question. The Navy has been involved in civil litigation over its use of mid-frequency active sonar during training exercises and its impact on the environment.
What is the Navy doing to comply with environmental laws so it can continue to effectively train with mid-frequency active sonar?

Answer. The Navy remains committed to accomplishing training goals while still achieving full compliance with all Federal environmental laws and regulations. Continued training with active sonar is absolutely essential in protecting the lives of our sailors and marines and defending our Nation. Increasingly quiet diesel-electric submarines continue to proliferate throughout the world, which requires our Navy to continue to train to counter them. Neutralizing this threat requires the ability to locate, track, and defeat these submarines; active sonar is the primary system to accomplish this task.

The Navy continues to work closely with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to receive annual permits under the Marine Mammal Protection Act and Biological Opinions under the Endangered Species Act. In 2002, the Navy began implementation of a comprehensive Phase I strategy to ensure compliance with applicable Federal laws. The process of completing this documentation, including the required analysis and public comment periods, was a multi-year effort and will continue indefinitely. As of July of this year, the Navy has completed environmental planning documentation for 13 of 14 Navy ranges and Operating Areas. This permitting process has ensured that the Navy mitigates its effect on the environment while still meeting national security requirements.

The Navy has already begun work on Phase II at-sea Environmental Impact Statements and permits, significantly expanding the sound sources analyzed and including at-sea testing events that were not part of phase I permits and documentation. Consolidating Phase I Navy ranges and Operating Areas into 6 study areas will achieve greater consistency, efficiency, and integration of acquisition/military readiness/scientific research information in Navy environmental planning documentation and permits. The Navy continues to work closely with NMFS to ensure these Phase II documents and permits are informed by best available data, providing the most accurate representation of potential impacts to the marine environment. The first of these documents and permits is currently on track to be approved in early 2014.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
posals to basically substitute F/A–18s and F–16s for about half of the Air Force’s and Navy’s planned buys of the F–35? They say this change could save about $9.5 billion.

Admiral GREENERT. The Navy’s TACAIR transition plan is centered on a balanced force of F–35 and F/A–18E/F. F–35 and F/A–18E/F capabilities are complementary, and together deliver a balance of versatility, lethality, survivability, and capacity that will pace the threat through 2025. The F–18E/F provides a proven combat capability and higher weapons capacity at a known cost modeled throughout its service life with planned capability enhancements. The F–35 offers reduced signature with improved sensors and command and control. A mix of F/A–18 E/F and F–35 provides the capacity and capability to carry out the full range of tactical air operations and the requirement for both aircraft remains consistent with the DoN TACAIR transition plan.

2. Senator MCCASKILL. Admiral Greenert, have you considered adopting the Fiscal Commission’s option, and if not, why not?

Admiral GREENERT. Each year we consider modifications to the number of F–35 we purchase. This is part of our own budget deliberations and is also part of achieving the right mix of F–35 and F–18E/F aircraft in our future air wings. The Department of the Navy has historically managed its entire aircraft inventory in a purposeful and responsible manner, balancing future operational requirements with the need to maximize the utility of our current aircraft. The F–35 and FA–18E/F provide complementary capabilities across the spectrum of conflict and the requirement for both aircraft remains consistent with the DoN’s TACAIR transition plan. Purchasing both aircraft represents a solution to the strike-fighter shortfall and provides proven conventional combat capability and capacity to support anticipated Carrier Strike Group mission requirements through 2025.

3. Senator BEGICH. Admiral Greenert, the Navy has been at the forefront of Arctic issues and studying climate change. Your predecessor, Admiral Roughead, understood that Arctic requirements will fall largely on the Navy and he was already preparing for them, establishing a Task Force Climate Change and producing an Arctic Roadmap in 2009. The Arctic Roadmap called for a number of actionable items. If confirmed, do you intend to continue this work on the Arctic and climate change, to include executing the actionable items in the Arctic Roadmap?

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, I intend to continue the work initiated by Admiral Roughead on the Arctic and climate change. I believe that climate change and the Arctic will be a challenge to Navy. In my remarks at the Navy Climate Change and Energy Symposium in March of this year, I encouraged the Navy and industry to take the discussion and ideas generated from the symposium toward future programmatic options.

The Navy views the Arctic as an emerging theater that may require new programs to face the unique challenges of the region. The challenges will be similar to those when the Navy first started operating in the Persian Gulf, where our equipment was not optimized for operations in the new environment. The Navy must also consider the Arctic in our concept of operations especially with respect to our surface ship capabilities in conducting cold weather operations. I recognize that the Navy has to balance preparation for an opening Arctic against other global commitments and fiscal pressures, but we are taking a deliberate approach to the Arctic. This includes conducting studies and assessments that will inform us of gaps in our capabilities to operate in the region, and yet not buying ahead of need.

Outside of the Arctic, global climate change will present additional challenges to our Navy. We are beginning to study the effects that sea level rise and associated processes will have on our installations worldwide. We are closely monitoring the effects of changing precipitation and resource patterns around the world to determine how they may affect humanitarian assistance, and we are identifying partnerships that will ensure the Navy leverages a whole-of-government approach to climate change adaptation.

The Arctic and Climate Change Roadmaps include action items that move the Navy forward in the efforts needed to meet these challenges. The roadmaps are vital tools for preparing the Navy for the future and ensuring that we are ready and capable to meet the mission requirements of the 21st century.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

SUBMARINE SUPPORT FOR SPECIAL FORCES

4. Senator SHAHEEN. Admiral Greenert, the four current Ohio-class cruise missile submarines (SSGN) are scheduled to be retired between fiscal years 2026 to 2028. These boats have been particularly useful in providing our combatant commanders with both additional strike capability and Special Forces support. I understand the Navy is considering adding, to at least some of the future Virginia-class subs, an additional mid-body section equipped with large-diameter vertical launch tubes suitable for cruise missiles to replace some of the strike capability lost with the end of the SSGNs. I am concerned there is no current plan to replace the SSGN's capability to support larger Special Forces Operations. Could you share with me the Navy's plans to accommodate future covert Special Forces Operations too large for Virginia-class submarines once the SSGNs reach the end of their service life?

Admiral GREENERT. While an individual Virginia-class attack submarine (SSN) does not provide the same volume as an SSGN for support of Special Forces, the Virginia-class is the first SSN class designed up front to support Special Forces. As a result, all Virginia-class SSNs have many of the same capabilities to support Special Forces as the SSGN including: the ability to host a Dry-Deck Shelter, the ability to conduct swimmer lock-in and lock-out, advanced ship control for slow-speed station keeping, and dedicated spaces for Special Forces fitness and stowage. In the future, as the SSGNs retire from the inventory, the entire Virginia-class will be ready to support a wide range of Special Forces Operations.

The Navy will continue to work closely with Commander, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to define the long-term requirements for undersea mobility of Special Forces. As the Navy evaluates options to restore undersea payload volume, such as the mid-body section described above, we will also continue to consider the need for enhanced Special Forces support.

PUBLIC SHIPYARDS

5. Senator SHAHEEN. Admiral Greenert, according to a 2009 Government Accountability Office report, the Navy had a backlog of $3 billion in unfunded, yet absolutely critical, infrastructure projects at the Nation's four public shipyards. At Portsmouth Naval Shipyard alone, the unfunded requirements were valued at $513 million. Going forward, how will the Navy prioritize investments and support modernization at each of the four public shipyards?

Admiral GREENERT. With workforce safety, health, and quality of life as top priorities, the Navy develops projects to improve shipyard efficiency and productivity, based on Infrastructure Condition Assessment Program (ICAP) and Asset Evaluation (AE) program data. Regrettably we are unable to address every shortfall in the desired timeframe due to fiscal constraints; therefore, shipyard projects are evaluated and prioritized with all other Navy infrastructure projects. Our shore investments are prioritized to best enable warfighting and Joint capabilities, minimize the decline of mission-essential and quality of life infrastructure, and optimize warfare enterprise outputs and quality of service.

The Navy continues to invest in Naval Shipyard infrastructure within today's financially constrained environment through Sustainment (ST), Restoration and Modernization (RM), and Military Construction (MILCON). U.S. Code Title 10, Section 2476, requires that the Navy invest at least 6 percent of intermediate and depot maintenance funds (averaged over the previous 3 years) into the shipyard recapitalization program. The Navy spent 9.5 percent, 9.9 percent, and 15.6 percent of these funds on shipyard recapitalization in fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2010, respectively, and is in the process of investing 11.1 percent in fiscal year 2011.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS

6. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Greenert, in a House of Representatives hearing yesterday you testified in response to a question about the possibility of drastic defense budget cuts ranging from $400 billion to a trillion dollars over the next 10 years that, “without a comprehensive strategic review, a fundamental look at what we were asking our forces to do, without a change in activity, we won’t be able to meet the global force management plan today.” As Vice Chief of Naval Operations, are you taking part in DOD’s comprehensive strategic review?
Admiral GREENERT. As Vice Chief of Naval Operations, I was personally involved in decisional and informational meetings associated with DOD’s comprehensive strategy review. This review involves inter-Service working groups and initiatives including the Joint Staff “Operational Availability 2012” analysis, the Director, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) “Comprehensive Review,” and Deputy Secretary of Defense Advisory Working Group (DAWG) meetings. These initiatives and analyses were helpful in establishing the impact on Joint Force Structure, missions, and capabilities associated with changing priorities or requirements inherent in today’s DOD strategic and programmatic guidance. Until we revise today’s strategy—what we are asking our forces to do—we will not have a sustainable global force management plan for the expected fiscal environment. Regardless, I remain personally committed to not allowing across-the-board cuts with unchanged operational demands to hollow out the force.

7. Senator M. McCain. Admiral Greenert, is the review an objective look at our national security commitments or an exercise to find at least $400 billion to a trillion dollars?

Admiral GREENERT. The need to reduce Federal deficits initiated the review. The review is part of the “ways and means” to an end state of remaining within fiscal guidance.

8. Senator M. McCain. Admiral Greenert, if the Navy is asked to significantly cut budgets during your tenure as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), what programs or other current activities do you think you can cut or scale back?

Admiral GREENERT. There are no obvious programs or activities to make further reductions. Today, the Navy is unable to meet unrestrained combatant commander demands. In the fiscal year 2012 budget Navy proposes to cut overhead to reinvest in our ability to provide forces. It would be imprudent to make further overhead reductions without first evaluating the impact of these cuts. Going forward, we will have to make reductions based on an evaluation of the level of budget cuts and the strategic priorities DOD establishes to defend the Nation. In meeting this challenge, my intention would be to:

- Prioritize readiness to ensure the force we have is fully mission capable
- Ensure our sailors, civilians, and their families are properly supported
- Sustain relevant Navy-unique capabilities that support the Joint Mission
- Ensure a coherent balance of capability and capacity of the force, and
- Consider the stability of the industrial base

NAVY SHIP READINESS

9. Senator M. McCain. Admiral Greenert, I remain concerned about what I see as an overall downward trend in ship maintenance funding and a commensurate rise in ship inspection failures. In a House Armed Services Committee hearing this week you testified, “there is a consistent, downward trend in some indicators of material readiness since 2007. I don’t see how we can keep at the current tempo of operations. I’m concerned we will not reach the expected ship service lives planned for in our shipbuilding plan. I can’t tell you for sure if we’re at a tipping point. However, we’re on the edge.” What, in your view, has caused this dramatic increase in inspection failures?

Admiral GREENERT. The singular and significant indicator of reduced material readiness has been higher failure rates for surface ships during inspections by the Navy Board of Inspection and Survey. Recent readiness reports by the Fleet indicate that this trend is turning. However, we will remain vigilant and proactive. We conducted a review of surface force readiness, which identified a number of root causes. These include reduced surface ship and intermediate maintenance center manning and the disestablishment (by BRAC 1995) of the surface ship life cycle engineering organization. These changes stopped updates to ship Class Maintenance Plans (CMP); eliminated the technical support to plan maintenance periods, and reduced the ability of crews to complete required maintenance.

In response, we put executive-level oversight in place and initiated a multi-prong plan to improve surface ship readiness. This plan includes increasing surface ship manning (in progress) and restoring organizations to plan and manage ship lifecycle maintenance, including technical support for planning and conducting maintenance periods. We also significantly increased the fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 baseline ship maintenance budget submissions (compared to fiscal year 2010). Today, Navy’s maintenance account is fully funded.
While our ability to plan and conduct maintenance is much more comprehensive, an additional factor affecting surface ship readiness is the high operational tempo of the last 10 years. Since 2001, underway days per ship increased by 15 percent while Fleet size decreased by 10 percent. This reduces the time a ship is available in port to conduct maintenance—even if it is pre-planned and fully funded. The Navy is investigating options to improve the balance between presence and pre-deployment training and maintenance requirements, in order to achieve a sustainable level of operations that is consistent with the size of the fleet.

10. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, how do you intend to fix it?
Admiral Greenert. Numerous initiatives are currently underway to reverse the identified negative trends in Surface Force readiness, and to ensure our ships achieve their Expected Service Life (ESL). Most importantly, Navy has established:

- A surface ship life cycle manager—Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare (SEA 21);
- A Regional Maintenance Center (RMC) Command for waterfront maintenance oversight—Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center (CNRMC); and
- A surface ship life cycle engineering agent—Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP).

With the establishment of SEA 21 and CNRMC, the Surface Force now has organizations in place to manage fleet maintenance and modernization. CNRMC leads the development and execution of standardized processes, policies, and training at the RMCs, and is improving the management of multi-ship/multi-option private industry maintenance contracts. Under NAVSEA’s guidance, the maintenance philosophy for surface ships now parallels the engineering and life cycle processes currently in place for carriers and submarines, which traditionally meet or exceed their design service life.

SURFMEPP reports directly to SEA 21, and will re-establish the engineered requirements and CMPs necessary for surface ships to reach their ESL. Additionally, they are creating life cycle maintenance plans for each ship, based on the CMP and actual ship condition. As a result, the Navy now has a better understanding of the impacts from, and the ability to accurately track, deferred maintenance that must be accomplished in the future.

The Navy is incorporating best practices into how we evaluate and improve material condition. We partnered with the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) to help assess the material condition of our surface ships. We established the Surface Warfare Enterprise Assessment Program, supported by technical experts from the RMCs, to conduct ship material condition assessments, and are focusing on development and demonstration of new corrosion control technology, materials, and processes. Corrosion control assistance teams have also been established in each Fleet concentration area.

The Navy increased surface ship manning by 1,105 sailors in the fiscal year 2012 budget submission, and is increasing military and civilian manning at RMCs as well. With increased RMC manning, we are reestablishing some intermediate maintenance capabilities and expanding intermediate maintenance capacity. This also increases shore-duty opportunities for Fleet Sailors, who can then return to sea with journeyman-level maintenance skills.

Since fiscal year 2010, the Navy added significant resources to annual ship maintenance budgets, specifically targeted at surface ship maintenance. While fiscal challenges in fiscal year 2012 have required that some risk be taken in ship depot maintenance, we will work to minimize the impacts and continue the gains made in surface ship readiness over the last several budget cycles.

I intend to continue to support these programs and expect that, as they mature, Fleet material readiness will improve. I anticipate it will take a long-term deliberate effort to deliver consistent tangible improvements. The first depot maintenance availabilities planned under SURFMEPP are scheduled to occur in fiscal year 2012. I expect ships to meet Fleet standards and we will continue to closely monitor the Fleet’s progress. I am confident that the improvements we are making, based on proven Navy and industry practices, are on the right course.

NAVY’S SUBMARINE PROGRAMS—OHIO—CLASS AND VIRGINIA—CLASS

11. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, I note in the answers to your advance policy questions you cite $5.6 billion for the first two hulls with a goal to reach $4.9 billion. The Ohio-class replacement SSGNs are expected to run about $6 billion each and the Virginia-class submarines cost about $2 billion each, under the current
multi-year procurement plan. With more than half of the construction and development cost dollars being needed to build extraordinarily expensive nuclear submarines, I'm concerned that our commitment to submarines may be crowding out funding needed to modernize the surface fleet. Given a $400 billion target for reductions in the DOD budget, and potentially up to a trillion dollar cut, can we afford new submarines that cost that much money?

Admiral GREENERT. Although a significant capital investment, submarines are extraordinarily important to our Nation's security. Attack submarines (SSN) are uniquely capable and possess access-denial capabilities to gather intelligence or perform multiple combat missions—creating considerable strategic uncertainty for an adversary. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) are the most survivable leg of our Nation's nuclear deterrent triad.

While we have reduced the cost of the Ohio Replacement SSBN substantially, our total shipbuilding budget will be pressurized in the 2020s as we seek to recapitalize our surface and submarine forces while sustaining warfighting readiness and supporting our people. To accommodate SSBN recapitalization we are considering reducing (in the 30-year Shipbuilding Plan) SSN procurement to one per year (from the current two) in the mid-2020s while maintaining the same approximate build rate for surface combatants. In that same timeframe however, many of our existing cruisers, destroyers, and SSNs will reach the end of their service lives. As a result, the number of surface combatants and SSNs may go below our current goal in the mid-2020s; while amphibious ships will remain above their goal until the 2030s. I am confident our near-term force structure plans provide the capability and capacity we need to meet demands today, but within this decade we must determine how to best resource the shipbuilding programs required in the 2020s. The Navy will continue to consider mitigation strategies for these anticipated changes.

12. Senator M CCAIN. Admiral Greenert, how does the Navy intend to ensure that overall surface ship production does not substantially decrease while it’s building submarines?

Admiral GREENERT. The Navy remains committed to sustaining the force structure required to implement the Maritime Strategy. Our current shipbuilding plan continues to grow the fleet within available resources over the next decade.

In the 2020s, several factors will challenge our ability to sustain the fleet capacity needed to meet today's level of operational demand. Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) must be recapitalized in that timeframe to sustain the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad while many of today's attack submarines (SSN) and large surface combatants will reach their end of service life and be decommissioned. During the years in which the new SSBN is being procured, construction of other ship types will be reduced, impacting our force size and the shipbuilding industrial base.

To reduce costs and minimize the impact on other ship construction, the Ohio Replacement Program has been thoroughly reviewed. All aspects of the program (warfighting requirements, program execution, design, and construction efforts) were aggressively challenged to drive down non-recurring engineering and construction costs while still meeting the core military requirements for a survivable nuclear deterrent. In all shipbuilding programs, the Navy continually strives to reduce costs, specifically through designs that reduce total ownership and acquisition costs, establishment of reasonable operational and maintenance requirements, and prudent planning for future disposal.

While the threats, demands, and mission requirements for mid to late 2020s are not well understood, we will continue to consider mitigation strategies for the anticipated shortfalls in fleet capacity. The Navy is planning to manage the service lives and modernization of existing ships during this period to minimize block obsolescence. As requirements, available resources, and the industrial landscape come into better focus, the Navy will procure the most appropriate mix of ships to address the anticipated mission needs of combatant commanders.

NAVY SHIPBUILDING STRATEGY

13. Senator McCaIN. Admiral Greenert, last year the Navy submitted to Congress its 30-year shipbuilding plan, calling for a 313-ship battle force inventory as its baseline. However, building the required force structure will largely depend on controlling shipbuilding costs (including related combat systems) within an affordable range. Will the Navy be able to maintain stability in requirements, funding, and profiles in an effort to control costs?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy remains committed to sustaining the force structure required to implement the Maritime Strategy. By identifying efficiencies within Navy's portfolio, the fiscal year 2012 President's budget added five ships from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2016 to provide more stability and sustainability to the industrial base and better maintain fleet capacity. Our combined efforts with Congress and industry to stabilize production of ships such as the Burke-class destroyer and Virginia-class submarine have paid off in lower per-unit costs and more rapid production.

In the 2020s, however, the cost of replacing the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) will impact other elements of the Navy's shipbuilding plan. Recapitalizing this most survivable leg of the nuclear deterrent triad will occur at the same time many of today's cruisers, destroyers and attack submarines will be retiring. As a result, the number of large surface combatants and SSNs may decrease below our current goal in the mid-2020s. This would challenge the Navy's ability to maintain today's level of operations—if that level is required in the future.

To maximize our ability to recapitalize the fleet during SSBN procurement, the Navy will carefully manage the cost of future platforms. We will balance the operational and technical requirements of future platforms against their cost before they are contracted. We will continuously evaluate force structure requirements over the next decade to determine how the force should evolve in the 2020s while staying within available resources. We will continue to rely on proven designs and technology as much as possible to reduce technical risk and cost risk associated with new platforms.

The Navy is committed to maintaining stability in requirements, funding and profiles in an effort to control costs. This will require the combined efforts of and collaboration between the Navy, Congress, the shipbuilding industry and the combat systems industry.

14. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, controlling shipbuilding costs will require the combined efforts of the Navy, the shipbuilding industry, and the combat systems industry. What is the Navy doing to encourage fixed price contracts and ensuring that requirements are approved by the leadership will not change? Please give some discrete examples by program type.

Admiral Greenert. The Navy addresses the acquisition strategy for new shipbuilding programs early in the acquisition process as part of the Material Development Decision and prior to initiation of the Analysis of Alternatives. The strategy includes a planned contract type based on a consideration of the risk associated with the program. To reduce costs in general, the Navy shipbuilding strategy leverages existing production designs. Because this also reduces risk, fixed price type contracts are more easily negotiated. If technical risk is considered high because of new program elements, we look for ways to invest in prototyping during technology development to mitigate the risk and achieve fixed price type contract terms prior to detail design and construction. Currently, all shipbuilding contracts are fixed-price, except for the CVN–78 aircraft carrier and DDG–1000 since both are lead ships.

The Navy continues to refine its Two-Pass/Six-Gate Review process to ensure requirements are set early and balanced against cost, and that this balance is visible and managed throughout the acquisition process. The Navy has also strengthened acquisition policy to improve program oversight, control cost growth, and more effectively monitor contractor performance.

For example, prior to Milestone A approval for the Ohio Replacement submarine, the Department evaluated numerous capability trades to reduce costs. As a result, the Navy (OPNAV and Secretariat staffs) made trades in the number of ballistic missile tubes, the diameter of those tubes, the number of torpedoes to be carried, acoustic sensors, and other defensive features throughout the design. These trades made the submarine more affordable while maintaining the necessary level of capability, resulting in a reduction of the projected cost to an objective cost of $4.9 billion (fiscal year 2010 $) for hulls 2–12.

DDG–1000

15. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, 13 years ago, the Navy began what we now call the DDG–1000 program and over that time taxpayers have invested over $10 billion. For that investment in time and money, we have to show one partially completed ship and no additional combat capability. At last report, the Navy and the builder of the DDG–1000 class were at loggerheads over contract negotiations for the last two DDG–1000 ships. What is the status of this program and why shouldn't it be killed and the savings transferred to other shipbuilding programs,
like the DDG–51 series ships that will have BMD capability that we have a growing need for?

Admiral Greenert. Work on DDG–1000 and DDG–1001 at Bath Iron Works (BIW) is progressing well. DDG–1000 is over 50-percent complete and scheduled to deliver in fiscal year 2014 with an initial operating capability in fiscal year 2016. The second ship (DDG–1001) is more than 20-percent complete.

After careful and deliberate negotiations, Navy and General Dynamics BIW reached an agreement for pricing, terms, and conditions for construction of DDG–1001 and –1002. Details of the ship construction contract awards are expected to be finalized by the end of September. This agreement includes transitioning the partial construction contract for DDG–1001 into a full ship construction contract. The agreement also includes construction for DDG–1002. Both ships will be procured using fixed-price type contracts.

DDG–1000 Zumwalt-class guided missile destroyers will be an optimally crewed, multi-mission surface combatant designed to provide long-range, precision naval surface fire support for ground forces and Marines conducting littoral maneuver and subsequent operations ashore. DDG–1000 features two 155mm Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) capable of engaging targets with the Long-Range Land Attack Projectile at a range of more than 63 nautical miles. In addition to providing vital precise and volume fires in support of ground forces and Marines, DDG–1000 will field advanced technologies such as signature reduction, active and passive self-defense systems, and enhanced survivability features that will, when appropriate, be incorporated into future ship designs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

CHALLENGES IN EAST ASIA


Admiral Greenert. I think you can divide our emerging security challenges in Asia into two broad categories: traditional and non-traditional.

Addressing traditional challenges first, one of the most pressing concerns is stability on the Korean peninsula, especially in light of North Korea’s impending leadership transition and continued economic decline. Shortages of fuel, food, and capital in North Korea could hit a “tipping point” in the near term that prompts large flows of refugees into South Korea or China. As last year’s sinking of a South Korean naval ship and artillery strikes on a South Korean island demonstrate, North Korea’s leaders remain unpredictable in the face of these challenges. We also continue to be concerned about North Korea’s nuclear weapons, their developing ballistic missile capabilities, and their role in proliferating advanced weapons and associated technology abroad.

The biggest issue worthy of vigilance in the region is China’s emergence as a major power economically, politically and militarily. In my view, the PRC is still in the process of defining its role in the world. One key factor in this process is how the PRC leadership perceives the future U.S. role in the region. The U.S. Navy is important to reassuring regional allies and partners. But the Navy can also demonstrate to the PRC the benefits of international security cooperation in areas such as counterpiracy, disaster relief and non-proliferation.

Beyond the Taiwan situation, there is increasing concern in East Asia about China’s increasing assertiveness regarding maritime claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea. In both areas, U.S. naval presence plays an important role in reassuring our allies and ensuring that these disputes are settled peacefully, and that the fundamental rights of freedom of navigation and the flow of international trade are respected.

Among nontraditional security challenges, two of the biggest long-term concerns are demographic trends and the potential effects of climate change. These will significantly influence the future foreign policy decisions of countries throughout Asia, and in some cases will challenge their internal stability.

17. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, do such challenges require the United States to maintain adequate maritime and air assets in theater for the indefinite future?

Admiral Greenert. Yes. As articulated in the Maritime Strategy, the Navy remains committed to advancing our national interests in the Western Pacific. Strong, consistent U.S. military presence is a critical symbol of U.S. commitment to the region, and a key ingredient of continued peace and stability there.
Toward this end, we will remain vigilant, and evaluate and adapt our posture in the Western Pacific, including rotational deployments, forward stationing, and episodic operations with allies and partners. We also explore opportunities for more forward presence in the region that supports increased multilateral cooperation on maritime security and enhances our capabilities for assured Joint access to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace.

18. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, as the United States faces growing challenges in East Asia and the need for budget austerity at home, what future role do you see amphibious ships and aircraft carriers playing in our force projection abroad?

Admiral Greenert. Forward-stationed and rotationally deployed amphibious ready groups and carrier strike groups are essential to the U.S. Navy's ability to dissuade, deter and (if necessary) project power abroad. The synergistic application of the capabilities within these forces, while forward in the region, projects U.S. influence, responds to crises, and sustains key international relationships. Naval forces' posture—and inherent speed of response—show our commitment to the East Asia region, our partners and allies, and protect our vital national interests.

19. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, this committee has long been interested in ensuring Taiwan's ability to defend itself. In your opinion, do continued arms sales and technical support to Taiwan's military lend to continued stability in the region?

Admiral Greenert. Consistent with the provisions in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantity as may be necessary and appropriate. The United States Taiwan policy is based on our one China Policy, the three joint U.S.-China Communiques, and the Taiwan Relations Act and reflects longstanding U.S. policy towards Taiwan.

NAVY BATTLE FORCE REQUIREMENTS

20. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, I believe investments in shipbuilding must be directed where necessary to ensure that the Navy's battle force remains equal to the challenges of today as well as those it may face in the future. Our shipbuilding program must represent a balance between the expected demands upon the naval fleet for presence, partnership building, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, deterrence, and warfighting, as well as available future resources.

With more than half of the construction and development cost dollars being needed to build extraordinarily expensive nuclear submarines, there is concern that our commitment to submarines may be crowding out funding needed to carry out ship modernization and construction of aircraft carriers as well as amphibious ships. This concern is exacerbated as the Navy faces an increasingly austere budget environment.

I am concerned the financial resources may not exist in the coming years to maintain the long-time stated requirement of a 313-ship fleet. As such, how will the Navy ensure proper balance in our shipbuilding programs to ensure our combatant commanders have the ability to maintain security in their respective regions?

Admiral Greenert. The Navy remains committed to sustaining the force structure required to implement the Maritime Strategy. Our current shipbuilding plan balances the projected demands for naval forces from combatant commanders against expected future resources, taking into account the importance of maintaining an adequate national shipbuilding industrial base. The plan strives to be realistic about the costs of future ships. It is also part of an overall budget submission that balances risk against available resources across the entire Navy portfolio.

Today's fleet is unable to meet the unrestrained combatant commander demand for naval forces. Our current shipbuilding plan grows the fleet within projected resources over the next decade. While the Navy will continue to provide the best capability and capacity it can, combatant commanders will also have to explore innovative and alternative solutions to address the security challenges in their regions. We will collaborate with them in their endeavor.

In the 2020s, several factors will challenge our ability to sustain the fleet capacity needed to meet today's level of operational demand. Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) must be recapitalized in that timeframe to sustain the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad while many of today's attack submarines (SSN) and large surface combatants will reach their end of service life and be decommissioned. During the years in which the new SSBN is being procured, construction of other
ship types may be reduced, impacting our force size and the shipbuilding industrial base.

To reduce costs and minimize the impact on other ship construction, the Ohio Replacement Program has been thoroughly reviewed. All aspects of the program (warfighting requirements, program execution, design, and construction efforts) were aggressively challenged to drive down non-recurring engineering and construction costs while still meeting the core military requirements for a survivable nuclear deterrent. In all shipbuilding programs, the Navy continually strives to reduce costs, specifically through designs that reduce total ownership and acquisition costs, establishment of reasonable operational and maintenance requirements, and prudent planning for future disposal.

While the specific threats, demands, and mission requirements for mid- to late-2020s are not fully understood, we will continue to consider mitigation strategies for the anticipated shortfalls in fleet capacity. The Navy is planning to manage the service lives and modernization of existing ships during this period to minimize block obsolescence. As requirements, available resources, and the industrial landscape come into better focus, the Navy will procure the most appropriate mix of ships to address the anticipated mission needs of combatant commanders. The Department of Defense will also continue employing a comprehensive Global Force Management (GFM) process to most effectively allocate naval forces to the highest priority combatant commander requirements, and if necessary, re-task assets from other missions to support crisis response.

21. Senator WICKER. Admiral Greenert, please give your view on the impact of submarine construction costs on surface-ship building, including amphibious ships, and how it may impact the shipbuilding industrial base.

Admiral GREENERT. Between 2011 and 2021, submarine construction should not impact our ability to sustain the surface fleet. According to our projected ship inventory, the number of large surface combatants will grow to 97, small surface combatants will return to today’s levels after the retirement of the Perry-class frigates, and the amphibious fleet will reach our goal of 33 ship.

Recapitalization of the Nation’s sea-based strategic deterrent within the Navy shipbuilding account over a 15 year period (fiscal year 2019–fiscal year 2033) creates significant challenges to Navy shipbuilding goals. While we have reduced the projected cost of the Ohio Replacement substantially, our total shipbuilding budget will be pressurized in the 2020s as we seek to recapitalize our surface and submarine forces while sustaining warfighting readiness and supporting our people. Pending funding relief from outside the Navy, to accommodate SSBN recapitalization we would plan to reduce our build rate for destroyers and cut our SSN procurement to one per year (from the current two) in the mid-2020s. In that same timeframe however, many of our existing cruisers, destroyers, and SSN may reach the end of their service lives. As a result, the number of destroyers and SSNs will go below our current goal in the mid-2020s, while amphibious ships will remain above their goal until the 2030s.

While the threats, demands, and mission requirements for mid to late 2020s are unpredictable to some extent, we will continue to consider mitigation strategies for the anticipated shortfalls in fleet capacity. The Navy is planning to manage the service lives and modernization of existing ships during this period to minimize block obsolescence. As requirements, available resources, and the industrial landscape come into better focus, the Navy will procure the most appropriate mix of ships to address the anticipated mission needs of combatant commanders.

It is difficult to predict the impact to the shipbuilding industrial base with any precision during the period the Ohio Replacement will be procured. The Navy remains committed to sustaining the force structure required to implement the Maritime Strategy and to work with industry to maintain a viable shipbuilding industrial base, since it is the key to our future adaptability.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROB PORTMAN

UNMANNED SYSTEMS

22. Senator PORTMAN. Admiral Greenert, the Navy’s unmanned systems master plan was released in 2004 and most recently updated in 2007. What are your intentions to update this plan and what priority will you accord planning, development, and acquisition of unmanned systems?

Admiral GREENERT. The Navy updated and integrated the 2004 and 2007 unmanned system plans earlier this year. The 2004 Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Mas-
ter Plan and the 2007 Unmanned Surface Vehicle Master Plan laid out a vision for development and employment of unmanned systems in the undersea and sea surface domains, respectively. Those documents were developed by the undersea and surface warfare communities, respectively, supported by their technical communities and fleet counterparts.

With the establishment of Navy’s Information Dominance Corps in 2010, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance (N2N6) assumed responsibility for unmanned systems across all domains—over, on and under the sea. This alignment is consistent with a significant purpose of these systems to collect and transmit information to support the warfighter. In January 2011, N2N6 developed a single roadmap for unmanned systems that updates and integrates the preceding domain-specific documents as “The U.S. Navy’s Information Dominance Roadmap for Unmanned Systems.”

This updated roadmap describes how unmanned systems will add significant capabilities to the Navy’s Information Dominance systems and platforms and act as a force multiplier for long-endurance, hazardous or high-threat missions where humans are limited in achieving mission success. The roadmap also identifies where unmanned systems can provide a viable alternative to “traditionally” manned missions. It focuses on the years 2011–2020 and guides development, production, and fielding of unmanned systems and associated support systems into the fleet. I intend to continue placing priority on the planning, development and acquisition of unmanned systems as guided by this roadmap.

23. Senator Portman. Admiral Greenert, what are your thoughts and plans for how to evolve Navy personnel and related programs to support the unmanned systems technology?

Admiral Greenert. Navy currently operates the majority of its unmanned systems as adjuncts to manned warfare systems. For example, the helicopter community employs the Firescout vertical takeoff and landing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and the maritime patrol community operates the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance UAV. This approach maintains the focus of unmanned systems and their operators on needed missions, capitalizes on commonalities between manned and unmanned systems, and leverages the knowledge and experience of personnel in existing warfare communities. We will expeditiously move from “adjacent” to full integration.

Training for unmanned systems is planned to be modular, and will leverage best-practices developed to support similar manned systems. Modular training for Navy unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) will allow standardization in common subject areas between systems with the flexibility to address specific mission requirements for each UAS. This approach to training allows aviation and non-aviation personnel to attend only those training courses required to attain the necessary skill sets to operate a specific UAS.

Navy is currently working with other services to develop joint operational and training concepts using unmanned systems, and to determine if commonalities between systems will create greater capabilities and increased efficiencies.

As unmanned systems technologies mature and inventories increase, Navy will re-evaluate the need for a separate unmanned systems community. As each new unmanned system is developed and integrated within the fleet, Navy manpower and personnel officials will ensure proper community management and career development for personnel involved in these systems. The Navy will also continue to assess new missions and evolving technologies to determine whether new or additional training, education, or experience will be needed to provide the required skills and expertise to maximize our return on investment in unmanned systems.

24. Senator Portman. Admiral Greenert, recently, Admiral Roughead made comments to the effect that unmanned systems might be able to reduce the needs for manned forces, specifically unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV) in place of manned nuclear submarines. Do you see UUVs as an eventual replacement for manned nuclear submarines or in particular, manned nuclear submarine missions?

Admiral Greenert. UUVs are not specific replacements for manned nuclear submarines (SSN/SSGN). It is unlikely they will have the autonomy, range or endurance to conduct the range of current manned submarine missions for the foreseeable future. UUVs will complement submarines by expanding their reach or conducting specific missions for which UUVs are particularly well-suited. Especially in the littoral environment, UUVs have significant advantages in cost, size, and ability to conduct higher risk operations compared to manned submarines. This will allow UUVs to take on new missions we would not or could not do with a manned plat-
form. UUVs can also take on some current undersea tasks, freeing manned submarines for other critical missions.

Over the past decade, unmanned systems have evolved from unique, stand-alone systems to an integrated part of our warfighting capability. The introduction of UAVs into the fleet has been a great success and I believe that we can duplicate this success with UUVs. I share Admiral Roughead’s concern regarding UUV endurance and autonomy. These hurdles are being addressed and I believe that UUVs will eventually serve as a force multiplier and complement to our manned nuclear submarine force, as well as service in other peacetime and warfighting requirements.

There is a very high demand for our manned submarine force in a variety of mission areas and theaters. This sustained demand in the face of decreasing submarine force structure will result in a submarine capacity gap. UUVs can be used to mitigate this capacity gap in some cases by performing important missions that may be allocated to a mission-focused UUV, rather than a multi-mission manned submarine. By combining UUVs and manned submarines as part of an overall undersea network, missions can be performed across a much larger area and for extended periods of time at a significantly reduced cost.

BUDGET CONSTRAINTS

25. Senator Portman. Admiral Greenert, given the budget pressure on the Navy, what is your position on using multiyear service contracts for underway combat logistics force services?

Admiral Greenert. We are examining multi-year “fee-for-service” contracts in the T–AO(X) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). We have asked OMB for an opinion how such a construct should be scored, since previous long-term operating lease/service contracts have been scored as capital, vice operating leases, and would not necessarily be cost-effective compared to direct acquisition.

26. Senator Portman. Admiral Greenert, is this approach being considered in the analysis of alternatives for the T–AO(X) program?

Admiral Greenert. Yes. The Fleet Replenishment Oiler Analysis of Alternatives Scope and Tasking Directive lists a variety of financing including, “consider various leasing options for a commercial tanker modified to provide refueling at sea, to include a fee-for-service cost option.”

ALL-ELECTRIC SHIP INITIATIVE

27. Senator Portman. Admiral Greenert, what is your assessment of the progress being made with the All-Electric Ship Initiative?

Admiral Greenert. The Navy is beginning to realize the benefits of all-electric ship technologies. The flexibility of transmitting electricity around the ship instead of fuel or steam allows power generating and conversion modules to be installed and connected to propulsion or combat systems in the arrangement that best supports the ship’s mission at the lowest total ownership cost. We are currently fielding several new all-electric technologies such as hybrid electric drives, advanced energy storage modules, and Integrated Power Systems (IPS) to meet increasing electrical power demands, enhance operational flexibility, and reduce fuel requirements. The Navy is also pursuing an open architecture approach for the next generation IPS, including electric propulsion, power conversion, generation, storage and distribution components, to obtain simpler, more affordable and more capable shipboard systems.

The Navy has begun adoption of the all-electric or IPS architecture. The Lewis and Clark-class (T–AKE) dry cargo ships are powered by a commercial IPS, realizing reduced acquisition and life cycle costs. USS Zumwalt (DDG–1000), now under construction, will be the first fully militarized IPS ship, providing 78 megawatts of installed power for propulsion and ship service in a single, unified electrical system. USS Makin Island (LHD–8) is the first amphibious ship built with gas turbine engines and hybrid electric drive. This system has demonstrated significant fuel savings as compared with steam driven LHDs. The Navy will be demonstrating both hybrid electric drive and energy storage module prototypes on DDG–51 class ships in 2012 as part of the Green Strike Group. Acquisition of both of these energy saving technologies for backfit into existing ships is beginning with production systems expected in the Fleet by 2016.
28. Senator Portman. Admiral Greenert, do you assess that development and testing for the electrification of submarine actuation is progressing to meet program goals?

Admiral Greenert. Yes I do. Although the migration to the “all-electric” submarine has been slowed by funding constraints and schedule imposed by delivery dates, significant progress is being made toward achieving this goal.

In support of exploiting the benefits of electric actuation, several families of reliable electric actuation components, which will replace their hydraulic counterparts, are being installed this year on a Virginia-class submarine for evaluation purposes. These components will be cycled through realistic operational scenarios to the same degree that their hydraulic counterparts are typically cycled during a deployment. Additionally, a retractable bow plane electrically actuated control surface system is under development for Virginia-class.

The Virginia-class and Ohio-replacement submarine programs are already leveraging these electric actuation development efforts. Additionally, a common, open architecture, multiplexing controller for these electric actuators is under development to facilitate lower acquisition and life cycle costs. Final implementation of these electric actuators and the common controller on Virginia-class and Ohio replacement will continue to undergo evaluation as analysis is conducted and specifics of the detailed design process for each platform are developed.

In addition, a Project Arrangement between the United States and United Kingdom is under development to perform land based comparative performance testing of both countries’ submarine control surface electric actuation systems. This Project Arrangement will include sharing of test data and insight into alternative electric actuation prototypes.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS

29. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, in your response to the advance policy questions, you state: “The Nation cannot have a strong defense without a strong economy; therefore I view the deficit crisis and corresponding deep cuts in defense as one of the most significant challenges to the entire national security community.” Do you agree with Chairman Mullen that, “The most significant threat to our national security is our debt?” Please explain your answer.

Admiral Greenert. Over the long-term, history shows that a nation’s economic strength is the foundation of its national security. This has been true of the United States, as evidenced by our success in two World Wars and the Cold War. If our national debt grows to the point where it begins to tangibly and significantly erode our overall economic position, I think it could become a detriment to our national security. But, I believe this effect would take time to manifest itself. Our current economic challenge is a result of many interrelated factors, of which the debt is one element.

My concern today is balancing the need to reduce our current deficits while minimizing the possibility our national debt will rise to a damaging level. We need to do our part. That means we have to deliver whole and effective warfighting capability and capacity in the most affordable manner possible. Achieving this is one of our most significant challenges.

[Nomination reference of ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, follows:]
[The biographical sketch of ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ADM JONATHAN WILLIAM GREENERT, USN

15 May 1953 .... Born in Butler, PA
30 June 1971 .... Midshipman, U.S. Naval Academy
04 June 1975 .... Ensign
04 June 1977 .... Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 July 1979 .... Lieutenant
01 Oct. 1983 .... Lieutenant Commander
01 Sep. 1988 .... Commander
01 Oct. 1994 .... Captain
25 Sep. 1998 .... Designated Rear Admiral (lower half) while serving in billets commensurate with that grade
01 Oct. 1999 .... Rear Admiral (lower half)
20 Nov. 2001 .... Designated Rear Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade
01 Nov. 2002 .... Rear Admiral
01 Oct. 2004 .... Vice Admiral
28 Sep. 2007 .... Admiral, Service continuous to date

Major duty assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignments and dates</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Nuclear Power School, Naval Training Center, Orlando, FL (DUINS)</td>
<td>Apr. 1976</td>
<td>Sep. 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Nuclear Power Training Unit, Windsor, CT (DUINS)</td>
<td>Sep. 1976</td>
<td>Apr. 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS <em>Tautog</em> (SSN–639) (Electrical Division Officer)</td>
<td>Apr. 1977</td>
<td>July 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine (NR 1) (Engineer Officer)</td>
<td>July 1982</td>
<td>Oct. 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Submarine School, Groton, CT (DUINS)</td>
<td>May 1985</td>
<td>June 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trident Training Facility, Bangor, WA (DUINS)</td>
<td>June 1986</td>
<td>June 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the CNO (Head, Submarine Programs Section) (OP–8)</td>
<td>May 1988</td>
<td>June 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reactors, Department of Energy (PCO Course)</td>
<td>June 1990</td>
<td>Sep. 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Studies Group Fellow, Newport, RI</td>
<td>July 1993</td>
<td>June 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the CNO (Head, Program Planning and Development Branch) (N801)</td>
<td>June 1994</td>
<td>June 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Submarine Squadron Eleven</td>
<td>June 1996</td>
<td>June 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Seventh Fleet (Chief of Staff)</td>
<td>June 1997</td>
<td>Oct. 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (Deputy and Chief of Staff)</td>
<td>Aug. 2002</td>
<td>Aug. 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Seventh Fleet</td>
<td>Aug. 2004</td>
<td>Nov. 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the CNO (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources) (N8)</td>
<td>Nov. 2006</td>
<td>Sep. 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td>Aug. 2009</td>
<td>To date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Medals and awards:
Distinguished Service Medal with two Gold Stars
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with three Gold Stars
Meritorious Service Medal with one Gold Bronze Star
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with three Gold Stars
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal with two Gold Stars
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
Navy “E” Ribbon with “E” Device
Navy Expeditionary Medal with one Bronze Star
National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Armed Forces Service Medal
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with three Bronze Stars
Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon
Coast Guard Special Operations Service Ribbon

Special qualifications:
BS (Engineering) U.S. Naval Academy, 1975
Designated Qualified in Submarines, 1978
Capstone, 2000–4
Designated Level IV Joint Qualified Officer, 2009

Personal data:
Wife: Darleen E. Hodges of Kalamazoo, MI
Children: Jonathan R. Greenert (Son), Born: 01 May 1983
Brian L. Greenert (Son), Born: 21 January 1985
Sarah E. Greenert (Daughter), Born: 12 November 1988

Summary of joint duty assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command Representative, Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau/Commander, Naval Base, Guam.</td>
<td>Oct. 98–Jan. 00</td>
<td>RDML</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Jonathan W. Greenert.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Chief of Naval Operations.

3. Date of nomination:
   July 22, 2011.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
   15 May 1953; Butler, PA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Darleen Elizabeth Greenert (Maiden Name: Hodges).
7. Names and ages of children:
   Brian L. Greenert, age 26.
   Sarah E. Greenert, age 22.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.
   None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Knights of Columbus
    U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association
    U.S. Naval Institute
    U.S. Navy League
    U.S. Navy Memorial
    U.S. Naval Submarine League
    American Legion
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    Distinguished graduate award, Butler Area Senior High School, Butler, PA, received: Jun 22, 2002.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes.
13. Personal view: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power.
    Yes.

[The nominee responded to Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

J.W. GREENERT, ADM, USN.

This 29th day of June, 2011.

[The nomination of ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]
[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr.,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers sup-
plied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

*Question.* The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

*Answer.* My first combat operation as an Army officer was to command a parachute rifle company in the U.S. intervention in Grenada in 1983. I witnessed first-hand the problems, deficiencies, and challenges we faced in conducting joint operations. A little over a year ago, I completed a tour as the Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq. This time, I witnessed first-hand the tremendous power, integration, and the unsurpassed adaptability and dominance of our joint force. I attribute the foundation of this remarkable transformation to be the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

At this time, I do not see a need to modify the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. If confirmed, I will recommend changes to this landmark legislation, if needed.

*Question.* If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

*Answer.* Not applicable.

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

*Question.* What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)?

*Answer.* The Commander, NORTHCOM, is responsible for defending the people and territory of the United States against threats to our Homeland. The commander is also responsible for security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas, as well as providing military support to Federal, State and local authorities in response to natural or manmade disasters. The Commander’s newest responsibility is to advocate for Arctic capabilities as assigned in the 2011 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

*Question.* What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)?

*Answer.* The Commander of NORAD is responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning of North America. Reporting to both the President of the United States and the Canadian Prime Minister, the Commander of NORAD provides both governments tactical warning and attack assessment through an integrated aerospace threat picture.

*Question.* What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?

*Answer.* It is my privilege to have served over 33 years in a variety of positions from platoon leader to Commanding General, I Corp. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Central America, I guided combined and joint task force headquarters comprised of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, as well as interagency and coalition partners. My current position as the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff has given me a clear understanding of joint, combined, and international operations; the role a combatant commander plays in theater security cooperation; the importance of interagency teamwork; and the interdependent role of all components of the Total Force—Active, Guard, and Reserves—in defending our Homeland and supporting civil authorities in times of crisis.

*Question.* Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, NORTHCOM, and Commander, NORAD?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will take advantage of every opportunity to build on my experience of homeland defense and civil support operations. I intend to deepen my understanding of the threat posed to the United States and our neighbors by
transnational criminal organizations (TCO), as well as the whole-of-government approach to defeat them. Another near-term activity, if confirmed, will be to work closely with The Adjutants General, State Governors, and the leadership of key Federal agencies regarding the vital role of National Guard and Federal Reserve Forces in our Nation's response to natural and manmade disasters.

RELATIONSHIPS

**Question.** Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, NORTHCOM, to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense.

**Answer.** The Commander of NORTHCOM executes his missions under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. He is directly responsible to him for the preparedness of his Command and its ability to carry out assigned missions. If confirmed, I will ensure NORTHCOM continues the close working relationship it currently has with the Secretary of Defense.

**Question.** The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

**Answer.** The Commander of NORTHCOM ensures the Deputy Secretary has the information and support he needs to perform duties as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The Commander of NORTHCOM also coordinates with the Deputy Secretary on major homeland defense and civil support activities.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

**Answer.** The Commander of NORTHCOM works closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in coordinating and exchanging information on strategic policy issues involving homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, and security cooperation. In addition, the Commander interacts with the Under Secretary to support her duties as a key advocate for NORTHCOM requirements.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

**Answer.** The Commander of NORTHCOM coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to obtain threat estimates and timely warning of worldwide threats to the NORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR).

**Question.** The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs.

**Answer.** The Commander of NORTHCOM works closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs on homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, and security cooperation issues.

**Question.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Answer.** The Chairman is not in the chain of command of the Commander of NORTHCOM to the President and the Secretary; however, title 10 does allow for communications from combatant commanders through the Chairman. This keeps the Chairman informed so that he can execute responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will communicate closely with the Chairman to enable him to perform his duties.

**Question.** The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

**Answer.** The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces assigned to all the combatant commands. The Commander of NORTHCOM works closely with the Secretaries to ensure homeland defense, civil support, and security cooperation requirements are met. This interaction is particularly important to ensure the Reserve component is prepared to respond to domestic crises.

**Question.** The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

**Answer.** The Commander of NORTHCOM exchanges information with the Chiefs of Staff of the Services to support their responsibility for organizing, training and equipping forces for homeland defense and civil support operations, as well as security cooperation activities. Additionally, the Commander of NORTHCOM communicates with the Chiefs on force protection matters within the command's AOR. Similar to the Chairman, the Service Chiefs are valuable sources of judgment and advice for combatant commanders.

**Question.** The other combatant commanders, particularly U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

**Answer.** The Commander of NORTHCOM maintains close relationships with the other combatant commanders, particularly SOUTHCOM, U.S. Strategic Command,
U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). These relationships are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of information on key issues. If confirmed, I will maintain open lines of communication with the other combatant commands to execute our National Military Strategy.

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. National Guard forces are likely to be involved in almost all homeland defense and civil support missions. As such, close coordination between the Commander of NORTHCOM and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau is central to the success of these operations. If confirmed, I look forward to advancing this important relationship to strengthen our homeland defense and disaster response capabilities.

Question. The State Governors and Adjutants General.
Answer. State Governors and the Adjutants General play a critical role in NORTHCOM’s homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities missions. If confirmed, I look forward to maintaining and developing strong relationships with these key partners, and especially sustaining the great teamwork and trusting relationships that Admiral Winnefeld has established.

Question. If confirmed, in carrying out your duties, how would you work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Homeland Security Council, and other Federal agencies, as well as state and local authorities and representatives from the private sector?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work operational issues with the DHS and other Federal agencies on a routine basis. If confirmed, I intend to communicate with local, State, and Federal agencies, as well as the private sector both personally and via the NORTHCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group, to facilitate DOD assistance in accordance with the National Response Framework, and as directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense. I also look forward to having close working relationships with the senior leadership of each of these entities.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, NORTHCOM?
Answer. I believe the biggest near-term challenge confronting the next Commander of NORTHCOM is the potential for an attack on our Homeland by violent extremists using asymmetric means or possibly weapons of mass destruction. Another immediate threat to our national security is the growing demand for illegal drugs in the United States, which is contributing to increasingly brutal and aggressive actions by TCOs in Mexico. In the longer term, the possibility of rogue nations acquiring nuclear weapons and the capability to use them against our Homeland may be a continuing challenge for the Commander of NORTHCOM.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure NORTHCOM’s plans and operations effectively address the full spectrum of threats to its AOR. In addition, if confirmed, I will strengthen the command’s already robust exercise program, involving participants from DOD, the National Guard, and the interagency community, as well as State and local officials, to challenge and improve our Nation’s capability to detect, deter, and defeat threats to our Homeland.

MISSION OF U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

Question. What is the mission of NORTHCOM?
Answer. NORTHCOM conducts homeland defense and civil support operations within its assigned AOR in order to defend and secure the United States and its interests. In addition, the command is responsible for executing theater security cooperation with Mexico, Canada, and The Bahamas, with full respect for their sovereignty. NORTHCOM also advocates for Arctic capabilities in accordance with the 2011 UCP.

Question. How does NORTHCOM’s mission relate to the mission of the DHS?
Answer. DHS is responsible for preventing terrorist attacks, as well as response and recovery from natural and manmade disasters. NORTHCOM is responsible for detecting, deterring, and preventing external threats to the United States, and when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, providing defense support of civil authorities. NORTHCOM works closely with the DHS at all levels to plan, train for, and execute homeland defense and civil support missions and bring a whole-of-government approach to each operational challenge.
Question. Are there circumstances under which you would anticipate NORTHCOM would have the lead Federal role in responding to a domestic terrorist incident? Or do you believe NORTHCOM would operate only in support of other Federal departments and agencies?

Answer. In the event of an armed terrorist attack against the United States, the President may direct that DOD have the lead role in defending the United States. As the geographic combatant command responsible for the homeland, the Command would likely be designated the supported commander for such an event. However, for most terrorist incidents within the United States, NORTHCOM will be in support of a primary agency, such as DHS, the Department of Justice, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Question. What responsibility, if any, does NORTHCOM have with respect to the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program?

Answer. I understand that NORTHCOM’s responsibility is defined by the January 2010 Secretary of Defense directive on critical infrastructure, which designates NORTHCOM as “responsible for preventing or mitigating the loss or degradation of DOD-owned critical assets within its AOR.”

Organization and Authority

Question. NORTHCOM has been assigned responsibility for force protection and antiterrorism within its AOR. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to mitigate force protection vulnerabilities, and what force protection challenges do you anticipate you would face within NORTHCOM’s AOR?

Answer. If confirmed, I will place emphasis on executing a synchronized and coordinated antiterrorism program and force protection mission across the NORTHCOM AOR. As part of this, if confirmed, I will continue the progress made in the area of rapid force protection event notification, the use of the e-Guardian system, and the sharing of sensitive force protection threat information between law enforcement and DOD.

If confirmed, I anticipate that a force protection challenge may be to synchronize and effectively execute emerging force protection and security-related policy that is new for DOD. Among the new policy initiatives are DOD’s Mission Assurance Strategy, the Defense Security Enterprise, and potentially, a new emergency management policy resulting from the Fort Hood Independent Review process.

Question. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure efficiency in the use of funding for force protection and to prevent unnecessary duplication of efforts between NORTHCOM, the Military Services, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense?

Answer. I believe a comprehensive resource management approach requires the linking of missions, risks, and force protection resources. Although NORTHCOM does not have “oversight authority” over how the Services execute funding, if confirmed, I will work closely with the Service components and DOD to identify and eliminate gaps in our force protection posture. Projects relating to biometrically-enabled installation access control, identity management, and mitigation of vulnerabilities relating to Defense Critical Infrastructure are a few examples where I believe force protection efficiencies can be identified. If confirmed, I will ensure all Service component requests for combatant commander initiative funds for force protection initiatives are properly validated and vetted before they are submitted for final approval.

Question. What specific forces, if any, have been assigned to NORTHCOM?

Answer. NORTHCOM’s assigned forces include the Headquarters Staff, as well as the following subordinate and component commands: U.S. Army North, Marine Forces North, Air Forces Northern, Joint Task Force Civil Support, Joint Task Force North and Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region.

Question. How has the assignment of forces to NORTHCOM changed since NORTHCOM was established on October 1, 2002?

Answer. NORTHCOM achieved full operational capability on 1 October 2003, with forces assigned consisting of the Service component headquarters and two standing Joint Task Force headquarters. The following year, the Command stood up a third Joint Task Force, Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region. In 2008, NORTHCOM was assigned forces in support of the standing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management Executive Order for a period of 12 months (October 2008–September 2009). In October 2009, the decision was reversed and CBRNE Consequence Management forces converted back to an allocated status, per the 2010 Global Force Management Allocation Plan. In 2011, NORTHCOM’s Standing Joint Forces Headquarters was
disestablished and those resources were re-allocated within NORTHCOM’s Operations Directorate.

**NORAD**

**Question.** What is the mission of NORAD?

**Answer.** NORAD conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in the defense of North America. Aerospace warning consists of detection, validation, and warning of an attack against North America. Aerospace control consists of air sovereignty and air defense of United States and Canadian airspace. Maritime warning consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating maritime intelligence and information and warning of maritime threats to or attacks against North America.

**Question.** How has NORAD’s mission evolved since the creation of NORTHCOM?

**Answer.** Since the creation of NORTHCOM in 2002, NORAD’s mission has expanded to include warning of maritime threats to or attacks against North America. NORAD also provides ballistic missile warning to NORTHCOM to support its ballistic missile defense mission.

**Question.** How does NORAD’s mission relate to NORTHCOM’s mission?

**Answer.** The missions of NORAD and NORTHCOM are distinctly separate, but complementary. NORAD conducts operations in the air domain and provides NORTHCOM warning of maritime threats to or attacks against North America, as well as warning of ballistic missile attack. NORTHCOM conducts land and maritime defense, U.S.-only air missions, and civil support. The commands coordinate on many issues, operate within a common security environment, and share a largely integrated headquarters staff.

**Question.** How does NORAD’s mission relate to the mission of the DHS?

**Answer.** NORAD supports DHS by deterring threats in the air and maritime domains and supporting law enforcement when called upon by civilian agencies.

**Question.** Do you believe that NORAD should continue to have a combined operations and planning staff, and a consolidated command center, with NORTHCOM? Why or why not?

**Answer.** At this time, I do not have an informed opinion on the merits of separate operations and planning staffs for NORAD and NORTHCOM. However, if confirmed, I will ensure the commands are structured to maximize operational effectiveness.

**NORTHCOM JOINT TASK FORCES**

**Question.** Since the establishment of NORTHCOM, several multi-service task forces, e.g., Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), Joint Task Force-North (JTF-North), have been placed under its authority. What is the current status of the Joint Task Force organizations under NORTHCOM in terms of mission, organization, planning, personnel allocation, and capability?

**Answer.** NORTHCOM currently has two Joint Task Forces organized under U.S. Army North:

- **JTF-CS** provides command and control of DOD incident management forces that respond to catastrophic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive events.
- **JTF-North** provides counterdrug and border patrol support along the United States-Canada and southwestern United States border, and other operations against transnational threats.

Also, NORTHCOM’s Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region provides land-based homeland defense, civil support, and incident management in the National Capital Region. These three task forces operate as multi-Service organizations under NORTHCOM’s authority and are manned to conduct homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities operations, as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Their planning efforts are guided through NORTHCOM’s family of plans for homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities.

**COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS**

**Question.** Each year, DOD spends several hundred million dollars to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, yet the availability of drugs on the street has not been significantly reduced, and some countries continue to face internal security challenges in responding to this threat. Some of these funds are exe-
cuted within the NORTHCOM AOR, and some have questioned the effectiveness and focus of our counter-narcotics programs.

**What role does NORTHCOM play in DOD's overall counterdrug mission and organization?**

Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM and its subordinate and component commands support the DOD counterdrug mission in both the domestic arena and with our international host nation partners. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) are a regional, hemispheric, and global threat to national security and interests. These transnational threats include drugs and other illicit trafficking activities. NORTHCOM has a very close relationship with SOUTHCOM and continues to build closer relationships with the other combatant commands in sharing information and situational awareness of TCO activities. NORTHCOM also works very closely with its host nation partners within its AOR, including its Canadian partners and with The Bahamas on counterdrug matters.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the ongoing counternarcotics operations within the NORTHCOM AOR and the geographic seam NORTHCOM shares with SOUTHCOM?

Answer. As I understand it, counternarcotics operations in the NORTHCOM AOR are conducted at the local, State, Federal, and bi-lateral level. As Joint Interagency Task Force-South succeeds in interdicting an increasing amount of the traffic heading to North America, TCOs quickly adapt to continue the flow of illicit drugs. Drug demand is a significant challenge in our country and the United States, and our neighbors together are trying to approach this and the flow of drugs as a whole-of-government(s) approach to the problem.

The geographic boundary between SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM is a key route for drugs to enter Mexico on their way to the United States. My understanding is that the two commands are working closely on a regional approach in support of Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize. The Mexican government's efforts against TCOs have forced drug trafficking activities further south in these border countries where those governments have limited capability and capacity to fight TCOs. If confirmed, I will work to ensure a synchronized, seamless effort across borders between the two areas of responsibility (AOR). If confirmed, I will also further strengthen the command's relationship between Joint Interagency Task Force-South and NORTHCOM's Headquarters and subordinate commands, and continue to facilitate coordinated efforts with interagency and host nation partners.

**Question.** How are counterdrug operations coordinated across combatant command boundaries with PACOM?

Answer. Counterdrug operations on the boundaries with PACOM are coordinated via shared intelligence information among combatant commands, interagency partners, and the National Interdiction Centers, which includes PACOM's Joint Interagency Task Force-West. I believe synchronization between combatant commands is critical to counterdrug operations, and even more important is bringing to bear the resources of the Nation (a whole-of-government approach) to truly achieve unity of effort. If confirmed, I will continue to foster a strong relationship with PACOM.

**Question.** If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose?

Answer. If confirmed, I will examine NORTHCOM's relationship with the other combatant commands and determine if any changes are needed.

**Question.** How would you recommend that the success of the Department's counter-narcotics programs be measured?

Answer. As I've served in many capacities over the last 10 years of my career as a Commanding General, I've seen that being a commander is a time for assessing how command missions are being executed and then taking appropriate actions as needed. If confirmed, I commit to looking closely at the current capabilities and partnering efforts in place, as well as the resultant effects, and provide you my thoughts on this important effort.

**Question.** Do you believe that the current programs that the Department is pursuing are the most effective for the region, or should the Department's efforts focus elsewhere?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to developing my personal views regarding the Department's programs for Mexico and its neighbors to improve the success of countering the threats from TCOs.

**Question.** Compared to other missions that you would be responsible for as Commander, NORTHCOM, if confirmed, where would you rank counter-narcotics in terms of its contribution to our national security and the ability of DOD to make a meaningful contribution?

Answer. I believe that there is no higher priority mission for NORTHCOM than to defend the United States and its interests. Yet, countering the devastating effects related to the TCOs and its importance relative to U.S. national security is a very
important mission for NORTHCOM, and thus I would rank NORTHCOM’s role in counternarcotics high. If confirmed, I look forward to contributing to the counter-narcotics effort within the authorities granted to NORTHCOM.

**Question.** There has been a surge in drug-related violence in Mexico over the past year, which has increased the risk of cross-border violence into the United States. Much of the drug supply comes into Mexico across its southern border. The vast majority of Latin America, however, is in the SOUTHCOM AOR, so the security situation in Mexico is an example of the need for a well-coordinated effort between NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM.

What is your vision of how SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM could work together in a fully coordinated and seamless fashion with respect to Mexico and other security challenges?

**Answer.** I support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s belief that efforts to disrupt illicit sources and transit zones must be coordinated across North, Central, and South America, and the Caribbean. If confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to work with SOUTHCOM, the interagency community, and my Mexican counterparts to develop a regional strategy that harnesses the valuable lessons learned from Joint Interagency Task Force-South and the Mexican military’s experience in confronting TCOs.

**Question.** The United States and Mexico announced in 2007, the start of a multiyear, bilateral security agreement called the Mérida Initiative. This Initiative aims to combat drug trafficking and other criminal activity along the U.S.-Mexican border, as well as in Central America. The U.S.-Mexican border is viewed as especially important for U.S. counternarcotics efforts because Mexico is currently the primary point of entry for cocaine and other drug shipments smuggled into the United States.

What is your understanding of the Mérida Initiative as it relates to NORTHCOM?

**Answer.** I believe the Mérida Initiative has placed us on the road to success in terms of the strong U.S. commitment to shared responsibility in countering the threat from TCOs in North America. The military contribution to the Mérida Initiative is a relatively modest portion of the total package of support, most of which is law enforcement-related and is now making a significant positive impact in Mexico. The long-term success will depend on Mexico’s capacity to sustain and advance short-term gains, and to give communities the confidence that they can restore the rule of law.

**Question.** What is your view of the appropriate role of DOD in countering transnational drug cartels and gangs?

**Answer.** In my view, the Department’s role in countering TCOs is one of support for other U.S. Government efforts and our Mexican partners as well. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM is focused on contributing to the success of the objectives framed by the Beyond Mérida Initiative: disrupt TCOs; promote justice, and the rule of law; build strong and resilient communities; and create a 21st century border. To these ends, the Department is focused on contributing the necessary capabilities and support to disrupt, degrade, or defeat TCOs’ abilities that would negatively affect the national security and interests of United States and partner nations.

**SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS WITH CANADA AND MEXICO**

**Question.** The NORTHCOM AOR includes the land areas of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The bi-national NORAD Command ensures close cooperation between the United States and Canada on security matters. NORTHCOM has been working with the Mexican military on security cooperation related to Mexico’s efforts to counter TCOs that are involved in trafficking and causing extraordinary violence. Joint Task Force-North (JTF–N) has established itself as a active partner with U.S. law enforcement, mitigating cross border threats posed by trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and humans.

What is your assessment of the current security relationship between the United States and Canada?

**Answer.** Canada and the United States are close friends, allies, and trading partners. U.S. defense arrangements with Canada pre-date World War II and are one of our country’s most extensive defense pacts. Canada and the United States view North American defense and security as shared responsibilities. NORAD is symbolic of this close defense relationship and has served as the epitome of the unique and long-lasting security cooperation relationship between our Nations for over 55 years.

I believe the NORAD and NORTHCOM relationship with Canada is exceptionally strong, especially the relationship that has been developed with Canada Command.
If confirmed, I will be honored to contribute to the long-standing partnership our country shares with Canada.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the current security relationship between the United States and Mexico?

**Answer.** My view is that the current security relationship between the U.S. and Mexican military is at its highest level ever at all echelons of command. If confirmed, I look forward to building upon many personal and professional relationships that have been formed by NORTHCOM. As discussed between the Presidents of Mexico and the United States in March 2011, the countries are strategic partners with shared responsibilities in the fight against the TCOs affecting the safety and security of North America.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the current security relationship between the United States and Mexico?

**Answer.** I believe that in today's increasingly globalized world, the prosperity and security of our friends and neighbors in North and Central America directly impact the welfare of the United States. Narcotics continue to be a significant security challenge to the United States and as long as there is demand within our borders, cash and weapons will continue to find their way into the hands of TCOs. TCOs not only traffic illicit drugs, they are involved in other significant criminal activity, such as extortion, robbery, kidnapping, trafficking in firearms and persons, and as evident in the 400 percent increase in violence over the past 3 years, they are extremely ruthless and brutal. Many of the TCOs are better financed and armed than many of the Mexican law enforcement agencies. This situation presents a substantial security challenge to the United States as it devastates the communities of our Mexican friends.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the security challenges to the United States posed by TCOs in Mexico?

**Answer.** I believe that in today's increasingly globalized world, the prosperity and security of our friends and neighbors in North and Central America directly impact the welfare of the United States. Narcotics continue to be a significant security challenge to the United States and as long as there is demand within our borders, cash and weapons will continue to find their way into the hands of TCOs. TCOs not only traffic illicit drugs, they are involved in other significant criminal activity, such as extortion, robbery, kidnapping, trafficking in firearms and persons, and as evident in the 400 percent increase in violence over the past 3 years, they are extremely ruthless and brutal. Many of the TCOs are better financed and armed than many of the Mexican law enforcement agencies. This situation presents a substantial security challenge to the United States as it devastates the communities of our Mexican friends.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the security challenges to the United States posed by TCOs in Mexico?

**Answer.** I believe that the current security relationship between the U.S. and Mexican military is at its highest level ever at all echelons of command. If confirmed, I look forward to building upon many personal and professional relationships that have been formed by NORTHCOM. As discussed between the Presidents of Mexico and the United States in March 2011, the countries are strategic partners with shared responsibilities in the fight against the TCOs affecting the safety and security of North America.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the security challenges to the United States posed by TCOs in Mexico?

**Answer.** I believe that the current security relationship between the U.S. and Mexican military is at its highest level ever at all echelons of command. If confirmed, I look forward to building upon many personal and professional relationships that have been formed by NORTHCOM. As discussed between the Presidents of Mexico and the United States in March 2011, the countries are strategic partners with shared responsibilities in the fight against the TCOs affecting the safety and security of North America.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the security situation along the U.S.-Mexico border?

**Answer.** Responsibility for security along the U.S.-Mexico border falls under the responsibility of DHS. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the DHS and many others in the interagency community and, when directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, providing DOD support to civil authorities.

**Question.** What improvements in border protection capability, if any, would you recommend?

**Answer.** Since DHS is responsible for advocating for border protection capabilities, I would defer this question to the DHS.

**Question.** What is your understanding of NORTHCOM's support to civil authorities operating along the southern border?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that NORTHCOM supports civil authorities when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM has partnered with U.S. Customs and Border Protection and other interagency community partners to provide DOD capabilities along the U.S. southern border.

**Question.** What improvements in border protection capability, if any, would you recommend?

**Answer.** Since DHS is responsible for advocating for border protection capabilities, I would defer this question to the DHS.

**Question.** If confirmed, what would be your goals as Commander of NORTHCOM for improving security relations with Mexico, and how would you plan to achieve them?

**Answer.** If confirmed, my primary goal will be to continue to support the Mexican military to combat the threat of TCOs as effectively as possible while fully respecting Mexican sovereignty. The Mexican military has been asked by its civilian leadership to actively support Mexican law enforcement agencies to combat TCOs, while respecting Mexico's democratic ideals and the Nation’s commitment to the Rule of Law and Human Rights. Mexican Security Forces have exhibited exemplary moral, political, and physical courage in combating TCOs. This struggle is being conducted on Mexican soil and Mexican families are being impacted by the recent escalation in TCO-related violence. If confirmed, I support NORTHCOM plans to continue to increase senior level Distinguished Visitor engagements, Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, Mobile Training Teams, and exercises with the Mexican Military to better counter the TCO threat.

**UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES**

**Question.** Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight within the continental United States is severely restricted including portions of the Canadian and Mexican bor-
ders. The Federal Aviation Administration is studying how to integrate unmanned systems and conventionally piloted aircraft in the same airspace.

In your view, have airspace restrictions on unmanned aerial systems (UAS) hindered the development and evolution of these aircraft?

Answer. In my view, airspace management is more of a challenge to UAV employment, than it is to development and evolution.

Question. Would you recommend opening larger parcels of airspace within the continental United States to UAS/UAV over flight?

Answer. It is my understanding that only the Secretary of Defense may approve the use of unmanned aircraft systems for defense support of civil operations, including Federal, State, local, and tribal government organizations. If confirmed, in that case, I would coordinate airspace requirements for an operation with the lead agency.

NORTHCOM-STATE RELATIONS

Question. NORTHCOM has the primary military responsibility to provide defense support to civil authorities when directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, including consequence management operations. Such military assistance would support Federal assistance to State and local emergency response units.

In your view, is it important for NORTHCOM to have an understanding of the emergency response capabilities and plans of the various States before a crisis arises, in order to optimize NORTHCOM's consequence management support to civil authorities?

Answer. Yes. It is my belief that State forces for consequence management, including the new Homeland Response Forces (HRF), are integral components of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise. It is my understanding that the State National Guards, the National Guard Bureau and interagency partners such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency have participated in NORTHCOM's development of a plan for CBRN response. I believe that this unprecedented level of cooperation will ensure the success of the CBRN Response Enterprise in the whole-of-government response to a CBRN attack or incident.

Question. If so, how would you plan to ensure that NORTHCOM has sufficient knowledge of State emergency response capabilities, including capabilities of National Guard units, capabilities of title 10 Reserve component forces, and a good working relationship with State emergency response leaders?

Answer. I understand NORTHCOM has an array of initiatives and efforts to sustain awareness of civil support requirements, including robust relationships between Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense Coordinating Elements and State emergency officials within their Federal Emergency Management Agency regions; the establishment of the Regional Desk Officer program at NORTHCOM headquarters; direct interaction with their assigned states by Title 10 Deputy Commanders under the Dual-Status Commander concept; and participation in state planning for HRFs as part of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise. In addition, DOD has established the policy and procedures to share operational plans with mission critical partners, to include Title 10 Reserve component forces, the National Guard of the States, and the National Guard Dual-Status Commanders. It is my belief that these efforts will enhance shared awareness of state military response plans and requirements. If confirmed, I will continue to support unity of effort in this important area.

FORCE PROVISION FOR NORTHCOM

Question. NORTHCOM has the mission of conducting military operations for homeland defense and, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, for providing military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management for natural disasters and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) incidents. Yet NORTHCOM has relatively few military forces assigned to it on a permanent basis.

What is your understanding of how forces are planned to be allocated to NORTHCOM for its full range of mission requirements?

Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM's contingency plans and orders for all assigned missions contain force requirements that are allocated by joint force providers. Forces are not normally identified and sourced until just prior to a planned event or impending incident, or immediately after a no-warning incident. The exceptions are the standing Execute Orders for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management response forces and the Homeland Defense Quick Reaction Force/Rapid Response Force. Additionally, under the De-
fense Support of Civil Authorities Operations Standing Execute Order, the NORTHCOM Commander has the authority to place certain military capabilities on a 24-hour prepare-deploy order in advance of or in response to a contingency or national emergency.

**Question.** If confirmed, how do you intend to ensure that NORTHCOM will have sufficient forces available to it, properly trained and equipped, to accomplish its assigned missions?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I intend to use the established Force Allocation Process to identify NORTHCOM's force requirements for each of its unique assigned missions to the joint force providers to ensure that allocated forces are prepared to support homeland defense and civil support missions. If confirmed, I will ensure that those requirements are matched with trained, equipped, and ready forces that meet NORTHCOM's mission requirements, using the Defense Readiness Reporting System to review unit readiness and training metrics.

**Question.** If confirmed, how will you monitor the personnel, equipment, and training readiness of U.S. military forces (Active and Reserve) for homeland defense mission-essential tasks in support of NORTHCOM's contingency plans, and for its defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) missions?

**Answer.** I understand that NORTHCOM has the ability to track the readiness (personnel, equipment, and training) of all DOD forces within its AOR. This includes both Title 10 and Title 32 forces, using the Defense Readiness Reporting System. For units assigned to NORTHCOM missions, if confirmed, I will work with the Services and the National Guard Bureau to validate their readiness.

**NORTHCOM–DHS RELATIONSHIP**

**Question.** DHS is still a relatively new Federal agency, and is continuing to improve its ability to meet its homeland security missions.

As the DHS improves and matures its homeland security capabilities, do you expect that will reduce the demands on NORTHCOM to provide defense support to civil authorities, including support for crisis response planning?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that DHS capabilities to respond to disasters continues to improve and that the relationship between DOD and DHS is very strong. However, I believe that NORTHCOM will have an enduring mission to provide DOD support and capabilities to civil authorities in accordance with the National Response Framework.

**Question.** What do you consider to be the appropriate role for DOD and NORTHCOM's vis-a-vis DHS and State authorities in identifying and validating the dual-use equipment and other requirements associated with defense and homeland security missions?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the role of NORTHCOM, in close coordination with other DOD entities, identifies dual-use equipment required to support civil authorities in natural or manmade disasters. I believe this is an appropriate role for DOD and if confirmed, I look forward to working with DHS and the States to identify equipment requirements.

**RESPONSE TO CHRISTMAS DAY AIRCRAFT BOMB PLOT**

**Question.** There has been considerable confusion about the events surrounding the attempted bombing of a commercial U.S. aircraft over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.

Do you believe that NORTHCOM or NORAD have any responsibility for apprehending, detaining, or interrogating a terrorist suspect who tries to destroy an aircraft in flight inside U.S. airspace? If so, what is that role?

**Answer.** No. I believe U.S. law enforcement agencies have the sole responsibility for the apprehension, detention, and interrogation of any individual alleged to have committed a criminal act within U.S. airspace.

**NATIONAL GUARD**

**Question.** There is still debate about the role the National Guard should play in homeland security and defense. In an April 21, 2008, letter to the committee concerning the recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote that, "I have some concerns about the Commission's ideas on enhancing the Defense Department's role in the Homeland. While Reserve component civil support requirements are important, they should not be of equal importance to DOD combat responsibilities."

**Question.** Do you agree with this view of Admiral Mullen?
Answer. Yes. All of our Armed Forces are organized, trained, and equipped for their primary mission to fight and win our Nation’s wars. There are key roles the Total Force plays in civil support missions and it is important that our forces remained postured that important mission.

Question. Do you believe that defending the homeland or civil support should become the National Guard’s primary missions?

Answer. No. It is my belief that the National Guard as a part of the Total Force has a critical responsibility in homeland defense and civil support missions, but should not be limited from participating in other vital DOD missions.

Question. What is the current status of the working relationship between NORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and individual State National Guard headquarters?

Answer. It is my understanding that Admiral Winnefeld has greatly enhanced the cooperation and collaboration among NORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and individual States’ Guard headquarters. If confirmed, one of my priorities will be to ensure that these relationships continue to expand and mature as a natural extension of planning and executing NORTHCOM’s missions.

Question. If confirmed, what type of liaison relationships for planning and operational purposes would you advocate between NORTHCOM, DHS, Federal, State, and local first responders, and National Guard units under State authority?

Answer. My experience in Afghanistan and Iraq solidified my belief in strong and transparent relationships with liaisons at all levels to coordinate and collaborate for planning and operational details. If confirmed, I will continue to enhance existing partnerships between all of NORTHCOM mission partners, and where appropriate, forge new relationships.

DUAL-STATUS COMMAND ARRANGEMENT

Question. The administration, including Defense Department and NORTHCOM leadership, has been working with the Council of Governors to define appropriate means for Federal military support to the states in the event of natural disasters or other disasters. This effort has apparently produced agreement on a Joint Action Plan, and on the concept for using “dual-status commanders” in each State to ensure that Federal military forces are able to support the needs of the Governors. What is your understanding of the Department’s plan of action with respect to implementing the agreement on a Joint Action Plan?

Answer. My understanding is that the Council of Governors, DHS, and DOD endorsed the Memorandum of Agreement with the States earlier this month, paving the way for a Dual-Status Commander in each of the States and territories. I believe that NORTHCOM supports the DOD position to endorse the Joint Action Plan.

Question. Do you support this effort to establish appropriate command and control arrangements between the states and the Federal Government to ensure that Federal military forces, including the Reserves, are available to support the needs of the Governors in time of crisis?

Answer. Yes. I understand the dual-status command construct has been agreed to by the Governors and the DOD as a mechanism to strengthen unity of effort and improve speed of response to domestic emergency operations when Federal support has been requested and approved. If confirmed, I intend to continue to support the rapid and effective delivery of capabilities to citizens in need in order to mitigate the effects of major disasters or emergencies, whether natural or manmade, when directed by the Secretary of Defense or the President.

Question. If confirmed, would you plan to continue working with the Council of Governors to improve coordination and collaboration between the Federal and state levels of government on the use of military forces for emergency response?

Answer. I believe that the Council of Governors has been integral in the formulation of the Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort, advancing the Dual-Status Commander Memorandum of Agreement, and supporting legislation to allow Reserve mobilization for events that require DOD support of civil authorities. If confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to work with the Council to continue important progress in many areas aimed at improving our ability to meet our mission requirements and the needs of the citizens we serve.

CBRNE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

Question. NORTHCOM has two primary missions: Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), including preparation for and response to an incident or attack involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) materials or weapons, in the NORTHCOM AOR.
If confirmed, how would you approach the challenge of ensuring adequate military forces, capabilities, and plans to respond to such incidents in support of civil authorities?

Answer. I fully understand that failure is not an option in any CBRN response, and that speed is essential when responding. Moreover, I also understand that our partnership with the National Guard Bureau, the States, and other Federal agencies is critical to success, both in planning and in execution.

If confirmed, I intend to leverage my predecessor’s efforts in continuing to work closely with the National Guard Bureau, the States, and the Services to ensure all forces established to accomplish this mission are, and remain, properly manned, trained, and equipped, and that response timelines and command and control relationships during execution of this mission are clearly understood and verified.

Question. There are currently a variety of organizations and units intended for CBRNE response and consequence management, including JTF–CS, the Defense Consequence Management Response Force (DCMRF), the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) units, and National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD–CSTs).

If confirmed, how would you plan to manage this mix of capabilities to ensure the best possible response force to support civil authorities in the event of a CBRNE incident, and to avoid unnecessary duplication?

Answer. I understand the existing two CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRFs) have, to this point, provided a responsive and flexible capability with federally-controlled forces that are trained, equipped, exercised, evaluated, and employed by NORTHCOM to respond to near-simultaneous incidents. The existing CCMRFs will stand down at the end of this fiscal year to establish the new CBRN Response Enterprise, directed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

I am also aware that the 2010 QDR directed the establishment of regional CBRN response capability by the National Guard, called HRFs, in order to leverage geographic proximity to quicken the response. I understand that establishment of the HRFs is ongoing, and recognize that challenges are likely as we fully implement the CBRN response enterprise concept.

If confirmed, I will closely partner with the National Guard Bureau, and the States, to ensure implementation of the new CBRN Response Enterprise is completed as directed by the 2010 QDR and that existing forces are ready to answer the call when needed.

Question. What is your assessment of the ability of the revised DOD Consequence Management Response Forces (DCMRF), as currently constituted, to provide a significant capability to support Federal civil authorities in the event of a CBRNE incident?

Answer. My assessment is that each of these forces presents complementary capabilities that enhance an overall CBRN Consequence Management response. I understand that the new Defense CBRN Response Force is a relatively large force (5,200 personnel) that contains the required centralized capabilities to integrate with and support a Federal response under the National Response Framework. These capabilities include search and extraction, patient decontamination, medical triage and stabilization, air and ground casualty evacuation, mortuary affairs, information dissemination, communications, logistics, and a command and control structure to support integration of follow on forces.

If confirmed, I look forward to seeing the readiness and capability of these forces and I will report to the committee if I determine there are any significant concerns.

Question. How would you ensure the necessary level of coordination and planning between the DCMRF and National Guard HRFs to ensure an adequate response to a CBRNE incident?

Answer. I understand that under the new CBRN Response Enterprise, planning activities are linked between States hosting regional HRFs and NORTHCOM to ensure integration between State and Federal plans. HRF plans are designed to support the States within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region and also a national response. Therefore, HRF plans support the NORTHCOM Concept Plan (CONPLAN) and likewise, the NORTHCOM CONPLAN supports regional HRF plans. As I understand it, the National Guard Bureau and U.S. Army North have been closely collaborating during the development of these plans and if confirmed, I intend to further strengthen planning relationships and integrate other activities, such as readiness exercises to ensure an adequate, effective, and integrated response.
Question. Do you believe that U.S. military forces providing Defense Support to Civil Authorities in the event of CBRNE incidents should be under the command of the Commander, NORTHCOM?

Answer. When Federal forces respond to a CBRN incident, it would be at the request, and in support of the State Governor(s). If title 10 forces do respond, I believe the Dual-Status Command arrangement may also be identified as a way to command and control these forces to achieve unity of effort. During execution, Federal forces can anticipate mission assignments, as permitted under the National Response Framework, but must always remain in consultation with State Governors and the designated Federal primary agency.

WMD–CSTS AND CERFPs

Question. There is now at least 1 National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team (WMD–CST) in each of the 54 States and territories, and there are 17 National Guard CERFP units. In addition, there are 10 HRFs planned, 1 in each FEMA Region.

Do you believe the WMD–CSTs and CERFPs are appropriately organized, sized, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions?

Answer. It is my understanding that the States’ WMD–CSTs are appropriately organized, sized, trained and equipped to accomplish their assigned mission. If confirmed, I will review how NORTHCOM supports the training and readiness of WMD–CSTs through its Army component, U.S. Army North to ensure that they can accomplish their missions.

Question. If not, what changes do you believe are needed?

Answer. If confirmed, as DOD implements the new CBRN Response Enterprise, I will look for opportunities to recommend adjustments to the Enterprise to ensure a rapid and effective response to mitigate the effects of a CBRN incident on our citizens.

CYBERSECURITY

Question. DOD recently issued its cybersecurity strategy. Cyber threats could affect both our military and civilian sectors in the United States, public and private. What is NORTHCOM’s current role in cybersecurity within its Area of Operations, and how does it relate to the cybersecurity role of DHS?

Answer. DHS is the lead Federal agency for national security policy and programs. I understand NORTHCOM is in a supporting role to the DHS. STRATCOM and its subordinate command, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), will support the technical aspects of mitigating a major cyber attack. NORTHCOM, in its role of protecting critical infrastructure within the homeland, will provide physical support to the DHS as part of the defense support of civil authorities’ mission. If confirmed, I will work with the DHS to further refine these relationships.

Question. What is the relationship between NORTHCOM and CYBERCOM?

Answer. My understanding is that NORTHCOM works with STRATCOM and CYBERCOM on cyber issues ranging from attack mitigation to network defense. NORTHCOM is generally in support of physical aspects, while CYBERCOM leads on the virtual front from within the .mil domain.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY COOPERATION

Question. The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), which replaced the School of the Americas in 2001, has the mission of contributing to theater cooperation activities through the education and training of students in the Western Hemisphere from Canada to Chile. If confirmed, you will be a member of the WHINSEC Board of Visitors.

What is the relationship between NORTHCOM and WHINSEC?

Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM serves on the Board of Visitors (BoV) for WHINSEC, which provides for an opportunity to contribute to the curriculum and ensure compliance with U.S. laws and policy. If confirmed, I look forward to serving on the WHINSEC BoV.

Question. In your view, does WHINSEC promote the national security interests of the United States in the Western Hemisphere?

Answer. Yes, I see WHINSEC as a school that teaches and influences future Latin American leaders in military topics as well as human rights. It is my belief WHINSEC’s education and training have had a significant impact on the Latin American leaders in attendance annually from military, law enforcement, and civilian institutions.

Question. In your view, how should NORTHCOM participate in command oversight and curriculum development?
Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM is already participating in command oversight and curriculum development for WHINSEC. In addition, the Commander of NORTHCOM serves on the WHINSEC Board of Visitors (BoV), which reviews and advises on areas such as curriculum, academic instruction, and fiscal affairs of the Institute, and if confirmed, I will continue this support. I believe the WHINSEC BoV reviews provide an invaluable contribution to ensure relevance and consistency with U.S. policy, laws, regulations, and doctrine.

Question. In your view, what more, if anything, does WHINSEC need to do to emphasize human rights in its curriculum?

Answer. I believe that WHINSEC must continue to emphasize human rights in its curriculum and address the concerns of human rights organizations. If confirmed, I will take a close look at this critical portion of the curriculum and advocate for any changes, if needed.

Question. In your view, how can WHINSEC improve its outreach efforts to individuals or groups interested in its activities, particularly those who have accused the school of contributing to human rights violations by former students?

Answer. I have not formed an opinion on this critical issue. If confirmed, I look forward to serving on the Board of Visitors and developing initiatives for broadened outreach efforts in support of their overall mission.

Question. If confirmed, will you attend the WHINSEC Board of Visitors' annual meeting?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will be honored to serve on the WHINSEC Board of Visitors and attend the annual meetings.

INTELLIGENCE SHARING/NCTC

Question. What is NORTHCOM's role and involvement in developing intelligence assessments regarding terrorist threats?

Answer. It is my understanding that NORAD and NORTHCOM's Intelligence Directorate receives raw reports, information and analysis from other intelligence agencies and organizations within the Intelligence Community and within DOD. Command terrorism analysts review this information for threats to the NORTHCOM AOR. This information is analyzed and then developed into original threat assessments that are provided to the Commander, NORAD and NORTHCOM and component commands, tailored to support unique NORAD and NORTHCOM missions and responsibilities. This analysis is also provided to the wider Intelligence Community (IC) at large to supplement analysis and assessments generated by the other elements of the IC, adding to the greater collective body of information.

Question. What intelligence agencies are involved in providing input to U.S. NORTHCOM's staff for the development of intelligence assessments?

Answer. I understand that NORTHCOM receives and has access to information from all members of the Intelligence Community, as well as members of select Federal law enforcement entities. This information provided by other mission partners is the basis for Command analytic assessments and intelligence products. Multiple Intelligence organizations also provide senior liaisons to NORTHCOM to ensure seamless integration of analysis and operations. NORTHCOM liaison officers are likewise embedded in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Joint Terrorism Task Force, the DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and Canadian Defence Intelligence staff to ensure a synchronized understanding of significant terrorist threats that could necessitate command responses or preparedness.

Question. What is the current relationship between NORTHCOM and NCTC?

Answer. It is my understanding that in addition to the terrorism analyst NORTHCOM assigns to the NCTC, NORTHCOM terrorism analysts work collaboratively and frequently with NCTC analysts focused on terrorist threats to North America. The Command frequently sends analysts to support NCTC working groups and conferences to ensure Command visibility into developing threats which may impact NORTHCOM mission sets, particularly Force Protection, threats to the aviation sector, or threats with potential Weapons of Mass Destruction and Consequence Management implications. Command terrorism analysts also periodically augment NCTC analytic elements during National Special Security Events or other special events as appropriate.

Question. Does NORTHCOM have representatives located at the NCTC on a daily basis? If so, what are their functions and responsibilities? If not, why not?

Answer. Yes. NORTHCOM has a full-time civilian intelligence officer billet assigned to the Directorate of Intelligence in the NCTC. Additionally, NORTHCOM has assigned an active duty officer as an operations representative to the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning at the NCTC. The objectives for these ar-
rangements are to produce homeland threat analysis for the NCTC, while ensuring the Command has visibility into homeland threats that may affect NORTHCOM mission sets.

Question. Do you believe NORTHCOM representatives at NCTC have the access to intelligence needed to fully perform their functions?

Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM’s analyst embedded in the NCTC has excellent access to terrorist threat information, including information not shared directly with the Command or other DOD elements. NORTHCOM continues to work with NCTC to find the balance between greater information sharing and protecting sensitive operations, investigations, and sources.

Question. How do posse comitatus, privacy restrictions, and other laws and regulations concerning the collection of intelligence within the United States, affect the way U.S. NORTHCOM receives and uses intelligence?

Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM is extremely careful to comply fully with intelligence oversight law and policy in conducting all intelligence activities in support of its mission. If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure all intelligence activities conducted in support of NORTHCOM operations continue to be reviewed by intelligence oversight specialists, thus ensuring the Command completely complies with law and policy.

**BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

Question. One of NORTHCOM’s missions is the defense of the United States against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack from nations such as North Korea and Iran. The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review report stated as one of its policy priorities: “Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic conditions.”

Do you agree that it is essential that our deployed ballistic missile defense systems are operationally effective?

Answer. Yes. Our deployed missile defense system provides a defensive capability against a limited number of missiles launched by potential adversary rogue nations. The spiral development process used to develop this capability relies in part on ensuring the defensive capabilities we have are indeed operationally effective. If confirmed, I will continue to work with all responsible agencies to ensure the system is operationally effective.

Question. Do you agree that it is important to conduct operationally realistic flight tests to demonstrate the operational capability and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system?

Answer. Yes. The ballistic missile defense capability now fielded used a capability-based development process. This process allowed the United States to rapidly field a capability to meet the emerging threat posed by rogue nations developing long-range ballistic missiles. An essential part of that development process is an operationally-realistic testing program to verify the capabilities being fielded and ensure a complete understanding of those capabilities by all of the commands and agencies who support this mission and will employ these systems. Because our missile defense capabilities were tested and then fielded following processes to ensure operational effectiveness, we have a more complete understanding of our missile defense capabilities, and can continue to improve those capabilities over time to ensure we outpace developments in the threat.

Question. Do you support the continued modernization and sustainment of the GMD system?

Answer. I believe that continued modernization ensures the Ground Missile Defense (GMD) system will pace ahead of the threat. Continued sustainment of the GMD system ensures that the capabilities the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has already developed and fielded will be ready when needed.

Question. Do you believe that understanding and correcting the GMD program should be the MDA’s highest priority?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of the MDA to balance the needs to continually assess and maintain our current system with development of future capabilities, as I explain my requirements as the combatant commander responsible for operation of the ground missile defense system.

Question. The GMD system has experienced two successive flight test failures, and the Director of the MDA is working to fully understand and correct the problems that caused the December 2010 flight test failure, including verifying the correction with two flight tests, before resuming production of the kill vehicles for GMD interceptors.
Do you agree that we should verify the successful correction of the flight test failure problem through extensive testing, and demonstrate that the system works before resuming production of the interceptor kill vehicles?

Answer. Yes. I understand the ballistic missile defense system is based on a design, test, fix, and deploy process. The MDA's efforts to do extensive analysis of the failure and follow that with several tests to verify the success of the fix prior to continuing production and delivery of new exoatmospheric kill vehicles (EKV) is in line with this process. Fixing the EKV problems now on the production line will ensure we do not need to potentially invest additional dollars in the future to repair faulty EKVs.

Question. What priority would you give to the funding of planned work deferred as a result of such remediation efforts?

Answer. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review stated homeland defense is the primary concern for any current or future Ballistic Missile Defense and Ground-Based Missile Defense programs. I understand the MDA continues to keep that foremost in their development of all ballistic missile capabilities. If confirmed, I will work with the MDA, as well as combatant commanders and agencies supporting missile defense capabilities, to ensure the systems we need for future threats is appropriately balanced against the risk of any deferment of work.

MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

Question. The United States and NATO are pursuing efforts at missile defense cooperation with Russia against common missile threats from Iran. President Obama has made clear that any such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.

Do you agree that missile defense cooperation with Russia could enhance our security and, if so, what security benefits do you believe might be available through such cooperation?

Answer. Yes. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review outlined opportunities to partner with Russia to enhance overall missile defense security. Missile defense capabilities provide a mutually beneficial path to deter rogue nations and terrorist organizations from deploying and employing ballistic missiles. By cooperating with Russia, we can focus on the deterrence benefits that such capabilities provide and strengthen each nation’s overall defensive capabilities without limiting either's national interests. I believe there is little political or defensive cost to pursuing such cooperation and much to be gained by doing so.

Question. Do you believe that the United States is committed to the continued development of U.S. missile defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative improvements, should go forward without regard to Russian objections?

Answer. It is my belief that the pace of our missile defense development should be based on how the threat develops in order to stay ahead of that threat. I believe there is great opportunity to work with the Russians, given our mutual concerns for the defense of our Nation's individual interests, while adequately addressing their concerns over the development of our defensive capability and capacity.

OTHER MILITARY COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

Question. The United States and Russia are engaged in a variety of security cooperation efforts. Last year, the two nations conducted a joint exercise simulating a coordinated response to a hijacked aircraft crossing into our respective airspace, an exercise named “Vigilant Eagle.”

Do you believe such exercises and cooperative efforts enhance our security and, if confirmed, would you plan to continue such cooperation and other military-to-military contacts?

Answer. Yes. I strongly believe cooperative exercises like Vigilant Eagle enhance national security, and if confirmed, I will fully support continuation and expansion of this type of military-to-military contact. Bilateral exercises enhance our security in a variety of ways and serve as a template for future exercise events. These efforts expand transparency and cooperation between NORAD and the Russian military, fostering shared understanding and mutual respect. From an operational perspective, these exercises serve a very real purpose by testing and validating procedures between NORAD and Russian Federation Air Force (RFAF) in the event of an airborne terrorist event (e.g., a hijacked aircraft that transits between the NORAD and RFAF Areas of Operations). If such an event would transpire, both NORAD and the Russian Federation will be much better prepared to deal with the emergency.
CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. NORTHCOM and NORAD have responsibilities for warning and defending the United States against airborne threats, including cruise missiles. Relative to cruise missile defense, what do you believe should be the relationship between the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) of the Joint Staff, on the one hand, and NORTHCOM and NORAD, on the other hand?

Answer. I believe the work that the JIAMDO and NORAD and NORTHCOM are doing is inextricably linked. Previous commanders have developed a great working relationship with JIAMDO over the years and, if confirmed, I will continue to cultivate that partnership through our liaison officers and direct interaction at all levels.

Question. Relative to the full spectrum of threats to the United States, how would you assess the cruise missile threat to the United States and its territories?

Answer. I believe that although a cruise missile attack is possible, it is unlikely to occur from a nation state without significant indications, warnings, and a deterioration of relationships; I also believe terrorists will continue to focus on less technical and less expensive means to attack the United States. Based on that, I believe the threat of a cruise missile attack is low, but if confirmed, I will continue to pursue efforts to ensure we have a robust capability to defend against such attacks.

Question. If confirmed, what capabilities would you prioritize to address this threat?

Answer. If confirmed, I will consider numerous ongoing initiatives such as improvements to the Wide Area Surveillance network to meet cruise missile and other low altitude threats to North America. If confirmed, I would also continue to support ongoing efforts that the Services and interagency community are making to upgrade fighter aircraft and ground-based missile defense radars to detect and, if required, engage and destroy low radar-cross section and low altitude targets. In addition, if confirmed, I will emphasize the continued need for a rapidly-deployable integrated air and missile defense capability that can be used to protect national, high-interest security venues or critical infrastructure when required.

CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE

Question. How has the continental air defense mission changed since the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, 2001?

Answer. Both the mission and threat have changed significantly. Prior to the end of the Cold War, and as recently as September 11, 2001, NORAD was very much focused on looking to deter, detect, and defend against external threats approaching the United States and Canada from beyond our borders. However, since September 11, 2001, effectively executing the air defense mission now requires NORAD to look not only outward, but also within the borders of the United States and Canada to deter, detect, and defend against asymmetric threats originating from within our borders.

Question. Do you believe that current U.S. continental air defense capabilities are adequate to meet national security needs?

Answer. Yes. NORAD successfully defends the skies of the United States and Canada employing early warning radars, fighter aircraft, tanker aircraft, air/ground-based communication systems and ground-based missile systems as required to maintain aerospace control of the U.S. and Canada. NORAD also maintains a close relationship with the interagency community, sharing a network of vital information and intelligence necessary to provide a common operating picture to support air-control and air-intercept missions. NORAD continues to evaluate and upgrade its air defense capabilities to defend against not only tradition airborne threats, but new and emerging airborne threats.

Question. If confirmed, what capabilities and programs would you prioritize to address any identified deficiencies?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review NORAD’s air defense capabilities to assess their ability to meet national security needs. Should I identify any deficiencies, I will work with the Joint Staff and the Services to validate those requirements.

MARITIME WARNING AND MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS

Question. NORAD has gained the mission of Maritime Warning for North America. How does this mission fit into the larger Maritime Domain Awareness mission, and what role do you expect NORAD and NORTHCOM to have in Maritime Domain Awareness in the near term?

Answer. It is my understanding that the NORAD Maritime Warning mission relies upon Maritime Domain Awareness to develop a comprehensive shared under-
standing of the maritime operational environment and to issue binational warnings of maritime threats or attacks against North America. The Commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM coordinates with adjacent geographic combatant commanders, U.S. Government partner agencies, adjacent nations, and the commercial/private sector to further expand MDA in the NORAD Area of Operations and the NORTHCOM AOR through information sharing agreements, plans development, cooperative training, and acquisition of Maritime Domain Awareness sensors/tools.

If confirmed, I will look into the efficacy of the current NORAD Maritime Warning mission and provide the committee my views on this after I have had the opportunity to look at this further.

ARCTIC REGION MISSION

Question. The 2011 UCP realigned the boundaries of combatant command AOR in the Arctic region. NORTHCOM’s AOR now includes the Bering Strait and the North Pole. NORTHCOM was also tasked to become DOD’s advocate for Arctic capabilities. What is the practical effect of this assignment, and how has it changed NORTHCOM planning and operations?
Answer. The April 2011 UCP expands the roles and responsibilities of NORTHCOM by identifying NORTHCOM as the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities. The UCP also identifies two combatant commands with distinct AOR in the Arctic: U.S. European Command and NORTHCOM. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing and validating the NORTHCOM Commander’s Estimate on the Arctic, which I understand is in the final stages of coordination.

Question. What specific programs, if any, will you put in place if confirmed to identify and develop capabilities to protect and defend American sovereignty and interests in the Arctic region?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department, the interagency community, and international partners to examine what programs might be necessary to identify and develop capabilities needed to protect and defend our sovereignty.

LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

Question. Do you support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention? If so, please explain why.
Answer. Yes, I believe that joining the Convention protects and advances a broad range of U.S. interests, including navigational mobility and offshore resources. The Convention would protect and advance U.S. interests, bolster our national security, secure U.S. rights over extensive marine areas, and give the United States a seat at the table when our vital interests are at stake.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, NORTHCOM, and Commander, NORAD?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK BEGICH

THE ARCTIC

1. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, your predecessor, Admiral Winnefeld, was crafting a commander’s estimate on the Arctic for use within the Department of Defense (DOD) and examining how U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) can best support interagency partners in this region with search and rescue assets, humanitarian assistance, disaster response capabilities, and support to law enforcement. If confirmed, will you complete the estimate and what is the timeline for completion?

General Jacoby. It is my understanding that the initial NORTHCOM Commander’s Estimate is complete. However, it should be noted that the Estimate process is continuous so as to consider the operational environment, the nature of anticipated operations, and national and multinational strategic direction. The Estimate is currently being coordinated throughout the Department of Defense in anticipation of its presentation to the Secretary of Defense before the end of 2011. Once approved by the Secretary, NORTHCOM will socialize the Estimate with interagency partners, as well as with Canadian military and policy counterparts in early 2012, prior to being briefed on the Hill.

2. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, Alaska needs to play a key role in these initiatives since it is the only U.S. State in the Arctic. The Armed Forces in Alaska are accustomed to the climate, distance, geography, and overall operating environment and have much to offer NORTHCOM and other agencies. How do you see Alaska fitting into NORTHCOM’s support of interagency partners in the region?

General Jacoby. If confirmed, a critical area I intend to study as part of NORTHCOM’s ongoing Commander’s Estimate for the Arctic is how Alaska fits into NORTHCOM’s support of interagency partners. The 2011 Unified Command Plan expanded the command’s roles and responsibilities by identifying NORTHCOM as the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities. We will continue to use the Arctic Estimate to help inform how we can best support the Department, our interagency partners, and international partners in order to advance security, safety, and stability in the Arctic region.

3. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, have you considered sustaining Joint Task Force (JTF) Alaska as an entity for NORTHCOM to carry out support of agency partners in the Arctic? Why or why not?

General Jacoby. If confirmed, I will support sustaining the JTF–AK Support Element as NORTHCOM’s operational command and control headquarters for operations in Alaska and the Arctic. I understand Admiral Winnefeld realigned 12 positions (8 military and 4 civilian) from the NORTHCOM staff in Colorado Springs to the Support Element to perform planning and interagency coordination functions in Alaska. This, coupled with the matrixed support provided by U.S. Pacific Command’s (PACOM) Alaskan Command, appears to be a manageable solution. However, if confirmed, as organizational efficiencies are investigated within the Department, I expect there will likely be continued assessment to determine the most appropriate command and control arrangement to support accomplishment of NORTHCOM missions in Alaska and the Arctic.

4. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, 2008 saw a return of foreign flights on North American Aerospace Defense Command’s (NORAD) northern areas. While the foreign aircraft have not violated U.S. or Canadian airspace, many of the flights are unannounced requiring a response from the fighters in the Alaska NORAD region. With continued activity and the growing interest in the Arctic, would you concur that sustaining the response resources—the F–22s—at Alaska NORAD region are of critical importance?

General Jacoby. F–22s in Alaska enforce NORAD’s Aerospace Control mission by conducting Air Defense and Air Sovereignty operations in the Alaskan NORAD region. Part of the NORAD Aerospace Control mission includes identifying all air traffic entering North American airspace. Although indefinitely grounded at this time, when operational, F–22s provide advanced technological capabilities to track, intercept, and identify unknown aircraft in the Alaskan NORAD Region.
5. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Review set forth priorities for missile defense. One of the priorities is defending the Homeland against an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack by continuing to sustain and modernize the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. Do you support the policy of ensuring our Homeland is protected from an ICBM attack by a rogue nation or non-state actor?

General Jacoby. Yes. I support the policy of ensuring our Homeland is protected from an ICBM attack by a rogue nation or non-state actor following the priorities in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The BMDR took a holistic view at the different aspects of the U.S. missile defense strategy and its programs and specified that homeland defense was top priority. The missile defense system now fielded protects our Homeland against ICBM attacks from rogue or non-state actors.

6. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you support continued modernization and sustainment of the GMD system in support of this policy?

General Jacoby. Yes. The missile defense system that is now fielded protects our Homeland against ICBM attacks from rogue or non-state actors. I believe it is important to maintain this advantage by continuing to improve the GMD system and ensuring there are adequate capacity to counter limited threats as they evolve.

7. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you support the current hedge strategy for Homeland defense which includes the completion of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely for additional capacity and development of the two-stage interceptor?

General Jacoby. Yes. The current strategy gives the Nation a critical hedge beyond the program of record to respond to unforeseen threats, both in terms of capability and capacity for Homeland defense.

8. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, are you aware and supportive of the hedge strategy review that is currently underway to ensure risk is mitigated should the threat evolve sooner or more capable than anticipated?

General Jacoby. As the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, I have been very involved with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), NORTHCOM, and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in the hedge strategy review. I support the efforts of this review to mitigate risk should the threat evolve sooner or if the threat is more capable than anticipated.

9. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, although the MDA is still reviewing the number of additional interceptors required, there is a need to enhance the ground-based interceptor (GBI) inventory to ensure there are adequate assets for testing and stockpile sustainment. Do you support the procurement of additional interceptors?

General Jacoby. I believe it is prudent to continually reassess the number of GBIs we need as our capabilities and knowledge of potential threats mature. Based on the most recent threat assessment, it appears that the current number of 30 operational GBIs is sufficient.

10. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you support increasing protection of the east coast against an ICBM attack by building an In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS) Data Terminal (IDT) at Fort Drum?

General Jacoby. Yes. An east coast IFICS IDT will significantly enhance our ability to communicate with in-flight GBIs for protection of the east coast.

11. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, are you confident the IDT is sufficient enough to protect the east coast from a limited ICBM?

General Jacoby. Yes. Against today’s threat, I believe an east coast IFICS IDT enhances our ability to communicate with in-flight GBIs for protection of the east coast.

12. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, as the threat matures and if the nature of the attack becomes less limited, would the current GMD system still be sufficient enough to protect the east coast?

General Jacoby. Today, the current GMD system provides protection for the east coast. With the addition of the east coast IFICS IDT, that capability is enhanced. As the threat matures, or if the nature of the threat becomes less limited, and as
we gain better understanding of that threat, we will engage with the Department and with the MDA to ensure the Nation is postured to stay ahead of that threat.

13. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, if confirmed, will you continue to assess and evaluate options for defending the east coast as the threat evolves?

General Jacoby. Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to assess and evaluate options for defending the east coast and I will engage with the Department and with the MDA to ensure the Nation is postured to stay ahead of that threat.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

NATIONAL GUARD AND NORTHERN COMMAND

14. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Jacoby, given the vital role the National Guard plays in NORTHCOM’s operations, what benefits are there in having National Guard members in NORTHCOM’s leadership positions and decisionmaking processes?

General Jacoby. I understand that every day, there are close to 100 National Guard soldiers and airmen supporting the NORTHCOM headquarters from as many as 20 States. This includes one three-star, two two-star, and three one-star National Guard officers who serve as the NORTHCOM Deputy Commander, subordinate commanders and direct advisors. I believe this allows the command to leverage National Guard expertise and experience in executing the full spectrum of homeland defense and civil support missions. The command also benefits from their understanding of National Guard policies and programs to ensure the command’s planning and collaboration with National Guard forces are informed and effective.

STATE AND LOCAL CRISSES

15. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Jacoby, as you know well, NORTHCOM is charged with coordinating DOD resources with State/local first responders in the event of an attack or natural disaster. From my time as Governor, I know that all crises are local. It is critical that the Federal Government and NORTHCOM in particular reach out and develop relationships with State/local governments. Admiral Winnefeld had some important efforts with State Governors and National Guard units, but there is a lot that needs to be done to educate, understand, and partner with local cities and counties where appropriate. What specifically are your plans for working with State and local emergency responders?

General Jacoby. I believe that developing great relationships and establishing open communications with state and local emergency managers prior to a crisis are essential to any successful disaster response operation. If confirmed, I will support recently-added initiatives to enhance communications, such as the stand-up of a 10-person Regional Desk Office in HQ NORTHCOM to work closely with each of the 10 NORTHCOM Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs), who are Federal military officers that work on developing relationships with State and local officials on a daily basis. I believe that focus on understanding both State and Federal mission partners’ crisis management organizations, knowing their plans, and integrating the command’s planning process with those of NORTHCOM’s many mission partners is a vital component to ensure success. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM DCOs continue to hone DOD support options and work closely with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regional planners and state officials in developing detailed response timelines to potential crises. For example, during the recent flooding along the Mississippi River in Louisiana, a NORTHCOM DCO team, in coordination with FEMA Region VI partners, helped State and local search and rescue officials develop a specific, all-domain rescue plan that incorporated 10 Louisiana State agencies and 3 supporting Federal agencies. They also developed a Federal supporting plan that will be used during this year’s hurricane season. I support continuing to develop these types of relationships with various State and local officials in close coordination with FEMA partners and the National Guard Bureau.

16. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Jacoby, how would you approach responding to a medium- to large-scale terrorist attack in a major U.S. city?

General Jacoby. In the event of an attack, if confirmed, I would immediately begin posturing forces to respond to requests for assistance. As the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, I have seen over the past 18 months that the DOD has taken significant steps to improve its ability to support civilian authorities in responding to catastrophic incidents in major metropolitan areas, par-
particularly weapons of mass destruction attacks, but also major industrial accidents (such as the recent nuclear power plant disaster in Japan). Approximately 13,500 National Guard and Title 10 forces are now ready to respond, growing to 18,000 by 1 October 2012. These forces are trained and equipped to provide critical search and extraction, decontamination, emergency medical care, and medical evacuation in support of the Primary Federal Agency, the affected State, and local incident commanders. Many of these forces are on a very rapid response timeline and are prepared to deploy within hours in order to save lives and minimize human suffering within the critical initial 72 hours after an incident.

17. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Jacoby, in the event of an attack, how do you envision your role and the chain of command?

General Jacoby. In the event of a maritime or land attack on the U.S. Homeland, the Commander, NORTHCOM, would command and control Title 10 forces responding to the event, as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. In the event of an air attack on the U.S. Homeland, Commander, NORAD, would command and control title 10 fighter aircraft and land-based air defense capabilities as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

CYBER

18. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, more must be done both here in Congress and across the executive branch on addressing the threats we face in the cyber domain. The recent findings from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) highlight some key areas that must be addressed. According to GAO, “DOD’s organization to address cyber security threats is decentralized and spread across various offices, commands, Military Services, and military agencies,” and that the “supporting relationships necessary to achieve command and control of cyberspace operations remain unclear.” Do you agree with GAO’s assessment?

General Jacoby. I believe that the support relationships which are necessary to achieve command and control of cyberspace operations still need some clarity. However, it is my understanding that details of Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and control are being worked and senior-level discussions should clarify DOD direction in the near-term. The stand-up of CYBERCOM demonstrates DOD’s commitment to clearly lay out this complex mission and establish proper command and support relationships to succeed in the cyber environment.

19. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you believe that NORTHCOM’s role in support of a cyber attack is well defined and that the mechanisms exist for NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, and CYBERCOM to all operate in concert with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the event of a serious domestic cyber attack?

General Jacoby. I believe NORTHCOM’s support role in the event of a serious domestic cyber attack is primarily to respond to second and third order physical effects in a “response and recovery” mode supporting civil authorities. This would likely involve supporting the DHS in a Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) role, utilizing the existing DSCA process, which also applies to the support provided by STRATCOM/CYBERCOM. I understand NORTHCOM has a good relationship with CYBERCOM via its liaison officer and daily collaboration through NORTHCOM’s Theater Network Control Center and Network Operations Security Center. Further, NORTHCOM coordinates and collaborates with CYBERCOM in its situational awareness, planning, and exercises. Finally, NORTHCOM has included the DHS, STRATCOM, and CYBERCOM in a series of mission analysis and tabletop exercises to build professional relationships and explore roles and responsibilities in cyberspace for both homeland defense and DSCA missions.

20. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, in your answers to the committee’s advance policy questions, you indicate that NORTHCOM’s responsibility extends to defense of physical assets in the event of a cyber attack. Does that mean NORTHCOM has the means and authority to defend against and respond to a cyber attack that results in physical damage to assets inside the United States?
General Jacoby. Depending on the nature of a cyber attack, it is my understanding that NORTHCOM would most likely coordinate transportation and other physical recovery support using the capacities that we have as a military. Eighty-five percent of the cyber infrastructure that DOD and civil authorities use is owned by the private sector, which is largely responsible for its maintenance and protection. DHS, in partnership with other Federal Departments and Agencies; State, local, tribal and territorial governments; the private sector; and international partners, will manage and lead a fully coordinated response to a significant cyber incident to minimize impact, restore operations, and reduce the risk of future occurrence of the event or events. In accordance with a Memorandum of Agreement signed in 2010 by Secretary Gates and Secretary Napolitano, such a request would likely be directed to STRATCOM, with expertise provided by their subordinate command, CYBERCOM. As a supporting command, NORTHCOM will provide full support to STRATCOM's efforts.

21. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, after the release of the DOD cyber security strategy last week, General Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that DOD is spending 90 percent of its time playing defense against cyber attacks and 10 percent playing offense and that DOD should invert this defense/defense ratio to assert that there will be consequences to a cyber attack against the United States. Do you agree with General Cartwright's statements?

General Jacoby. I believe cyber operations that are entirely passive and defensive will fail and that we cannot simply hunker down in a defensive mode and wait for things to happen. That said, defensive measures must be continually evaluated and improved to keep up with the rapidly evolving threats we face, so understandably there may currently be an imbalance between defensive and offensive cyber operations. Cyber is a relatively new domain, thus more analysis is needed before the Department decides on a way ahead on balance of offensive/defensive cyber operations.

22. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, what do you view as the appropriate direction DOD should be headed with respect to cyber strategy?

General Jacoby. The DOD understands the importance of cyber, which is why it stood up CYBERCOM to focus the Department's efforts in operating and defending the Global Information Grid. The DOD has some of the brightest and most dedicated professionals working the challenges of operating in cyberspace, and I believe the underpinning for success will be the partnerships established throughout the U.S. Government, private sector, and internationally. Additionally, I believe it is essential that our military make command and control in cyberspace more responsive by developing policy, doctrine, and authorities to support combatant commander requirements.

23. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you view this as a matter of urgency?

General Jacoby. Absolutely. I believe the cyber security threat is one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic challenges the Department faces. A whole-of-government approach is vital to address cyber threats across the DOD and the public and private sectors.

BUDGET CUTS

24. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, on Tuesday, General Dempsey stated that the President's proposed cut of $400 billion from defense spending over the next 12 years will be difficult to implement. He went on to say that recent calls for cuts of $800 billion or greater would be extraordinarily difficult and very high risk. Do you agree with General Dempsey that proposed cuts to defense of the magnitude being discussed will be of very high risk to our military capabilities?

General Jacoby. I agree with General Dempsey's statement that reductions of this magnitude would be difficult to implement, particularly as we strive to minimize risk and ensure a continuing strong national defense. But, as we look strategically at the fiscal landscape, we should realize that reductions are in fact necessary and that we, in the Department of Defense, must do our part. The key is how we approach these reductions. I think a general reduction across all accounts would be inefficient. We need a continuation of the targeted reductions started under Secretaries Gates and Panetta to reach the $400 billion plateau. To go beyond this level, however, could cause serious readiness issues.
25. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you believe the impact of such cuts would significantly degrade the readiness of our Armed Forces?

General Jacoby. I believe we can minimize negative impacts with targeted reductions, focusing on areas where some additional risk could be assumed, of course depending on the level of cuts. At any level of cuts, I believe across-the-board reductions would be an inefficient way to proceed and more likely result in significant degradation to readiness.

26. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, I understand from comments by General Dempsey earlier this week that DOD is in the process of analyzing the President’s proposed $400 billion in cuts to defense and will develop commensurate military strategy. Do you believe we should develop a military strategy first and then formulate a budget to accomplish such a strategy, not the other way around?

General Jacoby. We certainly need to be cognizant of both as we proceed, however, I believe we should focus principally on driving program and budget decisions from choices about strategy and risks. Such an approach is essential to ensure preservation of a superb defense force to meet national security goals, even given the existing fiscal environment.

AFGHANISTAN

27. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, I believe your time commanding soldiers in Afghanistan in 2004 and your recent tour as Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq provides you with a unique perspective on our current engagements in both countries. On Afghanistan, do you believe the surge of forces has led to an improved security situation that is placing enormous pressure on the Taliban and affiliated groups?

General Jacoby. Yes, I believe significant advances in Afghanistan have been made due to the surge of forces. The increased number of forces allowed the DOD to establish security in areas of importance to the insurgency such as Central Helmand and Kandahar. In addition, the surge allowed the Afghan National Security Force to expand their capacity, capability and control of Afghanistan. Most importantly, I believe the surge was a major factor in halting Afghanistan's potential regression into a refuge and training location for al Qaeda.

28. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you believe that withdrawing these 33,000 U.S. forces by next summer places additional risk on our soldiers and our mission?

General Jacoby. I agree with the theater and combatant commanders that we can drawdown, while continuing to mitigate risk given current circumstances. However, I believe there should be a continual assessment of situation to make adjustments if conditions on the ground deteriorate.

29. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you believe, as it was reported yesterday in the Washington Post, that we are within reach of rendering al Qaeda incapable of launching large-scale attacks against the Homeland of the United States like we experienced on September 11? If so, what should we do to finish the job?

General Jacoby. I believe al Qaeda is a dangerous threat that remains focused on attacking the United States and our interests abroad. I also believe that the death of Osama Bin Laden and the success of our Nation's counterterrorism campaign in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region provide an opportunity to strike a blow to al Qaeda ability to conduct complex attacks on the United States. To defeat al Qaeda and prevent its return, we should continue to aggressively pursue our worldwide counterterrorism strategy.

IRAQ

30. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, if requested by the Iraqis, do you believe the United States should maintain a residual presence of military personnel in country?

General Jacoby. I believe the United States should consider providing limited assistance to fill anticipated gaps in Iraqi Security Forces' capabilities, should the Government of Iraq request such support.
1002

31. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, what do you believe would be a sufficient number of U.S. military personnel to assist in maintaining security in a number of key areas, such as Mosul?

General Jacoby. The Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq determines U.S. military force requirements for security operations in Iraq. As such, I defer to General Lloyd J. Austin III for specifics regarding force structure in Iraq.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS

32. Senator Ayotte. Lieutenant General Jacoby, as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, you are responsible for overseeing DOD's contingency plans. Please explain, generally and in an unclassified way, how $400 billion or even an $800 billion cut in defense over the next decade would impact DOD's ability to carry out these contingency plans that are essential to our national security?

General Jacoby. As part of our ongoing Comprehensive Defense Review, we are assessing how defense cuts of $400 billion would impact the DOD's ability to carry out contingency plans. At the unclassified level, I can tell you that defense cuts would impact the concurrency with which the joint force is able to execute contingency plans. For example, as we reduce the joint force's capacity, we will also reduce the range of options available for the President, especially once the joint force is committed somewhere. This reduction of capacity covers the entire spectrum of missions in the Quadrennial Defense Review, including, conventional and strategic deterrence, countering terrorism, conducting counter-insurgency and stability operations, helping to build the capacity and commitment of our allies and partners, and DSCA. We are also examining the impact of further cuts in the Defense budget as to the level of risk in executing our plans, as well as our ability to conduct other operations and deter in other theaters. We have not initiated planning to defense cuts of up to $800 billion, but suffice to say that as $400 billion cuts will elevate risk in many areas, deeper cuts could pose an unacceptable risk to achieve our strategic security objectives.

THREATS TO THE HOMELAND

33. Senator Ayotte. Lieutenant General Jacoby, as Commander of NORTHCOM, you will be responsible for helping defend the people and territory of the United States against threats to our Homeland. Based on your nomination to serve as the Commander of NORTHCOM, as well as your current position as Director of Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, what do you believe are the greatest threats to the Homeland and the people of the United States?

General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

34. Senator Ayotte. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you believe that al Qaeda affiliated groups, such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, continue to constitute one of the most serious threats to Americans and the U.S. Homeland?

General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

35. Senator Ayotte. Lieutenant General Jacoby, in your professional military judgment, does it make sense to bring terrorists captured overseas by our military, in accordance with the law of war, to U.S. soil where they could ultimately be released into local populations?

General Jacoby. I believe that the U.S. Government has the capability to detain captured international terrorists, either within or outside the United States. I do not believe that any captured terrorist would be released into a community in this country.

[The nomination reference of LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA, follows:]
1003
Nomination Reference and Report

As in Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
July 25, 2011.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General
LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., 0000.

[The biographical sketch of LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA

Source of commissioned service: USMA

Educational degrees:
- U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
- University of Michigan - MA - History
- U.S. Army Command and General Staff College - MMAS - Military Art and Sciences
- National Defense University - MS - National Security and Strategic Studies

Military schools attended:
- Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
- U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
- School of Advanced Military Studies
- National War College

Foreign language(s): Spanish

Promotions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promotions</th>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>7 June 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>7 June 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>1 Jan. 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAI</td>
<td>1 July 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>1 July 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>1 June 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>1 July 02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>14 Nov. 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>31 May 07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major duty assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 78 ...</td>
<td>Oct. 80</td>
<td>Rifle Platoon Leader, C Company, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 80 ...</td>
<td>Feb. 81</td>
<td>Scout Platoon Leader, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division. Fort Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 81 ...</td>
<td>Aug. 81</td>
<td>S-3 (Air), 1st Battalion (Airborne), 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 81 ...</td>
<td>Aug. 82</td>
<td>Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General. Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 82 ...</td>
<td>Dec. 83</td>
<td>Commander, A Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC, and Operation Urgent Fury, Grenada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 84</td>
<td>July 84</td>
<td>Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 84</td>
<td>May 86</td>
<td>Student, Department of History, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 86</td>
<td>May 89</td>
<td>Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of History, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 89</td>
<td>May 91</td>
<td>Student, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 91</td>
<td>Jan. 92</td>
<td>Chief, G-3 (Operations), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 92</td>
<td>June 93</td>
<td>S-3 (Operations), 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 93</td>
<td>Oct. 93</td>
<td>Chief, G-3 (External Evaluation Branch), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks. HI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From          To Assignment
Oct. 93 ... Oct. 95 Commander, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC
Oct. 95 ... Aug. 96 Staff Action Officer, Congressional Activities Division, Management Directorate, Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, DC
Aug. 96 ... June 97 Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC
June 97 ... Oct. 97 Student, Spanish Language Training, Defense Language Institute-Washington Office, Washington, DC
Nov. 97 ... Feb. 99 Commander, Joint Task Force-Bravo, U.S. Southern Command, Honduras
Feb. 99 ... Nov. 00 Deputy Chief of Staff, later Executive Officer to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, Miami, FL
Nov. 00 ... July 02 Deputy Director for Global/Multilateral Issues/International-American Affairs, J–5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
July 02 ... Mar. 04 Assistant Division Commander (Operations), later Assistant Division Commander (Support), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, HI
Mar. 04 ... Mar. 05 Assistant Division Commander (Support), 25th Infantry Division (Light)/Combined Joint Task Force-76, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan
Mar. 05 ... June 05 Assistant Division Commander (Support), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, HI
July 05 ... May 07 Commanding General, U.S. Army Alaska/Deputy Commander, U.S. Alaskan Command, Fort Richardson, AK
May 07 ... June 10 Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis, Fort Lewis, WA
Apr. 09 ... Dec. 09 Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis/Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq
Jan. 10 ... Mar. 10 Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis/Deputy Commander for Operations, U.S. Forces-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq
Mar. 10 ... June 10 Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis, Fort Lewis, WA
June 10 ... Present Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J–5, The Joint Staff/Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, Washington, DC

Summary of joint assignments:

Assignments Date Grade
Commander, Joint Task Force-Bravo, U.S. Southern Command, Honduras Nov. 97–Feb. 99 Colonel
Deputy Chief of Staff, later Executive Officer to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, Miami, FL Feb. 99–Nov. 00 Colonel
Deputy Director for Global/Multilateral Issues/International-American Affairs, J–5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC Nov. 00–July 02 Colonel/Brigadier General
Assistant Division Commander (Support), 25th Infantry Division (Light)/Combined Joint Task Force-76, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan Mar. 04–Mar. 05 Brigadier General
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis/Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq Apr. 09–Dec. 09 Lieutenant General
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis/Deputy Commander for Operations, U.S. Forces-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq Jan. 10–Mar. 10 Lieutenant General
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J–5, The Joint Staff/Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, Washington, DC June 10–Present Lieutenant General

Summary of operations assignments:

Assignments Date Grade
Commander, A Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Operation Urgent Fury, Grenada Aug. 83–Dec. 83 Captain
Assistant Division Commander (Support), 25th Infantry Division (Light)/Combined Joint Task Force-76, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan Mar. 04–Mar. 05 Brigadier General
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis/Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq Apr. 09–Dec. 09 Lieutenant General
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis/Deputy Commander for Operations, U.S. Forces-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq Jan. 10–Mar. 10 Lieutenant General

U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Superior Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Commendation Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Achievement Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Combat Infantryman Badge
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Air Assault Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Charles H. Jacoby, Jr.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Commander, Northern Command/North American Aerospace Defense Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO.

3. Date of nomination:
   July 25, 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   June 19, 1954; Detroit, MI.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Grace A. Dorta.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Victor D. Jacoby, age 16.
   Michael C. Jacoby, age 13.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than
those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

Limited partnership in a family LLC. Jacoby Land & Timber, LCC.
Managing partner, Robert Jacoby, Brother).

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA).
Association of Graduates, U.S. Military Academy.
Council on Foreign Relations.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

None.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power.

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

Signature and Date

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR.

This 21st day of July, 2011.

[The nomination of LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]
NOMINATION OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman), presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Robie I. Samanta Roy, professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative counsel; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Hannah I. Lloyd, and Bradley S. Watson.

Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Maria Mahler-Haug, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Brooke Jamison, assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Matthew Rimkunas and Sergio Sarkany, assistants to Senator Graham; and Joshua Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. This morning the committee meets to consider the nomination of Ashton Carter to be Deputy Secretary of Defense. We welcome the nominee and his family to today's hearing. We appreciate the long hours and other sacrifices that our nominees make to serve their country, and we know that these sacrifices would not be possible without the support of their families.

Senator Lieberman, who is going to be introducing Dr. Carter this morning, needs to chair another committee meeting. I know that firsthand because I'm supposed to be there later myself. In any event, what we're going to do now is call upon Chairman Lieberman, Senator Lieberman, who's a member of this committee, as well, to introduce our nominee, and then we'll come back to the opening statements. I've consulted with Senator McCain and he's perfectly happy to do it that way.

Senator Lieberman.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much for your courtesy, Mr. Chairman, and for your skill at overcoming the obvious irascible reluctance of Senator McCain to allow me to speak first.

Chairman LEVIN. He's a soft touch. [Laughter.]

Senator LIEBERMAN. I am really grateful for the opportunity to appear before you now, not from my customary seat, in order to introduce Dr. Ash Carter, the President's nominee to be our 30th Deputy Secretary of Defense. Just slightly more than 2 years ago, I had the privilege of introducing and supporting Ash's nomination as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. After that hearing, this committee in its wisdom endorsed the nomination, approved it by voice vote, and then the Senate did the same. I think we have some momentum going here.

If anything, over the last 2 years I think Ash Carter has strengthened his case, the case for him to assume at this particular time this extraordinary position. I've known Ash for years and we've become personal friends, both during his time serving in the Defense Department under Bill Perry during the Clinton administration and now.

We've also had the opportunity to travel under the esteemed leadership of Senator McCain, with me in a supporting role, to the security conference in Munich every February, and it's been a great opportunity to get to know him both as a person and a public official.

His résumé is quite impressive. I'll just state some of the highlights for you. He has, unusually, a Ph.D. in theoretical physics, has been a professor of international relations, security, and science and, going back to the Clinton administration, served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

Since then he's also served during the Bush administration on the Defense Science Board and the Defense Policy Board, and is widely recognized and respected, I think on a bipartisan basis, as one of our country's leading thinkers and leaders, actors, on defense and national security issues.
For the last 2 years, as I’ve mentioned, Ash has served as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. In this position he has overseen billion-dollar military programs and procurement of critical equipment for our men and women in the Armed Forces. In this job, as so many others, I believe he has truly distinguished himself.

Of particular note, Ash has played a pivotal role in getting 6,500 mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicles to our troops in Afghanistan at really breakneck speed. Of course, we all know that these vehicles have saved countless lives. The success of the program I think speaks to Ash’s fierce dedication to our men and women on the front lines, but also to the importance of the acquisition programs delivering equipment our troops need in a way that is not only timely, but cost effective.

When and I hope, of course, if Ash is confirmed, he will assume his new responsibilities at a time when the Pentagon faces the prospect of what I would call extreme, draconian budget cuts, so severe that Secretary of Defense Panetta has warned that they could, “hollow out the force and weaken our national defense.” Of course, I totally agree and I know many members on both sides of the aisle on this committee agree.

In the face of this danger, I think Ash’s considerable talents, his experience, his skill as an advocate, will be more necessary than ever. I have great confidence that he will work ceaselessly, first to make sure that every dollar entrusted to our Department of Defense (DOD) is used as efficiently and effectively as possible, but also that he will be a determined advocate for the programs and the funding that are needed to ensure that our military stays what it is today, the best in the world, and that our Nation therefore, at a time when the world remains dangerous and unpredictable, remains as secure and free as we all want it to be.

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, I thank you again for your courtesy and I am proud to offer my wholehearted endorsement for this nomination and hope that my colleagues will give him the same unanimous support that he received the last time he appeared before the committee.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.

We just heard from Senator Lieberman and his support for you, and much about your record, your career. I think most of us, perhaps all, are familiar with your distinguished record of public service culminated in your current position as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. If you’re confirmed as Deputy Secretary, you’re going to be the number two official in DOD, and in that capacity you’re going to play a key role in determining how our country addresses an extraordinarily complex set of challenges that face our Armed Forces.

For example, how can we reduce the stress of repeated deployments on our men and women in uniform and their families after 10 years of non-stop military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? How will we complete the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and what continuing role, if any, is the U.S. military willing to play after the December 31 withdrawal deadline if there is a request from Iraq? How can we most effectively contribute to the success
of the mission in Afghanistan by keeping the focus on transitioning security responsibility to Afghan forces, including continuing the drawdown of U.S. forces in that country?

How can we reduce our force posture around the world to bring down the huge costs we're facing, while at the same time maintaining a strong forward presence in key areas?

At the same time all that’s on your plate, the next Deputy Secretary is going to play a key role in implementing ongoing efficiencies initiatives and achieving the additional savings that are needed in the current fiscal climate. Last year then-Secretary Gates approved roughly $180 billion in cuts to defense programs over the Future Years Defense Program. The recent legislation on the debt ceiling calls for an additional $400 billion in reductions in security spending over a 10-year period, with the possibility of far deeper cuts if the joint committee is unable to reach agreement and a sequester is triggered.

Now, just the reductions required so far, required by the legislation on the debt ceiling, just those reductions are going to require an extremely careful review of every program and expenditure in the defense budget and tough decisions to be made to balance the requirements of today’s force and current military missions against investment in needed preparations for the threats of tomorrow.

I know that Dr. Carter agrees that DOD budget reductions must contribute to overall deficit reduction, but must do so without compromising our current or our future security. Unless we impose much greater discipline on our acquisition process and unless we bring down the costs of our weapons programs, we are unlikely to achieve that objective.

Finally, the Deputy Secretary has traditionally handled a wide array of management duties, a role that was enhanced by recent legislation formally designating the Deputy Secretary as Chief Management Officer of DOD. Virtually every area of DOD management is included in the annual list that we get of high risk areas prepared by the Government Accountability Office. Those high risk areas have not changed much over the years.

Dr. Carter, as Deputy Secretary you’re going to be responsible for addressing each of those high risk problem areas, including: DOD business transformation, DOD business systems modernization, DOD support infrastructure management, DOD financial management, DOD supply chain management, DOD weapons systems acquisition, DOD contract management, management of interagency contracting, strategic human capital management, and management of real property.

Dr. Carter has demonstrated in his current position that he can be a strong manager and a decisive leader. We particularly appreciate the efforts that you have made to implement the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA), the Better Buying Power Initiative, and to begin the process of bringing some of our largest acquisition programs under control.

Now, I emphasize that you’ve helped to begin the process of bringing some of our largest acquisition programs under control, but we have a long way to go. Secretary Carter in his new capacity is going to need to speed up the process to help that speed-up effort, to speed up the process of controlling costs of acquisition.
Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN M CCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Carter, thank you for your service as Under Secretary of State for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and for your willingness to continue to serve as the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Your willingness and ability to bear the burden of senior leadership is both noteworthy and highly commendable.

The position of Deputy Secretary of Defense is as challenging today as it's ever been. On the one hand, the Department is being confronted by daunting challenges to its ability to ensure the Nation's defense. On the other hand, there's the specter of dramatic cuts in defense spending. Against that backdrop, the Department must find ways to operate more efficiently and effectively than ever before. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, you must be prepared to lead both these efforts and succeed in doing so.

Providing for our national defense is the most important responsibility that our or any government has. It's our Nation's insurance policy. In a world that is more complex and threatening as I have ever seen, we cannot allow arbitrary budget arithmetic to drive our defense strategy and spending. Some of the defense cuts being discussed would do grave harm to our military and our Nation's security. Defense spending is not what is sinking this country into fiscal crisis and if Congress and the President act on that flawed assumption they will create a situation that is truly unaffordable, the decline of U.S. military power.

Do not misunderstand me. Real defense cuts are coming and for that reason it's now more essential than ever for DOD to efficiently manage the taxpayers' money. But I will be blunt. This will require not just good leadership; it will require a change in culture at DOD. By that I mean an end to the Department's systemic tendency to spend the taxpayers' money in a manner that is far too often disconnected from what the warfighter actually needs and what is in the taxpayers' best interests.

Particularly over the last 10 years, senior defense management has been inclined to lose sight of affordability as a goal and has just reached for more money as a solution to most problems. Today I see evidence of this cultural problem all too frequently and it must be changed.

Every few weeks I get reports about huge cost overruns on the Pentagon's biggest weapons programs, like the recent projection of a $1.1 billion overrun in the cost of the first 28 production-quality jets in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, a program that is now in its 10th year of development and the recipient of about $56 billion of taxpayer investment to date. Or, the estimated $560 million estimated cost overruns, or roughly 11 percent growth in cost, in the program to build the USS Gerald Ford.

Then, there are the Defense Department's recent reprogramming requests. Four times over the last 2 months, the Department has asked this committee to let it shift a total of over $10 billion amongst its spending accounts. In doing so, it asks only the chairman and ranking members of the defense committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives to let it reallocate billions of dol-
lars to, among other things, pay hundreds of millions of dollars for the cost overrun in the JSF program and provide authority to start dozens of new programs never before presented to Congress.

Authorizing funding in this way, outside of regular order, subverts transparent congressional oversight, undermines accountability in how defense programs are managed, and actually encourages underperformance.

Just a few days ago, the Bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting reported that at least $30 billion has been wasted on ill-conceived and poorly overseen contracts and grants in Iraq and Afghanistan. Earlier this year, a study of Army procurement showed that between $3.3 billion and $3.8 billion had been wasted by the Army every year since 2004 in developing new weapons programs that were cancelled without providing any new capability to the troops risking their lives fighting two wars.

A culture that has allowed massive waste of taxpayers’ dollars has become business as usual at DOD. Particularly in today’s fiscal environment, this cannot be tolerated. If this is not corrected, the Department’s ability to continue defending the Nation and to provide for its national security will be compromised. Taxpayers simply will not tolerate the continuing waste of their resources in light of the debt we face and our competing budgetary needs.

I also want to know if you share my concern that solving this problem may be hindered by the revolving door of retired flag and general officers, top Pentagon civilian officials, and mid-level bureaucrats who had overseen weapons procurement programs before leaving government to join private sector defense industry. With the defense contracting pie expected to get smaller in the future, this problem may get worse than before. I hope you are as sensitive to this as I am.

Notably, as the Deputy Secretary you would also serve as the Department’s Chief Management Officer. You’d be responsible for ensuring, among other things, the Defense Department becomes fully auditable by 2017, as required under law. I strongly support the requirement for the Department to pass a clean audit so I’d like to hear from you on this issue.

Finally, I’ve been told that the Defense Department’s comprehensive strategic review of military roles, missions, and requirements that underpins how it intends to carry out the President’s direction for a $400 billion reduction in defense spending over the next 12 years may not come out before next year. If true, this review would not be available to inform the deliberations of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, or Congress generally, on how the currently proposed defense spending cuts will affect national security. This is unacceptable.

The efforts of the Department or Congress cannot be conducted in a vacuum. Any major budget review, whether conducted by the administration or Congress, must be accompanied by an open, honest, and comprehensive review of requirements and set priorities based on sound strategy.

Dr. Carter, I have come to know you as a hardworking, honest and committed public servant. But, if confirmed, you would face major challenges in confronting the cultural impediments to proper fiscal stewardship at the Defense Department, which I trust you
have come to understand. This culture needs to change. The Defense Department needs to change. It must do so in order to be the best provider it can be of our Nation’s most essential service, our national defense.

On all these vital matters, failure truly is not an option, and as the Department’s senior leadership applies itself to this urgent and critical task you should know that you will have the support of your friends in Congress. The challenge ahead is daunting, yes, but I have confidence in our men and women in uniform that, given the task ahead, they will rise to the challenges and indeed do more with less. Your leadership and that of Secretary Panetta will be more crucial than ever.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Now let me call on you, Dr. Carter. We know you’re accompanied by your family here, so please feel free to introduce them.

STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON CARTER, Ph.D., NOMINATED TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to you, Ranking Member McCain. If I may, I’d like to make a brief statement, and then a number of questions have been raised already and I’ll take them at whatever time it’s convenient to you.

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, all the distinguished members of this committee, it’s a privilege and a deep honor to appear before you as the President’s nominee for Deputy Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to continue to serve President Obama and Secretary Panetta in a new role and to continue to work with the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with this committee to protect this great country, to serve the troops who serve us, and to leave a more secure world for our children.

I’d like to thank my wife Stephanie, son Will, daughter Ava for being here today and for their support. I’d also like to thank Senator Lieberman for the kindness and honor of his introduction, for all he’s done for this country, and for all he’s taught me.

If confirmed, I will step into large shoes and I would like to take this moment to express my admiration for the job Bill Lynn has done as Deputy. It has been a privilege to serve him.

I have served, in one way or another, almost every Secretary of Defense since Caspar Weinberger, and I feel fortunate to have been a member of the Pentagon team led over these past years by Secretary Gates, Secretary Panetta, and Secretary Lynn.

As Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I have had two overriding priorities. The first has been to wake up every morning and ask myself what my office can do to support our troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, or anywhere else in the world they are deployed, whether with better protection against improvised explosive devices (IED), better reconnaissance and surveillance, or better logistics, and on their timetable and not on the timetable of the Pentagon’s frequently ponderous acquisition and budgeting process.

My second priority has been to deliver better buying power to the taxpayers and the warfighters for their defense dollars, working
closely with our acquisition professionals, our industry partners, and Congress. It's an effort, as has been noted, that this committee began in its 2009 Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, and I began with Secretary Gates, all well before the current budget crunch.

But the performance of the system is in my judgment still not acceptable. I think Senator McCain used the word “intolerable” and I would agree with that. I believe that there are some additional actions we’re going to need to take to get better value for the defense dollar. This is something the American taxpayer should expect no matter what the defense budget is, but it becomes even more urgent in the serious budget predicament that faces us.

Like Secretary Panetta, I do not believe we need to choose between strong fiscal discipline and strong national defense. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, these two priorities will continue, but many others will be added. Secretary Panetta has made it clear to me that he expects his deputy to be prepared to act and speak in his stead at all times. He expects the deputy to shape an orderly deliberative process for him, so that he can make decisions and advise the President based on careful consideration of accurate management information and a full range of options. He expects his deputy to manage the budget down to a finite number of key issues that he needs to decide and to manage other Department-wide matters that require his attention only for final decisions of greatest consequence.

Finally, Secretary Panetta expects all this to be done with the same heart, the same integrity, and the same dedication to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that he brings to the job.

In all these tasks, I pledge to Secretary Panetta and to this committee, if confirmed, my most earnest efforts. Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Carter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. ASHTON B. CARTER

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and all the distinguished members of this committee, it is a privilege and a deep honor to appear before you as President Obama’s nominee for Deputy Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to continue to serve the President and Secretary Panetta in a new role, and to continue to work with the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with this committee, to protect this great country, to serve the troops who serve us, and to leave a more secure world for our children.

I would like to thank my wife, Stephanie, and children, Will and Ava, for being here today and for their support. I would also like to thank Senator Lieberman for the kindness and honor of his introduction, for all he has done for this country, and for all he has taught me.

If confirmed, I will step into large shoes, and I would like to take this moment to express my admiration for the job Bill Lynn has done as Deputy. It has been a privilege to serve him. I have served in one way or another almost every Secretary of Defense since Caspar Weinberger, and I feel fortunate to have been a member of the Pentagon team led over these past years by Secretary Gates, Secretary Panetta, and Secretary Lynn.

As Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I have had two overriding priorities. The first has been to wake up every morning and ask myself what my office can do to support our troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, or anywhere else in the world they are deployed—whether with better protection against improvised explosive devices, better reconnaissance and surveillance, or better logistics—on their timetable, and not on the timetable of the Pentagon’s frequently ponderous acquisition and budgeting processes. My second priority has been to deliver better buying power to the taxpayers for their defense dollars, working closely with
our acquisition professionals, our industry partners, and Congress. It is an effort this committee began in its 2009 Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, and I began with Secretary Gates—all well before the current budget crunch. But the performance of the system is in my judgment still not acceptable, and I believe that there are some additional actions we are going to need to take to get better value for the defense dollar. This is something the American taxpayer should expect no matter what the defense budget is. But it becomes even more urgent in the serious budget predicament that faces us. Like Secretary Panetta, I do not believe that we need to choose between strong fiscal discipline and strong national defense.

If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, these two priorities will continue. But many others will be added. Secretary Panetta has made it clear to me that he expects his Deputy to be prepared to act and speak in his stead at all times. He expects the Deputy to shape an orderly deliberative process for him, so that he can make decisions and advise the President based on careful consideration of accurate management information and a full range of options. He expects his Deputy to manage the budget process down to a finite number of key issues that he needs to decide, and to manage other Department-wide matters that require his attention only for final decisions of greatest consequence. Finally, Secretary Panetta expects all this to be done with the same heart, the same integrity, and the same dedication to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that he brings to the job.

In all these tasks, I pledge to the Secretary of Defense and to this committee, if confirmed, my most earnest effort.

Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Dr. Carter.

We start, as we always do with nominees, with the standard questions. You’ve answered them before, but we’ll be asking you to answer them again.

In order to exercise our legislative and our oversight responsibilities, we have to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information in a timely way.

The first question is: Have you adhered to all of the applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Dr. Carter. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Dr. Carter. No.

Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

Dr. Carter. I will.

Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Dr. Carter. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Dr. Carter. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

Dr. Carter. I do.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Dr. Carter. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Let’s try an 8-minute first round of questions.
First on the budget. It is very clear that substantial cuts to the defense budget are on their way. We’ve already made cuts in our authorization bill. There’s already cuts that we’re working on for a possible modification of that bill so that the committee could consider a committee modernization before the bill comes to the floor.

The recent legislation on the debt ceiling calls for $400 billion of reductions in security spending. That’s a slightly larger item than just defense spending, but it’s mainly defense spending. It’s $400 billion in reductions in security spending over 10 years, and if the joint committee which has been appointed cannot reach agreement and if a sequester is triggered, then there could be additional cuts approaching $600 billion over 10 years.

The joint committee has requested this committee and other standing committees for input. They need our input by mid-October, recommendations to them for reductions. It is a critically important review by them and by us. Now, we’re going to need the Department to give us recommendations, data, detail, before we consider our input that we would recommend to that new committee.

My first question is, will you, immediately upon confirmation, work to ensure that this committee gets the views of the Department on two things: one, steps that you recommend that we recommend to achieve reductions and to help avoid sequestration; and two, your views on the consequences of sequestration if it occurred?

Dr. CARTER. I do. Secretary Panetta’s made it quite clear that this is a circumstance that’s unprecedented and we can’t get through it and do the right thing unless we are in close consultation with Congress, and that means that the way we would normally do budget business we’re going to have to change this year. I certainly pledge to you, if confirmed, that close consultation. But the important thing is Secretary Panetta has made that quite clear.

Chairman LEVIN. Consultation is important, but we also need recommendations. What we will need from you, I would say probably immediately upon confirmation, is a timetable for when you will be giving us the Department’s recommendations for reductions to meet the legislation which has been adopted. Will you give us that timetable promptly upon confirmation?

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed, absolutely, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, do you believe that we also as part of that need to reexamine military personnel costs, including health care, compensation, retirement benefits, the things which we obviously are reluctant to impact, nonetheless we have to at least look at for possibilities? Do you agree with that?

Dr. CARTER. I do. Secretary Panetta has used the phrase “everything on the table”. However, that is subject to one proviso and that is that, as he puts it, he doesn’t want us to do anything that breaks faith with those who are serving or have served and therefore have an understanding about those matters that you just named. He doesn’t want us to break faith with those understandings. But subject to that limitation, compensation, like acquisition, like operations and maintenance, like everything else, he says has to be on the table, given the magnitude of the task in front of us.
Chairman Levin. That's a limitation which I think every member of this committee would share.

Given the budget pressures under which the Department's going to be operating, one of the things that some of us believe we have to do is to take a look at the stationing and restationing of and the location of our military forces overseas, where we have a large number of bases, and to consider both relocation and the restationing possibly of some of those military forces from overseas back to the United States. Is that on the table?

Dr. Carter. On the table.

Chairman Levin. One of the areas where a number of us have focused, particularly Senator Webb, who along with Senator McCain and I have proposed changes to basing plans on Okinawa and Guam, and also urged a review of the plans that we have in Korea relative to stationing of forces and tour normalization. Is that all on the table?

Dr. Carter. On the table.

Chairman Levin. By the way, the Government Accountability Office reviewed that Okinawa-Guam issue and concluded that the total cost of the Okinawa-Guam realignment would be over $27 billion and that the Guam buildup alone would cost more than $17 billion, with the U.S. share being $11 billion, which is much more than originally projected, and in our current fiscal environment I believe that we simply cannot continue with such massive restructuring and surely we can't do that until we have reliable cost and schedule data.

We may not be able to get that data in time for this review, but we're going to have to do the best that we can, and I'm glad to know that you are going to be working with us.

Now, that also would include, I hope, stationing forces in Europe and their location. Is that included?

Dr. Carter. Yes, it is.

Chairman Levin. Okay.

On acquisition issues: We have these huge cost overruns and, while there's been some efforts, and we applaud the efforts which have been made, to try to bring them under control, and we have our Acquisition Reform Act now which is in place, which hopefully is going to avoid these kind of cost overruns in the future, nonetheless we must act. One of the things that we have to do is take a look at the JSF program. I'm wondering whether you believe that, for example, it is important that program look at the possibility of competing subsystems on the JSF or to compete logistics support to help reduce this year's estimate that the life cycle costs of the JSF are going to exceed $1 trillion. Are you willing to look at all that?

Dr. Carter. I am, Mr. Chairman, absolutely.

Chairman Levin. Please just expand on that.

Dr. Carter. You mentioned the sustainment costs of the JSF. Senator McCain was referencing the production cost of the JSF. The JSF isn't alone among our programs and activities which have exhibited, as Senator McCain said, intolerable cost growth. We are working on both the production and the sustainment part of JSF and others.
On the sustainment part in particular, Admiral Venlet and I are just beginning work on that this fall. That’s a project that the program office hadn’t really taken on before, managing that very large sustainment cost. I’ve seen the estimates for the costs of sustainment for JSF and they’re unacceptably high. At the same time, we have not begun to manage them yet, and when we do so I’m expecting that they will come down.

But in all of these matters, on all of our programs, we have a lot of work to do. WSARA was a fundamental foundation for us. We have tried to implement it in each and every one of our programs. But as I indicated to Senator McCain, we have more to do and there are some new chapters I think we need to open in our acquisition efforts to get even better.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, if deficit reduction negotiations fail, triggering sequestration, Secretary Panetta has said that bigger defense cuts would have a “devastating effect on the Nation’s security”. Do you agree with Secretary Panetta?

Dr. CARTER. I absolutely do.

Senator MCCAIN. It would be devastating?

Dr. CARTER. Devastating, and I say “devastating” not lightly, but in light of two things. One is the scale. Chairman Levin already alluded to the scale, $600-ish billion on top of what we’re facing already, which would take us to a total reduction over the next 10 years of in the neighborhood of $1 trillion. Just the scale of it alone would lead us to have to consider truly draconian things—abandoning major weapons systems, furloughing civilian employees, and abruptly curtailing training because we couldn’t pay for fuel, and so forth. That’s the scale.

The other thing about the sequester provision is that it’s arbitrary. It’s across the board, meaning it deprives us of the opportunity for choice, strategic choice. It puts a haircut across everything. You get yourself in a circumstance where, for example, you can’t execute. You can’t buy three-quarters of an aircraft carrier or three-quarters of a building.

Both in the size and in the nature of the sequester, I think that word applies.

Senator McCAN. Thank you. I hope that all of our members and the American people pay attention to what you and Secretary Panetta are saying.

I want to be a little more specific. In your answer to Chairman Levin’s statement, you said, do I understand you correctly, you will be sending us recommendations as to what reductions need to be made to comply with the $20 billion reduction in authorization that is going to be appropriated? Is that correct, you will be sending us recommendations?

Dr. CARTER. That is. I think the shape they’ll be in as they come across is not their final recommendations, but the options that we’re considering. Decisions haven’t been made. The comprehensive review is surfacing those options, so I would say even before decisions are being made——

Senator McCAN. Are you going to send us the recommendations?

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely.
Senator McCain. Now, are you going to be sending us a comprehensive strategic review before we act, in other words before the end of this year?

Dr. Carter. Yes, the comprehensive review will provide those recommendations before the end of the year.

Senator McCain. Will we receive them before 2013?

Dr. Carter. Yes.

Senator McCain. Thank you.

Do you agree there's a systemic cultural problem in how the Department does its acquisition business?

Dr. Carter. I do.

Senator McCain. What is your assessment of the enduring security needs of Iraq and of U.S. national security interests there?

Dr. Carter. We have spent a lot of time, blood, and treasure in Iraq and have gotten ourselves to a point now where in my judgment we have created a future of stability for Iraq, and I think we all want to act at this juncture to make sure that's preserved. As we reach the end of the year and look forward to what happens after the end of the year, preserving those gains is the objective.

Senator McCain. Have you formed your own opinion of the number of U.S. troops that would be needed and how to ensure their security?

Dr. Carter. I have not. That is not one of my current responsibilities.

Senator McCain. Do you know whether any military officer recommended to the President that troops be withdrawn from Afghanistan at the size and pace his plan dictates?

Dr. Carter. I do not, no.

Senator McCain. Your view of that decision you have not formed yet?

Dr. Carter. No. If your reference is to the 3,000 number that's been in the press, that's not a number that I can validate at all. No decision has been made. No decision could have been made because, as I understand it, we're in discussions with the Iraqis about the mission and what goes forward.

Senator McCain. This is probably not the subject of this hearing, but no one has denied that number, Dr. Carter. It's been published in the press and the media and no one in the Pentagon has said: No, that's not the number.

Dr. Carter. I'm not familiar with the number.

Senator McCain. On the JSF program, over the last year and a half you restructured the program twice by adding $7.4 billion and 33 months to the development part of the program. If by the end of the year and under a fixed-price contract the program is not on track, what should we do?

Dr. Carter. We have put in place a progressive step and we're going to continue to do that.

Senator McCain. But let's assume that they do not reach the fixed-price contract and the program is not on track.

Dr. Carter. The contract is very clear about the penalty paid. We do not bear the cost this time, unlike the cost overruns you referred to earlier. Because we have a fixed-price contract, the Government's liability is not open-ended, as it was in the past. If it overruns past the ceiling price on this fixed-price incentive firm
(FPIF) contract, that’s entirely on those performing the work and the taxpayer does not share in that liability.

Senator McCain. I’d like to believe that, but that hasn’t happened yet and the program has been in the making for, what, 10 years now? How much has it cost, $56 billion? We have 18 airplanes.

Dr. Carter. I’m sorry, I thought you were referring to the low rate production contract—it’s total value is about $56 billion, yes.

Senator McCain. Have you seen the report that says that “The study paints a bleak picture of billions sunk into incomplete Army programs. Cancelled programs have eaten up between $3.3 billion and $3.8 billion since 2004. Numbers represent an average of 35 percent to 45 percent of the Army’s annual budget for development, testing, and engineering.” Are you familiar with that?

Dr. Carter. I am, and it’s unbelievable and as far as I can see, true. There were so many programs that were begun with optimistic assumptions or with an extravagant expectation. Then they get halfway built, it’s like a bridge to nowhere, you can’t complete them. This is something that you had in your WSARA. Now as we start new starts—and we do have some new starts even in this budget climate, for example the Ohio-class submarine—we’re not going to let them start until and unless we see affordability and a target for affordability set early in the program, so that we don’t have these bridges to nowhere.

Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, I hope that’s the case. We continue to be reassured that things are changing and somehow they don’t.

Finally, are you confident that we can have DOD fully auditable by 2017? That’s another moving target that we have been watching for many years.

Dr. Carter. It’s not moving any longer, as near as I can tell. Secretary Panetta made it clear that 2017, he means it. In fact, he said sooner if possible.

Senator McCain. I thank you.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First let me welcome Dr. Carter, who I’ve had the privilege of knowing and working with for many years. I can’t think of anyone who is better prepared, not just intellectually and academically, but through the last several years of experience of dealing with these challenges we’re talking about. I welcome your nomination and look forward to your confirmation.

I also want to recognize your family and thank them for all they’ve done to allow you to serve the Nation.

Let me say, I associate myself with the remarks of Senator McCain. I don’t think I’ve heard it as insightfully or thoughtfully put in terms of the cultural challenges facing the Department, the issue specifically of the revolving door, of auditing issues, and the, frankly, poor performance over the last, not several years, but many years of acquisition and procurement programs.

I think one of the issues is that, looking back now over 4 decades or so of involvement with the military, sometimes it’s a contractor-
driven environment, no longer strategic, even budgetary, and certainly not sort of uniformed military advice, but a contractor-driven environment. That’s something you’re going to have to face.

But let me focus on two issues. One was raised by Senator McCain. It’s the auditing. In order to fully audit DOD, you need auditors. We’ve had this discussion before. One of the reasons that literally we have seen millions and millions of dollars disappear in places like Afghanistan and Iraq is that you have not been able to put on the ground adequate number of auditors; is that correct?

Dr. CARTER. That is correct.

Senator REED. What are we doing to fix that?

Dr. CARTER. Trying to put more on the ground, that’s just one of the things we’re trying to do. We are increasing the number of investigators so that the investigations and prosecution of transgressions is strengthened. General David Petraeus when he was commander over there established a number of task forces to do that, that have made a lot of progress and that we support.

Of course, you don’t want to get to the point where you’re investigating and prosecuting. You want to prevent in the first place. That is, you don’t want to have the conditions where it’s even possible to defraud us on a contract. That means having contracting officers, contracting officer representatives, construction engineers, all the things associated with the programs that we’re contracting for in Afghanistan and Iraq, in adequate numbers and with adequate skills.

It means having commanders who are contractor-aware and proficient and know how to do this in their area of responsibility. In this and all of these areas, we have to improve our performance in contingency contracting. I fully recognize that.

The Commission on Wartime Contracting has made a number of recommendations, the great bulk of which I agree with and we are actually implementing. But we have a ways to go.

Senator REED. In that context, I think this is one of those areas, too, which is the first to be thrown overboard when the budget gets done in terms of auditors, professional auditors, career personnel. I think we’ve learned to our disappointment that contracting out some of these procedures doesn’t help, either. You are challenged to rebuild, essentially, a professional DOD auditor corps and Service-connected auditor corps. Is that going to be one of your commitments?

Dr. CARTER. It is, absolutely, and it actually began in this committee before I took office. It affects the acquisition workforce as a whole. We need to have within the Government the expertise and the controls. That is not something that we can outsource. That is something that we need to have within the walls of government, and that’s why we’ve been working so hard to increase the strength of the overall acquisition workforce, which includes the auditing workforce.

It’s not just a numbers thing. It’s skills, it’s giving them opportunities for professional development, adequate training, and accreditation. All of that we are doing.

Senator REED. Let me also raise an issue that Senator McCain raised, which I concur in, and that is this revolving door phenomenon. We’ve had discussions about this also. My sense is that’s
obviously a challenge to you and Secretary Panetta, but I think it also has to begin or it has to be substantially embraced by the professional uniformed officers and noncommissioned officers in terms of their expectations of what they will do when they leave and the expectations of their relationship to the Department after they leave.

I would urge you—I've done this privately to General Dempsey—to begin thinking very seriously about, is there, not a law, but a code or a reevaluation of the ethical dimensions of service after retirement in relation to DOD, because unless you have that you won't have the best guide or the buy-in by those people who are affected by this.

Do you have any thoughts on that?

Dr. CARTER. Just that I share the thought. I think Senator McCain began it. I will say this. I travel all around the country to the places where the real work is done. These are our systems command, our logistics centers, and so forth, where the folks actually do the work of contracting and program management, this tremendous workforce, mixed military and civilian.

They know what the right thing to do is. The overwhelming majority of them know what the right thing to do is. They hear what I'm saying and they know what the right thing to do is. It is a huge source of support to them in doing the right thing when they hear from you, from you here, that you are behind us and the leadership in the Pentagon in supporting them. They're supposed to be acting in the warfighters' and the taxpayers' interest and we just need to stand behind them, give them the tools to do the right thing and then support them.

It's great for me. I go out all the time, I talk to them, and they say: I appreciate what you're saying because it sounds like if I make a hard decision and drive a hard bargain on behalf of the taxpayer and the warfighter you'll stand behind me. I will, but that's only half the action. It's important that they know that Congress stands behind them, too.

I just wanted to say I appreciate the support. I understand the frustration that you feel over the performance of the acquisition system, but I don't mind the pressure because it's right and it sends the right signal to our people.

Senator REED. Let me just add a quick postscript. I can't think collectively of a more ethical group of people than professional military officers and noncommissioned officers who served the Nation and retired. But the context has changed over the last several decades, and I think you're right, we do have to send a message about obligations to the taxpayers, to the service men and women who continue to serve. Again, I think what we do and what you do is going to be critical. But without enlisting the senior retired and the currently senior members of the military in this thoughtful discussion, we won't be as successful as we must.

My time has expired, but again, Dr. Carter, for your remarkable service to the Nation let me thank you and wish you well.

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Dr. Carter, for being responsive and coming by and talking to us, not just in preparation for this particular position, but in years in the past. I appreciate that very much.

I have six things real quickly, two of which will be something for the record I’d like to get back from you, but they’re more specific than some of the general things that were talked about by the other questioners on this panel. One would be—and I have to go back historically and look at this—one of the deficiencies that we have had for a long period of time has been in our Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Cannon.

I can remember back when I was in the House Armed Services Committee many years ago and we talked about that. Then along came the Crusader. We developed that over a period of time and it was—I hate to say this as a Republican about a Republican President, but it was President Bush in 2002 with just no warning at all, at least to me, terminated that program.

General Shinseki came along and started working on a Future Combat System (FCS) that would go farther than just an NLOS Cannon. But nonetheless, we’re still operating, it had been up until recently, where there are five countries, including South Africa, that have a better NLOS cannon than we do. This isn’t what the American people expect.

On this particular program, I disagreed with all those. However, the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program now that you and I talked about, is now the Army’s lead fire support modernization effort and I think it’s moving along well now. But judging from the past when we had our programs, the Crusader, the FCS, all moving along fine, all of a sudden something happened.

I’d just like to have you make any comments that you might have concerning this program, seeing it through, and its significance?

Dr. Carter. It certainly is significant, Senator, and I’m personally involved in the acquisition strategy for Paladin, PIM. I’m very familiar with it. We’re crafting that acquisition strategy now. The Army acquisition executive has that ball. She’s doing a really good job of it and I think it’s a well managed activity.

Senator Inhofe. All right. Several of us up here have talked about the F–35. It’s one that certainly is a great concern. The Pentagon recently sent a report to Congress on the Chinese military warning. I’m quoting now. It said: “China’s military has benefited from robust investment in modern hardware and technology. Many modern systems have reached maturity and others will become operational in the next few years.”

One of those investments that they have been talking about is their new J–20 stealth fighter. You say the same thing about Russia with its fifth generation fighter, the T–50. The F–35 being our only fifth generation fighter, I am more concerned now about it than I was before, back when the termination of the F–22 came along.

But I understand the missions of both of them and what can be done with the F–35. When you stop and think about the need, as I recall when this program first came it was 2001, they were anticipating 2,852 copies. That’s what they talked about at that time. Now, since that time reports such as the two that I just mentioned
from Russia and China have—to me, if our amount, the number that we should have had was 2,800 back in 2001, it would be actually more now.

You are now looking at 2,443 of the F–35s that would be required by our Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. I’ve often wondered why it’s fewer now, in the absence of the F–22 and with the developments that are taking place in Russia and China. Do you feel that number is adequate? I know that you’re involved in that, but also I know that you might have a different opinion.

Dr. Carter. No, that is the joint requirement right now, 2,443 for the U.S. force, and then of course there are additional F–35s that are going to be built for the partner nations. I did do a Nunn-McCurdy certification this past summer, as required by law, of the F–35 program, and in the course of that our independent cost analysis and program evaluation shop did an assessment of the need for the JSF, because as part of certifying a program that is in Nunn-McCurdy breach, as JSF is, I have to ascertain whether there are alternatives that could replace it.

We did not find alternatives to the JSF, no other alternative that met the joint requirement that exists, “joint” meaning there’s an Air Force variant, a Navy variant, and a Marine Corps variant.

Senator Inhofe. Why don’t you give me some detail for the record, concentrating on the figure that was used in 2001, the developments in Russia and China, and then that reduced figure today, just for the record.

Dr. Carter. Will do.

[The information referred to follows:]

Based on the current and projected threats, I believe it is critical that we transition to a fifth generation capability across the U.S. Services while maintaining sufficient legacy inventory capacity to prevail in current and near-term conflicts. The Joint Strike Fighter’s (JSF) unprecedented combination of stealth, sensing, and firepower will give our force the crucial edge it needs against advanced threats. The current U.S. joint Service requirement of 2,443 F–35s (plus F–35s for partner nations) remains in force based on the existing strategy, force structure, and available resources.

In 2001, the planned JSF procurement strategy for the Department was 2,866 aircraft (1,763 U.S. Air Force and 1,089 Department of the Navy). In 2002, the Department of the Navy reduced their planned procurement to 680 JSF with the incorporation of the Tactical Aircraft Integration (TAI) Plan. TAI more fully integrates the Navy and Marine Corps forces by having Marine Corps TACAIR squadrons deploy with Carrier Air Wings and Navy squadrons deploy with Marine Aircraft Wings. TAI efficiencies allow the Department of the Navy to operate a smaller total of strike fighters and therefore will enable a reduced JSF procurement plan.

Senator Inhofe. Now, you were in my office. You gave me this cute little thing here to carry around and I have looked at it. No one understands it. I don’t understand it. I don’t think you understand it. But it is very complicated.

What I’ve done is blow this up for my colleagues up here. Let me tell them what we’re talking about here. This is the “Federal Acquisition Rule”. This is how we do business. I look at this and I feel a little bit like Kit Bond [former Senator Christopher Bond, R-MO], although he’s not here in the Senate with us any more, but he used to carry these around.

When you look at the complications that are there—and Senator McCain referred to this also—there are 1,680 policy documents and 91 laws affecting Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs). Here
they are right here. Now, we know it can be done faster. We've made exceptions. We have developed alternative procedures and working groups and organizations, such as the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), as I mentioned to you. That's the IED technology that's coming along. I'm very proud of Lieutenant General Mike Barbero, who brought his team in and looked at what we can do. I just sat there and I thought, this is something that's happening today; we're responding; we can come up with something and have it in the field almost in a week.

If that's possible, I get the impression that, as complicated as this is, the FAR Council is made up of the Administrator of the Federal Procurement Policy Office, Secretary of Defense, Administrator of National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Administrator of the General Services Administration. I think they're just too busy to get into this thing and get their hands dirty and fix it.

Do you have any alternatives to overcome this process if we're not able to do it by getting those four entities in one room until it's done?

Dr. CARTER. First of all, for those who haven't had the joy of contemplating that chart, that shows the budgeting process, the acquisition process, and the requirements process in one big chart, and I was in an earlier conversation joking with a Senator that anybody who could master all of that probably would get pretty frustrated with how ponderous is.

Mike Barbero, the really superb Director of JIEDDO, with whom I work every day, does things differently, and we can do things differently. I said in my opening statement that I have two priorities now. One is supporting the warfighter in the here and now and the other is managing all our programs and activities. When we do things like MRAP or JIEDDO, we can't follow that because the battlefield changes too quickly and we can't wait.

Senator INHOFE. Exactly.

Dr. CARTER. Also, in response to Senator McCain, who was saying, can't we turn yet more pages and do things differently, one of the things I think we have ahead of us now is to try to take the experience of the wars and apply that to our usual FAR-driven acquisition system and see if we can't take some of the lessons of what I call the fast lane and apply them to the FAR and review the FAR.

Senator INHOFE. Okay, that's good. It has worked, and I ask unanimous consent that this be made a part of the record at this point in the record.

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]
Senator INHOFE. I know my time has expired, and I was going to get into the Army Ground Vehicle. Almost everything that I've said about the NLOS Cannon would apply to that, too. In 2009, General Thompson said the Army has to modernize those 16,000 fighting vehicles for the future or we are going to put soldiers in harm's way. That was 2009.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Army has a comprehensive Combat Vehicle Modernization (CVM) strategy that addresses key capability shortfalls for the entire combat vehicle fleet (Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Stryker, and M113 family). The strategy is based on three parallel and complementary efforts: transform, replace, and improve. The highest priority effort is transforming the capability of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team by acquiring the Ground Combat Vehicle Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The second priority is replacing the M113 Family of Vehicles with an Armored-Multi Purpose Vehicle (AMPV). Lastly, the Army will improve the Abrams tank, Bradley Cavalry, Fire Support, Engineer Vehicles, and the Stryker to increase protection, ensure required mobility, and allow integration of the emerging network. This strategy ensures the Army's entire fleet of combat vehicles will be able to operate side-by-side across formations with common situational awareness and required levels of protection, mobility, and lethality.

The Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) is funded in the President's budget for fiscal year 2012 (PB12) and the funding extends throughout the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). In addition to the GCV, the Army's CVM strategy has several other components, to include upgrading Abrams tanks and non-infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) Bradleys. Upon congressional approval of a new start, the Army intends to initiate the AMPV program. The AMPV will replace the M113 Family of Vehicles (FOV) with a platform that is more survivable, mobile, and can accomplish missions across the full spectrum of conflict.

The Army's PB12 request includes RDT&E funding for all three CVM components. Procurement funding for the AMPV is planned to start in fiscal year 2014 with the first unit equipped planned for fiscal year 2017. Abrams and non-IFV Bradley upgrades are also funded in PB12 and the funding extends throughout the FYDP.

The Army believes that collectively, all components of the CVM Strategy are within the Army's projected funding resources.

Senator INHOFE. For the record, I'd like to have you address that, as well as, in Afghanistan I know our Oklahoma 45th, we've lost now 10 people already, and one I've been very, very close to is Specialist Chris Horton. I look at these results coming in and I look at the question of reducing our numbers and how we're going about it. I'd like for the record to have you evaluate that for both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

Iraq:

We continue to abide by the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, which requires pulling out all U.S. forces by the end of the year. This would fulfill the drawdown that the President began with his Iraq strategy announcement in February 2009, which included an end to the combat mission in August 2010, and a responsible drawdown of all U.S. forces by the end of this year. Since that announcement, more than 100,000 U.S. forces have departed Iraq. The U.S. forces that remain have shifted into an advisory capacity, and Iraqis have fully taken the lead on security, and have been successful in keeping violence levels low. Over the next 2 months, the remainder of U.S. forces will depart Iraq unless the United States and Iraq negotiate a follow-on presence.

Afghanistan:

The International Security Assistance Force, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and U.S. Central Command are looking at ways to optimize our headquarters forces structure and then the lines in areas that have transitioned to Afghan security forces lead, while ensuring that U.S. and coalition forces maintain the capabilities they need. The plans for the first phase of the drawdown will be briefed to the President in
mid-October. The details of the U.S. surge recovery are classified, and will be presented in the October version of the congressional boots-on-the-ground report.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr. Carter. Sorry that you’re going to have to strain your neck looking over in this direction. I want to thank you for being here, your extraordinary service to our Nation over many years, your teaching at Harvard and other institutions, and helping to develop a new cadre of public servants. Thank you also to your family for their support over those many years.

You and I talked briefly about the Joint Strike Fighter and about the two submarine-building programs, both very important to our national security, and I’m gratified that you will continue to support those two programs, as we discussed, and thank you for that support.

We talked as well a little bit about the IED roadside bomb problem, which is so heinous and pernicious a cause of injury and death to our troops, in fact, I think it’s responsible for more than 85 percent of all our casualties, deaths, and wounds to our warfighters abroad. I wonder if you could reaffirm for me your commitment, which you stated so eloquently in our meeting, to continuing and enhancing the effort to provide better body armor and better protection to our troops who are fighting right now.

Dr. Carter. I absolutely do. It’s what I wake up to every morning. Secretary Gates gave me the responsibility for the counter-IED fight 2 1/2 years ago and then expanded that to all of our fast lane activities, and it’s job one.

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.

I recently visited both Afghanistan and Pakistan in a trip led by Senator Casey, also joined by Senator Whitehouse and Senator Bennett. We spoke with a number of the leaders of Pakistan, the highest ranking leaders, including Army Chief of Staff Kayani, the Prime Minister, and the President. They have a plan. It still needs to be judged in whether in fact it’s implemented, let alone implemented effectively.

But if resources are necessary to help to stop and stem the flow of fertilizer and the substances used by terrorists to make those roadside bombs, would you consider using some of the $800 million now going to the task force for that purpose?

Dr. Carter. I would. Just let me say that I appreciate that you have keyed in on this as an important part of the IED fight. The calcium ammonium nitrate that originates in Pakistan and then shows up as homemade explosives in Pakistan, other chemicals—potassium chlorate, which is a favorite of the enemy in the east, as the home-made explosive is a favorite of the enemy in the south—we have to attack this IED problem in every single possible way we can, and you can’t just wait for it to come and get you. You have to go back into the supply chain. Part of that supply chain traces back into Pakistan. We need to get back and get at that. I know that we’ve been working with Pakistan to that effect, but really just in a preliminary way, and a lot more needs to be done.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. I would like to pledge to you—I know that many of my colleagues would join me in this commitment to persuading, cajoling, whatever we can do to put pressure, very simply, very bluntly, on the Pakistanis to face their responsibility, not only to their allies, but to their own people, who are often the victims of the devastating effects of these roadside bombs and suicide bombs made with those materials.

I understand also that you are very much on top of the program to provide better body armor, and other protection to our warfighters from these roadside bombs, and that the growing protective armament, as well as the so-called biker shorts, are likely to be fully delivered by next month or within that time period; is that correct?

Dr. CARTER. That’s correct. We are procuring large quantities of ballistic underwear, several different variants of it that offer differing levels of protection, both male and female. Obviously, this is a critically important effort, so we’re sparing no effort in that regard. We have a number of suppliers to make sure that we’re not dependent upon any single supplier who might have a production interruption or something like that and people wouldn’t get to have the protection.

We want to, within limits, provide folks with some choice, so we’d like to make several different variants, because it’s obviously an issue of personal sensitivity. But, like all our armor issues, with vehicles, body armor, and so forth, there’s nothing more important than this. We’re all over it.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I’m hopeful that we’ll continue the effort—I know of your very distinguished scientific background in areas of physics and so forth, as well as in public policy—to develop even more effective protective devices for our troops there.

Dr. CARTER. We are, absolutely.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. One last area before my time expires. While many of these horrific wounds are visible in loss of limb and other kinds of very destructive internal wounds, some of them are invisible—the post-traumatic stress and chronic brain injury. I wonder what efforts you envision—I know there are a lot of ongoing efforts—to address these kinds of invisible wounds that are often undiagnosed and therefore completely untreated?

Dr. CARTER. We look back in history and one of the good things that will come out of what is otherwise not a good thing—that is, a decade of war—will be the progress we have made in recognizing the unseen injuries of war, and not only recognizing them, but treating them.

I’ll just make one comment. If you go up, as I’m sure many of you had, up to Bethesda to the Intrepid Center there, that particular Intrepid Center focuses on post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injury in the same way that the one in San Antonio, for example, focuses on amputation and prosthesis. It’s just amazing what is being done to bring together the—I probably won’t use the right words here; I’m not a medical doctor—the psychological and social aspects of the treatment with the neurophysiological. That you can now see as people reexperience an injury, they can track the pathways, neuronal pathways. It’s just truly remarkable.
That’s something we bring to our warfighters and that they deserve, certainly in my heart. But it’s something that’s going to be good for society as a whole going forward. As I said, it’s one of the few good things you can say about what is otherwise a shame, to have been at war for a decade.

Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much for those responses to my questions, and I just want to say in closing that there are other areas that I would have explored if I had more time, such as cyber security. I know others on the panel may mention those areas, but I would like very much to follow up with you on the IED and roadside bomb issue, as well as cyber security, and say in closing that I agree very much with the comments made by Senators Reed and McCain and very much welcome your receptivity to those areas as well.

Thank you very much. I don’t want to give you bad luck by congratulating you in advance, but I look forward to working with you once you’re confirmed. Thank you.

Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Sessions.

Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congratulations, Dr. Carter, on this important nomination. I’ve observed your work over the years. I think you are capable and would make a fine Deputy Secretary. Based on what I know today, I intend to support your nomination.

You are taking the lead in a very important time. You’ve had questions about spending. As the ranking member of the Budget Committee, I know just how dangerous our debt situation is. We are going to be working with you.

I’ll ask you one thing: Will you speak up and point out dangers and risks that might be incurred by certain reductions in spending that may be proposed? In other words, we need the best advice we can get from the Defense Department, and some things may sound good to us in Congress, but in reality, as the professional, it could be dangerous.

Are you willing to defend the legitimate programs and policies that are necessary for a healthy Defense Department?

Dr. Carter. Absolutely, and I will, Senator, absolutely.

Senator Sessions. I believe Senator Levin asked you about deployments in Europe. It’s just a matter that’s come up again recently. I am of the belief it’s difficult to justify 40,000 troops in Europe at this point in time. For our economy it’s better for those troops to be in the United States spending their wealth and creating tax growth for the local communities and jobs.

Will you examine our force levels in areas like Europe and maintain the levels we need, but not maintain them at higher amounts than necessary?

Dr. Carter. Absolutely. Secretary Panetta says everything’s on the table.

Senator Sessions. That’s important to me.

As you go about looking to defend the reasonable defense budget, we ought to ask ourselves how much the base budget has been increased over the last several years. It’s about 2 percent, is that cor-
rect? Do you have the numbers offhand, about how much increase DOD has had over the last 2, 3, 4 years?

Dr. Carter. It's a few percent in real terms, yes, has been the pattern over the decade or so.

Senator Sessions. That was proposed in the President's budget, I believe, a little less than around 2 percent over a decade for each year's growth.

Dr. Carter. Correct.

Senator Sessions. We need to ask ourselves a few things. All of us want to contain spending, but I would point out—and maybe you could use this when you defend DOD—the non-defense discretionary spending in the last 2 years has gone up 24 percent, not 4 percent like the Defense Department.

As we talk about the Defense Department, I'm talking about the base budget, not the overseas contingency operations, which is the war cost. That's projected to drop from $158 billion this fiscal year to $118 billion, I believe, next fiscal year; is that right?

Dr. Carter. Correct.

Senator Sessions. Then have another drop, perhaps even larger, the next year.

Dr. Carter. Correct.

Senator Sessions. But the base defense budget that we rely on to defend America has to be examined and not unnecessarily weakened, in my opinion.

In fact, the stimulus package of a couple of years ago alone spent more money than the entire cost of the Iraq war, almost $850 billion. It's more than that. We look at the new proposal for a stimulus package, $450 billion; that would provide a nice increase for the Defense Department over the next number of years. It's a lot of money.

I guess what I say is if we set priorities for America, don't you think we need to know that the war costs are coming down significantly, but we need to focus on how much you can bring down the base defense budget, and there is a difference between the two?

Dr. Carter. That's true. To your larger point, Secretary Panetta has said that we can't deal with the deficit situation solely by looking at discretionary spending, period. Certainly as we look at things in the defense budget, as I noted earlier, for the Budget Control Act target that we're given we're facing and will share with you some very difficult choices, all these things that we've been saying that are now on the table that haven't been on the table for a decade. That's going to be hard enough. When you get to the levels of the sequester and the manner of the sequester, it's just devastating.

Senator Sessions. Thank you for saying that. I believe it's the responsibility of Congress to reduce spending. We're going to have to do that. But we need not to see the Defense Department as an easy place to take our savings. We have to have it smartly done and throughout our Government.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.

Senator Begich.

Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Carter, thank you for coming to see me a few days ago. I appreciate the opportunity to have a conversation with you. I want to just make sure of a couple things. With all due respect to my colleague from Alabama, actually, the 40,000 troops in Europe, we are on the same page here. We want to see some reassessment, not only in Europe, but around the globe, of where we have our resources and so forth.

I want to make sure we put all the numbers on the table. $800 billion or so in Iraq, $400 plus billion in Afghanistan, but the real cost comes later, not in your Department, but in the Veterans Affairs, which will be in the trillions. The numbers, what I hear is $3, $4, $5 trillion over time, money that we will have to pay for these brave soldiers who served our country and have now needs and services through the Veterans Administration.

The real cost of the war is in the trillions, not in the billions, in the trillions. We're here in the Armed Services Committee, but when I walk down the hall going to another meeting, which will be the Veterans Affairs Committee, we'll have this discussion and then we will blame the Defense Department for $800 billion. I want to make sure as people watch this, it's the big number here.

I agree with my colleague—there are no easy places in the Defense Department. There's no easy places in the overall budget. We sit on the Budget Committee together and we are struggling, I would say, on a lot of fronts of how to resolve this. We have some tough calls.

I hope as we sit down and work on the defense budget—I think you're going to find, as we've talked on the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) issue, on this European issue, there's a lot of opportunity, I think, for us to have good conversation about how to manage the Defense Department budget. But we have to not keep it in isolation of the other pieces to the equation, because when we go to war there are multiple components, because once we leave at some point Afghanistan, whatever remains in Iraq, State Department's going to be spending who knows what, because in Afghanistan they can't support their military. They have no capacity monetarily. Is that a fair statement? They can't write a check and pay for the defense that we're trying to build for them; is that fair?

Dr. Carter. That is correct. At the moment we are bearing the lion's share of the cost for the Afghan National Security Forces as they are built up.

Senator Begich. You define the lion's share, probably—I don't know what the percentage is—80 percent?

Dr. Carter. That's about right, because the other partners are paying a share of it as well.

Senator Begich. They're light on their commitments, that's my view, and that's a personal view. I just think we spend a lot in helping all these countries and some of these others need to lean up a little bit more.

But let me leave that off to the side. First a couple quick questions. Law of the Sea Convention. Do you support that we need to be a signatory to the Law of the Sea Convention in order to put our place on the map?

Dr. Carter. I do.
Senator Begich. We talked about the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) and the importance of it. If confirmed, will you support the 2010 ballistic missile defense review, which established the GMD as a priority and ensures the program is resourced appropriately?

Dr. Carter. Yes.

Senator Begich. I think it’s important from the national and international perspective, but also I’m biased—it’s located in Alaska and we need to make sure the resources are there to keep it moving forward.

What is your understanding of the Failure Review Board’s conclusions and recommendations on the GMD at this point? I know there’s been some current reviews.

Dr. Carter. The Failure Review Board did take up the matter, I think it has a pretty good idea of both what happened and what the path to rectification is for that flight test failure.

Senator Begich. I know we’re in the first stage of this. You’re always going to have failures at a higher percentage in the first stages of testing on anything, because you’re trying to test it to determine how it works and you’re going to have some failure. As you move the testing forward, you get a higher level of accuracy and competency. Is that fair?

Dr. Carter. It is. In missile defense, it’s particularly important because of the nature of the mission. It’s the defense of the country against long-range missiles. You want to make sure things work the way they’re supposed to. I work very hard with General O’Reilly, who runs the Missile Defense Agency and works for me on missile defense, on the test program to make sure we have tests that are realistic, that they’re numerous enough, by the way that they’re affordable enough, because testing’s very expensive also, so that when we say the system performs at a given level we have some basis for saying that.

Senator Begich. Very good. It’s fair to say that—and this is my simplistic way to look at it—when we did the first kind of testing, it was hitting the missiles on the side; now we’re testing it straight on. The missiles on the side had low accuracy at the beginning, but now they’re very accurate in the sense of their capacity.

Dr. Carter. Right.

Senator Begich. Through testing and development over time; is that fair?

Dr. Carter. It is. We changed the kinematics and geometry of the end game to make that more and more stressing.

Senator Begich. Now we’re trying to shoot head-on and that takes a little more accuracy and more testing. As we move forward we’ll improve on that. Is that fair?

Dr. Carter. That’s right.

Senator Begich. On energy security—there’s a good story—I can’t remember which newscast had it yesterday—in regards to our dependency on foreign oil and where we’re engaged, especially in the Middle East, in defense activity. My argument is the issue of a national energy plan is not—I know a lot of people want to argue and debate over clean energy issues, cap and trade and all that. My issue is national security and economic security.
Do you see the issue of energy from the Defense Department’s perspective as an important piece of the equation, trying to figure out how to become more energy efficient? Because I know I think defense runs about $2 billion over budget because the price of fuel has gone up. But also, a lot of our casualties and fatalities are about moving fuel to the front line and defending that. Is that a priority, or where would you rank that as a priority?

Dr. Carter. It has to be a priority, for all the three reasons you described. It costs money. It costs lives in a war if you are, for example, trucking fuel around. You put lives at risk to do that. Of course, it’s a national necessity to strengthen our energy security. For all those reasons, it’s a big deal for DOD.

I will say that we established a post—and this was an initiative that originated in Congress—a Director of Operational Energy at the Assistant Secretary of Defense level. She reports to me. She’s superb. She has made a big difference just in the short time she’s been in office. She’s looking at operational energy, which is the fuel efficiency of vehicles, the insulation of buildings in the field, and things like that.

We also are the largest real property owner in the world, as has been mentioned earlier, and therefore our installations and our buildings and their energy security are a big deal for us also. In all these ways it has to be a priority for the Department.

Senator Begich. Great. I appreciate the new staffing that you have in this area, because I think you’re right on, that DOD has a huge role here, not only during times of war, but also, as you said, you’re a large consumer of energy and how you can tweak that can make a big deal on the consumption.

We briefly talked in our meeting, and I know you’re working on it, and that’s an updated commentary regarding the report on rare earth minerals. We’ll look forward to seeing that.

Last, because my time is up, is at some point, and maybe it can be down the road—I know we’ll have some more discussions in regards to this, and that’s on Afghanistan and Pakistan and your assessment. I’ve heard some already, but I know we’ll have some more discussion, so I’ll just leave that and I may send you some additional questions on that. Is that okay?

Dr. Carter. I look forward to answering them, sir.

Senator Begich. Congratulations. Thank you very much for spending the time with me a few days ago.

Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.

Senator Ayotte.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, Dr. Carter, for your prior service. You’re very well qualified to take over this position.

On Sunday we all remembered September 11, the 10-year anniversary of a horrible day in our Nation’s history. Do you believe it’s an accident that we haven’t had another major incident on our soil, and would you agree with what former Secretary Gates said, which is that the ultimate guarantee against the success of aggressors, dictators, and terrorists in the 21st century, as in the 20th, is hard power, the size, strength, and global reach of the U.S. military?
Dr. CARTER. It’s no accident, and I absolutely agree with what Secretary Gates said.

Senator AYOTTE. To echo what some of my colleagues have already said to you, if we fail to have the political courage in Congress to make the difficult decisions and look at the entire breadth of Federal spending, including reforming our entitlement programs, allowing the Defense Department sequestration to occur, do you think this will make us less safe as we look forward?

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely. When we say disastrous, that’s exactly the disaster we mean.

Senator AYOTTE. I appreciate that. I do not believe that we should subjugate our national security for our failure to have political courage here in Washington and to address the fundamental drivers of our spending.

I wanted to ask you about what Senator McCain asked you about with respect to Iraq. Have you spoken to Secretary Panetta at all about troop levels in Iraq?

Dr. CARTER. I have not, I mean except casually, because in my current responsibilities that is not a subject that I have responsibility for. The piece of it that I work on is the implementation. When decisions are made about that, I will be involved in the implementation of it, the logistics associated with whatever is decided.

Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, as I understand your position you will be Secretary Panetta’s right-hand man; is that right?

Dr. CARTER. If confirmed as deputy, yes.

Senator AYOTTE. If confirmed. In that capacity, you will be making recommendations to him based on your best assessment of what should be done on all major areas in DOD?

Dr. CARTER. Yes, absolutely.

Senator AYOTTE. I would ask you, with respect to the troop levels in Iraq, to make a pledge to this committee that you will give very serious and due weight and consideration to what our commanders in the military are saying on troop levels that we need to make sure that our troops are protected, that we do not undermine the hard-fought security we’ve gotten through Iraq, with many who have sacrificed for that security, based on political considerations? Will you make that assurance to this committee?

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely.

Senator AYOTTE. Because I’m very deeply concerned with what I heard about the 3,000 level of troops, just for the security of those who will remain, for our assets, for securing our embassy in Baghdad, when you look at what happened the other day in Afghanistan to our embassy. These are all missions that these troops will be tasked with. I appreciate that, and I remain concerned from what we’re hearing in the press and I hope that it’s not true.

I appreciate your spending time in my office to meet with me prior to this hearing. One of the issues that you and I talked about and also you’ve been asked about today is acquisition costs and how we go about acquisition in DOD. My view, which I think I shared with you in my office, but I’ll share again, is that from the limited time that I’ve spent on the Armed Services Committee that I think a third year law student could negotiate better terms for
the United States of America than we have been negotiating at the DOD on behalf of the taxpayers of this country.

What can we do to make sure that we are negotiating better terms for our country, better results, particularly when we’re going to be asking you to have to implement these cuts, which will be very difficult?

Dr. CARTER. I remember that conversation. I appreciate the opportunity to have met with you. I remember that phrase as well. There’s so much we can do to do better. I think the place I’d start, Senator, is with the people—we were talking about this earlier—our acquisition workforce, uniformed and civilian, who does this kind of work. I really meant it when I said it earlier: When we back them and we say, we expect you to negotiate a better deal than a third year law student could negotiate, they want to hear that. They want to do the right thing. They want to be backed up by us, and they know that the power of the purse resides ultimately in Congress. When they hear you asking for the same thing, it helps us.

I said there are some new pages I think we need to turn in the acquisition picture, and I’ll just mention a few of them. One is to try to create on a lasting basis a fast lane, learn the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq for acquisition.

Another one is in acquisition of services. You and I talked about this. We spend a lot for services, not just planes, ships, and tanks, but services as well. We are looking at the requirements system, which is what do you ask for in the first place and is that reasonable, is there feedback between the acquisition system and the requirements system.

In all of these ways, I think—and this is something that Senator McCain was asking about—we need to keep turning the page here. There’s a lot more we can do.

Senator AYOTTE. How can we ensure that we only reserve cost-plus contracts for the limited situations where they’re warranted?

Dr. CARTER. That’s my direction to our contracting people and they have to have a reason for deviating from that expectation. There are reasonable reasons for deviating from that, but we have gotten into a habit of doing way too many things on a cost-plus basis that it wasn’t necessary to do on that basis.

Senator AYOTTE. How do we end the end-of-the-year spendfest? Because we have all heard, end of the fiscal year, people buying things we don’t need just because they want to make sure that they spend all the money we have. I’m interested in creating incentives, whether it’s through legislation here, I’d like you to create incentives, to make sure that does not continue, because with limited dollars we just can’t continue to buy things we don’t need.

Dr. CARTER. I agree with you 100 percent, and it is really about incentives, creating the right incentives, so the incentive is not to spend it all by the end of September.

Senator AYOTTE. Do you have any ideas about what incentives you think would be effective?

Dr. CARTER. Yes, there are a number of things. First and foremost—and I had this discussion directly with our program managers and program executive officers, and I say: You will be judged by the value you deliver to the taxpayer, not by the size of the
budget you’re able to secure through the budget process. We will consider you a good program manager and not a failed program manager if you’re returning budget to the Treasury at the end of the year.

The other thing you have to do is say to the manager of a portfolio of programs, say a program executive officer: If you manage to be efficient in one area of your spending and you’re having troubles in another, we’ll give you a break where you’re having trouble and you can reallocate some of that funding to where it would make another program more efficient, or if you save money in this way we’ll help you buy more of something else, buy more capability.

You have to make people understand that by saving money in one area they can serve their Service better, fix a broken program, and so in that sense they’re sharing in the proceeds of good management.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Dr. Carter. I look forward to working with you on these issues and I know many others who serve on the committee as well, so we can improve this process.

My time is up, but I also wanted to mention the Commission on Wartime Contracting: half of our money is going to insurgents. Senator Brown and I have a piece of legislation I hope you’ll support, to cut off funding as soon as possible when our money goes into enemy hands.

Thank you so much for testifying today and we very much appreciate your service.

Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.

Senator McCaskill [presiding]. Dr. Carter, I’m sitting in briefly for the chairman while he’s away, and I love it that Senator Ayotte ended with the Commission on Wartime Contracting. You are well aware from many conversations we’ve had over the last 4\(\frac{1}{2}\) years how high up on the priority list this has been for my term on this committee.

Have you had a chance to read the report from the Commission on Wartime Contracting yet?

Dr. Carter. I have, and I’ve talked to the commissioners on a number of occasions about the report. My general impression is it’s extremely well done. We’ve been working with them side by side. I think we were trying to work off the same list of recommendations that they have. It points to a problem that is a very serious one, and I thought it was a good piece of work, with great benefits to us, insights that we could use.

Senator McCaskill. Is there anything in the report that you disagree with? Is there anything that you took issue with?

Dr. Carter. There are a few of the recommendations—we haven’t finished assessing this final report, which contains so-called strategic recommendations, which are more general. We haven’t really had a chance to assess them. In fact, I testified before the commission with respect to their two interim reports.

Senator McCaskill. Right.

Dr. Carter. I forget what the numbers are, but they had in the neighborhood of 70 to 80 specific recommendations, and I think we adopted somewhere, I want to say, between 60—I’ll get you the specific numbers and the details at any level you want. But almost
all of their recommendations made a lot of sense and were things that we either were doing or should have been doing.

[The information referred to follows:]

This report included 15 strategic recommendations, of which 11 were Department of Defense (DOD)-specific recommendations and 4 were directed at Congress. As for the 11 DOD-specific recommendations, we embrace all of them in principle and are already in the process of implementing some of them.

Senator McCASKILL. I will look forward to any, particularly any issues that you don't completely agree with, because I think it's important that we figure out whether we all are on the same page going forward with the commission's work. This is going to be a subject of a hearing in the full Committee of Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs next week, and then the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee of this committee, we're going to do some work on it, too, and perhaps the Contracting Subcommittee of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee also.

There's going to be several follow-up opportunities to work on these recommendations over the coming weeks. I would really like to know if there's anything there that you are not completely comfortable with, because if there is I think we have to sort that out at the beginning, because my job now is to hold you accountable to make this work of this Contracting Commission be real to our military.

I think that we have two problems on contracting. One is contracting within the big Pentagon picture and the other is contingency contracting. They have different sets of problems. Now, many of them are kissing cousins, but they are different sets of problems.

The biggest problem with the contingency contracting is an over-reliance on contractors in order to meet the mission and the supremacy of the mission in terms of shortcutting good contracting practices and a culture that is all about that. The view: I want what I want when I need it in theater; I don't want to listen to any acquisition personnel tell me I can't have it.

It is anecdotal, but it is true that one of the major generals over contracting in Kuwait when I visited there—and a member of your staff was with us—actually said to me: I wanted three kinds of ice cream in the mess hall yesterday and I didn't care what it cost. Now, that is obviously problematic. We all want our soldiers in theater to get ice cream. We want them to get a variety of kinds of ice cream. But we have to care what it costs. It's that culture that I think your leadership at the very top is going to be absolutely essential on. I wanted to make sure we find out if there is any place that we disagree.

The other big issue about contingency contracting is sustainability. I am very uncomfortable with the analysis that's going on in theater about sustainability of the money we're spending. I'm even more concerned that, for the first time, we have now morphed the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP began as something that was supposed to be for the on-the-ground commanders to be able to use to win hearts and minds in small projects. We now have an Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund in the DOD budget for the first time.
We are actually going beyond what CERP was ever intended to be and we're building infrastructure in DOD. I'm not aware that we ever had a policy debate about whether that was a good idea or not. I would love to know why we think that's a good idea, and is this just going to be in contingencies or are we going to start taking this responsibility away from the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development? I would love your follow-up thoughts on that.

Also, Dr. Carter, about this Iraq Infrastructure Fund, it's $400 million. That's not a huge amount of money now, but neither was CERP when we started. Neither was CERP, and it obviously has grown significantly.

Can you illuminate for me why they felt that they had a need to create an infrastructure fund in addition to the CERP funds that were being used for projects, road-building and community redevelopment?

Dr. Carter. I would be pleased to, Senator. I'd like to get back to you on that particular issue in some detail because it's partly a policy issue as well.

Senator McCaskill. Okay.

[The information referred to follows:]

As there is no Iraq Infrastructure Fund, the question appears to be focused on the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF). In fiscal year 2011, Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton requested that $400 million be appropriated to the Department of Defense (DOD) for the AIF to execute critical infrastructure projects in support of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. The AIF is designed to bridge the resources and capabilities and serve the missions of both departments in supporting projects critical to counterinsurgency objectives and economic development such as electricity projects in Kandahar. The AIF projects are developed jointly with the Department of State.

With regard to the question of an overlap with the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) mission, the CERP is a DOD program to enable military commanders to respond to urgent, small scale, humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility. The DOD reduced the fiscal year 2011 CERP request by $400 million to resource the AIF.

Dr. Carter. If I could just comment on your general point, you're absolutely right, contingency contracting and all the rest of the contracting we've been talking about, JSF and so forth, present a different set of challenges. You have it in a nutshell that it's war, so people want to move quickly, and very understandably.

What we need to do is not make it a choice between appropriate controls and contracting discipline and responsiveness to the warfighter. That's where I think the Commission on Wartime Contracting said we've fallen down over the last decade. We're getting better. We're trying to get better.

With respect to the commission, I absolutely will get back to you on it on anything we disagree with. I know they have some numbers in there that we're trying to look at. I can't validate their numbers, but I can validate the overall accuracy of the report in the sense that any level of waste, fraud, and abuse is unacceptable, and all of the recommendations they've made, as I said, we're working off the same list.

Senator McCaskill. We built a $300 million power plant in Kabul that is not fully operational and it's too expensive for them to use. If anybody tries to tell me there was a sustainability analysis done before we spent $300 million, I'd like to know who takes
ownership of that, because I find it incredibly hard to believe that anybody looked at the long-term sustainability of a high tech, dual fuel power plant that’s too expensive and, frankly, beyond the capability of the Afghan people to actually use it in a way that it was intended.

That’s a lot of money, and that’s just one example, and unfortunately I could list too many. I would like you to address the sustainability analysis. I would like to see that in war colleges throughout the training of our amazing leaders in our military we begin to embrace contracting as part of that training, because we are never going to be able to get away from contingency contracting. The sooner these leaders know that’s very important, the better.

Let me very briefly, because I’m out of time. If you’re going to contrast two acquisition programs, we have the poster child of bad with the JSF and the poster child of good with the Super Hornet. Now, factually that’s great for me because I happen to care a lot about the Super Hornet in some of this, obviously. It would be obvious to point out that some of this is parochial.

But there’s no better example, we’ve never had a program more out of control, more over cost, than the JSF. Meanwhile, the Super Hornet has always delivered, on time, and now we’re down to a cost of $52.7 million fly-away, and today’s estimate on the JSF is $113 million, so half the cost.

I just have one simple question: Given the Navy has publicly stated that the Super Hornet can undertake virtually any combat mission, is it your opinion that the Super Hornet remains a viable alternative based on the Navy’s tactical needs?

Dr. CARTER. You’re right that the performance of the Super Hornet program is commendable. Obviously, we’re trying to manage in a direction so that JSF will one day replicate that kind of performance. I said in the Nunn-McCurdy certification this summer that no alternative meets the joint requirement as it is now spelled out for a fifth generation fighter but the JSF.

Finally, we have in the last couple of years procured additional Super Hornets as we have been forced to delay the onset of production ramp-up for the JSF.

Senator MCCASKILL. I have some more specific questions about the Super Hornet versus the JSF and I will get those for the record for you.

Thank you very much, Dr. Carter. My time has expired.

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator McCaskill.

Senator GRAHAM. I’d like to associate myself with Senator McCaskill’s comments about the Super Hornet. I have some questions for you, too. I think it is a viable airplane at a good price and we ought to make sure we have an adequate inventory until we get the JSF in a better situation.

Let’s see if I can summarize your testimony when it comes to defense spending. Is your understanding and your belief and that of Secretary Panetta that if Congress were to follow through with the $400 billion cuts that are being asked by the administration, President Obama, to the defense budget and we took $600 billion more
if the super committee fails to do their job, a trillion dollars, it
would be devastating to the Defense Department? Is that correct?

Dr. CARTER. That’s correct.

Senator GRAHAM. We would take the finest military in the his-
tory of mankind and gut it, is that right?

Dr. CARTER. Yes. The word Secretary Panetta uses is——

Senator GRAHAM. Do you have any idea why we would do that
in Congress? What were we thinking? I don’t know. I’m asking you
because I can’t think of a good reason to do that. Is the world that
safe?

Dr. CARTER. The world’s not that safe. We still are looking in our
defense strategy to be ready for this very wide range of threats and
contingencies that the world presents to us. We don’t see that end-
ing at any time in the future. We don’t see anyone else in the world
being able to assume the leadership role that the United States
has. We never ever again want to have a hollow military.

Senator GRAHAM. We’re on the path to do all those things if we
follow through with this potential proposal?

Dr. CARTER. I think that’s what Secretary Panetta means when
he used the word “disastrous”.

Senator GRAHAM. I think it’s just completely brain-dead for us
even to consider this, and we’re not going to let it happen. You just
tell the men and women in uniform we’re going to wake up and get
some good common sense here pretty soon.

Iraq. Does it matter how it ends in Iraq in terms of our national
security interest?

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely.

Senator GRAHAM. On a scale of 1 to 10, how important is it for
Iraq to end well, become stable, and not be a satellite state of Iran?

Dr. CARTER. It’s a 10, after all we’ve put into it.

Senator GRAHAM. If it’s a 10—and I couldn’t agree with you
more—we ought to be looking at resourcing it as a 10. Do you
agree with that?

Dr. CARTER. The decisions haven’t been made about
resourcing——

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with the concept that if it’s a 10
we ought to resource it consistently?

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely.

Senator GRAHAM. Let’s talk about Afghanistan. Does it matter
how that ends?

Dr. CARTER. It does.

Senator GRAHAM. It does. It matters a lot, because that’s the
place where the attacks of September 11 were planned; is that cor-
correct?

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely.

Senator GRAHAM. What would happen after all of these years
and all the blood and treasure and mistakes we made, if the
Taliban were somehow able to come back? What would it mean to
our national security interests down the road?

Dr. CARTER. It would be very serious.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe we can prevent that?

Dr. CARTER. I do.
Senator GRAHAM. I think we have a plan to prevent it. The only thing I worry about is that we’re going to be penny wise and pound foolish.

I know you very well, and I know that you and Secretary Panetta are going to give us the unvarnished truth. As we transition to Afghan control, please realize, to the committee and those who are listening, that how it ends does matter.

The strategic partnership agreement that’s being negotiated with the Afghan Government, are you familiar with the concept?

Dr. CARTER. I am.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you support the idea that post-2014 we would have an enduring relationship with the Afghan Government and people?

Dr. CARTER. Yes, I do.

Senator GRAHAM. It is in our national security interest to have a political relationship with the Afghan Government and people; do you agree with that?

Dr. CARTER. Sure.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree that it would be in our national security interest to have an economic relationship with the Afghan people?

Dr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree it’s in our national security interest to have a military relationship with the Afghan Government, security forces, and people post-2014?

Dr. CARTER. I do.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that training of the Afghan army will be a need that goes past 2014?

Dr. CARTER. I will.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that General Caldwell is one of the unsung heroes of this war by creating a training regime that is more efficient and more productive?

Dr. CARTER. Double yes.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that the counterterrorism component that exists today will be needed past 2014 to make sure al Qaeda and Taliban do not regenerate?

Dr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that the Afghan Government has virtually no air force and they will need some air capability?

Dr. CARTER. Yes, and that’s part of——

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that the intelligence-gathering capability of the United States is second to none?

Dr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. That the Afghan Government and the Afghan security forces would benefit from that assistance?

Dr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that we need to embed some American soldiers in the future to make sure the Afghan army develops in a mature professional fashion?

Dr. CARTER. If Afghanistan agrees to that, of course.

Senator GRAHAM. All of this is contingent on them asking.

Dr. CARTER. You bet.
Senator G RAHAM. Do you agree with me it would be in our national security interest to leave behind a military footprint that would have American air power available to the Afghan security forces and counterterrorism units to suppress the Taliban as far as the eye could see?

Dr. CARTER. I think that's desirable, but of course we haven't begun to address the issue——

Senator GRAHAM. But if the Afghan people through their government would ask, it would be in our national security interest to say yes?

Dr. CARTER. It would.

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree with me that if we had such an enduring relationship, it would be a signal to Iran that needs to be sent?

Dr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that the Iranians are trying to develop a nuclear program, not for peaceful purposes?

Dr. CARTER. That's my understanding, yes.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that it would change the world as we know it if they were successful?

Dr. CARTER. It's very undesirable to let Iran go nuclear.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe that we're on a collision course with Pakistan?

Dr. CARTER. I can't say that. We work very closely with Pakistan in some areas. Obviously, there is great frustration in some other areas on both sides.

Senator G RAHAM. Would you agree that the relationship is in a new phase, very problematic?

Dr. CARTER. It is certainly problematic.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree that a lot of the IEDs coming into Afghanistan are made from products in Pakistan?

Dr. CARTER. They are.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree that it is now time for the Pakistani Government to step up and make a decision as to who they are and what they want to be?

Dr. CARTER. Certainly as regards terrorism and as regards weapons crossing the border from Pakistan to Afghanistan, we need their help. I mentioned that earlier with respect to ammonium nitrate, but it's across the board. They need to step up.

Senator GRAHAM. Would it be in our national security interest to open up transportation routes in the north to get supplies and equipment into Afghanistan without having to send everything through Pakistan?

Dr. CARTER. It is and we are.

Senator GRAHAM. The Uzbekistan Government, I met with them. They're willing to expand the relationship with the United States. Do you think that is in our national security interest to do so?

Dr. CARTER. It is. They have been part of that northern resupply system and——

Senator GRAHAM. It's my understanding that the administration is negotiating with the Uzbekistan Government to dramatically expand that supply capability and that we would need some waivers from this committee to support the Uzbekistan security forces. Sec-
Secretary Panetta has written me a letter suggesting he supports that. Would you support that?

Dr. Carter. Certainly if Secretary Panetta supports it, I would. I understand enough about the northern distribution network to understand its importance.

Senator Graham. This is a critical area for us regarding Afghanistan. I want to let the committee know, Mr. Chairman, that we’re on the verge of a major breakthrough in terms of northern supply and the committee will need to come up with a consensus about how we can help the Uzbekistan Government. Some waivers would be necessary to sell them equipment, monitoring their human rights problems in the past.

I think you’re an ideal candidate for this job. Most of the defense budget is personnel costs. When you want to reform retirement, count me in. I want to do it in a humane, generous way, but it needs to change. When you want to adjust TRICARE premiums for people like myself who is going to be a retired colonel one day, count me in, because even though you serve and you sacrifice you still have, I think, the ability to serve in retirement. We’re not going to ask more of the retired force than they can give, but change has to come.

I think you’re an ideal choice to be Deputy Secretary of Defense and I look forward to supporting you.

Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Cornyn. Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief UC request?

Chairman Levin. You certainly can. Before you do that, I want to just say—this retirement announcement as a colonel, this precludes the possibility, which is there apparently, of you being promoted to a general.

Senator Graham. We have enough challenges in the world. [Laughter.]

Chairman Levin. Senator Cornyn.

Senator Cornyn. I’m grateful, Mr. Chairman. I want to say to Dr. Carter how much I appreciated him visiting with me. I support his nomination.

I’d like to make a unanimous consent request that two letters that I have written to him and two letters he’s written back to me relating to the JSF be made part of the record.

Chairman Levin. They will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]
August 1, 2011

The Honorable Ashton B. Carter
Under Secretary of Defense
3010 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-3010

Dear Dr. Carter,

As strong supporters of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, we write to express concern regarding reports that the latest official cost estimate suggests that operating and support costs for the program could total more than $1 trillion over 50 years.

The JSF represents the backbone of the Department of Defense’s fighter recapitalization efforts and will serve as the cornerstone of future U.S. tactical airpower. The JSF program is intended to enable the United States to produce fifth-generation strike fighters to support our national defense and help ensure air superiority for decades to come.

We are concerned that the Department’s F-35 operating and support cost models make overly conservative assumptions using cost factors and maintenance procedures from legacy aircraft systems, rather than actual cost data. It appears this has led to uninformed speculation in recent press articles that may significantly overstate costs for the entire F-35 program. Likewise, this leads us to believe that the F-35 operating and support cost estimates presented to Congress along with the submission of the April 15th Selected Acquisition Report may not be of sufficient quality and fidelity to enable Congress to make informed budget decisions.

As you noted in recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning the JSF operating and support cost estimates: "...you shouldn’t believe them because we haven’t really begun to manage them yet. They are parametric forecasts." It is imperative that JSF program performance and cost be portrayed to Congress and the program’s international partners as accurately as possible. Releasing an official operating and support cost estimate that lacks analytical rigor has raised undue alarm, despite the fact that the JSF program’s technical performance and cost trends indicate the program is making considerable progress.

We appreciate your work on the Technical Baseline Review, which placed the JSF program on a sound footing going forward. However, in order to guarantee the continued success of this program, it is imperative that this effort be followed with solid analysis of JSF life cycle costs, so both the Department and Congress can make well-informed decisions about the program in the future. These decisions will require sound analysis of analytical methodologies that accurately reflects actual program costs, is consistent with the scope and definition of operating and support costs on other major DoD acquisition systems, and fully incorporates the benefit of next-generation logistical approaches that will be utilized to maintain the JSF over its life cycle.
The Honorable Ashton B. Carter  
August 1, 2011  
Page 2

In addition, please inform us as to when the Department’s sustainment strategy for the JSF fleet will be completed, when that will be shared with Congress, and whether the FY13 DoD budget and the accompanying FYDP will reflect its requirements. We look forward to your prompt response to these concerns.

Sincerely,

[Signatures]

JOHN CORNYN  
United States Senator

JEANNE SHAHEEN  
United States Senator

KELLY Ayotte  
United States Senator

SAXBY CHAMBLISS  
United States Senator

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON  
United States Senator

ORRIN G. HATCH  
United States Senator
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

The Honorable John Cornyn
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Cornyn:

Thank you for your August 1 letter concerning cost estimates for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Your support of the F-35 program is valued, and your concern over the fidelity of the estimate for Operating and Support (O&S) costs is well founded and shared by the Department. This estimate represents a projection based on an extensive set of assumptions and historical data drawn from previous aircraft programs adjusted to reflect the F-35’s configuration and support structure. While it is currently our only assessment of O&S costs, it does not yet reflect the application of any management discipline to these costs or realism to the assumptions made in the models, something the Department is committed to doing.

Nor have these estimates yet been informed by actual JSF data. Estimates at this point in a program are – by their nature – imprecise and need be informed and continually adjusted by actual system performance. For the F-35, that process will begin when the Services start operating the first production aircraft later this year. In the near term, the JSF team will continue to analyze the detailed basing, manpower requirements, and reliability forecasts that form the foundation of the O&S estimate to identify the most efficient and effective support solutions. While the F-35 is designed to achieve efficiencies through commonality, shared support, and state-of-the-art maintenance, logistics, and supply chain systems, we will need to exercise the system before we can make accurate assessments of the those benefits. I strongly believe we can reduce the costs that will be required to operate and support the F-35, but it will take time to accrue the data required to more accurately inform the estimates. This data will also inform a careful review of the O&S cost drivers for F-35.

We are undertaking a number of initiatives to inform sustainment decisions to better control the lifetime O&S costs for the F-35 fleet. The JPO is: baselining requirements with the Services and leveraging increased efficiency opportunities provided by the F-35; developing an Affordability Management Plan (AMP) that is focused on reducing the costs of support products (e.g., support equipment, spare parts, and training devices); and addressing reliability and maintainability. For example, the F-35 JPO is performing a deep dive on key depot-level repairables and consumables – which account for approximately 30 percent of the projected O&S costs – to identify candidates for targeted reliability improvements and both unit and life cycle cost reductions.

The JPO is conducting a Business Case Analysis (BCA) that will evaluate both the current sustainment strategy and potential options to determine the best value, long-term support solution for the program – the first phase of which is scheduled for completion in December 2011. This effort will evaluate options for supply chain management, sustaining engineering, field operations support, and fleet management. Additionally, the JPO is conducting a series of
design reviews on sustainment elements (e.g., the supply chain) throughout 2011 and 2012 to verify the technical design and identify whether there are any opportunities for redesign that could reduce costs. As we mature all of these cost-reduction initiatives from the AMP, BCA and design reviews, the results will be incorporated into the F-35 life cycle cost estimate and ultimately realized by the Services and international partners.

I will ensure Congress has full visibility into all of these efforts. The BCA will not be completed in time for the requirements to be reflected in the FY 2013 budget request; however, we are using real-time analysis as much as possible to inform our budget planning.

Again, thank you for your continued support of this important program and the Department of Defense. I will continue to work with Congress to provide transparency and visibility into the F-35 program to ensure we achieve our shared goal of providing the taxpayers with the right 5th-generation strike fighter capability at the least cost. A similar letter has been sent to the other signatories of your letter.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Ashton B. Carter
August 24, 2011

The Honorable Ashton B. Carter
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
3010 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-3010

Dear Dr. Carter,

As the Senate prepares to consider your nomination to serve as the next Deputy Secretary of Defense, I write to express disappointment with your apparent lack of commitment to the success of the largest DoD major defense acquisition program in our nation’s history, the F-35 Lightning II. This program is the centerpiece of our strategy to retain air dominance for decades to come, and it is critical to our long-term national security. If confirmed by the Senate to serve in this important role, your personal commitment to making F-35 succeed will be essential. Simply put, there is no acceptable alternative to the F-35 program, and it must be placed on a path to success.

As you know, the three variants of the F-35 will replace our military’s aging fleets of AV-8s, A-10s, F-16s, and F-18s. In your written testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in May of this year, you correctly stated that "the F-35 will form the backbone of U.S. air combat superiority for generations to come." This 5th-generation stealth aircraft, with its multi-role precision attack capability, represents a tremendous leap in capabilities, as compared to the legacy aircraft it will replace. However, the U.S. is not alone in pursuing this level of capability, as both Russia and China have made substantial progress in developing their own 5th-generation tactical aircraft. If we fail to field the F-35 in adequate numbers, our nation will run the risk of losing its status as the preeminent air power in the coming years.

I am concerned that the DoD’s failure to sufficiently defend and advocate for the F-35 program has enabled and even invited unwarranted criticisms from many corners, including calls for partial or complete cancellation of the program. It is my hope that, as Deputy Secretary of Defense, you would be a champion of the F-35 program, using your voice to remind Congress that this weapon system is one our nation cannot do without. I strongly encourage you to step up your defense of this key program.

I look forward to discussing this issue with you before your Senate confirmation, and I would appreciate your written answers to the following questions:

1. Why is it imperative for the United States to successfully field the F-35 for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, as envisioned in the latest Future Years Defense Program?
The Honorable Ashton B. Carter  
August 24, 2011  
Page 2

2. In the FY12 budget request, the Department cut approximately $12 billion from the F-35 production budget and returned just $4.6 billion back into the development budget. The Department then spent a significant portion of the remaining $8 billion on 4th-generation F/A-18E/F aircraft. Continuing to procure less capable 4th-generation aircraft is a questionable strategy given that our adversaries are already developing their own 5th-generation aircraft, and cutting F-35 production funding in order to fund these 4th-generation aircraft makes little sense. Can you assure me that this will not occur again in the future?

3. After the Department moved a net $8 billion out of the F-35 program, it then submitted a reprogramming request to cover early production cost growth and concurrency costs. Can you assure me that you will budget for sufficient funding to cover known costs in the future?

4. As you testified in May, while procurement has been held flat in FY10–FY12, your intent is to support a 1.5X “ramp rate” going forward. Will this Administration begin to ramp up in FY13 at 1.5X per year, or will the Department continue to use the F-35 program as a bill-payer for other programs, undermining affordability and driving up costs to both the U.S. Government and our F-35 international partners?

5. This program is critical to the national security of our eight F-35 international partners and for the successful execution of future coalition operations. As such, will you commit to a more proactive dialogue with the international partners on this program in the future?

Thank you for your service to our nation, and for your prompt reply to this request.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

JOHN CORKY
United States Senator
The Honorable John Cornyn  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC  20510  

Dear Senator Cornyn:  

Thank you for your August 24 letter concerning the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter program. I assure you that the Department is committed to the success of the F-35 program and it has received steadfast attention and support during my tenure as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The Department will continue to focus on delivering this important capability for the warfighter.  

On June 1, 2010, I certified to Congress that the F-35 program is essential to national security and that there are no alternatives to the F-35 program that would provide acceptable capability to meet the joint military requirement at less cost. That certification, following a thorough Nunn-McCurdy review, highlighted the continued need for the F-35 program and the need to control program costs in production and in sustainment. Since then, the Department has continued to focus its efforts on controlling the costs associated with the F-35. The success of the F-35 is absolutely dependent on both affordability for the U.S. Services, as well as our international partners. I have maintained close communication with our industry partners and international partners on our efforts to manage those costs as we transition from development to production and into long-term sustainment. I appreciate the opportunity to provide responses to your specific questions:  

1. Why is it imperative for the United States to successfully field the F-35 for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, as envisioned in the latest Future Years Defense Program?  

During the Nunn-McCurdy review we examined the importance of the F-35 to national security. The review assessed the F-35 against current legacy aircraft operated by the Services, as well as upgrades to those weapons systems, for their potential to fulfill the Department’s future operational needs. The analysis compared the options on the basis of survivability, basing, lethality, and networking and determined that there are no alternatives to the F-35 that provide acceptable capability to meet the joint military requirement at less cost. This analysis depends critically on the ability of the Department to deliver the F-35 at an affordable cost. My focus is on managing that cost and making decisions now that will ensure affordability in the future.  

2. In the FY12 budget request, the Department cut approximately $12 billion from the F-35 production budget and returned just $4.6 billion back into the development budget. The Department then spent a significant portion of the remaining $8 billion on 4th-generation F/A-18E/F aircraft. Continuing to procure less capable 4th-generation
aircraft is a questionable strategy given that our adversaries are already developing their own 5th-generation aircraft, and cutting F-35 production funding in order to fund these 4th-generation aircraft makes little sense. Can you assure me that this will not occur again in the future?

Secretary Panetta has emphasized that in meeting the Department’s budget challenges, every program and activity must be on the table. In reviewing the upcoming President’s budget for FY13, the Department is giving programs particularly close scrutiny as a result of the reductions in budget authority for security spending included in the Budget Control Act of 2011. That said, the F-35 program changes in the FY12 budget request were driven by managerial, rather than budget, concerns. The F-35 program was undergoing a restructuring as a consequence of the Nunn-McCurdy review and the subsequent Technical Baseline Review. As a result of these reviews, the Department determined that additional time and money ($4.6 billion) were required to complete the development and test phase of the program. Given this decision, it was important to revise the production profile (moving some production money to later years) to reduce the risks associated with concurrency, as well as to allow the manufacturing processes at Lockheed Martin to mature. The Manufacturing Review Team (MRT) assessed that a 1.5X production ramp was an optimal balance between production efficiency and concurrency risk for the F-35 program and the Department built its plans around that production goal, which also includes the planned international partner procurements. The decision to procure F/A-18E/Fs for the Department of the Navy was an acknowledgement that the delay in F-35C procurement would slow down the rate at which Department of the Navy F-35s would reach the fleet. The Department of the Navy assesses that its strike fighter shortfall will peak in the 2015-2020 timeframe. The procurement of additional F/A-18E/F aircraft will help to mitigate that shortfall while we continue to ramp up F-35 procurement. The Department’s commitment to the F-35 is solid, and we are committed to production rates that minimize program cost, but it is impossible to absolutely guarantee at any point in the program that fact-of-life discovery in the development program, the need to balance increasing production rates against concurrency costs in the interest of lower total program cost, and overall affordability constraints will not affect future production rate decisions.

3. After the Department moved a net $8 billion out of the F-35 program, it then submitted a reprogramming request to cover early production cost growth and concurrency costs. Can you assure me that you will budget for sufficient funding to cover known costs in the future?

The reprogramming request was necessary to cover unexpected cost growth on the first 3 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 1-3 contracts. These contracts were negotiated in 2007, 2008, and 2009 and are cost-type contracts in which the government undertook to reimburse cost overruns. I assure you that we are aggressively managing future F-35 contracts to prevent overruns. We are continuing with the fixed-price type of contract initiated in LRIP 4 last year and applying realistic Should-Cost analysis in preparation for the negotiation of the LRIP 5 contract. This will provide a maximum limit on the Department’s liability for future cost growth, increase the contractors’ incentives to control costs, and ensure that LRIP 5 negotiations result in a price that is fair and reasonable to the taxpayers. Even with solid Should-Cost analysis, there will be a need for modifications to LRIP aircraft, as testing continues and test results are analyzed. These modification costs for the early LRIP lots are proving larger than
originally estimated, increasing concurrency risk, as already noted. The Department is budgeting for those future modification costs that are now estimated; however, the full extent of modification costs cannot be known with certainty until the testing program concludes.

4. As you testified in May, while procurement has been held flat in FY10-FY12, your intent is to support a 1.5X “ramp rate” going forward. Will this Administration begin to ramp up in FY13 at 1.5X per year, or will the Department continue to use the F-35 program as a bill-payer for other programs, undermining affordability and driving up costs to both the U.S. Government and our F-35 international partners?

As noted in the response to question 2, the 1.5X ramp rate was based on our best understanding at the time of the appropriate balance between concurrency risk and production efficiency. I am opposed to changes in the F-35 production profile that are inefficient from a cost perspective. That includes ramping up too fast, as well as too slow. The Department will continue to assess that balance as the F-35 program progresses with testing and low rate initial production. The F-35 is a very high Department priority and the production rate will not be reduced solely to pay other bills in the budget.

5. This program is critical to the national security of our eight F-35 international partners and for the successful execution of future coalition operations. As such, will you commit to a more proactive dialogue with the international partners on this program in the future?

The F-35 is the largest cooperative program in the Department and it can only succeed if the three U.S. Services, the Department, and our eight international partners are informed, aware, and included in the developments and decisions that affect all collectively. I have made it my practice to consult promptly by phone and message with my counterpart National Armaments Directors of the JSF partner countries whenever a significant managerial decision involving JSF is made. Additionally, I annually host the F-35 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) conference where F-35 partners are briefed on and discuss the status of the program. Each of the partner nations, like the United States, has a strong requirement for the JSF’s capabilities but faces budget challenges that make affordability paramount. I can assure you that the Department will continue to be proactive, transparent, and candid with our eight international partners so that they can have confidence that we are giving the program our highest managerial attention.

The Department’s support for the F-35 program is strong. The F-35 will be the backbone of the future tactical aircraft inventory for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as our international partners. We are committed to ensuring that decisions concerning the F-35 are made for the correct reasons and with a commitment toward overall F-35 program success. I look forward to continuing to discuss these important issues with you in the future as the program progresses. Your support of the Department and the F-35 program is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Ashton B. Carter
Senator Cornyn. I’m grateful to you. I have a conflicting appointment, so I won’t be able to stay. But thank you for that.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.

Senator Hagan.

Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Carter, thanks for taking the time to come visit with me recently. I appreciated our discussion. In that discussion, as we discussed, you know that I am a strong supporter of the F–35B. It does provide the Marine Corps with the capability to launch from the large-deck amphibious ships, refuel in forward operating sites. As the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Amos, has said, if we lose the F–35B there is no plan B for fixed wing aircraft on large-deck amphibious ships, and this would drastically cut our Nation’s capability to project power in remote environments.

Recently, when the F–15 airplane crashed in Benghazi, Libya, the AV–8B fighter jets conducted a tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel mission in Libya. The rescue forces took off from two amphibious assault ships in the Mediterranean. When the aircraft went down, there were no aircraft carriers in the area.

I want to work with you to get the F–35B off probation and resolve the engineering issues inside the weight limits and financial boundaries. The term “probation” has a negative connotation. My question is, what kind of effect does the F–35B being on probation have on the Marine Corps’s ability to transition to a fifth generation fighter? Does it affect the industrial base by putting suppliers on notice and increasing production costs?

Dr. Carter. The F–35B is everything you said. Namely, there is a firm requirement for it; the attractiveness of the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the F–35 is the ability to take off from the smaller decked amphib ships; and General Amos has indicated that’s a capability that he very much wants to have. That’s why Secretary Gates, who originated the fact of and also the term “probation” for F–35, the instructions he gave us were to be success-oriented, and as the managers of the program we are. That is, we are trying to work through the engineering issues from which the concept of probation arose.

Just to recap them briefly, it’s a complicated variant because of its short takeoff and vertical landing nature, and therefore does present some engineering issues that the other variants don’t. Those surfaced in flight tests and we know what they are and we’re working through the engineering fixes to them. We can’t rule out that additional ones will arise in flight tests. You can never say that. But we know what they are and we have a schedule for resolving them.

What Secretary Gates said at the time was: Resolve those issues and then we’ll look at the cost impact and the weight impact associated with those engineering fixes and decide where we go with STOVL from that point. My focus has been on resolving those issues. That’s where Admiral Venlet’s focus is. We are success-oriented. We will work through those engineering issues and get to that point.

Senator Hagan. The F–35B I understand has performed very well in operational testing so far this year, and I think there’s quite a few number of tests taking place next month. If the variant per-
forms successfully during these sea trials next month, would you consider lifting the program from probation?

Dr. Carter. General Amos and I talk about this all the time—probation is—I'll borrow a phrase from elsewhere—conditions-based. In other words, we told Secretary Gates that it would take us around 2 years to work through the engineering issues to which I referred, and we're on schedule to do that within those 2 years. If we resolve them within the 2 years, then we have done what he said probation was supposed to do.

There's nothing magic about 2 years. There is something magic about resolving the issues.

Senator Hagan. I agree with that. But if they get resolved—I think it's been a year now. If they get resolved, I think it would be important to the industrial base to be sure that probation would be removed as quickly as those issues are taken care of.

I wanted to talk about the science and technical talent. DOD and the defense industry are facing challenges seeking new graduates with advanced degrees in scientific and technical fields to help develop complex military systems. Some of these challenges include Federal hiring and/or pay freezes, budgetary pressures leading to declining numbers of new defense programs, recruiting issues stemming from graduates being more interested in the commercial sectors related to information technology and energy versus the traditional defense industrial sector, such as aerospace or naval shipbuilding.

What is the Department doing to ensure that it as well as the defense industrial base is able to have access to future scientific and technical talent, and what is the Department doing to recruit and retain the best and the brightest scientists and engineers, and how do you measure the effectiveness of these efforts? I just think it's critically important that we focus on this at DOD as well as, obviously, in our education system with science, technology, engineering, and math curriculum that is so critically important in our country today.

Dr. Carter. It's critically important. Next to and after the superb nature of the men and women we have in uniform, the thing that makes our military the greatest in the world is the technology within it. There is a challenge associated with the globalization of the technology base for defense. It's no longer the case that all new technologies emerge in this country or in association with the defense technology base.

We need to reach out and gather those ideas and those people who might otherwise end up not in defense and attract them into defense. We're doing a lot to strengthen the science and technology workforce.

I think another point I'd make is that as we go into the budget situation that we're facing, we've talked about difficult choices; one of the difficult choices is between the present and the future, how much you invest in the present and how much you invest in the future. I think one of the things that we're going to need to do is make sure that we protect those investments in science and technology that will allow us 10 years from now, 20 years from now, to have the skill base and the new ideas that will constitute the
military of the future and make sure that we don't mortgage the future.

That's the kind of balancing that we're trying to do in the comprehensive review, present versus future, even as we're trying to balance different kinds of threats. It's a very big effort within the acquisition, technology, and logistics department.

Senator HAGAN. You said that you're doing quite a bit in this area, especially from recruiting. Can you give me any concrete examples?

Dr. CARTER. Yes. Let's see. I'll take the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for example. We've made a lot of progress there in the last few years, and I credit the current director for doing that, in making it more attractive for people who are first-rate technical people to come in, spend some time in DARPA, make their contributions, get the feel of the excitement and the commitment of national defense as a place to apply their scientific talents. We've made a lot of progress there, but all of our technical managers are doing that.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. I've worked quite closely with Dr. Duke and I think she is definitely doing a very good job at that example.

Dr. Carter, thank you and thank you for your family, for your participation in I know what's going to be a nominee that will be confirmed very swiftly. Thank you for doing this.

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan.

Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you also for taking time to come and visit with me. I appreciate it. I know we briefly talked about your thoughts about the Department's willingness to invest in the Reserve component, Guard and Reserve, to see how we can maximize those valuable dollars and maybe shift some of the responsibilities in training and resources to the Guard and Reserves. What's your position on that?

Dr. CARTER. The Guard and Reserves, we couldn't have done what we've done over the last 10 years without the contribution of the Guard and Reserves. I know that they've been asked to do things that were not foreseen at the time that many of them joined the Guard and Reserves. You can go, and I do, to theater and visit a unit and you can't tell whether that's an Active Duty unit or a Guard or Reserve unit. They're a critical part of the total force and their continuing vitality, like everything else that we're trying to protect, is an important part of this comprehensive review we're conducting.

Senator BROWN. I know you have some real economic and financial challenges, obviously, with the dollars that are so valuable. I'd like to just follow up with Senator McCain and Senator Levin's comments regarding the cost growth and delays on the JSF program, which are not limited to the airframe only. They also relate to the engine, which has increased from $385 million to $2.3 billion. That's nearly a 500 percent increase.
Yet DOD continues to say it’s happy with the engine it has. I’m wondering, do you remain pleased with the cost, development, testing, and performance of the F–135 engine?

Dr. Carter. I monitor the F–135 engine closely. No, I can’t say I’m completely satisfied with that. I’m not completely satisfied with any part of the F–35 that’s showing cost growth and the F–135 engine has. I will say that, like with everything else on the JSF, we are working very hard to manage to a better result, and those performing the work on the engine, like those performing the work on the airframe, are joining us in trying to restore affordability.

Senator Brown. I noted in your testimony that you indicated that competing subsystems and support would be put on the table. Does that include the self-funding proposal being put forth on the engines?

Dr. Carter. With regard to the self-funding proposal by General Electric (GE) and Rolls-Royce for the F–136 engine, I understand that a meeting was scheduled between GE and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary Lynn, and also the Air Force acquisition executive, to get more insight into that concept. Those meetings haven’t occurred or haven’t been scheduled.

But if I’m confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I’d be happy to have those meetings and to learn more about the so-called “self-funding” proposal. I do have to say I have real concerns about that proposal on the basis of what I’ve heard so far. But again, if confirmed, if that meeting hasn’t been held by the time that Secretary Lynn would leave, I’d be happy to have that meeting, because any time one of our industry partners has an idea on affordability I’m very open to ideas on affordability and would be willing to listen to that.

Senator Brown. I noted in some of the letters I received from other Senators to you and in our conversation, you indicated that you would keep an open mind and you would meet with that leadership team to discuss all options. Is that still your position?

Dr. Carter. It is. By the way, I have to meet with them on other things that they do for us also. GE does a lot for us—a number of different engine types, sustainment, research and development (R&D). We value their contribution to the military aircraft engine business.

Senator Brown. If confirmed, will you have the authority to permit the self-funding to go forward, and obviously as a result will they be allowed to have access so they can in fact move forward with it?

Dr. Carter. Until I know more about it, I don’t know what authorities would be required and whether they would require additional legislative authority.

Senator Brown. I had the honor of being able to go over to Afghanistan on duty and serve for a short time. The most talked-about issue was the proposed cut in military pensions among current servicemembers. Could you talk about that a little bit and say what your position is, not only for the people that are presently serving and have already done their 20 years and are eligible, but as to how it affects Active, Guard, and reservists?

Dr. Carter. I think two critical things on that that Secretary Panetta’s made clear. One thing is that, like everything else, compensation and benefits has to be on the table, but—this is the only
“but” he’s made to that general guidance to us—don’t break faith with the force. That would mean that significant, abrupt changes that would affect the understanding and the bond or deal made between service people and us when they entered service, that is not somewhere he wants to go. He has taken that off the table. He calls it “breaking faith”.

Senator BROWN. It’s interesting you say that, because before people knew I was a Senator, I was just there as a lieutenant colonel and we were just talking as soldiers, and without even blinking, sir, Mr. Chairman, that was the talk in every breakfast, lunch, and dinner that I sat down with the troops. Then when they found out I was a Senator, it was groups of people coming up and saying: What are you guys trying to do? I’m like, I’m not trying to do anything; I’ll speak to the Secretary and, obviously, you, because I agree with you, there is a real dependency on them doing their job and them depending on getting their fair share once they’ve done their job and having that commitment honored. I appreciate that.

One final question. I’m trying to figure out the numbers a little bit. On the MEADS program, the development of this program is governed by the international memorandum which everybody has been talking about for months and months. It specifies a maximum national commitment limit of $2.3 billion. Our appropriated funds from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2011, however, total $2.98 billion, and that number exceeds the MEADS maximum national commitment limit of $2.3 billion.

Can you help me understand the numbers, what the difference is?

Dr. CARTER. I will have to get back to you on those specific numbers.

[The information referred to follows:]
Senator BROWN. That's fine.

Dr. CARTER. Because I'm not familiar with those specific numbers. But I will say some that I am familiar with that may be helpful. The memorandum of understanding, which is the extant international agreement that you referred to, would under our proposal which is before you take about another $800 million to complete the proof of concept part of that program.

Senator BROWN. Yes, to get out of the deal, basically, we have to pay $800 million.

Dr. CARTER. The alternative would be to terminate, which costs a comparable amount. Given those alternatives, we have asked for the funding to complete the proof of concept.

Refer to the table below and the detailed descriptions for each column that follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Program Funds by Year (CYS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Appropriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 2004 – $40.95 million allocated to RRE Bridging Contract

Column #1 reflects the U.S. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Program Element 0604869A line for the “Patriot-MEADS Combined Aggregated Program.”

Column #2 reflects U.S.-provided funding to the NATO MEADS Management Agency (NAMEADSMA) for the tri-national MEADS Program per the Design and Development (D&D) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This includes the U.S. D&D MOU ceiling amount of $2.3 billion (FY 2004) (or $2.67 billion (CY dollars)) plus the $40.95 million of MEADS D&D funding allocated in 2004 to fund the MEADS Risk Reduction Effort (RRE) Bridging Contract prior to D&D MOU signature.

The remaining two columns reflect U.S.-only efforts in support of the tri-national MEADS program and the U.S. PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missile development. The MSE program was initiated by the Army to upgrade and replace the PAC-3 missile and was later selected as the MEADS missile by the partners. Neither of the funding in these columns is part of the formal MOU ceiling amount provided to the tri-national consortium.

Column #3 reflects U.S. support to MEADS efforts managed by the U.S. Army's MEADS National Program Office (NPO). This includes U.S.-only compliance efforts to meet U.S. export and security policy (e.g., U.S.-only radar exciter and U.S. simulation work) as well as any other U.S.-unique MEADS requirements.

Column #4 reflects separate U.S. PAC-3 MSE missile development work that was funded under the Patriot-MEADS Combined Aggregated Program line until FY 2011, when MSE funding was shifted to its own Program Element line.
Senator Brown. Maybe we can follow up, Mr. Chairman, with a question for the record which we'll submit to you, and just see where that discrepancy is. Maybe we don't have the right numbers. I just want to make sure I understand it.

Thank you for your time and good luck.

Dr. Carter. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.

Just a few additional quick questions from me. On cyber security, there was a commitment by General Alexander when he was confirmed to command the newly created Cyber Command that there would be a major effort to address a whole host of cyber security issues, and it was under way or to be completed by the end of calendar year 2010. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, already law, required a report from the Secretary by March of this year. We don't have the report that we're owed on cyber security issues. Are you aware of that and will you commit to get us that report promptly?

Dr. Carter. Mr. Chairman, I'm not aware of the status of that report, but I certainly commit to you that, if confirmed, I'll make sure it's completed.

Chairman Levin. Promptly?

Dr. Carter. Promptly.

Chairman Levin. Do you support the President's decision to withdraw 30,000 U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan by next summer?

Dr. Carter. I do.

Chairman Levin. How important is it to the success of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan that we maintain the process of transitioning responsibility to the Afghan Security Forces for their own security?

Dr. Carter. Very important.

Chairman Levin. Do you also agree it's essential for the Afghan Government to provide services for their people in order for the mission to prevent Taliban recontrol of Afghanistan to succeed?

Dr. Carter. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree that it's in the security interest of the Afghans that their government end corruption?

Dr. Carter. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree that the reconciliation or the reintegration of lower level Taliban be continued and that it is an important part of success of the mission?

Dr. Carter. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Now, relative to Pakistan, do you agree that it's important that Pakistan address the Haqqani Network's use of their soil as a safe haven to attack us?

Dr. Carter. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Relative to Iraq, General Odierno said yesterday or the day before that we must avoid the appearance of leaving a large occupation force in Iraq. Do you agree with General Odierno?

Dr. Carter. I do.

Chairman Levin. Secretary Carter, to you, your family, your wife, your two children who are here—I don't think they probably learned anything new because they know you very well. They know
your competence, they know your steadiness, and we've learned that, too, over the years, all of us on this committee. We look forward to a prompt confirmation, and we will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Ashton B. Carter by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?  
Answer. I do not see a need for modification of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions at this time. The Act has served the Department and our Nation well, fostering a spirit of jointness that has enhanced the Department's capabilities to respond when called, such as in Operation Enduring Freedom. If confirmed, I will continue to consider this issue and will make proposals for modifications if and when required.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?  
Answer. N/A.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and each of the following?

The Secretary of Defense.  
Answer. The Deputy Secretary performs duties as assigned by the Secretary and must be able to perform the Secretary's duties when the Secretary is absent. The Secretary and the Deputy work closely together to develop defense strategy and policy. The Deputy Secretary serves as the Department's Chief Operating Officer (COO) and focuses primarily on the daily activities of the Department, including financial management, acquisition, and personnel policy matters (both civilian and military) and on the implementation of policy and strategy decisions.

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.  
Answer. The Deputy Secretary oversees and ensures the coordination of the activities of the Under Secretaries. The Deputy Secretary ensures that the Secretary's direction and guidance is implemented promptly and properly by the Under Secretaries. The Deputy Secretary elevates to the Secretary issues raised by the Under Secretaries that require the Secretary's personal attention.

Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer (CMO) of the Department of Defense (DOD).  
Answer. The DCMO reports directly to the Deputy Secretary, and there must be a close working relationship between the two. The DCMO monitors and reports on the progress of the Department toward achieving management goals, keeps the Deputy Secretary informed, and proposes solutions to significant issues to the Deputy Secretary.

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.  
Answer. For Assistant Secretaries who report directly to the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary's relationship with them would be similar to the Deputy Secretary's relationship with the Under Secretaries. For Assistant Secretaries who report directly to Under Secretaries, the Deputy Secretary works with them through the appropriate Under Secretary.

Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
Answer. The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy Secretary has an especially close working relationship with the Vice Chairman on requirements, programming, budgeting, and departmental management matters.

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure that the Secretary of Defense's policies are implemented fully and effectively in a timely manner.

Question. The CMOs of the Military Departments.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary works with the CMOs of the Military Departments in close coordination with the Deputy CMO. The CMOs of the Military Departments play an important role in ensuring that the Department carries out its strategic plan and attains its management goals.

Question. The Service Acquisition Executives.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary plays an important role in establishing acquisition policy for the Department, and interacts with the Service Acquisition Executives primarily through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Military Services.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Service Chiefs, as appropriate, in ensuring the Services have the resources they need to accomplish assigned missions and implement the Secretary’s policy effectively and efficiently. The Deputy Secretary normally works with the Service Chiefs, in their role as Service Chiefs, through the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Deputy Secretary normally works with the Service Chiefs, in their role as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the Chairman and the Vice Chairman.

Question. The Director of National Intelligence.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Director of National Intelligence on matters of mutual interest to the Department and the Intelligence Community, for example, the relationship between the Military Intelligence Program and the National Intelligence Program.

Question. The Inspector General of DOD.

Answer. The Inspector General performs a vital function for DOD, and the Deputy Secretary receives advice from the Inspector General on significant issues. The Deputy Secretary ensures that the Inspector General is able to perform his functions in an independent manner.

Question. The General Counsel of DOD.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary relies on the General Counsel for legal advice on all issues that come before him. The Deputy Secretary must be able to rely on the candid advice of the General Counsel.

Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary works with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on matters related to the National Guard and in coordinating issues related to the National Guard with the States. The Deputy Secretary may receive advice from the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on any matter related to the National Guard.

Question. The Judge Advocates General of the Services.

Answer. The Judge Advocates General have important roles in their respective Military Departments, providing legal advice to the senior leaders of the Military Departments, overseeing the military justice system, and leading their respective teams of military and civilian lawyers. The Deputy Secretary works with the Judge Advocates General primarily through the General Counsel of DOD.

DUTIES OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Question. Section 132 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense are to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

Assuming that you are confirmed, what duties do you expect the Secretary to prescribe for you?

Answer. The primary duty of the Deputy Secretary of Defense is to assist the Secretary as needed. If confirmed, my expectation is that the Secretary will ask me to serve as his alter ego when necessary; to assist him in organizing the decision-making process within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); to carry out the statutory duties of CMO of DOD; and to carry out other duties as assigned.

Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?

Answer. My background includes service in a number of previous civilian positions in DOD, culminating in my current service as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. During this service, I have had the opportunity to serve under four Secretaries of Defense, working most closely with William J. Perry and Robert M. Gates, and to work closely with four Deputy Secretaries of Defense: William J. Perry, John P. White, John J. Hamre, and William J. Lynn III. In addition to my service within DOD, I have served as a member of the Defense
Science Board, the Defense Policy Board, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s International Security Advisory Board. I have also served as chair of the International and Global Affairs faculty at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and Co-Director of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Harvard and Stanford Universities. If confirmed, I would bring to this position substantial experience with the Department in each of the last 3 decades; current detailed knowledge of the Department’s operations; experience with managing major policy initiatives; experience with managing one of the Department’s largest organizations and several large defense agencies; a solid understanding of many of the major technological issues confronting the Department; and experience tackling some of the Department’s most persistent management problems.

Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

Answer. If confirmed, there would be many actions I would need to take to best perform the duties of Deputy Secretary. First and foremost among these would be to build a strong working relationship with Secretary Panetta as his Deputy. Likewise, I would need to build on my existing relationships with the Joint Staff, the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and their military leadership, and the OSD staff to enlist their knowledge and assistance in helping me carry out the duties of Deputy Secretary. I would work closely with Deputy Secretary Lynn to ensure a smooth transition and seamless hand off of his major initiatives to ensure they are continued within the Department. Of critical importance initially would be to learn in greater detail the significant budget issues pending in the Department where my position as Under Secretary has not required deep involvement.

Question. What changes to section 132, if any, would you recommend?

Answer. At this time, I believe the statutory authorities for the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense are appropriate. If confirmed, I would be sure to inform Congress if I determined that any change in the statute were necessary to effectively perform the duties of this office.

Question. Section 132 was amended by section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, to provide that the Deputy Secretary serves as the CMO of DOD. The Deputy Secretary is to be assisted in this capacity by a Deputy CMO. What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO of DOD?

Answer. My understanding is that the primary duty of the CMO is to provide leadership and to ensure accountability for the business operations of DOD. These operations involve all of the Department’s components and cut across the responsibilities of the Under Secretaries of Defense, so they require leadership and accountability at a high level. The CMO’s role is to lead, oversee, and support, rather than supplant, the roles of the Secretaries of the Military Departments and agency heads in managing their business operations.

The CMO also provides leadership to the CMOs of the Military Departments and is responsible for the development of the Strategic Management Plan for DOD. The Deputy Secretary chairs the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, a responsibility consistent with the CMO role.

Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties and responsibilities?

Answer. As Under Secretary, I have been deeply involved in the Department’s operations over the last 2 years. As Defense Acquisition Executive and Defense Logistics Executive, I have fulfilled leadership roles similar in nature to the CMO role. This experience has provided me with the background and expertise to serve as CMO.

Question. Do you believe that the CMO and DCMO have the resources and authority needed to carry out the business transformation of DOD?

Answer. At this time, I believe that these positions have all of the authority needed to carry out business transformation. I am not currently in a position to determine if the CMO and DCMO have the appropriate resources to carry out these roles, although I have no reason to believe that they do not. If confirmed, I will examine the resources available to the CMO and DCMO to determine if they fully address the need.

Question. What role do you believe the DCMO of DOD should play in the planning, development, and implementation of specific business systems by the Military Departments?

Answer. As with the CMO, the role of the DCMO is to support and oversee rather than to supplant the responsibilities of the Secretaries of the Military Departments and other agency heads in acquiring specific business systems. The DCMO has spe-
specific responsibilities for many of our Major Automated Information System acquisitions as Milestone Decision Authority and broad responsibility for defense business systems as the Vice Chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee. The DCMO ensures that the acquisition of business systems is consistent with principles of sound business investment, has applied appropriate business process reengineering efforts, and is compliant with the Department's business enterprise architecture.

**Question.** Do you believe that the DCMO should have clearly defined decision-making authorities, or should the DCMO serve exclusively as an advisor to the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO?

**Answer.** I believe that the DCMO should have duties as assigned by the CMO and the Secretary of Defense. These duties may include decisionmaking authority where the CMO or the Secretary determines appropriate.

**Question.** What changes, if any, would you recommend to the statutory provisions establishing the positions of CMO and DCMO?

**Answer.** At this time, I believe the statutory authorities for the positions of the CMO and the Deputy CMO are appropriate. If confirmed, I would be sure to inform Congress if I determined that any change in the statute were necessary to effectively perform the duties of this office.

**MAJOR CHALLENGES**

**Question.** In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Deputy Secretary of Defense?

**Answer.** The main tasks of the Deputy Secretary of Defense are to be fully prepared to act and speak in the Secretary's stead at all times; to shape an orderly deliberative process for the Secretary, so that he can make decisions and advise the President based on careful consideration of accurate management information and a full range of options; and to manage the budget process and other Department-wide matters, reserving decisions of greatest consequence for the Secretary.

I have had the opportunity to discuss these matters with Secretary Panetta, with other members of the Obama administration, with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs, with combatant commanders, and with other leaders in OSD. I have also had the benefit of the advice of many Members of Congress, including members of this committee. Finally, it has been my privilege to know personally a number of former Deputy Secretaries of Defense throughout my career and I have worked, in one way or another, for almost every Secretary of Defense since Caspar Weinberger. Last, as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I have responsibility for a number of the matters that fall under the Deputy, and I look forward, if confirmed, to working with this committee to acquaint myself with the additional responsibilities that fall under the Deputy.

**PRIORITIES**

**Question.** What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed, with respect to issues which must be addressed by DOD?

**Answer.** The top priority of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, like that of the Secretary, is to ensure the security of the American people.

Key challenges facing the Department at this time include: prevailing in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the fight against al Qaeda; keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations; preparing to counter future threats and military technologies; preserving the finest fighting force in the world and taking care of servicemembers and their families; and continuing the process of reform which will be crucial in this time of constrained budgets.

**NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET REDUCTIONS**

**Question.** The President has called for $400 billion in reductions to national security spending over a 10-year period starting in 2013, and has asked the Secretary of Defense to lead a review to provide recommendations on where to make those cuts.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would be sure to inform Congress if I determined that any change in the statute were necessary to effectively perform the duties of this office.
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to play a significant role in the Department’s program and budget review, including serving as chairman of the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group which provides the Secretary informed views of major budget issues.

Question. The recent agreement on the debt ceiling calls for reductions in defense spending that could range from $350 billion in the first phase, to as much as $900 billion, if the joint committee is unable to reach agreement and a sequester is required.

Do you believe that a national security spending reduction of this magnitude can be accomplished without significant adverse impact on our national security?

Answer. I believe the Department can build a balanced defense program that also achieves the national security reductions enacted as part of the Budget Control Act of 2011. These reductions are in line with what the Department was anticipating at a time of considerable fiscal challenge. However, making these reductions will require difficult choices by the Department and Congress. Any further reductions that may result from a failure of the joint committee to reach agreement will undermine our ability to meet our national security objectives. The risk of hollowing out the force and weakening our ability to respond to threats around the globe will go up significantly. It is imperative that the joint committee be successful.

Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the objectives of: making needed investments in the future force, addressing pressing requirements for completing the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan, resetting the force, meeting ongoing operational commitments across the globe, and achieving the level of savings proposed by the President?

Answer. The art of budgeting is about setting priorities. Winning today’s wars, investing in force modernization, resetting the force, and meeting our operational commitments are all priorities that must be addressed. In addition, Secretary Panetta has been clear that we must ensure that we are able to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorist and rogue nations and that we always support our servicemembers and their families. In addressing these priorities in the budget, it is important that we build a balanced defense program that meets the demands of today, but also prepares us to meet the inevitable challenges of tomorrow. That balance requires a careful assessment of the contribution each program makes toward those ends. Difficult choices will have to be made and, if confirmed, I look forward to contributing to that effort.

EFFICIENCIES INITIATIVE

Question. Last year, then-Secretary Gates announced an efficiencies initiative designed to reform the business operations of the Pentagon and root out duplication, waste, and excess spending. The Secretary identified $78 billion of defense-wide cuts over the Future Years Defense Program; the Military Departments identified an additional $100 billion of reductions, which they were permitted to reinvest in other areas.

What is your view of the process by which DOD identified the $178 billion in reductions called for in the efficiencies initiative?

Answer. I believe that Secretary Gates acted with great foresight in establishing last year’s efficiencies initiative. He clearly foresaw the fiscal and economic challenges our Nation is now confronting. As a result, the Department had a strong head start in identifying areas in its budget to target for efficiency. The process used by Secretary Gates, however, was designed to support his goal of largely redirecting, rather than reducing, defense spending. As a result, the processes that were used to identify the $178 billion in reductions may not be the best model for identifying the savings needed to meet the Department’s current budget limitations. That said, the overall intent of Secretary Gates’s initiative remains highly relevant, especially the Better Buying Power initiative, which we expect to continue to generate efficiencies in the Department’s operations for years to come.

Question. Do you believe that these reductions are achievable and have been appropriately distributed through the Department?

Answer. I believe that the level of reductions projected by last year’s efficiencies initiative are achievable and have been distributed appropriately throughout the Department. There will inevitably be a few efficiency items that produce lower savings than anticipated, thereby requiring the Services to make adjustments to meet their targets. However, it is my understanding that the Department, on the whole, is making good progress towards achieving the necessary reductions.

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in ensuring that the expected savings are achieved?

Answer. If confirmed, I expect that I would oversee the Department’s efforts to ensure that expected savings from the efficiencies initiative are realized.
Question. What is your view of the decision to disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Business Transformation Agency, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration?
Answer. I believe the disestablishment of these organizations has been executed with minimal disruption to the Department’s operations and with satisfactory distribution of their enduring functions.

Question. Do you believe that the Department can achieve significant additional savings through the elimination of duplication, waste, and excess spending?
Answer. Yes. Over the last 10 years, the Department has been engaged in two wars and a range of other contingencies and has experienced growth in its base budget at a rate faster than inflation. These circumstances fostered a tendency to defer some difficult decisions because management attention was consumed by the wars and funding was not so tight that these decisions were unavoidable. In the current fiscal environment, we can no longer afford to defer these difficult choices. I believe, however, that meeting the budget limits established in the recent Budget Control Act of 2011 will require us to cut significantly more than just duplication, waste, and excess spending.

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in identifying such potential savings?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to play a central leadership role in identifying potential savings in the Department’s budget.

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. If confirmed, what key management performance goals would you want to accomplish, and what standards or metrics would you use to judge whether you have accomplished them?
Answer. If confirmed, my key management goals will be those that have been identified in the fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 Strategic Management Plan. These seven key goals are:

- Strengthen and right-size the DOD Total Workforce mix (military, civilian, and contracted support) to accomplish the DOD mission and sustain superior performance in a time of constrained resources.
- Strengthen DOD Financial Management to respond to warfighter needs and sustain public confidence through auditable financial statements.
- Build agile and secure information technology capabilities to enhance combat power and decisionmaking while optimizing value.
- Increase the buying power of the DOD acquisition system and processes spanning requirements determination, development, procurement, and support to ensure that the force structure is modernized, recapitalized, and sustained within available resources.
- Increase operational and installation energy efficiency to lower risks to our warfighters, reduce costs, and improve energy security.
- Reengineer/use end-to-end business support processes to reduce transaction times, drive down costs, and improve service.
- Create agile business operations that plan for, support, and sustain contingency missions.

These goals are aligned with and support the Department’s overarching strategy as articulated in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Each goal is supported by sets of key initiatives and performance measures which serve as our management standards and metrics. The Department closely monitors these performance measures to assess whether we are achieving our goals.

Question. GAO recently reported that “the DOD systems environment that supports its business functions is overly complex and error prone, and is characterized by: (1) little standardization across the department, (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks, (3) the same data stored in multiple systems, and (4) the need for data to be entered manually into multiple systems. According to the department’s systems inventory, this environment is composed of 2,258 business systems and includes 335 financial management, 709 human resource management, 645 logistics, 243 real property and installation, and 281 weapon acquisition management systems.”
Would you agree that the Department will not be able to put its financial house in order until it effectively addresses this problem?
Answer. It is extremely important for the Department to rationalize its defense business system environment and ensure that its suite of systems is tightly integrated. However, while we must ensure that the Department’s feeder systems, in all of its business areas, properly capture and report financial information, greater integration of our business systems environment alone will not correct the long-
standing weaknesses in our business and financial operations. We must also continue to implement an integrated business strategy and pursue process improvement to enable interoperable business solutions and financial auditability.

Question. Section 2222 of title 10, U.S.C., requires that the Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive business enterprise architecture and transition plan to guide the development of its business systems and processes.

Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the successful transformation of DOD's business systems?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that DOD’s enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the requirements of section 2222?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the ongoing efforts to define, capture and enforce the business processes, data standards and business rules in the Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) from an end-to-end perspective and hold the Under Secretaries of Defense and the Military Departments accountable for those functional portions of the BEA for which they are responsible.

Question. What are your views on the importance and role of timely and accurate financial and business information in managing operations and holding managers accountable?

Answer. Timely and accurate financial and business information (aka business intelligence) is the operational intelligence we use to inform the management of our business operations. It provides assurance that we are effectively and efficiently using our limited resources, while ensuring good stewardship of the taxpayers’ money.

Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial and business information available to DOD managers?

Answer. If confirmed, I would take my role as CMO/COO and chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee seriously. In these roles, I will hold those responsible for managing our business operations accountable for meeting the objectives identified in the Department’s Strategic Management Plan that are directly linked to improving financial and business information.

Question. The Department has chosen to implement the requirement for an enterprise architecture and transition plan through a “federated” approach in which the Business Transformation Agency has developed the top level architecture while leaving it to the Military Departments to fill in most of the detail. GAO recently reported that none of the three Military Departments has yet fully developed a well-defined business enterprise architecture and transition plan to guide and constrain business transformation initiatives.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Secretaries and CMOs of the business enterprise architecture and transition plans of the Military Departments meet the requirements of section 2222 and provide a sound roadmap for business transformation initiatives?

Answer. If confirmed, I would intend to hold the Secretaries and CMOs accountable for delivering integrated business solutions defined in the federated business enterprise architecture and affiliated transition plans.

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that business system investments are defined and implemented in accordance with the Department’s business enterprise architecture?

Answer. If confirmed, I would assess the investment review process currently in place to review and certify business system investments and implement improved policies and procedures as necessary. My focus would be to ensure that we review our investments from a holistic, end-to-end perspective.

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that supporting architectures for component organizations are further developed and aligned with the corporate architecture to provide a truly federated business enterprise architecture?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the plans of the Service Secretaries and CMOs of the Military Departments for aligning their enterprise architectures with the Department’s overall business enterprise architecture approach.

AUDIT READINESS

Question. Secretary Panetta has stated: “While we have reasonable controls over much of our budgetary information, it is unacceptable to me that DOD cannot produce a financial statement that passes all financial audit standards. That will
change. I have directed that this requirement be put in place as soon as possible. America deserves nothing less.”

What is your understanding of the efforts and progress that have been made in DOD since 1999 toward the goal of being able to produce a clean audit?  
Answer. While I am not familiar with the details or history of DOD accounting systems, I understand that DOD financial processes were established and ingrained in legacy systems long ago. These processes and systems were designed for budgetary accounting—not for the accounting standards called for in the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act. I also understand that there has been limited progress made toward auditability until recently. Our CFO has established a set of priorities and a roadmap for making progress. It focuses on the budgetary information that we use to manage the Department and ensures we can account for the material we need to support our mission.

Question. Do you believe that these efforts will result in a clean audit opinion by the end of fiscal year 2017, as required by statute, or are additional steps needed?  
Answer. Yes. 2017 is an ambitious goal but, as Secretary Panetta has indicated, the Department is committed to it. In addition, Secretary Panetta has directed a review of audit efforts to ensure that our focus is on completing the project as soon as possible.  

Question. Do you believe that the Department can achieve a clean audit opinion through better accounting and auditing, or is the systematic improvement of the Department’s business systems and processes a perquisite?  
Answer. From my discussions with Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO Hale, systematic improvement of the Department’s business systems and processes is necessary to achieve a clean audit opinion.  

Question. When do you believe the Department can achieve a clean audit?  
Answer. The Department is working to have auditable financial statements by 2017. Secretary Panetta’s review of audit efforts will inform that goal.

Question. The Department’s Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) plan is organized into five waves that focus on audit readiness of the Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) (waves 1 and 2), the existence and completeness of assets (wave 3), and a full financial statement audit (waves 4 and 5).

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure the development and implementation of specific detailed plans for achieving a full audit through waves 4 and 5?  
Answer. I understand that while the longer-term goal involves planning for and executing the final two “waves”, the Department remains focused on near-term milestones. Senior leadership within the military components is committed to, and accountable for, accomplishing these interim goals. As directed in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011, the Department has developed a strategy for producing fully auditable financial statements. If confirmed, I would work with our CFO to prepare implementation plans that will lay out exactly how we will do this.

Question. What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the military-department CMOs in implementing the FIAR plan through their individual financial improvement plans (FIPs)?

Answer. The oversight role of the CMOs was established in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008. Since then, the Department has developed more detailed responsibilities for the CMOs regarding their financial improvement role and responsibilities. Specifically, the Military Department CMOs:

• Coordinate and marshal resources from across the Department in support of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO financial improvement goals, objectives and priorities.
• Carry out budget, finance, accounting and human resource operations in a manner consistent with the comprehensive business transformation plan.
• Eliminate or reduce financial management systems that are inconsistent with the business systems architecture and transition plan.
• Ensure that the functional communities recognize their role in achieving audit readiness, since most financial transactions originate from business events in the functional community’s business operations.
• Provide the unifying support needed to ensure that business system modernization efforts are fully linked with Component financial improvement activities.

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe are needed to clarify those roles and responsibilities?  
Answer. I believe the currently defined roles are sufficiently clear, but, if confirmed, I would continue to monitor and make adjustments as needed.
Question. Do you believe that performance measurement and monitoring mechanisms need to be improved?
Answer. The Department has established a robust governance structure to oversee progress towards FIAR goals. If confirmed, I would plan to review our performance measures to see if any improvements are necessary to enable us to meet these goals.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to sustain the commitment of the Department’s top leadership to the long-term goal of transforming the Department’s financial management?
Answer. Secretary Panetta has emphasized the importance of making the Department auditable. Our CFO has developed a plan for achieving audit readiness. If confirmed, I would intend to work closely with them and other leaders in the Department to transform the Department’s financial management processes.

Question. Do you think that having the Deputy Secretary of Defense “dual-hatted” as the CMO is consistent with the prioritization and sustained day-to-day focus needed for the success of the Department’s financial improvement efforts?
Answer. Yes. Overall accountability rests with the Deputy Secretary in his CMO role. However, day-to-day responsibility falls to the CFO, the Deputy CMO, and the CMOs of the Military Departments, as well as line management throughout the DOD business enterprise.

BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION

Question. Since 2005, the General Accountability Office (GAO) has designated DOD’s approach to business transformation as “high risk” due to its vulnerability to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. However, GAO has recently found that the Department’s senior leadership has shown commitment to transforming business system operations and has made progress in establishing management oversight and developing a strategic plan to guide transformation efforts. Nonetheless, in GAO’s view, the Department needs to take additional action to further define management roles and responsibilities and to strengthen strategic planning.

Do you believe that the Department needs to more clearly define roles and responsibilities, as well as relationships among key positions and governance entities, for implementing the Secretary of Defense’s efficiency initiative with ongoing reform efforts; overseeing its implementation and otherwise institutionalizing the effort in the long term?
Answer. I do not believe additional steps are necessary at this time, but, if confirmed, I would continue to closely monitor the situation and take corrective action where necessary. The tools that Congress has provided the Department over the past 6 years, including the establishment of a clear business system investment review process in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005, the creation of the CMO construct in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, and specific strategic planning requirements in the Government Performance and Results (GPRA) Modernization Act of 2010, have created a strong framework for our business transformation efforts.

Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department should take to achieve this objective?
Answer. I do not believe that additional steps are necessary at this time, but, if confirmed, I would continue to closely monitor the situation and take corrective action where necessary.

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to further refine strategic goals, performance measures and other elements of the Department’s strategic management plan?
Answer. The Department’s current strategic planning process is quite robust and has continued to improve with regard to planning for defense business operations since the introduction of the Strategic Management Plan (SMP) in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008. In my current role as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I have been involved in the latest planning efforts for the fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 SMP and believe that it faithfully aligns the Department’s business goals with the Department’s overall strategic goals. It also establishes a set of key initiatives and performance measures that will allow the Department’s senior leaders the opportunity to track performance throughout the year and take corrective action where necessary. If confirmed, I would look to incorporate additional improvements and lessons learned from each iteration of this process.

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to more clearly define the Department’s strategic planning process, including mechanisms to guide and synchronize efforts to develop strategic plans; monitor the implementation of reform initiatives; and report progress, on a periodic basis, towards achieving established goals?
Answer. The Department's current strategic planning process is effective. However, if confirmed, I would work to better align the timing of our business operations planning cycle with that of our overall strategic planning and budgeting activities. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process produces the following fiscal year's President's budget (PB) submission in February. The SMP articulates the Department's business priorities and is due in July. My goal would be to make the SMP timeline a more deliberate process aligning to the PPBE cycle.

Question. Do you believe that the Deputy CMO should have control over funds for the components' business systems programs to ensure that the components follow guidance from OSD on the Department's business transformation efforts?

Answer. I believe that it is important to allow the components to maintain control over their budgeting process, while simultaneously maintaining an enterprise perspective on our business system investments. The Department's current investment review process, established by Congress in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005, effectively allows OSD, including the Deputy CMO, in the role of vice chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, to ensure that component investments are aligned with the enterprise strategy as laid out in the Business Enterprise Architecture.

ACQUISITION OF BUSINESS SYSTEMS

Question. Most of the Department's business transformation programs are substantially over budget and behind schedule. Last year, at the request of the Armed Services Committee, GAO reviewed DOD's 9 largest Enterprise Resource Programs (ERPs), which are intended to replace more than 500 outdated business systems, and reported that 6 of the 9 had experienced schedule delays ranging from 2 to 12 years and incurred cost increases ranging from $530 million to $2.4 billion. GAO reported that DOD has failed to follow good management practices for developing schedules and cost estimates for many of these programs.

If confirmed, how would you work with the Deputy CMO, the CMOs of the Military Departments, and the Under Secretaries of Defense to address these problems?

Answer. If confirmed, I would assess the investment review process the Department is using to review and certify business system investments and implement improved policies and procedures as necessary. The Department is currently implementing a Business Capability Lifecycle approach to acquiring business systems that emphasizes the use of well defined and relatively short increments of capability. Many of the Department's problems with business systems have stemmed from overly ambitious programs with severely underestimated budgets and schedules. The Business Capability Lifecycle approach is intended to constrain requirements and discipline programs to deliver testable and fieldable increments. I believe that adopting these practices will improve the results the Department achieves with its business systems investments.

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that business system investments are managed with the kind of acquisition management rigor and discipline that is embodied in relevant guidance and best practices, so that each investment will deliver expected benefits and capabilities on time and within budget?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to implement the principles and initiatives outlined in the report to Congress, "A New Approach for Delivering Information Technology Capabilities in DOD," which was signed by Deputy Secretary Lynn, and which provides an update on the Department's progress toward developing a new
acquisition process for information capabilities. The Department has already begun this process through the implementation of the Business Capability Lifecycle, an alternative acquisition approach for defense business systems, pursuant to guidance I issued in my current role as Under Secretary on November 15, 2010. If confirmed, I would ensure that this alternative acquisition approach is followed and that the Department does not revert to the old way of doing business out of habit or inertia.

Question. Do you believe that unique challenges to acquiring services related to information technology (IT) systems may require an acquisition strategy or approach different from those used for acquiring property or services unrelated to IT systems?

Answer. Yes, I believe that there are unique challenges to acquiring services related to IT systems and we must tailor our acquisition strategies to meet these unique circumstances. In fact, the Department has already begun to adapt to the unique challenges of IT acquisition through the implementation of the Business Capability Lifecycle, an alternative acquisition approach for defense business systems.

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that requirements management, systems testing, and data quality are improved and to help resolve other problems that have continued to hinder the Department’s efforts to implement its automated systems on schedule, within cost and with the intended capabilities?

Answer. The issuance of the report to Congress, “A New Approach for Delivering Information Technology Capabilities in the Department of Defense,” and the November 15, 2010 directive requiring the use of the Business Capability Lifecycle are important initial steps, however, more work remains to be done. The Department is in the process of revising its acquisition process governing directives to incorporate this approach, but implementation has already begun on a case-by-case basis. If confirmed, I will actively pursue the implementation of these initiatives.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM

Question. Two years ago, Congress enacted the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), without a dissenting vote in either House. WSARA is designed to ensure that new defense acquisition programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the acquisition process. What are your views regarding WSARA and the need for improvements in the Defense acquisition process?

Answer. When I initially took office as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I received a mandate from Secretary Gates to improve the defense acquisition system, including weapon systems acquisition, and particularly acquisition in response to urgent operational needs. Shortly thereafter, the administration supported, and Congress passed, the WSARA. I continue to support the improvements in the areas of defense acquisition organization and policy that are addressed in the WSARA. A number of the memos issued under the Department’s Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative directly address WSARA mandates, ensuring that the act’s requirements are reflected not only in acquisition policy, but also in our acquisition practice. This is particularly true in the case of the Department’s mandate that affordability be treated as a requirement at major acquisition milestones, supporting the act’s requirements that DOD examine trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance, and in the Department’s emphasis on promoting competition. If confirmed, I would continue the effort to improve the defense acquisition system consistent with the direction provided in WSARA. I would also continue to enforce the Better Buying Power guidance, based on WSARA, to target affordability and control cost growth, incentivize productivity and innovation in industry, promote real competition, improve tradecraft in services acquisition, and reduce non-productive processes and bureaucracy.

Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of the acquisition process—requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?

Answer. My experience as Under Secretary has deepened my belief that the acquisition process must be closely coordinated with the requirements and budget processes in order for the defense acquisition system to function properly. I believe that in the last 2 years the Department has improved in this area, but it remains an ongoing challenge. The Department has made the most significant improvement in the area of rapid acquisition through the use of coordinating entities such as the Senior Integration Group (SIG), previously known as the Counter-Improvised Explosive Device SIG (C-SIG), which regularly brings together the leadership of the three processes with theater commanders to coordinate action on fulfilling warfighter needs. In July of this year, the Department broadened the responsibilities of the SIG to cover all urgent warfighter requirements.
Prospectively, I believe it is necessary to create a closer alignment of the acquisition, requirements, and budget processes across the Department by expanding the type of cooperation and coordination we have instituted for urgent needs. If confirmed, I would make doing so a priority.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you improve acquisition accountability?

**Answer.** The Goldwater-Nichols Act established a chain of authority for the acquisition process that provides for clear accountability in a chain beginning with the Defense Acquisition Executive and extending through the Component Acquisition Executives to the program Executive Officers and Program Managers. I emphasized this chain of responsibility as Under Secretary and, if confirmed, would continue to do so as Deputy Secretary. Additionally, the acquisition process must be operated in close coordination with the requirements process and the budget process, and this requires active participation by DOD’s senior leadership to ensure all three processes are properly coordinated and held accountable. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring accountability in all aspects of acquisition during my tenure.

As Under Secretary, I have also worked to reward productivity, and innovation in the defense industry by ensuring that the terms and conditions of our contracts fundamentally align contractors’ incentives with the Department’s interest so that our industry partners are accountable for performance not just to the Department but to their shareholders.

**Question.** Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?

**Answer.** Since becoming Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I have expressed my belief that the unacceptable cost growth in far too many individual programs, combined with a habit of mind born from an unrealistic belief that the defense budget would keep growing, had to be reversed in order to avoid an affordability crisis in defense acquisition. With the recent passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Department will need to redouble its efforts to control cost growth in investment and reexamine all areas of the budget for affordability in the context of the caps put in place on discretionary spending. If confirmed, I would assist the Secretary in leading and managing the Department’s review of all areas of the budget, including investment.

**Question.** If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would continue to implement all aspects of WSARA and the Better Buying Power Initiative to reverse unacceptable cost growth in our programs and activities.

**Question.** Do you believe that the Department has adequately addressed its shortfalls in systems engineering and developmental testing capabilities, or does more remain to be done in these areas?

**Answer.** The Department has recognized and Congress has reinforced, with the WSARA, the need to reinvigorate and grow our capacity and capability in systems engineering and developmental testing and evaluation. I recognize the criticality of good systems engineering and strong developmental testing and evaluation to acquisition program success.

The Department has appointed strong technical leaders as Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Systems Engineering (DASD(SE)) and Developmental Test & Evaluation (DASD(DT&E)), implemented new and updated Department acquisition policy and guidance, grown and educated its technical workforce, and increased program engagement with our Major Defense Acquisition Programs in supporting effective systems engineering and developmental test and evaluation activities.

I believe that the resources and attention applied to these areas have been appropriate and I have supported the revitalization in these areas over the last 2 years, but I do not believe this work is done. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary and Congress to ensure, within budget constraints, that we sustain the Department’s commitment to grow a skilled acquisition workforce that provides the technical capabilities needed to deliver effective solutions to the warfighter on schedule and under budget.

**Question.** Do you believe that additional steps are needed to ensure that WSARA principles are implemented on current major programs like the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program?

**Answer.** WSARA principles have been widely implemented in the Department, but more can be done to implement them and extend them to non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). The WSARA directly led to refined Department guidance and complementary policy initiatives that are positively affecting the JSF program, as well as the other MDAPs. Subsequent to passage of WSARA, the JSF program was the subject of numerous reviews, culminating in a Nunn-McCurdy crit-
ical cost breach certification review that was guided by the acquisition reform principles outlined in WSARA. The review incorporated the inputs of the WSARA-formed Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and also included the participation and assessments of the Office of Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analysis (PARCA), and the Offices of the Director, Systems Engineering and Developmental Test and Evaluation. These organizational changes were instrumental in the completion of the thorough review and restructuring of the JSF program that resulted in the Nunn-McCurdy certification on June 2, 2010. The WSARA has also contributed to a renewed emphasis on sound systems engineering principles, realistic cost and schedule estimating, a re-energized focus on integrated test and evaluation, and implementation of tighter cost control measures across the MDAPs, to include JSF. Implementation of the Department's Better Buying Power guidance, reflecting WSARA principles, has also resulted in an increased emphasis on affordability and the incorporation of should-cost target goals for JSF and other MDAPs.

ROLE OF SERVICE CHIEFS IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

Question. Some have suggested that the Service Chiefs should be given a different or expanded role in the acquisition of major systems. Others have expressed concern that such a change would reverse efforts in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation to reduce the layers between the Under Secretary and the program managers, and ensure that there was a dynamic tension between those who defined requirements (Service Chiefs) and those who filled the requirements (Service Acquisition Executives).

What do you believe is the appropriate role for Service Chiefs in the acquisition of major systems?

Answer. Goldwater-Nichols establishes a clear chain of authority for the acquisition process and I believe this chain of authority—program manager, program executive officer, component acquisition executive, defense acquisition executive—is appropriate for acquisition decisions. The acquisition process does not exist in isolation, however, and Service Chiefs play a major role as a result of their deep involvement in the budget and requirements processes, and because they fund, manage, and train the acquisition workforce of their respective Services. The acquisition process functions properly only when the Service Chiefs, acting through their chain of command, are actively involved.

CONTRACTING FOR SERVICES

Question. Over the last decade, DOD's spending on contract services has more than doubled. As a result, the Department now spends more for the purchase of services than it does for products (including major weapon systems). You testified last year that "the low-hanging fruit really is [in contract services]. There's a lot of money. There has been a very, very high rate of growth over the last decade, in Services. They have grown faster than everything else. ... So, there's a lot we can do. I think great savings can be had there, across the Services' spending. It's essential that we look there, because that's half the money."

Do you believe that the cuts made to contract services pursuant to the efficiencies initiative fully addressed the issues of waste and inefficiency in this area, or are further reductions possible?

Answer. I believe the reductions the Department has made to date, primarily in the area of service support contracts performing staff augmentation functions, are a good start but are insufficient. Further reductions are possible. One of the major focus areas of the Better Buying Power Initiative the Department has instituted is to improve the Department's tradecraft in services acquisition.

Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to control the Department's spending on contract services?

Answer. Under the Better Buying Power initiative, the Department is working to have a cohesive and integrated strategy for services acquisition. The steps already taken include appointment of senior managers for acquisition of services in each Military Department, adoption of a standard taxonomy for services and identifying best practices, and revised contracting policies to increase the use of competition. Additional steps that can be taken include improved benchmarking against commercial experience and employment of stronger incentives for efficient performance. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that the Department focuses on those areas where we know improvements can be made so that we are not spending too much on contracted services.
CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE OF CRITICAL GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result, contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions as DOD employees.

In your view, is DOD still too reliant on contractors to support the basic functions of the Department?

Answer. The appropriate balance between organic government performance and reliance on contractors is something that must be assessed function by function. Many functions are appropriate for contractor support; however, some functions, such as program management, are more appropriately performed by Government personnel. Some functions are inherently governmental and should not be performed by contractors.

As Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I worked to adjust this balance in the acquisition workforce, which had become overly reliant on contractors in a number of areas. As a result, and with the committee’s assistance, the Department has significantly strengthened the civilian and military components of the acquisition workforce. At the same time, I communicated to our entire organization that contractors are an important component of the Department’s Total Force. If confirmed, I would assess the issue of appropriate use of contractors across the Department to determine whether and where else DOD’s reliance on contractors has become excessive.

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to reduce the Department’s reliance on contractors to perform critical functions?

Answer. I understand there are functions that are so critical to the Department’s activities that some portion of the function must be performed organically for the Department to have sufficient internal capability to continue to be able to perform and control its operations. Critical functions must be assessed on a case-by-case basis because the level of internal capability required is dependent on the function in question. In my role as Under Secretary, I have sought to ensure that the Department retains sufficient organic capability for critical acquisition and logistics functions. At this time I believe the Department has identified and eliminated most, if not all, over-reliance on contractors for critical functions. Over the next few years, however, I believe the Department needs to be watchful to ensure that this trend is not reversed. As budgets decline and as the organic workforce is reduced, there is a risk that reliance on contractors may increase, particularly in response to new contingencies. As the Department reduces its overseas deployments, it must identify and retain critical capabilities that have been built up over the past decade, at least at the level required to rapidly redeploy those capabilities in response to changing needs. Contingency contracting is an example of the type of expertise that must be institutionalized and retained. If confirmed, I would continue to work to address any shortfalls in the Department’s ability to perform critical functions using organic resources.

Question. Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal services contracts is in the best interest of DOD?

Answer. I support the statutory framework that Congress has constructed governing the use of personal services contracts. I believe the Department should adhere to this framework. If confirmed, I would ensure that personal services contracts are not used inappropriately.

Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq have relied on contractor support to a greater degree than any previous U.S. military operations. According to widely published reports, the number of U.S. contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan has roughly equaled the number of U.S. military deployed in those countries. Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on contractor support for military operations?

Answer. Contractors are a necessary part of the Total Force. They provide the Department with the ability to obtain a mix of unique skill sets and knowledge that may not be available in our organic force structure and permit us to concentrate our organic resources on those areas that are inherently governmental. Contractors provide a broad range of supplies, services, and critical logistics support in many capability areas, while reducing military footprint and increasing the availability and readiness of resources. Based on our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe we should continue to improve and evolve our strategy regarding the use and management of contractors. At this time, I do not believe the Department is too de-
pendent on contractors for support of operations; however, this is an area that will require continuous scrutiny, particularly as budgets and organic capabilities are reduced. If confirmed, I would ensure that this scrutiny is provided.

Question. What risks do you see in the Department’s reliance on such contractor support? What steps do you believe the Department should take to mitigate such risk?

Answer. Reliance on contractor support can lead to operational problems if contractors fail to perform. Experience has shown that a number of other problems can arise, including a potential for increased waste, fraud, and abuse; problems that arise from contractor interaction with local communities; and issues with the use of force.

In my role as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I have worked to ensure that these risks are mitigated. The study conducted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs regarding reliance on contracted support in contingency operations and the assessments being conducted by the Military Departments and agencies are key components in this effort. It is also critical to ensure adequate and appropriate planning for contractor support. The Department is integrating contractor support estimates into existing planning systems, and also ensuring that Operational Contract Support requirements are considered in force planning scenario development and joint force assessments. If confirmed, I would continue to monitor these initiatives closely.

Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?

Answer. Not yet, but there has been improvement and more is underway. At the start of our conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department was not properly organized and staffed to manage contractors in the ongoing contingency operations effectively, but a number of corrective actions have been taken over the last several years. If confirmed, I would continue to oversee ongoing efforts to ensure DOD institutionalizes its contingency contracting capabilities and applies lessons learned from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan to future conflicts.

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?

Answer. The Department needs to further ensure that training and contingency plans account realistically for the role of contractors on the modern battlefield; that adequate numbers of contracting officers, contracting officer representatives, and other skilled personnel are available to manage contractors; that there is transparency into contractor and subcontractor performance; that waste, fraud, and abuse, and corruption are prevented and vigorously punished; that DOD coordinates with civil agencies effectively; and that other measures identified by the Department are taken. Many of these actions are the same as those recommended by the Commission on Wartime Contracting.

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

Question. Do you believe DOD and other Federal agencies should rely upon contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations?

Answer. Without a substantial increase in the force structure committed to contingency operations, the use of contractors for some security functions in contingencies is a necessity. However, these security contractors must be properly regulated and supervised, and their roles must be carefully limited and defined. Contractors cannot engage in combat operations. Their use of force is limited to self-defense, the defense of others against violence, and the protection of critical property. Under these circumstances, I believe that the limited use of security contractors in contingency operations is acceptable. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on their use by other departments and agencies. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department continues its efforts to implement and enforce appropriate limitations on private security contractors.

Question. In your view, has the United States’ reliance upon private security contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. The use of force by contractors or military personnel could, if misapplied, undermine our policy objectives. Private security providers are a necessity in Iraq and Afghanistan and will likely continue to be so in future contingency operations. DOD has established policies and procedures to manage contractors effectively to prevent unnecessary violence that would be detrimental to our policy objectives and to address incidents where violence may occur. As Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, I recently approved a revised instruction, DODI 3020.50, “Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises,” which, as the title notes, expanded our oversight of such contractors from those operating in contingency areas to essentially all overseas operations. This is an area that requires constant attention.

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support the efforts already begun in this regard within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in the Military Services, and in the combatant commands. These efforts include development of Department-level policy, coordinating this policy with the Departments of State and Justice and other Government agencies, and engaging the international community to provide a common framework for the proper roles and oversight of private security contractors and the enforcement of those policies during overseas operations by the appropriate authorities. The administration recently published rules that will apply to private security contractors working for all Federal agencies operating in overseas operations, consistent with DODI 3020.50.

Additionally, I believe that work remains to be done to ensure that DOD instructions and combatant commander guidance and orders remain current, clear, and aligned with, with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives. Collaboration among DOD, the Department of State, and other Governmental agencies must continue to ensure consistent policy is developed across the Federal Government and with potential coalition partners and host nations to promote a common interagency and international understanding of responsible use and oversight of private security services and binding enforceable standards for private security contractors operating in areas of combat operations.

Question. Do you support the extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of all Federal agencies?

Answer. I support steps to ensure that there is accountability for the actions of all contractors performing work for the U.S. Government in an area of combat operations. If confirmed, I would consult with DOD’s interagency partners concerning appropriate mechanisms to ensure such accountability.

Question. What is your view of the appropriate application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to employees of private security contractors operating in an area of combat operations?

Answer. There must be an assurance of accountability for the actions of all contractors deployed to an area of combat operations. In most cases, the best option for handling cases involving contractors will be in the civil legal system. It is my understanding that in cases where there is no jurisdiction under an effective civil legal system justice is one tool to consider for ensuring accountability.

Question. What is your view of the recently signed International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers?

Answer. I believe that the endorsement of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service providers was an important step for improving the performance of security functions by all private security contractors, not just those under contract to DOD or the U.S. Government. Codes of conduct, however, are aspirational and difficult to enforce. To make the Code effective, there needs to be auditable and measurable standards that exist separately from, and give teeth to, the principles of the Code: standards that are enforceable under contract law. Currently, the Department is sponsoring the development of business and operational standards for private security companies, and those which can be written into all Defense contracts for security functions. These standards are based on the principles described in the International Code of Conduct, along with the Montreux Document, and the regulations recently published in the Federal Register regarding private security functions.

IRAQ LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from the Iraq invasion, the effort to stabilize the country following that invasion, and the transition of security responsibility to the Government of Iraq?

Answer. One of the most important lessons is that 21st century conflict will occur along the entire spectrum of conflict. DOD cannot be prepared only for combat, but also must be prepared to assist in addressing the social, political, and economic factors that can fuel a conflict. The U.S. military must plan and train with its civilian
counterparts and be prepared to operate effectively in all phases of conflict. Indeed, the need for greater capabilities and capacity in civilian agencies has been a recurring lesson for the entire U.S. Government.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the Department's adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force structure, or operational concepts based upon these lessons learned?

**Answer.** Lessons learned from Iraq have led to wide-ranging changes in all of the areas listed above. For example, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine has been completely revised, culminating in the publication of Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. Force structure changes include the development of Advise and Assist Brigades. DOD has demonstrated the ability to learn and adapt across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy.

**Question.** If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you propose making to policy, programs, force structure, or operating concepts based on the lessons of combat and stability operations in Iraq?

**Answer.** I understand that many of the lessons from Iraq are in the process of being integrated into DOD policy and doctrine, and are contributing to the progress being made in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I would ensure that the integration of lessons learned from Iraq into policy and doctrine are carried through to completion.

**LEAD AGENCY TRANSITION IN IRAQ**

**Question.** Responsibility and authority for lead U.S. agency in Iraq is scheduled this year to transition from DOD to Department of State (DOS). By October 2011, the Department of State is supposed to achieve an initial operating capability as lead agency and achieve full operating capability by December. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the planning and progress on executing this transition from DOD to DOS? In your view, what are the sources of greatest risk, if any, to the current plan and successful implementation of this transition?

**Answer.** DOD, DOS, and other agencies and departments have undertaken unprecedented levels of coordination and planning for the transition in Iraq. As USD(AT&L), my office has had some role in the logistics and contracting aspects of the transition plan, and my observation is that DOD has an excellent working relationship with DOS, and the two departments are working together at all levels to achieve a successful transition. As one would expect with a transition of this scope and complexity, challenges exist, and DOD is doing everything it can to help set up DOS for success. The greatest source of risk would be failure to provide the State Department with adequate funding in fiscal year 2012 in order to implement a successful transition of the U.S. mission from DOD to State.

**Question.** If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the current plan or actions for implementation of the transition?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would carefully monitor the transition with other senior Defense leaders and make any necessary recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

**STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

**Question.** The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of stability and support operations in post-conflict situations. In your view, what is the appropriate allocation of roles and responsibilities, if any, between DOD and other departments and agencies of the Federal Government in the planning and conduct of stability operations?

**Answer.** Ideally, DOD would provide support to civilian agencies such as the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Justice in the planning and conduct of stability operations. But, when directed, DOD has led stability operations activities to establish civil security and control and to restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, deliver humanitarian assistance, and then has transitioned lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments' security forces, and international governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD operates within U.S. Government and international structures for managing civil-military operations, and would seek to enable the deployment and use of civilian capabilities and resources, as directed and as appropriate.

**Question.** In developing the capabilities necessary for stability operations, what adjustments, if any, should be made to prepare U.S. Armed Forces to conduct stability operations without detracting from its ability to perform combat missions?
Stability operations are a core mission that DOD must be ready to carry out with proficiency equivalent to high-intensity combat operations. Although this represents a cultural shift for DOD, we understand that all of our Military Departments must adequately train, organize, and equip forces to conduct such missions. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary, the Chairman, and leadership of the Military Departments to ensure that DOD is preparing U.S. forces for stability operations.

Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government needs to establish new procedures to manage stability operations? If so, why?

Answer. I think we need to strengthen the U.S. Government's collective ability to plan together and be more collaborative in designing stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Department is working with interagency partners to identify areas where we can improve planning efforts.

**Drawdown in Iraq**

Question. Do you support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq consistent with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement of 2008 signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki?

Answer. As the President has stated, we intend to fulfill our obligations under the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, which requires all U.S. forces to withdraw by the end of the year. I would also note, however, that it is possible that the United States and Iraq could agree on follow-on arrangements that could include continued presence of U.S. forces in Iraq after 2011. I support this plan.

Question. If the Government of Iraq were to ask for the continued presence in Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the end of 2011, would you support the deployment or retention of additional troops in Iraq beyond the current deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?

Answer. On August 2, Iraqi bloc leaders stated that they have agreed to mandate the Iraqi Government start talks with the United States. Talks are focused on training assistance under the Strategic Framework Agreement, given the Iraqi Security Forces’ requirement for further development. I agree that we should talk to them about their request.

**U.S.-Iraq Strategic Relationship**

Question. In your view, what will be the nature of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship after December 31, 2011?

Answer. The United States is committed to a long-term partnership with Iraq, as outlined in the November 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement, which describes a security relationship that addresses Iraqi needs and advances U.S. interests.

Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for that relationship over the coming years?

Answer. Our greatest challenge is to ensure continued U.S. engagement and support for Iraq in an austere budget environment. The United States is at a critical point in its relationship with Iraq as U.S. forces draw down and the State Department becomes the lead U.S. Agency for the mission. Recent turmoil in the broader Middle East highlights the importance of active U.S. engagement and maintaining strategic partnerships with regional partners based on mutual interests and mutual respect.

**Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Strategy**

Question. Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?

Answer. Yes, I support the strategy that the President has set forth, and I believe it is the right strategy. A focused counterinsurgency campaign will allow us to help the Afghans build security forces and government capacity capable of providing the security and basic services necessary to achieve a peaceful, stable Afghanistan that does not again become a safe haven for terrorists.

Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? For example, would you support an increase in counterterrorism action in Afghanistan?

Answer. I believe the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. The administration tracks metrics on progress toward its objectives in Afghanistan throughout the year, and the Department is constantly assessing and adjusting its implementation of the overall strategy. Counterterrorism is a significant part of the counterinsurgency strategy, and managing the balance of all aspects of the strategy is an ongoing process.
Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?

Answer. Important gains have been made over the past 24 months, establishing security and the authority of the Afghan Government in former Taliban strongholds, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar where we focused our surge forces, as well as building the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. The momentum has shifted to the Afghan Government supported by Coalition forces, and the transition process has begun with the Afghan Government assuming lead security responsibilities in several areas of the country this summer. This progress is, however, fragile and reversible.

TRANSITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND U.S. TROOP REDUCTIONS

Question. On June 22, President Obama announced his decision to draw down 10,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year and to withdraw the remaining 23,000 ‘surge’ force by next summer, for a total drawdown of 33,000. Do you support the President’s decision to begin reducing U.S. forces in July 2011? Why or why not?

Answer. Yes. I support a responsible conditions-based drawdown as called for by the President. I believe we have made the progress necessary to allow us to begin to bring home U.S. surge forces. As USD(AT&L), I have worked through my co-chairmanship of the Senior Integration Group (SIG) to ensure that the forces in Afghanistan grow in overall capability even as the U.S. troop presence begins to decrease.

Question. Do you support the President’s decision regarding the size and pace of reductions in U.S. forces? Why or why not?

Answer. Yes. I believe we have made the progress necessary to allow us to begin to bring home U.S. surge forces.

Question. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon, the participants in the International Security Assistance Force endorsed President Karzai’s goal of the Afghanistan National Security Forces having the primary responsibility for providing security throughout Afghanistan by 2014. Last month, transition of lead responsibility for security from ISAF forces to Afghan security forces began in seven areas around Afghanistan.

Do you support the goal of transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan security forces by 2014?

Answer. Yes. The transition of security-lead to the ANSF in the first tranche of provinces and municipalities has progressed smoothly and without any significant uptick in violence in those areas. Our transition strategy, as stated at the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Conference, is to complete security transition nation-wide by the end of 2014. Transition remains conditions-based. The ISAF Commander and NATO Senior Civilian Representative are working together to refine the transition process to take into account the gradual drawdown of Coalition forces, declining funding, and the need to focus enablers and resources in contested areas as we move forward with transition.

Question. How important is it to the civil-military campaign in Afghanistan that the initial round of transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan security forces begins this summer and be completed by the end of the year?

Answer. Successful transition depends upon sufficient development and capable governance to underpin security gains. The timetable is and should be conditions-based.

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing professional and effective Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)?

Answer. In partnership with U.S. and NATO forces, the ANSF have made enormous progress in size and quality over the past 2 years and remain ahead of schedule for their growth targets this year. In addition, both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have made significant gains in effectiveness and professionalism. The establishment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program has also fostered greater local capability to resist insurgents. However, real challenges remain, for example, in stemming attrition rates.

Question. Do you support the proposed increase in the size of the ANSF to the level of 352,000 personnel by 2012?

Answer. Military commanders who are the closest to the issue have conducted detailed analyses of ANSF personnel and capabilities requirements and have concluded that right now, a level of 352,000 personnel appears to be the right force size,
although the balance of forces between the Army and Police may change over time. President Obama and NATO have endorsed that growth to 352,000 personnel, and I support those decisions.

**Question.** What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges?

**Answer.** Some of the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF include poor literacy rates and low education levels in the Afghan population, which constrain the development of more advanced ANSF capabilities such as logistics, aviation, medical, and communications. These capabilities will be necessary for an increasingly self-sufficient ANSF to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorists. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has put considerable attention on, and resources toward, the literacy problem. Another key challenge is the development of strong and capable leaders, which takes time and experience to cultivate. If confirmed, I would work with military and civilian leaders and international partners to explore ways to bolster ANSF capacity.

**Question.** If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have to address challenges relating to the sustainment of the ANSF over the long-term?

**Answer.** We need to challenge our planning assumptions continually to ensure the Afghans are developing a security force that is sustainable, in terms of size, capabilities, and cost. We need to continue to resist providing certain advanced aviation and armor capabilities that do not appear to be necessary for Afghan security and are likely to be unsustainable over the long term. Currently, the United States provides the bulk of funding for the Afghan National Security Forces. We need to continue to urge other countries to increase the amounts they contribute. For example, former Secretary of Defense Gates challenged NATO Allies and partners to contribute a combined one billion euros annually to the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund.

**AFGHAN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT**

**Question.** While improving security for the Afghan people is a key component of our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, the success of that strategy also depends on improving the Government of Afghanistan’s capacity to provide governance, better services and economic development. Significant concerns remain over the performance of the Government of Afghanistan in meeting the needs of the Afghan people and fighting corruption.

**What do you see as the role for DOD in building the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to deliver services, provide better governance, improve economic development and fight corruption in Afghanistan?**

**Answer.** Improving governance and economic development is crucial to our strategy in Afghanistan. Although the Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are the lead agencies within the U.S. Government on governance and development initiatives in Afghanistan, DOD contributes to this effort and cooperates closely with DOS and USAID. Coordinating DOD stabilization projects with civilian reconstruction and development efforts ensures that the military and civilian activities work together to support longer-term development objectives, as well as near-term stabilization.

**U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN**

**Question.** What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to Pakistan?

**Answer.** Our relationship with Pakistan is not always easy, but it is vital to our national security and to our regional interests. The core national security goal remains to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates to ensure that they do not have safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to eliminate their capacity to threaten the United States in Pakistan, our allies, and interests abroad. Al Qaeda and other extremists continue to use safe havens in Pakistan to plan and prepare attacks against the United States and our allies and partners, and it is essential to continue working with Pakistan to eliminate these safe havens.

The fact that Pakistan is a nuclear state that faces internal threats from extremist organizations adds to the urgency of these requirements. Furthermore, U.S. economic interests in South Asia require stability in the region. Preventing, if possible, a potential Pakistan-India conflict is another important strategic interest. For these reasons, it is in the United States’ interest for Pakistan to have a strong, civilian-led government and an open society, to live in peace and security with its neighbors, and to ensure its nuclear assets remain secure, in accordance with international
standards. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress as we pursue these strategic interests with Pakistan.

Question. What in your view are the key lessons from the operation to kill Osama bin Laden for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship?

Answer. The key lesson from the raid is that the U.S. must act when U.S. vital national interests are at stake, including unilaterally, if other options present too much risk to mission success. A second lesson is that the Pakistan sanctuary for al Qaeda, Afghan insurgents, and other terrorist groups remains a threat to U.S. vital national interests that must be eliminated. A third lesson is that the United States must remain engaged in Pakistan to secure its vital interests, and that Pakistan needs the United States as much as the United States needs Pakistan.

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-military relations?

Answer. Our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, like our overall relationship, has experienced good and bad periods. If confirmed, I would continue to support joint efforts, in coordination with our interagency partners, to improve our counterterrorism cooperation and develop a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan, aimed at advancing shared national security objectives.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant military assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing and training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to conduct counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the United States has provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and other support provided in connection with Operation Enduring Freedom. How effective, in your view, has this assistance been in improving Pakistan's efforts and commitment to counter terrorists in Pakistan?

Answer. Security-related assistance, Coalition Support Fund reimbursements, and cross-border coordination with ISAF and Afghan forces have helped enable Pakistan's counterinsurgency campaign. Since 2009, Pakistan has undertaken counterinsurgency operations against extremist organizations in its northwest areas, including in Swat, South Waziristan, Mohmand, and Bajaur, with varying levels of success. If confirmed, I would work with Congress to ensure that the support we provide is yielding the results we seek.

Question. What conditions or factors should the Department take into consideration in determining whether additional U.S. military assistance should be provided to Pakistan in the future?

Answer. The current "train-advice-equip" programs with the Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an important component in pursuing the near-term objective of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries and disrupting the al Qaeda network. It is vital, however, that Pakistan live up to its responsibilities, including to cooperate more fully in counterterrorism matters, to expand its counterinsurgency campaign, and to cease providing sanctuary to Afghan Taliban and other militant groups perceived to be beneficial to the Pakistani state. Future requests for security-related assistance will be informed by Pakistan's steps in these areas. Additionally, all U.S. security-related assistance will continue to be provided to Pakistan in accordance with the Leahy vetting requirements.

OSAMA BIN LADEN AND AL QAEDA

Question. In your view, will the death of Osama bin Laden have a significant impact on the conflict against al Qaeda and if so, how?

Answer. The death of Osama bin Laden is a significant blow to al Qaeda and brings us closer to that organization's strategic defeat. However, al Qaeda remains a potent, dangerous, and adaptable foe. Even as the core al Qaeda organization is weakened, decentralized affiliates and adherents pose a continuing threat to the United States.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda affiliates to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?

Answer. Al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents are diverse, dispersed, and decentralized. They are present in the Arabian Peninsula, North and East Africa, South Asia, and elsewhere around the globe, including within the United States. Their intent and ability to attack the United States varies by group, but striking the Homeland is a common theme in their propaganda and planning. Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula has already demonstrated both the intent and the capability to conduct attacks against the United States. Also, despite the death of bin Laden, core al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region remain a persistent and serious threat.

SOMALIA

Question. Somalia is a collapsed state with a weak government unable to project either power or stability or to provide services to its people in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. Somalia is also a training and operations hub for al Shabab and other violent extremists; pirates operating in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Peninsula; illicit traffickers of weapons, humans, and drugs; and remnants of the al Qaeda East Africa cell that was responsible for the destruction of our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August of 1998.

What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Shabab to the U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa and to the U.S. Homeland?

Answer. The threat from al Shabab to the U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa and to the U.S. Homeland is significant. Al Shabab leaders, who have claimed affiliation with al Qaeda since 2007, are developing ties with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and are showing an increasing desire to stage international terrorist attacks in addition to their acts of violence inside Somalia. Al Shabab employs several hundred foreign fighters and regularly tries to recruit fighters from Somali diaspora communities in the United States and Europe. Al Shabab continues to repress the Somali people—it is not a coincidence that the areas in Somalia where the UN has declared famine conditions to exist are areas under al Shabab’s control.

Further, Somalia’s lack of governance and sparse population could make it appealing as a safe haven for al Qaeda. As al Qaeda undergoes leadership changes and regroups from counterterrorism operations in Pakistan, we need to ensure that it does not relocate its center of operations to Somalia.

YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Question. A number of senior U.S. officials have indicated that the most significant threat to the U.S. Homeland currently emanates from Yemen.

What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen?

Answer. I understand the United States is disappointed by President Saleh’s continued refusal to transfer power. U.S. leaders continue to urge him to do so immediately, and to ensure that the legitimate will of the Yemeni people is respected.

The ongoing unrest has weakened an already fragile economy and allowed al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to expand its influence. Despite this, U.S. goals in Yemen remain the same: to help Yemen deny AQAP a safe haven and operational platform and to ensure Yemen is stable, unified, and economically viable.

AQAP has attempted two dramatic attacks on the United States since December 2009, and has expressed intent to try again. AQAP attack planning demonstrates sophisticated and innovative techniques, such as concealed explosive devices and printer cartridge bombs. AQAP is also increasingly attempting to recruit and radicalize would-be terrorists in the West through its extensive media outreach, increasing the threat of lone-wolf terrorists inspired by AQAP.
The administration has just released a comprehensive National Strategy for Counterterrorism that calls for a collaborative U.S.-Yemeni effort to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQAP. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that DOD plays a constructive and appropriate role in carrying out this strategy.

Question. Given the ongoing political upheaval and splintering of the military in Yemen, what are your views on the United States continuing to provide security assistance—most significantly DOD section 1206 funding—to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?

Answer. As with every country, we are regularly evaluating U.S. assistance and counterterrorism cooperation to ensure that the assistance to be provided is appropriate and effective. The Republic of Yemen Government is a critical partner in the war against al Qaeda, and the Department must be particularly mindful of the continued and growing threat to the United States from AQAP. Given the challenges unfolding in Yemen, the United States will need to continually re-evaluate the partnership.

CHINA

Question. Much has been made about the economic and military growth in China and what that growth might mean in terms of regional and global security.

From your perspective, what effect is China’s expanding economy and growing military having on the region at-large and how is that growth influencing the U.S. security posture in Asia and the Pacific?

Answer. In terms of regional security, China’s economic growth has increased China’s international profile and influence, and has enabled China’s leaders to embark upon and sustain a comprehensive transformation of its military forces. The pace and scale of China’s military modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency, raises many questions, both within the United States and the region as a whole, about China’s future.

From my perspective, DOD has a special responsibility to monitor China’s military and to deter conflict. Through a robust forward presence, prudent capability developments, and sustained action to strengthen alliances and partnerships, DOD can support our national interest in promoting a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.

Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China’s military modernization program?

Answer. China appears to be building the capability to fight and win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. Its near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, including possible U.S. military intervention. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area denial capabilities. China is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China’s immediate periphery. Beijing’s growing focus on military missions other than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through modernization of its nuclear forces, and improving other strategic capabilities such as space and counter-space operations and computer network operations.

Question. How do you believe the United States should respond to China’s military modernization program?

Answer. The United States has been and should remain the pivotal military power in the Asia-Pacific region. Our response to China’s military modernization should be flexible and supported by the continued transformation of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, the maintenance of our global presence and access, the modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as anti-access and area denial, and the strengthening of our Alliances and partnerships.

Question. U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue has been strained over the past several years and efforts to establish and maintain mutually beneficial military relations has been hampered by China’s propensity for postponing or canceling military engagements in an apparent effort to influence U.S. actions. Since the beginning of 2011, there have been a number of senior-level meetings between U.S. and Chinese military officials, including visits to China by Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, and a visit to United States by the People’s Liberation Army Chief of Staff, General Chen. By most accounts, gains from these meetings have been modest at best, but they do represent an encouraging step towards perhaps a more mutually beneficial understanding between the militaries of our countries.

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations and what would be your intention, if confirmed, regarding these relations?
Answer. I have long supported a continuous dialogue between the armed forces of the United States and China to expand practical cooperation where our national interests converge and to discuss candidly those areas where we have disagreement. Such dialogue can be especially important during periods of friction and turbulence. I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive role in the region, and to press China to partner with the United States and our Asian allies and partners in addressing common security challenges.

Question. What is your view of the relative importance of sustained military-to-military relations with China?

Answer. President Obama and President Hu have expressed that a healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relationship is an essential part of their shared vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. I fully agree with that assertion.

Question. Do you believe that we should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

Answer. I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can only truly work if China is willing to reciprocate with transparent and substantive discussions. If confirmed, I would look for ways to deepen and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.

NORTH KOREA

Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near-term threats to regional security and stability. This seriousness of the threat is seen by North Korea’s continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and ballistic missile program, and particularly, over the past year, by North Korea’s unprovoked and deadly attacks against South Korea—specifically the attack on the Republic of Korea navy ship Cheonan in March 2010 and the artillery attack on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

Answer. North Korea’s large conventional military, proliferation activities, and pursuit of asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, including uranium enrichment, present a serious threat to the United States, our allies in the region, and to the international community. The two North Korean attacks against South Korea last year provide a sober reminder that Pyongyang is willing to utilize its capabilities to undertake provocative actions. If confirmed, I would intend to monitor the security situation on the Korean Peninsula closely; work for the continued transformation of our alliances and partnerships in the region; and maintain the military capabilities necessary to protect our interests, defend our allies, and deter North Korea from acts of aggression and intimidation.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of those capabilities?

Answer. North Korea’s missile and WMD programs pose a direct and serious threat to our regional allies and partners and have the potential to become a direct threat to U.S. territory. The United States must continue to monitor carefully North Korea’s WMD and missile development programs and related proliferation activities. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD continues to work closely with other parts of the U.S. Government to address these and other emerging threats, reduce our vulnerabilities, and those of our allies and partners, and work cooperatively with our allies to ensure our contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.

Question. In your view are there additional steps that DOD could take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology to Syria, Iran, and others?

Answer. I understand that DOD, with its interagency partners, has taken several steps to prevent North Korea’s proliferation of weapons-related technology, including working to advance international nonproliferation norms and cooperating with partner nations to inspect and interdict vessels and aircraft suspected of carrying illicit cargo. If confirmed, I would continue to work to strengthen international consensus against proliferation, invest in capacity-building programs with partner nations, and increase WMD-related information sharing with international partners.
1085

LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

Question. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is pending consideration in the U.S. Senate. What is your view on whether or not the United States should join the Law of the Sea convention?


Question. How would being a party to the Law of the Sea convention help or hinder the United States’ security posture in the Asia-Pacific region?

Answer. Being a party to the Law of the Sea Convention would not hinder the U.S. security posture in the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, it would enhance our leadership and ability to influence future developments in the law of the sea, strengthen our position in bilateral discussions with the People’s Republic of China, and improve our position in a large number of Asia-focused multilateral venues. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2007, “The legal framework that the Convention establishes is essential to the mission of DOD, and the Department of Homeland Security concurs that it is also essential for their mission. For that reason, Secretary Gates, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Department Secretaries, all of the combatant commanders, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard join me in asking the Senate to give its swift approval for U.S. Accession to the Law of the Sea Convention and ratification of the 1994 Agreement.”

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS

Question. On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department’s CN operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that DOD “does not have an effective performance measurement system to track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.” This is the second such finding relating to DOD CN in the last decade. What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?

Answer. I understand that the Department’s counternarcotics activities are intended to perform important roles, including detection and monitoring of drug trafficking bound for the United States, counternarcotics support to law enforcement agencies, drug demand reduction for the armed services, and critical support for combatant commanders’ efforts to confront drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime that support terrorists, insurgents, and other criminal groups. If confirmed, I would assess the Department’s progress against these goals.

Question. In your view, should DOD continue to play a role in attempting to stem the flow of illegal narcotics?

Answer. Yes. In support of the National Drug Control Strategy, DOD plays an important, statutory role as the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking bound for the United States. Additionally, as outlined in the President’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime released in July 2011, drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime pose a national security threat to the United States. The enemies we face on the battlefield today are increasingly financed through non-traditional means, including through drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. Just as the Department has long been focused on how traditional, state-funded adversaries are supported, we must use all of the tools at our disposal to attack the sources of revenue that support the asymmetrical threat we face today and are likely to face for the foreseeable future. Transnational organized crime contributes to global instability by undermining legitimate government institutions, fostering corruption, and distorting legitimate economic activity. The Department’s efforts to build the counternarcotics capabilities of partner nation security forces serve to prevent and deter broader conflicts that could require a much more costly military intervention in the future.

Question. In your view, should DOD continue to fund the National Guard Counterdrug Program for Youth Intervention and local law enforcement education programs that may be duplicative of the efforts of other agencies, using CN funds?

Answer. I am aware of the purposes of this program, and, if confirmed, will assess its level of funding.

ENGAGEMENT POLICY

Question. One of the central pillars of our recent national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world.
Military-to-military contacts, Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises, combatant commander (COCOM) exercises, humanitarian demining operations, and other engagement activities have been used to achieve this goal.

Do you believe that these activities contribute positively to U.S. national security?

Answer. Yes, DOD’s engagement activities encourage and enable partner nations to provide political support, to give us access to territory and resources, to secure and govern their territory more effectively, and to contribute to regional and global security. Partner support reduces our risk around the world and enables U.S. deterrence and, when necessary, military actions. Further, enabling our foreign partners to provide for their own security and contribute to multilateral security efforts is an investment that pays immediate and long-term dividends by reducing the need for costlier U.S. interventions in response to turmoil in regions critical to U.S. interests. I believe that taken on the whole, these engagement activities are a cost-effective way to strengthen our national security posture by building lasting relationships and alliances with partner nations.

Question. If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of the U.S. military?

Answer. Yes, I believe that maintaining cooperative security relationships with foreign militaries will be imperative for DOD in the foreseeable future.

Question. What improvements, if any, would you suggest to the COCOM or interagency process for undertaking these activities?

Answer. As with stability operations and security sector assistance, DOD’s investment in international engagement is most effective when coordinated with U.S. Government civilian counterparts with adequate capacity. If confirmed, I would ensure the Department works closely with other agencies to ensure that the U.S. military plans and trains with our interagency civilian counterparts, that we are jointly prepared to engage with partner nations to prevent conflicts and, if prevention fails, to respond effectively in all phases of conflict.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”). In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

Answer. Our primary objective in building the capacity of foreign partners should continue to be to help them develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their countries’ internal security, and contribute to regional and multilateral responses to threats and instability. This, in turn, mitigates the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States and promotes interoperability between our forces.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews have mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and enablers that directly support their operations. Do you believe that we should further increase the number of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?

Answer. U.S. Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) current throughput is programmed to meet the growth mandated by the last two QDRs. This planned special operations personnel growth, at the rate of 3 to 5 percent per year, includes Navy SEAL, Army Special Forces and Special Operations Aviation, and combat and combat support personnel. Until that programmed growth is complete, I do not believe it is prudent to consider additional growth to the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community.

Question. In your view, how can the size of SOF be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for special operators?

Answer. SOF cannot be mass produced. As Admiral McRaven has pointed out, Special Operations growth should stay between 3 to 5 percent per year in order to ensure quality of the manpower being produced. This is the pace SOCOM has sustained over the past several years and is on track to sustain over the next several years. However, as the security landscape has changed, the demands for indirect kinds of missions have begun to exceed the ability of the Special Operations community alone to meet. As a partial remedy to this situation, the 2010 QDR recommended expanding general purpose forces’ capacities and capabilities to execute some missions that used to fall exclusively to SOF. I support this recommendation.
Question. In recent years, SOF have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to SOCOM title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.

What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by SOCOM, and why?

Answer. The Department uses a range of processes, such as the Unified Command Plan, to review the mission sets and responsibilities it assigns to SOCOM on an ongoing basis. Additionally, the language in section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., includes “such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense,” which provides the President and the Secretary of Defense the flexibility needed to meet changing circumstances. At this time, I would not advocate significant changes to SOCOM’s title 10 missions, though, if confirmed, I would review these responsibilities.

Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?

Answer. At this time, I would not advocate significant changes to SOCOM’s title 10 missions.

Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?

Answer. The activities of Special Operations Forces are significantly varied, from strikes and counterterrorist raids to working by, with, and through local partners, whether that be in the form of training and advising foreign counterparts or providing support to civilian authorities abroad. I believe that each of these missions is an essential component of the Department’s national security responsibilities and highly valued within the Special Operations community. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that investments are made in an appropriately balanced way.

RUSSIA

Question. What are the areas of engagement with Russia that are most beneficial from a DOD perspective? How would you recommend carrying out such engagement?

Answer. I understand that the Department has a robust engagement plan with the Russian Armed Forces through two working groups under the Bilateral Presidential Commission: (1) the Defense Relations Working Group (co-chaired by the Secretary of Defense and the Russian Minister of Defense) and (2) the Military Cooperation Working Group (co-chaired by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Russian Chief of the General Staff). The Defense Relations Working Group focuses on high-level policy issues, such as missile defense cooperation, defense technology cooperation, security issues, and defense reform. The Military Cooperation Working Group focuses on military-to-military cooperation, including counter-terrorism, Afghanistan-Pakistan, crisis response and counter-piracy. Services Chiefs and combatant commanders (particularly U.S. European, Pacific, and Northern Commands) also take part in military-to-military engagement activities contained in a mutually agreed upon annual work plan. Combined, these efforts strive to increase transparency and maintain direct and frank lines of communication, and I support their continuation and strengthening.

Question. As Russia and the United States implement the New START treaty, do you believe that it will be possible to begin a discussion on tactical nuclear weapons, and are there any conditions that you believe should be precedent to such discussions?

Answer. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States intends to pursue further reductions in strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons with Russia, including both deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons. Because of the verification challenges associated with limiting non-strategic and non-deployed weapons, I believe that a discussion of potential cooperation measures would be useful as an early component of discussions on reductions and strengthened security measures.

DOD’S COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

Question. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program was historically focused primarily on eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the states of the former Soviet Union. The emphasis of the program is beginning
to shift away from Russia and to new threats, such as biological weapons surveillance mechanisms in Africa and elsewhere.

In your view, what still needs to be done to reduce the proliferation threat from the residual Cold War stockpiles of WMD weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union?

Answer. I have been involved in the Nunn-Lugar program from its inception and continue to participate in its management as USD(AT&L). I believe the countries of the former Soviet Union have made significant progress to reduce the threats associated with the extensive Soviet WMD programs, facilities, and stockpiles in their territories. In many cases this was accomplished with the support and assistance of DOD's Nunn-Lugar CTR program. The threat posed by WMD terrorism underscores the need for continued attention to residual Cold War stockpiles of WMD and materials. Where and when host governments are unable to mitigate this threat on their own, CTR and other U.S. programs should work with these nations to reduce these threats through the dismantlement of WMD and associated infrastructure and the consolidation and securing of WMD and related technology.

Question. Are Russia and the former Soviet Union countries now making a significant contribution to efforts to reduce the proliferation threats they inherited?

Answer. It is my understanding that, through direct national funding as well as collaboration with U.S. agencies and other international partners, Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) are making significant contributions to reduce proliferation threats they inherited and to address new ones.

The Nunn-Lugar CTR program continues to be DOD's principal vehicle to support these activities. FSU countries are partnering with CTR and other U.S. programs to reduce a variety of Soviet-era WMD threats within their borders and the region. As a specific example, we continue a strong partnership with the Government of Kazakhstan to destroy, secure, and consolidate dangerous pathogens and improve Central Asia's capacity to prevent and respond to a bioterrorism attack.

Question. What do you see as the key remaining objectives of the CTR program in Russia?

Answer. I view the key remaining objectives of CTR in Russia to be the prevention of proliferation and WMD terrorism through dismantlement of WMD and associated infrastructure; consolidation and security of WMD and related technology; transition of sustainment responsibilities for U.S.-provided security upgrades to the Russian Ministry of Defense; increased transparency; and support to bilateral defense and military cooperation, with the goal of reducing WMD threats.

Question. Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts, including DOD, the Department of Energy, and the State Department?

Answer. From my current position, I appreciate that DOD's CTR mission is executed with strong White House leadership, essential support from the Department of State, and in close cooperation with the Department of Energy and other interagency partners. Robust collaboration across U.S. agencies and interagency coordination is a hallmark of the program and key to its effectiveness. If confirmed, I would continue efforts to maximize coordination and cooperation with our interagency and international partners.

Question. As the CTR program expands to geographic regions beyond the states of the former Soviet Union, in your view what proliferation and threat reduction goals should DOD establish?

Answer. In my current position with responsibility for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, I have made it a priority to expand the geographic reach of the CTR program beyond the former Soviet Union. WMD threats are global, and DOD has substantial experience in building partner capacity to address WMD threats worldwide. The President has highlighted the threats posed by nuclear and biological terrorism as key proliferation concerns requiring international attention. In line with these priorities, DOD's goals for the program are: (1) reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons threats; (2) improving the security and accounting of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile material; (3) detecting, eliminating, and preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons and biological materials; and (4) encouraging development of capabilities to reduce proliferation threats among key partners and regions.

Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that the United States will continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has been no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the effort is early in the
technology and testing phase. One test failed and the second test will occur in August.

In your view, is there a role for a conventional prompt global strike capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national security in the near future?

Answer. The Department continues to investigate options for this unique capability. It is envisioned that a conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capability could be useful in certain scenarios involving regional adversaries considering an attack using weapons of mass destruction or against high priority non-state adversaries. It may also serve a unique role in situations where a fleeting, serious threat was located in a region not readily accessible by other means.

Question. What approach to implementation of this capability would you expect to pursue if confirmed?

Answer. DOD is developing and testing technologies relevant to both land-based and sea-based CPGS concepts. It would be premature to make any decisions regarding a future acquisition strategy or development concept for this technology until this concept assessment has been completed.

Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike capability?

Answer. As with other weapon systems, effective employment of CPGS weapons would depend on the availability of timely and accurate intelligence on the nature, location, and disposition of a potential target. Given the precision and promptness inherent in the CPGS concept, the intelligence requirements for this system would be especially demanding.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

As the stockpile continues to age, and as the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, what do you view as the greatest challenges with respect to assuring the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile?

Answer. The most recent certification of the stockpile, completed in April 2011, indicates the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. The greatest challenge, as reflected in the comments of the national security laboratory directors, concerns the long-term sustainment and viability of the stockpile and the supporting infrastructure. As the weapons complex and nuclear stockpile continue to age, efforts to sustain them are becoming more costly and technically difficult. Since the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, substantial financial and political commitments have been made to address age-related issues in the nuclear weapons complex. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress and the Department of Energy on this effort to maintain the skills, capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of our nuclear stockpile in a constrained budget environment.

Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing?

Answer. If the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program remains adequately funded to maintain critical technical and manufacturing capabilities, I believe it is likely to continue to be effective. My recommendation on what steps to take in the event that the stockpile could not be certified as safe, secure, and reliable would depend upon the causes of the problems in the stockpile, and what technical steps would be needed to address them.

Question. As the current Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, what are the most significant issues facing the Council?

Answer. The continued safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear stockpile is the most significant challenge facing the Council, and it is important to meet this challenge in a cost-effective manner. It is essential that the United States continue to invest in critical technical and manufacturing capabilities and infrastructure. If confirmed, I will make this a priority and continue the strong partnership between the Departments of Defense and Energy that is essential to maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to work to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and to advocate for the required funding. Maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile is a critical national security priority, and the section 1251 report represents the administration's current best estimate of required funding. At the same time, like DOD delivery system sustainment and modernization efforts, NNSA nuclear weapons complex modernization must be undertaken in a cost-effective manner. DOD has already taken steps to reduce the estimated cost of the Ohio-class replacement ballistic missile submarine and new Long-Range Strike Family of Systems.

Question. Can DOD afford the plan set out in the report?

Answer. Given the potentially significant future budget reductions we are facing, DOD is examining all programs for affordability and national security requirements, including our plans for modernization of the nuclear enterprise. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress to ensure that our most critical national security investments, including those in the nuclear enterprise, are balanced with the realities of the current fiscal environment.

Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START treaty limits for the deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?

I support the Obama administration’s agenda for reducing global nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, as outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. I also support the NPR’s conclusion: “The United States will retain the smallest possible nuclear stockpile consistent with our need to deter adversaries, reassure our allies, and hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise.” Reductions below the New START treaty limits must only be considered in the context of the geopolitical environment and the status of our nuclear stockpile and the enterprise modernization effort.

TACTICAL FIGHTER PROGRAMS

Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will face over the next several years is the set of programs to modernize our tactical aviation forces with fifth generation tactical aircraft equipped with stealth technology, to include the JSF.

Based on current and projected threats, what are your views on the requirements for and timing of these programs?

Answer. Based on current and projected threats, I believe it is critical that we transition to a 5th generation capability across the Services while maintaining sufficient legacy inventory capacity to prevail. Over the next 10 years, the Department’s 5th generation capability will grow from a relatively small percentage to approximately one third of the TACAIR force structure. In the 20 years that follow, JSF will become the mainstay of the force. We need JSF to deal with advanced fighters and surface-to-air missiles worldwide, especially in the stressing electronic warfare environments of the future. Additionally, the F–22A modernization program will provide improved capability to ensure the United States is unmatched in both fighter and ground attack capability as JSF begins operational employment. To ensure we have sufficient capacity of fighter attack aircraft during the transition period, the Department has continued the production of the F/A–18E/F, extended the service life of the Department of Navy’s older F/A–18s, and invested in affordable F–15, F–16, and A–10 sustainment and modernization efforts.

Question. What is your view on the affordability of these programs?

Answer. I believe affordability is critical to these programs, as well as all of our acquisition programs and services. As Under Secretary, I have instituted a number of strategic initiatives designed to target affordability and control cost growth. Examples include establishing an affordability target at Milestone (MS) A for both production and sustainment costs and the requirement to report on systems engineering trades showing how key design features affect the target cost at MS B. Additionally, I believe the establishment of “Should Cost” targets will provide us with a continuous focus on reducing program cost during planning and execution, especially in preparation for contract negotiations. In looking at the affordability of the current TACAIR modernization programs, I believe we can do better at controlling costs, but I also believe that these programs are affordable if managed properly. The JSF program has a track record of cost growth that must be reversed. Last year I directed a bottom up technical review of the development and test program to provide us the
best assessment of the time and costs required to complete the development phase. We are aggressively managing the early production contracts to ensure the Government achieves best value in procurement. Finally, the estimate for life-cycle program costs is very concerning to me and the Department is taking a very detailed look at all aspects of JSF operations, support, and sustainment to identify best value solutions to control the lifetime operating and support costs for the JSF fleet.

Question. Even if all of the current aircraft modernization programs execute as planned, the average age of the tactical, strategic, and tanker fleet will increase. Aging aircraft require ever-increasing maintenance, but even with these increasing maintenance costs, readiness levels continue to decline. Can both the maintenance of the legacy force and the modernization efforts be affordable at anywhere near the expected budget levels?

Answer. Based on expected budget levels, I believe there will have to be some tradeoffs. Balancing the costs of maintaining an aging aircraft fleet with recapitalizing and modernizing that fleet is one of the most difficult problems the Department will deal with over the next few years. The austere fiscal environment we currently face, and the projected future budget levels we anticipate, make the problem challenging. As part of addressing increasing maintenance costs and declining readiness levels, we must improve how we currently do business. I believe we can do that by working with our industry partners to achieve more efficient and cost-effective supply chain and logistics management. We are also taking Service best value processes and mandating establishment across DOD, such as the Navy’s predecessor plan to the Department’s Superior Supplier Incentive Program (SSIP) and the Air Force’s initiatives to improve the management of services contracts. I believe that an affordable JSF is absolutely vital if the Department is going to be able to meet the capability and force structure requirements that the combatant commanders, Services, and warfighters need.

Question. Some critics believe that there is still too much service parochial duplication in procuring new systems.

Answer. In part, I do. I would offer that the Department is improving in this area but can certainly do better. Procuring systems that duplicate or overlap Service requirements is inefficient and does not provide the best value for defense spending.

Question. What steps have you taken as Under Secretary to reduce such duplication?

Answer. I have taken a number of steps to reduce duplication. Conducting comprehensive cross-Service warfighting portfolio reviews is part of the Better Buying Power initiative. Additionally, I meet regularly with the Service Acquisition Executives (SAE), both individually and collectively. These meetings help ensure that the SAEs are kept up to date on policy, guidance decisions, and direction, and they allow me to gain insight into service-specific acquisition issues and direction. Open and direct communication with the SAEs has helped in identifying common capability requirements prior to Materiel Development Decision milestones. As a participant in the Department’s budget process, I have worked with the Deputy Secretary, the Services, and others to eliminate duplication.

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the Department should take in the future?

Answer. Last year, Secretary Gates directed the Department to pursue a wide-ranging efficiencies initiative. This effort extends well beyond removing inefficiencies associated with duplication. Working with the senior leadership across the Department’s acquisition community, I drafted guidance focused on obtaining greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending. The guidance covered five focus areas: (1) Target affordability and control cost growth; (2) Incentivize productivity and innovation in industry; (3) Promote real competition; (4) Improve tradecraft in services acquisition; and (5) Reduce non-productive processes and bureaucracy. In November of last year, I issued direction designed to achieve specific action in those initiative areas. Since that time I have worked continuously to follow through on the implementation of these initiatives, to adjust them as necessary, and to identify other opportunities. I believe this is a start; however, there are many additional steps that the Department must take in the future to improve the way we do business and deliver better value to the taxpayer and warfighter. Improving how the Department does business is a continuous process. If confirmed, I would intend to focus on these areas and look for ways to expand sound business practices more broadly across the Department.
UNMANNED SYSTEMS

**Question.** Congress has established a goal that by 2015, one-third of the aircraft in the operational deep strike force aircraft fleet and one-third of operational ground combat vehicles will be unmanned.

**Do you support this goal?**

**Answer.** I support the goal of fielding unmanned systems with greater capability; however, resources should be focused on warfighter capability needs and systems that are within technological reach. The Department's January 2001 congressional report stated that the 2015 goal would be largely driven by the pace of the technology and that the timelines at the time did not fully support the goal. The Military Departments' acquisition strategies did, however, reflect an aggressive pace for the fielding of these systems, should the technologies prove viable.

Today, unmanned systems are providing tactical and soldier focused capabilities critical to winning the current overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The capabilities needed for these conflicts (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; armed reconnaissance; Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detection/disposal), however, are not the same as the unmanned capabilities envisioned at the time the goal was established. The Department should continue to pursue the needed technology and consider unmanned systems on a case-by-case basis implementing them when it makes sense from a capability, technological, and affordability perspective.

**Question.** What is your assessment of DOD's ability to achieve this goal?

**Answer.** Because of technological challenges, an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) providing an "operational deep strike" capability will not be fielded by 2015. However, the Air Force and Army are both operating armed UASs (MQ–9 Reaper, MQ–1B Predator, and MQ–1C Gray Eagle) in current overseas contingency operations. These aircraft are providing critical intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities to combatant commanders. At this time, because of current operations, the Services are focused on higher priority missions than deep strike. The Navy has entered the materiel development phase of an unmanned carrier launched surveillance and strike capability, but with the goal of fielding a UAS with limited strike capability by 2018.

For unmanned ground combat vehicles the Department is more than 4 years away from a fielded capability that approaches the mobility, perception, and intelligence comparable to a trained squad of soldiers aboard a Stryker or Bradley combat vehicle or an Abrams tank crew. More limited capabilities are feasible, but may not be affordable within projected budgets. The Department is actively working on unmanned requirements to detect, mark, and report IEDs.

**Question.** What steps do you believe the Department should take to achieve this goal?

**Answer.** The Department should continue robust, focused research and development efforts related to UAS and ground robotics technology. This is vital to realizing increased unmanned capabilities that are properly aligned with evolving warfighter needs, at affordable cost.

SHIPBUILDING BUDGET

**Question.** With about half of the Navy's construction and development dollars being needed to build nuclear submarines, the Navy's commitment to building new submarines could crowd out funding needed to modernize the surface fleet. With regard to the ballistic missile submarine replacement program—a 12 submarine $60 billion acquisition program—Admiral Roughead, has stated that, "[SSBN–X] is a strategic national asset and should not necessarily be funded in the shipbuilding account."

In your view, will the level of funding in the shipbuilding budget and certain high-cost programs force the Department to make requirement decisions in a constrained budget environment that may not be in the best interest for our national security?

**What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should take to address this concern and ensure adequate funding for the ballistic missile submarine replacement program?**

**Do you believe that certain high cost "national assets" should be funded outside the Services' budgets where they do not have to compete with other critical weapon systems modernization needs of the Services?**

**Answer.** DOD remains committed to sustaining the force structure required to maintain our Nation's security, and recapitalization of the Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent is critical to this mission. While the Ohio Replacement program presents certain resource challenges for the Department, we are aggressively acting now, during the design phase, to drive down costs while meeting the core military
requirements for a survivable nuclear deterrent. These efforts, coupled with many other significant cost-saving initiatives throughout the Department, are critical to meeting our broad national security needs within the Department’s budget. The Department considers all funding priorities together and must frequently make judgments that cross budget account lines.

INFORMATION ASSURANCE

Question. Protection of military networks, information, and communications is critical to DOD operations. The Department has not yet provided Congress with a comprehensive legislative proposal that would enable the Department to implement the President’s guidance on dealing with current and future cyber threats. What is your assessment of the cyber security posture of the Department’s critical information systems?

Answer. DOD is developing a solid foundation for securing critical information systems. Due to the advanced persistent threat, DOD’s critical information systems, like other critical financial, energy, and transportation information systems, are at risk of having their vulnerabilities exploited by a sophisticated adversary. To address this threat and mitigate these vulnerabilities DOD has implemented and continues to improve a capability for protecting and defending its networks. Among other things, the recent establishment of U.S. Cyber Command has brought increased operational focus to these tasks.

Prospectively, an enormous amount of work will be required to keep pace with technology and capabilities, and to stay ahead of system vulnerabilities that put our information and communications technology systems at risk. If confirmed, I will continue the efforts to secure DOD’s information and communications technology, address cyber challenges, and ensure DOD can defend against network adversaries.

Question. What Department-wide policies or guidance do you believe are necessary to address information and cyber security challenges for current and future systems?

Answer. The administration is currently working with Congress to develop new cyber legislation, and the Department is an active participant in these ongoing discussions. Additionally, the Department is currently developing policy and guidance in a number of cyber security areas. For example, the Department is developing policy for a strengthened insider threat program and is working with other Federal agencies on policy and practices that will strengthen the security of classified information sharing while still providing the information to those who need it when they need it. The Department has also recently published revised policy on the use of DOD Public Key Infrastructure for user authentication, digital signatures, and encryption, and is also currently developing cyber security policy in such areas as supply chain risk management, protection of DOD information held by the defense industrial base, and continuous monitoring of DOD information systems. The Department is also in the process of consolidating its network infrastructure in order to better enable protection of those networks. If confirmed, I will assess this issue further, and if I determine that additional legislative changes are needed, I will work with the administration to provide those recommendations to Congress.

CYBER SECURITY

Question. Deputy Secretary Lynn has been heavily involved in developing the DOD cyber strategy. If confirmed will you also play a major role in DOD cyber issues?

Answer. If confirmed as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I would devote significant attention to cybersecurity and more broadly to continuing to strengthen the Department’s ability to operate effectively in cyberspace. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of Defense and others in DOD to build on recent progress and continue to improve the Department’s and the Nation’s cyber security.

TEST AND EVALUATION (T&E)

Question. What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between the desire to reduce acquisition cycle times and the need to perform adequate testing?

Answer. I believe that cycle time is best reduced by ensuring reasonable requirements are set, by being willing to trade away requirements that prove to be excessive, and by controlling requirements creep so that development time can be constrained. I support rigorous developmental and independent operational test and evaluation to provide accurate and objective information on the capabilities and limitations of defense systems to both acquisition executives and warfighters, and to ensure contractors deliver products that meet requirements. When systems are urgently needed in the field, the imperative for accurate and objective testing is still
just as important but should be addressed through efforts to expedite the test and evaluation process, with some acceptance of risk. This has been accomplished successfully for such urgent efforts as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle program. In those urgent cases some risk could be taken, but safety and basic performance had to be verified prior to fielding. Testing is needed to validate system performance and I believe it is a necessary part of the acquisition process. That said, there may be opportunities to achieve this goal through more efficient processes than those currently in practice.

**Question.** Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe we should procure weapon systems and equipment that has not been demonstrated through test and evaluation to be operationally effective, suitable, and survivable?

**Answer.** Systems should demonstrate their effectiveness, suitability and survivability through operational testing prior to a full rate production decision. In specific cases, based on the nature and seriousness of the deficiencies found in testing, it may be acceptable to continue production while the deficiencies are corrected. In a limited number of urgent circumstances it might also be necessary to field a system prior to operational testing in order to address an urgent gap in a critical capability. But even in such cases, operational evaluation should still be conducted at the earliest opportunity to assess the system’s capabilities and limitations and identify any deficiencies that might need to be corrected.

**Question.** Congress established the position of Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to serve as an independent voice on matters relating to operational testing of weapons systems. As established, the Director has a unique and direct relationship with Congress which allows him to preserve his independence.

**Do you support the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s ability to speak freely and independently with Congress?**

**Answer.** Yes.

**FUNDING FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS**

**Question.** In the past, the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Department’s leaders have endorsed the statutory goal of investing 3 percent of the Department’s budget into science and technology programs.

**Do you support that investment goal?**

**Answer.** As a scientist and in my current position, I fully recognize the critical importance of a robust science and technology (S&T) program that can develop and deliver near-term capabilities and maintain long term options for the Department. At this point in the consideration of the Department’s future budget situation, however, every part of the budget must be considered “on the table”.

**Question.** How will you assess whether the science and technology investment portfolio is adequate to meet the current and future needs of the Department?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Services and others to establish guidelines for investment priorities. Based on these priorities, I would work through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to assess the adequacy of the current program and recommend changes in the future program to address the Department’s priorities.

**SPACE**

**Question.** In your current position you have been the milestone decision authority for major space acquisition programs.

**Do you believe that this authority should be retained by your successor? Why or why not?**

**Answer.** For the foreseeable future, I believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) should retain milestone decision authority (MDA) for major space acquisitions. Independent acquisition oversight is a statutory requirement for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and major space programs should be overseen by the USD(AT&L) in his capacity as the Defense Acquisition Executive, consistent with all other MDAPs in other domains, including air, sea, and ground. Most of our national security space programs, including those executed by the Air Force and Navy under title 10 authorities and those executed by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) under title 50 authorities, entail very substantial resource commitments and substantial development and acquisition risks. As a result of the hard work of the Service Acquisition Executives, the Director of the NRO, their staffs and the staffs of OSD and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, we are recovering from more than a decade of very serious space acquisition shortcomings. While that progress continues, we still confront serious challenges in space acquisition, which will become even greater in a constrained
resource and budget environment. Therefore, I believe the USD(AT&L) should con-
tinue to be the MDA for major space acquisition programs, while working with the
Service Acquisition Executives, the DNRO, and the ODNI to consider MDA delega-
tion on a case-by-case basis at appropriate milestone decision points.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had accepted
the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe.
This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and emerging
threats from Iranian missiles, starting this year and increasing in capability with
each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capa-
bility to defend against long-range missiles that could reach the United States, thus
augmenting the existing homeland missile defense capability.

Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe and,
if confirmed, will you implement it?

Answer. I support the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and, if con-
firmed, I would continue to advance the substantial U.S. efforts already underway
to implement all four phases of the EPAA, as I have done as USD(AT&L) and as
chair of the Missile Defense Executive Board.

Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the
first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy,
the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR
established a number of policy priorities, including establishing defense against
near-term regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans, pro-
grams and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and enhancing the
ability of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the Home-
land against attack by a small number of long-range missiles by countries such as
North Korea and Iran, and of hedging against future uncertainties.

Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the Ballistic Mis-
sile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you implement them?

Answer. Yes, I support the conclusions of the 2010 BMDR and, if confirmed,
would support continuing U.S. efforts already underway to implement the BMDR,
as I have done as USD(AT&L).

Question. Do you agree that our missile defense must be fiscally sustainable?

Answer. Yes, I support the U.S. commitment, described in the 2010 BMDR, to de-
ploying capabilities that have been proven through extensive testing and assess-
ment and that are affordable over the long term.

Question. The two most recent flight tests of the GMD system failed to intercept
their targets. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has formed a Fail-
ure Review Board to determine the root cause of the most recent failure and will
device a plan to correct it, including two flight tests to confirm the correction. Until
the second flight test confirms the correction, probably sometime in late 2012, the
Director of MDA has suspended production of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicles
(EKVs) of the type that failed last year’s flight tests, in order to ensure that those
EKVs do not contain a flaw that would need to be corrected later.

Do you agree that it is prudent to verify that the flight test failure problem has
been corrected before continuing production of the EKVs, and before building more
Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) or deciding how many additional GBIs may be
needed in the future?

Answer. Verifying and correcting any problems with the EKVs prior to continuing
production is prudent and supports the policy priority to “fly before you buy” in
order to improve reliability, confidence, and cost control.

Question. Do you believe that such verification should include a successful inter-
cept flight test?

Answer. A non-intercept test will provide a more rigorous evaluation of the kill
vehicle flight envelope than could be achieved in an operational scenario flight test.
A successful non-intercept flight test will sufficiently reduce risk to restart produc-
tion of the EKV, in particular for long-lead items and items common to both EKV
designs. Certification of the Capability Enhancement II (CE II) EKV will remain de-
pendent on a successful intercept.

Question. Do you support the continued modernization and sustainment of the
GMD system?

Answer. Yes. The United States is currently provided protection against the
threat of ICBM attack from states like North Korea and Iran. It is important that
we maintain this advantageous position by continuing to improve the GMD system.
Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.

Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from nations such as Iran?

Answer. Yes, cooperation with Russia could strengthen the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses, as well as those of the Russian Federation. Effective ballistic missile defenses devalue Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal by reducing its confidence that an attack would be successful.

Question. Do you agree that, irrespective of Russian objections, the United States is committed to the continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems?

Answer. Yes.

READINESS FUNDING

Question. After almost a decade of combat operations, each of the military services faces a rising bill for maintenance and repair. The Army has stated that reset funding will be needed for at least 2 to 3 years beyond the end of overseas contingency operations. The Marine Corps leadership has acknowledged that a $10 billion bill awaits at the end of combat operations, but has requested only $250 million for reset this year. The Navy has identified a 1-year backlog of deferred ship and aircraft depot maintenance. The Air Force has requested funding for only 84 percent of needed aircraft repairs this year.

What level of priority do you place on reset and reconstitution funding for the Military Services?

Answer. I place a very high priority on reset and reconstitution funding for the Military Services. The current requests reflect the difficult challenge of balancing investments in deployed readiness, which is a top priority to support troops in the field, with investments in non-deployed readiness such as reset and reconstitution. It is imperative that Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for reset and reconstitution continue to be enacted for 2 to 3 years after a drawdown of forces to fully reset the forces.

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address maintenance backlogs and ensure that the Military Departments request adequate funding for reset, reconstitution, and other maintenance requirements?

Answer. I will work to ensure that the Department properly considers and balances maintenance and reset requirements with fiscal realities and future risk during Program and Budget development.

PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

Question. On November 5, 2009, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, TX, killing 13 people and wounding or injuring 43 others. A DOD review of the attack released in January 2010 concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization among military personnel.

What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at Fort Hood?

Answer. I understand that the Fort Hood review released by DOD in August 2010 included 79 recommendations on how to improve personnel policies, force protection, emergency response and mass casualty preparedness, and support to DOD healthcare providers. DOD has completed implementation of half of these recommendations.

If confirmed, I would work to ensure that all the lessons learned and recommendations for improvement continue to be implemented and would work closely with Members of Congress to ensure that DOD is prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization among DOD’s military and civilian personnel.

Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?

Answer. The findings and recommendations of the Fort Hood Review are the foundation of the Department’s current strategy. Leadership, clear guidance, and accountability are key. If confirmed, I would review this strategy and how it has been implemented, seek the advice of DOD’s civilian and military leadership, and consult with Congress to ensure that the Department implements the most effective policies to prevent and mitigate such threats in the future.
RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

Question. The Independent Review Related to the Tragedy at Fort Hood observed that “DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization.” Recommendation 2.7 of the Final Recommendations urged the Department to update policy to clarify guidelines for religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the Department to task the Defense Science Board to “undertake a multi-disciplinary study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and self-radicalization . . .”

What is your view of these recommendations?

Answer. The Fort Hood Follow-on Review prepared an implementation plan in response to both of these recommendations. If confirmed, I would review that report and the progress that has been made to ensure DOD policies, programs, and procedures appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion.

Question. Has DOD updated its policy to clarify guidelines for religious accommodation? If so, what is the revised policy?

Answer. It is my understanding that DOD is updating its policy to clarify guidelines for religious accommodation. If confirmed, I would review the proposed update to ensure accommodation of servicemembers whenever possible without compromising accomplishment of mission, unit cohesion, and personnel safety.

Question. What is your understanding of current policies and programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the military?

Answer. The military places a high value on the rights of servicemembers to observe their respective religious faiths and this is reflected in our policies and programs.

Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

Answer. I understand each religious ministry professional has committed to functioning in a pluralistic environment and to supporting, both directly and indirectly, the free exercise of religion by all members of the Military Services, their family members, and other persons authorized to be served by the military chaplaincies. If confirmed, I will review the relevant policies, seek the advice of the military leadership, and consult with Congress to ensure that the Department appropriately accommodates the free exercise of religion.

Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?

Answer. Current policy appears to strike the proper balance by allowing chaplains to voluntarily participate, or not participate, in settings which conflict with their faith traditions, while also ensuring chaplains performing in an interfaith setting, such as an official dinner or interfaith memorial service, are mindful of the requirement for inclusiveness. If confirmed, I would monitor these policies and practices.

Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that a scientific fact-based approach to understanding radicalization will drive the Department’s relevant policies on this topic?

Answer. DOD has commissioned a Defense Science Board study on violent radicalization and plans to commission two additional clinical studies to identify any potential indicators of violent behavior in military personnel. The results of these studies will inform DOD’s policies and programs on radicalization. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that DOD continues to rely on a scientific, fact-based approach to countering radicalization and protecting our force.

Question. Current policy in the Department gives discretion to military leaders to decide whether requests to waive uniform and appearance standards should be granted based on religious beliefs. The Department has submitted a legislative proposal that would clearly exempt the armed services from the requirements of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).

In your view, do DOD policies appropriately accommodate religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith?

Answer. An important and delicate balance must be struck between accommodating religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith and maintaining the military’s uniform grooming and appearance standards. If confirmed, I will work with the leaders of the Military Services to achieve an appropriate balance between granting religious accommodations and maintaining the military’s uniform grooming and appearance standards.
Question. Do you believe that the Armed Forces should be exempted from RFRA? If so, why?

Answer. The Armed Forces have long relied on uniformity of dress and appearance to create a common identity, provide visual reminders of shared experiences, reinforce a sense of tradition, and foster pride. These factors are understood by the military, and historically by the courts, as critical to development of cohesion and esprit de corps, and thus to mission accomplishment. In section 774 of title 10 of the U.S. Code, Congress established a standard that balances religious imperatives with the military’s dress and appearance requirements.

I understand the RFRA establishes a “very high” standard for the executive branch, including the military, to use when denying any request for religious accommodation, which is why the Services have asked for an exemption.

At this time, I do not have an informed view about the specific legislative proposal but if confirmed, I would consider this issue carefully.

MUSLIMS IN THE U.S. MILITARY

Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?

Answer. The attack at Fort Hood was a tragedy for all involved. It is possible that the attack could spur retaliation in the form of harassment and violence; it is therefore important that military leaders and supervisors take precautions to prevent such occurrences and maintain good order and discipline in the force. No form of harassment can be tolerated.

Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the U.S. military?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to advocate for open communications in the workplace, decisive action by our military leaders and supervisors, and command emphasis on the military standard for maintaining good order and discipline. If confirmed, I would also review the effectiveness of these feedback systems and take measures to improve them, as appropriate.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Department has in recent years developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assault, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However, incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in combat areas of operation and at home stations are still being reported. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential or restricted reporting, to be effective?

Answer. Sexual assault has no place in DOD. The Department’s zero tolerance policy on sexual assault is the right policy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and the Service Chiefs, are continuously and directly engaged in emphasizing the importance of responding to sexual assault. It is my understanding that according to experts, sexual assaults in both civilian and military society are underreported—meaning that the number of sexual assaults estimated by anonymous surveys vastly outnumber reports to police. In 2005, the Department put in place new policies to prevent sexual assault and increase the number of reports received by DOD authorities. I understand these new policies have had positive results. However, there is still work to do to integrate and continue to improve our efforts across DOD and the Services. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD continues to be committed to addressing sexual assault in this comprehensive manner.

Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the restricted reporting procedure has been put into operation?

Answer. I am not aware of any specific problems in the implementation of the restricted reporting option. It is my understanding that restricted reporting allows victims who wish to remain anonymous to come forward and obtain the support they need following an assault without being identified. I believe that the most important results of this reporting procedure should be that victims are coming forward so they can receive the care and support they need. I understand that the number of victims choosing a restricted report has increased by about 7 percent each year since 2007, and in fiscal year 2010, restricted reports accounted for about a quarter of all sexual assault reports made to the Department. Experts believe these are victims who would never have come forward had there not been a confidential reporting option. If confirmed, I would review DOD’s program to gain a clear picture of progress and areas for future improvement in sexual assault reporting procedures.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including assaults against contractor personnel?

Answer. Sexual assault against anyone is unacceptable in any location. I do not have enough information to make a comprehensive assessment at this time, but it is my understanding that if any of our deployed servicemembers, civilians, or contractors is assaulted, he or she will receive appropriate and responsive support and care.

I understand DOD policy mandates a 24–7 response to sexual assault, regardless of location. In addition, I understand that DOD personnel travelling to combat zones receive pre-deployment training on prevention and response procedures in country. Furthermore, it is my understanding that the Department takes action against individuals who perpetrate sexual assault whenever it has the jurisdiction and sufficient evidence to do so. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD continues to address sexual assault comprehensively across the Services in all locations. There must be no tolerance in DOD for sexual assault in any location, including any of our personnel or others who serve with our personnel while deployed in a combat zone.

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Answer. DOD is committed to addressing sexual assault in a comprehensive, integrated and uniform manner. As stated above, all of the Services have been directed to establish guidelines for a 24-hour, 7 days-a-week sexual assault response capability for all locations, including deployed areas. I also understand that the Services recently invested $1.8 million to improve prosecutor training and resources, and that the three military criminal investigative organizations have committed to adding over 100 specially trained agents, dedicated to sexual assault investigations. While I cannot make a specific assessment at this time, if I am confirmed, I would make it a priority to evaluate the adequacy and efficacy of training and resources allocated to the Services for sexual assault investigation.

Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?

Answer. DOD’s policies emphasize the commander’s role in effective response to sexual assault. DOD has taken action to provide training for commanders and to ensure adequate training and resources for prosecutors and investigators. I have been told that DOD policy requires commanders to forward all unrestricted reports to criminal investigators. I also understand that DOD’s policies seek to build the victim’s confidence, so that the victim feels able to come forward with an unrestricted report and to assist in the investigation, which is essential to achieving the goal of accountability. If confirmed, I will ensure that accountability, supported by a foundation of victim care, remains an important focus of DOD’s sexual assault prevention and response efforts.

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults?

Answer. I believe that sexual assault has no place in the Armed Forces. Recently, the Department has assigned a General Officer with operational experience as the Director of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program office. If confirmed, I would ensure that sexual assault prevention and response continues to be a priority for the Department, and would work closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chiefs of the Military Services to ensure that DOD maintains senior leadership focus on this issue.

MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. In support of the current ongoing conflicts, the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems have arisen over time in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening and medical response to service-connected injuries or illnesses, antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and inefficient policies regarding members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve Force management policies and systems have been characterized in the past as “inefficient and rigid” and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment shortages, cross-leveling, and reset policies.

What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems remain?

Answer. I understand that many changes have been made to policies governing the utilization of the Reserve components, including: (1) providing for a minimum notification period of 180 days prior to mobilization; (2) establishing a dwell ratio
goal of no more than 1 year mobilized for every 5 years not mobilized; and (3) limiting the involuntary activation of Guard members and reservists to 1 year.

These changes have improved effectiveness and morale by providing a predictable cycle of Active Duty and alert notification well in advance of activation, benefitting families, employers, servicemembers.

A key problem is the lack of an integrated pay and personnel system to support Guard and Reserve personnel as they transition between various duty statuses. This is compounded by the fact that there remains over 30 different duty statuses for Guard and Reserve personnel. This diversity of duty statuses is cumbersome and results in mobilization and demobilization delays.

**Question.** What do you consider to be the most significant enduring changes to the enabling of an operational Reserve aimed at ensuring Reserve component readiness for future mobilization requirements?

**Answer.** I believe the most significant change to the Operational Reserve is its acceptance and inclusion as a full partner in the Total Force. The use of the Guard and Reserve over the past 10 years has proven their exceptional value to the Nation. Their equipping, modernization, and readiness are essentially managed in the same manner as the Active component. They are ready, capable, and expect to be used on a predictable and regular basis.

Going forward, the Department must maintain Reserve component readiness, set expectations with members, families and employers, and seek ways to use the Guard and Reserve to the best advantage of the Nation. Their mobilization and demobilization is critical. There must be a funding stream in the baseline budget that is carried through the future years to ensure the Reserve components remain trained, ready, and available to meet ongoing and emerging operational requirements. I believe the future environment will demand we use all components of the Total Force—Active, Guard, Reserve, DOD civilians, and contractors in the most efficient and effective manner possible.

**Question.** Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves or to further enhance their ability to perform various national security missions?

**Answer.** I believe the Department needs to be able to access the Reserve components on a predictable and regular basis. Current mobilization authorities have served us well but do not account for the continued use of the Guard and Reserve as full partners in the Total Force. I support current proposals before Congress to expand section 12304 of title 10 to increase authorities to fully use the Reserve components as a rotational, operational force to augment the Active component forces. These proposals will enhance their ability to execute planned missions in support of the President’s national security strategy.

**MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF THE RESERVES**

**Question.** Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee, and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for improved policy oversight and accountability. If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?

**Answer.** In order to fully assess the capability of the Reserve components, it is critical to measure and report medical and dental readiness in a standardized manner. It is my understanding that over the past several years, small, but steady improvements have been made across the Services, but there is more work to do in confirming the medical and dental readiness of the entire Reserve Force.

Medical and dental readiness is tracked through standardized calculations each quarter. Currently, the medical readiness achievement goal is 75 percent and DOD is at 63 percent. The dental readiness achievement goal is 85 percent, and DOD has met that goal.

While some progress has been achieved, the medical and dental readiness of the Reserve components must remain a priority.

**Question.** How would you improve upon the Department’s ability to maintain a healthy and fit Reserve component?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that DOD continues to pursue new and improved opportunities to provide flexible options for the Guard and Reserve to improve their overall readiness. Producing and maintaining a healthy and fit Reserve component requires more than access to health care—it also requires command emphasis and individual accountability.

Recently, the Army Reserve approved and funded two medical/dental readiness days per soldier starting in fiscal year 2010.
Resiliency is a key aspect of Yellow Ribbon Reintegration events. At pre-, during-, and post-deployment events, Guard and Reserve members and families are given tools to help build resiliency and coping skills. These tools encourage open dialogue with families and encourage members to maintain mental and physical fitness during deployment cycles.

If confirmed, I would advance health and safety promotion and injury/illness prevention policy initiatives to address readiness requirements developed from evidence-based research.

**Dwell Time**

**Question.** While dwell time is improving as our forces draw down in Iraq, many active duty military members are still not experiencing the dwell time goal of 2 years at home for every year deployed.

In your view, when will the Active component dwell time goal be met?

**Answer.** The Active component of the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, on average, are already meeting or exceeding the Department's dwell time goal of 1:2. I understand that the Army is now averaging better than a 1:1 dwell ratio, with some combat elements meeting the goal of 1:2. As we execute our drawdown plans for Afghanistan, these dwell times will continue to improve. Recently, the Army has shortened deployments for their Active component units to 9 months. These shorter deployments will reduce the stress on soldiers and their families. It is estimated that Army units will meet dwell time goals within the next 2 years as the drawdown progress.

**Question.** When will dwell time objectives be met for the Reserve components?

**Answer.** The goal for the Guard and Reserve is 1 year of Active Duty for every 5 years at home (1:5). The goal for the Active Forces is 1:2. My understanding is that the Reserve components being mobilized are currently running closer to the active goal. Active and Reserve component dwell and current rotation models are linked and can only improve together.

**Active-Duty End Strength**

**Question.** Secretary Gates announced this year that the Army would reduce its end strength by 22,000 through fiscal year 2013, including 7,400 in fiscal year 2012. This end strength was part of the temporary increase authorized in 2009 and was intended to enable the Army to cease relying on “stoploss” and to make up for a growing population of non-deployable soldiers. Beginning in fiscal year 2015, depending on conditions on the ground, the Army and Marine Corps plan to reduce their permanent end strength and force structure by 27,000 soldiers and at least 15,000 marines, respectively.

Do you agree with this Active Duty end strength reduction plan, especially given the fact that the population of non-deployables is growing?

**Answer.** I am familiar with the Army’s and Marine Corps’ projected personnel reductions, and if confirmed, I would review their respective plans to make these reductions. Based on what we know today, and the assumptions that have been made, I believe that the troop reductions previously announced by Secretary Gates represent a prudent balance between meeting operational mission requirements and ensuring the funds are available for recapitalization. Both are critical to future readiness.

**Question.** What is your view of how these planned end strength reductions will affect dwell time ratios?

**Answer.** The Army and Marine Corps personnel strength reductions, starting in fiscal year 2012 for the Army, are based on the assumption of a future draw-down in Afghanistan. These are significant reductions, but if the Afghanistan force draw-down stays on track, the dwell ratio goal of 1:2 for Active personnel should be achieved.

**Question.** What effect would inability to meet dwell time objectives have on your decision to implement the planned end strength reductions?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would take into consideration our ability to meet strategic mission objectives and dwell time objectives prior to implementing the planned Army and Marine Corps strength reductions.

**Question.** In your view, can the Army accelerate to 2012 more of its planned reduction in its temporary over-strength without an adverse impact on national security?

**Answer.** The Army is developing force reduction plans that consider ongoing and projected future operational requirements. Given our current commitments around the globe and dwell time ratios, accelerating reductions may not be prudent at this time. The Department is committed to working closely with the Army to ensure they...
achieve the appropriate personnel strength level and also retain the ability to meet national security objectives.

**Question.** What would be the effect on dwell time of accelerating the Army’s force reduction plan?

**Answer.** The effect on dwell time would depend on the Army’s deployment requirements coupled with the pace of its troop reductions. I would anticipate the Army might not be able to fully achieve the dwell ratio goal of 1:2 during the drawdown phase.

**Question.** What are the assumptions regarding “conditions on the ground” that will allow for the planned reductions beginning in 2015 to occur on time?

**Answer.** We must balance our national security requirements and continue to have a ready, flexible, and capable force. The reductions in end strength for the Army and Marine Corps beginning in 2015 should be predicated on the assumption that we have a much smaller presence in Afghanistan at the end of 2014 than we do today. I also would consider our progress towards the established security objectives and I would solicit the advice of DOD’s senior military and civilian leaders prior to making any recommendations to the Secretary.

**Question.** The Services have requested congressional authorization of force management tools to avoid exceeding end strength limits and save money. In your view, what tools do the Department and Services need to get down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these require congressional authorization?

**Answer.** Several authorities used during previous force reductions have either expired or will be expiring soon, to include Enhanced Selective Early Retirement Boards, Reduction in Force, and Voluntary Separation Pay. The Department is seeking to renew or extend these authorities, and in some cases is requesting new legislation, in order to properly size and shape the force. The Department’s policy is to make maximum use of voluntary authorities. Further, a balanced approach must be used to ensure to the greatest extent possible that those servicemembers who leave do not possess skills needed over the short term.

**RECRUITING STANDARDS**

**Question.** Recruiting highly qualified individuals for military service during wartime in a cost-constrained environment presents unique challenges. The Army has been criticized in past years for relaxing enlistment standards in tough recruiting environments with respect to factors such as age, intelligence, weight and physical fitness standards, citizenship status, tattoos, and past criminal misconduct. On the other hand, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G–1, recently testified, less than 25 percent of all 17–24 year olds are eligible to enlist, primarily due to physical and educational requirements.

What is your assessment of the adequacy of current standards regarding qualifications for enlistment in the Armed Forces?

**Answer.** The current enlistment qualification standards are well-defined and have stood the test of time. They are driven by the need to provide the Services with men and women who are prepared to adapt to the rigors of military life and meet performance requirements. To that end, the Services carefully screen applicants, who come from all walks of life. The Department has two key indicators of recruit quality: (1) traditional high school diploma graduates; and (2) above average scores on the enlistment aptitude screen (the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery or ASVAB). The traditional high school diploma is the best single predictor of attrition, while the ASVAB is a robust predictor of training and job performance.

Since it is more costly to recruit such “high quality” recruits, the Department has used a cost-performance tradeoff model, developed under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, to set recruiting and enlistment goals. The recruit quality enlistment goals are 90 percent traditional high school diploma graduates and 60 percent scoring above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), the math and verbal components of the ASVAB.

When recruitment is not difficult, when the supply exceeds demand, as in the current environment, Services tend to recruit above the goals. When recruitment is more challenging, Services adjust and will recruit closer to the goals. During some particularly difficult periods, such as 2005, the Army developed special programs to reduce the attrition risk related to the enlistment of more individuals who did not possess traditional high school diplomas.

**Question.** In your view, is there any way to increase the pool of eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality?

**Answer.** Yes, I believe there are ways to increase the pool of eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality. The Services continually review medical standards, for
example, to ensure they are relevant and in the best interest of the military, as well as the individual. For example, the Assessment of Recruit Motivation and Strength (ARMS) Study provided evidence that recruits who are over body fat standards but could pass certain tailored physical tests would have attrition rates similar to weight-qualified recruits. Since implementation of the ARMS program, close to 12,000 soldiers have entered the Army with an ARMS waiver across the three components. The Services are also constantly exploring ways to improve other screening tools – especially with respect to our ability to predict attrition. Recent findings suggest the Services may be able to augment their screening procedures by incorporating other measures, such as personality, to identify applicants who are likely to adapt well to the military. If confirmed, I would work with the Services to continually find new and better ways to recruit and screen applicants.

Question. In your view, are there any enlistment requirements or standards that are overly restrictive or which do not directly correlate to successful military service?

Answer. I am not aware that the Department’s military enlistment standards are overly restrictive. The Services employ fitness, adaptability, and aptitude standards that correlate to the physical, disciplined, regulated lifestyle and cognitive demands needed to succeed in the Armed Forces.

Question. Do you believe that current policies defining three tiers of high school diploma credentials, aimed at minimizing attrition during the initial enlistment term, should be retained?

Answer. My understanding is the Services track the attrition rates of military recruits by a variety of credential types, and traditional high school diploma graduates have lower rates of attrition than any other type of credential holder for the first term (3 years) of service. While the 36-month attrition rate for traditional high school diploma graduates is 28 percent, the attrition rates for other types of credential holders ranges from 38–45 percent. That is a meaningful difference, because it costs the Services approximately $45,000 to replace each individual who fails to successfully complete his/her term of service. Given the track record of the current policy, I believe it should be retained and augmented as needed to improve the accuracy of our ability to predict the attrition risk of individual recruits.

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Question. The Navy has opened service on submarines to women, the Marine Corps recently expanded service opportunities for women in intelligence specialties, and the Army is reviewing its assignment policy for female soldiers. The issue of the appropriate role of women in the Armed Forces remains a matter of interest to Congress and the American public.

Do you believe additional specialties should be opened up for service by women?

Answer. As the nature of the combat environment has evolved, the roles of women in the military have expanded, and will continue to do so. It is my understanding that the Department believes it has sufficient flexibility under current law to make appropriate assignment policy for women. The Department will continue to monitor combat needs, and if the Services recommend expanding combat roles for women, the Department will notify Congress accordingly as required by statute (10 U.S.C. § 652 and/or § 6035). Any decision regarding opening additional specialties for service by women should be based on our obligation to maintain a high state of mission readiness of our All-Volunteer Force.

Question. Do you believe any changes are needed in the assignment policies regarding women in the Armed Forces?

Answer. The USD(P&R) is conducting a Women in Services Restrictions review of the direct ground combat assignment policy in coordination with the Military Departments and the Joint Staff. This report on review findings will be provided to congressional defense committees by October 2011. If confirmed, I would examine proposed policy changes as a result of this review and work with Congress to implement them.

RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that “medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.” In April 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force Base that “health care is eating the Department alive.” The administration has proposed health care efficiencies to save nearly $8.0 billion through 2016.

Do you agree with the proposed health care efficiencies?
Answer. Yes, I believe the proposed efficiencies are modest, sensible efforts to control the Department's health care costs while ensuring superior levels of care are maintained.

Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of military health care?

Answer. While the reform proposals included in the fiscal year 2012 President's budget are a significant first step, I think it is important, especially in view of the fiscal challenges we face, that we continue to find additional opportunities to control the costs of health care. At the same time, we must preserve our ability to provide the best health care possible to our servicemembers and their families, and especially to our wounded warriors.

Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs on future DOD plans?

Answer. While the reform proposals included in the fiscal year 2012 budget are a significant first step, I think it is important, especially in view of the fiscal challenges we face, that we continue to find additional opportunities to control the costs of health care. At the same time, we must preserve our ability to provide the best health care possible to our servicemembers and their families, and especially to our wounded warriors.

PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related entitlement spending continue to grow and comprise an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget. If personnel costs are not curtailed, the Nation may find itself with a military that is both too small and insufficiently equipped. Both former Secretary Gates and Secretary Panetta have called for a comprehensive review of military compensation and the retirement benefit.

How might the retirement benefit, including the provision of health care to retirees, be modernized to reflect the needs of a new generation of recruits, ensure greater equity between those who serve a career and those who don't, while easing the long-term cost to the Government?

Answer. We must maintain a strong, vibrant military force structure that will serve us well into the future while also looking at prudent ways to control personnel and entitlement spending. If confirmed, I would look forward to reviewing proposals that seek to balance these objectives.

Question. What changes should be made to the military compensation system, including the one-size-fits-all approach to basic pay, separate allowances for housing and subsistence, and the tax treatment of various compensation components, to ensure that the compensation package is fair, economical, and sufficient to field a high quality All-Volunteer Force?

Answer. I believe we need a military compensation system that continues to attract and support the highest quality personnel to sustain the All-Volunteer Force while also containing costs. I share Secretary Panetta's view that it is appropriate to conduct a comprehensive review of the military's pay and benefits structure to determine where costs can be contained, while ensuring that we are able to attract and support our men and women in uniform and their families in a wide variety of situations.

DEPENDENT CARE AND FLEXIBLE SPENDING ACCOUNTS

Question. The 10th QRMC recommended providing dependent care and flexible spending benefits to active-duty servicemembers. Providing these benefits would seem consistent with the initiatives of First Lady Michelle Obama and Dr. Jill Biden on behalf of military families. It would appear that no new legislative authority is needed for the Department to provide these benefits to servicemembers and their families.

If confirmed, would you extend these benefits to the Active Duty servicemembers and their families?
Answer. I support the goals provided for in Dependent Care and Flexible Spending Accounts. I believe that we need to continue to provide a total compensation package to recruit and retain the military servicemembers the Department needs to achieve its worldwide missions while at the same time taking care of military families. If confirmed, I would review how Dependent Care and Flexible Spending Accounts could be integrated into the military's total compensation package while recognizing the difficulties of the current fiscal environment.

SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured performing duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007 illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of significant numbers of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain, including a growing population of soldiers awaiting disability evaluation.

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured servicemembers and their families?

Answer. The Walter Reed revelations were a sobering moment for both Departments. The progress, focus, and improvements in this area have been substantial since 2007. In the 2½ years that I have been visiting wounded warriors and their families, I have seen advances in the knowledge and understanding of the prevention and treatment of wounds and their effects on individuals and families. But I believe there is more to learn, and more to be done. If confirmed, this would be a continuing priority of mine.

Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based?

Answer. The high priority the Department has placed on caring for our wounded warriors and their families is one such strength. The sustained focus and assessment of the needs of the wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers in areas such as traumatic brain injuries, stress, and amputation allows the Department to continue its progress in caring for these members.

It is also important that the Department take a collaborative approach to caring for our wounded warriors with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Labor, the Office of Personnel Management, and other stakeholders to ensure that the needs of servicemembers and their families are met across the Federal Government.

Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?

Answer. The Department should continue to identify opportunities for capturing best practices and implementing improvements by using a proactive assessment and evaluation process that corrects weaknesses in a cost-efficient and timely manner. Additionally, the Department needs to be proactive in identifying post-traumatic stress in our Reserve components who, following redeployment, return home and are removed from a military environment and chain-of-command.

There are also opportunities to try new programs in the areas of employment, credentialing, licensing, and education and training for our wounded that can be explored.

Lastly, a frequent complaint of our servicemembers is that services are simply not delivered in a timely manner. Our application of any program, whether aimed at transition services or care, needs to be timely in order to be effective.

Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

Answer. The Department needs to regularly evaluate and ensure that current programs and policies are current, helpful, and productive. Outcome assessments need to be conducted with adjustments made, as needed, to ensure necessary resources are in place to properly take care of our recovering wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and their families.

We must also continue to approach this from an interagency perspective. There are many agencies that want to contribute and help. The Department must ensure resources are fielded in a harmonious and productive manner.

In addition, in August 2011, the President directed DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to develop reforms to ensure that every servicemember re-
ceives the training, credentials, and education they need to transition to the civilian workforce or to pursue higher education.

This DOD and VA-led task force will be an important part of our ongoing efforts to better assist our servicemembers as they return to civilian life.

Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A DES pilot program and an Integrated DES program have been established to improve processing of servicemembers.

What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the Integrated DES?

Answer. The revised and improved Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) developed by DOD and VA is an improvement over the legacy system. It is fairer and faster than the system it replaced. It has also eliminated the gap in pay and benefits that always happened under the old system that was executed by the two Departments. The chief problem with the IDES is that it takes too long.

Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change, particularly the Army's growing population of non-deployable soldiers and their need for expedited disability evaluation?

Answer. If confirmed, I would assist the Secretary in executing the fielding of the IDES and in concurrently fielding enhancements to IDES. These enhancements would ensure that timeliness is improved and best practices shared. In any area where it is determined that legislative action could help improve this process, I would follow up with Congress.

SUICIDE PREVENTION AND MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services has increased in recent years. The Army released a report in June 2010 that analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In addition, studies conducted by the Army of soldiers and marines in theater are showing declines in individual morale and increases in mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced multiple deployments.

In your view, what role should DOD play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members of the Reserve components?

Answer. Every suicide among members of the Armed Forces is tragic and the Department has a responsibility to address the factors that contribute to suicidal behavior among our military men and women, whether they are deployed, at a military installation, or in their home communities. All of the Services have established robust suicide prevention programs, and senior leaders across the Department are engaged to address this very important issue. In addition to identifying and reducing risk factors primarily through prevention, we have undertaken multiple initiatives to increase protective factors. The Services have made significant efforts to build resilience among our servicemembers to enhance the key protective factors that enhance performance and increase the overall readiness of the force. I understand that the Final Report of the Department of Defense Task Force on the Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces is being used as a vehicle to review all Departmental policies and procedures related to suicide prevention. The Department’s Implementation Plan based on these recommendations is undergoing final review and will be delivered to Congress soon. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department stays focused on this very important issue and continues to improve suicide prevention policies and processes.

Question. What is your understanding of the action that OSD and the Army are taking in response to the June 2010 Army report, and the data in Chapter 3 (“The Lost Art of Leadership in Garrison”) in particular?

Answer. I am fully aware that sustaining a force steadily engaged in combat for over a decade has unexpected challenges. Unfortunately, some of those challenges include a rise in “high risk” behaviors and suicides. The Army’s Health Promotion and Risk Reduction Task Force was created to identify program and policy changes needed to respond to issues identified in this and other related reports. I understand that the Task Force is in the process of implementing 417 actionable tasks to rapidly improve Army health promotion, risk reduction and protection policies, programs and processes and is making significant progress. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Department brings these tasks to completion and that the Services share lessons learned to jointly address these risk factors.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to home station?

Answer. Ensuring that our servicemembers and their families have sufficient access to the behavioral health resources that they need is critical to the wellness of our total force. The Department has been working to determine workforce requirements for behavioral health professionals, and how best to utilize all of the medical, educational, and counseling resources available. I understand that there has been significant progress in this area, but there is still room for improvement. If confirmed, I would monitor how well we are meeting these goals by assessing current utilization rates and further determining ways in which we can leverage more resources for our servicemembers and their families.

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. In January 2009, the Department published its second Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of key quality of life factors for military families, such as family support, child care, education, health care, and morale, welfare, and recreation services.

How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment and retention and quality of life improvements and your own top priorities for the Armed Forces?

Answer. I know that quality of life factors, such as the ones mentioned above, contribute significantly to recruiting and retention. Surveys and studies have shown that a servicemember's satisfaction with various aspects of military life, as well as the family's experience and support for staying in the military, have a strong influence on the member's decision to reenlist. One good example that influences retention is the Department's military child development program. This program provides quality, affordable child care for over 200,000 children every day, permitting servicemembers and their working spouses to be more committed and successful in their respective careers. The degree of success in meeting those needs can have a strong influence on servicemembers' decisions to continue their military careers. If confirmed, I would monitor how effectively DOD programs, in conjunction with community efforts, not only meet the needs of servicemembers and their families but also contribute to the readiness of the Total Force. Taking care of servicemembers and their families is one of the Department's top priorities.

Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements to military qualify of life would you consider a priority, and how do you envision working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and Congress to achieve them?

Answer. DOD is undertaking a number of initiatives to improve the well-being of the Total Force. These initiatives include expanding child care services, modernizing the DOD schools, improving the DOD Tuition Assistance program, new spouse education and career opportunities, and expanding counseling support for geographically-dispersed military members and their families. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with the DOD components, advocacy groups and Congress to close gaps and reduce overlaps in programs and ensure effective communications with families to ensure that they know how to access available support programs and services when they need it.

FAMILY SUPPORT

Question. Military members and their families in both the Active and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations that go with them.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for servicemembers and their families?

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure family readiness remains one of the Department's top priorities. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Presidential Study Directive Nine identified access to health care (to include psychological health), military spouse career assistance, child care services, and servicemember and family education needs as the Department's highest priority family support initiatives. I concur and, if confirmed, will work diligently to ensure these areas remain at the forefront of the Department's efforts to support families.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

Answer. I believe that family readiness is correlated with family resilience. It is the Department's responsibility to ensure that families are well prepared to meet the challenges that come with deployment and service. Through focusing on the psy-
chological, social, financial and educational well-being of military families, DOD can continue to build family resilience. A recent DOD survey of active duty spouses shows that families overall are coping well, but certain families are more vulnerable—especially our enlisted families and those who have recently deployed. Since 2006, active duty spouses have reported higher levels of stress in every DOD-wide survey. On the other hand, the number of spouses satisfied with military life has increased since 2006. I understand that programs like MilitaryOne Source and the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program have made great strides in improving access to resources for families. However, the Department can do more, and if confirmed I will seek continued improvements in this critical area.

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and future reductions in end strength?

Answer. In order to appropriately address the needs of our families in today's dynamic environment, it is critical for DOD to build community partnerships with Federal agencies, State and local governments, businesses, and nonprofit organizations, all of which are key stakeholders in meeting the needs of our military families as they continue to serve or transition to civilian life.

Global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and changes to end strength all alter the context of a servicemember's family life and thus the needs of family readiness. The Department's efforts to ensure family readiness must constantly adapt to these changing conditions.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

Answer. DOD has a duty to ensure that every family has access to quality resources, regardless of location. An appropriate network of support for our geographically dispersed families must be underwritten by a coordinated, community-based network of care, encompassing DOD, the Department of Veterans Affairs, State, local, non-profit and private providers. It is my understanding that DOD's Yellow Ribbon Program has been successful in establishing the required networks, and if confirmed, I would assess the program to ensure that it remains capable of addressing the support requirements of our Guard, and Reserve servicemembers and their families, wherever they serve. In addition, I understand that the Joint Family Support Assistance Program (JFSAP) has significantly expanded outreach services for military members and their families who are geographically isolated from installation services.

Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to enhance family support?

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department continues to adapt and evolve our resources and programs to meet the needs of all servicemembers and their families. For example, we should appreciate the fact that we have a very young force, and the information, the resources, and the support we provide must be delivered in a manner they feel comfortable receiving; otherwise, the information may go unheeded and the resources and support may go unused. This means using technology, social media, and other innovative means. Additionally, there can be a wealth of helpful resources and support resident just outside our gates and residing in our communities. Partnerships with communities and community programs can therefore significantly enhance the Department's efforts to meet the needs of our families. Finally, we must continue to build on the great successes in family support that we have made since the start of combat operations nearly 10 years ago.

Question. In your view, are the recent increases in military family support (which have risen to $8.3 billion in the fiscal year 2012 President's budget) sustainable in future years?

Answer. I believe family programs are sustainable in future years. Clearly it will be necessary to review family support programs with respect to efficiencies just as every other program in DOD will be reviewed, however, the focus should not merely be on improved efficiencies. We will need to provide the right programs—the ones that are targeted to the needs of our contemporary servicemembers and their families and that are shown to be effective in meeting those needs.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS COLLABORATION

Question. Then-Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of Veterans Affairs Shinseki pledged to improve and increase collaboration between the respective departments to support military servicemembers as they transition to veteran status, in areas of health and mental health care, disability evaluation, and compensation.
If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs achieve the administration’s objectives in DOD and VA collaboration?

Answer. I understand significant improvements have been made in DOD–VA collaboration in the last few years. Secretary Panetta has made it clear that he intends to continue the efforts of Secretary Gates and Shinseki and seek to accelerate current timelines. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD continues to work closely with VA to support servicemembers and their families in all facets of making a seamless transition to veteran status.

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS FOR THE INTERAGENCY

Question. The successful integration of joint capabilities within the Armed Forces under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been held up as a potential model for integration of military and civilian agencies with related missions. A “Goldwater Nichols Act for the Interagency” is considered necessary by some to force changes in organization, training, policies, and procedures in order to achieve unity of effort and enhance cooperation between military and civilian departments. Presidential Executive Order (E.O) 13434 (National Security Professional Development) and DOD’s Civilian National Security Professional Development Program reflect the intent to improve performance in this regard.

What is your understanding of the concept of “Goldwater Nichols for the Interagency”? What are your views on the merits of mandating a Goldwater Nichols Act for the Federal Government designed to achieve the goals set forth in E.O. 13434? How would you evaluate the progress of DOD and the interagency in achieving the goals of E.O. 13434?

Answer. I understand that this concept originates from two facts. The first fact is that virtually every security problem in the modern world requires a joint mix of the skills and authorities that are resident in the military; the diplomatic corps; the development, intelligence, and law enforcement communities; and other Federal agencies. The second fact is that the Goldwater-Nichols Act enabled us to combine the efforts of the separate armed forces that constitute today’s joint force. I believe this is a sound, indeed vitally important, concept. If confirmed, I would seek to move this concept forward, whether in law or by other mechanisms.

If confirmed, I intend to reiterate the important role each interagency partner plays in supporting our Nation’s security. We should also continue to adapt the education and training of our national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges. Developing future national security leaders who understand whole-of-government operations and thinking will remain an important priority.

HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING

Question. Section 115b of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Secretary of Defense to develop and annually update a strategic human capital plan that specifically identifies gaps in the Department’s civilian workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps. DOD has not yet produced a strategic human capital plan that meets the requirements of these provisions.

Would you agree that a strategic human capital plan that identifies gaps in the workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps is a key step toward ensuring that the Department has the skills and capabilities needed to meet future challenges?

Answer. Yes. A strategic workforce plan is essential to ensure a capable and mission ready civilian workforce. I understand that the Department has committed to a revised plan which meets congressional direction, by the end of fiscal year 2015. Interim updates will be provided. The revised strategic human capital plan will clearly link the missions of the Department to the size, mix and skill sets of military, civilian and contractor employees. If confirmed, I will review this plan for adequacy before it is submitted.

Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the requirements of section 115b regarding the requirement for a strategic human capital plan?

Answer. Yes, it would be helpful to the Department to report biennially on the status of the DOD strategic workforce plan. A biennial report will allow time to mature the Department’s strategic human capital processes, close identified workforce gaps, and implement strategies for recruitment and retention of the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to accomplish the mission.

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that DOD fully complies with these requirements?

Answer. Yes.
ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Question. The All-Volunteer Force came into existence almost 40 years ago and, since its inception, volunteer soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have helped to win the Cold War, defeat aggression during the Persian Gulf War, keep peace in the former Yugoslavia, combat terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, and defend freedom around the world.

Are you committed to the All-Volunteer Force?

Answer. Yes, I am committed to preserving the All-Volunteer Force. The All-Volunteer Force has not only met, but surpassed, the visions and expectations of its founders, and provided this nation with the highest quality, most capable force in its history at a lower cost than a conscripted force. The All-Volunteer Force has proved its viability and resilience through over a decade of prolonged warfighting.

Question. Under what conditions, if any, would you support reinitiation of the draft?

Answer. I can think of no likely situation where I would support resumption of the draft. The All-Volunteer Force has surpassed all expectations of its founders. Today's force is unique because each person wearing the uniform today either entered or chose to remain in the military during this period of prolonged conflict. The All-Volunteer Force today is highly educated, of high aptitude, disciplined, physically fit, and representative of America. Today's recruits are the highest quality we have seen in the past 20 years.

Question. What factors do you consider most significant to the success of the All-Volunteer Force?

Answer. The success of the All-Volunteer Force is built upon three cornerstones: (1) recruiting a quality force; (2) appropriately compensating that force; and (3) providing force management policies that retain the right kinds of people in the right skills.

Question. Do you share the concerns expressed by Admiral Mullen that there is a growing disconnect between the military and U.S. civilian society and, if so, how would you address this problem?

Answer. Yes, because we want our military to be representative of the society which it defends. This is an inherent challenge when the Services only take in less than 1 percent of the youth population each year. The Department's civilian and military leadership, and the Nation's leadership as a whole, needs to work to prevent such a disconnect.

DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Answer. Yes, I believe that DOD's leadership should always be mindful of multiple considerations when developing standards for detainee treatment, including that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts.

Question. Do you believe that DOD has the authorities it needs to detain and try individuals captured in the course of the current conflict, where it is appropriate to do so?
Answer. It is my understanding DOD has the authorities it needs to capture, detain, and prosecute by military commission supporters and members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces.

It is my understanding over the course of nearly a decade of policy development and litigation, the 2001 AUMF has provided the executive branch with the legal basis for using necessary and appropriate force, including detention, against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. The United States has relentlessly and effectively pursued the enemy under this existing authority, and has successfully defended its authority to detain in the Federal courts. DOD is utilizing its existing authority under the Military Commissions Act of 2009 to prosecute certain of these detainees.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE

1. Senator Akaka. Dr. Carter, in November 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates delivered a speech at Kansas State University during which he expressed his thoughts that the Department of Defense (DOD) needed to enhance its ability to conduct soft power. He stated, “In short, based on my experience serving seven Presidents, as former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and now as Secretary of Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use ‘soft’ power and for better integrating it with ‘hard’ power.”

While I firmly believe that a strong and capable military must be available if the situation requires, I also feel that a responsive soft power capability is essential to our strategy. Do you agree with Secretary Gates’ assessment and do you believe that organizations such as the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) can contribute?

Dr. Carter. Yes, I agree that the United States must strengthen its capacity to use “soft power”, and I believe that organizations like the USIP contribute significantly to our collective efforts to manage conflict worldwide, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, the USIP is currently addressing the challenge of ensuring long-term peace and stability by contributing to the achievement of four interrelated goals: strengthening peaceful reconciliation and capacity to mitigate conflict; enhancing the rule of law; improving cooperation for peace, security, and economic development; and increasing understanding and effectiveness of operations in Afghanistan. Most notably, the USIP developed and continues to refine the curriculum for the Ministry of Defense Advisors program, which provides critical U.S. civilian expertise for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.

In Iraq, USIP synchronized the training of Iraqi facilitators, enhancing field coordination with military units and the Department of State (DOS)-led embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams. In the Mahmoudiya region of Iraq specifically, these contributions helped tribal and local government leaders forge an agreement
that led to a substantial decrease in violence there. This agreement was viewed by local leaders and military officials as a “turning point” toward peace and stability in one of Iraq’s most violent regions.

Long-term success in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as overall U.S. efforts to prevent conflict and strengthen peace-building globally, depend in large part on a holistic approach to foreign engagement and assistance, with responsibilities shared across U.S. Government agencies and organizations. In order to fulfill these responsibilities, DOD’s civilian counterparts throughout the government require robust capabilities and resources if we are to succeed against the wide range of threats facing the Nation.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

2. Senator Akaka. Dr. Carter, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires DOD to provide auditable financial statements by 2017. In your responses to the committee’s advance policy questions, you list as one of your management performance goals, “To strengthen DOD Financial Management to respond to warfighter needs and sustain public confidence through auditable financial statements.” After many years of sustained efforts to make this a reality, what are the biggest challenges remaining and how are they being addressed?

Dr. Carter. DOD’s legacy financial processes and systems were established many years ago and designed to ensure budgetary accountability—not meet the proprietary or commercial accounting standards called for in the CFO Act, which are necessary to achieve auditability. To meet these standards, there is a substantial amount of work to be done. Some of the most significant impediments include:

- DOD business and financial management systems are not fully integrated and do not always collect data at the necessary transaction level.
- Reliable end-to-end processes and internal controls have not fully been defined to support financial reporting.
- DOD lacks sufficient operational and financial personnel experienced in financial audits.

Meeting these challenges and improving our business processes have more attention in the Department than ever before. DOD is addressing them by changing the way it does business. To realize success, DOD is using a streamlined approach, implemented in August 2009, which focuses on improving and auditing budgetary and mission-critical asset information that informs key management decisions. Improving the quality of this information will enable commanders and other leaders to better meet mission needs with available resources. I believe this alignment of operational and financial objectives is the most effective incentive to improve financial management.

MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMMISSION

3. Senator Akaka. Dr. Carter, section 596 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, directed the creation of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC). The MLDC was given the task of evaluating policies to advance minority members of the Armed Forces. After 18 months of research, one of the primary findings reported by the Commission noted that the Armed Forces have not yet found a way to continuously develop senior leaders who are as diverse as the population of our country. What are your thoughts on diversity in the leadership ranks within the civilian and uniformed members of DOD?

Dr. Carter. DOD looks at diversity as a strategic imperative that impacts readiness and mission accomplishment. As Secretary Panetta has said, “If we all look the same, our mission will suffer. If we all think the same, failure is certain.” The Department’s leadership is committed to building a Total Force that attracts, recruits, develops, mentors and retains a diverse workforce now, and well into the 21st century. Further, we will communicate this priority clearly and hold leadership accountable for advancing minority members of the Armed Forces. Because changes in the composition of military leadership will be gradual, our commitment to this effort must be enduring.

4. Senator Akaka. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, what steps would you recommend to develop senior leaders who are as diverse as our country?

Dr. Carter. To develop a cadre of diverse senior leaders, the Department, in part, must take the following steps:

(1) Sustain engagement with affinity groups to attract talent.
(2) Mentor and provide access to key professional assignments to promising junior minority members of our Armed Forces so that they can attain the necessary skills and qualifications to ascend to senior leadership positions over time.

(3) Work closely with the Office of Personnel Management as it develops an overarching Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan for the Federal Government and incorporates the tenants of the President's Executive Order on Diversity in the diversity strategies DOD develops and employs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL

F/A–18 SUPER HORNET

5. Senator McCASKILL. Dr. Carter, some critics of the F/A–18 Super Hornet are incorrectly insisting that the Navy's most advanced high-performance strike fighter will not be capable of overcoming future threats. According to the experts, and that of our troops overseas, nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the Navy has publicly stated that the Super Hornet can "outperform any top-line fighter aircraft of today and tomorrow due to its balanced approach to aircraft survivability, blending low observable technology with state-of-the-art defensive electronic countermeasures, reduced areas of vulnerability, and high precision technology air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons." The missions the Super Hornet can undertake are virtually any combat mission, including scenarios for first-day-of-the-war strike and every-day-of-the-war dominance. In Afghanistan, the Super Hornet is conducting a majority of the sorties that provide ground cover for our men and women in combat. The Super Hornet is also the Navy's model procurement program. Since 2007, all Super Hornets have been delivered on or ahead of schedule and below estimated program cost. The congressionally-approved third Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) contract for F/A–18E/F aircraft will save an estimated $818 million over single-year contracts, and the $52.7 million fly-away cost per aircraft and low sustainment costs make the Super Hornet the best value for money of any strike fighter in the U.S. inventory.

Considering how well the F/A–18 program has delivered advanced capability and the potential of the Super Hornet, along with the high return the U.S. taxpayer has received for the funds invested in the F/A–18 program, do you think it's prudent to take funds away from the program to invest in other tenuous tactical aviation programs, as some of my colleagues have recently advocated?

Dr. CARTER. All Naval Aviation programs are feeling the impact of the current fiscal environment. Direction from Congress and the President indicates DOD’s and Navy’s Total Obligation Authority will decrease over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The Navy's aviation investment provides the capability needed to meet current and projected national security objectives, while prudently balancing security risks against these fiscal realities. The Super Hornet program is not specifically being targeted to divert funds to another program; rather, the Department's goal is to allocate resources to meet the most pressing fleet requirements, balancing warfighting risks with available resources.

The savings stated on the MYP III should be approximately $615 million.

6. Senator McCASKILL. Dr. Carter, could DOD benefit from shifting some research and development (R&D) funds to further the development of the Super Hornet to increase its already impressive capabilities and make it an even more viable complement to other aircraft under development that are suffering from cost overruns and development delays?

Dr. CARTER. In keeping with the Department's desire to provide a flexible and balanced force, DOD's aviation investment plan provides the diverse mix of aircraft needed to carry out DOD missions. The F–35C is being procured as a complement to the F/A–18E/F, and as such has complementary rather than competing or redundant capabilities. Continued investment in both programs is required to meet warfighting needs. The Department continues to pursue a TACAIR investment strategy that provides an ideal balance of versatility, lethality, survivability, and capacity.

7. Senator McCASKILL. Dr. Carter, in your testimony before this committee in May, you were asked about the alternatives to the procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. In your response, you stated that the tactical aviation requirements of individual Military Services differ from each other. Specifically, that the Navy has a current alternative to the F–35C variant in the F/A–18 E/F Block II Super Hornet. Because this alternative exists, the Secretary of Defense budgeted...
for 41 additional Super Hornets as the F–35C has slipped in its delivery schedule to the Navy. Given that the Navy has publicly stated that the Super Hornet can undertake virtually any combat mission, is it your opinion that the Super Hornet remains a viable alternative based on the Navy’s tactical aviation needs?

Dr. CARTER. F–35C and F/A–18E/F capabilities are complementary, with an ideal balance of versatility, lethality, survivability, and capacity that will pace the threat through 2025. A mix of the two aircraft in future carrier air wings represents an affordable, timely solution to the strike-fighter shortfall and provides conventional conflict analysis, validated combat capability, and capacity to support foreseen carrier strike group mission requirements. Continued investment in both programs is required to meet warfighting needs.

8. Senator McCaskill. Dr. Carter, at the end of the acquisition run for the F/A–18, this country will have only one strike fighter aircraft manufacturer. From a competition standpoint, is this of concern to DOD?

Dr. CARTER. The combination of buying more F/A–18E/F, developing the F–35, and modernizing the F–22A provides strike fighter capability for the Departments of Navy and Air Force for the next 30-plus years. Additionally, some legacy strike fighter aircraft have service-life extensions that allow those aircraft to fly into the 2020s. By that time, the Department projects that it will begin recapitalizing the fifth generation force. Industry has already begun examining applicable materiel concepts and related technology for a sixth generation aircraft and the Department believes the military aircraft industrial base will be well positioned to provide competitive alternatives at that time.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TALENT

9. Senator HAGAN. Dr. Carter, during your confirmation hearing, I asked you: “What is DOD doing to recruit and retain the best and brightest scientists and engineers? How do you measure the effectiveness of these efforts?” In response to being asked to provide specific examples, you mentioned Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. What other examples can you provide? Also, how do you measure the effectiveness of these efforts?

Dr. CARTER. The scientists and engineers at DOD Laboratories serve as the foundation of the Department’s technical base. DOD uses several approaches to recruit and retain the brightest scientists and engineers. One approach to maintain an effective cadre of talent is through application of the Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratory (STRL) program, also known as Demonstration or Demo Laboratories program. Directors at an STRL have considerable latitude within their existing demo project plans and current regulations in establishing personnel policies tailored to meet their specific needs for recruiting and retaining the necessary scientific and engineering talent to meet program requirements. Under STRL, Lab directors can use such approaches as pay for performance systems that reward the highest performers; education programs to train the workforce; and various hiring flexibilities with the most promising being a direct hire authority for candidates with advanced degrees. This direct hire authority allows laboratory leadership the ability to quickly hire promising new graduates and experienced scientists and engineers.

Eight of the 15 STRL demo projects are in operation between 9 and 14 years with the success of their demo interventions last evaluated through a pulse survey conducted in 2005. Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) staff members are working with demo laboratory representatives on an evaluation of current initiatives as well as the need for additional flexibilities that may arise. The data collected and the analysis will be used to refresh current initiatives and develop new ones as appropriate to further enhance the personnel demo projects’ positive impact on assisting the STRLs to recruit and retain the talent needed to accomplish their missions.

In addition to the STRL demo program, another key element of the Labs’ ability to maintain a skilled workforce is section 219 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. This section provides authority for a laboratory director to use up to 3 percent of all available funds for establishment of high risk technology programs, education, and training of the workforce; transition of new technology to acquisition programs; and infrastructure improvements. One of the highlights of this program is found at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). The Director established the Karle Fellowships (named in honor of two of
NRL’s most prolific scientists) enabling the lab to recruit up to 50 exceptional university graduates per year and place them in technology development programs for 2 years at no cost to existing programs with minimal administrative burden. Upon transitioning to Navy programs, they are highly productive and well versed on Service technology needs.

To measure effectiveness, DOD collects laboratory demographic data every 2 years, which allows it to analyze the skills, diversity, and experience levels of the technical workforce. Concurrent with collection of laboratory demographics, DOD maintains a high level of communication with the Military Departments and the labs on the technical viability of their workforce. As of the end of fiscal year 2011, there were no significant gaps in the ability of the Military Departments to provide technical support for their programs or deployed forces.

DEVELOPMENTAL AND OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION

10. Senator HAGAN. Dr. Carter, both the developmental and operational test and evaluation communities play a vital role in ensuring that weapons systems that are fielded ultimately deliver capabilities to the warfighters as promised.

Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) discovers problems early on in the developmental phase when it is significantly cheaper to fix them than later on, and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) confirms the operational effectiveness and suitability of the weapons systems in combat use. Unfortunately, the majority of problems that OT&E is discovering with weapons systems should have been detected and fixed during the DT&E phase.

What will you do to ensure that such developmental problems are addressed earlier in the lifetime of a weapons program and hence, decrease costs and accelerate fielding?

Dr. CARTER. Section 102 of Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 enacted 10 U.S.C. 139d (now 10 U.S.C. 139b) establishes the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation with well-defined responsibilities. This office is committed to early and continuous engagement with the major defense acquisition programs. This engagement includes providing guidance for test planning and resourcing, assessing progress-to-plan throughout the acquisition cycle, helping programs to adjust to inevitable problems during development, and informing decisionmakers about residual risk prior to OT&E (e.g., via Assessments of Operational Test Readiness). Measurable DT&E performance criteria that address a sound planning framework and objective measures of system maturity are developed to provide early indicators for decision makers. In addition, efforts are ongoing to strengthen the DT&E workforce through more robust education and certification requirements and assessment of workforce balance across the components. This will make best use of the available personnel resources to best influence effective DT&E programs, and minimize late and costly discovery of deficiencies.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK BEGICH

AFGHANISTAN

11. Senator BEGICH. Dr. Carter, I support eliminating the threat to U.S. national security in Afghanistan and Pakistan by defeating al Qaeda and preventing those countries from being safe havens again. However, like many of my colleagues, after a decade in the country I am concerned about an indefinite U.S. presence. At the end of the year, approximately 9,000 Alaska troops will be in the country. I believe we need a thorough threat assessment and to concisely define a realistic and achievable end-state. What is your assessment of our current strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Dr. CARTER. We are seeing clear progress in our strategy, particularly in our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al Qaeda. There has been steady progress in the development of the Afghan National Security Forces, and there was a clear decline in violence in 2011, compared to the previous year. I see the greatest risks to our goals and strategy stemming from safe havens in Pakistan, and from inadequate progress in developing more inclusive, capable, and legitimate Afghan governance.

Successful U.S. operations in Afghanistan and our efforts in the larger region are making the United States safer. In Afghanistan, we are helping the Afghan people stand on their own so that Afghanistan can become a responsible, stable partner with others in the region, and, ultimately, a productive member of the international
community. The Department is also cooperating closely with Pakistan to put unprecedented pressure on al Qaeda. As a result, the United States is moving toward achieving the core goal of ultimately defeating al Qaeda. As part of this greater effort, DOD is also engaging its partners in Central Asia to ensure uninterrupted support to our ongoing operations. We are helping to build regional, partner-nation security capacity to achieve greater stability in the region, which is vital to U.S. national security.

12. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what is your assessment of the threat to U.S. national security in the region?

Dr. Carter. Security and stability in the region—and our success in this war—are vital to U.S. national security. Instability, extremism, and transnational terrorism in this region are among the many challenges that threaten our security, as well as the security of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and other countries. The attacks of September 11, 2001, emanated from Afghanistan and point to the direct link between developments in this region and the security of the United States.

13. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, how do you view the United States’ long-term commitment—financially, reconstruction-wise, and security-wise?

Dr. Carter. The United States and the international community have sacrificed an extraordinary amount—in lives and resources—to ensure Afghanistan never again provides a safe haven from which al Qaeda and its affiliates can attack us. Working with our coalition and Afghan partners, the Department remains committed to that goal. Ultimately, the Afghans must be responsible for taking the lead for security in their country, and the transition process through 2014 to achieve this objective is under way.

To realize lasting security and stability, President Obama and President Karzai agreed that the United States and Afghanistan should have an enduring strategic partnership beyond 2014. Negotiations on that partnership framework are progressing. Likewise, NATO and the international community also made clear that their commitments to Afghanistan are enduring and will continue beyond the completion of the transition to Afghan security responsibility.

Afghanistan will require international assistance for many years to come; this is the reality of more than 30 years of war that shattered many of the basic institutions of Afghan society. Our assistance, however, must be focused on helping the Afghans take full responsibility for their own future. We need to ensure that, as a nation, Afghanistan continues to develop the capacity and the resources it needs to reduce reliance on international aid.

14. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what is your assessment of President Karzai as a partner?

Dr. Carter. U.S. policy toward Afghanistan is not contingent on a single leader. Rather, our commitment is to the people of Afghanistan, based on the core interests that we share. President Karzai is the democratically elected leader of Afghanistan, and the Department is committed to working with him to achieve our shared objectives.

President Karzai faces a difficult situation in Afghanistan. He is fighting an insurgency with the assistance of more than 140,000 foreign forces. The burden of this war on the Afghan people is great, and they have been traumatized by some 30 years of war. Inevitably, there are times of tension or disagreement, and just as President Karzai needs to listen to our concerns, we also need to listen carefully to his. President Karzai has sometimes aired these concerns in ways we find unhelpful, but he ultimately appreciates what the United States is doing and the sacrifices made by our forces.

15. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what do you see as the role for DOD in building the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to deliver services, provide better governance, improve economic development, and fight corruption in Afghanistan?

Dr. Carter. DOD’s primary role in Afghan Government capacity-building is to support the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, and their ability to provide security for the Afghan people. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan made significant progress in growing the size and capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This progress is enabling the transition of lead security responsibility to the ANSF throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

The DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have the lead for broader U.S. governance and development efforts in Afghanistan. That said, DOD stabilization activities also contribute to this effort in important ways. The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) allows U.S. military com-
manders to carry out small-scale projects that meet urgent humanitarian relief or urgent reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility. Village stability operations led by our Special Operations Forces provide security and build linkages between villages and district and provincial authorities that help the Afghan Government deliver important services. The Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) develops near-term tactical and strategic programs that create economic opportunities in Afghanistan in support of U.S. military commanders’ campaign objectives. TFBSO’s national-level activities, such as its assistance to the Ministry of Mines, complement the governance and development efforts of U.S. civilian agencies by attracting U.S. and foreign investors and helping set the conditions for long-term economic development as security improves. Finally, the Afghan Infrastructure Fund, bridges the stabilization efforts of DOD with the development efforts of USAID by allowing coordinated planning and funding of programs that have both near-term stabilization benefits and meet longer-term economic development needs.

To understand the corruption problem more fully and to address it, the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan formed Task Force Shafafiyat (“Transparency”), which is coordinating the development of anti-corruption strategies and working to ensure that DOD contracts do not foster or enable corruption. These efforts improved the Department’s ability to know both contractors and subcontractors, and to track money flows. They have also led to the adoption of new procedures that reduce the chances American resources would inadvertently strengthen criminal networks or insurgent groups.

16. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, do you have concerns with the Afghan Government’s ability to sustain our efforts—like funding their own security forces? What more can we be doing?

Dr. Carter. The cost of sustaining the ANSFs will continue to outpace the Government of Afghanistan’s near-term resourcing abilities. The ANSF will require continued international assistance until new Afghan national sources of revenue can be brought on-line.

To that end, DOD is currently looking at how to reduce the remaining ANSF development and long-run sustainment costs. This effort includes looking into potential force structure changes in a post-counterinsurgency environment, as well as avoiding redundancies and the specific capability standards required for the Afghans. As the Department transitions areas to Afghan lead for security, DOD emphasized to its allies and partners the importance of maintaining their overall financial commitment to security in Afghanistan. In addition, DOD allies and partners continue to make contributions to ANSF sustainability through multi-donor trust funds, such as the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan. DOD also implemented programs through its Task Force for Business Stability Operations to connect outside investors to potential Afghan producers, and to help Afghanistan build the capacity to develop its mineral and other natural resources in environmentally sound and sustainable ways.

The Department also continues to participate in a concerted interagency effort to develop an overall economic strategy for improving Afghanistan’s economic sustainability, economic development, revenue generation, and budget execution. Over time, such efforts will help enable the Afghans to take on increasing responsibility for their own security forces, with decreasing reliance on donor support.

17. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you support the drawdown in July?

Dr. Carter. I support President Obama’s decision to begin the deliberate, responsible drawdown of 10,000 U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan over the course of this year, with a further drawdown of the remaining 23,000 surge forces by the end of summer 2012.

At the end of summer 2012—when the U.S. surge forces have departed—there will actually be more Afghan and coalition forces in the fight than there are today because we will have added another 55,400 members to the ANSF, not including the Afghan Local Police.

Additionally, over the coming year, we will continue to develop more capable ANSF. A well-trained, operationally effective ANSF will allow the Afghans to assume more responsibility as we redeploy the U.S. surge forces. As a result, ISAF and the ANSF will be able to maintain a necessary level of combat operations against anti-coalition forces while completing the successful transition of lead security responsibility to the Afghans by the end of 2014.
18. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional and effective ANSF?

Dr. Carter. The Afghans, in partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), made tremendous progress toward developing a professional ANSF that is both capable of sustaining a properly trained and equipped force over the long term and preventing the return of al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates to Afghanistan.

This progress is due, in large part, to the unifying efforts of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM–A). Since November 2009, NTM–A consolidated all training efforts under one command, and established iterative, professional, and standards-based training across the ANSF—none of which existed before.

As the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior are consistently meeting their recruitment goals, NTM–A focused intensely on improving the quality of the force, especially in areas of literacy, leadership, and operational performance. In 2009, only 4,000 soldiers possessed some degree of literacy. Today, NTM–A estimates that the ANSF will achieve 50 percent overall literacy rates at the third-grade level in 2012, with more than 70,000 police and 55,000 soldiers having received some level of literacy training. Only 14 percent of the Afghan recruiting age population (males aged 18–40 years old) and just 20 percent of ANSF recruits are literate, so achieving a 50 percent literacy rate in the ANSF will not only increase the ANSF’s operational effectiveness, but it will also contribute to Afghanistan’s overall economic development in the longer-term.

The Department is also focused on improving the quality and quantity of leaders in order to accelerate the ANSF’s development. Although the ANSF is challenged by leadership shortfalls, as a result of a range of training and mentoring programs over the last 2 years, the ANSF noncommissioned officer and officer corps grew by more than 20,000 leaders, significantly reducing the leadership shortfall. Through a strong partnership program with Coalition forces, the ANSF’s operational performance in the field has also greatly accelerated. In January 2011, there were 124 Afghan battalions and headquarters elements rated as “effective with coalition assistance” or better. As of August, 147 units had achieved that standard (out of 184 units assessed).

The result of these efforts—consolidated training and an intense focus on literacy, leadership, and operational performance—is that the ANSF made significant progress on the battlefield and began successfully taking the lead responsibility for security in areas of the country that entered transition. By the end of 2014, this increasingly capable ANSF will have the lead security responsibility throughout the country.

19. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you make it a goal to transfer the security mission to the Afghans sooner than 2014?

Dr. Carter. I think the current goal of completing transition by the end of 2014, as proposed by President Karzai and confirmed by our allies and partners at the November 2010 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Lisbon, remains a feasible and appropriate target. However, the Department will carefully monitor progress toward this goal, taking into consideration “on-the-ground” conditions.

20. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-military relations?

Dr. Carter. Our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, like our overall relationship, experiences high and low points, and is challenged by a lack of trust on both sides. I will continue to support DOD’s efforts, in coordination with our interagency partners, to improve our counterterrorism cooperation and develop a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan that is aimed at advancing shared national security objectives.

SPACE LAUNCH PROCUREMENT

21. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, according to publicly disclosed reports, the U.S. Air Force Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program costs are set to increase by nearly 50 percent over the next 5 years. What are the reasons for these costs increases?

Dr. Carter. The EELV program projects incurring a cost increase on EELV of approximately 40 percent over the next 5 years. There are multiple reasons why the EELV costs increased. These include unrealistically low 1998 competitive prices for
the initial EELV orders due to the anticipated commercial launch market failing to materialize and the rising costs in launch vehicle production due to low order quantities causing suppliers to restart and recertify production lines. With the cancellation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Shuttle and Constellation programs, overhead costs for EELV, especially on propulsion providers, have increased, and are being borne almost exclusively by DOD. The recently approved acquisition strategy is designed to target these causes and drive increased cost stability into the program.

22. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what insights does DOD have into its current vendor’s cost and pricing structures?

Dr. Carter. DOD certified cost and pricing data or acceptable equivalent data for our existing contracts. We intend to continue this practice on future contracts. In addition, we recently gained a great deal of cost insight into the EELV main and upper stage engines, which are two major cost drivers for the program. The Air Force Program Executive Officer for Space Launch (AFPEO/SL) commissioned two separate Independent Cost Estimates (ICE), the results of which have been provided to program stakeholders. In September 2011, the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) completed an ICE for the RS–68 Delta main engine, which is manufactured by Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne (PWR). The ICE was a data driven estimate based on historical data from an earlier purchase, other PWR programs and recent subcontractor quotes. The study gathered data on labor, material, profit, overhead, and general and administrative costs. Also in September 2011, the National Reconnaissance Office’s (NRO) Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) completed an ICE for the RL10 upper stage engine, for both Delta and Atlas configurations, which is also manufactured by PWR. The study used historical data from fiscal year 2006–2010 for previous purchases of RL10 engines, as well as a bill of material from the PWR proposal. The data provided by AFCAA and the CAIG will be used in conjunction with existing certified cost and pricing data to assist in negotiations for the upcoming EELV procurements, including the fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013–2017 buys.

23. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what actions has the Air Force or DOD taken to control costs?

Dr. Carter. In June 2011, the EELV program signed an EELV Launch Capability (ELC) bridge contract, changing the contract type from an Award Fee type contract to an Incentive Fee construct incentivizing cost reductions while maintaining mission success. The recently approved EELV acquisition strategy supports a minimum production rate by implementing a more economical multi-core approach to procuring launch vehicles. The new acquisition is scheduled to be awarded by the fall 2012. Key elements of the strategy are a buy of sufficient size to ensure economic order quantity prices and a steady launch vehicle production rate. This strategy also includes a “new entrant” approach to allow for near-term on-ramp opportunities and future full and open competition with certified launch providers. The Air Force also recently completed a Should Cost Review of the EELV program. The Air Force incorporated the Should Cost Review recommendations in negotiations with the prime contractor on the ELC bridge contract, upcoming mission contracts and will use the Should Cost Review during negotiations for the fiscal year 2013–2017 acquisition. Additionally, the results of two recently completed Independent Costs Estimates (ICE) on the RS–68 main engine and RL–10 upper stage engine will be incorporated into negotiations for future contracts.

24. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that “the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) decision to advance the EELV program from the development and production phases, which began in 1998, to the sustainment phase will significantly reduce EELV’s reporting requirements to OSD, such as program cost and status information, limiting its own ability to oversee the program.” Given the lack of insight into the program, what specific actions has the Air Force or DOD taken to better understand EELV’s costs?

Dr. Carter. The Air Force took a number of steps to better understand the program costs. A Should Cost Review was completed in June 2010. In March 2011, a Blue Ribbon Panel was led by the SAF/AQ and the Program Executive Officer (PEO). In June 2011, the program changed the construct of the ELC contract to cost plus incentive fee and implemented activity based charging codes used by the prime contractor to gain better understanding of costs. The program continues to provide cost reporting at the prime and subcontractor level to the Defense Cost and Resource Center at OSD, as required by regulation. In addition to requiring ULA to submit certified cost and pricing data prior to negotiations, the Air Force program
team will also conduct a complete evaluation of ULA costs and any supporting data for approximately $280 million of inventory items purchased by Boeing for the initial EELV contract in 1998. The evaluation will look at incurred costs, quotes, purchase orders, invoices, and will compare prices to similar items manufactured on the open market. The Contracting Officer will use this data to determine whether the material costs submitted by ULA are supported and reasonable. The Defense Contract Management Agency approved ULA’s purchasing system in September 2011, and the Defense Contract Audit Agency is finalizing its cost accounting system audit. If the auditors find deficiencies, AFPEO/SL will require the Contracting Officer to withhold a certain percentage of all progress payments in accordance with the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement until the system achieves compliance. This should motivate ULA to make any other necessary changes to its business systems and accounting practices.

25. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, as Deputy Secretary of Defense, would you require additional cost reporting, such as a reporting required in the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) as provided in title 10 U.S.C. 2432, of which the EELV program is currently not subject?

Dr. Carter. Section 838 of the Conference Agreement on the fiscal year 2012 Defense Authorization Bill, which originated as amendment 1071 by Senator McCain, led the Department to further understand and appreciate the importance of providing EELV program cost, schedule and performance information to the congressional defense committees and OSD for oversight. OSD and the Air Force are working together to implement the right level of acquisition reporting. Of particular interest is a shared concern toward limiting the influence of factors outside the program’s control that can drive unit cost such as satellite constellation sustainment, satellite production schedules, and launch range constraints.

26. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, currently the EELV program is divided into two separate contracts: a cost-plus Launch Capability (ELC) contract that annually funds all fixed costs for United Launch Alliance (ULA); and a Launch Services (ELS) contract through which the Air Force purchases individual launches for its payloads. Combining costs associated for each contract, what is the average cost for a launch on an Atlas V?

Dr. Carter. There is no average price for an Atlas V launch or launch vehicle. The cost-plus Launch Capability effort provides the minimum launch capability required to meet a launch rate of eight missions per year. There are 10 variants in the Atlas V launch vehicle family, and each one has a different cost. Additionally, every National Security Space mission is a different price depending on mission-specific integration required, launch location, and number of the same/similar payloads previously flown.

27. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what is the average cost of a launch on a Delta V and a Delta V Heavy?

Dr. Carter. There is no average price for a Delta IV launch or launch vehicle. There are five variants in the Delta IV launch vehicle family and each one has a different cost. Additionally, every National Security Space mission is a different price depending on mission integration costs, payload fairing and launch location, and number of the same payloads previously flown.

28. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what are the total costs of a 40 core block buy?

Dr. Carter. The Air Force has not yet determined the actual size of the proposed lot buy of EELV booster cores. The recently approved acquisition strategy entails an examination of an economic order quantity of EELV booster cores using 40 cores (8 cores per year over 5 years) as our budget baseline. However, as part of the acquisition strategy, the Air Force will request the current EELV provider, United Launch Alliance, propose firm-fixed prices against a range of 6–10 booster cores per year over contract periods ranging from 3 to 5 years, thus allowing the program to balance the launch vehicle production rate and length of commitment decision among price, operational requirements, budget realities, and potential for new entrant competition.

29. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, I understand the Air Force is moving forward with a planned acquisition to purchase 40 rocket booster cores from its current provider over the next 5 years (fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2018), at a guaranteed annual rate of eight cores per year. What is the basis of this acquisition strategy?

Dr. Carter. In late 2009, cost increases in the EELV program prompted the Commander of Air Force Space Command and the Director of the NRO to begin looking
at alternative business models. The practice of ordering launch vehicles in small quantities was inefficient and did not provide a predictable production rhythm sufficient to control costs. They commissioned an external study, the Broad Area Review (BAR-X), conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses, and an internal Tiger Team study as well. The BAR-X looked at the entire spectrum of space launch to include infrastructure, while the Tiger Team focused on the EELV contracting approach. The BAR-X, Tiger Team, and Air Force Program Executive Officer for Space Launch (AFPEO/SL) all recommended an annual minimum production rate of launch vehicle cores plus associated upper stage engines, payload fairings, and solid rockets for multiple years as a baseline.

The acquisition strategy allows the Air Force to make an informed decision on quantity and contract length based on the accumulation of sufficient pricing information and incorporates the findings of the studies as well as the GAO report. The request for proposal will require the contractor to provide prices for a range of quantities from 6 to 10 cores over a contract period of 3 to 5 years. Specific decisions about unit quantities and contract duration will not be made until summer 2012, allowing the Air Force time to balance contractual commitments with operational requirements, budget, cost reductions and the potential for competition. To facilitate our assessment of potential new entrants, we are taking specific steps to enable competition, including the release—with our partners at NASA and the NRO—of the Joint Strategy for New Entrant Certification.

30. **Senator Begich.** Dr. Carter, when will the Air Force finalize the contract or issue the request for proposal (RFP) for this block buy?

**Dr. Carter.** I anticipate a formal RFP release in the first quarter of 2012 with a decision about quantity and duration during the summer of 2012 and contract award by the fall of 2012.

31. **Senator Begich.** Dr. Carter, what, if any, are the estimated cost savings associated with a 40 core block buy? Has the Air Force or an independent examiner looked at the costs savings of a 40 core block buy versus a smaller block purchase, such as annual block buys of 8 cores; a 2-year block buy of 16 cores, etc.?

**Dr. Carter.** The Air Force will not know the total cost for the upcoming EELV lot buy until the new contract is negotiated. But as the question suggests, the Air Force is looking at a range of options for the size and length of a lot buy. The Air Force/NRO Tiger Team, Broad Area Review (BAR-X) and Air Force Program Executive Officer for Space Launch (AFPEO/SL) all recommended an annual minimum production rate of launch vehicle cores plus associated upper stage engines, payload fairings, and solid rockets for multiple years as a baseline. The implementation of this new strategy is intended to reduce costs for National Security Space (NSS) launches and stabilize the U.S. Launch industrial base. The Air Force will request that the prime contractor propose various rate-over-time combinations to inform the Air Force’s final decision, and provide maximum flexibility to best meet NSS requirements and budgets. I am confident that a multi-core buy strategy will generate significant savings versus the current practice of buying individual missions. In addition to savings on the service portion of the contract, there are savings to be generated in the administrative area as well. The RFP will require ULA to submit one combined ELC and ELS proposal, with separate Contract Line Items (CLINs) for launch service and capability, which should significantly reduce the cost of proposal preparation and negotiations that were prevalent in past EELV acquisitions. This construct will also save both time and money by taking advantage of economic order quantity purchasing, as well as a single proposal preparation and negotiation. With this proposal, the Air Force will understand the specifics of different sizes of buys, and therefore, make a fully informed decision in the best interest of the taxpayer and DOD.

32. **Senator Begich.** Dr. Carter, what is the basis for the planned acquisition of 40 cores over 5 years, specifically?

**Dr. Carter.** The Air Force did not decide on a firm quantity purchase of 40 cores over 5 years; the Air Force acquisition strategy allows the Air Force to make an informed decision on quantity and contract length based on the accumulation of sufficient pricing information, and incorporates the findings of the Broad Area Review (BAR-X) and Tiger Team studies as well as the GAO report. The request for proposal will require the contractor to provide prices for a range of quantities from 6 to 10 cores over a contract period of 3 to 5 years. Specific decisions about unit quantities and contract duration will not be made until summer 2012, allowing the Air Force time to balance contractual commitments with operational requirements, budget, cost reductions and the potential for competition. To facilitate the assess-
ment of potential new entrants, the Air Force is taking specific steps to enable competition, including the release—with partners at NASA and the NRO—of the Joint Strategy for New Entrant Certification.

However, it is important to recognize the benefits of pursuing a multi-core buy, versus purchasing individual launch missions, as was done in the past. The Air Force/NRO Tiger Team, BAR–X and AFPEO/SL all recommended an annual minimum production rate of launch vehicle cores plus associated upper stage engines, payload fairings, and solid rockets for multiple years as a baseline. The implementation of this new strategy is intended to reduce costs for National Security Space launches and stabilize the U.S. Launch industrial base.

In addition, the acquisition strategy was designed to support the planned launch manifest. For example, 46 launches (some use as many as 3 cores per launch) are planned from fiscal year 2013–2017, with an additional 16 launches in fiscal years 2018–2019. Most of these launches will be reflights for programs that have already launched satellites to support their respective missions. Therefore, future satellites are using identical designs as their predecessors. This greatly reduces the chance of production delays and increases the likelihood these satellites will launch on schedule. Additionally, the Atlas “white tail” concept (a common booster core for Atlas rockets) and the Delta Fleet Standardization increase flexibility in booster assignment, which reduces launch delays.

33. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, currently the Air Force has 41 rocket booster cores purchased from its current vendor for 39 missions that have not yet launched. Ten of these cores were purchased in 1998 under Buy 1. To a significant extent, this excess inventory is associated with launch schedule slippage associated with satellite manufacturing and integration delays. Should the Air Force and NRO launch schedules slip in the next 5 years in the context of a 40 core block buy from a single incumbent vendor, how will new entrants be able to compete for launches?

Dr. Carter. The majority of satellite slips seen in the past 10 years were in the development process. Based on recent experience, I anticipate a much more stable flow of satellite launches in this timeframe as these programs have transitioned to production. For example, fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 had seven and nine launches, respectively, with a 100 percent launch rate.

In addition, there are more launch requirements during fiscal year 2013–2017 than the up-to-40 cores budgeted in the buy (approximately 55). These additional cores may be available for competition with new entrants to the program should any become a certified EELV provider. The Air Force is committed to competition on the EELV program and is taking steps to facilitate new entrant certification.

The New Entrant Certification Strategy was signed by the Air Force, the NRO, and NASA, and was released in October 2011. The document defines the coordinated certification strategy for commercial new entrant launch vehicles. Also, the U.S. Air Force Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide was signed and released in November 2011. The Guide provides a risk-based approach that the Air Force will use to certify the capability of potential New Entrant launch companies to provide launch services for EELV missions. The Guide lists a set of criteria that any New Entrant must meet in order to launch a high-value operational satellite. The Guide provides the standard or specifications the contractor must meet, the documents or data the contractor must provide and the evaluation process the Air Force will employ in assessing the criteria. These are important steps toward introducing competition into the EELV program. In addition, the Air Force will identify specific launch opportunities reserved for potential new entrants.

34. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, the historical average launches under the EELV program is three flights per year over the last 9 years. Yet, the Air Force is expecting a launch demand of 13 to 14 launches in fiscal year 2013 alone. Has DOD assessed the cost impacts of a 40 core block buy in the context of well-documented and empirical schedule delays associated with payloads?

Dr. Carter. The reason for the relatively low number of launches in the past is primarily due to slips within the satellite programs. The majority of satellite schedule slips seen in the past 10 years have been because they were still in the development process. However, as these satellites programs are transitioning into production, we expect a steadier, more dependable launch rate. For example, fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 had seven and nine launches scheduled, respectively, with a 100 percent launch rate. We expect this more stable flow of satellites to continue.

To that end, 46 launches are planned from fiscal year 2013–2017 with an additional 16 launches in fiscal year 2018–2019. Most of these launches will be reflights for programs that have already launched satellites to support their respective missions. Therefore, future satellites are using identical designs as their predecessors.
This greatly reduces the chance of production delays and increases the likelihood these satellites will launch on schedule. Additionally, the Atlas “white tail” concept (a common booster core for Atlas rockets) and the Delta Fleet Standardization increase flexibility in booster assignment, which reduces launch delays.

In addition, based on the current manifest, there are more launch requirements in the timeframe of the first buy (fiscal year 2013–2017), with approximately 55 cores required in this timeframe. Therefore, I see little risk of oversupply on the 40 core buy, should the Air Force pursue this course of action.

35. Senator BEGICH. Dr. Carter, I understand that DOD is currently finalizing its New Entrant certification requirements for the EELV program. What actions is DOD taking to ensure that New Entrant requirements will be equitable and reasonable to allow for full and open competition under the EELV program?

Dr. CARTER. The Air Force developed a strategy that maintains the current level of mission success while reducing costs; providing opportunities for potential new entrants is an important part of that strategy. To that end, the Air Force worked in close cooperation with NASA and NRO to finalize criteria by which potential new entrants can qualify for EELV-class National Security Space launches. These criteria are equitable and reflect our commitment to competition for qualified new entrants and our obligation to thoroughly examine the performance of competitors. The New Entrant Certification Strategy has been signed by the Air Force, the NRO and NASA, and was released in October 2011. The document defines the coordinated certification strategy for commercial new entrant launch vehicles. Also, the U.S. Air Force Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide has been signed and was released in November 2011. The Guide provides a risk-based approach that the Air Force will use to certify the capability of potential New Entrant launch companies to provide launch services for EELV missions. The Guide lists a set of criteria that any New Entrant must meet in order to launch a high-value operational satellite. The Guide provides the standard or specifications the contractor must meet, the documents or data the contractor must provide and the evaluation process the Air Force will employ in assessing the criteria. These are important steps toward introducing competition into the EELV program. Additionally, SMC held an industry day on 1 December 2011, which provided the EELV criteria to interested potential space launch providers. The feedback was very positive. I believe this new process will provide a level playing field for any certified new/entrant to fairly compete for EELV missions. In addition, the Air Force will identify specific launch opportunities Reserved for potential new entrants.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

ENERGY EFFICIENCY

36. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Carter, there is no better opportunity for DOD to simultaneously satisfy the demands of the current economic climate and advance its strategic objectives than by improving energy efficiency in our military operations. I am pleased to see the advances each of the Services are making toward improving their respective efficiency standards. How will you evaluate if the Services are effectively sharing technologies and lessons learned to maximize investment?

Dr. CARTER. In the current fiscal and strategic environment, the Department is preparing to do more without more. Energy is a key part of this solution. By operating more efficiently and incorporating energy and sustainment considerations into our plans and operations, we expect to gain capability without increasing costs.

The Honorable Sharon Burke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs (ASD/OEPP), leads the Department’s efforts to ensure energy security for military operations by providing overall policy and guidance pursuant to the Operational Energy Strategy, released this June. In addition, the ASD/OEPP reviews the budgets of each of the Components to certify if the Department’s budget is adequate to implement the Strategy. This certification process allows her to take a comprehensive look across all the Department’s energy investments. The ASD/OEPP completed her first certification for fiscal year 2012 earlier this year and found the process very useful to coordinate technology choices and lessons learned across the Department.

Both the Operational Energy Strategy and fiscal year 2012 Budget Certification are available online (http://energy.defense.gov). In addition, the Department is finalizing our Implementation Plan to support the Strategy, which will promote close coordination across the Department to identify
and share best practices across the full range of activities that affect operational energy.

37. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Carter, energy efficiency technologies often require significant upfront investment in order to achieve long-term savings. How will you make the case that these investments are needed given the difficult budget environment and long-term nature of efficiency savings?

Dr. CARTER. It is often difficult for planners and decision makers to make significant investments upfront to save money in the long term, but these sorts of decisions are becoming increasingly important in today's budgetary environment. As the Department considers how it responds to a more constrained budget environment we must take life-cycle cost savings into account, like those that result from improvements in energy efficiency. Investments in a more energy efficient force do more than save money in the long term; they make us a more capable and effective force. I would also note that there are opportunities for near-term energy efficiency improvements that will pay back within the Department's 5-year budget planning horizon.

A more energy-efficient force will make it easier to sustain and operate at the forward edge of the battlefield or in remote regions and reduce the risks to our logistics train. Greater energy efficiency means fewer resupply convoys, greater tactical stealth, longer strike ranges for aircraft, longer time on station for sensors and platforms, and greater operational agility. The Department will push forward with energy efficiency improvements on this operational basis with the consequent financial benefits.

The Department is also pursuing energy efficiency opportunities at our fixed installations, often by leveraging private sector partnerships and financing.

ACTIVE AND RESERVE READINESS

38. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Carter, during past difficult fiscal environments, whenever a choice seemed necessary between maintaining Active or Reserve component capability, that choice invariably seemed to be weighted towards the Active component. Given the investment in and growing reliance on the National Guard and Reserves over the last 10 years, do you agree that there is an inherent risk in potentially allowing our Reserve Forces to return to their pre-September 11 readiness?

Dr. CARTER. Yes, I agree that there is an inherent risk in potentially allowing the Reserve component to return to pre-September 11 readiness levels. The Department invested heavily in the Guard and Reserve over the past 10 years in order to prevail in today's wars—meeting the operational demands, while relieving stress on the active Component and bringing their unique skills and experience to the fight. Given this period of fiscal restraint, DOD must make tough decisions and determine acceptable levels of risks in all programs. I will strive to make the most efficient use of the Total Force. I appreciate the value provided by the Reserve components and believe continuing to support their readiness at an appropriate level is an important part in meeting that end.

39. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Carter, what steps would you take to prevent this from happening?

Dr. CARTER. At this time, I do not have any specific recommendations, but I understand that the Department will continue to rely on periodic contributions of the Reserve components as an integral part of the Total Force to meet operational demands. This utilization of the Reserve components in operational missions helps to maintain their continued high readiness levels. Additionally, as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding levels wind down, I believe it is important for the Services to ensure the appropriate levels of readiness for their active and Reserve components are funded in base budgets. Given the fiscal constraints and uncertain security environment, I recognize the need for an efficient Total Force. Additionally, I understand the importance of maintaining appropriate readiness levels for the Reserve components in order to realize the value they provide in delivering capability and maintaining capacity.

RECRUITING SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS

40. Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Carter, DOD and the traditional defense industry are facing challenges seeking new graduates with advanced degrees in scientific and technical fields to help develop complex military systems. What is DOD doing to recruit and retain the best and brightest scientists and engineers?
Dr. Carter. Each of the DOD Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratories (STRL) labs has the authority to directly hire scientists and engineers with advanced degrees outside of the established Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations. This allows Demonstration laboratory directors to quickly make tentative job offers to university graduates and experienced candidates and bring them on-board in only a fraction of the time required for conventional government employment hiring. This process makes DOD labs more competitive with industry and academia for the best talent. In addition, STRL labs all have pay banding systems that enable a director to offer higher starting salaries than non-STRL labs or other government organizations. While DOD labs may not offer starting salaries as high as many employers in the private sector, the type of work offered is often more attractive to graduates than the higher salaries in industry. Facile hiring procedures might be the deciding factor in a candidate's employment selection decision.

Once on-board a Defense Lab, authorities such as those offered by STRL demonstration projects of Section 219 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 allow a director to better reward high performers and provide training and education opportunities to the workforce. Laboratory demographic data reveal that the organic workforce is overall more highly educated than the general workforce of DOD and the Nation.

41. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, in your view, are those efforts effective?

Dr. Carter. Yes, the efforts of the Department for recruiting scientists and engineers (S&E) are effective. We collect and analyze laboratory demographic data that shows our organic workforce to be overall more highly educated than the general workforce of DOD and the Nation. OSD works closely with the Military Departments to ensure the laboratory workforce has the necessary skills and talents to meet the needs of the Department and deployed forces. Authorities given to laboratory directors via the STRL (STRL, also known as Demonstration or Demo Lab) Program and section 219 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 provides them with flexibilities to recruit and rapidly hire promising university graduates, reward top performers, and provide them with exciting and meaningful work as well as training to maintain their skills. As of the end of fiscal year 2011, there were no identified gaps in DOD’s organic laboratory workforce. If shortfalls are identified in the future, we are prepared to make the necessary investments in training and education programs to strengthen the technical workforce.

42. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, how do you measure the effectiveness of these efforts?

Dr. Carter. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)) Defense Laboratories Office collects and analyzes laboratory demographic data every 2 years. This information includes skills, diversity, education levels, years of experience and age distribution of scientists and engineers at all DOD in-house laboratories. ASD(R&E) provides this data to the Military Departments and maintains high levels of communication with them on their programs and the status of the laboratory workforce in meeting the technical demands of these programs. As of the end of fiscal year 2011, there were no reported gaps in the skills of the in-house workforce. If shortfalls are identified, ASD(R&E) is prepared to reallocate Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) program funds in education and training programs for DOD’s current organic workforce.

Implementation of available authorities such as section 219 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 is closely monitored to ensure the Military Departments have the ability to execute training and education programs for their workforce. Currently, the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) is working with demo laboratory representatives on an evaluation of STRL (STRL, also known as Demonstration or Demo Laboratory) Program initiatives as well as the need for additional flexibilities that may have arisen since the conduct of the last DOD evaluation in 2005. The data collected and the analysis will be used to refresh current initiatives and develop new ones as appropriate to enhance further the personnel demo projects' positive impact on recruitment and retention of scientists and engineers. ASD(R&E) supports USD(P&R) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civilian Personnel Policy) in the review, refresh, development and implementation of STRL program authorities such as direct hire for candidates with advanced degrees and pay-for-performance systems that both maintain and strengthen the technical workforce of the labs.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

ACQUISITION REFORM

43. Senator M CCAIN. Dr. Carter, in my view, one of the lessons of the JSF program and other problematic weapons systems procurement programs has been the following: DOD tends to start developing weapon systems even though its critical technologies are immature; it begins testing before the systems' designs are demonstrated as stable; and it then ramps up production before testing has shown that these designs meet requirements and are producible. This often leads to higher costs, lengthy development times, and late deliveries to the warfighter. In other words, there tends to be too much concurrency allowing development and procurement to go forward simultaneously. Do you agree with my appraisal that this is what happened in the JSF program?

Dr. CARTER. I agree that the Department must carefully monitor the level of concurrency on the JSF program and other programs. The decision to accept a level of concurrency on the JSF program was made consciously, based on lessons learned from past programs, and the requirement to modernize and recapitalize DOD strike fighter forces. In accepting a concurrent program, the Department planned to replace aging, less capable legacy fighters with a fifth generation strike fighter sooner than what was possible without concurrency. However, development of the three variants of the JSF has taken longer than originally planned, and the aircraft costs have risen and need to be addressed. The Department made procurement and programmatic decisions to mitigate the risks due to concurrency and will continue to review the program with this in mind.

44. Senator M CCAIN. Dr. Carter, what, if anything, can be done to make sure that DOD doesn't start big weapons procurement programs with too much concurrency between development and production in the future?

Dr. CARTER. Starting programs with too much concurrency between development and production is counter to the spirit of the reforms that the Department has undertaken. Concurrency risks are evaluated on a case by case basis, and the Department does not plan to approve of concurrency in our acquisitions without well thought out strategies to balance risk appropriately. It is also important for us to reevaluate concurrency as programs progress to ensure that concurrency risk does not increase unacceptably when schedules are adjusted to reflect discovery in testing.

45. Senator M CCAIN. Dr. Carter, in what other areas could, in your view, DOD improve how it buys major systems?

Dr. CARTER. The Better Buying Power Initiative includes several critical initiatives where the Department can improve the way we procure our major systems. The most important of these for buying major weapon systems is targeting affordability, controlling cost growth, and promoting real competition. Fully implementing these reforms for every program will lead to improvements now, and also to economies of scale as we successfully apply the same reforms to future programs. The Better Buying Power Initiative includes many important reforms, but it is inevitably not the Department's final word on acquisition improvement. I will continue to work with the acquisition community and Congress, as appropriate, to improve the way we buy our major systems.

46. Senator M CCAIN. Dr. Carter, setting aside those areas squarely addressed under the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009, what remain the most significant impediments to the ability of DOD to effectively procure major systems?

Dr. CARTER. I don't believe the Department has significant impediments to effectively procure major systems that are not addressed in WSARA. I have found many examples of very effective use of existing techniques already present in DOD toolkits. In the Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative, for example, there is nothing really new. BBP places an emphasis on thinking very carefully about what the Department is trying to achieve and more effectively employing existing practices to increase productivity, constantly manage costs, and incentivize efficiency.

47. Senator M CCAIN. Dr. Carter, in your view, what is the next page of reforming how DOD procures goods and services generally? Please be as specific as possible.

Dr. CARTER. I would continue the effort to improve the defense acquisition system consistent with the direction provided in the WSARA of 2009. However, while WSARA principles have been widely implemented in the Department, more can be
done to further them. Furthermore, the BBP initiative recognizes that the Department’s practices for buying services are much less mature than our practices for buying weapons systems. The BBP initiative articulates several ways to improve tradecraft in services acquisition, which forms the next chapter for improving how the Department buys services. To assist with this, each of the Military Services has appointed a senior manager for the acquisition of services at the general officer/flag/senior executive service level. These service managers are responsible for governance in planning, execution, strategic sourcing, and management of service contracts.

Another critical area for improvement is the requirements process. ADM Winnefeld is currently taking steps to reform the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process to ensure it actually makes tradeoffs between cost and performance. The Department is also working to implement a process for determining requirements for services. Lastly, I continue to focus on rapid acquisition, both in institutionalizing the processes developing for satisfying Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) and making the entire acquisition system more responsive to the Warfighter.

48. Senator M. McCain. Dr. Carter, what aspects of the JCIDS are most in need of reform?

Dr. Carter. The JCIDS process most in need of reform is to produce clearly articulated Military needs in their operational context, informed by rigorous analysis of possible alternatives as to potential cost, schedule and performance. A clear understanding of total force capability needs and a proposed solution’s fit and priority in its portfolio’s architecture must be effectively communicated to the Acquisition Enterprise to enable transformation into design and manufacture of appropriately resourced systems and components. The JCIDS process formulates warfighter needs from a joint perspective, but key inputs lag acquisition activities. Specifically, JCIDS assessment must produce and then facilitate better synchronization of operational factors such as desired performance parameters developed through Materiel Solution Analysis (Analyses of Alternatives and others) in preparation for Technology Development—Milestone A, and refined Key Performance Parameters for Engineering and Manufacturing Development—Milestone B. It is also critical that the JCIDS process allow for realistic tradeoffs between cost and performance.

49. Senator M. McCain. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you vet the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s initiative to reform JCIDS that I understand will be issued late this year (or early next year)? If so, would you provide your professional views on its likely efficacy?

Dr. Carter. AT&L has been actively engaged in the Joint Staff Joint Capabilities Development Process Review (JCD PR) since the summer of 2010, and has assisted in formulation of revisions and refinements to the process that will be promulgated in November or December of this year.

The JCD PR focused on adjusting Joint Requirements Oversight Council support structures and advisory processes to fulfill the Council’s goal to shape the future Joint Force. These include early analysis of desired warfighter performance parameters in terms of affordability, risk calculation of tradespace, and prioritization across portfolios; and as Technology Development and Engineering and Manufacturing further refine those parameters, continuous monitoring of a program’s achievement of quantified cost, schedule and performance. The concurrent, ongoing reforms of Defense Acquisition System processes to synchronize with JCIDS and incorporate rapid fielding of urgently required capabilities, and continuous coordination with Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution, will be necessary for all three processes to succeed as the Department evolves toward a new Joint Force in the current fiscal environment.

50. Senator M. McCain. Dr. Carter, what aspects of the resource allocation process, as it relates to DOD’s procurement of goods and services, is most in need of reform?

Dr. Carter. Over the last 2 years, the Department has greatly improved in the area of addressing urgent needs; however, I believe it is necessary to create a closer alignment of the acquisition, requirements, and budget processes across the Department to continue those improvements. In the same way that the Senior Integration Group broadened its purview to cover all urgent warfighter requirements, there are other means by which the Department can expand the type of cooperation and coordination we have instituted for urgent needs, and I plan to make that a priority.

51. Senator M. McCain. Dr. Carter, what aspects of how DOD contracts for services not addressed in your Better Buying Power Initiative remain in need of reform?
Dr. CARTER. One area that was not expressly addressed in my September 14, 2010, “Better Buying Power” memorandum last year, but remains ripe for reform in order to improve DOD’s ability to acquire services effectively, is to enhance and develop the capability of the people who manage service contracts. With the Better Buying Power initiative, we have taken the key first step by putting in place senior managers at the general officer/senior executive service level in each of the DOD components as the responsible agents to oversee the full range of activity associated with the management of service contracts. In order to carry out their responsibilities, these senior managers will need people who have the training and experience necessary to execute the unique aspects of a given service acquisition. As noted by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Improvements in Services Contracting and documented in its report of March 2011, a significant number of functional personnel who are now managing service programs in the Department are not considered members of the acquisition workforce and as such have not received formal training as is mandated for DOD weapon system acquisition program managers under the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act. We can improve by extending our focus to that community of people. To that end, we have established a Functional Integrated Process Team for Services. The Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy will work with the President of the Defense Acquisition University to develop training modules, tools, and other innovative solutions targeted to prepare this cadre of people who are generating requirements and managing a wide range of mission capabilities that are fulfilled through service contracts.

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Carter, are there any elements of your Better Buying Power Initiative that you believe could benefit from codification in law? If so, please explain.

Dr. CARTER. No, not at this time. The Better Buying Power initiative is aimed at improving our effectiveness of execution and improving our use of existing tools. Also, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has sufficient authority as the Defense Acquisition Executive to enforce these changes.

DEFENSE FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATION

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Carter, for only the second time, the position of Deputy Secretary is dual-hatted with DOD’s Chief Management Officer (CMO). As CMO, you would be responsible for DOD’s financial management efforts, including getting it fully auditable by 2017, as required under law. Why do you think you are particularly well-suited and sufficiently qualified to making sure that DOD achieves this important objective?

Dr. CARTER. I have served in various positions with DOD, most recently as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. I led the Department’s efforts to accelerate the fulfillment of urgent operational needs; increase the Department’s buying power; and strengthen the Nation’s defenses against weapons of mass destruction and other emerging threats. I also led this Department in preparing for new strategic and fiscal realities, shaping key major acquisition decisions. Additionally worked to ensure DOD provides rapid and responsive support to the warfighter, and to transform the way this Department does business and acquires weapons systems. Finally, I worked to ensure that the weapons the U.S. military buys are more effective and more affordable. I intend to leverage this experience to oversee our audit readiness efforts, while relying on the Chief Financial Officer and Deputy CMO for day-to-day execution.

I believe the current streamlined approach to achieving auditability, which focuses on improving and auditing the information most used to manage, is consistent with these efforts. Improving the information used to manage—budgetary and mission critical asset information—allows commanders and other leaders to better meet mission needs with the available resources. This alignment of operational and financial objectives is the most effective incentive to improve financial management. I look forward to working with Secretary Panetta in driving solutions to the strategic management challenges facing DOD.

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Carter, what, in your view, are the most significant impediments to DOD becoming auditable?

Dr. CARTER. DOD’s legacy financial processes and systems were established many years ago and designed to ensure budgetary accountability—not meet the proprietary or commercial accounting standards called for in the CFO Act, which are nec-
ecessary to achieve auditability. To meet these standards, there is a substantial amount of work to be done. Some of the most significant impediments include:

- DOD business and financial management systems are not fully integrated and do not always collect data at the necessary transaction level.
- Reliable end-to-end processes and internal controls have not fully been defined to support financial reporting.
- DOD lacks sufficient operational and financial personnel experienced in financial audits.

55. Senator M CCAIN. Dr. Carter, if confirmed as DOD’s CMO, how would you address these impediments?

Dr. CARTER. Meeting these challenges and improving our business processes have more attention in the Department than ever before. DOD will address them by changing the way it does business. To realize success, DOD is using a streamlined approach, implemented in August 2009, which focuses on improving and auditing the information most used to manage. Improving the information used to manage—budgetary and mission critical asset information—allows commanders and other leaders to better meet mission needs with available resources. I believe this alignment of operational and financial objectives is the most effective incentive to improve financial management.

The Department is committed to achieving auditability goals and has taken significant steps to ensure the goals are achieved by September 30, 2017, as directed by Congress. There is still a great deal of work required to further improve our financial and business processes in order to meet this goal. I believe the Department can succeed because it has a well-defined plan with specific short-term and intermediate milestones, combined with a long-term roadmap. DOD also provided resources for the effort (approximately $300 million per year), and a clear governance process. Overall accountability rests with me as the Deputy Secretary of Defense and CMO. However, day-to-day responsibility falls to the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and DCMO and their staffs, as well as line management throughout the DOD business enterprise. To meet audit challenges, we have developed an effective partnership between the CFO and DCMO communities that will help with implementation. The DCMO and the Military Department CMOs play an integral role in the governance processes, including overseeing the implementation of new systems and the processes they enable. Senior leadership within the military components are committed to, and accountable for, accomplishing these interim goals.

56. Senator M CCAIN. Dr. Carter, in connection with his confirmation hearing, Secretary Panetta said getting DOD auditable is a “top priority” and that he would see about accelerating the timetable to getting DOD auditable. Do you share Secretary Panetta’s views?

Dr. CARTER. I share Secretary Panetta’s desire to increase our efforts to implement the required changes and accelerate our progress in this area.

57. Senator M CCAIN. Dr. Carter, how would you improve or accelerate DOD’s plan to become auditable?

Dr. CARTER. The Department is dedicated to having fully auditable financial statements by 2017, the deadline established by Congress. On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (USD(C)/CFO) is reviewing DOD/Component Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness plans with appropriate DOD leaders to determine what improvements can be made to speed progress. Upon completion of this review, the Secretary will issue formal direction to the Service Secretaries and other leaders on additional actions they must take to ensure sufficient and qualified resources are devoted to achieving this priority in alignment with the Department’s strategy and methodology.

58. Senator M CCAIN. Dr. Carter, as CMO, you would also be responsible for ensuring that DOD fundamentally transforms how it does business—modernizes its business systems and restructures its processes. For years, GAO has identified these aspects of how DOD does business as exposing defense dollars to the risk of being waste, stolen, or otherwise abused. Why, based on your background and experience, do you think you are particularly well-suited and sufficiently qualified to address how DOD does business and how, if confirmed, you would address challenges in this area?

Dr. CARTER. As Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), I was deeply involved in the Department’s operations over the last 2 years. As Defense Acquisition Executive and Defense Logistics Executive, I have fulfilled


leadership roles similar in nature to the CMO. This experience, and particularly my experience in establishing the Better Buying Power initiative across the acquisition activities of the Department, makes me well suited and qualified to address how DOD does business. I look forward to overseeing the Department’s responses to both the broad and specific challenges that come with operating such a large, complex and vitally important resource for the Nation. I would address the challenges of modernization of our business systems and processes with the attention and thoroughness appropriate to such a costly and complex undertaking, ensuring that our senior leaders are all carrying out their roles in creating an integrated, effective, and agile business environment, while remaining good stewards of the taxpayers’ dollars.

59. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, do you think that there is merit to separating the CMO function from the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense? Please explain your answer.

Dr. Carter. I believe the current joining of functions of the CMO and Deputy Secretary of Defense is appropriate. I would inform Congress if I determined that a separation of these duties was merited.

ALTERNATIVE ENGINE FOR THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

60. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, you have steadfastly supported a single-engine for the JSF, citing the significant upfront cost of a dual-source strategy and numerous analyses showing that, under the best of circumstances, there may never be a payback for carrying two engine suppliers. Given the enormity of possible spending cuts DOD is facing and the possibility that overall production numbers of the F-35 might be reduced, what is your assessment of the business case for two engine sources today?

Dr. Carter. My position as well as the Department’s position on the business case for the alternate engine remains unchanged: the costs to pursue a second engine are significant and immediate, while the benefits are speculative and would not be realized until many years later. As you allude to, the fiscal situation facing the Department amplifies our concerns with the second engine program. The Department anticipates that many difficult situations will have to be made on major weapon systems, including the JSF program at large. DOD simply cannot afford to continue the second engine development activities with the many higher military priorities and the stringent budgets it faces.

61. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, based on what you currently know about it, why isn’t this self-financing offer something we should embrace?

Dr. Carter. The Department did not receive a proposal to self-finance the development of the alternative engine. In the absence of a proposal, it is difficult to determine whether such an idea would be in the best interests of the Department. The Department anticipates that the government would bear costs even under a self-funding proposal. For example, if the contractor self-financed the effort in isolation from the government, there would likely be a significant cost to the Government to re-integrate the second engine at a later time. The contractor may also require access to Government test assets and facilities and this would also come at a cost to the Government. In addition, the contractor could pass the self-funding costs back to the Government via increased overhead rates and production prices. Careful scrutiny of a submitted detailed proposal would be required before DOD could objectively assess whether a self-financing “offer” would be something it should embrace.

62. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, outgoing Deputy Secretary Lynn recently disagreed with the suggestion of a number of my colleagues that DOD should preserve
all the equipment associated with development of the alternate engine so that the contractors could self-fund development. Do you share Secretary Lynn’s position? Please explain.

Dr. CARTER. I do share Deputy Secretary Lynn’s position that equipment purchased by DOD should be preserved as deemed necessary for use by DOD. A significant amount of the government equipment acquired under the F136 contract does, in fact, possess utility and value to the Department. For example, the F136 ground test engines have potential value to other DOD engine science and technology programs, such as the Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology program, and requests for F136 hardware have already been received from DOD research labs. Additionally, common hardware procured under the F135 contract and provided to the F136 development program, is also useful to the F135 program. Examples include the use of exhaust modules as development and flight test spares, and the use of the lift system controls hardware in software bench testing. The lift system common hardware (lift fan, driveshaft, exhaust module, and roll posts) can also be used by the F135 program. Preservation of any other equipment not found useful would come at additional expense to the Government, something the Department is not prepared to do.

U.S. FORCE REALIGNMENTS IN THE PACIFIC REGION

64. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Carter, we were recently briefed that the current cost estimate for the U.S. share of expenses of the planned relocation of 8,700 U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam, is now over $17 billion. That’s $10 billion more than what we estimated when we reaffirmed the agreement with the Government of Japan in 2009. I expect that the U.S. cost for construction of facilities will only rise as we include land acquisitions and improvements to the infrastructure of Guam. While I understand and support the need to maintain U.S. forces in the western Pacific, at what point does the movement of marines and their families to Guam become cost prohibitive?

Dr. CARTER. Our military forces in Japan are a central feature of our Asia-Pacific strategy, and the geostategic location of Okinawa in East Asia is a critical component of this strategy. In order to ensure our continued use of facilities in Okinawa, we must not only address the impact of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on the surrounding communities, but we must also seek to reduce our overall footprint. The 2006 Realignment Roadmap attempts to accomplish these goals.

In the context of reducing the U.S. presence on Okinawa, and consistent with our renewed emphasis on the global importance of the Asia-Pacific region, we seek a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable presence in the region. Guam must be part of that solution. As the westernmost reach of U.S. sovereign territory, Guam provides unconstrained access and operational flexibility for our forces. The Department is committed to establishing an operational U.S. Marine Corps presence on Guam.

In response to numerous comments from Members of Congress, local political leaders, and citizens groups, the Department is carefully re-examining its options for Guam and is focused on developing an efficient, cost-effective laydown and master plan. I recognize the fiscal constraints we face in developing and implementing a force posture consistent with our strategy.

65. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Carter, in your opinion, given the direction to reduce defense spending, is DOD studying less costly alternatives that would achieve the same strategic benefits?

Dr. CARTER. In response to numerous comments from Members of Congress, local political leaders, and citizens groups, the Department is carefully reexamining our options for Guam and are focused on developing an efficient, cost-effective laydown and master plan. I recognize the fiscal constraints we face in developing and implementing a force posture consistent with our strategy for the region.

66. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Carter, what is your assessment of the status of the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Camp Schwab on Okinawa, a Japanese funded initiative which is supposed to be contingent on the move of marines from Okinawa to Guam?

Dr. CARTER. The Department conveyed to the Government of Japan the urgency of taking the necessary steps to get construction on the airfield underway, starting with the approval of the landfill permit. In my judgment, the Japanese remain committed to the Realignment Roadmap.
At the “2+2” meeting in June of this year, Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton endorsed a plan for the configuration of the runway, while acknowledging that the FRF would not be completed by the Realignment Roadmap target date of 2014.

Construction on the ground at Camp Schwab, which will enable the airfield construction to move forward more rapidly, has been underway for the past few years.

Dr. CARTER. “Tangible progress” on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) should be understood within the context of the complete language in the Roadmap concerning the linkage between actions on Okinawa and Guam: “the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF and (2) Japan’s financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.”

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on February 15, 2011, Secretary of Defense Gates reiterated this formula, and further indicated his expectation that a decision on runway configuration would allow us to continue implementing the agreement. At the “2+2” meeting on June 21, 2011, Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton endorsed a plan for the configuration of the runway, while acknowledging that the FRF would not be completed by the Realignment Roadmap target date of 2014.

Tangible progress should not be thought of as single, specific event, but rather as a series of steps of roughly parallel Japanese and U.S. actions. Our understanding with the Government of Japan is that as progress on the FRF is achieved, the United States will take associated steps to move forward on Guam. I would see examples of noteworthy progress on the FRF being the decision on the runway configuration, approval of the environmental impact assessment, issuance of the landfill permit, construction of the seawall, and progress on the landfill itself.

68. Senator M. CCAIN. Dr. Carter, DOD recently awarded construction projects on Guam using funds provided by the Government of Japan, despite the lack of tangible progress on Futenma and despite concerns formally raised by this committee on the lack of a plan and cost estimate for the marines on Guam. Can you explain why the construction contract was awarded at this time in light of congressional concerns and unanswered questions?

Dr. CARTER. I appreciate the committee’s concern regarding the Guam military realignment. In determining whether to award the Japanese-funded utilities and site improvements project, the Department seriously considered these concerns, as well as the interests of our partners in Japan and Guam, and the actions taken by the House. DOD deferred award of both the Apra Harbor Medical Clinic project and the option for utilities and site improvements at Finegayan. However, we elected to move forward with the utilities and site improvement work at Apra Harbor and Andersen Air Force Base (AFB), funded with Japanese fiscal year 2009 cash contributions, as these projects directly support previously awarded Military Construction (MILCON) projects and will be operationally beneficial. Congressional notification was completed in October 2010, and your staff was briefed at that time.

The Government of Japan supported the decision to award the contract. With this first award of a Japanese-funded project, the United States is demonstrating its commitment to the Realignment Roadmap in accordance with the joint statement at the time of the June 2011 “2+2” meeting.

Tangible progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) should not be viewed as a single, specific event, but rather as a series of steps of roughly parallel Japanese and U.S. actions, as spelled out in our bilateral understandings on realignment. As the Government of Japan makes progress on the FRF, DOD will take associated steps to move forward on Guam.

An essential point regarding the relationship between the Okinawa and Guam initiatives is that preparation on Guam will need to begin in advance of actual construction on the ground for the replacement facility at Camp Schwab. This will ensure that when Japan makes satisfactory progress on the FRF, suitable facilities will be available on Guam allowing the phased relocation of marines from Okinawa, sequenced in such a way as to maintain unit cohesion and operational readiness. The movement of marines to Guam, consistent with the agreement, depends on tangible progress towards the completion of the FRF at Camp Schwab.

69. Senator M. CCAIN. Dr. Carter, if you are confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, how would you approach this issue?
Dr. Carter, I will continue to consult closely with all relevant committees of Congress, allies, and partners in implementing the necessary force posture adjustments, consistent with the Department’s regional strategy.

**MILITARY PAY REFORM**

70. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (JSCDR) has to make some decisions in the weeks ahead about future defense costs. The current 20-year military retirement system has come under scrutiny, particularly as the JSCDR begins its work and the requirement for deep cuts in defense costs looms. What is your sense of DOD’s current position regarding retention of the current 20-year retirement system?

Dr. Carter. The 20-year retirement system has been a part of the military compensation and culture for decades; the entire force profile and promotion system is built around that structure. Revising or eliminating such a system must be approached deliberately and with a great amount of circumspection. The Department’s leadership must be confident that any change in retirement will not have a significantly deleterious effect on the force or on individuals in the force, but will be supportive of recruitment and retention and will fairly compensate our servicemembers.

71. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, do you see the need for change? Please explain.

Dr. Carter. Overall, I see the need for a close review and analysis of the military retirement package. The review must consider the impact on recruiting and retention, the welfare of individual members, and judicious use of taxpayer dollars and the defense budget. Whether that review and analysis will support the case for change is undetermined at this point.

72. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, what would DOD’s response be to a call for a recommendation regarding maintaining the current system or relying on a new system?

Dr. Carter. As far as recommendations, the Department already had several such calls, from various sources, for both preservation and reformation of the military retirement system. At this point, DOD’s response is that the impact on military accessions and retention and other impacts on the force structure must be carefully assessed. While the military retirement system, as with all other compensation and benefits, is a fair subject of review for effectiveness and efficiency, no changes to the current retirement system have been recommended or approved by the Department, and no changes will be made precipitously or without careful consideration of potential consequences for both the current and future force.

73. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, what would be your answer to a question from a currently serving military member about the future of the 20-year retirement system?

Dr. Carter. The Department’s leadership is extremely sensitive to ensure we do not break faith with our currently serving members, especially those who demonstrated an inclination to a full military career by serving past their initial obligation period. Any proposed change or changes to the current system will be evaluated carefully and consideration of those obligations will be of the highest priority.

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE**

**CIVILIAN HIRING FREEZE**

74. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, many small units in my State are being negatively affected by the civilian hiring freeze. They are not able to replace important positions in maintenance on our flight lines and depots, flight training, and other specialties. These cuts affect each unit’s ability to accomplish their mission. In the last 5 years, blue collar and technical positions have flatlined. However, white collar professional and administrative positions have grown by 19 percent. This statistic may be an indicator of an increasingly top-heavy corps of DOD civilians, but reflects that at the worker-level, our DOD professionals continue to do more with less. What is the way forward for the civilian hiring freeze?

Dr. Carter. As part of the Department’s efficiency initiative, Secretary Gates directed DOD organizations to hold to fiscal year 2010 civilian funding levels, with some exceptions, for the next 3 years. This should not be perceived as a civilian hiring freeze but rather the Department’s commitment to challenge workload requirements and more appropriately size its workforce to meet the most pressing and crit-
ical priorities. In particular, Secretary Gates’ efforts focused on reducing administrative functions associated with headquarters staff while realigning resources to warfighting capability, force structure recapitalization, and unit readiness. Secretary Panetta and I are committed to ensuring that the Department possesses everything it needs to protect national security at a time of considerable fiscal challenge in our country. To do so, spending choices must be based on sound strategy and policy. While some DOD organizations may be implementing short-term hiring freezes, sometimes referred to as strategic pauses, there is no Department-wide hiring freeze or constraint on any specific aspect of the workforce. These strategic pauses give Commanders and managers an opportunity to assess their organizational structure, identify their most pressing and critical areas, and minimize the potential adverse impact on our dedicated civil service workforce. Mission capability and unit readiness are a key element of these assessments.

75. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, how will you ensure that DOD operations are not affected by the reductions in DOD civilians?

Dr. CARTER. Reductions in the Department’s civilian workforce are being considered strategically and holistically (along with military end-strength, contracted services, and overall force structure). Any such reductions will be made in a manner that mitigates risk and minimizes impact on overall DOD operations, mission capability, operational readiness, and warfighter/family support. However, as Secretary Panetta and the Department’s leadership have repeatedly stated, any further budget reductions beyond those in the current agreements, or constraints on hiring or retention of the Department’s civilian workforce, would have an extremely adverse impact on our military’s readiness and ability to execute the Nation’s defense.

COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL ACQUISITION RULE REFORM

76. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, despite well-founded attempts to improve our Federal Acquisition Rules (FARs) they remain complicated and outdated, leading to increased procurement times and costs. There are 1,680 policy documents and 91 laws affecting the FARs. There were 30 new documents added in 2011 alone. DOD has developed alternative procedures, working groups, and organizations, such as the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), that essentially bypass the current FARs, in order to rapidly field new weapons systems.

The General Services Administration (GSA), NASA, DOD, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) met in February to develop “bold, new ways to improve the product quality and timeliness of the FAR process … [and call] for a tune-up of the FARs.” FARs need more than a tune-up. The FAR Counsel, made up of the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of National Aeronautics and Space, and the Administrator of General Services, are too busy to focus on rewriting and overhauling FARs. Do you believe the FARs have played a role in increasing the procurement costs and timelines of our weapon systems?

Dr. CARTER. On the whole, I do not believe that the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) increases procurement costs and timelines of our weapon systems. I also note that we continuously update the FAR to reflect current statutes, executive orders, and acquisition policies. DOD supplements the FAR in the Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) to reflect Department-unique laws and policies, and continuously updates the DFARS to ensure currency. The FAR and DFARS are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, and revisions/updates to the FAR and DFARS are processed in accordance with the requirements of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act. These requirements include public comment periods that allow for all interested parties to provide comments and recommendations.

As part of our Better Buying Power Initiative, we are looking very carefully at all processes and regulations that govern the operation of the acquisition system. My intent is to eliminate all that fail to add value and, consequently, to avoid the cost and unnecessary administrative burden they impose on our acquisitions.

Separately, as a matter of clarification, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) does not bypass the FAR. The JIEDDO leads, advocates, and coordinates all DOD actions in support of the combatant commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices (IED) as weapons of strategic influence. It leverages the experience and expertise of warfighters across the Military Services, enhances network attack focus, increases procurement of device-defeat tools, and builds a robust set of IED-specific force training operations. However, it does not use procurement processes outside the FAR and DFARS.
Finally, the Department established the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) to facilitate an expeditious response to validated urgent Warfighter needs. The JRAC provides help in pushing urgent requirements through processes that are optimized for speed but compliant with the FAR and DFARS.

77. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, what do you think of setting up a 1-year commission to overhaul and rewrite FARs, a commission with members selected by Congress and organizations on the FAR Council responsible to reporting back to Congress their recommendations on streamlining and simplifying the FARs while ensuring proper oversight?

Dr. CARTER. I do not believe that we need such a commission. We continuously update the FAR and the DOD FAR Supplement (DFARS) to ensure implementation of current statutes, executive orders, and acquisition policies, as well as the deletion of obsolete text. As the Department takes these actions, one of the principles is to simplify and streamline the text to the maximum extent possible.

The FAR does not increase the lead times or costs of procurements. The existing process ensures the currency of the FAR and DFARS, and a 1-year commission to overhaul and rewrite the FAR is not necessary and not an effective use of resources.

PALADIN

78. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, I disagreed with the decision to terminate the Future Combat Systems (FCS) because our Army is in desperate need of modernization and our soldiers deserve better than 50-year-old combat vehicles with layers of new paint. The Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) is now the Army’s lead fire support modernization effort in the wake of non-line-of-sight cannon (NLOS–C) cancellation. PIM will enhance the operational capability of the 46-year-old Paladin until we are able to acquire the next generation self-propelled howitzer. PIM is currently funded and I continue to work with the Army to accelerate fielding. Can you explain the significance of the PIM program and the importance of this program moving forward?

Dr. CARTER. The PIM program consists of a process that rebuilds vehicle platforms to original factory standards and applies modifications to deliver “like new” platforms, while incorporating improved subsystems and components to address obsolescence and supportability issues. The objectives are to ensure supportability/maintainability/interoperability by leveraging Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) fleet commonality for key components (engine, transmission, final drives, and suspension); replacing obsolete components; reducing logistics footprints; reducing operations and support costs; maintaining performance; leveraging Bradley common components; addressing crew survivability issues; and performing technology insertion.

PIM will address increased force protection and survivability requirements. The PIM also fills existing capability gaps in the self-propelled artillery portfolio brought about by an aging fleet and the termination of prior modernization efforts. PIM provides growth potential in Space, Weight and Power (SWaP) and capacity for network expansion to accommodate future howitzer related needs, such as force protection packages. The Department is scheduled to award a Comprehensive Contract Modification by the end of 2011 and maintain Milestone C in June 2013.

F–35

79. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, DOD recently sent a report to Congress on the Chinese military, warning that: “…China’s military has benefited from robust investment in modern hardware and technology. Many modern systems have reached maturity and others will become operational in the next few years.” One of those investments includes their new J–20 stealth fighter, which is actively undergoing testing. Russia is also unveiling its fifth generation fighter jet—the T–50—and is preparing to present it to the world market.

What impact does the development and potential export of Chinese and Russian fifth generation fighters, proliferation the new surface-to-air missile systems, and improvements in missiles and sensor technology have on our legacy aircraft?

Dr. CARTER. Modern fighter aircraft, surface to air missiles, and sensors constitute a part of the growing threat posed to U.S. military forces by a wide array of systems. Our most capable adversaries are also deploying ballistic and cruise missiles, modern surface ships and submarines, mines, anti-satellite weapons, cyber threats, electronic warfare systems, and other weapons that enable anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategies.
DOD is assessing these threats and instituted a number of initiatives to counter them. These run the gamut from developing new platforms (e.g., the F–35 and a new penetrating bomber), to fielding improved weapons and munitions (e.g., an extended range air-to-surface standoff monition and a beyond-visual-range infrared air-to-air missile), to advanced electronic countermeasures, to new concepts for integrating and employing joint forces.

In this dynamic threat environment, legacy aircraft operate at higher risk compared to fifth-generation aircraft but can conduct a range of necessary missions given adequate investments in upgraded avionics, sensors, and weapons. Within the context of these and other developments, U.S. forces will continue to operate a mixed fleet of mutually supporting fifth generation and legacy aircraft, investing in a more modern force over time.

80. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, is 2,443 the validated number of F–35s required by our Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps? If so, is DOD committed to fielding the required fleet of 2,443 F–35s for all three Services and delivering the airplane to our international partners and allies as quickly and affordably as possible?

Dr. CARTER. The current program of record is 2,443 F–35s for the three U.S. Military Services. The Department is committed to fielding the F–35 as efficiently and affordably as possible to meet the Services and DOD requirements. Our international partners determine their own requirements, based on how many F–35 aircraft they need and when they need to purchase those aircraft. The partners negotiate directly with the contractor based on their requirements timeline.

81. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, as a proportion of total combat deaths, infantry has increased from 71 percent in World War II to 81 percent in wars fought since. Our acquisitions system is optimized for procuring large systems instead of extending our tactical dominance to the tactical edge. We need to meet the challenge, however, to make our small units tactically dominant. I echo General Dempsey’s call to make the infantry squad more lethal. He said, “We don’t want to send a soldier into harm’s way who doesn’t overmatch his enemies.” I am concerned that we may lose budget-share for our organizations that support the individual rifleman—a large portion of the program executive office (PEO) soldier budget comes from overseas contingency operations (OCO) which is dwindling even though we are still heavily engaged in Afghanistan. Is DOD looking at warfare from the ground up?

Dr. CARTER. Despite anticipated changes in overseas contingency operations and fiscal challenges, the Department is committed to providing small units with the equipment and training needed to maintain tactical dominance. Although our warfighters are better trained, led, and equipped, and more capable than ever, the Department must continuously evolve to maintain dominance over changing enemies and threats.

82. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, what are some of the ways DOD is working to improve and lighten the load on our ground forces?

Dr. CARTER. The Department intends to continue pursuit of lighter body armor; lighter and more capable individual and crew-served weapons; and smaller, lighter, and more efficient batteries in order to reduce the burden on our ground forces.

83. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, how will you ensure our acquisition system can better equip our soldiers and marines at the tactical edge?

Dr. CARTER. It is important for the Department to continue using all available acquisition means to lighten the rifleman’s load and increase survivability and lethality. In addition to employing a deliberate acquisition approach to mature new technologies and integrate them into military equipment, the Department is responding to urgent warfighting needs by fielding mature capabilities as rapidly as possible, using all available rapid acquisition authorities, and working to better formalize and enhance the rapid acquisition process.

ARMY VEHICLE MODERNIZATION

84. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, the Army procured its current fleet of combat vehicles 30 to 60 years ago and they are aging at an increasingly rapid rate. General Casey and General Chiarelli have stated they are burning up equipment as soon as they can procure it. Yet, Army procurement funding decreased $31 billion from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2010. In a June 16, 2009, Senate Armed Services
Committee Airland Subcommittee hearing, LTG Thompson (Army Chief Acquisition Officer) said, “The Army has tried 5 times in the past 20 years to modernize its fighting vehicles . . . It has kept its tanks and Bradleys operationally relevant [but] at some point in time the Army has to modernize those 16,000 fighting vehicles for the future or we are going to put soldiers in harm’s way.” The Army is moving forward with plans on the next combat ground vehicle but the only vehicle being discussed is the infantry vehicle. What is the overall plan for Army vehicle modernization?

Dr. CARTER. The Army has a comprehensive Combat Vehicle Modernization strategy that addresses key capability shortfalls for the entire combat vehicle fleet (Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Stryker, and M113 family). The strategy is based on three parallel and complementary efforts: transform, replace, and improve. The highest priority effort is transforming the capability of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team by acquiring the Ground Combat Vehicle Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The second priority is replacing the M113 Family of Vehicles with an Armored-Multi Purpose Vehicle (AMPV). Lastly, the Army will improve the Abrams tank, Bradley Cavalry, Fire Support, and Engineer Vehicles, and the Stryker to increase protection, ensure required mobility, and allow integration of the emerging network. This strategy ensures the Army’s entire fleet of combat vehicles will be able to operate side-by-side across formations with common situational awareness and required levels of protection, mobility, and lethality.

85. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, what vehicles will be included as part of the Army’s next combat ground vehicle?

Dr. CARTER. The Army is pursuing an incremental approach to procuring new Ground Combat Vehicle capabilities. The Army will first replace the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle with a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). The GCV acquisition strategy implements innovative measures designed to keep the program on schedule and on budget, to include fixed-price incentive fee contracts in the 2-year Technology Development phase, an increased emphasis on mature technologies and reliance on competition throughout the program as an incentive. First, contractors will work collaboratively with the Army to develop competitive, best-value engineering designs to meet critical Army needs. Concurrently, the Army will initiate a dynamic update to its GCV Infantry Fighting Vehicle analysis of alternatives and conduct separate technical and operational assessments of existing non-developmental vehicles. Results from this assessment, along with contractors design efforts, will inform GCV requirements to support the next program milestone and facilitate a full and open competition for the next phase of the GCV program. Further increments of the vehicle are anticipated in the future, as additional capabilities are required.

In terms of the overall combat vehicle portfolio, the Army is also examining potential solutions for the Armored Multi-Platform Vehicle to replace the M113. The Army will conduct analysis to determine whether modified platforms already in the inventory or non-developmental vehicles provide the best capability.

86. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, will we be procuring one type of vehicle at time or multiple platforms?

Dr. CARTER. To ensure interoperability of the Army’s mounted force, the Department will invest in multiple platforms simultaneously, through a combination of new procurement and vehicle upgrade programs.

87. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, when do you expect increased budgets for procuring these vehicles?

Dr. CARTER. The Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) is funded in PB12 and the funding extends throughout the FYDP. In addition to the GCV, the Army’s Combat Vehicle Modernization (CVM) strategy has several other components, to include upgrading Abrams tanks and non-IFV Bradleys. Upon congressional approval of a new start, the Army intends to initiate the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) program. The AMPV will replace the M113 Family of Vehicles (FOV) with a platform that is more survivable and mobile and can accomplish missions across the full spectrum of conflict.

The Army’s PB12 request includes RDT&E funding for all three CVM components. Procurement funding for the AMPV is planned to start in fiscal year 2014 with the first unit equipped planned for fiscal year 2017. Abrams and non-IFV Bradley upgrades are also funded in PB12 and the funding extends throughout the FYDP.

The Army believes that collectively, all components of the Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy are within the Army’s projected funding resources.
IRAQ

88. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, there are approximately 46,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and other Iraqi leaders have indicated they would like a U.S. presence beyond 2011 focused on training their forces, intelligence, and protecting their air space and borders. Massoud Barzani, President of Iraqi Kurdistan, said if American troops leave, the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq after U.S.-led operations began might erupt anew and called on the Iraqi Government to sign an agreement with the Americans to keep forces in the country.

The Obama administration is finalizing several options that could leave as little as 3,000 to 4,000 U.S. forces in Iraq beyond that date, but no decision has been made by Iraq or the United States. This number is significantly lower than the 14,000 to 18,000 recently presented by General Lloyd Austin, Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Iraq. I believe leaving 3,000–4,000 U.S. forces in Iraq increases the risk to those forces and jeopardizes the successes achieved made by the Iraqi people and the coalition of nations who help liberate them. What is the U.S. Government’s strategic plan in Iraq and how does a U.S. force presence contribute to that strategy?

Dr. Carter. Strategically, a long-term partnership with the Iraqi Government and people is in the United States’ interest, and a relationship with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) will be an important part of that partnership. The Department is currently in negotiations with the Iraqi Government about the nature of that relationship. The negotiations to date focused on possible mission sets to support the ISF in areas that Iraqi commanders have identified as shortfalls, such as: logistics, air and maritime security training, combined arms training for Iraq’s external defense, and intelligence fusion for Iraqi counterterrorism operations.

Iraq no longer needs large numbers of U.S. forces to maintain internal stability, and the commanders in the field assess that the ISF can handle counter-insurgency operations. The ISF has the lead for security, and levels of violence remain dramatically reduced from where they were in 2006 and 2007.

At this point, no decisions have been made about any force levels in Iraq after 2011. The United States will continue to adhere to the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.

89. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, how does a U.S. force presence in Iraq impact the security of the region?

Dr. Carter. Given Iraq’s importance and strategic location, it is profoundly in the U.S. national interest that Iraq emerge as a strategic partner to the United States; sovereign, stable and self-reliant; and a positive force for moderation and stability.

We seek to achieve that end in part through the development of a continuing security partnership similar to those the United States has with other countries in the region. Such a partnership, which would center around a training mission, would be defined based on Iraqi desires, available U.S. and Iraqi resources, and competing global requirements. Training the Iraqi Security Forces would increase Iraq’s capacity for both internal and external defense, and would build toward our shared objective of a strong strategic partnership that contributes to regional security.

That said, no final decisions have been made—nor have we reached an agreement with the Government of Iraq—about a post-2011 U.S. presence in Iraq.

90. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, what are the courses of action currently being looked at in Iraq, what are the risks associated with different courses with regard to troop levels, and what missions can be accomplished with those force levels?

Dr. Carter. We are currently in negotiations with the Iraqi Government about the nature and scope of a potential future relationship. Any future security relationship would be fundamentally different from the one that we have had since 2003. The United States wants a normal, productive relationship with Iraq going forward—a partnership like we have with other countries in the region and around the world.

For some time, the Department had had informal consultations with our Iraqi partners, including senior Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) officials, regarding ISF gaps and areas in which the ISF might request training post-2011. These areas include combined arms training, necessary for Iraq’s external defense; intelligence fusion (essential for a counterterrorism capability); air and maritime security training; and logistics.

The negotiations to date have focused on the possible mission sets to support the ISF in these and other areas. Any post-2011 U.S. forces presence upon which the United States and Iraq might ultimately agree would flow from the requirements to support training and related mission sets.
Again, we have made no final decisions—nor reached any agreement with the Iraqis—about a post-2011 U.S. forces presence in Iraq.

AFGHANISTAN

91. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, Afghanistan remains as one of the epicenters of violent extremism. Progress has been made but it is fragile and reversible. The deadlines of July 2011, summer of 2012, and December 2014 continue to have a devastating effect on operations and has sent the wrong message to our coalition partners, the people of Afghanistan, and the Taliban. Enemy activity in Afghanistan historically intensifies during the summer and this summer prove no different as evidenced by the bombing in Wardak Province on Sunday and the attacks in Kabul today. However, the Obama administration began drawing down U.S. forces beginning this July when almost 1,000 soldiers from the 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team from Oklahoma were rerouted at the 11th hour to Kuwait. This strategy of not replacing units as they rotate out of Afghanistan is disruptive and increases risk.

August was the deadliest month for U.S. forces since the war in Afghanistan began in 2001 with a total of 66 killed, 30 in a Chinook helicopter crash on August 6. Since July 29, 2011, Oklahoma soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan—they are doing a great job, are well-trained, but they are fighting it out every day executing the mission we have given them. President Obama has ordered the withdrawal of 10,000 U.S. forces by the end of 2011 and another 23,000 by the summer of 2012, leaving about 68,000 forces on the ground. What rationale drove the drawdown at the height of the fighting season?

Dr. CARTER. The "surge" of forces ordered by President Obama in 2009 was never intended to be open-ended, and has always been connected to the beginning of the transition process, which began in 2011. Campaign progress allowed the Department to begin recovering "surge forces," marking an important milestone toward the completion of the transition of lead security responsibility to the ANSFs by the end of 2014. Further, decisions over the pace and timing of the drawdown, within the designated milestones, were delegated to Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force (USFOR–A/ISAF). DOD is carefully monitoring campaign progress, and will ensure that decisions about force strength support the strategy.

92. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, Ambassador Crocker said earlier this month that the United States must demonstrate strategic presence to win this long war in Afghanistan. Do you believe setting withdrawal dates of July 2012 and December 2014 demonstrates strategic patience and shows U.S. long-term commitment?

Dr. CARTER. The beginning of the recovery of the surge forces and the plan for completing transition of lead responsibility for security throughout the country to Afghan forces by the end of 2014, combined with the strategic partnership the United States is negotiating with the Afghan Government, show strategic patience and long-term commitment. These dates are achievable and consistent with the Afghans' own desire and efforts to increase their responsibility and leadership for the security of their country.

93. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, do you believe that a stable Afghanistan will help prevent future attacks like that of September 11, 2001, on this country?

Dr. CARTER. Yes, President Obama’s strategy—as laid out in his West Point address on December 1, 2009—focuses on our core goal, which is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and to prevent its capacity to threaten the United States and our allies and partners in the future.

To accomplish this, the Department is pursuing three objectives that will secure and stabilize the country: deny al Qaeda a safe haven, reverse the Taliban’s momentum, and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.

DOD made substantial progress on these objectives and have exceeded our expectations on the core goal of defeating al Qaeda, killing 20 of its top 30 leaders, including Osama bin Laden. The United States and its allies have broken the Taliban’s momentum in their heartland in Kandahar and Helmand. We have also trained more than 100,000 new ANSF personnel, who are now in the lead for security responsibilities in seven areas of the country, with more to follow this fall.

This undeniable progress is important to American security because it helps foster an Afghanistan that is stable and secure—a country in which extremists will not find
a safe haven or a platform for launching attacks on the United States and our allies and partners.

WEAPONS BOYCOTTS

94. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, European activists, including European parliamentarians, are pressuring European banks and funds to divest themselves of millions of dollars in investments in U.S. companies that produce landmines, cluster munitions, and nuclear weapons. Such actions harm the U.S. defense industrial base and also imperil the military strategy of our Armed Forces and allies. The efforts of these groups are occurring outside the legitimate international dialogue about these important weapons systems, the United Nations’ (UN) Convention on Cluster Weapons.

In fact, efforts by international activists to disrupt U.S. munitions industries are misguided. Modern cluster munitions like the CBU–97 are more properly termed sensor fused weapons because they use sensors to increase their lethality against legitimate targets while protecting civilians against unexploded munitions and indiscriminate effects.

Moreover, as DOS says, sensor-fused weapons, cluster munitions, and nuclear weapons are important tools in the U.S. national defense strategy that ensures our freedom and protects the lives of our soldiers. “Their elimination from U.S. stockpiles would put the lives of its soldiers and those of its coalition partners at risk,” DOS writes.

There have been proposals to register and sanction foreign entities that seek to disrupt the U.S. defense industry. Such foreign entities, private and public, hold important defense suppliers at risk and endanger the U.S. defense industrial base, an important part of our Nation’s military power. Do these foreign boycotts pose a material risk to our national defense?

Dr. CARTER. Given the interdependence of global commerce, I share the concern that national security and economic security face new risks. Foreign laws, policies, and international agreements, to which the United States is not a party, may impact our industrial base and thus affect our national defense.

95. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, what actions is DOD taking to ensure that we are able to continue to be able to use these legitimate weapons systems?

Dr. CARTER. The Department established a policy in 2008 that restricts use of cluster munitions after 2018 to those that have a submunition failure rate of not more than 1 percent, thereby preserving the ability to employ an important military capability while addressing humanitarian concerns associated with cluster munition use. The Department continues to support negotiations within the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons framework on a cluster munitions protocol that will protect U.S. national security interests.

96. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, does DOD currently have the authorities necessary to protect our defense industrial base from weapons boycotts?

Dr. CARTER. The influence of activists and foreign governments on the U.S. defense industrial base is a complex dynamic. Protecting the U.S. defense industrial base and national security interests will require the Department to collaborate effectively with other executive branch agencies and Congress. We continue to work to understand and communicate the risks to the industrial base and work closely with other nations to preserve domestic industrial capabilities.

TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

97. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, traumatic brain injury (TBI) continues to be one of the most prevalent wounds from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ability to diagnose and treat TBI continues to be problematic despite the priority Congress and the Army have given to it. I remain concerned that we are not adequately screening our soldiers when they return. Once diagnosed with TBI, we need to be able to treat our wounded warriors and ensure that treatment is continued as long as needed to include transition to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) care. Various alternative treatments for TBI may have promise and are used in the private sector but few of these treatments have been approved for use on Army soldiers. In a report by National Public Radio, General Chiarelli expressed frustration about the pace of the vetting of these treatments. What frictions are delaying the vetting of alternative treatments?
Dr. CARTER. DOD has enacted TBI screening programs by establishing policies that mandate a medical evaluation after a servicemember is exposed to a potentially concussive event and post-deployment health assessments. Alternative treatment studies must be developed in accordance with the highest standards of scientific research and analysis. Each discovery leads to new questions or problems to be solved such as co-occurrence with disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder. Well-considered research designs paired with streamlined research policies allow military supported research to answer critical questions and make valuable contributions to the health and welfare of our servicemembers and to the country. DOD is looked to as the leader in neurotrauma research, and the DOD neurotrauma portfolio complements similar areas of research funded through the National Institutes of Health and the Department of Veterans Affairs. As the many investments in TBI and psychological health research begin to come to fruition, the collective understanding of these health concerns will improve, leading to more effective screening techniques and treatment strategies.

98. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, what can we do to speed up the process of the vetting better ways of diagnosing and treating TBI?

Dr. CARTER. To address this process of vetting better ways of diagnosis and treatment, we have put into place a method for a comprehensive review of a large portfolio of over 400 studies on TBI. DOD used a series of In Process Reviews (IPRs) to examine individual studies in specific subsections of the portfolio. In these IPRs, individual researchers are invited to present their ongoing work to panels of individuals from DOD, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). This presents opportunities for the government to share information across agencies, to mitigate any potential redundancies, to leverage overlaps, and to remain informed of study progress and/or delays. As some of these individuals are clinicians, the IPRs help facilitate rapid translation of emerging research data into improved clinical care. The IPR process also presents investigators with opportunities to ask questions of the government, to share data or lessons-learned, and to identify collaborators. For example, just this year, DOD reviewed the current status on studies that address neuroimaging, non-invasive diagnostics in mild TBI, blast brain research and biomarker findings, cognitive rehabilitation and biomechanics after injury. This review process allows the Department to quickly assess what strategies work and just as important, what strategies do not work. The size of the entire DOD research portfolio on TBI cannot be overstated. The process for vetting research findings to identify and field safe and effective clinical care has proven to be the most efficient methodology to date.

To further speed up the process of vetting better ways of diagnosing and treating TBI, researchers need access to emerging data from studies. To help facilitate direct comparison among studies, the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command and NIH are developing a Federal Interagency Traumatic Brain Injury Research (FITBIR) database to store, integrate and share datasets from numerous small and large studies so that researchers can collaborate on future research. The FITBIR database will allow for comparison across research studies based on a common set of data elements, thereby advancing our understanding of research outcomes more quickly, and lead to more rapid validation and adoption of best practices, to include effective diagnostic modalities and treatment alternatives.¹

99. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, what types of equipment solutions are being developed, procured, and fielded to help prevent, measure, and identify TBI?

Dr. CARTER. DOD TBI research portfolio is comprised of more than 400 studies investigating numerous questions across the full spectrum of TBI prevention, screening, diagnosis, treatment, and recovery. Some of these studies have led to the development or refinement of new blast wave sensors and accelerometers. Different versions of sensors are currently being fielded with deploying units as part of new helmet designs. Characterizing the effects of blast waves with different parameters on the human body is a very complicated endeavor, and is a high priority in many areas of the DOD research portfolio, not just in the TBI portion. A wide variety of approaches are being taken simultaneously to address these questions, including computational modeling, improved animal models, advanced physics, and even unprecedented integration of operational and field epidemiologic data.

Other areas of major investment include of non-invasive, field deployable mild TBI (mTBI) diagnostics, and neuroimaging. Currently, mTBI, by definition, is not

visible using conventional imaging technologies, but data from ongoing studies is beginning to reveal improved ways of identifying, measuring, and describing specific brain changes associated with TBI. Research which includes Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI), a new imaging modality, is starting to show promising—but still very early—results for detecting mTBI. In addition, other technological advancements are being fielded to include EYE–TRAC (Eye-Tracking Rapid Attention Computation) that may help to evaluate attention and concentration problems after mTBI. Quantitative EEG (Electroencephalography) is also being fielded as an objective diagnostic device that may help identify mild TBI on the battlefield.

SALE OF MI–17S TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

100. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, DOD is spending billions to rebuild the helicopter fleets of Iraq and Afghanistan, by using Russian helicopters. The rationale is that Iraq and Afghan pilots, along with maintainers are used to operating Russian hardware. This ignores the fact that we are not equipping the same personnel that flew and maintained the old aircraft. We are training new pilots starting in small training aircraft. The program misses an opportunity to build ongoing relationships with these two countries. Iraq and Afghanistan will have to deal with Russia, not the United States, to supply and fix their aircraft for decades to come. We are also missing an opportunity to spend tax dollars at home. The money to buy the Russian helicopters is spent at the Russian defense export agency, and the money to refurbish and fix the Russian helicopters is paid to Russia-certified Russian airframe and propulsion mechanics. What is the rationale that DOD is using to justify buying Russian-made and maintained helicopters for our Iraq and Afghan allies?

Dr. CARTER. The United States provides assistance to our partner nations as a critical enabler in building an enduring capability for them to operate and maintain rotary wing fleets for both the ongoing war on terrorism and to enhance their internal security. To develop capabilities that they can sustain without continued U.S. assistance, some partners require low-cost, low-maintenance platforms.

As stated in the question, the rationale to provide and support Mi-17s involve pilot and maintenance personnel familiarity, as well as complementing prior inventories of these aircraft models; cultural suitability; and the partner nation’s preferences. Decisions were guided by the commanders on scene. Past procurements focused on the Mi-17 to leverage existing experience and because the aircraft provides critical capabilities not easily replaced by other platforms. The Mi-17 is a multi-purpose aircraft that spans the medium- and heavy-lift categories, and can carry out attack and transport roles simultaneously. Simply stated, it is a low-tech platform that can lift a large payload.

The Afghans have been using the Mi-17/Mi-8 series helicopters since the early 1980s due to its ability to operate at high-altitudes and in high temperatures with heavy loads. When the United States began rebuilding the Afghan Air Force (AAF), there were at least six Mi-17/Mi-8 aircraft being operated by the Afghans. The Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) decided to continue to support the Mi-17 due to: its proven operational capabilities in the extreme environments of Afghanistan; its relatively low cost; and the fact that the maintenance system for the Mi-17 is easier for the AAF members to operate—an important factor due to the limitations of the education system in Afghanistan. The Afghans have since been introduced to western helicopters in the form of the MD–530 which is a very basic, light training helicopter that will be used for their initial entry rotary wing training.

The initial Iraqi Air Force procurement of 18 Mi-17s, one of the first procurement decisions made by the fledgling Iraq Ministry of Defense (MoD), was undertaken without assistance from U.S. advisors and proved problematic. The decision to fill out the Iraqi fleet with 22 additional Mi-17s was made by the Government of Iraq (GoI) and supported by the Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq (MNSTC–I) to meet Iraq’s priorities. The latter MoD contract was processed through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program which is a more robust and transparent approach for building Iraq’s security forces. Iraq has not indicated any intent to procure additional Mi-17s.

As the Iraq security forces and their sustaining institutions have grown more comfortable with U.S. equipment and the FMS program, the GoI has expressed increasing interest in U.S. helicopters. The Iraqi MoD has already purchased 24 Bell helicopters, and has shown interest in purchasing additional U.S.-made helicopters when funding is available. Also, the Department recently notified Congress of our intent to sell six observation and 10–12 utility helicopters to the Iraqi police forces. We will continue to work with Iraq using the FMS system.
101. Senator INHOFE. Dr. Carter, what opportunities were U.S. companies given to compete their helicopters for this purpose or to compete for the procurement and maintenance of the Russian helicopters?

Dr. CARTER. Russian helicopters, such as the Mi-17, have been procured four times; competitive details are summarized as follows:

In December 2007, the Army Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation purchased 22 Mi-17 aircraft for an Iraq FMS case. The contract was awarded sole source to ARINC, a U.S.-based firm, on the basis of unusual and compelling urgency. The Justification and Approval was approved by the Army Acquisition Executive.

In 2008, the U.S. Navy Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office (CNTPO) purchased 10 Mi-17 aircraft, through the Strategic Missile Defense Command (SMDC), in support of an Afghan requirement. The competitively awarded, Indefinite Delivery/ Indefinite Quantity, Multiple Award Task Order Contract has five U.S. prime contractors: ARINC, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and U.S. Training Center; ARINC was competitively selected for this order.

In 2009, the Naval Air Systems Command awarded a competitive contract to a U.S. company, DTI, for four civilian Mi-17 aircraft in support of an Afghan requirement.

In May 2011, the Army Nonstandard Rotary Wing Program Office awarded a sole source contract, through the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM), for 21 Mi-17 aircraft in support of an Afghan requirement to Rosoboronexport (ROE), the Russian Federation's approved military export agency. The Secretary of the Army approved a Public Interest Determination and Findings that ROE is the only lawful source under Russian export control laws for the acquisition of military end-use Mi-17 aircraft. Diplomatic exchanges had previously confirmed the Russian assertions, first raised in November 2010, when the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the U.S. Ambassador to Russia that aircraft to be procured for the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense were considered Military End Use and, as such, Russian law required they be procured as military items through ROE. Prior to May 2010, DOS sanctions imposed on ROE precluded such a contract. Future procurement of Russian aircraft for military end-use purposes is expected to be subject to the same constraint.

Sustainment and overhaul contracts should continue to provide competitive opportunities for U.S. companies in the future. Many of these aircraft, especially the civilian variants, are widely supported through both foreign and domestic commercial providers. At present, the U.S. Army, in its role as the designated, single Non-Standard Rotary Wing Program Office, is leveraging existing support contracts, which include the CNTPO SMDC IDIQ and an AMCOM Logistics Support Facility (LSF) contract. Both were competitively awarded contracts. As previously stated, the CNTPO SMDC IDIQ was awarded to five prime contractors (ARINC, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and USTC), all of which are U.S. based firms. The LSF prime contractor is Science and Engineering Services, Incorporated (SESI), also a U.S. based firm.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

102. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Carter, I am concerned that DOD has redirected money originally planned for F–35 purchases to buy significantly less-capable fourth generation F–18s which are unable to operate in contested air space and each year can operate in fewer and fewer environments. This is especially the case given the accelerated Russian and Chinese J–20 and T–50 development, the alarming proliferation of the very latest sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAM), as well as rapid development of Chinese sensors and other advanced systems. Not only are we buying these aircraft but we're going to have to pay to operate and sustain them for well over a decade at further expense to taxpayers. If confirmed, will you commit to examining this expenditure of taxpayers' resources and report back to us regarding the extent to which you believe this is a wise way to spend DOD and taxpayers' dollars?

Dr. CARTER. In building the fiscal year 2013 President's budget, the Department is working hard to balance risk appropriately, avoiding over-expenditure in some areas so that we can attenuate key shortfalls elsewhere. For the fiscal year 2013–2017 timeframe, DOD must fund a tactical air forces portfolio that meets security
needs in terms of both capability and capacity in the face of significant budget pressures. The Department is also assessing to what extent it should extend the service life of DOD’s legacy fleet of F/A–18A–Ds and F–16s to maintain appropriate inventory levels. The Department remains fully committed to the F–35 program and is actively managing JSF costs and schedule.

103. Senator CHAMBLISS. Dr. Carter, DOD has reduced the number of F–35 aircraft in the near-term budget plan by 246 over the last 2 years. There are rumors that DOD may reduce the planned numbers even further in next year’s budget request. How can DOD continue to delay the procurement of fifth generation fighters while buying more fourth generation fighters when the threat is so clearly increasing and fourth generation F–18 fighters cannot survive when flying against the latest threat SAMs that are being fielded today?

Dr. CARTER. Based on the current and projected threats, I believe it is critical that the U.S. transitions to a fifth generation capability across the Services, while maintaining sufficient legacy inventory capacity to prevail in current and near-term conflicts. DOD needs JSF to deal with advanced fighters and surface-to-air missiles worldwide, especially in the stressing electronic warfare environments of the future. Additionally, the F–22A modernization program will provide improved fifth generation capability versus a high-end foe. To ensure the United States possesses sufficient capacity of fighter attack aircraft, the Department funded production of the F/A–18E/F through fiscal year 2014. While this aircraft is not stealthy like JSF and F–22, it has advanced sensing and is highly capable against many of the threats faced today and expected to face in the future.

104. Senator CHAMBLISS. Dr. Carter, last year you said you needed about $5 billion over 4 years to pay for more F–35 flight test and development costs and justified a cutback in F–35 production aircraft to pay for it. But DOD actually cut over $12 billion from the F–35 production program by reducing procurement and spent much of the money on fourth generation F–18s. I don’t believe that shows much appreciation for the strategic need to retain our air dominance and follow through on our own Government’s strategy to keep us ahead of China and Russia. Can you assure me that you will not cut fifth generation airplanes in the future to buy additional obsolete fourth generation airplanes?

Dr. CARTER. The Department is carefully assessing the best approach in balancing tactical air forces’ capability and capacity, while managing JSF concurrency. JSF brings an unprecedented combination of advanced sensing, stealth, and firepower; that said, the program is still under development and in the past two budget submissions resulted in slowed production in order to properly fund development and allow manufacturing processes to mature. Also, in the fiscal year 2013 budget, as with the 2012 submission, the Department faces significant resourcing pressures. The decision to procure additional F/A–18E/F aircraft in the fiscal year 2012 budget was an acknowledgement of the need to maintain sufficient DON inventory; the FA–18E/F is not as advanced as the JSF, but it is fully mature and highly capable against many of the threats we faced today and expect to face in the future.

C–130 ADVANCED PROCUREMENT

105. Senator CHAMBLISS. Dr. Carter, DOD did not request advance procurement (AP) funding for C–130s in fiscal year 2012 as you have normally done. When I queried DOD on this back in the spring DOD indicated that the AP funding was unnecessary since AP funding had been obligated late over the last 2 years. I did some research into this and learned that the Air Force notified DOD during the fiscal year 2011 budget build process that they intentionally withheld previous year’s AP funding for “negotiating leverage with the contractor” and were able to save money on a future lot of C–130s. However, the Air Force also told DOD that not having AP funding in fiscal year 2012 would create greater costs over the FYDP and result in later delivery of aircraft. In response to a request from this committee during mark-up, you recently sent the committee a letter on this issue. In response to the question, “would the addition of AP funding in fiscal year 2012 save resources over the FYDP,” you responded that: “DOD now believes that the inclusion of AP in fiscal year 2012 may save $54 million over the FYDP.”

I appreciate your response and would just like to ask you, do you agree that, in the case of major acquisition programs where long lead items are needed to ensure the most efficient production process, that advanced procurement funding makes sense, assuming that the funding can be obligated in a timely manner?
Dr. Carter. In most cases involving aircraft production under major defense acquisition programs, the use of advanced procurement funding to purchase long lead items makes sense.

GUARD CHIEF IN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

106. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Carter, there is talk of making the Chief of the National Guard a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Do you think the Chief of the National Guard should be a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Dr. Carter. No. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is now a 4-star general, attends Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings, and provides invaluable advice. Members of the Guard are members of the uniformed Services and adding its Chief to the Joint Chiefs of Staff would introduce inconsistencies among its members, while at the same time creating the impression that the National Guard is a separate military Service.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDING

107. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Carter, continued investment in defense R&D is critical to ensuring our future technological superiority. Specifically, DOD’s science and technology programs engage the Nation’s universities and other research entities in basic and applied research on behalf of our national security. How do you plan to sustain support for these programs despite fiscal constraints?

Dr. Carter. Secretary Panetta set the strategic direction for the Department in his October 13, 2011, testimony to the House Armed Services Committee when he said:

“Innovation is instrumental to the future of our joint force. We’ve expanded many of our—what we refer to in years past as low-density capabilities, and we’ve fielded many new technologies. We must continue to unleash innovation in the ranks and challenge ourselves to leverage these emergent capabilities in new and creative ways.”

Following this guidance, it is clear that the Department needs to continue to invest in the engine of innovation—basic and applied research on behalf of our national security. This investment is guided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and I will look to the Assistant Secretary to advocate for, and shape the Department’s investment, in these critical capabilities.

108. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Carter, are you still planning for 2 percent real growth for DOD basic research programs in the coming years?

Dr. Carter. This level of investment in basic research remains a goal, however, with the current budgetary pressures facing DOD, we will have to carefully weigh this goal in the context of overall DOD priorities and needs. At the same time, I do affirm the role and importance of basic research in providing long term capabilities for the Department and Nation. I also can echo Secretary Panetta’s comments at the October 13, 2011, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, when he said:

“Innovation is instrumental to the future of our joint force. We’ve expanded many of our—what we refer to in years past as low-density capabilities, and we’ve fielded many new technologies. We must continue to unleash innovation in the ranks and challenge ourselves to leverage these emergent capabilities in new and creative ways.”

The Department’s basic research investment, of which roughly 60 percent is accomplished through universities, is the bedrock of innovation for the Department. I believe it is important to maintain a healthy and vigorous investment in basic research and to maintain a clear link from the Department to the academic community. It is our investment in basic research that enables the connection.

109. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Carter, fostering the next generation technical workforce for DOD and its industrial base is another key ingredient in our future security. Can you explain how DOD plans to enhance its science, technology, engineering, and mathematics programs in order to ensure that the Nation has a qualified national security workforce going forward?

Dr. Carter. The Department conducts effective programs along the full Kindergarten-Workforce science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) pathway to ensure that DOD and our Nation’s industrial base are supplied with the technical workforce critical to preserving national security. Current and projected
DOD budget limitations offer few opportunities to enhance the scope of these programs, but proactive management will continue to enhance the impact that these programs can achieve through innovative STEM activities. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is delegated lead responsibility for DOD STEM efforts. Several specific examples of STEM efforts coordinated and supported by the ASD(R&E) are as follows:

1. **DOD STEM Executive Board—Leadership for the Department’s STEM efforts** is provided by the DOD STEM Executive Board, chaired by ASD(R&E). The STEM Executive Board aims to maximize the effectiveness of DOD STEM investments within budgetary limits. Technological solutions to national security at all levels and the pace of technological change require an adept military and civilian workforce. The Executive Board is: developing a taxonomy to describe the military and civilian STEM workforces; articulating necessary skill sets for a technically competent workforce; and aligning DOD investments and policies across the DOD components. Further, the Executive Board synchronizes the DOD’s future STEM workforce with the Department’s S&T priorities.

2. **National Academies Study—A joint National Academy of Engineering (NAE)-National Research Council (NRC) study funded by ASD(R&E) is assessing the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) workforce demands for the Department and strategies for meeting these demands. The work scope includes:** reviewing current and projected STEM workforce demands relevant to DOD and defense industrial base needs; identifying emerging science and technology fields that will likely have significant impact on DOD and national needs; and assessing current limitations and options for overcoming impediments to meeting these needs. The results of this study will enable the Department to enhance its STEM efforts by shaping investments more closely to expected future needs.

3. **National Defense Education Program (NDEP)—Directly builds the Department’s technical workforce and fosters STEM skill development:**
   a. The Science, Mathematics, And Research for Transformation (SMART) scholarship-for-service program selects highly-qualified undergraduate and graduate students pursuing any of 19 STEM disciplines important to DOD. Students are provided a stipend for tuition, fees, books, health insurance, and housing to support them in their studies and perform internships in the Department’s R&D facilities to develop key skill-sets for DOD employment. Students commit to a one-to-one service obligation and are eligible for up to 5 years of funding. Since 2006, there have been over 1,100 SMART U.S. student participants who have studied at over 250 colleges and universities. Nearly 400 have graduated with bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral degrees and joined the DOD workforce.
   b. The National Security Science and Engineering Faculty Fellowship (NSSEFF) program makes grants to leading researchers to work on important research questions of great value to DOD. Since 2009, 29 NSSEFF fellows at 20 research universities support more than 300 graduate and undergraduate students and postdoctoral scholars and reported 125 interactions with DOD laboratories and Services.
   c. Systems Engineering (SE) Capstone Program and Joint Cooperative Unmanned Systems Initiative (JCUSI)—Project-based learning exposes engineering students to systems engineering for DOD. These initiatives build institutional capacity for systems engineering for DOD and defense industrial base. Students are mentored by DOD personnel to solve actual DOD systems engineering problems. Over 300 students at 14 universities and Service Academies completed SE Capstone projects in the 2010–2011 academic year. JCUSI exposes cadets and midshipmen from all three of the Service academies in a joint autonomous systems scenario integrating land, air, and surface sea autonomous vehicles.
   d. K–12—DOD and its partners support and engage with elementary, middle school, and high school initiatives that inspire students to pursue STEM fields. National and local initiatives are designed to build STEM skills. Over 1,700 DOD scientists and engineers have engaged with more than 180,000 students and 8,000 teachers in 28 States. Since 2009, the Department has developed “Lab TV,” a series of Web-based video programs of cutting-edge DOD laboratory research used by educators. The top 6 Lab TV programs have posted over 350,000 views, and several programs have “gone viral” on the YouTube Lab TV Channel.
110. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, the Continental U.S. Subsistence Prime Vendor Program was created to bring the efficiency of the domestic food service distribution industry to military food service. Through this program, distributors provide the military with the best products available in the marketplace at competitive prices in the most efficient manner possible.

I am concerned the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) proposed non-commercial contracting model threatens the success of the Subsistence Prime Vendor Program. By proposing contract terms inconsistent with current industry practices, DLA may be limiting competition, which could result in increased food costs for taxpayers and lower service levels for our military.

Can you provide a rationale for DLA’s move toward a proposed non-commercial model?

Dr. CARTER. I can assure you the DLA is committed to using commercial terms and conditions to the most reasonable extent possible. Nonetheless, DLA was concerned that the Program, as structured, was vulnerable to price manipulation and fraud because of a lack of transparency. Over the past several years, DLA investigated options to address these vulnerabilities of the existing commercial model. DLA met with the foodservice industry, including the International Foodservice Distributors Association and individual companies, and, more recently, issued a request for information. Discussions focused on how to incorporate practices to increase transparency of the commercial business model, and DLA also sought input on a proposed pricing model.

Recent Program changes are meant to reduce the risk of overcharges to the Government. The changes do not alter the fact that this is a commercial acquisition with specific provisions added only to the extent necessary to protect the Government. Among other things, the changes will ensure that all rebates and discounts that prime vendors receive from manufacturers, no matter how those rebates and discounts are described or designated by the vendors, are returned to the Government.

The changes also afford the Government more oversight to prevent fraud by ensuring the Government has the right to review the original manufacturer’s invoices to confirm the Government is charged the manufacturer’s price. These changes are necessary to prevent the Government from paying more than is necessary for these products and to allow the Government to know for what it is paying.

The contracts will remain fixed-price with economic price adjustment, but the pricing definitions have been clarified. These changes will allow insight into the management of the program that previously did not exist. DLA’s changes have been challenged in bid protests filed at the Government Accountability Office, and more recently, the Court of Federal Claims. In a decision dated October 12, 2011, the Court of Federal Claims determined that one provision DLA included in its CONUS subsistence prime vendor solicitations was not legally supportable, and DLA plans to remove that provision in accordance with the Court’s finding.

DLA will continue to work with the food distribution industry to craft a prime vendor model that maximizes competition and the use of commercial practices while protecting the Government and taxpayers from potential fraud and overcharges.

111. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, what additional oversight would such a model provide to ensure the prevention of waste, fraud, and abuse?

Dr. CARTER. The changes are necessary to prevent the Government from paying more than is necessary for these products and to allow the Government to know for what it is paying. The changes also afford the Government more oversight to prevent fraud by ensuring the Government has the right to review the original manufacturer’s invoices to confirm the Government is charged the manufacturer’s price.

The contracts will remain fixed-price with economic price adjustment, but the pricing definitions have been clarified. These changes will allow insight into the management of the program that previously did not exist. DLA will continue to work with the food distribution industry to craft a prime vendor model that maximizes competition and the use of commercial practices while protecting the Government and taxpayers from potential fraud and overcharges.
MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

112. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, we have spent over $30 billion on the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle fleet of vehicles. To what extent have we maximized the capability of this platform?

Dr. CARTER. Congress generously provided nearly $50 billion in support of protecting America’s most precious resources: soldiers, airmen, sailors, marines, and special operators. Currently, more than 27,000 MRAP vehicles maximized this capability in supporting unique Service missions and to an even greater extent to fighting unit requirements.

There are dozens of MRAP variants with common exceptional protection capabilities, but also unique customizations in support of specific mission roles. This includes MRAP ambulances, wrecker and recovery vehicles, troop transport, route clearance, command and control platforms, and Special Forces variants, to name a few. There are significant commonality and systems design attributes, and concurrent additional capability adaptations are ongoing.

Because of the significant payload capacity of many of the variants, commanders in theater have options, based on threat, to apply different armor protection kits. System engineers and industry design teams continue to develop solutions to keep the MRAP vehicle fleet the most protected in the entire theater. Also, in support of the off-road terrain throughout Afghanistan, independent suspensions have been integrated on virtually every vehicle in theater.

113. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, have you considered integrating additional capability into this very survivable platform?

Dr. CARTER. Throughout the entire execution of the Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program, the teams operated with a sense of urgency on mission capabilities for the MRAP fleet. With the help of our very capable industry partners, DOD integrated dozens of capabilities and literally hundreds of configurations in response of the Warfighters’ demand signal.

The most recent example is adding impressive under-body protection for the MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (which is already highly survivable and effective off-road) with the Underbody Installation Kits (UIK). Because of the payload capacity of this configuration, the system engineers designed a significant upgrade that is being installed on the in-theater fleet rapidly.

Numerous adaptations of the MRAP vehicle have occurred to adapt the more general purpose troop carrier designs to ambulances, wrecker and recovery vehicles, and command and control platforms. Additionally, numerous variations of light weapons were integrated onto the roofs.

Finally, in addition to the all of the electronics and power integration for radio communications, counter-improvised explosive device capabilities (jammers), and displays, a significant portion of the fleet has evolved to have independent suspensions, creating a more capable, and more effective vehicle platform. The MRAP vehicles proved inherent capacity and versatility to integrate requirements; DOD will continue to exploit this capacity as the mission demands.

114. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, we have equipped the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) with a substantial number of vehicles. What steps are we taking to ensure the Afghans can sustain this fleet going forward?

Dr. CARTER. The long-term future plan is for the ANSF to have an organic maintenance and supply capability. There are many efforts underway on many levels by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), International Joint Command (IJC), and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM–A), in conjunction with Afghan senior leaders as part of the ISAF campaign plan.

The reality in Afghanistan is that the logistics systems are very early in the process of being built. The ANA transitioned to organic maintenance at the organizational level in April 2011. Its equivalent of Direct Support-level maintenance is contracted by the Combined Joint Logistics Office (CJ4). Its General Support equivalent (at the national level in Kabul) has some organic capability, but not what can be called a robust industrial base.

For the ANP, CJ4 contracted maintenance for weapons and vehicles. NTM–A is conducting ongoing analysis on how to create an enduring ANP maintenance system. The ANP is likely a couple years behind the ANA. The ANA Air Force has NTM–A/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan-provided contract logistics support (CLS), and transition to organic logistics support is a long-term effort.
The bottom line vision is to foster organic maintenance, however the reality today is that maintenance is largely CLS as DOD continues to develop ANSF logistics capacity.

PAKISTAN

115. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, recognizing that the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund provides the Government of Pakistan with critical goods that are manufactured here in the United States, what is the status of DOD’s certification of Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts?

Dr. CARTER. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) is instrumental in the training, advising, and equipping of the Pakistan military and paramilitary forces so that they can pursue the near-term objective of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries and disrupting the al Qaeda network. The Department apprises Congress regularly of our assessment of Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts through two primary means. First, the biannual report to Congress, Progress Toward Security and Stability in Pakistan, provides our overall assessment of Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts. The next edition of that report is due by the end of October. Additionally, DOD must notify Congress prior to its use of PCF funds, and this is achieved by submitting a spending plan to Congress, which details how the Department intends to spend the PCF funds. The delay in appropriations for fiscal year 2011 for PCF—followed shortly thereafter by increased tensions in the relationship with Pakistan as a result of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden—have led to a delay in notification of the fiscal year 2011 PCF spending plan.

JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE

116. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, what is DOD’s position regarding the Senate Appropriations Committee’s termination of Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)?

Dr. CARTER. The proposed termination will fail to resolve clearly identified capability gaps in U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps light tactical vehicle fleets. Those gaps cannot be cost effectively addressed by rebuilding the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) fleet and would result in the Services fielding a light vehicle that lacks protection for the crew and provides insufficient mobility, reduced fuel efficiency, decreased reliability, inadequate net-ready integrated C4I suite, and an inability to meet both current payload requirements and future combat loads. Following an extensive technology development phase, a comprehensive analysis of alternatives, and cost-informed trades throughout, the JLTV acquisition strategy planned is the most effective and affordable approach to deliver the required JLTV vehicle capability.

The Army and Marine Corps completely revised the JLTV Acquisition Strategy, finalized the essential requirements, and made the necessary cost informed trades to achieve an affordable program. The Improvised Explosive Device-threat environment and fiscal environment have changed significantly since approval of the original JLTV acquisition strategy in 2007. The Army and the Marine Corps have made the proper adjustments in response to the changing threat, fiscal environment and congressional concerns. The Technology Development phase was executed on schedule and within budget, accomplishing its intent to identify the capabilities that are achievable and affordable to control cost growth. Senior leadership for the Army and Marine Corps agreed on requirements and reduced the Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) phase by 15 months, which will significantly reduce the overall expense of EMD.

F–16 SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM

117. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, the Air Force fiscal year 2012 budget request contains money for an F–16 service life extension program (SLEP). Can you describe how SLEP money will be used between structural (e.g. full scale durability testing) and avionics modernization?

Dr. CARTER. The fiscal year 2012 President’s Budget (PB) reflects the F–16 SLEP to include a structural program (Full-Scale Durability Test and Structures Engineering, Manufacturing and Development phase) as well as an avionics modernization effort that includes active electronically scanned array radar, center pedestal display, ALQ–213 electronic warfare suites, and integrated broadcast service. Total funding as reflected in fiscal year 2012 PB is $24.767 million; $12 million for avionics modernization and $12.767 million for structures. The $12 million associated with the F–16 SLEP avionics modernization program (now known as combat avio-
onics programmed extension suite) will be committed to initial development and risk
reduction efforts.

118. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, is it premature to start the avionics acquisition
activity prior to durability testing being completed and confirming viability of the
F–16 fleet?

Dr. CARTER. The Department does not believe starting the avionics activity prior
to completion of durability testing is premature. Based on studies by F–16 struc-
tural engineers and Lockheed Martin, I am confident that, with some modifications,
the F–16 service life can be extended to at least 10,000 Equivalent Flight Hours
(EFH) on the Block 40/50 aircraft. The full-scale durability testing will validate that
study and determine the extent of the modifications required to bring these aircraft
to 10,000 EFH (the goal is 12,000 EFH). Additionally, the fleet viability board re-
cently completed their study of the Block 40/50 aircraft. This study concluded that
although the weapon system cannot achieve 5th generation fighter capability, it is
more affordable and can be made viable and relevant with respect to future force
structure requirements. F–16 SLEP avionics modernization acquisition activity is
programmed to start in fiscal year 2012 in order to meet the Air Combat Com-
mand’s requirement for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2018.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

119. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, how does the U.S. Air Force intend to support
a Korean-led competition and selection for both avionics and active electronically
scanned array (AESA) radar for their KF–16 fighter program?

Dr. CARTER. To date, the Department did not receive a Letter of Request (LOR)
from the Government of Korea concerning their proposed F–16 avionics and AESA
radar modernization program. Following receipt of an LOR, we will work with the
Korean Government to formalize their requirements and provide a Letter of Offer
and Acceptance (LOA) in accordance with the AESA acquisition radar strategy. Ac-
quision for FMS purchases is done in accordance with U.S. law and DOD regula-
tions and procedures. The competitive procurement process is used to the maximum
extent possible when procuring articles or services. Sole source procurement can be
approved by the implementing DOD Service when the FMS purchaser requests it
in writing and provides sufficient rationale. Due to the complex interaction between
the aircraft avionics and the AESA radar, we anticipate that the procurement of the
avionics will likely be combined with the AESA procurement.

120. Senator WICKER. Dr. Carter, how does a potential Taiwan F–16 Letter of Re-
quest for Letter of Acceptance affect U.S. Air Force plans?

Dr. CARTER. The Department received an updated Taiwan F–16 Letter of Request
(LOR) for Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) in September 2011 and subse-
quently provided congressional notification of intent to sell on 21 September 2011.
The LOR does not include a request to sole source the active electronically-scanned
array (AESA) radar. Therefore, the U.S. Air Force F–16 Program Executive Officer
will select an acquisition strategy for Taiwan’s F–16 modernization and potential
U.S. Air Force modernization efforts that ensures full and open competition in ac-
cordance with U.S. law and regulations. U.S. Air Force modernization efforts are not
hinged upon Taiwan’s investments and are not necessarily affected by this sale.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROB PORTMAN

F–136 FIGHTER ENGINE TEAM SELF-FUNDING PROPOSAL

121. Senator PORTMAN. Dr. Carter, what authorities prohibit DOD from permit-
ting the continued use of limited government equipment deemed essential to the F–
136 Fighter Engine Team (FET) self-funding proposal?

Dr. CARTER. There are no authorities that prohibit the Department from permit-
ting use of Government equipment deemed essential to the F136 self funding pro-
posal. However, if the Department determines that certain equipment is useful to
another program, it will use that equipment in the most optimal and cost-effective
manner. Additionally, if continued use of Government equipment following the ter-
mination of a contract would incur additional costs to the Government, the Depart-
ment would oppose that use.
1151

122. Senator Portman. Dr. Carter, what steps have you taken to better understand this self-funding proposal and identify processes or procedures within DOD that would need to be altered to facilitate such a proposal?

Dr. Carter. As I testified, I am willing to meet with General Electric and learn more about the self-funding proposal. General Electric is a valued partner on many DOD programs, including aircraft engines, and anytime an industry partner has new ideas on affordability, the Department is interested in learning about these ideas.

CORROSION PREVENTION AND MITIGATION

123. Senator Portman. Dr. Carter, given that Congress has consistently added funding to strengthen the corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts of DOD, and GAO has consistently encouraged DOD to fully fund this successful cost reduction program, what are your plans for addressing this in the fiscal year 2013 budget request?

Dr. Carter. The DOD corrosion prevention and mitigation program is successful and is important for the long-term viability of our equipment and infrastructure. The Government Accountability Office cited the program for achieving significant cost avoidance by reducing the incidence and effects of material degradation on DOD weapon systems and infrastructure.

The Department is working diligently in preparing the fiscal year 2013 budget request. There are many requirements competing for constrained funding. As a part of this process, the corrosion prevention and mitigation program budget is being considered, along with other important programs. The final funding level will be determined over the next several months.

124. Senator Portman. Dr. Carter, in light of DOD’s F-22/F-35 corrosion evaluation, what steps are being taken with the KC-46A program to avoid repeating mistakes that result in significantly higher than expected long-term sustainment costs?

Dr. Carter. The Department understands the critical importance of corrosion prevention and control (CPC) to maintain the airworthiness and control the long-term total ownership costs of the KC-46A. Specific steps the Department is taking in this regard include the following:

1. CPC is covered by our Weapon System Integrity Program (WSIP) approach. The WSIP is composed of four distinct integrity programs that address corrosion across the entire aircraft system, including structures, mechanical equipment and subsystems, avionics, and propulsion systems.

2. As a commercial derivative system, the KC-46A leverages the corrosion control processes established for commercial aircraft. Boeing is on contract to provide a KC-46A CPC Plan, which will be reviewed and approved by the Government.

3. Given the environmental concerns regarding the chromated coating systems that traditionally are used for corrosion protection for military systems, the Air Force has convened a KC-46 Outer Mold Line Coating System Independent Review Team to review options and make recommendations for corrosion coatings. The team includes technical experts from industry, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Corrosion Prevention Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

4. A Corrosion Prevention Advisory Board, comprised of representatives from engineering, manufacturing, quality assurance, and other areas involved in the design, engineering development, and production of the aircraft, provides ongoing oversight during the execution of the program.

5. The Department includes CPC in its ongoing oversight activities, including reviews by the Overarching Integrated Product Team.

6. The program office has ongoing dialogue with corrosion experts in the Navy’s P-8 program office about a Boeing commercial derivative aircraft, which has a robust CPC program, given that aircraft’s corrosive operating environment.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY A. AYOTTE

REDUCTION IN DEFENSE SPENDING

125. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, the President has called for $400 billion in reductions to national security spending over a 10-year period starting in 2013. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and General Martin Dempsey acknowledged that a further reduction of defense spending would be detrimental to our national security. With your acquisitions background, what programs and capabilities must not be cut...
if the Federal Government is to fulfill its constitutional responsibility of securing the common defense?

Dr. CARTER. I agree that there is a point beyond which additional cuts place national security at risk. However, Secretary Panetta has clearly stated that everything must be “on the table” when considering these potential reductions. Given the potentially significant future budget reductions we are facing, DOD is examining all programs for affordability and national security requirements.

AUDIT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

126. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, as you are aware, DOD is one of the few agencies in the entire Federal Government that cannot pass an independent audit of its finances. DOD’s lack of audit readiness makes it difficult to implement efficiencies, achieve savings, and direct increasingly scarce defense dollars to higher priorities. In your response to the advance policy questions, you concede that, “...there has been limited progress made towards auditability until recently.” Why, in your view, is DOD not auditible today?

Dr. CARTER. DOD’s massive size and complexity make it hard to achieve full auditability. DOD financial processes were established and ingrained in systems long ago. These processes and systems were designed for budgetary accounting—not proprietary or commercial accounting called for in the CFO Act.

127. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, what are the most significant challenges to making DOD auditible by the 2017 statutory deadline?

Dr. CARTER. To meet standards in CFO Act, there is a substantial amount of work to be done. Some of the most significant impediments include:

- DOD has thousands of business and financial systems which support ongoing operations. The process of modifying these systems is complex, time-consuming, and costly.
- DOD business and financial management systems are not fully integrated and do not always collect data at the necessary transaction level.
- Reliable end-to-end processes and internal controls have not fully been defined to support financial reporting.
- DOD lacks sufficient operational and financial personnel experienced in financial audits.

128. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, what is your plan to overcome those obstacles?

Dr. CARTER. Meeting these challenges and improving our business processes have more attention in the Department than ever before. DOD will address them by changing the way it does business. To realize success, the Department is using a streamlined approach, implemented in August 2009, which focuses on improving and auditing the information used to manage the Department. Improving the information used to manage—budgetary and mission critical asset information—allows commanders and other leaders to better meet mission needs with their available resources. I believe this alignment of operational and financial objectives is the most effective incentive to improve financial management.

The Department is committed to achieving auditability goals and has taken significant steps to ensure the goals are achieved by September 30, 2017, as directed by Congress. There is still a great deal of work required to further improve financial and business processes in order to meet this goal. I believe DOD can succeed because it has a well defined plan with specific short-term and interim-term milestones and a long-term roadmap. The Department also provided resources for the effort (approximately $300 million per year), and a clear governance process. Overall accountability rests with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and CMO; however, day-to-day responsibility falls to the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and DCMO and their staffs, as well as line management throughout the DOD business enterprise. To meet audit challenges, we have developed an effective partnership between the CFO and DCMO communities that will help with implementation. The DCMO and the Military Department CMOs play an integral role in the governance processes, including overseeing the implementation of new systems and the processes they enable. Senior leaderships within the Military Departments are committed to, and accountable for accomplishing these interim goals.

129. Senator AYOTTE. Dr. Carter, what can Congress do to help?

Dr. CARTER. Continued attention and oversight from Congress encourages more attention and participation from the non-financial management community to sustain the current focus. Additionally, providing a timely appropriations bill without
the use of multiple continuing resolutions will help leaders devote more time to audit readiness.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

130. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, the F–35 JSF will form the backbone of U.S. air combat superiority for generations to come. However, in order to guarantee the continued success of this program, it is imperative that this effort be followed with solid analyses of the JSF life cycle costs so both DOD and Congress can make well-informed decisions about the program in the future. Can you provide an update on what investments or changes have been made in the development and design of the F–35 to reduce operations and support costs over the life of the program?

Dr. Carter. The JSF has been designed to improve maintainability and overall supportability over legacy platforms. As the aircraft design matures, the program office is actively managing systems to ensure they meet or exceed their reliability design specification, and identify opportunities for Life Cycle Cost (LCC) reductions. In cases where systems fall short of meeting their goal, or where significant LCC reduction opportunities are identified, the JSF Program Office is making the appropriate programmatic and system/component modifications to increase reliability, while reducing LCC. In addition, we are initiating a targeted affordability program to identify technical and programmatic changes that will reduce the operating cost of the system, which will be tracked through our affordability management plan, the draft of which will be available early next year. The program is also conducting a business case analysis on the sustainment strategy to identify if changes to the sustainment baseline are required to achieve the best value solution.

131. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, if the JSF program were canceled, what would be the operations and support costs for the legacy fleet that JSF is replacing? Please provide data that can be directly compared to the JSF. Please use the same time period for both.

Dr. Carter. The JSF is scheduled to replace the AV–8B, F/A–18 A–D, and F–16 for the U.S. Military Services. A portion of the F/A–18A–D and F–16 fleet is already planned for service life extensions to meet force structure requirements. If the JSF were canceled, the Services would have to assess the possibility of even more aircraft having service life extended. For many of those aircraft with excessive flight hours, extending service life would not be an option, and they would have to be retired. It is possible that the development of other platforms would be required. The range of options that would need to be assessed in this unlikely scenario is unlimited and makes a direct comparison of data extremely difficult.

132. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, will operations and support costs for the F–35 be the same, more than, or less than the legacy aircraft it will replace?

Dr. Carter. DOD’s analysis is that the costs per aircraft to operate and sustain the JSF are less than the F–22, about the same as the F–15C/D, and more than the F–16 and F–18. Given the significant increase in capability, it is not unreasonable that JSF costs more to operate and sustain than some legacy aircraft.

IRAQ TROOP LEVELS

133. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, I am concerned about the December deadline in Iraq. Multiple senior military officials have expressed concerns regarding Iraq’s ability to independently provide for their external defense and air sovereignty. Iraq will also require continued development in the areas of logistics, sustainment, intelligence, and training. It is important to bring our mission in Iraq to a successful conclusion. The Obama administration is considering keeping 3,000 troops in Iraq beyond the December deadline in order to achieve this objective. What have our commanders on the ground requested for troop levels?

Dr. Carter. In 2008, the United States concluded a Security Agreement with Iraq, which established conditions for the temporary presence of our forces in the country and for their withdrawal by the end of 2011. The United States complied with the terms of that agreement, and will comply with the requirement to withdraw our forces by the end of 2011.

However, the Departments believe that an enduring security partnership with the Iraqi Government and people is in the best interest of the United States, and a continuing relationship with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) would be an important part of that partnership.
The United States is currently in negotiations with the Iraqi Government about the nature of that relationship. America wants a normal, productive relationship with Iraq going forward—a partnership like we have with other nations around the world.

Our negotiations with the Iraqis so far have focused on possible mission sets to support the ISF in areas where Iraq has identified shortfalls, such as logistics, air and maritime security training, combined arms training for Iraq's external defense, and intelligence fusion for Iraqi counterterrorism operations. Any post-2011 U.S. forces presence upon which the United States and Iraq might ultimately agree would flow from the requirements necessary to support training and related mission sets, including areas that the Iraqis identify as key to addressing their shortfalls.

Again, there are no final decisions—nor reached any agreement with the Iraqis—about a post-2011 U.S. forces presence in Iraq.

134. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, what have the Iraqis requested?

Dr. Carter. On August 2, Iraqi President Talabani, upon the request of Prime Minister Maliki, held the third meeting of all major Iraqi political parties to discuss the nature and details of the U.S.-Iraq security partnership under the terms of the Strategic Framework Agreement, and how this would be affected by a potential U.S. presence in Iraq after December 31, 2011.

At the conclusion of that meeting, the parties' leadership authorized Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Shaways to issue the following statement: "Participants have agreed to mandate the Iraqi Government to start talks with the American side. Talks are limited to training issues under the Strategic Framework Agreement due to Iraq's need for training. A relationship must be designed in all aspects to support the full sovereignty of Iraq. The political leaders will monitor the talks to consider any final agreement with the American side. These talks must be conducted with a spirit of cooperation."

Consistent with this Iraqi position, the United States began negotiations with Iraq on the nature of this potential U.S.-Iraq security relationship post-2011, including training of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and related missions. For some time, we have had informal consultations with our Iraqi partners, including senior ISF officials, regarding remaining ISF gaps and areas in which Iraq might request training post-2011. These areas include combined arms training, intelligence fusion, air and maritime security training, and logistics. Our negotiations to date have focused on the possible mission sets to support the ISF in these and other areas. However, there are no final decisions, nor reached any agreement with the Iraqis, about a post-2011 U.S. forces presence in Iraq.

135. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, what, in your view, is the correct troop level?

Dr. Carter. The post-2011 U.S. force presence and mission set, if any, will be addressed through U.S. negotiations with Iraqi leaders. Because discussions are ongoing, no final agreement with Iraq has been reached, no final decisions have been made, and the current operative plan remains that the United States will remove all of its forces by the end of 2011. However, if the United States were to have a post-2011 U.S. force presence, it would be at a much lower level than the current level of U.S. forces in Iraq.

Again, there are no final decisions, or any agreement reached with the Iraqis, about a post-2011 U.S. force presence in Iraq.

136. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, what missions will the remaining troops perform?

Dr. Carter. We are currently in negotiations with the Iraqi Government about the nature and scope of a potential future relationship. Our discussions with the Iraqis are focused on the types of training the United States may provide after December 31, 2011, and we have made no final decisions—nor reached any agreement with the Iraqis—about the nature of a U.S. presence in Iraq post-2011. We want a normal, productive relationship with Iraq going forward, like we have with other countries in the region and around the world.

For some time, we have had informal consultations with our Iraqi partners, including senior Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) officials, regarding ISF gaps and areas in which the ISF might request training post-2011. These areas include combined arms, training necessary for Iraq’s external defense; intelligence fusion to support counterterrorism efforts, air and maritime security training, and logistics.

Our negotiations to date have focused on the possible mission sets to support the ISF in these and other areas. Any post-2011 U.S. forces presence upon which the United States and Iraq might ultimately agree would flow from the requirements necessary to support training and related mission sets.
Again, there are no final decisions—nor reached any agreement with the Iraqis—about a post-2011 U.S. forces presence in Iraq.

RESERVE COMPONENT

137. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, our Nation must reduce Federal spending, and defense has a role. However, in the coming months and years, we must avoid defense cuts that endanger our military readiness and shortchange the Guard and Reserve. General Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently stated that the future fiscal environment will present significant challenges in preserving the readiness gains of the Reserve component. General Dempsey also stated that, “the Reserve component of our Armed Forces has transformed from an exclusively Strategic Reserve to one that also provides operational, full-spectrum capabilities to the Nation. Repeated combat deployments, as well as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and Homeland defense missions, have produced a Reserve component far more operationally capable and experienced than any time in our Nation’s history.” Do you believe it would not be in the Nation’s best interests to return the National Guard to strictly a Strategic Reserve?

Dr. Carter. No, I do not believe that returning the National Guard to strictly a strategic Reserve is the correct solution or in the best interests of the Nation. I understand that the “force mix” of Strategic versus Operational Reserve component forces as well as the optimal AC/RC mix for certain capabilities are under review. I will ensure that the Department continues this vital work in order to ensure it can meet the demands of the National Military Strategy in a fiscally responsible manner.

138. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, how do you recommend we maintain the readiness of the Reserve component in a period of fiscal restraint?

Dr. Carter. While I do not have specific recommendations at this time, I recognize that the consistent operational experience the Reserve components have gained over the last decade has significantly increased their readiness and confirmed that they are an integral part of the Total Force. It is my opinion that in order to reduce stress on the overall force, maintain an All-Volunteer Force, and leverage the skills and experience resident in the Guard and Reserve, their continued contribution in the future will be critical. These contributions—planned, periodic utilization of the Reserve component in missions for which they are best suited—often have the added benefit of maintaining their readiness. Additionally, it will be my goal to make the most efficient use of the Total Force. The Reserve component is an experienced and well-trained element of that force, providing value in many mission areas by maintaining capability and capacity at lesser cost.

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard

139. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) is an essential part of our Nation’s naval readiness. PNSY conducts nuclear submarine maintenance on the Los Angeles-class and Virginia-class submarines. In fact, PNSY is currently conducting the first-in-the-Navy Virginia-class maintenance availability on the USS Virginia. A recent GAO study found that DOD has a backlog of over $3 billion and at PNSY alone totaling over $500 million which impacts readiness, efficiency, and the health and safety of our sailors and workforce. If confirmed, do you commit to working to address this modernization backlog at this and other important shipyards?

Dr. Carter. I am committed to investing in the Naval Shipyard infrastructure through Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization, and MILCON as part of a risk-balanced, fiscally constrained Navy infrastructure portfolio. Shipyard projects are evaluated and prioritized with all other Navy infrastructure projects to best enable warfighting and joint capabilities, minimize the decline of mission-essential and quality of life infrastructure, and optimize warfare enterprise outputs and quality of service.

Section 2476 of title 10, U.S. Code, requires that the Navy invest at least 6 percent of the average combined workload funded at all Navy depots for the preceding 5 years. The Navy spent 9.5 percent, 9.9 percent, and 15.6 percent of these funds on shipyard recapitalization in fiscal year 2008–fiscal year 2010, respectively, and is in the process of investing 11.1 percent in fiscal year 2011.

In fiscal year 2010, the Navy executed eight Operations and Maintenance (Sustainment and Restoration and Modernization) special projects at PNSY with a total value of $40.9 million. In fiscal year 2011, the Navy planned additional special
projects, valued at $17 million, to repair and enable certification of Dry Dock #1. In fiscal year 2012, the Navy plans to invest $100.3 million in four energy special projects at PNSY.

PEASE AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE

140. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, Pease Air National Guard Base in New Hampshire is a key base for Air Force refueling tankers. If DOD uses transparent and objective basing criteria for its KC–46A basing decisions, I am confident that Pease will continue to be a key strategic refueling base far into the future. Pease is the closest airbase to the operational and training refueling tracks, which will result in significant cost savings over the KC–46A’s decades of service. The aerial refueling wing also has a unique Active Duty association that results in a very high aircraft utilization rate. The basing decision will be heavily scrutinized, so it is important that the process is objective and transparent. As Deputy Secretary of Defense, do you agree to work to ensure that the process for basing decisions for the KC–46A is objective and transparent?

Dr. Carter. Yes. The Air Force is using its Strategic Basing Process to determine future locations for the KC–46A.

U.S. NAVAL SUPREMACY

141. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, the U.S. Navy has the fewest number of ships since America’s entrance into World War I. Yet the Navy is being tasked with arguably more responsibilities than ever before. Our fleet is undoubtedly the finest ever put to the seas, but it is said that quantity has a quality all of its own. Security in Asia and around the world would increasingly rely on the U.S. maintaining naval supremacy. Since shipbuilding is one of the largest DOD expenditures, I worry that DOD will be tempted to cut our Nation’s shipbuilding program. As a member of the Seapower Subcommittee, I would like to know, how important it is in your mind that the United States maintains naval supremacy?

Dr. Carter. There is no question that this country relies upon continued naval supremacy, and I am firmly committed to maintaining it.

142. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, what ship-count is needed to accomplish naval supremacy?

Dr. Carter. Ship count alone does not ultimately provide the proper mix of capabilities necessary to achieve naval supremacy across a wide range of possible contingencies. I believe procuring and maintaining the right mix of capabilities in our battle forces is what gives our Nation naval supremacy. The Department is committed to maintaining naval supremacy, but, as Secretary Panetta has stated, all areas of the budget are currently on the table in the budget review.

143. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, the Navy has called the 313-ship requirement a floor. In terms of ships in the Navy, based on strategy, rather than budget exercises, is there a floor you would not go below? If so, what is it?

Dr. Carter. The number of ships, while important, is less important than having in the fleet the proper mix of those critical capabilities necessary to defeat adversaries. I believe the Department needs to strategically prioritize its battle force mix consistent with ensuring it is a ready and agile battle force that is in balance with the other armed forces needed to maintain American national security.

EFFICIENCIES

144. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, after a series of hearings Senator McCaskill and I conducted earlier this year on efficiencies and financial management with DOD, it is not apparent that DOD is placing sufficient emphasis on eliminating non-essential spending. In an unprecedented time of budget deficits and skyrocketing debt, we have repeatedly called for DOD to rein in wasteful or unnecessary spending across the board. Yet, DOD continues to notify us of new programs and new projects to fund with savings they have accumulated as opposed to returning those savings to American taxpayers. As an example, a recent decision by the Air Force illustrates the conflict we see between statements by the Secretary of Defense and the actions of the Military Departments to continue to fund requirements that are not absolutely essential to their core missions and operations.

In November 2010, we received a notification from the Air Force of their intent to transfer $28 million from operations and maintenance accounts in order to con-
struct a student activities center at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in support of a training mission consolidation directed by the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. This facility is intended to support community and recreational activities, student processing, commander's calls, and graduation activities. After extensive meetings and a visit by our staffs to Fort Sam Houston, this committee concluded that the $589 million BRAC plan implemented by DOD for this decision was adequate, and that an additional construction project to build a student center funded through BRAC appropriations was not essential to the successful completion of the BRAC decision by September 15, 2011. In a letter to the Secretary of the Air Force dated April 15, 2011, we provided this position, which is consistent with our intent to take action when DOD spending may not be essential or efficient in these tough fiscal times.

On June 1, 2011, we received a reply from the Air Force that indicated their intent to carry out the project, despite our objections. We immediately wrote the Secretary of Defense asking for his personal review of this decision to determine whether it is consistent with the current efforts of DOD. While we are still awaiting an answer, we were notified last week that the Air Force has awarded the contract to construct the student center. This disregard for the spending concerns of this committee is unacceptable. Do you condone the decision by the Air Force?

Dr. Carter. At time of the hearing, the Department had not yet completed its response to Congress. On October 4, 2011, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment sent a letter to you and Senator McCaskill affirming the Air Force decision to build the student activity center. The Air Force's decision to spend $28 million from available resources within the BRAC account is necessary and therefore, appropriate, because it supports the significantly increased population of enlisted medical trainees at this location. For example, the student activity center will provide space for student processing (averaging 400 students weekly) and an academic support forum large enough for commander's calls and graduation activities. This project provides our front-line medics needed functionality overlooked in the initial planning for this BRAC recommendation. As such, the student activity center is an example of how we used the flexibility of the BRAC account to make appropriate adjustments as we approached the end of the BRAC implementation period.

145. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, what would you do to ensure the members of congressional defense committees are adequately consulted about concerns formally raised to DOD before spending taxpayers' funds?

Dr. Carter. I will make every effort to work with Congress to address your concerns.

146. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, is a recreation center the type of priority you will continue to support as a critical new spending item?

Dr. Carter. In light of the current funding climate, the Department must ensure that the highest priority needs are met. I will be diligent in finding and eliminating wasteful spending. It is also important that the United States continues to take care of the troops and their families in order to sustain our high quality All-Volunteer Force.

147. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, what is DOD doing exactly to rein in unnecessary spending as we approach the end of the fiscal year?

Dr. Carter. All echelons of the enterprise must be alert to any unnecessary, wasteful spending. There is a legal limitation to spending more than 20 percent of an appropriation in the last 2 months of a fiscal year. It must be noted that in recent years the Department faced persistent continuing resolutions and late enactment of supplemental appropriations which have the effect of delaying contractual actions until late in a fiscal year.
and 12-month unaccompanied tour. Four families are slated to move to Al Udeid, Qatar, in 2011 for a 24-month accompanied tour. The current plan is to increase the number of families by 12 per year for the next 5 years for a total of 60 families by the end of fiscal year 2015.

149. Senator GRAHAM. Dr. Carter, what is the timeframe for these moves?

Dr. CARTER. One family was in place July 2011, three more families will be in place fall 2011. The current plan is to increase the number of families by 12 per year for 5 years for a total of 60 families by the end of fiscal year 2015.

150. Senator GRAHAM. Dr. Carter, does AFCENT intend to eliminate or transfer any positions from Shaw AFB between now and October 2012? If so, what is the reasoning behind the elimination or transfer?

Dr. CARTER. To meet the OSD direction to target civilian manpower billets at fiscal year 2010 levels, the Air Force is conducting a comprehensive strategic review to improve efficiency, reduce overhead, and eliminate redundancy, processes, or growing in critical mission areas. As a result of this review, five AFCENT civilian billets will be eliminated at Shaw AFB. Reductions were due to efficiencies in reach-back support for Eskan Village (two billets) and reductions in staff support to AFCENT (three billets). The Air Force continues to develop enterprise-wide solutions to increase efficiency and remain within fiscal year 2012 civilian pay budget and therefore further reductions are possible. The Air Force will finish the review in mid-December and will notify Congress of the results in late January 2012.

151. Senator GRAHAM. Dr. Carter, are any such positions slated to be transferred to the CENTCOM AOR?

Dr. CARTER. There are currently no plans to transfer any positions affected by DOD's direction to limit each military Service's civilian end strength to levels in effect at the end of fiscal year 2010.

152. Senator GRAHAM. Dr. Carter, if the CENTCOM AOR is sufficiently stable to allow families to reside there does this signify that the AFCENT Commander's presence is no longer needed in the region? If so, do the Commander's ongoing obligations at Shaw AFB now require that he move back?

Dr. CARTER. The decision to initially move the Commander, U.S. Air Force Central (COMUSAFCENT) to reside in the CENTCOM AOR was made by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) based on the U.S.'s vital national interests in the region and the desire to continue building robust partnerships in this key area of the world. The decision to keep COMUSAFCENT assigned within the AOR will be driven by the current operating environment and environments within the AOR. At some point in the future DOD could envision the Deputy COMUSAFCENT being assigned in the AOR with his or her family while the Commander resides at Shaw AFB. Ultimately, however, the CSAF will look at all the key factors in making the decision if or when to return the Commander's position back to Shaw.

153. Senator GRAHAM. Dr. Carter, if the AFCENT Commander moves his family to the AOR, does this change the promise by the Air Force to return the AFCENT Commander to Shaw AFB once hostilities cease in the CENTCOM AOR?

Dr. CARTER. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force's decision to keep COMUSAFCENT assigned within the AOR will be driven by the current operating environment and relationships within the AOR. Whether the COMUSAFCENT moves his family to the AOR will not affect that decision.

154. Senator GRAHAM. Dr. Carter, with privatized housing now beginning at Shaw AFB, will new housing be built for the AFCENT Commander, as is being done for the AFCENT Commander?

Dr. CARTER. Yes. The project provides for a new home for both the AFCENT and the Army Central Command commanders. Five general officer homes will be constructed at Shaw AFB, SC, as part of housing privatization. The Southern Group Housing Privatization project which includes Shaw AFB, SC; Charleston AFB, SC; Arnold AFB, TN; and Keesler AFB, MS, was awarded to Forest City Southern Group, LLC on 30 September 2011. The project owner started management operations the same day and has received authorization to commence construction from the Air Force.

155. Senator GRAHAM. Dr. Carter, unlike Naval Central Command (NAVCENT) Headquarters (HQ) the current AFCENT HQ location in the AOR is not controlled by the United States. Will the lack of U.S. control impact the security, support, or
quality of life structure for family members who will be without access to a U.S. base?

Dr. CARTER. The safety of our Air Force members and their families is our number one priority. A prerequisite to Commander, CENTCOM, approving of the AFCENT plan was assurance that our families would be able to enjoy similar levels of safety and security afforded to ARCENT families by living in the same housing communities managed under DOS Housing Pool that satisfy CENTCOM force protection requirements. According to the DOS (http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis—pa—tw/cis/cis—1003.html#crime), violence in Qatar is “rare” and a “large police presence is deployed throughout the country.” Reports of petty theft, credit card theft, and theft of unsecured items (e.g., cash, jewelry, electronics, etc.) in hotel rooms or other unattended public places are also noted, however, these crimes are not uncommon in the U.S. and awareness and vigilance are recommended.

Owing to the availability, proximity, and quality of resources afforded to Air Force family members within the greater Doha region, we don’t believe limited access or lack of robust, traditional family support resources at Al Udeid will degrade quality of life for servicemembers or their dependents while living in Doha, Qatar. The AFCENT command sponsorship program is an extension of a pre-existing ARCENT program, partnering with the U.S. Embassy, Qatar, and placing Air Force family members into secure, select, western-style DOS Housing Pool quarters. Neighborhoods are filled with ARCENT families, U.S. citizens, allies, and a wide variety of professionals serving in diverse capacities including academics, doctors, and corporate executives.

Doha is a very modern Middle Eastern city with many western amenities including instantly-recognizable, western-style restaurants, retailers, and grocery stores that offer international cuisines. For families with K–12 children, there are several education options including enrollment in the American School of Doha, a world-renowned, fully-accredited institution. Families with dependents in college can choose from branch campuses of internationally-recognized universities including Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon, and Northwestern. Modern medical care is available and covered by TRICARE. Finally, the Qatari Ministry of Defense recently approved Air Force military family members access to Al Udeid Air Base, including access to limited morale, welfare, and recreation services, chaplain services, and fitness center resources.

156. Senator GRAHAM. Dr. Carter, what is cost-per-year required to support and protect families on accompanied tours to the CENTCOM AOR?

Dr. CARTER. Bringing up to 60 families to the CENTCOM AOR by fiscal year 2015 increases the support footprint. The Department estimates that the additional net cost to support and protect families in the CENTCOM AOR will be approximately $6 million per year. This cost includes personnel entitlement and related costs, schooling, housing, additional civilian positions to provide support to families, and associated force protection costs. This figure also takes into account partially offsetting expenses because families assigned to the CENTCOM AOR will no longer receive Basic Allowance for Housing or Family Separation Allowance.

The report of the AFCENT “Families At Al Udeid” (F@AUAB) Working Group, which met at regular intervals from August 2010 through July 2011, included the steps taken to assign the initial set of command-sponsored families in summer 2011. The report also identified the steps required in future years to achieve the COMUSAFCENT’s intent to increase the number of command-sponsored families in Qatar by approximately 12 each year, to a total of about 60 families by 2015.

157. Senator GRAHAM. Dr. Carter, who initiated moving the families from Shaw AFB to the CENTCOM AOR (e.g., AFCENT, CENTCOM, Air Force, DOD and/or DOS)?

Dr. CARTER. The request to expand on the U.S. Army Central program was initiated by then-Lieutenant General Gilmary M. Hostage, former Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central, in coordination with, and approval from, General James N. Mattis, Commander, CENTCOM, and Dr. Clifford L. Stanley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Resources).

A small percentage of Air Force members are stationed, unaccompanied, at Al Udeid Air Base (AB), Qatar via permanent change of station orders for 1 year. Tour lengths will be extended to 2 years for a targeted group of individuals who choose to bring their families—there is no move of position authorizations from Shaw AFB to Al Udeid AB. The number of accompanied tours will increase and the number of unaccompanied decrease to maintain the same number of billets at Shaw AFB and Al Udeid AB.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

F–35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

158. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, in your responses to advance policy questions, you made the following statements: “Based on current and projected threats, I believe it is critical that we transition to a fifth generation capability across the Services while maintaining sufficient legacy inventory capacity to prevail in current and near-term conflicts” and “we need JSF to deal with advanced fighters and surface-to-air missiles worldwide, especially in the stressing electronic warfare environments of the future.” Can you elaborate on these statements?

Dr. CARTER. I have not wavered in my firm belief that JSF is the centerpiece of the Department’s tactical air forces. Its unprecedented combination of stealth, sensing, and firepower will give American forces a crucial edge against advanced threats. Thus, as a matter of utmost importance, DOD continued to actively manage the JSF program as it proceeds through development, balancing the capability benefits with the concurrency risks—within increasingly tight resourcing constraints.

159. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, some F–35 critics have called for our military’s planned buy of F–35s to be downsized from the full 2,443 requirement, resulting in a silver bullet fleet of far fewer F–35s, with the rest of the requirement to be filled by fourth generation aircraft. What concerns does this scenario raise for you?

Dr. CARTER. The Department is currently developing the fiscal year 2013 budget and thus is still deliberating investment strategies with respect to specific programs. I understand that the Department must maintain a tactical air portfolio that meets the near and longer-term requirements of the warfighter within the bounds of affordability. JSF’s impressive capabilities make it a key focus of our attention as the Department examines the appropriate size and mix of fourth generation and fifth generation fighter attack aircraft inventories based on strategic priorities, threat assessments, concepts of operations, and force structure requirements.

160. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, what would the effect on our warfighters be, especially in the face of a large-scale military conflict in which they were asked to operate for weeks or months on end in highly contested airspace?

Dr. CARTER. Sustained, large-scale combat operations are inherently stressful, but the key to lowering risk in any type of conflict is to modernize and support our forces with the right capabilities and adequate capacity. The Department is dedicated to that task in building the fiscal year 2013 President’s budget.

161. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, DOD recently provided Congress with the annual report on Communist China’s military modernization and expansion, in which it warned us that, “... China’s military has benefited from robust investment in modern hardware and technology. Many modern systems have reached maturity and others will become operational in the next few years.” One of those investments includes China’s new J–20 stealth fighter unveiled earlier this year. More recently, Russia unveiled its own stealth fighter called the T–50 at the Moscow Air Show in August. Speaking at the air show, the Russian Federation Air Force Commander in Chief said that series production of this fifth generation aircraft could begin as early as 2014. Additionally, the Chinese, North Koreans, and Iranians are fielding sophisticated SAMs that threaten our fleet of fourth generation aircraft. In your written testimony to this committee in May, you stated that “the F–35 will form the backbone of U.S. air combat superiority for generations to come.” Would you agree that in order to maintain air combat superiority for generations to come, the United States needs to successfully field a stealthy, multi-role fighter such as the F–35 in sufficient quantities?

Dr. CARTER. Tactical Air (TACAIR) modernization is a critical component in the Department’s ability to meet our national security requirements. The Department’s goal is to transition the TACAIR fleet to primarily a fifth generation force as efficiently as we can. On June 1, 2010, I certified to Congress that the F–35 program is essential to national security. That certification, following a thorough Nunn–McCurdy review, highlighted the continued need for the F–35 program. However, the F–35 is still under development and the Department has a number of aging legacy aircraft, a portion of which may need replacing before the F–35 is ready for deployment. It is vitally important that DOD maintains a TACAIR force structure that can fight the wars the U.S. military is currently involved in and the threats it may confront in the near future.
162. Senator CORYN. Dr. Carter, in your opinion, what does development by our potential adversaries of fifth generation fighters and sophisticated SAMs mean for the U.S. inventory of fourth generation aircraft?

Dr. CARTER. The Department is investing in F–35 and F–22 to address high end threats. While the high-end scenarios are stressing, the F–35 brings an unprecedented combination of stealth, sensing, and firepower, complimented by the F–22's unmatched survivability and lethality in the air-to-air arena. However, pending full rate production of JSF, the Department must consider prudent investments to maintain our inventory capacity, which in the 2012 President’s Budget involved expenditure in new FA–18E/Fs and legacy attack fighter aircraft modernization.

163. Senator CORYN. Dr. Carter, would you agree that these threats are reason to procure more fifth generation aircraft and phase out procurement of fourth generation aircraft?

Dr. CARTER. The Department needs the JSF to deal with advanced fighters and surface-to-air missiles world-wide, especially in the stressing electronic warfare environments of the future, and it is committed to making responsible investment decisions relative to the F–35 that accurately reflect the status of the program, the Services’ requirements, and the larger Department priorities.

164. Senator CORYN. Dr. Carter, in your opinion, what is the survivability of a fourth generation fighter, such as the latest versions of the F/A–18, against a Russian T–50, Chinese J–20, and advanced SAMs?

Dr. CARTER. The F/A–18E/F is a highly capable aircraft designed to meet and defeat today’s threats with growth potential for the future. It operates at higher risk in a war fight compared to the JSF but ably conducts the full range of strike fighter missions. F/A–18E/F will be a complementary platform on the Nation’s carrier decks with the F–35C into the 2030s and will meet current and projected requirements, with planned investments in the fiscal years 2012–2016 FYDP and beyond. Investments in the F/A–18E/F include upgraded avionics, sensors, and weapons such as Infra-Red Search and Track, AIM–9X Block II, Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures Block 2, and Active Electronically Scanned Array electronic protection upgrades, which will ensure relevancy against many emerging and future threats.

SHORT TAKEOFF VERTICAL LANDING AIRCRAFT

165. Senator CORYN. Dr. Carter, the Marine Corps has a validated and pressing need for a short takeoff, vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft to replace its famous AV–8B Harrier jump-jets. During the conflict in Libya, Marine Corps Harriers operated with great combat effectiveness from the USS Kearsarge, approximately 150 miles off the coast of Libya. Their flight time of 25 minutes from ship to target was just a fraction of the 440-mile, 75-minute transit that conventional U.S. tactical aircraft made from the nearest base in Italy. Additionally, due to the short transit time, Marine Corps combat aviators were able to return to the ship, load more weapons, and fly a second mission that same day. It seems pretty clear that the STOVL capability is a combat multiplier. Do you agree that this unique capability greatly increases the capability of our military units to execute their missions?

Dr. CARTER. STOVL fixed-wing aircraft, operating from forward deployed amphibious ships and expeditionary bases, provide important operational flexibility. With regards to the Libya operation, the presence of the USS Kearsarge and its air combat element allowed the United States to provide tactical aircraft capabilities from the sea without changing the disposition of aircraft carriers deployed elsewhere. While our NATO allies operated from bases 440 miles from Libya, most tactical U.S. strike aircraft operated from Aviano Airbase, 1,045 miles from Benghazi. The AV–8B Harriers, however, were based as close as 120 miles from Benghazi, allowing them to operate without aerial refueling and generate multiple sorties per aircraft per day. This ability to operate from such close proximity to the Libyan coast made the Harrier highly effective in attacking fleeting targets of Qaddafi’s highly mobile forces.

166. Senator CORYN. Dr. Carter, the Harrier, due to its STOVL capability, is the only U.S. tactical jet aircraft capable of operating from the Navy’s fleet of amphibious assault ships, until the F–35B fleet comes online. It seems that, if the F–35B variant is not fielded in its intended numbers, the United States will have failed to leverage the enormous capability provided by amphibious assault ships and also
the huge investment that U.S. taxpayers have made in these ships. Do you agree? How can we avoid such an undesirable outcome?

Dr. CARTER. The F–35B was designed to operate off our current Landing Helicopter Deck (LHD) class large deck amphibious assault ships, and is currently conducting sea trials aboard the USS Wasp LHD. The Department’s future America Class Landing Helicopter Assault LHA(R) class vessels are specifically designed to operate F–35Bs, along with the full contingent of Marine Corps assault support rotorcraft. The integration of F–35B and F–35C aircraft into our strike groups will provide multi-role, fifth-generation capabilities across a range of combat operations to deter potential adversaries and enable future Navy and Marine Corps power projection. DOD remains strongly committed to both the F–35B and F–35C JSF.

F–35 CONCURRENCY

167. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, the JSF program was designed with a substantial amount of concurrency built in by DOD. My understanding is that concurrency is the deliberate overlap of the development/testing phase and the production phase of a program. By building in concurrency, DOD decided to start buying production models of the F–35 before development and testing of the aircraft was completed. As I understand it, the goal of building in concurrency would be to get the F–35 to the warfighter faster, but at the risk of creating cost overruns during the early stages of production. Can you comment on why DOD built concurrency into the JSF program?

Dr. CARTER. The Department established a concurrent JSF program with the goal of providing the Department with incremental JSF capability in order to meet operational requirements and address strike fighter shortfall forecasts. Department leadership accepted a level of concurrency that it felt best balanced the risks of concurrent development and production against the need to meet the Services IOC requirements. In the time since this initial decision was made, program delays have substantially increased the level of concurrency and have made it necessary for the Services to delay their IOC dates and extend their legacy fleets. The Department will continue to review concurrency in the program to ensure that it is managed appropriately.

168. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, how has that affected the program’s costs?

Dr. CARTER. Concurrency has increased procurement costs. Aircraft procured prior to the completion of the development and testing phase require modifications to incorporate changes discovered during testing and those costs are not insignificant. However, those increases have to be taken in the context that accepting concurrency costs allows for earlier delivery of the aircraft.

169. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, has concurrency led to a faster ramp-up to full-rate production?

Dr. CARTER. Yes. Because the program began Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) during development, full-rate production can be achieved sooner than if LRIP was delayed until the completion of the development and test phase.

170. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, my understanding is that the total cost overruns for LRIP Lots 1 through 3, which include both performance and concurrency overruns, was $1.054 billion, of which the Government’s share was $771 million and industry’s (both Lockheed Martin and United Technologies Corporation) was $283 million. DOD built concurrency into the JSF program. Would you agree that a significant portion of these cost overruns is a result of that concurrency?

Dr. CARTER. No. The cost overruns on the LRIP 1–3 contracts are not primarily a result of the concurrent aspects of the program. The good bulk of cost overruns are attributable to additional labor hours required for wing and mate assembly on the production line. It took the contractor longer to manufacture the early lots of aircraft than was predicted and negotiated for. Since these were Cost Plus Incentive Fee contracts, negotiated in 2007, 2008, and 2009, the Department was responsible for the cost increases. For this reason, in 2010 the Department transitioned to a Fixed-Price Incentive Firm contract for LRIP 4. In both the LRIP 4 contract and the LRIP 5 contract currently being negotiated, the Government will be protected against this type of open ended overrun. The costs due to concurrency can be predicted, based on the expected change to the design, and negotiated into these Fixed-Price type contracts. Additionally, an equitable sharing arrangement for overruns, or underruns, as well as a ceiling price is included in the costs to cap the Government’s liability.
1163

TAIWAN SELF DEFENSE

171. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the United States is statutorily obligated to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services "as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." Yet DOD's 2011 report, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, concludes that the "balance of cross-Strait military forces and capabilities continues to shift in the mainland's favor." Given this predictable shift in China's favor, do you assess that the United States has been upholding our obligations under the TRA?

Dr. CARTER. Yes. The balance of military forces and defense capabilities was expected to shift, and indeed it did. The Department is monitoring this shift very closely and discussed these changes and their effects with Taiwan. It is not possible for Taiwan to match China's military expansion, nor would it be desirable for Taiwan to try to do so. Instead, Taiwan must acquire and deploy advanced and asymmetric military capabilities to defend itself. To offset the shift in military balance we are working with Taiwan to help it develop these capabilities and the appropriate military force that will deter PRC aggression and, should deterrence fail, provide the Taiwan military the capability to defend the island for an extended time.

172. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, in your responses to advance policy questions, you stated that China's "near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, including possible U.S. military intervention." Since 2006, Taiwan has made repeated requests to purchase new F–16C/D multirole combat aircraft from the United States to augment their air force, which is becoming increasingly obsolete. In your opinion, does Taiwan need these 66 new F–16C/D fighters in order to maintain adequate self-defense capabilities?

Dr. CARTER. The Obama administration is firmly committed to the one-China policy, which is based on the three joint U.S.-China communiqués and the TRA. This is a policy that endured across eight administrations, transcended political parties, and served as a central element of our approach to Asia for more than three decades. The administration’s strong commitment to the TRA is evident in its actions, which include the September 21 notification to Congress of our intent to sell Taiwan $5.85 billion worth of new defense articles and services—including an upgrade package for Taiwan's 145 F–16 A/B fighters; spare parts for its F–16, F–5, and C–130 aircraft; and training for F–16 pilots in order to maintain adequate self-defense capabilities?

Dr. CARTER. The Obama administration is firmly committed to the one-China policy, which is based on the three joint U.S.-China communiqués and the TRA. This is a policy that endured across eight administrations, transcended political parties, and served as a central element of our approach to Asia for more than three decades. The administration’s strong commitment to the TRA is evident in its actions, which include the September 21 notification to Congress of our intent to sell Taiwan $5.85 billion worth of new defense articles and services—including an upgrade package for Taiwan's 145 F–16 A/B fighters; spare parts for its F–16, F–5, and C–130 aircraft; and training for F–16 pilots in order to maintain adequate self-defense capabilities?

This decision follows the January 29, 2010 decision to sell Taiwan $6.4 billion in defensive arms, including 60 UH–60M Blackhawk helicopters, Patriot PAC–III firing units and missiles (three firing units, one training unit, and 114 missiles), Harpoon missiles, two Osprey-class mine hunters, and follow-on support for command and control systems. In addition, in August 2011, the Obama administration submitted a $310 million direct commercial sales notification to Congress for the approval of export licenses in support of radar equipment for Taiwan Indigenous Defense Fighters and Hughes air defense radars. These collective sales of more than $12.5 billion in arms to Taiwan are an important indication of our commitment to Taiwan's defense.

The F–16 retrofit reflects a smart defense policy that provides real and immediate contributions to Taiwan's security. The retrofit fitted F–16 A/Bs will provide a more reliable, survivable, and capable aircraft—comparable to the F–16 C/D, but at a lower cost—and Taiwan will have 145 of them.

173. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, what risks would the United States face if Taiwan is unable to protect itself in the future?

Dr. CARTER. A Taiwan that is unable to protect itself could lead to instability in Northeast Asia. A weak Taiwan would be less likely to continue cross-strait engagement with China if it could not resist coercion. The lack of dialogue would potentially result in misunderstandings across the Strait and could escalate to crisis due to miscalculations. Additionally, China may be more likely to resort to force against Taiwan if the island lacks the means to resist coercion and deter aggression.

Taiwan is a visible and important indicator of U.S. commitment to Asia. A Taiwan that is unable to defend itself undermines U.S. interests, and the failure to provide for Taiwan's defense could cast doubt on U.S. commitments to other friends and allies in the region. Maintaining the current balance of power in the region and across the Taiwan Strait promotes stability and discourages regional arms races from materializing.
Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 designates the Deputy Secretary of Defense as the CMO of DOD. In this capacity, the Deputy Secretary is responsible for overseeing the synchronization, integration, and coordination of DOD business operations, ensuring effectiveness and efficiency—including in DOD's financial management practices. Arguably, past deputy secretaries have not spent the necessary time on performing the critical job of CMO, which has fallen well short of Congress' intent for the CMO function. Do you agree that now, more than ever, there is a pressing need for DOD to improve its overall business practices and financial management systems in order to maximize each and every dollar and serve as better stewards of taxpayers' funding?

Dr. CARTER. I believe that, particularly in light of the current need to rein in spending, in order to acquire with wisdom and care and to make the most of each and every one of the taxpayers' dollars entrusted to the Department, the oversight of the Department's business operations and its financial management practices could not be of greater importance.

Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, are you fully committed to carrying out the important function of DOD CMO on a daily basis?

Dr. CARTER. Yes, I am thoroughly committed to carrying out the function of DOD CMO on a daily basis.

Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, how much time do you anticipate dedicating to your responsibilities as CMO?

Dr. CARTER. I anticipate dedicating a significant amount of my time to my responsibilities as DOD's CMO.

Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, in a speech earlier this year, former Secretary Gates stated that "we must reject the traditional approach of applying across-the-board cuts, the simplest and most politically expedient approach both inside this building and outside of it. . . . It results in a hollowing-out of the force from a lack of proper training, maintenance, and equipment. We've been there before, in the 1970s and in the 1990s." What assurances can you give that you will make every effort to avoid a "hollowing-out of the force", as described by Secretary Gates?

Dr. CARTER. The Secretary made maintaining an extremely agile, deployable force one of his major priorities. I will use my position to ensure that adequate resources are programmed and budgeted in the readiness accounts in order to meet this priority. We all understand that this force will likely be smaller but will ensure that it is trained to be ready and deployable when called upon to do so.

Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, given our experience in recent years in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, can the United States afford to take another procurement holiday?

Dr. CARTER. Engaging in two simultaneous unconventional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated that our enemies do not look the same as they did in previous wars. This truth has changed the nature of our engagement and the nature of the systems required to properly equip our warfighters. Similarly, we cannot predict exactly what our enemies will look like in the future, and the defense acquisition system must be able to adapt. As we reduce budgets, we must take care to sustain the industrial base in ways that preserve the ability to equip our forces, as well as protect the future in ways that foster innovation, technical superiority, and essential intellectual capability.

Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, what would doing so mean for our national security?

Dr. CARTER. A procurement "holiday" of sufficient magnitude could erode key sectors of the industrial base, which could in turn impair our ability to equip our warfighters adequately. It could also degrade key industrial capabilities necessary to sustain technical superiority.
DOD EFFICIENCIES INITIATIVES

180. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, it has been over a year since DOD launched its ambitious efficiencies initiative to spur savings. Can you provide specific examples where these initiatives had resulted in real dollar savings and efficiencies?

Dr. CARTER. Increasing competition is a main initiative to spur savings for the Department. Below is an example from each Military Department in which competition resulted in real dollar savings.

In the Army, within the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) portfolio, the Multi-functional Distribution Information System-Low Volume Terminal (MIDS–LVT) radio program is an example of how competition has resulted in cost savings. During the production phase of the MIDS–LVT program, competition has resulted in approximately 60 percent cost savings. The initial production cost of the radio was $435 thousand per unit and, through ongoing competition between the two approved vendor production sources, the cost per unit has steadily decreased to $181 thousand per unit. With over 2,600 MIDS–LVT units purchased to date, the program has achieved hundreds of millions of dollars in procurement savings through the successful MIDS–LVT competitive acquisition strategy.

For the Air Force, the MQ–1 Predator organizational-level maintenance contract is a good example of how competition produced acquisition cost savings. The initial contract, issued in March 2005, was a sole source award to the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. This decision not to compete the organization-level maintenance contract was primarily driven by the lack of published technical orders. When those technical orders became available, the contract was recompeted a year ahead of schedule and awarded to Battle Space Flight Services, resulting in a savings of $102 million. Because of increased and accelerated wartime demand, the Air Force is anticipating additional savings over the life of the contract. The ability to compete the requirement in the future will continue to enable cost savings.

For the Department of Navy (DON), the most visible example is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. After receiving proposals from Lockheed Martin and Austal USA in early 2010 that were deemed unaffordable, the DON changed its acquisition strategy to an all-or-nothing competitive contract award and encouraged the companies to establish leaner teaming arrangements. After proposals were submitted, the DON realized it could achieve competitive prices. In December 2010, Lockheed Martin and Austal USA were each awarded fixed-price incentive contracts for the design and construction of 10 ships from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2015. The benefits of competition, serial production, employment of mature technologies, design stability, fixed-price contracting, commonality, and economies of scale contributed to a highly affordable ship construction program. The approach, self-financed within the program budget by reinvesting a portion of the greater than $2 billion in total savings through the FYDP. The approach also enables the DON to efficiently produce the ships at an increased rate to meet operational requirements sooner.

181. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, recognizing that over 70 percent of weapons systems costs are borne in the sustainment vice the initial purchase, you have spurred the Services to focus their efforts at savings there. Can you provide specific examples where your efforts have brought increased competition and lower costs in the sustainment arena?

Dr. CARTER. Program Managers and Product Support Managers have been focused on sustainment solutions that affordably and effectively satisfy the Warfighter’s requirements for the weapon system under their control. Part of the solution addressing the tenets reflected in the Better Buying Power initiative is performance-based, life-cycle product support (also known as Performance Based Logistics (PBL)).

PBL strategies involve buying performance (as defined by the Military Services) rather than a traditional transactional support strategy. Inherent in PBL strategy are the overall reduction of financial and mission performance risk and the transfer of some of that risk from the Military Service to the PBL provider.

Fixed-price, incentive-type contracts are central to effective PBL strategies with commercial examples. This approach is consistent with the “Should Cost” philosophy, which challenges programs to find specific ways to beat the existing cost projections reflected by the Independent Cost Estimate or program estimates. It specifically focuses on eliminating non-value added overhead and incentivizes the provider to improve processes and product. It creates “internal competition,” as cost savings is in the organization’s best interest, and it is also in the best interests of the warfighter and taxpayer.
The Department instituted a PBL Awards program in 2005 to enhance PBL awareness and encourage PBL excellence. Three PBL award winners recognized this year by the Department for their success delivering sustainment in a more affordable and effective fashion are the Air Force Joint Stars (AF JSTAR), Apache Sensors, and Navy Tires program.

The AF JSTAR program team delivered an average 96-percent mission-effectiveness rate and $47 million in savings since contract inception. Apache Sensor PBL improved mean time between failure by 100 percent between July 2010 and the present, and reduced sustainment costs by $7 million over the same period. The Navy Tire program has resulted in $46 million in savings across the life of the contract and the elimination of Navy wholesale tire inventory, which freed up 280,000 cubic feet of storage space in the DLA and allowed for the reassignment of personnel to other work. Most importantly, warfighter support has been superb with 100 percent of all orders filled without a backorder in delivering more 289,000 tires worldwide.

182. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Carter, Air Force leadership (Major General Fedder at a National Defense Industrial Association breakfast on September 7, 2011) has recognized that in the Air Force garnering savings in sustainment must be lead by focusing on aircraft engines. Given that over 85 percent of Air Force engine sustainment work is sole-sourced, what is OSD doing to help the Air Force spur competition in sustainment?

Dr. CARTER. A key factor necessary for competition is licensing of the data rights to maintenance manuals for continued sustainment. The Department is addressing this issue as part of the Better Buying Power Initiative for promoting real competition. Proper consideration given to acquiring technical data and the appropriate accompanying licenses in both initial acquisition and in recompetition ensures the Department has repair capability available through organic field and depot maintenance, commercial sources of repair, or a combination of both, with the focus of optimizing competition to reduce cost and provide best value.

[The nomination reference of Hon. Ashton B. Carter follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

As in Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
August 2, 2011.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Ashton B. Carter, of Massachusetts, to be Deputy Secretary of Defense, vice William J. Lynn III.

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Ashton B. Carter, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

RESUMÉ OF CAREER SERVICE OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER

Education:

• Oxford University
  • 1976–1979
  • Ph.D., Theoretical Physics
  • Senior Scholar, St. John’s College
  • Best Participant Prize, NATO Center for Subnuclear Physics

• University of Edinburgh
  • Spring 1975, no degree

• Yale University
  • 1972–1976
  • B.A., summa cum laude
  • Honors in Medieval History
  • Honors in Physics
  • Phi Beta Kappa
• Andrew D. White Essay Prize in European History

Employment Record:

• U.S. Department of Defense
  • Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    • 2009–present

• Harvard University
  • Chair, International and Global Affairs Faculty
  • John F. Kennedy School of Government

• Harvard University
  • Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs
  • John F. Kennedy School of Government
    • 1996–2009

• Preventive Defense Project, Harvard and Stanford Universities
  • Co-Director (with William J. Perry)
    • 1997–2009

• U.S. Department of State
  • Senior Advisor to the North Korea Policy Review
    • 1998–2000

• U.S. Department of Defense
  • Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
    • 1993–1996

• Harvard University
  • Director, Center for Science and International Affairs
    • 1990–1993

• Harvard University
  • Professor, and Associate Director, Center for Science and International Affairs
    • 1988–1990

• Harvard University
  • Associate Professor
    • 1986–1990

• Harvard University
  • Assistant Professor
    • 1984–1986

• Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Research Fellow, Center for International Studies
    • 1982–1984

• U.S. Department of Defense
  • Program Analysis and Evaluation
    • 1981–1982

• Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress
  • International Security and Commerce Program
    • 1980–1981

• Rockefeller University, New York
  • Research Associate
    • 1979–1980

• Oxford University
  • Physics Instructor (“Tutor” in the Oxford system)
  • Quantum Mechanics and Relativity
    • 1977–1979

• Brookhaven National Laboratory
  • Experimental Research Associate
    • 1976

• Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
  • Experimental Research Associate
    • 1975
Honors and Awards:

- Forum Award, American Physical Society, “For his clear and lucid exposition of the physics issues in the nuclear arms race and his unique ability to combine his physics background and good judgment to clarify the technical parameters of these important public policy issues,” 1988.
- Ten Outstanding Young Americans, United States Jaycees, 1987.
- Rhodes Scholar, 1976
- See above under “Education.”

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Ashton B. Carter, in connection with his nomination follows:]
Ava Clayton Carter, 19.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

- University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, spring 1975, no degree
- Oxford University, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1976–1979, D. Phil., 1979

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

- Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2009–present; U.S. Department of Defense—Washington, DC
- Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs, 1996–2009; John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University—Cambridge, MA

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

- Member, White House Government Accountability and Transparency Board (2011–present)
- Member, International Security Advisory Board to the Secretary of State, 2006–2008
- Member National Academy of Sciences Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, 2001–2003
- Member, Defense Policy Board, 1997–2001
- Member, National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, 1990–1993
- Member, Sandia National Laboratory, President’s Advisory Council, 1992–1993
- Member, Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, Advisory Panel on START Verification Technologies, 1991–1992
- Member, National Academy of Sciences Panel on National Security Export Controls, 1990–1991
- Member, National Research Council Naval Studies Advisory Committee on the Future of the Aircraft Carrier, 1990–1991
- Member, White House, President’s Council of Advisers on Science and Technology, Panel on National Security, 1990–1991
- Member, Defense Science Board Task Force on New Scenarios and Intelligence, 1990
- Member, Congressional Office of Technology Assessment Advisory Panel on START Verification Technologies, 1989–1990
- Member, Commission on The Presidency and Science Advising, 1988
- Consultant, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, 1986–1988
- Member, Advisory Panel on Military Uses of Space, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1985–86
- Experimental Research Associate, Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1976
1170

Experimental Research Associate, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, 1975

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
   c. Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1989–present
   d. American Physical Society, 1976–present
   e. American Association of Rhodes Scholars, 1977–present

13. Political affiliations and activities:
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
      None.
   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
      Member, Department of Defense Agency Review Team, Obama-Biden Transition, 2008–2009
      Member of National Security Advisory Group to Senator Tom Daschle, then Senator Harry Reid, chaired by William J. Perry, 2005–2008
   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

8/28/2008 ........................................ $2,300 ...... Friends of Hillary
6/24/2008 ........................................ $4,600 ...... Obama for America
9/15/2007 ........................................ $2,300 ...... Hillary Clinton for President
9/15/2007 ........................................ $2,300 ...... Hillary Clinton for President
9/15/2007 ........................................ $1,500 ...... Friends of Dick Lugar, Inc.
11/2/2006 .......................................... $1,500 ...... Friends of Dick Lugar, Inc.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
   3. Forum Award, American Physical Society. “For his clear and lucid exposition of the physics issues in the nuclear arms race and his unique ability to combine his physics background and good judgment to clarify the technical parameters of these important public policy issues,” 1988.
   5. Senior Scholar, St. John’s College, 1978–1979
   7. Rhodes Scholar, 1976
   8. Summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa graduate, Yale University, with honors in medieval history and physics (B.A. 1976).

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written. Please see attached. [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

I have delivered a large number of speeches in my capacity as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and, previously, as Chair of
the International and Global Affairs Faculty at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. In a majority of cases, I have delivered these speeches using no notes, or using handwritten notes that have not been archived. Almost all of my speeches are derived from, or form the basis of, written publications or testimony, and their content can be found in my response to the previous question. As per the committee’s request, I am providing two copies of each formal speech I have delivered (of which I have copies) on topics that are relevant to the position for which I have been nominated.


[Nominee provided copies and they are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

17. Commitment regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]
(The committee may require that copies of your Federal income tax returns be provided to the committee. These documents will be made available only to Senators and the staff designated by the chairman. They will not be available for public inspection.)

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

**Ashton B. Carter.**

This 6th day of September, 2011.

[The nomination of Hon. Ashton B. Carter was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 21, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on September 23, 2011.]
NOMINATIONS OF MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT; MARK W. LIPPERT TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS; BRAD R. CARSON TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; AND KEVIN A. OHLSON TO BE A JUDGE OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2011

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Webb, McCain, Inhofe, Graham, and Cornyn.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Kathleen A. Kullenkampff.

Committee members’ assistants present: Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Sergio Sarkany, assistant to Senator Graham; and Dave Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.

(1173)
The committee meets today to consider the nominations of Mark Lippert to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs; Michael Sheehan to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC); Brad Carson to be General Counsel of the Army; and Kevin Ohlson to be a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. We welcome our witnesses and our nominees and their families to today’s hearing.

The long hours and the other sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make to serve our country are appreciated by us, and as they know full well, they could not happen without the support of their families.

Each of our nominees has a distinguished record of public service.

Mr. Lippert worked in the Senate for the better part of 10 years serving as an advisor to a number of Senators and as a professional staff member for the Senate Appropriations Committee before joining the National Security Council (NSC) staff in 2009. In the same period, he has somehow found time to serve two tours on Active Duty as a naval intelligence officer, earning a Bronze Star in Iraq in 2008.

Mr. Sheehan is currently the president of Lexington Security Group. He previously served on the NSC staff under the first President Bush, under President Clinton as coordinator for counterterrorism in the State Department, as Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations (U.N.), and as a Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism for the New York City Police Department (NYPD). Mr. Sheehan is a West Point graduate with a distinguished 20-year career in the Army.

Mr. Carson served as a Congressman from Oklahoma from 2001 to 2005. In 2008 and 2009, Mr. Carson served on Active Duty with an explosive ordnance disposal battalion in Iraq where he was awarded the Bronze Star. Mr. Carson is currently the Director of the National Energy Policy Institute and an associate professor of law and business at the University of Tulsa.

Mr. Ohlson served as the chief of staff to the Attorney General from 2009 to 2011 and chief of staff to the Deputy Attorney General from 1997 to 2001. Before that, he served as a judge advocate in the Army and was awarded a Bronze Star for his role in the first Gulf War. Mr. Ohlson is currently the Chief of the Professional Misconduct Review Unit at the Department of Justice.

If confirmed, Mr. Sheehan and Mr. Lippert would play a key role in guiding Department of Defense (DOD) policy as the Department works to address continuing threats to our national security in an austere budget environment, while Mr. Carson and Mr. Ohlson would be among the most senior legal officials in DOD.

We look forward to the testimony of our nominees and hopefully to their confirmation.

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our nominees and their families today, and I congratulate them on their nominations.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our nominees and their families today, and I congratulate them on their nominations.
As you mentioned, Mr. Sheehan has been nominated to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC. He has an extensive background in counterterrorism having served as a special forces officer in the Army and subsequently as coordinator for counterterrorism in the Department of State during the Clinton administration and as Assistant Secretary General at the United Nations in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations during the Bush administration.

Mr. Sheehan, if confirmed, you will have a critical, important role given the importance of our Special Operations Forces counterterrorism efforts around the globe. Al Qaeda and associated organizations are becoming increasingly decentralized in nature and remain a serious threat. Prolonged instability in places like Yemen and Somalia continue to provide safe havens for these groups allowing them greater areas of operation to organize and plan attacks against America's allies, interests, and Homeland.

Mr. Lippert has been nominated to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. Since graduating college in 1997, he has gained national security policy experience on Capitol Hill, with the administration, and without question his service as an intelligence officer with the Navy Reserve has added to his understanding. The next few years are critical to this broader and strategic endeavor. Mr. Lippert appears to be qualified, and I praise his service in uniform.

I have serious concerns regarding his nomination. In a meeting in my office, I asked Mr. Lippert his views on the success of the surge in Iraq, and I find his answers to be less than satisfactory. I would like to follow up on that matter this morning.

Mr. Carson has been nominated to be the Army's General Counsel and is well qualified to be a key advisor to Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. He possesses extensive experience in the public and private sectors, including representing the Second District of Oklahoma in the House of Representatives in the 107th and 108th Congresses. Mr. Carson's military service as a mobilized Navy Reserve intelligence officer serving with the 84th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Battalion in Iraq in 2008 and 2009 is particularly noteworthy.

Finally, Mr. Ohlson has been nominated to be a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the civilian appellate court that oversees our military justice system. The court that you will serve on, if confirmed, is a key element in guaranteeing that the goals of the Uniform Code of Military Justice legislation enacted 60 years ago continue to be realized.

Mr. Ohlson, your military service as a judge advocate in the Army and your years of service in the Department of Justice in a variety of capacities demonstrate your qualifications. However, your assignment from 2009 to 2011 as Attorney General Eric Holder's chief of staff and counselor during the period in which the Justice Department managed Operation Fast and Furious raised serious concerns. As a result, I am very troubled. Operation Fast and Furious, as we now know, resulted in over 2,000 weapons walking into Mexico where they have been connected to the slaying of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special Agent Jaime Zapata. On November 10,
I submitted to you in writing a series of questions on this matter. I find your answers to be problematic.

Without objection, I ask that my letter, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ohlson's response be made part of today's record. In other words, Mr. Ohlson's answer was he did not know a thing about it. I wonder why. I wonder why as chief of staff to Eric Holder, he does not know a thing about an operation of the scope and size resulting in the death of one of the citizens of my State, a killing with weapons that he did not know a thing about it.

Chairman Levin. Those letters will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Kevin A. Oihlon
/o Ms. Kathryn Ruemmler
Assistant to the President and Counsel
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Oihlon:

On September 15, 2011, you were nominated by the President to be a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Your biographical information indicates that you served as Chief of Staff and Counsel to Attorney General Eric Holder from January 2009 to January 2011.

In evaluating your nomination, the Committee must be provided with comprehensive information about your involvement with respect to Operation Fast and Furious. Operation Fast and Furious was conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives as part of its investigation into illegal gun trafficking. The Operation started in the fall of 2009 and ended in late 2010 after the slayings of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry, who was murdered in Rio Rico, Arizona, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special Agent Jaime Zapata who was killed in the Mexican state of San Luis Potosí on February 15, 2011. As Mr. Holder's Chief of Staff and Counselor from January 2009 until January 2011, you were in a position to be informed about the Operation, to make decisions regarding the operation, and to know what information about it was and was not provided to the Attorney General.

Please respond to the following questions and requests for documents with respect to Operation Fast and Furious ("the Operation"): 

1. Describe in detail your actions, knowledge, advice, and involvement as Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General regarding the Operation.

2. Were you aware of the Operation at any time prior to your departure in January 2011 to become Chief of the Professional Misconduct Review Unit?

3. What recommendations or assistance, if any, regarding the Operation have you provided to Attorney General. Holder since first learning of its existence? Please provide the Committee with any written memoranda or other briefing materials you drafted or reviewed in connection with your duties as Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General regarding the Operation.
4. To your knowledge, what information about the Operation was provided to you or to Attorney General Holder about its concept, purpose, progress, and methods while you served as Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General?

5. Media reports have indicated that internal Department of Justice emails showed that Attorney General Holder was provided with information about the Operation as early as July 2010. As Attorney General Holder’s Chief of Staff and Counselor, when did you personally learn of the existence of the Operation and what was the extent of your knowledge in December 2010? Do you believe your transfer in January 2011 was in any way related to the Operation or the slaying of Agent Brian Terry? If so, how?

6. Since moving to the Professional Misconduct Review Unit, what has been your involvement, if any, in responding to questions sent to Attorney General Holder or the Department of Justice about the Operation?

7. Have you been subpoenaed or interviewed in connection with ongoing investigations into the Operation? If so, please provide the Armed Services Committee with copies of the subpoenas and any documents, copies of emails, or other responses you have provided to other congressional committees or any other investigative bodies.

8. The Administration’s Office of National Drug Control Policy, the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, the General Accountability Office in its report on combating firearms trafficking of June 2009, and the U.S. Department of Justice Inspector General Review on Project Gun Runner of November 2010, all cited inter-agency and Department of Justice information sharing and coordination as a priority in order to making Project Gun Runner, of which Operation Fast and Furious was a part, successful.

Following the release of these reports, what actions, if any, were taken by the Attorney General, and what role did you play in initiating action in the Department of Justice to increase coordination and information sharing between the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Immigration Customs Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection? Please describe in detail what actions, if any, you took or directed be taken, to comply with the inter-agency information sharing priority of the Department.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

John McCain
Ranking Member
Dear Chairman Levin and Senator McCain,

This correspondence is in response to the November 10, 2011, letter sent to Kathryn Ruemmler, Counsel to the President, by Senator McCain asking about my knowledge of, and involvement in, Operation Fast and Furious. I am pleased to provide you with the following responses.

1. Describe in detail your actions, knowledge, advice, and involvement as Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General regarding the Operation.

During my tenure as Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General, I took no actions in regard to, had no knowledge of, provided no advice about, and had no involvement in Operation Fast and Furious.

2. Were you aware of the Operation at any time prior to your departure in January 2011 to become Chief of the Professional Misconduct Review Unit?

No.

3. What recommendations or assistance, if any, regarding the Operation have you provided to Attorney General Holder since first learning of its existence? Please provide the Committee with any written memoranda or other briefing materials you drafted or reviewed in connection with your duties as Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General regarding the Operation.
On Sunday, November 5, 2011, I participated in a moot session in preparation for the Attorney General's appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing two days later, and approximately one month ago I made a recommendation to the Attorney General about press outreach in regard to this matter. During my tenure as Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General, I did not draft any material related to Operation Fast and Furious. I have been informed that routine courtesy copies of weekly reports were forwarded to me that referred to the operation by name, but that did not provide any operational details and did not refer to gun walking or anything similar. There was nothing on the cover sheets of these routine weekly reports indicating that important or sensitive material was included in them, and I did not review them.

4. To your knowledge, what information about the Operation was provided to you or to Attorney General Holder about its concept, purpose, progress, and methods while you served as Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General?

During my tenure as Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General, I did not review or hear about any information that pertained to the concept, purpose, progress, or methods of Operation Fast and Furious. I have been informed that routine courtesy copies of weekly reports were forwarded to me that referred to the operation by name, but that did not provide any operational details and did not refer to gun walking or anything similar. There was nothing on the cover sheets of these routine weekly reports indicating that important or sensitive material was included in them, and I did not review them.

5. Media reports have indicated that Internal Department of Justice emails showed that Attorney General Holder was provided with information about the Operation as early as July 2010. As Attorney General Holder's Chief of Staff and Counselor, when did you personally learn of the existence of the Operation and what was the extent of your knowledge in December 2010? Do you believe your transfer in January 2011 was in any way related to the Operation or the slaying of Agent Brian Terry? If so, how?

I did not have any knowledge of Operation Fast and Furious in December 2010. I learned of the existence of the Operation in February 2011 from press reports. My assignment to serve as Chief of the Professional Misconduct Review Unit was in no way related to the Operation or to the slaying of Agent Brian Terry.

6. Since moving to the Professional Misconduct Review Unit, what has been your involvement, if any, in responding to questions sent to Attorney General Holder or the Department of Justice about the Operation?

I have not had any involvement in preparing written responses to questions posed by Members of Congress and sent to the Attorney General or the Department of Justice about the Operation. As noted above, on Sunday, November 5, 2011, I participated in a moot session in preparation for the Attorney General's appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Senator McCaIN. I thank the Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Let me call on Senator Inhofe first, and then we are going to welcome Senator Leahy to our committee for their comments on two of these nominees. Senator Inhofe?

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Senator Inhofe. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was going to introduce my friend, Brad Carson, and I have been crossing off the list things that have already been mentioned. Let me just say that
he actually, Senator McCain, was born in Arizona in Winslow, and he had the good judgment to come to Oklahoma and spend up to this time there. He graduated from Jenks High School in Tulsa and attended Baylor and Trinity College and then ultimately the University of Oklahoma College of Law.

He has been a friend of mine for a long period of time. We have disagreed on some of the political issues, but I can tell you right now, when he was first nominated and I discussed him with our mutual friend, Secretary McHugh, I went back and looked to refresh my memory and found that his voting record on our defense issues is right down the line where I think it should be for the position that he is nominated for. I am looking forward to supporting his nomination and serving with him.

I want to say that, unfortunately, we have a 10 o'clock meeting in this building of the Environment and Public Works Committee where my attendance is mandatory since I am ranking member. So I have to leave a little bit early and I apologize for that, Mr. Carson.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Leahy, we are delighted to have you with us. You are the dear friend to all of the members of this committee, all the other Senators that serve with you, and your presence here will make an important statement on behalf of the nominee that you are here for. Senator Leahy?

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK LEAHY, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT

Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate being here. Earlier I wished Senator Inhofe a happy birthday and I will do it again publicly. It is good to be with you and Senator McCain and Senator Webb. Like Senator Inhofe, I have to leave for the Judiciary Committee right after this.

But I really wanted to be here to introduce Mark Lippert. He is a personal friend but he is also a former member of my staff. The President has nominated him to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. I told the President I thought that was a great nomination. I have known him for years. I know what a lifelong public servant he is. He was raised in Ohio, went to Stanford University for his undergraduate degree, then a master’s in international relations in 1997.

When he joined my office 11 years ago in the year 2000, he quickly was promoted through the ranks. I promoted him to be a professional staff member for the Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations where all of the State Department appropriations and all of our international programs go. He assisted me with U.S. foreign policy and assistance programs with a focus on East Asia. He traveled there a number of times. He learned the history, the culture, the people. His advice was very valuable to both Democrats and Republicans on the subcommittee because we knew how professional it was and how non-political it was. He spoke with the highest integrity, but also with great analytical abilities and exceptional intellectual abilities. I hated to see him leave when he went to join then Senator Barack Obama as his chief foreign policy advisor, but then remained with the President.
as one of his top foreign policy experts, ultimately as the chief of staff for the NSC.

But then he decided to leave the White House. He had joined the Navy while working in my office. He told me about his commission—I asked him why. He said it was a result of his lifelong dream to serve as a military officer. I remember how proud we all were to see him as a naval officer. He left the White House post. He did it to return to Active Duty in the Navy, including the posting, as you have already indicated, Mr. Chairman, in Afghanistan.

Throughout all this, I have seen nothing but integrity, intelligence, and a willingness, perhaps a desire to serve the United States of America, and I think this is a great appointment.

I should note that Mark’s wife Robyn is here, as well as his parents. Robyn was a staff member in my office when she and Mark first met. So I take full credit for their successful marriage. She herself is somebody of great accomplishment.

I will put my full statement in the record, but, Mr. Chairman, those of us who are either chairs or ranking members of various authorizing committees have a great responsibility, along with the other members, in passing on nominees. I can assure you this is one nominee that you can vote to confirm and you will not find a reason to second-guess your decision.

I thank the chair and I thank the ranking member.

[The prepared statement of Senator Leahy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the committee, it is my pleasure to introduce Mark Lippert, my friend and a former member of my staff, and President Obama’s nominee to be his Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.

I have known Mark for many years and am proud of his accomplishments as a lifelong public servant. Mark has the character and the qualifications to make an outstanding defense senior leader, and I am proud to give him my highest endorsement.

Mark was raised in Ohio and attended Stanford University where he received his undergraduate degree in Political Science in 1996 and a Masters in International Relations in 1997. In 2000, Mark joined my office as a research assistant and quickly stood out on account of the sharpness of his intellect which was matched only by his sense of humor.

In 2001, I promoted him to be a professional staff member for the Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, where he assisted me with U.S. foreign policy and assistance programs with a focus on East Asia. In that capacity, he traveled to the region several times and developed a deep knowledge of the history, politics, and cultures of that critically important part of the world.

Mark did an outstanding job for the subcommittee and was universally respected by his peers of both parties for being a person of the highest integrity with exceptional intellectual and analytical abilities.

In 2005, I felt a mixture of pride and sadness when I bid Mark good luck as he joined the staff of then Senator Barack Obama as his chief foreign policy advisor. After President Obama’s election in 2008, Mark remained one of the President’s top foreign policy experts and ultimately the chief of staff of the National Security Council.

Parallel to his civilian career, Mark has also had an exemplary military career as a Naval Reserve officer. In 2007, Mark paused his civilian life—which at that time meant taking the difficult step of leaving a political campaign during a key moment—and deployed to provide intelligence support to Navy SEAL operations in Iraq.

When he decided to leave his White House post in 2009, Mark did so in order to return to Active Duty in the Navy. That tour included postings in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa.
Mark actually joined the Navy while working in my office, and he expressed to me that his commission was the result of his lifelong dream to serve as a military officer. In that light, I see this nomination, and today's hearing, as the predictable consequence of Mark's passion for service, his professional excellence, and his outstanding character and integrity.

I would be remiss if I did not also introduce Mark's wife Robyn to the committee. Robyn was also a staff member in my office when she and Mark first met, so I take full credit for that. Robyn has had well-deserved success in her own career, and I know the committee joins me in thanking her for her support of Mark during his multiple mobilizations overseas.

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of this committee, I urge you to favorably report the nomination of Mark Lippert to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. I know firsthand, as does the President, that Mark is well-qualified for the job.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Leahy, and we know that you, like Senator Inhofe, have to leave us and we totally understand.

Senator Inhofe, apparently today is your birthday.

Chairman Levin. The little birdie just said that, Senator Leahy. Happy Birthday Senator Inhofe.

Thank you very much, Senator Leahy.

We will now move to our nominees. The defense authorization bill is on the floor beginning at 11 o'clock, so we may have to do some scrambling if we are not done by then.

Please introduce any family or any other people who are here with you; feel free to do that. We will start with Mr. Sheehan.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, NOMINATED TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Mr. Sheehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee today. I am grateful of the confidence that President Obama has shown by nominating me to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC. I also want to thank Secretary Panetta, Deputy Secretary Carter, and Under Secretary Flournoy for their support of my nomination. If confirmed, I will be deeply honored to serve.

Given that SOLIC was created by Congress, there has always been a unique and valuable relationship between this committee and the office for which I have been nominated. Your support and that of the American people for our Special Operations Forces continues to be one of the key enablers of our success. Thank you for that.

I also want to thank my family for my support. My wife Sita Vasan is with me this morning and my son Michael is right directly behind me. Thank you to them for their great support during my career and their being with me today.

I believe that my policy background, as mentioned before, at the State Department, the U.N., and at the NYPD has well prepared me for this nomination, as well as my operational experience as an Active Duty Special Forces officer in both the counterterrorism unit as the assault team leader for our Special Forces A team in Pan-
ama and also as a counterinsurgency advisor in Central America for many years.

If the Senate confirms me in this position, I will make every effort to live up to the confidence placed in me and the excellence demonstrated by our Special Operations Forces around the world every day.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sheehan.

Now Mr. Lippert.

STATEMENT OF MARK W. LIPPERT, NOMINATED TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. LIPPERT. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning.

I have to admit that after working for 10 years on Capitol Hill as a staff member, it is much more intimidating to sit on this side of the dais.

I would also like to thank my former boss, Senator Leahy, for his gracious introduction. From past experience, I know how busy he is every Thursday morning with his responsibilities as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and I very much appreciate his time.

I wish to thank President Obama, Secretary Panetta, and Under Secretary Flournoy for their support of my nomination.

Please let me say a few words about my family. I would like to introduce my wife, Robyn Lippert, whom I met while working, as Senator Leahy mentioned, together on Capitol Hill. She has been the best partner that anyone could ask for and has patiently put up with military deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, long hours at the NSC, and the grind of the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee.

My mother and father, Susan and Jim Lippert, have made the trip from home, Cincinnati, OH, and I am deeply grateful for their lifetime of support.

I would also be remiss if I did not introduce Captain John Burnham and Master Chief Bubba Dodson, two friends and mentors from my time on Active Duty at Naval Special Warfare Development Group.

Members of the committee, from the fight to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, to maintaining and enhancing our force posture with treaty allies and partners in East and Southeast Asia, to engaging emerging powers such as India and China and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the challenges of this dynamic and important portfolio are self-evident. Accordingly, in the interest of time, I will simply say that these are among the greatest challenges that our Nation faces today and could face well into the future.

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee and Congress as a whole to help address these challenges in an effective and bipartisan way to keep America safe, secure, and prosperous, ensuring it continues to be the greatest country on Earth.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much.
Next we will call on Brad Carson. We welcome you particularly as a former colleague. Mr. Carson?

STATEMENT OF BRAD R. CARSON, NOMINATED TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, Senator Webb, Senator Cornyn, other members of the committee, I do appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. I would like to thank President Obama for nominating me to the position of General Counsel of the Army. I would also like to thank Secretary McHugh for his support of my nomination, and Senator Inhofe for his very kind words. If confirmed, I will be honored to serve as General Counsel of the Army.

My wife Julie is here with me today. She has always been an unflinching supporter of mine. Also present is Karen Kuhlman who is a dear friend and the former legislative director of my office when I served in the U.S. House of Representatives.

I believe that my background in law, education, business, and politics well prepare me to meet the extraordinary challenges facing the U.S. Army today. If the Senate confirms me to this position, I will make every effort to live up to the confidence placed in me. I am grateful for your consideration, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Carson. Mr. Ohlson?

STATEMENT OF KEVIN A. OHLSON, NOMINATED TO BE A JUDGE OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Mr. OHLSON. Thank you, Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, it is a great privilege to appear before this committee as the President’s nominee to be a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of this committee for convening this hearing today and for considering me for this important post.

I would also like to thank the President for his expression of confidence in me by nominating me for this position. If confirmed, I promise to do my level best to vindicate that trust.

Of course, I would like to thank my wife Carolyn and our two children, Matthew and Katherine, who are in school today. It is clear to me that I would not be sitting here today if it were not for their enduring love and support.

Mr. Chairman, during my entire professional career, I have experienced no greater honor than serving as an officer in the U.S. Army. I was privileged to serve in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps and to prosecute a number of cases as a trial counsel, as well as to provide legal advice to commanders and their staff on a wide range of legal issues.

But beyond that, during my time in the Army, I was privileged to become personally familiar with the men, women, mission, and ethos of the U.S. military and to see firsthand the exceptional quality of our Armed Forces. I will always treasure the opportunities I had to rappel out of helicopters at Air Assault School, to jump out
of airplanes during my tour of duty at Fort Bragg, and to serve our Nation during Operation Desert Storm. If confirmed, I will bring to bear on my duties as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces all of these experiences that I have had in the military.

But in addition to this, if I am confirmed, I will also keep in mind my family’s long tradition of serving as citizen soldiers at the hour of our Nation’s greatest need. I have had relatives serve in virtually every armed conflict that our country has engaged in during the last century. As just a few examples, my grandfather, Leo Gauvreau, was an American doughboy who served in the trenches during World War I. My uncle, Leif Ohlson, made the ultimate sacrifice for our country on the battlefields of France on June 29, 1944, and today lies at rest at the cemetery at Normandy. Mr. Chairman, I am very proud to note that even as we sit here today, my nephew, Blake Perron, is in basic training at Fort Benning striving to become the very best infantryman he can be.

So if I am confirmed, it is to these citizen soldiers and to all their comrades in arms to whom I will dedicate my service on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Ohlson.

Let me now ask you a set of standard questions and you can answer together.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Mr. Sheehan. Yes.

Mr. Lippert. Yes.

Mr. Carson. Yes.

Mr. Ohlson. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Mr. Sheehan. No.

Mr. Lippert. No.

Mr. Carson. No.

Mr. Ohlson. No.

Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

Mr. Sheehan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Lippert. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ohlson. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Mr. Sheehan. Yes.

Mr. Lippert. Yes.

Mr. Carson. Yes.

Mr. Ohlson. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Mr. Sheehan. Yes.

Mr. Lippert. Yes.
Mr. CARSON. Yes.
Mr. OHLSON. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?
Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes.
Mr. LIPPERT. Yes.
Mr. CARSON. Yes.
Mr. OHLSON. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes.
Mr. LIPPERT. Yes.
Mr. CARSON. Yes.
Mr. OHLSON. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Let us have a first round of 7 minutes for questions, and there are only a few of us here at the moment. We can have a second round if appropriate or needed, a third round for that matter. We can have whatever number of rounds we need.

Let me start with you, Mr. Sheehan. In your book titled “Crush the Cell”, you say that by working closely with foreign units that we may be able to reduce human rights violations associated with those operations. But if you want to get things done, sometimes we must work in conjunction with tough organizations with spotty human rights records.

Can you give us an idea as to how the benefits of working with partners be balanced with the necessity that they meet our human rights standards under the law?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. When I was Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism prior to September 11 and I was focusing on al Qaeda, I found that our Government had cut off relationships with some of the intelligence agencies for human rights violations and that I felt made our life a little bit more difficult. Moving forward, I find that often where al Qaeda resides, you are often working with countries that have less developed systems of governance and less developed judicial systems. So often you are dealing with organizations that do not maintain the same standards that we are accustomed to in the United States and in the West.

I feel that working together with them, we can achieve both our intelligence collection objectives and work to professionalize those services as they work towards moving to the standards of professionalism in human rights that we expect of them. I think there has been great progress in that area, but as with most of these very developing and sometimes broken states, it requires a lot of patience and long work to achieve those objectives. But in the long run, I think both are equally important to achieving our security objectives in those broken and developing states.

Chairman LEVIN. Let me ask you another question, Mr. Sheehan, relative to the Special Operations Forces night raids along with Afghan commandoes in Afghanistan. Frequently they have removed literally thousands of insurgents from the battlefield without any
shots being fired, but nonetheless, night raids remain controversial in Afghanistan as we read again in this morning’s paper when we see President Karzai indicating that the ending of those night raids is a condition of a long-term relationship with the United States. The Afghan Government and community leaders have repeatedly called for eliminating their use.

Can you talk about those night raids? How important is the participation of Afghan commandoes in those operations? How do we address Afghan concerns about those night raids?

Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, the ability to operate at night is one of the great advantages our Special Operations Forces have in every theater of operations, to include as we train our local counterparts and give them the technology and expertise to work at night, it also gives them a great advantage. Simultaneously we are aware of the cultural issues and other problems raised politically by the Afghan Government. We are trying to find the proper balance in that.

But as you mentioned, the key here is transferring the lead of these night operations to the local Special Operations Forces as they develop their capacity in conjunction with ours. I think we are moving well in that direction. I think the commanders are very aware of the issue of the sensitivity of night raids and have taken that under consideration. I think there has been a reduction in the amount of civilian casualties from what I understand. I think we are moving on the right track in that very important area, but as you had mentioned, the key, as in all counter-insurgency operations, is shifting that primary burden to the local security forces that then can make that initial interaction in the villages in Afghanistan.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Mr. Lippert, there is a real issue that has been raised by Senator Webb, Senator McCain, and myself relative to the realignment issues on Okinawa and Guam. I have a lot of questions of you about that, but I see that Senator Webb is here, and in the hope that he may take on that subject, I will withhold at this time. However, if he either is unable to or has to leave—and I do not want to put this onus on him, but if he is unable to do it—I know what his thoughts are on this and I totally share them—I would then ask you questions for the record. I am just going to leave it at that at the moment because I think we have to change, the road we are on is not workable, and that is my view. I think Senator Webb would probably go into it in more detail, but I will press you on more detail again on the record if he is not able to get into that for whatever reason.

Mr. Lippert, I will ask you, though, about the Haqqani Network. Would you agree that in order for relations between the United States and Pakistan to be normalized, that the Government of Pakistan has to go after safe havens in Pakistan for the extremists who are crossing the border and attacking U.S., Afghan, and coalition forces?

Mr. Lippert. Yes, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Mr. Carson, just one quick question for you and that has to do with the legal status of contractors on the battlefield. There is a very significant number of issues here about the
legal status of contractors in the battlefield areas. Are you familiar with some of those issues? If so, would you agree that DOD needs to review the legal status of contractors on the battlefield to ensure that we are not subjecting contractor employees to legal jeopardy when they work to support our efforts in hostile areas like Iraq and Afghanistan?

Mr. CARSON. Senator, I believe that is, in fact, a very significant issue, and I know DOD is reviewing those issues even as we speak. If confirmed, I hope to get myself more expert in those issues and make it a top priority to resolve them.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Mr. Ohlson, criminal defendants in the Article III judicial system have an automatic right to appeal to Federal courts of appeal and then a right to at least petition the U.S. Supreme Court for final review of their criminal cases. In contrast, defendants in military courts martial may not appeal their cases to the U.S. Supreme Court unless the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has also granted discretionary review.

Should defendants in the military justice system in your opinion in Article I courts have the same right as defendants in Article III courts to petition the Supreme Court for review of their case even if the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has denied their petition for review?

Mr. OHLSON. Mr. Chairman, I do believe that individuals within the Article I court made up by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces should have the identical right as those defendants in the Article III courts and that the Supreme Court should have the ability to address those cases.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you all.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ohlson, in your response to my letter of November 10, you stated you had no knowledge of Operation Fast and Furious throughout your assignment as Attorney General Holder’s chief of staff and counselor. Your letter, not surprisingly, seems to track closely with Attorney General Holder’s assertions about a lack of knowledge of this disastrous operation.

Was there ever a time in 2009 or 2010 you can remember reading about or discussing with Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) officials Operation Gun Runner or Operation Fast and Furious?

Mr. OHLSON. No, Senator. That never occurred.

Senator McCain. Agent Brian Terry was murdered in Arizona in a firefight on December 14, 2010. Did you hear about his death at that time and the circumstances?

Mr. OHLSON. I did, Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. When did you become aware then that two weapons that were found at the scene were linked to the gun-walking program known as Operation Fast and Furious?

Mr. OHLSON. Senator, I found out about that through press accounts sometime after I left serving as chief of staff to the Attorney General.

Senator McCain. So when this agent was murdered, it did not arouse your curiosity as to find out the details of his death?
Mr. OHLSON. There was no indication at that time, sir, that there was any connection with Fast and Furious. I was not aware of Fast and Furious.

Senator MCCAIN. But when a Border Patrol agent is murdered, you did not say, hey, what is the story here? How did this happen?

Mr. OHLSON. Yes, sir, and I remember the tragedy of—

Senator MCCAIN. Well, did you ask questions about it?

Mr. OHLSON. No, sir. I was in a briefing of the Attorney General at that time and I learned of the death of Agent Terry.

Senator MCCAIN. When you learned about it, no matter what you were doing, it did not arouse your curiosity as to ask what the circumstances were?

Mr. OHLSON. We were briefed on that, sir. It certainly aroused my sympathy for the family and I think it was——

Senator MCCAIN. But you did not ask enough to find out that this was part of Fast and Furious.

Mr. OHLSON. Senator McCain, there was not a basis for me to ask that question at that time.

Senator MCCAIN. You would not ask how did the murderers get the weapons that they were using? That again did not arouse your curiosity?

Mr. OHLSON. Sir, I did not ask that question.

Senator MCCAIN. You discussed in your letter routine courtesy copies of weekly reports that were sent to you. What information did those reports include about the gun-selling tactics of Operation Fast and Furious?

Mr. OHLSON. Sir, as I understand it, those reports did not make any mention of gun-walking. They simply referred to the operation as Operation Fast and Furious.

Senator MCCAIN. So you get a memo and it says it is part of Operation Fast and Furious and you do not say, hey, what is Operation Fast and Furious?

Mr. OHLSON. As it turned out, Senator, I did not read that weekly report.

Senator MCCAIN. So you are given weekly reports that you do not read?

Mr. OHLSON. Sir, there were a number of courtesy copies that are sent around the Department, and you are correct. I did not read that report.

Senator MCCAIN. So we have reports that are required to be submitted to your department and they come to you, the chief of staff for the Attorney General of the United States, only as a courtesy.

Mr. OHLSON. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Did you or Mr. Holder ever receive information from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives about its efforts to curtail firearms smuggling into Mexico?

Mr. OHLSON. I was not privy to any such conversation, sir, no.

Senator MCCAIN. Again, you were not curious even though the issue of guns being smuggled into Mexico has been widely discussed, widely—a source of deep concern amongst many of us in public life. But it did not arouse your curiosity.

Mr. OHLSON. I certainly take your point, Senator. As chief of staff, that was not within my area of purview, but in retrospect, I wish I had known more about that operation.
Senator McCain. What actions did you take following news about Agent Terry's death?

Mr. Ohlson. I did not take any actions in particular, Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Mr. Lippert, it has been widely reported that while serving in the White House, you and then-National Security Advisor General Jim Jones clashed significantly. It has also been widely reported that your departure from the White House to return to Active Duty in the Navy was an attempt to resolve this conflict. Would you please explain your interpretation of these events?

Mr. Lippert. Senator, I have great respect for General Jones' lifetime of service from Vietnam veteran to Commandant of the Marine Corps to Supreme Allied Commander to his service in the White House, just the highest degree of respect for him and his service.

In terms of the press accounts, I did not leak to the press about General Jones. My departure from the White House was voluntary. I actually turned down a promotion at the White House to return to Active Duty.

Senator McCain. So there was no conflict between you and General Jones?

Mr. Lippert. Senator, General Jones and I worked collaboratively on many issues, and I am proud of what we accomplished. But there were also times we disagreed. But I knew General Jones was the boss.

Senator McCain. So your departure from the White House had no relation whatsoever to the problems with the relationship between you and General Jones?

Mr. Lippert. Senator, as I mentioned, I was offered a promotion in the White House and then I turned down that promotion to return to Active Duty.

Senator McCain. You are not answering the question.

Mr. Lippert. Senator, the promotion was to the White House Military Affairs Office which would have been separate and apart from the NSC. At that point, I turned down that job and returned to——

Senator McCain. I will ask the question one more time, Mr. Lippert, and I would like to have an answer. Did your departure from the White House have anything to do with the widely reported conflict that you had with General Jones?

Mr. Lippert. Again, Senator, I would say it was due to the fact that I wanted to leave the NSC, went over to the White House Military Affairs Office, and turned down that promotion, sir.

Senator McCain. If you do not choose to answer the question, that is fine.

Ambassador Sheehan, very quickly do you believe that the Afghans are capable of carrying on night raids without U.S. military presence?

Mr. Sheehan. Senator McCain, from my understanding, the Afghan Special Operations Forces that work in tandem with our Special Operations Forces have demonstrated a greatly increased capacity to operate on a wide range and some night operations. Right now at this point, I am not sure they are ready to really step up fully to the plate.
Senator McCain. Do you know anybody that does?
Mr. Sheehan. No, sir. I think most believe they still need some more work with our folks.
Senator McCain. I thank you.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, with respect to the chairman’s question about the issue on Okinawa and Guam, I would suggest that we work up a joint written question for the record that could be answered in an accelerated fashion before the confirmation comes before the whole committee. I do not have enough time in 7 minutes to do the question justice, but it is a vital question in terms of what we are doing in that part of the world including, by the way, the announcement yesterday after a court ruling that the Navy says it is going to take more than 2 years for it to figure out an environmental impact report on the training ranges in Guam, which really I find kind of confusing at this point.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb, for that suggestion, and I just checked also with Senator McCain and we will ask our staffs, the three of us, to put together a joint question.
Senator Webb. I appreciate that. It is very important for us to have a clear understanding of where Mr. Lippert and the Pentagon at large is going on that.
First, I would like to congratulate all of the nominees and to thank them for having taken time in various ways to serve our country as they moved forward on those other careers and to welcome family and friends who are here today. I intend to support, without question, three of these nominations.
Mr. Lippert, you and I need to have a longer meeting. These nominations, although they may have been in process for some time, were moved very quickly once they were announced. I have a number of concerns.
First is this position that you are being nominated to is one of the three or four most vital assistant secretaryships right now in DOD given the transitions that we are looking at and the renewed emphasis which I have cared about for a very long time on our strategic presence in that part of the world. There have been questions about how this matches up with your professional skill set, however accomplished it is at this point. I would ask, first, if you would give us an explanation, first in terms of your view of the scope policy-wise and geographically of the position and how your experiences match up with that.
Mr. Lippert. Senator, the answer to your first question on the scope of the position, it covers everything from the Western Pacific, U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility to South Asia, Armed Forces Pacific, up to Central Asia.
In terms of my qualifications for the job, I bring a unique skill set of hands-on and policy experience to the position. In terms of hands-on, I was on the ground in Afghanistan. I have that experience. I studied Mandarin Chinese, lived in Beijing while I was a graduate student at Beijing University taking language courses.
In terms of policy experience, I have 10 years of service on Capitol Hill working for Senator Daschle, the Democratic Policy Committee, working for Senator Leahy on the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee, and then working for Senator Obama on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. All of that time gave me the skill set to tackle a lot of complex, difficult problems. It also had me engage in a range of these issues that we are still facing today. It allowed me to balance portfolios, juggle responsibilities, and deal with these substantive issues head on.

Then finally my time with the NSC. During that time, I regularly engaged in these types of issues day-in, day-out, and at senior levels of the Government.

I would just say in terms of my experience, I bring somewhat anomalously to someone who sat in summits with the President and Asian leaders, someone who has been on the ground in Afghanistan, and someone who has a mastery of foreign assistance programs in Southeast Asia and the South Asia region.

Senator Webb. I thank you for that. I look forward to spending some time with you when you can visit my office when we can discuss that connection further.

I want to follow on to something that Senator McCain raised because it is a question that has been widely reported in the media and it affects not simply whether or not you and General Jones had some sort of a fallout but it is also a question of how someone works when they are on one of these high-level staffs.

I, like most people on this committee, have a tremendous regard for General Jones. I have known him for many, many years. I believe he is one of the most knowing public servants that we have had, and I greatly admire his leadership style.

The question that came up—and there have been a couple of reports on this. This is to give you an opportunity to clarify this. It said you were widely suspected of leaking salacious and damaging stories about General Jones. This was reported—I am reading from an article by Josh Rogin, but it was also reported by Bob Woodward in his book. There was a comment in there that at one point people seemed to agree this was rank insubordination. These are words that have been reported.

Can you explain to us a little more what these reports were all about?

Mr. Lippert. Senator, there were a number of reports derogatory towards General Jones that were coming out while I was chief of staff at the NSC. I, again as I said to Senator McCain, had nothing to do with those reports. I did not talk to the press about General Jones. Full stop there.

On the other issue, in terms of rank insubordination, I knew General Jones was the boss. So on this issue, it is clear in my head. It is that I did not leak to the press and there was not insubordination.

Senator Webb. So you can say categorically you were not the author of any of these personal leaks to the press directly or indirectly through a third party?

Mr. Lippert. Yes.

Senator Webb. Thank you. I will look forward to seeing you on a longer visit in my office.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ohlson, I wanted to just ask you some questions briefly following up on Senator McCain. What was the description of your duties as chief of staff for the Attorney General from January 2009 through January 2011?
Mr. OHLSON. Senator Cornyn, there were a number of attorneys who worked within the Office of the Attorney General. I supervised them, and I also provided advice as a career member of the Department of Justice for 22 years. I am quite familiar with the Department and advised the Attorney General on issues related to it.
Senator CORNYN. Let me ask specifically. In the Judiciary hearings of last week or so when we were asking the Attorney General some questions about memos that had been directed to him, there was one directed to him, an NDIC memo. Do you know what that stands for?
Mr. OHLSON. National Drug Intelligence Center, sir.
Senator CORNYN. That referred to Fast and Furious. It was dated July 5, 2010. There was a subsequent memo entitled “Significant Recent Events Memo” that was dated November 1, 2010. Would you have been involved in either the preparation of or in the forwarding of those memos to the Attorney General for his attention?
Mr. OHLSON. No, Senator Cornyn.
Senator CORNYN. But is there anybody who serves as, for lack of a better word, a traffic cop for the Attorney General to make sure that he sees the most important things that require his eyes-on attention?
Mr. OHLSON. I would be the ultimate funnel point for that information, sir.
Senator CORNYN. When did you first learn about the gun-walking associated with Fast and Furious?
Mr. OHLSON. Through press accounts in approximately February of this year after I was no longer chief of staff, Senator Cornyn.
Senator CORNYN. Was that about the time the Assistant Attorney General Weich delivered a letter to Senator Grassley denying that any gun-walking had occurred?
Mr. OHLSON. Yes, sir, that would be the same time frame.
Senator CORNYN. Were you involved in preparing or approving that letter?
Mr. OHLSON. I was not, sir. I was no longer serving within main Justice at that time.
Senator CORNYN. When did you first learn that that letter was false?
Mr. OHLSON. Approximately 10 days ago.
Senator CORNYN. Would that have been roughly the time Lanny Breuer was testifying before the Judiciary Committee?

Mr. OHLSON. Yes, sir.

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, let me ask you some questions about Taiwan. You have been nominated for a very important position in that very important part of the world. I have some charts here I would like to just show you. First, a chart that shows the official estimates by DOD. It shows the People's Republic of China with about 2,300 operational combat aircraft while the Government of Taiwan has only 490 operational combat aircraft.

Let me show the second chart, please. The reason why that is very important is out of the 490 operational aircraft—as you can see, this chart from the Defense Intelligence Agency demonstrates that F–5 aircraft, as well as French Mirage aircraft, are old and becoming quickly obsolete, hard to repair, hard to get replacement parts for. You can see the huge cliff here dropping down in roughly 2020 in terms of the number of operational combat aircraft that Taiwan will have to deal with any Chinese aggression.

[The information referred to follows:]
Senator CORNYN. If confirmed, what course of action do you plan to pursue to ensure that the U.S. Government keeps its commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to make sure they have the defensive weaponry necessary to defend that nation against aggression by communist China?

Mr. LIPPERT. Senator, I strongly support a comprehensive, durable, and unofficial relationship with Taiwan, this vibrant democracy, and I am deeply concerned with the buildup that you referenced in your charts. My thinking will be guided by the “one China policy”, the three communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the six assurances. If confirmed, I can assure you that I am going to be an open-minded official that hears all sides of this debate, but I am not in the job yet, so I would not want to go further on that point.

Senator CORNYN. Do you have an opinion as to how many viable combat aircraft Taiwan needs in order to defend itself against communist aggression?

Mr. LIPPERT. I do not at this point in time, but if confirmed, I would dig into that question and work with your staff on that, sir.

Senator CORNYN. In light of the imbalance that I have just shown you and the deterioration of Taiwan’s air force, do you believe that the U.S. Government is fully upholding our legal responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act?

Mr. LIPPERT. Senator, my sense is that the administration is upholding their responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act.

Senator CORNYN. What is that based on?

Mr. LIPPERT. That is based on the decision to upgrade the F–16 As and Bs. That is based on the $12 billion in sales over the last 2 years to Taiwan, and that is based on the close coordination and consultation with the Taiwan Government.
Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, you know that upgrading the As and Bs does nothing to replace the obsolete F–5s and French Mirages. Do you think that sort of a dramatic decrease in the number of operating combat aircraft increases the risk for Taiwan, or do you think it is irrelevant?

Mr. LIPPERT. My sense, Senator, is that reading the testimony of Assistant Secretary Campbell and Deputy Assistant Secretary Lavoy, that this decision was made on the As and Bs to get the most bang for the buck quickly, get the 160-plus aircrafts over to Taipei as soon as possible, and then go from there.

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, during the upgrades of the As and Bs, there will be a period of time where the As and Bs will actually be out of service. When though Taiwan has As and Bs aircraft, there will be—and it is reflected here in the circled area around 2020. It is going to take a long time, and there will actually be even a reduction beyond the retiring F–5s and French Mirages where the As and Bs will not be in service. Are you serious when you say you think that this provides Taiwan what they need in order to defend themselves?

Mr. LIPPERT. Senator, what I am saying is that the administration, from what I have seen in testimony, felt that the best bang for the buck was to get the As and Bs over there as soon as possible.

Senator CORNYN. You have no other views other than embracing the administration’s position?

Mr. LIPPERT. Senator, as I said in the first point, I would look forward to working with you and your office on this issue going forward.

Senator CORNYN. Why are we trying to manage Taiwan’s defense budget?

Mr. LIPPERT. Could you clarify the question, Senator?

Senator CORNYN. Yes. When Taiwan is ready to pay cash for American exported military aircraft, why would we deny them that ability? Is there any rationale you can see either from a commercial perspective or from a national security perspective why we would deny Taiwan those aircraft?

Mr. LIPPERT. Again, Senator, all I can say is that the administration, from what I saw outside of the Government, made this decision consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act to try to get the best capability over there as soon as possible.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.

Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Very quickly. Let us follow up with that line of reasoning. Senator Cornyn is the expert on this. I will certainly defer to him and may get him involved in this question. But they are willing to buy new F–16s. Is that right?

Senator CORNYN. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Why would we not sell a good friend the F–16s?

Mr. LIPPERT. Again, Senator, the decision——

Senator GRAHAM. Best bang for whose buck? Best bang for the buck. Whose buck?

Mr. LIPPERT. The bottom line here, Senator, is that——
Senator GRAHAM. We are not letting the People’s Republic of China manage our military sales to Taiwan, are we?

Mr. LIPPERT. Absolutely not.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Well then, when you say “bang for buck”, is it our buck or their buck that you are worried about?

Mr. LIPPERT. Senator, again, it was a question of getting 160-plus aircraft over with similar capabilities as soon as possible versus the newer airframes.

Senator GRAHAM. It takes longer to get the newer airframes over there?

Mr. LIPPERT. Senator, that is my understanding, but again, I am happy to dig into this and work with your office on it.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. We are selling new F–16s to Iraq. Is that right?

Mr. LIPPERT. I will take your word for it on that, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I am very curious. I do not know why we would not be willing to sell them the plane they want and think they need the most, and I hope mainland China is not dictating what we are doing.

Mr. Sheehan, are you familiar with the special operations missions in Afghanistan?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, Senator, I am somewhat although I am not in a post and I am a civilian right now.

Senator GRAHAM. I understand.

Back to Senator McCain’s question. There were some disturbing reports coming out of Afghanistan today from President Karzai, and I just want to be on the record that I am very supportive of an enduring relationship with Afghanistan. I think it is in our national security interest to have a political, economic, military relationship that extends to 2014. I have been open about the idea of having bases, joint bases, post 2014 with American aircraft, Special Operations Forces units, to make sure that the Afghan security forces can always win any engagement with the Taliban. I think you could do that with a footprint around 20,000 or less. But between now and that time—do you feel the insurgency is still alive and well in Afghanistan?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Absolutely, Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. As a matter of fact, it is important not only for the Afghan people to defeat the insurgency, but it is important to...
make sure that the leadership of the insurgency is kept off balance and cannot mount attacks against our forces. Is that correct?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Absolutely correct, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. So you are of the mind set representing the special operations community that we are not ready yet, nor are the Afghans ready yet to do this without American assistance?

Mr. SHEEHAN. My understanding, Senator, is that the Special Operations Forces that we have been working with for many years over there have greatly enhanced their capability. I have talked to special operators that say they are pretty good, but they are not quite ready.

Senator GRAHAM. How many helicopters do they have?

Mr. SHEEHAN. I do not know the exact answers.

Senator GRAHAM. I can tell you almost none that can do this. So when you look at the equipment and the technology and the expertise, I think we need to be joint special operation, Afghan-U.S. night raid capable for a while to come.

I just want our Afghan friends to understand that they have a political concern. We want you to have sovereignty. On the detention front, nothing would please me more to transfer the 2,800 prisoners we have in American law of war detention to Afghan control, but there is no legal system capable of receiving them yet. As long as you have American troops at the level we are anticipating, we have an obligation here to protect them.

That is sort of my editorial comment about detention and night raids. We do respect Afghan sovereignty. We want to enhance it but we want to do it in a way to make sure we defeat the insurgency, protect the Afghan people, and protect American soldiers and those who are fighting on our behalf.

Now, when it comes to special operations missions throughout the world, if we captured a high-level al Qaeda operative tomorrow, a special operator, what are they supposed to do with him in terms of detention?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, right now, my understanding is they go to Bagram Air Force Base.

Senator GRAHAM. I would correct that. If we caught someone in Yemen tomorrow, we are not taking them to Bagram.

Mr. SHEEHAN. Caught them in Afghanistan.

Senator GRAHAM. Yes.

In Afghanistan, we have available Afghanistan confinement facilities at least for a little while longer. Do you think that is a long-term detention facility for the U.S. war on terror? Do you think the Afghans are going to allow Afghan soil to be the U.S. prison in the war on terror?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Probably not, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. Now, let us say a capture was made in Yemen, special operations. Where would we put that person? What would we do with them?

Mr. SHEEHAN. I am not sure of the exact answer to that, Senator, at this point.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you not think humane detention should be available to every member of the military, particularly special operators because that takes them out of the dilemma of having to kill or release, that we need a coherent detention strategy?
Mr. SHEEHAN. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator GRAHAM. It is hard to interrogate a dead man, is it not?
Mr. SHEEHAN. Absolutely.
Senator GRAHAM. I would just urge you on behalf of the special operations community to push the administration and Congress to take a burden off their backs. It is not fair to these men and women who are on the tip of the spear to have to capture people, let them go or kill them when this country's intelligence gathering needs are going to be left behind if you cannot capture, detain, and interrogate. We need an answer to that question, do you not agree?
Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, Senator, and if confirmed, I will work closely with you and this committee to get a better answer to that question.
Senator GRAHAM. Is your understanding that Congress basically has prohibited transfers into the United States of terror suspects? That is the law?
Mr. SHEEHAN. I am aware of that, yes, Senator.
Senator GRAHAM. Please work on this with us because this is an unacceptable outcome for our military, for our Intelligence Community, and for our own safety. Thank you very much.
Chairman LEVIN. Let me just quickly ask one question. I can just see if I can ask Senator Graham this question. My understanding is that the prohibition is that terror suspects cannot be brought here from Guantanamo. Is that correct?
Senator GRAHAM. Yes, sir. If you captured someone in Yemen tomorrow, the idea of bringing them into the United States for civilian prosecution seems to be the only lane available because we are not using military commissions. We are not using Guantanamo Bay as the detention facility. My concern, Mr. Chairman, is that that is criminalizing the war, that if you do not use Guantanamo Bay as a confinement facility to hold and interrogate, then there is no other jail available other than American civilian institutions.
Chairman LEVIN. Or a military commission inside the United States?
Senator GRAHAM. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, I think that idea of, say, bringing someone captured in Yemen to Charleston Air Force Base for a military commission is not going to fly because most of us believe that Guantanamo Bay is a very appropriate place to do the trials, detention, and interrogation.
Here is the main concern, Mr. Chairman. I am not so much worried about the prosecution as I am holding these people long enough to gather good intelligence. Being on a Navy ship is an ad hoc approach. You cannot keep someone on a ship very long. We have learned that long-term detention sometimes is the most appropriate way to gather intelligence that would be humane, but the only place I know that would allow us to do that is going to be Guantanamo Bay. If you bring them back to the United States, Mr. Chairman, for civilian prosecutions, I believe that is criminalizing the war. You lose intelligence gathering. I just do not think Congress is going to allow this administration or a Republican administration to jump over Guantanamo Bay. I may be wrong, but we are a Nation without a jail, and that is not good for us.
Chairman LEVIN. I just want to clarify factually there is no prohibition on bringing folks other——
Senator GRAHAM. No. You are right.

Chairman LEVIN. I just wanted to know.

Senator GRAHAM. You are right, Mr. Chairman, but the fact is we are not doing it. We do not have a confinement facility because of executive policy, but there is no bar of bringing someone back in the United States for civilian trial captured overseas or for confinement at a military base inside the United States. But we both know one would lead to criminalization of the war and the second is going to be rejected by Congress. The fact that we are not doing it shows that the policy is broken. We are not doing any of the above.

Chairman LEVIN. I happen to agree with you. Our policy is broken for many reasons, probably for different reasons, however, but——

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, but we are where we are.

Chairman LEVIN. However, I just want to clarify that factually—and this is for your benefit, Mr. Sheehan—at the moment at least, there is no prohibition on bringing in folks that are captured into the United States either for a civilian trial or for a military commission trial and to be kept at a proper prison or jail, more accurately, on a military base. I think that factually is correct.

Senator GRAHAM. That is factually correct and we are not using any of those facilities, but that is factually accurate.

Chairman LEVIN. Just in terms of your response, Mr. Sheehan, I wanted to clarify that.

One quick question and that has to do with—and this is the point also that Senator Graham was making accurately, I believe, with my total support, and that has to do with these night raids. I also made a comment about those night raids in addition to what Senator Graham said about the night raids and the importance of them and the care with which they are done and how few people have actually been killed, if any Afghans. We have captured a lot of insurgents and it is important for intelligence purposes. But in addition to everything which he mentioned, I believe that we also have female troops that go in with those teams on those night raids. We are being sensitive to Afghan culture in many, many ways. I just wanted to add that to what Senator Graham was saying.

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, you are dead right. We have learned night raids have been problematic for the Afghan people. Early on, we were doing them in probably less than an effective manner. We were creating more enemies than we were friends. But I would say that Admiral McCraven and the current task force commander, along with Generals Allen and Petraeus, have created a system, not only are we Afghan culturally sensitive, that when someone is called out, there is an Afghan partner doing the calling out. There are women associated with these raids to deal with the sensitivity of interrogating a woman. The amount of force being used now is just very small. They are very well coordinated with the Afghan legal system. Before we do a raid, we have a cell of Afghans who get to vote as to whether or not we go and take this target down. It is a very Afghan-centric system, but it cannot be done without American capability at this point.
So when President Karzai says things like he said about 2 hours ago or it was reported about 2 hours ago, it is not helpful. I think all of us—Senator Levin, McCain, and myself—have a goal of transitioning to Afghan control. We have 2,800 law of order detainees at Parwan Prison, the old Bagram Air Base prison, the most modern prison I have seen anywhere in that part of the world, more modern than most in South Carolina. We want to shift those prisoners under the Afghan control.

If you will just bear with me a second, this is important for the committee to understand. We have a court panel. We have three panels of Afghan judges at the air base doing trials with our prison population. They do about 50 a month, but we are capturing 150 a month. Outside their criminal system, there is no way to detain people under Afghan law. So we are trying to create a new way forward under Afghan law to hold people as a threat to the state with ample due process. We are not there yet.

One final thought about the Afghan legal system. It is very immature, and it would be a national security mistake for us to dump 2,800 people that we have caught on the battlefield into the Afghan legal system. They do not have the capacity or capability, but we are getting there. President Karzai, we share your goal but we are just not there yet.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, I know we are short of time. We are due on the floor in just a few minutes, so I will try to be very brief.

Mr. Carson, do you believe that water-boarding qualifies as torture in violation of the Geneva Conventions?

Mr. Carson. These are complicated questions, but I do believe it does, Senator.

Senator McCain. You really think that that is complicated?

Mr. Carson. I think the definition of torture is a complicated question, but I do believe that water-boarding is a violation of the Geneva Conventions.

Senator McCain. Mr. Ohlson?

Mr. Ohlson. Yes, I do believe it is a violation of the Geneva Conventions.

Senator McCain. Ambassador?

Mr. Sheehan. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. On the issue of detention, we need a couple more answers from you, Ambassador Sheehan, on this whole issue of night raids and detention because we need to know your thoughts on it, and I hope you will get up to speed in response to some written questions that we will be submitting to you.

Mr. Ohlson, I guess according to your testimony that despite all the information about the murder of Agent Brian Terry and the ATF significant involvement with Operation Fast and Furious, you knew nothing about it nor expressed any curiosity about it.

Mr. Ohlson. I did not know about any connection to Fast and Furious. That is correct, Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. I guess we were shocked that gambling was going on in the establishment.
Mr. Lippert, it has been documented in numerous books and other reports that there were significant, shall we say, disconnects and leaks to the media concerning General Jones that was harmful to his reputation during your tenure at the NSC, but your testimony is you had nothing to do with any of it.

Mr. LIPPERT. That is correct.

Senator MCCAIN. Finally, I will ask you again, do you believe that we could have succeeded in Iraq without the surge?

Mr. LIPPERT. Senator, the surge was vital in our success in Iraq, and I was in Anbar Province 2007–2008 to witness the surge break the back of the insurgency firsthand. I think we are where we are because of the surge.

Senator McCAIN. We are out of time I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses. Thank you.

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, could I just add one thing? You said that water-boarding violated the Geneva Convention. Would you agree that it violates the War Crimes Act and the Detainee Treatment Act that are now U.S. law? If you do not know the answer, go look at it, I mean, if you are unsure.

Mr. CARSON. I do not know the answer to those questions and do not know the specific provisions of the statutes. I believe it is bad policy in addition to a violation of the Geneva Convention. I would be happy to look at those laws as well to see——

Senator GRAHAM. The Detainee Treatment Act and the War Crimes Act. Okay? Is that the same with the rest of you?

All of them nodded in the affirmative.

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Nodded in the affirmative that what?

Senator GRAHAM. That it does violate the War Crimes Act and it does violate the Detainee Treatment Act.

Chairman LEVIN. I would hope they would nod in the affirmative, and Mr. Carson, I hope when you answer for the record—that you provide us an answer to the question for the record and you do that promptly.

Mr. CARSON. Certainly, Senator.

[The information referred to follows:]

The use of waterboarding against a person in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense (DOD) or under detention in a DOD facility would violate section 1402(a) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (Public Law 109–163), which provides that “No person in the custody or under the effective control of DOD or under detention in a DOD facility shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the U.S. Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.” Waterboarding is not one of the interrogation techniques authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual on intelligence interrogation (i.e., Army Field Manual 2–22.3, “Human Intelligence Collector Operations,” September 2006). Furthermore, paragraph 5–75 of the Army Field Manual specifically prohibits waterboarding if used in conjunction with intelligence interrogations. This prohibition is reiterated in DOD Directive 3115.09, which establishes Department-wide policy for intelligence interrogations.

DOD does not use waterboarding in conjunction with intelligence interrogations and, therefore, has not considered whether its use would violate the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. §2441). Waterboarding is prohibited by the Detainee Treatment Act, DOD policy, and the Army Field Manual.

Chairman LEVIN. I want to thank my colleagues and thank you all for your presence, and I thank your families.

We will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:52 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
Questions and Responses

Defense Reforms

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the special operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act or special operations reform provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. No. The Act and current special operations authorities have served the Department and our Nation well and have enhanced the Department’s capabilities to respond when called, such as in Operation Enduring Freedom. If confirmed, I will make proposals for modifications if and when required.

Duties

Question. Section 138(b)(4) of title 10, U.S.C., describes the duties and roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)). What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD(SO/LIC)?

Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters. After the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, the ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal special operations and low-intensity conflict official within the senior management of the Department of Defense (DOD). The ASD(SO/LIC) has as his principal duty overall supervision (to include oversight of policy and resources) of special operations and low-intensity conflict activities. In addition, the ASD(SO/LIC) oversees DOD’s counternarcotics policies and resources, humanitarian assistance policies, strategies for building partner capacity, and stability operations policies in accordance with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s priorities and guidance.

Question. What DOD activities are currently encompassed by the Department’s definition of special operations and low-intensity conflict?

Answer. Special operations and low intensity conflict activities, as defined in title 10 U.S.C. section 167, include direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, and such other activities as may be specified by the President or Secretary of Defense.

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, in the duties and functions of ASD(SO/LIC) do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

Answer. I do not currently expect any changes to the duties and functions assigned.

Question. In your view, are the duties set forth in section 138(b)(4) of title 10, U.S.C., up to date, or should changes be considered?

Answer. I do not believe any changes are needed at this time.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the ASD(SO/LIC)?

Answer. No.

Qualifications

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. I believe that my background in operational units, working counternarcotics strategy on the NSC staff, as Coordinator for Counterterrorism (Ambassador-at-Large), as Assistant Secretary General for the U.N.’s Department of Peacekeeping, as Deputy Commissioner of Counter Terrorism for the New York Police Department, and as an analyst of the best methods for combating terrorism at New York University (NYU) and West Point provide me with the necessary foundation for this position.
In addition, I served as an Active Duty Army Special Forces officer in a counterterrorism unit (as a detachment commander of an assault team) and as a counterinsurgency advisor in El Salvador.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. If confirmed, I will perform my duties to provide overall supervision of special operations activities and advise to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy regarding special operations activities and low-intensity conflict.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. If confirmed, I will provide advice and support to the Deputy Secretary on special operations, stability operations, counternarcotics, and low-intensity conflict capabilities development and employment, among other matters.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Answer. If confirmed, I will work very closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy my advice on matters pertaining to special operations, stability operations, counternarcotics, and low-intensity conflict capabilities, among other matters.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Answer. Special operations and intelligence are mutually supporting, so, if confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.


Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the regional Assistant Secretaries of Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, providing advice regarding special operations and stability operations that are ongoing or in the planning stage. We would also work together on policies to build partner capacity, counternarcotics, and combat global threats. I would also anticipate working very closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs on our counterproliferation and cyber policy efforts.

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. Successful policy and resource oversight of special operations requires close coordination and collaboration with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman’s staff. If confirmed, I plan to maintain a close working relationship with the Chairman, the Chiefs, and the Chairman’s staff.

Question. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs.

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Military Department Secretaries and Service Chiefs to ensure that the requirements to organize, train, and equip personnel and units that enable or feed Special Operations Forces are met and that maintaining the capability to perform stability operations is a priority. I would also work with them to ensure adequate resourcing of Service-common requirements and infrastructure for Special Operations Forces.


Answer. The Commander, SOCOM and the ASD(SO/LIC) must be partners in defining and meeting the needs of our Special Operations Forces. If confirmed, I am committed to maximizing that partnership and providing SOCOM with a senior civilian advisor in accordance with the ASD(SO/LIC)’s statutory requirement to oversee the policy and resources for special operations activities.

Question. The commanders of the Service SOCOMs.

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service special operations commands to ensure they have the policies and resources needed to develop and provide the capabilities needed by the Commander, SOCOM and the regional combatant commanders.

Question. The regional combatant commanders.

Answer. The regional combatant commands are at the forefront of the global fight against terrorists and violent extremists. They are responsible for maintaining a forward posture to deter and dissuade adversaries and assure and build the capabilities of our allies. If confirmed, I will work closely with the regional combatant commands in all of these areas.

Question. The Director of National Intelligence.

Answer. As mentioned above, special operations and intelligence are mutually supporting, so, if confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of National Intelligence and his subordinates.
Question. The Director of Central Intelligence.

Answer. Again, special operations and intelligence are mutually supporting, so, if confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of Central Intelligence and his subordinates.

Question. The Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State.

Answer. The Department of State is a key partner in the fight against global terrorists and violent extremists. As the former Coordinator (Ambassador-at-Large) for Counterterrorism at the Department of State, I would hope to find opportunities to further integrate and coordinate our efforts with the Coordinator.


Answer. All aspects of the ASD(SO/LIC)'s responsibilities require interagency engagement, coordination, and cooperation. The ASD(SO/LIC) represents DOD in the interagency on relevant matters including counterterrorism, counternarcotics, stability operations, partner capacity building, and other relevant SO/LIC issues.

Question. The Director, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).

Answer. Special Operations Forces (SOF) activities are central to counterterrorism; the NCTC helps ensure coordination of all U.S. Government counterterrorism activities. If confirmed, I will maintain ASD SO/LIC's role as the primary Office of the Secretary of Defense's interface on SOF and counterterrorism (CT) matters.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the ASD(SO/LIC)?

Answer. In addition to ensuring adequate resources to provide the special operations and stability operations capabilities needed by the Nation, the ASD(SO/LIC) must also provide policies and resources to keep the pressure on al Qaeda and its affiliates worldwide as we draw down force structure in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is vital that the U.S. Government remain focused on denying al Qaeda and its affiliates the “sanctuary of impunity” globally.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. As a veteran of the interagency process, if confirmed, I plan to keep the issue front and center—and to ensure that programs key to effective counterterrorism operations are properly supported—both politically and with resources.

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD(SO/LIC)?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to prioritize the defeat of al Qaeda and like-minded extremists, dismantling their ability to attack us at home or our interests abroad. I would also focus on sustaining the warfighting capability of SOF warriors. In the past 10 years, they have developed enormous capability both to fight terrorists and to build partner capacity which must be sustained for the long haul; terrorism will not go away any time soon and the need for effective allies and partners is critical to our national security.

Question. Former ASD(SO/LIC) Michael Vickers was quoted as saying “I spend about 95 percent of my time on operations” leaving the rest of his time for “Service Secretary-like” activities including policy, personnel, organizational, and development and acquisition decisions impacting Special Operations Forces.

Would you anticipate a similar division of time as ASD(SO/LIC)?

Answer. Mike Vickers did a great job as the ASD(SO/LIC). If confirmed, I will certainly evaluate his approach as I take this job, but would expect to spend more time on Military Department Secretary-like activities as we face a period of declining DOD budgets.

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. The legislation creating the SOCOM assigned extraordinary authority to the commander to conduct some of the functions of both a military service and a unified combatant command.

Which civilian officials in the DOD exercise civilian oversight of the “service-like” authorities of the Commander, SOCOM?

Answer. Per title 10 U.S.C. § 138 and DOD Directive 5111.10 (in accordance with USD(P) priorities and guidance), the ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal civilian oversight for all special operations activities. Other DOD civilian officials also exercise oversight in some capacity:

- USD(I) coordinates on intelligence issues
- USD(AT&L) coordinates on acquisition issues
1208

- USD(P&R) coordinates on personnel policies such as SOF-unique incentive packages
- USD(Comptroller) coordinates on SOF budget and year-of-execution program issues
- Military Department Secretaries coordinate on SOF manpower issues
- Director, CAPE, coordinates on SOF Program development and issues

Question. In your view, what organizational relationship should exist between the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, SOCOM?

Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) provides civilian oversight of all special operations matters as required by title 10 U.S.C. § 138. As such, the ASD(SO/LIC) provides oversight of special operations policy and resources matters and advice to implement Secretary of Defense and USD(P) priorities. The ASD(SO/LIC) is a voting member of SOCOM’s Board of Directors for program guidance and decisions. The relationship with the Commander, SOCOM should be collaborative and cooperative to develop the best possible forces and employ them effectively.

Question. What should be the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in preparation and review of Major Force Program 11 and the SOCOM’s Program Objective Memorandum?

Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) provides policy oversight for the preparation and justification of the SOCOM program and budget. The ASD(SO/LIC) co-chairs the SOCOM Board of Directors—the SOCOM resource decision forum. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, SOCOM, to ensure that SOCOM funding sustains a ready, capable force, prepared to meet this new era’s challenges.

Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the research and development and procurement functions of the SOCOM?

Answer. The appropriate role of ASD(SO/LIC) is to provide policy oversight in resolving special operations acquisition issues. As the lead OSD official for SOF acquisition matters, the ASD(SO/LIC) represents SOF acquisition interests within DOD and before Congress. The responsibilities and relationships between the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, SOCOM are defined and described in a Memorandum of Agreement between the ASD and Commander, SOCOM. The ASD directs and provides policy oversight to technology development programs that address priority mission areas to meet other Departmental, interagency, and international capability needs (e.g., the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office).

Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the operational planning of missions that involve Special Operations Forces, whether the supported command is SOCOM, a Geographic Combatant Command, or another department or agency of the U.S. Government?

Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) serves as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense for all aspects of employment, deployment, and oversight of special operations and counterterrorism capabilities. The ASD(SO/LIC) provides policy oversight of SOCOM’s mission planning and Geographic Combatant Commanders’ employment of SOF to ensure compliance with law and DOD priorities. The LSD(SO/LIC) coordinates deployment authorities and plans involving SOF within DOD and with interagency partners as required.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

Question. SOCOM is unique within DOD as the only unified command with acquisition authorities and funding. Further, the Commander of SOCOM is the only uniformed commander with a subordinate senior acquisition executive. If confirmed, how would you ensure SOCOM requirements are adequately vetted and balanced against available resources before moving forward with an acquisition program?

Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) is closely involved in all facets of the SOCOM Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution system, providing oversight of these matters. Additionally, through the annual program budget review process, the ASD(SO/LIC) is able to ensure that SOCOM’s priorities and resource allocation are in alignment with the Department’s strategic and policy imperatives.

Question. What role can SOCOM’s development and acquisition activities play in broader Service and DOD efforts?

Answer. SOCOM can continue to serve as an incubator for developing new equipment and capabilities that initially are for special operations-specific needs but often transition to the rest of the Services. Some of the SOF technologies that have made their way to the Services include the MH–47 Chinook helicopter common avionics architecture system cockpit, an extended service life wing for the C–130, the MK48 lightweight machine gun, software-defined tactical radios, and an improved sniper sight. Particularly noteworthy is SOCOM’s ability to conduct rapid evaluations of
technology, systems, and concepts of operations, and the ability to integrate emerging off-the-shelf technologies.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure that special operations capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall DOD research, development, and acquisition programs?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would continue to support SOCOM's important initiatives in this area, particularly the regularly-convened SOCOM-led "Acquisition Summits" with OSD, drawing together SOCOM, USD(AT&L), and the Service Acquisition Executives where all elements discuss acquisition issues of common interest. As SOCOM requirements are provided to the Joint Staff for inclusion in the Joint Requirements Knowledge Management System, I am comfortable that SOCOM's efforts are synchronized with the DOD process.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure sufficient resources are dedicated to the development of special operations-unique platforms, when required?

**Answer.** As noted above, ASD(SO/LIC) is closely involved and integrated with SOCOM's planning, resourcing, and execution. Additionally, the ASD(SO/LIC) attends the SOCOM Board of Directors meetings, which allows him to ensure that he is aware of matters of concern and import to SOCOM and its subordinate commands. Naturally, advocating for steady and predictable resourcing of SOCOM is the principal means I would use, if confirmed, to oversee the investment strategy in these capabilities. If confirmed, I will also provide advice and support to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as she sits on critical resource decision-making bodies.

**Question.** If confirmed, what metrics will you use to determine the effectiveness of SOCOM technology development investments and whether SOCOM is investing sufficient resources in these efforts?

**Answer.** SOCOM has created a series of technology roadmaps that are effective in identifying promising solutions to meet requirements. These roadmaps have quantifiable metrics (e.g., cost, schedule, performance, and technology readiness) embedded in them and allow the ASD(SO/LIC) to monitor progress and identify obstacles that may require Department-level involvement.

**Question.** If confirmed, how will you ensure that SOCOM has an acquisition workforce with the skills, qualifications, and experience needed to develop and manage its acquisition and research and development programs?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would support Admiral McRaven's efforts to manage the SOF acquisition workforce, which is similar to the process used by the Service Acquisition Executives. SOCOM's acquisition workforce experts are professionally trained and certified, and have substantial experience in the SOF-unique processes needed to meet the equipping needs of SOF. I would also support SOCOM's efforts with USD(AT&L) to expand its organic acquisition workforce, as well as to create a unique identifier for SOF acquisition positions.

### SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

**Question.** Some have argued that the Commander of SOCOM should have greater influence on special operations personnel management issues including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of Special Operations Forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., to change the role of the SOCOM Commander from "monitoring" the readiness of special operations personnel to "coordinating" with the services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect Special Operations Forces.

What is your view of this proposal?

**Answer.** Changing section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., to change the role of the SOCOM Commander from "monitoring" to "coordinating" would give SOCOM more influence over Service personnel policies that affect SOF retention. However, I believe that additional coordination and study should be done within the Department to fully understand the impact of this proposal.

### SIZE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

**Question.** The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews have mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and enablers that directly support their operations.

Do you believe that we should further increase the number of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?

**Answer.** I believe that completing the directed growth in SOF and Combat Support and Combat Service Support personnel directed in the 2006 and 2010 QDRs would posture SOCOM to conduct the range of anticipated operations effectively to meet future requirements.
Question. In your view, how can the size of Special Operations Forces be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for special operators?

Answer. Experience has shown that SOF manpower growth of 3 to 5 percent annually can be sustained and will not dilute the force or outpace the required training and support structure. In my view, SOCOM has done a magnificent job of adjusting its processes to maintain the quality of SOF operators and support personnel during this current era of SOF growth.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to SOCOM’s title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.

What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by SOCOM, and why?

Answer. As a result of the 2010 QDR, the Department is building the capacity and capabilities of the general-purpose forces (GPF) to conduct security force assistance to develop the capacity and capabilities of foreign security forces in permissive or semi-permissive environments. The GPF capability to train, equip and advise large numbers of foreign security forces could allow SOF to focus on more complex missions. However, I believe that SOF must maintain a very robust capability to train, equip, and advise foreign security forces as part of ensuring SOF capability to conduct operations in politically-sensitive environments, ensuring access for other SOF activities, and ensuring the ability to train, equip and advise either Special Operations Forces or irregular forces.

Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?

Answer. I do not currently foresee any additional missions that SOCOM should assume. I believe however, that SOF-led approaches to counterinsurgency are worth exploring. Counterinsurgency operations conducted by the United States will, more often than not, be conducted indirectly. SOF specializes in the indirect approach. I believe that employing unconventional warfare against non-state actors holds considerable promise as an expanded SOCOM mission area.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL AWARENESS CAPABILITIES

Question. Deployed special operations personnel remain heavily concentrated in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) theater of operations, including many who have been deployed outside of their regional area of expertise.

Are you concerned that the language and cultural skills among Special Operations Forces have been degraded because of repeated deployments outside their regional area of expertise?

Answer. Rotational deployments of SOF units not regionally aligned to the CENTCOM area of responsibility have indeed taken a toll on the language, regional expertise, and culture capabilities of those units for their aligned regions. Current operations tempo limits the ability to train SOF for their primary areas of responsibility while still preparing for the next CENTCOM deployment. This is being addressed to a degree by SOCOM force structure growth and requires continued monitoring.

Question. If so and if confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to ensure these unique skills are adequately maintained?

Answer. I support recent SOCOM initiatives to implement higher requirements for language capability as well as to improve the training processes for its components. If confirmed, I would seek to continue to pursue several key policy issues in close coordination with SOCOM, including: native/heritage recruiting, valuing language and regional capabilities in selections and promotions, language testing and incentives, maintaining DOD-funded Defense Language Institute detachments at some of our components, adding SOF-specific school billets and funding from the Services for foreign education, and encouraging the Services to award Intermediate Level Education and Senior Level Education equivalency for Foreign Professional Military Education programs.

MARINE CORPS FORCES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC), is a subordinate component command to SOCOM established in 2005.
What is your assessment of the progress made in standing up and growing MARSOC, and what do you consider to be the principal issues that need to be addressed to improve its operations?

Answer. I believe that the establishment of MARSOC has been a resounding success, largely due to the commitment of the Marine Corps and Navy. My initial assessment is that the planned Combat Service and Combat Service Support growth must be fully implemented to support most effectively MARSOC’s full spectrum of capabilities.

Question. What unique attributes, if any, does MARSOC contribute to the capabilities of U.S. Special Operations Forces?

Answer. Incorporating the wonderful heritage, spirit, expeditionary mindset, and “can do” attitude of the U.S. Marine Corps into SOCOM has been an extremely positive thing, in my view. MARSOC has led the effort to integrate intelligence and operations completely at the lowest possible level, and MARSOC’s distinctive command and control procedures have created dynamism in the SOF community.

Question. The Marine Corps have approved a primary military occupational specialty for enlisted marines trained as special operators allowing these personnel to remain in MARSOC for their professional careers. Do you believe officers should have a similar opportunity as enlisted marines to serve the duration of their military career in MARSOC rather than rotating through the command as they do currently?

Answer. As a former Army Special Forces officer, I recall the process that the Army went through to establish Special Forces as a separate officer career field. One lesson from that experience was that such transitions occur during the maturation of an organization, and that it is probably too early to decide definitively how MARSOC-qualified officers should be managed long-term. I am confident that the Marine Corps will regularly review this topic and conduct the necessary study and analysis to determine if it is appropriate to make a change.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Question. DOD recently announced that it was discontinuing use of the term “Psychological Operations” in favor of the term “Military Information Support Operations (MISO).” Do you support this change? Why or why not?

Answer. Yes. Today, for some, the terms “Psychological Operations” or “PSYOP” unfortunately conjure up images of propaganda, lies, or deception. These inaccurate perceptions limit the willingness to employ MISO personnel in some areas where they could be extremely effective.

To date, there are some indications that the name change has allowed for some increases in acceptance, cooperation, and coordination regarding MISO activities throughout the U.S. Government and with our partner nations.

Question. What operational and doctrinal impacts do you believe such a change will have?

Answer. Changing the term “Psychological Operations” to “Military Information Support Operations” throughout military doctrine, manuals, and other documents is one of semantics. There were no directed changes in doctrine or operational employment of the force.

Question. Do you believe the Armed Forces have sufficient personnel and other assets to conduct the range of MISO being asked of them?

Answer. MISO forces and assets, like the rest of the military, are stretched thin with the ongoing operational requirements to support deployed combat forces. MISO forces are low-density forces and are among the most deployed forces in the U.S. military. Under Admiral Olson, SOCOM conducted several reviews to address this issue. I am confident that Admiral McRaven is committed to following through on this with the objective of enhancing DOD’s MISO capabilities. One of the first efforts toward increasing the MISO capability is the reorganization of SOCOM MISO forces. This reorganization will reduce redundancy in commands and allow for the repurposing of numerous positions from staff to operational capability.

Question. Al Qaeda and affiliated violent extremist groups work hard to appeal to both local and foreign populations. The composition and size of these groups in comparison to the U.S. Government permits them to make policy decisions quickly. Do you believe DOD is organized to respond quickly and effectively to the messaging and influence efforts of al Qaeda and other affiliated terrorist groups?

Answer. DOD is well positioned and organized from the strategic level to the tactical level to respond quickly to al Qaeda and its affiliates when a quick response is required. But unlike kinetic warfare, effectiveness in the war of ideas does not necessarily lie in outpacing the tempo of our enemies. A steady drumbeat that clear-
ly articulates U.S. policy over time, anchored in the bedrock truth, best serves our national interests. DOD takes its lead from the President, and relies heavily on the Department of State, in reinforcing the Nation’s message. In doing so, DOD has been extremely effective in face-to-face encounters, through a broad array of engagements with our allied, partner, and host nations on a daily basis. As a representative example, DOD reinforces its engagements with printed products, such as Geographic Combatant Commands’ Regional Magazines and the foreign engagement websites. These mediums provide DOD a broad range of options.

In addressing al Qaeda, DOD seeks collectively to identify and exploit their missteps and errors, and force them into a reactive role. In that way, DOD determines the appropriate level of response and quickly coordinates that response with other agencies.

Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role for Military Information Support Teams (MIST) in these activities?

Answer. The MIST is the MISO equivalent of the Special Forces operational detachment. This is the element that executes MISO at the operational and tactical level. MISTs develop messages to counter hostile information and propaganda, in a manner that is culturally relevant and acceptable to the host national population. Such messaging is closely coordinated with the U.S. Embassy. MISTs also can maintain awareness of the information environment by identifying current trends in local and regional media reporting, detecting hostile messaging, and measuring local populace reaction.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations personnel different from those carried out by others in the Intelligence Community?

Answer. In my view, Special Operations Forces (SOF) intelligence operations are complementary and mutually supporting to those carried out by the Intelligence Community (IC). These operations comply with the policies and regulations guiding DOD and interagency activities. One key distinction between SOF intelligence operations and those conducted by the IC is the pace of these activities. SOF have refined the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze (F3EA) intelligence cycle to support the rapid cycle rate of special operations activities. The F3EA process is now being migrated to conventional forces. SOF have also placed a premium on sensitive site exploitation and the collection and registration of biometrics data from the battlefield. SOCOM elements have also developed a series of joint interagency task force nodes, both in deployed areas and in the United States, that bring together expertise from all our interagency partners. SOF maximizes interagency contributions through reachback, de-confliction, and coordination of activities between agencies. This improves our forces’ chances to get inside the enemy’s decision cycle.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by Special Operations Forces are coordinated adequately with other activities carried out by those in the Intelligence Community?

Answer. I believe that interagency collaboration is the most important contributing factor to many of SOF’s achievements. As Admiral McRaven has stated, SOCOM will continue to follow all applicable Intelligence Community directives, report required sensitive activities to the USD(I), and maintain the robust intelligence oversight processes they have established with their Inspector General, Staff Judge Advocate, and the Command Oversight Review Board.

If confirmed, I will oversee, maintain, and build upon the important relationships SOCOM—as a key member of DOD’s Intelligence Community—has developed with the Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Additionally, I am aware that SOCOM continues to employ SOF liaison officers, called Special Operations Support Team members, effectively to coordinate with agencies in the national capital region.

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

Question. Civil Affairs activities carried out by U.S. Special Operations Forces in partnership with host nation personnel play an important role in developing infrastructure, supporting good governance and civil societies, and providing humanitarian assistance, including medical and veterinary services to needy populations.

In your view, does SOCOM have sufficient personnel and resources to conduct the range of Civil Affairs missions required for today’s operations?

Answer. I understand that SOCOM and the Army have determined that current and already programmed Civil Affairs (CA) force structure provides sufficient capacity within the CENTCOM AOR and other combatant command generated Theater
Security Cooperation requirements. Any capability shortfalls within the CA force are being addressed in detail by the respective Military Departments and SOCOM, and solution sets are being provided through the CA Capabilities Based Assessment. Implementation of those solutions, by the Military Departments, will eliminate much of the existing capability gaps. Ensuring the Department has the correct force capacity to meet current requirements will be one of my priorities, and if confirmed, I would resist the temptation to create a new capability or increase capacity when it may suffice simply to enhance capabilities within current force structure, through additional, enhanced, or new training; structure and manning updates; and progressive equipping coupled with continued evolution of the roles, missions, and responsibilities of the current CA force.

Question. Civil Affairs activities are most effective when coordinated with other U.S. Government efforts, most notably those carried out by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs activities by special operations personnel are integrated into larger U.S. Government efforts?

Answer. I understand that SOCOM employs two significant tools to ensure effective interagency coordination: the SOCOM Interagency Task Force (IATF), and an Interagency Partnership Program. The IATF identifies discrete problems and opportunities to foster interagency collaboration by leveraging unique interagency authorities, resources, and capabilities in support of the mission to expose, disrupt, dismantle, and defeat threats. This capability is available to the CA force as a reach-back mechanism for interagency coordination.

The Interagency Partnership Program established and maintains a network of SOCOM personnel in the national capital region to facilitate the synchronization of planning for global operations against terrorist networks and addressing other emerging national security concerns in coordination with appropriate U.S. Government agencies, the Joint Staff, OSD, combatant commands, combat support agencies, the military departments, and others. Two CA officers are currently in the USAID Military Affairs office. These mechanisms seek to ensure that SOF CA remains integrated into key U.S. Government efforts.

Question. MISOs can have an amplifying effect on Civil Affairs activities by actively promoting the efforts of the U.S. military and host nation and by communicating truthful messages to counter the spread of violent extremist ideology among vulnerable populations.

If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs and MISOs are adequately coordinated to achieve a maximum impact?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support SOCOM in its role as joint proponent for both CA and MISO. This will enable unity of effort and the coordinated execution of CA and MISO. CA and MISO force representation at the operational and strategic levels will also remain critical in achieving a coordinated impact. At the tactical and operational levels, (e.g., country teams at the U.S. Embassies where CA and MISO are working), this is accomplished as a matter of course. CA and MISO personnel receive similar training and understand that their specialties are mutually supporting.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENABLING CAPABILITIES

Question. The previous Commander of SOCOM described the “non-availability” of force enablers as SOCOM’s “most vexing issue in the operational environment.” The 2010 QDR sought to balance previously mandated growth in Special Operations Forces with additional enabling capabilities. What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling capabilities facing Special Operations Forces?

Answer. Shortages of enabling capabilities for SOF are often similar to the shortage of high-demand enablers that challenge the rest of the deployed forces (e.g., intelligence, explosive ordnance disposal, communications, medical, security).

SOCOM’s organic enabling capabilities are those that provide SOF the ability to self-sustain for short durations while maintaining the agility to deploy forces quickly in support of the combatant commanders. Longer-term support of Special Operations Forces, by doctrine, and except under special circumstances, becomes the responsibility of each Service’s theater logistic command and control structure.

Question. Do you believe additional enabling capabilities, beyond those mandated by the QDR, are required to support Special Operations Forces?

Answer. The QDR mandated an increase in the number of organic combat and combat service support assets available to both the Army and Navy special operations units. These capabilities include logisticians, communications assets, forensic analysts, information support specialists, and intelligence experts. DOD is slowly re-
alizing this programmed growth, and it will make a difference in how SOF units are supported. The QDR only addresses growth within SOCOM, however, SOCOM will always rely on the Services for some level of support as addressed in the previous question.

**Question.** Do you believe additional enabling capabilities should be grown within SOCOM or provided in support of Special Operations Forces by the Services?

**Answer.** I believe both should occur, but the preponderance of those support capabilities should remain in the conventional force and be provided to SOF through the habitual association of Service Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities with the SOF units they primarily support. Currently the responsibility of the conventional force to provide sustainment support to SOF is not clearly defined or specified. At times, this limits SOF’s ability to sustain operations. SOCOM is currently working with its components, the Services, and the Joint Staff to develop the Special Operations Force Generation process to improve how it requests these critical capabilities. If confirmed, I will work with SOCOM to define enabler requirements more clearly, and to identify them farther in advance to allow the Services to plan for the employment of habitually associated units in support of SOF. A reduction of SOF emergent requests and an increase in habitually associated Service-provided capabilities will go a long way toward resolving this problem.

**RENDER SAFE PROFICIENCY**

**Question.** The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a growing and especially concerning threat to our Nation. Select special operations units are assigned the task of interdicting and rendering-safe weapons of mass destruction should they ever fall into the wrong hands.

If confirmed, how would you ensure render-safe capabilities are adequately maintained by special operations units who may currently be heavily engaged in offensive kill/capture missions against high value targets in Afghanistan and elsewhere?

**Answer.** The National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights the danger of nuclear terrorism as being the single greatest threat to global security. I understand that, even amidst a sustained focus on offensive operations to capture/kill high-value targets in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the Department ensures that its render-safe capabilities are adequately maintained. If confirmed, I will work closely with SOCOM on this important issue. I will carefully monitor and assess the impact of our operational tempo on DOD’s render-safe capabilities and ensure that these capabilities are maintained.

**Question.** Do you believe additional render-safe capabilities are needed within SOCOM?

**Answer.** Not at this time, though I have not yet had the opportunity to examine these capabilities in detail. I believe SOCOM has the capabilities now to accomplish its render-safe mission.

As long as States continue to proliferate weapons of mass destruction, and both state and non-state actors continue their attempts to acquire these devices with the intent to target the United States and/or U.S. interests, we must remain vigilant and effective in our efforts. It is important to stay ahead of the threat, which requires expanded research and development efforts to ensure that our skilled operators are properly trained and equipped to defeat these threats.

**SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMAND**

**Question.** Under certain circumstances and subject to direction by the President or Secretary of Defense, SOCOM may operate as a supported combatant command. In your view, under what circumstances should SOCOM conduct operations as a supported combatant command?

**Answer.** SOCOM should be, in accordance with the Unified Command Plan, the supported commander for planning and synchronizing planning for global operations against terrorist networks. Mission execution in most instances remains under the command of Geographic Combatant Commanders, or, more precisely, in accordance with title 10 U.S.C. 167 unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, a special operations activity or mission shall be conducted under the command of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted.

Only in rare instances, involving highly sensitive targets or significant political considerations, does Commander, SOCOM execute a mission. In your view, what resource, organization, and force structure changes, if any, are required in order for SOCOM to more effectively conduct both supporting and supported combatant command responsibilities?
Answer. It seems to me that, after 10 years of active combat, SOCOM is probably structured correctly to conduct both supporting and supported combatant command responsibilities. I understand SOCOM and the office of the ASD(SO/LIC) are currently studying the Theater Special Operations Commands to determine what changes, if any, should be considered in the future. I will look at this issue carefully if confirmed.

TRAINING CAPABILITY

Question. What capabilities do you consider most important for effective training of special operations personnel?

Answer. Special Operations Forces cannot be created rapidly since they require a high degree of training, experience, and job skill sets that are often unique. The human component of SOCOM is where its strength lies and to develop our special operations personnel we must be willing to invest the necessary time and resources in advanced, realistic training. We must be able to leverage real-world exercises like the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programs to expose our SOF to real-world experiences. It is critical that they develop language and cultural skills that allow them to operate in diverse foreign environments where our national interests are greatest. Special operations personnel must develop a mastery of their skills. DOD/SOCOM must maintain or increase resources and time spent on training ranges and developing interoperability with the Services and our allies who serve as significant enabling components to SOF.

Question. What improvements are necessary, in your view, to enhance training for special operations personnel?

Answer. Professional military education remains an important part of developing the critical language and cultural skills required of SOF personnel. DOD must be willing to prioritize additional resources and incentives to encourage the development of language and cultural skills in our servicemembers and more importantly within our special operations personnel. DOD should take advantage of, and encourage, immersion training opportunities, exchanges, and advanced education opportunities. At the same time, DOD/SOCOM must not allow our SOF to lose their core combat capabilities; the balance between warrior and ambassador should be respected and SOCOM needs to prioritize the continued development of the core combat skills that make our SOF unique and experienced.

Admiral McRaven has additionally highlighted that pre-mission and predeployment training with relevant Service-provided capabilities (e.g. mobility, fires, engineers, etc) is critical to ensure that joint SOF packages are effective.

Question. What are the most significant challenges in achieving effective training of special operations personnel?

Answer. SOCOM has highlighted that it needs to move from a primarily threat-focused approach to a population-focused indirect warfare and moving beyond core SOF skills. It already takes significant time to develop the basic skill sets for special operations personnel. Developing additional language, cultural, diplomatic, and other non-combat SOF skills will be a challenge. SOF are deployed at an extremely high rate leading an effective effort to combat terrorism throughout the world. Deploying persistently and for long durations results in great experiences for special operations personnel, but in many cases a focused mission may result in the atrophy of other skill sets. For example, aircrews may conduct repetitive air-land missions on a long deployment, but may not conduct a specific airdrop mission due to deployment constraints. SOCOM must ensure there is enough time to train in the deployment cycles to maintain proficiency in core SOF capabilities. Additionally, since most SOF missions require non-SOF support, time must be added to work closely with Service counterparts supporting SOF.

Question. What, if any, training benefits accrue to U.S. Special Operations Forces from training foreign military personnel?

Answer. Training foreign military personnel has a substantial benefit for SOF, especially when they are foreign military units tied directly to current and future operations. The training of these units can increase interoperability, and allow the foreign units to take a larger lead in their own defense operations while our special operations trainers maintain their instructor skills. The training of the foreign military personnel greatly benefits SOF as they gain an increased situational awareness of future operating environments and allies while honing language and cultural skill sets that are critical to successful operations. JCETs and other regionally synchronized training efforts help pave the way for critical counterterrorism operations or even humanitarian efforts or other SOF mission sets. These activities help expose SOF to new tactics, techniques, and procedures while also encouraging the development of communication and intelligence-sharing mechanisms that enable CT oper-
ations. Training foreign military units helps build trusting relationships and fosters familiarization that in return enables our SOF to work in foreign countries with greater success and confidence.

Question. To what extent, in your view, is it appropriate for the U.S. to rely upon contractors for training foreign military personnel? What do you see as the primary risks and advantages in such contractor training?

Answer. SOF cannot be replaced by contractors, but there may be times when utilizing contractors makes more sense and should be the course of action. In some situations, it may be prudent to contract out a specific mission because we may not possess that skill within our own SOF. For example, there may not be a SOF aviator trained on a certain aircraft, or there may not be a Green Beret with a specific language skill required for a training event. In these cases, a contract solution might be the best option to ensure an important mission is still conducted.

Answer. On the other hand, there are risks of utilizing contractors. DOD is obligated to maintain strong oversight over contractors. Contractors are also not permitted to represent the U.S. Government. They are not a replacement for SOF and if not properly utilized may undermine efforts to train foreign units. Contractors can help provide augmented logistics, administrative support, and technical/computer expertise which in turn frees up special operations personnel for more SOF-unique training opportunities and operational missions.

Question. On March 1, 2011, Admiral Eric Olson, the former Commander of SOCOM, provided written testimony to this committee that stated: “The shortage of readily available, local ranges currently hampers Special Operations Forces’ ability to meet deployment training timelines and causes our operators to ‘travel to train,’ further increasing their already excessive time away from home.”

What efforts do you plan to undertake in coordination with the military services to ensure that Special Operations Forces have timely, consistent and predictable access to training ranges and facilities?

Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate with SOCOM and take a closer look at how the GPF and SOF share training ranges and facilities. Where possible I would look to prioritize limited training resources for SOF training and those Service enablers supporting SOF. For example, if confirmed, I would prioritize future military construction efforts to expand training capabilities for SOF. I would also look to enter into additional memorandums of agreement for expanded GPF-SOF training opportunities on ranges and associated facilities to prepare our SOF for combat deployments.

CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for increased counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces. What is your assessment of the QDR with regard to the mix of responsibilities assigned to general purpose and Special Operations Forces, particularly with respect to security force assistance and building partner military capabilities? Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to become more like Special Operations Forces in mission areas that are critical to countering violent extremists? Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for Special Operations Forces only?

Answer. I fully support the strategy of building the defense capacity and capabilities of our partners as articulated in the 2010 QDR. I believe that the mix of capabilities between general purpose and Special Operations Forces as called for in the QDR is correct. Each of the Services has gained valuable experience in this area over the past 10 years, especially as a result of operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Services are increasingly growing their organic capability and capacity to conduct security force assistance (SFA) operations in permissive and non-sensitive environments or where a large U.S. footprint is acceptable. Likewise, SOF have gained valuable experience in building the military capability and capacities of our partners not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also with our coalition partners as they prepare to deploy in support of both combat and stability operations. The Service SFA capability and capacity, however, should be for Service core competencies and not for missions best suited for SOF. SOF are still the force of choice for those security force assistance missions in non-permissive and politically sensitive areas and where the host nation demands a small footprint. In addition, SOF are the correct choice to train our partner nation SOF and improve their capabilities for counterterrorism operations.
SOF have worked closely with the Service general purpose forces to prepare them to execute COIN and combating terrorism missions appropriate to their capabilities. The partnership between general purpose and Special Operations Forces is strong. The extensive combat employment of both forces in shared battle spaces has increased the need to coordinate our operations closely. This has resulted in a sharing of tactics, techniques, and procedures between SOF and general purpose forces that has helped to increase the Services' capabilities to execute COIN and combating terrorism missions. The Services can continue to complement SOF's capabilities by providing those combat enablers that are not organic to SOF units or that are not available in adequate quantities. These combat enablers, including intelligence and combat support service, are vital to the success of SOF, especially in today's complex operating environment.

COMBATTING TERRORISM

Question. What is your understanding of the Department's strategy for combating terrorism?

Answer. The President's National Strategy for Counterterrorism maintains the focus on pressuring al Qaeda's core while emphasizing the need to build foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen our resilience. The United States is specifically at war with al Qaeda and associated forces, not the tactic of terrorism or the larger group of violent extremists in the world. Overarching goals are to protect the American people, Homeland, and interests; disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda; prevent terrorists from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction; eliminate sanctuaries; build enduring counterterrorism partnerships; degrade links between al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents; counter al Qaeda's ideology; and deprive terrorists of their financial support and other enablers.

The U.S. Government is engaged in a multi-departmental, multinational effort. Some of the activities that DOD directly undertakes to support this strategy include training, advising, and assisting partner security forces; supporting intelligence collection on al Qaeda; conducting information operations against al Qaeda; and, when appropriate, capturing or killing al Qaeda operatives. However, I understand DOD is also committed to enabling its intelligence and law enforcement partners, both in the United States and overseas, in their efforts to counter this threat.

Question. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to combating terrorism?

Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) is the DOD lead for all special operations and low-intensity conflict matters. If confirmed, I would also advise the Secretary of Defense on sensitive counterterrorism and information operations; sections 1206, 1208, and related counterterrorism authorities; and the development of Special Operations Force capabilities necessary for countering the terrorist threat.

Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and agencies?

Answer. In general, I think DOD is doing a good job of coordinating its counterterrorism efforts. At the operational level, the U.S. military, Intelligence Community, and law enforcement agencies regularly collaborate on operations. The various departments and agencies constantly share intelligence, with little of the “stovepiping” that we saw before September 11. At the strategic level, the multiple counterterrorism bodies chaired by the National Security Staff provide ample opportunity for senior leaders to discuss key terrorism issues. There will always be some natural bureaucratic tensions, but I think the U.S. Government is well postured for continued strong counterterrorism collaboration. I will look at this closely if confirmed.

Question. As you look around the globe at this moment, what do you see to be the most significant counterterrorism threats to the United States, our allies, and partners?

Answer. The most significant groups that threaten the United States and our allies are al Qaeda in Pakistan and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. However, a few key operatives operating from any of al Qaeda's affiliates, or even "lone wolves" inspired by al Qaeda, can wreak havoc anywhere in the world. I am very concerned with preventing terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction or loose anti-aircraft weapons proliferating from unstable states. I understand that the U.S. Government is continually working to identify new terrorist methods of concealing improvised explosives.

Question. On September 22, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton launched the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) with 30 founding members from around the world. The GCTF is a major initiative within the Obama administration's broader effort to build the international architecture for dealing with terrorism. The primary
focus of the GCTF is capacity building in relevant areas and aims to increase the number of countries capable of dealing with the terrorist threats within their borders and regions.

What is your understanding of this initiative?

Answer. The GCTF is a multilateral platform that will provide a venue for countries to meet and identify counterterrorism needs, and mobilize the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs and enhance global cooperation. The GCTF is intended to complement ongoing efforts with the United Nations, as well as other regional and sub-regional bodies. I understand that the September launch of the GCTF was positively received by all of the countries involved.

Question. Given the emphasis on building partner capacity, what is your understanding for the role of DOD—and in particular Special Operations Forces—in this initiative?

Answer. The defeat of al Qaeda cannot be achieved without bringing together the expertise and resources of the entire U.S. Government—intelligence, law enforcement, and other elements of national power—in a coordinated and synchronized manner. If confirmed, I would seek strong relationships with DOD’s interagency partners, in particular, the National Counterterrorism Center, the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, to maximize DOD's efforts to counter violent extremism. The GCTF, as a State Department-led effort, is one example where SOF's counterterrorism and security cooperation activities can support and inform interagency partners' efforts in counterterrorism.

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

What is your assessment of this authority?

Answer. I understand that section 1208 authority is a key tool that combatant commanders have repeatedly confirmed as essential to combating terrorism in their areas of responsibility. It enables the Special Operations Forces under their control to leverage willing partners who possess access to areas, people, and information that are denied to U.S. forces, but which are critical to our tactical and strategic success. The authority has allowed DOD to respond quickly to emergent global challenges. Use of section 1208 requires appropriate civilian oversight, including the Secretary of Defense's approval and congressional notification.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan? What are the weaknesses and shortcomings in the current effort to combat terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan?

Answer. In my view, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Afghan partners have made important security gains, reversing violence trends in much of the country, and beginning to transition Afghan security to lead in seven areas. Continued military pressure through partnered operations has allowed joint ISAF-Afghan forces to maintain and expand the security gains, especially in the former Taliban strongholds in Helmand and Kandahar. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been integral to this success, demonstrating substantial growth in quantity, quality, and operational effectiveness.

The United States is employing the right methodology, and security continues to improve. However, the insurgency's safe havens in Pakistan and the limited capacity of the Afghan Government remain the biggest threats to consolidating security gains to enable an enduring, stable Afghanistan. The insurgency remains resilient, benefiting from safe havens, with a notable operational capacity as reflected in isolated, high-profile attacks and elevated violence levels in eastern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, this partnered campaign has provided increased security and stability for the Afghan population, and the United States continues to build upon this success.

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, and the proper relationship between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations there?

Answer. In my view, counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) are inextricably linked in Afghanistan. There must be a balanced and measured approach to their application. CT efforts, including direct action, shape the environment and create conditions necessary for the causes of instability to be addressed. This en-
ables the further capacity development of Afghan governance and Afghan security forces.

**Question.** Night raids conducted by U.S Special Operations Forces and Afghan commandos have resulted in removing thousands of insurgents from the battlefield, often without any shots being fired. Nonetheless, night raids remain controversial in Afghanistan, and the Afghan Government and community leaders have repeatedly called for restricting or eliminating their use.

**In your view, what should be the role of night raids in our strategy in Afghanistan?**

**Answer.** In my view, night operations are an essential and highly effective element of a strategy against al-Qaeda and the Afghan insurgency, and they should continue to play an important role in maintaining pressure on militant groups. Night operations allow the United States, with its Afghan and international partners, to fight the insurgency with precision and focus while minimizing risk to civilians.

I understand that Afghanistan’s highly trained Special Operations Forces are steadily growing, and that Afghans currently play a key role in coordinating and partnering in the vast majority of these operations. Of course, night operations must continue to be conducted with due respect for cultural sensitivities and great care for the prevention of civilian casualties. Ultimately, the goal must be to ensure that Afghan and international forces have the capabilities and authorities necessary to achieve the transition goals agreed at the Lisbon Summit last November, while also being mindful of the goal to increase Afghan ownership throughout the transition process.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the effectiveness of night raids, particularly in removing from the battlefield mid- and senior-level insurgent commanders?

**Answer.** The amount of pressure these operations have placed on the insurgency has been immense. Night operations have been particularly effective at using rapid exploitation of intelligence to target command and control structures, organizational capabilities, support networks, and infrastructure of insurgent and militant groups.

I understand that the United States conducts the vast majority of night operations jointly with Afghan Security Forces, and we share a common goal—transition to Afghan security lead by 2014 and full transition as soon as the ANSF has the necessary capacity. Because of the high level of skill and professionalism of the joint U.S.-Afghan forces, no shots are fired during approximately 90 percent of night operations, and less than 1 percent of these operations result in civilian casualties.

**Question.** What steps, if any, would you recommend to address Afghan concerns regarding the use of night raids?

**Answer.** I understand that the United States has already taken numerous steps to minimize the potential for civilian casualties and give Afghan security forces leadership on night operations. All of our forces receive formal instruction in theater tactical directives pertaining to civilian casualties. Afghan Security Forces leadership has been integrated into the planning, execution, and post-operation phases to ensure full transparency and enable its leadership to balance risk, cultural considerations, and operational requirements. Every U.S. operation is conducted with Afghan counterparts, and the Afghans are always in the lead during entry of compounds and call-outs. Measures for escalation of force are strictly followed. I understand that our Afghan partners, as well as U.S. commanders, strive to keep district and provincial political leadership informed of all operations.

**Question.** Secretary Panetta and others have emphasized the importance of the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police programs to the strategy in Afghanistan.

**What has been the effect of these programs on rural Afghan populations and what has been the response from the Taliban?**

**Answer.** Village Stability Operations (VSO) are a critical component of the COIN/CT balance in the ISAF campaign plan. VSO is a bottom-up approach linking governance to the village level. VSO uses Afghan and ISAF Special Operations Forces embedded in the community full-time to help improve security, governance, and development in more remote areas of Afghanistan where the ANSF and ISAF have a limited presence. I understand that, since its inception, VSO has expanded Afghan Government influence in key rural areas from 1,000 square kilometers to 23,500 square kilometers today. VSO has also enabled a massive expansion in small-scale infrastructure development in these key rural areas. Across Afghanistan, increasing numbers of local communities are requesting to participate in this program.

The Afghan Local Police (ALP), the armed local security program associated with VSO and established by President Karzai, has expanded to more than 8,000 members. Due to the increase in ALP effectiveness, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior has authorized an ALP end strength of 30,000. ALP are empowering local commu-
nities and have proven to be a significant threat to the Taliban, denying them safe-
haven, and ultimately creating the conditions for long-term stability.

As a result, the Taliban have mounted an aggressive intimidation, assassination, 
and disruption effort against Afghan Government officials, ALP members, and sup-
portive populations. These attacks have largely failed to intimidate ALP forces and 
local communities, which continue to defend their villages effectively against insur-
gent attacks.

**Question.** Do you believe the availability of U.S. Special Operations Forces is a 
limiting factor in expanding these programs to a point where they can have a stra-
tegic impact in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Yes, I believe that the expansion of this effort will need to rely on the 
application of theater Special Operations Forces and enablers. To assist in the re-
sponsible growth of these programs, ISAF has integrated specially trained conven-
tional forces into the SOF-led VSO program, mainly to augment security require-
ments. These combined teams are producing strategic changes, and additional Spe-
cial Operations Force structure will demonstrably expand this effect across the 
country. The approved expansion to 30,000 ALP patrolmen will likely strain the ca-
pacity of the coalition Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and may require ad-
ditional conventional forces to partner with SOF in order to support projected ALP 
growth adequately.

**Question.** How do indirect approaches like the Village Stability Operations and Af-
ghan Local Police Programs complement direct action counterterrorism missions 
within the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** The U.S. National and Military strategies are based on direct and indi-
rect approaches. Indirect SOF missions are part of what the Department now calls 
foundational activities. Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police are 
part of that indirect approach and are critical to the success of General Allen’s popu-
lation-centric campaign strategy in key rural areas across Afghanistan. Counter-
terrorism efforts complement these rural efforts by shaping and managing the secu-
rity environment where these indirect approaches are pursued. One is no less or 
more important than the other; they are distinct yet complementary efforts that 
work in tandem to achieve near-term and enduring stability.

**Question.** On an annual basis, DOD spends approximately $500 million building 
the capacity of the Afghanistan Government to counter the illegal narcotics trade. 
Despite this sizeable annual investment, according to the United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan remains the “wellspring of the global 
opium trade, accounting for 93 percent of all opium poppy cultivation.” UNODC has 
also found that about 80 percent of the drugs derived from Afghan opium poppies 
are smuggled out by transnational organized criminal groups through the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Pakistan; the rest flows through Central Asia.

What is your assessment of DOD’s counternarcotics program in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** I understand that DOD supports counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan 
by building Afghan capacity and working with U.S. law enforcement agencies such 
as DEA, CBP, FBI, and ICE to interdict narcotics trafficking. Although DOD sup-
ports Afghan eradication efforts, the Department of State has the lead for that ef-
fort. This year the interdiction of opiates and precursor chemicals in Afghanistan 
has increased. Afghan Counternarcotics Police vetted units, mentored by DEA, are 
now capable of conducting drug interdiction operations and have been actively in-
volved in combined operations with DEA and military forces. DOD has also been 
building the capacity of the Afghan border management efforts to stop drugs from 
leaving Afghanistan and precursor chemicals from entering the country.

**Question.** How would you improve DOD’s counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** I believe that there have been considerable improvements this year in 
military and law enforcement coordination. Military commanders in Afghanistan are 
now requesting support from DEA and Afghanistan’s Counternarcotics Police. Al-
though there has been improvement there are probably other improvements that 
could be made; if confirmed, I will look into this.

**PAKISTAN**

**Question.** The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has often been 
described as tumultuous. Reports indicate Pakistan has expelled U.S. special 
operations personnel who were deployed there to train the Frontier Corps and other 
Pakistani security forces to fight al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other associated groups. 
How important in your assessment is the U.S.-Pakistan military-to-military rela-
tionship to the success of our overall counterterrorism strategy?

**Answer.** The National Strategy for Counterterrorism is clear in stating that the 
United States will only achieve the strategic defeat of al Qaeda through a sustained
partnership with Pakistan. In my view, the military-to-military relationship is an important part of this partnership as it facilitates the indirect approach of working through and with our Pakistan Military (PAKMIL) partners to achieve mutually beneficial counterterrorism goals. U.S. military assistance to Pakistan has helped the PAKMIL achieve success in its counterinsurgency efforts. Despite recent setbacks in this relationship, it is important that we continue to engage our PAKMIL counterparts to reestablish and rebuild the relationship and continue achieving these successes.

**Question.** Do you believe the current difficulties, including the reductions in U.S. trainers, are temporary or lasting?

**Answer.** The recent ouster of Special Operations Command (Forward)-Pakistan trainers was a significant setback in the overall military-to-military relationship in Pakistan. However, I do not believe that this event is indicative of the relationships that U.S. and Pakistan military leaders have established at the unit levels. I understand these relationships are strong, and I believe we should be making every attempt to ensure that our tactical and operational level leaders are able to maintain these ties however possible. In terms of disagreements at the more senior levels, I believe that these can be mended, but it will require persistent, patient engagement. It may require reducing expectations of the military-to-military relationship in the short term, but I do believe that over time the two countries can return to more robust levels of military cooperation.

**IRAQ**

**Question.** What are the main “lessons learned” from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn as they pertain to Special Operations Forces?

**Answer.** I believe that the U.S. has learned many lessons through current operations. Some of these lessons include: the need to maximize combined operations with partner forces, the necessity of culturally attuned forces, the need for a unified U.S. Government approach, and the need for active and integrated interagency coordination.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the security situation in Iraq?

**Answer.** Although Iraq today is closer to being a stable and secure country, I remain mindful of the challenges. The Iraqis are taking critical steps to resolve ongoing political issues, but internal divisions remain. These issues must be addressed to avoid potential conflicts.

The push for influence by Iran, and the activities of Iranian-backed militias that have attacked U.S. forces and the Iraqi people, are other issues that Iraq will still need to face. Unlike Iran, the United States is working to build a safer and stronger Iraq, and it is that shared interest that gives me confidence that the United States can build an enduring partnership with the Iraqi Government. I am also mindful of al Qaeda’s role in Iraq.

Regardless of DOD’s post-2011 role, its civilian mission should be focused on helping Iraqis address their issues through a robust and representative Iraqi political process which is the best safeguard against a return to violence.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the capability of the Iraqi security forces?

**Do you assess that they are capable of conducting independent operations throughout the country?**

**Answer.** Iraq no longer needs large numbers of U.S. forces to maintain internal stability. U.S. commanders in the field believe that the Iraqi Security Forces are competent at conducting counter-insurgency operations, but that the Iraqis will have gaps in their ability to defend against external threats and in areas such as integrated air defense, intelligence sharing, and logistics.

**Question.** Do you believe an enduring military-to-military relationship with Iraq is important to the long-term stability of Iraq?

**Answer.** Yes. The United States wants a normal, productive relationship and close strategic partnership with a sovereign Iraqi Government going forward—similar to the partnerships we have with other countries in the region and around the world.

**Question.** What do you believe to be the threat of al Qaeda to security and stability in Iraq?

**Answer.** Iraq’s security and political situation is improving after years of instability that enabled groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to spread chaos and sectarian conflict. AQI continues to be the main focus of counterterrorism efforts in Iraq, as it poses a threat not only to stability but to remaining U.S. military forces and civilians. Iraqi-led counterterrorism operations have dismantled AQI’s previous senior leadership, but new AQI leaders have assumed control and the group continues to conduct high-profile attacks. DOD will continue to watch for AQI attempts
to reinvigorate its efforts and draw on a still-significant network of associates that spans the region and includes associates in the United States.

YEMEN

Question. Prior to the current political crisis in Yemen, the U.S. Government had a robust security assistance program to help the Yemeni security forces take action against al Qaeda. Some observers, while supportive of U.S. security assistance to Yemen, have suggested that the problems being confronted by the Government of Yemen cannot simply be addressed with the provision of additional security assistance.

What is your assessment of the security situation in Yemen?

Answer. The security situation remains tense. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage of the instability in Yemen, and operates with greater impunity in the most unstable areas while attempting to seize and control territory in the south.

The Yemeni Government has recently made some gains against AQAP in the south, driving most of the group out of Zinjibar and removing several key leaders from the battlefield. However, the larger political instability in Yemen will not be resolved until President Saleh agrees to a political transition plan, which he has thus far been unwilling to do.

Question. What criteria would you use in determining whether security assistance activities in Yemen should resume?

Answer. I understand the United States is currently providing some modest, non-lethal assistance to Yemeni forces, but DOD is also assessing how the United States could resume more robust security assistance. This will require greater political stability, which will probably require President Saleh to leave power. The United States will also need to see an improved security situation that allows U.S. personnel to work safely with Yemeni forces. It will be important to ensure any partner units have not committed human rights abuses or been involved in suppressing the political opposition over these past months. Finally, it will be necessary to assess Yemeni willingness to employ partner units against AQAP and focus support on those units that are most receptive to U.S. assistance and most likely to be used against our common adversary.

Question. Given the current limitations on lethal security assistance to the Yemeni counterterrorism forces, what is your assessment of the U.S. strategy to counter al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?

Answer. Although resuming capacity building is critical to long-term efforts against AQAP, the U.S. strategy goes beyond capacity building. I believe a number of important gains against AQAP have been made over the past year. DOD continues to collaborate extensively with Yemeni forces on operational matters. The United States is closely monitoring AQAP and regularly improving understanding of its external attack plots. Efforts to counter AQAP’s narrative have also helped delegitimize the group and discourage its efforts to recruit new operatives. The U.S. Government’s work on countering threat financing has made it more difficult for AQAP to receive funds and to support other parts of al Qaeda. Finally, the past year has seen several key leaders removed from the battlefield, including Anwar al-Aulaqi.

SOMALIA

Question. In your view, what should be the U.S. policy towards Somalia and what do you believe to be the appropriate role of the DOD in support of that policy?

Answer. U.S. policies toward Somalia should support the Somali Transitional Federal Government’s and the African Union Mission to Somalia’s abilities to deliver security and basic services and lay the foundation for a stable, functioning government. That is what the United States wants to see for the people of Somalia.

However, Somalia’s decades-long lack of governance and sparse population make it appealing as a safe haven for al Qaeda. As al Qaeda undergoes leadership changes and responds to counterterrorism operations in Pakistan, the need to ensure that it does not relocate its center of operations to Somalia is critical.

I understand that DOD’s primary mission in the Horn of Africa is to build partner nation capacity in order to promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. interests. I believe this mission is appropriate. I am informed that U.S. Africa Command is undertaking a review of East Africa to determine how military efforts in the region work in concert with DOD’s interagency partners to achieve collective regional goals and counter al Qaeda’s linkages to elements of al Shabaab. DOD’s ultimate goal should be a fully integrated strategy under which security assistance, capacity building, operational collaboration with regional partners,
and counterterrorism actions which are synchronized to provide the regional security and stability that are in the interest of both the United States and our regional partners.

If confirmed, I would work to ensure our strategy is developed as part of a coordinated U.S. national security policy towards the Horn of Africa, and to determine how DOD can and should best support this policy.

TERRORISM THREATS IN AFRICA

Question. Over the course of the last decade, al Qaeda-inspired and affiliated groups in Africa have gained strength, leading some to express concern about their intent and ability to strike the interests of the U.S. and partner nations.

What is your understanding of U.S. policy with regard to countering the threats posed by these groups?

Answer. In East Africa the U.S. strategy is focused on dismantling al Qaeda elements while building the capacity of countries and local administrations to serve as countervailing forces to the supporters of al Qaeda and the purveyors of instability that enable the transnational terrorist threat to persist.

Al Qaeda elements in East Africa continue to be a primary focus of the United States in light of clear indications of their ongoing intent to conduct attacks against U.S. facilities and interests abroad. Al Qaeda’s presence within al Shabaab is increasingly leading that group to pose a regional threat with growing trans-regional ties to other al Qaeda affiliates.

U.S. efforts against al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are closely integrated into the broader U.S. regional strategy, especially since the long-term eradication of AQIM will not be addressed by traditional counterterrorism tools alone. As appropriate, the United States will use its counterterrorism tools, weighing the costs and benefits of its approach in the context of regional dynamics and perceptions and the actions, will, and capabilities of its partners in the region—local governments and European allies. I understand that the United States will seek to bolster efforts for regional cooperation against AQIM, especially among Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger as an essential element of our strategy. The United States should also continue to work with our interagency and international partners on mitigating threats from emergent groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Question. Do you believe DOD’s assets and other resources allocated to countering terrorist threats in Africa are adequate to understand and respond to the threats posed by these groups?

Answer. A significant portion of the U.S. counterterrorism effort is focused on the Middle East and Afghanistan/Pakistan regions and CENTCOM has received the majority of DOD’s operational and intelligence assets. To address terrorist threats in Africa, I understand we have executed an economy of effort. As our Nation’s activities in the CENTCOM region change, additional assets may be available to address U.S. Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) needs. Our Special Operations Forces will undoubtedly be an integral part of future engagements in Africa and will support partner nations in their response to terrorist networks working on the continent.

COLOMBIA

Question. For more than a decade, Colombian security forces have worked in partnership with U.S. Special Operations Forces to counter security threats. This partnership has helped to enable the Colombians to significantly degrade the terrorist organization known as the FARC.

What do you believe are the primary lessons learned from U.S. Special Operations Forces training and advising activities in Colombia?

Answer. In Colombia, the U.S. military learned the value of playing a supporting role, seeking to complement Colombian strategies, rather than develop competing ones. DOD’s experience in Colombia also prepared us to adapt to the changing environment; to recognize and embrace opportunities when they presented themselves. DOD has learned that our partnerships must constantly evolve from the point where they start, to confront and counter threats that are also adapting and changing.

Question. Are there lessons learned that may apply to U.S. support to Mexico and Central America in their efforts to counter the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations?

Answer. Yes. Many of the U.S. Government’s lessons learned from our experiences in Colombia are currently reflected in our efforts in Mexico. Transnational criminal activities, including narcotics trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, and arms smuggling, provide pathways and opportunities for criminal and terrorist organizations to move people and resources across the region. Moreover, effectively addressing
these transnational criminal threats in Colombia and Mexico is critical to addressing security throughout the region, including in Central America and along our southwest border.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Question. What is your view of the effectiveness of U.S. assistance being provided through the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines to the military of the Republic of the Philippines in its fight against terrorist groups?

Answer. Though a great deal of our focus in the Philippines has been on countering terrorist groups, U.S. assistance to the Philippines has always been, and continues to be, a multi-faceted approach. The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF–P) engages each branch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP) using appropriate authorities to help build capacity and improve the image and professionalism of all elements of the AFP and PNP. Examples of successes range from the Department of State (DOS)-funded training to improve AFP aviation and maritime capabilities to DOD-funded procurement of precision munitions under section 1206. DOD has also conducted MISO activities and Civil Affairs projects, and has supported DOS-led diplomatic efforts. As a direct result of these combined efforts, the capability of the Philippine Security Forces has been vastly improved. The Philippine Government has become more effective in maintaining the pressure on the key terrorist groups.

STABILITY AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Question. The office of ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for policy and activities concerning stability operations, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. If confirmed, what role would you play in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future stability operations? What are the major challenges in this area and how would you address them?

Answer. Stability operations are a core mission that DOD must be ready to carry out with proficiency equivalent to high-intensity combat operations. Although this represents a cultural shift for DOD, they understand that all the Military Departments must adequately train, organize, and equip forces to conduct such missions. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary, the Chairman, and leadership of the Military Departments to ensure that DOD is preparing U.S. forces for stability operations.

Question. From 2000 to 2003, you served as the Assistant Secretary General (ASG) for Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations (U.N.). What lessons did you learn from your experience at the U.N. that might apply to your work as the ASD(SO/LIC)?

Answer. My time at the U.N. was invaluable. Much like assuming a leadership position at DOD, working as an ASG at the U.N. meant learning how to navigate an enormous organization with a culture and a bureaucracy all its own, the pressures of competing priorities and multiple stakeholders, and managing a large staff and complex operations with finite resources. It was a challenging experience, and, if confirmed, I look forward to applying it to my new post in SO/LIC.

Question. Experience in Iraq has underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of stability operations in post-conflict situations.

In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between DOD and other departments of government in the planning and conduct of stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?

Answer. Ideally, DOD would provide support to other departments and agencies such as the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Justice in the planning and conduct of stability operations. But, when directed, DOD has led stability operations activities to establish civil security and control and to restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance, and then has transitioned lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments’ security forces, and international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD operates within U.S. Government and international structures for managing civil-military operations, and would seek to enable the deployment and use of civilian capabilities and resources, as directed and as appropriate.

Question. What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq?

Answer. I think we need to strengthen the U.S. Government’s collective ability to plan and train together and be more collaborative in designing stabilization and re-
construction activities. I am aware that the Department is working with interagency partners to identify areas where they can improve planning efforts.

Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., stated that the United States “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations.”

What is your view on whether the United States should contribute additional military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

Answer. In general, I would support additional contributions of personnel to staff officer positions, provided that they are positions that would add significant value to the mission, and that the mission is a strategic priority for the United States.

Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations?

Answer. There are several potential advantages to contributing additional military personnel to U.N. missions: the opportunity to shape these missions from the inside; professional development opportunities for servicemembers to serve in a joint, multi-lateral environment; and the benefit of receiving real-time information and insights on emerging threats and crises from places where there might not otherwise be a U.S. presence. It also enables an increased professional interaction by U.S. servicemembers with numerous partner nations’ servicemembers, with whom we may not normally have the opportunity to serve.

The potential disadvantage of providing additional military personnel is the additional demands these assignments would impose on a U.S. military force that has seen extensive deployments in recent years and is still heavily engaged in overseas operations. I do not believe the United States will be in a position to provide significant numbers of military personnel to peacekeeping missions anytime in the foreseeable future. However, I believe the selective placement of even modest numbers of U.S. military personnel in addition to the fewer than 30 currently assigned to U.N. operations can have a significant, positive, impact on U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the U.N.?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support exploring ways that DOD could more quickly respond to requests for personnel support, bearing in mind applicable legal requirements and the current operational tempo of U.S. forces.

Question. DOD has provided logistics, communications, and headquarters staff to a variety of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping missions over the past decade.

In your view, beyond providing key personnel and observers, what support, if any, should DOD provide to multilateral peacekeeping missions?

Answer. The Department already provides support to multilateral peacekeeping missions beyond personnel and observers. For example, the combatant commands implement roughly half of all Global Peace Operations Initiative activities, and many troop contributor countries also benefit from inclusion in the regional Combatant Commands’ regional peacekeeping exercises. The Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute is involved in a number of efforts to improve international peacekeeping. Additional support might also be possible, but DOD will need to balance increase support for peacekeeping with other operational requirements.

Question. In 2005, the United States along with our partners in the G-8 launched the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) to train peacekeepers. This program is run by the Department of State. DOD has provided varying degrees of support since the program’s inception.

What are your views on the GPOI program?

Answer. I fully support the GPOI program. GPOI is not only a successful capacity-building program, but it is also a great example of a DOD-State Department partnership.

GPOI’s efforts are especially needed now as the demands on U.N. peacekeeping are great and missions continue to increase in scope and complexity.

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of the DOD in this program and, more generally, in the training of peacekeepers?

In general, peacekeeping training should be done by the military to the extent possible.

As previously mentioned, the combatant commands already implement roughly half of all GPOI activities, and include peacekeeping contributor countries in their regional peacekeeping exercises.
The State Partnership Program has also taken a role in peacekeeping training, partnering with contingents readying to deploy to U.N. peacekeeping missions.

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

**Question.** The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature. What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?

**Answer.** Our Nation has learned many hard lessons about the importance of whole-of-government approaches in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations over the past several years. One of the most important lessons of our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq is that success in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and post-conflict stability operations depends upon the integrated efforts of both civilian and military organizations in all phases of an operation, from planning through execution. Sustainable outcomes require civilian development and governance experts who can help build local civilian capacity. I understand that DOD supports the lead by other departments and agencies such as State, Justice, and USAID in areas such as fostering political reconciliation, building accountable institutions of government, restoring public infrastructure, and reviving economic activity, so that DOD can focus on providing a safe and secure environment and assisting in building accountable armed forces. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to ensure that interagency collaboration is as robust and effective as possible.

**Question.** How do you believe these efforts can be improved?

**Answer.** I believe interagency collaboration can be improved by continuing to ensure that the U.S. military plans and trains with our civilian counterparts, and is prepared to operate effectively in all phases of conflict, including post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. In addition, improving the interagency planning process would ensure that optimal use is made of all national instruments of statecraft, while also enhancing the ability to conduct comprehensive assessments, analyses, planning, and execution of whole-of-government operations. I understand a 3D (Development, Diplomacy, and Defense) planning group is underway as one method of reviewing and improving interagency planning and coordination efforts. Robust civilian capabilities are critical to realizing any improvements in interagency efforts and implementation of best practices for future operations.

**Question.** Should these informal and ad hoc arrangements be made more formal (i.e. through legislation, DOD Directives or Instructions, etc . . . ) or is their ad hoc nature the reason for their success?

**Answer.** I note that DOD policy states that “integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of stability operations.” The same policy states that the Department shall support, collaborate with, and assist other U.S. Government departments and agencies to plan, prepare for, and conduct stability operations. Although I have not studied this issue in detail, I believe we should build on the working relationships developed as a result of experience in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to improve interagency cooperation, interoperability, and unity of effort. If confirmed, I will be open to the advice of others on this issue.

TREATMENT OF DETAINEE

**Question.** Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. In your view, is the prohibition in the best interest of the United States? Why or why not?

**Answer.** Yes, this prohibition helps to ensure that individuals in the custody of U.S. forces are treated humanely consistent with the applicable U.S. laws and the laws governing armed conflicts. To treat individuals in our custody otherwise could increase the chances that U.S. servicemembers will be treated inhumanely should they be captured by enemy forces.

**Question.** Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

**Answer.** Yes.

Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that our Special Operations Forces comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that all U.S. Special Operations Forces continue to receive the necessary education and training in the standards established in the Army Field Manual, relevant DOD Directives, and other applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations.

Question. What steps, if any, would you take to ensure that those foreign forces trained by our Special Operations Forces understand the necessity of complying with the Geneva Conventions when detaining and interrogating individuals?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that our Special Operations Forces continue to stress in our training operations with foreign forces the importance of complying with the Geneva Conventions when detaining and interrogating individuals.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL IN EMBASSIES

Question. SOCOM deploys personnel to work with country teams in a number of priority countries where the United States is not engaged in direct action operations, but rather trying to counter the spread of violent extremism. Their mission is to support the priorities of the ambassador and the combatant commander’s theater campaign plan against terrorist networks. At times, ambassadors have expressed concern that they have not been adequately informed of activities by Special Operations Forces in their country.

Are you aware of these concerns?

Answer. Yes. However, no significant concerns have been raised in recent years that I am aware of.

Question. If confirmed, what do you intend to do to make sure the goals of special operations personnel deployed to these countries are aligned closely with those of the Ambassadors they are working with?

Please describe the value of these special operations personnel to their respective Geographic Combatant Commands and the country teams they are supporting.

Answer. The partnership among our geographic combatant commanders, ambassadors overseas, embassy country teams, and forward deployed Special Operations Forces has been strong throughout the past 10 years, even in view of the few isolated incidents where coordination could have been better. If confirmed, a priority of mine will be to continue working with Admiral McRaven, the Geographic Combatant Commanders, and State Department colleagues to strengthen these trusted partnerships further.

DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

Question. DOD serves as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing toward the United States. On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department’s CN operations, including to build the capacity of Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, and certain foreign governments, and provide intelligence support on CN-related matters and a variety of other unique enabling capabilities.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD in U.S. counterdrug efforts?

Answer. In my view, DOD should continue to play an important role in U.S. counterdrug efforts in support of the National Security Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. In addition to being the statutory lead agency for the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking bound for the United States, DOD provides critical counterdrug support to supporting State, local, Federal, and foreign law enforcement partners. The enemies America faces on the battlefield today are increasingly financed through non-traditional means, including through drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. Just as DOD has long been focused on how traditional, State-funded adversaries are supported, the U.S. must use all of the tools at its disposal to attack the
sources of revenue that support the asymmetrical threat the U.S. faces today and is likely to face for the foreseeable future. Transnational organized crime contributes to global instability by undermining legitimate government institutions, fostering corruption, and distorting legitimate economic activity. DOD’s efforts to build the counternarcotics capacity of partner nation security forces serve to prevent and deter broader conflicts that could require a much more costly military intervention in the future.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?

**Answer.** I have not yet had the opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the CN program. Based on my past experience, however, I fully recognize the importance of DOD counterdrug activities, including as the statutory lead agency for aerial and maritime detection and monitoring of drugs bound for the United States, DOD’s activities in support of the warfighter in Afghanistan, and other areas of national security interest such as Mexico and Colombia. I also believe that DOD CN authorities are extremely useful tools that fit well into the current construct of the ASD for SO/LIC. If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that these activities are given their appropriate level of attention and oversight, and to ensure that they are as cost-effective as possible.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the ongoing efforts of the United States to reduce the amount of illegal narcotics entering into the United States?

**Answer.** As outlined in the National Drug Control Strategy, the counterdrug efforts of the United States and partner nations have achieved major and sustained progress against cocaine use and distribution throughout the Western Hemisphere. These efforts have had an impact on both the demand and supply side of the cocaine threat as evidenced by declining border seizures, increased street price, falling cocaine retail purity, and sharply decreased domestic cocaine consumption. DOD support, such as the establishment of Joint Interagency Task Force-South and support to Plan Colombia, has played a critical role in this whole-of-government effort by bringing unique military capabilities and expertise to enhance the capability of our law enforcement partners.

**Question.** In your view, what should be the role of the United States in countering the flow of narcotics to nations other than the United States?

**Answer.** Confronting the threat of drugs bound for the United States should continue to be a high priority, but we cannot afford to turn a blind eye to drug trafficking that is not directly bound for the United States. Drug trafficking is by far the world’s most lucrative illicit activity and therefore is used as a source of revenue by terrorists, insurgents, and other threats to national security. The vast illicit proceeds of drug trafficking can also contribute to instability in affected countries, particularly in smaller, more vulnerable countries along key transit routes as we are seeing today in Central America and West Africa. The national security implications of drug trafficking necessitate our close attention—even when the drugs are not bound directly for the United States.

**Question.** Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. In July 2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. One of the priority action areas designating in the strategy is “enhancing DOD support to U.S. law enforcement”.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the President’s strategy to combat transnational criminal organizations?

**Answer.** The President’s strategy declares that transnational organized crime is a threat to national and international security. It calls on the U.S. Government to build, balance, and integrate the tools of national power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats to national security. The strategy calls for integrated, whole-of-government approaches to transnational organized crime. Importantly, the President’s strategy addresses drug trafficking and transnational organized crime as increasingly intertwined threats. The fact that transnational organized crime poses a national security threat beyond that of illegal narcotics and requires integrated interagency responses means that DOD must ensure that it is organized, resourced, and appropriately authorized to provide vital support to law enforcement and foreign partners against transnational organized crime. DOD is not in the lead against transnational organized crime, but it provides unique and critically important support in efforts to combat the manifestations of transnational organized crime that threaten national security.

**Question.** What kind of additional support, if any, would you envision DOD providing to U.S. law enforcement—either in the United States or in support of U.S. law enforcement operations abroad?
Answer. It is important that DOD’s unique supporting capabilities—from military intelligence support to counter-threat finance support—be available to support U.S. law enforcement at home and abroad. If confirmed, I will examine whether additional forms of such support are needed.

Question. DOD and the Intelligence Community have determined that some terrorist organizations are beginning to rely more heavily on producing and trafficking narcotics to fund their operations. In your view, what role, if any, should DOD have in broader U.S. Government efforts to combat the nexus between narcotics and terrorism? Should DOD be the lead agency?

Answer. DOD should continue to provide a range of support to law enforcement, the broader interagency, and foreign partner nations as part of integrated efforts to combat the narcotics-terrorism nexus. Support includes military intelligence support to law enforcement, counter threat finance support, military-to-military capability development, and operational activities against threats to the United States.

DOD should not assume the role of lead agency in combating the drug-terror nexus. In some cases, DOD might be the operational lead in actions to degrade a specific threat related to the narcotics-terrorism nexus, but, in general, the Department should focus on remaining ready to deploy our unique capabilities as part of coordinated U.S. Government approaches against this nexus. It is also important to note that the nexus is broader than just drugs and terrorism—it often manifests as a crime-terror-insurgent nexus, in which a range of illicit activities undertaken by networks of criminals merge with, or are exploited by, violent, politically-motivated groups.

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence Community have called for investing additional resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking. What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance activities?

Answer. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other adversaries rely heavily on legal and illegal funding sources to support their activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests. In my view, it is critical to engage all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the flow of money associated with these organizations. It is my understanding that DOD has a capability, working with its interagency counterparts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, to identify and disrupt our adversaries’ finances. Although DOD is not the U.S. Government lead agency in counter-threat finance, it plays a supportive role by working with other departments and agencies, and with partner nations, to fight our adversaries’ ability to use global financial networks.

Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of SOCOM in supporting counter threat finance activities?

Answer. I believe SOCOM plays a critical role in the field of counter-threat finance, and should continue to pursue activities, as appropriate, with interagency partners in identifying and disrupting threat-finance networks. This involves synchronizing DOD counter-threat finance activities and integrating them into broader counter-network planning and operations.

Question. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities (such as Department of Treasury, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation)?

Answer. I believe that DOD should increase its cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies, the Department of the Treasury, the intelligence community, and Department of State to target and degrade our adversaries’ funding sources where necessary and possible. DOD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy provides that DOD should work with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and with partner nations to deny and disrupt, or defeat and degrade, adversaries’ ability to use global licit and illicit financial networks to affect U.S. interests negatively. Greater cooperation would yield an enhanced ability to target our adversaries’ vulnerabilities using a whole-of-government approach, including interdiction, sanctions, and other law enforcement actions.

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Question. Over the past few years, DOD has funded a growing number of MISOs and influence programs under the rubric of strategic communications programs. While the Department does not have any separate documentation outlining these activities, the Government Accountability Office reports that DOD “spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year” to support these operations, including initiatives
funded by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, the geographic combatant commands, and SOCOM.

What are your views on DOD’s strategic communications, MISOs and other influence programs, and their integration into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives?

Answer. Operating in an information environment is a critical component of military operations. DOD’s information and influence activities support military objectives established by Combatant Commanders, which in turn support the National Military Strategy. U.S. military objectives, by design, support U.S. foreign policy objectives. Recent changes to how DOD oversees, organizes, and employs Information Operations have resulted in significant improvements in the management and accountability of these activities. DOD recognizes the challenges of evaluating the effectiveness of these operations in the short-term and has placed an emphasis on better evaluating these activities.

Question. In 2005, al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that “We are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking place in the battlefield of the media.” Many observers have criticized the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment violence.

As ASD(SO/LIC), how would you seek to further DOD’s strategic appreciation of the ideological basis of al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other non-state actors?

Answer. DOD’s global presence means our forces often come face-to-face with radical ideologies and the violence propagated by Islamist extremists. Therefore, DOD personnel are in an ideal position to contribute to U.S. Government efforts to counter the extremist messages. DOD seeks to reduce support for al Qaeda, its affiliates, and adherents by engaging foreign local populations, countering adversarial propaganda, and developing relationships with key leaders and credible local interlocutors across the globe.

Building Partner Capacity

Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations. In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

Answer. DOD’s primary objective in building the capacity of foreign partners should continue to be to help them develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their countries’ internal security, and contribute to regional and multilateral responses to threats and instability. This, in turn, mitigates the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States and promotes interoperability between U.S. and partner forces.

Question. In light of demands for defense budget cuts, how would you assess the trade-offs between providing funding for U.S. military forces and providing assistance to build the capacity of partner nations’ security forces?

Answer. The energy and resources devoted to building partner capacity contribute directly to country, regional, and global security and better enable our partners to provide for their own security needs. Even modest military and security capabilities may prevent or help manage conflict so that the United States and its allies and partners are not called to intervene in a much larger conflagration at great cost to the United States and U.S. forces. Cooperation through security capacity-building efforts ensures a relationship and interoperability with ready partners able to participate competently in coalition or collaborative operations. Building partner capacity in like-minded partners will mean less demand on U.S. forces to lead military operations, enabling the United States instead to work with and through our partners to meet common security challenges.

Question. What is your understanding of the purpose of the section 1206 train and equip authority? What is your assessment of the implementation of the global train and equip program?

Answer. This authority has two discrete purposes outlined in law: to build a partner’s national military or maritime security forces’ capacity either to: (1) conduct counterterrorist operations, or (2) conduct or support stability operations where U.S. forces are participating.
I have not been involved in the implementation of section 1206, but I understand the Department has begun an in-depth assessment of the effectiveness of section 1206 programs. If confirmed, I will ensure the authority is used in keeping with the intent of the authority and that it produces the intended security outcomes. I will also look forward to sharing the results of the ongoing assessment effort with Congress, and specifically this committee. As I understand it, section 1206 to date has enthusiastic support from embassies and combatant commanders, and reflects close collaboration between the Department of State and the Pentagon.

**Question.** What is the relationship of the train and equip authority to other security assistance authorities, such as counternarcotics assistance, foreign military financing, and other title 22 authorities? What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?

**Answer.** It is critical that duplication of effort among these activities be avoided. If confirmed, I will do everything I can to deconflict among them.

The Global Train and Equip (section 1206) authority fills two specific legal requirements: to build capacity for counterterrorism operations and stability operations where U.S. forces are a participant. Counternarcotics authorities are focused on providing DOD the ability to support U.S. or other government efforts to counter the flow of narcotics globally. If confirmed, both section 1206 and counternarcotics authorities will be under my purview, and I will monitor their implementation to ensure they continue to be used appropriately, and in keeping with their intent.

Foreign Military Financing serves broad foreign policy objectives such as improving bilateral relations, encouraging behavior in the U.S. interest, increasing access and influence, and building capacity particularly where host-nation and U.S. interests align. As I understand it, the close collaboration between DOD and the State Department on the development, selection, and approval of section 1206 program ensures we make the best use of available authorities.

**COUNTERPIRACY OPERATIONS**

**Question.** Since January 2009, the U.S. Navy has been patrolling the waters of the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia as part of the international coalition engaged in counterpiracy operations. The Office of ASD(SO/LIC) leads the Department’s policy and coordination efforts relating to counterpiracy operations. What is your understanding and assessment of the Department’s ongoing counter piracy and counter piracy support operations?

**Answer.** I understand that U.S. naval forces participate in Combined Task Force 151, a multinational counterpiracy task force established in January 2009, and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Operation Ocean Shield. On average, there are three to four U.S. Navy ships supporting both of these task forces on a daily basis. Since 2008, DOD has provided surface combatants (including helicopters and boarding teams), replenishment ships, P-3C maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, communications support, and command staff in support of counterpiracy operations.

Somali pirate operations have become more lucrative over the last 3 years, demonstrating success as a business model. Despite the expansion of the piracy enterprise, there is still an overwhelming lack of judicial capacity in the region.

The U.S. Government has focused on encouraging the use of Best Management Practices (BMPs) and Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) in its outreach to industry, which DOD strongly supports. To date, ships that employ BMPs and armed security have a 100 percent success rate in countering pirate attacks, strategically diminishing the pirates’ success rate.

**Question.** What do you believe to be the appropriate role of DOD in countering the threat posed by piracy?

**Answer.** I believe that DOD should continue to support the National Security Council’s “Action Plan” for countering piracy off the Horn of Africa by interrupting and terminating acts of piracy. Furthermore, DOD should continue to remain engaged with the international “Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia” on numerous initiatives related to military operations, industry outreach, public diplomacy, legal issues, and supporting the Departments of State and Treasury in their efforts to make piracy less lucrative.

Countering piracy in the region must be a shared responsibility with the maritime shipping industry—the first line of defense against pirates. The single most effective way to deter piracy is to ensure vessels follow BMPs and employ armed security personnel.

The root causes of Somali piracy lie in the poverty and instability of Somalia. I believe that the solution to piracy does not lie in committing additional naval forces.
Rather, addressing the problem depends on progress in restoring Somalia from a failed state to a functioning one.

**Question.** Some have argued for kinetic operations against the network of pirates that operate in Somalia. Others argue that the threat of piracy is primarily a law enforcement issue and should be dealt with by civilian agencies. What is your assessment of these two views and what do you believe to be the most effective approach?

**Answer.** I have also heard about both proposals. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about these proposals, and would weigh the implications before deciding what I believe would be the most effective approach.

**CRUSH THE CELL**

**Question.** In 2008, you published a book called “Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism without Terrorizing Ourselves.” In your book, you state that U.S. counterterror policy should focus on “strategic terrorism” which you define as “the capability to sustain multiple conventional attacks over time, or develop and deploy a single catastrophic attack with a weapon of mass destruction.”

In your view, what terrorist organizations are strategic terrorists?

**Answer.** I would define al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents as a strategic terrorist organization.

**Question.** Do you believe the National Counterterrorism Strategy is appropriately focused on only those organizations that pose a “strategic terrorist” threat to the United States and our interests?

**Answer.** I believe the National Strategy for Counterterrorism is appropriately focused on the preeminent security threat to the United States—namely al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents. The Strategy also rightly ensures we remain committed to working vigorously and effectively to counter the efforts and activities of other foreign and domestic terrorists, even as we are careful to avoid conflating them with al Qaeda into a single enemy.

**Question.** Your book is critical of Congress for creating the National Counterterrorism Center, Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence following September 11. You state, “I'm convinced we could have fought this war with no budget increase, just a shifting of funds to counterterrorism and a new focus on the problem.”

Do you still hold these views today? Why or why not?

**Answer.** I was not in favor of creating new Federal bureaucracies after September 11. However, at this point, I would not reverse course.

In terms of budget, I have long believed that the Federal Government should find off-sets for new, higher-priority missions whenever possible.

**Question.** Your book includes a discussion of the effectiveness of U.S. military and intelligence personnel partnering with host nation personnel to conduct counterterrorism operations. You state, “By working closely with foreign units, we may be able to reduce human rights violations associated with these operations. But if we want to get things done, sometimes we must work in conjunction with tough organizations with spotty human rights records.”

Do you still hold these views today? Why or why not?

**Answer.** When I was in the Federal Government, we were restricted from working with some key agencies in the Middle East and other parts of the world. I believe this was shortsighted, as working with them exposes them to operational tactics that are both more effective and based on protecting civilians. It is still true that many foreign police and intelligence agencies do not uphold the highest standards of human rights, but I believe we should engage both to improve their record and be effective in fighting terrorists—the two goals can and should be compatible. Of course, such engagement is currently restricted by law in many circumstances, and I would take care to oversee compliance with applicable law in contemplating any such engagement.

**Question.** Your book expresses concern about the risk averse nature of senior commanders, bureaucratic decisionmaking, and separation of intelligence and operational functions as they relate to U.S. counterterrorism operations. To help solve these issues, you recommend that a single organization, either DOD or CIA, be assigned responsibility for “special operations” to combat terrorism. This recommendation echoes one made by the 9/11 Commission that lead responsibility for all clandestine and covert paramilitary operations be assigned to DOD.

Do you still hold these views today? Why or why not?
Answer. I wrote this 5 years ago, and much has changed. If confirmed, I will have the opportunity to evaluate our current decisionmaking process closely. I am open-minded and not sure I still hold those views.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress when called upon to do so.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD(SO/LIC)?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will provide this committee or members of this committee accurate and appropriate information to the best of my ability when called upon to do so.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will provide the necessary information to this committee and other appropriate committees and their staff when asked to do so.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will provide the committee the necessary documents when appropriate and will consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing documents.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SCOTT P. BROWN

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

1. Senator BROWN. Ambassador Sheehan, last spring Admiral Olson testified that our Special Operations Forces (SOF) are “fraying at the edges.” The current fight’s high demand for SOF and its relatively small size has placed strain on our most elite fighting force. With the continuing budget cuts affecting all aspects of the military and with the military as a whole downsizing in troop end strength are you concerned about the future of our SOF?

Mr. SHEEHAN. If confirmed as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Forces and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), I would place the highest priority on addressing the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) commander’s concerns about the demand on the force. I would also staunchly advocate preserving programmed SOF growth to ensure SOCOM is sized to the current and future demand. This would include ensuring that SOF are resourced at a level that supports a sustainable rotation model that provides time in between deployments for reset, special skills training, professional development, and appropriate predeployment training.

2. Senator BROWN. Ambassador Sheehan, do you believe that our SOF will be able to grow at a rate of 3 to 5 percent per year that is currently projected?

Mr. SHEEHAN. Although I have not seen the details of the current SOF growth plan, my general sense is that the Department has done an excellent job improving quality while also growing the force over the past 10 years. An average growth rate of 3 to 5 percent per year sounds reasonable to me, but I know from my own experience that this will vary across the force given varying complexity of skills and functions within the special operations community. Our core principle must be not to sacrifice quality for quantity as we grow and sustain SOF, and if confirmed as ASD(SO/LIC), I will work closely with the SOCOM commander to ensure our SOF accession programs are resourced and managed accordingly.
[The nomination reference of Michael A. Sheehan follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
November 1, 2011.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
Michael A. Sheehan, of New Jersey, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Michael G. Vickers.

[The biographical sketch of Michael A. Sheehan, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIографICAL SKETCH OF MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN

Education:
• U.S. Military Academy
  • 1973–1977 (BS, 1977)
• Georgetown University School of Foreign Service
  • 1986–1988 (MSFS, 1988)
• Army Command and General Staff College
  • (MA 1991–1992)

Employment Record:
• Terrorism Analyst, NBC News
  • 2006 to Current
• CEO and Partner, Lexington Security Group, LLC
  • 2007 to 2011
• Partner, Torch Hill Equity Partners
  • 2006 to Current
  • Private equity firm (I have been unpaid and inactive in the past year)
• Fellow, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY
  • 2006 to Current
• Fellow (for counterterrorism), NYU Center for Law and Security
  • 2006 to Current
• Executive Director, Madison Policy Forum
  • 2009 to Current
• Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, NYPD
  • 2003 to 2006
• Assistant Secretary General, U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations
  (In charge of logistics, budgets, and personnel for U.N. peacekeeping operations)
  • 2001 to 2003

Honors and Awards:
• Fellow: NYU Center for Law and Security (2006 to Current)
• Fellow: Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY (2006 to Current)
• Selected/Graduated from Colombian Special Forces School, Lancero (1980)

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Michael A. Sheehan in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF
NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Michael A. Sheehan.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) and Interdependent Capabilities.

3. Date of nomination:
   1 November 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   10 February 1955; Red Bank, NJ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Sita G. Vasan.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Alexandra Eitel Sheehan, 20.
   Michael Vasan Sheehan, 8.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   Terrorism Analyst, NBC News (2006 to Current), 30 Rockefeller Center, New York, NY.
   Partner, Torch Hill Equity Partners (2006 to Current), Private equity firm (I have been unpaid and inactive in the past year), 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 5100, Washington, DC.
   Fellow, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, (2006 to Current), U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY.
   Fellow (for counterterrorism), NYU Center for Law and Security (2006 to Current), 139 MacDougal Street, 4th Floor, New York, NY.
   Executive Director, Madison Policy Forum (2009 to current), 645 Madison Ave., New York, NY.
   Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, NYPD (2003 to 2006), New York City Police Department, One Police Plaza, New York, NY.

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
   - Member, Senior Advisory Group for the Director of National Intelligence (2008–2010).
   - Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organizations Affairs, Department of State (1997–1998).

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   - Partner, Torch Hill Equity Partners (2006 to Current).
   - Periodic consultancy on international police and counterterrorism issues with the following organizations (All inactive except as noted):
     - Boeing
     - Lockheed-PAE (Active-termination in progress) UAE, Ministry of Interior
     - AAR Corporation
     - Pacific Architect and Engineers
     - CTC (Active-termination in progress)
     - NBC (Active-termination in progress)

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
   - Special Forces Association (1980–present).
   - Veterans of Foreign Wars (1999–present).

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
   - (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
     - None.
   - (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
     - None.
   - (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
     - None.

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
   - Fellow: Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY (2006 to Current).
   - Selected/Graduated from Colombian Special Forces School, Lancero (1980).

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.


16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

I have given a variety of speeches, mainly in regards to my book; Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism Without Terrorizing Ourselves. For those speeches I have given, I primarily use note cards which I have not retained.

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Yes, however the Department of Defense recently determined that my receipt of compensation from the United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Interior, as part of my consulting work through Lexington Security Group, LLC, violated the Emoluments Clause (U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 8). This determination carries with it a monetary penalty that is deducted from my retirement pay. I am currently appealing the amount of the penalty.

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

No.

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

Yes.

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to Congressional requests?

Yes.

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Yes.

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

Yes.

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN.

This 16th day of November, 2011.

[The nomination of Michael A. Sheehan was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on December 15, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 17, 2011.]
QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. I do not see a need for modification of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions at this time. The Act has served the Department and our Nation well, fostering the spirit of a joint force that has enhanced the Department’s capabilities to respond to critical security demands, such as in Operation Enduring Freedom. If confirmed, I will continue to consider this issue, and I will make proposals for modifications if, and when, required.

DUTIES

Question. Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5111.17 assigns the responsibilities, functions, relationships and authorities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (ASD(APSA)). The directive establishes ASD(APSA) as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on various matters relating to the Asian and Pacific regions, their governments, and defense establishments.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD(APSA)? Will they differ in any way from those described in DOD Directive 5111.17?

Answer. The ASD(APSA) is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of DOD interest that relate to the Nations and international organizations of the Asian and Pacific regions, their governments, and defense establishments and for oversight of security cooperation programs, including Foreign Military Sales, in these regions. The ASD(APSA) is also responsible for developing regional security and defense strategy and policy, as well as for overseeing the implementation and coordination with appropriate DOD officials of such policies and strategies.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. My experience on Capitol Hill, at the National Security Staff, and in the military have provided me with a unique skill set and the relationships that will allow me to be effective at managing a large issue portfolio and staff.

As the Chief of Staff to the National Security Staff, my duties often required me to work at senior levels of the U.S. Government on a number of issues related to the East and South Asia region. In this capacity, I collaborated closely with key U.S. officials (such as NSS Senior Directors and officials of various agencies) on a range of policy matters, participated in bilateral and multilateral meetings, and coordinated foreign travel conducted by the President. I also performed similar functions with respect to the Obama-Biden Transition Project. During my tenure in these positions, I was responsible for helping to manage complex organizations with large numbers of employees and/or volunteers.

As a staff member of the U.S. Senate, I held three different positions over the course of a decade, each of which required me to engage on East Asia and Pacific Rim issues. As foreign policy advisor to then-Senator Obama, I handled all of the Asia-related work for the Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee, including spearheading early efforts to combat avian flu in Asia. As a professional staff member on the State-Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, I dealt frequently and extensively with East Asia-Pacific issues especially related to U.S. bilateral and multilateral assistance programs and associated legislation. As an aide to Senator Daschle (Democratic Policy Committee), I worked on issues such as the accession of China to the World Trade Organization.
During my time in the military, I deployed in support of Joint Task Force operations in Afghanistan. I helped to manage a number of intelligence professionals spread out over a large forward deployed area, facilitating timely intelligence support for multiple direct action operations. I was selected to lead multiple, post-operation mitigation efforts with senior Afghans and coalition military and political leaders. As a reservist at the Office of Naval Intelligence, I was selected to work on highly-specialized projects concerning a key nation in East Asia.

As for my education, I was awarded an M.A. in International Policy Studies from Stanford University. My coursework included a Stanford University-Beijing University study abroad program which focused on Mandarin language training (as well as continued Chinese language studies upon return to the United States).

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:

- The Secretary of Defense
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
- Commander, U.S. Central Command
- Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
- Other Combatant Commanders
- The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
- Commander, U.S. Forces Korea

Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I expect to develop and maintain a close working relationship with under secretaries and assistant secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of DOD, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and as appropriate, the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea. If confirmed, I would also work closely with and coordinate with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy. Examples of this coordination include working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on the role of NATO in Afghanistan; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict on counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and security assistance matters; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in Asia; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs to implement the Proliferation Security Initiative in the Asian and Pacific regions.

CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next ASDAPS?

Answer. I think the administration has rightly acknowledged that Asia is increasingly critical to U.S. prosperity and security interests. This is evident from the administration's steadfast commitment to defeating al Qaeda and countering violent extremism in South and Central Asia and efforts to enhance U.S. relationships across the Asia-Pacific region. At the broadest level, I believe the most significant challenge for the entire DOD is managing a changing global security environment in an era of budget austerity. As Secretary Panetta has noted, the Department faces hard, but manageable, choices in order to maintain a globally engaged force amidst domestic fiscal constraints.

In Afghanistan, I note undeniable progress on the security front—particularly in the core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al Qaeda. U.S. forces along with Afghan and coalition partners are degrading the insurgency, building up the Afghan security forces, and continuing to transition key areas of the country to Afghan lead for security. Pakistan continues to remain a critical part of the fight against al Qaeda, and despite the many challenges in this relationship, I believe we need to continue to work closely with Pakistan to combat the extremists that threaten U.S. and regional security and stability.
In the Asia-Pacific region, I think the administration has rightly focused on the need to support key norms and principles that benefit all nations. China's military buildup continues to pose anti-access/area-denial challenges and shift the cross-Strait balance in the mainland's favor. It remains important to encourage greater transparency from China about how it will use its growing capabilities.

It is also vital to modernize and enhance U.S. regional security alliances, including efforts to enhance defense posture in the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, I think it will be essential to continue the administration's strong efforts to address the increase in non-traditional threats beyond violent extremism, such as the proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies, competition for scarce resources, and devastating natural disasters. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to address these issues.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. I believe the administration has done a good job of putting in place the right strategies and plans to address the challenges facing the next ASD(APSA). These issues, and the plans associated with them, are always evolving. If confirmed, I would work closely with others in the Department, the interagency, Congress, and our international allies and partners to adapt and shape these strategies for the future. I would analyze current strategies, review the results of the recent strategy reviews, and participate in ongoing policy reviews as deemed necessary. If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating closely with the committee on the range of challenges and opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region.

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD(APSA)?

Answer. Strategies for dealing with the set of challenges facing the ASD(APSA) are largely in place in DOD and in other departments and agencies within the U.S. Government, and are reflected in agreements with our allies and partners in the region. If confirmed, I see the challenge as principally one of careful, sustained execution of these strategies. However, if confirmed, I will be carefully evaluating current strategies to determine if a reordering of priorities, applicable to ASD(APSA), is in order. Overall, the key priorities are to continue to make progress against al Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan; to broaden and deepen existing alliances, while developing our ties to new allies and partners; to work on a constructive relationship with China; to enhance the development of action-oriented regional organizations that can tackle shared challenges; and to ensure that the U.S. military is postured to protect and advance American interests in this critical region.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the priority will remain to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and affiliates, and to prevent their return to either country, while increasing the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan Government so they can assume the lead for Afghanistan’s security by the end of 2014. If confirmed, I will work first and foremost to ensure the U.S. military stays on track and has the guidance and tools required to succeed in these missions.

With regard to China, it is my understanding that DOD seeks a healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relationship with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in support of President Obama and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Hu’s vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive bilateral relationship. Strengthening the military-to-military relationship serves a critical role in shaping China’s choices, as does the continued adaptation of U.S. forces, posture, and operational concepts to ensure a stable and secure environment.

U.S. regional security alliances remain vital, and central to the larger regional strategy. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to continue to broaden and deepen the U.S. defense and security agenda with allies and partners, expanding areas of cooperation even while reinforcing traditional missions of deterrence and reassurance. Finally, if confirmed, I will work to support the Department’s effort to maintain and enhance defense posture and capabilities across the Asia-Pacific region.

ENGAGEMENT POLICY

Question. One of the central pillars of our national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, joint combined exchange training exercises, combatant commander exercises, humanitarian assistance operations, and similar activities are used to achieve this goal.

If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of the U.S. military? If yes, would you advocate for expanding U.S. military-to-military engagement? If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support continued U.S. military-to-military engagement with nations in Asia. I believe the current and emerging security environment will require robust engagement with the militaries of our allies and partners around the world, and building productive relationships with many States in which our past military-to-military engagements have been limited or absent entirely.

**Question.** Do you believe that these activities contribute to U.S. national security?

**Answer.** Yes.

**STABILITY OPERATIONS**

**Question.** Experience in Iraq has underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of stability operations in post-conflict situations.

In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between DOD and other departments of government in the planning and conduct of stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?

**Answer.** DOD has played and will continue to play an important role supporting other key U.S. departments and agencies in stability and support operations post-conflict.

**Question.** What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq?

**Answer.** Operations in Iraq demonstrate that long-term success requires a robust capacity for integrated civil-military action and substantially more resources to support the expeditionary capacity of other key departments and agencies. Long-term success will also require close cooperation between DOD and other U.S. Government departments in planning, preparing for and conducting stability and support operations, both in terms of DOD participation in whole-of-government efforts and for interagency participation in the review of military campaign and contingency planning. The U.S. military must plan and train with civilian counterparts, be prepared to operate effectively in all phases of conflict, and develop better awareness of political, cultural, and economic factors to ensure that our actions will meet our objectives.

**BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY**

**Question.** In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the global train and equip authority (section 1206).

In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations in the Asia and Pacific region?

**Answer.** The United States’ primary objective in building the capacity of foreign partners should continue to be to help them develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their countries’ internal security, and contribute to regional and multilateral responses to threats and instability. This, in turn, mitigates the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States and promotes interoperability between our forces.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the purpose of the section 1206 global train and equip authority?

**Answer.** As I understand it, this authority has two discrete purposes outlined in law: to build a partner’s national military or maritime security forces’ capacity either to: (1) conduct counterterrorist operations; or (2) conduct or support stability operations where U.S. forces are participating.

**Question.** Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for an expansion of the Government’s resources devoted to instruments of non-military “soft power”—civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and governance.

In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-à-vis other civilian departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of instruments of soft power?

**Answer.** In my view, the Department’s role should generally be to support, not lead, in the exercise of soft power.

**AFGHANISTAN POLICY**

**Question.** Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?

**Answer.** Yes, I support the strategy that the President has set forth, and I believe it is the right strategy. A focused counterinsurgency campaign will allow us to help the Afghans build security forces and government capacity capable of providing the security and basic services necessary to achieve a peaceful, stable Afghanistan that does not again become a safe haven for terrorists.
Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? For example, would you support an increase in counterterrorism action in Afghanistan?

Answer. I believe the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. The administration tracks metrics on progress toward its objectives in Afghanistan throughout the year, and constantly assesses and adjusts its implementation of the overall strategy. Counterterrorism is a significant part of the counterinsurgency strategy, and managing the balance of all aspects of the strategy is an ongoing process.

Question. Do you support the President’s decision to withdraw the 33,000 U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan, with 10,000 troops to be withdrawn by the end of this year and the remaining 23,000 troops to return by next summer?

Answer. Yes. I support a responsible, conditions-based drawdown as called for by the President. I believe we have made the progress necessary to allow us to begin to bring home U.S. surge forces.

AFGHANISTAN TRANSITION

Question. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon last November, the participants in the International Security Assistance Force endorsed President Karzai’s goal of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) having the primary responsibility for providing security throughout Afghanistan by 2014. Do you support the goal of transitioning responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces by 2014?

Answer. Yes. As I understand it, the transition to Afghan security lead in the first tranche of provinces and municipalities has progressed smoothly and without any significant increase of enemy-initiated attacks in those areas. The administration’s transition strategy, as adopted at the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit, is to complete security transition nationwide by the end of 2014.

Question. In your view, how important is it to the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan that the transition of primary responsibility for providing security throughout Afghanistan be completed by 2014?

Answer. In my view, the current goal of completing transition by the end of 2014—as proposed by President Karzai and confirmed by our allies and partners at the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit—is important to our effort in Afghanistan. A key element of U.S. strategy is building an increasingly capable and professional Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) that can protect its citizens. To that end, my understanding is that the administration is focused on increasing the size, quality and performance of the ANSF to ensure the successful transition of security lead to Afghan control.

With an increasingly capable ANSF, the Afghan Government has been able to begin the process of transitioning areas to Afghan security lead—a process that began in July 2011 and will continue through 2014. As a result, about 25 percent of the Afghan population now lives in areas where the ANSF have lead security responsibility. The Afghan Government will soon announce a second set of areas to begin the transition process, and will likely include locations where approximately 50 percent of Afghans live.

Question. In your view, what are the main challenges to the success of the transition to an Afghan lead for security throughout the country by 2014?

Answer. Safe havens for insurgents in Pakistan, and Afghan capacity in the governance and development areas, remain the most challenging aspects of transition. The limited capacity of the Afghan Government to manage development programs and fill government positions at the national and subnational levels.hinders the ability to assume leadership on these lines of operation. Efforts in these areas must underpin the success of the security transition in order to achieve durable stability in Afghanistan.

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Question. According to a recent DOD report, the NATO training mission has met its target end strength of 305,000 ANSF by October of this year. The Afghan Government has approved a new ANSF target end strength of 352,000 by 2012 comprised of 171,600 Afghan National Army (ANA) and 134,000 Afghan National Police (ANP).

What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional and effective Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)?

Answer. My assessment is that the ANSF, in partnership with U.S. and NATO forces, have made enormous progress in size and quality over the past 2 years and remain ahead of schedule for their growth targets this year. In addition, both the ANA and ANP have made significant gains in effectiveness and professionalism.
The establishment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program has also fostered greater local capability to resist insurgents. However, real challenges remain, such as stemming attrition rates.

**Question.** What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges?

**Answer.** Some of the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF include poor literacy rates and low education levels in the Afghan population, which constrain the development of operational enablers, including logistics, aviation, medical, and communications capabilities. These capabilities will be necessary for an increasingly self-sufficient ANSF to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorists. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has put considerable attention on, and resources toward, the literacy challenge. Another key challenge is the development of strong and capable leaders, which will take time and experience to cultivate. If confirmed, I would work with military and civilian leaders and international partners to explore ways to bolster ANSF capabilities.

**AFGHAN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT**

**Question.** While improving security for the Afghan people is critical, the success of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan also depends on improving the Government of Afghanistan’s capacity to provide governance, better services, and economic development. Significant concerns remain over the performance of the Government of Afghanistan in meeting the needs of the Afghan people and fighting corruption.

What do you see as the role for DOD in building the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to deliver services, provide better governance, improve economic development, and fight corruption in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** The role of DOD should be a supporting one. Improving governance and economic development is crucial to our strategy in Afghanistan. Although the Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are the lead agencies within the U.S. Government on governance and development initiatives in Afghanistan, DOD contributes to this effort and cooperates closely with DOS and USAID. Coordinating DOD stabilization projects with civilian reconstruction and development efforts ensures that the military and civilian activities work together to support longer-term development objectives, as well as near-term stabilization. If confirmed, I would emphasize continued close coordination of these interconnected civilian and military efforts.

**RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION**

**Question.** Under what conditions, if any, should reconciliation talks with the Taliban leadership be pursued? In your view, should negotiations be pursued with the leadership of the Haqqani network? If so, under what conditions?

**Answer.** The President has clearly outlined U.S. support for an Afghan-led process to pursue a political resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan. I support the Afghan Government’s efforts to reconcile with groups who agree to cut ties with al Qaeda, cease violence, and accept the Afghan Constitution.

I would defer to the Department of State for further discussion of reconciliation issues.

**Question.** In your view, what role should Pakistan play in any reconciliation talks?

**Answer.** I believe Pakistan should play a constructive role in the effort to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan.

**Question.** What is your understanding and assessment of the current program for reintegrating insurgent fighters willing to lay down their arms? What additional steps, if any, should be taken to improve the reintegration program?

**Answer.** I understand that, since the Afghan Government established the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program last summer, the Afghans—with international community support—have made steady progress in establishing the support structures to implement the program at the national and sub-national levels. The High Peace Council and working-level Joint Secretariat have conducted extensive outreach activities to spread awareness of this new program. There is a steady entry of reintegration candidates (now more than 2,700) into the program, and I believe the program has inspired informal reintegration as well. The international community should continue its support for program implementers and for the Afghan interagency cooperation necessary to reintegrate these former fighters in a timely way.
U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

Question. In September, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen testified to the committee that he believed a “flawed and difficult relationship [with Pakistan] is better than no relationship at all.”

Do you agree with Admiral Mullen regarding maintaining a “flawed” relationship with Pakistan? Why or why not?

Answer. Our relationship with Pakistan is not always easy, but it is vital to our national security and to our regional interests. The core national security goal remains to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates to ensure that they do not have safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to eliminate their capacity to threaten the United States, our allies, and interests abroad. Over the past several years, the United States has made major progress in reducing al Qaeda’s ability to conduct transnational attacks. As Secretary Panetta has said, “the United States is within reach of strategically defeating al Qaeda”. At the same time, there are serious questions about Pakistan’s ability to prevent its territory from being used as a safe haven by the Haqqani network and other militant extremists to attack coalition forces in Afghanistan. Therefore, I believe it is essential to continue working with Pakistan to eliminate these safe havens.

The U.S. military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, like our overall relationship, has seen good and bad phases. Pakistan has suffered more than 11,000 military personnel killed or wounded and more than 30,000 civilian causalities in recent years from terrorist actions, most recently in the significant attacks following the Osama bin Laden operation. Therefore, the United States has a shared interest with Pakistan in preventing terrorism. As President Obama has said, “We have killed more terrorists on Pakistani soil than anywhere else, and that could not have been done without their cooperation.”

Question. What do you believe are the United States’ key strategic interests with regard to Pakistan?

Answer. I believe the United States’ interests in the region and in Asia more broadly require a stable and constructive relationship with Pakistan. The fact that Pakistan is a nuclear state that faces internal threats from extremist organizations adds to the importance of a continued relationship with Pakistan. Preventing, if possible, a potential Pakistan-India conflict is another important strategic interest. It is in the United States’ interest for Pakistan to have a strong, civilian-led government and an open society, to live in peace and security with its neighbors, and to ensure its nuclear assets remain secure, in accordance with international standards.

If confirmed, I will continue to support DOD’s efforts in coordination with our interagency partners for a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan, aimed at advancing shared national security objectives.

THE HAQQANI NETWORK

Question. A number of recent deadly attacks on Afghan, U.S., and other coalition forces in Afghanistan have allegedly been linked to the Haqqani network operating from safe havens across Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan. The Pakistan intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), appears to provide support to the Haqqani network, which then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen has called a “veritable arm” of the Pakistani ISI. What is your understanding of the rules of engagement for U.S. troops in Afghanistan who are subjected to cross-border attacks from Haqqani or other insurgent forces on the Pakistan side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border?

Answer. My understanding is that U.S. forces in Afghanistan are authorized to act in self-defense when they are under attack. I understand that ISAF and CENTCOM are working with the Pakistanis to improve cross-border coordination.

Question. Do you agree that it is essential, if U.S.-Pakistan relations are ever to be normalized, that Pakistan eliminate its support for the Haqqani network and denounce the cross-border attacks conducted by the Haqqanis and other insurgents against Afghan and coalition forces in Afghanistan? Why or why not?

Answer. The ability of violent extremist groups to find support and safe haven in Pakistan poses a significant threat to U.S. forces, the NATO mission, and the long-term stability of Afghanistan. Attacks against U.S. and coalition personnel are unacceptable. It is Pakistan’s responsibility to prevent attacks from its territory on others, including Afghanistan and our forces there. If Pakistan does not address these threats, the United States will have to consider a range of options, but it is best when we have Pakistan’s cooperation. Pakistan has legitimate concerns that should be understood and addressed by the Afghan Government in any process to bring about a stable and durable political solution in Afghanistan. But Pakistan also has responsibilities of its own, including taking decisive steps to ensure that the Afghan...
Taliban and affiliated organizations cannot continue to conduct the insurgency from Pakistani territory. Increased action is particularly critical with groups such as the Haqqani network, who continue to maintain close ties to al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations that pose real threats not only to the United States, but also to the people and Government of Pakistan.

Pakistani military leaders cannot pick and choose among militant groups. However, Pakistan remains a critical country in the fight against terrorists. Therefore, I believe we should continue to work closely with Pakistan to act against the extremists that threaten U.S. and Pakistani security, and pursue a stable, peaceful, and prosperous region. As Secretary Clinton stated in her testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 20, working with our Afghan and Pakistani partners is not always easy, but these relationships are advancing U.S. national security interests, and walking away from them would undermine those interests.

Question. Would you support designating the Haqqani network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended? Why or why not?

Answer. I would defer to the Secretary of State regarding designation of the Haqqani network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. It is in the interests of both Pakistan and the United States to eliminate terrorists and safe havens. As Secretary Clinton told the Pakistanis, “There will be dire consequences for Pakistan as well as Afghanistan if this threat from the terrorist networks is not contained, at the very least, because there’s no way that any government in Islamabad can control these groups.”

**U.S. Assistance to Pakistan**

**Question.** The United States has provided significant military assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing and training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to conduct counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the United States has provided significant funds (“Coalition Support Funds”) to reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and other support provided in connection with Operation Enduring Freedom. More recently, the United States has suspended assistance to Pakistan under the PCF and Coalition Support Funds pending greater cooperation from Pakistan.

In your view, under what conditions, if any, would it be in the U.S. strategic interest to resume the provision of PCF assistance and Coalition Support Fund reimbursements to Pakistan?

**Answer.** In my view, the current “train-advise-equip” programs with the Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an important component in pursuing the objective of improving Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities and improving cross-border coordination. Going forward, it is vital that Pakistan live up to its responsibilities, including to cooperate fully in counterterrorism matters, to expand its counterinsurgency campaign against all extremists and militant groups that have found safe haven inside Pakistan. I understand that in the wake of the Osama bin Laden raid, the administration asked Pakistan to take a number of concrete steps to demonstrate its continued commitment to a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship. Future provision of security-related assistance will be informed by Pakistan’s response to these requests. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure that the support the United States provides yields the results we seek.

**Detainee Treatment Policy**

**Question.** Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?
Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Answer. Yes, I believe that DOD should always maintain principled and legal standards for detainee treatment and comply fully with the law, keeping in mind that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts.

FORCE POSTURE IN THE USPACOM AOR

Question. In connection with his recent trip to the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility, Secretary Panetta stated that “the United States remains committed to a robust forward presence in Asia.” Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the region are planned over the next several years, including movement of marines from Okinawa to Guam and the relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea. There are also discussions about increasing presence in southern parts of the Asia-Pacific, including countries like Australia and Singapore, and developing more comprehensive engagement strategies with a number of other countries in the region. These initiatives will likely compete with other global commitments for increasingly constrained funding.

If confirmed, how would you propose to make the tradeoffs and tough choices necessary to manage risks that might result from a U.S. commitment to a “robust” forward presence in Asia in light of other global commitments and in the face of a shrinking DOD budget?

Answer. In keeping with Secretary Panetta’s recent statements I believe it is essential that the United States maintain an enduring military presence that provides a tangible reassurance that the United States is committed to Asia’s security, economic development, and the prosperity essential to the region’s success. It is also important to ensure that the Department maintains a fiscally responsible approach to a defense posture that maximizes U.S. resources. In many cases, it is most efficient to sustain our global posture by forward stationing a portion of our forces closer to where they will be used. Doing so maximizes the capability of our military, giving us “more for less,” and potentially offsetting the impact of necessary force structure cuts.

If confirmed, I would work with my counterparts across the Department and our Commanders in the field to assess the potential global tradeoffs, risks, and budgetary implications associated with any changes in U.S. forward presence in the Asia-Pacific.

Question. In your opinion, what should be the United States’ national security priorities in the Asia-Pacific?

Answer. As outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy, the United States must develop a positive security agenda for the region. DOD’s priorities include protecting U.S. territory, citizens, and allies; deterring aggression and maintaining regional stability; maintaining free and open access to the maritime, air, and space domains; deterring and defeating violent extremism; and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their associated materials.

Question. In your view, what strategic criteria, if any, should guide the posture of U.S. military forces in that region to best address those priorities at acceptable risk?

Answer. I agree with DOD’s assessment that we should establish a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable posture in the Asia-Pacific region.

Question. What, in your view, does “robust” forward presence mean?

Answer. In my view, a “robust” forward presence connotes a powerful, capable, military presence—one that is sufficient for a wide range of contingencies and activities across the range of military operations.

I believe the Department must keep pace with changes in the Asia-Pacific security environment that pose profound challenges to international security, such as the rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-state actors, and the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

As such, I believe the Department should maintain an enduring military presence in the Asia-Pacific region that provides a tangible reassurance that the United States is committed to Asia’s security. To do so, as the Secretary has consistently
said, will require that U.S. posture in the region be geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and, of course, politically sustainable.

My understanding is that the Department is seeking to distribute U.S. forces geographically into Southeast Asia, Oceania, and the Indian Ocean region to address the significant security challenges we face across the entirety of the region. This will allow the United States to perform the types of missions our forces are more likely to face in the future—combating terrorism, responding to natural disasters, and strengthening regional stability. Consulting closely with U.S. allies and partners, and tailoring defense posture appropriately will allow the United States to respond more effectively to the wide range of challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century.

In East Asia, a robust presence is one that continues to support our long-time alliances while also ensuring our force remains operationally resilient in response to any future challenges. The United States must ensure that our regional allies and partners are confident in the continued strength of our deterrence against the full range of potential threats.

Question. How, if at all, do the methods of forward basing, rotational forces, and agreements with allies for training and logistics activities throughout the region contribute to “robust” forward presence?

Answer. From my understanding, DOD views posture as a combination of three elements: forces, footprint, and agreements. Forces are U.S. military, capabilities, equipment, and units assigned and rotationally deployed overseas. Footprint is the term the Department uses to describe the overseas network of infrastructure, facilities, land, and propositioned equipment. Lastly, “agreements” are the series of treaties and access, transit, support, and status protection agreements and arrangements with allies and partners that set the terms of U.S. military presence within the territory of a host country, as agreed with the host government. In combination, these elements underwrite the Department’s ability to develop a robust forward presence and project military power in support of our national interests.

Some of these elements are more flexible than others, and this fact dictates the ways in which the Department can adapt its current posture to changes, including changes in the security environment, new diplomatic realities, or mounting budgetary pressure. For posture, I believe the whole is greater than the sum of its parts—not only is posture the fundamental enabler of U.S. defense activities overseas, it is also central to defining and communicating U.S. strategic interests to allies, partners, rivals, and adversaries.

Question. In your view, is the right mix of these forward presence methods necessary to achieve an affordable theater posture at acceptable levels of risk? If so, how would you propose broadly assessing each method relative to its cost and benefit?

Answer. Yes. Finding the right mix of forward stationed and rotational forces is one of the U.S.’s toughest challenges; requiring continuous review and assessment with respect to the evolving strategic environment, national interests, regional threats, opportunities, and our operational requirements to respond to crises. The right mix of presence provides the United States affordable regional posture at an acceptable level of military risk.

I believe the Department must ensure defense posture reflects the unique regional and political security dynamics by harmonizing the right combination of relationships and agreements, forward-stationed forces, rotational presence, prepositioned equipment, and basing infrastructure to enable the Department to prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies. This will naturally include the appropriate mix of assigned and rotationally allocated forces in theater in order to meet operational requirements in the most efficient manner.

Question. How important is a forward basing strategy to the ability of PACOM to execute its day-to-day mission? Its operational contingency plans?

Answer. I believe the United States’ forward-basing strategy is critical to enable PACOM’s execution of both its day-to-day operations as well as operational contingency plans. U.S. forward presence provides unique capabilities that can be flexibly deployed, employed, and sustained in a timely manner across a wide spectrum of operations and contingencies.

Question. What do you see as the implications, if any, of the planned force posture changes in Korea, Japan, and Guam on the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in general? How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam improve U.S. security in the region? How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula improve security?

Answer. As the administration considers posture changes in the Asia-Pacific region, my understanding is that we are seeking to build a presence that is geographi-
cally distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. As this effort evolves, I understand that our goal is to sustain the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia, while enhancing it in Southeast Asia. I believe that all of the initiatives underway support these broad objectives.

Question. What is your understanding of the plans for the possible U.S. military presence in Australia and how, in your view, will such a presence advance U.S. security interests?

Answer. It is my understanding that in November 2010, the Department established a working group with our Australian counterparts to develop options to align our respective force postures in ways that would benefit the national security of both countries. In September 2011, at the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) meeting in San Francisco, Secretaries Clinton and Panetta discussed a number of options aimed at positioning the military forces of both nations to respond in a timely and effective way to contingencies, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and to enhance their ability to train and exercise together and with regional partners. As I understand it, these options will demonstrate the strength of the U.S.-Australia alliance and the combined resolve to enhance regional stability and security.

Question. In your view, are the levels of funding, manning and military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region appropriate to the management of current and future risk to U.S. strategic interests in the region? Do you foresee a requirement to increase or to decrease those funding levels in the coming years?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in DOD and our military commanders to assess the appropriate levels of funding, personnel, and military-to-military engagement necessary to meet our strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific region.

CHINA

Question. China is viewed by some in the United States as an emerging adversary that poses a potential threat to security in the region, and by others as a constructive international partner that should be welcomed and integrated into the international economic and political community. Others yet believe we are at a crossroads somewhere between those two scenarios.

How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China?

Answer. As President Obama stated in January 2011, the United States seeks a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China. I would describe the relationship as cooperative and competitive. The United States continues to pursue opportunities to engage where there is mutual benefit while discussing frankly areas where we may have differences.

Question. To what extent do you believe the policies and actions of the United States and other major regional and international actors will affect the direction in which China develops?

Answer. I believe that U.S. policies and actions can influence the direction of China’s development. No country has done more to assist, facilitate, and encourage China’s national development and integration into the international system than the United States. However, U.S. policy and actions, or the policies and actions of any country or group of countries for that matter, cannot alone determine China’s future which, in many ways, will be based upon the choices that China’s leaders make. More fundamentally, the United States can also help to shape the environment in which China makes its strategic choices, and in so doing, encourage China to “do the right thing.”

Question. What do you see as the impact of current global economic challenges on stability and security in China specifically, and in the Asia-Pacific region generally?

Answer. The full impact of the global economic crisis upon China and stability in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly will continue to play out over time. But those who manage defense and security issues must be attentive to the connections between security and economic issues, and be prepared to work together with colleagues in economic and diplomatic fields, both to guard against negative outcomes and also to seek positive ways forward where they may exist.

Question. China’s defense spending has had double-digit increases annually for about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of military growth is to be expected for a country experiencing the kind of economic growth that China has had over that same period, the types of platforms and capabilities China is developing have been interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at increasing dis-
tances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China’s intentions in the region.

What do you believe are the objectives of China’s steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program?

Answer. China appears to be building the capability to fight and win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. Its near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, and to deter or deny effective intervention in a cross-strait conflict. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area denial capabilities. China is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China’s immediate periphery. Beijing’s growing focus on military missions other than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and counterpiracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through the modernization of its nuclear forces, and is improving other strategic capabilities, such as in space and counter-space operations and in computer network operations.

Question. How should the United States respond to this Chinese military growth and modernization?

Answer. The United States has been and should remain the pivotal military power in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States’ response to China’s military modernization should be flexible and supported by the continued transformation of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, the maintenance of our global presence and access, the modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as countering anti-access and area denial, and the strengthening of our alliances and partnerships.

Question. What do you believe are the Chinese political-military goals in the Asia-Pacific region? Globally?

Answer. Broadly, the overriding objectives of China’s leaders appear to be to ensure the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party, continue China’s economic development, maintain the country’s domestic political stability, defend China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and secure China’s status as a great power. Within this context, preventing any moves by Taipei toward de jure independence is a key part of Beijing’s strategy. Within each dimension there lies a mix of important challenges and opportunities for the United States that will continue to deserve priority attention.

Question. What effect is China’s military growth having on other countries in the region?

Answer. In terms of regional security, China’s economic growth has increased China’s international profile and influence, and has enabled China’s leaders to embark upon and sustain a comprehensive transformation of its military forces. The pace and scale of China’s military modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency, raise many questions, both within the United States and in the region as a whole, about China’s future.

Other countries in the region are closely watching the growth of China’s military, and how its military acts. Although on the one hand China has recently deployed its first hospital ship, conducting good-will missions far from its shores, on the other hand, there have been worrisome incidents in disputed waters in China’s neighboring seas that have caused concern in nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Security concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have contributed to a greater focus on regional forums, such as the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN), where issues may be addressed multilaterally; such security concerns have also led to stronger and more welcoming relations with the United States as a security partner of choice.

Question. How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship between China and Taiwan, and how can we help prevent miscalculation on either side?

Answer. Taiwan has made significant strides to reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait. These initiatives should be encouraged. I believe the United States can help to prevent miscalculation on either side by continuing to abide by our longstanding policies, based on the three joint U.S.-China Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, including making available to Taiwan “defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Such a continued commitment by the United States will allow Taiwan to continue its outreach to the PRC without fear of coercion.

Question. How do China’s efforts to establish a strategic presence in the Indian Ocean by securing and maintaining access to various seaports in South and Southeast Asia countries affect its political-military posture and influence in the region?

Answer. China looks to South and Southeast Asia as an area of strategic importance, which includes political objectives, access to resources, trade, and investment.
With regard to South and Southeast Asian sea-ports, the important question is how China intends to use its presence. The United States retains strong relationships in South and Southeast Asia and should continue to monitor China’s growing presence in the region.

Question. What are your views of China’s deployment of warships to counter piracy in the western Indian Ocean and how does this deployment contribute to China’s ability to project power?

Answer. Generally speaking, I see China’s participation in counterpiracy operations as a positive development that contributes to addressing a global security challenge and demonstrates China’s ability to use its military in a positive, constructive, and responsible manner. It is more than likely that from this experience China could begin to develop capabilities that would enhance its ability to sustain a deployed force over an extended period of time.

Question. What is the role of DOD in helping to ensure that China’s nuclear power industry does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region?

Answer. The Obama administration has reiterated that preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, along with related technologies and materials, is a key goal for the United States. I believe that DOD should work in the interagency process to ensure that any proliferation concerns relating to China, including its nuclear power industry, are expressed to the Chinese Government in appropriate forums, and should similarly support the development of appropriate interagency responses in the event that China takes steps that do contribute to nuclear proliferation.

Question. Our military-to-military relations with the Chinese military can be characterized as modest at best and the Chinese approach to these relations can be accurately described as “on again, off again”. Clearly, one thing that has hobbled U.S.-China military relations has been China’s history of canceling or postponing military-to-military engagements in response to U.S. arm sales to Taiwan.

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations?

Answer. I have long supported a continuous dialogue between the armed forces of the United States and China to expand practical cooperation where our national interests converge and to discuss candidly those areas where we have disagreement. Such dialogue can be especially important during periods of friction and turbulence. I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive role in the region, and to press China to partner with the United States and our Asian allies and partners in addressing common security challenges.

Question. Do you believe that the United States should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

Answer. I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can only truly work if China is willing to reciprocate with transparent and substantive discussions and engagements. If confirmed, I would look for ways to deepen and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.

Question. What is your view regarding the longstanding U.S. policy of selling defense articles and services to Taiwan despite objections and criticism from China?

Answer. U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which provides that the United States will make available to Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Act also states that the President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. That policy has contributed to peace and stability in the region for more than 30 years and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I believe our arms sales have been carried out in a responsible manner.

Question. In your view, to what extent, if at all, should China’s possible reaction to such sales be considered by the United States when making decisions about the provision of defense articles and services to Taiwan?

Answer. None. The United States should not be held hostage to any potential reaction China may have in response to arms sales to Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act provided that the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
Question. By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air, and space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, but one in particular is China’s increased aggressiveness in asserting its excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea. In one such incident, Chinese-flagged ships harassed the USNS Impeccable, a U.S. military ship conducting ocean surveillance in the international waters of the South China Sea. That incident underscored the nature of Chinese maritime claims and the Chinese sensitivity associated with U.S. Navy operations in these areas.

What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime dispute in the South China Sea?

Answer. As Secretary Gates affirmed at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June of this year, and Secretary Clinton affirmed at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in July of this year, the United States is a Pacific nation that has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open commerce, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.

I agree with the assessments of the Departments of State and Defense that the United States should not take a position on the competing territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea, and I believe all parties should resolve their disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with customary international law, without resorting to the threat or use of force. The United States should sustain its presence in the South China Sea and uphold its commitments to its allies and partners in order to maintain peace and stability in the region.

Question. How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or destabilize the situation?

Answer. The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the South China Sea. Although the United States does not take a position on the territorial and maritime disputes, I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to maintain its presence and assert its freedom of navigation and overflight rights in the South China Sea in accordance with customary international law.

If confirmed, I will work with our military commanders to evaluate the appropriate level of naval activities in the South China Sea to maintain regional peace and stability as well as unimpeded access for lawful commerce and economic development.

Question. What should the United States do to help prevent dangerous encounters in the South China Sea?

Answer. To reduce the risk of conflict in the South China Sea, I believe the United States should use its position in several regional organizations, including the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, to facilitate initiatives and confidence-building measures that will help claimant states reach agreement on a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Additionally, the United States should encourage all claimants to abide by international “rules of the road”, such as the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, to ensure greater operational safety and reduce the risk of dangerous incidents at sea.

Question. Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and military applications and, as a result, it represents a potentially substantial vulnerability. There are reports that China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential conflict situation.

What is your understanding of China’s efforts to develop and deploy cyber warfare capabilities?

Answer. It is my understanding that in 2010, numerous computer systems around the world, including those owned by the U.S. Government, were the target of intrusions, some of which appear to have originated within the PRC. These intrusions were focused on exfiltrating information. Although this alone is a serious concern, the accesses and skills required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct computer network attacks. I also understand that developing capabilities for cyber warfare is consistent with authoritative People’s Liberation Army military writings. Additionally, China’s 2010 Defense White Paper noted China’s own concern over foreign cyber warfare efforts and highlighted the importance of cyber-security in China’s national defense.

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack?

Answer. The United States, like many other nations, has been the target of innumerable malicious activities via cyber space from hackers, criminals, and identi-
fied entities, some of which may well be nation states. I understand that numerous steps have been taken to increase network defense and monitoring capabilities. This work continues actively today. DOD should continue to evaluate all global threats to its networks and work closely with other government agencies, industry, and the international community in order to meet those threats. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, the lead for cyber policy, on these efforts.

**Question.** In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community. Since then, China has continued its active pursuit of missile and satellite technology.

What is your view of China’s purposes for its pursuit of these capabilities?

**Answer.** In my view, this test was just one element of China’s military modernization effort to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare. The United States’ goal should be to promote the responsible use of space.

**Question.** What do you see as the long-term implications of such developments for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space?

**Answer.** Space systems are vital to our national security and our economy. In this regard, the United States should seek ways to protect our interests in space. U.S. space policies and programs should be informed by China’s space and counterspace capabilities, which have contributed to today’s challenging space environment. I believe we need to enhance our deterrence and ability to operate in a degraded environment. At the same time, the United States should seek to engage China, a major space-faring nation, to promote the responsible use of space. However, our concern should not be focused on only one country, but on the range of actors that make space increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.

**Question.** What are your views regarding the potential weaponization of space and the international agreements to prevent space weaponization?

**Answer.** I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, including that all nations have a right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes, and that all nations should act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust.

Space is vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies and partners. I support our longstanding national policies of affirming the right of all nations to use outer space for peaceful purposes, the right of free passage through space, and the right to protect our forces and our Nation from those that would use space for hostile purposes.

**TAIWAN**

**Question.** Much of the recent discourse regarding Taiwan has involved the state of Taiwan’s defensive military capabilities and the U.S. commitment to do what is “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” as required by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In particular, much of the debate about how best to enhance Taiwan’s current defensive capabilities has revolved around fighter aircraft and what air defense capabilities are most prudent and appropriate under the circumstances.

What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Taiwan security relations?

**Answer.** In my view, U.S.-Taiwan security relations are excellent and have never been stronger. DOD engages Taiwan at every level to ensure that it maintains its ability to deter aggression from the China.

**Question.** What do you believe should be the priorities for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?

**Answer.** I believe our priority should be to assist Taiwan in the implementation of an innovative defense strategy to deter aggression from China. Taiwan cannot compete militarily with China; it must develop a future defense force that is capable of limiting China’s ability to coerce Taiwan.

**Question.** What is your opinion of the TRA? Enacted 30 years ago this year, do you see any need to modify the TRA to reflect the current state of affairs in the region? If so, how?

**Answer.** I believe DOD has a special responsibility to monitor China’s military developments and to deter aggression and conflict. The TRA has served our country and the region well and has helped guarantee peace and stability in Northeast Asia for more than 30 years. Consistent with the TRA, DOD assists in maintaining the capacity of the United States to take appropriate actions, as determined by the President and Congress in accordance with U.S. constitutional processes, in response to threats to the security or the social or economic system of the people on
Taiwan. DOD works closely with its interagency partners to make available to Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantities to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. This is consistent with longstanding policy that has provided a basis for maintaining security and stability across the Taiwan Strait. I believe that the TRA is a good law that makes for good policy.

**Question.** Given the increasing military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait, do you think Taiwan is making appropriate investments in its defensive capabilities? If not, what is the best way to encourage Taiwan to invest more in its military?

**Answer.** My view is that Taiwan needs to increase its defense budget to 3 percent of its GDP. The under-resourcing of Taiwan's defense jeopardizes Taiwan's security and sends the wrong signal to Beijing.

I believe that the best way to encourage Taiwan to invest more in its military is to send strong and consistent messages from both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government to Taiwan.

**Question.** What military capabilities do you believe would be most effective in improving Taiwan's self-defense capability over the next 5 to 10 years?

**Answer.** In my view, Taiwan needs to implement a defense strategy that includes asymmetric solutions that undermine the offensive capabilities of the PLA. This strategy requires systems that are survivable. Survivability is enhanced through the implementation and integration of measures that include mobility, redundancy, integration, camouflage, concealment, quantity, deception, decoys, hardening, and joint operations. This defense strategy would not replace traditional military approaches; however, it would ensure that in a crisis Taiwan’s defenses would be more effective.

**Question.** Do you think the United States should sell new F–16 C/D aircraft to Taiwan?

**Answer.** Given the nature of the multi-dimensional threat that Taiwan faces and the need to prioritize and ensure that Taiwan has a full range of self-defense articles and services (as opposed to simply one platform), I believe that Taiwan needs multiple capabilities and methods that will provide Taiwan the means to defend itself. I believe that retrofitting Taiwan’s F–16 A/B is a higher priority than assimilating new F–16 C/D airframes into Taiwan’s air force. The F–16 A/B retrofit would provide Taiwan with a robust aircraft that is nearly equivalent to the F–16 C/D in its capabilities. There are a number of other weapons systems that provide important capabilities at reasonable cost and should be a higher priority than Taiwan purchases of F–16 C/Ds.

**NORTH KOREA**

**Question.** North Korea still represents one of the greatest near-term challenges to security and stability in Asia and deterring conflict on the Korean peninsula remains a top U.S. priority.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and of the diplomatic efforts to date to persuade North Korea to comply with international mandates regarding its missile and nuclear programs?

**Answer.** North Korea’s provocative behavior, large conventional military, proliferation activities, and pursuit of asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, including uranium enrichment, present a serious threat to the United States, our allies and partners in the region, and the international community. The opaque nature of the North Korean system, coupled with an uncertain political transition, add to our concerns. The two North Korean attacks against South Korea last year provide a sober reminder that Pyongyang is willing to utilize its capabilities to undertake provocative actions. I believe the United States must work with its allies and other key partners in the region and internationally on diplomatic solutions to the range of pressing concerns we face with North Korea. Under the appropriate conditions, diplomatic engagement with North Korea is important as well. The U.S. commitment to its allies has helped preserve deterrence against North Korea, but deterrence alone will not bring issues of North Korean compliance to a close. Diplomacy too is essential for a lasting resolution to the nuclear, missile, and proliferation threats we face.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the threat posed to the United States and our allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities, and the export of those capabilities?

**Answer.** North Korea’s missile and WMD programs pose a direct and serious threat to our regional allies and partners and have the potential to become a direct threat to U.S. territory. The United States must continue to monitor carefully North Korea’s WMD and missile development programs and related proliferation activities. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD continues to work closely with other parts
of the U.S. Government to address these and other emerging threats, reduce our vulnerabilities and those of our allies and partners, and work cooperatively with our allies to ensure our contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.

Question. What concerns you most about North Korea?

Answer. North Korea maintains a large, offensively-postured conventional military; it continues to develop long-range ballistic missiles; it seeks to develop nuclear weapons; and it engages in proliferation of WMD in contravention of international norms and law. What concerns me most is that this range of threats comes from a single actor who stands on the outside of the international community.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Question. The longstanding alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been a key pillar of security in the Asia-Pacific region. This relationship, while strong, is undergoing substantial changes in terms of command and control and force laydown over the next several years. What is your understanding of the current status of the U.S. security relationship with South Korea?

Answer. In my view, the U.S.-ROK alliance remains one of the cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and is as strong and viable today as it has ever been. This was most recently reaffirmed by the Secretary during his travel and participation in the Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul on October 28, 2011. Our security relationship is based on mutual commitment to common interests, shared values, continuous dialogue, and combined planning, ensuring a comprehensive strategic alliance.

Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-South Korean security relationship?

Answer. As I understand it, DOD and the ROK continue to work closely to realign U.S. forces on the Peninsula and to prepare for the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK by December 2015. If confirmed, I would support this continued realignment and the return of facilities that our forces no longer require. The United States is also working toward developing new command and control relationships with Korea, which will ensure that contingency plans remain appropriate to changing circumstances. Additionally, I believe it is important to ensure the U.S. and Korean publics continue to understand the enduring mutual benefits derived from this alliance, and that the United States works effectively with the ROK as it plays an increasing role in regional and global security issues commensurate with the ROK’s economic status and influence. If confirmed, I would work hard to maintain close contact with my ROK counterpart and to build upon the solid foundation developed to date to improve and transform this important security relationship.

Question. What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now planned for December 2015, and what will you do to ensure this transition takes place by the end of 2015?

Answer. I understand that the United States and the ROK have a comprehensive way forward to transition wartime operational control by December 2015. If confirmed, I will work with my ROK counterpart to complete this process under the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework, ensuring the transition is implemented methodically and validating that the combined defense posture remains strong and seamless.

Question. How do we ensure that we continue to protect our vital regional interests, while continuing meaningful progress toward the transfer of command and control to the Republic of Korea and the relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula?

Answer. I believe regional interests are best protected through our presence in the region, strong alliances, and further developing mechanisms that enhance our abilities to engage in the region. A good example in Korea is the Secretary’s effort to formalize the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue, a senior-level policy consultative channel, as an umbrella framework that encompasses various defense dialogue mechanisms between the ROK and the United States to ensure high-level political oversight and synchronization of alliance objectives.

Question. Do you support expanding the number of U.S. personnel assigned to the Korean Peninsula for 2- or 3-year tours of duty and increasing the number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for these longer assignments?

Answer. I understand tour normalization in Korea was designed to further our commitment to support our forward-stationed forces and family members. It was to be implemented on an “as affordable” basis and not according to any specific
timeline. However, as Secretary Panetta has said, DOD is taking a hard look at everything that costs a lot of money, as this would. If confirmed, I will continue to assess thoroughly the cost of implementation and our proposed force posture to determine the best way forward.

Question. Do you believe that the security relationship with South Korea should remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or should U.S. forces stationed in Korea be available for regional or global deployments?

Answer. In accordance with the commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the ROK, U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula serves to deter potential aggressors from taking hostile actions that would threaten the peace and security of the Republic of Korea. In my view, this presence has both deterred further war on the Korean Peninsula and contributed to the stability of the Northeast Asia region. The U.S.-ROK alliance is transforming to ensure a capable and relevant forward presence for the future security environment. For U.S. forces in Korea, it is my understanding that the principles of force management decided at the 42nd Security Consultative Meeting in 2010 provide greater flexibility for regional and global deployments. As ROK military forces have served and will continue to serve with the U.S. military in places off the Peninsula (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the Gulf of Aden), I believe the U.S.-ROK alliance will continue to serve an important role regionally and globally.

Question. What is your assessment of the security benefits of the force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?

Answer. The two plans work to consolidate and relocate U.S. forces from north of Seoul and from the Seoul metropolitan area to locations south of Seoul, primarily U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys and Daegu. The movement of units and facilities to areas south of the Han River improves force protection and survivability, placing the majority of personnel and equipment outside of the tactical effective range of North Korean artillery. In addition, the move to a central location outside of Seoul provides efficiencies, reduces costs, contributes to the political sustainability of our forward presence, and improves military readiness on the Korean Peninsula.

Question. Since the North Korean attacks last year—the sinking of the South Korean navy ship Cheonan and the artillery attack on the South Korean island—South Korea has been adamant that it will respond “firmly” to the next such provocation. A main topic during recent U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meetings was reportedly the Joint Operational Plan for responding to future North Korean provocations. What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe the U.S. Armed Forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?

Answer. My understanding is that, under the Mutual Defense Treaty, when the political independence or security of South Korea or the United States are threatened by external armed attack, the United States and South Korea will consult together and develop appropriate means to deter the attack. Given the pattern and future likelihood of North Korean provocations, the two sides should continue to consult closely so that responses are effective.

Question. The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report established a policy and program priority for defending against near-term regional ballistic missile threats, and elaborated on the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to regional missile defense, including to defend against North Korean ballistic missile threats. Do you support the missile defense policies and priorities established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, including the PAA to missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region to defend against North Korean regional ballistic missile threats?

Answer. Yes, I support the missile defense policy priorities established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, including the implementation of PAA to regional missile defense that are tailored to the threats in each region and capabilities best suited for deployment. It is my understanding that the administration is currently developing a PAA to missile defense for the Asia-Pacific region that builds on our current missile defense efforts in the region.

Question. There has been some speculation, mainly in the South Korean press, that recent incidents in South Korea, such as allegations of assault by U.S. soldiers on Korean civilians and environmental issues associated with U.S. bases, may cause the ROK to seek to renegotiate some of the terms of the current Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and the Republic of Korea. What is your opinion regarding whether or not the United States should reopen the SOFA to renegotiate any of the terms?
Answer. I believe the SOFA has served the alliance well since its inception in 1967. The U.S.-ROK SOFA is a living document that is constantly reviewed and kept current and fresh through the work of the Joint Committee, the Special Joint Committee, and some 20 subject matter subcommittees that consult frequently with their counterparts across the ROK Government. Although the SOFA has been updated twice through long, difficult negotiations in 1991 and 2001, the Joint Committee process has approved thousands of implementing arrangements that effectively address the way in which the SOFA is implemented. This process has served both countries well over the years and continues to be the best path to address SOFA-related issues.

JAPAN

Question. How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security relationship?

Answer. The U.S.-Japan relationship is the cornerstone of security in East Asia. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and prosperity in the region. Our alliance has held fast through the turbulence of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and some contentious trade disputes, and now stands poised to become a truly global alliance. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a complicated realignment process that is part of a larger alliance transformation agenda that also includes a review of roles, missions, and capabilities to strengthen and ensure the relevance, capability, and cohesiveness of the alliance for the next several decades. The updated Common Strategic Objectives announced at the Security Consultative Committee in June 2011 highlight the alliance's ambitious agenda, which I fully support.

Question. How does Japan's relationship with its regional neighbors, mainly China, North Korea, and South Korea, influence the U.S.-Japan relationship?

Answer. I believe it is important for Japan to continue to cultivate constructive relations with all of its neighbors. By moving forward, Japan and other East Asian nations can increase their security cooperation. Working with other U.S. allies and partners in the region, Japan can increase its contribution to peace, security, and prosperity throughout Asia and globally. Japan is a valued and essential partner in the Six-Party Talks process and in other important regional security architectures.

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international security arena?

Answer. The security environment in Asia is changing and the United States needs a more capable alliance with Japan to deal with those challenges, including greater interoperability between our Armed Forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. If confirmed, I would work to encourage Japan's increasing contributions to the alliance, both regionally and globally. I would also encourage trilateral security cooperation with the Republic of Korea and with Australia, as these kinds of activities effectively strengthen the functional capacity of the emerging regional security architecture. Cooperation and the development of complementary and mutually reinforcing capabilities should range from missile defense to increased bilateral training opportunities—in Guam, for example.

Question. What is your view of the U.S.-Japanese joint development of the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense interceptor, and of the overall program of cooperation between the United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense?

Answer. Ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan is a success story for the alliance and has resulted in Japan's fielding of both sea- and land-based missile defense systems. Japan is one of our most important ballistic missile defense partners, and U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defense plays an important role in supporting our common strategic objectives on defense. The SM-3 Block IIA is an important cooperative program that will result in a significant increase in ballistic missile defense capability.

Question. Currently, the 2006 Roadmap Agreement between the United States and Japan links the closure of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station on Okinawa and the movement of U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam to the plan to build a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab on Okinawa. The plan to build the FRF has run into difficulty and, as a result, the closure of Futenma and the movement of marines remain uncertain.

What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa?

Answer. I believe that the Government of Japan (GOJ), like the U.S. Government, remains committed to the 2006 Realignment Roadmap, and although both governments have acknowledged that the Futenma Replacement Facility will not be con-
constructed by 2014, as originally planned, there appears to be positive movement on
the construction of a replacement facility at Camp Schwab.

Question. Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan
to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and the costs associ-
ated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why not?

Answer. I believe the cost-arrangement between the United States and Japan as
outlined in the May 2006 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) document known
as the Realignment Roadmap is equitable and appropriate. For relocations within
Japan, the GOJ is paying the lion’s share of the costs to develop new facilities. The
GOJ also understood the strong desire of Okinawa residents for the relocation of
Marine Corps forces from Japan to Guam to occur rapidly and recognized that this
move—which it explicitly sought—would not happen without substantial investment
on its part. Spending less than 1 percent of its gross domestic product on its na-
tional defense, yet desiring the continued presence of U.S. forces in close proximity,
Japan could also clearly justify financial support for U.S. military construction within
a U.S. territory on the grounds that it is making a direct contribution to Japa-
nese security and to overall alliance burdensharing. This decision was not without
controversy in Japan, as it is highly unusual—perhaps even unprecedented—for a
host country to pay for U.S. forces to relocate out of that country. It will be impor-
tant for DOD to work closely with the GOJ on the project scope, management, and
other factors to minimize risks to the efforts.

Question. How, in your view, does building an unpopular new airfield on Oki-
nawa, one that could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a cost of at least $3.6 billion,
serve to improve the U.S.-Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa
relations in particular?

Answer. It is my understanding that the relocation to the Futenma Replacement
Facility will enable the closing of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS
Futenma), which is located in a very densely populated portion of Okinawa. I be-
lieve both the U.S. and Japanese Governments recognize that retaining the Marine
Corps air assets on Okinawa, while moving them to a relatively isolated part of the
island, is essential to the operational readiness of the Marine Corps ground units
stationed there. Successive Japanese and U.S. Government officials have examined
this problem, and have concluded that the vicinity of Henoko and Camp Schwab is
the best place for this capability.

Question. What do you see as the implications, if any, of the planned force posture
changes in Korea, Japan, and Guam on the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific re-
region in general? How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to
Guam improve U.S. security in the region? How does the planned relocation of U.S.
forces on the Korean Peninsula improve security?

Answer. As this administration considers posture changes in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion, my understanding is that we are seeking to build a presence that is geographi-
cally distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. I understand
that our goal is to sustain the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia, while enhancing it in
Southeast Asia. I believe that all of the initiatives underway, including changes
on the Korean Peninsula as well as Okinawa and Guam, support these broad objec-
tives.

INDIA

Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India security rela-
tions?

Answer. In my view, a close and continuing security relationship with India will
be important for security in Asia and for effectively managing Indian Ocean security
in the 21st century. The United States and India have a range of common security
interests that include maritime security, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assist-
ance and disaster relief. Over the past decade, there has been a rapid trans-
formation in the U.S.-India defense relationship. What was once a nascent relation-
ship between unfamiliar nations has now evolved into a strategic partnership be-
tween two of the preeminent security powers in Asia. Today, U.S.-India defense ties
are strong and growing. Our defense relationship involves a robust slate of dia-
logues, military exercises, defense trade, personnel exchanges, and armaments co-
operation. Efforts over the past 10 years have focused on relationship-building and
establishing the foundation for a long-term partnership. The strong ties between our
two militaries reflect this. It is also my understanding that the United States re-
mains committed to a broad defense trade relationship that enables transfers of
some of our most advanced technologies.
Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe our priorities for this relationship should be focused on increasing maritime security cooperation, expanding the military-to-military relationship, and deepening cooperation on defense trade and production. Additionally, I believe there is potential for cooperating on counterproliferation, collaborating on humanitarian assistance and disaster response, dealing with piracy, cooperating on counterterrorism, greater intelligence sharing on common threats, and working towards stability in Afghanistan and the broader Indian Ocean region.

Question. What, in your view, is the effect on DOD interests, if any, of the civil-nuclear cooperation agreement with India?
Answer. The civil-nuclear cooperation agreement was a landmark agreement that significantly transformed the U.S.-India bilateral relationship. The agreement has also deepened the level of trust between the United States and India that will have positive effects on DOD interests and will hopefully lead to greater military-to-military cooperation and increased defense trade.

Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between India and China and how does that relationship impact the security and stability of the region?
Answer. As Asia’s two largest powers, India and China collectively will have a significant impact on Asia’s future security landscape. Both countries are in the process of building their respective military capabilities. It is important to engage actively with both of these Asian powers to ensure they both contribute in a positive way towards Asian stability and security. Both countries should adhere to international norms and standards in their resolution of outstanding issues.

Question. What do you believe the United States should do to assist the Indian Government in the prevention of and response to terrorist events in India?
Answer. As the world’s largest democracy, I believe that India is a critical strategic partner of the United States. Both India and the United States share an interest in preventing terrorism. Counterterrorism cooperation with India is led by the Departments of State and Homeland Security, with support from DOD. If confirmed, I will work with both Departments to consider carefully all requests for counterterrorism assistance from India.

Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship between India and Pakistan?
Answer. In announcing the return to talks in early February, India and Pakistan’s foreign secretaries agreed that a number of outstanding issues were on the table, including Kashmir, counterterrorism, humanitarian issues, and trade. It is good to see both nations make progress on these fronts. In early November, Pakistan’s cabinet approved extending Most Favored Nation trade status to India. Subsequently, India and Pakistan’s Prime Ministers met on the sidelines of the recent South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in the Maldives, where they heralded a new chapter in their relationship. I understand there will be talks soon on nuclear and conventional confidence-building measures, which will be critically important. I am pleased that both nations continue to engage with each other, and I am hopeful that confidence-building measures are able to take root to promote a greater level of trust between the two countries.

Question. In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?
Answer. India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are linked by history, culture, language, and trade, and regional stability cannot be achieved without the cooperation of all three countries. It is critically important that Afghanistan work to build positive relationships with all of its neighbors. In my view, the strategic partnership between India and Afghanistan is a bilateral matter between these two countries. It is my understanding that both countries have made clear that their partnership is not directed at any other countries. This should not be seen as a threat to Pakistan, nor a statement that Pakistan is no longer part of the solution. I believe it is the administration’s view that India and Afghanistan should be transparent with their neighbors, including Pakistan, on the content of their partnership and the activities they carry out under it. I support this position because it has the best chances for stability of Central and South Asia.

Republic of the Philippines

Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippines military-to-military relations?
Answer. The Philippines is one of five treaty allies of the United States and is a committed bilateral and regional partner, especially in combating terrorism. The
alliance with the Philippines remains strong, and the Philippines remains important to the United States and to regional stability in general.

**Question.** What do you believe the U.S. goals should be in the Republic of the Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals?

**Answer.** I believe U.S. defense goals should be to deny safe haven, sanctuary, and training areas for terrorist groups; and to partner in cooperative regional maritime security programs. These goals are best achieved through U.S. Government security assistance and security cooperation programs.

**Question.** What is your assessment of recent U.S. military efforts in the Philippines and the effectiveness of the U.S. assistance being provided to the Philippines military in its fight against insurgent groups?

**Answer.** In my view, the U.S. military is working effectively with the armed forces of the Philippines to provide assistance that is consistent with Philippines constitutional restrictions on foreign forces. The Philippines armed forces continue to professionalize and reform in a manner consistent with U.S. and Philippine defense goals and objectives. They benefit from various security assistance programs, exercises, and engagement opportunities that develop capacity and capability with their military. These efforts have resulted in successful counterterrorism operations against the Abu Sayaf Group and Jemah Ismaliya in the Southern Philippines. Lastly, it is my understanding that our security engagement programs have also resulted in better regional maritime security cooperation.

**Question.** Do you anticipate a reduced U.S. military footprint or change in mission for U.S. military forces in the Philippines in the near- to mid-term?

**Answer.** In my view, it is important to support the Philippines military in its operations in the south. It is my understanding that DOD is monitoring progress and plans to assess whether there needs to be an adjustment in the overall mission. If confirmed, I will work to coordinate these efforts with other departments and agencies with an eye towards a whole-of-government approach.

**Question.** What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if confirmed, to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in combat or law enforcement in the Republic of the Philippines?

**Answer.** In my view, the established current policy guidelines are clear: the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement guide bilateral policy with the Republic of the Philippines. The Philippines constitution prevents foreign forces from conducting combat operations in the Philippines. Deployed U.S. forces will continue to comply with these limitations set by the Philippines Government.

**INDONESIA**

**Question.** Indonesia is a key Asian power and is the largest Muslim country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on opportunities to improve and expand U.S. relations with Indonesia where possible. Last summer, Secretary Gates announced that DOD intended to resume working with elements of the Indonesian Special Forces, known as Kopassus. DOD engagement with Kopassus had been suspended for more than a decade because of past human rights violations by some of its members.

What is your view of the current state of military-to-military relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?

**Answer.** The U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relationship continues to improve after the end of years of restrictions. I believe the 2005 decision to waive congressional restrictions on bilateral military cooperation and the July 2010 decision by Secretary Gates to begin limited engagement with Kopassus have enhanced our ability to support Indonesia’s efforts to consolidate its democratic transformation and to support its efforts to reform and professionalize the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI).

**Question.** What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian Government is cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would consult with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict on this question. Based on my current understanding, I believe that the Government of Indonesia has cooperated closely and effectively with the United States and our allies in combating global terrorist networks in the region, particularly against Jema’a Islamiya.

**Question.** Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-military contacts. I believe we owe an open and frank discussion with Indonesia and the TNI to consider the United States as a strong and credible partner, particularly where our values and interests coincide in the critical areas of democratization and reform, bilateral and regional security coopera-
tion, and counterterrorism. Our measured and gradual program of security activities
with Kopassus will continue to take into account the implementation of reforms
within the TNI. All activities will be in accordance with U.S. law, which, of course,
requires individual and unit human rights vetting as a prelude to receiving U.S.
military training or assistance.

Question. What is your understanding of the factors that informed the decision
to re-engage with Kopassus members?
Answer. My understanding is that the significant reforms across the TNI and the
Indonesian defense ministers’ commitment to protect human rights and advance ac-
countability contributed to Secretary Gates’ decision for DOD to begin a measured
and gradual program of security cooperation activities with Kopassus.

Question. What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leader-
ship to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards,
improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to inves-
tigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?
Answer. The Government of Indonesia continues to make progress in military re-
form. Early progress toward defense reform—separation of the police from the mili-
tary, eliminating formal political roles for the TNI, increasing accountability, and
human rights training—has been sustained. Continued progress on the divestiture
of TNI businesses would be an unmistakable indication of Indonesia’s commitment
to reform. The 2002 Defense Law and the 2004 TNI Law codified the roles and re-
sponsibilities of the TNI as a mechanism to support, not replace, civilian govern-
ment. Continued “hard” reforms that the United States should continue to support
include full accountability for past human rights abuses, strengthening civilian con-
trol, putting the TNI fully “on budget,” and continued professionalization of the TNI
officer corps.

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights
and accountability in the Indonesian military?
Answer. If confirmed, I would sustain efforts to encourage professionalism within
the military in terms of both respect for human rights and accountability, through
bilateral security discussions, joint training, military assistance, and military train-
ing programs. U.S. security assistance and security cooperation programs are the
most effective channels to encourage professionalism in the Indonesian military.

HIGH ALTITUDE TRANSITION PLAN

Question. DOD, under the High Altitude Transition (HAT) Plan, intends to retire
the U–2 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) fleet in the middle of
this decade and replace these aircraft with the Global Hawk RQ–4. Under the HAT
Plan, the RQ–4s will apparently be a PACOM-wide asset, flying missions through-
out the region, whereas the U–2s have been dedicated to supporting U.S. and Ko-
orean forces on the Korean peninsula. The United States and the ROK have been
considering a ROK purchase of the Global Hawk aircraft through the Foreign Mili-
tary Sales (FMS) process. If this FMS case were to proceed, much but not all of the
impact of U–2 retirement would be mitigated, but either way the level of airborne
ISR available on a day-to-day basis in Korea may well be diminished.

In your assessment, is the possibility that the level of airborne ISR available on
a day-to-day basis will be diminished a concern, or are there other means to com-
penate for the retirement of the U–2?
Answer. Allied ISR capabilities on the Korean Peninsula and in the region con-
tribute significantly to our ability to defend the United States and our allies and
partners, promote regional stability, and protect our collective interests. I have not
had a chance to review the U–2 retirement issue in detail, but if confirmed, I will
be an advocate for a strong and well-equipped U.S. forward presence on the Korean
peninsula.

Question. If the sale does not go through, how would you propose that the United
States sustain required levels of airborne ISR support on the Korean peninsula?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to examine this issue in detail. If con-
formed, I will research this issue and work closely with my colleagues in DOD and
other relevant departments and agencies to ensure that we do not experience a re-
duction in ISR capabilities that would diminish our ability to execute our required
missions.

COUNTERPIRACY OPERATIONS

Question. Since January 2009, the U.S. Navy has been patrolling the waters of
the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia as part of the international coalition
engaged in counterpiracy operations. Prior to the engagement off the coast of Soma-
lia, DOD worked with many of our Asian partners to address the threat of piracy in Southeast Asia, such as in the Strait of Malacca.

What is your understanding of the current threat of piracy in the Asia-Pacific region?

Answer. Piracy in the Asia-Pacific region has declined in recent years, largely due to committed efforts of regional littoral states. Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, for example, took the initiative—with U.S. support to provide increased security to key sea lines, in particular, the Strait of Malacca. Although piracy has declined in the Strait of Malacca, there are instances of piracy in the southern parts of the South China Sea, and we should be mindful that, as long as piracy remains a lucrative business model, it will be attractive not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but around the world.

Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in countering any piracy threat in the Asia-Pacific region?

Answer. The situation off the coast of Somalia and in the western Indian Ocean demonstrates that the military cannot solve the overall problem of piracy. Military force addresses the symptoms, not the causes, of piracy. In the Asia-Pacific region, DOD should provide capacity building and training support to enhance the ability of regional states to counter piracy when such support aligns with broader U.S. objectives and interests in the region and complements the political commitment of regional countries, as was the case with Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia regarding piracy in the Strait of Malacca.

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS

Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the United States “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel— including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations.” What is your view on whether the United States should contribute more military personnel as both staff officers and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations?

If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the United Nations?

Answer. The United States has a stake in the success of U.N. peacekeeping operations. I believe that, where practicable, the United States should continue to provide military personnel for U.N. peacekeeping operations, especially for key staff positions that can help shape the direction and success of the mission. However, as with any investment, there are associated costs.

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that DOD evaluates requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions, weighing the potential positive impact of U.S. participation in the mission against other military commitments and the proposed cost of U.S. involvement.

COMBATTING TERRORISM

Question. The administration recently released its National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda’s core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked groups “that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia.”

If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to counterterrorism?

Answer. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism maintains focus on pressuring al Qaeda’s core while emphasizing the need to build foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen our resilience. If confirmed, I understand that my role in this effort will be to work closely with the nations in this strategically important region to build enduring partnerships and capabilities, degrade the links between al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents, and eliminate terrorist safe havens. At the same time, I would work closely with colleagues in the U.S. interagency, as well as with our allies and partners, in order to support the counterterrorism strategy’s objective of applying a whole-of-government approach to defeating al Qaeda.

Question. What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda and affiliated groups in the Asia-Pacific region?
There have been important recent successes in the fight against al Qaeda, most notably the successful operation against Osama bin Laden. Despite these important successes, from its base of operations in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, al Qaeda continues to pose a persistent and evolving threat to the United States. Despite significant losses to its command structure, al Qaeda is adapting, and uses its safe haven to continue attack-planning as well as produce propaganda, communicate guidance to affiliates and operational cells in the region and abroad, solicit logistical and financial support, and provide training and indoctrination to new operatives.

Is there a nexus between terrorist groups and criminal networks in the Asia-Pacific region?

Question. Is there a nexus between terrorist groups and criminal networks in the Asia-Pacific region?

Answer. Transnational criminal activity, including narcotics trafficking and arms smuggling, provides pathways and opportunities for terrorist organizations to move people and resources across the region. Kidnapping for ransom and piracy have the potential to generate millions of dollars, some of which may end up in the hands of terrorists to fund operations, training, and recruitment.

In Southeast Asia, most notably in the Philippines and Indonesia, U.S. engagement with partner nations has helped combat violent extremist ideology and activities. The integration of operations by host nation security forces with U.S. capacity building, development, and information support operations has dramatically reduced the ability of violent extremist organizations to operate.

What more can the United States do in Southeast Asia to help combat the threat of terrorism perpetrated by violent extremists?

Question. Which Southeast Asian countries are most important in the fight against terrorism in that region and what should the United States do to enhance relations with those countries?

Answer. Because of the prominent interagency aspects of building partner-nation counterterrorism capacity, especially on the law enforcement side, DOD will often serve in a supporting role. As reflected in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the United States has developed a robust network of bilateral counterterrorism relationships with key countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Australia. For DOD, Indonesia and the Philippines should be the top priorities for counterterrorism capacity-building assistance in Southeast Asia, notably through section 1206 programs. Section 1206 (of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended) remains one of DOD’s most effective authorities for building partner capacity to combat terrorism. DOD enjoys good relations with Indonesia and the Philippines and, in close consultation with Congress and the Department of State, should sustain and enhance these relationships through continued policy dialogues, security cooperation, and security assistance programs.

SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this authority?

Answer. I understand that section 1208 authority is a key tool that combatant commanders have repeatedly confirmed as essential to combating terrorism in their areas of responsibility. It enables the special operations forces under their control to leverage willing partners that possess access to areas, people, and information that are otherwise denied to our forces, but critical to tactical and strategic success. The authority has allowed DOD to respond quickly to emergent global challenges. Section 1208 requires appropriate civilian oversight, including Secretary of Defense approval and congressional notification.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

Question. On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to support CN operations, build the capacity of certain for-
eign governments in Asia and around the globe, and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters.

What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?

Answer. Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are multidimensional threats to the United States. In addition to the impact on our Nation’s public health and economy, drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime provide a funding source for terrorists and insurgents, undermine legitimate government institutions, and contribute to international instability.

I have not had an opportunity to assess the DOD CN program. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress, and counterparts at DOD, the Department of State, and the National Security Staff to ensure that these programs achieve measurable results in the Asia-Pacific region and that those results are clearly aligned with the goals of the National Security Strategy and the National Drug Control Strategy.

Question. What is your understanding of the illegal narcotics industry in Asia?

Answer. South and Southeast Asia have become increasingly more attractive as bases for drug trafficking organizations’ production and smuggling operations. Several Asian and Pacific nations have experienced a significant increase in the production, transshipment, trafficking, and consumption of narcotics in recent years. Methamphetamine produced using diverted precursor chemicals, heroin transshipment through Asia, poppy cultivation, and potential narco-terrorist funding remain the primary drug threats to the United States from the Asia-Pacific region.

Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in countering—either directly or by, through, and with our Asian partners—the illegal narcotics industry in Asia?

Answer. I believe that the current DOD role is appropriate. DOD serves as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime trafficking of illicit drugs flowing toward the United States. In addition, DOD plays a critical role in supporting U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies responsible for counterdrug and drug-related activities, primarily through information-sharing and building partner-nation security capacity. In cooperation with U.S. interagency and foreign partners, DOD conducts activities to detect, disrupt, and dismantle drug-related transnational threats in Asia and the Pacific.

Question. On an annual basis, DOD spends approximately $500 million building the capacity of the Afghanistan Government to counter the illegal narcotics trade. Despite this sizable annual investment, Afghanistan remains the “wellspring of the global opium trade, accounting for 93 percent of all opium poppy cultivation,” according to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). UNODC has also found that about 80 percent of the drugs derived from Afghan opium poppies are smuggled out by transnational organized criminal groups through the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan; the rest flow through Central Asia.

What is your assessment of DOD’s CN program in Afghanistan?

Answer. I understand that DOD supports CN efforts in Afghanistan by building Afghan capacity and working with U.S. law enforcement agencies such as DEA, CBP, FBI, and ICE to interdict narcotics trafficking. Although DOD supports Afghan eradication efforts, the Department of State has the lead for that effort. This year the interdiction of opiates and precursor chemicals in Afghanistan has increased. Afghan CN police-vetted units, mentored by DEA, are now capable of conducting drug interdiction operations and have been actively involved in combined operations with DEA and military forces. DOD has also been building the capacity of the Afghan border management efforts to stop drugs from leaving Afghanistan and precursor chemicals from entering the country.

Question. Do you think the DOD CN program in Afghanistan has been successful to date?

Answer. Yes. I believe that considerable improvements have been made this year with military and law enforcement coordination.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA


Answer. I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. It is in the enduring interests of the United States to be at the forefront of promoting the rule of law at sea. Additionally, under the Convention, the United States would have the firmest possible legal foundation for the navigational rights and freedoms needed to project power, reassure allies and partners, deter adversaries, respond to
cises, sustain deployed combat forces, and secure sea and air lines of communication that underpin international trade and our own economic prosperity.

**Question.** Would U.S. accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention benefit the U.S. military’s mission in the Asia-Pacific region? If so, how?

**Answer.** U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would benefit the U.S. military’s mission in the Asia-Pacific region by enabling the United States to reinforce and assert the Convention’s freedom of navigation and overflight rights, including transit passage in strategic straits. In addition, becoming a party to the Convention would support combined operations with regional partners and support the Proliferation Security Initiative; establish undisputed title to our extended continental shelf areas; strengthen our position in bilateral discussions with the People’s Republic of China; and bolster our leadership in future developments in the law of the sea. Accession would also improve the United States’ position and add to our credibility in a large number of Asia-focused multilateral venues where Law of the Sea matters are discussed.

**POW/MIA ACCOUNTING EFFORTS**

**Question.** The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command is critical to the recovery and identification of remains of missing military members. Recovery of remains of U.S. servicemembers from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War continues to be a high priority. On October 20, 2011, DOD announced an agreement with North Korea that will allow U.S. personnel to return to North Korea to resume recovery of remains of U.S. servicemembers missing from the Korean War. Recovery operations in North Korea were suspended in 2005.

What is your understanding of this recent agreement to resume recovery operations in North Korea?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Newberry, Director of the POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), led an interagency team to conduct negotiations with the North Korean military last month, which reached a successful arrangement to resume recovery operations. The operations in North Korea are expected to begin next year and will mark the first operations since 2005 when the United States halted missions because of increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Prior to that time, U.S. specialists from the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command conducted recovery operations in that country for 10 years, recovering remains believed to be more than 225 servicemen since 1996.

It is my understanding that the arrangement calls for U.S. teams to work in two areas in North Korea—Unsan County, about 60 miles north of Pyongyang, and near the Chosin/Jangjin Reservoir—where more than 2,000 soldiers and marines are believed to be missing.

**Question.** How might the resumption of recovery efforts in North Korea impact the future of the Six-Party Talks or the stability on the Korean Peninsula?

**Answer.** Remains recovery operations are a humanitarian issue between the United States and North Korea and are divorced from other political issues. I would have to defer to the Department of State for remarks on the future of the Six-Party Talks. The ROK-U.S. alliance and the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea remains a cornerstone not only of stability on the Korean Peninsula, but throughout Northeast Asia more broadly.

**Question.** If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for DPMO, Pacific Command, the State Department, and all other organizations involved to provide advice and support whenever necessary.

**FOREIGN LANGUAGE POLICY**

**Question.** In 2005, DOD approved the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap to improve the Department’s foreign language capability and regional area expertise. Since then, the Department has been working toward implementing that roadmap.

How many Mandarin and/or Cantonese speakers does DOD have in intelligence analyst positions?

Is this number sufficient to ensure good intelligence assessments for use by the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

In your view, how should the United States expand the foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel in order to improve the quality of intelligence input and policy output by the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

**Answer.** I have not had an opportunity to examine this issue in detail. If confirmed, I will research this issue and will look forward to working with Congress.
to ensure DOD builds sufficient foreign language capability and regional area expertise.

COUNTER-THREAT FINANCE

Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence Community have called for investing significantly more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking.

Answer. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other adversaries rely heavily on legal and illegal funding sources to support their activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests. It is critical to engage all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the flow of money associated with these organizations. It is my understanding that DOD has capability to identify and disrupt our adversaries’ finances while working with its interagency counterparts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD is not the U.S. Government lead agency in counter-threat finance, but I believe it plays a supportive role by working with other departments and agencies, and with partner nations, to fight our adversaries’ abilities to use global financial networks.

Question. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter-threat finance activities?

Answer. DOD should increase its cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies, the Treasury Department, the Intelligence Community, and the Department of State to target and degrade adversaries’ funding sources where possible. DOD counter-threat finance policy provides that DOD should work with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and with partner nations to deny or disrupt, or defeat and degrade adversaries’ abilities to use global licit and illicit financial networks to affect U.S. interests negatively. Greater cooperation will yield greater ability to target adversaries’ vulnerabilities using a whole-of-government approach including interdiction, sanctions, and other law enforcement actions.

Question. Transnational criminal organizations are having a debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people.

Do you think expanding counter-threat finance activities in the Asia-Pacific region would be beneficial? If so, what role—if any—should DOD play in those activities?

Answer. Several dangerous terrorist organizations operate in the Asia-Pacific region. Not only do they seek to target the United States, but they work to destabilize the region. Expanding counter-threat finance activities in this part of the world would be a powerful way to target the finances of these organizations, hindering their ability to purchase weapons, pay salaries, and conduct attacks. Conducting counter-threat finance activities is most successful through a whole-of-government approach. I understand that PACOM and JIATF-West have already undertaken counter-threat finance efforts. If confirmed, I would advocate that DOD continue to work in collaboration with interagency partners and provide analytical capabilities, technology, strategic and operations planning, and personnel to attack the revenue used by these terrorist organizations.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

Answer. Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JIM WEBB

U.S. BASES IN EAST ASIA

1. Senator Webb, Mr. Lippert, please describe the leadership approach you would take, if confirmed, to resolve the present challenges regarding the realignment of U.S. bases in East Asia, including Korea, Japan, and Guam. This should include which offices and leaders you believe should be consulted, both in the United States and abroad.

Mr. Lippert. If confirmed, I will take an active, intense, and inclusive leadership approach to resolving ongoing realignment initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, ensuring that the United States remains a Pacific power with a sustainable forward military presence in the region.

I will be sure to give priority to these issues commensurate with the importance that our allies place upon them. For example, basing issues in Japan are among the most important bilateral issues for this key treaty ally, and I believe they should be treated as such. If confirmed, I would request to make my first overseas trip centered around this set of issues.

If confirmed, I will be sure to keep an open mind and consult thoroughly with key stakeholders on these issues. It is critical to hear the views of U.S. Military Services, relevant components of DOD and the rest of the interagency, concerned congressional offices with long track records on this issue, and the elected leadership in Guam. As mentioned above, it is also important to gather the views of foreign leadership—which includes the national-level (to include parliamentarians) and local-level officials in these countries. The views of groups outside the government such as NGOs and think-tanks should also be taken into consideration.

I recognize the limits of the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense on this issue, but I believe that, if confirmed, my background in the executive branch and on Capitol Hill makes me well-positioned to play an important role as a conduit between different elements of the U.S. Government and foreign governments on this complex and critical set of issues.

2. Senator Webb. Mr. Lippert, please provide your views on the observations contained on these realignment matters contained in the May 6, 2011, letter from Chairman Levin and Senator Webb to then Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates. [The information referred to follows:]
May 6, 2011

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense
The Department of Defense
The Pentagon, Suite 319
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Gates:

The purpose for this letter is to give you our observations and recommendations regarding the future U.S. defense posture and restructuring of our forces in East Asia. During the recent Senate recess, we visited Guam, Tinian, Okinawa, and Tokyo. Numerous meetings with US military commanders and diplomats, government officials, business leaders, and members of local communities allowed us to assess the current status of the planned realignment of our military forces and the political dynamics associated with them.

Our country has reached a critical moment in terms of redefining our military role in East Asia. This moment in history requires that we clearly articulate our operational doctrine, thus reshaping the structure of our military posture in that region, particularly in Korea, Japan and Guam. Importantly, it also wares against a basing policy that now seems to be driven by little more than the momentum of DOD appropriations related to construction projects, rather than an analysis of the logic that set those projects into motion. It calls upon those of us in the Congress, and especially on the Armed Services Committee, to both evaluate and become the stewards of the vital role that the United States military will play in Asia throughout the present century.

Much has changed since the US-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation agreement was signed in 2006. The projected times are totally unrealistic. The significant estimated cost growth associated with some projects is simply unaffordable in today's increasingly constrained fiscal environment. Political realities in Okinawa and Guam, as well as the enormous financial burden imposed on Japan by the devastation resulting from the disastrous March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, also must be considered. What has not changed is that our country is the key to stability in this region. The success of our relationships is guaranteed by the stability our forward-deployed military forces provide and by our continuing close alliance with Japan.

In our view, present realignment plans are unrealistic and unworkable. They need to be carefully re-examined, while providing assurance to Japan, Korea, and other countries in East Asia that we strongly support a continuous and vigorous US presence in the region. Our observations are brief and general in nature, intended as the basis for detailed analysis by your staff.
Observations:

Korea

1. We are not confident that the proposed basing realignment in Korea is proceeding from an operational posture that fits our future role in Korea and the region writ large. Unlike any other "permanent" posturing of US forces abroad, our military forces in Korea are justified in terms of "local defense"—in other words, the defense of South Korea against an attack from the north. By contrast, our forces in Okinawa and Germany are considered to be available for multiple contingencies throughout their regions and beyond.

This reality calls into question their size, positioning, and compatibility with the South Korean military. Thus, the credibility of our commitment to the defense of Korea should not be measured by the simple number of our troops, but by the specific missions that they perform. In that regard, we recommend a stringent review of their present missions to examine which are redundant, or capable of being performed by the South Korean military, and which are unique to the special capabilities of our own.

2. The ongoing construction of facilities at Camp Humphreys has been taking place through three separate funding mechanisms, only one of which seems to have been subject to careful review by the Congress. First, the South Korean government has been funding "one for one" replacement facilities for the transplacement of US bases in Seoul. Second, the US Commanding General seems to have had wide latitude in approving projects from discretionary funds under his control. And third, future projects, especially those related to the reconfiguration of combat units now on or near the DMZ, will be funded through specific appropriations and thus should receive closer scrutiny by Congress. In some respects this scrutiny is at risk because the momentum from the projects already underway threatens the ability of the Congress to properly examine issues related to the size, functioning and capabilities of US forces that were raised in the above paragraph.

Additionally, the estimated costs for relocations to Camp Humphreys are growing substantially. It is unclear how they will be distributed and whether the Republic of Korea's share of costs is over and above its total direct financial contribution to support US troops in ways not contemplated when the relocation agreement was adopted. In today's fiscal environment, we must achieve cost savings and identify cost avoidance in current and planned military construction projects.

We recommend that the proposed restructuring of US forces in South Korea be placed on hold until the review mentioned above has taken place.

3. The US commander in Korea has decided that the number of American family members and civilians be dramatically increased under a process known as "tour normalization." This process, which would convert almost all US military assignments in Korea from "deployed" status, without family members, to "accompanying" status, would drive up
housing, medical, school, recreational, and other infrastructure costs. We are not convinced of the arguments that have been used to support this concept. Nor have we seen clear, measurable data that properly calculates the cost.

We question the analysis that has been used to support the decision to pursue tour normalization. There is an inherent contradiction in planning to increase the number of U.S. military family members in South Korea when there is the real potential that a destabilizing security situation in North Korea could unfold rapidly and unpredictably.

We recommend that this proposal be the subject of further, careful review.

Okinawa / Guam

The issues related to downsizing the US presence on Okinawa and transferring some of these functions to Guam are militarily complex, potentially costly, and politically sensitive. The US and Japanese governments have been working for fifteen years to come up with an acceptable formula. A general framework has now been agreed upon, whereby the US will relocate many of its bases from the populous southern end of Okinawa, moving some forces to the less populous north and also rebasing 8,000 US Marines on Guam. However, a stalemate has ensued, with many in Okinawa growing intransigent and, to a lesser extent, many on Guam losing their enthusiasm.

On Okinawa, the most difficult issue regards the long-standing dilemma of relocating the US Marine Corps air facility at Futenma, now operating in a highly populated section of the island and the subject of numerous protests. The Marine Corps insists that any relocation must remain on Okinawa due to the unique air / ground partnership that is characteristic of Marine Corps operations. One option – moving Marine Corps helicopter and other functions from Futenma to nearby Kadena Air Force Base – has been opposed because it would bring increased noise levels to Kadena. Many Okinawans, including many leaders, are adamantly that the facility should be relocated off-island.

The present compromise reached between the US government and the Government of Japan calls for the construction of a contiguous, partially offshore replacement facility to the far north at Camp Schwab. The US government and the GOJ seem determined to pursue this option in order to bring final closure to the debate, but it is rife with difficulties. This would be a massive, multi-billion dollar undertaking, requiring extensive landfill, destruction and relocation of many existing facilities, and in a best-case scenario, several years of effort – some estimate that the process could take as long as ten years. Moreover, the recent earthquake and tsunami around Sendai in the north of Japan is creating an enormous burden on the Japanese economy and will require years of reconstruction.

On Guam, environmental issues have not been resolved, and many community leaders are concerned that local communities and facilities would be overwhelmed by any large increase in our military presence. Their clear message is that federal money would be necessary to build up infrastructure outside of the bases in a manner commensurate with an increase in the bases themselves. Although several issues are being debated related to firing ranges on Guam and
training activities on places like Tinian, the principal issue for military planners involves whether to relocate families along with the 8,000 Marines who would be assigned to that island or to configure the Marines mostly as deployed units rotating into and out of Guam from a home base such as Hawaii or Camp Pendleton. This distinction would make a strong difference in terms of infrastructure costs for schools, medical, recreational facilities, and housing. A good estimate is that 8,000 Marines would become 23,000 Americans if family members were included.

It should also be noted that Guam's Anderson Air Force Base is a large, under-utilized facility. Mindful that B-52 missions were conducted continuously there in the 1970s, we estimate that Anderson Air Force Base is now operating at less than half of its capacity.

Recommendations.

1. The Marine Corps should consider revising its implementation plan for Guam to a stripped-down presence with a permanently-assigned (family accompanied) headquarters element bolstered by deployed, rotating combat units that are home-based elsewhere, and the construction of a "Camp Fuji" style training site on Tinian. The "planned" versus "preferred" options for Marine Corps presence on Guam need to be resolved so that the Navy can develop and provide to the Committee the master plan for the overall buildup on Guam that was first requested in 2006.

2. DOD should immediately examine the feasibility of moving the Marine Corps assets at Futemma into Kadena Air Force Base, while dispersing a percentage of Air Force assets now at Kadena into other areas of the Pacific region. A number of other options exist in Japan and, especially, Anderson Air Force Base in Guam. In addition, the 6,000-acre ammunition storage area at Kadena could potentially be down-sized, especially in light of the two ammunition storage areas already located on Guam -- one of them comprising 8,000 acres in and of itself, and the other one already located on Anderson Air Force Base.

Reducing the burden of the US presence on the people of Okinawa is an important goal associated with the realignment roadmap. Relocating Marine Corps aviation assets as outlined above will allow the US to return the land at the Futemma Air Base faster and at substantially less expense than the current plan for the Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab. Additionally, it is imperative that we pursue every opportunity to avoid unnecessary and unaffordable costs to the US taxpayer. Money saved by abandoning the Camp Schwab FRP could be applied to new projects in the revised realignment plan following negotiations with the Government of Japan to formulate a new cost-sharing agreement.

This option would keep our military forces in the region, would greatly reduce the timing of the sensitive political issues surrounding Futemma, could save billions in costs that would have gone into the offshore facility at Camp Schwab, would reduce the American footprint on Okinawa, and potentially could result in the return of more land to the Okinawan people if the size of the ammunition storage area at Kadena could be reduced.
We look forward to discussing these and other possibilities with you and your staff at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Carl Levin
Chairman

Jinck Webb
United States Senator

Mr. LIPPERT. It is my belief that this is a thoughtful and an insightful letter written by Members of the Senate with decades of defense and Asian policy experience. After reading the letter, talking with you personally, and consulting with others, I have a clear understanding that there are concerns regarding the feasibility of certain planned realignments and the complexities surrounding these issues—especially cost and political issues. I share your stated goal of a “continuous and vig-
orous U.S. presence in the region” and the importance you place upon the relationship with our allies in the region.

I understand that senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials have been in contact with you to follow-up on this and other letters that you have written on the subject. If confirmed, I will endeavor to get up-to-speed on the latest developments, conduct a rigorous round of consultations, and engage with you further on these issues.

Like you, I am committed to working with the interagency, Congress, our allies, and other stakeholders to effectively address operational, political, and fiscal realities while enhancing our strategic interests in East Asia.

3. Senator Webb. Mr. Lippert, please provide your views on the questions raised in the October 21, 2011, letter from Chairman Levin and Senator McCain to Secretary Panetta, and the October 19, 2011, letter from Senator Webb to Secretary Panetta.

[The information referred to follows:]
The Honorable Leon E. Panetta  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301  

Dear Secretary Panetta:

During your upcoming trip to Japan, we urge you to raise with the Japanese Minister of Defense and other senior Japanese officials the possibility of a joint reconsideration of the terms of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Agreement that relate to the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and the movement of Marines to Guam. As you know, we and other members of this Committee remain concerned that the plan as agreed to in the 2006 Roadmap Agreement has become unworkable, unrealistic and unaffordable. Also, the Committee recently received a letter from the Governor of Okinawa in which he reiterates his concerns regarding the FRF and calls for a review of the plan.

Reducing the U.S. military presence on Okinawa and transferring personnel and functions to Guam is a complex, costly, and politically sensitive endeavor. In the current environment, the profound difficulties associated with the FRF plan, which is estimated to cost at least $3.6 billion and take 7- to 10-years to complete in the face of significant public opposition, warrant the review of alternatives that are more realistic in the long term and will avert driving a wedge between the United States and one of our strongest allies, while supporting the strategic needs of the alliance. Moreover, the movement of approximately 8,000 Marines to Guam is tied to tangible progress on the FRF. This movement also faces a number of challenges. While we may not oppose some military build-up on Guam, the Congress has repeatedly withheld funding for the build-up because of a lack of a master plan detailing the cost and schedule for the build-up. Congress has not been provided that plan and has not received information as to which units will actually move, what infrastructure is required to support them, and how they will adequately train once moved.

We appreciate your willingness to look into this issue, as you agreed to do during your confirmation process and most recently during the breakfast meeting with this Committee. We look forward to hearing your assessment of the situation and to working with you to resolve this matter in a manner that benefits the United States and Japan.

Sincerely,

Carl Levin  
Chairman

John McCain  
Ranking Member
The Honorable Leon Panetta  
Secretary of Defense  
1300 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Panetta:

As you depart for your visit to the Pacific region, I would like to emphasize the critical importance of resolving the dispute surrounding US military bases in Japan.

Our security alliance with Japan, buttressed by the presence of U.S. military bases in that country, has long served as an absolutely crucial element in guaranteeing the stability of East Asia. A necessary adjustment of these military bases, especially as it relates to facilities on Okinawa, has now been under serious discussion for fifteen years. But, despite well-intentioned efforts on both sides, there are credible concerns that the provisions of the 2006 agreement between our two national governments are not capable of a timely, cost-effective, politically agreeable and strategically viable implementation.

As we have discussed, our failure to resolve the issue of American bases on Okinawa has resulted in a volatile political debate in Japan, the implications of which should not be under-estimated by American leaders. It is in our national interest that this matter be resolved both quickly and smartly, for the well-being of our alliance and the stability of the region.

Five months ago Senator Levin, Senator McCain, and I forwarded a series of recommendations to then-Secretary of Defense Gates. With regard to basing in Okinawa, we recommended that the Department examine the feasibility of moving U.S. Marine Corps aviation assets assigned at Futenma into Kadena Air Base, while dispersing a percentage of Air Force assets now at Futenma to other locations in the Pacific region, including Andersen Air Force Base in Guam.

Personally, my recommendations were based on many years of careful consideration dating to my time in the Pacific as a military planner during the 1970s, as well as two visits to Okinawa and Guam during the past 20 months. I have also made three visits to Tokyo during that period, and have hosted numerous meetings with Japanese officials here in Washington. I believe this alternative for Futenma is the most
workable, cost-effective, and least intrusive approach to resolving the most serious
defense and foreign policy issue facing our foremost ally in the Pacific region.

I am well aware that resolving the Okinawa basing issue would require stiff
political debate with different interest groups here in Japan. I am also aware that any
change in the American basing structure threatens institutional “turf” areas within our
own military. At the same time, Senator Levin and I were told repeatedly by officials at
the highest level of DOD and the uniformed military that there are deep concerns
regarding the affordability and workability of the 2006 Roadmap Agreement for basing
on Okinawa and Guam, even though our two national governments seem unable to admit
this publicly. Thus, my sole purpose in raising this matter with you is to encourage the
formulation of a reasonable and timely solution that will guarantee a credible U.S.
presence in this vital part of the world, well into the future.

In that spirit, as you examine the relocation of missions related to MCAS Futenma
and contingency planning that might occur depending on the implementation of various
war scenarios, I would suggest that you seriously re-examine carefully the proposals that
Senators Levin, McCain and I put forward last May. I would also suggest that you look
at the possibility of our military contingency plans including the option of sharing non-
American aviation facilities on Okinawa, which were specifically called for in the 2006
Road Map Agreement.

As you know, the Senate has expressed strong interest in these matters, as
reflected in legislative provisions in both the Senate versions of the Fiscal Year 2012
National Defense Authorization Act and the Fiscal Year 2012 Military Construction and
Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act. I hope you will keep this in mind during your
discussions with government officials in Japan.

Please accept my best wishes for your upcoming visit to the Pacific region.

Sincerely,

Jim Webb
United States Senator

Mr. LIPPERT. My answer to this question does not vary significantly from question
#2, as I believe the October 21 and October 19 letters can and should be read as
specific proposals that stem from the well-articulated views in the May 6 letter.

I certainly agree with your comments concerning the importance of the security
alliance with Japan and the need to resolve the basing issues in that country.
Again, after reviewing this correspondence, speaking with you personally, and con-
sulting with others, I have a clear understanding that there are concerns regarding
the feasibility of certain planned realignments and the complexities surrounding
these issues—especially cost and political issues.

As outlined in question #2, if confirmed, I look forward to engaging with you as
a key partner in working to try to resolve these difficult, complex—yet critical—
issues.

4. Senator WEBB. Mr. Lippert, please provide your views on the recent statement
in the court papers filed by the Department of Justice, as reported in the press, that
it will take the Navy at least 2 more years to complete a supplemental environ-
mental study of certain training requirements associated with the military buildup on Guam.

Mr. LIPPERT. I am aware that the Navy is currently responding to this lawsuit, but do not know the specific details at this time. If confirmed, I will be sure to work closely with my counterparts to resolve this issue in an expeditious manner.

5. Senator WEBB. Mr. Lippert, please provide your views on alternate scenarios related to the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma including the possibility of joint-use runways in Naha, Okinawa.

Mr. LIPPERT. I understand that there are proposals outside of the administration to examine the feasibility of moving Marine Corps assets at Futenma to Kadena Air Force Base, while dispersing a percentage of Air Force assets now at Kadena into other areas of the Pacific. This would be part of a broader plan that would revise the current Marine Corps implementation plan for Guam.

I have heard only the broad contours of proposals, also coming from outside the administration, concerning development of the international airport at Naha as a joint-use facility that could be utilized by U.S. forces in contingency situations. My understanding is that Naha has a single runway, currently shared with the Japan Air Self Defense Force.

If confirmed, I would need to consult thoroughly with key stakeholders and experts on these issues before commenting further.

6. Senator WEBB. Mr. Lippert, please provide your views on the impact on these East Asia realignments, if any, of the recent decision to utilize certain military facilities in Darwin, Australia, for U.S. Marine Corps training and other activities.

Mr. LIPPERT. It is my understanding that the recent announcement regarding enhanced Marine Corps rotational training in Australia is not linked to our realignment agreement with Japan. The U.S. marines deployed to Darwin will be globally sourced.

---

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SCOTT P. BROWN

CHINESE THREAT

7. Senator BROWN. Mr. Lippert, last year China asserted itself as the second largest economy in world. Along with its growing industrial prowess, China continues to grow and modernize its military. It has both increased its conventional forces, with programs like the J–20 5th generation fighter, and its diplomatic and humanitarian efforts to increase its access to raw materials and overseas markets. Furthermore, China has conducted pervasive collection efforts on the United States including private sector, dual-use, and military industries and technologies. The growth of China’s military and its cyber capabilities are of great concern to me. How do you perceive China's threat to the United States and its allies and how is the threat being mitigated?

Mr. LIPPERT. I have a clear-eyed view concerning the U.S. relationship with China. In some aspects it is cooperative; in others aspects it is competitive. As President Obama has stated, "the [U.S.-China] relationship has not been without disagreement and difficulty. But the notion that we must be adversaries is not predestined." China is rapidly modernizing its military in the information age. With a focused set of missions and ready access to advanced technology in the global marketplace, China is accelerating the pace of its military modernization. If unanswered by an effective strategy, this could lead to a gradual erosion of our relative advantage and influence. I believe in a strategy that engages China; helps integrate China into international institutions; and balances China with our capabilities, alliances, and partnerships. Given the uncertainty around the evolution of China, I believe it is vital that we maintain a strong and effective force posture in the region that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.

---

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

CHINA AND TAIWAN CROSS-Straits SECURITY BALANCE

8. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, in your answers to the advance policy questions, you stated that “China’s military buildup continues to pose anti-access/area-denial challenges and shift the cross-strait balance” (between China and Taiwan) in China’s favor. You also acknowledged that China’s “near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, and to deter or deny effec-
tive intervention in a cross-strait conflict." Many of us remember the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, when China tried to intimidate Taiwan on the eve of its first free presidential elections by conducting a series of military exercises that included the firing of missiles just a few miles north of Taiwan. President Clinton responded by ordering the largest U.S. military force since the Vietnam War to deploy to the region, including two carrier battle groups. Such a scenario may repeat itself, though this time with a much more capable and willful Chinese military. Would you agree that, were China to launch some type of military offensive against Taiwan, such a scenario would have the potential to draw the United States into a dangerous large-scale conflict in the region?

Mr. LIPPERT. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) states: "It is the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan." In such a scenario, the President would determine the appropriate response; however, this question highlights the importance of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan. The Obama administration’s strong commitment to the TRA is evident in its actions, which include the September 21 notification to Congress of its intent to sell Taiwan $5.85 billion worth of new defense articles and services—including an upgrade package for Taiwan’s 145 F–16 A/B fighters; spare parts for its F–16, F–5, and C–130 aircraft; and training for F–16 pilots at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. This decision follows the January 29, 2010, decision to sell Taiwan $6.4 billion in defensive arms, including 60 UH–60M Blackhawk helicopters, Patriot PAC–III firing units and missiles (3 firing units, 1 training unit, and 114 missiles), Harpoon missiles, 2 Osprey-class mine hunters, and follow-on support for command and control systems. In addition, in August 2011, the Obama administration submitted a $310 million direct commercial sales notification to Congress for the approval of export licenses in support of radar equipment for Taiwan Indigenous Defense Fighters and Hughes Air Defense Radars. These collective sales of more than $12.5 billion in arms to Taiwan are an important indication of DOD’s commitment to its obligations of the TRA and to Taiwan’s defense.

9. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, do you agree that helping deter any cross-strait military conflict is in both our own security interests and the Asia/Pacific region’s security interests?

Mr. LIPPERT. Absolutely.

10. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, would you also agree that the likelihood of Chinese aggression against Taiwan becomes more likely as Taiwan’s ability to defend itself deteriorates further?

Mr. LIPPERT. I would agree that Chinese aggression could be perceived, by the leadership in China, as an option in a crisis if Taiwan is weak, and the U.S. commitment to Taiwan waivers. This is precisely why I believe the administration was right to pursue collective sales of over $12.5 billion in arms to Taiwan, continue robust engagement with Taipei, and, more broadly, make a point of emphasis on strong and enduring U.S. presence in the Western Pacific.

TAIWAN’S DETERIORATING AIR FORCE

11. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, in official estimates provided by DOD, they show that the People’s Republic of China has 2,300 operational combat aircraft, while the Government of Taiwan has only 490 operational combat aircraft. In my opinion, there now exists a serious airpower imbalance between China and Taiwan. Do you disagree?

Mr. LIPPERT. The 2009 Annual Report to Congress on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China reported: “In the 2002 report, DOD assessed that Taiwan ‘has enjoyed dominance of the airspace over the Taiwan Strait for many years. This conclusion no longer holds true.’” China’s military has improved across the board, and the threat from combat aircraft is just one of many threats to Taiwan and regional stability. Taiwan will never be able to go toe-to-toe with the PRC; there is no silver bullet to solve this growing problem. Taiwan must properly fund its military and prioritize a defense transformation that incorporates an asymmetric strategy that both deters PRC aggression and, should deterrence fail, allow Taiwan to defend the island.

12. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, what is your assessment of the risk to both Taiwanese and U.S. interests as a result of this cross-strait imbalance in air power?
Mr. LIPPERT. The defense of Taiwan cannot be viewed through the narrow prism of airpower alone. A more holistic approach that considers all aspects of a joint defense of the island is vital.

13. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, for years, DOD has documented a steady increase in advanced Chinese weaponry and aircraft positioned opposite Taiwan. It is a consensus belief among security and military experts that Taiwan has lost its technological edge in defense weaponry. What is the tipping point, in terms of Chinese force buildup, that would necessitate the sale of additional U.S. fighter aircraft to Taiwan?

Mr. LIPPERT. The conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (House Rep. 111–288) requested the Secretary of Defense to provide a report on Taiwan’s Air Defense Force. It is my understanding that a detailed classified report addressing these concerns was delivered to Congress in September 2011.

14. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, do you honestly believe that the current Taiwan forces can successfully repel China’s increasingly capable fighter aircraft?

Mr. LIPPERT. The Annual Report to Congress on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009 reported: “In the 2002 report, DOD assessed that Taiwan has enjoyed dominance of the airspace over the Taiwan Strait for many years. This conclusion no longer holds true.” From what I am able to discern, China’s military has improved across the board; the threat from combat aircraft is just one of many threats to Taiwan and regional stability. My general view is that Taiwan will have severe difficulty in matching the PRC capability for capability, and that there is no silver bullet for this growing problem. I am informed that the DOD Report to Congress on Taiwan’s Air Defense Force may contain useful recommendations for the defense of Taiwan.

In my view, the United States must continue its strong commitment to the TRA and that Taiwan must properly fund their military and prioritize a defense transformation that incorporates an asymmetric strategy that both deters PRC aggression, and should deterrence fail, allow Taiwan to defend the island.

15. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, it is my understanding that DOD conducted its own assessments of Taiwan’s defense needs from 1997 through early 2004, producing over a dozen studies. Since that time, DOD has only produced the one 2010 study on Taiwan’s air defense forces that was mandated by Congress, although reports indicate it also began a study on Taiwan’s joint defense transformation in 2010. Do you believe reports, such as those produced between 1997 and 2004, are essential in understanding the threat posed by shifting China-Taiwan relations?

Mr. LIPPERT. It is my understanding that the conclusions stated in the reports from 1997 to 2004 are no longer valid; these assessments could not have envisioned the rapid growth of PRC capabilities, nor Taiwan’s failure to fund its defense adequately. However, the services DOD provides to Taiwan to improve its defensive capabilities have never been more robust. DOD has conducted numerous assessments with Taiwan, and is in year 4 of a 7-year assessment to assist Taiwan in developing an asymmetric strategy that reduces the threat from the PRC. This is just one of many assessments that have been conducted since 2004 to improve Taiwan’s defense capabilities.

16. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, if confirmed, how do you intend to ensure that the executive and legislative branches possess the necessary information to accurately evaluate Taiwan’s defense needs?

Mr. LIPPERT. If confirmed, I believe that frequent dialogue would ensure both the executive and legislative branches understand how to improve Taiwan’s defense capabilities.

SALE OF F–16s TO TAIWAN

17. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, what is your position on the proposed sale of 66 new F–16s C/Ds to Taiwan?

Mr. LIPPERT. I believe the congressional notification of the F–16 retrofit reflects a smart defense policy that provides real and immediate contributions to Taiwan’s security. The retrofitted F–16 A/B aircraft will provide a more reliable, survivable, and capable aircraft—comparable to the F–16 C/D, but at a lower cost—and Taiwan will have a total of 145 of them.
18. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, the F–16 production line may shut down before the administration authorizes additional F–16 sales to Taiwan. If that is allowed to happen, would you be in favor of selling Taiwan F–35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) to ensure that Taiwan can deter threats from China?

Mr. LIPPERT. I believe we should provide Taiwan real defensive capabilities that will allow Taiwan’s military to execute its defense missions effectively today and well into the future. Without the benefit of being in the position, I am limited on the insights I can provide on specific capabilities that would match the administration’s strategic intent, though I recognize that is an evolving conversation.

19. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, in terms of economic benefits, the F–16 C/D sales to Taiwan would mean at least $8 billion to a critical portion of our industrial base that is about to get hammered by defense cuts. Taiwan clearly needs these aircraft and the United States clearly needs the thousands of jobs that are supported by the F–16 production line. Do you agree that American jobs, overall economic impact, and the future of the defense industrial base are important considerations in determining whether to sell new F–16s to Taiwan?

Mr. LIPPERT. I believe DOD’s first priority is to ensure Taiwan acquires and maintains the necessary defensive equipment to ensure Taiwan acquires and maintains the necessary defensive equipment to deter aggression from the PRC.

IMPACT OF TAIWAN POLICY ON RELATIONS IN EAST ASIA

20. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, what message do you think the administration’s de facto denial of Taiwan’s request for new F–16 C/Ds has sent to other U.S. allies, both in the region and around the world?

Mr. LIPPERT. The Obama administration’s strong commitment to the TRA is evident in its actions, which include the September 21, 2011, notification to Congress of the intent to sell Taiwan $5.85 billion worth of new defense articles and services—including an upgrade package for Taiwan’s 145 F–16 A/B fighters; spare parts for its F–16, F–5, and C–130 aircraft; and training for F–16 pilots at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. This decision follows the January 29, 2010, decision to sell Taiwan $6.4 billion in defensive arms, including 60 UH–60M Blackhawk helicopters, Patriot PAC–III firing units and missiles (three firing units, one training unit, and 114 missiles), Harpoon missiles, two Osprey-class mine hunters, and follow-on support for command and control systems. In addition, in August 2011, the Obama administration submitted a $310 million direct commercial sales notification to Congress for the approval of export licenses in support of radar equipment for Taiwan Indigenous Defense Fighters and Hughes air defense radars. These collective sales of more than $12.5 billion in arms to Taiwan are an important indication of DOD’s commitment to the obligations of the TRA and to Taiwan’s defense. These sales are a very clear demonstration of U.S. commitment to Taiwan and to maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

21. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, recently, the United States has engaged in military capacity building for Japan and Korea, which are also threatened by China’s second artillery missile threat. The administration also recently announced the planned transfer and upgrade of 24 excess defense article F–16s to Indonesia, which sits on South China Sea. However, this same threat has been halfheartedly addressed by the administration, when it comes to selling Taiwan the F–16s they have requested. Can you explain this policy inconsistency and, if confirmed, will you work to rectify it?

Mr. LIPPERT. In my view, the Obama administration is correct in pursuing collective sales of over $12.5 billion in arms to Taiwan, continuing robust engagement with Taipei, strongly supporting the TRA, and, more broadly, making a point of emphasis on a strong and enduring U.S. presence in the Western Pacific. If confirmed, I will look for ways to advance both U.S. and Taiwanese interests and mitigate risk in the region. My belief is that the defense of Taiwan should be a multi-faceted approach that considers all aspects of a joint defense of the island versus one that relies solely on air power. It is through this general approach that, if confirmed, I will review intelligence assessments, DOD studies, and other information—in order to form opinions on the state of U.S. and Taiwanese interests. My understanding is that a useful starting point could be the classified report delivered to Congress in September 2011 on Taiwan’s Air Defense Force, pursuant to the conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (House Rep. 111–288).
AIR-SEA BATTLE CONCEPT

22. Senator CORKNIN. Mr. Lippert, the Air-Sea Battle Concept has been described by some as a new way for the Navy and Air Force to work together to fight future wars against major powers. As I understand it, the Air-Sea Battle Concept is aimed at maintaining U.S. dominance of the air and sea domains and overpowering any nation-state that might try to defeat our military forces through the use of advanced missiles, stealth aircraft, and/or a blue-water naval fleet of its own. China is currently pursuing advanced missiles, stealth aircraft and a blue-water naval fleet. Does the implementation of the Air-Sea Battle Concept represent the U.S. policy response to a rising military threat from China?

Mr. LIPPERT. It is my understanding that the Air-Sea Battle Concept is not designed with a specific country in mind. Instead, it is a much broader operational concept aimed at countering proliferating capabilities that present significant anti-access/areal denial (A2/AD) challenges. I believe Air-Sea Battle Concept will ultimately be about staying ahead of evolutionary changes in warfare that challenge U.S. power projection.

23. Senator CORKNIN. Mr. Lippert, why is it important that the U.S. military have a strategy to deal with China?

Mr. LIPPERT. The U.S.-China relationship has assumed an enduring and global dimension and has become progressively more multi-faceted and complex. Moreover, given the uncertainty around the evolution of China, I believe it is vital that we maintain a strong and effective force posture in the region that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. The U.S. military must support coordinated and deliberate whole-of-government strategic efforts in all regions of the world, and the necessity of doing so with respect to China is no different. DOD contributes to U.S. efforts to promote U.S. interests most effectively, identify shared interests and opportunities for cooperation, and address the most difficult areas of the U.S.-China relationship.

24. Senator CORKNIN. Mr. Lippert, in your opinion, does China pose a threat to the United States?

Mr. LIPPERT. I have a clear-eyed view concerning the U.S. relationship with China. In some aspects it is cooperative; in other aspects it is competitive. I agree with President Obama’s statement that, “the [U.S.-China] relationship has not been without disagreement and difficulty. But the notion that we must be adversaries is not predestined.” I believe in a strategy that engages China; helps integrate China into international institutions; and balances China with our capabilities, alliances, and partnerships. Given the uncertainty around the evolution of China, I believe it is vital that we maintain a strong and effective force posture in the region that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.

UNITED STATES AS A PACIFIC POWER

25. Senator CORKNIN. Mr. Lippert, Secretary Panetta said during his recent trip to Asia that the purpose of his visit was “to make very clear to this region and to our allies in the Pacific that … the Pacific will remain a key priority for the United States, that we will maintain our force projection in this area, that we will maintain a presence in this area, that we will remain a Pacific power.” In light of China’s aggressive military buildup, how do you believe the United States can best project itself as a Pacific power in the coming years?

Mr. LIPPERT. As an Asia-Pacific power, I believe the United States must field a military presence in the Asia-Pacific region that is sufficient for a wide range of contingencies and activities, and that keeps pace with changes in the Asia-Pacific security environment, such as the rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-state actors, and the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction.

I believe the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region should provide reassurance that the United States is committed to Asia’s security. To do so, as Secretary Panetta has consistently said, will require that U.S. posture in the region be geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.

My understanding is that DOD is seeking a more enhanced U.S. force presence in the Southeast Asia, Oceania, and the Indian Ocean regions, enabled by a more geographically distributed network of access relationships and capabilities. This will allow the United States to perform a range of future missions—combating terrorism, responding to natural disasters, and strengthening regional stability. I believe consulting closely with U.S. allies and partners, and with Congress, on defense posture
will allow the United States to respond effectively to the challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century.

26. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, if confirmed, how do you intend to support and promote this strategic objective?

Mr. LIPPERT. If confirmed, I will work closely with other components of DOD, the rest of the U.S. Government, and Congress to develop and implement policies that bolster U.S. capabilities and presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

CHINA AND CYBER-WARFARE

27. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, according to the 2011 DOD report, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China," China maintains aggressive efforts directed toward illegally obtaining sensitive U.S. technologies. The 2009 version of this report cited the conclusion of the Intelligence Community that China is the most aggressive of foreign intelligence organizations in attempts to penetrate U.S. agencies. Additionally, this year’s report notes that, of the numerous cyber intrusions directed against the United States, some appear to have originated from within China. According to the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, in April 2009; “a large number of routing paths to various Internet Protocol addresses were redirected through networks in China for 17 minutes … This diversion of data would have given the operators of the servers on those networks the ability to read, delete, or edit e-mail or other information sent along those paths. This incident affected traffic to and from U.S. Government and military sites, including sites for the Senate, the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense …”. In your opinion, is China engaging in state-sponsored cyber-attacks and cyber-theft against the United States?

Mr. LIPPERT. It is my understanding that attribution of cyber intrusions is extremely difficult. According to DOD’s 2011 Report to Congress on “Military and Security Developments in China”, “developing capabilities for cyber warfare is consistent with authoritative People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military writings. Although [the writings do not identify] the specific criteria for employing computer network attack against an adversary, [they do] advocate developing capabilities to compete in this medium.”

As described in the unclassified DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, the theft of intellectual property may be the most pervasive cyber threat today. The ability to innovate and build intellectual capital is the foundation upon which U.S. military and economic strength rests. Beyond addressing the theft of intellectual property, I understand that DOD is working actively to defend and deter potential cyber attacks and to encourage responsible state behavior in cyberspace.

28. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, what is your assessment of the threat of cyber-attacks that originate in China?

Mr. LIPPERT. I believe the use of sophisticated and powerful cyber capabilities could be crippling, regardless of where it originates. The unclassified International Strategy for Cyberspace provides a clear statement that the United States reserves the right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests in cyberspace.

As stated in the 2011 Report to Congress on “Military and Security Developments in China”, “developing capabilities for cyber warfare is consistent with authoritative PLA military writings. Although [the writings do not identify] the specific criteria for employing computer network attack against an adversary, [they do] advocate developing capabilities to compete in this medium.”

29. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, the 2011 DOD report also stated that China continues to leverage “state-sponsored industrial/technical espionage to increase the levels of technologies and expertise available to support military research, development, and acquisition.” In April 2009, computer spies successfully hacked into the JSF program and copied large quantities of data related to the design and electronics systems of the aircraft. Former U.S. officials said the attack appears to have originated in China. I view this as a serious risk to our long-term national security. Are you concerned about this?

Mr. LIPPERT. Yes, I am very concerned about this issue. The loss of intellectual property from U.S. public and private sector networks has a corrosive effect on our military strength and the economic competitiveness upon which it depends. More
immediately, the loss of sensitive government information poses great risks to our servicemembers and to DOD operations around the globe.

30. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, do you think more needs to be done in this area?
Mr. LIPPERT. I absolutely agree that DOD should expand and strengthen its efforts to protect sensitive government information from theft through cyber means.

31. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, if confirmed for this position, how do you intend to address this problem?
Mr. LIPPERT. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, the Military Departments, the combatant commands, and interagency and international partners to undertake the sustained and integrated effort that these challenges require. This includes continuing to improve upon DOD’s cyberspace capabilities and training, deepening efforts with the U.S. public and private sector, and working closely with allies and international partners, and strengthen military partnerships to sustain a secure, open, and interoperable cyberspace.

32. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Lippert, given DOD’s report indicating that China continues to leverage state-sponsored industrial/technical espionage, and the fact that China is a suspect virtually any time a major cyber-attack against U.S. defense networks occurs, how should the United States respond to the growing threat of Chinese cyber-warfare?
Mr. LIPPERT. I support the President’s International Strategy for Cyberspace, which advocates a whole-of-government approach to ensure the risks associated with attacking or exploiting U.S. networks vastly outweigh the potential benefits. I understand that DOD works to ensure that the U.S. military continues to have all necessary capabilities in cyberspace to defend the United States and its interests, as it does in all domains. If confirmed, I will assist in the Department’s efforts to improve its cyber capabilities and training, work more closely with the interagency and private sector to expand capacity and cooperation, and strengthen military partnerships to deter and dissuade malicious activity in cyberspace.

[Nomination reference of Mark W. Lippert follows:]

Nomination Reference and Report

As in Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
October 20, 2011.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
Mark William Lippert, of Ohio, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Wallace C. Gregson, resigned.

[Biographical sketch of Mark W. Lippert, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Mark W. Lippert

Education:
• Stanford University
  • September 1993–June 1997
  • Bachelor of Arts Degree awarded June 1997
• Stanford University
  • September 1996–January 1998
  • Master of Arts Degree awarded January 1998

Employment Record:
• Naval Special Warfare Development Group
  • Intelligence Officer
  • October 2009–present (on terminal leave)
National Security Council
  • Deputy National Security Adviser/Chief of Staff
  • January 2009–October 2009 (on military leave)

Obama-Biden Transition Project
  • Deputy Director for Foreign Policy
  • November 2008–January 2009

Obama For America
  • Senior Foreign Policy Adviser
  • August 2008–November 2008

SEAL Team One, Task Unit Al Asad
  • Intelligence Officer
  • June 2007–May 2008

Office of Senator Barack Obama
  • Foreign Policy Adviser
  • Personal Representative of the Member to the Foreign Relations Committee
  • May 2005–August 2008 (on military leave June 2007–May 2008)

Office of Naval Intelligence, Reserve Unit 0499
  • Intelligence Officer
  • January 2005–present

Senate Committee on Appropriations, State-Foreign Operations Subcommittee
  • Professional Staff Member
  • August 2000–May 2005

Office of Senator Tom Daschle, Democratic Policy Committee
  • Policy Adviser
  • Policy Analyst
  • January 1999–August 2000

Office of Senator Dianne Feinstein
  • Legislative Correspondent
  • July 1998–January 1999

Legal Aid of Cincinnati
  • Research Assistant
  • September 1992–July 1993

Honors and Awards:
  • Presidential Unit Citation (2011)
  • Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (2011)
  • Joint Service Commendation Medal (2010)
  • Afghanistan Campaign Medal (2010)
  • Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal (2010)
  • Basic Parachutist Badge (2010)
  • Information Dominance Warfare Qualification (2010)
  • Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (2009)
  • Expert Rifleman Medal (2009)
  • Expert Pistol Shot Medal (2009)
  • Sea Service Deployment Ribbon x3 (2009–2011)
  • Bronze Star Medal (2008)
  • Iraq Campaign Medal (2008)
  • Global War on Terrorism Medal (2008)
  • Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon (2008)
  • Armed Forces Reserve Medal (2008)
  • National Defense Medal (2005)
  • Term Member, Council on Foreign Relations (2004–2009)
  • Certificate of Completion, Intensive Mandarin Chinese Language Studies Course, Beijing University-Stanford University (1997)
  • Graduated With Distinction, Stanford University (1997)
  • Teaching Assistant (partial tuition payment), Stanford University (1996)
  • Phi Beta Kappa, Stanford University (1996)
  • Selected to Intern, U.S. Department of State, Policy Planning Staff (1995)
  • Dean’s List, University of Chicago (1991–1992)
  • Varsity Baseball, University of Chicago (1991–1992)
The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Mark W. Lippert in connection with his nomination follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Mark William Lippert.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.

3. Date of nomination:
20 October 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
28 February 1973; Cincinnati, OH.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
Married to Robin Elizabeth (Schmidek) Lippert.

7. Names and ages of children:
N/A.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Stanford University, Sept. 1993–June 1997
B.A., Political Science, June 1997
Beijing University, Exchange Program with Stanford, Summer 1997
Additional coursework from higher education institutions that was transferred to Stanford University: University of Chicago (9/91–6/92), University of Cincinnati (7/95–8/95), Xavier University (7/95–8/95), San Francisco State University (6/96–8/96)
Mariemont High School, Mariemont, OH, June 1991

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Naval Special Warfare Development Group, Virginia Beach, VA, October 2009–Present (on terminal leave until end of year), Intelligence Officer
National Security Council, Washington, DC, January 2009–October 2009, Chief of Staff (currently on military leave)
Obama-Biden Transition Project, Chicago, IL/Washington, DC, November 2008–January 2009, Deputy Director for Foreign Policy
Obama for America, Chicago, IL, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor, August 2008–November 2008
SEAL Team One, Coronado, CA, Intelligence Officer, June 2007–May 2008
Office of Naval Intelligence, Suitland, MD, Intelligence Officer (Reserve Component), January 2005–Present
Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State-Foreign Operations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, Professional Staff Member, August 2006–May 2005

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
Department of State, Office of Policy Planning, Washington, DC, Intern (during graduate school) September 1996–December 1996
Office of the Mayor, City of San Jose, San Jose, CA, Intern (Stanford University in Government Program), June 1994–August 1994
Commander’s Advisory Group, Naval Special Warfare Development Group, U.S. Navy Dam Neck, VA (Note: Have been invited by the Commanding Officer, group has not yet been established)

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
Stanford Alumni Association
Capitol Hill, Navy “Wardroom”

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
Obama for America, Chicago, IL, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor, August 2008–November 2008
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Wayne Lippert for Cincinnati City Council, $1,100, 9/29/11

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
- Presidential Unit Citation (2011)
- Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (2011)
- Joint Service Commendation Medal (2010)
- Afghanistan Campaign Medal (2010)
- Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal (2010)
- Basic Parachutist Badge (2010)
- Information Dominance Warfare Qualification (2010)
- Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (2009)
- Expert Rifleman Medal (2009)
- Expert Pistol Shot Medal (2009)
- Sea Service Deployment Ribbon x3 (2009–2011)
- Bronze Star Medal (2008)
- Iraq Campaign Medal (2008)
- Global War on Terrorism Medal (2008)
- Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon (2008)
- Armed Forces Reserve Medal (2008)
1286

- Term Member, Council on Foreign Relations (2004–2009)
- Graduated With Distinction, Stanford University (1997)
- Teaching Assistant (partial tuition payment), Stanford University (1996)
- Phi Beta Kappa, Stanford University (1996)
- Selected to Intern, U.S. Department of State, Policy Planning Staff (1995)
- Dean’s List, University of Chicago (1991–1992)

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

None.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

None.

17. **Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:**

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Yes.

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

No.

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

Yes.

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Yes.

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Yes.

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

Yes.

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

MARK W. LIPPERT.

This 16th day of November, 2011.

[The nomination of Mark W. Lippert was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on February 17, 2012, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April 26, 2012.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Brad R. Carson by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. This milestone legislation is now more than 25-years-old and has served our Nation well. Although I believe that the framework established by Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved inter-Service and joint relationships and promoted the effective execution of responsibilities, the Department, working with Congress, should continually assess the law in light of improving capabilities, evolving threats, and changing organizational dynamics. Although I am currently unaware of any reason to amend Goldwater-Nichols, if confirmed, I hope to have an opportunity to assess whether the challenges posed by today’s security environment require amendments to the legislation.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. As noted above, I have no specific proposals to modify Goldwater-Nichols. As with any legislation of this magnitude, however, I believe it may be appropriate to review past experience with the legislation with a view to identifying any areas in which it can be improved upon, and then to consider with Congress whether the act should be revised.

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army?

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 3019, provides that the General Counsel of the Army shall perform such functions as the Secretary of the Army may prescribe. The Secretary has prescribed the General Counsel’s duties through general orders, regulations, and memoranda. The General Counsel provides legal advice to the Secretary of the Army, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, and other offices within the Army Secretariat. As the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army, the General Counsel determines the controlling legal positions of the Department of the Army. The General Counsel’s responsibilities extend to any matter of law and to other matters as directed by the Secretary. I understand that examples of specific responsibilities currently assigned to the General Counsel include providing professional guidance to the Army’s legal community, overseeing matters in which the Army is involved in litigation, serving as the Designated Agency Ethics Official, exercising the Secretary’s oversight of intelligence and other sensitive activities and investigations, providing legal advice to the Army Acquisition Executive, and taking final action on certain claims filed against the Army.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. The duties and responsibilities of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army are broad and far-reaching. Consequently, the General Counsel must possess sound legal and analytical skills, together with absolute integrity and mature judgment. As the diversity and complexity of the legal and policy issues confronting the Army are such that no one lawyer can have in-depth experience in all of them, the General Counsel must have strong interpersonal and leadership abilities and a willingness to work collaboratively with experts in numerous areas. I believe that, if confirmed, my background and diverse legal and executive experiences have well prepared me to execute the duties of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army. A summary of my experience follows:

Currently, I am a professor in the College of Business and College of Law at the University of Tulsa. I attended Baylor University, where I graduated with highest honors, was inducted into Phi Beta Kappa, and selected as a Rhodes Scholar. Studying at Trinity College, Oxford, I earned a B.A./M.A. in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. I graduated from the University of Oklahoma College of Law, where I served on the law review, received the award for Outstanding Note in the Oklahoma Law Review, and was recognized as the Outstanding Graduate. In 1994, I entered the practice of law at Crowe & Dunlevy, the largest firm in the State of Oklahoma.
During my early years of legal work, I focused on commercial litigation, with a particular emphasis on antitrust law. From 1997 through 1998, I was a White House Fellow, serving in the Department of Defense (DOD). After completing the White House Fellowship, I returned to practicing commercial litigation at Crowe & Dunlevy. In 2000, I was elected to represent the 2nd District of Oklahoma in the U.S. House of Representatives. In 2005, after leaving politics, I was a fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. From 2005 to 2008, I was a director and then Chief Executive Officer of CNB, LLC, where I oversaw all legal matters and a large team of in-house lawyers. From 2009 to 2010, as an officer in the U.S. Navy, I served in Iraq on active military duty with the 84th Explosive Ordnance Battalion of the U.S. Army, where I was officer-in-charge of Weapons Intelligence Teams in Multi-National Division-South. I was awarded the Bronze Star and Army Achievement Medal.

I believe that my extensive experience in law, business, education, politics, and the military have all helped prepare me for the extraordinary challenge of serving as General Counsel of the Department of the Army. I recognize the legal and policy issues facing the Department of the Army in this time of war and transformation. I have extensive experience in compliance, human resources management, corporate governance and strategy, and understanding legal and enterprise risk. If confirmed, I commit to using my skills and experience to diligently and effectively perform the duties of General Counsel.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army? Answer. I am confident that I have the requisite legal experience, analytic abilities, and leadership skills to serve as the General Counsel of the Department of the Army. If confirmed, I will work to broaden my expertise and further my understanding and knowledge of the major legal challenges facing the Army, including its personnel and its component organizations. Additionally, if confirmed, I will undertake to establish and maintain collaborative and productive professional working relationships with the career civil servants in the Office of the General Counsel as well as with The Judge Advocate General of the Army and with other offices dealing with matters of mutual interest. If confirmed, I would expect to benefit from their knowledge as we work collaboratively to provide the best possible legal services to all members of the Department of the Army.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of the Army would prescribe for you? Answer. Although the Secretary of the Army has not discussed with me the duties and functions he will expect of me, I anticipate that he will rely on me to provide accurate and timely legal advice to help ensure that the Army complies with both the letter and spirit of the law. I would expect the current enumeration of General Counsel responsibilities set forth in the General Order prescribing the duties of each principal official of Headquarters, Department of the Army, generally to remain in effect. Apart from such formally prescribed duties, I believe the Secretary of the Army would expect me to continue a collegial and professional relationship with the General Counsels of DOD, the other Military Departments, and the defense agencies and the legal staffs of other Federal agencies. I anticipate that the Secretary of the Army will expect me to continue the extraordinarily effective and professional working relationship that exists between the Office of the General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General and his staff. Finally, I anticipate that the Secretary of the Army will expect me to manage the General Counsel’s office efficiently and effectively, and to ensure that the Army legal community is adequately resourced to perform its important mission.

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the General Counsel of the Department of the Army? Answer. In my opinion, a major challenge will be consistently to provide responsive, accurate legal advice on the broad array of complex issues that will arise in
conjunction with the Army’s execution of its mission to provide trained and ready forces to combatant commanders while shaping its structure and operations in an environment of declining resources. Although it is difficult to anticipate specific legal questions, I expect to confront issues relating to operational matters, acquisition reform, privatization initiatives, military and civilian personnel policies, and compliance with environmental laws. I am not aware of any problems in the current delivery of legal services. However, if confirmed, I will work hard to ensure that the Army legal community is adequately staffed and resourced to provide the responsive, accurate, and timely legal advice necessary to ensure success in all of the Army’s endeavors.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize legal issues in the manner that best serves the Department of the Army. I will also ensure that the talented and dedicated lawyers comprising the Army legal community continue to provide timely, value-added legal and policy advice of the highest quality, executing the Department’s recurring legal responsibilities and anticipating and responding to the numerous issues that the Army confronts every day. I will endeavor to keep Army lawyers involved at all stages of the decisionmaking process, because I believe that preventive law, practiced early in the formulation of departmental policies, will underpin the Army’s efforts to facilitate the Department’s adaptation to the changing operational environment. Additionally, if confirmed, I will work diligently to resource adequately and staff expertly the Army legal community, in order to guarantee decisionmakers at all levels access to the best possible legal advice.

Question. What broad priorities will you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Office of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army?

Answer. If confirmed, I will focus foremost on the issues that directly impact soldiers, their families, readiness, and the support of military operations. I anticipate that the other legal issues of highest priority will arise from the Army’s execution of its mission to provide trained and ready forces to combatant commanders while shaping its structure and operations in an environment of declining resources. I will ensure that expert advice is provided to those engaged in the Army’s efforts to improve the acquisition process and to eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse. I will also ensure that the Army legal community continues to provide timely legal advice of the highest quality, executing the Department’s recurring legal responsibilities and anticipating and responding to the numerous issues the Army confronts every day.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What is your understanding of the formal and informal relationship between the General Counsel of the Army and the following offices?

Answer. As noted above, I am advised that the General Counsel of DOD, Mr. Jeh Johnson, has made clear his intent to work closely with the General Counsels of the Military Departments. If confirmed, I anticipate developing a close and professional relationship with Mr. Johnson, characterized by continuing consultation, communication, and cooperation on matters of mutual interest, in furtherance of the best interests of the Department of the Army and DOD.

Question. The Secretary of the Army.

Answer. The Secretary of the Army is the head of the Department of the Army and is responsible for, and has the authority to conduct, all affairs of the Department. If confirmed, my primary responsibility will be to provide the Secretary with competent legal advice and counsel and to perform the duties and functions he prescribes for me. My goal will be to execute these responsibilities by establishing a close and professional relationship with the Secretary of the Army that will ensure my ability to communicate with him directly and candidly on matters of significance to the Army.

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army.

Answer. The Chief of Staff, Army, is the senior military officer of the Department of the Army and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of Staff is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Army. If confirmed, I will endeavor to continue what I understand to be an excellent relationship between the Army General Counsel and the Chief of Staff and the Army Staff and will work closely with The Judge Advocate General to provide the Chief of Staff with appropriate legal advice and support in the performance of his assigned duties and responsibilities.

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.

Answer. The five Assistant Secretaries of the Army perform such duties and exercise such authorities as are provided by statute or prescribed by the Secretary. Gen-
eraly, the Assistant Secretaries are charged to formulate and oversee policies and programs within their functional areas of responsibility. As the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army, the General Counsel provides legal advice, counsel, and guidance to the Assistant Secretaries and their staffs. If confirmed, I will establish a close and professional relationship with the Assistant Secretaries and provide candid and objective advice regarding the matters entrusted to them.

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General is the legal adviser to the Chief of Staff of the Army, members of the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as military legal adviser to the Secretary of the Army. By law, The Judge Advocate General is primarily responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the administration of military discipline. I believe that close, professional cooperation between the civilian and uniformed members of the Army’s legal community is absolutely essential to the effective delivery of legal services to the Department. If confirmed, I will work closely and collaboratively with The Judge Advocate General to ensure that the legal services and legal advice provided to the Army are of the highest possible quality.

Answer. The Inspector General of DOD is the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on all audit and criminal investigative matters and for matters relating to the prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and operations of DOD. The Office of the Inspector General is an independent and objective organization within DOD. If confirmed, I will work with the Inspector General of DOD on matters related to the Department of the Army, to ensure that Army interests are fully and fairly represented and that Army actions taken as a result of DOD Inspector General recommendations are executed in compliance with applicable law, directives, and regulations.

Question. The Inspector General of the Army.
Answer. I understand that The Inspector General of the Army reports directly to the Secretary of the Army regarding the discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army, and on other matters as required. If confirmed, I anticipate maintaining a close and professional relationship with The Inspector General to ensure he has the legal advice and support required to accomplish his assigned duties and responsibilities.

Question. The General Counsels of the other Military Departments.
Answer. I am aware that the General Counsels of the other Military Departments serve and act under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretaries of their respective Departments. If confirmed, I would expect to consult closely and collegially with them on matters of mutual interest or concern. I understand that the General Counsel of DOD acts to foster coordination of effort among all of the General Counsels so that DOD, as a whole, can make the best use of the legal services at its disposal. I look forward to participating in that effort, if I am confirmed.

Question. The Attorney General and the Department of Justice.
Answer. I am aware that the Attorney General and the Department of Justice represent the Department of the Army in civil litigation. Further, I have been advised that DOD and the Department of Justice have signed a Memorandum of Understanding delineating the areas of responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of offenses over which the two departments have concurrent jurisdiction. In view of the importance of the Army’s relationship with the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, our communications must be clear, consistent, and timely on every level. If confirmed, I will work in conjunction with The Judge Advocate General and the General Counsel of DOD to ensure the continuation of a collaborative relationship with the Attorney General and the Department of Justice.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Question. In carrying out your duties, if you are confirmed, how will you work with the Judge Advocate General of the Army?
Answer. I believe that close, professional cooperation between the civilian and uniformed members of the Army’s legal community is absolutely essential to the effective delivery of legal services to the Department. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the Offices of the General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General, as well as The Judge Advocate General and I, work closely together to deliver the best possible legal services to the Department of the Army.

Question. How are the legal responsibilities of the Department of the Army allocated between the General Counsel and the Judge Advocate General?
Answer. The Army General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army. The Office of the Army General Counsel is a component of the Army Secretariat, and provides advice to the Secretary of the Army and other Secretariat officials on any subject of law and on other matters, as directed by the Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General is the legal adviser to the Chief of Staff of the Army, members of the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as military legal adviser to The Secretary of the Army. The law expressly prohibits interference with the ability of The Judge Advocate General to give independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Army. Even in the absence of that statutory requirement, I would always welcome the expression of independent views about any legal matter under consideration. The Judge Advocate General also directs the members of The Judge Advocate General’s Corps in the performance of their duties. By law, The Judge Advocate General is primarily responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding the UCMJ and the administration of military discipline. The Offices of the Army General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General have developed and maintain a close and effective working relationship in performing their respective responsibilities. If confirmed, I will work to continue this synergistic partnership.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure that legal opinions of your office will be available to Army attorneys, including judge advocates?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the majority of legal opinions provided to Army attorneys and Judge Advocates are issued by the Office of The Judge Advocate General, and that many of these opinions are coordinated with the Office of the Army General Counsel. The close, professional cooperation between the civilian and uniformed members of the Army’s legal community is absolutely essential to ensure that legal opinions issued by the Office of the Army General Counsel will be available to all Army attorneys and Judge Advocates and vice versa. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the Office of the Army General Counsel appropriately makes available any legal opinions that it issues.

**Question.** In response to attempts within DOD to subordinate legal functions and authorities of the Judge Advocates General to the General Counsels of DOD and the Military Services, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting any officer or employee of DOD from interfering with the ability of the Judge Advocates General of the military services and the legal adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide independent legal advice to the Chairman, service secretaries, and service chiefs. What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocate General of the Army to have the authority to provide independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army?

**Answer.** The Judge Advocate General’s statutory responsibility and authority to provide independent legal advice, set forth in title 10, U.S.C., section 3037, have repeatedly been recognized as essential to the effective delivery of legal services. Uniformed attorneys bring another perspective to the practice of law, providing insight and advice shaped by years of service across the Army. In today’s environment, our senior leaders both demand and deserve independent advice from their counsel.

**Question.** What is your view of the responsibility of Army judge advocates to provide independent legal advice to military commanders?

**Answer.** I believe that Army Judge Advocates in the field are vested with a critical responsibility: to provide quality, candid, legal advice to military commanders. Army commanders need and deserve the best legal advice and judgment available—that is, in part, made possible when Judge Advocates are empowered to provide commanders with independent legal advice, with appropriate guidance from supervising attorneys in their technical chain.

**Question.** If confirmed, would you propose any changes to the current relationships between the Judge Advocate General of the Army and the Army General Counsel?

**Answer.** Based upon my knowledge and understanding to date, I believe that The Judge Advocate General and the Army General Counsel have an excellent working relationship. If confirmed, I will continue to foster this professional and collaborative relationship with The Judge Advocate General and his staff to ensure the effective delivery of legal services to the Department of the Army.

**Question.** Article 6 of the UCMJ gives primary jurisdiction over military justice to the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. How do you view the responsibilities of the Army General Counsel in the performance of military justice matters with regard to the Judge Advocate General of the Army?
Answer. The Judge Advocate General’s responsibilities to ensure the proper administration of the military justice system require his direct and independent advice to the Secretary of the Army on military justice matters. I look forward to providing The Judge Advocate General with whatever support and coordination I can in this respect. I will, if confirmed, consult with The Judge Advocate General on matters of mutual interest or concern relating to military justice, recognizing his statutory duties and special expertise in this area. I will also work with The Judge Advocate General in safeguarding the integrity of the military justice system.

ATTORNEY RECRUITING AND RETENTION ISSUES

Question. If confirmed, how do you assess your ability to hire and retain top quality attorneys and provide sufficient opportunity for advancement?

Answer. I understand that the Army continues to recruit and retain top quality military and civilian attorneys and provide them opportunities for advancement. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor and assess recruitment, retention, and advancement programs for our military and civilian attorneys.

Question. In your view, does the Department of the Army have a sufficient number of civilian and military attorneys to perform its missions?

Answer. I understand that the Army’s enhanced mission requirements in recent years have fueled appropriate growth in the Army’s legal community. If confirmed, I will evaluate whether the number of attorneys in the Department of the Army is sufficient to support the successful accomplishment of all the Army’s assigned missions.

Question. In your view, what incentives to successful recruiting and retention of attorneys, if any, need to be implemented or established?

Answer. In my view, retention of top notch military and civilian attorneys is essential to the current and future success of Army legal services. Although I am unfamiliar with the full scope of attorney retention programs available in the Army, if confirmed, I intend to review these programs carefully and support those incentives and initiatives that affect the retention of the best attorneys to support the Army mission.

DETAINEE ISSUES

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in addressing legal issues regarding detainees?

Answer. Properly addressing legal and policy issues associated with detainees and detention operations is of vital importance to DOD and the Nation as a whole. I understand that the Office of the Army General Counsel and the Office of The Judge Advocate General support the DOD General Counsel in executing elements of the President’s Executive Orders related to detainee operations. Additionally, if confirmed, and in coordination with The Judge Advocate General, I will provide advice to the Secretary of the Army in his role as the DOD Executive Agent for the administration of detainee operations policy, with particular focus on our obligation to treat all detainees humanely.

Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. In your view, is the foregoing prohibition in the best interest of the United States? Why or why not?

Answer. Yes, I firmly believe that this prohibition is in the best interest of the United States. This prohibition is consistent with the long-standing military tradition of applying the humanitarian provisions of the Law of War to those individuals who, for whatever reason, are no longer actively participating in hostilities and find themselves in custody. Moreover, this prohibition is consistent with international standards to which the United States is a party. Prohibiting the cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment of individuals in our custody or under our physical control upholds our ideals and reinforces our moral authority around the world.

Question. Do you believe that the phrase “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” has been adequately and appropriately defined for the purpose of this provision?

Answer. Although the phrase “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” is, on its face, susceptible to broad interpretation, the proscriptions on such conduct contained in the Department’s implementing directives, as well as the provisions of the Geneva Conventions that are embodied in those directives, make it clear to soldiers what
conduct is prohibited. If confirmed, I will ensure the Army’s implementation of this policy in doctrine, to include training manuals, is clearly understood.

**Question.** What role do you believe the General Counsel of the Army should play in the interpretation of this standard?

**Answer.** The appropriate role of the General Counsel is to provide advice to the Secretary of the Army and his staff on detention and interrogation policies that implement this standard. If confirmed, I will ensure Army implementation is consistent with the law, the intent of the administration, and the guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense.

**Question.** What role do you believe the Judge Advocate General of the Army should play in the interpretation of this standard?

**Answer.** The appropriate role of the Judge Advocate General is to provide advice to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army staff on detention and interrogation policies that implement this standard. I believe that the Judge Advocate General should continue the training programs that have been developed for Judge Advocates in the field. I understand that these programs have proven to be instrumental in attaining and maintaining adherence to this standard.

**Question.** If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant Army directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

**Answer.** I will. I believe the requirements of section 1403 and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are essential to maintaining a disciplined Army, whose actions are grounded in the rule of law.

**Question.** Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

**Answer.** I do. These standards have been instrumental in promoting the confidence of the American people in the Army and have been and will continue to be important in guiding our soldiers’ actions in contingency operations.

**Question.** Section 2441 of title 18, U.S.C., as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and inhuman treatment. In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a manner that provides appropriate protection from abusive treatment to U.S. detainees in foreign custody and to foreign detainees in U.S. custody?

**Answer.** These sections of the War Crimes Act were necessary to define the “serious crimes” or “grave breaches” of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. Identifying these felony-level offenses in our domestic law implemented our international law obligations to define, with specificity, the grave breaches that must be prosecuted under the Law of War. In addition, I believe that we must continue to enforce these standards through the promulgation of doctrine, training, and oversight, and that we must hold soldiers accountable for violations of these standards.

**CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD**

**Question.** U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have relied on contractor support to a greater degree than any previous U.S. military operations. The extensive involvement of contractor employees in a broad array of activities—including security functions—has raised questions about the legal accountability of contractor employees for their actions.

**Do you believe that current DOD and Department of the Army regulations appropriately define and limit the scope of security functions that may be performed by contractors in an area of combat operations?**

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the DOD regulation concerning workforce mix was updated in 2010 to better define and limit the scope of security functions that may be performed by contractors in an area of combat operations. It is also my understanding that the DOD regulation on contractor personnel authorized to accompany the U.S. Armed Forces is presently under review. If confirmed, I will support this review, as appropriate. Additionally, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) recently redefined the term “inherently governmental” in OFPP Policy 11–01, effective on October 12, 2011. This new policy added to the list of inherently governmental functions: (i) security functions performed in combat; and (ii) security operations in certain situations connected with combat or potential combat. I am advised that this means that each and every one of these situations should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine which security functions and activities are inherently governmental and which can be performed by contractors...
with appropriate management and oversight. If confirmed, I will support this process.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to such regulations?

Answer. It would be premature for me to recommend any changes to DOD or Department of the Army regulations. If confirmed, I will carefully consider the current departmental regulations and the results of ongoing reviews and make appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of the Army.

Question. Do you believe that current DOD and Department of the Army regulations appropriately define and limit the scope of contractor participation in the interrogation of detainees?

Answer. I understand that the current DOD and Department of the Army regulations define and, as properly implemented, limit the scope of contractor participation in the interrogation of detainees. However, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 significantly limits departmental authority to use contractors in an interrogation role. It is my understanding that DODD 3115.09, DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Briefings, and Tactical Questioning, is under revision, and that the draft addresses the limitations on contract interrogators prescribed in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to such regulations?

Answer. Although I have no basis of knowledge on which to propose changes at this time, I will, if confirmed, review applicable DOD and Department of the Army regulations to determine what, if any, changes may be necessary and appropriate.

Question. OMB Circular A–76 defines “inherently governmental functions” to include “discretionary functions” that could “significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons.” OMB recently issued guidance clarifying the applicability of these terms to the performance of security functions.

In your view, is the performance of security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations an inherently governmental function?

Answer. In the recently revised Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) policy addressing inherently governmental functions, security operations are listed as inherently governmental when they are performed in actual combat situations. For situations where security will be performed in any hostile situation other than actual combat, the circumstances should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine which security functions and activities are inherently governmental and which can be performed by contractors with appropriate management and oversight. If I am confirmed, I intend to examine this issue in greater depth.

Question. In your view, is the interrogation of enemy prisoners of war and other detainees during and in the aftermath of hostilities an inherently governmental function?

Answer. Currently, DOD policy allows properly trained and cleared contractors to conduct government-approved interrogations, provided they are supervised and closely monitored throughout the process by properly trained DOD military or civilian personnel. However, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 significantly limits departmental authority to use contractors in an interrogation role. It is my understanding that DODD 3115.09, DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Briefings, and Tactical Questioning, is under revision, and that the draft addresses the limitations on contract interrogators prescribed in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010.

Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in addressing the issue of what functions may appropriately be performed by contractors on the battlefield?

Answer. If confirmed, I will provide advice to the Secretary of the Army and other senior departmental officials regarding the functions that contractors may legally perform on the battlefield. I will assist them in implementing policies regarding the use of contractors that are consistent with applicable statutory and regulatory constraints.

Question. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was enacted in 2000 to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. courts to persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States.

In your view, does MEJA provide appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas of combat operations?

Answer. Under the MEJA, Federal jurisdiction covers felony offenses committed overseas by members of the Armed Forces who leave military service prior to prosecution or who conspire with non-servicemembers covered by MEJA: civilian employees of DOD; contractors (including subcontractors at any tier) of DOD; dependents of the above; and civilian employees and contractors (including subcontractors at any tier) of any other Federal agency, but only to the extent their “employment relates to supporting the mission of DOD.” I understand that the goal of MEJA is
to ensure that U.S. Federal employees and contractors supporting DOD missions overseas, who commit serious crimes, are not able to escape Federal prosecution for serious offenses such as murder and rape simply because of a potential jurisdictional gap in the law. There is no analogue to MEJA for felony offenses committed by non-defense personnel overseas who are not supporting the mission of DOD. Rather, civilian employees and contractors who cannot be shown to be supporting the mission of DOD may be prosecuted only under certain specific statutes of extraterritorial scope. I understand, however, that this gap would be addressed by the enactment of the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA) of 2011, currently pending before the Senate.

**Question.** What changes, if any, would you recommend to MEJA?

**Answer.** In my opinion, CEJA would provide an effective means for the United States to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over non-DOD Federal employees and contractors in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas of operation, who engage in conduct that would constitute a felony-level Federal crime in the United States. If confirmed, I will assess whether any change or supplement to MEJA may be appropriate.

**Question.** What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in developing administration recommendations for changes to MEJA?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would seek to offer my views and assist in developing proposals to change or supplement MEJA. I would also coordinate closely with The Judge Advocate General and the DOD Office of General Counsel in the development of any such proposals, given the complementary and sometimes competing availability of criminal jurisdiction under the UCMJ.

**Question.** Section 552 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 extended criminal jurisdiction of military courts-martial under the UCMJ to persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field during time of declared war or a contingency operation, such as our current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In your view, does the UCMJ provide appropriate jurisdiction over alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas of combat operations?

**Answer.** I am aware that Article 2 of the UCMJ was amended in 2006 to extend UCMJ jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying U.S. Armed Forces in the field in times of declared war or in a contingency operation. This amendment authorized a commander's exercise of UCMJ disciplinary authority over certain civilians—for example, a contractor employee whose criminal conduct jeopardized good order and discipline or discredited the Armed Forces and thereby had a potential adverse effect on military operation. The Secretary of Defense, in turn, published guidance on the prudent exercise of this unique authority. I understand that this guidance enumerated the command and law enforcement authorities available when a crime is committed within a commander's geographic area of responsibility outside the United States. This guidance further ensures that the Department of Justice and DOD each play an appropriate role in resolving whether jurisdiction over the civilian is most appropriately exercised in a military court under Article 2 of the UCMJ, or in a Federal District Court under MEJA or other Federal laws.

**Question.** What is your view of the procedures agreed upon by DOD and the Department of Justice to reconcile jurisdictional responsibilities under MEJA and the UCMJ?

**Answer.** I understand that current policy requires DOD to notify the Department of Justice when offenses alleged to have been committed by civilians violate U.S. Federal criminal laws and to afford the Department of Justice the opportunity to pursue prosecution of the case in Federal Court. As stated above, such notification provides DOD and the Department of Justice the opportunity to determine whether jurisdiction is more appropriately exercised under the UCMJ or pursuant to MEJA or other Federal laws. If confirmed, in coordination with The Judge Advocate General and subject to consultation with the General Counsel of DOD, I will monitor cases in which the UCMJ or MEJA are employed to assess the effectiveness of the current procedures and evaluate whether further refinements of these procedures may be necessary.

**Question.** What changes, if any, would you recommend to the UCMJ to ensure appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of contractor employees?

**Answer.** At this time, I am not aware of any specific provisions in the UCMJ that need change in this area.

**ATTACKS AT FORT HOOD**

**Question.** In your view, do current Army policies limit the ability to include information in official records that may assist in the identification of potential threats?
At this time, I am not sufficiently familiar with current Army policies regarding the filing of information in official records to permit me to express an opinion on this important question. I am informed, however, that the Army has made progress in addressing the issues associated with the identification of potential threats. If confirmed, I will look closely at this issue, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1; and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2.

**Question.** Do current Army procedures hinder the ability to share this type of information with other official agencies charged with identifying and monitoring potential extremist or terrorist activities?

**Answer.** I am not aware of any specific procedures that hinder the ability to share information between agencies. However, if confirmed, I will review this matter to ensure that the Army’s procedures for sharing potential threat and other force protection-related information, both internally (e.g., with the Army Criminal Investigation Command), and with other DOD or Federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies are effective and in compliance with all applicable laws, directives, and regulations, as appropriate.

**Question.** What is your understanding of how the Army balances the need to identify and respond to potentially harmful extremist views held by soldiers against individual privacy and respect for the right of soldiers to hold and express personal beliefs?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the Army currently has a robust policy that proscribes participation in extremist organizations and activities. Commanders have been empowered to maintain good order and discipline in their units, and enforcement of this policy is a function of command. I further understand that the Army mandates reporting of suspected or possible international or domestic terrorist activity, espionage, compromises of security or classified information, and similar activities. It is my understanding that the Army regulation addressing counterintelligence and other threat awareness and reporting was updated in November 2010. If confirmed, I will work closely with the proponents of force protection policies to ensure that Army programs addressing potential threats maintain the proper balance between the need for commanders to maintain good order and discipline and protect the force, and soldiers’ rights to privacy and to hold and express personal beliefs.

**Question.** Do you see a need for a change in this balance?

**Answer.** At this time, I have no basis of knowledge on which to formulate an opinion on this important issue. I do, however, recognize that this is a Department-wide issue that extends beyond the Army. If confirmed, I would support any and all DOD initiatives in this area.

### Religious Guidelines

**Question.** What is your understanding of current policies and programs of DOD and the Department of the Army regarding religious practices in the military?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the Army’s policies support religious tolerance and mutual respect. If confirmed, I would continue the Army’s firm commitment to upholding the Constitutional tenets of the “free exercise” and “establishment” clauses and review policies as necessary to assure continued compliance with the First Amendment.

**Question.** In your view, do these policies accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

**Answer.** I have been informed that current Army policies require chaplains to support all unit personnel, regardless of their beliefs. It is my view that these Army policies do accommodate free exercise of religion. If confirmed, I am willing to study this issue further to determine if changes in policy are necessary and appropriate.

**Question.** In your opinion, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain’s ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no religious belief?

**Answer.** I understand that during mandatory official functions, chaplains are not compelled to offer prayers that are inconsistent with their faith, but are expected to remain sensitive to the pluralistic Army and society they serve. In my opinion, these policies strike an appropriate balance, given the diversity of religious views in the Army. If confirmed, I would be willing to study this issue further to determine if changes in policy are necessary and appropriate.
ROLE IN THE OFFICER PROMOTION AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army in ensuring the integrity and proper functioning of the officer promotion process?

Answer. I have been informed that under title 10, U.S.C., chapter 36, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the proper functioning of the Department of the Army’s promotion selection process. In addition to the legal review of Memoranda of Instruction and selection board reports to ensure they comport with statutory standards, the Army General Counsel must also ensure the conduct of the board process conforms to all legal requirements. The diligent execution of this function requires advising the Secretary of the Army of any case in which a selection board report or selection board process fails to adhere to the statutory standards, either generally or with regard to a particular officer being considered for promotion. In advising the Secretary of the Army and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), the General Counsel helps to ensure that Army promotion policies properly implement applicable laws and regulations and are fairly applied. In these matters, the Office of the Army General Counsel coordinates closely with The Office of the Judge Advocate General.

Question. Do you see a need for change in this role?

Answer. It is my understanding that the current process is working well; however, if I am confirmed and determine that a change is necessary, I would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), The Judge Advocate General, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1, to effect such change, while maintaining both the integrity of the Army’s promotion process and the trust of the Army Officer Corps, Congress, and the American people.

GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER NOMINATIONS

Question. Under DOD Instruction 1320.4, adverse and alleged adverse information pertaining to general and flag officers must be evaluated by senior leaders in the Services and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense prior to nomination for promotion and certain assignments.

If confirmed, what role, if any, would you play in the officer promotion system, particularly in reviewing general officer nominations?

Answer.

• I have been informed that for all officer promotions, including general officer promotions, the Office of the Army General Counsel, in coordination with the Office of The Judge Advocate General, plays an active role in the officer promotion system, to include: Reviewing Memoranda of Instruction that govern the conduct of promotion selection boards and subsequent promotion selection board reports.

• As to officers being considered for promotion to a grade below general officer, I have been advised that adverse information that is not in an officer’s official military personnel file that may be presented to the promotion selection board is reviewed to ensure it is accurate and comports with the requirements of title 10 (i.e., that it is “substantiated, relevant information that could reasonably affect the deliberations of the selection board”).

• In general officer cases, the standard for adverse information that must be presented to a promotion selection board is “any credible information of an adverse nature.” I have been advised that the Office of the Army General Counsel participates in a robust screening process designed to ensure that all adverse information is properly identified for presentation to the promotion selection board.

• I have been advised that when adverse information about an officer becomes available after a promotion selection board makes its recommendations, the Office of the Army General Counsel and the Office of The Judge Advocate General coordinate in providing legal advice to the Secretary of the Army. This advice enables the Secretary’s determination as to whether a promotion review board should be convened to consider whether to continue to support the promotion of the considered officer or take steps to remove the officer from the promotion list.

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army in ensuring the legal sufficiency of statutory selection board processes?

Answer. I understand that under title 10, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the proper functioning of the Department of the Army’s promotion selection process. Prior to approval by the Secretary of the Army, all Memoranda of Instruction for officer promotion selection boards are reviewed by the Office of the Army Gen-
eral Counsel, in coordination with the Office of The Judge Advocate General, to ensure the Secretary’s instructions conform to statutes and accurately reflect his guidance regarding attributes necessary for service in the next grade. All reports of promotion selection boards are processed through the Office of the Army General Counsel prior to final action on the report by the Secretary. The Army General Counsel must be satisfied that the Army has met applicable statutory standards and that individual selection board reports conform to the law. The Army General Counsel must advise the Secretary of the Army of any case in which a selection board report fails to adhere to the statutory standards, either generally or with regard to a particular officer being considered for promotion. In advising the Secretary of the Army and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), the Army General Counsel helps to ensure that Army promotion policies properly implement applicable laws and regulations and are fairly applied.

**Question.** What is the role, if any, of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army in reviewing and providing potentially adverse information pertaining to a nomination to the Senate Armed Services Committee?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that under current Department of the Army practice, the Office of the Army General Counsel reviews each selection board report, as well as departmental communications to the Committee, the President, and the Secretary of Defense, to ensure that the reports and communications comply in form and substance with law and applicable directives and regulation. The Office of the Army General Counsel gives special attention to cases of nominees with substantiated or potentially adverse information and cases with reportable information in order to ensure that such information is reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee in a timely, accurate, and comprehensible manner.

**MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY AND CASES**

**Question.** In your view, what role, if any, should the General Counsel and civilian attorneys assigned to the Office of General Counsel play in military personnel policy and individual cases, including cases before the Board for Correction of Military Records?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and other senior leaders, to ensure that the Army properly develops and fairly applies military personnel policies. Were I to become aware that the Department did not fairly and lawfully apply military personnel policies, I would take appropriate action to ensure that the Army properly resolves the issue. In addition, I am aware of and fully respect the independent role that the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) plays in the correction of military records, and if confirmed, I would coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), who exercises overall responsibility for the Army Review Boards Agency, regarding the legal sufficiency of ABCMR recommendations to the Secretary of the Army.

**SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE POLICY**

**Question.** Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving soldiers have been reported from Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan over the last several years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They asserted that the military failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services, including medical attention and criminal investigations of their charges. What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Army has in place in deployed locations to offer victims of serious sexual assaults the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?

**Answer.** This is an extremely important issue for the Army and, if confirmed, I will focus significant attention on it. Although I am not fully aware of all Army initiatives or resources to help sexual assault victims, I understand that the Army has taken significant steps to improve the assistance to all victims of sexual assaults, with specific attention to victims in a deployed environment. If confirmed, I will study this matter in greater depth with a view to ensuring the Army continues to take appropriate steps to provide medical, psychological, and legal help to soldiers who are victims of sexual assault, both in garrison and in deployed locations.

**Question.** What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to prevent sexual assaults on female soldiers at their home stations and when they are deployed?

**Answer.** It is my view that the Army has taken several extremely important steps in its campaign to prevent sexual assaults on female soldiers at their home stations and when deployed. I am aware that in 2008, the Army launched a comprehensive new sexual assault prevention and response campaign that has continued to grow
through the present day. If confirmed, I will ensure that the legal community fully supports this initiative.

**Question.** What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Army has in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

**Answer.** At this time I am not familiar with all of the Army's training and resources to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will assess whether additional steps should be taken to support victims and hold offenders accountable.

**Question.** Do you consider the Army's current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

**Answer.** I have been advised that the Army has focused both on eliminating sexual assault from its ranks and on increasing victim support—both key elements of an effective program to address sexual assault. I have been advised that part of the focus on victim support involves an option for confidential reporting (also called “restricted” reporting), which I understand allows sexual assault victims to disclose, confidentially, the details of their assault to specified individuals and to receive medical treatment and counseling without triggering the official investigative process. If confirmed, I will work with knowledgeable professionals to assess and ensure the continued effectiveness of these and other Army programs in this regard.

**Question.** Specifically, do you think that Sexual Assault Response Coordinators should be attended a confidentiality privilege in order to help them perform their duties more effectively?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work with knowledgeable professionals to determine whether extending a confidentiality privilege to Sexual Assault Response Coordinators would allow them to perform their duties more effectively.

**WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION**

**Question.** Section 1034 of title 10, U.S.C., prohibits taking retaliatory personnel action against a member of the Armed Forces as reprisal for making a protected communication. By definition, protected communications include communications to certain individuals and organizations outside of the chain of command.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that senior military leaders understand the need to protect servicemembers who report misconduct to appropriate authorities within or outside the chain of command?

**Answer.** Whistleblower protections for military personnel affirm that members of the Armed Forces must be free from reprisal for making or preparing a protected communication. By definition, protected communications include communications to certain individuals and organizations outside of the chain of command.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that senior military leaders understand the need to protect servicemembers who report misconduct to appropriate authorities within or outside the chain of command?

**Answer.** Whistleblower protections for military personnel affirm that members of the Armed Forces must be free from reprisal for making or preparing a protected communication to a Member of Congress; an Inspector General; a member of a DOD audit, inspection, investigation, or law enforcement organization; or any other person or organization (within or outside the chain of command) designated under regulations or established procedures to receive such communications. I believe that these protections are essential. If confirmed, I will work with The Judge Advocate General to ensure that senior military leaders are fully and accurately advised of these protections and that they understand their legal responsibilities in this important area. In addition, I will ensure that any individual cases involving allegations of reprisal that may come to my attention are fully addressed in accordance with the law.

**SUPPORT TO ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**Question.** What role, if any, do you think the General Counsel of the Army should have in reviewing the investigations and recommendations of the Army Inspector General?

**Answer.** If confirmed as the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army and counsel to the Secretary of the Army and other Secretariat officials, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with The Inspector General, and will communicate with him directly and candidly. I will provide independent and objective legal advice to The Inspector General and the Secretary with regard to all matters that relate to Inspector General programs, duties, functions, and responsibilities. In coordination with The Judge Advocate General, I will oversee the provision of effective legal guidance to the Office of The Inspector General in conducting investigations and making recommendations. Further, as part of my responsibility to review legal and policy issues arising from the Army's intelligence and counterintelligence activities, I will advise The Inspector General concerning proper reporting of the Army's intelligence oversight activities.

**WOMEN IN COMBAT**

**Question.** Current DOD policies regarding the combat role of women in uniform have been in effect since 1994.
What is your understanding of the conclusions and lessons that have been learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan about the feasibility of current policies regarding the assignment of women?

Answer. At this time, I do not have enough information to make an informed assessment of the conclusions and lessons learned from operations in Iraq or Afghanistan in regard to women in combat. It is my understanding that the Army is in compliance with DOD policy relating to the assignment of women.

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s compliance with the requirements of law relating to the assignment of women?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Army is in compliance with the requirements of the DOD policy relating to women in combat. Women have and will continue to be an integral part of the Army team, performing exceptionally well in all specialties and positions open to them.

CIVILIAN ATTORNEYS

Question. Judge advocates in the Armed Forces benefit from an established career progression, substantial mentoring and training opportunities, and exposure to a broad spectrum of legal areas and leadership responsibilities. By contrast, civilian attorneys in the Military Departments normally do not have established career programs and may do the same work for many years, with promotion based solely upon longevity and vacancies.

What is your understanding of the personnel management and career development system for civilian attorneys?

Answer. It is my view that robust attorney career development programs result in excellence in client service, the recruitment and retention of high-performing professionals, and building the bench for the future. If confirmed, I will be in a position to examine this issue closely to ensure comprehensive and effective personnel management and career development programs for civilian attorneys.

Question. In your view does that system need revision? If so, what do you see as the major problems and what changes would you suggest?

Answer. As discussed above, robust attorney career development programs result in excellence in client service, the recruitment and retention of high-performing professionals, and build the bench for the future. However, it may be appropriate to review past experience with a view toward identifying any areas that can be approved. If confirmed, I will be in a position to examine this issue closely to ensure comprehensive and effective personnel management and career development programs for civilian attorneys.

CLIENT

Question. In your opinion, who is the client of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army?

Answer. The client of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army is the Department of the Army, acting through its authorized officials.

ACQUISITION ISSUES

Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that Army procurement programs are executed in accordance with the law and DOD acquisition policy?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), and other senior Department of the Army leaders to ensure that the Department of the Army's acquisition and procurement programs are executed in accordance with applicable provisions of the U.S. Code, as well as controlling regulations and policies. Today's acquisition professionals face the challenge of managing their programs' cost, schedule, and performance while remaining in compliance with a myriad of legal and policy requirements. I believe it is the responsibility of Army lawyers to proactively assist their acquisition clients in meeting that challenge. From the earliest stages of program development, counsel should be involved in identifying potential issues and, where appropriate, legally-compliant alternative courses of action. In those rare situations where an issue cannot be satisfactorily resolved, it is incumbent on counsel to elevate their concerns promptly in order to protect the Department's overarching interests.

Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that Army acquisition officials understand flexibilities provided by Congress in the acquisition and financial statutes and can take advantage of those flexibilities to act in the best interests of the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) to ensure that the Army’s acquisition programs and financial operations are executed in a manner that is consistent with their governing legal framework and to challenge program strategies that may be premised on an unduly restrictive interpretation of the applicable authorities.

Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that ethics provisions on conflict of interest are followed both by Army personnel and by Army contractors?

Answer. Structuring departmental business practices to avoid both personal and organizational conflicts of interest should be one of the Army’s highest priorities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) and other senior departmental officials to promote an organizational climate that is sensitive to the need to avoid conflicts of interest and that reacts appropriately when specific issues arise. I believe that Army lawyers can make a significant contribution to this endeavor through the provision of acquisition ethics training and through early and sustained involvement in the Department’s acquisition programs and procurement activities.

Question. Allegations of fraud and abuse during contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan have been widespread.

What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that Army personnel are properly trained in contingency contracting and are supervised in the performance of their duties?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), and other senior Department of the Army personnel to ensure that the legal community continues to support fully the initiatives currently being implemented to improve contingency contracting and to enhance the contracting workforce overall. I would also work closely with The Judge Advocate General of the Army and the other legal offices to ensure that adequate legal resources are available to support the contingency contracting mission.

DETECTING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Question. Personal and organizational conflicts of interest have become a major concern. DOD’s expanded use of private contractors being tasked to perform key functions that the Services had formerly performed in-house and the new requirement to fill thousands of DOD civilian positions with experienced, qualified individuals present challenges in preventing conflicts of interest and the appearance of conflicts of interest.

What do you think the Army should do, and what should the General Counsel’s role be, in ensuring that the Army identifies personal and organizational conflicts of interests and takes the appropriate steps to avoid or mitigate them?

Answer. If confirmed, I would closely examine the Army’s process for reviewing and preventing both personal and organizational conflicts of interest. I believe that ethics awareness and instruction for all personnel is vitally important, and I would ensure that ethics training is a priority at all echelons. Bringing functions back “in-house” must be closely monitored with respect to former contractor employees and their relationships to their former employers. If confirmed, I would work closely with senior Army officials to foster a high level of organizational sensitivity to these concerns and to assist in the appropriate resolution of individual situations that may arise.

Question. What is your understanding of the steps the Army takes to identify and address potential conflicts of interest during the hiring process?

Answer. I understand that financial disclosure reporting is a primary source of information to identify and prevent conflicts of interest. If confirmed, I would emphasize the importance of properly identifying positions requiring financial disclosure reporting and ensure that rigorous and timely review of the reports is accomplished by both ethics counselors and supervisors. If confirmed, I will emphasize education in conflicts of interest in the Army’s ethics training program.

Question. Recent reports have raised concerns about potential personal conflicts of interest by contractor employees, including retired general and flag officers (“senior mentors”) who advise senior government officials.

What is your understanding of existing statutes and regulations pertaining to personal conflicts of interest by contractor employees who advise senior government officials?

Answer. I understand that concerns have been raised in media reports about the Military Services’ senior mentor programs. In the past, the Army’s senior mentors
often were contractor employees, but I understand the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army have issued policies that mandate employment of senior mentors as Highly-Qualified Experts (HQEs). This means they are Federal Government employees and not contractor employees. Further, I understand that in this capacity, senior mentors file public financial disclosure reports, which are reviewed by their supervisors and Army ethics counselors for financial conflicts of interest. Thus, all the normal statutes and regulations pertaining to employee conflicts of interest now apply to senior mentors. With respect to other contractor employees who might advise senior government officials, if confirmed, I would emphasize the importance of finding acceptable employment or contract arrangements that would minimize conflicts of interest, or any appearance thereof, that could undermine the public's confidence in the integrity of this program.

Question. Do you see any need for changes to these statutes and regulations?

Answer. At the present time, with the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army policies pertaining to senior mentors in place, I believe that the statutes and regulations on personal conflicts of interest adequately protect the public interest. If confirmed, I would monitor this issue and, if I concluded that any changes were warranted, I would proceed through the Department’s procedures for proposing legislative and regulatory changes.

Question. What role do you see for the General Counsel in identifying and addressing potential conflicts of interest by employees of Army contractors?

Answer. In my opinion, the Army General Counsel should work closely with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) to ensure compliance with restrictions imposed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation pertaining to organizational conflicts of interest. I also would ensure that Army lawyers emphasize this area as part of the Department of the Army’s program for annual ethics training.

LEGAL ETHICS

Question. What is your understanding of the action a Department of the Army attorney or an Army judge advocate should take if the attorney becomes aware of improper activities by a Department of the Army official who has sought the attorney's legal advice, the official is unwilling to follow the attorney's advice?

Answer. Army attorneys generally provide legal advice to Army officials in their capacity as representatives of the Department of the Army. The Department of the Army is the attorney's client, and no attorney-client privilege is established between the attorney and the Army official. When an Army attorney advises an Army official, the official may use that advice to exercise official functions and duties. If an Army attorney suspects that the individual Army official, either in exercising such functions or in failing to do so, violates a law or standard of conduct, I believe the attorney has an obligation to report the potential violation to the appropriate higher authority.

Question. Do you believe that the present limits on pro bono activities of government attorneys are generally correct as a matter of policy or does the policy need to be reviewed and revised?

Answer. I understand that government attorneys may participate in pro bono activities so long as the representation is consistent with general governmental ethical rules and with the rules of professional responsibility applicable to attorneys. I understand that Army civilian attorneys may, for instance, perform pro bono work with supervisory approval so long as the representation does not occur on government time or at its expense, does not interfere with official duties, and does not create a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest. I understand the Army also operates a legal assistance program for soldiers and their families, providing free services in areas such as family law, wills and estate planning, tax law, landlord/tenant matters, contract disputes, consumer law, and assistance during the disability evaluation system. If confirmed, I would review the current policies in coordination with The Judge Advocate General and recommend revisions, if appropriate.

Question. In your view, do the laws, regulations, and guidelines that establish the rules of professional responsibility for attorneys in the Department of the Army provide adequate guidance?

Answer. The Army has comprehensive regulations, based upon the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, that govern the ethical conduct of Army lawyers, both military and civilian. All Army attorneys must, at all times, be in good standing with the licensing authority of at least one State, territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. This regulatory system would appear to provide adequate guidance; however, if con-
firmed, I would review the current policy, in coordination with The Judge Advocate General and, as appropriate, recommend revisions.

LITIGATION INVOLVING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between the Department of the Army and the Department of Justice with respect to litigation involving DOD?

Answer. The Department of Justice represents the Department of the Army in civil litigation. In general, it is my understanding that coordination between the Department of Justice and the Department of the Army is timely and consistent on every level. If confirmed, I will work with The Judge Advocate General and the General Counsel of DOD to ensure the continuation of a collaborative relationship with the Department of Justice with respect to litigation involving the Department of the Army.

Question. In your view, does the Department need more independence and resources to conduct its own litigation or to improve upon its current supporting role?

Answer. The Department of the Army’s interests in civil litigation are effectively protected and defended by the Department of Justice. If confirmed, I will work with The Judge Advocate General to ensure that adequate resources are available to ensure that the Army is able to provide the appropriate level of support to the Department of Justice and to protect the Army’s interests and equities in civil litigation in which it is involved.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the General Counsel of the Department of the Army?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[The nomination reference of Brad R. Carson follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.
September 15, 2011.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Brad Carson, of Oklahoma, to be General Counsel of the Department of the Army, vice Benedict S. Cohen, resigned.

[The biographical sketch of Brad R. Carson, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]
Degrees Completed


Professional Experience

• Associate Professor of Law and Business, University of Tulsa, January 2010–present. Joint appointment in University of Tulsa College of Law and the Collins College of Business at the University of Tulsa. Classes taught include: Property, Energy Policy, Negotiations and Game Theory, and Seminar on Globalization.
• President and Chief Executive Officer, Director, Cherokee Nation Businesses, L.L.C., Catoosa, OK, April 2005–December 2008.
• Fellow, Institute of Politics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2005, Led seminar at Harvard University on contemporary American politics.

Memberships

• U.S. Association for Energy Economics, council member, 2010–present.
• Oklahoma Bar Association, Member, 1994–present.
• Society of Petroleum Engineers, Member, 2011.
• American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2010–present.

Selected Activities and Honors

• Bronze Star. 2010.
• Army Achievement Medal. 2010.
• U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce Ten Outstanding Young Americans, Awarded 2002.
• Exceptional Contribution to Legal Services of Eastern Oklahoma, Awarded 1996.
• Bledsoe Award for Outstanding Law School Graduate from the University of Oklahoma, 1994.
• Adjunct Professor of Law (Law and Literature), University of Tulsa College of Law, 1997.
• Legal Services of Eastern Oklahoma Board of Directors, 1997.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Brad R. Carson in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more
space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the ques-
tion number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part
of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior
to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made
available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Brad Rogers Carson.

2. Position to which nominated:
   General Counsel, U.S. Army.

3. Date of nomination:
   September 15, 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive
   files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   March 11, 1967; Winslow, AZ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Julie Kruse Carson.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Jack David Carson, age 5.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended,
degree received, and date degree granted.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years,
whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location
of work, and dates of employment.
   Fellow, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005, Cambridge,
   MA.
   CEO & President/Director, Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC, 2005–2008,
   Catoosa, OK.
   Associate Professor of Business, Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa,
   2009–present, Tulsa, OK.
   Director, National Energy Policy Institute, University of Tulsa, 2009–present,
   Tulsa, OK.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other
part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than
those listed above.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director,
trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corpora-
tion, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other
institutions.
1306

Director, Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC, 2009–present.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
   - Oklahoma Bar Association, Member, 1994–present.
   - U.S. Association for Energy Economics, Council Member, 2010–present.
   - Society of Petroleum Engineers, Member, 2011.
   - American Association for the Advancement of Science, Member, 2010–present.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
      - U.S. Congress, 2nd District of Oklahoma.
   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
      - Obama for America National Finance Committee.
   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
      - Williams for City Council, 2011, $500
      - Smith-Soap for Chief, 2011, $5,500
      - Obama for America, 2011, $1,000
      - Reid for Senate, 2010, $1,000
      - Edmondson for Governor, 2010, $4,000
      - Gumm for Senate, 2010, $1,000
      - Williams for House, 2010, $500
      - Burrag for Senate, 2010, $2,000
      - Boren for Congress, 2010, $2,000
      - Paddock for State Superintendent, 2010, $750
      - Adelson for Mayor, 2009, $3,000
      - AmeriPac, 2008, $2,500
      - Adelson for Senate, 2008, $2,000
      - Hoskin for House, 2008, $250
      - Boren for Congress, 2007, $1,000
      - Jim Himes for Congress, 2007, $1,000
      - Rice for Senate, 2007, $500
      - Rice for Senate, 2008, $250
      - Snyder for House, 2007, $250
      - Obama for America, 2007, $4,600
      - Sparks for Senate, 2006, $250
      - Burrag for Senate, 2006, $1,000
      - Regan for Lt Gov, 2006, $500

14. **Honors and awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
   - Army Achievement Medal, 2009.
   - U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce Ten Outstanding Young Americans, 2002.
   - Exceptional Contribution To Legal Services Of Eastern Oklahoma, 1996.
   - Bledsoe Award For Outstanding Law School Graduate From The University Of Oklahoma, 1994.
   - Adjunct Professor of Law (Law and Literature). University of Tulsa College of Law, 1997.

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.
16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

N/A.

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Yes.

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

No.

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

Yes.

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Yes.

(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Yes.

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

Yes.

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

BRAD R. CARSON.

This 3rd day of November, 2011.

[The nomination of Brad R. Carson was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on December 15, 2011, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 17, 2011.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Kevin A. Ohlson by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]
QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES

Question. Subchapter XII of Chapter 47 of title 10, U.S.C., establishes the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (USCAAF) and provides for its organization and administrative procedures.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the USCAAF and its judges?

Answer. The duty of the judges on the USCAAF is to ensure independent civilian oversight of the military courts. This responsibility is accomplished through appellate review of the decisions of the military courts of criminal appeals. The judges also have the duty of serving on the Code Committee which meets annually for the purpose of making an annual survey of the operations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). This committee also is responsible for preparing an annual report that, among other things, provides information about the number and status of pending cases in the military court system.

The function of the USCAAF is to provide independent civilian oversight of the military justice system through appellate review of the decisions of the military courts of criminal appeals. In exercising this responsibility, the USCAAF is responsible for reviewing those cases where a military court of criminal appeals has affirmed a death sentence, where a Service Judge Advocate General orders a case to be sent to the USCAAF after it has been reviewed by a military court of criminal appeals, and where, upon petition of the accused and for good cause shown, the USCAAF has granted review of a decision rendered by a military court of criminal appeals.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. First, I served as a judge advocate officer in the U.S. Army for 4 years. During that time I not only became familiar with the military justice system by serving as a trial counsel and prosecuting a number of criminal cases, I also became familiar with the men, women, mission, and ethos of the U.S. Armed Forces. I achieved the latter by attending Air Assault school, attending Airborne school, being on “jump status” as a parachutist at Fort Bragg for 4 years, deploying to four foreign countries, and serving in Saudi Arabia (with two very brief forays into Iraq) during the Persian Gulf War and being awarded the Bronze Star.

Second, I served as a Federal prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. In that capacity I indicted and prosecuted a wide variety of cases in a fast-paced, high-volume office, and I became very familiar with the criminal justice system and the duties and responsibilities of prosecutors.

Third, I was appointed as a member of the Board of Immigration Appeals. In that position, I served in a judicial capacity deciding appeals in immigration cases. This professional opportunity enabled me to gain an understanding and appreciation of the role and function of adjudicators at the appellate level.

Fourth, I served as a senior manager within the Department of Justice, and the experiences I had in those positions would help me to run an efficient and productive chambers if I were to have the honor of being confirmed by the Senate.

Fifth, I served for 2 years as the Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General, which provided me with a broad appreciation of the policy issues that confront any criminal justice system.

Sixth, I currently serve as the Chief of the Department of Justice's Professional Misconduct Review Unit. In collaboration with the attorneys who work for me, I review instances where Federal prosecutors have been accused of misconduct, I determine whether misconduct actually occurred, I write detailed memoranda explaining my reasoning, and then I impose discipline, if appropriate. Serving in this position has reinforced for me the vital importance of performing one's duties consistent with the highest standards of honor, excellence, integrity, and fairness.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of a judge on the USCAAF?

Answer. Being considered for a position that is as important, as challenging, and as consequential as serving as a judge on the USCAAF is a tremendous honor, and I would very willingly take any steps that may be helpful in enhancing my ability to perform those duties. Accordingly, if I have the privilege of being confirmed by the Senate, and even during the confirmation process, I will endeavor to obtain a more in-depth knowledge of the legal issues facing the USCAAF by reviewing and refreshing my memory of the UCMJ, the Rules for Courts-Martial, and the Military Rules of Evidence, and by reading key decisions of the USCAAF and scholarly articles about the military justice system.

VerDate Aug 31 2005 09:33 Jun 14, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01316 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\74537.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What are the respective roles of each of the following with respect to the military justice system, and if confirmed, what would your relationship be with:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to be a convening authority for general or special courts-martial, and may promulgate orders and regulations that are actionable under the UCMJ. Further, because the Secretary is responsible for the formulation of policy related to matters directly affecting the Department of Defense (DOD), working through the Joint Services Committee the Secretary may propose legislative or other changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) and the UCMJ.

However, Article 141 of the UCMJ clearly states that the USCAAF is located in DOD “for administrative purposes only”. Therefore, although it is unlikely that I would have any interaction with the Secretary of Defense even if I were confirmed, if I did so I would treat him or her with the greatest respect and courtesy, but I would always be mindful of the fact that, when it comes to my professional duties and responsibilities, USCAAF judges are wholly independent of the Secretary of Defense.

Question. The Chief Judge of the USCAAF.

Answer. The Chief Judge of the USCAAF is selected based on seniority of commission among those judges on the court who have not previously served in that position. The term of service is 5 years. The Chief Judge presides at court sessions, and oversees the administrative functions of the court. If confirmed, my relationship with the Chief Judge would be both collegial and respectful, but when it comes to decision-making in cases, I would fully exercise my independent judgment.

Question. Judges of the USCAAF.

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect my relationship with the other judges on the court to be very collegial, and I would closely listen to and consider their points-of-view on all issues that come before the court. However, when it comes to a vote on a petition, a writ, or a case, if confirmed, I would exercise my independent judgment in each and every matter.

Question. The military courts of criminal appeals.

The USCAAF reviews all cases where a military court of criminal appeals has affirmed a death sentence, where a Service Judge Advocate General orders the case to be sent to the USCAAF after it has been reviewed by a military court of criminal appeals, and where, upon petition of the accused and for good cause shown, the USCAAF has granted review of a decision rendered by a military court of criminal appeals. If confirmed, I would give full and due consideration to the analysis and reasoning of members of the military courts of criminal appeals in each and every case that comes before me. However, I ultimately would exercise my independent judgment in deciding each case.

Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.

Answer. Although the General Counsel is the chief legal officer of DOD, Article 141 of the UCMJ states that the USCAAF falls under the Department for administrative purposes only. Thus, the court does not fall under the purview, management, or supervision of the General Counsel. However, the General Counsel does have the authority to exercise those delegated duties as the Secretary may prescribe, and thus coordinates any proposed legislative changes to the UCMJ that the Joint Services Committee may recommend. If confirmed, my relationship with the General Counsel would be respectful and cordial, but I would act independently in my role as a judge.

Question. The Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Answer. The Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, provide advice on military justice matters to the Service Chiefs of and to the Commandant, respectively. They are responsible for such actions as supervising the administration of military justice, overseeing the judge advocates and military judges within their Service, and reviewing and taking action on certain records of trial. Additionally, a Judge Advocate General may certify questions to the USCAAF, and serves as a member of both the Joint Services Committee and the Code Committee. If confirmed, my relationship with these senior officers would be collegial and respectful, but I would always maintain my judicial independence and neutrality.

LEGAL ISSUES

Question. What do you anticipate would be the most significant legal issues you will be called upon to address if confirmed as a judge of the USCAAF?
Answer. If confirmed, undoubtedly one of the most significant legal issues I would be called upon to address would be the changes to Article 120 of the UCMJ regarding the offense of rape. I also firmly believe that when deciding cases, the judges on the USCAAF must continue to be vigilant about protecting the integrity of the military justice system from the corrosive effects of command influence and ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, I believe the court will be confronted with issues arising from the use of emerging technology as it pertains to such issues as possession of child pornography and the right of privacy.

JURISDICTION OF THE USCAAF

Question. In your view, has the USCAAF fulfilled the expectations of Congress when the court was established in 1951?
Answer. Yes, very much so. Not only has the court provided the necessary civilian oversight of the military justice system, it also has provided independent judicial review in military justice cases and has served as a bulwark against unlawful command influence.

Question. In your view, are there any legislative changes needed regarding the role and responsibilities or the jurisdiction of the USCAAF?
Answer. I am not aware of the need for any changes at this time.

UCMJ JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS

Question. Section 552 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 amended the UCMJ to clarify that persons serving with or accompanying an Armed Force in the field are subject to the UCMJ during a contingency operation as well as in a time of declared war.

What challenges, if any, do you anticipate that the armed services and the USCAAF will encounter in implementing the UCMJ with regard to persons serving with or accompanying an Armed Force in the field?
Answer. As with any new law that has not been thoroughly reviewed by the courts, there likely will be a number of challenges to this piece of legislation when and if it is invoked in any additional cases in the future. First and foremost, if it is a U.S. citizen who is prosecuted pursuant to this provision of the UCMJ, the issue will undoubtedly arise whether its application to a civilian violates a defendant’s constitutional guarantees, such as the right to a trial by a jury of one’s peers. Second, the USCAAF will have to wrestle with determining the scope of the law. For example, issues that may arise in any specific case will likely include determining the definition of such phrases as “serving with or accompanying an Armed Force,” “in the field,” and “contingency operation.” Third, there will be issues about whether the appropriate person within the military command structure exercised jurisdiction in any particular case.

The armed services also will likely encounter challenges when implementing this UCMJ provision. I anticipate that when confronted with a case where this UCMJ provision is potentially applicable, the armed services may become concerned about the need to delay taking action until the Department of Justice (DOJ) has reviewed the case to determine whether DOJ will exercise jurisdiction. Further, when a particular case arises, depending upon the circumstances of the alleged offense, the American public may express concerns about the invocation of this provision of the UCMJ and the resulting prosecution of a civilian who is a U.S. citizen in the military justice system.

DECISIONS OF THE USCAAF

Question. Please describe the three decisions of the USCAAF since 2005 which you believe to have been the most significant.
Answer. United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405 (C.A.A.F. 2006). This case reiterates the fact that unlawful command influence is the mortal enemy of military justice and that, where it is found to exist, judicial authorities must take those steps necessary to preserve both the actual fairness, and the apparent fairness, of criminal proceedings.

United States v. Prother, 69 M.J. 338 (2010). In this case the accused was charged with aggravated sexual assault for engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who was substantially incapacitated. The court held that an accused’s burden to prove the affirmative defense of consent by a preponderance of the evidence unconstitutionally shifted the burden onto the defense to disprove an element of the offense.

United States v. Lee, 66 M.J. 387 (2008). After conviction at court-martial, the accused alleged that his detailed defense counsel failed to adequately disclose a conflict of interest. The USCAAF held that counsel provided to or retained by the ac-
cused must provide reasonably effective assistance, and that where a constitutional
game rule to counsel exists, there is a correlative right to representation that is free from
conflicts of interest.

**Question.** What is your view of the role of stare decisis in terms of prior decisions
of the USCAAF?

**Answer.** The doctrine of stare decisis is an essential guiding principle for any ap-
pealate court. In the military justice system this doctrine is especially important be-
cause it provides both commanders and servicemembers with needed stability, consis-
tency, and predictability regarding the handling of criminal offenses. However,
there may be rare instances where applicable precedent should be overturned. This
step should only be taken after long and careful consideration, and in those in-
stances when it does occur, I believe the judges of the USCAAF are obligated to ex-
plain their rationale for doing so clearly, fully, and persuasively.

**Question.** In view of Article 36 of the UCMJ, what is your view as to the hierarchy
of sources of law that must be applied by the USCAAF in determining appropriate
rules of evidence and procedure in courts-martial?

**Answer.** First and foremost, the USCAAF must ensure that its decisions are con-
sistent with the Constitution. The USCAAF is also bound by the decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court. Next, the court should look to the provisions of the UCMJ,
other applicable Federal statutes, and its own precedents. Then the court should
apply the rules and procedures set forth in the MCM. Finally, the court should look
to DOD and Service regulations.

**Question.** In your view, what is the appropriate standard for determining when
the USCAAF should apply a rule that is different from the rule generally applied
in the trial of criminal cases in the Federal district courts?

**Answer.** When the MCM and the Military Rules of Evidence provide guidance in
a particular matter, and when that guidance is not contrary to or inconsistent with
the Constitution, binding Supreme Court precedent, or the UCMJ, then those rules
are applicable. It is only when the MCM or the Military Rules of Evidence are silent
on an issue that the court should look to analogous rules applicable in the Federal
civilian courts.

**MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM**

**Question.** In your view, what are the major strengths and weaknesses of the mili-
tary justice system?

**Answer.** In my view, the following are the major strengths of the military justice
system. First, every accused in the military is entitled to a free, qualified defense
counsel at every step of the judicial process. Second, there are sufficient resources
devoted to criminal cases in the military so that every case receives the necessary
and proper amount of attention. Third, in the military justice system there is no
undue pressure for either the government or the defendant to plea bargain a case.
Fourth, the accused’s right to be present at, and to participate in, the Article 32
proceeding far exceeds any rights that a similarly-situated defendant would have in
the civilian justice system. Fifth, the jurors in the military are uniformly educated,
informed, and engaged.

In my view, the two greatest weaknesses of the military system are the potential
for command influence to play a role in the ultimate outcome of a criminal case,
and the flawed perception among some that the military system doles out
“drumhead justice” because of their mistaken belief that the rights of the accused
are not adequately protected.

**Question.** What is your view of the relationship between the rights of Service per-
sonnel and the disciplinary role of commanders?

**Answer.** At the core of the UCMJ is the delicate balance that exists between the
rights of servicemembers on the one hand and the need for commanders to maintain
good order and discipline on the other hand. In the military justice context, an effec-
tive military force is grounded both on the high morale that is sustained by the
knowledge and belief of the average servicemember that he or she will be treated
fairly and that his or her rights will be protected, and on the ability of commanders
to enforce high standards of behavior in a wide variety of situations, some of which
are not analogous to those found in civilian society. In striking this balance, the
UCMJ empowers a commander to take such steps as serving as the convening au-
thority and selecting court members, while at the same time providing
servicemembers with a variety of rights and with strong protections against com-
mand influence. The fact that fundamental changes to the military justice system
have been relatively rare over the last 6 decades serves as a testament to the fact
that the UCMJ has struck this balance correctly.
Question. Do you think that changes to the military justice system are called for in light of the experiences of the armed services in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe the military justice system has proven itself to be remarkably adept at adjusting to the varied situations arising out of the many operations, missions, and deployments of our Armed Forces during the last decade. Accordingly, I am not currently aware of any changes that are needed in light of the experiences of the armed services in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, if confirmed, I would always be keenly interested in any recommendations that may be generated by the Joint Services Committee or the Code Committee, as well as any legislative proposals that may be made by, or to, Congress, including the Senate Armed Services Committee.

CAPITAL CASES IN THE ARMED FORCES

Question. The ability of the military justice system to provide qualified personnel and resources necessary to capably defend and prosecute death penalty cases and respond to the constitutional requirements associated with such cases has come under scrutiny.
Answer. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established a framework for determining whether the performance of a defense counsel in a capital case was constitutionally adequate. Specifically, Strickland requires the defendant to prove both that the counsel’s representation was deficient, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s deficiency, the outcome of the trial would have been different. In later cases the Supreme Court held that failure to conduct a thorough investigation of potential mitigating factors may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003); Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct 447 (2009).)

Question. Based on your review of military jurisprudence regarding death penalty cases since the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Furman v. Georgia, what are the issues or errors that have most frequently resulted in overturning of death sentences on appeal?
Answer. In the vast majority of death penalty cases in the military that have been overturned on appeal, the reason for the reversal has been due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

Question. What do you consider to be the essential elements in preparing court-martial practitioners for the prosecution and defense in capital cases?
Answer. In capital cases it is critically important for both the trial counsel and the defense counsel to be top-notch lawyers of the highest caliber. Next, these lawyers must receive the necessary training in order to ensure that they are fully aware of all the facets of handling a capital case so that they will be informed and effective advocates at each stage of the proceedings. Further, these lawyers must have significant experience litigating cases; training is vitaly important, but there is no substitute for hands-on litigation experience in the courtroom when handling a capital case. Next, the lawyers must have ready access to assistance and support in handling certain legal aspects of issues that are unique to capital cases. Lastly, the lawyers on both sides must have adequate time to prepare their cases. Even great lawyers with great training, great experience, and great access to resources cannot perform at a level commensurate with what we must demand in all capital cases unless they have adequate time to analyze and prepare the case.

COMMAND INFLUENCE

Question. The problem of command influence, including instances involving judge advocates as well as commanders, is a constant threat to the military justice system.
Answer. As the USCAAF reiterated in United States v. Lewis, unlawful command influence is the mortal enemy of military justice, and where it is found to exist, judicial authorities must take those steps necessary to preserve both the actual and apparent fairness of criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the USCAAF has been, and must continue to be, vigilant against the corrosive effects of unlawful command influence at every stage of legal proceedings. Further, the court must ensure that all allegations of unlawful command influence are fully litigated at trial and on appeal. Finally, in those cases where unlawful command influence has occurred, the court must take strong, appropriate action to remedy the problem.
1313

PRECEDENT UNDER MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT

Question. The Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA) provides that the judicial construction and application of the UCMJ, while instructive, is "not of its own force binding on military commissions established under this chapter." In addition, the MCA amended Article 39 of the UCMJ to provide that the findings, holdings, interpretations, and other precedents of military commissions "may not form the basis of any holding, decision, or other determination of a court-martial."

What is your understanding of the relationship between the judicial construction of the UCMJ and the judicial construction of the MCA?

Answer. The rules of evidence and procedure in the Manual for Military Commissions (MMC) differ in several important respects from those in the MCM. For example, the MMC allows for admission of certain hearsay evidence "not otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence applicable in trial by general courts-martial." The Manual notes that these differences "reflect the [Secretary of Defense's] determinations that departures are required by the unique circumstances" arising out of the conduct of certain military and intelligence operations. However, despite these differences, the procedures for military commissions are generally based on the procedures for trial by general courts-martial under the UCMJ. Nonetheless, as noted above, while the judicial construction and application of the UCMJ are to be considered instructive, they "are not of their own force binding on military commissions."

Therefore, the judges within the military commission system are authorized to interpret the MMC provisions that are the same or similar to provisions in the UCMJ in a different manner than they otherwise would be required to interpret them if USCAAF precedential decisions were binding upon them.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS

1. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ohlson, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer has testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee that he learned about the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) use of gun-walking tactics in April 2010. Attorney General Eric Holder has been unclear about the exact date on which he learned about Operation Fast and Furious, but we know that it was no later than January 30, 2011—when Senator Grassley personally handed him two letters discussing that program and requesting documentation relating to it. On November 14, you sent a letter to Senator McCain stating that you "took no actions in regard to, had no knowledge of, provided no advice about, and had no involvement in Operation Fast and Furious." While you were the Chief of Staff to Attorney General Holder, did you ever have knowledge that the ATF may have been using gun-walking tactics, whether or not you had specific knowledge about Operation Fast and Furious?

Mr. OHLSON. No. While I was Chief of Staff I never had any knowledge that ATF may have been using gun-walking tactics in any case or operation, past or present.

2. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ohlson, while you were the Chief of Staff to Attorney General Holder, were you ever present at a briefing or meeting where ATF gun-walking tactics or Operation Fast and Furious were discussed?

Mr. OHLSON. No. While I was Chief of Staff to Attorney General Holder, I was not present at any briefing or meeting where ATF gun-walking tactics or Operation Fast and Furious were discussed.

3. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ohlson, did you attend a briefing on March 12, 2010, with Acting Deputy Attorney General Gary Grindler where paper copies of an Operation Fast and Furious PowerPoint presentation were distributed?

Mr. OHLSON. No. I did not attend that meeting.

4. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ohlson, while you were the Chief of Staff to Attorney General Holder, did you ever have any conversations with Acting Deputy Attorney General Gary Grindler about either weapons trafficking investigations or gun-walking tactics were discussed?

Mr. OHLSON. While I was the Chief of Staff to Attorney General Holder, I did not have any conversations with Acting Deputy Attorney General Gary Grindler about gun-walking tactics. In regard to the more general topic of weapons trafficking investigations, I do not recall ever having a conversation with Mr. Grindler about that
issue, but I may have been present when Mr. Grindler discussed that topic with others. If so, I do not recall such a discussion.

5. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ohlson, while you were the Chief of Staff to Attorney General Holder, did you ever have any conversations with Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer where either weapons trafficking investigations or gun-walking tactics were discussed?

Mr. OHLSON. While I was the Chief of Staff to Attorney General Holder, I did not have any conversations with Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer about gun-walking tactics. In regard to the more general topic of weapons trafficking investigations, I do not recall ever having a conversation with Mr. Breuer about that issue, but I may have been present when Mr. Breuer discussed that topic with others. If so, I do not recall such a discussion.

6. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ohlson, while you were the Chief of Staff to Attorney General Holder, did you ever hear of a large firearms case being operated by the Phoenix Field Division of the ATF?

Mr. OHLSON. I do not recall ever hearing of a large firearms case being operated by the Phoenix Field Division of the ATF while I was Chief of Staff to Attorney General Holder.

7. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ohlson, do you believe that Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer should have immediately disclosed his knowledge of ATF gun-walking tactics to yourself and the Attorney General in April 2010?

Mr. OHLSON. I have no personal knowledge of what Assistant Attorney General Breuer knew or did not know about ATF gun-walking tactics in April 2010. However, if Assistant Attorney General Breuer had known about ongoing gun-walking tactics at that time, I believe that he should have, and I expect that he would have, immediately disclosed that information to the Deputy Attorney General and the Attorney General so that those tactics could be halted immediately.

8. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ohlson, do you have any knowledge of whether gun-walking tactics were used in the State of Texas during your tenure as chief of staff to Attorney General Holder?

Mr. OHLSON. I have seen media reports speculating that these tactics may have been used in Texas, but I have no knowledge to support the contention that it actually occurred.

9. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ohlson, in the summer of 2010, the Attorney General's office—in which you served as the Chief of Staff—received a series of at least five memos from National Drug Intelligence Center Director Michael Walther that discussed Operation Fast and Furious. These memos were personally addressed to Attorney General Holder, even though he now claims that he never received or reviewed any of these memos.

The documents expressly discuss Operation Fast and Furious as an ATF investigation of a "firearms trafficking ring headed by Manuel Celia-Acosta. Celia-Acosta and straw purchasers are responsible for the purchase of 1,500 firearms that were then supplied to Mexican drug trafficking cartels." Obviously, this language should have triggered some investigation by the Office of the Attorney General.

Additionally, on November 1, 2010, your office received a memo addressed to the Attorney General from Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer that discussed Operation Fast and Furious under the heading of “Significant Recent Events”. On November 14, you sent a letter to Senator McCain stating that “copies of weekly reports were forwarded to me that referred to the operation [Fast and Furious] by name." Additionally, at your nomination hearing, you told Senator McCain that “I did not read that weekly report.” At that same hearing, however, you also told me that “I would be the ultimate funnel point for that information.”

As the “ultimate funnel point” for the information contained in these reports, as well as an actual recipient of that information, shouldn’t you have taken the time to read these memos?

Mr. OHLSON. When I was Chief of Staff, there were a number of attorneys within the Attorney General's office who reported to me. Each of these attorneys was responsible for providing oversight of specific components within the Department of Justice. As part of their duties, these attorneys read the weekly reports prepared by their respective components and informed me of any sensitive or important matters in each week's submission that required my attention. I took this approach because there are many different components within the Department of Justice handling exceedingly complex issues (e.g., Antitrust, Tax, Environment and Natural Re-
sources, the Criminal Division, the Solicitor General’s Office, et cetera) and the attorneys in my office were the subject matter experts in regard to their components and possessed the necessary background and knowledge to place any information contained in the weekly reports into proper context. It was through this process that I determined which of the exceedingly large number of informational documents that the Office of the Attorney General typically received each day needed to be provided to (i.e., “funneled to”) the Attorney General.

None of the entries in any weekly reports circulated to the Leadership Offices contained any reference to “gun-walking” or other similar tactics that violated Department policies. Therefore, no “alarm bells” went off in anyone’s mind who reviewed these documents and they were not flagged for my attention.

10. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ohlson, shouldn’t the American people expect that the Attorney General or the Chief Deputy within his office will be familiar with the operational details of an operation that involved the straw purchase of 1,500 firearms in the United States that were then supplied to Mexican drug trafficking cartels?

Mr. OHLSON. Based on what I have learned from public testimony and media reports during the past 10 months, it is now clear to me that Operation Fast and Furious was a fundamentally-flawed operation and was not handled in a manner consistent with what the American people have a right to expect. First and foremost, gun-walking never should have been allowed to occur at any time or in any place. It was a grievous mistake. Further, the former Acting Director of ATF and the former U.S. Attorney for Arizona should have been knowledgeable about this case, so that they could have exercised proper operational oversight. Next, information about an operation of this importance and magnitude should have been conveyed to the leadership offices of the Department in a fuller, more effective, and more timely manner. Finally, as for my part, I sincerely regret that I was not knowledgeable about this matter and therefore was unable to take steps to inform the Attorney General. I have every confidence that if either the Acting Deputy Attorney General or the Attorney General had been made aware of the inappropriate tactics being employed in this operation, they would have put a stop to them immediately.

11. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ohlson, shouldn’t you have familiarized yourself with the details of the weapons trafficking operation described above, especially where that operation was discussed by the Assistant Attorney General and put to the Attorney General’s attention in a memo under the heading of “Significant Recent Events”?

Mr. OHLSON. Within the Office of the Attorney General there were a number of attorneys who reported to me. These attorneys were responsible for providing oversight of certain components within the Department of Justice, and they were the subject matter experts in regard to these components. Further, these attorneys attended the meetings that the Attorney General convened with the heads of each of these components, and they were in constant contact with senior staff within the components to ensure a free flow of information. It is my understanding that at no time was the issue of gun-walking ever raised with any of these attorneys, and there was no basis for these attorneys to raise a red flag with me in my capacity as Chief of Staff. In fact, I understand that the former Acting Director of ATF and the former U.S. Attorney for Arizona have both indicated that even they did not know of these inappropriate tactics while they were being used. In retrospect, I sincerely wish that everyone within the chain-of-command at the Department of Justice, including myself, had been appropriately informed of the misguided and inappropriate tactics employed in Operation Fast and Furious.

12. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ohlson, are you aware of any individual who has been held accountable for this breakdown in the informational chain under your watch?

Mr. OHLSON. Based on the Attorney General’s public testimony and media reports, it is my understanding that there have been some personnel changes in the offices that had supervisory responsibility over Operation Fast and Furious, and that additional actions to hold individuals accountable will likely follow the issuance of the Acting Inspector General’s investigation into this matter.

13. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ohlson, do you believe that anyone should be held accountable for this episode?

Mr. OHLSON. Yes, I do. Based on what I now know about Operation Fast and Furious, it was a fundamentally-flawed operation. These inappropriate tactics never should have occurred under any circumstances. Therefore, I do believe that whoever
was responsible for approving and implementing these tactics should be held accountable.

[The nomination reference of Kevin A. Ohlson follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
September 15, 2011.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
Kevin A. Ohlson, of Virginia, to be a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces for the term of 15 years to expire on the date prescribed by law, vice Andrew S. Effron, term expiring.

[The biographical sketch of Kevin A. Ohlson, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF KEVIN A. OHLSON

Education:
• Washington and Jefferson College
  • September 1978–May 1982
  • Bachelor of Arts Degree awarded May 1982
• University of Virginia School of Law
  • August 1982–May 1985
  • Juris Doctorate Degree awarded May 1985

Employment Record:
• U.S. Department of Justice Professional Misconduct Review Unit
  • Chief
  • January 2011–present
• Office of the Attorney General
  • Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General
  • January 2009–January 2011
• Executive Office for Immigration Review
  • Director
  • Deputy Director
  • Member of the Board of Immigration Appeals
  • March 2001–January 2009
• Office of the Deputy Attorney General
  • Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General
  • June 1997–March 2001
• Office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia
  • Special Counsel to the U.S. Attorney
  • Assistant U.S. Attorney
  • December 1989–June 1997
• Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, Saudi Arabia
  • Judge Advocate Officer
  • October 1990–April 1991
• Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Fort Bragg
  • Judge Advocate Officer
  • January 1986–December 1989

Honors and Awards:
• Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award (2011)
• Department of Justice Distinguished Service Award (2010)
• Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award (2001)
• Bronze Star (1991)
• Kuwait Liberation Medal (1991)
• Southwest Asia Service Medal (1991)
• National Defense Service Medal (1991)
• Army Achievement Medal (1989)
• Honduran Parachutist Badge (1988)
• Army Parachutist Badge (1986)
• Phi Beta Kappa (1982)
• George C. Marshall Award (1981)
• Army Air Assault Badge (1980)
• Four-year Army R.O.T.C. College Scholarship (1978)

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Kevin A. Ohlson in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Kevin Alan Ohlson.

2. Position to which nominated:
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.

3. Date of nomination:
September 15, 2011.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
March 29, 1960; Town of Holden, Worcester County, MA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
Married to Carolyn Florence Davis.

7. Names and ages of children:
Matthew Edward Ohlson, 14.
Katherine Elizabeth Ohlson, 12.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Wachusett Regional High School; attended 1974 to 1978; high school diploma received in June 1978
Washington and Jefferson College; attended 1978 to 1982; Bachelor of Arts degree received in May 1982
University of Virginia School of Law; attended 1982 to 1985; Juris Doctorate degree received in May 1985

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   a. Board Member, Board of Immigration Appeals. I served in a judicial capacity deciding appeals in immigration cases; my employer was the U.S. Department of Justice; my office was located at 5107 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA; I served in this position from March 2001 to November 2002.
   b. Deputy Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review. I supervised the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge; my employer was the U.S. Department of Justice; my office was located at 5107 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA; I served in this position from December 2002 to March 2007.
   c. Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review. I served as the head of the agency which is responsible for adjudicating all immigration cases nationwide; my employer was the U.S. Department of Justice; my office was located at 5107 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA; I served in this position from March 2007 to January 2009.
   d. Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General. I advised the Attorney General on legal and policy issues, and I managed the attorneys and staff who worked within the Office of the Attorney General; my employer was the U.S. Department of Justice; my office was located at 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC; I served in this position from January 2009 to January 2011.
   e. Chief, Professional Misconduct Review Unit. This newly-created office is responsible for handling disciplinary actions and State bar referrals in all instances where the Office of Professional Responsibility has made preliminary findings that a Federal prosecutor has engaged in professional misconduct; my employer is the U.S. Department of Justice; my office is located at 1577 Spring Hill Road, Vienna, VA; I have served in this position from January 2011 to the present.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
   a. I served on Active Duty as an officer in the U.S. Army from January 1986 to December 1989. I then was recalled to Active Duty from October 1990 to April 1991 and served overseas during the Persian Gulf War. I also served on Inactive Reserve Duty from January 1990 to September 1990, and from June 1991 to October 1995.
   b. I served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the District of Columbia from December 1989 until June 1997 (with a break in service during the time I was recalled to Active Duty, as mentioned above).
   c. I served as Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General at the Department of Justice from June 1997 to March 2001.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   Not applicable.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
   Member, American Legion (1992 to present)
   Member, Veterans of Foreign Wars (1992 to present)
   Member, Virginia State Bar (1985 to present; on inactive status since 1995)
   Member, Bar of the District of Columbia (1992 to present)

13. Political affiliations and activities:
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
   Not applicable.
   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
   Not applicable.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years:
- 06/27/2008, $1,000 contribution to Obama for America
- 07/01/2008, $200 contribution to ActBlue

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
- Four-year Army ROTC college scholarship (1978)
- Phi Beta Kappa (1982)
- George C. Marshall Award (1981)
- Bronze Star Medal (1991)
- Southwest Asia Service Medal with Two Bronze Service Stars (1991)
- Kuwait Liberation Medal (1991)
- Army Achievement Medal (1989)
- Army Air Assault Badge (1980)
- Army Parachutist Badge (1986)
- Honduran Parachutist Badge (1988)
- Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award (2001)
- Department of Justice Distinguished Service Award (2010)
- Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award (2011)

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.
- Not applicable.

17. **Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:**
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?
- Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
- No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?
- Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?
- Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
- Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?
- Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
- Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. 

KEVIN A. OHLSON.

This 24th day of October, 2011.

[At the time of printing, neither the committee nor the Senate had taken further action on the nomination of Kevin A. Ohlson.]
APPENDIX

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE ON BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)

5. Date and place of birth:

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)

7. Names and ages of children:

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

(1321)
11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
   
   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
   
   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM**

**FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES**

**INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE:** Information furnished in Parts B through F will be retained in the committee’s executive files and will not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the committee.

**Name:**

**PART B—FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS**

1. Will you sever all business connections with your present employers, business firms, business associations or business organizations if you are confirmed by the Senate?

2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the government? If so, explain.

3. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after completing government service to resume employment, affiliation or practice with your previous employer, business firm, association or organization?

4. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after you leave government service?

5. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?

6. If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable?
PART C—POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have engaged for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modification of any legislation or affecting the administration and execution of law or public policy.

5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

6. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Attorney General's office concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this position?

PART D—LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide details.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of any Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination.

PART E—FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such relationship.

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, accounting, public relations firm or other service organization, have any of your or your spouse’s associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such relationship.
3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish details.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

PART F—FINANCIAL DATA

All information requested under this heading must be provided for yourself, your spouse, and your dependents.

1. Describe the terms of any beneficial trust or blind trust of which you, your spouse, or your dependents may be a beneficiary. In the case of a blind trust, provide the name of the trustee(s) and a copy of the trust agreement.

2. Provide a description of any fiduciary responsibility or power of attorney which you hold for or on behalf of any other person.

3. List sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock options, executory contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from current or previous business relationships, professional services and firm memberships, employers, clients and customers.

4. Have you filed a Federal income tax return for each of the past 10 years? If not, please explain.

5. Have your taxes always been paid on time?

6. Were all your taxes, Federal, State, and local, current (filed and paid) as of the date of your nomination?

7. Has the Internal Revenue Service ever audited your Federal tax return? If so, what resulted from the audit?

8. Have any tax liens, either Federal, State, or local, been filed against you or against any real property or personal property which you own either individually, jointly, or in partnership?

(The committee may require that copies of your Federal income tax returns be provided to the committee. These documents will be made available only to Senators and the staff designated by the Chairman. They will not be available for public inspection.)

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

__________________________________________

This ——— day of ———————, 20———.
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE ON BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY NOMINEES

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES FOR CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE:
Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

If you have completed this form in connection with a prior military nomination, you may use the following procedure in lieu of submitting a new form. In your letter to the Chairman, add the following paragraph to the end:

“I hereby incorporate by reference the information and commitments contained in the Senate Armed Services Committee form ‘Biographical and Financial Information Requested of Nominees for Certain Senior Military Positions,’ submitted to the Committee on [insert date or your prior form]. I agree that all such commitments apply to the position to which I have been nominated and that all such information is current except as follows: . . . .” [If any information on your prior form needs to be updated, please cite the part of the form and the question number and set forth the updated information in your letter to the Chairman.]

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)

2. **Position to which nominated:**

3. **Date of nomination:**

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses. Also include your office telephone number.)

5. **Date and place of birth:**

6. **Marital Status:** (Include name of husband or wife, including wife’s maiden name.)

7. **Names and ages of children:**

8. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations.

11. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

---

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM**

**FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES**

**INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE:** Information furnished in Parts B through E will be retained in the committee's executive files and will not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the committee.

**Name:**

**PART B—FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS**

1. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your military service. If so, explain.

2. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after you leave military service?

**PART C—POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST**

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

4. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

5. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this position?

6. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?
PART D—LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide details.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or litigation? If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination.

PART E—FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such relationship.

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, accounting, public relations firm or other service organization, have any of your or your spouse's associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such relationship.

3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish details.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

__________________________________

This ——— day of ————, 20———.